    [Senate Hearing 114-204, Part 7]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1376

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
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                                     PART 7

                                STRATEGIC FORCES

                                   ----------

                      MARCH 4, 25; APRIL 15, 22, 29, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

                                                     S. Hrg. 114-204, Pt. 7

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARINGS

                                   before the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                       ON

                                    S. 1376

         TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 FOR MILITARY
    ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND
       FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE
       MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL YEAR, AND FOR OTHER
                                    PURPOSES
                                   __________

                                     PART 7

                                STATEGIC FORCES
                                   __________

                      MARCH 4, 25; APRIL 15, 22, 29, 2015
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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            JACK REED, Rhode Island
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               BILL NELSON, Florida
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
    MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota            RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    THOM TILLIS, North Carolina          MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 TIM KAINE, Virginia
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    TED CRUZ, Texas

                       Christian D. Brose, Staff Director

                   Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director

                                     ______

                        Subcommittee on Strategic Forces

                        JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama, Chairman

    JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma            JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                BILL NELSON, Florida
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina       ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico

                                      (ii)

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                                 March 4, 2015

                                                                       Page

    U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Programs, and Strategy..............     1

    Kendall, Hon. Frank, III, Under Secretary of Defense for
      Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Hon. Brian P. McKeon,
      Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Michael
      S. Elliott, Deputy Director for Strategic Stability, Strategic
      Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) Joint Chiefs of Staff; Adm
      Cecil D. Haney, USN, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command; and LT.
      Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret.), Under Secretary for Nuclear
      Security, Department of Energy, and Administrator, National
      Nuclear Security Administration................................     4

    Questions for the Record.........................................    29

                                 March 25, 2015

    Ballistic Missile Defense Programs...............................    31
    McKeon, Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
      Policy, Department of Defense..................................    33
    Syring, Vice Admiral James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense
      Agency Department of Defense...................................    39
    Mann, Lieutenant General David L., USA, Commanding General, U.S.
      Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army Forces Strategic
      Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
      Missile Defense................................................    49
    Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director of Operational Test and
      Evaluation, Department of Defense..............................    58

    Questions for the Record.........................................    79

                                 April 15, 2015

    The National Nuclear Security Administration Plans and Programs..    83
    Klotz, Hon. Frank G., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and
      Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration,
      Department of Energy; Accompanied by Hon. Donald L. Cook,
      Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear
      Security Administration, Department of Energy; Hon. Anne M.
      Harrington, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
      Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration,
      Department of Energy; and ADM John M. Richardson, USN,
      Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion and Office of Naval
      Reactors, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department
      of Energy......................................................    85
    Trimble, David C., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
      Government Accountability Office...............................    97

    Questions for the Record.........................................   140

                                 April 22, 2015

    Air Force and Navy Nuclear Programs and the Implementation of
      Nuclear Enterprise Review Recommendations......................   145
    Creedon, Hon. Madelyn, Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
      Security Administration........................................   146
    Brumer, Dr. Yisroel E., Director, Strategic, Defensive and Space
      Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Assessment
      and Program Evaluation.........................................   150
    Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
      Programs.......................................................   153
    Wilson, Lt. Gen. Stephen W., USAF, Commander, Air Force Global
      Strike Command.................................................   160
    Harencak, Maj. Gen. Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
      Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration...................   169

    Questions for the Record.........................................   189

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2015

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

              U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, PROGRAMS, AND STRATEGY

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:33 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
    Nelson, King, and Heinrich.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. The subcommittee welcomes Secretary
    Kendall and other distinguished officials. The witnesses
    represent the policy, acquisition, force structure and
    warfighter components of the U.S. nuclear weapons. Collectively
    they comprise the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), a body
    established by Congress in 1986 to facilitate cooperation and
    coordination between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
    Department of Energy (DOE).
        Today's hearing, however, will go beyond the specifics of
    the nuclear stockpile to address broader nuclear policy and
    strategy issues as the members see fit.
        Let me just say, gentlemen, I believe the NWC is stronger
    and more effective than it has ever been. I believe there is
    better transparency. I believe there is better coordination
    between DOE and DOD. I think the fact that you have produced
    one statement that speaks for all of you is proof that you are
    getting along better than we have had sometimes in the past or
    a better coordination at least. It is something that I and I
    think Senator Nelson and others have pushed for in recent
    years, and it is really pleasing to me to see that we are
    moving in this direction.
        So on balance, the President's 2016 budget and out-year
    spending profile represents a good faith effort, given the
    budget constraints, to modernize all three legs of the nuclear
    triad while addressing aging DOD [Department of Defense] and
    DOE [Department of Energy] nuclear weapons and infrastructure
    problems.
        Notably, for the first time since fiscal year 2012, the
    President's budget request for DOE and NNSA [National Nuclear
    Security Administration] nuclear weapons activities, which is
    $8.9 billion, meets the funding target established in the 2010
    New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] treaty ratification
    process discussion and commitments that were made. So we are
    pleased about that.
        Also, notable is Secretary Carter's announcement that there
    will be about $8 billion over the next 5 years to fund
    improvements across the nuclear enterprise to address current
    readiness, training, and infrastructure shortfalls. As Deputy
    Secretary Work explained in February, ``our nuclear deterrent
    force is aging. It will be modernized in the 20s and 30s. We
    need to keep the old equipment and systems going, but it is
    becoming more expensive to do so.''
        Over the past few years, Congress moved forward with the
    President's nuclear modernization program indicating broad
    bipartisan support for nuclear modernization.
        You know, to follow up on Bob Work's comments, General
    Klotz, you said last fall at the end of the Cold War, we
    entered into a sort of procurement holiday as far as our
    strategic nuclear forces were concerned, and we were able to do
    that because they were extraordinary capable systems. But now,
    after a couple of decades of doing that, the bill is coming
    due. I see some nods there. I think that is a fair statement of
    where we are.
        I have got a chart we will show later that really does show
    the dramatic decline in the percentage of the defense budget
    going to nuclear weapons and the fact that we are going to now
    have to have some increase to maintain what I think is an
    essential requirement.
        So, unfortunately, there remains a net $2.5 billion
    shortfall in DOE and NNSA weapons activity funding over the
    past 4 years that has led to some delays. Likewise, there has
    been a 2-year delay in fielding the new ballistic missile
    submarine, which will have operational consequences. Mr.
    Kendall, as you noted last year, quote, the program is fragile,
    and any funding reductions at this point could pose
    unacceptable risk to the health of the nuclear enterprise.
        Critics of the nuclear weapons--and we have had some that
    have been pretty aggressive at times, but I think they have not
    prevailed in the battle of ideas. So their hopes to derail
    modernization plans by claiming that nuclear modernization is
    unaffordable or a distraction from more pressing nuclear
    capabilities has not prevailed. So we will address this claim
    today.
        But I would note that according to CBO [Congressional
    Budget Office] estimates--and I think, colleagues, this is
    important--funding to maintain and modernize DOE and DOD
    nuclear programs will account for roughly 5 to 6 percent of the
    National defense budget funding 050 during the peak funding
    years. This is out there 2024-2025. There are a few years it
    peaks out there, but it is, I think, about less than 3 percent
    today.
        If we examine only modernization cost, the cost of
    replacing existing delivery systems, missiles, planes, subs,
    and costs for life extension of the warheads, CBO estimates
    that during the period 2024 to 2030 modernization costs would
    average about $15 billion per year. According to OMB [Office of
    Management and Budget], national defense funding during that
    time would be over $806 billion in 2024, $15 billion out of
    $806 billion, which means that nuclear modernization will
    account for less than 2 percent of the defense spending during
    that period of peak funding. So the nuclear warheads themselves
    are a particularly small part of the budget. Considering the
    decades of decline in spending on nuclear forces, this level is
    not only affordable but certainly necessary.
        So, Senator Nelson, glad to have you with us and any
    comments you would like to have. Welcome back to that seat. You
    have held it and chaired this committee over the years, and you
    have full experience in all of these issues.

                    STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON

        Senator Nelson. I am standing in for Senator Donnelly today
    who is away at a funeral.
        But you remember those old times. The two of us got along
    on very controversial issues. Miracles never ceased. I used to
    persuade you to my position.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Sessions. I always gave in to you whenever you were
    right, which was normal.
        Senator Nelson. I want to get on. So what I am going to do
    is just insert my statement into the record. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Nelson follows:]

                       Prepared statement by Bill Nelson
        Let me thank Senator Sessions for holding today's hearing. I will
    be filling in for a short period as ranking member since Senator
    Donnelly, the committee's ranking member, cannot make it today.
        There are several issues I would like to consider today.
        First the commitment we must make to our nuclear deterrent, which
    as Secretary Carter so aptly described as the ``bedrock'' of our
    national security strategy. This commitment is seen in two ways. What
    we must do now to ensure the force is ready and able to execute its
    mission if the President so chooses and second what we must spend in a
    time of tight budget choices, to modernize the force to meet our
    deterrence requirements for the next 20 to 30 years.
        Second, I will want to understand how we are structuring our
    deterrent now and in the future to meet challenges not only with
    Russia, which is modernizing its triad but countries similar to China,
    which is developing a ballistic missile submarine that will patrol the
    South China seas or India and Pakistan which is increasing the size and
    scope of their arsenals, and in India's case, a ballistic submarine
    much like China.
        Again, I want to thank Senator Sessions for holding this hearing
    and I look forward to today's testimony.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Secretary Kendall, do you want to give us the statement
    that you prepared?

    STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK KENDALL III, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
       FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. BRIAN P.
    McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY;
     MICHAEL S. ELLIOTT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY,
     STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE (J-5), JOINT CHIEFS OF
       STAFF; ADM CECIL D. HANEY, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC
       COMMAND; AND LT. GEN. FRANK G. KLOTZ, USAF (RET.), UNDER
       SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND
        ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Kendall. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your kind
    remarks at the beginning.
        Chairman Sessions and I guess it is Acting Ranking Member
    Nelson, distinguished members of the subcommittee, on behalf of
    Admiral Haney, Lieutenant General Klotz, Honorable McKeon, and
    Mr. Elliott, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today.
        We are or we represent the statutory members of the Nuclear
    Weapons Council. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) is a joint
    Department of Defense and Department of Energy National Nuclear
    Security Administration forum established to facilitate
    priorities between the two Departments as they fulfill their
    dual agency responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile.
        We look forward to discussing both the role of the NWC, the
    status of life extension programs, infrastructure, delivery
    platform modernization programs, sustainability of the
    stockpile and all other responsibilities charged to the
    council, as well as the challenge that we face.
        Sir, I would like my written testimony which provides more
    detail--if I could ask it be admitted to record, please.
        Senator Sessions. We will make it a part of the record,
    without objection.
        Mr. Kendall. Thank you, sir.
        Our nuclear deterrent plays a unique and critical role in
    ensuring our National security. The Departments of Defense and
    Energy and the NWC have a fundamental and solemn obligation to
    responsibly manage this capability, to ensure its effectiveness
    and safety not only for today but into an uncertain and
    challenging future.
        The fundamental role of our nuclear forces is to deter a
    nuclear attack on the United States and our allies, and no
    other military capability we possess is more important and
    deserving of our focus and attention more. For over 3 years, I
    have had the privilege to serve as chairman of the NWC, along
    with other professionals representing our nuclear enterprise
    such as those here with me today. During this period, the NWC
    has responded to policy direction, including the Nuclear
    Posture Review, the implications of the New START treaty,
    technical developments in the aging of the stockpile, the
    Defense Department reviews of the nuclear enterprise conducted
    last year, and other developments.
        The strategy for our nuclear stockpile that forms the basis
    for our plans has remained constant during this period. That
    strategy known as the 3+2 strategy envisions three
    interoperable nuclear explosive packages for ballistic
    missiles, ground-based and sea-based, and two air-delivered
    warheads. A nuclear warhead strategy is tied to the Defense
    Department's delivery system modernization plans, which include
    the Ohio replacement submarine, a replacement for our Minuteman
    III ICBMs [Intercontinental Ballistic Missile's], a new long-
    range strike bomber, and the replacement for the air-launched
    cruise missile. It is also tied to our plan to modernize the
    Department of Energy's infrastructure for plutonium, uranium,
    and tritium and the plan to sustain the science and engineering
    base that ensures our stockpile of nuclear weapons is safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective.
        The 3+2 strategy addresses stockpile sustainment and
    modernization and meets policy objectives of sustained
    deterrence through a smaller stockpile with fewer weapons types
    and a modernized, responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of
    addressing the technological and geological surprises that we
    may face.
        Making nuclear explosive packages interoperable on
    different delivery systems will reduce the number of different
    systems that must be maintained and provide sufficient
    diversity among our deployed systems.
        Over my 3 years as NWC chairman, budget constraints,
    particularly the implementation of sequestration in fiscal year
    2013, have forced the NWC to annually adjust its stockpile
    maintenance and infrastructure plans to fit within the
    resources appropriated. These adjustments cause delays or
    cancellations, reduce work scope, or extend development or
    production periods. Today we have reached a point where all
    flexibility from nuclear weapons life extension programs has
    been removed.
        We have worked with the U.S. Strategic Command to adjust
    stockpile requirements where possible. We continuously strive
    to strike the best balance between the science and engineering
    required to certify the stockpile, the program's plan to extend
    the life of the stockpile, and the plans for a responsive
    infrastructure. Achieving our plans for tomorrow's stockpile
    will require adequate resources, national commitment, and
    balanced investments. The NWC remains committed to our
    responsibility to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and
    effective nuclear strategic deterrent, and we urge continued
    congressional attention to the Nation's essential security
    needs by sustaining a stable nuclear enterprise budget in
    general and in specific removing the threat of sequestration.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time, and we wait for
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of the Nuclear Weapons Council
    follows:]

               Witness Statement of the Nuclear Weapons Council:
                          Hon. Frank Kendall, Chairman
                               ADM Cecil D. Haney
                         Hon. Lt Gen (Ret) Frank Klotz
                               Hon. Brian McKeon
                              Mr. Michael Elliott
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity for the
    Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) to testify before you today. The NWC is a
    joint Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE)/
    National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) organization
    established to facilitate cooperation and coordination, reach
    consensus, and institute priorities between the two departments as they
    fulfill their dual-agency responsibilities for U.S. nuclear weapons
    stockpile management. Together, the Council represents extraordinary
    and highly skilled Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, civilians,
    laboratory personnel, and contractors who are the core of the nuclear
    enterprise. They are professional, mission-oriented, and innovative
    problem-solvers charged with ensuring our Nation sustains a safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent. Today, we will
    discuss the role of the NWC, the status of life extension programs,
    infrastructure and delivery platform modernization programs, our
    ability to sustain the stockpile, and all of the other responsibilities
    of the NWC, along with our challenges.
                                nwc organization
        As mandated by Title X, U.S. Code 179, the NWC manages and achieves
    consensus on priorities for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Our
    membership includes the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
    Technology and Logistics (Chairman), the DOE Under Secretary for
    Nuclear Security/Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
    Administration, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Vice
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of the U.S.
    Strategic Command. Additionally, to ensure all equities in the
    enterprise are represented, we receive consistent, valuable
    participation from the Military Services, the Comptroller, the DOD
    Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), Department of
    State, and the National Security Council. Over the last year, the NWC
    convened 10 meetings, including our annual joint meeting with the
    United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, which we hold to review our
    continued cooperation in warhead development, the Ohio-class
    submarines, and the D-5 missile program.
        In order to engage at all levels of the enterprise, we utilize our
    subordinate committees and action groups to identify and analyze issues
    and to provide recommendations to the Council. The NWC Standing and
    Safety Committee (NWCSSC), co-chaired by DOD and the NNSA, functions to
    advise, assist, and provide information and analysis and
    recommendations on issues and topics for the Council's consideration.
    Additionally, NNSA details a member of its staff to DOD to serve as the
    NWCSSC Executive Secretary, ensuring interagency representation in day-
    to-day operations. Finally, a dedicated working group of staff,
    representing the diverse stakeholders in the nuclear enterprise, meets
    informally about twice a month to review weapon and infrastructure
    programs. We continually analyze our current working relationships to
    ensure a streamlined decision-making process and to ensure that our
    teams are informed and empowered to assess issues and make
    recommendations to the NWC. NWC issues are not only addressed when the
    Members meet; our mission is executed every day through the
    organizational structure just described.
                                  nwc mission
        The NWC convenes approximately monthly to ensure focused attention
    on our greatest nuclear enterprise challenges in four vital areas.
    First, we must maintain and strengthen our ability to extend the life
    of warheads through comprehensive component reuse, refurbishment,
    replacement and ensuring alignment with the delivery platform (see
    Table 1 for a breakdown of the current and future nuclear weapons
    stockpile). Second, we must safeguard our ability to provide the
    intensive science and engineering required to assess an aging stockpile
    and certify the safety and effectiveness without underground testing.
    Third, we must remain steadfast in our commitment to sustain and
    modernize our aging infrastructure that provides materials, components,
    and testing facilities essential for our nuclear deterrent enterprise.
    Finally, we must ensure that our nuclear weapons and delivery systems
    modernization programs are aligned.

                                    Table 1. The Current and Future Triad Composition
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                 ICBM                SLBM               Air-Leg
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  ..................
                                                        Current-----------------------------------------------------
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Weapon System.......................................        W87 Warhead         W76 Warhead            B61 Bomb
                                                                W78 Warhead         W88 Warhead            B83 Bomb
                                                                                                      W80-1 Warhead
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Delivery Platform...................................      Minuteman III       Trident II D5                B-2A
                                                                                                              B-52H
                                                                                                            F15/F16
                                                                                                                 ALCM\1\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        Future
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Weapon System.......................................   W78/88-1 IW-1\2\       W78/88-1 IW-1         B61-12 Bomb
                                                                       IW-2                IW-2       W80-4 Warhead
                                                                       IW-3                IW-3
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Delivery Platform...................................            GBSD\3\        D5 Follow-on                B-2A
                                                                                                              B-52H
                                                                                                             JSF\4\
                                                                                                            LRSB\5\
                                                                                                            LRSO\6\
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1 Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    2 Interoperable Warhead
    3 Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent
    4 Joint Strike Fighter
    5 Long Range Strike Bomber
    6 Long Range Standoff

                     stockpile planning and life extension
        The NWC sees our future nuclear stockpile as one that is flexible
    and adaptable to technical and geopolitical changes. As envisioned, the
    future stockpile plan will include three interoperable nuclear
    explosive packages for ballistic missiles and two air-delivered
    warheads, referred to as the ``3+2 strategy.'' The 3+2 strategy
    addresses stockpile obsolescence and meets policy objectives of
    sustaining deterrence through a smaller stockpile with fewer weapon
    types and a modernized, responsive nuclear infrastructure capable of
    addressing technological and geopolitical surprise. Making nuclear
    explosive packages interoperable on different delivery platforms will
    reduce the number of different systems that must be maintained and
    serviced, while providing sufficient diversity among deployed systems.
        The NWC oversees implementation planning for the strategy.
    Established in 2012 for the fiscal year (FY) 2014 budget formulation,
    the NWC's 25-year plan for the nuclear weapons stockpile--also known as
    the Baseline Plan--aligned warhead life extension plans, platforms
    modernization, and infrastructure needs. The coordinated Baseline Plan
    integrated NNSA nuclear security enterprise requirements and plans with
    operational warfighter requirements.
        Budget realities have forced changes to the 2012 plan. Since the
    plan was adopted, we endorsed deferrals to several key warhead life
    extension programs (LEPs) and infrastructure modernization milestones,
    delaying implementation of our 3+2 strategy. We deferred the
    Interoperable Warhead 1 (IW-1) and delayed the Long Range Standoff
    (LRSO) warhead schedules. For the B83-1 bomb, we adjusted the deployed
    requirement to meet operational requirements and align with the air-
    delivered gravity weapon strategy. For the B61-12 bomb LEP, we accepted
    a schedule delay due to the sequestration cuts in the fiscal year 2014
    budget. We have little, if any, margin left in the schedule for the
    program, and both Departments are aggressively managing costs and
    schedules. Plutonium pit production schedules and supporting plutonium
    infrastructure investments experienced significant delays due to
    shortfalls in the fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2015 budgets.
    Additionally, we accept risk each year in NNSA's science and
    engineering programs in order to achieve a balance between life
    extension work and the science and engineering needed for
    certification.
        Continued uncertainty in our DOD and NNSA budgets, especially the
    threat of sequestration, exacerbates long-term challenges to our
    ability to sustain the stockpile. Despite these persistent challenges,
    we have had many success stories. The following highlights the work
    accomplished through the dedicated talent and focus of the people
    working in the nuclear enterprise.

    B61 Bomb (Aircraft-delivered)

        We are working to extend the lifespan of the B61 gravity bomb. In
    April 2010, the Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed both the extended and
    strategic deterrent roles of the B61 bomb and directed its life
    extension. The B61-12 LEP with Air Force-provided Tailkit Assembly is
    undergoing development engineering and remains on schedule and budget
    to meet its March 2020 First Production Unit (FPU). The B61-12 LEP
    consolidates four variants of the B61 bomb--the -3, -4, -7, and -10--
    and improves the safety and security of the oldest nuclear weapon
    system in the U.S. arsenal. The B61-12 LEP will achieve: 1) a 50
    percent reduction in the number of nuclear gravity bombs in the
    stockpile, 2) the removal of a megaton-class weapon--the B83-1, 3) an
    80 percent reduction in the amount of special nuclear material in those
    bombs, and 4) the first step toward implementing the 3+2 strategy.

    W88 Warhead (SLBM-delivered)

        Over the last year, the nuclear enterprise faced several pivotal
    decisions for our future stockpile, one pertaining to the W88. The W88
    SLBM warhead is in the development engineering phase for Alteration
    (ALT) 370 to replace the aging arming, fuzing, and firing components
    and is on schedule to achieve its December 2019 FPU. In August 2014,
    the NWC agreed to address potential conventional high explosive (CHE)
    scope for the W88, which was not part of the original ALT 370 program.
    After extensive review by our national laboratories, NNSA, and the
    Navy, the NWC made the decision to refresh the W88 CHE and identified
    the majority of funding offsets needed for this work. The offsets were
    generated by reducing sustainment activities and hedge quantities for
    some legacy systems to make the majority of funds available for the CHE
    refresh. The remaining required funds for CHE refresh in future years
    will be resourced from within the NNSA. That decision, identified areas
    where increased risk could be accepted to produce cost-savings within
    the current program--without additional funding--and without additional
    delays to future work.

    Interoperable Warhead (for ballistic missile-delivered systems)

        IW-1, also known as the W78/88-1, will be the first of three
    ballistic missile warheads under the 3+2 strategy. The IW-1 was delayed
    as part of the fiscal year 2015 budget request and is now scheduled for
    a 2030 FPU. In 2014, the NNSA completed an abbreviated IW-1 feasibility
    study and briefed the NWC with the conclusion that interoperable
    nuclear explosive packages could be used in the ICBM and SLBM forces. A
    full feasibility study is planned for completion in the early 2020s.

    W80-4 (Long Range Standoff Cruise Missile Warhead)

        Over the last two years, the NWC selected the follow-on warhead for
    the Air-Launched Cruise Missile replacement, the Long Range Standoff
    (LRSO) missile. We considered the B61, W80, and W84 warhead families.
    The interagency effort analyzed the trade space of military
    requirements, surety features, military characteristics, and cost. We
    performed rigorous analysis at all levels of the NWC structure to
    select the W80 Nuclear Explosive Package as the basis for the LRSO
    warhead, and designated the LEP as the W80-4. In January 2014, the NWC
    had delayed the LRSO warhead from an FPU of 2024 to fiscal year 2025-
    2027 but as a result of the ongoing program review, the fiscal year
    2016 President's Budget requests resources for an fiscal year 2025 FPU
    and an fiscal year 2026 LRSO first missile delivery.
    nnsa nuclear enterprise infrastructure and nuclear material commodities
        The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stressed the importance of a NNSA
    infrastructure that can respond to technical challenges or geopolitical
    surprises and ultimately enable our consideration of stockpile
    reductions. The NWC focuses specifically on the plutonium, uranium, and
    tritium capabilities to support the current and future stockpile as
    documented in the NWC's Baseline Plan. Our nuclear enterprise
    infrastructure challenges are two-fold: 1) addressing aged, end-of-life
    facilities maintenance, recapitalization, and replacement and 2)
    working to achieve a responsive infrastructure. In addition, NNSA's
    general purpose infrastructure (e.g., electrical distribution systems)
    that enables the plutonium, uranium, and tritium capabilities is also
    aging, brittle, and a limiting factor.
        We reinforce NNSA's need to fully develop responsive and productive
    plutonium and uranium capabilities for this Nation. Today, these
    capabilities and their enabling infrastructure are at great risk and
    rank among our highest priority infrastructure challenges. We must
    relocate our uranium production from 1950s-era buildings that are
    deteriorating rapidly and creating a hazardous work environment for our
    people. We must also have a plutonium pit production capability to
    support future stockpile requirements, move toward a responsive
    infrastructure, and address plutonium aging issues.
        In January 2014, The Secretary of Defense revalidated the DOD
    requirement for NNSA to produce 50-80 plutonium pits per year by 2030.
    This analysis was predicated on four drivers for pit production: 1)
    policy objectives for the U.S. nuclear deterrent, 2) stockpile aging,
    3) military requirements, and 4) infrastructure costs and capacity. The
    NWC is working with NNSA to achieve the requirement of 50-80 pits per
    year in 2030. NNSA developed a strategy to achieve this goal, including
    ramp-up time, through recapitalization of the existing Plutonium
    Facility 4 at Los Alamos and the construction of additional smaller,
    modular nuclear facilities for plutonium work. The concept of
    constructing smaller, modular nuclear facilities over time alleviates
    the cost associated with one large nuclear facility to replace all
    capabilities at one time. Building large, one-of-a-kind nuclear
    facilities presents significant challenges in terms of planning,
    design, and development and thus NNSA adopted a modular approach. The
    NWC engaged the DOD CAPE to assist NNSA on the benefits and feasibility
    of this strategy through a Business Case Analysis completed in November
    2013. The CAPE agreed with NWC's endorsement that a modular strategy
    for nuclear facilities provides the most affordable and flexible
    option. The NWC supports NNSA's plan to achieve two operational modular
    plutonium facilities at Los Alamos by 2027. Success will require
    continued sustained funding over the next decade to design, construct,
    and ensure initial operational start-up.
        Using lessons learned from the pit production approach, NNSA
    applied the smaller, scalable modular facility strategy to the Uranium
    Capabilities Replacement Project, the follow-on capability to produce
    nuclear weapon secondaries at the Y-12 National Security Complex.
    Congress has asked the DOD to validate its annual requirement for
    secondaries, and we are in the process of providing this analysis. We
    anticipate that our report will be consistent with our most recent NWC
    Baseline Plan and that there will be no changes to our requirements.
        Finally, the ability to enrich uranium to produce tritium for
    stockpile use is a critical infrastructure issue, and the NWC remains
    focused on sustaining a supply of enriched uranium for tritium
    production. Under current policy guidelines, without a domestically
    enriched uranium production capability, we will eventually be unable to
    produce new tritium for stockpile use. The NWC remains cognizant of the
    stockpile's requirement for tritium and is supporting a DOE update of
    our tritium requirements. We will certify this requirement in a letter
    to Congress by April of this year. As we update the NWC Baseline Plan,
    we will include tritium along with plutonium and uranium infrastructure
    plans in the next revision.
                             stockpile stewardship
        Science is paramount to the NWC's ability to sustain a safe,
    secure, reliable, and effective deterrent. NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship
    Program, composed of research, development, testing, and evaluation
    (RDT&E) facilities and personnel, enables the surveillance and
    assessment of the stockpile condition by revealing anomalies,
    evaluating impacts of anomalies on warhead performance, and
    implementing solutions. In general, RDT&E supports broader national
    security objectives by providing capabilities to avoid technological
    surprise and to have confidence in system performance. The NWC Baseline
    Plan relies on continued investments in research, development, design,
    and production capabilities--something that sequestration would
    threaten.
        The link between science and engineering and the future stockpile
    is inextricable. This science base capability allows the Laboratory
    directors to conduct their annual assessment of the stockpile, certify
    components for longer life in the stockpile, and resolve warhead issues
    discovered during surveillance. Additionally, RDT&E plays an important
    role in enabling key elements of the stockpile vision, including
    interoperability, plutonium pit reuse, understanding plutonium aging
    effects, and technology certification for life-extended warheads. In
    fiscal year 2014, NNSA completed a comparative analysis of LEP options
    for the W78, W88, and interoperability and presented the results. This
    analysis demonstrated how the RDT&E capabilities of the Stockpile
    Stewardship Program inform stockpile design decisions and provide
    critical insight into the feasibility of the 3+2 strategy.
        The nation needs a highly skilled nuclear workforce to meet future
    demands of our long-term stockpile plan. With the end of underground
    nuclear explosive testing, limited opportunities exist to exercise the
    full range of weapon design and production skills, including materials
    handling, code development, and design and production engineering.
    Exacerbated by an aging workforce, the pressure and risk to sustain
    critical skills is increasing.
        In the era of science-based stewardship--that is, implementing new
    components without underground testing--we must provide a strong
    science and research program that includes research, experiment, and
    advanced computation and modeling. The NWC endorses a balanced approach
    between the near and longer term risk we must take in to meet the needs
    of the nuclear deterrent within available budgets.
        dod nuclear weapon platform modernization and enterprise review
        As part of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, the National Security
    Council, DOD, and related agencies reviewed our deterrence requirements
    and the range of scenarios for which we must prepare. This analysis
    concluded that the Triad offers the flexibility needed for the range of
    contingencies we might face. We cannot say exactly what mix of
    capabilities the United States will require in the next 20, 30, or 40
    years, but continued modernization of the Triad will provide future
    policy makers with a flexible and resilient range of capabilities.
        Our budget request is consistent with our plans to ensure that
    current nuclear delivery systems can be sustained and that the
    modernization/replacement programs are affordable, executable, and on
    schedule to avoid capability gaps.
        Most of the Nation's nuclear weapons delivery systems are reaching
    their end of life in the 2025-2030 timeframe and have been extended
    beyond their original service lives. While we can sustain these systems
    until they can be replaced in the 2025-2030 timeframe, we have little
    schedule margin between legacy systems' end-of-life and deployment of
    the replacement systems.
        The recent Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear Enterprise and
    Strategic Portfolio Reviews and the Program and Budget Review for the
    fiscal year 2016 budget formulation focused significant attention on
    recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear
    deterrence systems and infrastructure.
        In the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) leg of the Triad,
    the Minuteman III will be replaced by a follow-on ICBM--the Ground
    Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD). Within the SLBM leg, Ohio-class
    Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) will be replaced by new Ohio-class
    Replacement SSBNs. The Trident D-5 SLBMs are undergoing a life-
    extension, which is approximately 90 percent complete. Finally, for the
    bomber leg, the B-52H and B-2A bombers will remain critical elements of
    the Triad. The Long Range Strike-Bomber will become part of our long-
    range penetrating strategic bomber force in the late 2020s. The current
    air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) will be sustained through 2030 and
    will be replaced by the LRSO cruise missile.
        We remain concerned about the ability to fund these modernization
    efforts within current resource levels. The replacement programs create
    a bow-wave in nuclear delivery system costs and modernization will
    require increased investment over current levels for much of the next
    15 years.
        The Defense Department is taking steps to control the costs of
    these efforts. However, even with success in this regard, we face
    difficult budget choices entering the 2020s in funding needed Navy
    shipbuilding programs, the Ohio-class Replacement, and the Air Force
    strategic deterrent recapitalization programs.
        The NWC is working to ensure corresponding NNSA development
    programs remain aligned with the Nation's nuclear Triad revitalization.
    The NWC provides the Services, Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
    Defense, and NNSA a senior-level forum to address warhead and delivery
    platform system integration areas of concern, and develops budget and
    program recommendations to the Departments' leadership. The B61-12 LEP
    is an example of how the NWC coordinates planning and integration with
    the closely linked B61-12 Tailkit Assembly and Bomb Assembly programs.
    This integration allowed DOD to better tailor the acquisition plan for
    the Tailkit Assembly, ensured minimal disruption to ongoing development
    and testing activities, and supported a more effective stewardship of
    taxpayer investments.
        The DOD Nuclear Enterprise Review highlighted evidence of systemic
    problems in the strategic deterrent forces that threaten the future
    safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear forces. These
    interrelated problems require cultural, structural, and sustained long-
    term solutions. We are addressing these issues and implementing
    solutions managed through monthly senior leadership meetings of the
    Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review Group chaired by Deputy Secretary
    of Defense Work. The review teams made clear the need to refocus
    attention and resources at all levels of the DOD on this essential
    mission with four targeted areas: 1) the morale and accountability of
    personnel, 2) a culture of excessive inspections, 3) the age and
    condition of the current infrastructure and maintenance, and 4) the
    organization of the Nuclear Enterprise. The reinvigoration of the DOD
    nuclear enterprise remains the Defense Department's highest priority,
    and we are committed to treating it as such.
                                   governance
        The NWC's role expanded under the NDAA in 2013 to certify that the
    NNSA budget request meets NWC requirements. This certification process
    led to greater transparency between two Cabinet Departments, and it
    strengthened and unified our interagency relationship. We understand
    the congressional interest in the overall governance of the nuclear
    enterprise as expressed in the Congressional Advisory Panel Report on
    Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. The NWC Members
    participated in interviews with the panel and received briefings on the
    final report's findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The NWC
    supports strengthening NNSA's planning and costing functions. The NWC
    is ready to assist NNSA with implementation, and we look forward to
    providing Congress with comments on this report in the weeks to come as
    requested in the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act.
                                   conclusion
        Budget constraints have forced the NWC to annually adjust its
    stockpile maintenance and infrastructure plans to fit within resources
    appropriated. These adjustments cause delays or cancellations, reduce
    work scope, or extend development or production periods. We have
    reached a point where we have removed all flexibility from the nuclear
    weapons life extension programs and have worked with the U.S. Strategic
    Command to accept lower stockpile requirements where possible. We
    continuously strive to strike the best balance between the science and
    engineering required to certify the stockpile, the programs planned to
    extend the life of the stockpile, and the plans for a responsive
    infrastructure. Achieving our plans for tomorrow's stockpile will
    require adequate resources, national commitment, and balanced
    investments. The NWC remains committed to our responsibility to ensure
    a safe, secure, reliable, and effective nuclear deterrent, and we urge
    continued congressional attention to the Nation's essential security
    needs by sustaining a stable nuclear enterprise budget in general, and
    by removing the threat of sequestration specifically.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        I guess I will sum it up and ask all of you--and Secretary
    Kendall, you are going to answer, I guess, first. But do you
    believe that the basic plans that we have laid out that, as I
    understand, you support in your opening statement, a move to
    modernize our triad and our delivery systems and to modernize
    the aging warheads is a substantial need for America? It needs
    to be funded, and the general outline of funds can get this job
    done?
        Mr. Kendall. Yes, Mr. Chairman, absolutely. It is a
    critical national security need. The funding that we have
    requested for both Departments through the 5-year plan that we
    submitted is adequate to execute our plan during that period.
    After the end of that period, as we start to actually produce
    the systems I talked about, we are going to have an
    affordability program that we have to deal with. You alluded to
    that earlier.
        Senator Sessions. Your period is what time?
        Mr. Kendall. This will surface in next year's budget. In
    2021, we are going to start to have a problem finding ways to
    afford these systems. We will work to do that. It is a very
    high priority, and we will work to do that. But it is going to
    be a challenge for us.
        Senator Sessions. Do any of you have any comment about
    that? Do you agree with the essential unity of statement of
    purpose and goal? Any other comments you would like to
    contribute?
        Mr. Klotz. Senator, absolutely I agree with the statement.
    I would add that from the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] Department of Energy side, we have taken a very
    careful look at the requirements in terms of what it means for
    our scientific, technical, and engineering base at the
    laboratories and production facilities, the workload that they
    will have as we move through the series of life extension
    programs and modernization of our plutonium, uranium, and
    tritium capabilities. This is a busy--it is a challenging but
    it is an imminently executable plan that we have laid out.
        With one caveat, just to underscore what Mr. Kendall said,
    one of the most important things is stable and predictable
    funding so that we can ensure that we have the right people,
    the right tools, and the right facilities there to execute this
    program.
        Senator Sessions. Well, Secretary Kendall, you said in
    March I believe of last year, quote, the program is fragile,
    and any funding reductions at this point could pose
    unacceptable risk to the health of the nuclear enterprise. You
    noted that budget constraints force the Nuclear Weapons Council
    to annually adjust its stockpile maintenance and infrastructure
    plans to fit within the money actually appropriated. And,
    quote, we have reached a point where we have removed all
    flexibility from the nuclear weapon life extension programs and
    have worked with the Strategic Command to lower stockpile
    requirements where possible.
        So what do you mean by ``fragile,'' and how serious do you
    consider stable funding to be?
        Mr. Kendall. It is very important.
        What we have done is we have slipped the first production
    of the new submarine about 2 years, which puts it right up
    against--and we have to replace the existing submarine fleet.
    There are aging effects on the current force structure that are
    predictable and understood, and we have to deal with those. We
    acquired a lot of the current force structure basically at the
    same time historically. It is all aging out at the same time.
    The submarines are aging out.
        Senator Sessions. Yes, submarines. I know one is
    celebrating its 30th anniversary in a few weeks, and others are
    pushing 40 I believe. That is a long time to maintain a
    sophisticated piece of equipment like that.
        Mr. Kendall. It is a long time. Both the hulls themselves
    and the reactors have predictable aging effects that have to be
    dealt with. The rocket motors and our ICBM's are similar. We
    have renewed those but we are going to be at a point where we
    have to modernize those again. There are a lot of older
    technologies in those systems that have to be replaced in the
    ICBM force. The air-launched cruise missile is showing a lot of
    reliability problems right now. It is becoming harder to
    maintain, and it is going to have to be replaced as well.
        What we did in this most recent budget, which you may have
    noticed came in a little bit higher than last year's request in
    the out-years in the 5-year plan, was we were able to
    accelerate the Elkem replacement about 2 years because of those
    aging effects.
        We are also seeing some effects in the nuclear stockpile
    itself. We found some money--and it is mentioned there, the
    item about the requirement for maintaining the stockpile. We
    found some money to address a conventional high-explosive
    problem in one of our warheads, which we had hoped would last
    longer than is going to be, but we are seeing signs that it
    will not and we have to replace that. So that has added a few
    hundred million dollars of cost, which we were able to cover.
    But we are essentially out of room to maneuver in our plan.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think you are right. We have got
    a chart. Let me just show it.
        [Deleted.]
        Senator Sessions. This chart, I think, is pretty revealing,
    and it is produced by the Defense Department I believe. But it
    shows the blue you cannot read there is investments, and the
    red is operation and support for our nuclear enterprise, which
    includes the triad, I mean, our launch system, as well as the
    bombs. So you can see this dramatic reduction here in 2002 to
    2010. We end up by 2017 to 2018, we got to start making some
    changes. This yellow is a new submarine, the Ohio-class. The
    new bomber. The orange is ICBM and the new SLBM [Submarine
    Launched Ballistic Missile], submarine-launched ballistic
    missile. Then it begins to drop again. It drops again in 2034
    through 2042.
        So I see that we have been able to go a long time, General
    Klotz, without putting much money in the system, and if we can
    get by and modernize our entire fleet for this small a
    percentage--maximal is the 15 percent, I believe. If we can get
    by at that, then we have not bankrupted the country and have
    still been able to maintain a robust nuclear deterrence that I
    think all of us share.
        Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
    yield most of my time to Senator King.
        But let me just say this is a plan that you put out for $35
    billion a year for 10 years, which is that blue added above the
    yellow there. Now, in the decade of the 2020s, you are
    expecting to product 50 to 80 pits a year. Is that sufficient?
        Mr. Kendall. We would like to have the capacity to produce
    50 to 80. That number is, in part, a hedge against
    uncertainties of aging effects on the current stockpile. It
    puts us in a position--if there is a change in the geopolitical
    environment or a problem with our stockpile, we can respond to
    that. We do not know that we will have to actually produce that
    many pits.
        General Klotz can probably address that question more
    fully.
        Mr. Klotz. It does two things for us, Senator. The capacity
    to produce pits--which, by the way, it used to be very
    substantial during the Cold War period. We had a facility in
    Colorado, Rocky Flats, 30,000 square feet, produced thousands
    of pits, up to 2,000 pits a year. We now essentially have
    60,000 square feet at Los Alamos in New Mexico to do the same
    thing, and our pit production is way down.
        We will have a need, as we move towards the interoperable
    warhead, which will have an explosive package that could be
    used on both an Air Force and a Navy ballistic missile in the
    future that may require us to produce new pits, and I would be
    happy to discuss that in a little more detail in a closed
    session.
        But also as Chairman Kendall said, this is also part of
    having a responsive infrastructure and a capability to respond
    to unforeseen political developments or unforeseen technical
    challenges within the stockpile. It is a capability that we
    need and that we are in the process of pursuing through a
    plutonium strategy which has been approved by the Nuclear
    Weapons Council in a collaborative fashion. In fact, Chairman
    Kendall and I came up and briefed Members of the Hill, and it
    has been approved in the appropriations and authorization
    bills.
        Senator Nelson. Well, I thought I was going to yield to
    Senator King, but the time has just about run.
        Let me just say--Admiral Haney, the fiscal year 2016 budget
    begins a life extension of the air-launched cruise missile. Is
    there a military requirement for replacing our current air-
    launched cruise missile?
        Admiral Haney. Senator, absolutely. As mentioned by
    Chairman Kendall, the fact of the matter is the current air-
    launched cruise missile has reliability problems. It is well
    over its life, designed for about 10 years, and we are well
    over the 30-year point for the current missile system. It is
    important from a deterrence in warfighting requirement, given
    that we need to have for our air leg, our flexible deterrent
    part of the triad, the ability to have standoff capability now
    and well into the future.
        Senator Nelson. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, I was pleased to see in the budget request this
    year that it moved up the development and the production of the
    replacement cruise missile to 2025. Secretary Kendall,
    previously the council had decided to delay that to 2027. Is
    there a consensus now among the members that 2025 is the date
    that you are anticipating and that you probably will stay with?
        Mr. Kendall. Thank you, Senator. Our preference was always
    to start that program earlier. Budget realities would not allow
    us to do it last year. We did, as I mentioned, come in with a
    slightly higher budget particularly in the out-years after 2016
    in our 5-year plan. That allowed us to move it back up 2 years.
    There was very strong--and Admiral Haney may want to address
    this. There was very strong interest in accelerating that
    program if we could find a way to do it, and we did so.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Admiral, if you can clarify there, there is a difference
    between the nuclear cruise missiles and the nuclear gravity
    bombs and what they do in their missions. Can you enlarge upon
    that and why we need them?
        Admiral Haney. When we look at our air leg, the flexible
    leg of the deterrence, it is important as we look at today the
    B-2 capability, and part of that comes with the bomber--bomb
    piece. It does not have currently the capability to do an air-
    launched cruise missile. The B-52 platform requires the air-
    launched cruise missile to provide that standoff capability,
    unlike the B-2, designed with stealth. Very important. This
    platform, the B-52, will be around until around 2040. So we
    have more decades to come in its utilization, and as a result,
    we need to be able to have a reliable air-launched cruise
    missile, the long-range strike option we talk about today, in
    order to address, particularly as we look at how countries are
    developing more and more anti-access, access denial type of
    capability, to give us further reach and to make more complex
    their decision matrix associated with escalating their way out
    of a conflict.
        Senator Fischer. It offers our commander in chief more
    options as you provide advice when conflicts may arise.
    Correct?
        Admiral Haney. That is correct.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. Elliott, if you could comment on this as well. These
    systems are not redundant. Are they? The two systems. They are
    specific in their missions?
        Mr. Elliott. They are, Senator. I would add on the bomb,
    for example, the B-61 that will replace the existing inventory
    of those is carried by our dual-capable aircraft also. They do
    not have a capability to carry the cruise missile. They do not
    have the capability to carry some of our larger weapons like
    the B-83. So it is critically important that we get that for
    both the dual-capable aircraft and for the strategic systems
    like the B-2, and it will be available for long-range strike
    bomber later on.
        At the same time, aging systems like the B-52, which when
    the first Elkem came off the inventory or into the inventory,
    was already 20 years old, now past 50 years old, is no longer
    able to penetrate those defenses. Yet, it has significant
    capabilities and a replacement air-launched cruise missile,
    LRSO [Long Range Standoff Weapon] in this case, will extend its
    utility to the plan in its primary role of deterring attacks on
    the United States. So they are equally important and serve a
    very different purpose in our plans.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        General Klotz, thank you once again for allowing Senator
    King and I to come and giving us a very thorough tour of the
    facilities. We appreciated it and learned so much.
        But if you could comment on moving the warhead up, and does
    it stabilize the load for the NNSA?
        Mr. Klotz. Thank you very much for joining us out there in
    New Mexico. I am sure Senator Heinrich would say you visited
    two of the finest of the labs, but we love all our children in
    NNSA.
        Senator Fischer. We do, we do.
        Mr. Klotz. If I could just make one point to what Mr.
    Elliott just said. On the gravity bombs, the B-61, they, in
    addition to the strategic bombers, also go into these dual-
    capable aircraft. Those are fighter aircraft that can conduct
    both conventional and nuclear missions. That capability is so
    essential to our overall policy of extended deterrence, in
    other words, providing that nuclear umbrella to our allies and
    partners across the globe. So that is why it is very important.
        On the issue with moving the date to the left for the long-
    range standoff, we looked at that very carefully. This actually
    fits in very well with our workload projections. We will be in
    the phase of two other life extension programs where if we did
    not have work to do, we would have a gap in work for our
    employees at the laboratories, as well as the production plan.
    So by moving that a couple years to the left, it actually has a
    positive, beneficial effect by smoothing out the workflow, not
    having to go through letting some people go and then hiring
    them back at a later date.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. I am not sure who to address this question
    to, but I note that a lot of our nuclear force calculations are
    based upon applying the terms of the New START treaty. My
    question is, is Russia abiding by the terms of the New START
    treaty, and do we know that?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator King, what we are seeing is that Russia
    is abiding by the New START treaty. The main, central limits of
    the treaty do not come into effect until February 2018, but the
    assessment of the intelligence community at the moment is that
    we expect that they will fulfill their obligations under the
    treaty.
        We also have ongoing inspections and verification
    mechanisms in place with mutual inspections, and those are
    proceeding without any violations.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Mr. Kendall, when I hear the word ``interoperable,'' it
    gives me a sort of uneasy feeling because I next think of the
    word ``Joint Strike Fighter.'' Execution is as important as
    vision. ``Interoperable'' sounds good. Are there practical
    problems? Please reassure me that we are not going to make
    something more expensive and difficult by trying to make it
    interoperable.
        Mr. Kendall. We have completed a fair amount of study of
    options for a common word that could be used by either of the
    ballistic missiles. While we have delayed that 5 years now in
    our plan--it does not start until late in the 5-year plan--we
    do think that is technically feasible, and it will lead to
    significant cost savings as well. So ``interoperable'' in this
    case I think is a very, very different matter, the idea of
    three largely common variants of aircraft which is what we
    tried to do in the F-35.
        Senator King. Command and control, a crucial part of the
    nuclear deterrent. How do you feel about where we are in
    command and control particularly in light of the developing
    cyber threat?
        Mr. Kendall. It is a concern. I co-chair a body with the
    Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Winnefeld, which by
    statute now oversees the nuclear command and control
    enterprise.
        We have taken some steps over the last 2 or 3 years to put
    some modernization funds into that part of the structure. Our
    chief information officer is currently doing a review of that
    and he is going to be reporting out very shortly to us. From
    the preliminary indications I have from him, we do have some
    additional things that we have to pay attention to. A lot of
    that infrastructure, like other parts of the nuclear
    enterprise, has been aging, and the cyber threats are getting
    much more severe over time. So we have to pay close attention
    to that.
        Senator King. We had a hearing a week or so ago with some
    deep thinkers on these issues, and one of the things they
    talked about was the Soviet--sorry--the Russian--that is the
    second time I have made that mistake.
        Mr. Kendall. I do that all the time too.
        Senator King. The Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear
    weapons. Is this a gap, if you will, in our deterrent? We are
    talking here about strategic weapons. If we are talking about
    deterrence, it is important, it seems to me, to have something
    to deter the tactical usage.
        Mr. Kendall. That is a cause for concern. The Russians are
    changing their doctrine and they are pursuing an approach that
    we took at one time in the 1950s. We had a lot of small-yield,
    short-range nuclear weapons. The Russians seem to be going down
    a similar path and their doctrine is changing consistent with
    that. That would suggest a more willingness to use those to try
    to control escalation.
        I would like to ask Secretary McKeon to address that
    because I know Policy has been looking at that very closely.
        Mr. McKeon. Senator, I probably cannot get into the numbers
    in this forum, but it is not a secret that Russia has more
    tactical nuclear weapons than we do. I think we still are of
    the view that our conventional and nuclear forces, taken
    together, provide us adequate capabilities to deal with that
    disparity in tactical nuclear weapons.
        Admiral Haney may also have a view on that.
        Senator King. Ironically it appears that the world was
    turned upside down in terms of perceptions. We had them because
    we perceived the Red Army as a massive conventional threat, and
    I gather they now consider us to have a more severe
    conventional threat and therefore they are moving toward the
    tactical weapons that we were relying upon.
        Mr. McKeon. That is our assessment of why they have so
    many. It is because of what they perceive to be our
    overwhelming conventional spear.
        Senator King. A question about deterrence. The whole theory
    of deterrence rests upon rational state actors, and we are now
    in a world of irrational non-state actors. How do we develop a
    doctrine that is equivalent to deterrence? Deterrence was a
    very effective doctrine for 50, 60, 70 years. But how do we
    deter somebody who: (A) does not represent a country, and (B)
    does not care about dying?
        Let the record show they pointed at each other.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Kendall. It is a policy question, and I would like
    Secretary McKeon to address it. But that is a cause for deep
    concern, and that is why counter-proliferation is so important
    to us. We do not want one of these groups, who is exactly as
    you described them, get their hands on a weapon of mass
    destruction of any type.
        Mr. McKeon. I do not have much to add to it. Under
    Secretary Kendall said there are certain people who cannot be
    deterred. We keep a close eye on terrorist groups and others
    who are trying to get either nuclear weapons or nuclear
    material, and we have a lot of programs in this area that both
    our Department and the Department of Energy work on, and they
    are also a critically important part of our budget.
        Admiral Haney. The only piece I would add, Senator, is that
    as we look at the art of deterrence and the cost and benefit
    ratio, it is the whole-of-government kind of approach
    associated with that. As a result, as we look at that, although
    you might argue that rational thought and terrorism, for
    example--are they congruent or not? I would just say in terms
    of a reactor state or not, there are costs and there are
    benefits, and we have to get at that in terms of the deterrence
    calculation.
        Mr. Klotz. Can I pick up on a point that was raised
    earlier? That is, a very, very important part of our overall
    nuclear security strategy also deals with making sure that
    would-be proliferators and would-be terrorists can never get
    their hands on the special nuclear materials which they would
    need to either make a bomb or to fashion a nuclear or
    radiological device that they could use in a terrorist
    scenario.
        So a large part of what we do and a large part of our
    budget requests, beyond the weapons activity, has to deal with
    putting in place systems to prevent proliferators or terrorists
    getting that material, if somehow they do, countering what they
    can do with that material, and then, God forbid, if anything
    ever actually happened, being able to respond to the
    consequences of that. So that is a very, very large part of
    what NNSA does, drawing upon the scientific, technical,
    engineering capabilities that are resident in our network of
    laboratories and production facilities.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        I want to thank you for bringing up the technical nuke
    issue. I think it is something we need to put a lot of thought
    into.
        General Klotz and Under Secretary Kendall, I understand
    that you are already working to address some of the
    congressional advisory panel's recommendations for NNSA
    governance reform, and I wanted to ask on the specific issue of
    NNSA's structure, is that something you plan to address or do
    you think that this committee should be looking at legislation
    to improve on the current organization of NNSA within the
    Department?
        Mr. Kendall. I am going to let General Klotz deal with that
    question because it is a DOE organizational question.
        But I will say that I think our relationship with NNSA has
    been very good. It has been very collegial. We have worked very
    closely together to try to address problems together. I think
    how the Department of Energy organizes itself and how the
    Congress chooses to have that organization in place--we will
    find a way to work together and get the job done in any
    arrangement. But I think the current arrangements are working
    fine from our point of view. I think my colleagues from the
    Defense Department would agree with that.
        Mr. Klotz. Well, Senator, first of all, we appreciate the
    work that was done by the panel. They are a panel of
    distinguished Americans, many former Members of Congress
    represented on that, and they gave a lot of thought and spent a
    lot of time coming up with a very comprehensive list of
    recommendations.
        Many of the recommendations that they make, particularly in
    the area of management, cost estimation, analysis of
    alternatives, project oversight, are things, quite frankly,
    which the Department under Secretary Moniz's leadership--he has
    been in the saddle between a year and a half-2 years. Now with
    confirmed leadership in key positions at NNSA, we are already
    moving out very smartly on in terms of enhancing the rigor and
    the discipline and the process which we use for life extension
    programs, construction projects. Many of the things that the
    Secretary is doing and the Department is doing we can do within
    existing authorities which the Secretary or the Administrator
    of NNSA already have, and we are moving out on that.
        In legislation that came out at the end of last year, I am
    required to submit a report by March 17, and we will lay out in
    some detail our views and our responses to each of the 19
    overall recommendations and 63 sub-recommendations. I do not
    think, however, we will comment on how the Congress should
    organize itself as the panel suggested we do.
        Senator Heinrich. Everyone else does. You might as well.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, I want to continue with
    another issue. I am a strong supporter of a modest set-aside of
    funding for laboratory-directed research and development, or
    LDRD. LDRD investment in high-risk, high-payoff activities
    supports the National security mission while allowing the lab
    scientists to pursue innovative solutions to some of our
    Nation's most challenging energy as well as national security
    problems. One of the things that this really helps with is
    attracting the best and the brightest talent. I actually
    believe that a set-aside for LDRD of 8 or even 10 percent can
    be justified.
        I wanted to ask you more broadly. Do you agree that
    Congress should maintain a robust LDRD program?
        Mr. Klotz. Absolutely, Senator. I could not have said it
    any better than you did. It has payoffs both in terms of the
    basic research that is necessary to maintain the stockpile but,
    more importantly, to recruit and retain the best and the
    brightest out of STEM programs at our leading colleges and
    universities by giving them the opportunity to work on leading-
    edge scientific and engineering work to establish their bona
    fides with their colleagues around the country. Once we allow
    them to do that, we find they get very intrigued by the other
    things that are going on in the laboratory, and we can hold----
        Senator Heinrich. We suck them in and they are there for
    30-plus years, which is really the goal. Some of our most
    amazing scientists have been intrigued by these issues. It is
    one of those things that for not only retention, but just
    attracting them in the first place has been incredibly
    powerful.
        One of the things that I would encourage my colleagues to
    do, as they get a chance to visit some of the labs, is to ask
    for a specific brief on some of the things coming out of LDRD
    because I have always been amazed. Not only is it really
    important for this sort recruitment and retention piece, but
    some of the most innovative things that spin off and end up
    helping our warfighters, really saving lives, doing things in
    the cyber field that we did not think was possible just a short
    time ago come out of these projects. It is fascinating to see
    that window. So I would encourage you all to do that.
        I want to move on to Los Alamos really quickly. Your
    submitted testimony says that we reinforced NNSA's need to
    fully develop responsive and productive plutonium and uranium
    capabilities for this Nation. Today these capabilities and
    their enabling infrastructure are at great risk and rank among
    our highest priority infrastructure challenges. General Klotz,
    can you explain to the subcommittee how important it is to
    ensure that the replacement for the plutonium facility is built
    and that we get that rolling in order to address some of the
    issues that my colleagues brought up regarding pit production
    and unforeseen future events?
        Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator. As I said earlier, we have
    gone down dramatically in terms of our ability as a Nation to
    produce pits either for future systems like the interoperable
    warhead or in response to a technical challenge that we have to
    deal with. Much of that work is going to be done at Los Alamos.
    There is also work done at our other labs and our other
    production facilities, but the heart and soul of that is at Los
    Alamos.
        We have a plutonium strategy which this whole Nuclear
    Weapons Council has agreed to that will result in repurposing
    and reusing some of the space that is in the PF-4 and at the
    rad lab, and also later this year, we will establish a mission
    need statement regarding building additional modules which will
    allow us to move some of the work that requires the highest
    degree of security and safety and free up more space within PF-
    4 to actually do pit production.
        Senator Heinrich. So it is important again that we keep
    this on track. We have had great support from this committee
    and other committees on the Hill in terms of moving forward. I
    look forward to working with you on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. First of all, I want you all to know how
    much we appreciate what you do. It is not in the press, and it
    is absolutely super important to the National security of this
    country. You all do it in a collaborative fashion, and the
    results speak for themselves. So thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Kendall, since you chair the council, it is my
    understanding that as an acquisition body that works with the
    NNSA to set requirements and develop planned warhead activities
    as you collaborate, do you think it needs to be expanded to
    include other groups such as the services or set requirements
    for DOD delivery platforms?
        Mr. Kendall. The short answer is, no, I do not. The council
    operates by consensus, and if you expand the group, it is
    harder to achieve consensus. I think we have the right people
    here before you, Admiral Winnefeld represented by Mr. Elliott,
    to represent the policy and the acquisition aspects from the
    Pentagon, as well as the operational aspects and the services
    through the Joint Staff and, of course, the Department of
    Energy through NNSA's Director.
        I just want to make the comment that we do include in
    Nuclear Weapons Council meetings all the relevant stakeholders
    whenever we meet. So we have people there from our comptroller,
    financial side of the house, from our cost analysis and program
    evaluation, CAPE [Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation],
    organization, from each of the military departments, and
    frequently from the national security staff or perhaps OMB as
    well if they are engaged on the issue. So we are very
    inclusive. We include people. We hear their points of view. We
    take them into account, and I think the membership is suitable
    as it is today.
        I would invite my colleagues to comment on that if they
    would like to as well.
        Mr. McKeon. I agree with what Under Secretary Kendall said.
    Everyone is in the room who needs to be in the room. In my
    short time in the Department--I just got there in August--my
    impression is it all works pretty well at our level. There may
    be some skirmishes amongst our staff, but by the time it gets
    to us, we come together on recommendations. I do not get the
    sense that any of the services feel like they do not have an
    adequate voice in that forum.
        Senator Nelson. Well, let me ask you something. You all
    have identified in your report, titled ``The Report on Balance
    in Nuclear Weapons Programs,'' that you need to certify and
    maintain the current stockpile, that you need to perform the
    life extensions and you need to prepare to respond to future
    uncertainties. Can you explain each of those functions?
        Mr. Kendall. Sure. Our stockpile--because we cannot do any
    underground testing anymore, we have to keep track of the
    safety and security and reliability of the stockpile. So
    surveilling the stockpile, testing it, looking for any aging
    effects that might have been predicted is one activity that we
    have to do.
        There are aging effects that take place that we understand,
    and those require us--and also, because there is some
    obsolescence of technology, we have to upgrades to the weapons
    over time. The B61, for example, is responding in part to some
    very obvious aging effects, which we understand and are aware
    of, and we are in a bit of a race against time to get that
    program and other programs like it done. So those two aspects
    deal with that.
        We also have to consider any needs in the future in terms
    of production and have the infrastructure in place that will
    support those needs. Part of this, of course, is the life
    extensions programs. We need production for that. But if we
    were called upon to do more in the case of a geopolitical
    change or something we did not foresee, the infrastructure
    needs to be there to produce weapons as well as to meet the
    needs that we do foresee.
        So those are the basic three pieces.
        Frank, do you want to add to that?
        Mr. Klotz. If I could add just a bit, Senator. Sometimes
    some people will make a distinction between production on the
    one hand and science, engineering, and research on the other.
    In my view, it is not an either/or situation. In order to do
    surveillance of the current stockpile and also understand those
    aging effects, we have to do some pretty leading-edge science
    and engineering, particularly as these systems age. As the
    components, the uranium, the plutonium, the tritium age, we
    need to understand that. The way we understand it is by doing
    diagnostic experiments and then putting the data from those
    experiments and past test data into high performance computing
    platforms which allow us to understand the effects of aging.
    They also allow us to understand the effects of changing
    components perhaps using new materials because the old
    materials are no longer manufactured or available.
        Mr. Kendall. If I could make a comment. I would encourage
    all of you to find an opportunity to come see nuclear weapons,
    come see what is in those designs. They are not simple devices.
    They are extremely complicated devices. If you look at some of
    the technology that is in some of our older weapons and you
    compare that to some of the newer life extension program
    designs, there is a remarkable difference. I think it will be
    very obvious to you why we need to do this work.
        The other thing I want to say is that we have devices which
    are critical to national security which are terribly
    destructive that we cannot test, and we have maintained them.
    If you look at the chart that you have up there, this is
    largely the platform side, but there is a similar set of charts
    for the weapons side. We built a lot of weapons. We tried to
    keep them for about 40 years. We want to be sure that those
    weapons are safe, they will not go off accidentally. We want to
    be that if they ever are asked to go off, that they will go off
    reliably. These are very stringent requirements. This is a very
    stressing, difficult, technical task. It demands the best from
    our scientists and engineers. You should see for yourselves
    what we are doing with these systems. This is a very difficult
    task. What we are doing in the science and engineering program,
    other aspects of it are all necessary to ensure the safety,
    security, and reliability of that force structure.
        Senator Nelson. Admiral Haney, in your opinion do we need
    new nuclear weapons, or can we do the job with the existing
    stockpile?
        Admiral Haney. We can do the job with the existing
    stockpile, Senator, as long as we work this 3+2 strategy, we
    work the life extension programs, as we have been talking about
    here. Those are critical for us to be able to sustain ourselves
    through the future. So I cannot say enough about staying on
    track with the 3+2 strategy.
        Senator Sessions. Well, thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Sort of to follow up on that and Senator Heinrich's
    questions, the 2015 STRATCOM report on balance in the nuclear
    weapons program suggests that due to the current funding
    emphasis on certifying the nuclear stockpile and performing
    life extension programs on aging weapons, there may be
    insufficient funding in science activity to respond to future
    uncertainties. In other words, there is concern about losing,
    ``a full design and production capability,'' which is, ``a
    critical component of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.''
        Maybe Admiral Haney and General Klotz, you can comment on
    that.
        It also relates to the idea that we do not want to have
    legislation and funding so restricted that the good scientists
    who come up with good ideas are not even able to research and
    test them. Of course, Congress is not going to allow something
    new to be done that they have not ultimately approved. But do
    you feel like that is a problem? Would there be benefits
    derived from directing our scientists and engineers to gain
    practice and experience by designing at least, if not building,
    a new prototype weapon as we determine--as we go forward in the
    future?
        Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
        I am not a nuclear physicist. I am in awe of nuclear
    physicists. But when I visit the laboratories and when I visit
    the production plants, it seems to me that the work that our
    people are doing requires and imbues in them a very thorough
    understanding of the engineering and the operation of these
    very sophisticated, complicated devices. They are fully engaged
    and fully employed in that. Without going into the details of
    all that that means because of the level of sensitivity, I
    sense our people understand that.
        We are, of course, concerned about the fact that a lot of
    our workforce is aging. Many of them came of age the same time
    I did, and they are about ready to pass the torch on to the
    next generation. So we have to provide them challenging work to
    do, but I think they have a full slate of challenging work to
    do.
        The other important thing, as far as legislation is
    concerned on this or any other area--we have a broad consensus
    in the Nuclear Weapons Council that this is the right path that
    we are on. I think there is a broad consensus based upon
    authorization and appropriations on the Congress that we are on
    the right path. It seems to me that holding that consensus
    about the body of work that we have to do both on delivery
    systems and warheads that we have outlined in the 3+2 strategy
    is important to preserve.
        Mr. Kendall. Mr. Chairman, if I may. I am not a nuclear
    physicist either, but I am an engineer. I think the scientific
    and engineering challenge that we have placed upon our people
    does certainly give them the experience to be confident of
    their products.
        I do not think we need to do new designs. We have very
    state-of-the-art modeling and simulation capabilities. We are
    doing laboratory testing and other testing, to the extent we
    can, to verify the performance of our systems and the
    components that we are upgrading or redesigning within the
    existing weapons design framework basically I think is adequate
    to keep the expertise at a reasonable level. I do not think we
    need to do new designs.
        Senator Sessions. Admiral Haney?
        Admiral Haney. Chairman, I would also add the fact that
    when you look at the intricacies associated with these life
    extension programs that are underway or planned, those in
    themselves are challenging to the workforce and to such an
    extent that I think it also helps keep them proficient in terms
    of if there was ever a need for a new design, that we would
    have the workforce we need to do that, from the visits I have
    had. This business of reuse, refurbishment, and then the
    electronics associated with it is not trivial stuff, as Frank
    Kendall mentioned, and I just want to sound off that that in
    itself keeps them very gainfully not just employed but
    requiring significant thinking and cranial power.
        Senator Sessions. Well, let us just say it this way. There
    is a consensus in the Congress, and when you say a consensus
    among yourselves, I think you mean you consider a little bit of
    the political world you live in when you make those statements
    that you have made.
        The lab directors, as I understand, are concerned about
    having full design and production capability. They think that
    is a critical component to a nuclear deterrent because there
    could be future uncertainties and other developments by other
    countries.
        So I am not rocking the boat. We are not going to rock the
    boat and say what some have said like if we are going to
    refurbish this thing, why do we not just build a new one. It
    will be safer, smaller, more capable, and more flexible, and
    probably cost less money.
        So we are just going to update the ones we have got. That
    is the consensus that we have got.
        But I think you do not want to hold your people back from
    if not doing design, doing work on possible new systems in the
    future. Would you agree with that? Maybe we could at least do
    that, Secretary Kendall?
        Mr. Kendall. I think we are constrained in what we can do,
    but I do think, as we said, that the work that we give our
    people is adequately challenging to maintain their expertise.
        Mr. McKeon. If I can add one thing, Senator.
        Senator Sessions. Yes.
        Mr. McKeon. I was in a meeting in the first term with the
    Vice President, my old boss, and Secretary Chu and the three
    lab directors. General Klotz repeated this point the other day.
    They all said to a person that they have learned more in the
    last 20 years about nuclear weapons during the stockpile
    stewardship program than they did through several decades of
    testing. So you should ask them today if they still hold that
    view. General Klotz said that in our prep session the other
    day. So I think the work they have is definitely challenging.
        Senator Sessions. Well, good. I think we can move forward
    the way we are. We will move forward in a bipartisan way. Let
    us do it that way.
        General Klotz, look, I believe we need to complete the
    goals we have got and to refurbish these weapons on the
    timeframe we are. But it is an expensive proposition. We talk
    about how little we spend, but still, it is billions of
    dollars. We are talking about several years there at $15
    billion a year. I guess what I would say to you and all of you
    is that if we have to have more buildings, more infrastructure,
    let us know, but do not ask for more than we need. We are not
    able to just rebuild whole new nuclear laboratories and
    research things. The initial idea was that there were going to
    be $8 billion and $10 billion and $12 billion buildings took us
    all a bit by surprise. So I think you are creatively working
    forward with modular approaches that get you the new space you
    need. So, again, if you have to have more, please let us know,
    but if you can keep that cost down, that is going to free up
    some money that we can do things we need to do with.
        Mr. Klotz. Senator, I recall that when we met prior to my
    confirmation, that was one of the things that you stressed, and
    it has been uppermost in my mind ever since. I think you are
    right in terms of the modular approaches we take, but also in
    terms of repurposing some of the existing facilities we have
    and also looking for processes that will allow us to do things
    more effectively and with a greater margin of safety is also a
    thing that we are exploring. But we are focused on bringing
    discipline, rigor that is very much already a part of the DOD
    into the way in which we approach our project management, as
    well as program management.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Just a couple of follow-up questions.
        One is I think your chart, Mr. Chairman, is very
    informative. It would be even interesting to compare it with
    the decline of the defense budget as a percent of GDP because
    what you have is a declining share of a declining share. The
    defense budget in 1962 was something like 5-6 percent of GDP
    [Gross Domestic Product]. It is now at 3.3. So it makes this
    even more dramatic in terms of its cost to the taxpayers.
        Senator Sessions. Can I say one thing about that chart? The
    new bomber, as I understand it, is considered about three-
    fourths non-nuclear costs. So we have got the full cost of the
    new bomber in there, which is really a little higher. It makes
    it look a little higher than otherwise would be.
        Senator King. I do not think we have talked about this
    directly. All these plans and well laid scenarios and what you
    are going to do with refurbishing--what does sequester do to
    all that?
        Mr. Kendall. That is a great question, Senator.
        Well, first of all, this is an extremely high priority for
    us. We would, I think, have to reexamine everything that both
    Departments do under sequester. That said, we are looking at
    the percentage of our budget that is involved here. We would do
    our best to protect this area because of the strategic
    deterrence mission area is so vital. I think we would have to
    make some adjustments, but I think we----
        Senator King. Do you have a choice to do so, or would
    sequester require cuts in this area as in all others? Would you
    have that kind of flexibility and discretion under the way the
    law is----
        Mr. Kendall. My understanding--and I may be incorrect about
    this--is that after fiscal year 2013, there is more discretion
    in how sequester is implemented, and we would have some
    discretion. I would hope that would be the case because doing
    what we did in fiscal year 2013 and taking the same cuts from
    everything essentially was a very dysfunctional way to take
    cuts.
        Senator King. But if you did protect this area, it would
    simply mean that we would have to take it out of readiness or
    end strength or modernization of the other part of the Defense
    Department.
        Mr. Kendall. That is right.
        Senator King. So is it fair to say that sequester would be
    damaging to this program?
        Mr. Kendall. Yes, it is.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Klotz, you were discussing the issues that you
    faced with your workforce, whether they are aging and looking
    at retirement, to make sure that they are challenged with their
    work, to keep a workload even so you do not have to have
    layoffs and lose those people to other industries. I would ask
    Admiral Haney, do you have issues like that with your workforce
    at STRATCOM? Do you share some of those same concerns about
    keeping a workforce that has the abilities and the needed
    knowledge actively employed?
        Admiral Haney. Senator Fischer, absolutely I remain
    concerned. I would say we had the furlough. That was a signal
    to all of our workforce. Quite frankly, we lost some people as
    a result of that.
        You combine that as well as how some of the pundits like to
    talk about this capability we have here in this discussion, the
    strategic nuclear capability, and as a result, in some of those
    discussions, it further devalues what this workforce is about
    that is so important to our country.
        So this is an area that we spend time, just as I think
    General Klotz and his team does, in terms of working intern
    programs and what have you to connect this to universities to
    bring in new talent while at the same time working hard to
    retain the talent we have. Headquarters of your Strategic
    Command is about 60 percent civilian, very important when you
    look at the intricacies of the strategic deterrent that we keep
    the right and relevant workforce.
        Senator Fischer. We had a discussion earlier on the
    effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent and looking at the
    Russians and their tactical weapons. It kind of looked like
    maybe you wanted to join in that discussion. Did you have
    anything you wanted to say with regards to the effectiveness of
    our deterrent and also with the Russian tactical weapons and
    how those affect our outlook to the future as well?
        Admiral Haney. I thought our discussion was rich, and I
    agree with everything that was stated relative to our whole
    capability, strategic capability, as well as conventional
    capability that a joint military force operates day in and day
    out.
        The only piece that I would add is when people talk about
    the use of a tactical nuke, I would just say if one of those
    were to go off and our deterrence failed, that tactical nuclear
    weapon or non-strategic nuclear weapon, as we sometimes call
    it, would have a strategic effect, and that we can ill afford
    to have.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Let me follow up on that question just a
    little bit because with regard to the Russian tactical nuclear
    weapons, or non-strategic weapons, how do the rules of
    deterrence differ for tactical versus strategic nuclear weapons
    in your view? Are more tactical nukes, in other words, a better
    deterrent than maybe the conventional forces? How do those
    general rules--because I think everybody intuitively kind of
    understands how our doctrine and deterrence works with
    strategic nuclear weapons, but it seems to me that tactical
    nuclear weapons do not exactly operate by the same set of
    rules.
        Admiral Haney. Well, I would say it is not the weapons that
    operate by the rules. It is the actors, nation states, et
    cetera that have those weapons at their disposal that are more
    of a concern. I think it would be inappropriate for me to
    compare a brigade or a conventional capability and say X number
    of this equals one of that. I do not think that is what we are
    talking about. I think the real key, when you look at our
    strategic nuclear capability, it is to make deterrence work so
    that we do not have any type of nuclear weapon utilization, and
    a whole-of-government approach to that has to be part of that
    equation.
        Senator Heinrich. A related question sort of harkening back
    to Senator King's mention of non-state actors. Do you have any
    comments about how some of the more recent nuclear breakout
    states, the Pakistans, Indias, fit into our overall doctrine of
    deterrence?
        Admiral Haney. I would just say that--interesting you would
    ask that question. I had a deterrence symposium last year, and
    I had a Pakistani individual associated with their program and
    he had breakfast with me. I asked him about his program, and he
    wanted to make sure he was clear to me it was not a program
    against us. However, I would just say it is very problematic,
    as we watch Pakistan modernize its capability. As we have
    stated before here, part of this is being able to prevent more
    development of nuclear weapons in the world and to contain that
    piece. So looking at the modernization programs that Pakistan
    has right now can be troubling as we look into the future and
    how the world could change.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Sort of moving back to slightly more mundane issues, there
    has always been a little bit of a--and I will direct this back
    to, General Klotz--a perpetual question about balancing
    workload between Lawrence Livermore and Los Alamos. There have
    been a number of occasions where something was developed in Los
    Alamos and then shifted over to Livermore for work balance. I
    am curious. I would like your thoughts on what the future holds
    for these two labs, as you see it, in terms of work balance.
        Mr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator.
        First of all, I think we need both labs.
        Senator Heinrich. For the record, I would agree.
        Mr. Klotz. Thank you, sir.
        One of the key things that has been a part of our whole
    enterprise for the past several decades is the fact that the
    labs conduct peer review with each other. Without getting into
    any of the details, there have been instances in the past
    where, quite frankly, one lab was able to see things in a very
    different way and come up with a slightly different solution.
    On the issue of the W88, which we talked about, and the need
    for CHE refresh, one lab did the primary work, and another lab
    checked their homework. That as very useful to us I think in
    our deliberations in the Nuclear Weapons Council that we had
    that verification.
        There is work the two labs do together that is very
    similar, and that is where we do a lot of the balancing of the
    work. But there are also some unique capabilities at each of
    the laboratories. Clearly, as I said earlier, Los Alamos is the
    center of excellence for plutonium science, chemistry, and
    operations. It also has facilities like DARHT, which are one of
    a kind. Lawrence Livermore in California has the National
    Ignition Facility, which is very, very important to us. Then,
    of course, Sandia in Albuquerque is the systems engineer for
    the entire enterprise. So I think we have got sort of the right
    mix there, and I think the balance is appropriate.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you very much.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Just to pursue one a little more. In South Korea, the
    President said nuclear ambitions in the United States and
    Russia--no. That is a different report.
        Here it is. He said as President I changed our nuclear
    posture to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in our
    National security strategy. I made it clear that the United
    States will not develop new nuclear warheads. So that is why we
    have just agreed to agree. We will not pursue new military
    missions for nuclear weapons. We have narrowed the range of
    contingencies under which we would ever use or threaten to use
    nuclear weapons. He said that at Hankuk University in South
    Korea, and it caused a lot of unease among our Korean allies,
    among others.
        Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller in Prague in
    December of last year said we have seen new and enduring
    pressures on the nonproliferation regime, pressures that
    threaten global stability. We are seeing nations turn away from
    cooperation, turn away from the common good of nonproliferation
    efforts, and cling ever more tightly to their nuclear arsenals.
    I think that is true.
        This is the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Global
    Trends 2030 that was produced in December 2012. ``Nuclear
    ambitions in the United States and Russia over the past 20
    years have evolved in opposite directions. Reducing the role of
    nuclear weapons in U.S. security is a U.S. objective, while
    Russia is pursuing new concepts and capabilities for expanding
    the role of nuclear weapons in its national security.''
        It goes on to say, ``other nuclear powers, such as Pakistan
    and potential aspirants, Iran and North Korea, desire nuclear
    weapons as compensation for other security weaknesses.'' So I
    think that is accurate.
        I asked former Secretary Kissinger at a hearing a few weeks
    ago about the negotiations with Iran, and he actually was
    alarmed. He thought our negotiation position had moved too far,
    that we are accepting too close an ability of Iran to have a
    nuclear weapon, noting that if we were down to 9 months, he
    explicitly said Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt he believed
    would develop or buy a nuclear weapon.
        So I do not know how we achieve nuclear stability around
    the world. We have had it pretty good for a long time. But if
    we have three or four Nations or five nations in the Middle
    East all with nuclear weapons, this is taking us in the wrong
    direction. It really is dangerous, and there would be a major
    expansion of the number of countries that would have nuclear
    weapons.
        So forgive me if I am a bit concerned that de-emphasizing
    our nuclear posture could have the perverse effect of lessening
    confidence or increasing the desire of other nations to expand
    theirs--well, I do not know that I will say any more about
    that.
        If any of you would like to comment on it, I would be--
    Secretary McKeon, you are the policy man. Maybe you would like
    to comment on it. But things are not going as well as we would
    like with regard to the risk of nuclear proliferation.
        Mr. McKeon. Senator, you have laid out a pretty complicated
    set of statements there. Let me try to address some of them.
        On the first one, in terms of the Koreans--Mr. Elliott may
    be able to add some flavor to this--we spend a lot of time
    worrying about extended deterrence and our commitments both in
    Europe and in Asia. In fact, Mr. Elliott just returned from
    some extended deterrence talks both with our Japanese and
    Korean partners that he does in concert with somebody on my
    staff, Elaine Bunn, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary. So
    he can speak to the current Korean frame of mind.
        I would agree with Under Secretary Gottemoeller that the
    nonproliferation system is under stress. We have an NPT review
    conference coming up next month where the system will be
    debated. In terms of the Middle East, there is no question. It
    is one of the reasons that the President is trying to prevent
    Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is the concerns among
    proliferation among its neighbors if they were to have a
    breakout capability, which is what these talks are about.
        Senator Sessions. Well, thank you.
        Do any of the others have any comments?
        [No response.]
        Then we will wrap it up. Thank you all. It was a very
    excellent panel. I appreciate the good work of what you are
    doing, and I think it has made a positive impact financially
    and to our national security.
        [Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                         supply chain management center
        1. Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, many small businesses in New
    Mexico are concerned about the NNSA's increasing the targets for M&O
    contractors to use enterprise-side purchasing agreement through the
    Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC). Small and disadvantaged
    businesses believe NNSA's and EM's use of enterprise-wide agreements
    tilts the playing field against them, resulting in lost business, lost
    jobs, reduced community involvement, and harm to the local communities'
    economies. Northern New Mexico is especially impacted given Los Alamos
    National Laboratory's massive size relative to the local economy. As
    use of the SCMC grows, M&O contractors will find it increasingly
    difficult to meet their contracting goals for small and disadvantaged
    businesses.
        What are NNSA and EM doing to ensure small disadvantaged businesses
    are notified of opportunities from SCMC and can successfully compete
    for enterprise-wide purchase agreements?
        General Klotz. Discounting Supply Chain Management Center (SCMC)
    agreements for travel and procurement/bank cards, where there are no
    opportunities for small businesses, 95 percent of SCMC agreement
    dollars are with small businesses. The SCMC works with the 24 NNSA and
    EM contractor locations that use its ePlatform tools and enterprise-
    wide agreements to identify opportunities to educate potential small
    business suppliers; individual companies contact SCMC directly to
    request assistance; and, SCMC attends DOE's Small Business Expos to
    provide demonstrations and information about SCMC, including its
    platforms and processes. Additionally, SCMC has an initiative and
    process to work with the DOE/NNSA contractors to identify potential
    local agreements that can be expanded to all SCMC user contractors in
    order to improve the financial impact to the local community. Enhancing
    that initiative, the SCMC has planned to launch a web site this month
    or in the very near future to provide a ``small business information
    exchange.'' Also, SCMC, in collaboration with Los Alamos National
    Laboratory (LANL), recently completed an initiative to address Northern
    New Mexico small business concerns by incorporating the LANL
    ``subcontractor's Regional and Community Development Plan,'' clause to
    its solicitations and agreements. Through SCMC agreements, small
    businesses are able to reach the many DOE/NNSA contractors at once,
    where previously they would have needed to compete for individual
    contracting opportunities.
                                 local spending
        2. Senator Heinrich. General Klotz, the NNSA's national
    laboratories and facilities play a vital role in my state's economy.
    However, in fiscal year 2014, Sandia National Laboratories' spending in
    New Mexico declined $58 million over fiscal year 2013 and LANL's New
    Mexico spending declined $63 million. Are there ways to strengthen the
    M&O contractors' annual performance management plans to ensure local
    businesses have an equal opportunity to compete for procurements?
        General Klotz. All NNSA management and operating contractors have
    commitments to local community development which are often manifested
    through subcontract awards to local businesses. Sandia National
    Laboratories and Los Alamos National Laboratory routinely spend well
    over half of their procurement dollars in New Mexico. Strategic
    Sourcing agreements issued by the NNSA M&O Supply Chain Management
    Center to Northern New Mexico small businesses are being used by
    additional NNSA contractors and four DOE contractors as well. These
    actions resulted in contractors spending $29 million in fiscal year
    2014, and thereby expanding the business base on a national scale.
    Additionally, the Supply Chain Management Center and Los Alamos
    National Laboratory have collaborated to incorporate LANL's requirement
    ` Subcontractor's Regional and Community Development Plan'' into SCMC
    solicitations; thus levelling the playing field for all suppliers and
    ensuring further commitment to community development within Northern
    New Mexico. Lastly, Los Alamos National Laboratory provides for a 5
    percent pricing preference for Northern New Mexico businesses.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, MARCH 25, 2015

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

                       BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:32 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
    Sullivan, Donnelly, and King.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Chairman Sessions. We just left an Armed Services Committee
    briefing with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, so some of our
    members are still there participating in that, but I wanted to
    go on and get started on this important hearing.
        Thank you for being with us. Thank you for the work you
    have been doing, which I think is smart and sound and on the
    right path, in general.
        Ten years ago, the United States began initial operations
    of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, our homeland
    missile capability. Today we enjoy a good measure of protection
    against limited ICBM threats, especially from rogue nations
    like North Korea or, potentially, Iran.
        In 2 years, we will increase that capacity from 30 to 44
    interceptors. I think that was a good step. In 5 years, we will
    enhance the GMD sensor network and begin to retrofit the
    ground-based interceptors with a high-performance, Redesigned
    Kill Vehicle. Also, I believe it will be successful, and I
    believe that will be a major step forward.
        Within 10 years, the plan is, in the words of Admiral
    Syring, to ``revolutionize our missile defense architecture''
    by placing several kill vehicles atop each GBI, increasing the
    number of lethal objects that can be intercepted with a single
    GBI.
        So the important question is whether Admiral Syring has
    sufficient funding, because the threat continues to grow. As it
    has evolved from the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
    to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to today's
    Missile Defense Agency, the men and women who design, develop,
    and deploy our homeland and regional missile defenses deserve
    the thanks of the Nation.
        I know that we are working hard to make sure that THAAD is
    alert and with good morale and excellent leadership.
        Admiral Syring, in particular, deserves credit for his
    recommendation to modernize the entire GMD system, including
    the interceptors, the sensors, and ground components,
    especially with the financial constraints we are under. In
    fact, this year's 5-year spending plan for MDA is about $6
    billion below the spending projection provided several years
    ago.
        A recent memo to the Secretary of Defense from the chief of
    Naval Operations and chief of staff warns that ``ballistic
    missile threats are increasingly capable, continue to outpace
    our active defense systems, and exceed our Services' capacity
    to meet combatant commanders' demand.''
        Two Service Chiefs call for long-term BMD strategy that
    addresses homeland and regional missile defense from a more
    holistic approach, including nonkinetic means.
        Perhaps General Mann can explain what prompted this appeal,
    and Mr. McKeon can shed light on the Secretary's views on it.
    The memo does raise an important point, which is, what is the
    future of ballistic missile defense?
        The MDA has been so focused on deploying our current
    missile defense capabilities that it has had little time or
    funding available to think about the next generation of missile
    defense capabilities that will be necessary to address the
    growing threat, although I know all of you have given thought
    to that.
        As Deputy Secretary Work recently noted, we need to come up
    with other ideas to defeat this threat. I think that is a good
    challenge to all of us.
        While MDA does have an advanced technology component, it is
    too limited, in my view, and what it can hope to accomplish
    over the next 10 years is important. Perhaps what is needed is
    a new Strategic Defense Initiative.
        So I turn to our ranking member for his opening remarks,
    and look forward to hearing from our excellent witnesses.
        Without objection, all statements will be entered into the
    record.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    Senator Sessions for holding this hearing.
        Let me also thank our witnesses for testifying. We very
    much appreciate the time you took to prepare for today's
    hearing and for the work you do for our country.
        Protecting our country and our forward-deployed troops
    around the world is of utmost importance. I am pleased we have
    begun to get our missile defense systems on track so they
    perform reliably and effectively. We should continue to improve
    our sensor and discrimination capabilities, so we have a better
    picture of the threats.
        We need to continue to conduct smart simulation and testing
    before we commit to buying new technologies. Fly before you buy
    has been a tough lesson learned in these programs.
        While we continue to improve our homeland defense systems,
    we should not take our eyes off the ball when it comes to
    protecting our deployed troops and reassuring our allies and
    partners. The demand from our combatant commanders for Aegis
    ships, for THAAD, and for Patriot batteries remains high. We
    need to consider how we can best allocate these systems and
    effectively train the warfighters who will operate them to
    provide the protection that is needed in today's budget-
    constrained environment.
        Finally, I would be remiss if I didn't note the great
    relationship between MDA and my constituents at Purdue in West
    Lafayette. You have formed a great partnership that I think
    adds tremendous value to our Nation, and I know that the
    Boilermakers are glad to support MDA's mission.
        Thank you again for coming today, and I look forward to the
    dialogue.
        Chairman Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        We will have 6-minute rounds, and maybe we can start right
    off.
        Senator King, do you have an opening statement?
        Senator King. No, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Oh, from the witnesses. Well, we would
    like to hear your opening statements.
        Mr. Secretary, would you like to start first?

        STATEMENT HON. BRIAN P. McKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
         SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. McKeon. I would be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Pardon me for getting ahead of myself.
        Mr. McKeon. No worries.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Donnelly, Senator King, thank you for
    the opportunity to be here today to testify on the fiscal year
    2016 budget request for missile defense, which we regard as a
    critical national security priority. We are grateful for your
    attention to and support of this critical mission of defending
    our Homeland, our partners and allies, and deployed forces.
        The President's budget requests $9.6 billion in fiscal year
    2016, of which $8.1 billion is for the Missile Defense Agency
    to develop and deploy missile defense capabilities that protect
    the U.S. Homeland and strengthen regional missile defenses.
        Sequestration levels would, of course, be significantly
    lower and, as Secretary Carter has said, would make the Nation
    less secure. Even without sequestration, however, in these
    austere times, there is not enough money to fund every program
    that we might wish to have. We are required to prioritize
    investments accordingly.
        As members of this subcommittee, you are well aware of the
    ballistic missile threats and trends. I will focus on several
    key policy priorities for addressing these threats: defending
    the United States against limited long-range ballistic missile
    attacks, strengthening defense against regional missile
    threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and
    examining how to advance the missile defense technology base in
    a cost-effective manner.
        The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential
    ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure
    that we stay ahead of the threat, we are continuing to
    strengthen our homeland defense posture and invest in
    technologies to better enable us to address emerging threats in
    the next decade. This requires continued improvement to the
    Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, including enhanced
    performance of the ground-based interceptor and deployment of
    new sensors.
        As you noted, Mr. Chairman, we are planning to deploy 14
    additional interceptors in Alaska. We are on track to do that
    by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30
    currently deployed, will provide protection against both North
    Korean and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve.
        We have also deployed a second forward base missile defense
    radar in Japan that is operating today thanks to the hard work
    of MDA and the Japanese Government. This radar strengthens both
    our homeland and regional defenses.
        This year's budget request also reflects the department's
    commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us
    toward a more reliable and effective defense of the United
    States. It includes funding for development of a new radar
    that, when deployed in Alaska, will provide persistent sensor
    coverage and improve our discrimination capabilities against
    North Korea. It also continues funding for the redesign of the
    kill vehicle for the ground-based interceptor.
        As directed by the Congress, the MDA is also conducting
    environmental impact studies at four sites in the Eastern part
    of the United States that could host an additional GBI missile
    field. These will be completed next year.
        The cost of building an additional missile defense site in
    the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from
    Iran has not yet emerged and the need to fix the current GBI
    kill vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the
    homeland are improving the reliability and effectiveness of the
    GBI and improving the GMD sensor architecture.
        The current GMD system provides coverage of the entire
    United States from North Korean and potential Iranian ICBMs,
    and no decision has been made to deploy an additional missile
    field in the United States.
        Our request also continues to implement deployment of
    missile defenses tailored to security circumstances in Europe,
    the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. Our focus is on
    developing and fielding missile defense capabilities that are
    mobile and relocatable, which allow us to address crises as
    they emerge.
        We also encourage our allies and partners to acquire
    missile defense capabilities and to strengthen operational
    missile defense cooperation.
        This year, we initiated a Joint staff-led effort to update
    the 2012 Joint Capabilities Mix study to ensure we are making
    the most effective regional missile defense investments
    possible. In a regional context, we know we will not be able to
    purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense
    for the duration of a conflict.
        In such a situation, we must protect our most valuable
    assets, while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide
    a comprehensive approach to defeating the threat from ballistic
    missiles.
        We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that
    our investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of
    addressing the most dangerous threats we confront today while
    positioning us to respond to threat developments in the next
    decade. Our budget contains various technology investments in
    that regard.
        In conclusion, the austere budget environment will continue
    to compel us to make difficult choices. Sequestration would
    undermine our ability to improve the GBI fleet, place new and
    advanced sensors, and defend our deployed forces and allies
    against ballistic missile attack.
        Quite simply, it would hinder our ability to keep up with
    the growing threat. We believe we cannot let our guard down,
    much less in the current security environment, so we urge you
    to focus on repealing sequestration, and we would ask you to
    fund our request for missile defense.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]

                          Prepared Statement of McKeon
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the Fiscal
    Year 2016 Budget Request for missile defense, a critical national
    security priority. I am grateful for your consistent attention to and
    continuing support of the critical mission of defending our homeland,
    our partners and Allies, and deployed forces from a growing ballistic
    missile threat.
        Let me offer my assessment of how the programs and fiscal year 2016
    budget request for the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) ensure we are
    sustaining and modernizing our homeland missile defense capability so
    that we remain ahead of the threat while providing effective,
    integrated, and interoperable regional ballistic missile defense (BMD)
    capability. The President's budget requests $9.6 billion in fiscal year
    2016, of which $8.1 billion is for the MDA to develop and deploy
    missile defense capabilities that protect the U.S. homeland and
    strengthen regional missile defenses. Sequestration levels would, of
    course, be significantly lower and as Secretary Carter has said, would
    make the nation less secure. Even without sequestration, however, in
    these austere times, there is still not enough money to fund every
    program we might wish to have, and we are required to prioritize
    investments accordingly.
        I will begin with a discussion of ballistic missile threats and
    other trends, and then focus on several key policy priorities:
    defending the United States against limited long-range ballistic
    missile attacks, strengthening defense against regional missile
    threats, fostering defense cooperation with partners, and examining how
    to advance the missile defense technology base in a cost-effective
    manner.
                           ballistic missile threats
        Ballistic missiles continue to become more survivable, reliable,
    and accurate at greater ranges, and regional powers are basing more
    missiles on mobile platforms. Technical and operational measures to
    defeat missile defenses are also increasing. Several countries are
    designing missiles to launch from multiple transporters against a broad
    array of targets, enhancing their mobility and capacity for salvo
    fires, which increases their effectiveness on the battlefield. Shorter
    launch time preparations are making newer systems more survivable.
    Iran
        Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
    Middle East, and today can strike targets throughout the region and
    into Eastern Europe. In addition to its growing missile inventories,
    Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing
    systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs. Iran is
    developing an anti-ship ballistic missile which could threaten maritime
    activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuz. While Iran
    has not yet deployed an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), its
    progress on space launch vehicles--along with its desire to deter the
    United States and its allies--provides Tehran with the means and
    motivation to develop longer-range missiles, including an ICBM. Iran
    publicly stated that it intends to launch a space-launch vehicle as
    early as this year capable of intercontinental ranges, if configured as
    such.
    North Korea
        North Korea's weapons and missile programs pose a serious threat to
    the United States and to East Asia. North Korea has conducted three
    nuclear tests. It is also seeking to develop longer-range ballistic
    missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States,
    and continues efforts to bring its KN08 road mobile ICBM to operational
    capacity. While the reliability of an untested North Korean ICBM is
    likely to be very low, North Korea has used its Taepo-Dong-2 launch
    vehicle to put a satellite in orbit, thus successfully demonstrating
    technologies applicable to a long-range missile.
        North Korea's efforts to produce and market ballistic missiles
    raise broader regional and global security concerns, by threatening the
    United States' allies and partners and increasing our concerns about
    ballistic missile technology proliferation.
    Syria
        While Syria does not pose a ballistic missile threat to the U.S.
    homeland, the Assad regime does possess short-range ballistic missiles,
    and has shown a willingness to use them repeatedly against its own
    people. Syria has several hundred short-range ballistic missiles, all
    of which are mobile and can reach much of Israel and large portions of
    Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey from launch sites well within the country.
    Other Trends
        In the regional ballistic missile context, one trend that
    particularly concerns the United States is China's development of
    advanced ballistic missiles. China is augmenting the over 1,200
    conventional short-range ballistic missiles with a limited but growing
    number of conventionally armed, medium- and intermediate range
    ballistic missiles that will improve China's ability to strike regional
    targets at greater ranges. China also continues to deploy growing
    numbers of anti-ship ballistic missiles.
        Russia's recent behavior currently poses one of our most pressing
    and evolving strategic challenges--challenges felt across the strategic
    forces mission space. We are confronted with Russia's occupation of
    Crimea, continuing Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine, Russia's
    increasingly aggressive nuclear posturing and threats, including the
    prospect of nuclear weapons in Crimea, and its violation of the
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
    Homeland Defense
        The U.S. homeland is currently protected against potential ICBM
    attacks from states like North Korea and Iran. To ensure that we stay
    ahead of the threat, we are continuing to strengthen our homeland
    defense posture and invest in technologies to better enable us to
    address emerging threats in the next decade. This requires continued
    improvement to the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system,
    including enhanced performance of the Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI)
    and the deployment of new sensors.
        We remain on track to deploy 14 additional interceptors in Alaska
    by the end of 2017. These interceptors, along with the 30 that are
    currently deployed, will provide protection against both North Korean
    and Iranian ICBM threats as they emerge and evolve. We have also
    deployed a second forward-based missile defense radar to Japan, which
    is operating today thanks to the hard work of the MDA and the Japanese
    government, to meet our goal of having the radar deployed by the end of
    2014. This radar strengthens both homeland and regional defense.
        This year's budget request also reflects Department of Defense's
    (DOD's) commitment to modernizing the GMD system. It will move us
    towards a more reliable and effective defense of the United States. It
    includes funding for development of a new radar that, when deployed in
    Alaska, will provide persistent sensor coverage and improve
    discrimination capabilities against North Korea. It also continues
    funding for the redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-Based
    Interceptor. Although we have fixed the causes of past failures in the
    GBI related to the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the redesigned kill
    vehicle will have greater performance and discrimination capability.
        As directed by Congress, the MDA is also conducting environmental
    impact studies (EIS) at four sites in the eastern United States that
    could host an additional GBI missile field. These EISs will be
    completed in 2016. The cost of building an additional missile defense
    site in the United States is very high. Given that the ICBM threat from
    Iran has not yet emerged, and the need to fix the current GBI kill
    vehicles, the highest priorities for the protection of the homeland are
    improving the reliability and effectiveness of the GBI and improving
    the GMD sensor architecture. The current GMD system provides coverage
    of the entire United States from North Korean and potential Iranian
    ICBMs. No decision has been made to deploy an additional missile field
    in the United States. If an ICBM threat were to emerge in numbers that
    necessitated the deployment of additional interceptors, the steps being
    taken now, to include conducting an environmental impact statement,
    will shorten the construction timelines associated with deployment of a
    new missile defense site.
                                regional defense
        The Department's fiscal year 2016 budget request also continues to
    implement deployment of missile defenses that are tailored to the
    security circumstances in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific.
    Our focus is on developing and fielding missile defense capabilities
    that are mobile and relocatable, which allows us to address crises as
    they emerge. We are also encouraging our allies and partners to acquire
    missile defense capabilities, and to strengthen operational missile
    defense cooperation. This year, we initiated a Joint Staff-led effort
    to update the 2012 Joint Capabilities Mix study to ensure that we are
    making the most effective regional missile defense investments
    possible. In a regional context, we know that we will not be able to
    purchase enough interceptors to rely purely on missile defense for the
    duration of a conflict. In such a situation, we must protect our most
    valuable assets while also drawing on our other capabilities to provide
    a comprehensive military approach to defeating the threat from
    ballistic missiles.
    Europe
        We are continuing to implement the European Phased Adaptive
    Approach (EPAA), and we are working in close collaboration with our
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies to develop an advanced
    network of sensors and interceptors--on land and at sea--to protect
    NATO European territory, our military forces, and facilities. Since
    2011, the United States has operated a forward-based radar in Turkey
    and maintained a sea-based missile defense presence in Europe. The
    Aegis Ashore site in Romania is on schedule to be completed by the end
    of 2015. Two additional U.S. Aegis BMD destroyers, the USS Carney and
    USS Porter, will be joining USS Donald Cook and USS Ross later this
    year as they forward deploy to the naval facility at Rota, Spain. These
    multi-mission ships will support the missile defense mission, as well
    as other U.S. European Command and NATO maritime missions.
        The President's budget request also supports the Aegis Ashore site
    that will be deployed in Poland in the 2018 timeframe and the
    development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor that will be deployed on
    land and at sea later this decade. As these capabilities become
    operationally available, they will extend BMD coverage to all NATO
    European territory.
        Our NATO Allies are also making significant contributions to the
    European missile defense mission. Romania, Spain, and Turkey are
    hosting U.S. missile defense assets and provide the external security
    for the facilities. Beyond hosting the second Aegis Ashore site in
    Europe, Poland has also announced its intention to spend up to $10
    billion to acquire advanced air and missile defense capabilities. DOD
    is engaging directly with Poland to assist it obtaining a lower-tier
    missile defense system to meet its missile defense requirements. The
    U.S. Patriot system is a finalist in this competition. Several other
    Allies are in the process of considering the purchase of air and
    missile defense capabilities. The United States will continue to
    encourage its NATO Allies to do more to cooperate and invest in missile
    defenses that will contribute to Alliance security.
        Several Allies have modern surface combatant ships that could be
    equipped with BMD sensor or interceptor capability upgrades. The
    Netherlands and Denmark have committed to upgrading the SMART-L radars
    on their frigates to contribute to NATO BMD.
        The Netherlands and Germany have committed Patriot PAC-3 systems to
    NATO missile defense as demonstrated through the ongoing NATO
    deployment in defense of Turkey. Spain recently replaced the
    Netherlands in the defense of the Turkey mission through deployment of
    a Patriot system, and is strengthening its air and missile defense
    capabilities by acquiring additional Patriot systems from Germany.
        France is planning to provide its Spirale satellite detection
    system and a long-range radar for NATO territorial missile defense and
    has offered the SAMP/T air and missile defense system, which became
    operational in 2013, to NATO BMD.
        The United States conducts exercises designed to hone our Alliance
    missile defense capabilities and integration. U.S. European Command
    (USEUCOM) is engaged with NATO in the development of a biennial NATO-
    led BMD exercise event that serves to reinforce and expand upon other,
    routine BMD training evolutions that take place on a quarterly and
    semi-annual basis.
        Many NATO Allies also participate in NIMBLE TITAN, an unclassified,
    two-year, multinational, BMD campaign of experimentation. The
    overarching purpose of NIMBLE TITAN is to serve as a venue for
    collaboration, exchange of views, and coordination of BMD policy and
    operational development among participating nations and organizations,
    along with U.S. government agencies and military organizations. The
    NIBLE TITAN 16 campaign, which began last year, has 25 participating
    nations and organizations, including NATO.
    Asia-Pacific
        In the Asia-Pacific region, our force posture includes Aegis BMD
    capable ships, along with Patriot batteries deployed in Japan and South
    Korea. We have also maintained the THAAD battery deployment to Guam in
    response to North Korean provocation.
        The cornerstone of our security and diplomacy in the region has
    been our strong bilateral alliances, including with South Korea, Japan,
    and Australia. All three of these nations play an important role in our
    regional efforts to achieve effective missile defense.
        South Korea obviously has an immediate, proximate stake in
    preventing missile strikes from North Korea. We have worked closely
    with South Korea to ensure that our Alliance maintains the capacity to
    do just that. The United States deploys Patriot PAC-3 batteries in
    South Korea to defend U.S. and South Korean forces. In addition, South
    Korea is taking steps to enhance its own air and missile defense
    systems, which include sea- and land-based sensors and Patriot PAC-2
    batteries. DOD has been consulting with South Korea about how it can
    upgrade its missile defense capabilities as part of an Alliance
    response to the growing North Korean missile threat.
        Japan has its own layered missile defense system, which includes
    Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile-3 interceptors, PAC-3 batteries,
    early-warning radars, and sophisticated command-and-control systems.
    Japan is upgrading two ATAGO-class Aegis destroyers to BMD capability
    with certification scheduled for fiscal year 2018 and fiscal year 2019,
    and plans to build two additional Aegis BMD ships, which would increase
    its inventory to a total of eight BMD-capable ships. As mentioned
    earlier, Japan also hosts two U.S. missile defense radars.
        Additionally, Japan is a critical international partner for BMD
    development. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-
    development of an advanced version of the SM-3 interceptor, the SM-3
    Block IIA.
        The United States and Australia have forged a longstanding
    partnership on missile defense research and development--most notably
    with regard to sensors. In addition, Australia is involved in a
    trilateral discussion on missile defense in the Pacific involving the
    United States, Australia, and Japan.
        We will continue to emphasize the importance of developing a
    regional ballistic missile defense system that includes the sharing of
    sensor data among Allies to take full advantage of the benefits of
    system interoperability and integration.
    Middle East
        We also maintain a robust missile defense presence in the Middle
    East including land- and sea-based assets deployed in defense of our
    forward deployed forces, allies, and partners. This is in addition to
    our efforts to build the capacity of those allies and partners that
    will ultimately contribute to their ability to defend themselves.
        The United States maintains a strong defense relationship with
    Israel, and our cooperation on missile defense has resulted in a
    comprehensive missile defense architecture. Israeli programs such as
    Iron Dome, the David's Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon
    System, in conjunction with operational cooperation with the United
    States, create a multi-layered architecture designed to protect the
    Israeli people from varying types of missile threats. Missile defense
    figured prominently in the AUSTERE CHALLENGE exercise we conducted with
    Israel in the fall of 2012, the largest U.S.-Israeli military exercise
    in history. A similar exercise, JUNIPER COBRA, is scheduled to take
    place in May of this year.
        The United States is also working with a number of Gulf Cooperation
    Council (GCC) countries on missile defense, including supporting the
    purchase of missile defense systems through the Foreign Military Sales
    program. The United Arab Emirates is procuring the Terminal High
    Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, with the first delivery expected
    later this year. This is in addition to the UAE's earlier purchase of
    Patriot systems, which have been delivered. Saudi Arabia is in the
    process of upgrading its existing Patriot PAC-2 batteries to the PAC-3
    configuration. Kuwait is also purchasing Patriot PAC-3 batteries. Qatar
    also joined the international community of U.S. Patriot partners late
    last year--a community which also includes Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in
    addition to the UAE.
        U.S. Air Force Central Command maintains a series of regular
    exchanges between United States and GCC air defense officers at the
    Combined Air Operations Center located at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar.
    These exchanges provide an opportunity for increased situational
    awareness of missile threats in the region as well as the potential for
    future BMD planning and operational cooperation.
        As the GCC states begin to field more capable systems, the United
    States and its Gulf partners must work toward greater integration of
    those capabilities across the region. The desired end state is a
    regional missile defense architecture in which GCC member states
    participate and contribute to the extent practical, leading to a
    networked, layered defense of key strategic centers that strengthens
    deterrence and increases our collective ability to defeat a ballistic
    missile attack.
    Technology Development
        We must continue to look ahead. This means ensuring that our
    investment strategy and priorities balance the needs of addressing the
    most dangerous threats we confront today while positioning us to
    respond to threat developments in the next decade. Areas for priority
    technology investment include persistent discrimination in the current
    and future Ballistic Missile Defense System sensor architecture; high
    power lasers for multiple BMD applications; common kill vehicle
    technology leading to a multi-object kill vehicle; advanced technology
    for high risk/high pay-off breakthroughs; and a rail gun to lower the
    cost per kill.
    Conclusion
        The austere budget environment will continue to compel us to make
    difficult choices here. Sequestration would undermine our ability to
    improve the GBI fleet, emplace new and more advanced sensors, and
    defend our deployed forces and Allies against ballistic missile attack.
    Quite simply, it would hinder our ability to keep up with the growing
    threat. We cannot let our guard down at any time, much less in the
    current security environment. I urge you to repeal sequestration before
    it causes irreparable damage to the nation's missile defenses.
        Thank you for having me here today, and I look forward to your
    questions.

        Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
        Admiral Syring?

       STATEMENT OF VICE ADMIRAL JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR,
              MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Admiral Syring. Thank you, Chairman Sessions, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, Senator King, Senator Fischer. I appreciate
    the opportunity to testify today in front of you. I will be
    very brief in my opening statement.
        Our budget request for fiscal year 2016 maintains the
    commitment to operate and sustain our homeland defenses,
    including the planned deployment of 44 GBIs by the end of 2017
    and GBI fleet reliability enhancements. As was noted, we will
    also continue development of the Redesigned Kill Vehicle for
    improved reliability, availability, performance, and
    producibility, with initial deployment after successful testing
    planned in 2020.
        We anticipate contract award for the long-range
    discrimination radar development, deployment, and initial
    operation before the end of 2015 with fielding by 2020.
        For regional missile defense, our 2016 budget request
    supports the continued procurement of the SM-3 IB and THAAD
    interceptors. Also, the Aegis Ashore site in Romania will be
    completed by the end of 2015, and we are on track to deploy
    Aegis Ashore Poland by the end of 2018.
        Finally, will continue our discrimination sensor, weapons
    technology, directed energy, Common Kill Vehicle, and other
    technology maturation initiatives at an increased rate in this
    budget request. These investments will help us deploy a future
    BMDS architecture more capable of discriminating and killing
    reentry vehicles with a high degree of confidence.
        Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, this is a sound
    budget request. I believe our Nation is well-defended and that
    our missile defense programs are on track to improve protection
    for our deployed forces, allies, and friends with the support
    of this budget.
        Thank you, sir, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Syring follows:]

              Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral J.D. Syring, USN
        Good afternoon, Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this
    opportunity to testify before you today. Our current budget request of
    $8.127 billion for fiscal year (FY) 2016 will continue the development
    of defenses for our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international
    partners against increasingly capable ballistic missiles. The fiscal
    year 2016 missile defense program will continue to support the
    warfighter and needs of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) with the
    development and deployment of interceptors, sensors, and the command,
    control, battle management and communications (C2BMC) system for the
    integrated Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). Our request for
    fiscal year 2016 will improve and expand homeland and regional missile
    defenses and invest in advanced technology development and future
    capabilities to counter the increasingly complex threat.
                            ballistic missile threat
        The threat continues to grow as our potential adversaries acquire a
    greater number of ballistic missiles, increasing their range,
    incorporating BMD countermeasures, and making them more complex,
    survivable, reliable, and accurate. Space-launch activities involve
    multistage systems that further the development of technologies for
    intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). In addition to the Taepo
    Dong 2 space launch vehicle/ICBM, North Korea is developing and has
    paraded the KN08 road-mobile ICBM and an intermediate-range ballistic
    missile (IRBM) capable of North Korea conducted multiple short- and
    medium-range ballistic missile launches and threatened to conduct
    additional longer-range launches. Today it fields hundreds of Scud and
    No Dong missiles that can reach U.S. forces forward deployed to the
    Republic of Korea and Japan.
        Iran has publicly stated it intends to launch a space launch
    vehicle as early as this year (2015) that could be capable of
    intercontinental ballistic missile ranges if configured as such. Iran
    also has steadily increased its ballistic missile force, deploying
    next-generation short- and medium-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs and
    MRBMs) with increasing accuracy and new submunition payloads. Tehran's
    overall defense strategy relies on a substantial inventory of theater
    ballistic missiles capable of striking targets in southeastern Europe.
    Iran continues to develop more sophisticated missiles and improve the
    range and accuracy of current missile systems, and it has publicly
    demonstrated the ability to launch simultaneous salvos of multiple
    rockets and missiles. Demonstrating it is capable of modifying
    currently deployed ballistic missile systems, Iran has flight-tested a
    Fateh-110 ballistic missile in an anti-ship role. By adding a seeker to
    improve the missile's accuracy against sea-based targets, Iran could
    threaten maritime activity throughout the Persian Gulf and Strait of
    Hormuz.
                           support for the warfighter
        Our overriding goal is to support the warfighter, which includes
    delivering greater missile defense capability and capacity. With this
    budget we will maintain our commitment to build out homeland defenses
    to 44 Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs) by the end of 2017. We also will
    maintain our commitment to deploy Phases 2 and 3 of the deployment of
    Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB missiles and SM-3 Block IIAs (first
    available in 2018) on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites in Romania (2015)
    and Poland (2018). We currently have 33 Aegis BMD ships, on the way to
    35 by the end of fiscal year 2016. We are continuing efforts to improve
    the performance of the Aegis Weapons System and plan to procure a total
    of 209 SM-3 Block IBs by the end of fiscal year 2016. We announced a
    Technical Capability Declaration this past December for the second
    forward-based X-band AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan, which improves homeland
    and regional defense capabilities and increases our global operational
    AN/TPY-2 radar posture. By the end of fiscal year 2016, MDA is
    scheduled to deliver 48 additional Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
    (THAAD) interceptors, for a total of 155 interceptors fielded, and we
    are continuing our support of the operational Guam THAAD battery.
        Last year we conducted or participated in several multi-event
    exercises and wargames, which are critically important to the
    warfighter and the intensive engineering efforts across the Agency. In
    response to the continued fielding by U.S. adversaries of air, missile,
    and rocket capabilities, as Technical Authority for Integrated Air and
    Missile Defense (IAMD), MDA is leading the integration of evolving MDA,
    Service, and COCOM command and control capabilities through systems
    engineering analysis and development of technical integration
    requirements and interface control documents. Other IAMD initiatives
    include integrating C2BMC with the Army's Integrated Battlefield
    Control System (IBCS) to exchange ballistic missile data and exploring
    THAAD integration within the IBCS Army architecture.
        (DOT&E), independent testers, and the Services to develop an
    Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) to execute a robust, cost-effective
    flight test program that features operationally realistic conditions
    and integrates U.S. government stakeholders--to include Soldiers,
    Sailors, Airmen, and Marines--and allies to prove BMD capabilities. We
    have entered a period of unprecedented testing complexity and increased
    testing tempo. Our flight tests will involve increasingly stressful
    threat representative targets as well as longer range interceptors for
    our homeland and regional capabilities. From October 2013 to the
    present, we have executed seven high profile flight tests. In fiscal
    year 2015 we will conduct 12 flight tests, and in fiscal year 2016
    seven flight tests.
                                homeland defense
        MDA remains committed to operating, sustaining, and expanding our
    nation's homeland missile defenses and requests $1.76 billion for the
    Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, or $613 million over our
    PB 2015 request. This budget request will allow us to grow the number
    of currently deployed Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet to 44 by the
    end of 2017, continue flight and system ground testing, continue
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) development, enhance the Stockpile
    Reliability Program, modify the current booster to increase
    survivability and hardness to support RKV integration and expand the
    battle space to enable later GBI engagements, upgrade the GMD ground
    system, and deploy upgraded GMD fire control software to enhance our
    ability to use land-based sensor discrimination data.
        The successful FTG-06b intercept test this past June allowed us to
    assess the performance and interoperability of homeland defense weapon
    systems, including BMD ship acquired an Intermediate Range Ballistic
    Missile (IRBM) target and forwarded the track through C2BMC to the GMD
    fire control system, which developed a weapon task plan that the
    warfighter used to launch a GBI. The SBX acquired the target objects
    and forwarded precision tracks with discrimination data through the GMD
    ground system to the in-flight GBI. The interceptor used SBX data to
    locate the target objects, complete discrimination, and successfully
    intercept the target. Our analysis indicates that all components of the
    system performed as designed. This was the first flight test of an
    operationally configured GBI that demonstrated the ability to correctly
    discriminate and intercept the reentry vehicle in the presence of
    countermeasures. FTG-06b also demonstrated that a Capability
    Enhancement-II (CE-II) exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) with a
    cradled Inertial Measurement Unit dampens the vibration environments
    experienced during the failure of the FTG-06a flight test conducted in
    December 2010. With this successful flight test we were able to resume
    production of eight planned GBIs in the proven FTG-06b configuration.
        We are implementing several fixes to address the failed FTG-07
    flight test in July 2013. While the GBI was in flight, a voltage shift
    caused by battery electrolyte leakage shut down the flight computer and
    prevented EKV separation. We developed EKV software for CE-I GBIs,
    which includes a capability to reset and recover the flight computer
    following a voltage shift. This software was fully tested and is now
    fielded to all deployed CE-Is. New battery and ground ties, once
    tested, will be incorporated in the CE-II Block 1 deliveries beginning
    in fiscal year 2016.
        The next flight test of the GMD system will take place late this
    year. GM CTV -02+ is a non-intercept test of a CE-II GBI to demonstrate
    the performance of alternate divert thrusters in a flight environment
    and test end-to-end discrimination of a complex target scene through
    the GMD fire control loop. The EKV will use Aegis BMD SPY-1, SBX, and
    AN/TPY-2 data for target selection. Data collected from this test will
    be used to evaluate Discrimination Improvements for Homeland Defense
    (DIHD) objectives. At the end of calendar year 2016 we plan to conduct
    FTG-15, which will be the first intercept flight test for the CE-II
    Block 1 GBI and the first intercept of an ICBM range target. Following
    a successful intercept, the plan is to deliver 10 CE-II Block 1 GBIs
    over the next year to achieve our goal of 44 GBIs by the end of 2017.
        In addition to increasing the operational fleet from 30 to 44 GBIs
    by 2017, MDA will complete the refurbishment and reactivation of
    Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely by 2016 to provide sufficient silos for
    44 GBIs. We will deliver eight new CE-IIs in 2015, upgrade eight
    currently fielded CE-IIs in 2016, and deliver 10 new CE-II Block 1 GBIs
    in 2017. Four previously fielded CE-II GBIs will be used for flight and
    Stockpile Reliability testing.
        MDA completed a GBI Fleet Assessment last year that pointed out the
    need for improvements in reliability of the EKV, GBI, and ground
    systems, and we will continue to implement its findings in fiscal year
    2015 and beyond. We have introduced an enhanced Stockpile Reliability
    program to better understand the service life and reliability of the
    fielded fleet and are conducting design and reliability analysis on the
    fielded CE-IIs and booster to establish performance margins. We are
    analyzing the GBIs to identify potential failures modes and reliability
    risks so that we can conduct the right ground development of the next
    GBI with a Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
        We will continue development of a Redesigned Kill Vehicle (RKV) for
    initial deployment in 2020. The RKV will be a modular design using
    mature subassemblies and components to improve reliability,
    maintainability, producibility, and affordability when compared to the
    current EKV. The program will perform full qualification and
    reliability testing of components and subassemblies. The RKV will
    incorporate performance enhancements in target acquisition and
    discrimination and include on-demand communications. On-demand
    communications enables better use of off-board sensor data and provides
    improved situation awareness for the warfighter. The RKV also will
    include survivability enhancements. The first flight test of the RKV is
    planned for 2018, and the first intercept test is planned for 2019. We
    will acquire two additional boosters beginning in fiscal year 2016 to
    support RKV flight tests.
        This year we will finish construction of the GBI In-Flight
    Interceptor Communication System (IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort
    Drum, New York. The east coast IDT will enable communication with GBIs
    launched from Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in
    California over longer distances and improve defenses for the eastern
    United States.
        MDA will implement upgrades to the GMD ground system to improve
    reliability, maintainability, and eliminate obsolescence problems. The
    existing GMD ground system was built in 2004 using technology developed
    in the 1990s. Without an upgrade, the ground system reliability would
    decay and impact GBI availability to the warfighter. Phase I will
    upgrade the GBI command launch equipment, GMD fire control Phase II
    upgrades the GMD communications network and launch systems equipment
    and modifies the IFICS data terminal to support on-demand
    communications with the RKV by 2020.
        Working with our Japanese partners, we completed the deployment of
    the AN/TPY-2 radar in Kyogamisaki in southern Japan to complement the
    radar currently operating in Shariki in northern Japan. This radar and
    a new C2BMC capability will enhance the overall performance of the
    Kyogamisaki and Shariki radars when operating in a mutually supporting
    AN/TPY-2 dual radar mode. We made a Technical Capability Declaration
    for the Kyogamisaki radar this past December. Together with the Shariki
    AN/TPY-2 radar in the north, the new radar will enhance the ability to
    defend our forward deployed forces, Japan, and the U.S. homeland from
    ballistic missile attack by providing improved tracking coverage for
    launches out of North Korea.
        We will continue missile defense upgrades of the Early Warning
    Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape Cod, Massachusetts. We expect to
    complete the Clear radar upgrade in 2017 and the Cape Cod upgrade in
    2018. In fiscal year 2016 we will continue to support flight testing
    with the SBX to demonstrate improvements to discrimination and debris
    mitigation. Our budget request of $72.9 million for SBX includes funds
    for improving reaction time and conducting contingency operations for
    defense of the homeland. We also plan to support a near-term
    discrimination capability in 2016 and fielding near-term discrimination
    improvements for homeland defense in 2020 to enhance the tracking and
    discrimination capabilities of currently deployed sensors.
        Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), the new midcourse tracking radar
    that will provide persistent coverage and improve discrimination
    capabilities against threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater.
    LRDR will provide larger hit assessment coverage enabling improved
    warfighting capability to manage GBI inventory and improving the
    capacity of the BMDS. We have completed technical trade studies and
    defined requirements for the LRDR and started acquisition planning and
    pre-construction activities. MDA has released a Request for Proposal
    (RFP) for the development, deployment, and initial operation of the
    LRDR. We anticipate contract award before the end of fiscal year 2015.
    In fiscal year 2016 we plan to conduct a System Requirement Review and
    Preliminary Design Review. MDA worked closely with Air Force Space
    Command to verify LRDR's inherent capabilities to support the space
    situational awareness (SSA) mission. The Command is jointly exploring
    system design and operations alternatives to maximize the exploitation
    of LRDR's inherent SSA capabilities. Air Force Space Command envisions
    using LRDR to augment the Space Surveillance Network capabilities as a
    secondary mission if it proves viable.
        A Continental United States (CONUS) Interceptor Site (CIS) study,
    conducted in accordance with Section 227 of the fiscal year 2013
    National Defense Authorization Act, determined the following sites were
    viable candidates to be included in the Environmental Impact Statement
    (EIS): Fort Drum, New York; Portsmouth SERE Training Area, Maine
    (Rangley); Camp Ravenna, Ohio; and Fort Custer Combined Training
    Center, Michigan. The Department is conducting EIS activities that will
    evaluate each of the four candidate sites, to include potential impacts
    to land use, water resources, air quality, transportation,
    socioeconomics and other factors established by the National
    Environmental Policy Act. The EIS will take approximately 30 months and
    should conclude in 2016. There has been no decision by the Department
    to move forward with an additional CONUS interceptor site. The current
    GBI sites at Fort Greely and Vandenberg AFB provide capability
    necessary to protect the U.S. homeland against the current and
    projected ICBM threat from North Korea as well as the future Iranian
    ICBM threat should it emerge. Even though an additional CONUS
    interceptor site would add battle space and interceptor capacity, a
    decision to construct the new site would come at a significant material
    development and service sustainment cost. Near-term, upgrading the kill
    vehicle on the GBI and enhancing the homeland defense sensor network
    are higher priorities and prerequisites for improving protection
    against limited ICBM attack.
                               regional defenses
        Deployment of regional defenses to protect our deployed forces,
    allies and international partners remains one of our top priorities.
    Our fiscal year 2016 budget request funds the continued development and
    deployment of defenses against SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs in support of
    Combatant Commanders' near-term and future priorities and supports the
    President's commitment to EPAA.
    Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
        Today, four Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Weapon
    System Batteries are delivered, with the fifth planned for activation
    this year. To meet the demand from combatant commanders for THAAD, in
    fiscal year 2014, MDA accelerated procurement of THAAD Battery 7 for
    delivery in fiscal year 2017, two years earlier than Software Build
    1.4, which includes critical updates to weapon system components and
    Information Assurance update. MDA also continued its support of the
    first deployed THAAD battery in Guam, exceeding the Army's required
    operational readiness rate.
        This year THAAD will participate in two flight tests, FTT-18 and
    FTO-02. In FTT18 THAAD will demonstrate an intercept of a separating
    IRBM target using the THAAD radar, launcher, fire control and
    communication, interceptor operations and engagement functions. In FTO-
    02, Event 2, THAAD will engage a SRBM and demonstrate advanced radar
    algorithms. During this operational test of our regional defense
    architecture, which will include the attempted intercept of an MRBM and
    air-breathing target by Aegis BMD, THAAD will demonstrate a layered
    defense capability.
        For fiscal year 2016, MDA is requesting $464.1 million for THAAD
    procurement, which includes the purchase of 30 THAAD interceptors and
    procurement of training devices for the THAAD institutional training at
    Fort Sill, OK. By the end of fiscal year 2016, MDA will deliver an
    additional 48 THAAD interceptors to the U.S. Army, for a total of 155
    interceptors delivered. We will continue to support the forward
    deployed THAAD battery in Guam. We are requesting $228.0 million in
    RDT&E funding in fiscal year 2016 as part of the continued development
    of THAAD capabilities, and begin concept development and risk reduction
    activities for THAAD follow-on capabilities. These activities will
    explore and mature the design concept of expanding THAAD system
    interoperability with air and missile defense systems, and expanding
    the battlespace and defended area of the current baseline THAAD Weapon
    System. We are also batteries.
    Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
        In fiscal year 2014, MDA continued to expand global BMD capability
    for the Aegis Fleet. Together with the U.S. Navy, we completed four BMD
    Weapons System installations on Aegis ships--one Aegis BMD 3.6 ship and
    three Aegis BMD 4.0 ships--and we commenced upgrades on existing BMD
    ships, two from 3.6 to 4.0 and one from 3.6 to Aegis Baseline 9.C1 with
    BMD 5.0CU. We now have a total of 33 BMD capable Aegis ships in the
    Fleet. We continued delivery of Standard Missile-3s to the Fleet,
    including 29 Block IAs and 26 Block IBs.
        In fiscal year 2014, MDA conducted several critical flight tests to
    prove the operational capability of the Aegis BMD weapon system. In
    FTM-22, we successfully engaged and destroyed an MRBM target using the
    Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system and an SM-3 Block IB. This test exercised
    the second-generation Aegis BMD 4.0 weapon system and supported
    production decisions for the SM-3 Block IB by completing developmental
    and operational testing for both the weapon system and missile. With
    the successful completion of DOT&E testing requirements, Aegis BMD 4.0
    and the SM-3 Block IB were found to be operationally suitable and
    effective. FTM-22 was also the final flight test executed by the USS
    Lake Erie, the BMD test ship for over 10 years.
        We also brought ballistic missile defense flight testing back to
    the east coast in fiscal year 2014. In FTX-18 we successfully simulated
    engagements against a raid of three short-range targets using the Aegis
    BMD 4.0 Weapons System and simulated SM-3 environment off the coast of
    Virginia at NASA's Wallops Island facility.
        As construction began at the Aegis Ashore site in Romania, we
    conducted the first Controlled Test Vehicle at the Aegis Ashore Missile
    Defense Test Complex at the Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF) in
    Kauai, HI. This flight test proved the design of the Aegis Ashore
    system and the ability to launch an SM-3 from land. The first Aegis
    Ashore intercept test from PMRF will occur in the third quarter of this
    year to support turn-over of the Romanian site to the Navy for
    operation.
        In its homeland defense role, Aegis BMD executed long range
    surveillance and track to provide data for the GBI launch in FTG-06b.
    In the test, USS Hopper, with the BMD 4.0 weapon system, acquired the
    target and sent track data to the BMDS Command, Control, Battle
    Management and Communications system, directly contributing to
    successful intercept of the target.
        This past fall we conducted two operationally representative tests
    for certification of the Navy's Aegis Modernization Baseline 9 weapon
    system. In FTX-20, we used our new MRBM target to exercise several BMDS
    sensors and C2BMC. This was also the first tracking exercise for the
    new Navy/MDA Integrated Air and Missile Defense Baseline 9 test ship,
    USS John Paul Jones. A couple of weeks later, in FTM-25, USS John Paul
    Jones launched an SM-3 Block IB to intercept an SRBM target while
    simultaneously launching two SM-2 Block IIIAs against two air-breathing
    threats, successfully exercising the Navy's Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense capability inherent in Baseline 9.
        In fiscal year 2016, we will continue our commitment to develop,
    test, and deliver global naval capability to the warfighter and support
    defense of our deployed forces and NATO in fiscal year 2016 to procure
    40 SM-3 Block IBs, for a total of 209 procured and 107 delivered by the
    end of fiscal year 2016. In anticipation of fiscal year 2016 and beyond
    Multiyear Procurement Authorization for the SM-3 Block IB, MDA requests
    $147.8 million in economic order quantity for missile components for
    fiscal year 2016-19 Block IB multiyear procurements. By moving to a
    multiyear procurement, we may realize an estimated cost savings of up
    to 14 percent across the FYDP. To recertify SM-3 rounds which have been
    previously delivered and deployed to the Fleet, MDA requests $19.8
    million for sustainment of these assets.
        We request $172.6 million for the SM-3 Block IIA cooperative
    development effort with the Japan Ministry of Defense. In fiscal year
    2014, the SM-3 Block IIA completed Propulsion Test Vehicle-01, in which
    the missile and new composite canister both demonstrated successful and
    safe ignition and egress from the vertical launching system. Upon
    completion of this test and the system level critical design review,
    the SM-3 Block IIA transitioned into the integration and testing phase
    and will execute the first controlled test vehicle flight test in third
    quarter fiscal year 2015. Along with a total of five flight tests for
    the SM-3 Block IIA through fiscal year 2018, fiscal year 2016 will
    focus on an extensive ground test campaign to prove system design and
    missile capability. We are committed to delivering the SM-3 Block IIA
    to the Fleet to meet global threat requirements, and specifically to
    support EPAA Phase 3.
        MDA is strongly committed to further enhancing capability of the
    Aegis BMD weapon system to give Sailors the tools needed to
    successfully execute their mission. MDA requests $40.7 million for the
    BMD 4 series weapon systems to bring advanced 5.0CU development, MDA
    has prioritized delivering BMD 5.1 capability on schedule and requests
    $180.6 million to continue software development and testing to certify
    in fiscal year 2018 and meet the delivery timeline of the SM-3 Block
    IIA missile for deployment on ships and at Aegis Ashore sites. In
    addition to weapon system development, MDA requests $110.9 million to
    procure weapon system equipment for installation and upgrade to the BMD
    Fleet and $12.6 million to sustain BMD specific equipment on the
    existing Fleet.
        We also continue development of a Sea Based Terminal capability to
    provide protection of maritime forces against observed or demonstrated
    advanced anti-ship ballistic missiles and increased layered defense for
    forces ashore. Using an incremental development approach, we are
    incorporating BMD capability into the Navy's Baseline 9 architecture,
    to include terminal defense with the SM-6 guided missile and the BMD 5
    series weapon systems. In 2014, we completed Sea Based Terminal
    Increment 1 missile (SM-6 Dual I) software build 1, and we demonstrated
    its performance in a simulated environment. We plan to test and certify
    the first increment of Sea Based Terminal capability in fourth quarter
    fiscal year 2015 in four Multi-Mission Warfare events, with follow-on
    performance testing in fiscal year 2016. Sea Based Terminal Increment 2
    is on schedule to be certified and operational in 2018.
    European Phased Adaptive Approach
        We will continue to expand the EPAA to provide additional coverage
    of European NATO territory from Iranian ballistic missile threats by
    investing resources for EPAA development, testing and deployment. EPAA
    Phase 1 was implemented in 2011 with Eastern Mediterranean.
        MDA is on schedule to deliver EPAA Phase 2 by the end of 2015,
    which will enhance U.S. and NATO capabilities with the addition of more
    capable Aegis BMD SM3 Block IBs and upgraded Baseline 9 weapon system
    with BMD 5.0CU. Phase 2 will include deployment of Aegis Ashore to
    Romania with capability to launch both SM-3 Block IA and IB variants
    and upgraded versions of the Aegis BMD weapon system. Required military
    construction, installation, integration and testing activities will be
    complete for technical capability declaration in 2015. After having
    tested the system at the Moorestown, New Jersey site in 2014, the
    deckhouse, including all weapon system equipment was disassembled,
    packed and shipped to Romania. MDA requests $33.4 million in fiscal
    year 2016 to complete site activation, integration, and testing of the
    system in-country and to maintain the test site at PMRF to support
    system-wide testing for Phase 2 deployment. We are on track to turn
    over Aegis Ashore Romania to the Navy, and in fiscal year 2016 we have
    requested $13.9 million for sustainment of the system once it is
    operational. MDA also completed installations and upgrades to the BMD-
    capable multi-mission ships that are shifting homeports from Norfolk,
    VA to Rota, Spain, which will support the EPAA Phase II architecture.
    The homeport transfer of four multi-mission Aegis BMD ships to Rota,
    Spain began in 2014 with the USS Donald Cook and USS Ross. The
    remaining two Aegis BMD ships, USS Porter and USS Carney, will transfer
    this year.
        EPAA Phase 3 will improve defensive coverage against medium- and
    intermediate-range threats with the deployment of a second Aegis Ashore
    site in Block IIAs. Construction at Redzikowo, Poland is expected to
    begin in fiscal year 2016. We request $30.6 million in fiscal year 2016
    for procurement of Aegis Ashore equipment and $169.2 million for the
    construction of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland. We need this funding
    to complete this site by the end of 2018.
    Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications and Sensors
        C2BMC provides persistent tracking, cueing, discrimination, and
    fire control quality data to Aegis BMD, GMD, THAAD, and coalition
    partners to support homeland and regional defense objectives. Last June
    we successfully forwarded Aegis BMD system track data through the C2BMC
    system to the GMD fire control system during FTG-06b. We continue to
    support warfighter command and control and battle management needs
    across the globe by providing the strategic BMD planner, which provides
    Combatant Commanders situational awareness tools to support weapons
    release authority for homeland defense and control and tasking of
    forward-based AN/TPY-2 radars. C2BMC operators and maintainers are
    deployed forward in some of the world's highest threat spots and
    continue to provide around-the-clock support to the local commanders.
    As the BMDS integrating element, C2BMC has also demonstrated proven
    interoperability across regional BMD architectures.
        In addition to continuing the enhancement of global BMD survivable
    communications and support for operations and sustainment of C2BMC at
    fielded sites, this year we will integrate Space Based Infrared System
    Increment 2 capabilities into C2BMC to support cueing of BMD sensors
    worldwide. We have initiated a Space Based Kill Assessment (SKA)
    demonstration that will host sensors on commercial and pass that
    information on to the BMDS to support a multi-sensor kill assessment of
    the target.
        The Services and COCOMs, with logistical support from MDA, are
    operating forward based X-band radars (AN/TPY-2(FBM)) in Japan, Israel,
    Turkey, and United States Central Command. All of these radars
    contribute to regional defense, and some, including the second AN/TPY-2
    radar deployed to Japan last year, also provide a significant
    contribution to the defense of the U.S. homeland. Last year we also
    continued our AN/TPY-2 (Terminal Mode) support to warfighters on Guam.
    We accepted AN/TPY-2 Radar #9, providing it to THAAD Battery #4, and
    AN/TPY-2 Radar #10. We also awarded a production contract for AN/TPY-2
    Radar#12, and for additional spares. In fiscal year 2016 we plan to
    develop and test advanced discrimination algorithms to counter evolving
    threats to provide additional capability to the Combatant Commanders as
    well as close Materiel Release conditions for the Terminal Mode and
    Forward-Based Mode AN/TPY-2 radars. We plan to deliver Radar #10 to
    THAAD Battery #6, start production of an Antenna Equipment Unit Float,
    and complete production of AN/TPY-2 Radar #12, which will be allocated
    to THAAD Battery #7.
        We request $536.5 million in fiscal year 2016 to develop, deploy
    and test BMDS sensors (includes $138 million for the continued
    development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar), and $187.5 million
    to sustain the nine AN/TPY-2 radars and support the UEWRs and Cobra
    Dane radar. We will continue communications support for the AN/TPY-2
    radars and C2BMC upgrades. We request $450.1 million in fiscal year
    2016 to develop, test, field, sustain, and operate all C2BMC spirals.
    We also will integrate capabilities of C2BMC to provide fire control
    quality data to BMD weapon systems in support of homeland and regional
    defense. We request $31.6 million for continued operation of the Space
    Tracking and Surveillance System in fiscal year 2016.
                          developing new capabilities
        MDA is developing fiscally sustainable, off-setting technologies to
    address gaps in the BMDS and extend our dominance in missile defense.
    MDA's goal for these investments is to deploy a future BMDS
    architecture more capable of discriminating and destroying a reentry
    vehicle with a high degree of confidence.
        In 2014 and 2015, the warfighters emphasized the importance of
    improving discrimination capability, the missile defense function that
    distinguishes between lethal and non-lethal objects, in order to reduce
    the need for large, unaffordable interceptor inventories. Radars and
    electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensors are central to this
    capability. However, sensors require sufficient sensitivity and
    resolution to measure features useful for inferring which objects are
    lethal or non-lethal. Between now and 2020, we will use available
    technology to improve existing sensors, battle management and fire
    control, and kill vehicles. After 2020, our plan is to field new
    advanced EO/IR sensors and upgrade discrimination capabilities based on
    our new technology investments.
        Relying purely on terrestrial radars for precision tracking and
    discrimination of the threat is a potential weakness the enemy could
    exploit in the future. Adding persistent electro-optical sensors to the
    BMDS architecture is a high payoff solution for this gap. Last fall
    during FTM-25 we accelerated the Discrimination Sensor Technology
    flight test program by nearly six months to prove that our Aegis Weapon
    System could launch a Standard Missile based solely on tracks generated
    by remote sensors on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). MDA requests
    $28.2 million for our Discrimination Sensor Technology development and
    test plan to provide a cost-effective, stepping stone towards our goal
    of achieving persistent discrimination coverage of enemy missiles in
    all theaters, including ICBMs targeting the homeland. In fiscal year
    2016, we plan to upgrade UAV-borne sensors and demonstrate even greater
    discrimination capability in conjunction with Aegis flight testing in
    the first quarter fiscal year 2017 as a precursor to the development
    and test of a prototype advanced sensor under our Technology Maturation
    Initiatives program element.
        We request $45.4 million in Weapons Technology to continue
    development, integration, and testing of our high-powered directed
    energy program to build the foundation for the next-generation UAV-
    borne laser system. A UAV-borne laser would be capable of acquiring,
    tracking and eventually destroying an enemy missile at a much lower
    cost than the existing BMDS. Within the Directed Energy project, we
    will develop and demonstrate the technology necessary to scale laser
    power jointly with our Air Force and DARPA partners. The Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) Fiber Combining
    Laser achieved 34 kilowatts continuous power in October 2014, a record
    for fiber combined lasers. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
    (LLNL) achieved similar success with their Diode Pumped Alkali Laser
    system, reaching five kilowatts last year. In our effort to mature high
    altitude, low Mach UAVs for directed energy applications, we
    successfully completed five Phantom Eye flights at the Air Force's
    Edwards Flight Test Center in California. The Phantom Eye data from
    launch to landing.
        In fiscal year 2016, MIT/LL will conduct a Fiber Combining Laser
    critical design review and begin fabrication and integration of a
    lighter, more compact Fiber Combining Laser system, driving the weight
    of the system down from five kilograms per kilowatt to one kilogram per
    kilowatt. LLNL will demonstrate a DPAL system at 30 kilowatts average
    power, six times more powerful than ever achieved by a hybrid laser.
        Within the Interceptor Technology project, MDA develops technology
    to enhance the hit-to-kill capability within current and future BMDS
    architectures. MDA will invest in cutting edge technology for the
    competitive development of the next generation, solid Divert and
    Attitude Control System (DACS) for the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle. We
    will also investigate the suitability of rail gun technology for
    missile defense missions.
        MDA requests $96.3 million for Technology Maturation Initiatives to
    build on the successes in weapons technology and discrimination sensor
    technology. Airborne discrimination sensors and low power tracking
    lasers are sufficiently mature to develop flight prototypes that
    address complex tracking and discrimination challenges from evolving
    threats to the homeland. In fiscal year 2016, MDA will incorporate an
    advanced sensor into the tactically proven Multispectral Targeting
    System and MQ-9 Reaper combination to prove precision track and
    discrimination performance of airborne sensors at strategic ranges, or
    thousands of kilometers. MDA will also contract with industry for the
    design of a UAV-borne laser demonstrator to quantify the target
    acquisition, tracking, and handover performance required for boost
    phase missile defense under realistic conditions.
        MDA requests $46.7 million for the Common Kill Vehicle Technology
    effort. Last year, we began the first phase of a two phase, development
    strategy for the next generation of our exo-atmospheric kill vehicles.
    In that first phase, we defined concepts and developed requirements for
    a new Redesigned Kill Vehicle for our ground-based interceptor program.
    In fiscal year 2016, we are implementing phase II of that strategy
    during which we will work jointly with industry to define concepts for
    deploying multiple kill vehicles from a single booster. This year we
    plan to award several contracts with industry to define concepts for
    Multi-Object Kill Vehicles (MOKV). In parallel, we will reduce
    technical risk in several areas that are critical to making this
    revolutionary concept a reality. For example, we will develop and test,
    by 2017, MOKV command and control strategies in both digital and
    Hardware-in-the-Loop venues that will prove we can manage the
    engagements of many kill vehicles on many targets from a single
    interceptor. We will also invest in the communication architectures and
    guidance technology that support this game changing approach.
    Ultimately, these Multi-Object Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our
    missile defense architecture, substantially reducing the interceptor
    inventory required to defeat an evolving and more capable threat to the
    Homeland.
        MDA requests $17.4 million for Advanced Research and development
    that capitalizes on the creativity and innovation of the Nation's small
    business community and academia to enhance the BMDS. We are also
    fostering research between U.S. and foreign universities of allied
    nations through international cooperative science and technology
    projects. We awarded 216 new contracts for innovative new research in
    eight missile defense related topics last year.
        MDA also requests $12.1 million for the Advanced Concepts &
    Performance Assessment effort, which models the capability of advanced
    BMD technology to address evolving threats to the warfighter. The
    request will fund the digital simulation and hardware-in-the-loop
    framework and models required for testing of the Airborne Advanced
    Sensor, Kill Vehicle Modular Open Architecture test bed, and maturing
    sensor fusion algorithms.
                           international cooperation
        The fiscal year 2016 budget request includes funding for regional
    missile defense capabilities in order to protect U.S. forces, reassure
    allies and partners, and build cooperative regional security
    architectures. MDA is engaged with over twenty countries and
    international organizations, such as NATO. MDA remains committed to
    expanding work with our international partners, to include conducting
    joint analyses to support partner missile defense acquisition
    decisions, cooperative research and development projects, deployments,
    Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and co-production. Our major
    international efforts reflect the Department's goals in the Asia-
    Pacific, Middle East, and Europe and will help implement EPAA, build
    partner BMD capacity, and support the strategic shift to Asia-Pacific.
        As allies and partners invest in their own missile defense
    capabilities, this will enable us to build more effective regional
    security architectures and complement U.S. regional missile defense
    capabilities. MDA is currently executing an FMS case with the United
    Arab Emirates for two THAAD batteries and accompanying launchers,
    radars, and interceptors. This calendar year, we will deliver the first
    THAAD battery to our UAE partners to begin New Equipment Training. We
    continue to be actively engaged with cost data that may inform future
    decisions to procure THAAD.
        We continue to have a very strong cooperative missile defense
    partnership with Israel. In fiscal year 2014 the Israel Missile Defense
    Organization (IMDO) and MDA achieved a second successful intercept
    using the David's Sling Weapon System to defeat shorter-range ballistic
    missiles and conducted the second fly-out of the Arrow-3 upper tier
    interceptor, demonstrating its key functional capabilities in-flight.
    Arrow-3 is intended to intercept longer-range threats. The Arrow Weapon
    System 2 is a currently fielded capability operated by the Israeli Air
    Force. This past September, IMDO and MDA conducted an intercept test of
    the Arrow-2 interceptor missile against a MRBM target over the
    Mediterranean. The Department also reached agreement in March 2014 with
    Israel regarding coproduction of the Iron Dome defense system. The
    agreement garnered approximately $263 million in U.S. work share for
    coproduction of Iron Dome components. We are requesting $55.0 million
    to procure Iron Dome radars and associated equipment.
        MDA and our Japanese counterparts continue to make significant
    progress with the SM-3 IIA interceptor, our largest co-development
    effort. This development work, which remains on track for first
    delivery in the 2018 time frame, would expand extended deterrence to
    our friends and allies and establish an important vehicle for closer
    defense cooperation ties. These cooperative activities enable U.S.
    partners to be less vulnerable to coercion and ballistic missile
    attack. In addition, our strong partnership with Japan enabled a
    technical capability declaration of the second AN/TPY-2 radar now
    located at the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) base in
    Kyogamisaki, Japan with other strategic partners in the region.
        In addition to implementing our EPAA commitments to our NATO
    Allies, we continue to work with NATO to ensure U.S. C2BMC and NATO
    command and control networks are fully interoperable. We have
    successfully demonstrated interoperability between NATO and the U.S.
    command and control networks. MDA will continue to engage our NATO
    Allies to address international cooperation in missile defense.
                  cybersecurity/ supply chain risk management
        We are very cognizant of the growing cyber threat and aggressively
    working to ensure the Nation's missile defenses will be able to operate
    in a highly contested cyber environment. Potential adversaries are
    developing cyber forces as part of their military structure and
    integrating them into their overall strategy. We are working with the
    Armed Services, the Combatant Commands, especially Strategic Command's
    USCYBERCOM, and other agencies in DOD and the Federal Government to
    counter this growing threat.
        We are improving the cyber hygiene of our missile defense
    capabilities by ensuring our cybersecurity infrastructure has the
    latest security upgrades. We are assessing our systems, suppliers, and
    acquisition processes and ensure our critical software and hardware are
    strongly configured and trusted to lessen the risk of malicious
    activities. We have a rigorous cyber and Supply Chain Risk Management
    inspection program to examine everything about our systems from the
    trusted supply chain to the fielded capability. This helps us ensure
    the highest possible compliance levels. In May 2014, DISA Field
    Security Operations conducted a USCYBERCOMMissile Defense Integration
    and Operations Center in Colorado. MDA received an ``Excellent'' score.
    In June 2014 the MDA Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) was
    inspected as a Tier 2 Computer Network Defense Service Provider by
    USCYBERCOM/DISA Field Security Operations. The MDA CERT received a
    ``Commendable'' rating (second highest rating possible) and was awarded
    another three year Authorization to Operate. Over the last year we
    conducted four Enterprise Cyber Range Environment experiments with
    independent, DOT&E red team penetration testing on the Joint
    Information Operations Range. The purpose of these experiments is to
    better understand the cyber robustness of BMDS capabilities to insider
    threats. MDA also has one scheduled for May 2015. MDA completed 62
    cybersecurity inspections worldwide to ensure DOD and MDA compliance.
    We follow up on these inspections to ensure remediation of any
    identified cyber risks.
        We must build resilient cyber defenses that are capable of
    detecting and mitigating threats without impeding operations in order
    to ``fight through'' the cyber threat. MDA collaborates with the
    Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to conduct cyber
    penetration testing on key missile defense capabilities. We then use
    the results of those tests to conduct risk assessments to prioritize
    cybersecurity improvements, develop mitigation strategies, and improve
    cyber training. We are also working to develop better cyber CONOPS to
    ensure every network defender in every location knows how to quickly
    react to cyber challenges.
        We are working hard to incorporate cybersecurity requirements early
    into our acquisition lifecycle to ensure we are building cybersecurity
    into missile defenses, not the Defense Industrial Base to ensure they
    can protect any missile defense program sensitive information from
    getting into the hands of potential adversaries. We have seen too many
    instances where malicious cyber actors attempt to exfiltrate
    information from them, especially from their unclassified, commercial
    networks that have exposure to the internet. We will continue to work
    with Industry and the FBI to identify these issues and raise the costs
    of this type of behavior to those responsible in coordination with
    National authorities and in accordance with policy.
                                   conclusion
        This budget balances investment in homeland and regional missile
    defense capabilities while pursuing advanced technology to pace the
    emerging threat. We will do this by improving current system
    capabilities and investing in the most promising technology to reverse
    the adversary's numerical advantage. MDA continues to aggressively
    pursue cost reduction measures through competition, partnering, and
    cooperation. MDA is on track with the Department's schedule for
    financial improvement and audit readiness, ensuring full accountability
    of resources and processes.
        Mr. Chairman, we have several critical developmental and
    operational flight tests coming up this year and next. We will adhere
    to our ``fly before you buy'' approach, testing elements of the system
    to demonstrate they work before we commit to their fielding in order to
    ensure the warfighter will have cost-effective and reliable weapon
    systems. With the successful GMD intercept this past June, continued
    emphasis on GMD reliability and commitment to increase GBI inventory,
    planned RKV investments, and renewed focus on improved tracking and
    discrimination, I believe we are turning the corner with our homeland
    defenses. We remain on track with our EPAA deployments and continue to
    make good progress with our international partners across the globe. am
    also committed to investing in advanced technologies to defeat the
    threat of the future and to looking for new and innovative ways to
    deliver missile defense capability to protect our nation, our forward
    deployed forces and our friends and allies at lower cost to the
    government and the taxpayers.
        I look forward to answering the committee's questions. Thank you.

        Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
        General Mann?

    STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDING
       GENERAL, U.S. ARMY SPACE AND MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND/ARMY
    FORCES STRATEGIC COMMAND AND JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND
                     FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE

        General Mann. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    Senator King, Senator Fischer, and also your staff, thank you
    for your continued support of the soldiers and civilians and
    our families.
        This is my third appearance before the subcommittee. It is,
    indeed, an honor to testify before you today to discuss the
    importance of missile defense to our Nation and the need to
    maintain these capabilities in the face of a maturing threat
    and declining budgets.
        Today, I want to briefly summarize the missions of the
    organizations that I represent.
        First, the Space and Missile Defense Command Army Forces
    Strategic Command that serves as a force provider to our
    combatant commands. Three core tasks for this organization:
    first, to provide trained and ready global missile defenders
    today; to build future capabilities and structure for tomorrow;
    and then also to evaluate critical technologies to address
    future threats.
        I also represent the Joint Functional Component Command for
    Integrated Missile Defense, which supports STRATCOM in
    integrating and synchronizing our global missile defense
    operations. As many of you know, for example, today, we have
    over 300 full-time National Guardsmen located in Fort Greely,
    Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, who operate
    the ground-based missile defense system. It represents the
    Nation's only ground-based defense against limited
    intercontinental ballistic missile attack. The soldiers are
    very good at what they do, and they take their mission very
    seriously.
        In addition, JFCC IMD executes five key tasks. Number one,
    we synchronize operational level planning. We support ongoing
    operations. We integrate training exercises and test activities
    globally. We provide recommendations on the allocation of
    missile defense assets. Finally, we advocate for future
    capabilities.
        Today, the missile defense threat continues to grow both in
    terms of numbers and sophistication. We as a Nation cannot
    afford a decrease in our readiness or capabilities. That said,
    we are extremely concerned about sequestration's impact on our
    readiness, and our ability to evaluate and test new
    technologies in order to stay ahead of the threat.
        This committee's continued support of missile defense
    operations, and the men and women who develop and deploy our
    systems, is essential.
        Again, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our Nation's
    missile defense capabilities, and I look forward to addressing
    any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of General Mann follows:]

          Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General David L. Mann, USA
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for your continued support of
    our Service Members, Civilians, and Families. In the same capacity as
    my previous appearances before this subcommittee, I appear before you
    today bringing both a Joint and Army perspective on effective missile
    defense capabilities. Let me again express my appreciation to this
    Subcommittee for its continued support of the Army, the U.S. Strategic
    Command, the Department of Defense, and the missile defense community.
    I am honored to testify before this Subcommittee along with these
    distinguished witnesses who provide missile defense capabilities to our
    Nation, forward deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        As outlined during an appearance before this subcommittee last
    year, my responsibilities encompass three main areas. First, as the
    Commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC),
    I have Title 10 responsibilities to train, maintain, and equip space
    and global ballistic missile defense forces for the Army. Second, as
    the Commander, Army Forces Strategic Command (ARSTRAT), I am the Army
    Service Component Commander (ASCC) to the U.S. Strategic Command
    (USSTRATCOM). I am responsible for planning, integrating, and
    coordinating all Army space and missile defense forces and capabilities
    in support of USSTRATCOM missions. Third, as the Commander of
    USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense (JFCC IMD), I am responsible for synchronizing missile defense
    planning, supporting ballistic missile defense operations, and
    advocating for missile defense capabilities on behalf of the Combatant
    Commanders.
        In addition to the these three roles, the Chief of Staff of the
    Army recently designated USASMDC as the Army's Air and Missile Defense
    Enterprise Integrator with responsibility to synchronize the Army's air
    and missile defense (AMD) strategy in coordination with other
    organizations involved in providing this critical capability. My task
    is to ensure the implementation of a holistic Army AMD strategy that
    includes force planning requirements, coordinated combat and materiel
    development, AMD acquisition and life cycle management, and strategic
    communications.
        In accordance with these responsibilities, my intent today is to
    highlight the greatest missile defense asset--our great people; to
    briefly outline the strategic environment; to emphasize USASMDC/
    ARSTRAT's missile defense force provider responsibilities with respect
    to the Army and the Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs); to outline
    JFCC IMD's role as an operational integrator of Joint missile defense
    for USSTRATCOM; and finally to summarize a few of the key Army
    ballistic missile defense activities and developments in the context of
    a comprehensive approach to addressing an evolving ballistic missile
    threat.
          the workforce--recognizing and protecting our greatest asset
        The challenges that we face cannot be mitigated without the
    dedication of our greatest asset--our people. Just as I mentioned last
    year, I feel it important to highlight our workforce, my concern of
    sequestration on our workforce, and the Army's continued commitment to
    deter instances of sexual harassment and assault. At USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    and JFCC IMD, our people remain our most enduring strength. The Service
    Members, Civilians, and Contractors support the Army and Joint
    Warfighter each and every day, both those stationed in the homeland and
    those globally deployed. We remain committed to providing trained and
    ready Service Members and Civilians to operate and pursue enhanced
    capabilities for the Nation's ballistic missile defense system (BMDS).
        As recently highlighted during Congressional testimony by the
    Service Chiefs, the potential return of sequestration causes great
    concern--especially with regards to its impact on the workforce and our
    overall readiness. Within my commands, sequestration will negatively
    impact the space and missile defense enablers our Soldiers and
    Civilians provide to the Combatant Commanders. Specifically, readiness,
    training, and enhancements to space and missile defense capabilities
    will be degraded. Also, the return of sequestration will negatively
    impact the morale of our workforce. I believe that a more prudent
    course of action should be identified and implemented to ensure that we
    can continue to meet our current global responsibilities and those of
    tomorrow.
        Sexual harassment and assault violate the Army's core values and
    harm the Soldiers, Civilians, and Family Members that make up our
    Army--it must be eliminated. In accordance with the Chief of Staff of
    the Army's guidance and direction, my leadership team fully embraces
    the importance and fundamental necessity of an effective Sexual
    Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) Program. The SHARP
    program effort has made noticeable strides in preventing assault and
    encouraging reporting of sexual harassment incidents. In line with Army
    requirements, our program provides Soldiers, Civilians, and Family
    Members with a SHARP program manager, sexual assault response
    coordinators, and victim advocates who are available 24/7/365 in order
    to safeguard our personnel and maintain their trust. I require my
    leadership to comprehensively investigate and report each claim of
    sexual harassment or assault. I demand nothing less than upmost
    prevention, accountability, and advocacy of our personnel--they deserve
    nothing less.
                              the advancing threat
        Ballistic missile threats of our adversaries continue to grow, both
    quantitatively and qualitatively. Today, nine nations possess, or are
    suspected of possessing, nuclear weapons and 22 have ballistic missile
    capabilities that could carry nuclear weapons. Additionally,
    approximately 75 countries are developing unmanned aerial systems and
    several of these countries are exploiting land, sea, and air attack
    cruise missile capabilities. In the future, we expect to encounter more
    complex threats, to include advanced electronic and cyber intrusions,
    multiple simultaneous attacks, and even directed energy or supersonic
    capabilities.
        To meet the objectives of the current Quadrennial Defense Strategic
    Guidance, USSTRATCOM and the Army continue to provide and enhance
    homeland and regional missile defense. In accordance with the
    Department's strategy to rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region, we have
    worked with partners in U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), U.S. Northern
    Command (USNORTHCOM), and USSTRATCOM to review and improve our
    capabilities in the USPACOM area of responsibility. In addition to the
    deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery in
    Guam that enhanced our ability to protect U.S. interests in the region,
    we have deployed an additional forward-based sensor in Japan to bolster
    our defense capabilities.
        The emplacement of 14 additional Ground-Based Interceptors at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, scheduled for completion in 2017, and an operational
    second missile defense sensor in Japan will provide improved capability
    and capacity to defend the Nation against a limited intercontinental
    ballistic missile (ICBM) attack. Toward this end, we continue to work
    with regional partners and allies to increase our information and data
    sharing and develop a global AMD force posture that leverages ever
    growing partner nations' capabilities. This will result in reduced
    strain on our force and enable more timely modernization of our AMD
    assets.
        The Quadrennial Defense Review also establishes a priority to
    maintain a strong commitment to security and stability in Europe and
    the Middle East. We are continuing to maintain capability and capacity
    in these regions consistent with our regional security goals. In
    conjunction with our allies and partners, the DOD has deployed Patriot
    air and missile defense forces to Turkey and Jordan in order to enhance
    our current AMD posture while sending a strategic deterrence message to
    potential adversaries. It should be noted that these deployments add to
    the stress of an already highly deployed Patriot force. Without
    significant reduction in our worldwide deployments, it will be
    challenging for the Army to execute critical planned modernization of
    our AMD force over the next 5 years.
        In summary, enemy air and missile threats continue to develop in
    complexity, quantity and capacity. The evolution of multiple
    sophisticated capabilities requires a holistic approach that
    effectively integrates offensive and defensive, kinetic and non-
    kinetic, and alternative capabilities to defeat air and missile
    threats. The growing complexity of the strategic environment based on
    technological advances of the threat and fiscal realities requires cost
    efficient and effective methods of integrating current and future
    capabilities. We continue to prioritize integrated missile defense
    resources to optimize all our capabilities in support of the
    Warfighter, particularly in light of the expense associated with
    traditional approaches. We continue to partner with the Missile Defense
    Agency (MDA), Combatant Commands, and Services to ensure we pursue a
    fiscally responsible path to keep pace with evolving threats by
    identifying and prioritizing additional capabilities that provide the
    greatest operational value.
              providing and enhancing missile defense capabilities
        USASMDC/ARSTRAT, a force provider of missile defense capabilities,
    is a split-based command with dispersed locations that are manned by
    multi-component Soldiers, Civilians, and Contractors. Commands around
    the world, including USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, and the GCCs, leverage our
    capabilities. Our Title 10 responsibilities include operations,
    planning, integration, control, and coordination of Army forces and
    capabilities in support of USSTRATCOM's missile defense mission.
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT also serves as the Army's global operational integrator
    for missile defense, the Army's proponent for global missile defense
    force modernization, and the Army's technical center lead to conduct
    air and missile defense related research and development in support of
    Army Title 10 responsibilities.
        Our operational function is to provide trained and ready missile
    defense forces and capabilities to the GCCs and the Warfighter--in
    other words, to address the requirements of today. For example,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT Soldiers serving in the homeland and in remote and
    austere forward deployed locations operate the Ground-based Midcourse
    Defense (GMD) system and the Army-Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance
    Forward-Based Mode (AN/TPY-2 FBM) radars. Highlights of the ongoing
    missile defense capabilities provided by our missile defense
    professionals include:
        Support to Global Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD): Soldiers from
    the 100th Missile Defense Brigade, headquartered in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, and the 49th Missile Defense Battalion, headquartered at Fort
    Greely, Alaska, remain ready, 24/7/365, to defend our Nation and its
    territories from a limited intercontinental ballistic missile attack.
    Under the operational control of USNORTHCOM, Army National Guard and
    active component Soldiers operate the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
    Fire Control Systems located at the Fire Direction Center in Alaska,
    the Missile Defense Element in Colorado, and the GMD Command Launch
    Element at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. These Soldiers, in
    conjunction with USNORTHCOM, also oversee the maintenance of GMD
    interceptors and ground system components. At the Missile Defense
    Complex at the Fort Greely site, 49th Missile Defense Battalion
    military police secure the interceptors and communications capabilities
    at the Missile Defense Complex from physical threats. This brigade will
    also soon be responsible for security at the Fort Drum, New York, In-
    Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal. The GMD system
    remains our Nation's only defense against an ICBM attack.
        GMD System Test and Development: In addition, Soldiers from the
    100th Missile Defense Brigade actively participate in GMD test
    activities and continue to work with MDA developers on future
    improvements to the GMD system.
        Support to Regional Capabilities: The 100th Missile Defense Brigade
    also provides GCCs with trained and certified AN/TPY-2 FBM radar
    detachments. These operational capabilities are present today at
    strategic locations around the globe.
        Ballistic Missile Early Warning: In support of the Joint Force
    Commander's theater force protection, USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues to
    provide ballistic missile early warning within various theaters of
    operations. The 1st Space Brigade's Joint Tactical Ground Station
    (JTAGS) Detachments, under the tactical control of USSTRATCOM's Joint
    Functional Component Command for Space, but operated by USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    space-professional Soldiers, monitor launch activity and other infrared
    events. They provide essential information to members of the air,
    missile defense, and operational communities. Our JTAGS Detachments are
    forward deployed around the globe, providing 24/7/365, dedicated,
    assured missile warning to USSTRATCOM and GCCs in support of deployed
    and forward-based forces.
        Our second major task is to build and mature future missile defense
    forces--our capability development function. These are the missile
    defense capabilities we will provide tomorrow. A major component of our
    capability development function is to provide relevant and updated
    training on our global missile defense systems. During the past year,
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT trained over 350 Soldiers and was recertified as an
    Army Learning Institution of Excellence for missile defense training.
        The Army uses established and emerging processes to document its
    missile defense needs and pursue Joint and Army validation of its
    requirements. As a recognized Army Center for Analysis, USASMDC/ARSTRAT
    conducts studies to determine how to best meet the Army's assigned
    missile defense responsibilities. With these insights, we develop the
    Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education,
    Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) domains to address evolving threats
    and potential vulnerabilities to the GMD and AN/TPY-2 FBM missile
    defense systems. This disciplined approach helps to ensure limited
    resources are applied where Warfighter operational utility can be most
    effectively served.
        In our third major missile defense task, USASMDC/ARSTRAT provides
    critical technologies to address future needs that will enhance
    Warfighter effectiveness--our materiel development function. In
    USASMDC/ARSTRAT, our technology development function is primarily
    focused on the space and high altitude domains. However, while MDA is
    the principal materiel developer for ballistic missile defense
    capabilities, USASMDC/ARSTRAT has a number of supporting missile
    defense related materiel development efforts, to include supporting
    research and development of an OSD-sponsored conventional prompt global
    strike capability to address ballistic missile threats. Following is a
    brief summary of two of our research and development efforts, as well
    as an overview of the capabilities of an essential Army testing range.
        High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator: The technology objective of
    the High Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) is to demonstrate a
    solid-state laser weapon system to complement kinetic energy
    capabilities in countering rockets, artillery, and mortar (RAM)
    projectiles. This directed energy weapon system will also have a
    significant capability against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
    Considerable technology developments were realized over the past year
    for the HEL MD. Successful demonstrations were conducted for a
    pathfinder 10 kilowatt-class laser at White Sands Missile Range, New
    Mexico, and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. These demonstrations served
    as a risk reduction for future subsystem development and integration
    while advancing this technology effort to a 50 kilowatt demonstration
    in 2017. The 50 kilowatt HEL MD will consist of a ruggedized and
    supportable high energy laser installed on a tactical military vehicle
    to enhance the safety of deployed forces. Another major component of
    the HEL MD is the beam director which will provide full sky coverage
    and engage below-the-horizon targets. As technology matures, higher
    power lasers will integrate with improved pointing and tracking
    capabilities to extend range and increase system effectiveness. The
    continued positive technology advances and testing results were
    recognized by the Army's senior leadership as HEL MD was recently
    selected by the Army Science and Technology Working Group as one of
    only three Army Capability Enabler programs to be further evaluated.
    The synergy of both directed and kinetic energy systems has the
    potential to significantly enhance both regional and homeland defense
    capabilities, particularly against cruise missile and indirect fire
    threats.
        Low-Cost Target Development: The Army continues to pursue a
    technology effort to develop a suite of low-cost targets for the
    Patriot testing program. The intent is to design threat-representative
    targets at a substantially reduced cost for short-range ballistic
    missile testing. Over the past year, we completed preliminary designs
    for three new short range ballistic missile targets based on existing
    excess solid rocket motors. The Army will realize significant savings
    conducting operational test events using these new targets beginning in
    Fiscal Year 2017. In addition, the Missile Defense Agency will use our
    targets in its test program later this year. We will continue to
    leverage existing missile inventory and technology advancements to
    develop less expensive targets that are representative of real world
    threats.
        Missile Defense Testing: USASMDC/ARSTRAT operates the Ronald Reagan
    Ballistic Missile Test Site (RTS). RTS, located on the U.S. Army
    Garrison--Kwajalein Atoll in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, is
    critical to both offensive and defensive missile testing requirements,
    such as the GMD system and the U.S. Air Force strategic ballistic
    missile systems. In addition to their testing mission, personnel at the
    Reagan Test Site conduct continuous deep space surveillance and object
    identification missions. Just this past month, the U.S. Air Force began
    construction of their most advanced surveillance system--the Space
    Fence. In a few years, this improved surveillance capability will
    enable proactive space situational awareness while complementing
    existing systems at Reagan Test Site.
      joint functional component command for integrated missile defense--
     synchronizing global missile defense planning, force management, and
                               operations support
        The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile
    Defense, or JFCC IMD, is USSTRATCOM's missile defense integrating
    element. This past January, we held a ceremony to honor the 10 year
    anniversary of the JFCC IMD. Like the other Joint Functional Component
    Commands, JFCC IMD was formed to operationalize USSTRATCOM missions and
    allow the headquarters to focus on integration and advocacy.
    Headquartered at Schriever Air Force Base in Colorado Springs,
    Colorado, the JFCC IMD is manned by professional Army, Navy, Air Force,
    Marine Corps, Civilian, and Contractor personnel.
        As the Secretary of Defense and various Combatant Commanders have
    previously testified, the Warfighter remains confident in our ability
    to protect the Nation against a limited intercontinental ballistic
    missile attack, even in the face of the changing fiscal environment.
    Over the past year, we have deployed a new forward-based sensor in
    Japan to bolster regional and homeland defense capability and,
    following the June 2014 successful ground-based interceptor (GBI) test,
    we are in the process of integrating enhanced interceptors at Fort
    Greely. Additionally, MDA is on schedule to complete construction of
    the new Aegis Ashore site in Romania to meet our commitment to our
    allies in Phase 2 of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) and we
    continue to collaborate with MDA to initiate the procurement of the
    Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and the redesign of the GBI kill
    vehicle. These developments and deployment efforts are in line with
    warfighter priorities, which consist of sensor improvements, improved
    GBI reliability and performance, and increased regional capability and
    capacity.
        On behalf of USSTRATCOM, JFCC IMD is working across our DOD
    enterprise to improve the integration of existing capabilities in order
    to maximize our efficiency and effectiveness to protect the homeland,
    deployed forces, partners, and allies. The key force multiplier is
    ``integration,'' which is a critically important mission area for JFCC
    IMD and directly supports USSTRATCOM's assigned Unified Command Plan
    (UCP) responsibilities for missile defense.
        As an operational and functional component command of USSTRATCOM,
    JFCC IMD has derived five key mission tasks from the USSTRATCOM UCP
    responsibilities:

          Synchronize operational missile defense planning,
    security cooperation activities, and the global force management
    process for missile defense capabilities.
          Conduct global ballistic missile defense operations
    support, above element joint ballistic missile defense training, asset
    management, and alternative execution support.
          Integrate, synchronize, and conduct training, exercises,
    and test activities. As the Warfighter interface, lead the planning and
    development of operational input for execution of the Integrated Master
    Test Plan (IMTP).
          Advocate and coordinate for global missile defense
    capabilities, conduct analysis and assessments of current and future
    capabilities, and recommend operational acceptance.
          Protect information systems and provide network support
    for ballistic missile defense operations.

        To accomplish each of these five tasks, we maintain close
    collaborative relationships with the GCCs, MDA, the Services, the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and our
    allies. Through collaborative processes, we continually enhance our
    deployed capabilities while gaining operational experience and
    confidence in our collective ability to defend the Nation, deployed
    forces, partners, and allies. Furthermore, I will highlight some of our
    collaborative efforts to enhance missile defense planning and
    capabilities for both the homeland and regional architectures.
        Expansion and Integration of the Missile Defense Architecture: In
    response to the evolving strategic environment, we continue to bolster
    homeland and regional missile defense capabilities. In addition to the
    deployed AN/TPY-2 FBM radars and deployment of the THAAD battery to
    Guam, we are expanding our missile defense collaboration with allies.
    We continue to mature the European PAA with the forward deployment of
    Aegis BMD ships in Rota, Spain, developing the Aegis Ashore site in
    Romania, and continuing the production of the SM-3 IB interceptors used
    for ballistic missile defense. Given many of the challenges associated
    with implementation of these architectures, JFCC IMD, supporting
    USSTRATCOM as the global synchronizer for missile defense, is
    collaborating with the GCCs to assess and address the cross-regional
    gaps in the areas of planning, policy, capabilities, and operations.
        Global Planning and Assessment: Regional and global missile threats
    continue to increase in numbers and complexity. This year, JFCC IMD led
    the missile defense community in the development of the Global Missile
    Defense Concept of Operations which better articulates systemic risk
    with the likely simultaneous execution of GCC operational plans across
    multiple areas of operations. This fundamentally changes the way the
    missile defense enterprise analyzes and assesses the operational
    environment. The output of this analysis directly informs the Global
    Integrated Air and Missile Defense Assessment (GIAMDA). The GIAMDA
    serves to shape recommendations for global force management and
    advocacy efforts for future capability investments. We have completed
    the 2014 GIAMDA and are currently conducting the 2015 assessment. For
    the 2014 assessment, we continued to expand the assessment to look at
    integrating cyber, electronic warfare, and global strike in order to
    provide a more holistic set of military capabilities to counter an
    evolving adversary threat.
        Global Force Management: The increasing demand of BMD assets is
    managed by the Joint Staff and the Services. USSTRATCOM, as the
    designated Joint Functional Manager for missile defense, relies upon
    JFCC IMD to evaluate and recommend sourcing of BMD requirements based
    on assessed risk. Due to the high demand, low-density nature of missile
    defense assets, all sourcing decisions have a direct and significant
    impact to other Combatant Commanders' campaign and contingency plans.
    The Global Force Management process enables senior leaders to make more
    informed BMD sourcing decisions based on global risk.
        Multi-Regional BMD Asset Management: JFCC IMD, in coordination with
    USSTRATCOM and the GCCs, manages the availability of missile defense
    assets to balance operational readiness postures, scheduled and
    unscheduled maintenance activities, and the MDA and Services' test
    requirements. This important process allows us to continually assess
    our readiness to defend against a ballistic missile attack and to
    recommend adjustments to optimize the overall BMD architecture.
        Allied Ballistic Missile Defense Integration: JFCC IMD continues to
    focus on the integration of allies into regional missile defense
    architectures, enhanced security cooperation between missile defense
    capable nations, and shared regional deterrence and defense
    responsibilities across partner nations. One tool employed to promote
    cooperation is the Nimble Titan campaign, a biennial series of multi-
    national missile defense experiments designed to explore policy and
    operational concepts required for coalition missile defense. The Nimble
    Titan campaign provides a unique venue to advance U.S. missile defense
    policies and combatant command regional security objectives. The Nimble
    Titan community of interest consists of 23 nations and 2 international
    organizations. The campaign goals for Nimble Titan are four fold:

          Examine national and multinational BMD decision making
    processes and their effects on planning, design, and execution.
          Explore the effects of policy guidance on defense design.
          Develop a common understanding of integrated air and
    missile defense.
          Examine and identify opportunities to support planning
    and execution of integrated air and missile defense operations.

        In April 2014, we concluded our fourth biennial series--Nimble
    Titan 14. Nimble Titan 14 included Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
    Ministry of Defense representatives from 21 nations and 2 international
    organizations, along with Department of State, OSD, Joint Staff, MDA,
    and combatant command representatives. In addition, 40 senior leaders
    from the United States and 13 other nations participated in a
    concurrent senior leader program. For the first time, Nimble Titan 14
    included participants from the Middle East and non-NATO aligned
    European nations. Through Nimble Titan, we continue to focus on cross-
    regional coordination, sensor integration, and multinational MD
    planning solutions.
        Nimble Titan is critical to developing a common understanding of
    policy hurdles associated with combined missile defense architectures
    and to influence future U.S., ally, and partner missile defense policy
    development and cooperation. Additionally, this exercise provides
    participating nations with critical experience in information-sharing
    as well as command and control procedures that enhance synchronized
    missile defense capabilities. Conclusions derived from this exercise
    continue to inform policy decisions and multinational BMD planning.
    Planning has already begun for the next iteration of this war game--
    Nimble Titan 16.
        Joint BMD Training: DOD designated USSTRATCOM as the lead for
    integrating and synchronizing Joint BMD training. In coordination with
    USSTRATCOM, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Services, we
    have developed a comprehensive and innovative training program to close
    gaps between Service, Joint, and regional BMD training and education.
    New and updated courseware has been developed and fielded to enhance
    combatant command and warfighter training needs. Blended learning
    courseware and a Joint BMD Training Community of Practice are under
    development to improve efficiency in delivery and reduce costs. Over
    the past year, JFCC IMD provided 140 courses to over 2,300 students
    around the world via the Joint BMD Training and Education Center.
    Additionally, in keeping with Joint Vision 2020, JFCC IMD provided
    several training courses to ally and partner nations.
        Warfighter Acceptance and Integrated Master Test Plan: As the
    missile defense architectures mature, Warfighters require a credible,
    comprehensive assessment of new capabilities to inform operational
    acceptance. In 2014, we tested our new AN/TPY-2 FBM in Japan, conducted
    a successful intercept flight test of the GMD system, and flight tested
    a triple engagement of both cruise and ballistic missiles with our
    Aegis BMD system. The focus of this year's operational tests is to
    demonstrate the integrated capability of Phase 2 of the European PAA
    architecture, which will include Aegis BMD ships and Aegis Ashore.
    Additionally, JFCC IMD continues to work closely with the MDA, the
    Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, and USNORTHCOM
    to address issues future improvements of both the Capability
    Enhancement (CE)-I and CE-II variants.
        In summary, JFCC IMD serves an integrating role for missile defense
    across multiple regions as we operationalize new capabilities, enhance
    command relationships, and reinforce our missile defense partnerships
    with allies. In view of worldwide events and current fiscal challenges,
    JFCC IMD remains focused on our key mission task to collaborate with
    the GCCs and MDA to meet current and future ballistic missile threats.
    While work remains to be done, we have made significant progress in
    evolving our global missile defense capabilities, thereby strengthening
    the defense of the homeland and advancing our partnerships with allies
    in this pressing endeavor.
        army contributions to the nation's missile defense capabilities
        The Army works closely with MDA and continually supports its
    materiel development efforts to develop and field systems that are
    integral to our Nation's air and missile defense capabilities. A
    summary of the Army's major air and missile defense programs follows.

        Army Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD): As we transition
    from an Army at war to one of deterrence, air and missile defense (AMD)
    units have become a key strategic enabler. AMD is an enduring Army core
    function and an essential component of the Army mission to provide wide
    area security. In addition to defense against ballistic missiles, the
    current AMD strategy seeks to develop a more comprehensive portfolio of
    IAMD capabilities to provide protection against cruise missiles,
    unmanned aerial systems, and long-range precision rocket, artillery,
    and mortar attacks.
        The IAMD Battle Management Command System (IBCS) remains an Army
    priority effort and serves as the foundation for Army AMD
    modernization. Modernization is critical in our quest to stay ahead of
    the advancement of the threat. The program will field a common mission
    command system to all echelons of Army AMD forces in order to defend
    against cruise missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, air-to-ground
    missiles, tactical ballistic missiles, and rocket, artillery, and
    mortar attacks. IBCS will provide a common and flexible AMD mission
    command network capable of coordinating air surveillance and fire
    control across Services and with coalition partners. When fielded, IBCS
    will componentize the AMD force, breaking the current system-centric
    paradigm, which will facilitate open industry competition in support of
    the AMD community. Additional efforts are underway to integrate IBCS
    and Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC)
    to support the BMD mission.
        As the lead integrator for the AMD enterprise, one area of concern
    is the ever increasing operational demand and how this demand will
    impact planned modernization. Starting next fiscal year, the AMD
    enterprise will begin its most comprehensive modernization effort ever
    undertaken as IBCS is fielded to the AMD force. IBCS will interact with
    every AMD weapon component--shooters, sensors, and C2BMC. The AMD
    convergence between the existing demand and upcoming modernization
    effort will be a major undertaking for the AMD enterprise and the Army.
        Patriot/Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): The Patriot air and
    missile defense system remains the cornerstone of our BMD forces
    deployed in support of GCCs. It remains the Army's premier weapon
    system against air and tactical ballistic missile threats. The Patriot
    system is now over 35 years old and, not surprisingly, the effort and
    costs associated with maintaining operational reliability rise steadily
    each year. Fortunately, several years ago, the Army embarked on a
    comprehensive modernization strategy that will completely replace
    Patriot's command and control hardware and upgrade the radar, launcher,
    and interceptor components through competitive development and
    procurement. The aim is to increase reliability, drive down operational
    and sustainment costs, and remain viable well into the future. Each
    facet of this strategy, development of IBCS, radar and launcher
    modernization and the Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) are critical to
    our Nation's ability to provide our Combatant Commanders with more
    innovation and capabilities in the face of an ever evolving threat.
    With nearly half of all Patriot units currently deployed, operational
    tempo and stress remain high.
        A number of significant Patriot/PAC-3 capability enhancements have
    been accomplished over the past year. Among the accomplishments were
    the completion of the Army's planned PAC-3 capability upgrades of all
    15 Patriot battalions and continued successful operational flight tests
    of the next generation PAC-3 missile, the MSE. During recent successful
    testing, both tactical ballistic missiles and air breathing threats
    were simultaneously engaged. The Army remains on track for delivery of
    the MSE to the Warfighter by the fourth quarter of 2015. Additionally,
    the Patriot radar is receiving a new radar digital processor. Coupled
    with recent software upgrades, the new processor increases performance
    of the radar against evolving threats while dramatically improving
    reliability, availability, and maintainability. To make maximum use of
    the MSE missile and the radar upgrades, the Army is also preparing to
    test the next version of the Patriot software, Post Deployment Build-8.
    Successful testing and fielding of this software will advance the
    Patriot system into the next generation of hardware capability.
        Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
    System (JLENS): Homeland air and missile defense is heavily reliant on
    early warning and over-the-horizon target acquisition in order to
    provide decision and battle space. In accordance with guidance from OSD
    and the Joint Staff, the Army has deployed the JLENS system to Aberdeen
    Proving Grounds, Maryland, for a three-year operational exercise. This
    exercise will demonstrate the capability to detect, track, and identify
    potential air threats to the greater Washington, D.C. area, and to
    integrate JLENS into the North American Aerospace Defense Command's
    (NORAD) air defense architecture. During the 3-year exercise window,
    JLENS capabilities will be fully explored in a real-world environment
    and evaluated for its operational utility in support of NORAD's
    homeland defense mission.
        The JLENS system leverages proven aerostat technology to provide
    situational awareness and track airborne objects such as cruise
    missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, and large caliber rockets. The
    JLENS consists of two unmanned aerostats with radar systems for
    surveillance and fire control. Each radar system employs a separate 74-
    meter tethered aerostat, a mobile mooring station, radar and
    communications payloads, a processing station, and associated ground
    support equipment.
        Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System: THAAD, a key component
    of the BMDS architecture, is designed to defend deployed and allied
    forces, population centers, and critical infrastructure against short
    and medium-range ballistic missiles. THAAD is a high demand, low-
    density asset that is mobile and globally transportable. A fully
    operational THAAD battery consists of 95 Soldiers, an AN/TPY-2 radar,
    six launchers, a fire control and communications element, a battery
    support center, and a support element. THAAD has a unique intercept
    capability in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-
    kill technology. There are now four activated THAAD batteries.
    Equipment training and fielding has been completed for three of the
    batteries. In April 2013, one of these batteries conducted the first-
    ever operational deployment of THAAD in response to the escalation of
    tensions in the Pacific region. The fourth THAAD battery is currently
    undergoing training and will be operationally available next year. A
    fifth battery is scheduled to become fully operational the following
    year. By 2019, the THAAD force is scheduled to consist of seven
    batteries. A new training facility, which enables virtual training for
    the Soldiers who will operate the THAAD system, recently opened at Fort
    Sill, Oklahoma. The addition of THAAD capabilities to the Army's air
    and missile defense portfolio brings an unprecedented level of
    protection against missile attacks to deployed U.S. forces, partners,
    and allies.
                                   conclusion
        Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Donnelly, as a member of the Joint
    missile defense community, the Army continues to pursue enhancements to
    the Nation's missile defense system. As a Service, the Army has lead
    responsibility for GMD, AN/TPY-2 FBM, Patriot, JLENS, and THAAD. Our
    trained and ready Soldiers operating GMD elements in Colorado, Alaska,
    and California remain on point to defend the homeland against a limited
    intercontinental ballistic missile attack. As a force provider to the
    GCCs, our Soldiers provide essential regional sensor capabilities and
    ballistic missile early warning. Our regional forces continue to
    leverage ally collaboration and planning efforts in developing
    integrated and interoperable defenses against the various threat sets.
    USSTRATCOM, through the JFCC IMD, continues to integrate BMDS
    capabilities to counter global ballistic missile threats and to protect
    our Nation, deployed forces, partners, and allies.
        While the operational, doctrine, and materiel development
    enhancements of the BMDS are essential, our most essential assets are
    the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Civilians, and Contractors who
    develop, deploy, and operate our missile defense system. I appreciate
    having the opportunity to address missile defense matters and look
    forward to addressing your questions.

        Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
        Mr. Gilmore?

     STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONAL
               TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I will
    briefly summarize the highlights of my written testimony.
        Testing conducted during the past 5 years of the regional
    theater missile defense systems--that is Aegis, Terminal High
    Altitude Aerial Defense, and Patriot--have demonstrated their
    effectiveness under an expanding set of realistic operational
    conditions.
        During that same period, testing of the Ground-Based
    Midcourse Defense system has revealed a number of important
    engineering shortfalls that needed correction, but the
    intercept failures caused by those shortfalls precluded
    demonstration of GMDs effectiveness under a broader set of
    realistic operational conditions.
        However, if we execute the integrated master test plan that
    Admiral Syring has developed over the next several years, that
    will expand our knowledge and demonstration of the capabilities
    of GMD under a broader set of operational conditions, to
    include an upcoming test against an ICBM target, testing of
    salvos using salvos of interceptors, and testing of multiple
    simultaneous engagements, as well as testing in the presence of
    more realistic countermeasures.
        As I mentioned, several Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle fixes
    that were important were demonstrated during last year's
    developmental flight test, which successfully intercepted the
    target. That is definite progress.
        Nonetheless, as Admiral Syring himself has pointed out, the
    reliability and availability of the operational ground-based
    interceptors are less than desired. That is why the Admiral is
    undertaking a reliability improvement program that is now
    funded. That is very important to improve the reliability and
    availability of the interceptors.
        Although, in the long run, the solution there is the
    Redesigned Kill Vehicle based on a more rigorous systems
    engineering process.
        The next flight test of the GMD system will take place
    later this year. It will be a nonintercept test of a Capability
    Enhancement-II kill vehicle, similar to the one that was just
    tested, to demonstrate the performance of alternate different
    thrusters, which again are supposed to help with some of the
    problems that have been demonstrated in past tests, and the
    end-to-end discrimination of a complex target scene including
    countermeasures.
        In my view, a robust ability to discriminate is critical
    for an effective homeland defense. The planning and analysis
    being conducted for this test have already revealed significant
    issues that Admiral Syring is using to plan his future program.
        In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, MDA plans to
    conduct, as I mentioned just a moment ago, the first intercept
    of intercontinental ballistic missile. This is a critical
    flight test, as well as subsequent salvo tests and multiple
    simultaneous engagement tests, because those are going to be
    conducted under realistic conditions reflecting how the system
    would actually be used.
        The CE-I interceptor is the oldest in the GMD inventory.
    Its last flight test in fiscal year 2013 was a failure, so I
    recommend that we retest as soon as possible a CE-I
    interceptor, CE-I equipped interceptor, incorporating changes
    in hardware and software that are being made to correct the
    problems that were revealed in the past flight test.
        Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense with Standard Missile-3
    Block IB completed initial operational testing and evaluation
    in early fiscal year 2014. Testing has demonstrated Aegis is
    capable of defeating short-range and simple separating medium-
    range ballistic missile threats and shorter range intermediate-
    range threats, and its effectiveness depends upon the specifics
    of the threat and the circumstances of deployment.
        However, there have been third stage rocket motor failures
    common to the SM-3 IA and IB, and MDA has determined that a
    redesign of that Third-Stage Rocket Motor nozzle is needed to
    increase the missile's reliability. In my view, the new design
    will have to be flight tested, not just ground tested, a number
    of times before we can have confidence that those fixes and
    improved reliability is as desired.
        Later this year, we are going to do Flight Test
    Operational-02, the second operational flight test at a system
    level, of BMDS elements. That will be important. There are two
    events that are planned, one involving Aegis Ashore, the
    testing facility at the Pacific Missile Range Facility, as well
    as testing using Aegis ships in a second event. Both of those
    events will provide information that is critical to my
    evaluation of the effectiveness of European Phased Adaptive
    Approach Phase 2, which the Nation wants to declare operational
    by the end of the year.
        In the fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, Congress
    reduced MDA's funding for testing and flight test targets. In
    response, MDA, consistent with its priorities, eliminated one
    particular Aegis BMD flight test. I would, certainly, urge that
    MDA work with the Congress, if at all possible, to restore that
    flight test because it is against a critical ballistic missile
    threat. I would be happy to elaborate on the details in the
    appropriate setting.
        THAAD, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, has
    demonstrated effectiveness against short- and medium-range
    targets. As part of FTO-02 later this year, it will hopefully
    demonstrate effectiveness against complex separating short-
    range ballistic missiles and prove the effectiveness of its
    advanced discrimination algorithms. So that test will provide
    important information not just about Aegis, but also about
    THAAD.
        In my written testimony, I discuss concerns with Patriot
    reliability and training. I certainly recommend the Services
    and MDA work to address those concerns.
        Finally, flight testing and modeling and simulation of the
    regional theater BMDS systems--that is Patriot, THAAD, and
    Aegis--are sufficient to support a quantitative assessment of
    the systems performance against short- and medium-range
    ballistic missile threats.
        I provide those estimates, they are classified, in the
    classified section of the annual report I just submitted to
    Congress.
        However, flight testing and modeling and simulation are not
    yet sufficient. In my judgment, based on current program plans
    and the pace of testing, they will not be until the beginning
    of the next decade to enable me to provide a rigorous
    quantitative assessment of GMD effectiveness.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by J. Michael Gilmore
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
    missile defense testing and my assessment of the Ballistic Missile
    Defense System (BMDS) and the elements that comprise it.
        Testing conducted during the past five years of the Regional/
    Theater missile defense elements has demonstrated their effectiveness
    under an expanding set of realistic operational conditions. Testing
    conducted during that period of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense
    (GMD) element has revealed a number of important engineering shortfalls
    that needed correction, but the intercept failures caused by these
    problems precluded increased demonstration of GMD's effectiveness under
    a broader set of realistic operational conditions.
                                 gmd assessment
        The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has demonstrated GMD's capability
    to defend the United States against small numbers of simple ballistic
    missile threats launched from North Korea and Iran. Several Exo-
    atmospheric Kill Vehicle fixes were demonstrated during last year's
    developmental flight test (FTG-06b), which successfully intercepted the
    target. However, the reliability and availability of the operational
    Ground-based Interceptors are less than desired and need to be
    substantially improved; MDA is taking steps that, over time, should
    yield improvement.
        The next flight test of the GMD system will take place later this
    year. Ground-based Midcourse Controlled Test Vehicle-02+ (GM CTV-02+)
    is a non-intercept test of a Capability Enhancement-II (CE-II) kill
    vehicle that will demonstrate the performance of alternate divert
    thrusters in a flight environment and the end-to-end discrimination of
    a complex target scene including countermeasures through the GMD fire
    control loop. Data collected from this test will be used to evaluate
    discrimination techniques which can help distinguish a real warhead
    from a decoy. A robust ability to discriminate is critical for an
    effective homeland defense and the planning and analysis being
    conducted for this test have already revealed issues regarding GMD's
    discrimination capabilities. The MDA is using this information to
    determine the content of the Agency's future research and development
    efforts. In the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2016, the MDA plans to
    conduct Flight Test GMD-15 (FTG-15), which will be the first intercept
    flight test for the CE-II Block 1 Ground-Based Interceptor and the
    first intercept attempt of an intercontinental ballistic missile-range
    target. This is also a critical flight test.
        The CE-I interceptor is the oldest in the GMD inventory, and its
    last flight test in fiscal year 2013 was a failure. Numerous CE-I
    interceptors remain deployed as part of the GMD system. Consistent with
    the high priority of the Homeland Defense mission, I recommend the MDA
    retest as soon as feasible the CE-I interceptor incorporating changes
    in its hardware and software made to correct the problems that caused
    the flight test failure to demonstrate the problems have actually been
    fixed.
        As documented in MDA's Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), GMD
    flight testing is proceeding at a pace of one test per year. For these
    expensive flight tests to add value to the GMD program, enough time
    must be given to conduct analyses of the previous flight test data, to
    make system improvements based on the previous flight test results, and
    to plan for the next test. Substantial overlaps between analysis of
    data from a just-conducted test and planning for the next test would be
    counter-productive. The pace at which all these activities can be
    conducted depends on the quality, experience, and size of MDA's
    engineering staff and the capacity of the Agency's ground-test and
    analysis capabilities, not only on the number of interceptors available
    for flight testing or the number of targets available (target
    availability and readiness continue to be problematic). So, while it
    would be possible to increase the pace of GMD testing somewhat relative
    to the current (and historical) pace of about one test per year, doing
    so would require expanding MDA's staff of competent engineers and test
    infrastructure, both of which would require substantial resources and
    time to execute.
                aegis ballistic missile defense (bmd) assessment
        The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) 4.0 system with Standard
    Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IB guided missiles completed Initial Operational
    Test and Evaluation in early fiscal year 2014. Testing has demonstrated
    that the Aegis BMD 4.0 system is capable of defeating short-range and
    simple-separating medium-range ballistic missiles and shorter-range
    intermediate-range threats in the midcourse phase of flight for many
    realistic operational scenarios. Analysis of data obtained during
    flight testing and the maintenance demonstration showed that the Aegis
    BMD 4.0 system is also suitable.
        However, SM-3 Third-Stage Rocket Motor failures encountered during
    flight testing have affected the reliability of the SM-3 missile. The
    MDA has determined that a re-design of the Third-Stage Rocket Motor
    nozzle is needed to increase the missile's reliability. The MDA
    generated new design concepts and began the initial ground testing of
    the redesigned parts in fiscal year 2014. The new design will have to
    be flight tested (not just ground tested) multiple times before its
    reliability can be determined with confidence.
        The MDA also demonstrated the capability of the Aegis Ashore test
    site at the Pacific Missile Range Facility to fire, establish uplink/
    downlink communication, provide guidance commands, and provide target
    information to an SM-3 Block IB guided missile. The Aegis Ashore
    Controlled Test Vehicle-01 test was the first SM-3 missile firing from
    Aegis Ashore. Flight Test Operational-02 (FTO-02), scheduled for fiscal
    year 2015, is a BMDS system-level operational test, consisting of two
    events. Event 1 will provide critical data needed for my assessment of
    Aegis Ashore's capability to defend Europe as part of the President's
    European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). An AN/TPY-2 radar in forward-
    based mode will provide the target track data that will enable Aegis
    Ashore to conduct a launch-on-remote engagement. Space-based sensors
    and command, control, battle management, and communications systems
    will also participate. Event 1 will be the first intercept test of
    Aegis Ashore and it will be conducted against an intermediate-range
    ballistic missile target. Event 2, which will also provide data
    critical to my assessment of the EPAA's ability to integrate the
    defense provided by Aegis Ashore with the defense capabilities of Aegis
    ships, will use a U.S. European Command scenario to test the Aegis BMD
    capability to engage a medium-range ballistic missile in the presence
    of post-intercept debris while simultaneously conducting anti-air
    warfare operations against a cruise missile surrogate. To create the
    debris scene for Aegis BMD, THAAD will engage a short-range ballistic
    missile with its advanced radar algorithms and new Lot 4 interceptor.
        As a result of a successful critical design review conducted in
    2013, the design of the new and larger SM-3 Block IIA guided missile is
    now complete and the program is proceeding to product development and
    testing. In October 2013, the MDA conducted a propulsion test vehicle
    test called PTV-1. It demonstrated that the SM-3 Block IIA missile can
    launch from the Aegis BMD vertical launch system.
        In its fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill, Congress reduced MDA's
    funding for testing and flight test targets. The MDA addressed these
    funding cuts by eliminating the FTM-24 Aegis BMD flight test. In my
    view, this flight test is critical to determining the Aegis BMD system
    performance against a key ballistic missile threat. I urge MDA to work
    with the Congress to restore FTM-24 as soon as possible. I would be
    happy to elaborate further on this issue in the appropriate forum.
             terminal high altitude area defense (thaad) assessment
        The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has
    demonstrated effectiveness against short- and medium-range targets. In
    9 flight tests, beginning with FTT-06 and including one multi-
    simultaneous engagement, conducted between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal
    year 2013, THAAD intercepted all 10 target ballistic missiles including
    8 short-range and 2 medium-range ballistic missiles. One flight test in
    fiscal year 2009 demonstrated a salvo engagement and another flight
    test in fiscal year 2012 demonstrated a multiple simultaneous
    engagement. Further flight testing is planned to demonstrate the
    performance of the radar's advanced algorithms against more complex
    short- and medium-range ballistic missile targets and the system's
    capabilities against intermediate-range ballistic missile threats
    (which could be employed against Guam), with the latter test now
    scheduled to occur during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015.
        Analyses of data from the Reliability Confidence Test and multiple
    flight tests suggest that THAAD system components are not exhibiting
    consistent or steadily increasing reliability growth between test
    events. The tools and diagnostic equipment available to Soldiers are
    insufficient to accurately emplace, maintain, and assess the
    operational status of THAAD equipment. THAAD has also demonstrated
    deficiencies during natural environment testing, which tests a system's
    ability to withstand expected temperature extremes, temperature shock,
    humidity, rain, ice, snow, sand, and dust. The deficiencies need to be
    addressed to ensure THAAD is capable of operating properly when and
    where it is needed.
        A primary concern to me is the training being offered to THAAD
    Soldiers. The high demand for operational THAAD units overseas has
    reduced the time available for operator training, and I urge both MDA
    and the Army to work together to address this issue. For example,
    during recent tests, THAAD operators commented on the lack of
    opportunities to train with THAAD in an operationally realistic
    environment alongside other missile defense systems like Aegis BMD and
    Patriot. These systems are frequently expected to operate in
    conjunction with THAAD, and operators' ability to conduct proper
    coordination among all BMD systems is necessary for these missile
    defense systems to operate together effectively.
                               patriot assessment
        Patriot is effective against many types of short-range tactical
    ballistic missiles, and has demonstrated capability against a medium-
    range missile target. Patriot successfully engaged tactical ballistic
    missiles in flight tests against more than 30 short-range ballistic
    missile targets since 1999 and in one flight test against a medium-
    range ballistic missile target in 2002. Sixteen flight tests since 2000
    included multiple simultaneous Patriot engagements against two targets.
    In its most recent operational test conducted between May 2012 and
    January 2013, Patriot did not meet its operational requirements for
    reliability, maintainability, or availability.
        The recent operational test highlighted the growing complexity of
    the Patriot system, which requires a higher level of operator expertise
    and more intensive training than that which the Army currently
    provides. As with THAAD, there is a high demand for operational Patriot
    units in the field. In response to this demand, the Army deactivated
    its dedicated Patriot test unit in fiscal year 2013. Soldiers from the
    Patriot Test Battalion provided valuable user insight during
    development testing and provided operationally representative Soldiers
    for operational testing. The Test Battalion helped ensure proper
    training materials were developed and tested. The deactivation of the
    Test Battalion will lengthen the duration of operational testing and
    delay the fielding decisions for the Patriot Missile Segment
    Enhancement and Post-Deployment Build-8 software. The loss of the Test
    Battalion has reduced the Army's ability to ensure Patriot unit
    Soldiers are trained to operate the system safely and effectively in
    combat, when U.S. and coalition aircraft and other BMD systems will be
    sharing Patriot's battlespace. Also, Patriot's ability to operate (or
    not) in the presence of the proliferating and increasingly effective
    capabilities for electronic attack our potential adversaries are
    developing and fielding needs to be fully characterized through robust
    testing, and key shortfalls in performance revealed by that testing
    corrected without delay. I commend the Army for its recent efforts to
    begin that characterization testing.
        command, control, battle management, and communications (c2bmc)
                                   assessment
        Effective battle management is crucial for the success of the
    integrated BMDS, and Command, Control, Battle Management, and
    Communications (C2BMC) is the primary element intended to enable battle
    management at the system level. Battle management capability is needed
    to ensure effective engagement of threat missiles in a complex
    battlespace with multiple BMD systems, and to prevent interceptors
    being wasted by firing at enemy missiles which have already been
    engaged by other systems.
        Spiral 6.4, operational since 2011, is the currently deployed
    version of C2BMC. Spiral 6.4 provides situational awareness for the
    BMDS, forwards track data between BMDS elements, and provides battle
    management and engagement monitoring. However, it does not have the
    capability to provide automated engagement direction among BMD
    elements.
        With the addition of the Global Engagement Manager Suite, Spiral
    6.4 added the capability to manage multiple AN/TPY-2 forward-based
    radars. Dual radar management by the Global Engagement Manager was
    demonstrated during distributed ground testing in the United States
    European Command in support of European Phased Adaptive Approach Phase
    1. Spiral 6.4 has participated in flight tests FTM-15, FTG-06a, FTI-01,
    and FTO-01, in which it collectively demonstrated control of a single
    AN/TPY-2 radar and track forwarding capabilities. Spiral 6.4 also
    participated in FTG-07 and FTG-06b by forwarding Aegis Weapon System
    tracks to GMD.
                                 test adequacy
        The MDA conducted eight flight tests and five ground tests during
    FY/CY14. Data from a ninth flight test conducted at the end of fiscal
    year 2013, the first system-level operational test, Flight Test,
    Operational-01 (FTO-01) were also analyzed during the year. The MDA
    conducted these tests in accordance with the DOT&E-approved IMTP. In
    fiscal year 2015, the MDA plans to conduct 12 flight tests, and in
    fiscal year 2016, 7 flight tests.
        Flight testing of the Regional/Theater BMDS autonomous combat
    systems is sufficient to support a quantitative assessment of the
    systems' performance against short- and medium-range ballistic missile
    threats. However, flight testing is not adequate to provide
    quantitative assessments of effectiveness against intermediate-range
    ballistic missile threats. The classified sections of my annual report
    on BMD provide those quantitative estimates of effectiveness for the
    cases in which they are feasible.
        Homeland Defense flight test data and modeling and simulation
    (discussed subsequently) are not yet sufficient, and likely will not be
    until the beginning of the next decade, to enable a rigorous
    quantitative assessment of GMD effectiveness.
        As discussed above, MDA addressed a Congressionally-directed cut to
    the MDA test and targets programs in fiscal year 2015 by deleting FTM-
    24, a critical test of the SM-3 Block IB guided missile. This test
    should be restored and conducted as soon as feasible.
                                 cybersecurity
        The United States faces a growing cyber threat, and our Nation's
    ballistic missile defenses need to be secure against that threat. Over
    the last year the MDA conducted four experiments on a cyber testing
    range using independent cyber red teams provided by my office. The
    purpose of these experiments was to better understand the cyber
    robustness of BMDS capabilities to insider threats, and to address any
    cybersecurity vulnerabilities that were found. The MDA plans to
    continue to use cyber ranges to improve its cybersecurity posture, and
    plans to conduct its next cyber range experiment in May 2015.
                           thaad and patriot training
        As I mentioned previously, there are deficiencies in the training
    provided to THAAD and Patriot Soldiers. THAAD is a complex automated
    system that is designed to operate effectively with other BMD systems
    in the region where it is deployed. Training issues continue to surface
    during test events and as Soldiers rotate into and out of THAAD units.
    Some of these issues have been mitigated through the installation of a
    THAAD-specific training facility at the Ft. Sill Schoolhouse; by
    increasing the amount of training; and by developing training aids,
    devices, simulators, and simulation. However, the need to make
    additional improvements remains.
        Current Army training for THAAD emphasizes training for individual
    Soldiers. Current THAAD training does not provide the Soldier with a
    crew, team, or Joint-based operationally realistic fighting experience
    as part of an integrated BMDS. Hence, currently THAAD soldiers are not
    ``trained as they will fight.''
        Current institutional training devices do not implement the latest
    system software version and do not provide the Soldier with timely
    feedback. Training devices that do not accurately emulate the system
    and prepare the Soldier to operate and maintain the system to yield the
    best system performance can result in missed intercepts.
        THAAD-specific training gaps and deficiencies continue to be
    discovered. Soldiers are assigned to a THAAD unit without THAAD-
    specific training support. This impedes the Soldier's ability to
    effectively and efficiently carry out the THAAD mission, resulting in a
    greater reliance on contract support.
        An integrated, team-based, and Joint interoperability training
    environment is essential to ensuring THAAD effectiveness during a
    conflict. The Army, in coordination with the MDA, should modify its
    institutional training policy and move from an individual Military
    Occupational Specialties (MOS)-centric training approach to a systemic,
    integrated, team-based approach that includes Joint interoperability
    training.
        To properly implement such an approach, the Army should ensure the
    availability of adequate funding, training aids, software and radar
    simulator capabilities, and evaluate whether changes to career
    progression, crew rotation, and professional development programs are
    required.
        The Army should implement an objective and quantifiable Army
    training standard that reflects the level of expertise required for
    team and Joint operations, develop and fund a training plan with a
    sufficient number of training weeks to develop Soldier expertise, and
    consider the benefit of a THAAD-specific MOS.
        Patriot training is currently provided to Patriot unit Soldiers and
    as a foundation for THAAD unit Soldiers. However, the level of Patriot
    training is insufficient, given the complexity of the Patriot system
    and the fact that in combat a Patriot unit may be called upon to
    operate in a congested battlespace with friendly and enemy aircraft,
    high numbers of threat missiles, and numerous other U.S. and coalition
    BMD assets. Since my fiscal year 2010 Annual Report to Congress, I have
    recommended that the Army improve Patriot training to equip Soldiers
    with the required level of expertise to ensure a Patriot unit can
    effectively operate in a realistic combat environment. The Army should
    consider reestablishing the Patriot Test Battalion to help address both
    Patriot and THAAD training deficiencies.
                            modeling and simulation
        Realistic flight tests of BMD systems are expensive, and there is
    no practical way to conduct a flight test for all possible BMD
    scenarios. Hence, verified, validated and accredited modeling and
    simulation, grounded in flight test data, is required to ensure BMD
    systems will be effective in combat. My BMDS assessments are limited by
    the lack of properly accredited modeling and simulation. As the MDA
    executes its flight test program over the next several years and
    additional validation data are gathered, the MDA should ensure those
    data are used to improve the Agency's modeling and simulation
    capabilities. This effort will require dedicated resources and the
    support of MDA leadership.
        My BMD assessments often contain subjective content due to the
    limited amount of flight test data and the limited progress toward
    verification, validation, and accreditation of the BMDS models and
    simulations. This is especially true for the GMD program. Many of the
    models and simulations used in BMD system ground testing are still not
    accredited for performance assessment, thereby limiting quantitative
    assessments based on their results. I recommend strongly that the MDA
    work with the Congress to assure robust funding enabling timely
    development and rigorous accreditation of the models and simulations
    critical to understanding and assuring the effectiveness of all
    elements of the BMDS, including, in particular, GMD.
                                imtp assessment
        Admiral Syring leads a rigorous IMTP development process that has
    produced a well-justified set of tests within a budget-constrained
    environment. In 2014, the MDA continued to emphasize operational
    realism when planning for and conducting both ground and flight testing
    and my office continues to be involved substantively with each update
    of the IMTP. The process has enabled the IMTP to be revised in a timely
    manner consistent with policy changes, flight test results, and changes
    in budgetary resources. The IMTP continues to be a defensible and
    rigorous plan for obtaining the test information needed to assess BMDS
    performance more quantitatively over time.

        Chairman Sessions. Thank you, Dr. Gilmore. I know that you
    are the director of the Office of Test of Evaluation. You take
    pride in your independence. You might share with the committee
    how it is that you're structured as to give you independent
    analysis on what we're funding and the testing of it.
        Mr. Gilmore. Well, under the law, my office reports
    directly to the Secretary of Defense, as well as to the
    Congress, on the effectiveness, suitability, and survivability
    of weapon systems. Under subsequent NDAAs, we were given full
    access to information from the Missile Defense Agency,
    notwithstanding its removal from the normal acquisition
    oversight process in the department.
        I have worked very cooperatively with both Lieutenant
    General O'Reilly and Admiral Syring. There has been a complete
    free flow of information between our offices. I have found our
    interactions to be very useful, and I would invite Admiral
    Syring to make any comments he wants to make in that regard,
    obviously.
        But Admiral Syring and no one else in the department
    reviews or coordinates on the reports that I write, including
    the report that I just recently submitted to Congress, which is
    mandated by a past National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA),
    although they can certainly point out if we have made any
    mistakes, and so far, no one has done that.
        Chairman Sessions. That is unusual.
        Let me just say this, we have a lot to do, but I do think
    it is important that we have an independent evaluator not in
    the normal chain of command that reviews these key activities,
    because they are complex, and we need to be careful about it.
        Admiral Syring, we are going to be adding the 44 Ground-
    based Midcourse Defense System (GBIs), and we have the plans to
    bring forward the newer, updated Capability Enhancement-2 (CE-
    II) kill vehicle.
        But then again, you want to move forward with the
    Relativistic Kill Vehicle (RKV). The RKV will be a new and more
    advanced system that could defend against simultaneous attack
    from North Korea or Iran by 2025, as I understand it.
        So explain to us what advantages we get from the RVK. Are
    the plans moving forward technologically as you would like? Do
    you foresee any engineering problems that would be difficult or
    impossible to overcome?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, thank you.
        The plan for the RVK was started last year, and it was
    started because of the concerns that we have had with the early
    design of the EKV, which has evolved over the years with
    different versions. But essentially, the prototype nature of
    the design has remained, in terms of it was fielded very
    rapidly and without a complete system engineering turn, which I
    have testified on publicly in the past.
        The RVK will allow us to take a step back with what we have
    learned and design a kill vehicle that is modular, producible,
    testable, before we flight test. I think that is very
    important, to be able to have that modularity and test at the
    component level and find issues on the ground before you find
    them in flight, as we have experienced.
        We need to get the reliability up of the overall GBI, and
    the RVK will do that as we begin to field in 2020 with the pace
    up to 2025 not yet defined. But if that is successful, we will
    want to field that very rapidly back to the older Capability-
    enhancement-1 (CE-I) fleet and some of the older CE-IIs, and
    upgrade all 44 in a very short amount of time, hopefully.
        Chairman Sessions. You have 44. We are going to 44. This
    new kill vehicle, what can you tell us in this open session
    about the advantages of making the 44 missile interceptors more
    effective and valuable with this Redesigned Kill Vehicle.
        Admiral Syring. Sir, to make the best use of the 44 that
    will be in the ground by 2017, there are two fundamental issues
    that improve our capability and capacity. One is the
    reliability of the interceptor, and two is the discrimination
    capability of the system. Those two fundamental precepts go
    into defining the Northern Command commanders shot doctrine and
    his use of interceptors to defeat more threats with more
    complexity.
        Chairman Sessions. Well, I will talk to you about that. I
    think we have had closed hearings on that. I think you are on
    the right track. I think that is a smart step. It will make
    each one of those 44 interceptors more valuable.
        What about the Multi-Object Kill Vehicle, the MOKV? You
    said in your prepared statement, ultimately, these Multi-Object
    Kill Vehicles will revolutionize our missile defense
    architecture.
        What kind of revolutionary advance would that be? How
    confident are you that it can be done? Do we have, at this
    point, the funding necessary to keep it on track?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, let me take that in parts.
        Several years ago, we explored technology and matured
    technology to a point on the Multiple-Object Kill Vehicle, the
    MKV, at the time, up to a point where the department decided
    that the technology was not maturing fast enough. The
    requirements were really not firm. For a whole bunch of reasons
    that I am not familiar with at a detailed level, that was
    terminated. Secretary Gates was eloquent in the BMDR on those
    reasons that are available.
        That said, ultimately, we want to be able to get Multiple
    Kill Vehicles into a complex discrimination scene to be able to
    shoot less interceptors that can go after multiple lethal
    objects. That is what the MKV, MOKV, can bring to us.
        Now, sir, we have asked for money in this year's budget to
    ramp that effort up. It is not a program yet. We have requested
    money to get us down the path of concept development and to
    revisit the technology and to understand where that technology
    is today, and then come back with a program plan on how best to
    achieve that.
        But I can assure you, sir, it will be done independently,
    in terms of not concurrently with what is going on with the
    RVK. The RVK will, certainly, inform our assessment of the
    feasibility of an MOKV, but it is not a new development effort
    at this point. I would characterize it as a concept development
    effort with us doing a lot of work this year to define that
    better.
        Chairman Sessions. Well, thank you. The way I understand
    this, you are talking about having a system that can identify
    more accurately the nontargets instead of junk, going after
    junk, having multiple kill vehicles on one rocket launch
    vehicle, and be more effective. So it will multiply the
    capabilities of the interceptors that we have.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Sessions. Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to all
    the witnesses.
        Admiral Syring, you testified before other committees on
    this particular topic I am going to ask you about, but for the
    public record of this committee, does our current ground-based
    missile defense system cover all the United States, including
    the East Coast, against potential threats from North Korea and
    Iran?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. You have also stated that the greater
    priority for investment is improving your sensors, your
    discrimination capabilities, and the overall reliability of the
    GMD system. Could you describe how this will address the
    evolving threat?
        Admiral Syring. The threat is from North Korea, and let me
    just take North Korea first.
        The threat from North Korea is, at least at the short-range
    level, increasing in complexity. We have to assume that
    technology at the short- and medium-range level will eventually
    migrate to the longer range level.
        So the complexity of the threat must be accounted for, and
    the potential of that to increase, and we must be prepared for
    that. That is the whole premise of the discrimination radar, to
    be able to better defend against a more complex threat with
    fewer interceptors.
        Senator Donnelly. There has been some discussion regarding
    Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA's) assessment of Iran's
    Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Are you
    familiar with this assessment? Can you clarify a little bit for
    us?
        Admiral Syring. Thank you for the opportunity to clarify
    what I said at the hearing last week.
        The DIA's assessment is that Iran is capable of flight
    testing an ICBM in 2015. There is not a likelihood expressed
    with that assessment. Any future assessment, I will leave to
    DIA as they evaluate that this year.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Secretary McKeon and General Mann, what is the department's
    plan for responding to the high demand for THAAD and Patriot
    systems? Are there options you are looking at to increase the
    coverage or flexibility of these systems?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator Donnelly, as you are aware, we have a
    lot of stress on the Patriot force, and we have more demand
    from the COCOMs for Patriot battalions than we have in the
    Army.
        We are working on a modernization on the Patriot, which
    will effectively allow them to deploy without the headquarters
    unit, which will allow us to have more units able to deploy. We
    will be able to significantly increase the number of deployable
    battalions. So that modernization program is going on over the
    next several years.
        General Mann. Yes, Senator. In addition to what the
    Secretary has also shared, as you know, there is a holistic
    review that is taking place. There are a lot of different
    studies that are underway, led by the Joint staff, looking at
    how we address an evolving threat.
        Quite frankly, it goes beyond just the number of active
    defense platforms, whether Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
    ships, or Patriot, or Terminal High Attitutude Area Defense
    (THAAD). We really need to take a broader look at it, at the
    dilemma, and really try to leverage, whether cyber, electronic
    warfare, attack operations, where instead of waiting until
    after the missile is shot, go after the archer, as Admiral
    Gortney likes to say. So that is one of the things that we are
    looking at.
        Also, we are looking at nonkinetic applications, like
    directed energy. A lot of applications, a lot of promise in
    those technologies. They are still being developed. MDA is
    looking at some of that directed energy and where it could be
    applied against ballistic missiles.
        In the Army, we are looking at how we can use directed
    energy. We have had a lot of very, very successful tests
    against mortars and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and how
    can we utilize directed energy and also our indirect fire
    protection capability to address the cruise missile threat.
        So there are a lot of modernization efforts. But also, we
    need to look more holistically versus just the number of
    platforms you put out there.
        Senator Donnelly. Okay.
        I guess, Dr. Gilmore, this would be a follow-up to that
    question, which is in your prepared statement, you expressed
    concerns with the amount and quality of training that our
    soldiers are getting on THAAD and on Patriot.
        Could you elaborate a little bit on this? Are there ways
    that this committee can help solve that problem?
        General Mann, if you would also kick in on this.
        Mr. Gilmore. It all comes down to resources. There are a
    finite number of resources, in terms of training capability,
    training aids, simulators. The Army has a plan to improve those
    training aids and training systems for both THAAD and Patriot
    over the long run.
        But as the other members of the panel have testified, there
    is a great deal of demand for the use of these assets, and
    there is a large number of deployments that are ongoing. So the
    pace of training in what we have seen in tests isn't keeping up
    with the demand and isn't keeping up with the increasing
    complexity of the capabilities of the system as they are
    modernizing. That is true, in particular, of Patriot.
        So I think it is a matter of resources. In a resource-
    constrained environment, Admiral Syring and the Services have
    to make hard judgments. If there are high demands for deploying
    these systems and having a larger number of systems, it is
    possible that some of the training can be given--
        Senator Donnelly. General, I'm about out of time, if you
    want to kick in for a few seconds?
        General Mann. Yes. First of all, I just want to make sure
    that I assure this committee that our soldiers are properly
    prepared to execute operations. Naturally, it would be great to
    have a test battalion capability that we have had in the past.
    But because of the demand for this capability, we have had to
    use that test battalion to meet operational requirements. So I
    just want to make that very clear to the committee.
        We are looking at training aids and devices that we can use
    to help with the training and getting after that. We continue
    to raise the level of difficulty with our testing and our
    exercises, and continue to push the envelope in terms of
    presenting a challenging scenario for our soldiers to get
    after.
        This goes back to my earlier comments about the importance
    of sequestration. I don't want to belabor the point, but when
    you are looking at the effects of sequestration, not only does
    it have an impact on the readiness, which we are talking about,
    but on how we are able to address some of these evolving
    threats that are out there with new technologies. That is the
    reason why we are very, very concerned.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
    gentlemen, for being here today.
        Admiral, as we look at the threats out there, what benefits
    do you see if we would deploy the Sea-based X-band Radar (SBX)
    to the East Coast, given the threats that we are looking at
    with Iran, especially in 2020 into 2025? Wouldn't additional
    sensor capabilities be beneficial, even necessary?
        Admiral Syring. Thank you for your question, ma'am.
        Let me start with the last. Yes, additional sensor
    capabilities are not just nice to have but will be necessary
    beyond what we have asked for in this budget.
        Second, SBX is fulfilling a very important role today in
    the Pacific, with all the testing that we do and for a surge
    capability that we provided to the Northern Command commander
    when the situation arises.
        That is the importance, ma'am, of what we are doing with
    the continued request of the long-range radar in Alaska, some
    thinking about additional sensor capability in Hawaii.
        I think, in that priority order, when those are complete,
    you will see us offer the option to the Northern Command
    commander to move SBX to the East Coast. That will be his
    decision, and it will be predicated on the ability to do our
    testing in the Pacific, giving comfort to him that he is
    covered in an operation, if he needs the platform.
        I think we have it right, in terms of the priority of that
    order, in terms of North Korea certainly, as the DIA has said,
    can flight test at any time. We are focused on that assessment
    and that very real threat today in the Pacific.
        Senator Fischer. If you would, though, be looking at the
    possibility of deploying it to the East Coast, how much lead
    time would you need for that?
        Admiral Syring. The approvals would have to happen, and it
    would be months, not years.
        Senator Fischer. Have you broached the topic at all with
    NORTHCOM command?
        Admiral Syring. Not on a formal level, in any way.
        Senator Fischer. Do you know how it would be paid for and
    who would man it?
        Admiral Syring. The request this year is roughly $70
    million a year for the limited test support that it provides
    today in the underway time. I assume we would assess that
    budget adequacy for the future and the operational need on the
    East Coast.
        Senator Fischer. Where you would say it would take months,
    not years, to have this completed, are you comfortable with
    that in assessing the threats that are before us?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, ma'am. I am comfortable with what I
    understand, in terms of where Iran is today and the development
    of their ICBM technology and that threat.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you.
        Mr. McKeon, has the department looked at any policy, at
    improving the sensor capabilities, as we look to the growing
    threats from Iran?
        Mr. McKeon. Well, Senator, as Admiral Syring just said, the
    SBX in the Atlantic would be an option down the line, once we
    get our long-range discrimination radar in place in Alaska to
    face the North Korean threat. That is the focus right now,
    improving our sensor capability against North Korea.
        Senator Fischer. Do you agree that we would have plenty of
    lead time with the threats from Iran that we are going to be
    facing I think in the not too far future?
        Mr. McKeon. Yes, I believe so. Our current system is still
    adequate to deal with the current Iranian threat and how we
    expect it to evolve in the next several years.
        Senator Fischer. Is the department, though, taking any
    formal policy discussions on this?
        Mr. McKeon. We have not had that at my level. If somebody
    has at a lower level, it hasn't bubbled up to me. I can double
    check for you, Senator, but I don't think we have taken a
    formal policy review of this question.
        Admiral Syring. If I may, sir, there is an extensive sensor
    angle of attack (AOA) that the department is conducting. It is
    looking at all sensor options for many different applications,
    but missile defense is part of that. It, certainly, will
    account for our need on the East Coast in the future.
        I would also add, if I can, that the work we have done with
    integrated data terminal in Fort Drum, the System Data Terminal
    (IDT) in Fort Drum that will come online in 2017, helps us a
    lot with the Iranian threat today. I'm very comfortable and the
    warfighter is very comfortable with that increasing capability
    that will be online here.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Thank you.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. Gentlemen, you may have heard that there is
    an idea kicking around here to end-run the Budget Control Act
    and the sequester by pumping up the Overseas Contingency
    Operations (OCO) funds.
        Have you done any analysis of how that would actually work
    and where that money would go within the department? Would that
    help with your issues? Talk to me about this idea.
        Mr. McKeon. Senator King, I don't know that we have done a
    formal analysis. That would probably be the comptroller who
    would be looking at that. In terms of Admiral Syring's budget,
    there is not any money requested in the OCO. It is all in the
    base. So I'm not sure it would make much of a difference for
    missile defense.
        Senator King. My understanding of this idea is just to send
    a bunch of OCO money to the Pentagon and say, do with it what
    you will. I may be incorrect.
        Is that the way you are hearing it?
        Chairman Sessions. That has some truth to it. [Laughter.]
        Not completely so.
        Senator King. All right, I don't know the details, but my
    question is, if there was an additional $50 billion of OCO
    money, would it end up with you? Perhaps you just don't know at
    this point, because we don't know the details of what this
    proposal looks like.
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I don't know. I don't know the
    mechanics of that.
        Senator King. Okay.
        General Mann. Senator, if I could just add, though, because
    I think there has been discussion about the President's budget
    versus the House version of what you are alluding to. I can
    just say that it would be very, very important to really look
    at the base versus OCO. Because of predictability and making
    sure that our programs are stable over years versus episodic
    rises in the budget and falling off the next year, we would be
    recommending that the base be looked at.
        Senator King. That is a very important point. In other
    words, a one-time OCO infusion doesn't necessarily--in fact,
    given your sort of by definition long-range program, it would
    not be necessarily all that helpful. That is your testimony?
        General Mann. Obviously, we would be thankful for any
    additional resources that we would be given, but where you
    place them, again, I think placing them in the base would be a
    lot more advantageous to our programs.
        Senator King. Thank you. There are many of us trying to
    find a way to do that.
        How much does one GBI missile with kill vehicle cost?
        Admiral Syring. The budget number today, in today's costs,
    we don't have any requested this year, Senator. The request for
    additional GBI starts out in 2018. The budget number is $75
    million each, buying two per year.
        Senator King. That leads me to my next question. You
    mentioned directed energy. It seems to me that is a very
    promising development, because the cost of each missile, if you
    will, or railgun would be in the dollars instead of millions
    dollars. Is that part of your calculus?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. We are requesting this year an
    increase in directed energy funding, which is detailed in the
    budget that we have submitted for continued technology
    maturation, and then demonstration of a down-select of a
    technology by 2018, and then a demonstration by 2020 of a low-
    power directed energy platform.
        Senator King. Directed energy wouldn't work at the top, at
    the apogee. Where would it come into play? On the downward
    slope or on the upward slope?
        Admiral Syring. So two applications, sir, in terms of how
    we view directed energy. There are other parts of the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) that it will help with, and I
    will just leave it at that, in an unclassified setting.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Admiral Syring. But there is no doubt a boost phase
    intercept concept that we pursued with airborne laser in the
    last decade, that the technology that I am working on today
    with electric lasers, solid-state lasers, would build upon that
    success in a different technology.
        Senator King. Would sequestration impact that budget for
    this development of this directed energy program?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. It would impact everything in
    terms of the numbers that are being talked about. I cannot get
    all of that budget reduction out of just the new start
    programs, which are critically important. There are other parts
    of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) budget that we would have
    to go to maintain the commitment of 44 GBIs by 2017, and our
    European commitment as well.
        So, no doubt, directed energy would be impacted.
        Senator King. That would be pennywise and pound foolish, in
    my view.
        To what extent is this whole program reliant on satellite
    information?
        Admiral Syring. I will keep it unclassified, sir.
        Senator King. To the extent you can.
        Admiral Syring. The Overhead Persistent Infrared assets,
    specifically the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
    program, that brings Defense Support Program (DSP) and the Low
    Earth Orbit (LEO) and Highly Elipitical Earth Orbits (HEO)
    satellites, provide the initial detection of the lunch at the
    areas that we are interested in.
        Senator King. So the persistence and vulnerability or lack
    thereof of our satellite assets is an important part of this
    whole strategy?
        Admiral Syring. Absolutely.
        Senator King. Because we have had testimony on that subject
    as well. I think that is something we need to pay close
    attention to, in terms of where we go in our satellite
    strategy.
        Admiral Syring. I would agree.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Senator King, I think it is still
    incumbent on the Congress, when we appropriate money for the
    Defense Department Overseas Contingency Operating and base
    budget, to set forth where those monies are going to be spent.
    So we have to pay real attention to that in our authorizing and
    Appropriations Committee. I think the numbers that they have
    asked for, for this program, at the President's budget, we
    ought to try to achieve that.
        I think there will be a way to do that, but I appreciate
    your concern. It is worth talking about.
        Senator Sullivan, we are glad to have you on the committee.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. You bring the Alaska perspective.
        Senator Sullivan. Yes. As a matter fact, I was going to
    talk a little bit about that to begin with.
        Senator Donnelly. We are stunned to hear that, Senator
    Sullivan. [Laughter.]
        Senator Sullivan. No rolling of the eyes, gentlemen.
    [Laughter.]
        Gentlemen, first, thank you for your service. I really,
    really appreciate it. I was looking at everybody's bio and it
    is just decades of service to our country. So I am very
    appreciative of that.
        I am going to start out a little bit, and I think this is
    important only for my constituents to hear but for the
    Congress, the American people. You may have seen the Secretary
    of Defense in his confirmation hearing was very focused after
    an exchange he had with me on agreeing with the famous quote
    from Billy Mitchell, the father of the U.S. Air Force, that
    Alaska was the most strategic location in the world.
        Can you just give me a very quick sense, because I know you
    can probably go on forever, but you are free to use
    superlatives, just how important in terms of location Alaska is
    with regard to the country's missile defense?
        General Mann. I will go ahead and start.
        First of all, Senator, I am a big fan of those missile
    defenders you have up there that provide 24/7 coverage, those
    National Guardsmen, full-time National Guardsmen. But its
    location on the Earth, its proximity to North Korea and to the
    polls, I think is critically important.
        So from a strategic homeland defense standpoint, it is
    critical, where it is located.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Admiral?
        Admiral Syring. From a material developer, technology
    standpoint, in terms of the location of Alaska, there is a
    reason that we are there with the GBIs at Fort Greely. There is
    a reason that I am working with the NORTHCOM commander and
    STRATCOM commander on putting another radar in Alaska, because
    of that strategic importance to the threat from North Korea.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        I do want to talk about the strategic threat and follow up
    on Senator Fischer's concerns.
        I am sure you have seen both classified and even public
    reports that have come out recently about both the strategic
    threats from North Korea, from Iran. Johns Hopkins had a report
    recently that, by 2020, North Korea could have as many as 100
    nuclear weapons.
        Given the concerns that we are now seeing with regard to
    Iran and the negotiations that some of us have a lot of
    concerns about, are we in danger of falling behind the evolving
    North Korean or even Iranian ICBM threat, nuclear threat? What
    would falling behind mean for cities like Anchorage or L.A. or
    New York?
        Admiral Syring?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, let me take it.
        The Secretary's announcement back in 2013 to increase GBIs
    from 30 to 44 was in direct response to the escalation that we
    see in North Korea.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        Admiral Syring. Numbers matter in terms of what that was
    able to provide in a very short amount time.
        We see North Korea and Iran continuing to progress.
        Senator Sullivan. Right.
        Admiral Syring. In terms of not just the numbers of ICBMs
    they may have, but the complexity of what those threats may
    represent to us. That is why the budget request this year is so
    important, that we get the radar built and are able to stay
    ahead of the threat in terms of its complexity, and make the
    best and most efficient use of the 44 that we have in the
    ground.
        Senator Sullivan. So of course, we appreciate the 44 and
    think that is a good idea. If we see the threat continuing,
    though, is there capacity? Do you think we could possibly need
    at Fort Greely beyond the 44? Will we need it? Let's assume
    this threat gets beyond what we are anticipating today in 5
    years.
        Admiral Syring. The capacity, I will call it surge
    capacity, the extra capacity in Fort Greely does exist.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        Admiral Syring. That would be assessed on how we see the
    numbers, in terms of threats from North Korea progressing.
    Certainly, that would be an option available to the Secretary
    of Defense, to use that capability. That option would be, I
    think, weighed in terms of how those would be used versus
    future discrimination radar to the East Coast as well, in terms
    of how Iran may progress, and the complexity of that threat as
    well.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. You are talking radar. I do want to
    focus for a minute on the Long Range Discrimination Radar
    (LRDR) program.
        Can you give us just an update on the proposal, when the
    decision on the location will be made? Who actually makes that
    decision? Is that MDA? Is that contractors? What are the
    tradeoffs between the two different Alaska locations you are
    looking at?
        Admiral Syring. First, on the program, we have received
    proposals from the contractors, and our plan is to award by the
    end of this fiscal year.
        Senator Sullivan. Great.
        Admiral Syring. That said, we do need a location decision
    and we are working closely with NORTHCOM and STRATCOM on that
    location. Since I am the material developer, I need their
    warfighter input on the best location for performance.
    Certainly, cost and schedule play to that as well.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        I am glad you mentioned you are working because you know
    one of the things in Alaska, we are kind of at the seams. We
    are very important militarily but we are at the seams of
    NORTHCOM, STRATCOM, PACOM, EUCOM. I mean, we kind of fall into
    all those different areas.
        Let's assume, if there were a location chosen at Clear,
    what is the power usage that we would be looking at with regard
    to that kind of significant radar system?
        There is a coal facility being shut down. A lot of us are
    questioning why that was happening, whether it was strategic or
    whether it was some kind of clean air initiative that I didn't
    think it belonged in the DOD strategic outlook.
        What would be the kind of power generation required for
    that kind of radar system? Should we be looking at shutting
    down power generation in that part of Alaska when we might need
    a surge of power generation that is obviously not happening at
    Clear right now?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, in the interest of competition
    sensitivities with the ongoing competition on the radar today,
    I would like to take that to a closed session.
        Senator Sullivan. Sure. Again, I am not at all trying to
    get involved in one way or the other, in terms of location. It
    is just a question. You probably know there was a GAO study
    that was requested on that.
        Admiral Syring. Yes, I do. I would be happy to share my
    thoughts with you privately on that.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Mann. Senator, one thing, you asked about the
    decision, where it is going to be made. I can tell you that MDA
    and STRATCOM and NORTHCOM are working very, very closely
    together and will provide a recommendation to the department.
        So I am sure that at very, very high levels, that is where
    the decision is going to be made.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. That is expected soon?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, within the next several months.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Admiral Syring, just briefly, first, I
    believe the money you requested is appropriate, and I don't
    mean to suggest otherwise. But I asked you some questions
    earlier about, could we see savings as technology matures? I
    thought it was some good news, colleagues.
        Maybe you can give us some expectations as developments of
    these systems go forward. The per copy price isn't going to
    continue to go up, but might actually drop some.
        Thank you for your focus on cost. It is important.
        Admiral Syring. Sir, it is the agency's focus, and they
    embrace it every day. It is a matter of getting the results
    that we are after.
        I think this is a good news story on where we believe,
    after evaluating three of the contractors' proposals that
    ultimately we decided to use as a team in terms of how we are
    structured, with the government as the design authority with
    support from the three major contractors.
        Chairman Sessions. What project is this you are talking
    about?
        Admiral Syring. All the prices were very----
        Chairman Sessions. What project is this?
        Admiral Syring. This is for the new kill vehicle.
        Chairman Sessions. The new kill vehicle.
        Admiral Syring. The Redesigned Kill Vehicle. Our price
    objective would be in the neighborhood of $15 million for the
    new kill vehicle. I think that is achievable. I know that is
    achievable. That would be a huge savings over what we pay
    today, which is upwards of $35 million a kill vehicle.
        Chairman Sessions. It will be a considerably improved
    vehicle, too, right?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir, because we have given the team
    the runway and the space to system engineer it with the right
    amount of time and the right effort from the beginning.
        Chairman Sessions. General Mann, have you seen any ideas of
    that kind, Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) or others,
    that save money?
        General Mann. We continue to look at directed energy, and I
    think, like Admiral Syring was saying, that has a lot of
    promise. We have a high-energy laser mobile demonstrator that
    has been very, very effective against 60 mm mortars and UAVs.
    It also has the ability capability of the tracking beyond 30
    klicks, 30 km.
        We think it has a lot of promise. Right now, it is at the
    10 kW level. We expect by 2017 to have it up to the 50 kW,
    giving us the capability to address cruise missiles more
    effectively.
        As far as from a cost savings, when you are able to use
    directed energy or something like that versus an interceptor,
    there is a significant cost savings. So we are very encouraged
    by a lot of our tests.
        Chairman Sessions. Well, good. I remember, after much
    concern, we did not advance with the airborne laser concept,
    but it looks like we're coming forward with some new ideas that
    are more plausible.
        Admiral Syring, do you want to comment on that?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, I would say that and I would say that
    Dr. Gilmore's organization has been very helpful in helping us
    strive for alternatives to reduce the cost of testing, in
    targets and test layout. We have had a close relationship on
    that. I have to say, it is across the department, in terms of
    focus on that.
        Chairman Sessions. Good. That is good news.
        We are going to have a vote at 4:45. Any other questions?
        Senator King. Just a quick question. Could you give us an
    update on the status of the Environmental Impact Statement's
    (EISs) for the ground-based sites, U.S.-based?
        Admiral Syring. Senator King, thank you. There are four
    sites that are being evaluated, one in Maine, one in Ohio, one
    in Michigan, and one in New York. Those sites are well-known.
        That activity has progressed very well. We are going to
    need another season this summer for refinement of the analysis
    that we took last summer, and we will go out with a draft by
    the end of the year for public comment. I think you will see us
    get that through the department for publication in the 2016
    timeframe.
        Senator King. If you could find some excuse, I would urge
    you to come to Maine this summer.
        Admiral Syring. Maine is beautiful in the summertime.
        Senator King. Yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Does that include the entire committee,
    Mr. King?
        Senator King. An inspection trip, yes, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. I wanted to ask, is it your priority to
    fix the problems in the GMD system, and to demonstrate those
    fixes in realistic intercept tests before we build or deploy
    any additional interceptors?
        Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. That is the premise of the entire
    test plan that I have laid through the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP).
        Senator Donnelly. Let me ask just one other one, which is
    the Aegis Ashore site in Poland is expected to be completed by
    the end of 2018.
        Is Poland asking for additional capabilities?
        Mr. McKeon. Senator Donnelly, they have talked to us, not
    about additional capabilities along the lines of Aegis Ashore,
    but they have talked to us about Patriots.
        They are investing in a big program, a big buy upwards of
    $10 billion in integrated air and missile defense, and our
    Patriots are one of the competitors for that, and they are
    going to be making that decision in the near future. We have
    been talking to them very actively.
        What we have said to them about their request for Patriots
    is, as was discussed earlier with you, we don't have a lot of
    spares in the inventory, but we have talked to them about
    having some exercises and occasional rotations of Patriots into
    Poland. In fact, there is an exercise going on this month in
    Poland with the Patriot unit.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Senator Sullivan?
        Senator Sullivan. Mr. Chairman, I just have two quick
    questions, follow up.
        Gentlemen, with regard to Fort Greely and the requested
    budget, it is a strategic location. As you know, it is also an
    incredibly harsh environment. It is below zero there much of
    the winter and pretty remote.
        Are there areas that are not funded in the budget or budget
    areas that you are focused on that focus on ground system
    upgrades or even just capacity upgrades at Fort Greely?
        Admiral Syring. Sir, when I talk about the need to
    modernize the GMD system, the ground system is a big part of
    that. That is included in this year's budget request.
        Senator Sullivan. Right.
        Admiral Syring. Vitally important to keep up the
    reliability of the overall system.
        Senator Sullivan. But I am talking about any facility
    upgrades or anything that is in addition, or that you see that
    is not in the budget right now.
        General Mann. Quite honestly, Senator, I have some really
    good news because the Army has made some significant
    investments in the infrastructure there at Fort Greely. We are
    about to open up later on this year a medical facility that is
    much-needed up there.
        So we are trying to bring them up, in terms of the quality-
    of-life. It is a very, very harsh environment, and the Army is
    really stepping up.
        Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you, General.
        Then finally, you have obviously a hugely important
    mission. We are talking about an austere, in some ways, budget
    environment. You have many priorities.
        Can you just list what you would say are your top three or
    four right now, so we have a real solid understanding of that?
        Admiral Syring. The homeland defense system and everything
    that is being asked for in this budget, and the need to get to
    44 GBIs by 2017 is, certainly, my top priority and the
    department's top priority for missile defense.
        A close second is the regional capacity and capability of
    the European phased adaptive approach and all the other
    regional commitments that we have made around the world.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay.
        General?
        General Mann. In addition to that, I look at it two ways. I
    look at it from homeland defense standpoint, and Admiral Syring
    has talked a lot about the different improvements to the EKV
    system. But we are also looking at the regional, so Patriot
    modernization is critically important. The battle command
    system that we have for Patriot, where we get away from
    stovepipes and we're able to bring our different systems using
    one command-and-control system, a network, we're able to
    optimize our components versus having to deploy, as the
    Secretary was talking, a full Patriot battalion. Being able to
    use a network where you can break it up into pieces, cover more
    space more effectively and more cost informed is another thing
    that we are getting after.
        Then the third modernization effort that we would really
    ask for the committee's support is the indirect fire protection
    system. That will help us really get after the cruise missile
    threats that are out there, as well as being part of the
    networks.
        So modernization efforts are critically important, upgrades
    to the Patriot radar. This is a very, very old system, as you
    well know, and heavily utilized.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Sessions. Thank you. That is very good. I
    appreciate that.
        We may submit further questions for the record.
        Chairman Sessions. I believe that we have excellent
    leadership in these programs, and we thank you for that. The
    committee is ready to respond, if you have a new breakthrough
    that could make us more effective and you need to alter the
    course we are on. But in general, I believe the course that you
    have laid out, Admiral Syring, General Mann, is a sound course.
    Our committee has been supportive and will continue to be.
        Anything further that you would like to add before we
    break?
        Thank you very much. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                                directed energy
        1. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring and General Mann, in the House
    of Representatives, I founded the first-ever Congressional Directed
    Energy Caucus. I am a strong supporter of directed energy and remain a
    strong supporter of directed energy applications for military purposes,
    including missile defense. Can you provide an update to the committee
    on what programs you are pursuing as it relates to directed energy and
    missile defense?
        Admiral Syring. Our vision is to shift the calculus of our
    potential adversaries by introducing directed energy into the Ballistic
    Missile Defense System (BMDS) architecture. This will revolutionize
    missile defense, dramatically reducing, if not eliminating, the role of
    interceptors.
        Our long term goal is to use megawatt-class lasers on high
    altitude; long endurance unmanned aerial vehicle platforms to destroy
    intercontinental ballistic missiles in the boost phase at long standoff
    ranges. To achieve this vision we must prove two key elements: laser
    scaling to megawatt-class with high efficiency and excellent beam
    quality; and demonstration of a high altitude, long endurance aircraft
    to carry the laser and its beam pointing and control system.
        Our President's Budget 2016 request funds a structured plan that
    includes laser power scaling in the laboratory in parallel with
    reducing the risk of integrating a laser system onto an airborne
    platform and testing it in the field. The agency is pursuing two
    promising laser technologies today: Combined fiber lasers (MIT Lincoln
    Laboratory) and diode pumped alkali lasers (Lawrence Livermore). We are
    demonstrating high electrical-to-optical efficiency with excellent beam
    quality at incrementally increasing power levels in the laboratory.
        Lincoln has demonstrated up to 34 kW, with a plan to reach 50 kW,
    in a compact form factor, by 2018. Livermore has demonstrated 5 kW, and
    is on track to demonstrate 10 kW by May of this year with a plan to
    reach 120 kW by 2018. We are also monitoring the steady gains made by
    industry both in laser power and packaging.
        This year, we are bringing industry into the game by funding six
    month study contracts with five prime integrators; Boeing, General
    Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon, to define
    concepts and assess the feasibility, schedule and cost of building and
    testing an airborne laser. In fiscal year 2016, we will award a
    contract to one of the five to integrate a laser into an aircraft and
    ``piggyback'' BMDS tests at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in 2020
    to prove missile defense missions at lower power. In the 2025 time
    frame, our goal is to integrate a compact, efficient, high power
    (megawatt-class) laser into a high altitude, long endurance aircraft
    capable of carrying that laser and destroying targets in the boost
    phase.
        General Mann. USASMDC/ARSTRAT manages the high energy laser (HEL)
    program for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research &
    Technology). This program includes basic research, applied technology
    development, and advanced technology demonstration through the High
    Energy Laser Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) effort. The HEL MD integrates
    the laser source, power, and thermal management subsystems for the
    laser--a beam control subsystem that tracks and directs the laser
    energy to the intended target--and a command and control subsystem
    which interfaces with an external queuing radar. The HEL MD, using a
    modified 10 kilowatt (kW) commercial laser, demonstrated the ability to
    shoot down lightweight mortars and small unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs) in 2013. Future demonstrations at more weapon-relevant power
    levels (50-100 kW) will occur in fiscal years 2017-2022. These
    configurations will demonstrate robust performance against rockets,
    artillery, mortars, UAVs, and a subset of the cruise missile threat.
    The demonstrations will provide valuable data to support decisions
    regarding a future program of record for a laser weapon system that is
    complementary to kinetic energy capabilities.
        A laser weapon system for ballistic missile defense applications
    will require significantly higher power levels, and we are working in
    cooperation with the Missile Defense Agency to support their directed
    energy development activities.

        2. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring and General Mann, Iron Dome is
    a program has been extremely successful (80 percent success rate) but
    each Iron Dome Tamir missile that Israel fires--and usually two are
    sent up to intercept each descending rocket--costs at least $50,000.
    Are we pursuing anything similar to what Israel has developed in the
    form of their directed energy Iron Beam system to protect against
    short-range rockets, artillery shells, and mortar bombs?
        Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) efforts are
    focused on activities to defend the U.S. homeland, deployed forces, and
    international Allies and friends from ballistic missile threats. MDA is
    not focused on defense against shorter-range rockets and mortars. MDA
    is investing in directed energy technology, but only from a ballistic
    missile defense perspective. I defer to the U.S. Army on Department of
    Defense investments to address these shorter-range threats.
        General Mann. Yes, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is developing and demonstrating
    laser weapon capabilities to complement kinetic energy capabilities in
    countering rockets, artillery, mortars, unmanned aerial vehicles
    (UAVs), and cruise missiles. This work is done on behalf of the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research & Technology). The
    cornerstone of our high energy laser program is the High Energy Laser
    Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) effort. The HEL MD, using a modified 10
    kilowatt (kW) commercial laser, demonstrated the ability to shoot down
    lightweight mortars and small unmanned aerial vehicles in late 2013.
    Future demonstrations at more weapon-relevant power levels (50-100 kW)
    will occur in fiscal years 2017-2022. These configurations are expected
    to demonstrate robust performance against rockets, artillery, mortars,
    UAVs, and a subset of the cruise missile threat.
                            Iron Dome Co-Production
        3. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, in August 2013, I sent a
    letter to you and then-Secretary Hagel voicing support for co-
    production of Iron Dome. I later secured an amendment in the Fiscal
    Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizing $15
    million for the production of the Iron Dome short-range rocket defense
    system in the United States. To date, the United States has provided
    nearly a billion dollars to Israel for Iron Dome batteries,
    interceptors, and general maintenance. Despite these significant
    investments, the United States had not shared in production of this
    missile defense system until now. What kind of progress has been made
    on Iron Dome co-production?
        Admiral Syring. The United States and Israel signed the Iron Dome
    Procurement Agreement in March 2014. This agreement provides U.S.
    fiscal year (FY) 2013-2015 funding to procure Iron Dome components for
    the defense of Israel.
        The agreement includes spending requirements for Israel to obligate
    over $260 million (M) to U.S. suppliers from DOD funding provided in
    fiscal years 2014 and 2015. Thus far, contracts for co-production in
    the U.S. have been awarded to Raytheon ($149.3 million) and Elta-North
    America ($12.6 million). I anticipate Israel will reach the $260
    million goal.
        As the prime U.S. subcontractor to Israeli industry (Rafael),
    Raytheon is on track executing the current co-production program,
    providing Iron Dome component deliveries through the end of fiscal year
    2018. Twenty of twenty-three Raytheon purchase orders were awarded and
    the remaining orders are estimated to be finalized by the end of April
    2015.
        Overall, twenty-six suppliers located in twenty different states
    are currently involved with U.S. co-production of Iron Dome
    subcomponents. An additional procurement contract for Tamir missile
    hardware is expected to fully exercise all funding through fiscal year
    2015. The terms of this contract have not been finalized. U.S. delivery
    timeline for additional quantities will be finalized with an expected
    contract award between Rafael and Raytheon by December 2015.
        Additionally, Raytheon has received all technical data packages
    required for U.S. co-production of Iron Dome components. The DOD
    closely monitors the program and receives regular Industry and Israel
    Missile Defense Organization updates on program status.

        4. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, given the near-billion-dollars
    the United States has provided in assistance for this critical system,
    do you foresee a path toward eventual full production, as opposed to
    component production, in the United States to support American jobs?
        Admiral Syring. U.S. suppliers are on track to produce 70 percent
    of Iron Dome components for Israel security purposes. For the U.S. to
    produce, integrate and test the remaining 30 percent of components,
    additional factors will need to be addressed to include security,
    transportation, special equipment, and transfer of technical data
    packages. The non-recurring engineering / recurring engineering cost to
    develop the U.S. production capability to co-produce the Tamir
    Interceptor is estimated at over $175 million. In addition to the
    established costs, facilities capable of producing, integrating and
    testing the All-Up-Round in the U.S will be necessary. Depending on the
    total future procurement, this option may not be cost-effective.

        5. Senator Heinrich. Admiral Syring, do you envision co-production
    for other systems such as David's Sling?
        Admiral Syring. The Department of Defense is considering Israel's
    request for full-rate production of the David's Sling Weapon System and
    Arrow-3 interceptors and coordinating a consolidated position.
                               Electronic Warfare
        6. Senator Heinrich. Secretary McKeon, given the complexity and
    difficulty of missile defense, the enormous costs of each launch, and
    the vast number of incoming missiles that an adversary could
    potentially overwhelm U.S. missile defense systems, what steps are
    being taken in the realm of ``left of launch'' technologies such as
    electronic warfare and cyber that could blind, deceive, or burn enemy's
    sensors before they launch?
        Mr. McKeon. DOD continues to explore a wide range of technologies
    to defeat missiles in all phases of flight and ``left of launch.''
    Ballistic missile defense systems will remain a vital component of
    protecting our territory and forces from ballistic missile attack, and
    we will continue to pursue technologies to enhance our capabilities to
    defend against such threats.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 15, 2015

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PLANS AND PROGRAMS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:34 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Sessions, Fischer,
    Graham, Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.

          OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. Good afternoon. Our subcommittee will
    come to order.
        I thank all of you for being here, and we look forward to
    our good meeting.
        The Strategic Forces Subcommittee will receive testimony on
    the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration's] plans and
    programs for fiscal year 2016 and the Future Years Defense
    Program.
        We are pleased to have NNSA [National Nuclear Security
    Administration] Administrator Frank Klotz and his colleagues:
    Dr. Donald Cook for defense programs; Anne Harrington, Deputy
    for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation; and Admiral John
    Richardson, Director of the Office of Naval Reactors. We are
    also pleased to have with us Mr. David Trimble, Director of
    Natural Resources and Environment for the GAO [Government
    Accountability Office].
        As I stated on March 4th at that hearing with our Nuclear
    Weapons Council Chairman, Mr. Frank Kendall, the President's
    fiscal year 2016 budget request and out-year spending profiles
    represent a good faith effort given our financial difficulties,
    an effort that can help us modernize the nuclear triad and
    address the aging Department of Energy [DOE] nuclear weapons
    infrastructure problems.
        The President's budget request for nuclear weapons
    activities, $8.9 billion, meets the funding target established
    during the 2010 New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]
    ratification process.
        Administrator Klotz, I am hopeful that though funding
    constraints and in some cases poor management over the years
    have delayed NNSA modernization plans, the course you have
    charted over the next 2 decades I think is sound. And I want to
    congratulate you on certain cost containment measures. Your
    creative building review, created some using modular designs,
    has saved as much as $3 billion on two major buildings. So that
    is the kind of smart management we like to celebrate. So I
    wanted to thank you for that.
        So moving forward, I think that we are on a path to achieve
    the requirements we have for our Nation rather than, as we have
    so often been doing in recent years, just pushing things out
    further and further into the future.
        Based on the geopolitical situation today and as far as I
    can see into the future, I believe you will have the necessary
    congressional support. We want you to be frugal, all of you,
    and manage well, but I hope today that you can assure me that
    NNSA will be able to execute without huge cost overruns or
    delays.
        Looking ahead, it is apparent that future costs will be
    significant. NNSA's estimates for three planned interoperable
    warheads in the 2020-2040 timeframe have grown substantially.
    So it raises the question, is there more cost-effective design
    and production processes that can help contain these costs in
    the future.
        Finally, I would note that this is the first time the
    Strategic Forces Subcommittee will review defense nuclear
    nonproliferation programs, Ms. Harrington. While this work
    continues to receive less attention maybe than in the past and
    our activities with weapons today, NNSA's activities to
    prevent, counter, and especially respond to the threat of
    nuclear proliferation and terrorism is extremely important.
        With that, Ranking Member Donnelly, I will turn it over to
    you for comments and thank you for your strong and effective
    contributions to this subcommittee.

                   STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
    Senator Sessions for arranging this hearing and today's
    witnesses for agreeing to take time from your schedules to
    testify on a topic that is very important to the subcommittee.
        The National Nuclear Security Administration is the busiest
    it has ever been since it was created in 2000. It is
    overhauling our entire stockpile while struggling to keep our
    weapons scientists at the forefront to hedge against future
    uncertainties. It is providing critical expertise on issues
    related to negotiations on Iran's centrifuges and reactors. It
    is servicing the Navy's nuclear fleet while designing a reactor
    plan for the Ohio replacement submarine. Most of these efforts
    are long-term with little room for slippage in milestones.
        Four years ago, the NNSA was plagued with cost and schedule
    overruns. My impression today is that the management team under
    the leadership of Administrator Klotz, Madelyn Creedon, and all
    of you seem to be making headway in getting everything back on
    track. In that regard, I hope today's hearing will help us find
    out more about what the NNSA is doing to rein in cost growth to
    ensure the programs remain on track.
        Let me again thank today's witnesses for coming, and we
    look forward to your testimony.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly.
        I believe, Administrator Klotz and Mr. Trimble, you have
    agree that you two would have opening statements, and please
    commence, General Klotz.

     STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. KLOTZ, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR
        SECURITY, AND ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
       ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; ACCOMPANIED BY HON.
      DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
    NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
       HON. ANNE M. HARRINGTON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE
          NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
         ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND ADM JOHN M.
    RICHARDSON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL NUCLEAR PROPULSION AND OFFICE
     OF NAVAL REACTORS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
                          DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Dr. Klotz. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    present the President's fiscal year 2016 budget request for the
    Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
    Administration.
        I am pleased to be joined by my esteemed colleagues here
    today that you have already introduced.
        We have also provided the subcommittee a written statement
    and respectfully request that it be submitted for the record.
        Senator Sessions. It will be made a part of the record.
        Dr. Klotz. Thank you, sir.
        We value this committee's leadership in national security,
    as well as its robust and abiding support for the mission and
    the people of NNSA.
        Our budget request, which comprises more than 40 percent of
    the Department of Energy's budget, is $12.6 billion. This is an
    increase of $1.2 billion, or 10.2 percent, over the fiscal year
    2015 enacted level. This funding is extraordinarily important
    to NNSA's missions to provide and maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear weapons stockpile, to prevent, counter, and
    respond to the threat of nuclear proliferation and terrorism,
    and to support the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to
    project power and protect American and allied interests around
    the world.
        By supporting growth in each of our four appropriations
    accounts, this budget represents the commitment by the
    administration to NNSA's vital and enduring mission and to
    NNSA's role in ensuring a strong national defense.
        This mission is accomplished through the hard work and
    innovative spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to
    public service. To provide them the tools they need to carry
    out their complex and challenging tasks both now and in the
    future, we must continue to maintain and modernize our
    scientific, technical, and engineering capabilities and
    infrastructure. In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation
    to continually improve our business practices and to be
    responsible stewards of the resources that Congress and the
    American people have entrusted to us.
        To this end, NNSA continues to make progress on key
    surveillance and life extension programs which directly support
    the President's direction to maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective nuclear arsenal. Funding at the fiscal year 2016
    budget request level will ensure that these key life extension
    programs stay on track.
        For NNSA's important mission to reduce nuclear dangers, the
    fiscal year 2016 budget request shifts funding for our
    counterterrorism and emergency response missions to the defense
    nuclear nonproliferation account in order to better align funds
    across the spectrum of activities related to preventing,
    countering, and responding to nuclear threats.
        Additionally, the nuclear nonproliferation programs have
    been realigned into four business lines that better reflect the
    core competencies resident across that program.
        And the request for naval reactors? mission provides
    funding for three major initiatives, the Ohio-class reactor
    plant system development, the land-based prototype refueling
    overhaul, and the spent fuel handling recapitalization project
    in Idaho.
        For all of these missions, NNSA will continue driving
    improvements in acquisition and program management practices
    and policies and Federal oversight of the enterprise.
        Those highlights are just a handful of the critical
    national security work that this budget funds. However, if our
    appropriation from Congress remains at the Budget Control Act
    level for fiscal year 2016, NNSA's ability to meet our mission
    requirements will be at risk. In developing the budget, NNSA
    was directed to request the funds we need to accomplish the
    missions we have been tasked to do. The fiscal year 2016 budget
    request reflects this guidance. Any significant reduction to
    the amount would disrupt the science, technology, and
    engineering work taking place at our laboratories and plants,
    work that underpins our National security and broader national
    security missions.
        Again, sir, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
    before you today.
        [The prepared statements of Dr. Klotz and Admiral
    Richardson follow:]

           Prepared Statement of Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret)
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to present the President's
    Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 Budget Request for the Department of Energy's
    (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We value this
    Committee's leadership in national security, as well as its strong and
    abiding support for the mission and people of the NNSA.
        The President's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for NNSA, which
    comprises more than 40 percent of the DOE's budget, is $12.6 billion,
    up $1.2 billion or 10.2 percent over the fiscal year 2015 enacted
    level. The NNSA has a unique and special responsibility for maintaining
    a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile for as long as
    nuclear weapons exist; preventing, countering and responding to
    evolving and emerging threats of nuclear proliferation and terrorism;
    and, supporting the capability of our nuclear-powered Navy to project
    power and protect American and Allied interests around the world. By
    supporting growth in each of our four appropriations accounts, this
    budget request represents a strong endorsement of NNSA's vital and
    enduring mission, and is indicative of the Administration's unwavering
    commitment to a strong national defense.
        The NNSA's mission is accomplished through the hard work and
    innovative spirit of a highly talented workforce committed to public
    service. To provide them the tools they need to carry out their complex
    and challenging task, both now and in the future, we must continue to
    modernize our scientific, technical and engineering capabilities and
    infrastructure. In doing so, we are mindful of our obligation to
    continually improve our business practices and to be responsible
    stewards of the resources that Congress and the American people have
    entrusted to us. The NNSA took several significant steps toward this
    objective during the past year.
        NNSA's Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request reflects the close working
    partnership between NNSA and the Department of Defense (DoD) in
    providing for our Nation's nuclear deterrence capabilities and
    modernizing the nuclear security enterprise. As in last year's Budget,
    DoD is carrying a separate account in its Fiscal Year 2016 Budget
    Request for the out years, fiscal year 2017 and beyond, which
    identifies funds for NNSA's Weapons Activities and Naval Reactors. We
    urge this Subcommittee's support for alignment of its appropriations
    process and national defense or ``050'' allocations, including the
    subcommittee 302(b) allocations, with the President's Budget. The
    requested allocation supports NNSA and DoD priorities.
        Tough decisions and trades in fiscal year 2016 have been made to
    meet military commitments and nuclear security priorities. If the
    request is not fully supported, modernization of our nuclear enterprise
    and implementation of our long-term stockpile sustainment strategy
    could be put at risk. The program we have proposed is highly integrated
    and interdependent across the stockpile management, science and
    infrastructure accounts.
        Apart from the need for national defense allocation alignment, the
    looming possibility of sequestration is a major threat to all NNSA
    missions. The NNSA Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request exceeds the caps set
    on national security spending in the Budget Control Act (BCA); but is
    necessary to meet our national security commitments. Reduced funding
    levels will place these commitments at risk. We have made some tough
    resource decisions across the NNSA, but the Secretary of Energy and I
    believe that our enduring missions are too vital to the Nation's
    security to be further constrained by the current BCA spending caps.
        Details of the Fiscal Year 2016 President's Budget Request for the
    NNSA follow:
                        weapons activities appropriation
        The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for the Weapons Activities
    account is $8.8 billion, an increase of $666.6 million or 8.1 percent
    over fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. It is comprised not only of the
    Defense Programs portfolio, which is responsible for all aspects of
    stockpile stewardship and management; but also the enterprise-wide
    infrastructure sustainment activities managed by our Office of Safety,
    Infrastructure and Operations, as well as our physical and
    cybersecurity activities. It should be noted that in this budget
    request we have moved NNSA's on-going emergency response and
    counterterrorism and counterproliferation capabilities out of the
    Weapons Activities account and into the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation account. This action aligns activities for preventing,
    countering and responding to global nuclear threats into a single
    account.
    Maintaining the Stockpile
        Last year, we again successfully used science-based stockpile
    stewardship to certify to the President that the American nuclear
    weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective--without the need
    for underground nuclear testing. It is important to periodically remind
    ourselves that we have been able to do this every year largely due to
    the investments we have made and continue to make in state-of-the-art
    diagnostic tools, high performance computing platforms, and modern
    facilities staffed by extraordinarily talented scientists, engineers
    and technicians.
        For Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), the fiscal year 2016 request is
    $3.2 billion, a $494.7 million increase over fiscal year 2015 enacted
    levels, or about 18.4 percent. Approximately $133 million of this
    increase reflects a restructuring of the accounts when compared to the
    fiscal year 2015 budget request. These changes are discussed below.
        With respect to the major life extension programs (LEP), we have
    now passed the halfway mark in the production phase of the W76-1 LEP.
    This LEP, which directly supports the Navy, is now on track and on
    budget. Our fiscal year 2016 Request of $244.0 million will keep us on
    track to complete production in fiscal year 2019.
        We are also making significant progress in the engineering
    development phase of the B61-12 LEP. The B61 is a gravity bomb
    associated with Air Force long-range nuclear-capable bombers, as well
    as dual-capable fighter aircraft. Working with the Air Force, we
    successfully completed environmental flight tests on the F-15, F-16,
    and B-2 aircraft on or ahead of schedule. The B61-12 LEP will enter
    Phase 6.4 Production Engineering in 2016; and, with the $643.3 million
    requested, we will remain on track to deliver the First Production Unit
    (FPU) in fiscal year 2020.
        Based on results from the ongoing surveillance of the nuclear
    weapons stockpile performed by NNSA's laboratories and plants, the
    Nuclear Weapons Council decided that it was prudent to expand the
    planned W88 Alteration (ALT) 370 to now include replacement of the
    conventional high explosive in the warhead. The budget request reflects
    this decision and includes $220.2 million to support the FPU in fiscal
    year 2020.
        The budget request also includes $195.0 million to support the
    Nuclear Weapons Council decision to accelerate by two years an LEP of
    the W80 to serve as the warhead for the Air Force's Long Range Stand-
    Off system (LRSO). FPU is now slated for 2025.
        This budget request also supports our goal of dismantling all
    weapons retired prior to fiscal year 2009 by fiscal year 2022. In fact,
    we have already dismantled more than 42 percent of these weapons in 38
    percent of the time allotted. This funding will ensure that we stay on
    track to meet our dismantlement commitment.
        Within DSW, the budget request also includes $415.0 million for a
    new ``Nuclear Materials Commodities'' subprogram to support the
    investment needed in nuclear materials to maintain the viability of the
    enduring stockpile. Included in this subprogram are Uranium
    Sustainment, Plutonium Sustainment, and Tritium Sustainment which are
    all crucial to sustain our stockpile, even as we move to lower levels
    in our nuclear stockpile. Since last year, we have created and
    empowered new program manager positions to oversee each of these
    nuclear materials programs. Also included within DSW, is a subprogram
    for Domestic Uranium Enrichment. Ensuring we have a domestic uranium
    enrichment capability for national security needs is particularly
    important in maintaining a domestic source of LEU to produce tritium
    and for research reactor conversion program and eventually to produce
    HEU for Naval Reactors fuel.
        Consistent with the Consolidated and Further Continuing
    Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015, activities formerly carried
    out under Campaigns are now included under Research, Development, Test,
    and Evaluation (RDT&E). The funding request for RDT&E is about $1.8
    billion, essentially the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
    This includes $623.0 million for the Advanced Simulation and Computing
    (ASC) Program, an increase of $25.0 million for the Advanced Technology
    Development and Mitigation (ATDM) subprogram that supports high
    performance computing; $130.1 million for Advanced Manufacturing
    Development, an increase of $22.9 million. This funding will support
    work related to electronics-based arming, fusing, and firing, as well
    as other technologies that require significant technical effort to
    ensure production readiness for manufacturing technologies needed to
    replace sunset technologies. We continue to develop and mature additive
    manufacturing technologies that can provide significant cost avoidance
    by reducing costs to prototype and manufacture tooling and certain
    weapons components. These increases are largely offset by relatively
    small decreases in the Science (-$22.5 million for a total request of
    $389.6 million), Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield
    Program (-$10.4 million for a total request of $502.5 million), and
    Engineering (-$4.6 million for a total request of $131.4 million)
    Programs.
        The Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield program has
    spearheaded ongoing improvements in both management and operational
    efficiencies at NNSA's major high energy density (HED) facilities,
    including the National Ignition Facility (NIF) at Lawrence Livermore
    National Laboratory (LLNL). As a result of these improvements, LLNL has
    been able to increase the shot rate at NIF. NNSA recently completed a
    10-year HED Science Strategic Plan to guide work in this important
    field.
        Partnering with the DOE Office of Science, NNSA continues to make
    much needed investments in exascale computing. NNSA's ASC Program
    provides leading edge, high-end modeling and simulation capabilities to
    sustain and modernize the stockpile today and into the future. The
    fiscal year 2016 Request includes $64 million for the ASC's Advanced
    Technology Development and Mitigation subprogram to pursue long-term
    simulation and computing goals relevant to the exascale computing
    needed to support the broad national security missions of the NNSA.
    Both the NNSA and DOE's Office of Science continue to collaborate with
    the Office of Science providing $209 million towards the development of
    capable exascale systems.
        Defense Programs also supports the vitality of the broader National
    Security Enterprise. An important aspect of this is investing in
    Laboratory-, Site- and Plant-Directed Research and Development (LDRD).
    Independent reviews have consistently affirmed the importance of the
    program to the long-term vitality of the labs. LDRD provides basic
    research funding to foster innovation and to attract and retain young
    scientific and technical talent. Congressional support is essential to
    sustaining this essential national capability.
        Finally, another important accomplishment within Weapons Activities
    in 2014 was the renewal of the Mutual Defense Agreement with the United
    Kingdom. Since 1958, this enduring agreement has enabled mutually
    beneficial exchange of nuclear expertise between the United States and
    UK, contributing to a long and proud history of defense cooperation
    between our two nations. In this case, the Administration and the
    Congress worked closely together to achieve a shared goal. We are truly
    grateful for your support.
    Improving Safety, Operations and Infrastructure
        In order to support all of these critical programmatic activities,
    we are making important strides in recapitalizing our aging
    infrastructure throughout the enterprise. In August 2014, DOE and NNSA
    formally dedicated the new National Security Campus (NSC) in Kansas
    City, Missouri. The former Kansas City Plant was relocated from the
    Bannister Federal Complex, a 70-year-old facility, to the NSC with half
    the footprint and a modern operating environment. The move was safely
    and securely completed one month ahead of schedule and $10 million
    under budget. The NSC manufactures or purchases 85 percent of the non-
    nuclear components that make up our nuclear weapons, and thus plays a
    major role in keeping the Nation's nuclear stockpile safe, secure and
    effective.
        The fiscal year 2016 request restructures many of the activities
    formerly conducted under the Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
    (RTBF) into the Infrastructure and Safety program. This new program
    will maintain, operate and modernize the NNSA general purpose
    infrastructure in a safe, secure, and cost-effective manner.
    Infrastructure and Safety efforts are organized around five elements--
    Operations of Facilities; Safety Operations; Maintenance;
    Recapitalization; and, Line Item Construction. Together, these elements
    provide a comprehensive approach to arresting the declining state of
    NNSA infrastructure. The fiscal year 2016 request for Infrastructure
    and Safety is $1.5 billion and reflects an increase of $79.4 million
    for comparable activities from the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. This
    funding will allow NNSA to modernize and upgrade aging infrastructure
    and address safety and programmatic risks.
        We are developing a 10-year strategic plan that identifies the
    activities NNSA is undertaking to arrest the declining state of NNSA
    infrastructure, reduce Deferred Maintenance (DM), and dispose of excess
    facilities. The major elements of the plan include improving
    infrastructure decision-making with implementation of new, risk-
    informed analytical methods to better evaluate the ability of an asset
    to support program core capabilities; improving program management
    tools through implementation of standardized and automated processes
    and systems for scope, cost, and schedule management; accelerating
    recapitalization and construction efforts to revitalize infrastructure
    and make better use of the resources by strategically procuring common
    systems and components used across the enterprise; and shrinking the
    NNSA footprint by deactivating and disposing of excess facilities, with
    increased focus on timely deactivation and on repurposing and reuse as
    a strategy to avoid new construction. Within this 10-year plan, the
    transferring of the old Kansas City Bannister Road facility to a
    private developer to repurpose the site for local community use will
    eliminate $250 million in DM. We recognize that these goals will not be
    met quickly, and that arresting the declining state of NNSA
    infrastructure will require steady commitment at all levels of the
    organization over many years. We believe that the tools and processes
    we are developing and implementing, along with sustained investment in
    our infrastructure, will set NNSA on the right path to ensuring a
    viable, safe, and effective nuclear security enterprise well into the
    future.
        The Infrastructure and Safety program addresses the needs of
    program specific infrastructure, primarily the Uranium Processing
    Facility (UPF) and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
    (CMRR) project. RTBF provides a defined level of readiness and
    capability through infrastructure investments and strategy development
    that are dedicated to special nuclear material processing and inventory
    management. The RTBF program accomplishes this mission by modernizing
    stockpile stewardship and management infrastructure through capability
    investments, strategic development, and line-item construction projects
    for the sustainment or enhancement of capabilities. The fiscal year
    2016 request is $1.1 billion, with a reduction of $1.4 billion, due to
    the transfer of select activities to Infrastructure and Safety. For
    comparability purposes, the fiscal year 2016 request for RTBF is
    increased more than 50 percent to support a new source of high-purity
    depleted uranium, to realign recapitalization of Defense Programs
    capabilities through the Capabilities Based Investments (CBI), and to
    increase funding for the UPF at Y-12 to $430.0 million and the CMRR
    Project at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to $156.0 million.
        Last year, NNSA successfully executed one of the largest and most
    complex contract transitions in the history of the Department with the
    award of a contract to Consolidated Nuclear Security to operate and
    manage both the Pantex Plant and the Y-12 National Security Complex.
    The consolidated contract was written to require efficiencies and
    improved operations as a requirement for continued performance beyond
    the initial five-year base period. This is a departure from other
    management and operating contracts where efficiencies and effectiveness
    are considered but are not mandatory.
        Our Office of Secure Transportation (OST) provides safe, secure
    movement of nuclear weapons, special nuclear material, and weapon
    components to meet projected DOE, DoD, and other customer requirements.
    It continues to modernize assets by extending the life of the
    Safeguards Transporter and is currently looking at options for the next
    generation transporter, the Mobile Guardian Transporter. To meet an
    increasing workload, OST is planning a small increase in the number of
    federal agents.
        The primary mission of NNSA's Office of Defense Nuclear Security
    (DNS) and the Chief Security Officer is to develop and implement sound
    security programs to protect Special Nuclear Material (SNM), people,
    information, and facilities throughout the nuclear security enterprise.
    The NNSA's Defense Nuclear Security Fiscal Year 2016 request is $632.9
    million. The request manages risk among important competing needs even
    as NNSA continues to face the challenges associated with an aging
    physical security infrastructure that must be effectively addressed in
    the coming years. The request includes $13 million to initiate
    installation of Argus at the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada
    National Security Site. Argus is the enterprise security system for
    Category 1 SNM facilities that integrates access control, intrusion
    detection, and video assessment of alarms to protect and control high-
    consequence assets. DNS also has a prioritized list of smaller
    infrastructure upgrade projects it will execute as General Plant
    Projects within available O&M funding, for example, lighting systems
    supporting perimeter camera assessment, replacement and upgrades to
    Argus Field Processors, replacement of ported coax cables and buried
    cable electronics that will extend lifecycles and delay total system
    replacements. DNS initiated an Enterprise Vulnerability Assessment
    process across the enterprise with a focus on standardizing how
    vulnerability assessments are conducted and site protection strategies
    are formulated.
        The Information Technology and Cybersecurity fiscal year 2016
    request is $157.6 million, a decrease of $22.1 million or about 12.3
    percent from fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The difference is
    attributed to a one-time investment in fiscal year 2015 in the
    Infrastructure Program to implement a more secure classified computing
    environment. All activities related to the one-time increase were
    completed. Information Technology and Cybersecurity supports the
    nuclear security enterprise. This work includes continuous monitoring
    and enterprise wireless and security technologies (i.e., identity,
    credential, and access management) to help meet security challenges. In
    fiscal year 2016, NNSA plans to complete the recapitalization of the
    Enterprise Secure Network, modernize the Cybersecurity infrastructure,
    implement the Identity Control and Access Management project at NNSA
    Headquarters and site elements, and implement and coordinate all
    Committee on National Security Systems and Public Key Infrastructure
    capabilities. In addition, we will leverage the NNSA Network Vision
    framework to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of NNSA
    Information Technology (IT) services.
                 defense nuclear nonproliferation appropriation
        In fiscal year 2016, we have realigned the NNSA programs that
    continue to support the President's Prague Agenda to address the threat
    of nuclear proliferation and terrorism into the Defense Nuclear
    Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation. NNSA's activities work across the
    spectrum to prevent, counter and respond to the threat of nuclear and
    radiological proliferation and terrorism. We work to prevent the
    acquisition of nuclear or radiological materials, technology, and
    expertise; we actively counter efforts to develop the materials and
    scientific knowledge needed to construct a nuclear threat device; and
    we are poised to respond to terrorist acts by searching for and
    rendering safe any such devices.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) account request is $1.9
    billion, an increase of $325 million or about 20.1 percent from fiscal
    year 2015 enacted levels. At first glance, this figure looks like a
    very big increase but the number actually reflects a reorganization of
    our budget to include the Nuclear Counterterrorism Incident Response
    (NCTIR) and the Counterterrorism and Counterproliferation (CTCP)
    Programs from the Weapons Activities account. For comparability
    purposes, the DNN account increase is $101.0 million or over 5 percent
    above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. Additionally, we have combined
    the NCTIR and CTCP programs into a single budget program line to
    eliminate confusion about NNSA nuclear counterterrorism programs and
    activities. We also changed the NCTIR name to Nuclear Counterterrorism
    and Incident Response Program, reflecting this realignment. The DNN
    Appropriation will now support two enduring mission areas: 1) The
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program and 2) The Nuclear
    Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program. The Nuclear
    Nonproliferation Program is also restructuring to place more emphasis
    on capabilities as opposed to specific programs. This organizational
    restructuring is reflected in the DNN budget restructuring.
        To achieve all of these mission objectives, NNSA has restructured
    the budget request under the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account
    as follows:

          Material Management and Minimization
          Global Material Security
          Nonproliferation and Arms Control
          Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D
          Nonproliferation Construction
          Nuclear Counterterrorism and Incident Response Program.

        Together, this restructuring aligns funding for preventing,
    countering, and responding to global nuclear dangers in one
    appropriation.
    Nonproliferation Efforts
        The fiscal year 2016 request for the DNN Program, excluding NCTIR
    and Legacy Contractor Pensions, is $1.6 billion, an increase of $67.9
    million or about 4.4 percent above fiscal year 2015 enacted levels.
    This past year was a big year for our nonproliferation efforts. Our
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation organization was responsible for many
    of the significant deliverables at the third Nuclear Security Summit
    held in The Hague last spring. Of particular note, Japan announced at
    the Summit that it would work with us to remove and dispose of all
    highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium from its Fast
    Critical Assembly. NNSA is currently working with its counterparts in
    Japan to resolve technical and logistical issues to complete this
    effort in a timely manner.
        Also during the Summit, the United States joined 22 countries in
    signing up to a ``Gift Basket'' to secure all Category 1 radioactive
    sealed sources by 2016. In the United States, there are approximately
    465 buildings with Category 1 devices. Of these, NNSA has completed
    security enhancements at 300 and is currently involved in a targeted
    outreach campaign to engage the remaining 165 buildings by the end of
    spring 2015.
        And finally, NNSA partnered with five countries to remove 190 kg of
    HEU and plutonium from civilian facilities; which brings our cumulative
    total at the end of fiscal year 2014 to an impressive 5,207 kg; this is
    more than enough material for 200 nuclear weapons. While relations with
    Russia are severely strained, we anticipate that we will continue to
    cooperate in efforts to repatriate Russian-origin weapons-usable HEU
    material to Russia.
        The Material Management and Minimization (M3) program presents an
    integrated approach to addressing the persistent threat posed by
    nuclear materials through a full cycle of materials management and
    minimization efforts. Consistent with the priorities articulated in the
    National Security Strategy of the United States and the Nuclear Posture
    Review, the primary objective of the program is to achieve permanent
    threat reduction by minimizing and, when possible, eliminating weapons-
    usable nuclear material around the world. This program includes
    elements of the former Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and
    Fissile Materials Disposition Programs. The fiscal year 2016 request
    for this program is $311.6 million. For comparability purposes, the
    request reflects an increase of $38.7 million or about a 14.2 percent
    increase above the fiscal year 2015 enacted levels. The funding
    increases are primarily for the removal of HEU from miniature neutron
    source reactors in Africa as well as preparatory activities for future
    shipments from Europe and Japan, which will proceed with appropriate
    cost-sharing.
        The Global Material Security (GMS) program supports the President's
    nuclear and radiological security agenda and the Secretary's goal of
    enhancing nuclear security through nonproliferation. We work with
    partner countries to increase the security of vulnerable stockpiles of
    nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and radiological
    materials, and to improve partner countries' abilities to deter,
    detect, and interdict illicit trafficking. Elements of the former GTRI
    program, International Material Protection and Cooperation (IMPC)
    program, and Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program
    are being combined in GMS, in order to better integrate capabilities
    required to support DNN's enduring mission. The fiscal year 2016
    request for this program is $426.8 million. For comparability purposes
    the request reflects a slight increase of $2.5 million above the fiscal
    year 2015 enacted levels. This increase will accelerate the protection
    of International Atomic Energy Agency Category 1 radiological sources
    in order to meet the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit commitment to secure
    these sources by 2016.
        The Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) program supports the
    President's nonproliferation agenda and NNSA efforts to prevent the
    proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction by state and non-
    state actors. To carry out the goals of this program, we work with the
    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and foreign partners to build
    global capacity to safeguard nuclear materials and prevent illicit
    transfers of dual-use materials, equipment, technology and expertise.
    We also work with our partners and the IAEA to develop technologies and
    approaches to verify and monitor current and future arms control
    treaties and agreements. This funding also supports statutorily
    mandated activities such as technical reviews of export licenses and
    interdiction cases, and technical support for the negotiation and
    implementation of civil nuclear cooperation agreements (123
    Agreements), as well as international export control outreach
    activities, and activities to support and improve the execution of the
    NPAC 10 CFR Part 810 application process. The fiscal year 2016 request
    for this program is $126.7 million, and reflects a slight increase of
    $0.8 million above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level.
        The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Research and Development (DNN
    R&D) program supports innovative, unilateral and multi-lateral
    technical capabilities to detect, identify, and characterize: 1)
    foreign nuclear weapons programs, 2) illicit diversion of special
    nuclear materials, and 3) nuclear detonations. To meet national and
    Departmental nuclear security requirements, DNN R&D leverages the
    unique facilities and scientific skills of the Department of Energy,
    academia, and industry to perform research, including counterterrorism-
    related R&D. DNN R&D conducts technology demonstrations, and develops
    prototypes for integration into operational systems. The fiscal year
    2016 request for this program is $419.3 million, a $25.9 million
    increase or about 6.6 percent above fiscal year 2015 levels. Increased
    funding is requested for nuclear and energetic materials
    characterization experiments and development of advanced diagnostic
    equipment capabilities, for long-range nuclear detonation detection,
    and technical forensics research. This increase over fiscal year 2015
    levels is partially offset by a return to baseline funding for the
    Proliferation Detection subprogram after a one-time Congressional
    increase in fiscal year 2015 for test bed development and field
    experiments.
        Nonproliferation Construction consolidates construction costs for
    DNN projects previously contained within each program budget.
    Currently, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) is the only project
    in this program. The fiscal year 2016 request for MFFF is $345 million
    which is the same as the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The National
    Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 and the Consolidated and
    Further Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2015 directed the
    Department to conduct additional analyses of the MFFF construction
    project. These analyses will include independent cost and schedule
    estimates, and examination of alternative approaches for disposition of
    the 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium and their relationship to
    the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement (PMDA). The Department
    has requested Aerospace Corporation, a federally funded research and
    development center, to perform these analyses. They will be completed
    during fiscal year 2015, and will inform a final decision on the path
    forward. The fiscal year 2016 request emphasizes that while the
    Department continues to evaluate disposition paths (including the MFFF)
    to determine the most responsible path forward, any viable alternative
    will require a significant amount of funds to implement.
    Nuclear Counterterrorism and Emergency Response
        The fiscal year 2016 Request consolidates counterterrorism and
    emergency response funding into a single Nuclear Counterterrorism and
    Incident Response line in the amount of $234.4 million.
        Within NCTIR, the Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment program
    represents the primary scientific program to assess the threat of
    nuclear terrorism and develop technical countermeasures against it. The
    knowledge generated under this program ensures that NNSA's technical
    expertise on nuclear threat devices informs DoD and FBI emergency
    response capabilities. We have taken steps to address funding
    reductions to the nuclear counterterrorism activities. Over the last
    two years these activities, formerly known as Counterterrorism and
    Counterproliferation within the Weapons Activities appropriation, have
    been funded at a level significantly below the requested amount--70
    percent of the Request in fiscal year 2014 and 60 percent in fiscal
    year 2015. The fiscal year 2016 request would dedicate $57.8M to
    Nuclear Counterterrorism Assessment in support of improvised nuclear
    device analysis. Additionally, the request includes funds within
    Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D for materials characterization
    experiments and other research, which supports nuclear counterterrorism
    and incident response missions. Full funding of both lines will make it
    possible to continue NNSA's vital counterterrorism work at the national
    laboratories.
        NCTIR continues to work domestically and around the world to
    improve preparedness and emergency response capabilities. Its expert
    scientific teams and equipment provide a technically trained, rapid
    response to nuclear or radiological incidents worldwide. NCTIR assesses
    nuclear or radiological threats and leverages that knowledge to provide
    contingency planning and training to support national and international
    counterterrorism and incident response capabilities. In 2014, NNSA's
    emergency response teams deployed more than 100 times in support of law
    enforcement and for major public events, such as the Super Bowl, and
    conducted five large-scale field exercises with partners from the FBI,
    DoD, and FEMA In addition, they deployed over 70 times in support of
    DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office support to state and local first
    responders. Internationally, NNSA conducted 16 training courses to
    improve its foreign partners' emergency management capabilities and
    continued to work bilaterally with Israel, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand,
    Chile, China, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, Canada, France,
    Jordan, the Nordic countries, Armenia and Kazakhstan. New programs were
    also started with Romania, Belarus and the Philippines. These
    initiatives represent our effort to create a truly global defense
    against the threat of nuclear terrorism.
        NCTIR will also continue the initiative to equip cities with
    stabilization equipment and training, to ensure a prompt and effective
    response to nuclear terror threats.
        NCTIR also executes the DOE's Emergency Management and Operations
    Support program that manages the Emergency Operations Centers,
    Emergency Communications Network, and Continuity Programs for all of
    DOE, including NNSA.
                          naval reactors appropriation
    Advancing Naval Nuclear Propulsion
        During the past year, NNSA helped celebrate the 60th Anniversary of
    the USS Nautilus first getting underway on nuclear propulsion. The
    Naval Nuclear Propulsion program pioneered advances in nuclear reactor
    and warship design--such as improving reactor lifetimes, increasing
    submarine stealth, and reducing propulsion plant crewing. An example is
    the technology being developed by Naval Reactors that will enable the
    Ohio-class Replacement submarine to be designed for a 40-plus year
    operational life without refueling, resulting in significant savings.
        During 2014, Naval Reactors continued its record of operational
    excellence by providing the technical expertise required to resolve
    emergent issues in the Nation's nuclear-powered Fleet, enabling the
    Fleet to steam more 2 million miles. Through the work of its laboratory
    and highly skilled personnel, Naval Reactors also advanced the Ohio-
    class Replacement and the S8G Prototype Refueling projects as well as
    initiating integrated testing of the lead A1B reactor plant for the
    next generation Ford-class aircraft carrier.
        It is generally not well-known that if anything goes wrong with a
    reactor on one of the Navy's nuclear carriers or submarines while they
    are at sea, Naval Reactors' cadre of experts provide around-the-clock
    technical support, and can often resolve the problem and prevent the
    ship from having to return to port to be checked out and repaired--
    which would be quite costly and disruptive to the Navy's deployment
    schedules.
        The budget request for Naval Reactors is $1.4 billion, an increase
    of $141.6 million, about 11.5 percent from the fiscal year 2015 enacted
    level. The request includes the base funding required to safely
    maintain, operate and oversee the Navy's 83 nuclear-powered warships,
    constituting over 45 percent of the Navy's major combatants. The
    increase supports three high priority activities: $186.8 million to
    continue development of the advanced Ohio-class Replacement reactor;
    $133 million to continue preparations for the refueling and overhaul of
    the Land-Based Prototype reactor plant; and $86 million to continue the
    design work of the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project started
    in fiscal year 2015. To this end, we would like to thank the
    Subcommittee's support for appropriating $70 million for Spent Fuel
    Handling Recapitalization Project in the fiscal year 2015 enacted
    budget. These activities are essential to maintaining a credible sea-
    based strategic deterrent, to maintain the research and training
    capabilities of the Land-based Prototype, and to maintain the
    capability to safely inspect, store and package naval spent nuclear
    fuel.
                nnsa federal salaries and expenses appropriation
        NNSA Federal Salaries and Expenses (FSE) Request is $402.7 million,
    essentially equal to the rate of operations in fiscal year 2015, but
    8.9 percent above the fiscal year 2015 enacted level. The Request
    provides funding for 1,690 full-time equivalents (FTEs) and support
    expenses needed to meet mission requirements. We are actively engaged
    in hiring to that number in a thoughtful and strategic manner. I would
    note that the Request represents an increase of only $1.5 million from
    the fiscal year 2015 planned execution level of $401.2 million. This is
    due to the fact that the fiscal year 2015 enacted level was
    significantly below the request and we will need to use over $30
    million of planned carryover to sustain the currently projected
    operations of the NNSA federal workforce. We built up that reserve
    through prudent planning and execution to enable us to pay for large
    one-time costs, such as the movement of much of our federal workforce
    in Albuquerque into newer leased space. The increase includes a 1.3
    percent cost of living adjustment and benefits escalation, additional
    support to stand up the Office of Cost Estimation and Program
    Evaluation (CEPE) office in accordance with Section 3112 of the fiscal
    year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and funding to
    improve financial systems integration within the nuclear security
    enterprise in accordance with Section 3128 of the fiscal year 2014
    NDAA.
        In fiscal year 2016, NNSA will continue its on-going efforts to
    plan strategically to meet current and future workforce needs by
    analyzing how evolving missions are affecting job requirements.
    Reshaping of the workforce over the next several years will be
    essential, including obtaining both the right staffing size and skill
    sets. NNSA will also continue to identify efficiencies, particularly in
    travel and support services, to provide a lean and efficient
    organization and to support the President's Executive Order ``Promoting
    Efficient Spending''.
                            management & performance
        To enhance our ability to carry out our mission and execute this
    budget request, we will continue to focus on improving our project
    management and cost estimating capabilities. In keeping with the
    Secretary of Energy's increased focus on Management and Performance,
    the NNSA is committed to manage its operations, contracts and costs in
    an effective and efficient manner. The NNSA's Office of Acquisition and
    Project Management (APM) is driving continued improvement in contract
    and project management practices. APM is leading the NNSA's effort to
    deliver results by instituting rigorous analyses of alternatives,
    providing clear lines of authority and accountability for federal and
    contractor program and project management, and improving cost and
    schedule performance. NNSA participates in the Secretary's Project
    Management Risk Committee as a means to institutionalize and share best
    practices across the Department.
        We have used strategic partnerships with the National Laboratories
    to rethink some of our most challenging projects. As a result of the
    Red Team review of the UPF at the Y-12 National Security Complex, led
    by the director of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and a similar
    approach to the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
    Facility capability at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we are
    developing a disciplined, modular approach for both sites that will
    remove risks early in the process, and establish a well-defined cost
    and schedule, both of which were lacking in earlier efforts. This
    process will be an important and recurring project management theme at
    the NNSA and across the Department of Energy.
        The CEPE was established in September 2014 pursuant to the fiscal
    year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act. This legislation
    recognized the effort to improve cost estimating that the NNSA had
    already started. The CEPE office is a prime example of actions taken to
    improve our cost estimation efforts. Forging a strong partnership with
    the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation (CAPE), including joint training activities with CAPE, we
    have made good progress in establishing CEPE as an independent office.
    CEPE will provide independent cost estimating leadership, rigorous
    program analysis, and prudent fiscal guidance. Getting CEPE fully
    functional is a high priority for NNSA, and we will closely monitor its
    progress as it grows into its full potential over the next few years.
                                   conclusion
        The NNSA executes vital missions to ensure nuclear security at home
    and abroad. We do this by delivering the technology, capabilities and
    infrastructure essential to a 21st century national security
    organization. Our workforce continues to rise to the challenge and
    deliver mission effective and cost efficient nuclear security solutions
    critical for the NNSA to succeed in today's fiscal climate.
        In closing, I would also like to mention that the President's
    Budget Request is just the first in a series of documents slated for
    release this spring. The most important of those yet to be released is
    the NNSA Strategic Plan, last updated in May 2011. The goal of this
    document is to provide a single integrated guidepost for NNSA's
    leaders, our partners at the labs and plants, and Congress and our
    external stakeholders. The new strategic plan will articulate a clear
    direction and mission to everyone--no matter their rank or position.
    Also to be released is the Congressionally-mandated Stockpile
    Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) which details NNSA's multi-year plan
    for delivering a safe, secure and effective nuclear stockpile. And for
    the first time, we plan to release a companion plan to the SSMP,
    tentatively titled, ``Prevent, Counter and Respond'' to address our
    plans for nonproliferation, counterterrorism and emergency response
    programs. Finally, a report is being prepared for Congress in response
    to the Final Report from the Congressional Advisory Panel on the
    Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, co-chaired by Norm
    Augustine and Admiral Rich Mies.
        Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

                 Prepared Statement of Admiral John Richardson
        Since my last testimony before this subcommittee, U.S. Nuclear
    Powered Warships - 10 aircraft carriers, 14 ballistic missile
    submarines, 53 attack submarines, and 4 guided missile submarines -
    operated for another year safely and effectively, steaming more than 2
    million miles in support of our nation's interests. Some highlights of
    those operations include the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, USS
    George H.W. Bush (CVN 77), the only coalition strike option in the
    fight against ISIL militants for 54 days, executing 20-30 sorties each
    day. Our ballistic missile submarine force completed their 4000th
    strategic patrol, continuing over 50 years of peacekeeping capability
    through strategic deterrence. The USS Gerald R. Ford began her
    propulsion plant test program and will proudly set sail for the first
    time next year. The attack submarine USS North Dakota (SSN 784) was
    commissioned in November. We christened the USS John Warner, a
    submarine named after a truly great member of the Senate. We laid the
    keel for the USS Illinois, our thirteenth Virginia-class submarine.
    Finally, this past January, we commemorated a truly historic event for
    Naval Reactors and the Nation. We celebrated the 60th anniversary of
    the submarine USS Nautilus (SSN 571), the world's first nuclear-powered
    ship.
        Additionally, we finally completed construction and infrastructure
    projects, some deferred from 2010, to maintain and upgrade the
    facilities our engineers require to attain these important successes in
    the fleet. The $75 million Cask Shipping and Receiving Facility in
    Idaho completed and opened this year under budget and will soon begin
    receiving shipments of Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel in support of the USS
    Enterprise defueling.
        This progress and service to the fleet is only possible through the
    firm support of this subcommittee. Naval Reactors' request for fiscal
    year 2016 allows us to continue this work. The funding request is for
    $1.375 billion, an increase of $136 million (11 percent) over the
    fiscal year 2015 enacted funding level. The requested funding permits
    Naval Reactors to continue to support today's operational fleet, as
    well as deliver tomorrow's fleet by funding three national priority
    projects. The projects are:

          Designing a new reactor plant for the replacement for the
    Ohio-class SSBN
          Refueling a Research and Training Reactor in New York
          Build a new spent fuel handling facility in Idaho

        The fiscal year 2016 request adequately funds all of our
    requirements: the highly-qualified people, equipment, facilities, and
    technology development needed to support today's nuclear-powered fleet,
    and the three projects in support of tomorrow's fleet.
        Uncompromising and timely support for safe nuclear fleet operation
    will always be the highest priority for Naval Reactors. $973 million of
    my budget request funds the technical support base for the 96 operating
    reactors at sea on ships and at our training and research sites. The
    extremely talented men and women, along with the equipment and
    facilities upon which they depend, stand ready 24 hours per day, 365
    days per year to respond to advance the mission and respond to emergent
    fleet needs for assistance. They are the principal reason that the
    Program has delivered 60 years of safe and effective operations by
    ships on station supporting our national interests. The teams at our
    four Program sites - the Bettis Laboratory in Pittsburgh, the Knolls
    Laboratory and Kesselring Site in greater Albany, and our spent nuclear
    fuel facilities in Idaho - perform the research and development,
    analysis, engineering and testing needed to both support today's Fleet
    and develop future nuclear-powered warships. Importantly, they perform
    the technical evaluations that enable me to thoroughly assess emergent
    issues and deliver timely responses that both ensure nuclear safety and
    maximize operational flexibility. This technical support base is
    essential to enabling our submarines and aircraft carriers to deploy.
        Funding reductions in fiscal year 2015 most directly impacted this
    technical support base. The funding levels provided in fiscal year 2015
    will result in a delay to the start of the Engineroom Team Trainer
    facility in upstate New York, a structure that will host a first-of-a-
    kind nuclear simulation technology. This training simulation
    technology, when built, will lower the cost and improve the
    effectiveness of providing nuclear-trained sailors in the future. The
    delay in building this technology also reduces our future training
    capacity and will limit the number of nuclear-trained sailors provided
    to the fleet. I have again requested funding for this essential
    facility in my fiscal year 2016 request. fiscal year 2015 funding
    levels also prevented construction of the Central Office and Prototype
    Staff Buildings in New York. These buildings were planned to
    accommodate the over 200 engineers and training staff that will arrive
    at the site in fiscal year 2017-21 to conduct the S8G Prototype
    Refueling Overhaul discussed below. As a result, I will have to
    procure, at nearly the same total cost, temporary office spaces and
    trailers, reducing worker efficiency, effectiveness, and quality of
    life.
        In addition to funding the technical support base, my request in
    fiscal year 2016 includes $186 million to continue Naval Reactors'
    efforts in designing a new reactor plant for the Ohio-class
    Replacement. Activity this year includes reactor plant design and
    component development to support procurement of long lead components
    starting in fiscal year 2019. Progress in these areas in fiscal year
    2016 will ensure that the advanced capability that the life-of-the-ship
    reactor core provides is delivered in a technically satisfactory and
    cost effective manner in time to support lead ship construction
    beginning in fiscal year 2021.
        Related to the Ohio-class Replacement, the fiscal year 2016 request
    includes $133 million in funding for the Land-based Prototype Refueling
    Overhaul in upstate New York. Refueling this reactor supports two major
    purposes: reducing cost and schedule risk to the life-of-ship core for
    Ohio-class Replacement project and supporting training of about 1000
    Sailors per year for the next 20 years. In fiscal year 2015 and fiscal
    year 2016, Naval Reactors continues the core manufacturing development
    work needed for the Refueling Overhaul and the plant service life
    engineering design to ensure that the Land-based Prototype plant
    overhaul is performed concurrently with the refueling that starts in
    fiscal year 2018.
        Finally my fiscal year 2016 request contains $86 million to
    continue the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization Project (SFHP).
    Thanks to the support Congress provided in fiscal year 2015, we will
    complete the facility conceptual design and issue a draft Environmental
    Impact Statement this year. The fiscal year 2016 request will allow us
    to publish the final Environmental Impact Statement, set key facility
    dimensions, and continue to advance the design. Continued support in
    fiscal year 2016 and beyond is essential to ensure the facility can
    begin receiving spent fuel from the fleet in fiscal year 2025. Further
    delays to the project schedule incur costs of approximately $150
    million per year to procure shipping containers to temporarily store
    the spent fuel from aircraft carrier refuelings. Delays to date have
    incurred over $500M in costs for temporary containers. More of these
    containers will not be necessary if the project stays on track.
        In developing our request, I have worked closely with the
    leadership of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the
    Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Management and Budget and the
    Department of Defense. This budget not only reflects my priorities for
    Naval Reactors but also integrates them with the other important work
    of my colleagues at NNSA. There is clear recognition of the valuable
    capabilities Naval Reactors provides and our history in effectively
    meeting our obligations. I understand the difficult budget environment
    in which Congress must craft legislation and I respectfully urge your
    support for aligning allocations with the fiscal year 2016 Budget
    Request.
        Naval Reactors' fiscal year 2016 budget request will ensure that I
    can meet my statutory responsibilities to maintain a safe and effective
    nuclear-powered Fleet, continue environmental stewardship at my program
    sites, and progress Ohio-class replacement, Land-based Prototype
    Refueling Overhaul and the Spent Fuel Handling Recapitalization
    Project.
        With the help of Congress, Naval Reactors is committed to executing
    our projects on time and on budget, and I to continue to search for the
    most cost effective way to support safe operations of the nuclear
    fleet.

        Senator Sessions. Mr. Trimble?

    STATEMENT OF DAVID C. TRIMBLE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
             ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Mr. Trimble. Thank you. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, and members of the subcommittee, my testimony today
    is based on our past work and will address NNSA's modernization
    plans, difficulties in managing programs to cost and schedule,
    management and governance of the enterprise, and NNSA's
    nonproliferation programs.
        Regarding modernization, GAO annually reviews NNSA's plans
    and budget estimates for the modernization of the nuclear
    secured enterprise, and every year that we have reviewed it,
    significant changes have occurred. The Augustine-Mies Panel
    also observed that the SSMP has varied from year to year in the
    cost and schedules for the delivery of LEP's and nuclear
    facilities, concluding that the lack of a stable, executable
    plan for modernization is a fundamental weakness for NNSA.
        In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes. For example--
        Senator Sessions. A stable what kind of plan?
        Mr. Trimble. I am sorry. I am sorry. Concluding that the
    lack of a stable, executable plan for modernization is a
    fundamental weakness for NNSA.
        Senator Sessions. Okay.
        Mr. Trimble. That is from the Augustine-Mies report.
        In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes.
        Senator Sessions. That is the August of 2014 report?
        Mr. Trimble. The Augustine-Mies report on governance.
        Senator Sessions. When was it?
        Mr. Trimble. 2014.
        Senator Sessions. Go ahead.
        Mr. Trimble. In our 2014 work, we also noted such changes.
    For example, in fiscal year 2014, production of the
    interoperable W78/88 warhead was pushed back 2 years and
    production of the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 were also delayed. By
    fiscal year 2015, the W78/88 LEP was pushed back another 5
    years, and the B61 and W88 were each pushed back another year.
        NNSA has, however, taken actions to improve its plans. In
    the fiscal year 2015 plan, NNSA incorporated estimates
    previously omitted for UPF [the Uranium Processing Facility]
    and CMRR [the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement],
    improved the transparency of some budget estimates and based
    its LEP estimates on more current data.
        Regarding NNSA's contract and project management
    challenges, much work remains to be done. Modernization plans
    require NNSA to design and build new large nuclear facilities
    on time and on budget. Such projects have historically posed a
    challenge for DOE [the Department of Energy] and NNSA. DOE has
    shown progress in managing smaller projects, and DOE leadership
    continues to demonstrate a strong commitment to address its
    longstanding contract and project management challenges.
        However, our recent high risk report noted that DOE's cycle
    of identifying root causes and corrective actions raises
    concerns that DOE has not fully identified the root causes
    behind its problems. In 2008, DOE issued a corrective action
    plan which identified root causes, including front-end
    planning, project funding, accountability, cost estimating
    management workforce, and project oversight. In 2010, DOE
    identified six additional barriers and new corrective actions.
    In 2011, DOE stated that its corrective actions had mitigated
    most of the root causes of its issues. Most recently in 2014,
    DOE identified four factors that contribute to project
    management success or failure. Notably, all four are discussed
    in DOE's 2008 report and among those that DOE said in 2011 it
    had at least partially mitigated.
        Our recent reports have made numerous recommendations to
    help DOE in this area, but in some cases, DOE has appeared
    hesitant to implement them. In our 2014 report on MOX [mixed
    oxide fuel], we recommended that DOE require a root cause
    analysis for projects that experience cost increases or
    schedule delays exceeding a certain threshold, similar to a
    requirement that DOD [the Department of Defense] has. DOE
    disagreed with our recommendation.
        In 2014, we found that DOE and NNSA requirements for cost
    estimating and conducting analyses of alternatives generally do
    not reflect best practices. While DOE agreed with our
    recommendations to incorporate best practices into
    requirements, it did not specify a timeline for implementation.
        NNSA is embracing a new modular approach to address the
    mission of both UPF and CMRR. While this approach may simplify
    the challenge of managing a large construction project, it
    creates other challenges, including the need to coordinate
    activities across multiple facilities and the need to renovate
    facilities that were once expected to close. We plan to examine
    NNSA's new approaches to both UPF and CMRR this year.
        Regarding governance, the Augustine-Mies report highlighted
    many of the same issues we have reported on, including the
    management of capital projects, cost estimating, and workforce
    planning.
        The panel also examined NNSA's oversight of its M&O
    contractors and raised questions regarding the effectiveness of
    contract requirements and performance metrics on mission
    execution. We have ongoing work examining NNSA's contract
    oversight policies and the extent to which it relies on
    contractor assurance systems for evaluating and rewarding
    performance. We should complete this work in May of this year.
        Finally, regarding nonproliferation, NNSA has made progress
    in the President's 2009 initiative to secure all vulnerable
    nuclear material around the world.
        Senator Sessions. Mr. Trimble, if I could interrupt you. We
    think it is appropriate, Senator Donnelly and I, that we have a
    moment of silence for the Boston Marathon bombing. The time is
    now. So if you would join us in a moment of silence.
        [A moment of silence was observed.]
        Senator Sessions. Okay, move on.
        Senator Donnelly. One other thing that I think Senator
    Sessions and I would both like to join in on is this is a
    special day. At 3 o'clock, they are going to give the
    Congressional Gold Medal to Doolittle Raiders just down the
    hall. They set a pretty good standard for all of us, and we
    would like you to keep them in your thoughts today for
    everything they did for our country.
        Senator Sessions. That is a good point. I remember as a
    young kid reading about those brave Americans and that critical
    event in our history.
        All right. Mr. Trimble, I am sorry to interrupt you. You
    may continue.
        Mr. Trimble. I am almost done. No problems.
        So finally regarding nonproliferation, NNSA has made
    progress in the President's 2009 initiative to secure all
    vulnerable nuclear material around the world, but challenges
    remain. In 2011, we reported that DNN faced difficulties in
    ensuring the security of U.S. weapons usable nuclear materials
    that have been transferred to other nations. DNN's programs
    heavily depend on the cooperation of other countries. Notably,
    the decision by the Russian Government to cease joint
    cooperation with NNSA raises questions about the sustainability
    of past progress. Last year, NNSA reorganized DNN and has been
    assessing over-the-horizon nuclear and radiological
    proliferation threats. We have ongoing work directed by this
    committee looking at NNSA's long-term nonproliferation planning
    efforts.
        Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Trimble follows:]

      [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        Yes, Senator King?
        Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. I want to
    apologize to the witnesses. I have an unusual Wednesday
    afternoon Intelligence meeting on overhead architecture which
    is also related to this, and I have to excuse myself. But we
    will be submitting questions for the record.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. And if you would like to ask a
    few questions before you leave----
        Senator King. No. That is all right. I will submit the
    questions for the record.
        Thank you all very much and thanks for the work that you
    do. Senator Fischer and I had the opportunity to visit two of
    the labs, and Dr. Klotz, it was very impressive what the people
    are doing out there. I commend to you gentlemen a visit to
    those labs in New Mexico. Where are they? They are in New
    Mexico.
        [Laughter.]
        So I follow with interest what you are doing and apologize
    for having to absent myself. The Intelligence Committee very
    rarely meets on a Wednesday, but this is an important issue. So
    thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator King. And thanks for
    your faithful attendance and interest in this subcommittee.
        So, General Klotz, let me just sort of ask you quickly a
    serious of questions about projects that are ongoing that we
    need to keep on track at cost and schedule. My overall question
    is I believe it would be appropriate and necessary for you to
    let us know if there are problems in these areas that you know
    are going to be there or may be there. So give us a heads-up
    warning. So can you give us a quick update on the life
    extension programs in general? Dr. Cook, you contribute to this
    as you all agree. Are they on schedule? Are we having any cost
    overruns? Are they synchronized with the respective DOD
    delivery systems? Can you give us insight into that and how are
    we doing?
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir, I can. And I would welcome Dr. Cook,
    who has----
        Senator Sessions. I have about six of these I am going to
    ask. I would kind of like to just be on the record if you see a
    problem, and then maybe we can pursue that after we run the
    list to kind of give us a perspective of where we are.
        So let me start this way then. The W76-1, submarine-
    launched ballistic missile warhead. In production, it was
    expected to be complete by the end of 2019. How are we doing on
    that?
        Dr. Klotz. W76-1 is currently in the production phase. This
    past year, 2014, we past the halfway point. Everything is on
    track for completing the program in fiscal year 2019.
        Dr. Cook. It is meeting its full cost, schedule, and scope
    objectives, right now on track.
        Senator Sessions. Good.
        What about the B61-12, the tactical strategic bomb?
        Dr. Klotz. The B61-12 is in engineering development or
    development engineering. We had a very good year last year in
    terms of the initial tests and in terms of the funding, and it
    is on track to deliver the first production unit in 2020.
        Dr. Cook. Additionally, it is now in its fourth full year
    of full-scale engineering development and again meeting all
    cost, schedule, and scope milestones.
        Senator Sessions. Good.
        The W88 alternate 370, the submarine-launched ballistic
    missile warhead.
        Dr. Klotz. Senator, this is one of the significant changes
    in this year's budget submission. We had originally intended to
    do an alteration to the W88 affecting its arming, fusing, and
    firing assembly, as well as some other limited life component
    changes to the warhead. Based upon ongoing surveillance
    conducted by our laboratories and our plants, we detected an
    aging issue, and it made sense to us and to the United States
    Navy that when we bring these warheads back for this
    alteration, that we also change out the conventional high
    explosive, which is one of the components within the warhead.
    So that has required a cost increase in this year's budget
    submission. Yet we are still on track for doing the alteration
    and having the first production unit available in fiscal year
    2020.
        Dr. Cook. This one is in its third year of full-scale
    engineering development, and as Under Secretary Klotz said, we
    are adding new scope that results in new cost. But all of the
    existing scope is meeting cost and schedule requirements.
        Senator Sessions. Well, tell me about what do you expect--
    my understanding from previous discussions with General Klotz,
    this is a necessary thing. It is an appropriate, wise decision
    to do the explosive replacement at the same time. What kind of
    cost are we looking at? Is that in the budget?
        Dr. Cook. The cost estimate that we have for the whole
    refresh of the explosive is $530 million. We have expended
    about $30 million of that if you look through last year and you
    project this year to the end. It is in the budget. We have
    worked thoroughly with DOD and with U.S. Strategic Command
    [STRATCOM], and we have decided to cut out some other parts of
    the budget giving this higher priority, not requesting
    additional money.
        Dr. Klotz. Senator, if I could just stress, though, the W88
    warhead is a safe, secure, and effective warhead. This is the
    reason why we have a scientifically based stockpile stewardship
    program. We surveil these systems as they age, and we are
    trying to prudently head off a problem down the road while we
    are doing the already scheduled work on the W88. This decision
    was endorsed by the Nuclear Weapons Council and by the Navy. So
    we are going forward as a joint team on this.
        Senator Sessions. Good.
        And one more and I will go to Senator Donnelly. The W80-4,
    the air-launched cruise missile warhead.
        Dr. Klotz. Another change, Senator, to our budget
    submission this year. In the last year's budget submission, we
    had forecasted providing the first production unit in fiscal
    year 2027. That is how the budget was built. Again, because of
    discussions with DOD and STRATCOM and the Air Force over its
    requirements for a follow-on to the air-launched cruise
    missile, a system that has been in the Air Force for decades
    now, they wanted to deliver that capability earlier, and so we
    have moved up the delivery of the first production unit from
    2027 to 2025 with this budget request. And again, the
    additional cost for that acceleration is covered within our
    budget submission.
        Dr. Cook. This W80 Mod 4, as it is now called, is in the
    first phase 6-1, where we get the requirements right. We lay
    out the approaches to be taken. We are doing that analysis. We
    will conclude that work by June of this year, so just a couple
    of months. And then we will begin the phase 6-2. Again, it is
    meeting cost, scope, and schedule requirements and is strongly
    joined by the Air Force, STRATCOM, and NNSA. And given a down-
    selection to the W80 family made by Nuke Weapons Council last
    year, that is progressing well.
        Senator Sessions. Good.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator Klotz, in regards to the cost analysis and
    program evaluation office that was created in the NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act] for Fiscal Year 2014, are
    you still fully committed to filling that out?
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, Senator Donnelly, we are. We have worked
    very closely with the DOD Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation (CAPE) organization in putting together a staffing
    plan, as well as a training plan to have a similar capability
    within NNSA. We formally chartered that in September of this
    past year, and we are beginning to build out the number of
    people in the organization. We ultimately expect to have 18
    people, Federal employees, in the organization by 2017, and
    nine people by the end of this year. We currently stand at
    seven Federal officials in the office.
        Senator Donnelly. Well, that kind of leads into last year
    we upped the number of personnel to 1,690 positions. I was
    wondering what your long-term projections are for personnel, as
    well as the skill mix that you see.
        Dr. Klotz. Well, first of all, Senator, I would like to
    actually thank this committee for their help and assistance in
    preventing the cap which was set at 1,690 last year from being
    even lower than we feared it might by in the fiscal year 2015
    legislative cycle.
        NNSA staff has decreased by 10.4 percent since 2012. Yet at
    the same time, the scope and scale of our work has greatly
    expanded. As Senator Sessions just led us through, we have four
    ongoing life extension programs. We have three major capital
    construction projects. Yet the NNSA manpower to oversee this
    work and to look out for the Government and the taxpayers?
    interest is decreasing.
        By the way, this is not the way in which DOD does work. For
    instance, in the B61-12 life extension program, NNSA's
    responsibility for that joint program is $8.1 billion, and the
    Air Force is $1.6 billion. But to do our work, we have 20
    people for $8.1 billion, whereas the Air Force has 93 Federal
    officials and contractors for $1.6 billion. So our people are
    stretched. We are asking them to do a lot. So the 1,690 cap--we
    would hate to see that go any lower this year. In fact, we
    would actually like to see it lifted a bit.
        Senator Donnelly. Ms. Harrington, the NNSA is a world
    leader in emergency response to nuclear incidents. What are we
    doing to help build capacity around the world so other
    countries can deal with the same kind of events that we are
    training for constantly?
        Ms. Harrington. Thank you for that question.
        The international emergency response programs have
    leveraged what we do here domestically in emergency response.
    Our International Emergency Response Cooperation (IEMC)
    program, has adapted our domestic emergency training programs
    and other capacity-building programs, including development of
    plans and procedures, drills. Particularly important are the
    exercises. We help other countries organize and other
    assistance as requested worldwide.
        We use the same personnel for these international programs
    and to train people internationally that we use here in the
    United States to do the same thing. So we take the best of the
    best. And most importantly, we are working with the
    International Atomic Energy Agency to help build their
    capacity.
        Senator Donnelly. Let me ask you. One of the major programs
    you work with is installing radiation detectors at ports and
    border crossings and similar things. And some have said maybe
    this does not have as much value because it is easy to simply
    smuggle the materials around these sites. What do you think of
    that claim?
        Ms. Harrington. I have to confess that when I hear that
    sort of thing, I wonder what else would you do. Every one of
    us, when we go through an airport, has to walk through a
    detector, and that is there for a purpose because if you try to
    go around it, the TSA will not think kindly of it and will
    probably escort you aside to give you a secondary inspection.
    The same is true when you look at border crossings, airports,
    seaports.
        But what is important here, just like in an airport, a
    detector is not effective on its own. It takes people. It takes
    training. It takes other capabilities along with it. For us,
    that means mobile units. That means handheld units. That means
    reaching out to local law enforcement, local intelligence, and
    bringing them all together as a community to work together on
    this counter-smuggling effort.
        So when people try to say, well, you just stick one piece
    of equipment someplace, it is not going to work. We would agree
    with that. But that is not what we do. That is not how we
    design our programs. And we just actually had--I did not bring
    this for this reason, but we have a little quarterly
    newsletter, and a couple of the articles in here happen to be
    about how we work with the Federal Bureau Of Investigation to
    develop training programs because we believe that that is an
    essential element of how we actually are successful in
    preventing smuggling.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Fischer?
        Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you all for being here today.
        General Klotz, it is great to see you again. I really
    appreciated the tours we had of the two facilities in New
    Mexico but also Lawrence Livermore. It was very educational.
    And again, thank you for doing that.
        General, there is concern that investment in the
    laboratories is really too limited right now to be able to
    support any kind of balanced portfolio. You know, we are
    looking at production and modernization, which should be, I
    think, the first priority, but you also have to meet necessary
    scientific capabilities. We need to look at infrastructure. We
    have to look at attracting creative minds that are able to not
    just refurbish the weapons that we have but have an
    understanding of how to create those weapons as well if we are
    going to, I think, continue to be prepared in the future.
        How do you approach that necessary need to balance?
        Dr. Klotz. Well, thank you very much, Senator, for that
    question. And I will give, if I could, a broad, general
    comment, and then, of course, Dr. Cook, who is the scientist
    here, might like to add something.
        You are absolutely right. The scientific, technical,
    engineering base that we have to do this work is essential not
    only for production but for maintaining our capability over the
    longer term, but also addressing other pressing national
    security needs which all of our laboratories do. So we need to
    make sure that we attract the very best minds out of technical
    schools, the very best minds our of graduate schools.
        The work that they are given at the laboratories, as you
    had an opportunity to see firsthand, is leading edge physics.
    It is leading edge chemistry. It is leading edge materials
    science. And by attracting people in to do that work, giving
    them projects to do under our lab-directed research and
    development, which is an extraordinarily important part of our
    recruitment and retention capability, in many respects draws
    them in and keeps them there to work in this laboratory.
        I have always thought that in addition to the actual
    weapons systems themselves and all the people that organize,
    train, and equip those weapons systems, that our scientific,
    technical, and engineering base is also an essential pillar of
    our overall national deterrence policy and the power that we
    project to nations across the world.
        Senator Fischer. Do you think you are able to then achieve
    that balance right now with the programs you have in place, or
    do you think that it is going to have to be phased in in the
    future, that we take care of the number one priority now and
    then worry about it in the future? Can we do it now?
        Dr. Cook. So we can do some of the balance now. The balance
    will always change. There is no question that the labs and
    plants along with them are under the mission assignment of
    changing the oldest stockpile we have ever had and the smallest
    since the Eisenhower administration to one that is both smaller
    and younger. It has to be just as effective. Labs are not
    developing new nuclear explosive packages, but they are
    absolutely changing things within those packages and they are
    doing it with the best simulation that has ever existed, a
    factor of a million increase since the end of underground
    testing.
        And to give you one example of where excitement is--and it
    comes right directly to the comment by the chairman about cost
    reduction and schedule constraint--it is additive
    manufacturing. So there are ways of really getting right into
    the science of materials, of making parts.
        On the unclassified side, a lot can be published about
    application to non-weapons products. On the classified side, we
    are doing some exceptional work at the Lawrence Livermore Lab,
    Sandia Lab, Los Alamos Lab, and the Kansas City plant. And I
    would invite you to go through any one of those with us. When
    you do that, you can see that excitement is palpable, and it
    drives right to the issue of constraining cost.
        And another very quick example, a very important part of
    additive manufacturing--
        Senator Fischer. I have another question, if I could.
        Dr. Cook. All right. You can see the enthusiasm.
        Senator Fischer. I see the enthusiasm. [Laughter.]
        I am going to pick up on your comment about the smallest
    arsenal since Eisenhower. When you look at the size and the
    cost that is associated with that arsenal, you have commented
    in the past that those two items do not directly correspond to
    each other. Nevertheless, we have some that are calling for
    more reductions, particularly in the hedge that we have, and
    they view that as a way that we can pursue more cost savings.
        First, can you tell me why we have a hedge? Those old
    weapons--they do not have capabilities. I would like you
    publicly to be able to address that. And do you believe that
    reductions in that hedge are going to produce any kind of
    sizable cost savings?
        Dr. Cook. I will try to give you a couple of simple
    concepts.
        We believe that we have to go to the New START force
    balance by 2018. So deployed weapons will come down to the
    central limits of the treaty. In doing so, we also believe that
    we can reduce the hedge, which is the technical hedge, and the
    way we will get there is through the program of life
    extensions. What is not so often understood is that the path to
    reduction of the technical hedge is the path of life
    extensions. That gets us increased confidence. It gets us a
    newer set of weapons. We use parts that we have in the
    technical hedge because we are doing high reuse life extension
    programs. But these too are moving to a smaller, more trusted
    deterrent, which is also newer and has a higher ratio of
    deployed to total, and is entirely within reason.
        Senator Fischer. But would you say cost savings is a false
    narrative when it comes to the hedge?
        Dr. Cook. I would say that with any counting of the weapons
    only, it is a false narrative to think if you cut the numbers,
    you are going to save money. The cost is dependent on many
    other things, and there are large fixed costs.
        Senator Fischer. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I want to start out and just thank
    Senator Fischer for making it eminently clear that there is not
    a linear relationship between the number of devices and the
    budget ramifications here. I want to thank you as well for
    coming out to New Mexico to those two facilities, as well as
    the one in California, and invite any of you any time. I know
    many of you have visited those in the past, but please come
    back often.
        Admiral Klotz, I was really pleased to hear you talk a
    little bit about LDRD [Laboratory Directed Research and
    Development] and its importance for long-term retention. I want
    to say that the success I think of the ongoing life extension
    programs generally are largely dependent on the previous
    investments that we have made in programs like stockpile
    stewardship that help maintain the unique capabilities at our
    National labs. And as you know, these capabilities support many
    other Government agencies in addressing not just nuclear but an
    entire variety of national security challenges.
        I would like your thoughts on whether you think NNSA is
    doing enough now to ensure that we continue to have the
    expertise and the technical capabilities to anticipate and
    respond to future security challenges. And in particular, I am
    concerned about the labs? continued ability to attract and to
    retain that top talent that you talked about.
        Dr. Klotz. I think we do, but it is a challenge. As you
    well know, Senator, at all of our laboratories and our
    production facilities as well, a significant portion, in some
    cases more than half in some locations, of our enterprise, more
    than 50 percent of the workforce is eligible for retirement on
    both the Federal side, as well as on the management and
    operation contractor side. So again, attracting those people
    into replace them in a timely fashion is something that we have
    to deal with in many cases in a marketplace where the same
    science and engineering and technical skills are highly sought
    after by startups and high-tech industry.
        So it is important, one, I think that we continue to stress
    to our workforce that what they do is important and it is of
    enduring importance to the security of this country, and that
    they are making a contribution to that.
        Additionally, it is important that we have consistent,
    predictable funding in the work they do. Nothing is more
    dispiriting and demoralizing I think to our workforce than fear
    of whether what they are working on is going to be seen through
    to completion.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        As you know, technology transfer is incredibly important to
    me. It is a primary issue for me. It is not just a secondary
    one. And this year I introduced a bill, Senate bill 784, with
    Senator Gardner of Colorado to accelerate tech transfer by
    establishing an off-campus micro-lab that would serve sort of
    as a front door for national laboratories. Our 17 national labs
    annually conduct more than $12.5 billion in publicly funded
    research, but often times that is behind the fences. While it
    has proven to deliver a number of spin-off technologies, that
    is a real challenge for the kind of collaboration that we have
    really seen effectively accelerate those things. So the goal of
    this legislation is to give business owners and regional
    academia, even local government greater ability to interface
    with those resources.
        As NNSA Administrator overseeing three of the largest labs
    in the country, I would love your thoughts on this concept
    generally and if the Federal share of funding were available
    from existing tech transfer funds, would you be willing to
    carry out a pilot program at one of the labs to explore this
    concept further and to be able to evaluate the results?
        Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your
    personal interest on this as well. As you know, the NNSA labs
    have already transferred a lot of their innovations to
    industry, a lot of it in the engineering area, but also in
    medicine, in climate prediction, a whole host of issues.
        An ongoing challenge, as you pointed out, has been how do
    you have an interface between the entrepreneurial community and
    the broader academic community when a lot of our work is done
    behind the wire, behind the fence, and there are security
    barriers to doing that.
        So we are very supportive of the efforts that you have
    outlined to accelerate technology transfer within the statutory
    and appropriations constraints that we have to live with. And
    we support the notion of a pilot plant. And as you know, Sandia
    Laboratories has been in the lead in setting up a center for--
    or proposing a center for collaboration and commercialization
    in Albuquerque, as well as joining with Livermore National
    Laboratory in setting up the Livermore Valley Open Campus
    concept. So these are things which I know Secretary Moniz is
    very interested in pursuing. In fact, he has set up an office
    especially to do tech transfer, and we in NNSA fully support
    that and will be doing that in our own mission space.
        Senator Heinrich. I look forward very much to working with
    you on that.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Graham?
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        What is the effect of sequestration on your ability to do
    your job if it goes back into effect?
        Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Senator. We think that it would be--
    pick your adjective--devastating. It would certainly force us
    to take a look at the programs and projects that we have laid
    out. Clearly many of those programs and projects would have to
    be delayed, which would drive costs even higher for those
    programs, and in some cases might actually have to be
    eliminated.
        Anything that we did in terms of our weapons programs would
    have to be something we would do collaboratively with DOD and
    STRATCOM because we develop a warhead to go on one of their
    delivery systems, and to the extent that that was impacted by
    limits of the Budget Control Act, it would inform how we would
    proceed with our own life extension programs and the scientific
    programs that support those.
        Senator Graham. Would you say it would seriously compromise
    your ability to perform your duties for the country?
        Dr. Klotz. It would have a serious impact, yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. MOX.
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Okay, our favorite subject. [Laughter.]
        About 60-plus percent built. Do you agree with that?
        Dr. Klotz. There are a number of ways in which you can say
    ``percent built.'' I will not argue with you over 60 percent.
        Senator Graham. Some say 67. I say 60. It is over half
    built.
        Dr. Klotz. We agree with that, over half built.
        Senator Graham. The treaty with Russia regarding the MOX
    program takes 30-something tons of weapons-grade plutonium off
    the market in Russia and the United States. That is a good
    thing. Right?
        Dr. Klotz. Absolutely.
        Senator Graham. Maybe one of the best nonproliferation
    agreements we have negotiated with anybody.
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. We do not want to lose that.
        Dr. Klotz. No, sir.
        Senator Graham. In 2010 in the last update of the treaty,
    the United States said that we would use MOX as the disposition
    method. Is that correct?
        Dr. Klotz. That is correct.
        Senator Graham. So over half built, 60 percent. At the end
    of the day, they are studying alternatives. I have been looking
    at this since the 1990s. I do not see an alternative that is
    workable, that saves money, but I guess we will wait and see.
        From your point of view, to abandon the disposition of this
    material, would that be wise?
        Dr. Klotz. Senator, like you, we will be very interested in
    the results of the reports, which were mandated by Congress.
    The first one is due now and will be out within a matter of
    days. It will look at two alternatives: the MOX alternative,
    the one we have now, as well as an alternative that is referred
    to as----
        Senator Graham. Right. I guess my question is you would not
    suggest that we just basically withdraw from the treaty.
        Dr. Klotz. No, sir.
        Senator Graham. So we are going to do something with this
    material.
        Dr. Klotz. We should do something with this material.
        Senator Graham. If we do not, we are making a huge mistake.
        Dr. Klotz. I would not disagree with that.
        Senator Graham. The last thing you want to do right now
    with the Russians is break a treaty with them over reducing the
    amount of weapons-grade plutonium they possess.
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. So all I ask of the NNSA is that when we
    look at these alternatives, we understand that the goal is
    still the same, which is to alleviate the material. We have
    made a treaty with the Russians to go the MOX route. I have no
    interest in going back to the Russians and saying, hey, would
    you work with us to change this because I do not think that is
    particularly smart right now. We will stay on top of the cost,
    and when we get these reports, I look forward to talking to
    you.
        But at the end of the say, South Carolina, Mr. Chairman,
    has agreed to accept this weapons-grade plutonium years ago, 34
    tons, enough to build thousands of warheads. Is that fair to
    say?
        Dr. Klotz. Yes.
        Senator Graham. How many would you say, Ms. Harrington?
        Ms. Harrington. 34 tons divided by 8 kilograms per weapon.
        Senator Graham. So what does that come out to? Thousands.
        Ms. Harrington. Thousands.
        Senator Graham. Okay. So we got thousands of warheads that
    can be made from this material, 60 percent completion of the
    disposition method. South Carolina signed up for this a long
    time ago understanding certain things would happen. From the
    Department's point of view, the last thing you want to do in my
    view is to tell the State that you are going to do something,
    get the State to sign up for a mission that is--you know, this
    is pretty tough stuff, taking weapons-grade plutonium in your
    own State--and bail out on them. You do not want to bail out on
    the Russians. You do not want to bail out on South Carolina. So
    please understand that how we deal with the MOX program is
    going to affect a lot of things in the future.
        Dr. Klotz. Yes, sir.
        Senator Graham. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        If the sequester remains in effect, which the budget we
    passed does not--or at least provides more money for the
    Defense Department, what percentage of reduction in your
    numbers--was it $8.9 billion we are scoring you to have next
    year? Can you give an exact figure or would you know what it
    would be if the sequester stayed in place?
        Dr. Klotz. Our overall budget request was for 12.6.
        Senator Sessions. I have 8.9. What is the difference? What
    are we talking about?
        Dr. Klotz. So in the weapons activities, that is the 8
    percent, that portion of it. Again, it would depend on how--
    since we and the rest of the Defense Department all draw from
    the 050 budget account, it would depend on how things were
    allocated--
        Senator Sessions. DOD would make some allocation choices.
        Ms. Harrington, Mr. Trimble mentioned the Russians and the
    ceasing of cooperation. We just have a few minutes, but can you
    give us briefly where we are with cooperation with the Russians
    on nonproliferation and what that means for us?
        Ms. Harrington. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
        As you know, we have over 2 decades very close cooperation
    with the Russians, and we are very disappointed to see that
    Russia has chosen not to continue to work with us. We continue
    to view Russia as still being one of the highest risk countries
    in the world. They have huge stockpiles of highly enriched
    uranium and plutonium, and despite the fact that we, in
    partnership with our labs, have helped them improve their
    practices, improve their security, develop training programs,
    even helped them set up their own training center for security,
    we still lack the confidence that they recognize the scope of
    the problem, the issue of dealing with insider threats, and
    quite frankly, the materials that we have seen being smuggled.
    Real nuclear materials smuggled have all come out of the former
    Soviet Union.
        Senator Sessions. What kind of history can you share with
    us of actual smuggling of nuclear materials out of Russia?
        Ms. Harrington. We would be happy to come back in a
    classified setting and share that detailed information with
    you.
        Senator Sessions. Okay.
        Now, when you say they have ceased to cooperate, to what
    extent does that create risk? Can you give specific examples in
    this public setting?
        Ms. Harrington. Well, for example, one of our primary
    efforts in Russia--and it was a very unique opportunity--was to
    work with them not just on stockpiles, but actually work with
    them on the security of the facilities where they store their
    warheads. So extremely important in terms of maintaining
    control over the most single largest threat that could be posed
    against us. So that kind of work we are no longer able to do
    directly with them.
        Senator Sessions. They said no longer can you come to our
    facilities?
        Ms. Harrington. Correct.
        Senator Sessions. Did they explicitly state the reason for
    that?
        Ms. Harrington. They have stated that in the future they
    will be able to fully support all of the security programs that
    we had developed with them by themselves. They will support it
    out of their budget, and because they will be funding it, they
    do not see a need for us to be on site.
        Senator Sessions. General Klotz, the January 15 STRATCOM
    report on balance in nuclear weapons programs suggests that due
    to the current funding emphasis on certifying the nuclear
    stockpile and performing life extension programs on aging
    weapons, there may be insufficient funding and science activity
    to, ``prepare to respond to future uncertainties.'' And there
    is concern about losing, quote, a full design and production
    capability. Close quote.
        What can you do to ensure our labs maintain a responsive
    design capability to address future uncertainties?
        Dr. Klotz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        That is also a concern we share. As Dr. Cook mentioned
    earlier--I will let him amplify if he would like--striking a
    balance between the production that we need to do today, which
    depends an awful lot, obviously, on science and engineering,
    and for the future is one that we have to pay attention to and
    that we worry about, particularly with an aging workforce both
    on the Federal and the laboratory and plant production sides.
    But the work that our scientists, technicians, and engineers do
    at the laboratories and in the production facility really is
    leading edge physics, chemistry, materials science, computing
    science, and I think that the skill that they developed in
    terms of working with the existing systems and keeping them up
    to date provides the basic necessary requirements they would
    have to have for any future contingencies that would arise.
        Dr. Cook. If I were to add to that----
        Senator Sessions. Please, go ahead.
        Dr. Cook. Briefly, in the 2 decades since we stopped
    underground testing, it took about a decade to put the
    facilities in place for stewardship. It took about another
    decade to really get them under control, get the diagnostics
    there, get the people trained. We have achieved that now. There
    are still refinements to be made, but at all of the labs, they
    each now have facilities that are driven to get uncertainties
    down in the simulations that we have. And over the last 2
    years, with stable budgets and your support, we have achieved
    the level of experimental productivity in laser experiments and
    accelerated experiments and hydrodynamic experiments, explosive
    experiments that are really challenging the people and driving
    the codes. That comes right to the issue of challenging people.
    A lot of good training of people who have university
    backgrounds, but they are not trained in the weapon program
    until they get in the labs. All of that really is going on. And
    that is a part of the program that is not often seen.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you. I do think good, challenging
    work that is important to America is a motivating factor and
    keeping people busy is better than not being busy. Do you not
    agree?
        Mr. Trimble. Absolutely.
        Senator Sessions. This is important work and we need to
    make sure our people are properly challenged.
        Senator Donnelly?
        Senator Donnelly. I just have a couple of questions I would
    like to follow up with, somewhat along the same line, Dr. Cook.
    Much has been commented regarding balancing, overhauling the
    aging stockpile, and keeping our scientists at the forefront to
    hedge against uncertainty. So how do you work that nuance of
    achieving the balance between the two?
        Dr. Cook. The short answer is through appropriate
    challenges. An immediate example right now is with the W80 Mod
    4. In a modern way of looking at the alternatives we have, we
    are really challenging the labs to use their best codes, their
    best people, and get into some experimental data instead of
    guessing about what the results are with regard to a materials
    model, the behavior of materials, for example.
        Another way is looking at all the concepts and the ways
    that we could run the interoperable weapons for the Air Force
    and the Navy. While that effort is delayed, we have got some
    time to really go through in a more formal way challenging the
    people to look at some things that would otherwise be
    considered out-of-the-box and too risky. And so I am back to
    the experiments again. Experiments are being done with
    explosives driving both surrogate material and then in Nevada
    now plutonium to determine whether some of the ideas for
    improving things, including stuff like additive manufacturing
    and less toxic materials, can actually pay off. That is the way
    we get the balance. The engineering side very heavily taxed,
    but as the chairman just said, we are absolutely keeping the
    design side as challenged as we can.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Mr. Trimble, follow up a little bit on MOX. What do you see
    as the root causes of the large cost overruns that have
    happened there?
        Mr. Trimble. In I think it was 2014, we did a report
    looking at MOX and the cost increases. We were trying to get at
    that issue of what were the cost drivers. At the time, DOE had
    not done a formal root cause analysis. They had identified some
    areas that they believed are the reasons for their cost
    increases such as unanticipated safety requirements from the
    NRC and other things. As a result of that work we did, we
    recommended they conduct a formal root cause analysis.
        In January 2015, DOE came out with their root cause
    analysis. They identified three key areas driving those cost
    increases. One was the lack of experienced staff. One was the
    lack of alignment of contract incentives with performance, and
    one was the atrophy of the supply chain.
        We have now gone back to look at that analysis that they
    have done to see how thorough it was, or sometimes in the past,
    we have had concerns that what have been identified as causes
    are not really necessarily a reason, for example, if you had
    lack of experienced staff. The real cause is what led you to
    have inexperienced staff on that case. So those are the kind of
    questions we would look at.
        I think one of the things that was interesting was that out
    of that root cause study, they came up with a number of
    recommendations. 11 recommendations came out of DOE's root
    cause study. I think that speaks to another recommendation we
    had in that report, which was for DOE to establish a
    requirement to always conduct a root cause analysis when your
    cost increase or your schedule delayed by about 25 percent.
    This is like on the DOD side. I think it is the Nunn-McCurdy
    breach, if I am remembering correctly. We had a recommendation
    for DOE to pursue the same thing when they had a similar kind
    of overrun in their programs. Unfortunately, DOE disagreed with
    that recommendation.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Admiral, we would not want you to come all the way over
    here without throwing a pitch your way. So you are building a
    new spent fuel rod--a new spent fuel pond--I am sorry--at the
    Idaho National Lab. It has gone backwards a little bit due to
    the lack of appropriations. And I was wondering if you can
    explain the importance of this effort and what the delay has
    cost the program and what the cost will be if it continues this
    way.
        Admiral Richardson. Senator, thanks for the question, and
    thank you very much to everybody on the committee for their
    firm support of naval reactors.
        As I begin to answer the question, I would just like to
    compliment General Klotz and my colleagues in articulating the
    challenges that they share. And naval reactors, by virtue of
    managing the naval nuclear propulsion program from cradle to
    grave, shares all of those challenges whether it has attracted
    the right people, maintaining the right tools and equipment,
    and the infrastructure. All of those challenges, including tech
    transfer--we share those inside the naval nuclear propulsion
    program.
        Part of our challenge today is to recapitalize a spent fuel
    handling facility. To call it a pond is really to oversimplify
    it.
        Senator Donnelly. That would be my specialty. [Laughter.]
        Admiral Richardson. It is an absolutely critical node in
    our management of our program. All of the naval nuclear spent
    fuel goes to that facility for eventual processing and
    transition into dry storage, awaiting shipment to a national
    repository when ready. Without a facility that manages that
    production line efficiently to meet fleet needs, we would
    quickly become backed up and we would have to bring aircraft
    carriers and submarines and leave them next to the pier rather
    than underway.
        By virtue of the delays, we have incurred some costs, and
    before I describe those, I would like to say, though, that
    particularly in the last year, we got a tremendous signal from
    Congress to start funding of that facility in a serious manner,
    and we have come out of the blocks at a sprint to reach
    critical decision one. We are ready to publish our
    environmental impact statement this year. And so we are moving
    out briskly to move this down the track.
        It has cost us some. We have been delayed about 5 years
    from our original plan. That has resulted in about $400 million
    in escalation and inefficiency costs just moving the facility,
    as well as $500 million to buy temporary storage containers to
    store aircraft carrier fuel until the new facility is built. So
    we had a plan in place to recycle those containers. With the
    delay in the facility, there is no place to recycle them
    through, and we have to just store it and build temporary
    facilities.
        Going forward, we would see the same thing if it was
    delayed further. But as I said, I think we are off and running
    on that. We anticipate starting construction on that after
    getting the design very mature in about 2019, bringing the
    facility online in 2024, fully operational in 2025.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Admiral.
        Senator Sessions. Senator Heinrich?
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Cook, I understand that there may be a need in the
    future for a new source for tritium production. As you know,
    that only has a 12-year half-life. To produce tritium in a
    commercial power reactor and provide a new domestic facility to
    enrich the uranium fuel could literally cost taxpayers several
    billion dollars. In your view, could we secure enriched uranium
    instead from our allies such as in the UK to be used for
    tritium production instead of spending this very large amount
    of money, which inevitably would come out of the weapons
    budget?
        Dr. Cook. I will answer the first part of this, and then I
    will turn to Under Secretary Klotz for the second part.
        The first part is for the current supply of unobligated
    uranium, we are good for a period time. We know what the time
    is. And we actually provide tritium to the entire stockpile. So
    we know what the needs are.
        With regard to other sources of uranium, we are doing an
    in-depth study, but that might only get us down a period of
    time. Eventually the country needs a domestic source of uranium
    enrichment not only for tritium production, which we do with
    low-enriched uranium, but also for naval propulsion, which
    requires a higher level of enrichment. So we will not dodge
    that bullet, but we might extend the time if we find some more
    material. Nevertheless, we are adhering to the State Department
    and its obligations, our obligations, under existing treaties.
        Is there anything you wish to add?
        Dr. Klotz. The only thing I would add is we have to ask
    ourselves if we a major nuclear power--and we are--do we need
    the capability to do some of the basic things associated with
    being a major nuclear power, and that is providing low-enriched
    uranium to produce our own tritium as opposed to relying upon
    even our closest allies and friends, and over the longer term,
    developing highly enriched uranium ultimately for the U.S.
    Navy, which uses it in over 40 combatant ships.
        So this is an issue which the Congress has asked us to
    provide a report on in terms of what our tritium needs are,
    what our low-enriched uranium needs are in order to produce
    tritium, and that should be coming out very, very shortly.
        But again, I think the fundamental question is what do we
    as a Nation need in terms of capability in this regard.
        Senator Heinrich. Well, I would certainly suggest we should
    also look at the cost/benefit analysis there as well.
        Thank you.
        Let us see. One last question I guess for Administrator
    Klotz. Can you speak to whether there are any plans for the
    National labs to work with IAEA [International Atomic Energy
    Agency] in order to make sure if there is potential for adding
    additional trust and confidence to the inspections that are
    planned under the recent framework that was announced with
    Iran? Can you speak at all to whether or not there would be
    opportunities there for adding additional levels of security to
    that arrangement?
        Dr. Klotz. Let me just say at this stage, Senator, that as
    Secretary Moniz has said in his public statements and I believe
    in his briefings to Members of both houses, that a lot of the
    policy decisions that were part of the negotiation process were
    informed by the technical knowledge, expertise, and analysis
    that was done within our labs and within our production
    facilities. And I would expect that that would be an important
    part of further steps in bringing about an agreement and, if an
    agreement, implementing that agreement.
        Senator Heinrich. Well said. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        We thank you all.
        I would ask General Klotz. On the basis of money expended
    and the estimated cost of the MOX lab, what percentage of the
    money expended are we at at this point?
        Dr. Klotz. Senator, that depends upon your assumption of
    how long--what the annual appropriation will be, what we will
    spend on that, and how long it would take to finish the
    project. The longer we take to do it, the more the cost will
    be, and therefore, our cost to go would vary. I do not know if
    there is anything we would add to that.
        Senator Sessions. So you do not have a percentage.
        Dr. Klotz. I do not have a percentage. It depends on your
    assumption of how much we are going to fund that. You know,
    funding it at the current level, as Secretary Moniz has said,
    is not optimal funding, if what you are trying to do is to
    bring the project to closure. The less you spend, the longer it
    takes to bring the project home and the more expensive that is.
    So what we have spent to date would be a function of how long
    we expect that we would take to complete the project.
        Senator Sessions. The criticism at NNSA has been that you
    have been unable to plan, manage, or oversee and hold
    accountable a nuclear weapons expertise on time, within cost.
    The Mies-Augustine congressional advisory panel on the
    governance of the nuclear security enterprise found
    mismanagement at DOE and NNSA to be largely to blame for these
    flaws. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2015 directed you,
    Administrator Klotz, to provide views on this panel's
    recommendations. We have not received those yet I believe. Do
    you expect to have your reviews on that?
        Dr. Klotz. Yes. I hope that this will come up here very,
    very soon. It is still in the coordination process within our
    own Department.
        Senator Sessions. So, Mr. Trimble, do you have anything to
    add to that discussion of where we are and any ideas for
    corrective action?
        Mr. Trimble. Well, I think in my opening statement, my
    general comment is I think there are some areas where we have
    made specific recommendations where I think progress could be
    made in terms of cost estimating and analysis of alternatives,
    looking at programs. I think work we have ongoing that will be
    out later this year looking at contract management and reliance
    on contractor assurance systems will also dovetail nicely with
    the Mies report.
        Senator Sessions. With regard to, I think, Senator
    Heinrich's question, maybe to follow up on that, General Klotz
    what is NNSA's assessment concerning the ability of Iran to
    mount a future nuclear weapon atop an ICBM or cruise missile?
    And do the National labs have expertise that contributes to
    that discussion and analysis?
        Dr. Klotz. Well, in terms of specific capabilities of Iran
    or any country, I think we would have to discuss that in a
    smaller setting. But again, as responded to the Senator from
    New Mexico, there is extraordinary capability within our
    laboratories to do the types of research and analysis that can
    help inform our policymakers as they deal with----
        Senator Sessions. And they are doing that now? And there
    are no prohibitions that you are aware of in that cooperative
    effort--law or policy.
        Dr. Klotz. In terms of informing policy, no.
        Senator Sessions. Well, thank you all. It is an important
    hearing. You have a very important role in the National
    security. My impression, I will state again, is that some of
    the complaints that have been outlined, GAO and others, are
    being addressed effectively, and I have a sense that there is a
    tighter control and a more focused operation ongoing under your
    leadership, General Klotz. And we thank all of you for what you
    do. We appreciate your cooperation and service.
        We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
               Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
                            ohio replacement program
        1. Senator King. Admiral Richardson, can you explain how you are
    synchronizing the development of the new reactor plant for the Ohio-
    class replacement submarine, with the development of the submarine
    itself?
        Admiral Richardson. Naval Reactors is advancing the design of the
    Ohio-class Replacement propulsion plant on the schedule laid out in
    2010. The only change to the original schedule stems from the Navy's
    decision to delay construction of the first ship from fiscal year 2019
    to fiscal year 2021; Naval Reactors adjusted the propulsion plant
    development timeline to maintain alignment with the Navy following the
    schedule shift.
        Naval Reactors' Departments of Energy and Navy efforts are directed
    at supporting this schedule, including development of the propulsion
    plant design to support procurement of long-lead components in fiscal
    year 2019 to enable a construction start in fiscal year 2021 and ship
    delivery in fiscal year 2028. After completing ship operational
    testing, the first Ohio-class Replacement must be on strategic patrol
    by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level requirements. Given that the first
    Ohio-class Replacement submarine, a ship twice the size of the
    Virginia-class submarine, is planned to be constructed within the same
    span of time, this schedule is aggressive and requires close coupling
    of Department of Energy and Department of Navy activities to ensure on
    time ship delivery.
        To achieve this alignment, the design team has been in close
    coordination with the Lead Design Yard (Electric Boat) and Navy
    Leadership. The Chief of Naval Operations, in coordination with the
    Joint Staff, sets the ship requirements that drive decisions on reactor
    plant size and performance. The Navy's Program Executive Officer for
    Submarines and Naval Sea Systems Command coordinate with the Ohio-class
    Replacement Lead Design Yard, who is responsible for translating ship
    capability requirements into the overall submarine design
    specifications. As part of this overall coordination, Electric Boat
    developed a detailed construction schedule that specifies the required-
    in-yard dates for reactor heavy equipment, which is needed early in the
    build period, to support the construction timeline. These required-in-
    yard dates feed back into the design schedule to ensure that the design
    and follow-on component fabrication schedules are also aligned.
        In addition to the coordination between Naval Reactors and the
    Navy's shipbuilders, the design and construction of Ohio-class
    Replacement requires extensive coordination and alignment with the
    Navy's Strategic Systems Programs that are responsible for the missile
    systems and the British Navy, who will use the Common Missile
    Compartment design in their upcoming fleet ballistic missile submarines
    (SSBNs). Because they each depend so heavily on each other, these four
    design efforts must all remain tightly aligned and in close
    collaboration to retire risk early and minimize construction costs.
        Given the criticality of Naval Reactors' Department of Energy
    activities which are aligned to Navy priorities and mission, strong
    support for Naval Reactors' Department of Energy budget is absolutely
    critical to this facet of the nation's security.

        2. Senator King. Admiral Richardson, are there any points of risk
    that this subcommittee should be aware of as the Navy undertakes this
    massive project?
        Admiral Richardson. The Program remains on track to support reactor
    plant heavy equipment procurement of long-lead components in fiscal
    year 2019 enabling the lead ship construction start in fiscal year 2021
    and ship delivery in fiscal year 2028. After completing ship
    operational testing, the first Ohio-class Replacement must be on
    strategic patrol by 2031 to meet STRATCOM force level requirements.
    Within this aggressive program, two areas warrant special attention:
    ensuring the integration of the electric drive components into a fully
    functioning system meeting the Ohio-class Replacements' stealth
    requirements; and the manufacturability of the new cladding material
    for the life-of-the-ship reactor. My staff is focused on ensuring Naval
    Reactors delivers both of these technologies to the Navy. The risks are
    well known and a plan is in place to retire them, but it is a multi-
    year plan that requires firm funding support. With that support,
    combined with our past record and experience, these integration
    challenges are manageable and currently support the construction of the
    lead ship starting in f 2021.

                  nnsa management and modernization challenges
        3. Senator King. Mr. Trimble, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) has identified a number of challenges the National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA) faces in its plans to modernize the
    nuclear security enterprise. How many of those challenges are a result
    of unpredictable budgets versus structural problems?
        Mr. Trimble.
        GAO has not conducted work specifically focused on the extent to
    which unpredictable budgets or structural problems present challenges
    to NNSA's modernization plans.
        Our work on budget estimates for modernization has shown that at
    the top line, funding for NNSA modernization activities has been fairly
    close to the levels originally planned in 2010 for budgets through
    2019. However, there have been more significant changes from year to
    year at the individual program level, including instability in the
    schedules for major modernization efforts:

          The schedules for life extension programs have changed
    every year that GAO has evaluated them, which results in budgetary
    shifts.
          The schedules for construction of replacement plutonium
    and uranium facilities have significantly shifted and the scopes of
    these projects remain in flux.

        Our work has also shown weaknesses in cost and budget estimation
    processes that inform plans to modernize the nuclear security
    enterprise.

          GAO has made numerous recommendations to correct NNSA's
    project management problems--for example, for improving cost estimating
    capabilities and employing a rigorous analysis of alternatives to
    ensure that key capital asset and program decisions will both meet
    mission needs and be cost-effective. While NNSA has initiated some
    actions and made some progress, the agency has not taken action on many
    of these recommendations, which suggests a lack of urgency or
    commitment on DOE's part to address identified challenges.

        Also, as we noted in our high risk update (February 2015), NNSA
    does not have the capacity (people and resources) to resolve contract
    and project management problems. NNSA has taken some actions to address
    capacity issues, but these actions have not yet ensured that the
    department has the capacity to fully address its contract and project
    management challenges.
                                     ______

                 Questions Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                          los alamos transuranic waste
        4. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Klotz, my understanding is that the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Environmental Management is
    taking over management of the cleanup and disposal of transuranic
    wastes at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Much of the waste to
    be disposed of is legacy waste; however, how will the NNSA coordinate
    with the Office of Environmental Management for disposal of plutonium
    waste that is generated in future LANL operations?
        Dr. Klotz. The Secretary of Energy has directed NNSA and EM to
    transition the acquisition and management of EM-funded legacy cleanup
    work at Los Alamos from NNSA to EM. EM will assume direct management of
    prime contracts established for EM-funded cleanup work at Los Alamos.
    The Secretary has further directed that the two organizations work
    collaboratively to accomplish the transition so as to avoid gaps in
    responsibilities and minimize to the extent practicable duplication of
    effort or overlapping responsibilities. Since 2001, the National TRU
    Waste Corporate Board serves as a consensus-building and advisory body
    to the Assistant Secretary of Environmental Management to integrate DOE
    TRU Waste Complex disposition activities. NNSA and EM have protocols to
    facilitate coordination specifically on facilities and infrastructure
    issues related to TRU waste management at LANL to supplement existing
    coordination mechanisms. This includes legacy TRU waste and the newly
    generated waste from future operations. EM and NNSA employees at LANL
    and at Headquarters are in near-daily contact and participate on
    integrated project teams, review committees, and working groups
    together. NNSA and EM interact on a daily basis through our respective
    staffs in the Field and Headquarters with the more-formal coordination
    mechanisms discussed above, and in participation with integrated
    project teams, review committees, and working groups. We will continue
    with this approach as the contract transition activities progress over
    the next 18-24 months.
                 replacement of the cmr building at los alamos
        5. Senator Heinrich. Dr. Klotz, my understanding is that Los Alamos
    is starting to transfer operations from the old Chemistry and
    Metallurgy Research (CMR) building into PF-4 and the new Radiological
    Laboratory, Utility and Office Building (RULOB). Once the transition is
    complete, which office will assume responsibility for managing the
    demolition and disposal of the old CMR building--the NNSA or the Office
    of Environmental Management?
        Dr. Klotz. Facilities transfer to the Office of Environmental
    Management (EM) only after an EM review has confirmed the facilities
    meet the transfer criteria in accordance with DOE Order 430.1B, Real
    Property Asset Management. The program ultimately responsible for
    demolition cannot be presumed until after EM has conducted its review.
    The Department's management of excess facilities such as CMR is the
    subject of an ongoing Department level review. Plans for CMR will be
    finalized within the framework of the results of that review.
                       doe's emergency operations center
        6. Senator Heinrich. Ms. Harrington, you are responsible for
    maintaining the Department's Emergency Operations Center for nuclear
    terrorist incidents as well as incidents such as fires and releases of
    radiation at DOE facilities, such as the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
    (WIPP) in New Mexico. Have you conducted an internal review of how well
    the emergency operations center responded during the two incidents at
    WIPP in February 2014 and were you satisfied with the performance?
        Ms. Harrington. The NNSA Office of Emergency Operations manages the
    Department of Energy's (DOE) Emergency Operations Center (EOC), which
    maintains situational awareness of the DOE complex. In addition to
    providing situational awareness, the DOE EOC provides headquarters
    awareness and expertise for incidents requiring departmental decision,
    including performing notifications, disseminating information, and
    providing subject matter support. The emergency response to the
    incident at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was managed on the ground
    by the Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC. A review of the incident found
    there were delays in notification to the DOE EOC. In accordance with
    DOE Order 151.1C, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, State and
    local officials, the Cognizant Field Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
    and the Headquarters Operations Center must be notified within 15
    minutes and all other organizations within 30 minutes of the
    declaration of an emergency. By design and in practice, the DOE EOC is
    the first government official to be notified by the LLC. Once notified,
    the DOE EOC responded in accordance with Departmental policies. While
    the EOC acted in accordance with policy, there is room for improvement
    in terms of coordination with the sites to ensure timely notifications.
    DOE continues to work with all its Sites and Facilities to ensure
    reporting requirements are fully understood; communications gaps are
    identified and resolved; and enterprise-wide situational awareness and
    emergency management are enhanced. To address gaps, DOE is currently
    working to revise DOE Order 151.1C on emergency management to alleviate
    inconsistent interpretation and implementation of requirements at some
    DOE sites and incorporate lessons learned.
                     schedule to restart operations at wipp
        7. Senator Heinrich. Mr. Trimble, I understand the GAO has been
    reviewing the plans and schedule to restart limited operations at the
    Waste Isolation Pilot Plant as soon as fiscal year 2016. What are GAO's
    observations about the current schedule to resume normal operations and
    the planned restart process?
        Mr. Trimble. As you noted, we are conducting an ongoing review for
    this committee on DOE's plans to restart the WIPP facility. In
    particular, we are assessing (1) actions DOE is taking to improve the
    oversight of the contractor responsible for operating the WIPP
    facility, (2) the extent to which DOE has reliable cost and schedule
    estimates for restarting the facility, and (3) whether DOE used a
    reliable process for selecting its proposed solution for upgrading the
    WIPP ventilation system. We plan on briefing the committee within the
    next several months on the results of our review.

    DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR
                   2016 AND THE FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, APRIL 22, 2015

                                   U.S. Senate,
                      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.

     AIR FORCE AND NAVY NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NUCLEAR
                       ENTERPRISE REVIEW RECOMMENDATIONS

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 p.m. in
    room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Jeff
    Sessions (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Committee members present: Senators Inhofe, Sessions,
    Donnelly, King, and Heinrich.

               OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOE DONNELLY

        Senator Donnelly [presiding]. I would like to thank all the
    witnesses for being here, and you can take a seat.
        Senator Sessions will be here in just a moment. He is on
    his way over.
        I will read my opening statement, and we will keep rolling
    along until Senator Sessions gets here. Thank you all very
    much.
        I want to thank Senator Sessions for holding this important
    hearing. Over a year ago, we had a failure in ethics for both
    the Air Force and Navy nuclear missions. For the Air Force,
    this involved cheating on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
    (ICBM) proficiency exams. For the Navy, it involved cheating on
    naval reactors proficiency exams. While integrity of the Air
    Force nuclear weapons was never compromised, it pointed to a
    readiness and morale problem associated with the demanding
    mission that Strategic Command requires and how the Department
    of Defense (DOD) has paid a lesser amount of attention to its
    nuclear mission.
        One may have varying opinions of nuclear weapons, but as
    long as they exist and other nations have them, it will remain,
    as Secretary Carter termed, as the bedrock of our defense
    posture. We cannot let this mission lapse.
        I am gratified the Department has taken a head-on approach
    to correcting these issues with the nuclear mission, and we are
    anxious to help support the readiness of our deterrence posture
    now and in the future.
        Again, let me thank everyone for their attendance today. I
    look forward to your testimony, and Senator Sessions should be
    here with us in just a few minutes. And we will go left to
    right. Ms. Creedon, thank you.

       STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN CREEDON, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
                NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

        Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Senator.
        I would also like to thank Chairman Sessions, obviously
    when he gets here----
        Senator Donnelly. He gets thanked more while he is not here
    than when he is here.
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Creedon.--as well as the other members of the
    subcommittee.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss with you
    today the report of the Department of Defense internal nuclear
    enterprise review team. My co-chairs on the review were Rear
    Admiral Peter Fanta, former Deputy for Resources and
    Acquisition, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Sergeant Major Patrick
    Alston, the command's senior enlisted leader of the U.S.
    Strategic Command.
        Our internal review of the Department of Defense nuclear
    enterprise started in February 2014 at the direction of former
    Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. He started this after a
    series of troubling events involving the Nation's deterrent
    forces and their senior leadership when he directed both an
    internal and an external review of the health of the nuclear
    enterprise.
        The external review was conducted by former Air Force Chief
    of Staff and Commander of the Strategic Air Command, General
    Larry Welch, and former Commander of Fleet Forces Command,
    Admiral John Harvey. Their report, the Independent Review of
    the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, as well as the
    report of the internal review team, were provided to Congress
    this past November.
        For the most part, the findings of both the internal and
    the external reviews were very much in line. There were,
    however, some differences in the recommendations. Our internal
    team's report is a classified report. As such, I have attached
    to my written statement an unclassified summary describing the
    findings and the recommendations of the internal review team's
    report. The fact sheet was also provided to Congress in
    November, along with our report.
        One of the key findings of our internal review team was
    that in spite of the shortcomings in the enterprise--and there
    were many--the men and women of the nuclear enterprise are
    dedicated and committed to the mission and the work. And they
    work exceedingly hard to ensure the safety and the security of
    the U.S. deterrence forces. On balance, the forces, including
    the civilians, were understaffed, under-supported, under-
    appreciated, and in many instances were working with out-of-
    date equipment, a shortage of parts, and inadequate facilities.
        We also found that some of the fixes of the past had
    actually made things worse. As a result, we stressed in our
    report that an approach that simply checks the box and moves on
    is not the correct approach. This sort of approach will fail to
    recognize the interconnected nature of many of the problems and
    that many of the solutions are often long-term, organizational,
    and cultural.
        We had a fairly long list of key findings in our report,
    which are summarized, as I mentioned, in my written statement.
    But I wanted to take the opportunity to highlight that the most
    important of our recommendations are those that will help the
    people who work in the nuclear enterprise every day get their
    job done. These men and women are our most important asset in
    the nuclear enterprise.
        I want to close now by not only thanking the entire
    internal review team for their work, but also former Secretary
    Hagel for caring enough about the enterprise to bring his
    personal attention and credibility to its problems. He got the
    attention of the senior leaders in the DOD and the services.
    Already, there are some good results and some good efforts, and
    you will hear more about these from my colleagues on the panel
    here today. The real challenge, however, is to maintain that
    focus, energy, and attention for the long term.
        Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]

                Prepared Statement by Honorable Madelyn Creedon
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today
    the report of the Department of Defense Internal Nuclear Enterprise
    Review team. My co-chairs on the review were Rear Admiral Peter Fanta,
    former Deputy for Resources and Acquisition, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
    Sergeant Major Patrick Alston, Command Senior Enlisted Leader, U.S.
    Strategic Command.
        Our internal review of the Department of Defense (DOD) nuclear
    enterprise was undertaken beginning in February 2014 at the direction
    of former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, after a series of troubling
    events involving the nation's nuclear deterrent forces and their senior
    leadership. In addition to the internal review team's report: Internal
    Assessment of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, Secretary
    Hagel also directed an external review and report. The external review
    was conducted by former Air Force Chief of Staff and Commander of the
    Strategic Air Command, General Larry Welch, and former Commander of
    Fleet Forces Command, Admiral John Harvey. Their report: Independent
    Review of the Department of Defense Nuclear Enterprise, and the report
    of the Internal review team were provided to Congress this past
    November.
        Our internal team's report is a classified report. As such, I have
    attached an unclassified summary describing the findings and
    recommendations of the internal review team's report, as well as a fact
    sheet developed by DOD that sets out a description of the
    implementation plans for changing the nuclear enterprise. Both the fact
    sheet and the summary were also provided to the Congress in November.
        Over the course of three months, a team of 96 professionals, drawn
    from the relevant components of the Office of the Secretary of
    Defenses, the Joint Staff, Military Services, and the Defense Agencies,
    visited all of the operational nuclear facilities and most of the
    supporting facilities in CONUS, and a representative sampling of the
    nuclear forces in Europe. We established three sub-teams: Personnel,
    Performance, and Investment, to facilitate our review. We talked to
    over 1,500 people--offices, enlisted, civilian, and contractors who
    were directly involved in or provide training, education and support to
    the DOD nuclear enterprise.
        We talked with aircraft, missile, and warhead maintainers, shipyard
    workers, civil engineers, submariners, missileers, pilots, teachers and
    instructors, supply, sustainment and parts specialists, engineers,
    personnel specialists, doctors, nurses and medical technicians,
    security forces, financial managers and budget specialist, at all
    levels and ranks. Conversations were held individually and in small
    groups without supervisors present. These conversations were candid,
    honest, and direct. In addition, the team received extensive briefings
    from each of the services, reviewed hundreds of documents, and reviewed
    the findings of the previous reviews and reports.
        We also received extensive support from the historians of the Air
    Force Global Strike and other Commands, who provided a wealth of
    valuable historical documents dating back to the earliest days of the
    Air Force Nuclear Enterprise.
        We found that in spite of the various shortcomings in the
    enterprise, the men and women of the nuclear enterprise are dedicated
    and committed to the mission, and work exceedingly hard to ensure the
    safety and security of the United States.
        Our review focused on current operational issues of the DOD nuclear
    enterprise and what is needed to sustain the force until the various
    elements of the Triad are replaced. We did not evaluate any of the
    replacement programs themselves other than to note that it will be
    years before the new systems are fielded, and in the meantime, the
    existing systems must be maintained. Similarly the internal team did
    not review the nuclear warheads and the life extension programs being
    developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration to sustain
    them.
        One of the most important findings of the internal review team was
    the realization that the problems of the nuclear enterprise do not
    exist in isolation. The problems are inextricably interrelated. One
    problem begets another which begets another. This interdependence
    between and among the shortfalls and deficiencies requires a
    coordinated, holistic approach to resolving the issues. The
    interdependent relationship of the problems identified within each
    Service, but particularly the Air Force, led to our conclusion that in
    many instances the ultimate solutions would have to be cultural and
    structural, and sustained over the long term. In other words, although
    money is needed to solve many of the problems, money is certainly not
    the only solution to the problems. And while there are many things that
    can and need to be fixed in the near term, the solutions in many
    instances are long-term.
        For the most part, the findings of both the internal and external
    reviews were very much in line with one another. The external review
    team placed greater emphasis on the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    (OSD) while the internal review team focused primarily on the Services.
    There were also some differences in the recommendations and approach to
    addressing the problems, but in the end it is up to OSD and the
    Services ultimately to identify appropriate changes and put them into
    place.
        The key recommendations contained in the internal review teams
    report are:

          Allow leaders to learn from mistakes;
          Provide the necessary manning and skills and address
    skill level gaps throughout the forces;
          Develop nuclear professionals and the career management
    to develop a broad nuclear career field;
          Overhaul the nuclear inspections process and reinforce
    distinctions between inspections, reviews, technical assistance, and
    exercises;
          Develop and use a rigorous self-assessment program to
    highlight and fix problems at all levels of command;
          Simplify administration of the personnel reliability
    program;
          Provide long-term sustainment and plan for parts
    obsolescence;
          Ensure future investments include Navy shipyard and shore
    installations and new facilities needed by the Air Force, including
    support and alert facilities;
          Direct the Air Force to upgrade Air Force Global Strike
    Command to a 4-star command
          Increase Air Force Global Strike Command, Navy Strategic
    Systems Programs, and Naval Reactors oversight and say in essential
    support functions;
          Direct the Air Force to upgrade Headquarters Air Force A-
    10 position to a 3-star position
          Create a senior position reporting to the Secretary for
    oversight of the Nuclear Enterprise.
                                   conclusion
        Although not directly involved in the DOD's efforts to address the
    conclusions of the review teams and to implement the recommendations to
    address the problems in the enterprise, I am aware that much is being
    done to bring change to the nuclear enterprise. I also want to thank
    former Secretary of Defense Hagel for taking the initiative and
    providing the support to identify and resolve the problems that have
    been ongoing in the nuclear enterprise for many years. As one Air Force
    NCO said to our team, ``There have been a lot of studies, but nothing
    ever changes. We want this study to be worth it this time.''
               summary of dod internal nuclear enterprise review
        Earlier this year, after a series of missteps involving the
    nation's nuclear deterrent forces and their senior leadership,
    Secretary Hagel directed both an internal Department of Defense (DOD)
    review and an external, independent review of the DOD nuclear
    enterprise. This includes Air Force Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
    (ICBMs), nuclear-capable bombers and tactical fighters, Navy ballistic
    missile submarines, and the supporting infrastructure to build,
    maintain, and control these assets. The internal review led by then-
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Madelyn Creedon, Rear Admiral Peter
    Fanta formerly from the Joint Staff, and Command Sergeant Major Patrick
    Alston from U.S. Strategic Command. The external review was led by
    former Air Force Chief of Staff and Commander of Strategic Air Command,
    General Larry Welch (retired), and former Commander of Fleet Forces
    Command, Admiral John Harvey (retired).
        The review leaders and their staffs visited all of the operational
    U.S. nuclear bases and key supporting facilities. They interviewed more
    than a thousand officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and
    contractors from across the armed services. Both review teams found
    participants that were open, candid, and eager to engage in dialogue
    regarding their ability to perform their mission.
        The internal review was specifically asked by the Secretary of
    Defense to examine the nuclear mission regarding personnel, training,
    testing, command oversight, mission performance, and investment. This
    review also looked into mission readiness and other operational issues
    and therefore remains classified. The internal report is consistent
    with the findings and conclusions of the external review.
        The internal review disclosed systemic problems across the nuclear
    enterprise. In general, these problems can be divided into several
    categories: longstanding, known problems that remained unaddressed and
    so became, over time, under-reported; known problems that were
    addressed but the corrective actions made the problem worse (or created
    new problems); and problems that were common knowledge in the field but
    which were never communicated to leadership. Significantly, the review
    determined that many of these problems were inextricably interrelated,
    with one problem begetting another. While many issues will need
    additional investments, in many cases the necessary corrective actions
    are cultural and structural. These measures will take time to
    implement, and must also be sustained over the long-term.
        The review provided a number of recommendations for both short- and
    long-term action; some are service-specific, some are at the
    departmental level and others are relevant to the entire enterprise.
    The review team made clear that this essential mission requires
    refocused attention and resources at all levels of the Department. The
    review organized its inquiry, findings, and recommendations into four
    categories: personnel, inspections, investment, and organization.

          The review of personnel issues identified issues with
    accountability, manning and skills mix, career development, morale and
    recognition, the personnel reliability program, and security forces.
    Within these areas, some issues manifested at the departmental level,
    in both services, or in a specific service. Key findings include:
          -  A blurring of the lines between accountability and perfection
    in the Air Force;
          -  Inadequate facilities and equipment, including IT systems, for
    the civilian workforce;
          -  A rapidly aging civilian workforce in Navy shipyards, with a
    significant mid-career gap;
          -  Lack of promotion opportunities generally in the nuclear
    career field and lack of a defined, sustainable career path for nuclear
    officers in Air Force, and career constraints resulting from nuclear
    specialization for both officers and enlisted personnel;
          -  Stress on submarine crews created by shipyard shortfalls in
    the Navy;
          -  Unduly burdensome, overly technical, and excessively risk-
    averse implementation of the personnel reliability program.
          The internal review's inquiry into inspections found that
    the nuclear enterprise is subject to a culture of excessive
    inspections. The problem is particularly acute in the Air Force, in
    part owing to the relative scope of inspections (a submarine inspection
    involves 180 sailors, a missile wing inspection involves 84,000 airmen)
    and in part owing to important cultural differences between the
    services; in particular, the demand for perfection and lack of a
    meaningful self-assessment program.
          Regarding investment, the review surveyed an aging
    nuclear enterprise with a focus on sustainment, operations and
    maintenance (O&M) funding, and infrastructure issues. The review
    determined that as this infrastructure continues to age, sustainment
    will become increasingly more difficult, time-consuming and expensive.
    Findings included:
          -  The lack of ``weapon system'' approach to the ICBM force,
    leading to disparate and inefficient sustainment and investment
    decisions for different system components;
          -  Component issues resulting from an aging, unique, and
    (relative to other weapons programs) small-sized, programs and systems;
          -  Serious shortfalls in basic O&M requirements; and
          -  Shipyard inefficiency caused by use of obsolete and/or
    temporary facilities.
          Finally, looking at the organization of the nuclear
    enterprise, the internal review echoed the finding of the external
    review regarding the absence, at the departmental level, of an
    integrated ``nuclear enterprise.'' This absence led to reduced
    awareness of issues in the nuclear field, particularly those issues
    that cut across individual stovepipes.

        Collectively, the internal and external reviews found a nuclear
    workforce that was dedicated, capable, and performing well in spite of
    challenges resulting from being understaffed, underresourced, and
    reliant on an aging and fragile supporting infrastructure in an over-
    inspected and overly risk-averse environment. Both reports identified
    serious issues with potential real world consequences if not
    addressed--some of which require long term and permanent cultural and
    structural changes.
        As a result of these reports, the Department is undertaking a
    comprehensive effort to revitalize and integrate the nuclear
    enterprise. As long as the need for effective U.S. nuclear deterrence
    endures, the United States must operate its nuclear forces with world-
    class professionalism, ensure its plans and capabilities are tailored
    to emerging nuclear threats, and retain the human capital and
    infrastructure to adapt as the strategic landscape changes. The
    Department is using this opportunity to refocus attention and resources
    to continue to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of our
    nuclear enterprise.

        Senator Sessions [presiding]. Dr. Brumer?

       STATEMENT OF DR. YISROEL E. BRUMER, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC,
       DEFENSIVE AND SPACE PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF
            DEFENSE, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION

        Dr. Brumer. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and
    distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to be here
    today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about how my
    team is executing tasks resulting from these recent internal
    and external nuclear enterprise reviews.
        These reviews concluded that without intervention, issues
    related to resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture put
    the nuclear enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater
    problems than we have previously witnessed.
        Former Secretary Hagel directed the Department to place a
    renewed emphasis on the nuclear force. He specifically charged
    the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation to
    track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
    the reviews' recommendations with particular focus on assessing
    the health of the nuclear enterprise. He also tasked us to
    provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
    regular updates to the Secretary.
        Our eight-member team includes active duty ICBM and
    ballistic missile submarine military officers, as well as
    scientists and data experts to support technical assessments.
    This team has shown unwavering dedication to improving the
    enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective analysis
    of data on assessment as possible. Senior leadership has been
    keenly interested in comprehensive and sustainable solutions
    rather than short-term efforts that merely check boxes without
    placing the enterprise on a more solid footing.
        This charge has proven to be both the most important and
    the most difficult aspect of our task. It is easy to verify
    that an instruction has been modified to relieve the force of
    an unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has
    been delivered. It is much more difficult to measure changes in
    culture or personal attitudes towards the mission. We believe
    this kind of analysis is important to facilitate real change
    while also remaining vigilant to identify unintended second-
    and third-order effects.
        Our team has made significant strides in a short time.
    Since September, we have distilled every possible
    recommendation from the reviews. We have held meetings with all
    the stakeholders and formulated problem statements identifying
    the root causes of each issue. We have worked with each
    responsible organization to develop detailed approaches and
    milestones. Finally, to go beyond box checking, we developed
    metrics to determine whether we are achieving the desired
    intent to improve the overall health of the enterprise.
    Additionally, we are visiting key locations to become more
    familiar with the unique mission and quality-of-life
    challenges, as well as hold non-attributional discussions to
    gather empirical data on knowing what issues are most pressing.
        Assessing the overall health will prove challenging, and we
    do recognize it will take years of dedicated efforts to restore
    the risk margin that has been lost. We intend to provide
    leadership with our best analysis and advice to help them guide
    these efforts to completion. Our team has embraced this
    challenge, and we are proud to have been entrusted with the
    role of ensuring issues are addressed to provide the Nation
    with a safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is
    so critical to our National security.
        I will continue to report our progress to this committee on
    a regular basis. You have my assurance that we will remain
    vigilant and we will maintain our honesty and integrity for as
    long as the Secretary of Defense and this committee deem our
    services worthy and necessary.
        I thank you for your time, and I do welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Brumer follows:]

                    Prepared Statement by Dr. Yisroel Brumer
                                  introduction
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am
    honored to join you today. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
    about how my team is executing the Secretary of Defense's direction to
    track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
    recommendations from recent internal and external reviews of the
    Nuclear Enterprise and to support efforts to ensure the viability of
    our Nation's strategic deterrence in the 21st century.
        In February 2014, former Secretary Hagel directed both internal and
    external reviews of the entire Nuclear Enterprise. These reviews were
    conducted over the course of several months by highly esteemed nuclear
    professionals, including civilians as well as active duty and retired
    military. The review teams conducted hundreds of field interviews with
    individuals whose experiences spanned the Nuclear Enterprise, from
    first-term airmen, sailors, and marines to the most senior commanders.
    Both reviews concluded that without intervention, issues related to
    resourcing, personnel, organization, and culture have the Nuclear
    Enterprise on a path to more frequent and greater problems than we have
    previously witnessed.
        As you are aware, these were not the first studies detailing the
    shortfalls within the Nuclear Enterprise, and several had noted very
    similar, if not identical, findings. With that in mind, the Secretary
    of Defense directed that the Department must place a renewed emphasis
    on improving the health of the nuclear force.
        To enhance senior leader visibility and ensure effective
    implementation that addresses root causes, Secretary Hagel directed the
    Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE), with the
    support of the Joint Staff, Air Force, Navy, the Office of the
    Secretary of Defense, and U.S. Strategic Command, to:

        (1)  Track, monitor, and independently assess the implementation of
    the reviews' recommendations.
        (2)  Conduct analysis to determine if corrective actions are having
    the desired effect and yield long-term sustainable solutions.
        (3)  Assess the health of the nuclear enterprise.
        (4)  Provide monthly updates to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
        (5)  Provide quarterly updates to the Secretary of Defense.

        My division within CAPE is charged with this task because our
    portfolio includes program assessment and evaluation of the Nuclear
    Enterprise.
        In his tasking letter to CAPE, Secretary Hagel directed the
    Military Departments and other DOD components to provide CAPE
    everything necessary to conduct robust, complete, rigorous, and timely
    assessments. I am pleased to report we now have nuclear-specialized
    representatives from the Air Force, Navy, and STRATCOM on our team.
    Additionally, we have been granted access to the Joint Staff, STRATCOM,
    and Service agencies to gather pertinent data to meet the Secretary's
    charge of robust, complete, rigorous, and timely assessment.
        Our eight-member team includes Active Duty military officers that
    have served in the ICBM and ballistic missile submarine career fields,
    as well as scientists and data experts to support technical
    assessments. Additionally, we utilize a contractor team to conduct deep
    dive data analyses and leverage subject matter expertise. The diversity
    of the team, including expertise in nuclear operations, social science,
    data analysis, and more, has provided a broad understanding of the
    reviews' recommendations so we can properly assess the wide range of
    subjects brought forward. I am extremely proud of the team, which has
    been willing to put in the intensity and the hours necessary to do the
    job right. They have shown unwavering dedication to improving the
    Nuclear Enterprise by delivering the most honest and objective
    analysis, data, and assessments possible.
                              beyond box checking
        Department of Defense (DOD) senior leadership has been very clear
    that the Secretary was keenly interested in comprehensive and
    sustainable solutions, rather than short-term efforts that merely meet
    recommendations by checking boxes without placing the enterprise on
    more solid footing. The Secretary charged our team to go beyond
    ensuring that tasks are completed and to answer questions like ``Are
    DOD efforts having the intended effect?'', ``Are unanticipated risks
    arising?'' and most critically, ``Is the Nuclear Enterprise getting
    healthier?''
        This charge has proven to be both the most important and most
    difficult aspect of our task. It is comparatively easy to verify that
    an instruction has been modified to relieve the nuclear force of an
    unnecessary burden or that needed equipment and gear has been delivered
    to the force. It is much more difficult to measure changes in culture
    or personal attitudes toward the mission. For this reason, we added a
    social scientist to the team and have leveraged the expertise of the
    Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, which conducts surveys
    of the command climate in units across all the Services, to help us
    gather the pertinent data for accurate assessments of the overall
    health of the Nuclear Enterprise. Additionally, we remain vigilant to
    identify unintended second- and third-order effects of changes driven
    by the recommendations.
        We have also initiated efforts to ensure that we are capable of
    independently verifying the accuracy of the reports we are receiving,
    without becoming another inspection agency that places an additional
    burden on the force. We are gathering a broad array of data and are
    creating relationships with key agencies to obtain on-the-ground data
    from existing inspections to support our assessments. Lastly, we plan
    to regularly interact with forces in the field at all ranks, on a non-
    attribution basis, to better understand the challenges they are facing
    and the changes they are seeing.
                                progress to date
        I am proud to report to this Committee that our team has made
    significant strides in a short time. Since September, we have combed
    every possible recommendation from the two reviews, nearly 200 in all.
    We held meetings with all stakeholders and formulated problem
    statements in an effort to identify the root cause of each issue. We
    worked with each responsible organization to develop detailed
    approaches to correct the root problems. Finally, metrics and
    milestones were developed to provide mechanisms for moving the various
    efforts forward and for assessing their effects. In keeping with the
    spirit of the task to go ``beyond box checking,'' the team developed
    both process metrics to determine whether a particular task is
    completed, as well as outcome metrics to assess whether the cumulative
    effects of the tasks are achieving the desired intent of the
    recommendations and improving the overall health of the Enterprise.
        In line with the Secretary's charge for complete, rigorous, and
    timely assessment, the CAPE Director and our team has visited and will
    continue to visit key Nuclear Enterprise locations. During these
    visits, the team becomes more familiar with the unique mission and
    quality-of-life challenges of that particular location. Additionally,
    the team holds individual and group non-attributional discussions to
    gather empirical data to determine what issues are most pressing to
    those individuals or groups, and solicits feedback on whether personnel
    in the field think our metrics are appropriate for tracking the health
    of the Enterprise.
        As stated earlier, we recognize the outcome metrics will be the
    most challenging to assess. We also recognize these are the most
    challenging for those in the field to execute, and it will take years
    of dedicated efforts to restore the risk margin that has been lost. We
    intend to provide leadership with our best analysis and advice to help
    them guide these efforts to completion.
                                   conclusion
        The DOD leadership, from Secretary Carter on down, has been clear
    that the nuclear enterprise--and the deterrent effect it provides--is a
    high priority and will remain so as long as nuclear weapons exist. My
    team has embraced that challenge and they are proud to have been
    entrusted with the role of ensuring appropriate resourcing, personnel,
    organizational, and policy issues are addressed to provide the Nation
    with the safe, secure, and effective strategic deterrent that is so
    critical to our national security. The CAPE team will continue to
    report our progress to this committee on a regular basis. You have our
    assurance that we will remain vigilant and will maintain our reputation
    for rigor, honesty, and integrity in this important mission.

        Senator Sessions. Admiral Benedict?

     STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
                            SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Chairman Sessions, Ranking
    Member Donnelly, distinguished members of the committee, thank
    you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on
    Strategic Forces.
        I represent the men and women of the Navy's Strategic
    Systems Programs (SSP).
        Your continued support of our deterrence mission is
    appreciated, and I thank you for that.
        My mission as the Director of Strategic Systems Programs is
    to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the safety and
    security of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability, the Trident III (D5) strategic weapon system.
        My written statement, which I respectfully request be
    submitted for the record, addresses all of my top priorities.
    Due to time constraints, I would like to briefly address three:
    nuclear weapons safety and security, the Trident II (D5) life
    extension efforts, and the solid rocket motor industry.
        First, my top priority is the safety and security of our
    Navy's nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the
    nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of
    this program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to
    maintain a culture of excellence and self-assessment that
    produces the highest standards of performance and integrity.
        Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address
    aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is life-extending the
    Trident II (D5) SWS strategic weapon system to match the Ohio-
    class submarine service life and to serve as the initial
    baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement submarine
    platform. This is being accomplished through a life extension
    program for all of the Trident II (D5) subsystems, to include
    launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and
    reentry.
        Finally, I remain concerned with the decline in demand for
    the solid rocket motor industry. While the Navy is maintaining
    a continuous production of solid rocket motors, the demand for
    both National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and
    the Air Force has declined. This has put the entire specialized
    industry at risk. While the efforts of our industry partners
    and others have created short-term relief, a long-term support
    of the solid rocket motor industry remains a national problem.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am
    pleased to answer any of your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict follows:]

                 Prepared Statement by VADM Terry Benedict, USN
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, distinguished members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the
    Navy's strategic programs. It is an honor to testify before you this
    afternoon representing the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
        SSP's mission is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure
    the safety of our Navy's sea-based strategic deterrent, the Trident II
    (D5) Strategic Weapons System (SWS). The men and women of SSP and our
    industry partners remain dedicated to supporting the mission of our
    Sailors on strategic deterrent patrol and our marines, sailors, and
    coast guardsmen who are standing the watch, ensuring the security of
    the weapons we are entrusted with by this nation.
        The Navy provides the most survivable leg of the U.S. nuclear triad
    with our ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the Trident II (D5)
    SWS. A number of factors have contributed to an increased reliance on
    the sea-based leg of the triad. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
    reinforced the importance of SSBNs and the Submarine Launched Ballistic
    Missiles (SLBMs) they carry. SLBMs will comprise a significant majority
    of the Nation's operationally deployed nuclear warheads, thus
    increasing the Nation's reliance on the sea-based leg of the nuclear
    triad. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Vice Chief of Naval
    Operations have recently testified that the Navy's number one priority
    is to maintain a credible, modern, and survivable sea-based strategic
    deterrent. Maintaining our Nation's capability in this key mission area
    includes the proper funding of the Ohio Replacement Program--along with
    the propulsion and the SWS--it is ``The Navy's #1 acquisition
    program.''
        Ensuring sustainment of the sea-based strategic deterrent
    capability is a vital national requirement today and into the
    foreseeable future. Our PB-16 budget request provides required funding
    to support the program of record in fiscal year 2016 for the Trident II
    (D5) SWS. To sustain this capability, I am focusing on my top
    priorities: Nuclear Weapons Safety and Security; the Trident II (D5)
    SWS Life Extension Program; the Ohio Replacement Program; the Solid
    Rocket Motor (SRM) Industrial Base; the implementation of the Nuclear
    Enterprise Review recommendations; the newly codified Navy Nuclear
    Regulatory responsibility; and Collaboration with the Air Force.
                      nuclear weapons safety and security
        The first priority, and the most important, is the safety and
    security of the Navy's nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Navy leadership
    clearly delegated and defined SSP's role as the program manager and
    technical authority for the Navy's nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons
    security.
        At its most basic level, this priority is the physical security of
    one of our Nation's most valuable assets. Our Marines and Navy Masters
    at Arms provide an effective and integrated elite security force at our
    two Strategic Weapons Facilities and Waterfront Restricted Areas in
    Kings Bay, GA, and Bangor, WA. U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Force
    Protection Units have been commissioned at both facilities to protect
    our submarines as they transit to and from their dive points. These
    Coast Guardsmen and the vessels they man provide a security umbrella
    for our Ohio-class submarines. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and
    Coast Guard team form the foundation of our Nuclear Weapons Security
    Program, and my headquarters staff ensures that our nuclear weapons
    capable activities continuously meet or exceed security, safety, and
    compliance criteria.
        SSP's efforts to sustain the safety and improve the security of
    these national assets continue at all levels of the organization. The
    Navy's nuclear weapons enterprise maintains a culture of self-
    assessment in order to sustain safety and security. This is
    accomplished through biannual assessments by SSP headquarters staff,
    periodic technical evaluations, formal inspections, and continuous on-
    site monitoring and reporting at the Strategic Weapons Facilities.
    Technical evaluations, formal inspections, and on-site monitoring at
    the Strategic Weapons Facilities provide periodic and day-to-day
    assessment and oversight. Biannual assessments evaluate the ability of
    the organization to self-assess the execution of the assigned strategic
    weapons mission and compliance with requirements. The assessments
    leverage information gained from these oversight activities. The
    results of these biannual assessments are critically and independently
    reviewed through the Navy Nuclear Weapons Assessment and provided to
    the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO.
        We also strive to maintain a culture of excellence to achieve the
    highest standards of performance and integrity for personnel supporting
    the strategic deterrent mission. We continue to focus on the custody
    and accountability of the nuclear assets that have been entrusted to
    the Navy. SSP's number one priority is to maintain a safe, secure, and
    effective strategic deterrent.
                           d5 life extension program
        The next priority is SSP's life extension efforts to ensure the
    Trident II (D5) SWS remains an effective and reliable sea-based
    deterrent. The Trident II (D5) SWS continues to demonstrate itself as a
    credible deterrent and exceeds the operational requirements established
    for the system over 30 years ago. The submarine leg of the U.S.
    strategic deterrent is ready, credible, and effective, thereby assuring
    our allies and partners and deterring potential adversaries. However,
    we must remain vigilant about age-related issues to ensure a continued
    high level of reliability.
        The Trident II (D5) SWS has been deployed on our Ohio-class
    ballistic missile submarines for 25 years and is planned for a service
    life of 50 years. This is well beyond its original design life of 25
    years and more than double the historical service life of any previous
    sea-based strategic deterrent system. As a result, effort will be
    required to sustain credible SWS from now until the end of the current
    Ohio-class SSBN in the 2040s, as well as the end of the service life of
    the Ohio Replacement SSBN in the 2080s.
        The Navy is proactively taking steps to address aging and
    technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of the Trident II
    (D5) SWS to match the Ohio-class submarine service life and to serve as
    the initial baseline mission payload for the Ohio Replacement submarine
    platform. This is being accomplished through an update to all the
    Trident II (D5) SWS subsystems: launcher, navigation, fire control,
    guidance, missile, and reentry. Our flight hardware--missile and
    guidance--life extension efforts are designed to meet the same form,
    fit, and function of the original system to keep the deployed system as
    one homogeneous population, control costs, and sustain the demonstrated
    performance of the system. We will remain in continuous production of
    large energetic components such as solid rocket motors and Post Boost
    Control System Gas Generators, and are starting an age management
    replacement effort for missile small ordnance and control components.
    We have also started initial planning on the timing of when a follow-on
    to Trident II (D5) will be needed. These efforts will provide the Navy
    with the missiles and guidance systems we need to meet operational
    requirements through the introduction and deployment of the Ohio
    Replacement SSBNs through the 2080s.
        While budgetary pressures and impacts of sequestration have
    resulted in some deferred or delayed efforts, strategic deterrence
    remains the Navy's highest priority. As such, the Navy is committed to
    minimizing, to the maximum extent possible, impacts to this program in
    order to meet strategic requirements.
        One impacted effort is the change to our flight test program. In
    accordance with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) requirements, the
    Navy is required to flight test a minimum of four Trident II (D5)
    missiles per year in a tactically-representative environment. The
    purpose of flight testing is to detect any change in reliability or
    accuracy. The fiscal year 2016 budget request reflects a reduction of
    one planned flight test for affordability. The Navy has coordinated
    with STRATCOM to determine that this temporary reduction is manageable
    in the short-term, contingent upon our plan to ramp back up to four
    flight tests per year later in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
    A prolonged reduction beyond what is planned in fiscal year 2016 would
    impact our ability to detect changes in reliability and accuracy of an
    aging system with the required degree of statistical confidence to meet
    STRATCOM requirements. I am strongly committed to ensure our flight
    testing returns to four flight tests per year.
        Despite budgetary pressures, the Navy's D5 life extension program
    remains on track. In June 2014, the USS West Virginia (SSBN 736)
    successfully conducted her Demonstration and Shakedown Operation (DASO
    25) by launching two missiles. One missile marked the third flight test
    of the D5 life-extended (LE) guidance system and the second flight test
    of the D5 LE Command Sequencer. The second missile was the first flight
    of the D5 LE Flight Controls Electronics Assembly and Interlocks
    packages. Additionally, the first flight test of the D5 LE guidance
    system with the D5 LE Flight Controls Electronics Assembly and
    Interlocks packages is scheduled for DASO 26 in fiscal year 2016. The
    D5 LE Command Sequencer met its initial fleet introduction earlier this
    year. The life extension efforts for the remaining electronics packages
    are on budget and on schedule. The life-extended missiles will be
    available for initial fleet introduction in fiscal year 2017.
        Another major step to ensure the continued sustainment of our SWS
    is the SSP Shipboard Integration (SSI) Programs, which address
    obsolescence management and modernization of SWS shipboard systems
    through the use of open architecture design and commercial off-the-
    shelf hardware and software. The first increment of this update was
    installed on the final U.S. SSBN in April of last year. This completed
    installation on all 14 U.S. SSBNs, all 4 UK SSBNs and all U.S. and U.K.
    land-based facilities. Subsequent increments of this program begin
    installation this summer. The SSI Program includes refreshes of
    shipboard electronics hardware and software upgrades, which will extend
    service life, enable more efficient and affordable future maintenance
    of the SWS and ensure we continue to provide the highest level of
    nuclear weapons safety and security for our deployed SSBNs while
    meeting STRATCOM requirements.
        To sustain the Trident II (D5) SWS, SSP is extending the life of
    the W76 reentry system through a refurbishment program known as the
    W76-1. The W76-1 refurbishment maintains the military capability of the
    original W76 for an additional 30 years. This program, which is being
    executed in partnership with the Department of Energy, National Nuclear
    Security Administration (NNSA), has completed over 50 percent of the
    planned warhead production. The Navy will continue to work with NNSA to
    closely monitor production and deliveries to ensure there are no
    operational impacts.
        In addition, the Navy continues the design work to refurbish the
    aging electronics in the W88 reentry system. The Navy is collaborating
    with the Air Force to reduce costs through shared subsystems suitable
    for the W88/Mk5 and the W87/Mk21. Additionally, the Nuclear Weapons
    Council (NWC) has approved the inclusion of conventional high explosive
    refurbishment as part of this effort which will support deployment of
    the W88/Mk5 into the early 2040s. As directed by the NWC, we have
    submitted funding requests to support the initial concept studies (6.2/
    6.2A) for an Interoperable Warhead (IW) to begin in 2020. The Navy
    believes that the NWC is effective at managing and identifying
    priorities for the nuclear weapons stockpile. Moreover, the Navy is
    fully represented at the NWC and has every opportunity to raise any
    issues directly with the NWC when necessary. Therefore, I do not
    recommend a separate Service vote at the NWC.
                            ohio replacement program
        The Navy's highest priority acquisition program is the Ohio
    Replacement Program, which replaces the existing Ohio-class submarines.
    The continued assurance of our sea-based strategic deterrent requires a
    credible SWS, as well as the development of the next class of ballistic
    missile submarines. The Navy is taking the necessary steps to ensure
    the Ohio Replacement SSBN is designed, built, delivered, and tested on
    time with the right capabilities at an affordable cost.
        To lower development costs and leverage the proven reliability of
    the Trident II (D5) SWS, the Ohio replacement SSBN will enter service
    with the Trident II (D5) SWS and D5 LE missiles onboard. These D5 LE
    missiles will be shared with the existing Ohio-class submarine until
    the current Ohio-class retires. Maintaining one SWS during the
    transition to the Ohio-class replacement is beneficial from a cost,
    performance, and risk reduction standpoint. A program to support long-
    term SWS requirements will have to be developed in the future to
    support the Ohio-class replacement SSBN through its entire service
    life.
        The Navy continues to leverage from the Virginia-class program to
    implement lessons-learned and ensure the Ohio Replacement Program
    pursues affordability initiatives across design, construction, and life
    cycle operations and support. Several critical milestones and decisions
    were achieved by the SSBN design team as they progress the design of
    the Ohio Replacement. Maintaining the pace of design and submarine
    industrial capability is critical to the continued success of our sea-
    based strategic deterrent now and well into the 2080s.
        A critical component of the Ohio Replacement Program is the
    development of a Common Missile Compartment (CMC) that will support
    Trident II (D5) deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and the
    successor to the U.K. Vanguard-class. As the United Kingdom will be the
    first to test, launch, and deploy the Trident II (D5) system in a CMC,
    the U.S.-led design team is progressing at pace to support the U.K.
    Successor lead ship construction timeline. In 2014, the United States
    contracted for the first joint procurement of missile tubes to support
    building the U.S. prototype Quad-pack module, the Strategic Weapons
    System-Ashore (SWS Ashore) test site, and the U.K.'s first SSBN. The
    joint CMC effort is shifting from design to construction that will
    support production in both United States and United Kingdom build
    yards. Any delay to the common missile compartment effort has the
    potential to impact the U.K.'s ability to maintain a continuous at sea
    deterrent posture.
        To manage and mitigate technical risk to both the U.S. and U.K.
    programs, SSP is leading the development of SWS Ashore integration test
    site at Cape Canaveral, FL. This is a joint effort with the Navy and
    the State of Florida investing in the redevelopment of a Polaris site
    to conduct integration testing and verification for Ohio replacement
    and U.K. Successor programs. Refurbishment of the Polaris site and
    construction of the infrastructure and building is proceeding at a
    rapid pace. Trident II (D5), Ohio-class, and Ohio replacement new
    design hardware will be co-located and integrated to prove the
    successful re-host and redeployment of the Trident II (D5) SWS on the
    new submarines. To mitigate the restart of launch system production,
    SSP recently broke ground on a surface launch facility at the Naval Air
    Station, China Lake, CA. This facility will prove that the launcher
    industrial base can replicate the performance of the Ohio-class Trident
    II (D5) launch system. We will be launching the refurbished Trident II
    (D5) test shapes we used in the 1980s starting in fiscal year 2017.
    Launch performance is a critical factor we must understand at the
    systems level to ensure we maintain high reliability as we transition
    the weapon system to the next class of SSBNs.
        The United States and the United Kingdom have maintained a shared
    commitment to nuclear deterrence through the Polaris Sales Agreement
    since April 1963. As the Director of SSP, I am the U.S. Project Officer
    for the Polaris Sales Agreement. Our programs are tightly coupled both
    programmatically and technically to ensure we are providing the most
    cost effective, technically capable nuclear strategic deterrent for
    both nations. Last year, marked the 51st anniversary of this agreement,
    and I am pleased to report that our longstanding partnership with the
    United Kingdom remains strong. The United States will continue to
    maintain its strong strategic relationship with the United Kingdom as
    we execute our Trident II (D5) LE Program and develop the common
    missile compartment. Our continued stewardship of the Trident II (D5)
    SWS is necessary to ensure a credible and reliable SWS is deployed
    today on our Ohio-class submarines, the U.K. Vanguard-class, as well as
    in the future on our respective follow-on platforms. This is of
    particular importance as the New START treaty reductions are
    implemented, increasing the reliance on the sea-based leg of the Triad.
    The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset whose
    endurance and stealth will enable the Navy to provide continuous,
    uninterrupted strategic deterrence well into the 2080s.
                    solid rocket motor (srm) industrial base
        A priority is the importance of the defense and aerospace
    industrial base, in particular, the solid rocket motor industry. I
    remain concerned with the decline in demand for solid rocket motors.
    While the Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability at a
    minimum sustaining rate of 12 rocket motor sets per year, the demand
    from both NASA and Air Force has precipitously declined. Not only did
    this decline result in higher costs for the Navy, as practically a sole
    customer, but it also put an entire specialized industry at risk for
    extinction--or at least on the ``endangered species list.'' To allow
    this puts our National security at risk. The Navy cannot afford to
    singularly carry this cost, nor can our Nation afford to lose this
    capability. While the efforts of our industry partners and others have
    created short-term cost relief, the long-term support of the solid
    rocket motor industry remains an issue that must be addressed at the
    national level. To date, this has not happened. At SSP, we will
    continue to work with our industry partners, DOD, senior NASA
    leadership, Air Force and Congress to do everything we can to ensure
    this vital national security industry asset is preserved.
                           nuclear enterprise review
        The recent Secretary of Defense-directed Nuclear Enterprise Review
    (NER) and the Program and Budget Review for the fiscal year 2016 budget
    formulation focused significant attention on the recapitalization,
    sustainment, and modernization of our nuclear deterrence systems and
    infrastructure. The NER provided the Navy a thorough and unbiased look
    at our nuclear forces. Overall, the report found that the nuclear
    enterprise is safe, secure, and effective today but it also found
    evidence of systemic problems that, if not addressed, could undermine
    the safety, security, and effectiveness of elements of the force in the
    future. Fortunately the Navy's internal Nuclear Weapons Assessment and
    the SSP Comprehensive Self-Assessment identified most of the issues
    underscored during the NER. In fact, the report validated numerous
    efforts already underway.
        The Navy has taken active steps to address the more than 68
    recommendations with Navy equity contained in the report. Significant
    action has been taken to implement each recommendation, generally
    focused on a few key areas, including: oversight, investment, and
    personnel and training improvements. These implementation actions have
    been funded with an additional budget request of $407 million in fiscal
    year 2016 and $2.2 billion across the FYDP. With respect to oversight,
    the Navy is clarifying the nuclear deterrent enterprise leadership
    structure and reducing administrative burdens imposed on the forces.
    The Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Group (NDERG), formed and led by the
    Secretary of Defense will provide regular oversight of the nuclear
    enterprise. The Navy Nuclear Weapons Oversight Council has become the
    Navy's mechanism to ensure NDERG recommendations and guidance are
    properly implemented and that investments achieve the intended effect.
        Regarding training and personnel the Navy is planning a significant
    investment to build a margin in the deterrence force and clear the SSBN
    maintenance backlog. Some of the recommendations involve long-term
    cultural or organizational changes, and the Navy has matched the right
    responsibilities with the right leaders. There will be an emphasis on
    the importance of the deterrence mission through updated vision
    statements, revised campaign plans, and methods to eliminate obstacles
    to enhance moral conduct and relieve the pressures on sailors,
    training, and work-life balance. More specifically the Navy will apply
    additional resources to Strategic Mission personnel with a planned $28
    million and an increase of 44 Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) in fiscal
    year 2016. In addition 160 FTEs were added for the Strategic Weapons
    Facilities and Trident Training Facility to improve sustainment and
    training of the ballistic missile submarine force.
        The Navy has also planned a substantial increase in FTEs for the
    four Naval Public Shipyards. With an eventual target of 33,500 direct
    and reimbursable FTEs, the goal is to better match capacity with
    workload. In addition, some submarine maintenance will be outsourced to
    the private sector to ensure over capacity work does not result in
    deferred maintenance into the FYDP. Both of these actions result in an
    investment of $338 million with an overall planned FYDP investment of
    $1.1 billion. There will be accelerated infrastructure improvements and
    recapitalization plans to ensure long-term sustainment at Shipyards and
    Strategic Weapons Facilities. The Navy accelerated investment in the
    budget request for fiscal year 2016 from a 17 year plan to a 15 year
    plan to improve the condition of the Shipyards by adding $350 million
    across the FYDP. The Navy has also funded $324 million across the FYDP
    to address infrastructure issues at the Strategic Weapons Facilities.
    Navy is developing a 20 year investment plan to ensure the continued
    reliability of critical infrastructure at these facilities to support
    nuclear weapons movement and operations. While the Navy has made
    significant progress through actions taken to date, we recognize much
    work remains to be accomplished. The Navy is confident we have the
    right emphasis, oversight, and processes in place to maintain a
    credible, modern, and safe sea-based deterrent.
                     navy nuclear regulatory responsibility
        As a result of the Nuclear Enterprise Review the Navy implemented a
    centralized regulatory authority for nuclear force readiness. As the
    Director, Strategic Systems Programs (DIRSSP), I now have
    accountability, responsibility and authority to serve as the single
    Flag Officer to monitor performance and conduct end-to-end assessment
    of the Navy Nuclear Deterrence Mission (NNDM) elements. These
    responsibilities are defined in Secretary of the Navy Instruction
    8120.1B and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 8120.1.
    Nine Echelon 2 level commands directly contribute to the NNDM: U.S.
    Fleet Forces Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Fleet Cyber Command, Navy
    Supply Systems Command, Naval Sea Systems Command, Chief of Naval
    Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Commander, Navy
    Installations Command, and SSP.
        DIRSSP will be the NNDM regulatory authority responsible for
    assessing and reporting issues to the Navy Nuclear Weapons Council and
    the CNO. SSP is tasked with developing, coordinating, and implementing
    policies approved by the CNO, and conducting end-to-end assessments of
    the Department of the Navy nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems
    and personnel for safe, reliable, and effective execution of the NNDM.
        SSP is engaged with the Echelon 2 commands defined above to
    understand their current reporting and assessment processes and to
    define the NNDM regulatory assessment policy. My next in-progress
    review for the CNO, April 2015, will define the existing reporting and
    engagement strategies, the status of our interaction with the commands,
    and present the initial component assessment and reporting.
                        collaboration with the air force
        The final priority is strategic collaboration between the Services.
    The Navy and the Air Force are both addressing the challenges of
    sustaining aging strategic weapon systems and have begun to work
    collaboratively to ensure these capabilities are retained in the long-
    term to meet our requirements. To do so, we are seeking opportunities
    to leverage technologies and make the best use of scarce resources.
        As I testified last year, the Navy and the Air Force established an
    Executive Steering Group to identify and investigate potential
    collaboration opportunities and oversee collaborative investments for
    sustainment of our strategic systems. As a part of this effort,
    technology area working groups are studying collaboration opportunities
    in the areas of Reentry Systems, Guidance, Strategic Propulsion,
    Command and Control, Radiation Hardened Electronics, Testing and
    Surveillance, and Nuclear Weapons Surety.
        The Navy was an active participant in the Air Force's Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) effort. Members of my staff were involved
    with this effort, which began during the GBSD Analysis of Alternatives
    (AoA). Navy subject matter experts supported each of the GBSD AoA
    working groups and participated in an effort to evaluate the benefits
    and potential risks of commonality and collaboration for each of the
    GBSD AoA options. Since the completion of the AoA, the Navy has
    continued to support the Air Force technical and programmatic efforts
    on GBSD including technology identification and requirements
    development.
        The benefits of increased collaboration between the services are
    many. However, commonality is required to actually save costs.
    Commonality will help improve the affordability of the Nation's
    strategic services by eliminating redundant efforts and by improving
    economic order quantities of key constituents and components. In
    addition to the benefits gained by improved economic order quantities,
    the use of common constituents and components will make it easier for
    the Navy and Air Force to sustain the critical skills and capabilities
    needed by stabilizing demand signals to suppliers. Finally these
    efforts allow the Navy and Air Force to leverage work already being
    done by the other Service to avoid unnecessary duplication and costs.
        Each leg of the Triad has unique attributes. Furthermore, a
    sustained and ready Triad provides an effective hedge, allowing the
    Nation to shift to another leg, if necessary due to unforeseen
    technical problems or vulnerabilities. For this reason, the Department
    is focused on cooperative efforts that maintain affordability and
    reduces risk to both services while retaining essential diversity where
    needed to ensure a credible and reliable deterrent. Many of the
    industries and required engineering skills sets are unique to strategic
    systems. Key to SSP's historical success has been our technical
    applications programs, which in the past have provided a research and
    development foundation. As we evaluate maintaining this strategic
    capability until the 2080s to match the full service life of the Ohio
    Replacement submarine, we will need to resume these critical efforts.
                                   conclusion
        SSP continues to maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic
    deterrent and focus on the custody and accountability of the nuclear
    assets entrusted to the Navy. Our PB-16 budget request ensures that we
    will sustain this capability in fiscal year 2016. However, we must
    remain vigilant about unforeseen age-related issues to ensure the high
    reliability required of our SWS. SSP must maintain the engineering
    support and critical skills of our industry and government team to
    address any future challenges with the current system as well as
    prepare for the future of the program. Our Nation's sea-based deterrent
    has been a critical component of our national security since the 1950s
    and must continue to assure our allies and deter potential adversaries
    well into the future. I am privileged to represent this unique
    organization as we work to serve the best interests of our great
    Nation.

        Senator Sessions. Thank you.
        General Wilson?

     STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. STEPHEN W. WILSON, USAF, COMMANDER, AIR
                      FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMAND

        General Wilson. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you for allowing
    me to appear before you and represent the men and women of Air
    Force Global Strike Command.
        Let me first say that the airmen are doing an outstanding
    job every single day, providing a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear force for our Nation while ensuring our conventional
    mission continues to excel.
        The last time I testified before the committee, we had just
    experienced our unignorable moment when we discovered cheating
    at Mahlstrom Air Force Base. We have instituted major changes
    based on feedback from our airmen doing the mission and are
    constantly assessing whether and where we still need to
    improve.
        One of the most important changes we have instituted is
    empowering our people, not micro-managing them. Through their
    innovation, hard work, and shared commitment, they are able to
    truly create their own future and to write their own story.
        These changes we are undertaking are completely in line
    with both the internal and external nuclear enterprise reviews.
    With the support of the senior leadership, we have restored the
    nuclear focus and are starting to fund essential modernization
    efforts.
        Funding for the long-range strike bomber is critical to
    extending our dominance against next generation capabilities.
    The long-range standoff missile will improve our ability to
    strike heavily at defended targets. The ground-based strategic
    deterrent will provide the responsive capability and the
    strategic stability on which this Nation has come to rely. We
    are also continuing our efforts to upgrade the NC3 systems that
    underpin our nuclear deterrent to ensure we receive
    presidential orders. We are working with our Navy partners to
    find areas of intelligent commonality where appropriate.
        Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to
    appear before the committee, and I look forward to your
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Wilson follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Lt. Gen. Stephen W. Wilson, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee; thank you for allowing me to represent the
    over 23,000 Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) airmen. I will use
    this opportunity to update you on our mission, the status of our
    forces, and the future of the command.
                    air force global strike command mission
        In an effort to re-invigorate the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force
    re-activated Strategic Air Command and re-designated the organization
    as Air Force Global Strike Command. Last year AFGSC celebrated its
    fifth anniversary. As you know, the command was created to provide a
    focus on the stewardship and operation of two legs of our Nation's
    nuclear triad while also accomplishing the conventional global strike
    mission. Numerous Blue Ribbon panels, task forces, and other reviews
    have reaffirmed that a triad should be maintained under the New START
    agreement with the Russian Federation. Other nations' nuclear arsenal
    advancements and modernization efforts are a national concern and
    validate the fact that AFGSC's Nuclear Deterrence Operations mission
    set remains critical in today's unstable geopolitical environment. We
    live in a world that continues to rapidly change and until we have the
    peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons we must never
    forget the stabilizing influence the triad has on our allies, partners,
    and adversaries. In order for us to be effective across the spectrum of
    conflict from day-to-day deterrence and assurance operations to nuclear
    engagement, our airmen must be ready and equipped with the right tools
    to do the job. The world has not experienced a war between major super
    powers for over 70 years; there are a number of reasons for this, one
    of which is our Nation has provided credible deterrence for our
    adversaries and assurance for allies and partners. Due to the special
    trust and confidence the American people put in us every day, we can
    never fail them in ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    arsenal. Continuing in the proud heritage of Strategic Air Command, yet
    tailored for today's evolving world, AFGSC's mission is to: ``Develop
    and provide combat-ready forces for nuclear deterrence and global
    strike operations--Safe, Secure, and Effective--to support the
    President of the United States and combatant commanders.''
    Air Force Global Strike Command Nuclear Mission
        At the core of our mission statement are three reinforcing, key
    attributes: ``Safe-Secure-Effective.'' These were outlined in President
    Obama's 2009 Prague speech where he said: ``Make no mistake: as long as
    these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and
    effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to
    our allies.'' The attributes of ``safe, secure, effective'' serve to
    underpin every nuclear-related activity in AFGSC, from the discipline
    adhered to in the smallest task, to how we prioritize our planning and
    programming for the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The effects of
    our nuclear force, as outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, are
    to ensure strategic stability, to support the regional deterrence
    architecture, and to assure our allies and partners.
    Air Force Global Strike Command Conventional Mission
        The command's focus on nuclear operations cannot come at the cost
    of our conventional mission. Our conventional bomber forces defend our
    national interests by deterring or, should deterrence fail, defeating
    an adversary. Two capabilities are fundamental to the success of our
    bomber forces: our ability to hold heavily defended targets at risk and
    our ability to apply persistent combat power across the spectrum of
    conflict anywhere on the globe at any time. The United States' fleet of
    heavy bombers provide the Nation a visible global warfighting
    capability that is essential to the credibility of America's national
    security strategy. These bombers carry our latest high-tech munitions
    in quantities to ensure the Air Force can meet our Nation's global
    responsibilities, and therefore are in high-demand by the regional
    combatant commanders.
                              challenges answered
        It is no secret our nuclear forces have recently gone through a
    time of intense scrutiny, most notably with the cheating incident in
    our intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) community. However, we
    have turned this negative event into an opportunity for positive and
    lasting change. Remember, the bulk of our airmen are doing great work
    each and every day. They believe in the mission and are serving to the
    best of their abilities. Their faith in us deserves action; we have
    taken action to improve the two legs of the triad we operate. The
    challenge before us is to follow through on these actions.
    Force Improvement Program
        As you know, the Force Improvement Program (FIP) was directed in
    response to the aforementioned cheating incident. We knew we had to
    make changes, but instead of doing it the same way we always had in the
    past, we asked the airmen doing the job day in and day out what they
    would improve. They responded openly and thoroughly. Our bottom-up
    approach yielded 384 recommendations in the ICBM community and 215
    recommendations in the bomber community. We approved action on 98
    percent of the ICBM recommendations and 92 percent of the bomber
    recommendations.
        Some of the changes are significant paradigm shifts for our ICBM
    community. We are completely changing ICBM crewmember progression to a
    ``3+3'' construct where our crewmembers can focus on becoming weapon
    system experts during their first three years and then transition to
    instructor, evaluator, or flight commander duties for the second three
    years. We have also put assistant Operations Officers in place in all
    of the operations squadrons to provide mid-career leadership so
    desperately needed. Lastly, we changed the testing and evaluation
    culture that was the root cause of many of the problems within the
    operations community. Instead of studying to get a perfect score for an
    exam, we have refocused our training and evaluation programs to reflect
    the mission at hand.
        These changes are not just for the operations community, either. We
    are providing better tools and equipment to the maintainers. Our
    security forces members are getting new uniforms, cold weather gear,
    and weapons improvements--all commensurate with the important mission
    they do in harsh conditions protecting our Nation's most important
    assets. Another way we are showing our airmen the importance of the
    mission they perform is through increased pay. We now provide select
    officers Assignment Incentive Pay and critical enlisted members Special
    Duty Assignment Pay.
        As mentioned earlier, it is important to note that FIP is not just
    an ICBM program. We applied the same construct to our bomber mission
    areas and we have multiple efforts ongoing to address issues raised. We
    are looking at our Continuous Bomber Presence (CBP) program to ensure
    we are manning the mission appropriately while providing stability for
    our airmen. Additionally, we are completely rewriting our qualification
    training syllabi to ensure quality nuclear training without losing
    focus on the conventional mission. With the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense's (OSD) help, we are revamping our implementation of the
    Personnel Reliability Program. We have refocused the program back to
    its original intent--a commander's program with an ``up until down''
    mentality.
        In order to ensure we do not lose this momentum, we are
    transitioning the idea of the Force Improvement Program to a continuous
    Force Improvement Philosophy. We will internalize the much-needed
    change we have gone through so that we can sustain these efforts to
    improve our Air Force nuclear forces. These changes are examples of us
    bridging the ``Say-Do'' gap that had become so pervasive in the nuclear
    enterprise. We continue to grow and shape our upcoming nuclear experts
    and leaders. We are focusing on developing a force of nuclear leaders
    who understand nuclear strategy and policy, and are capable of
    thoughtfully articulating what deterrence means in the 21st century.
    AFGSC is leading the way by integrating education and training at
    different points in a nuclear professional's career. We are utilizing
    expertise both within the Air Force and in industry to develop airmen
    with the skills necessary to lead and the knowledge necessary to
    effectively shape deterrence theory and policy.
    Nuclear Enterprise Review Reports
        This past November, the Department of Defense (DOD) released two
    different reports that analyzed the nuclear missions for areas of
    concern and improvement. The internal and external reports were
    extremely thorough, and I sincerely thank all those involved in helping
    to make our nuclear forces better. I will also add that we had already
    begun addressing almost all of the same issues. The reports' findings
    overlapped a majority of our existing FIP recommendations; we look
    forward to continuing the implementation of the recommended changes.
    Senior Leader Support
        There was a common thread throughout the last year with regard to
    the nuclear enterprise--senior leader support. We had neglected our
    nuclear forces for decades; our current leadership recognized this fact
    and moved decisively to correct that shortcoming. Even as we move to
    reduce the roles and missions of nuclear weapons in U.S. nuclear
    policy, nuclear weapons must remain effective and reliable. Former
    Secretary of Defense Hagel recognized this fact by saying, ``Our
    nuclear deterrent plays a critical role in ensuring United States
    national security, and it's DOD's highest priority mission. No
    capability we have is more important.'' Secretary Carter said during
    his confirmation, `` . . . with respect to the nuclear enterprise, I
    have a long history in that regard and am a strong believer in a safe,
    secure and reliable nuclear arsenal for the United States.'' Our most
    senior leaders in both the DOD and Air Force have now made personal
    visits to all of our bases, not only showing support but also following
    up on the actions we are taking. Other ways we are seeing leaders take
    positive and lasting action are the funding increases and the follow
    through of the Nuclear Deterrence Enterprise Review Group chaired by
    the Secretary of Defense. Senior leaders today recognize the importance
    of what our nuclear deterrence offers this nation and are committed to
    lasting, positive change.
                     air force global strike command forces
    Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Forces
        Twentieth Air Force, one of two Numbered Air Forces (NAF) in AFGSC,
    is responsible for the Minuteman III (MM III) ICBM and our UH-1N
    helicopter forces. The 450 dispersed and hardened missile silos
    maintain strategic stability by presenting any potential adversary a
    near insurmountable obstacle should they consider a disarming attack on
    the United States. No potential adversary can hope to destroy this
    force without depleting their own arsenal. Every day over 900 airmen
    deploy to our 3 missile fields, executing effective deterrence and
    assurance operations. Accomplishing this vital mission demands we focus
    on sustaining our current systems while modernizing for the future.
      Minuteman III
        We continue efforts to sustain the Minuteman III ICBM. This
    includes upgrading the command, control, and communications systems and
    support equipment.
        One of these support systems is the Transporter Erector (TE)
    Replacement Program (TERP). The TE is used to transport boosters and
    emplace them at the Launch Facilities (LF). The current fleet averages
    23 years old and has experienced significant structural fatigue due to
    high mission tempo. We have completed the TERP design review and are
    preparing to prototype and test a new TE. We expect the new equipment
    to begin fielding in 2016.
        We are also equipping ICBM launch control centers (LCC) with
    modernized communications systems that will upgrade or replace other
    aging and obsolete systems. The LCC Block Upgrade is an overall
    modification effort that replaces multiple LCC components to include a
    modern data storage replacement for floppy disks and new Voice Control
    Panels to provide high quality voice communications. We expect a
    contract to be awarded this year with production in 2018 and deployment
    in 2019. The Minuteman Minimum Essential Emergency Communications
    Network Program Upgrade will modernize and better secure the Emergency
    Action Message network; this upgrade will begin fielding early next
    year.
        We conducted two MM III flight tests in fiscal year 2014 that,
    along with two Simulated Electronic Launch Minuteman tests in the
    operational environment of six LFs each, demonstrate the operational
    credibility of the nuclear deterrent force and the command's commitment
    to sustaining that capability. Operational flight testing is currently
    funded and planned for four operational test launches per year to
    satisfy requirements outlined by United States Strategic Command
    (STRATCOM) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In
    fact, I am pleased to report that last month we successfully test
    launched two ICBMs, both of which were the two longest MMIII flights in
    history. These special extended range missions have allowed us to
    gather important data and validate our global strike capability.
        We continue to examine emerging technologies to ensure the MM III
    weapon system remains reliable and ready through 2030. Additionally, we
    are looking into how investments in these technologies can transfer to
    and provide savings for the future Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
    (GBSD) program.
      Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
        The Minuteman flight system, currently on its third model, has been
    on continuous alert since the early 1960s, over 50 years ago, and has
    proven its value in deterrence well beyond the platform's initial 10-
    year lifespan. All parts of the triad are complementary; the ICBM
    provides the most responsive portion of the triad. ICBM capability gaps
    were identified and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight
    Council (JROC), and subsequently approved in August 2012 by the Air
    Force Chief of Staff, resulting in an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA).
    The AoA completed in June 2014 and identified a replacement to the MM
    III as the most cost-effective approach. Previously planned sustainment
    programs (e.g., guidance and propulsion replacement programs) will be
    leveraged into GBSD and serve as the foundation of the effort. Starting
    this summer, the Air Force's second Enterprise Capability Collaboration
    Team (ECCT) will assemble the resources, stakeholders, and expertise
    across the Air Force to identify ICBM program needs and gaps to
    determine the best command and control and other system requirements
    for GBSD. Additionally, we are engaged with our naval partners to
    further investigate areas for intelligent commonality between potential
    GBSD systems and future Navy weapons. We hope to find areas of overlap
    with the objective of reducing design, development, manufacturing,
    logistics support, production, and testing costs for the Nation's
    strategic systems while still acknowledging that the different weapon
    systems will always have some requirements that necessitate unique
    solutions.
        Successful fielding of a follow-on ICBM will require the
    acquisition team to design the entire system beginning now through
    2019. This approach provides flexible deployment options in light of
    budget constraints. Due to system age-out, the first priority is to
    replace the missile itself. However, command and control (C2) and
    infrastructure recapitalization is necessary to continue safe, secure,
    and effective operations. It is no small task to upgrade the command
    and control systems along with the underlying infrastructure that
    supports the weapon system. For example, at our largest missile field
    operated by the 341st Missile Wing, we must connect and support
    hardened systems across almost 14,000 square miles. As a comparison,
    this is larger than the entire state of Maryland; our nuclear command
    and control is currently serviced by copper wire and equipment
    installed in the 1960s. AFGSC is defining approaches to upgrade C2 and
    modernize necessary facilities. GBSD cannot be viewed as just another
    life extension to our existing MMIII; it is time to field a replacement
    ground-based capability that will assure our allies and deter potential
    adversaries well into the future. Thank you for your continued support
    of GBSD as we move forward ensuring it will lead to a viable
    replacement for the MM III ICBM.
      UH-1N
        AFGSC is the lead command for the Air Force's fleet of 62 UH-1N
    helicopters. The majority of these aircraft support two critical
    national missions: nuclear security in support of the ICBM force, and
    the Continuity of Operations/Continuity of Government mission in the
    National Capital Region. They also actively participate in the Defense
    Support of Civil Authorities program often being called to help with
    search and rescue activities.
        Although the UH-1Ns are 45+ years old, we plan to fly them until
    the mid-2020s. We must sustain the helicopter's current capabilities
    while selectively upgrading the platform to address the most critical
    safety and operational concerns. Safety improvements currently underway
    include the procurement of crashworthy aircrew seats across the fleet
    and night vision goggle-compatible cockpits that will be fully
    integrated by 2016. In addition, the command is fielding the Helicopter
    Terrain Avoidance and Warning System and Traffic Collision Avoidance
    System to improve situational awareness and survivability. Finally, in
    order to more effectively employ the UH-1N in its nuclear security
    role, AFGSC stood up the 582d Helicopter Operations Group, the only
    helicopter operations group in the Air Force, at F.E. Warren Air Force
    Base (AFB), WY, to better support and focus our helicopter employment
    at the three missile wings.
      UH-1N Follow On
        While we can, to some extent, mitigate the UH-1N's deficiencies in
    range, speed, and payload, no amount of modification will close these
    critical capability gaps entirely. This can only be accomplished by
    fielding a replacement aircraft that meets validated mission
    requirements. As such, a UH-1N Replacement Program is included in the
    fiscal year 2016 budget submission. We are working with SAF/AQ and Air
    Force Materiel Command to confirm and select the most cost-effective
    way to procure a new platform. We look forward to identifying and
    procuring a replacement helicopter that fully meets our nuclear mission
    needs.
    Dual-Capable Bomber Forces
        Eighth Air Force is responsible for the B-52H Stratofortress (B-52)
    and B-2A Spirit (B-2) bombers. This includes maintaining the
    operational readiness of both the bombers' nuclear and conventional
    missions. The B-52 serves as the Nation's most versatile and diverse
    weapon system in Air Force Global Strike Command by providing precision
    and timely long range strike capabilities. Meanwhile, the B-2 can
    penetrate our adversary's most advanced Integrated Air Defenses Systems
    to strike heavily defended targets. Our flexible dual-capable bomber
    fleet is the most visible leg of the nuclear triad. They provide
    decision makers the ability to demonstrate resolve through generation,
    dispersal, or deployment, and the ability to quickly place bomber
    sorties on alert thereby ensuring their continued survival in support
    of the President and to meet combatant command requirements.
      Global Assurance and Deterrence
        CBP, initiated in 2003, increases regional stability and assures
    our allies and partners in the U.S. Pacific Command area of
    responsibility. CBP is an enduring requirement; therefore we have taken
    steps to reduce the cost of squadron rotations. Specifically, over the
    past year we worked closely with Pacific Air Forces on the requirement
    to establish a detachment at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam. This
    detachment will be made up of operations and maintenance experts and
    will better enable us to support CBP operations. Through the Bomber
    Assurance and Deterrence program, we exercise with every combatant
    command and every joint partner annually. These exercises take place
    all over the world and are another example of the versatility AFGSC can
    provide in the conventional mission area.
      B-52H
        The B-52 may be the most universally recognized symbol of American
    airpower . . . its contributions to our national security through the
    Cold War, Vietnam, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom and
    Enduring Freedom are well documented. Our airmen have worked tirelessly
    to keep the venerable B-52 in the air. The B-52 is able to deliver a
    wide variety of nuclear and conventional weapons. This past year, we
    maintained complete coverage of our Nuclear Deterrence Operations
    requirements while supporting overseas CBP commitments.
        AFGSC continues work toward completing the Combat Network
    Communications Technology (CONECT) upgrade. This upgrade resolves
    sustainability issues with cockpit displays and communications while
    also providing a ``digital backbone'' enabling integration into the
    complex battlespace of the future. Specifically, CONECT replaces aging
    displays, adds an additional radio, and provides beyond-line-of-sight
    communications and situational awareness with machine-to-machine
    retargeting. CONECT achieved approval for full rate production by 2016.
    We have accepted our first B-52 CONECT jet, and expect to achieve
    initial operational capability this July.
        We are working on the 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade to the B-
    52's bomb bay that greatly improves flexibility and precision weapon
    capacity for all smart weapons. Configuring the aircraft to internally
    carry these smart weapons and the pathway for integration of the Joint
    Air to Surface Stand-Off Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) will give
    the warfighter additional advantages over an adversary and will provide
    increased capability to our Joint Force Commanders. JASSM-ER, for
    instance, will provide an increase in weapons employment range,
    allowing our forces to posture themselves outside of threat areas
    thereby increasing both the aircraft and weapon's survivability. This
    upgrade improves the B-52's carrying capacity by 60 percent.
        Our B-52s are still using 1960s radar technology. The radar is
    unreliable and will be less effective operationally in a future threat
    environment, especially if we expect this aircraft to operate for
    another 25 years. Without an improved radar system on the B-52 we will
    continue to increase risk of significant degradation in both
    conventional and nuclear mission areas. We are still in the study phase
    of the B-52 Radar Modernization Program. However, this is an important
    program that is absolutely required to bring the B-52 into the modern
    age; and is particularly vital when discussing B-52 viability through
    2040.
      B-2
        For over 25 years, the B-2 has defended America as our most modern
    strategic deterrent. In each of our Nation's last four armed conflicts,
    the B-2 has led the way in combat. This is a direct result of the
    outstanding airmen who work to operate, maintain, and secure the
    aircraft. The B-2 is able to penetrate heavily defended enemy defenses
    and deliver a wide variety of nuclear and conventional weapons due to
    its long-range and stealth capability.
        We will preserve and improve the B-2's capability to penetrate
    hostile airspace and hold any target at risk without subjecting the
    crew and aircraft to undetected threats. To do this, we secured JROC
    validation of the Defensive Management System-Modernization (DMS-M)
    Capabilities Development Document, which will allow the program to
    enter into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase to
    acquire a new system. This upgrade provides the B-2 aircrew with
    improved threat situational awareness and increased survivability by
    replacing the current DMS Threat Emitter Locator System and display
    system with modernized and sustainable systems capable of addressing
    advanced threats. This program will keep the B-2 viable in future anti-
    access environments. We also continue work on the Common Very Low
    Frequency Receiver (CVR) to permit aircrews to better receive strategic
    communication messages and the B-2 Flexible Strike Phase 1 that will
    allow for future weapon capability upgrades.
        AFGSC continues to evolve B-2 conventional combat capability by
    fielding vital programs such as the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP).
    Successful fielding of the 30,000-pound MOP bolstered our Nation's
    ability to hold hardened, deeply buried targets at risk. Flight testing
    of the MOP completed successfully and AFGSC will become the lead
    command for MOP sustainment starting next fiscal year. Additionally, we
    are still prototyping and testing the MOP dolly and rail system. Once
    complete, we will move to production and the dolly and rail system will
    increase storage capacity and create more efficient handling of the
    MOP. We would like to thank Congress for your support on this critical
    program.
        We are striving to maintain the proper balance of fleet sustainment
    efforts, testing, aircrew training, and combat readiness. The dynamics
    of a small fleet continue to challenge our sustainment efforts
    primarily due to vanishing vendors and diminishing sources of supply.
    Air Force Materiel Command is working to ensure timely parts
    availability; however, many manufacturers do not see a strong business
    case in supplying parts for a small aircraft fleet. Problems with a
    single part can have a significant readiness impact on a small fleet
    that lacks the flexibility of a large force to absorb parts shortages
    and logistics delays.
      Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)
        The combat edge our B-2 provides will be challenged by next
    generation air defenses and the proliferation of these advanced
    systems. The LRS-B program will extend American air dominance against
    next generation capabilities and advanced air defense environments. We
    continue to work closely with partners throughout the Air Force to
    develop the LRS-B and field a fleet of new dual-capable bombers;
    scheduled to become operational in the mid-2020s. Make no mistake--the
    LRS-B will be a nuclear bomber. However, the platform will not be
    delayed for use in a conventional capacity while it undergoes final
    nuclear certification. We request your support for this essential
    program to ensure we maintain the ability to hold any target on the
    globe at risk.
      Air Launched Cruise Missile
        The AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is an air-to-ground,
    winged, subsonic nuclear missile delivered by the B-52. It was fielded
    in the 1980s and is well beyond its originally designed 10-year service
    life. To ensure the B-52 remains a credible part of the triad, the ALCM
    requires Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). These SLEPs require
    ongoing support and attention to ensure the ALCM will remain viable
    through 2030. Despite its age, last year we successfully conducted six
    flight test evaluations, and we plan seven this year to fully comply
    with U.S. Strategic Command directives.
      Long Range Stand-Off Missile
        The LRSO is the replacement for the aging ALCM, which will have
    significant capability gaps beginning late this decade and worsening
    through the next. Replacement of the ALCM was identified by OSD in a
    2007 Program Decision Memorandum and reiterated in the 2010 Nuclear
    Posture Review, the Airborne Strategic Deterrence Capability Based
    Assessment, and the Initial Capability Document. In a similar manner to
    LRS-B, the LRSO is necessary to ensure we maintain a credible deterrent
    in the future with the ability to strike at targets from beyond
    contested airspace in anti-access and area denial environments. The
    LRSO will be compatible with the B-52, B-2, and the LRS-B platforms.
    The LRSO AoA is complete and JROC approved, and in February of last
    year the Air Force Chief of Staff signed the Draft Capabilities
    Development Document. LRSO was selected by SAF/AQ as a pilot program
    for ``Bending the Cost Curve'' and ``Owning the Technical Baseline,''
    which are new acquisition initiatives and is currently planned for
    reaching Milestone A next fiscal year. We fully intend to develop a
    conventional version of the LRSO as a future spiral to the nuclear
    variant.
      B61
        The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) will result in a smaller
    stockpile, reduced special nuclear material in the inventory, and
    improved B61 surety. AFGSC is the lead command for the B61-12 Tail Kit
    Assembly program, which is needed to meet STRATCOM requirements. The
    B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly program is in the Engineering and
    Manufacturing Development Phase 1 and is synchronized with NNSA
    efforts. The design and production processes are on schedule and within
    budget to meet the planned fiscal year 2020 First Production Unit date
    for the B61-12 Tail Kit Assembly, and support the lead time required
    for the March 2020 B61-12 all-up round. This joint AFGSC/NNSA endeavor
    allows for continued attainment of our strategic requirements and
    regional commitments.
                                    security
        Nuclear security is a key function of the Command's mission. A
    major AFGSC initiative to ensure security continues to be the new
    Weapon Storage Facilities (WSF) which will consolidate nuclear
    maintenance, inspection, and storage. We have put forward a $1.3
    billion program ($521 million across the FYDP) to replace all deficient
    buildings across our aging 1960's-era Weapon Storage Areas with a
    single modern and secure facility at each of our bases. This initiative
    eliminates security, design, and safety deficiencies and improves our
    maintenance processes. We have included $95 million in funding for the
    WSF at F.E. Warren AFB, WY, in this year's budget and the MILCON for
    the remaining facilities in future years. These facilities are needed
    to meet requirements for a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
        Through our continuing efforts to improve security and thanks to
    your strong support, we have completed the fast rising B-Plug system
    and the Remote Visual Assessment (RVA) system installation at all 450
    LFs. These two programs better protect our nuclear weapons. The fast
    rising B-Plug enables our teams to secure the LFs quickly ensuring the
    weapons remain secure. RVA enables our security forces members to have
    increased situational awareness as they determine response actions at a
    given LF.
                  nuclear command, control, and communications
        The ability to receive Presidential orders and convert those orders
    into action for the required weapon system is both critical to
    performing the nuclear mission and foundational to an effective
    strategic deterrent. As the Air Force Nuclear Command, Control, and
    Communications (NC3) Chief Architect, AFGSC plays a pivotal role in
    providing reliable and survivable NC3 systems to support national
    objectives. Cryptographic modernization upgrades allowed Air Force
    nuclear operations to transition to more secure equipment and satellite
    communications networks. These transitioned networks greatly improved
    security of sensitive nuclear command and control message traffic. Our
    weapon systems are only as good as the NC3 that underpins them and
    therefore we have redoubled our efforts in this area. We recently held
    the first-ever NC3 General Officer Steering Group to address top
    sustainment and readiness concerns. Additionally, AFGSC has been named
    the lead command for Air Force NC3 issues. Consolidating NC3 authority
    within the Service will enable us to better advocate for, support, and
    upgrade these critical systems. As the NC3 lead, AFGSC is participating
    in an Office of Secretary of Defense led 45-day study to analyze NC3
    systems and future capabilities across the Services. In addition, the
    Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed AFGSC to stand up a task force
    to develop an organizational construct to ensure AFGSC is resourced and
    has the appropriate authorities and command relationships to execute
    responsibilities as it assumes the newly designated role as the Air
    Force lead for the NC3 mission area. Efforts like this study combined
    with ongoing and future upgrades to the NC3 systems will improve
    reliability and readiness of this critical capability across the DOD.
      Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal
        The Global Aircrew Strategic Network Terminal (ASNT) program will
    provide a fixed and transportable system of survivable NC3 Command
    Posts. These Command Posts support nuclear-tasked bomber, tanker,
    National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC), Take Charge and Move Out
    aircraft (TACAMO), reconnaissance forces, and nuclear reconstitution
    teams. Global ASNT is one part of the ground element of the larger
    Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network. Global ASNT
    replaces degraded legacy NC3 systems in AFGSC, Air Combat Command, Air
    Mobility Command, U.S. Air Forces Europe, Air National Guard, and Air
    Force Reserve Command thereby providing redundant strategic
    communications paths. Global ASNT recently moved into the Engineering
    and Manufacturing Development phase of the acquisition process and full
    operational capability is expected in 2020.
                      new strategic arms reduction treaty
        New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) implementation
    continues ahead of schedule. In the latest data exchange with the
    Russians, the U.S. Government reported only 912 deployed and non-
    deployed strategic delivery vehicles, down from the 1,124 reported at
    entry into force in early 2011, and well on the way to the required 800
    combined deployed and non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles. We
    completed all of our planned silo eliminations which included 50
    Peacekeeper LFs, 50 Minuteman III LFs, and 4 test LFs. With the last
    Peacekeeper LF elimination, Peacekeeper is no longer accountable under
    NST. We completed all de-MIRV (i.e., moving to a single reentry vehicle
    configuration) actions in May of last year. AFGSC plans to remove 50 MM
    III boosters from LFs across the missile fleet; the booster removals
    are scheduled to begin next month with 9 boosters scheduled in fiscal
    year 2015. Additionally, we will reduce the number of dual-capable B-
    52H aircraft by converting 42 of them to a conventional-only
    configuration. Importantly, our B-52 fleet will maintain all of its
    conventional capability. The first B-52 conventional only conversion is
    scheduled for August of this year with an exhibition for Russian
    inspectors to immediately follow. All NST implementation actions are on
    time and within budget.
                  nuclear deterrence operations core function
        We continue to improve and strengthen the nuclear enterprise
    through our long-range planning efforts. One of the methods we use to
    inform our Nuclear Deterrence Operations long-range planning and
    investment strategy efforts is wargaming. Strategic Vigilance, AFGSC's
    biennial wargame, will be held this year and will build on previous
    scenarios to strengthen command innovation and preparation. These
    wargames help us anticipate future conventional and nuclear planning to
    further improve our strategic deterrence and assurance mission areas.
    Ultimately, this allows AFGSC to better organize, train, and equip our
    forces. Additionally, we continue to observe other wargames and stay
    engaged with our partners in the other services to learn from their
    experiences.
                       2015 focus areas (our priorities)
      Deter and Assure with a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Force
        Nuclear weapons demand a culture where safety, security, and
    effectiveness permeate all aspects of this critical national mission to
    include our people who embody this special trust and responsibility
    through all facets of their profession. As the greatest Air Force in
    the world we will only remain dominant through their professionalism,
    dedication, and commitment to service--and living our Air Force core
    values. Although we will continue to be challenged with sustaining
    aging weapon systems, we will leverage the innovation of our great
    airmen to get the most out of our resources.
      Win the Fight
        Whether that fight is in overseas contingencies where we have over
    1,000 airmen deployed, or with our over 900 member nuclear deterrent
    force deployed to the missile fields conducting a combatant commander
    assigned mission every day, we will forge ahead to keep both our
    nuclear and conventional forces combat ready.
      Strengthen and Empower the Team
        We will continue to improve the quality of life for our airmen and
    their families, aware of the unique demands of our mission and our
    locations. We will continue to foster resiliency within a wingman
    culture, and we will improve education, training, and development at
    all levels. Furthermore, we will continue to strengthen, broaden, and
    deepen our culture around our command values of:

              -  Individual responsibility for mission success
              -  Critical self-assessment of our performance
              -  Uncompromising adherence to all directives
              -  Superior technical and weapon system expertise
              -  Persistent innovation at all levels
              -  Pride in our nuclear heritage and our mission
              -  Respect for the worth and dignity of every airman
              -  Safety in all things large . . . and small
      Shape the Future
        We will stay focused on our human capital development and our
    weapon system modernization initiatives. Our responsive and resilient
    MM III, providing the foundation for strategic stability, must be
    sustained to 2030 until we are able to fully implement the Ground Based
    Strategic Deterrent weapon system. The B-52 will remain the Nation's
    visible deterrent for the next 25 years at least, and will prove a
    versatile platform with unmatched battlefield persistence. The B-2 will
    be our strategic penetrating platform denying safe haven to any
    adversary. The dual-capable Long Range Strike Bomber will ensure we can
    continue to hold any target on the globe at risk. As our Air Launched
    Cruise Missile becomes obsolete and unsupportable, we will field a
    credible and flexible deterrent with the Long Range Stand-Off missile.
      Uphold the Standard
        We understand the importance of ensuring compliance at all levels
    through critical self-assessment of our performance. We have undergone
    a complete shift in our AF inspection system to continually assess and
    fix problems; we refuse to walk by any problem area. One of the ways we
    uphold our standards is through inspections. We continue to implement
    the new Air Force Inspection System and integrate our nuclear
    inspections with that system. The Commander's Inspection Program (CCIP)
    is monitored virtually by our command IG and validated by a Unit
    Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) Capstone event every two years. Going
    forward, we will continue to utilize our rigorous inspection process to
    ensure the highest of standards and determine areas of the mission that
    require improvement.
                                   conclusion
        Thank you for your continued support of Air Force Global Strike
    Command and our nuclear deterrent and global strike missions. The
    President's 2015 National Security Strategy is clear: ``As long as
    nuclear weapons exist, the United States must invest the resources
    necessary to maintain--without testing--a safe, secure, and effective
    nuclear deterrent that preserves strategic stability.'' To that end,
    our enduring challenges in AFGSC are: first, to instill a culture where
    every airman understands the special trust and responsibility of
    nuclear weapons; second, to maintain excellence in our conventional
    forces; third, to sustain the current force while modernizing for the
    future; and fourth, to solidify and sustain a culture where our airmen
    are proud to serve in and embrace the great importance of the deterrent
    mission.
        Fiscal constraints, while posing planning challenges, do not alter
    the National security landscape or the intent of competitors and
    adversaries, nor do they diminish the enduring value of long range,
    strategic forces to our Nation. Although we account for less than one
    percent of the DOD budget, AFGSC nuclear forces represent two-thirds of
    the Nation's nuclear triad and play a critical role in ensuring U.S.
    national security, while AFGSC conventional forces provide joint
    commanders rapid global combat airpower. AFGSC will continue to seek
    innovative, cost-saving measures to ensure our weapon systems are
    operating as efficiently as possible. Modernization of the nuclear
    enterprise, however, is mandatory. AFGSC is operating B-52s built in
    the 1960s with equipment designed in the 1950s; our ICBMs are operating
    with 1960s infrastructure; and utilizing 1960s era weapon storage
    areas. We cannot afford to delay modernization initiatives across the
    two legs of the Nation's nuclear triad.
        It is my absolute privilege to lead this elite team empowered with
    special trust and responsibility, and I can assure you that we at Air
    Force Global Strike Command will meet our challenges head-on in order
    to provide our Nation with safe, secure, and effective forces for
    nuclear deterrence and global strike operations.

        Senator Sessions. General Harencak?

    STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF
         OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION

        General Harencak. Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member
    Donnelly, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
    subcommittee today to discuss Air Force nuclear policies and
    programs. I respectfully request my written statement be
    entered into the record and look forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Harencak follows:]

             Prepared Statement by Maj. Gen. Garrett Harencak, USAF
                                  introduction
        Chairman Sessions, Ranking Member Donnelly, and distinguished
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss
    Air Force nuclear programs and policies.
        As the Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
    Nuclear Integration, my team, on behalf of the Secretary and Chief of
    Staff of the Air Force, leads planning, policy development, advocacy,
    integration, and assessment for the airmen and weapon systems
    performing Nuclear Deterrence Operations, a core function of the U.S.
    Air Force. In today's increasingly complex, multi-polar environment,
    the highly stabilizing deterrence and assurance effects provided by Air
    Force nuclear forces--intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
    nuclear-capable bombers, and dual capable aircraft (DCA)--will continue
    to play a critical role in ensuring the security of the United States
    and assuring our allies and partners.
        Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, a confluence of forces
    contributed to an erosion of the nuclear mission within the Air Force.
    This period of decline was characterized by a loss of senior leader
    focus, fragmentation of responsibility, and chronic underinvestment in
    our personnel, weapon systems, and supporting infrastructure. While in
    recent years we have reversed this downward trend and made substantial
    progress towards addressing these deficiencies and the problems that
    resulted from them, we recognize considerable work lies ahead. As
    Secretary James has emphasized, restoring the health of the nuclear
    enterprise is an undertaking that will require sustained, long-term
    focus and effort.
        Despite challenges, the dedicated airmen who accomplish the nuclear
    mission every day continue to do so with remarkable professionalism,
    pride, and determination. For these women and men and the Nation they
    serve, the Air Force remains fully committed to identifying and
    confronting systemic issues in our nuclear forces, and making the
    investments necessary to ensure they remain credible and effective in
    the decades ahead.
                           nuclear enterprise reviews
        From the outset of the Internal and Independent Nuclear Enterprise
    Reviews (NERs) directed by former Secretary of Defense Hagel in
    February 2014, as well as the review led by the Commander, U.S.
    Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Air Force partnered closely with the
    assessment teams to provide unfettered access to our operations,
    personnel, and processes.
        Combined, these assessments examined an extensive range of
    personnel, management, oversight, mission performance, training,
    testing, and investment areas across the nuclear enterprise. To date,
    we have implemented a number of the Air Force-specific recommendations
    produced by the NERs, and our work towards completing the remaining
    ones continues at a steady pace.
        Under the direction of our Secretary and Chief of Staff, and with
    oversight and guidance from the Nuclear Deterrent Enterprise Review
    Group (chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense) and the Senior
    Oversight Group (chaired by the Director of Cost Assessment and Program
    Evaluation), we are approaching the implementation and tracking of NER
    follow-on actions through a systematic and responsive process, one
    intended to yield tangible and lasting improvements.
        Following completion of the NERs in the fall of 2014, the Air
    Force's immediate efforts were concentrated on addressing the most
    exigent gaps identified in the reviews. As we gradually transition our
    attention this year to implementing NER initiatives that require
    longer-term action, we are placing renewed emphasis on strengthening
    assessment processes and developing valid metrics to ensure that the
    changes we institute are measurable and enduring. While continuous
    improvement and rigorous self-assessment have been guiding precepts of
    our efforts to strengthen the enterprise since our broad reorganization
    of this mission area in 2008-2009, we recognize that the success of our
    NER follow-on actions is critically dependent on how well this effort
    is integrated into existing Air Force nuclear oversight structures and
    processes, where our senior leadership can apply sustained focus,
    provide accountability, and marshal necessary resources.
        Consistent with that objective, NER findings have assumed a central
    place in the agendas of our Nuclear Oversight Board, chaired by the
    Secretary and Chief of Staff with participation from all ten of our
    major command commanders, and the three-star level Nuclear Issues
    Resolution and Integration board. Both of these bodies, which are
    organized and managed by AF/A10 and meet quarterly to focus exclusively
    on issues of importance to the nuclear mission, serve as vital cross-
    functional forums where senior leaders can decisively prioritize,
    resource, and direct the implementation of solutions across the Air
    Force. We have determined that the Flight Plan for the Air Force
    Nuclear Enterprise, a comprehensive roadmap that outlines a series of
    strategic vectors for improving and monitoring the health of the
    nuclear enterprise, is the best framework through which to orchestrate
    our long-term NER response. Aligned in four focus areas--human capital,
    governance, inspections and assessments, and resourcing, with an
    understanding that culture and morale are impacted by all of them--
    these vectors each have a corresponding action plan with execution and
    follow-up responsibilities assigned to specific Air Force entities.
        The NER process has fostered an unprecedented renewal of senior
    level focus and collaborative engagement on the nuclear mission from
    the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DOD), and is already
    leading to positive outcomes that are visible throughout the force. We
    are optimistic that the new mechanisms created by the NERs can serve as
    a benchmark for future interagency collaboration as the Air Force
    continues its efforts in the coming years to improve the nuclear
    mission.
           sustaining the effectiveness and credibility of our forces
        As long as nuclear weapons exist, the consequences of their
    potential use against the U.S. remains an existential threat that
    demands our strategic forces be prepared to meet not only the most
    likely contingencies, but also the most unlikely. President Obama has
    established a clear mandate that the United States will maintain safe,
    secure, and effective nuclear forces, even as we seek the peace and
    security of a world without nuclear weapons and take concrete steps to
    reduce our total number of weapons and the role they serve in national
    security strategy.
        Consistent with the President's imperative, the fiscal year 2016
    budget request seeks key investments in the sustainment, modernization,
    and recapitalization of Air Force nuclear weapon systems, supporting
    infrastructure, and our nuclear command, control, and communications
    capabilities (NC3). In addition, the budget provides strong support for
    our most critical asset: the Airmen we entrust to perform nuclear
    deterrence operations every day. Closely aligned with the priorities
    established by the NERs, as well as in multiple internal Air Force
    reviews of the nuclear enterprise, these investments in our air and
    ground legs of the Triad make important headway towards ensuring these
    systems remain effective and credible now and in the years ahead.
                            weapon system investment
        The fiscal year 2016 budget supports an array of modernization
    initiatives for our B-2A and B-52H bombers that will enable these
    aircraft to remain capable of performing their assigned nuclear and
    conventional missions. Despite these upgrades, both the B-52H
    (delivered in 1961-1962) and the B-2A (delivered throughout the early/
    mid-1990s) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to modern air defenses.
    Accordingly, the fiscal year 2016 budget advances research and
    development efforts for the Long Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) in order
    to ensure the Nation retains a credible global strike and power
    projection capability in the decades ahead. We are anticipating a
    contract award for LRS-B in late spring of this year, with initial
    operational capability (IOC) for the planned fleet of 80-100 aircraft
    in the mid-2020s.
        The budget funds life extension to 2030 of the AGM-86B air launched
    cruise missile (ALCM)--the Nation's only air-delivered stand-off
    strategic weapon, fielded by the Air Force in 1982 with a designed
    service life of 10 years. When employed from B-52H bombers, ALCMs
    provide an extremely valuable signaling capability and a degree of
    versatility unmatched elsewhere in the Triad. For these and other
    reasons, the fiscal year 2016 budget request restores funding to the
    critical Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) effort, a follow-on ALCM program
    that will eventually replace the AGM-86B. The funding level requested
    enables the program to meet STRATCOM's operationally required need date
    and realigns Air Force integration efforts with the Department of
    Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) life extension
    program (LEP) to produce an LRSO warhead.
        The life extension effort for the B61, the Air Force's primary
    gravity nuclear weapon, is equally important to the continued
    effectiveness of our deterrence and assurance capabilities. Both the
    B61-12 LEP, which DOE/NNSA manages, and the associated Air Force
    Tailkit Assembly program are supported in the fiscal year 2016 DOE/NNSA
    and Air Force budgets. These efforts are synchronized and on schedule
    to deliver the first production unit B61-12 in 2020. The fiscal year
    2016 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) also supports risk reduction
    activities for dual capable aircraft (DCA) integration for the F-35
    Joint Strike Fighter. Our goal of reaching IOC for F-35 DCA with the
    life-extended B61-12 by 2024 remains unchanged. This program remains an
    important and highly tangible signal of the U.S.'s continued commitment
    to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has repeatedly
    affirmed the role of nuclear deterrence in the collective security of
    the Alliance.
        Several sustainment programs for the Nation's fleet of Minuteman
    III (MM III) ICBMs and supporting infrastructure are funded in the
    fiscal year 2016 budget that will extend the effectiveness of this
    system through 2030, consistent with Congressional mandates. For more
    than 50 years, continuously on-alert ICBMs have been a foundational
    pillar of America's strategic deterrent, providing a level of
    responsiveness and stability not replicated by other legs of the Triad.
    In order to preserve this capability for the Nation beyond the phase
    out of MM III, the fiscal year 2016 budget supports continued
    development and risk reduction for the follow-on Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrent (GBSD) program. Last summer, Air Force Global Strike Command
    (AFGSC) completed the GBSD analysis of alternatives, and the program is
    already leveraging synergies with MM III modernization efforts to meet
    a target IOC in 2027.
        For our major weapon system modernization and recapitalization
    efforts, the Air Force's partnership with DOE/NNSA--responsible for
    life extension of the nuclear explosive packages at the heart of our
    gravity weapons, cruise missiles, and ICBM reentry vehicles--remains
    productive and strong. Our ongoing cooperation with the Department of
    the Navy on ballistic missile sustainment, intended to leverage
    commonalities between the Air Force's MM III ICBM and the Navy's
    Trident II (D5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, is helping both
    Services reduce program risk and improve affordability. Through the
    joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council and other interagency channels,
    we will continue to pursue new opportunities to strengthen integration
    with our mission partners to ensure the success of our programs.
                    addressing other critical mission needs
        The fiscal year 2016 budget addresses a host of other important
    mission needs, particularly across the ICBM force. These investments
    include the establishment of a program office to manage
    recapitalization of the Vietnam-era fleet of UH-1N utility helicopters
    performing the ICBM security mission, as well as the replacement of
    aging ICBM payload transporters with updated models. Complementing the
    longer-term modernization and recapitalization programs underway for
    the missile force, this budget also advances multiple initiatives to
    address immediate, near-term ICBM operations and maintenance needs.
        Prior to the formal initiation of the NERs, in January 2014 AFGSC
    acted decisively to uncover and address urgent shortfalls throughout
    the missile wings through its Force Improvement Program (FIP). Guided
    by actual feedback provided by Airmen in the field performing missile
    operations, FIP yielded a diverse set of actionable recommendations,
    many of which were implemented or initiated last year with fiscal year
    2014 and fiscal year 2015 investments. Examples of improvements for the
    ICBM force supported by FIP to date include incentive pays,
    scholarships, fielding of important test and maintenance equipment,
    refurbishment and deep cleaning of launch control centers and alert
    facilities, new utility vehicles, and upgraded tactical equipment and
    uniforms for our security forces. Most significantly, FIP is supporting
    the addition of approximately 1,100 billets across AFGSC to strengthen
    manning in key nuclear specialties, as well as 158 technical and
    engineering billets at Air Force Materiel Command that will help
    preserve specialized skillsets within the nuclear sustainment
    enterprise and advance the GBSD program.
        The fiscal year 2016 budget also makes important first steps
    towards reversing the trend of decline in our critical nuclear mission
    facilities, particularly our 1950s-1960s era Weapons Storage Areas
    (WSAs) that support nuclear munitions storage and maintenance. The
    fiscal year 2016 FYDP includes military construction funding to
    initiate the first phases of a comprehensive plan--the Weapons Storage
    Facility (WSF) Investment Strategy--that will replace existing WSAs
    with modern WSFs at AFGSC installations in the coming years.
    Additionally, the budget supports robust facilities sustainment,
    restoration, and modernization levels that will allow AFGSC to begin
    addressing a number of previously deferred infrastructure repairs
    across its ICBM and bomber installations.
        As the lead military service for approximately two-thirds of the
    Nation's NC3 systems, the Air Force continues to work to improve focus
    on and resourcing of this vital mission. Critical to the execution of
    the nuclear mission, as well as Presidential and senior leader
    communications, NC3 must be secure, redundant, and highly survivable to
    ensure continuous connectivity in all environments. In order to
    consolidate and strengthen the life cycle management process for NC3,
    we continue to collaborate with mission partners to define key NC3
    system elements, interdependencies, and authorities. In February of
    this year, the Secretary and Chief of Staff designated AFGSC as the Air
    force lead for this mission area. In this capacity, AFGSC is presently
    leading an Air Force Task Force charged with assessing oversight and
    organizational relationships related to NC3 acquisition and
    sustainment, as well as participating in a comprehensive DOD led NC3
    capabilities study.
                 strengthening policies to support the mission
        We are effectively capitalizing on the NER process to address
    longstanding inefficiencies in many administrative and policy areas
    affecting the nuclear enterprise. In close partnership with AFGSC and
    other Air Force, Joint, and DOD stakeholders, over the past 12 months
    we have implemented a number of important revisions to key programs and
    policies that are yielding substantial efficiencies. For example, we
    have restructured our Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) to eliminate
    redundancy and vastly reduce the number of individuals required to be
    covered by the program. We anticipate these changes will result in
    considerable reductions in the man-hours required to administer PRP,
    while at the same maintaining the integrity and intent of the program.
        Through the NERs we have accelerated previously initiated efforts
    to refine the scope and methodology of our nuclear inspection process,
    with the goal of reducing duplicative structures, providing wings with
    critical ``white space'' to focus on successful performance of the
    mission in lieu of constant preparation for inspections, and empowering
    Airmen to innovate by removing unnecessary requirements that promote
    micro-management and perfectionism. We continue to strengthen the ICBM
    career field by creating new paths for professional development and
    education, providing additional opportunities for leadership
    experience, and offering incentives to our missileers who elect to
    pursue higher levels of responsibility.
                           treaty compliance efforts
        In accordance with the terms of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty, Air Force activities to align our ICBM and heavy bomber forces
    with the treaty-compliant force structure established by DOD last
    spring by the deadline of February 2018 remain on track. In support of
    this effort, modifications to treaty-accountable ICBM silos and bombers
    will continue in 2015. Consistent with statutory mandates and STRATCOM
    requirements, we continue to preserve the capability to reconfigure MM
    III ICBM with multiple warheads.
                                   conclusion
        The realization of the benefits intended from these investments and
    the Air Force's ability to continue supporting combatant command
    nuclear requirements is critically dependent on the funding levels
    requested in the President's budget. As the Secretary and Chief of
    Staff have made clear, should the Air Force have to operate at
    sequestration-level funding in fiscal year 2016, no mission area--
    including nuclear deterrence operations--would be impervious to its
    effects.
        Thank you for the opportunity to update the subcommittee on Air
    Force nuclear enterprise policies and programs and our actions to
    implement NER recommendations. Our near- and long-term commitment to
    continuous improvement of the nuclear mission--particularly through the
    deliberate development of our airmen--will remain one of the Air
    Force's top priorities.

              STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS, CHAIRMAN

        Senator Sessions. We are sorry to have this program
    interrupted, but I think it is time for us to go ahead and move
    forward, as Senator King and Donnelly reminded me.
        So we got a lot going on, and I would just say in terms of
    an opening statement, I do believe the Department of Defense,
    Ms. Creedon, and others has responded to this problem. I think
    Secretary Hagel deserves credit for insisting that we make an
    honest and very serious review, which you have done and I thank
    you for. Some of the findings are extremely troubling I
    thought, some of which is classified, but I believe that you
    folks are on that.
        Secretary Hagel said that the reviews found evidence of
    systemic problems that if not addressed could undermine the
    safety, security, and effectiveness of the elements of the
    force in the future. Close quote. I think that is a serious
    comment, and we need to address it.
        Admiral Benedict, I know your naval submarine crews and
    others are on constant stress and alert and acting. Ships are
    moving things. Plans are being executed. It perhaps is more
    difficult, I think, for the Air Force where you are at bases
    and missiles are in silos and not as much is happening. So I
    can understand the difficulties that we might have in
    maintaining the kind of alertness and morale that you need to
    have.
        Previous briefings I have had so far on this subject
    indicate that the Air Force is taking aggressive action to
    create the kind of morale and attention and evaluation that is
    necessary. But we will have, I am sure, other questions that
    would be asked.
        Also, from what I can see from Secretary Hagel's
    announcement, we may be talking about a 10 percent increase.
    That could be as much as $8 billion, and you can buy a lot with
    $8 billion. So I think we need to ask the question can we
    achieve the kind of improvements we need with less cost than
    that.
        On this vote, Senator King, you have not voted. Is that
    right? Did it just get called?
        Senator King. This is the next one.
        Senator Sessions. Well, there should not be much time left,
    is that not right, for us to vote? 5 minutes, okay. We are in
    better shape than I thought.
        Ms. Creedon, the review found that, quote, significant
    changes are required to ensure the safety and security and
    effectiveness of the force in the future. Can you give us some
    examples of where safety and security and effectiveness are at
    risk and some examples of recommendations that you might make?
    And what is meant by cultural and structural changes?
        Ms. Creedon. Thank you, sir. So let me start probably on
    the end of that.
        On the cultural changes--and I will just use a couple of
    examples to illustrate some of these. On the cultural side, we
    found that particularly in the Air Force, there was not a good
    culture of strong self-assessments that could provide up the
    chain of command no-kidding assessments of what was going on in
    the forces. So we found that what was happening was problems
    were not raised to the next level of attention, and when
    problems were raised, they were not treated with any
    significant degree of credibility. So what we had was a
    situation where the senior leaders for the most part did not
    even know how bad some of the situations were at the working
    level because they were simply not putting in place any sort of
    a good self-assessment regime or having any good, candid
    opportunities for conversation within the services.
        On the organizational, again an illustrative example. We
    found that particularly that the way the Air Force was
    organized for maintenance of the ICBMs, that the Air Force did
    not treat the entire universe of the ICBM as a single weapon
    system. So you have the missile itself. You have the silo that
    it is in, and the silos are covered by launch control centers.
    And the launch control centers then talk within their missile
    field. That whole missile field was not considered as a weapon
    system. So as a result, you had different pieces of the Air
    Force and different sources of money responsible for the long-
    term maintenance of different parts and pieces. So there was no
    holistic way to look at that ICBM system as a system of
    systems. So you had some parts of the Air Force taking care of
    other things, and then you had the base commanders taking care
    of other things. And particularly when the base commanders were
    using their money, we found that the base commanders were
    forced with choices of, say, plowing the snow or fixing blast
    doors on a large control facility. So they were not organized
    structurally to fix this.
        On the safety and security, for the most part, what we were
    worried about was the safety and security of the forces as they
    were operating. So we found in many instances that their
    equipment just was not adequate. So at the missile fields, for
    instance, these missile fields are all in the north. They have
    terrible winters. They have lots of snow, lots of ice, and yet
    the security forces were driving around in SUVs that were
    front-wheel drive. So it was as minor as that that could fix
    some of these no-kidding safety of life sorts of things.
        Senator Sessions. And can you give an example of a specific
    action such as the confused support system you just described
    that have been done to improve that? Maybe, General Wilson, you
    could comment on that. What steps do you think that you have
    taken that would alleviate some of the problems that Ms.
    Creedon just described?
        General Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Sessions. Let me give
    you three examples.
        The first thing that she talked about is cultural. So the
    big culture change that we have embarked upon is one of
    empowerment, empowering our airmen. So we started a force
    improvement program, and the force improvement was a different
    look. So it is a bottom-up look and it was a multi-diverse team
    of people who made up this individual--so in operations, it
    would be operators from each of the ICBM wings with submarine
    operators with airplane operators to give a different
    perspective.
        As part of the force improvement program, the ICBM alone
    has brought forward over 350 recommendations from the airmen
    doing the job on how to do it differently and better.
        Senator Sessions. These recommendations were from the
    ground up.
        General Wilson. From the ground up, so from the people
    doing the job. And I look at it as our job to remove the
    barriers to their success. So as an example, as Secretary
    Creedon just mentioned, the defenders out in the field did not
    have the right uniforms and the right vehicles and the right
    equipment. That has all been changed. Based on their
    recommendations, we went out and said what is the best cold
    weather gear and the best gear that we can get for the
    environment that they are in. We have funded that. We have
    delivered it to the field. It was no small task to do it. Just
    for the defenders in the security force, it was over 250,000
    individual line items that were delivered to the field.
        But in addition to the uniforms, we provided new vehicles,
    new radios, and we greatly improved the training of the
    security forces that they get. We do that at Camp Guernsey in
    Wyoming.
        So we are building a model defender program and the model
    defender is not just the outer gear. It is the whole human
    weapon system with the goal of making our airmen--the place
    that everybody wants to go to for the mission because they are
    doing a vitally important mission for our Nation, and we are
    equipping them properly with the right tools to do the mission.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, General Wilson.
        Of course, this is a big deal. Errors cannot happen in the
    area that you operate in. My impression, General Wilson, is the
    Air Force has taken seriously the concerns and have responded
    in a serious way. Without getting into too many details, would
    you explain to us the role Secretary of Defense Hagel had in
    moving this forward and what you can tell us--my time is
    already over. No. I guess I did my opening statement in this.
        But can you tell us what you have done that would convey to
    the Congress and to the American people that you have seriously
    evaluated the concerns in the report and from top down, actions
    are being undertaken to fix it?
        General Wilson. Yes, sir. If I were to describe it, first
    of all, the change from the past. So what is different today is
    we certainly have the attention and the focus of the senior
    leadership, both of the Department, the Secretary of the Air
    Force, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
        Senator Sessions. They have been personally engaged.
        General Wilson. They have been personally engaged in this.
        As an example, the Secretary of the Air Force has visited
    each of our missile wings three times in the last year. She
    meets with our airmen. She gets their direct feedback. The
    Chief of Staff has done the same. They have been personally
    engaged. They both have talked about how do we put our money
    where our mouth is. We have said this is the most important
    mission. We need to put the resources behind it to do that. We
    are on track to be able to provide those resources now.
        We do not disagree with anything in the reviews. Both the
    internal and the external reviews we are in complete agreement
    with. What we found is that our bottom-up reviews and the top-
    down reviews overlapped about 95 percent. Within that, we have
    got a multitude of areas that we are addressing, everything
    from ICBM training, recruiting, how do we evaluate, how do we
    instruct them from the security forces, how do we provide the
    right supplies and the maintenance. As Secretary Creedon talked
    about, how do we define the ICBM weapon system that had not
    been done before? There has been a multitude of efforts, but it
    is not just the ICBM. We started with the ICBM.
        The next place we went is to our bombers, and we did a
    bomber force improvement program. And the bombers brought over
    215 recommendations forward on how to do things better and more
    efficiently.
        So we are looking at this as a continuous improvement
    cycle, but it is not something that is one time and done. We
    will go back out to the field. We have been going out to the
    field regularly listening to our airmen and saying are the
    things that we are doing helping. If not, how do we readjust,
    and what do we need to be doing differently? So we are taking
    this as a holistic, systemic view of the enterprise with
    persistent attention and focus, and now it is our job to make
    sure that we follow through with all the things that we have
    got underway.
        Senator Donnelly. General Harencak, have you given your
    opening statement yet?
        General Harencak. Yes, sir, I have.
        Senator Donnelly. Very good.
        Let me ask you this question, General Wilson, and that
    would be like a ?why,? which is somewhat speculative but in the
    reports as well. Why did these things happen? Is it that the
    type of mission that we have, being in a missile silo keeping
    an eye on things there, that it is not a desirable mission? It
    is not challenging enough, that members of the Air Force look
    at it as it was kind of a sidetrack to their career? How does
    this happen?
        General Wilson. That may be part of it. It may be that we
    lost focus on the importance of what strategic deterrence does
    for our Nation. We got engaged in places around the world that
    took our eye off this. And we either relayed in some form or
    fashion that what the airmen were doing was not as important as
    other things.
        I think we are seeing a change in that today. I will give
    you an example. We recently met a captain at Mahlstrom Air
    Force Base. He is an academy grad. He has a 3.8 Grade Point
    Average (GPA) in physics. He is finishing up his 4 years in the
    ICBM community. He said I have noticed a change in the last
    year. I have seen the differences in the empowerment and what
    it can make, and I want to stay in this weapon system. This is
    a once in a lifetime opportunity to be part of something bigger
    and to make a difference. And so he is staying in the ICBM
    community. That is not one person. You will see broadly across
    the community now with this increased focus and attention and
    people know the mission is important, that the airmen value
    that. We just did not do a very good job.
        Senator Donnelly. My perception is that it will be viewed
    as important as the leadership of the Air Force makes it to be
    in the public messaging you have and in the way you look at
    promotions there and ways of a career path there.
        General Wilson. Yes, sir. Well, a couple of specific
    examples the Air Force has done--and you are well aware. We
    have elevated this position for this command from a three-star
    to a four-star. We have elevated the position of the A-10 on
    the headquarters air staff from a two-star to a three-star.
    Again, at all levels, we are seeing it. Before we would see not
    a lot of--from the different accession sources who would
    volunteer to go to missiles, they were seeing a complete
    difference. This year alone 29 first choice and all 174 coming
    in, it was in the top 6 choices. So it is making a difference.
        Senator Donnelly. Admiral Benedict, as you know, Indiana is
    home to the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane. It provides a
    lot of support to Strategic Systems Programs (SSP). As you look
    at that, one of the things that we have worked on at Crane that
    a lot of folks have put time and effort into is trying to
    enhance collaboration or commonality among the Navy and the Air
    Force nuclear programs. And Crane has been involved in that
    work to ensure lessons learned and best practices are shared
    between the Services. And I was wondering your view of how we
    are doing at promoting collaboration and commonality on these
    programs and how can we do better.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        We are working, I think, better today in a more
    collaborative manner on the topic of commonality than I think
    we have ever been between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force.
    I had the opportunity to host Air Force flags. In fact, Major
    General Harencak visited me when we were out there as part of
    the strategic forum seminar that Crane hosted so generously for
    us. We showed them all of our capability at Crane, and of
    course, Crane is the single largest warfare center provider for
    strategic systems in the United States Navy, and they do an
    exceptional job and they have for many, many years.
        I think we continue to progress in this area. We have an
    official structure set up now where we are looking at various
    areas, one of them in particular being rad hard electronics, of
    which Crane is intimately familiar with the way the Navy does
    business. We have identified that to the Air Force for their
    consideration as they move forward.
        Another example of collaboration and commonality is on
    Monday of next week, I am flying to Omaha. I will join Admiral
    Haney in Omaha. I am flying up with Admiral Haney to be a part
    of the ICBM flag officers forum up at Cheyenne, WY, with all
    the ICBM flags. And I have the opportunity to pitch commonality
    in that forum to the Air Force generals.
        So I think we are making good progress in that area, sir.
        Senator Donnelly. Thank you.
        Ms. Creedon, I know that the internal report on the DOD
    nuclear mission was classified. But in this unclassified forum
    that we have here, what was your biggest surprise when you
    looked in determining how serious the issues were?
        Ms. Creedon. There were probably two. One was that although
    we knew going in that the Air Force had significant problems
    because there were many years of reports that had laid out a
    lot of these problems, the problems that we found were worse
    and they were much more systemic.
        With the Navy, again the surprise was that although the
    strategic systems programs were good and the naval reactors
    programs were good, what we found was the part in the middle
    that neither Admiral Benedict nor Admiral Richardson had really
    much authority over--those were in worse shape than we had
    expected. And what I mean by those, those are a lot of the
    support facilities, particularly some of the shipyards. They
    were pretty severely understaffed. There was a pretty big
    bathtub in the mid-career sections, and the facilities needed a
    lot of work.
        And as a result of that, we understood why the submariners
    were under as much stress as they were in their operational
    capacities. So, for instance, a lot of the work that in the
    past should have or would have been done by the shipyard once a
    submarine was in port was being done by the crew. So there were
    a lot of people and infrastructure things that we were
    surprised to find in the Navy.
        Senator Donnelly. Like how did we miss this or how did we
    get in this spot in your opinion?
        Ms. Creedon. That is probably one of those questions that
    needs an hour or so to fully unpack.
        Senator Donnelly. Actually I am on overtime right now, but
    nobody else is here. So this is awesome.
        [Laughter.]
        Ms. Creedon. I will not take an hour.
        But I would say it is a combination of things. I think
    General Wilson touched on a few of them. I think over time
    certainly at the Air Force, the mission had been sort of pushed
    to the side. I do not think the leadership across the board
    took much of the mission as seriously as possible, although I
    want to caveat very quickly on this, that the morale in the
    Navy was good where the morale in the Air Force was not good.
    So for some complicated reasons, the Navy had managed to keep
    the morale good.
        There was just so much focus and attention over the course
    of the various wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that that is where
    you wanted to be. So from the Air Force perspective, a lot of
    the folks found themselves--and these were their words. There
    are sort of two things that have stuck with me. They felt
    trapped. And there was another phrase that we ran into a lot,
    that they would say, well, I have the nuclear stink on me, so I
    do not have much of a future in the rest of the Air Force. So
    they did not see themselves as having much of a career
    progression.
        All of this happened gradually. It happened over time. None
    of it was very quick. And so it will take a lot of time to
    rectify all these things. But it was very complicated, I think,
    how all these things happened, but a lot of it was I just do
    not think there was a lot of attention being paid at very
    senior levels to certain aspects of this enterprise.
        Senator Donnelly. General Wilson--and this goes back to
    what we were talking about before. You are seeing and changing
    and making sure that there is no stigma to being part of the
    nuclear program, I would assume.
        General Wilson. Yes, sir. The goal is we want this to be
    something that people aspire to. And I am heartened today with
    some of our airmen, you know, what I see and the ability--we
    tell them you are going to be able to create your own future
    here. You own this. You can make a difference. Every airman's
    voice needs to be heard on how do we make this better. And then
    we are trying to empower them, and we are trying to clear the
    obstacles to their success at all levels. And once they start
    seeing the fruits of the success, they start believing it. And
    right now, I think they are just starting to see we have said
    and you are doing this. We have said this, you are doing this.
    They believe it. We are on a journey here but I think we are
    making some important progress.
        Senator Donnelly. I think that Senator Sessions should be
    back in just a minute or 2. I am going to run over and vote
    very quickly, and then I will come back. And if he is not back
    by then, you will be tortured by me again as I return.
        Thank you very much. We will put this in the hearing. We
    will hold off until we get back from votes. Thank you very
    much.
        [Recess.]
        Senator Heinrich [presiding]. Let me start out by thanking
    all of you for your patience with our voting schedule this
    afternoon. It has not been very conducive to these hearings.
    But I sure appreciate the work that all of you do.
        I want to start out, General Harencak. It is great to see
    you. It has been too long. As you know as well as anyone, New
    Mexico is home to the Nuclear Weapons Center and the thousands
    of airmen who work very hard every day to ensure the safety and
    the reliability of our nuclear enterprise.
        The 2014 nuclear enterprise review noted that there was,
    quote, a lack of promotion opportunities generally in the
    nuclear career field and a lack of a defined, sustainable
    career path for nuclear officers in the Air Force and career
    constraints resulting from nuclear specialization for both
    officers and enlisted personnel. Unquote.
        What steps are you taking to fix these personnel issues to
    ensure that our airmen have increased opportunities and
    incentives to enter and stay in this incredibly important
    field? General Wilson, do you want to take that?
        General Wilson. Yes, Senator, absolutely. We have started
    for an ICBM operator a completely different model than we have
    done before. We are calling it the 3 Plus 3 model. So we give
    them 3 years where they experience in a missile field becoming
    a flight commander--excuse me--a deputy and then an aircraft
    commander, missile crew commander. At the 3-year point, we are
    going to PCS the majority of them to another base where they
    are going to become an instructor or a flight commander. And so
    we are going to develop a bench of expertise that they did not
    have before. So they are going to stay longer in their career
    field.
        We also have a bunch of educational opportunities as we
    move forward, education with all the National labs. We are
    spending a lot of time working on what I call the human weapon
    system. What are the things we can do to improve the deterrence
    thinking of the 21st century? Locally we are starting a
    leadership development center where we will have touch points
    for our officers, our enlisted, and our civilians throughout
    their career where we provide them leadership development
    opportunities.
        In addition to that, we are working with our Air Force
    partners at Air University to build a structure throughout the
    Air Force where we increase our deterrence thinking more
    broadly throughout the Air Force so that all airmen understand
    the importance of nuclear deterrence.
        At the strategic level in the air staff, we are doing the
    same thing. So how do we get the Air Force into the National
    policy debates? So General Harencak and his team, working with
    others at headquarters Air Force and STRATCOM, our Navy
    partners to get into the debate at the National level.
        And lastly we are working with academia throughout the
    world. We stood up something we call the Center for Assurance
    Deterrence, Escalation and Nonproliferation Science and
    Education (CADENCE). And what that is doing is bringing in
    academia from around the world to help improve how we do
    business, and they are doing some phenomenal research but how
    do we take advantage of that at the Air Force and more properly
    help our airmen.
        So I think we have laid out a broader, deeper structure for
    airmen. They can see a path. And we tell people with the number
    of airmen today coming into the career field, we have more that
    want to stay in than we have room for. As they grow up, we are
    going to provide them leadership development opportunities, and
    we have a number of operational squadrons and ops officer
    positions and group commander positions. There is a future that
    you have to be an ICBM operator in the United States Air Force.
        Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
        General Wilson. We got a bunch of efforts underway to
    improve that.
        And I will yield the remaining time to General Harencak
    here.
        General Harencak. The only thing I would add, Senator, is
    the proof of this is truly in the pudding, and I am absolutely
    confident that the leadership of the United States Air Force is
    committed in the long term to the purposeful development of
    nuclear officers and enlisted airmen that all work in this
    field. So I believe that we made structural and institutional
    changes to address your concern, and already we are seeing the
    benefits of that in just the last few months or a year.
        Senator Heinrich. And CADENCE. Where is that being stood
    up?
        General Wilson. Shreveport, LA.
        Senator Heinrich. Fantastic.
        And a related issue. As we know, nuclear missions require
    perfection. However, the nuclear enterprise review found that
    there is, quote, a blurring of lines between accountability and
    perfection in the Air Force. I was hoping you could explain
    what that means a little further. Either of you. General
    Wilson?
        General Wilson. What I am telling our airmen today is that
    they own the future. We are not going to walk by any problems.
    So when you see a problem, you need to identify it, so this
    culture of self-assessment and being able to have someone hear
    your voice and say this needs to be fixed, we can do this
    better.
        I recently had a conversation with a senior officer, and he
    said--
        Senator Heinrich. Basically you are saying accountability
    and perfection were working against each other in some cases.
        General Wilson. We did. We had a culture that was about
    passing the next inspection, and the culture of inspections
    became the mission. Today we are telling our airmen that is not
    it at all. We need to understand the importance of our mission,
    but you are empowered to make a difference.
        A senior officer said to me, well, you do not really
    believe a young airman has the wherewithal to--they just need
    to be told what to do. And I said, no, you are completely
    missing the boat. An example is a young airman at Barksdale Air
    Force Base who is 20 years old who works in the medical group,
    and he is a high school programmer. He was doing a job at that
    entry and realized I can do this better. He made a difference.
    He wrote a program that is now being used DOD-wide, and he is
    20 years old. That is the type of empowerment we are talking
    about, and it is going on throughout our enterprise where the
    youngest airmen and our NCOs and our young officers are
    speaking up because they see a way to make it better, and we
    need to listen to them and then let them do their job.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions [presiding]. Senator King?
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Ms. Creedon, I go to a lot of hearings around here, and
        I am starting to think that instead of the U.S. Congress,
    we should call ourselves ``Deficits are Us'' because I keep
    encountering deficits and this is another one. Can you give me,
    very briefly, just in a few seconds, top line, what is the size
    of the nuclear enterprise deficit and what is the timeframe
    that we have to address it? Is it $100 billion, $50 billion,
    $20 billion? What is the number, and how much time do we have
    to do this before national security is truly jeopardized?
        Ms. Creedon. So I think first we need to understand exactly
    what our review did. So our review looked at the people in DOD,
    the systems in DOD that we have now and that we need to
    maintain until such time as we have replacement systems.
        Senator King. I understand that. I want a number.
        Ms. Creedon. So our estimate was a range of between $9
    billion and $25 billion. I do not know the time because how
    those things get executed are up in the air. So we had said
    possibly as many as 5 years, somewhere along those lines.
        Senator King. That is the total number, though. $9 billion
    to $25 billion is the total number.
        Ms. Creedon. That is what we came up with. Not terribly
    scientific, but that is what we came up with, $9 billion to $25
    billion. And it will take years to fix.
        Senator King. Thank you.
        Second, I am concerned about command and control in this
    system and particularly in the world of cyber crimes. How are
    we doing on that front?
        Ms. Creedon. We are doing better. Obviously, a good bit of
    this needs to be taken to a classified session on this
    particular topic, but when we did our review, because of some
    work that had been done previously, one of the main areas of
    attention that we found that it had increased attention was the
    nuclear command and control. So although there is work to be
    done, it at least had, I think, started to get better.
        Senator King. It is being attended to.
        Ms. Creedon. It is being attended to.
        Senator King. General Wilson, the B-52 is reaching the end
    of its life, and we are talking about the long-range strike
    bomber, but that is still on the drawing boards. Is there a
    capacity gap? Will the B-52 last until the long-range strike
    fighter, bearing in mind that the last--the Defense Department
    average for new aircraft procurement is 23 years? That is the
    number that we saw in the full committee. Can we get from here
    to there with the B-52?
        General Wilson. We can. We are planning to fly the B-52 for
    another 25 years. It has service life to go beyond that.
        Senator King. So you are confident in that platform for
    that period of time.
        General Wilson. I am. We need to do some upgrades to it.
    But I am also confident that we need a new penetrating bomber.
    The B-52s that we have on our ramp are 1960 and 1961 models.
    The B-2, our new bomber, is 25 years old. So we absolutely need
    a new bomber. As technology improves around the world, the
    ability to hold targets at risk wherever they are on the planet
    is vitally important to our Nation and certainly to the United
    States Air Force.
        Senator King. I would like to follow up with you or whoever
    is appropriate about the long-range strike bomber, what the
    spec is, how it relates to the B-2 and the B-52. So that is a
    discussion we can have.
        General Wilson. We would be happy to have that with you.
        The information referred to follows:

        Senator King was briefed on the Long Range Strike Bomber, what the
    spec is, and how it relates to the B-2 and the B-52 on May 7, 2015 by
    RCO, SAPCO and SAF/AQP.

        Senator King. If you could be in touch with my office
    because I want to understand before we undertake a new--before
    we get too far into a new vehicle, I want to have that
    opportunity.
        Another deficit is Research and Development (R&D). Are
    there sufficient funds in the President's budget, if it were
    enacted as it is today, to do the R&D that is necessary to keep
    pace in a field which is essentially driven by technology?
    General Wilson, do you want to tackle that? Or, Admiral, why do
    you not give me a thought on that?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Well, I will address that as it
    relates to the Ohio replacement program, our new submarine. The
    answer is yes. As requested in the President's budget, if that
    is fully funded, then we will remain on track to do the design
    development and leading into production of that vitally
    important platform.
        Senator King. How about R&D generally in the nuclear
    enterprise?
        Admiral Benedict. I would say from my position as Director
    of SSP, there are four areas that I think my counterparts here
    in the Air Force would agree if we are not investing in, no one
    is investing in, and those would be reentry body science, rad
    hard electronics to the levels that we have to, strategic
    propulsion, which is vital to both us and the ICBM force, as
    well as the guidance systems which are well beyond any
    commercial case.
        Senator King. Could a current ICBM be used to put a
    satellite in orbit, the same rocket?
        Admiral Benedict. I will defer to the Air Force on that,
    sir.
        General Wilson. I would think the answer would be yes. I
    would have to get with the pros to be able to do that. But an
    ICBM is going to fly a significant distance, halfway around the
    world and go up into the hundreds of miles high. So the answer
    would be yes.
        Senator King. Well, I am just interested because we are
    talking about satellite overhead architecture and vehicles, and
    I just want to be sure we are not having a different vehicle
    for every trip to the store. And I would like to follow up on
    that as well in terms of the appropriateness of multiple use of
    some of these vehicles that are being developed.
        A final question. How is Russia doing in their compliance
    with New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)? Anybody?
    Answer quick. Nobody answering makes me nervous.
        Ms. Creedon. They are fine. Right now, the New START--they
    are full in compliance and we are full in compliance.
        Senator King. They are fully complying?
        Ms. Creedon. They are. It is one of the few bright spots in
    the relationship.
        Senator King. Good.
        That is all I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Sessions. A good question.
        Admiral Benedict, with regard to the study and the Navy's
    response, are there things that impacted the Navy that you have
    undertaken to make our arsenal more safe?
        Admiral Benedict. Mr. Chairman, both studies identified
    primarily two deficiencies within the U.S. Navy's actions. We
    are already in process. And we appreciate the confirmation that
    the two reviews gave us. Those are the infrastructure and, as
    Ms. Creedon stated, primarily in the shipyards. We were down in
    our shipyard worker numbers as a result of the impacts of
    sequestration. So those numbers were immediately authorized by
    Secretary Work when he identified that. And so we are hiring
    somewhere around 2,200 personnel for the shipyards and our
    repair facilities. We are on track on that hiring process, and
    that will certainly increase the throughput in our shipyards.
        The second piece, again as Ms. Creedon identified, was the
    infrastructure. We are now on a 15-year recapitalization plan
    of the naval shipyards, as well as a 25-year recapitalization
    program within the strategic weapons facilities that I am
    accountable for. So, yes, sir, we are on track.
        Senator Sessions. Well, your answer to Senator King I
    guess, Ms. Creedon, was $9 billion to $25 billion. Now, this is
    in addition to what our current expected expenditures are?
        Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. And it was to maintain the current
    systems in DOD between now and whenever they are replaced by
    the follow-on systems.
        Senator Sessions. But you are not counting like the Ohio-
    class replacement or the new bomber?
        Ms. Creedon. That is correct.
        Senator Sessions. That is not being counted. What does this
    money go for? I mean, we have been operating here for a long
    time, and we obviously are not at the level of safety and
    reliability we need to be. That is a huge sum of money.
        Ms. Creedon. And it is over a period of time. And I would
    turn to my colleagues for their indications as to how much each
    of them has begun to spend over the Future Years Defense
    Program (FYDP), but it is a wide range of things. Some of it is
    facilities. There are a lot of facilities that need to be
    replaced. Some of it is new equipment. The Air Force needs new
    helicopters for their missile fields. It is people. It is
    parts. It is a whole range of things. It is a very large bill,
    but a lot of it is facilities.
        Senator Sessions. Well, $25 billion would buy a lot, a lot
    of helicopters, a lot of automobiles with heaters in them. I am
    just telling you.
        I would think we need a specific request. So how would this
    reflect itself in future budget requests? You would just ask
    for more or are you talking about taking money out of existing
    programs?
        Ms. Creedon. Well, at that point, sir, I think I would like
    to turn it over to my DOD colleagues who are implementing the
    recommendations.
        Senator Sessions. Gentlemen, do you have thoughts about
    that? I mean, this is not a blank check. I mean, we have got to
    honor the taxpayers? money, and we are worried about not being
    able to maintain sufficient force levels and other matters too
    in this Defense Department.
        Admiral Benedict. Sir, if I may, I will go first.
        Our fiscal year 2016 increase was $446 million. That is in
    our budget within the Navy, and our FYDP increase across the 5-
    year defense plan for the Navy totaled just slightly over $2
    billion.
        As Ms. Creedon said, the majority of that is personnel in
    the shipyards, as I explained. We have self-funded--
        Senator Sessions. How many do you have in a shipyard now?
        Admiral Benedict. Across all four shipyards, sir? I would
    have to get you the specific number.
        Senator Sessions. 2,000 sounds like a big number.
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. Remember, these are the four
    naval nuclear shipyards. And so I do not have the exact number
    of all four in total. The number that I gave you, slightly over
    2,200, is the increase to the existing workforce in order to
    ensure that we can maintain the throughput through that system.
    I do not have the total number, sir.
        Senator Sessions. General Wilson?
        General Wilson. Mr. Chairman, we added $5.6 billion over
    the FYDP for the nuclear enterprise. That covers a spectrum of
    things from both people. It covers milcon.
        Senator Sessions. Well, is it not the rule of thumb that
    you can do--$1 billion is equal to 10,000 uniformed personnel?
        General Wilson. I do not know the rule of thumb, Mr.
    Chairman. We added 1,100 people to the nuclear enterprise this
    last year to help us in every area from security forces to our
    operators to supply specialists. 1,100 was the plus-up that we
    got to the nuclear enterprise. Some of that is for procurement
    going forward. We included the long-range standoff weapon
    across this 5-year defense budget. We have about $700 million
    of milcon to start getting after the weapons storage areas
    across all of our bases. So we added $5.6 billion on this FYDP
    to the nuclear enterprise.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think we should see that in more
    detail. I think we should know more in detail about that and
    exactly how many people and just to say $5 billion and we are
    talking about $1 billion will produce about 10,000. So that is
    a lot of people.
        Anyway, I think we have to look at this hard. We have got
    to create safety and reliability. We know you have been
    undercut and have not had sufficient funding for that, and we
    are going to have to find some more money. But doing it as
    smartly as possible would be good.
        Senator Donnelly, I believe you are next. Has a vote
    started again or do you know?
        Senator Donnelly. Where we are at is there are a number of
    voice votes taking place right now, so about 10 to 15 minutes
    before the final recorded vote. I already went through
    questions, and so, Senator King or Senator Heinrich.
        Senator Sessions. Please.
        Senator Heinrich. One more round if we have got the time.
        And I would just make the point that, unfortunately,
    nuclear weapons have never sort of conformed to the sort of
    ratios between personnel, obviously, and hardware that we see
    in other parts of the DOD budget.
        But I want to get back to a couple of issues with General
    Harencak and also Admiral Benedict. And you guys can decide who
    to answer first.
        But the NNSA labs and plants through the current
    refurbishment programs for the B61-12, the W88 Alt 370, and the
    fuse for the W87 are leveraging rate, our technology across
    these life extension programs now. And I wanted to ask you is
    this sort of leverage beneficial to your programs. Is it cost-
    effective? And is there a benefit for the U.S. deterrent as the
    full-scale engineering and design of these programs starts to
    level off over the next few years for Air Force, Navy, and NNSA
    to think about some sort of joint engineering programs to
    maintain the institutional knowledge of the labs? workforce?
        General Harencak. I will start, Senator. First off, as you
    are well aware, the tremendous work that the labs in New Mexico
    and Lawrence Livermore labs are doing in this collaboration.
    The short answer to your question is a resounding yes. We are
    leveraging. We are making affordable smart decisions where we
    collaborate with the United States Navy. And the B61 is a
    perfect example. There are components--we are just using Navy
    components in them, which has been obviously tremendously
    helpful. We are also collaborating on future ways that we could
    use joint common and adaptable materials, not just in hardware
    but also in our processes and using our people. We talked a
    little bit earlier about Navy Crane. The Navy is also using a
    facility in Heath, Ohio that the United States Air Force runs
    through a contractor, and it has also been enormously helpful.
        I will say, though, I have been banging around this
    particular aspect--business for the last 6 continuous years,
    and I can tell you I have never seen better cooperation. Our
    B61 program at the NNSA is working with us, and with
    collaboration from the Navy is on time, on cost. And that is
    just one example of where this collaboration and the great work
    between the Department of Energy, the NNSA, the Navy, and the
    Air Force has occurred.
        Senator Heinrich. That is exactly what I was hoping to hear
    because I think as you heard from Senator Sessions, the
    chairman, while we all recognize that this enterprise is not
    cheap, we have to get the most bang for the buck possible in
    this environment.
        I want to move on real quick to Kirtland Underground
    Munitions Storage Complex (KUMSC). General Wilson, as I
    understand it, the Global Strike Command now owns the Kirtland
    underground munitions and maintenance storage complex. This is
    a unique and strategic national asset. Do you have a long-term
    plan for its upkeep? And if you do, can you share it with the
    committee?
        General Wilson. Senator, I completely agree that KUMSC is a
    national treasure. We have not taken control of Kirtland KUMSC
    yet. We will on 1 October. As we have talked in the past,
    though, in the Air Force corporate structure, as we modernize
    our weapons storage facility, KUMSC absolutely has to be part
    of that plan. And so we will have that as part of the plan. I
    do not have it today, but as we develop it, we will make sure
    we share it with you.
        Senator Heinrich. That was certainly the case when the
    Nuclear Weapons Center was the lead, and we just need to make
    sure that that does not fall by the wayside as we make this
    incredibly important transition.
        General Wilson. Absolutely.
        Senator Heinrich. Thank you, General.
        Senator Sessions. Senator King?
        Senator King. I just want to take a moment to thank all of
    you, Ms. Creedon especially and Dr. Brumer, for the work on the
    report, on the review. I think so often we sort of just keep
    going, and to every now and then to stop and think and analyze
    and review and have some strategy about where we are headed I
    think is very valuable. And I commend former Secretary Hagel
    for initiating it and for your carrying it out. And I can
    assure you that it is going to help to guide our work and
    consideration. So just a thank you for that important work.
        Senator Donnelly. And I would just like to follow up what
    Senator King said to say thank you as well and to also let you
    know our goal is to simply make this all work the best possible
    and to create the most confidence in the people who work in
    this area, and that when we talk about these things, it is not
    to try to pick out people or pick on people. It is simply to
    say how can we do this better. What are the things we missed
    on? Just like the next day in practice, how can we run this
    better and make our team better? And so to all of you, thank
    you and thank you for your work on this effort.
        Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Donnelly. And I agree
    with those positive comments. I really believe that the Defense
    Department took the challenge seriously. The report is a
    serious report, and I believe that you are determined to
    eliminate the dangers and problems that we had. I truly believe
    that is so.
        Admiral Benedict, General Harencak mentioned the joint work
    that you have done. I understand there has been some real
    savings of money in that. And do you see possibilities in the
    future as we develop ICBM warheads and submarine-launched
    warheads that we could also have interoperable systems as the
    years go by?
        Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. And I think there is a spectrum
    of commonality. It goes from the simple constituents using the
    same materials in the weapon system all the way up through--you
    could envision at some point at least a discussion about how
    common could we be. Could we be a common missile? I am not
    certain we are at that far right side of the spectrum. But I
    will tell you that we are engaged at the engineering level, at
    the leadership level, and as I mentioned earlier, I am actually
    briefing the Air Force ICBM flags on Tuesday of next week with
    Admiral Haney on this very subject up in Cheyenne, Wyoming. And
    they were very generous to invite me up there to have the
    conversation on commonality.
        So I think the conversation is ongoing. The recognition
    that the bill that you very well recognize that is in front of
    the two services is something that we have to think about
    differently, and I think there is a commitment now within the
    leadership teams to ensure that we provide you evidence that we
    have thought about it differently and some different proposals
    than the past.
        I will turn it over to my colleagues.
        General Harencak. I would say, Senator, that it is not a
    possibility. It is a certainty that we are going to do it
    because we just cannot do it any other way. People ask me all
    the time, well, how can we afford to do all this
    recapitalization and modernization. Well, one way we are going
    to afford to do it is we are going to do it in a new way. We
    are not going to do it the same way we did it in the 1960s and
    the 1970s and the 1980s and the 1990s. We are going to do it in
    a smarter, better, faster way. And that starts with making sure
    wherever we can leverage another service or what the U.S. Navy
    has done or vice versa, we are going to do it. So this is not a
    possibility. This is a new way of doing things that we are
    committed to, both our services. And it is probably the only
    way we are actually going to be able to deliver the needed
    systems for our Nation in an affordable manner.
        Senator Sessions. Well, thank you. I think those are
    encouraging comments.
        Senator King?
        Senator King. I was just going to say amen, General. You
    got it right.
        Senator Donnelly. I would third that and then also say to
    General Wilson I understand you are moving to STRATCOM, And we
    want to thank you on behalf of the committee for all the help
    you have rendered to us and we hope to continue that
    relationship as we look forward.
        And, General Harencak, we understand there is a new
    incoming A-10. During the ICBM cheating incident and
    modernization of the Air Force's nuclear mission, you have been
    proud to defend and advocate for the Air Force, and we
    appreciate that very much and we wish you the very best in your
    next position as well.
        Senator Sessions. Dr. Brumer, this will be my final
    question. Secretary Hagel talked about a 10 percent need
    increase apparently. I believe Administrator Creedon has used
    $9 billion to $25 billion. That depends on the years. That
    might be even more.
        First, does the 2016 request and the FYDP funding profile
    reflect that increase? So let me ask you that.
        Dr. Brumer. Yes. Thank you for that question, Chairman.
        Indeed, as part of the PB 2016 build, we did bring the
    senior leadership detailed assessments of all of the budget
    options and how they addressed the review recommendations. The
    PB 2016 did add $8 billion across the FYDP. Early on, there
    were options to spend more money, but there were executability
    problems and the ability to spend the money efficiently. By the
    end of the FYDP, I believe it comes close to the 10 percent
    number.
        Senator Sessions. So that is a figure you can live with?
        Dr. Brumer. Sir, it is an outcome of trying to balance a
    good faith effort to address the recommendations of the
    reviews, as well as trying to ensure that there is good use of
    Government resources to ensure that the money is well spent. It
    is something that I am comfortable with today, but we are very
    early on in the efforts to address the issues. I believe that
    this is something that will require years of sustained effort
    and sustained attention, and we intend to comprehensively
    review those decisions and the funding levels every year and if
    changes are needed in future budget requests, we will recommend
    them.
        Senator Sessions. Well, I think that is the kind of answer
    you can give at this time and maybe no more than that. But we
    would like to see the Government do a little better than we
    normally do. We go for years under-investing and then sometimes
    we over-invest. And if we can get on a stable path that we can
    be confident would put us into a safe, secure, and modernized
    system that is reliable, then we want to do that. And we hope
    you will look for every way possible to keep that cost as
    reasonable as you can.
        Anything else, gentlemen?
        Thank you all. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
                 Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
                                 modernization
        1. Senator Inhofe. Major General Harencak, Lieutenant General
    Wilson, Vice Admiral Benedict, Dr. Brumer, and Ms. Creedon, do each of
    you believe our nuclear deterrence capability has been challenged by
    inadequate modernization funding and continued modernization by other
    nuclear powers?
        Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. As long as
    deficit reduction remains a national priority, federal agencies will
    continue to compete for diminishing resources. The modernization
    requirements across the entire Air Force have certainly created
    challenges, particularly for our efforts to simultaneously modernize
    the ICBM force, the dual-capable bomber fleets, and the intricate NC3
    infrastructure.
        In the five years since Air Force Global Strike Command stood up as
    a Major Command, both funding and manpower resources flowing to the
    nuclear mission have improved. However, significant work remains to
    correct 23 years of reduced nuclear focus and funding since standing
    down Strategic Air Command.
        We must continue to balance fleet recapitalization with continuous
    operations and maintenance of a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
    force, which is our number one priority. This nuclear capability is
    foundational to US national security, acting as assurance to our allies
    and a deterrent to those who might choose to harm us.
        Vice Admiral Benedict. Prioritizing limited resources to meet
    national strategic deterrence requirements among all our national
    defense requirements is a challenge. Today's fiscal environment is a
    concern as the Department of Defense (DOD) endeavors to sustain and
    modernize many central components of our strategic nuclear deterrent
    triad, the communications system that directs it and the underlying
    support structure.
        The Armed Services are implementing the President's guidance for
    aligning U.S. security policies to the 21st century security
    environment. Although our nuclear arsenal is the smallest it has been
    since the late 1950s, today's nuclear forces are fully capable of
    meeting current strategic defense needs and are expected to serve the
    nation well into the middle of this century. However, the percentage of
    defense department spending on our nuclear forces and infrastructure
    has declined to only 2.5% of total DOD spending in 2013--an historic
    low.
        Today our nuclear weapons and weapons systems are safe, secure and
    effective despite operating well beyond their originally designed life.
    Today our triad of nuclear forces is formidable and stands as an
    effective deterrent to strategic attack against the U.S. and our
    allies. However, this readiness cannot be sustained indefinitely.
    Recent reviews of our DOD nuclear weapons enterprise have revealed that
    it no longer has the margin of safety and reliability it once had.
    Consequently, the nation faces a substantive, multi-decade
    recapitalization challenge in which we must continue to invest. Our
    current and planned investments are significant compared to past
    expenditures in our strategic deterrent programs since 1992 yet are
    commensurate with the magnitude of the strategic deterrent mission
    which is not expected to markedly change for the foreseeable future. If
    we fail to sustain these investments we risk degrading the global
    stabilizing effect of a diverse, strong, and capable nuclear force. It
    is imperative we resource future sensor improvements; upgrades for
    nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) capabilities;
    strategic delivery system recapitalization efforts; weapon life-
    extension programs and stockpile surveillance activities; and nuclear
    complex infrastructure modernization. Together these exceptionally
    important and necessary investments will ensure our triad of nuclear
    forces remains viable and credible not only to our own defense but to
    our allies defense as well.
        Dr. Brumer. I believe that aging systems, coupled with competing
    priorities and topline pressure, have put stress on the Department's
    ability to maintain adequate risk margin in the nuclear enterprise. If
    left unaddressed over a long period of time, this might have challenged
    our deterrent capability in the future. However, the Department is
    taking action to address these issues, and I do not believe that this
    has undermined our nation's ability to provide a robust deterrent, even
    in the face of modernization by other nuclear powers.
        Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.

        2. Senator Inhofe. Major General Harencak, Lieutenant General
    Wilson, Vice Admiral Benedict, Dr. Brumer, and Ms. Creedon, do you all
    believe that the nuclear triad (strategic bombers, intercontinental
    ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles)
    is an essential deterrent and that each must be modernized and
    maintained?
        Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. Absolutely--
    the nuclear triad is as important today as it has been throughout its
    existence. In today's unpredictable world, our nuclear weapons provide
    the ultimate protection for the United States and our allies and
    partners. The three legs of the triad complement each other to provide
    quick response, visible deterrence, and survivability. If you remove
    any one of these capabilities, you risk increasing our vulnerability
    against the only existential threat our nation faces.
        With respect to modernization, we must continue to modernize our
    existing systems while also developing new weapon systems. For decades
    we have taken a procurement break with respect to our nuclear weapon
    systems, but now that bill has come due. The Air Force is operating B-
    52s that were produced in the 1960s, ICBMs that were deployed in the
    1970s, and B-2s and cruise missiles that were produced in the 1980s. We
    have upgraded these systems throughout the years; however, it becomes
    more and more expensive every time we do this. It is similar to
    maintaining an older car--there comes a point where it makes better
    financial and operational sense to simply buy a new one.
        Our adversaries are publicly developing new systems and modernizing
    their existing ones--both offensive and defensive. This is not to say
    we are engaging in a new arms race. But it does mean other countries
    are developing systems that will eventually challenge our capability to
    strike anywhere on the globe at any time. We cannot risk these
    countries turning the Air Force into a regional force instead of a
    global one.
        Vice Admiral Benedict. Per the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR),
    ``retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain strategic stability
    at reasonable cost, while hedging against potential technical problems
    or vulnerabilities.'' The commitment to the triad was reinforced in the
    U.S. Nuclear Weapons Employment Planning guidance the President issued
    in June 2013. USSTRATCOM executes strategic deterrence and assurance
    operations with Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Ballistic
    Missile Submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear capable heavy bombers. Each
    element of the nuclear triad provides unique and complimentary
    attributes of strategic deterrence, and the whole is greater than the
    sum of its parts.
    Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
        Recapitalizing our Sea-Based Strategic Deterrent (SBSD) is the Navy
    and USSTRATCOM's top modernization priority. The Navy's Ohio-class SSBN
    and Trident II D5 Strategic Weapons System (SWS) together are the
    nuclear triad's most survivable leg and are the assured response that
    is the core of our nuclear deterrent strategy. This stealthy and highly
    capable force is composed of two major elements, the SWS and delivery
    system. Both are undergoing needed modernization. With respect to the
    SWS, we are extending the life of the D5 system to be capable until
    after 2040. With respect to the submarine that delivers these missiles,
    the Ohio-class SSBN has already been extended from 30 to 42 years of
    service and no further extension is possible. Consequently, these
    submarines will start leaving service at the rate of one per year in
    2027. It cannot be emphasized enough that the OHIO Replacement Program
    must stay on schedule. No further delay is possible. Continued and
    stable funding for the OHIO Replacement SSBN also supports our
    commitment to the United Kingdom to provide a Common Missile
    Compartment design, ensuring both their and our new SSBNs achieve
    operational capability on schedule.
    Summary
        The nuclear Triad is essential to the strategic defense of the
    United States, and each of the legs therein plays a critical and
    complementary role in supporting the other legs of the Triad. Removing
    any of these essential legs would threaten the credibility of our
    strategic deterrent capability the NPR directs the military to maintain
    and would thereby increase the risk of nuclear war.
        Dr. Brumer. The nuclear Triad is the basis for the nation's
    deterrence capability and a key aspect of our national security
    enterprise. Each leg brings unique characteristics, and the multi-
    system nature of the Triad ensures that our deterrent is robust even in
    the face of unexpected technical issues or advancements by other
    nuclear powers.
        Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.

        3. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Wilson and Vice Admiral
    Benedict, if the Air Force and Navy are forced to accept the levels of
    funding in the Budget Control Act, what will the Air Force and Navy
    prioritize and what programs will be impacted?
        Lieutenant General Wilson. Thank you for the question, but I must
    defer to Air Force and DOD leadership on service priorities under
    sequestration.
        Vice Admiral Benedict. A return to sequestration in FY 2016 would
    necessitate a revisit and revision of the defense strategy.
    Sequestration would significantly reduce the Navy's ability to fully
    implement the President's defense strategy. The required cuts would
    force us to further delay critical warfighting capabilities, reduce
    readiness of forces needed for contingency responses, further downsize
    weapons capacity, and forego or stretch procurement of force structure
    as a last resort. Because of funding shortfalls over the last three
    years, our FY 2016 President's Budget represents the absolute minimum
    funding levels needed to execute our defense strategy. We cannot
    provide a responsible way to budget for the defense strategy at
    sequester levels because there isn't one.
        Today's world is more complex, more uncertain, and more turbulent,
    and this trend around the world will likely continue. Our adversaries'
    are modernizing and expanding their capabilities. It is vital that we
    have an adequate, predictable, and timely budget to remain an effective
    Navy. Put simply, sequestration will damage the national security of
    this country.

                                   personnel
        4. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Wilson and Vice Admiral
    Benedict, Ms. Creedon, what are we doing to ensure we can recruit and
    retain the right professionals, both military and civilian, to operate
    and sustain our nuclear forces?
        Lieutenant General Wilson. The Air Force has launched several
    initiatives and is leveraging existing programs aimed at recruiting and
    retaining nuclear professionals. We are focusing on developing,
    training, educating, and incentivizing personnel through deliberate
    efforts.
        In Air Force Global Strike Command, our education initiatives start
    at the commissioning sources and initial skills training. We have begun
    there so we can educate and inform current and future Airmen about the
    importance of the nuclear enterprise and how they contribute to that
    mission. We also send senior leaders to Reserve Officer Training Corps
    (ROTC) detachments around the country to engage students and inform
    them about the nuclear enterprise. We have done around 40 of these
    visits thus far, and have received great feedback.
        Additionally, the Air Force dedicated resources to developing
    nuclear professionals through formal education and development programs
    that enhance knowledge and build perspectives on leadership. These
    courses educate and provide research on the nuclear enterprise, weapons
    of mass destruction threats, and appropriate countermeasures to Air
    Force and Department of Defense leaders.
        One of these programs is the new School of Advanced Nuclear
    Deterrence Studies, where we will build a cadre of nuclear deterrence
    and assurance experts experienced in the concepts of leading,
    operating, maintaining, defending, supporting, planning, and sustaining
    the nuclear enterprise. The Air Force has also teamed with the Navy to
    create an exchange program for nuclear professionals. Moreover, there
    are Air Force sponsored fellowships and intern programs at the national
    nuclear laboratories used to further enhance our nuclear professionals'
    education, training, and development.
        The Air Force has taken action to provide monetary and non-monetary
    incentives for nuclear specialties currently performing nuclear related
    duties to include support personnel. Monetary incentives include
    Assignment Incentive Pay for ICBM operators, security forces and
    maintenance officers, and Special Duty Assignment Pay for critical
    enlisted nuclear career fields. Also, the Air Force is offering a
    Selective Reenlistment Bonus for certain specialties unable to meet
    retention goals. For civilians, the Air Force has requested and been
    approved special salary rates and recruitment, retention, and
    relocation incentives to attract personnel to some of our hard to fill
    locations.
        The intent of all these efforts is to meet the objective of
    attracting, and retaining nuclear professionals through education,
    training and developmental initiatives.
        Vice Admiral Benedict. Navy recruits, and eventually commissions or
    enlists, only highly-qualified and trusted candidates who possess the
    emotional stability and physical capability, and who demonstrate the
    reliability and professional competence, essential to maintaining the
    most advanced and sophisticated weapons systems in the world. Our
    future officers commission through the U.S. Naval Academy, Naval
    Reserve Officer Training Corps units at some of the nation's premier
    educational institutions, or through various other colleges and
    universities under the Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate (NUPOC)
    program. Enlisted personnel are selected from among Navy applicants who
    achieve the highest scores on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
    Battery (ASVAB). The chosen few must maintain certification in, and be
    continuously evaluated through, the Nuclear Weapons Personal
    Reliability Program, and must remain eligible at all times for the
    required levels of security clearance and access.
        Navy uses various special and incentive pays and bonuses to attract
    and retain intelligent, highly-motivated and uniquely-qualified
    officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the nation's nuclear
    deterrent mission, in submarines or in the Fleet Air Reconnaissance
    Take Charge and Move Out (i.e., VQ (TACAMO)) mission. In addition to
    competitive compensation, we invest substantial effort in educating
    Sailors on the benefits of this unique service, which includes the
    opportunity and honor of serving our nation in this unique arena, and
    exposure to world-class training and challenging duty assignments,
    eligibility for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits and access to continuing
    education, family support programs and world-class health care, while
    qualifying for tax advantages and, potentially, a generous retirement
    plan.
        In the civilian workforce, the Strategic Systems Program (SSP)
    office uses available hiring flexibilities, including Expedited Hiring
    Authority to access highly-qualified acquisition employees, and various
    Veterans' Recruitment Appointments (VRA) to quickly hire qualified
    veterans into civilian jobs. We offer Tuition Assistance and Student
    Loan Repayments to encourage employees to remain in SSP throughout
    their careers. We also provide retention incentives to employees in
    critical skills, and have been successful in hiring new employees to
    fill job vacancies and in retaining the needed skills to do the
    mission.
        Last fall, CNO initiated a Nuclear Enterprise Manpower Review to
    assess military and civilian manpower requirements across the nuclear
    weapons and nuclear propulsion enterprises to identify gaps in mission
    execution. The current phase of the review will provide gap analyses
    across all force management domains late this summer. The next phase
    will focus on competency management requirements for federal civilian
    employees and recommend significant improvements in community
    management and knowledge development practices.
        Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                  Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Donnelly
                    naval surface warfare center crane value
        5. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, can you characterize
    the role Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) Crane plays in support our
    Navy nuclear forces?
        Vice Admiral Benedict. For more than 50 years, NSWC Crane's Global
    Deterrence and Defense Department has provided product engineering and
    design capabilities for shipboard and flight electronics in support of
    a vast array of missile systems for the Navy. Strategic Systems
    Programs has relied on their expertise to ensure generations of Fleet
    Ballistic Missile systems were developed and continue to be deployed in
    support of our nation's strategic deterrence mission. NSWC Crane has
    played a critical role in each of the missile subsystems, including the
    system and platform integration of the Strategic Weapons System.
        They are also active participants in the Commonality efforts, led
    by the Navy and Air Force. NSWC Crane is currently leading the effort
    to develop a radiation hardened parts library for use by the Navy, Air
    Force, and other Defense Department customers. The database will serve
    as a repository for all current radiation hardened parts including the
    manufacturer, specifications, and test results.

                radiation-hardened parts and hardware assurance
        6. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, as you know, NSWC Crane
    is at the center of work on radiation-hardened electronics and hardware
    assurance efforts. Their work on detecting and protecting against
    counterfeit parts entering the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain
    is groundbreaking. What is the Navy doing to protect nuclear systems
    against counterfeit parts and how can we better leverage expertise like
    that at Crane to counter this threat, whether in the Navy or elsewhere?
        Vice Admiral Benedict. SSP and our Prime Contractors relied on NSWC
    Crane's expertise relative to detecting and protecting against
    counterfeit parts entering the Navy's TRIDENT II (D5) life extension
    program during the development phase and continuing into the production
    phase. Specifically we utilized an approved DMEA Trusted foundry,
    monitored the electronic parts' and printed circuit boards' supply
    chain, made procurements through OEMs and only if an OEM would not sell
    product directly did we procure through an OEM authorized distributor.
    In addition, we utilized NSWC Crane as an independent test agent to
    perform physical and functional verification of critical components.
        NSWC Crane's expertise in this area was highlighted during the
    recent Microelectronics Integrity Meeting hosted at NSWC Crane. The
    meeting was attended by several key DOD claimants. Continuing this type
    of engagement will help the DOD leverage NSWC Crane's expertise and
    allow the best practices of all of DOD to be highlighted.

        7. Senator Donnelly. Lieutenant General Wilson, I am aware that
    NSWC Crane is working with the Defense Advanced Research Projects
    Agency (DARPA), the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Air Force on
    efforts to better understand and protect against counterfeit parts
    entering the DOD supply chain. Whether in relation to this partnership
    or separately, can you explain how the Air Force is working to protect
    its nuclear systems against counterfeit parts?
        Lieutenant General Wilson. The Air Force is continuing work to
    comply with current and past Congressional language in response to new
    and emerging threats in the context of the supply chain. We continue to
    protect the nuclear enterprise supply chain through a multi-tiered
    approach of prevention, detection, and mitigation. This includes
    policy, oversight, direction, and actions ranging from the Secretary of
    the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQX); Headquarters, Air Force
    Materiel Command (AFMC); the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC);
    the specific weapons system program offices; and the Air Force Supply
    Chain Manager (448th Supply Chain Management Wing). The Air Force is
    also working in cooperation with other military services, offices,
    laboratories, and partners in industry and academia. Through
    coordination efforts between these various organizations, activities
    involving the identification, threat assessment, planning,
    surveillance, detection, and mitigation of counterfeit parts are
    performed.
        The Air Force controls weapon systems' parts from concept, design
    and development, and operational fielding phases through final weapon
    system disposal by developing and updating rigorous sets of technical
    requirements, specifications, standards, and key suppliers and support
    infrastructure. As systems move into sustainment and become more
    mature, changes in requirements and suppliers drive Air Force and
    Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reviews of technical data, supplier
    qualification, and test parameters to ensure technical compliance of
    parts. Many items require qualification, first article, and production
    lot sampling and testing.
        As older trusted sources go out of business, outsource,
    consolidate/merge or opt to no longer produce the parts we need, there
    is an increased threat of counterfeit parts entering our supply chain.
    The Air Force and DLA are driven to require more surveillance including
    such things as visual and physical inspection, x-ray analysis,
    deconstruction, software, quarantine, and marking of parts.
    Additionally, the Air Force uses their Discrepant Material Reporting
    Office (DMR) and the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
    to react to identified risks.
        As a part of a weapon system's longer sustainment process, the Air
    Force conducts a series of review processes to ensure parts are
    compatible and pass rigorous testing requirements. Additionally, the
    Air Force Supply Chain protects against counterfeit parts by developing
    tools and capabilities to detect counterfeits, and ensuring contractors
    have detection programs in place.
        The Air Force Supply Chain office actively continues to coordinate
    efforts with AFNWC, specific program offices, Air Force Office of
    Special Investigations (AFOSI), Intelligence Offices, higher
    headquarters, and the other military services and DOD agencies for
    future planning and mitigation efforts, as well as holding
    collaborative working groups.
        Furthermore, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) has
    specific Supply Chain processes and efforts underway to identify
    mission critical functions and critical components, and has developed
    implementation strategies to reduce vulnerabilities through a systems
    security engineering approach and by independently assessing
    vulnerabilities of AF strategic systems across the lifecycle of the
    weapon systems against current and emerging threats. AFNWC, in
    coordination with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA),
    is also establishing a Joint US/UK Supply Chain Assurance Working Group
    (JSCAWG). The purpose of the JSCAWG is to provide a joint US-UK
    coordination and communication forum for supporting trust and
    confidence in the respective US and UK nuclear weapon supply chains and
    in Information Technology systems (to include hardware and software).
        Finally, DLA employs an enhanced quality control program to protect
    Air Force ICBM systems from counterfeit/nonconforming parts. Key
    elements of the program include: tracking and managing ICBM parts
    separately from other parts; procuring ICBM parts to the specifications
    identified by the Air Force; employing high level quality assurance
    standards and requirements when procuring AF ICBM parts; conducting
    parts tests; and leveraging anti-counterfeiting technology to validate
    the authenticity of all microcircuits purchased by DLA.

        8. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Creedon, I am aware that NSWC Crane is
    working with DARPA, NSA, and the Air Force on efforts to better
    understand and protect against counterfeit parts entering the DOD
    supply chain for both our nuclear and conventional systems. Whether in
    relation to this partnership or separately, can you explain how NNSA is
    working to protect our nuclear systems against counterfeit parts?
        Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.

                    navy-air force collaboration/commonality
        9. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, following up on my
    question in the hearing, NSWC has been involved in efforts to enhance
    collaboration and/or commonality among Navy and Air Force nuclear
    programs. At one time, we heard talk of Air Force-Navy collaboration.
    Today we hear more about commonality. How would you characterize each
    of these aims?
        Vice Admiral Benedict. As viewed by the Navy, Commonality and
    Collaboration should cover and examine a large spectrum of potential
    effort. This spectrum covers areas from Sustainment of Current Systems
    (continuing MMIII and D5LE in their current forms) through
    ``Evolution'' (Air Force and Navy coordinated programs of joint
    components and constituents) to ``Revolution'' (i.e. Joint Ballistic
    Missile). The goal of the Commonality and Collaboration efforts between
    the Navy and Air Force is not entirely focused at the one extreme of
    building a common SLBM/ICBM, but more likely would utilize certain
    elements of each system that have the potential for being common. The
    full option space must be explored from a National perspective to
    ensure the correct balance of commonality.
        Although commonality and collaboration are often used
    interchangeably as if they are a single effort, they are different.
    Collaboration focuses on what each service is doing and trying to
    coordinate and consolidate those efforts that are similar. Commonality
    focuses on working efforts in the same manner, either by using the same
    components or the same facilities. The radiation hardened electronic
    parts library is a great example that addresses both collaboration and
    commonality. The library itself is a collaborative effort used by both
    services. In the future before developing or certifying a new part,
    both sides will aim to use the parts already included in the library--a
    commonality effort.

        10. Senator Donnelly. Vice Admiral Benedict, you spoke briefly in
    the hearing about the status of efforts to achieve commonality among
    Navy and Air Force nuclear systems. I request that your staff brief
    mine on the status of these efforts in detail, including current
    efforts and opportunities for the future.
        Vice Admiral Benedict. I have a brief ready and it can be scheduled
    at your convenience. My POC CAPT Tyler Meador can be reached at 703-
    697-2871 or tyler.meador@navy.mil or Ms. Meghan Raftery at 202-433-
    7105, meghan.raftery @ssp.navy.mil.

        11. Senator Donnelly. General Harencak and Lieutenant General
    Wilson, I request that your staff brief my office in detail on the
    status of efforts to enhance collaboration and commonality across Air
    Force and Navy nuclear programs, including current efforts and
    opportunities for the future.
        Major General Harencak and Lieutenant General Wilson. We look
    forward to briefing you on different ways in which the Air Force and
    Navy are working together to ensure commonality.

        12. Senator Donnelly. Ms. Creedon, what is your assessment of
    efforts to enhance collaboration and commonality across Navy and Air
    Force nuclear programs? Do you see value in such efforts and what are
    the challenges and opportunities now and in the future?
        Ms. Creedon did not respond in time for printing. When received,
    answer will be retained in committee files.
                                     ______

                 Question Submitted by Senator Martin Heinrich
                              long range stand off
        13. Senator Heinrich. Lieutenant General Wilson, in your testimony,
    you state that the Air Force ``fully intends to develop a conventional
    version of the Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) Weapon as a future spiral to
    the nuclear variant''. Does this mean that once the current program
    becomes a program of record and achieves Milestone A it will have the
    conventional version as part of its requirements for engineering past
    Milestone B, or will the Air Force come back to it later after they
    develop the nuclear version of LRSO?
        Lieutenant General Wilson. We do, in fact, intend a conventional
    variant of the Long Range Standoff weapon. However, currently, the main
    focus for LRSO is to develop the nuclear variant while ensuring the
    program is achieving the initial developmental guidelines. Upon
    successful development of the nuclear LRSO variant, Air Force Global
    Strike Command will pursue a conventional variant following the Joint
    Capabilities Integration & Development System process by evaluating
    alternatives and codifying any conventional variant requirements in a
    JROC validated capabilities document.

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