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**GLOBAL CHALLENGES, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY, AND DEFENSE ORGANIZATION**

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE**

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 21, 27, 29; OCTOBER 22, 2015



Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

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GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 21, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning. The committee hearing will come to order.

To start with, I would like to welcome our new members, Senator Tom Cotton, Senator Joni Ernst, Senator Thom Tillis, Senator Dan Sullivan, Senator Mike Rounds, and Senator Martin Heinrich. For the benefit of our new members and all, this committee has a long tradition of working in a bipartisan fashion, of which we are very proud.

I have had the opportunity of working with Senator Reed for many years. Despite his lack of quality education, he has done an outstanding job here as a ranking member of the committee [laughter].

For those who are political trivia experts, my staff tells me this is the first time that we have had a chairman and ranking member from the two oldest service academies, and so I welcome the opportunity of working closely, as I have for many years, with the Senator from Rhode Island.

Today, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) begins a series of hearings on global challenges to U.S. national security strategy. I am pleased to have as our first witnesses two of America's most respected strategic thinkers and public servants, General Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski. Each served as National Security Advisor to the President of the United States, their collective experiences of laying critical foundations for the United States-China relationship, confronting the ayatollahs in Iran, negotiating arms treaties with Moscow, and making tough choices on United States strategy in the Middle East, have clear salience for this committee today.

We are grateful to each of you for allowing us to draw on your wisdom.

Four decades ago, Secretary of State Dean Acheson titled his memoir on the construction of the post-World War II order, "Present at the Creation". Looking out at the state of that order today, it is fair to ask if we are now present at the unraveling.

For 7 decades, Republican and Democratic leaders alike have committed America's indispensable leadership and strength to defending a liberal world order, one that cherishes the rule of law, maintains free markets and free trade, provides peaceful means for the settlement of disputes, and relegates wars of aggression to their rightful place in the bloody past.

America has defended this order because it is as essential to our identity and purpose as it is to our safety and prosperity.

But the liberal world order is imperiled like never before. In a speech riddled with unrealistic, wishful thinking, President Obama told the Nation last night that the shadow of crisis has passed. That news came as quite a surprise to anyone who has been paying attention to what has been happening around the world.

A revisionist Russia has invaded and annexed the territory of a sovereign European state, the first time that has occurred since the days of Hitler and Stalin.

A rising China is forcefully asserting itself in historical and territorial disputes, and alarming its neighbors, all the while investing billions of dollars in military capabilities that appear designed to displace and erode United States power in the Asia-Pacific.

A theocratic Iran is seeking a nuclear weapon, which could unleash a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and collapse the global nonproliferation regime.

A vicious and violent strain of radical Islamist ideology continues to metastasize across the Middle East and North Africa.

In its latest and potentially most virulent form, the Islamic State, this evil has the manpower and resources to dissolve international borders, occupy wide swaths of sovereign territory, destabilize one of our most strategically important parts of the world, and possibly threaten our Homeland.

In Yemen, the country President Obama once hailed as a successful model for his brand of counterterrorism, al Qaeda continues to facilitate global terrorism, as we saw in the barbaric attacks in Paris. Iranian-backed Houthi rebels have pushed the country to the brink of collapse.

All the while, American allies are increasingly questioning whether we will live up to our commitments, and our adversaries seem to be betting that we won't.

It does not have to be this way. Working together, this Congress and the President can immediately begin to restore American credibility by strengthening our common defense. American military power has always been vital to the sustainment of the liberal world order. It enhances our economic power, adds leverage to our diplomacy, reassures our allies, and deters our adversaries.

Yet despite the growing array of complex threats to our security, we are on track to cut \$1 trillion out of America's defense budget by 2021. Readiness is cratering across the Services. Army and Marine Corps end-strength is falling dangerously low. The Air Force's

aircraft inventory is the oldest in its history. The Navy's fleet is shrinking to pre-World War I levels. Top Pentagon officials and military commanders are warning that advances by China, Russia, Iran, and other adversaries mean United States military technological superiority can no longer be taken for granted.

This state of affairs is dangerous and unacceptable, and represents a failure to meet our most basic constitutional responsibility to provide for the common defense. We must have a strategy-driven budget, and not a budget-driven strategy. We must have a strategy based on a clear-eyed assessment of the threats we face, and a budget that provides the resources necessary to confront them.

But crafting a reality-based national security strategy is simply impossible under the mindless mechanism of sequestration. There would be no clearer signal that America intends to commit to the defense of our National interests and the international system that protects them than its immediate repeal.

I would hasten to add, while a larger defense budget is essential, it will be meaningless without the continued pursuit of defense reform, rethinking how we build, posture, and operate our forces in order to maintain our technological edge and prevail in long-term competition with determined adversaries who seek to undermine the economic and security architecture we have long championed.

This hearing will be the first in a series on how we build a national security strategy that can sustain the American power and influence required to defend the international order that has produced an extended security, prosperity, and liberty across the globe.

I am pleased we have with us such a distinguished panel of American statesmen to help us begin that conversation.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me join you in welcoming our new members and our colleagues who have returned.

Also, let me congratulate and commend you, Mr. Chairman, on your leadership role. I think the committee is in very strong and very capable hands, and I look forward to working with you.

To underscore your comment about the nature of this committee, its bipartisan, thoughtful approach to problems which we will continue, I'm sure, under your leadership. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. Both of you have been leading American practitioners of diplomacy and strategic thinkers for several decades. We thank you for your service to your country and for your agreeing to be here today.

Let me again commend Chairman McCain for calling this hearing, as a series of hearings to look at the challenges he outlined so articulately that face the United States today, and how we may respond to those challenges.

This hearing and those that follow will provide us an opportunity to hear from leading experts, retired military commanders, and key leaders in our country about the National security issues that we face.

I welcome a chance to take this broad perspective and broad view. The number and breadth of these challenges seems unprecedented, from Russia's aggressive and destabilizing actions in Europe; to the breakdown of nation-states in the Middle East and the rise of non-state actors like al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) that threaten the integrity of states throughout the region; to Iran's continued pursuit of a nuclear weapons program and the proliferation risks associated with that; to the growing assertiveness of China, both regionally and globally; and to cyberthreats from North Korea and other malign actors.

General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, we would be interested in hearing your perspectives on each of these challenges and the principles that you believe should guide us in addressing them.

They include, and this is not an exhaustive list, but it is a lengthy list, with regard to the Middle East, first, how would you define the near- and long-term United States interests in the region; second, what do you believe will be required to defeat the threats from violent extremist groups like ISIL, both in terms of United States policy and international collaboration; and third, what role, if any, do you believe nations outside of the Middle East should play in addressing centuries-old divisions in that region, including the Sunni-Shia divide, ethnic rivalries, and political and ideological divisions?

With regard to Iran, there are a variety of ongoing developments. Another round of negotiations just wrapped up over the weekend. A July deadline looms. While it is a few months away, it is approaching quickly. The Senate Banking Committee is working on legislation that it hopes to mark up as early as next week that would impose additional sanctions.

The committee would be interested in your assessment of the likelihood that these negotiations will succeed or fail, and the value of giving this process an opportunity to play out, and your assessment of Iran's regional ambitions and how an Iran would, with or without a nuclear weapon, change the dynamics in that region, and also the broader Sunni-Shia conflict.

In regard to Europe, how should the United States and its allies contend with an aggressive, revanchist Russia, while reassuring our allies and respecting the aspirations of the people of Eastern Europe to draw nearer to our community of nations in Europe?

With regard to China, how should the United States keep the relationship from spiraling into conflict, while still demonstrating to its allies and partners in the region that it will help to counterbalance China's assertiveness?

Finally, regarding the cyber problem, our society appears to be very vulnerable to destructive attacks from even small states like North Korea, who currently have no other means of threatening the Homeland militarily. What are the implications of this vulnerability, not just from there but from many other sources?

Let me, again, commend the chairman and join with him, finally, in underscoring, echoing, and reinforcing his very timely and critical comments about sequestration effects on our military, and the need to couple sequestration with reform of purchasing.

With that, I can think of no more thoughtful gentlemen to ask to come forth than General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. In other words, if you both would take seats and proceed. However you choose to speak first is fine. Who is oldest?

Senator REED. Who went to a real college?

Chairman MCCAIN. Go ahead, Brent.

[Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF BRENT SCOWCROFT, PRESIDENT, THE SCOWCROFT GROUP AND FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

General SCOWCROFT. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to present some of my views on issues that the Chairman and Ranking Member have laid out in a world which is difficult for all of us.

My opening comment I hope can contribute to your deliberations over some very vexing issues and choices that we have. The world we live in is full of problems. Some of them seem to result from new or novel forces and influences, and I intend to focus on them.

Let me begin my comments with just a few words about the Cold War. The Cold War was a dangerous period in our history where problems abounded. A mistake could have resulted in a nuclear war, but the Cold War had one advantage. We knew what the strategy was. We argued mightily over tactics, but we were always able to come back to what is it we were trying to do, and that was to contain the Soviet Union until such time as it changed. That helped enormously in getting us through the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, that cohesion largely disappeared. But shortly thereafter, we were subjected to globalization, the blending of many worldwide trends of technology, trade, other kinds of things, and with it, an undermining of the Westphalia structure of most of the world's nation-state systems.

The Westphalian system was created in the 17th century after the 30 Years' War and the devastation it caused. It made the Nation-state the element of political sovereignty in the world. Totally independent, totally on its own, each one, all equal technically.

It was a tough system and for many have claimed it was responsible for World War I and World War II. But it is basically the structure of our Nation-state system today, as modified in the Westphalian system. Because the United States has spent much of its national interest focus softening the harsh independence of the Westphalian system, like the United Nations, like laws that apply to everybody, like bringing us together rather than having these unique cubicles who are law in themselves but do not relate outside.

Now we have something new to confuse the international system, and it is called globalization. Two aspects of it are particularly difficult to manage in this Westphalian world. Globalization says that modern technology, modern science and so on, is pushing the world together. The Westphalian system says nonsense, we are all unique, separate, sovereign.

Two of the globalization efforts are particularly intrusive, if that is the right word. One is communications, and another, in a different way, climate change.

Communications is connecting the world and connecting people to the world like never before in history. For most of history, most of the people of the world didn't participate in the politics of their system, didn't participate in anything except their daily lives. They were just like their parents, they expected their children to be just like them, on and on and on.

Now, they are surrounded by information. They are responding. They are reacting to it. "It is not that kind of a world at all. I am not just chattel for the boss down the street to use any way he wants. I am a human being, and I have unity." This is sweeping throughout the world and altering our system in ways that it is difficult for us to cope with.

One of the ways, of course, is the impact of cyber on our societies, which could be enormous, as deadly as nuclear war, not deadly to the person, but deadly to the society.

Those are the kinds of things that we face now. It focused, most importantly, on the Middle East. I think one of the things we have seen, that if you want to object, like in Egypt, for example, you go out and you parade in the square. That is a difficult thing to do, ordinarily. You have to find people who will go out with you. You have to avoid the police, so on and so forth.

But now, globalization has made it really easy. All you have to do is pick up your cell phone and say, "There will be a rally tomorrow in Tahrir Square at 10 o'clock," and you can get 10 million people.

This is a very, very different world, where the Westphalian system is blocked down. It used to keep out information it didn't want its people to see.

That is basically what we are facing, and we have barely begun to deal with it.

I add climate change to it, because it demonstrates what we cannot do, the Nation-state, alone. No nation-state can deal with climate change. We have to cooperate to make it work. It is just that way.

These are new impacts on our system, and they make governance more difficult, and more so for the United States, because we have been at the forefront in liberalizing the Westphalian system, in making a more just world for all.

To help us in this difficult task, we should look to our alliances, especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). I think NATO, in many ways, is as valuable as it was during the Cold War. In a world where the relationship of the individual to the state is frequently under attack, an alliance of states to whom that personal relationship to the state is sacred is valuable. NATO has many areas where it can deal with these new forces on us in a cooperative way, which negates the independent sovereignty and atomizing the world.

The impact of globalization on communications seems most dramatic in the Middle East where the impact of the Arab Spring was very heavy and still very much being felt. It has brought Sunni and Shia differences to acrimony and even combat.

The ISIL issue in Syria and Iraq is an excellent example of the devastation that communication can create in the Nation-state system. It is attempting to transform political state systems into a caliphate or religious order.

I don't think the Nation-state system is under gross attack, but this is a new and very different development, which could be dangerous or painful for all of us.

Also in the Middle East, however, besides chaos, are some situations where it is conceivable that real progress toward peace and stability might be made. One of these areas is Iran.

The Iranian nuclear issue is excruciatingly complicated. But resolution, I don't think, is out of the question. A resolution of this difficult issue could open the way to discussions of other issues in the Middle East region, which we used to have with Iran when it was a very different state. It might serve to change some of the Sunni-Shia issues in the region to benefit all of us.

Another enduring issue in the Middle East region has been the Palestinian peace process. Many would say that expecting progress is grasping at straws but a determined effort from the top, including the U.S., might bring surprising results.

Just a word about the nuclear arsenal. As more and more nuclear delivery vehicles reach replacement condition, the discussion about numbers and types required becomes more voluble and more difficult. One way to calculate nuclear needs could be to create a balance, and I am talking particularly between the United States and Russia. That means that nuclear weapons would never be used. That is that our numbers and character of the force is such that no one can reasonably calculate that in a first strike, he would destroy his opponent's systems and escape unscathed. If we look at that, it gives us guidance in numbers and characteristics of the system, which we need.

One other nuclear comment, in order to avoid a world demand for nuclear reactor fuel creating other Iran-like states, I think the U.S. should consider establishing a nuclear fuel bank, where states can check out fuel for reactors, return it after it has been used, and thus avoid what could be almost endless moves toward nuclear power.

Mr. Chairman, I focused remarks on aspects of world development I thought most vexing and unique. I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you very much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, General.

Doctor?

STATEMENT OF DR. ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI, COUNSELOR AND TRUSTEE, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AND FORMER U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, thank you for the invitation to address you. I will be very brief, and I generally agree with what General Scowcroft has just said. We did not consult on our statements.

My hope is that your deliberations will shape a bipartisan national security strategy. Such bipartisanship is badly needed, and I think we all know that, given the complexity and severity of the

challenges that America faces in Europe, in the Middle East, and potentially in the Far East. Together, they pose an ominous threat to global security.

In Europe, Putin is playing with fire, financing and arming a local rebellion, and occasionally even intervening directly by force in order to destabilize Ukraine economically and politically, and thereby destroy its European aspirations. Given that, the current sanctions should, certainly, be maintained until Russia's verbal commitments to respect Ukraine's sovereignty are actually implemented.

In the meantime, NATO and especially the United States should make some defensive weaponry available to Ukraine, something that I have been urging since the onset of the crisis. Not to provide them simply increases Russia's temptation to escalate the intervention.

At the same time, I have also advocated, and do so again today, that we indicate to the Kremlin that the United States realizes that a non-NATO status for a Europe-oriented Ukraine could be part of a constructive East-West accommodation. Finland offers a very good example.

The preservation of peace in Europe also requires enhanced security for the very vulnerable Baltic states. In recent years, and we should really take note of this, Russia has conducted menacing military maneuvers near the borders of these states and also in its isolated Kaliningrad region.

One of these exercises quite recently involved even a simulated nuclear attack on a neighboring European capital. That surely speaks for itself.

Accordingly, the only credible yet peaceful way to reinforce regional stability is to deploy now in the Baltic states some tripwire NATO contingents, including also from the United States.

Such deployments would not be threatening to Russia because of their limited scale. But they would reduce its temptation to recklessly replay the scenario that transpired recently in Crimea. Prompt pre-positioning of United States-NATO military equipment in nearby Poland would also significantly contribute to enhancing regional deterrence.

Turning to the Middle East, again, very briefly, we should try to avoid universalizing the current conflict in Europe into a worldwide collision with Russia. That's an important point. It is both in America's and Russia's interest that the escalating violence in the Middle East does not get out of hand. Containing it is also in China's long-range interest.

Otherwise, regional violence is likely to spread northward into Russia—don't forget that there are some 20 million Muslims living in Russia—and northeastward into Central Asia, eventually even to Xinjiang, to the direct detriment of both Russia and China.

America, Russia, and China should, therefore, jointly consult about how they can best support the more moderate Middle East states in pursuing either a political or a military solution. In different ways, America, Russia, and China should encourage Turkish engagement; Iranian cooperation, which is much needed and could be quite valuable; Saudi restraint, somewhat overdue; Egyptian

participation in seeking, if possible, some form of compromise in Syria; and the elimination of the regional extremists.

The three major powers should bear in mind that there will be no peace in the Middle East if “boots on the ground” come mainly from the outside and especially from the U.S. The era of colonial supremacy in the region is over.

Finally, with the President soon embarking on a trip to India, let me simply express the hope that the United States will not unintentionally intensify concerns in Beijing that the United States is inclined to help arm India as part of a de facto anti-Chinese Asian coalition. That will simply discourage the Chinese from becoming more helpful in coping with the volatile dangers that confront us in Europe and in the Middle East.

To sum up, in my preliminary statement, global stability means discriminating and determined, but not domineering, American engagement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you both. Those were very strong words, and that gives us a lot of food for thought.

I guess to begin with, would you both agree that sequestration, given the events as we see them in the world today, is something that we need to repeal?

Would you agree, General Scowcroft?

General SCOWCROFT. Absolutely, I would. It is a terrible way to determine force structure, strategy, anything like it. It is undermining our ability to do what we need to do to retain, as Zbig says, alert for the contingencies of the world. Yes, I am very much opposed to sequestration.

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree with Brent.

Chairman MCCAIN. It seems to me that if we are going to develop a national security strategy, given the myriad complexities of the challenges we face, as both of you pointed out, it seems to me that we have to have—

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Cyberattack. [Laughter.]

Chairman MCCAIN. That we need to set some priorities. Would you give us your view, both of you, of what our priorities should be?

General?

General SCOWCROFT. In foreign policy, I presume?

Chairman MCCAIN. In order to develop a national security strategy.

General SCOWCROFT. I believe we need, first of all, to pay attention to our nuclear structure and nuclear relations with Russia, because we do not want, above all, a nuclear war to erupt.

I think we also need to look carefully at how the world is changing and what we can do to assist that change, to produce a better, not a worse world.

One of the big challenges in this world is cyber. I am not intellectually capable of dealing with the cyber issue, but it is a worldwide issue and, as I say, could be as dangerous as nuclear weapons, and there is no control anywhere about it.

I think I agree with Zbig that the United States has areas where it can work with both the Chinese and the Russians, and sometimes both of them. I think we should not neglect those.

The Chinese especially didn't participate in the Westphalian world I was talking about. Their system is very different. There is China and there is anybody else. We need to learn, with the Chinese, how to communicate to them so that we have the desired effect.

I think Russia is a very difficult case right now, but I think the Cold War is not returning, and we should not aid and abet its return.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Brzezinski, on the issue of Russia, there are some that believe that because of the price of oil and its effect on the Russian economy, it'll lead Putin to be more conducive to lessening some of his aggressive and confrontational behaviors, such as you described, not only in Ukraine but with the Baltics and Moldova, et cetera. There are others that say because of this, it will make him more confrontational in order to maintain his standing, not only with the Russian people, but in the world.

I wonder what your assessment is, and I know it is a very difficult question.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, but could I comment very briefly on the previous one?

Chairman MCCAIN. Yes, anything, Doctor.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. First of all, about the nuclear confrontation, obviously, we confront each other, and we have had some crises in the past. I think we have learned a great deal from them, and I hope the Russians have, as well.

But what is somewhat alarming is the fact that in recent times, during this current crisis, which is a limited, ground-based crisis, Putin has invoked the threat of nuclear weapons. People haven't paid much attention to it, but he has publicly commented on the fact that we have the nuclear weapons, we have the capability, and so forth. He has then matched that with highly provocative air overflights over Scandinavia, over parts of Western Europe, even all the way to Portugal.

I am a little concerned—when I say “little,” I am underestimating my concern—that there may be a dangerous streak in his character that could push us to some possibly very dangerous confrontations. In that respect, he reminds me a little bit of Khrushchev. We all recall where that led, at one point.

This is why it is terribly important that he have no misunderstandings as to the nature of our commitment and our determination. This is why doing something on the ground that deters him, first, from trying to leapfrog on the ground with a military solution, is needed, and I alluded to that in my opening comments.

Insofar as China is concerned, I think probably the Chinese have some genuine interest from the standpoint of the enhancement of their international power in the acquisition of cyber-capabilities of a confrontational type.

I don't want to overexaggerate this, and I am searching for words that don't create some impression of an imminent danger, but part of their military strategic history is the notion that you don't pre-

pare to fight your opponent at that given stage of weaponry. You leapfrog and then you engage in some offensive activity.

I am concerned that the Chinese may feel that they cannot surpass us in the nuclear area, and note at their very significant nuclear restraint, in terms of nuclear deployments. They have hardly any nuclear weapons, really, targeted at us. We have many times over nuclear weapons targeted on China. But the cyber issue may pose, at least at this stage only theoretically but at some point really, the possibility of paralyzing an opponent entirely without killing anybody.

That could be a very tempting solution for a nation that is increasingly significant economically, but does realize that there is an enormous military disparity between China and us. That, I think, suggests we have to be far more inclined to raise those issues with the Chinese, which we have done to some extent, but even more important, to engage in deterrence by having a capability to respond effectively or to prevent an attempt from being successful.

Now, on the point you've just raised, which was about Putin and how to contain him, right?

Chairman MCCAIN. Basically, yes. His reaction to this economic crisis that he is confronting.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. He is confronting a very serious economic crisis, which he is trying to deny. I think he is in a denial phase. But it is quite interesting how many of his former immediate associates, political allies, express growing concern.

Now here the real question is not only how severe is the crisis in Russia, but the real question internationally is, will the Russian economy implode in some significant, geopolitically significant fashion first, or will Ukraine implode in some significant geopolitical fashion first? Because a great deal of what Putin is doing is not part of a comprehensive military invasion of Ukraine, other than the specific seizure of Crimea, but it is to sow discord, disorganization, economic tensions and costs, and the demoralization, as a consequence, in a regime which is expressing the will of the Ukrainian people for a closer association with the West, but as a regime that came to power after 20 years of very significant mismanagement of the Ukrainian economy.

The kind of needle-sticking in which Putin is engaging against Ukraine produces not only blood in some relatively moderate fashion, both annoying and painful, but could produce a much more serious economic crisis in Ukraine itself.

This is why I think we have to, in a sense, more credibly convince Putin that it is in his interest not to engage in this needle-sticking, because we can make it unpleasant for him by, for example, arming the Ukrainians, while at the same time reassuring him that we are not trying to engage the Ukrainians in membership in NATO. The arrangement we worked out together with others, and the others were more important than us, with Finland in 1945–1946 has worked pretty well.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Senator Reed?

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen, not only for your testimony but for your extraordinary service to the country.

About 2 years ago in 2013, I believe you coauthored an open letter about the Iranian negotiations, suggesting it was time now to support these negotiations, and specifically saying additional sanctions now against Iran with the view to extracting even more concessions in the negotiation will risk undermining or even shutting down the negotiations.

Let me ask General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, is that still your position? If Congress adopted sanctions, do you feel that would undermine negotiations and perhaps miss an opportunity not only in the nuclear realm but in the other areas of concern?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, Senator, it is. I think that the system, the regime in Iran, is different. We don't know how different, and we don't know what the results will be. But their behavior is quite different from when Ahmadinejad was the head of the government.

It seems to me that we ought to try to take advantage of that. The foreign minister has served in the United Nations (U.N.), in NATO. He is familiar with the West. They are talking different, and the mullahs are not nearly as vociferous as they were before.

Does that mean anything? We don't know, but it seems to me it is worth testing.

I think two things are likely to happen if we increase the sanctions. They will break the talks, and a lot of the people who have now joined us in the sanctions would be in danger of leaving, because most of the people who joined us in sanctions on Iran didn't do it to destroy Iran. They did it to help get a nuclear solution.

Senator REED. Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Basically, I have a similar perspective. I would only add to what Brent said, so as not to repeat, that in addition to what he said, I think the breaking off of the negotiations or the collapse of the negotiations would arrest and reverse the painful and difficult process of increasing moderation within Iranian political life.

We are dealing with an old generation of revolutionaries, extremists, and so forth. But there is in Iranian society a significant change, which every visitor to Iran now notices, toward a more moderate attitude and more moderate lifestyle and a more tempting inclination to emulate some Western standards, including how in Tehran women are dressed.

All of that I think indicates that Iran is beginning to evolve into what it traditionally has been, a very civilized and important historical country. But we have to be very careful not to have this dramatically and suddenly reversed, not to mention the negative consequences for global stability that this would have, and the reduction in any willingness, Iranian willingness, in some fashion to prevent the extremists and fanatics that are attempting to seize control over the Muslim world from prevailing.

Senator REED. Thank you. Dr. Brzezinski, turning very quickly, because my time is expiring, last September, you were asked to comment about the situation in Syria, and you indicated that an American role is definitely required, but that role essentially has to be very carefully limited. Is that your view today, or do you have any other comments?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. That is still my view. It probably goes even further.

I never quite understood why we had to help or at least endorse the overthrow of Assad. I am not really sure we knew what we were doing when we made the statement, because there wasn't any real action following on that.

What has happened, however, in the last 2 years or so since that happened is a demonstration of the fact that, whether we like it or not, Assad does have some significant support in Syrian society, probably more than any one of the several groups that are opposing him. That has to be taken into account.

I don't think that those who oppose him, perhaps with the exception of the relatively small and weakest group among the resisters, who favor us—he has a better standing than any one of them. Combined, maybe there is some division in the country across the board, but he is still there.

I think if we want to, in some fashion, promote the end of the horrible bloodletting and the progressive destruction of that country, not the promotion of democracy, I think we have to take that reality into account.

Senator REED. General Scowcroft, quickly, your comments, if at all, on this topic?

General SCOWCROFT. I pretty much agree with Zbig on Syria. I wouldn't rule out that at some point we can get some support for resolving the most difficult situation from the Russians. They have a big stake in Syria, and it seems to me that somewhere there is the possibility that we could have a ceasefire and Assad maybe steps aside, and we would agree that Russia would play an important role with us in resolving that.

Among terrible choices, it is one we ought to examine. The Russians have made a few comments in the last few days that they might be interested.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. May I just add one more point? I think the existing borders in the Middle East have run out of life. They were never authentically historic. They were created largely by West colonial powers.

I think part of the complication we face, particularly in view of this intense violence, not only just in Syria, is the problem of stabilizing a region that has different, so to speak, different preconditions for different borders or arrangements than the ones that were imposed right after World War I by the West.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Sessions?

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this hearing. I look forward to serving with you on the committee. There is no one in the Senate, almost no one in America, who has traveled and has the depth of experience as Senator McCain. It is an honor to serve with him and hear his ideas on so many important issues of today's life.

While reading Dr. Kissinger's book, "World Order", General Scowcroft, he talks about the Westphalian system. Your remarks touched me a bit.

You mentioned China not being part of that history. At least the people of the Middle East were also not part of any understanding of what went on with the Peace of Westphalia.

Do we have a miscommunication, and I'll ask both of you, in the sense of our understanding of the Nation-state and the reality of the Nation-state in that area, and a better understanding might make us more effective in responding to the challenges we face there?

General SCOWCROFT. I think that is possible, but I think the Middle East is a unique place.

For centuries, it belonged to the Ottoman Empire, which loosely governed it. Then with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the Middle East was redrawn. The map was redrawn. The Sykes-Picot Agreement quite arbitrarily, to pursue the interests that the British and the French had in it, as Zbig said, those borders are in danger. They are tenuous. They don't represent much of anything.

It is a very difficult region now, and unique in it is not participating, basically, in the European or Western system, the Russian system, or the Chinese.

Senator SESSIONS. Do you think, as Dr. Brzezinski has indicated, that we may be moving toward redrawing some of those boundaries or boundaries being altered in the next decade?

Either one of you, if you would like to comment on that.

General SCOWCROFT. I don't think we ought to engage in that. One of the things I think we should do, though, is to start mending our relationships with Egypt.

Egypt is a big player in the region, and because of its domestic problems, it has fallen off. They played a small role in the recent uprising, but I think we need help. Hopefully, we can get more from Turkey, but I think the chances of our making it worse rather than better are worrisome.

Senator SESSIONS. I thank both of you for your insights. It is very valuable to us.

With regard to strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, I believe it was mentioned earlier that we had a Cold War strategy. Everybody bought into it in a bipartisan way. The reality is I think it is much harder for us to have a strategy in this more complex world. Maybe not, but it seems to me that it is.

I would share your concern, as I have been here now 18 years, that we need to be a bit more humble in what we can accomplish. The world is complex. People are not able to move from one century to the next overnight. We need to be more responsible and thoughtful about how we exercise American power.

In developing a strategy, Dr. Brzezinski, do you see some things we might all agree on in the next decade or so that would be positive for the United States?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I can, certainly, think of a lot of things we should agree on. I am not sure we will agree. But in order to agree, we have to talk to each other.

I am not quite sure that in recent years, particularly in the face of the novelty of the challenges we face, that there has been enough of a bipartisan dialogue about these critical issues at the highest level, including obviously you, members of this very distinguished committee, irrespective of who actually controls the executive office.

I think we have to ask ourselves, how is the world different today? I am a little more skeptical of the Westphalian system as, so to speak, being in any way relevant, because the Westphalian system emerged in Europe when they were already being different countries with some territorial definitions. This is not the case in many parts of the world. China was unique in having a real advanced state, so to speak, earlier than Europe.

But the rest of the world is now coming into being, politically into being. That contributes to much of the instability and uncertainty of what is happening.

What are the real borders in the Middle East? A lot of the countries in the Middle East speak the same language, for example. Why should they be here or there? Or should they have a single state if they all speak the same language? Or should religion be the only determinant for a nation-state?

I am afraid this process will take a long time before it settles itself. I think we should not be directly involved in imposing a solution.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you both. I appreciate that.

I would say, with regard to Members of Congress, particularly members of the Senate, I believe we talk together more collegially and with more common understanding about international relations and defense issues than we do about most any other subject. I think we have not the kind of intensity of disagreement as some, some pretty big intensity going back, I guess, to the Iraq war and so forth. But I think we are getting past that. Hopefully, we can be more effective in working as a united country, because that is the essential.

Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Heinrich?

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, welcome. I read last year a piece by Thomas Friedman that I found was very interesting, where he described the Islamic State and the situation in the Middle East today by saying that there were really three civil wars raging in the Arab world today. One, the civil war within Sunni Islam between the radical jihadists and the moderate or mainstream Sunni Muslims and regimes; two, the civil war across the region between Sunnis funded by Saudi Arabia and Shiites funded by Iran; and, three, the civil war between Sunni jihadists all other minorities in the region, the Yazidis, the Turkmen, the Kurds, the Christians, the Jews, and the Alawites.

He wrote that when you have a region beset by that many civil wars at once, it means that there is no center, only sides. When you intervene in a middle of a region where there is no center, you very quickly become a side.

I am curious if either of you would agree with that assessment, and if you would also return to what you spoke about a little earlier regarding how important it is that the fighting on the frontlines against the Islamic State be conducted by Iraqis and other regional partners and members of the coalition, as opposed to Western or United States troops.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I agree basically with it. I think there are, fortunately, several states in the Middle East that do show signs of a capacity for conducting a responsible role. We have to rely on them.

I doubt they are going to prevail very quickly. These are the countries that were mentioned. But I don't think we have any other choice. I think getting involved in the internal dynamics, religious conflicts, sectarian animosities of the region is a prescription for a protracted engagement of the kind that can be very destructive to our National interests.

Now to be sure, there are some circumstances in which we have to act. When we were attacked on 9/11, we had to respond.

But I remember being called in with, I think, Brent and Henry Kissinger, to the session that made the basic decision. We were, of course, not participants in making the decision, but we would say something. I fully endorsed taking military actions against Osama and his associates, al Qaeda.

But I walked up to the Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald Rumsfeld, and said, look, let's go in. Let's knock them out, do what we can to destroy the Taliban, which held government control in the country, and then leave. Don't get engaged in development of democracy.

Now maybe I was wrong. Maybe time will demonstrate that I was wrong. But, certainly, I don't think anybody anticipated it would be 10 years, and it might be still another 10 years. Certainly, in the rest of the Middle East, if we were to try that, it would be far, far longer.

I think we have to face the fact that the region will probably be in some serious turmoil for a long time to come, and our bets ought to be on those countries, which, like the European countries in the era of formation, have already acquired some cohesion as states, and I mentioned them in my comments, but not try to do the heavy lifting ourselves.

If we could get the Russians and Chinese to be more cooperative, and they have a stake in being more cooperative, we would be better off, and each of them, in fact, be tempted to sit on the sidelines and think, well, the Americans will get more engaged, and this will improve our interests in competing with us here or there.

I don't think that is a smart solution in the long run for them. But it takes someone like us to indicate to them that we would like to collaborate with them in some limited steps in helping the moderates in the Middle East in different ways, because they have different aspirations.

Senator HEINRICH. Mr. Scowcroft, do you want to add to that?

General SCOWCROFT. I largely agree with Zbig on that.

I think we have to be a participant in the Middle East, but we should not want to be an owner. We ought to help those states that we think are trying to produce, if you will, a modern system.

That is why I mentioned Egypt, because Egypt is a serious power, and they are of the region, and they do have great capability. We don't have much of a discussion going on with them now, but there is a new government. I think that is one we should look to.

Turkey is an ally of ours. The Turks are in a very difficult position now with Syria.

But it seems to me that we ought to be careful and use force where it accomplishes specific ends. For example, try to go in and end the Syrian war, I don't think we want to own Syria. It is a very complicated country, as are some of the others in the Middle East.

I agree with Zbig, basically. We have to be in the Middle East but not of the Middle East.

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, both.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte?

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank both of you for being here, and thank you so much for everything you've done for the country.

I wanted to follow up on your comments, Dr. Brzezinski—I found them very interesting—about Putin and that, in fact, you are concerned about some of the statements that have been overlooked that he has made that have referenced nuclear weapons, including some of the overflights that Russia has undertaken in Scandinavia, west Portugal, and other areas.

I wanted to follow up in light of the potential and I think actual violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that we have seen, that I know, General Scowcroft, you have written about as well.

In fact, General, you wrote in an op-ed in August of 2014 that this should be a real concern to NATO because they have embarked on an across-the-board modernization of their nuclear forces. Of course, if Russia has developed a nuclear ground-launched cruise missile, in violation of the 1987 INF treaty, obviously that type of system could virtually reach all of NATO Europe.

How do you view, both of you, the idea of the violation of this treaty, in light of where we are right now and some of the statements you have heard Putin make? What should our concern be about that?

I appreciated your comments, Dr. Brzezinski, that we have to show commitment and determination to Putin, and that will hopefully help him stop being so escalatory with what he is doing with Ukraine, and also this treaty.

I would like to get both of your thoughts on this violation, what it means for their nuclear programs, our interactions with them.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't think he will go all the way in violating the nuclear treaty. I am more concerned about his misinterpreting what has happened recently.

Let's go back a little more than a year. I wonder how many people in this room or on this very important senatorial committee really anticipated that one day Putin would land military personnel in Crimea and seize it. I think if anybody said that is what he was going to do, he or she would be labeled as a warmonger.

He did it, and he got away with it. I think he is also drawing lessons from that.

I will tell you what my nightmare is. One day, and I literally mean one day, he just seizes Riga and Tallinn, Latvia and Estonia. It would literally take him 1 day. There is no way they could resist.

Then we will say how horrible, how shocking, how outrageous. But, of course, we can't do anything about it. It has happened. We are not going to assemble a fleet in the Baltics and then engage in amphibious landings and then storm ashore like in Normandy to take it back. We will have to respond in some larger fashion,

perhaps. But then there will be voices, "Well, this will plunge us into nuclear war."

I think deterrence has to have meaning. It has to have teeth in it. It has to create a situation in which someone planning an action like that has no choice but to anticipate, "What kind of resistance will I encounter?"

This is why I recommend what I do recommend, pre-positioning of some forces, limited forces, so it is not provocative.

An American company in Estonia is not going to invade Russia, and Putin will know that. But he will know that if he invades Estonia, he will encounter some American forces on the ground and, better still, some Germans, some French, some Brits, of course.

I think if we do that kind of stuff, we are consolidating stability, including nuclear. The same goes for the ongoing conflict in Russia and Ukraine.

I don't think Putin plans to invade Ukraine as a whole, because that would be too dangerous. You cannot simply predict what would happen.

But this continuous pinpricking can involve some escalation. It has already involved escalation. There are Russians, at least in the hundreds, according to some NATO accounts, in terms of several thousand, fighting in Ukraine against an established country. This is something that cannot be ignored.

Economic sanctions, yes. In the long run, they create an attitude, a concern in Russian society, which will deprive Putin of his popular support, and this ecstatic sense that we have become a superpower again. But in the short run, we have to deal also with his motivations.

The only way to do that is to indicate to him by tangible steps, such as defensive arming of the Ukrainians, that we will be involved in some fashion in making that military engagement more costly. At the same time, to indicate to him we are prepared to settle, send him a signal about non-NATO participation for Ukraine.

That to me is a strategy of responding to the possibility that you very rightly raise.

Senator AYOTTE. Without taking those steps, obviously, as I hear you saying you believe the economic sanctions alone will not deter him.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I am afraid that economic sanctions alone will damage, in the meantime, because of what he has a free hand in doing, Ukraine then Russia.

There is a kind of implicit race of which economy will collapse first. The Ukrainian Government is still not in full control of its entire society. It is putting together rapidly a makeshift army, and it is getting very little support in that regard from the outside.

I am not suggesting that the Ukrainians be armed to wage an offensive war against the Russians, but I do urge that we do something to make Putin ask himself, before he escalates, "Am I going to be in something much bigger? And what will that do to me?" That is all that is involved, but it is essential.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin?

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this hearing you are having for all of us, and the information.

I am so sorry that you see some of us running back and forth. We have a Veterans Affairs Committee meeting, and they overlap sometimes. I'm very sorry. I hope I don't ask the same questions that have been asked.

My main concern is that I am trying to learn as much as humanly possible about Syria, Iran, the whole sanctions on Iran. As you know, we are kind of in a tug-of-war right. Should we, should we not? The President has been very emphatic that, absolutely no sanctions, don't sign it now. You will mess up the deal if we do.

I understand that my colleagues are concerned about all the time that has gone by, and we really haven't had a secure briefing telling us where they are. Have they succeeded? Are they moving forward? Are they taking their centrifuges out? Should we keep the pressure on? Should this be something the President should be able to use that if they don't follow through and do what they are supposed to do, this is where the sense of the Senate and United States Congress is, and they will follow through, so it's best to work with me?

These are all things that I haven't made up my mind on yet, and I'm trying to. A little bit of help there.

Also, Syria, I know we have an awful lot of people who feel strongly. I believe that America has to be strong. I don't think they can succeed unless they have what seems like our direct leadership in kind of prodding them. Also, our airstrikes can't be as effective as they could be if we don't have ground intelligence and support.

I understand all of that. I just don't believe we should have massive forces on the ground as we have had in the past. That is my belief. I know some of my colleagues differ with that.

I think, strategically, with our Special Forces, black ops, we can do certain things. But unless they want to take the ground war in that part of the world, it is never going to be cured.

But make no mistake, if they make to fool with America, we should hit and hit hard.

With all that being said, do you believe that with Syria trying to train and arm some of the Syrians at \$500 million is what we have set aside for that, does that have the possibility of being successful? Could we do something different with that to be more successful?

What about the Kurds? They seem to be the only people who want to fight in that part of the world, that want to defend, and want a country, and want identity. Are we doing enough there? Could we do more? How in the world do you get the Turks to participate and the Saudi's to participate? That's a big thing.

But Syria and Iran are the two things that would be very helpful to me. Whoever wants to start, I think I need both of your opinions, if possible.

General SCOWCROFT. On Iran, I don't think anybody knows whether or not negotiations will work, but we are in the course of negotiations now. I think we should see them out and not take steps, which would destroy the negotiations.

Senator MANCHIN. In all due respect, we were told the first time that if we would sign a letter showing that we intended that these sanctions take place, it would weaken the President's hand. We went ahead and signed it anyway, and it hasn't weakened the

hand, but there have been extensions that we really don't know where we stand as far as the negotiations.

That is the hard thing I am having a problem with.

General SCOWCROFT. It is hard, but I think the outlines are sufficiently clear now—very complicated, but clear—that I think we are in the home stretch. To change our strategy now might work, but I wouldn't do it at this stage.

Senator MANCHIN. I understand.

General SCOWCROFT. I would wait and see if the administration is successful.

Senator MANCHIN. Dr. Brzezinski, your thoughts on Syria, our training and the commitment that we have there and if it might be a better investment somewhere else, in a different direction.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I am not sure whom we would train, because, in fact, the groups hostile to Assad are much stronger than those who seem to be inclined to rely on us. After what has happened over the last couple years, I think there are not terribly many Syrians who want us to wage a more intense war, because they don't know what that war would be. The other groupings have an advantage over us of either being more sectarian and specifically identified as such, or identified with specific regional goals that have some historic connection to the world as the Syrians perceive it.

I think some sort of ceasefire and discussions about the future would be the better outcome for us than an intensification of the war.

As far as Iran is concerned, don't forget that we are not the only negotiator with Iran, and all of the parties negotiating, including our closest allies, as well as the Russians and Chinese, favor a continuation of the negotiations for reasons specific to their own interests.

If the negotiations broke down, the whole process would collapse, and then what would be the alternative? Should we then attack and bomb them and thereby make the war in the Middle East even more explosive? We have to ask ourselves, why should we do this?

"Cui bono" is a very good, simple, practical question to ask. I don't see any benefit to the United States in that transpiring.

We have made some progress. Whether we have made enough progress, I don't know. Whether the negotiations have been perfectly conducted or not, I don't really know either, because I haven't been there. But I do have a feeling that there has developed a common stake with key countries in the world, which we shouldn't unilaterally abandon just because we are being pressured to do so.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you both so much. I appreciate it.

Chairman MCCAIN. I am sure you noted yesterday the signing of an agreement between Iran and Russia, a military cooperation deal, to confront United States interference in regional and international affairs.

Senator TILLIS?

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is more broad in nature. With the changing of the administration, there were clearly some changes in foreign policy strategy. I am interested in your view over the past 5 or 6 years, more or less, if you were engaged in the strategy formulation, what

things do you suggest that we stop doing? What things do you suggest that we start doing? What should we continue to do?

In other words, an objective assessment, in your view, of things that are working and things that need improvement in the Middle East.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In the Middle East? Wow.

For one thing, I think we have to continue doing what we have perhaps started doing, which is encouraging those states in the Middle East that have some historical identity and some capability to act, rather than to wait for us to do the job overall. I think the countries that we have mentioned, in varying degrees, are tempted to have something done, but would prefer us to carry the heavy water and are not very clear about their aspirations.

That leaves us in a very difficult position, because if we undertake to do what is necessary, we buy the whole shebang. We buy the whole conflict, and it becomes our baby. If we sit back, obviously, it may deteriorate. We have to find some formula in between.

I happen to be an admirer of Secretary Kerry. I think he has been trying really very energetically to find some viable compromise. It is difficult as hell to achieve it in these conditions.

Perhaps this very painful process that we are now witnessing in that region will continue for some time to come. But the better part of wisdom in these circumstances, in my judgment, is the one that Brent and I have been both advocating, which is a policy of very selective engagement, which prevents the other side, particularly the killers, the sadists, the fanatics, the extreme sectarians, from winning.

I think we can do that. But we don't have to do much more than that to maintain that.

Senator TILLIS. Can you give examples of what selective engagement would look like, in your view?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Somewhat along the lines of what is currently being practiced, in fact, which is airstrikes, probably some Special Forces, intelligence, political assistance, financial assistance, and a willingness, perhaps, to change our position on some issues, such as, to me, the still unclear motives for trying to get rid of Assad.

I don't quite understand why we are so eager to get him out of office. Is he that much worse than some other regimes in the area? What is it? Was he our enemy? Was he conspiring against us?

There were specific regional reasons why the war started, by countries in the region. I don't think that was our cup of tea, and we sort of got involved in it, and now have the whole problem.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Dr. Brzezinski.

Mr. Scowcroft, you made the comment that we need to be in the Middle East, but not of the Middle East. Can you give me an example of what that means in terms of policy execution?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think it means we should guide, help, assist, but not be a player in ourselves, that is, ground troops. I think what we are doing in Syria, it's okay. It was an emergency. I think that we should not carry the burden on that, much less being of the region, ground troops.

We don't know what the best outcome for Syria is. It is very complicated. We need to help our friends. We need to encourage others to be more helpful.

The Turks, for example, have a heavy interest in the Kurds, not necessarily the kind of interest that the Kurds want them to have.

We need to be careful all the way through, but help those who want to do what we think would improve the situation without it belonging to us.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Blumenthal?

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join in thanking you for holding this hearing to provide some intellectual and conceptual context to the very challenging work we are going to have ahead of us in these next 2 years.

I want to thank both of our witnesses not only for being here today but for your longstanding service to our Nation in uniform and as National Security Advisor. Each of you has contributed enormously to the readiness and the preparedness and the performance of our Armed Forces in protecting our National security.

I want to focus on an area you mentioned in your opening statement, Mr. Scowcroft, cyber, a new, emerging form of warfare, perhaps very difficult to imagine in the days that each of you served as National Security Advisor, illustrating how the nature of warfare is changing.

Perhaps I could ask each of you how you think we need to be better prepared not only in the mechanics of cyber-intelligence and cyber-warfare but also in the education of our country as to the importance of this very complex area, which is also probably going to be of increasing importance.

General SCOWCROFT. I think that cyber is of increasing importance. I believe we are just touching the surface and that we could profit by some innovative thinking about how we can approach that problem and how we can get other countries, like the Chinese, for example, involved in ways that are helpful.

We may have to try several different things, but the potential danger of cyber, not just to us, but to those who are practicing it now, should enable us to have some serious discussions with other countries. But we also need a serious discussion within the United States, too, because the government and some of our industries are not cooperating in the way, at least to my understanding, are not cooperating in the way which could really move the ball forward.

This is a ball that looks different to different people.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Do you think our response, for example, to the Sony attack should be more robust and vigorous? Let me pose that question to both of you.

General SCOWCROFT. I think you need to know more about it before you answer the question, because it depends who really pushed the attack, and what kind of reaction is best to move the ball forward and to give us a better grip on how we can deal with this difficult situation.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Dr. Brzezinski, do you have any observations?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't have an answer. I have a comment.

This is a hypersensitive issue, both in terms of what it involves and the need for secrecy in dealing with it. Basically, we have to seek two objectives.

One is to develop some predictable immunity against some preemptive action by a hostile force. I alluded to that possibility. That will require a major effort and major expenditure, and probably move us into a field that we haven't fully, sufficiently explored.

The second is to have a preemptive capability, a preemptive capability to preempt some action of that sort or matches some action against us tit-for-tat instantly.

I don't want to be too specific about who the enemy might be. I don't think we need to create public hysteria on the subject. But it, certainly, stands to reason that there are some countries in the world that might think that cyber-warfare against the United States is the best way to preempt the whole issue and to change the balance of power.

I think we are still in the very early phases of responding to that, something like the United States was in 1943, 1944 when we started getting really serious about the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I want to thank you. My time has expired.

We barely touched, let alone scratched, the surface. But I would just offer the observation that our private sector probably is less prepared than it should be. Our military, or at least our civilian leadership, has the opportunity to provide more incentives, and maybe more compulsory measures, to ensure that we are better prepared in the private sector against these kinds of attacks, because certain kinds of attacks are as much a threat to national security, whether they are to our financial system, our utilities, even a corporation like Sony—I shouldn't say, "even a corporation like Sony"—which employs and has such an important impact on our society.

Thank you very much for your responses.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Graham?

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both very much.

Some observations and conclusions that you've made seemed a bit—don't reconcile for me, but we will talk about that in a moment.

As to the Iranian situation, do you agree with me that whatever chance there is to get a deal with Iranian nuclear ambitions, we should take? Whatever opportunity we have to get a peaceful resolution of their nuclear ambitions, we should pursue that diplomatically? Just say yes.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

[Laughter.]

General SCOWCROFT. I think, if I understand the question.

Senator GRAHAM. I am not trying to trick you.

I agree with that. But one thing we should never allow to happen is for Iran to get a nuclear weapon.

Do you both agree with that?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. That would open up a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The Sunni Arabs would want a weapon of their own, right?

General SCOWCROFT. That's right.

Senator GRAHAM. Whatever problem we have today would get exponentially worse. How we find a peaceful resolution to the Iranian nuclear ambitions is the primary goal I share with you and everybody else in the world.

Do you agree that the Iranians in the past have been trying to build a bomb not a peaceful nuclear power program? Their past behavior would suggest they have been trying to get a weapons capability.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think there was a phase.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Do you agree with me that Congress may actually make things worse if we pass sanctions, but we should have a say about the final outcome through a 123 nuclear review process under the Atomic Energy Act? Does that make sense?

Let the negotiations go forward without sanctions, but when a deal is reached, would it be okay with both of you if Congress, under the 123 section of the Atomic Energy Act, had a chance to review it to see if it was, in fact, a good deal? Would that be a good outcome?

General SCOWCROFT. I don't know that I am equipped to say that.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. We have in the past approved 24 agreements regarding civilian nuclear programs between the United States and foreign powers. All I am suggesting is, let the administration pursue a deal with the P5-plus-1. If they reach an agreement, bring it to Congress for our review and our approval.

Do you think that makes sense? Would that be a good check and balance?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that depends a little bit also on the other partners in the negotiations. We are not the only ones.

Senator GRAHAM. Congress is not going to let the French or Iranians tell us what to do.

What we are trying to say to you and the administration is that we don't want to disrupt the last best chance to get a deal, but we don't want to be dealt out either. We would like to have a say.

Under the Atomic Energy Act, section 123, in the past, Congress has reviewed deals between the U.S. and foreign powers regarding civilian programs.

Would that be a provocative thing for Congress to do, look at the deal after the fact?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Let me take a stab at this. I think you will do it anyway, won't you?

Senator GRAHAM. The question is, should we do it?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think that depends a little bit on the nature of the relationship with the other powers and how much you are informed. You will make the judgment yourself, if you want to do it.

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough.

Let's get back to Syria. This whole conflict started when people went to the streets in Syria petitioning Assad to have a better life within Syria. Do you agree with that, that's how this all started?

General SCOWCROFT. That is one of the things anyway, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. You just made an observation that most people now are going to say, "I have dignity. I am not going to let the guy down the street tell me how to live. We can now read and see how life could be."

That is a good thing. Do you both agree that the individual in the world being empowered and knowing the difference between a good life and a bad life is, overall, a constructive thing?

General SCOWCROFT. It certainly is for humankind.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you like to live in Assad's Syria? Can you understand why millions of Syrians believe that Assad's Syria is not what they want to pass on to their children? Can you understand why people throughout the world no longer want to live in totalitarian dictatorships for our convenience?

I can understand that. There is a complication here I get.

But the big theme sweeping the world, to me, is that young people have enough living a life that none of us would adopt, for our convenience. I would like to help those young people, and in the process, not blow up the world.

Do you agree with the President that the goal should be to defeat and destroy ISIL, degrade and destroy?

General SCOWCROFT. Destroy what?

Senator GRAHAM. Defeat, degrade, and destroy ISIL, that should be the United States' goal?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I will speak for myself. I think it is important that we do what is necessary from the standpoint of our National interests.

Senator GRAHAM. I agree with that.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If ISIL kills our people, we certainly should act.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with the goal the President has stated that it is in our national interest to degrade and destroy ISIL?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I support that, but it depends on how we do it.

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn't agree with you more.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't want us to be the only protagonists and others to sit back in the region.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think the strategy in place today is working to achieve that goal?

General SCOWCROFT. No.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, so I agree with you, General.

Would you like to comment, Doctor? Is it working?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't know if it is working. I think it is going to take a long time, because we are in a situation where there is a mix of motivations in the region.

Senator GRAHAM. Absolutely. Two good answers.

I just got back from the Mideast. Nobody believes it is working. The best solution, from my point of view, would get an Islamic coalition together. It doesn't have to be all Arab. An Islamic coalition to go in on the ground in Syria and take ISIL down in the name

of Islam, saying, "You do not represent this great religion. We are here to take you on and destroy what you stand for."

Does that make sense? Would that be a good outcome, to have religion, a coalition of the willing within the religion, to go in and take ISIL down?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. If it is spontaneously formulated in the region and not created by us, yes.

Senator GRAHAM. I couldn't agree more.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think if we tried to create it, it wouldn't work.

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, should we support such an effort giving capacity to that will where we have unique capability? I am not advocating 100,000 American troops on the ground in Syria, but I am advocating that the longer this problem goes, the more likely we are going to get hit here. I am advocating that America cannot sit on the sideline and let 300,000 Syrians get slaughtered because it is complicated. I am advocating that we defeat this enemy to mankind, not just to Islam, and that we get the Islamic world engaged, but we provide capacity when they have will, that we provide airpower, that we provide Special Forces, intelligence capability.

Gentlemen, what I will not accept is the status quo, that it is okay to not go after these guys because it is not. At every level in the world, it is not okay.

So my only plea is that you would have an open mind to a ground component where we play a role, not the leading role, before it is too late.

Thank you both for your great service to this country.

Chairman MCCAIN. Would you like to make a response to that tirade?

[Laughter.]

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I wouldn't call it a tirade. I thought it was very sincere and impassioned, but I don't think it deals sufficiently with the complications of the region.

There are different countries in the region. There are some regimes we can work with. There are some that are playing a double game.

Last but not least, there is, unfortunately, unexpectedly, much more support for Assad in Syria than we would have wished or probably anticipated. Otherwise, why is he still there and has not been overthrown?

Chairman MCCAIN. General, would you like to make a comment on the exchange that just took place? I think it is important.

General SCOWCROFT. Syria is a most difficult place. Next to Lebanon, it is probably the most mixed up in terms of physical mix-up of different groups of any area in the Middle East.

I think I understand the concern. I am reluctant, sitting here, to get into executive-legislative struggles, but I think we ought to do what we can without getting ownership again. We have not only the Syrians to worry about. We have to worry about the Turks, too, because the Kurds are very heavily engaged there. They have different notions about their own future.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you support a no-fly zone that Turkey has been asking for, to protect the Free Syrian Army and the popu-

lation from further destruction, a no-fly zone to give people a chance to regroup?

General SCOWCROFT. I would consider that. But I would not use airpower to do it. There are some 20 airfields in Syria. We could bomb the runways of all of them with missiles and keep bombing them, and, in effect, ground their air force. I would have no problem doing that.

Chairman MCCAIN. Doctor?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, I probably would have no problem. But I don't think that solves the larger problem.

Chairman MCCAIN. I thank you. I think it has been a very important exchange.

Senator KING?

Senator KING. Thank you.

Gentlemen, I apologize for coming in and out. I had a meeting with Mr. Carter, who, as you know, has been nominated by the President to be Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Brzezinski, you mentioned something very interesting, which suggested that, given the threat of terrorism to Russia as well as other parts of the world, does this create an opportunity for an alliance with Russia to deal with an issue like ISIL that might be an opening to a more general settlement in Syria, that we have a common interest in dealing with this terrorist threat?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, but I wouldn't use the word "alliance," because that goes too far. I think a regional accommodation, regional cooperation, might be in their interest and our interest, for reasons I've mentioned. They have potentially exposed themselves, and it would make it more difficult for the Russians to simply sit on the sidelines and watch us getting bogged down alone. They own part of the responsibility for the problems in the Middle East, in terms of previous policies. Much of the same applies to China.

Senator KING. I would think the Russians would see this in their own national interest.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. One would have to assume that is the case, because they have a national interest.

Senator KING. A second question, partially a statement, partially a question. I was delighted to hear you, General Scowcroft, talk about the threat of cyber. I feel like we are England before World War II, ignoring a threat that is right in front of us.

What if Sony, instead of a movie production company, had been the New York Stock Exchange or a gas pipeline? I have never seen an issue where we have had more warnings and we're doing less.

I hope you would concur with me that this should be one of Congress' highest priorities, to deal with this cyber-threat and develop our cyber-strategy.

Would you agree with that?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I do agree with that. I think we are still at step one, and I think we need the very serious analysis of what the character of the problem is, what our alternatives to take a more positive role can be, and which one we should select.

Senator KING. I thought one of your interesting suggestions was kind of a reprise of the mutually assured destruction strategy of the 1950s in the cyber area, to create a deterrent, not only a defensive posture, but a deterrent posture.

Could you elaborate on that a bit?

General SCOWCROFT. I used that only to show how serious a threat I think cyber is. It is on the par with nuclear weapons. It doesn't kill people itself, but it can destroy the sinews of a country.

Senator KING. General, I just hope what you said today and that analogy is a headline tomorrow, because we have to deal with this issue.

One other area of concern, Dr. Brzezinski, I'm very interested in developing a strategy beyond ad hoc military intervention to deal with ISIL and the whole issue of jihadists and extremism.

Could you talk about what you would think would be the elements of an anti-extremist strategy beyond just military response?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. Some form of cooperation with the more moderate and more established states in the region in creating viable outcomes that consolidate well-being, permit their political evolution, and so forth. The list has been mentioned. It is Turkey. It could be Iran, under some circumstances. It could be Saudi Arabia, which otherwise might face serious international problems. It, certainly, is Egypt. On a more limited basis, it includes Lebanon and Jordan, with the latter being close to an explosive situation given the number of refugees that have flowed into the country.

There is some potential commonality of interest here, but it should not be focused primarily on American military action as such, though we have the right of self-defense and we have the right to deal with threats that become extensive enough to the possibility of destabilizing the region.

Last but not least, if I may say so, we should be very careful not to proclaim our actions are somehow or other anti-jihadist. You used the term. Because we don't want to convey to that part of the world that we in any way are engaged in a religious war against them.

Jihad means holy war. And so we don't—

Senator KING. Anti-extremist might be a better term.

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, exactly. Something along those lines. Fanatics. In some cases, sadists, like those beheadings. But certainly, avoid saying we are engaged in a struggle against jihadist terror, because that, frankly, attracts some people to engage in what they say is holy war.

Senator KING. That is a very good point. I appreciate that.

I think the other side of that is we have to be very careful in this country to not lump in the Muslim world with these extremists. I think that also is a recruiting poster for them, if we do that. This cannot be a war between the West and Islam.

General SCOWCROFT. That is right.

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Rounds?

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to our country. I apologize for not being here for the entire discussion this morning. We had several different committee hearings going on, as usual, it appears.

I did have one question that I'd like to focus on, and perhaps in a little different vein than I heard in the last 15, 20 minutes, and

that has to do with the National Security Strategy that was last presented in 2010.

My understanding is that normally that would be updated or had been expected to be updated in 2014. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was presented and completed based upon the 2010 strategy that was in place.

I don't understand but I was hoping you might give us your thoughts a little bit about whether or not that strategy that was completed in 2010, whether or not, with all of the changes today, particularly those issues in the Middle East, changes in terms of Russia and what has happened since 2010, whether or not the QDR that we currently operate with and the strategy that was proposed in 2010 that we operate with today, whether or not we are missing something here and does it really matter? Is it time for Congress to take a different approach in terms of looking at the overall strategy when it comes to our National defense?

General SCOWCROFT. That is a very difficult question to answer. I think my answer is both.

Congress is responsible for providing funding for a particular strategy for the military themselves. The President is in charge of the Armed Forces. That is the kind of cooperation that is getting increasingly difficult, but it still is the way we have to proceed. When you do unilaterally the kind of things like sequester, it destroys what is needed, which is consent between Congress, who's responsibility is the Armed Forces, and the President, who runs the Armed Forces.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would only add to this, and maybe this is not what you have in mind, that I think there is a bit of a problem in that the State Department has a policy planning council that presumably plans for diplomacy. The Defense Department has similar agencies in terms of defense capabilities and needs. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has its own view on how the world is changing. I am not aware of any large-scale, systematic effort in the National Security Council to define national objectives and to help the President think it through and eventually endorse it as a kind of overall national security planning mechanism. I think we could use that, and perhaps that would be helpful in clarifying some issues.

Senator ROUNDS. Would you consider that to be new in terms of how we have operated, or is that something that have you both seen. You have both seen the interactions between the administration and Congress over a period of literally decades. Is this new? Is this something that people have looked at and said that is the way it is, or is this something that clearly presents a threat in terms of how we do systematically the planning for the defense of our country that has not been there before?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I think we ought to take a look. I don't know if it is new or not. But I think we ought to take a look at the existing system.

My sense is we don't really have in the White House a service to the President when he makes his decisions, a deliberate effort at creating what might be called a national security plan for 4 years or whatever an administration is in office. The other agencies

do that. I think that creates, perhaps, some of the uncertainties as to what exactly we are doing.

Senator ROUNDS. I just have one more thought on this. It seems to me that, in business, when we talk about those issues that we are concerned about as being important versus on a day-to-day basis, those issues that come up as being urgent and in front of us—we tend sometimes to focus on the urgent as opposed to the critical or important. Would you care to comment?

Right now when we look at the defense of our country, we look at the issues that our military men and women face on a daily basis around the world today, of those items that all appear to be in front of us regularly, those urgent issues, have they clouded our ability to keep in front of us those important issues that we are losing sight of?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I don't know how to answer that.

General SCOWCROFT. I think the answer is probably yes. But it is not an easy thing to do, to bring all the elements of the government together on such a thing as our National military strategy.

We have tried different things. Some worked better than others. But it is also a political exercise as well as a strategic exercise. I don't think we have developed anything that goes beyond bureaucratic to genuine steps forward. But I think we ought to keep trying.

Senator ROUNDS. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to working on this committee and continue working with my colleagues.

I thank both of the witnesses for their presence today.

What is each of your opinion about the need for Congress to expeditiously work on an authorization of military force to cover the war on ISIL, which is now in its sixth month?

General SCOWCROFT. I'm not sure how to answer that. I think we should not be more involved in the ISIL exercise. I believe that this is a case where the region is being threatened, and the powers of the region are being threatened. The states of the region are being threatened. We ought to encourage and help them to respond, but not respond for them.

That is a difficult line, but I think it is an important one, because the Middle East does belong to the Middle East countries. We ought to encourage them to behave responsibly.

Senator KAINE. Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. In different ways, I think we ought to strive, first of all, to engage the other major powers in the world to be involved. It shouldn't be our baby only. I have in mind particularly, and I have said this this morning, Russia and China.

Second, I think we have to minimize the visual involvement in the problem of other powers who could be helpful but whose record in the region is so negative because of their involvement with colonialism that they in fact handicap the effort of dealing effectively with the region.

Third, we have to try to involve, and that's a difficult process, those states in the region that have both viability of sorts and some inclination to be moderate.

Senator Kaine. You each answered my question in the strategic and tactical sense, and I actually meant it in the institutional and constitutional sense.

The President started a unilateral military campaign against ISIL on the 8th of August that is now in its 6th month, justifying that based on the two previous authorizations that were done in 2001 and 2002. The President last night said Congress should do an authorization and weigh in and vote about whether this mission is in fact in the National interest.

Do have you an opinion on whether that is an important matter for Congress to take up?

Dr. Brzezinski. If he asks, and since he's acting as Commander in Chief, I should think that he's entitled to make that request, and probably Congress should consider it, if for no other reason that it helps to consolidate national unity on that delicate but terribly complicated issue.

Senator Kaine. I think, as I understood your last answer, on the tactical side, let me do a follow-up question, there has been much discussion about the role of ground troops as necessary in Iraq or Syria to defeat the threat of ISIL, ground troops broadly defined, regional ground troops, the Peshmerga, the Iraqi Security Forces, Syrian-trained Syrian moderate.

What do each of you think about the wisdom of using United States ground troops in the mission against ISIL in Iraq or Syria?

Dr. Brzezinski. Except in very special individual circumstances where the use of ground forces would be very limited in terms of its mission, I'm basically against what is called boots on the ground, as far as the United States is concerned. I think the political and historical climate is so uncongenial to us doing it, that we will simply become involved in a protracted conflict, which will be extremely costly, and which will be very difficult for us alone to win.

Senator Kaine. The President has announced a plan to withdraw United States forces completely from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. Should the United States actions with respect to its forces in Afghanistan be based on a date on the calendar? Or should it be based on conditions on the ground and whether there is sufficient stability to allow us to withdraw without plunging the country back into a chaos that could affect the region and the world?

Dr. Brzezinski. You can't entirely separate the two, but you have to take into account that at some point a prolonged engagement at the very least begins to create its own emphasis and you begin to be stuck with growing resentment on the part of the people in the region itself. I think some end line is absolutely necessary.

General Scowcroft. I think in the particular case of Afghanistan, an end line right now is not the right way to go. It is my sense that Afghanistan has made considerable progress, that the new leadership shows great promise, and that what their military security forces really need is a sense of a U.S. hand on their shoulder. "We are back here. We will give you some advice. We will help you here. We are not bailing out on all the effort we have put in, in past years."

I believe I don't know how many, but a few thousand forces would pay us back big dividends if Afghanistan moves forward in the direction that it seems to be moving. It is, certainly, worth a few thousand troops to be that hand on their shoulder.

Senator KAINE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Wicker?

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. This has been very helpful.

Let's talk about Russia and NATO. When Russia invaded Georgia, about all we could do was talk about it and denounce it. When Russia took the action they took in Crimea, a treaty ally of ours whose border we had promised to defend if they gave up nuclear weapons, military action was clearly off the table. Presumably, Russian action in Transnistria would not call for military action by the United States.

But, Dr. Brzezinski, you draw a line when it comes to the Baltic states. I'd, certainly, want to agree with you there.

Let me ask you this. Could you explain a little more your idea about working with NATO on tripwires in the Baltic states?

General Scowcroft, what do you think about that idea as you understand it having been described? What can we do to get our NATO allies to take national defense and Western defense responsibilities seriously? We asked them to spend a mere 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on the military and, frankly, it is only two or three of those NATO allies who actually do that.

If you would comment on that, and, Dr. Brzezinski, you can begin.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. First of all, on your last question, I think we should address that in NATO, and perhaps some device, some procedure could be formulated, whereby NATO members that fail to meet that 2 percent standard lose some of their entitlement to participate in key decisions. I don't know precisely how to work that out, but it seems to me, if you don't pay, you don't decide. That at least might make them a little more conscious of the fact that collective obligations should be treated seriously.

Insofar as the guarantee itself of the Baltic countries, what I said earlier I'll simply repeat. I think the Russians really don't know how active we would be in saving them for one reason or another. The leader of the Russian Federation decided that he can get away with a seizing, with a quick action, which altogether alters the situation that he finds so abhorrent, namely the creation of independent states or the re-creation of independent states in the place that the Soviet Union occupied in the late 1930s and early 1940s.

If he were to do that, we would be faced with a horrible situation, because we don't have the means to stage an amphibious warfare that results in the landing of our forces and then gradual ground war, presumably in the territory of the Baltic states under expulsion. The only sensible step we can now take, I think, is to pre-position some tripwire type forces, forcing Putin to consider seriously whether he's prepared to go into major conflict with us.

If he does that, then we have no choice but to respond, not only in the Baltic republics but perhaps elsewhere. For example, impose a worldwide embargo on any movement of Soviet ships or air-

planes, other actions of semimilitary type, which would be a response designed to impose further costs, and including perhaps some occasional military engagements chosen elsewhere, if we couldn't do something directly in the Baltic.

Senator WICKER. If we wouldn't defend our NATO allies in the Baltics, I don't know what our word would be worth.

General Scowcroft, what do you think of this topic?

General SCOWCROFT. First, I think that we don't want to re-create the Cold War, and I don't think it is necessary. I think if we want to do something, tripwires—NATO is the tripwire, to me. I think if we want to tell them what we will do if they do certain things, then they better not, I don't have a problem with that.

But I can see Putin just trying to provoke us to spend more efforts. I'm not sure it is necessary. I believe the contribution of some of the Europeans to NATO is deplorable.

There are two facts. First of all, they don't feel threatened. Secondly, they are basically exhausted after two wars, and they are just happy to leave everything up to us, including paying for it.

There, I think we ought to give it some thought, but my sense is we would get greater European support if we had ideas about how to use NATO usefully now that, to me, a threat of a march of Russian troops into Western Europe is not a reasonable thing to happen.

Senator WICKER. Let me ask you briefly, if the chair will indulge, do you have any comments for this committee about the adequacy of our naval fleet at the present time? The chair in his opening remarks talked about the size of our military being roughly the equivalent to what it was after World War I. Do we have enough ships? Are we building enough ships? Is our fleet adequate to protect national interests?

Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I have not looked into that specifically, so I can't give you a straightforward answer.

General SCOWCROFT. I don't think any one of us has examined that kind of question. I simply don't have an answer to that.

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Donnelly?

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both for being here. ISIL has said that they are establishing a caliphate. Their caliphate that they want to establish is a whole lot bigger than where they are right now. Can we simply watch this? Can they be left in place, if this is their goal, when their goal also, if you don't share their religion, you either convert or you are killed? They intend to expand.

How does the United States watch this when—and I don't want to get into exact historical references, and I don't mean to by this, but we have seen this kind of thing before.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The danger is that if we get involved directly in opposing them, we will make it easier for them to promote the whole concept.

Senator DONNELLY. I don't mean directly. I mean as a partner.

Mr. Scowcroft, you were talking about not getting more involved in ISIL actions. With training an Arab army or advising, providing

that kind of assistance, helping them to plan, helping them to train, do you think those are appropriate actions?

General SCOWCROFT. I have no problem with training as appropriate action. But let's remember that ISIS or ISIL, whatever you want to call it, is in the Middle East. There are a number of our friends and allies who live in the Middle East. Would they be happy to just sit back and have us deal with the problem? Maybe.

But this is a problem that is a potential threat to other Middle Eastern countries.

Senator DONNELLY. Do you see us having a role though as a partner?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes, I think a role in doing the kinds of things that they can't do, and encourage them in the things that they can, we can help them know how to do, yes, absolutely. But that is training.

Senator DONNELLY. Right. I don't think anybody is looking at our troops being the ground troops, but being somebody who can help provide with the backbone, the planning, the training. Does that make sense to you?

General SCOWCROFT. Absolutely.

Senator DONNELLY. Because it strikes me as no matter what we hope, and being from Indiana where we have suffered from them already, we have already lost citizens who have been kidnapped and killed by them. They continue to put plans together to cause other activities.

With their stated goals of further establishment of this and taking activities elsewhere, it would seem to me that we have to be engaged in some form with partners. It seems that the goal, it's not something that is going to stay static. It either grows or gets eliminated.

Would you agree with that?

General SCOWCROFT. Yes.

Senator DONNELLY. Dr. Brzezinski?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I also agree with that.

Senator DONNELLY. Okay. As we look at Putin, what do you think his endgame is in Ukraine?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. My own estimate is to reverse what transpired a year or so ago, namely the decision by the Ukrainian people to associate themselves and their long-range identity with the West. I think he views that as a major intrusion of a historically significant component of the larger Russian empire.

I think he has this general concept of imperial restoration as guiding him. If you look at some of the things he has done to define the presidency, the symbolism associated with it, and so forth, it has a lot of imperial trappings.

He is prepared to use force to make that happen. Our position has been that we have no desire to intrude into Russian security aspirations, but that a nation has a right to define itself voluntarily.

That is a very complicated issue. As a consequence, we now have this very serious problem between us and the Russians regarding the future of Ukraine. He's clearly striving to destabilize Ukraine, not risking an all-out invasion, but to destabilize it from within.

Senator DONNELLY. If he takes similar action in Latvia, his little green men and all those things, going into Latvian territory, and NATO does not respond, is that, in effect, the end of NATO?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. I would say so, because NATO is meant to be a collective alliance. If the United States does not respond, that certainly would be the result.

Now, conceivably, we could let him do it, let him take Latvia or Estonia, and then we would mobilize NATO to counter this somehow, either on the spot or on the larger world front. But that would be a much more risky enterprise than doing what I advocate, which is simply to create a tripwire in Latvia and Estonia, which communicates clearly to Russia that NATO would be involved, that the United States, in particular, is present, and therefore, the risks you are taking are much, much higher than you might calculate in light of the ease of the operation in seizing Crimea.

Senator DONNELLY. General Scowcroft, would you also see that as, that is the end of NATO?

General SCOWCROFT. Certainly, it would be the end of NATO if the Soviet Union moved into a NATO member and we did nothing. Absolutely, it would.

But I don't see that happening. Putin is a nasty piece of work. I probably should not have said that. But I don't think he is evil incarnate. I think if we tell him quite clearly what we won't stand for, in terms of NATO members, especially, there won't be such an action.

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The best way to tell him is to do something to make him think about it.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ernst?

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I appreciate your service very much.

Today, we have talked a lot about ISIL and the Middle East, and the fact that we do need partners in that region. We do need those Arab allies to come forward. You have mentioned it, both of you, as more of an aside comment. But I would really like to understand how can we more effectively engage Turkey, which is an ally, which is a friend in that region. How can we engage them more to combat ISIL and those other threats that exist in the Middle East?

Dr. BRZEZINSKI. The Turks are playing a role. It is partly worrisome, a little, partly very helpful. The Turks have a large minority in their country who are Kurd, so they have multiple concerns about what goes on. They also have very emotional feelings about Syria.

But I think we can help the countries of the Middle East—Turkey is one—with great military capability. As I say, Egypt is another one. Egypt is a large country in any part of the world.

They ought to want to shape their own region in the right direction. We ought to encourage that rather than taking their place in forming the region.

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I do agree. I would love to see more concrete methods of engaging them. They do have a lot at stake in that region, and I think they can be very valuable partners. I just

would love to know how we get them to play a more prominent role in the Middle East.

Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman McCAIN. Could I say that I thank you both, not only for your appearance here, but for your many years of outstanding service to the country, your wise and knowledgeable advice and counsel that you have provided to many Presidents, and you have proven again before this committee.

Obviously, there are some disagreements. In fact, I might make mention that the head of MI5 recently gave a speech, a week ago, saying that he believed that ISIL is planning an attack on the United States of America. I don't disagree with him.

I think that would change the outlook of the American people about the degree of our involvement, if there was such a thing, which we hope will not happen. But when you have thousands of young men going into this fight who will then be returning from the fight, I think it is something that is not beyond the realm of responsibility.

But I would like to say that I am personally very honored to be in the company of two individuals who have served our country and continue to do so with such distinction.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

TUESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Kelly Ayotte presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Ayotte, Sessions, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, King, and Heinrich.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KELLY AYOTTE

Senator AYOTTE. The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today for its second hearing in a series on Global Challenges and U.S. National Security.

Chairman McCain was invited to join the American Delegation to the funeral of the King of Saudi Arabia, and he asked that I chair this hearing in his absence. I know he regrets not being able to join all of us today.

I request unanimous consent that Chairman McCain's opening statement be entered into the record.

Senator REED. Without objection.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Chairman McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today for its second hearing in a series on global challenges and U.S. national security. I am pleased to welcome three of America's most distinguished military leaders. General James Mattis, General Jack Keane, and Admiral William Fallon have each served at the highest ranks of our military. Critically important in the context of this hearing, each of our witnesses served at the nexus of military operations and strategic national security decision-making.

After the struggles we faced in Afghanistan and Iraq, there's been extensive discussion about the role of military power in United States strategy around the world. This is a healthy debate, in which this committee will be fully engaged. But too often, pundits and politicians—including President Obama—have adopted a cheap fatalism summed up in the Administration's constant refrain, "there is no military solution."

Rather than stating the obvious and important point that our military cannot solve every foreign policy problem, this slogan is really an excuse to avoid taking even the most-limited military action that might shape and improve conditions for a political solution, and provide the nation with the flexibility to draw from all instruments of national power effectively to address the problem. While it may be true

there is no military solution, it is just as true there may be a military dimension to a political solution. But as problems fester and go from bad to worse, the Administration then claims its inaction was justified all along given the complexities of the situation. The consequences of this reactive bystander foreign policy are on full display around the world in places like Syria and Ukraine.

I hope, with their background and expertise, our witnesses can offer their perspectives on the most basic element of strategy: matching military means to policy goals. In particular, what is the role of military power in a comprehensive United States strategy for a Middle East characterized by political instability as well as a daunting range of conventional and unconventional threats? And as we look at threats throughout the world, how should American policymakers use military power to address global challenges before they become crises? For example, the longer we wait to provide defensive weapons to Ukraine, the more entrenched the Russians become, and as we've seen in Georgia, the more difficult it will become to dislodge them and restore Ukraine's sovereignty.

The President was determined to turn the page on questions like these in his State of the Union address last week, but we remain stuck in a grim foreign policy chapter of his authorship.

The President recently proclaimed the success of his limited-footprint counterterrorism approach by pointing to Yemen. Yemen is now in chaos, with the government deposed by Iranian-backed militants and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) emboldened to facilitate and execute terrorist attacks around the world.

President Obama has been applying the Yemen model in the fight against ISIL in Iraq and Syria with predictable results. The ISIL flag still flies over major cities in Iraq, such as Mosul and Fallujah. In Syria, ISIL has significantly enlarged its territorial control since United States strikes began last year. And despite the President's stated goal of degrading and destroying ISIL, we have no strategy in place to accomplish it. Basic strategic questions remain unanswered: Is an ISIL-first strategy really feasible when our Syrian partners are at war with Assad, and his regime's brutality feeds their power? Can we successfully defeat ISIL without even small numbers of American ground forces in both Iraq and Syria? Does the President still believe Assad must go, and do we have a strategy to achieve that goal? How will we protect brave Syrians we send back into Syria from Assad's airpower? The fact is that President Obama's delayed and feeble response is not degrading or destroying ISIL, nor is it inspiring confidence among our allies and partners.

Underlying these conflicts is the broader challenge of Iran's malign influence in the Middle East, a problem which the Administration has no strategy to address. Iran is not just an arms control problem. And as negotiations continue over its illegal nuclear program, the Administration is silent about Iran's reckless behavior that destabilizes the region by providing weapons, funding, and training to terrorists and militant groups in places like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Gaza, and Bahrain.

There is not a military-only solution to all the world's challenges. But as we have learned again in Iraq and Syria and hopefully won't relearn in Afghanistan, the American military remains an indispensable element to bringing stability and securing United States interests. Military power should not be used lightly, but it should also not be used anemically or withdrawn precipitously. When we refuse to address global problems at an early stage, or remove troops too quickly, it is the men and women of our armed services who must face an even-more chaotic, challenging and dangerous environment in the future.

I look forward to each of your views on how we can bring a coherent strategy to the complex global environment we now face.

Senator AYOTTE. I am pleased to welcome three of America's most distinguished military leaders: General Jim Mattis, General Jack Keane, and Admiral William Fallon. I welcome each of you today, and I thank you for your willingness to testify before us. Even more so, I thank you, on behalf of this committee and the American people, for your decades of brave and honorable service to our country. It is because of leaders like you and the men and women you've commanded and you continue to serve in uniform that Americans enjoy unprecedented freedom, security, and prosperity. Each of you commanded at all levels and ultimately served in positions that required not only a deep knowledge of tactical, operational, and strategic levels of military operations, but also an understanding of national security decisionmaking at the highest

levels. It is that experience at the nexus of military operations and strategic national security decisionmaking that is particularly relevant to our hearing today.

There is a broad consensus among national security experts that the threats to the United States and our allies that we are confronting, are growing both in complexity and severity:

In Ukraine, we have witnessed blatant Russian aggression that has forced the administration to undertake a belated reassessment of the nature of the Putin regime and question long-held assumptions regarding the security situation in Europe.

In Iraq and Syria, ISIS [the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] has established a safe haven and training ground in the heart of the Middle East that it is using to destabilize the region and threaten the core national security interests of the United States and our allies.

Meanwhile, the regime in Tehran seeks to use negotiations to achieve sanctions relief while avoiding a permanent and verifiable end to its nuclear weapons program.

Simultaneously, Iran continues to oppress its own people, threaten key allies, like Israel, and support terrorist groups, like Hezbollah.

Across the Middle East and into North Africa, emboldened al-Qaeda affiliates plot attacks against the United States and our allies. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula uses the horrible security situation in Yemen, a country the President cited as recently as September as a counterterrorism success story, to plot and carry out terrorist attacks around the world.

In the Asia-Pacific, China is using historic economic growth to build military power that it is using to bully its neighbors and test international laws that are essential to the United States, and our partners' international security and prosperity in the free waters in that region.

While each of these threats and challenges are unique, with each of them there is a consistent and concerning gap between the strategies our National security interests require and the strategies that this administration is pursuing. Likewise, with defense sequestration set to return next year and the threats to our country growing, there is also an increasing gap between the military capabilities we have and the military capabilities that we will need to address these threats.

The key question for this panel and for all of us remains: What is the best path forward to address these national security challenges? Few in our country have as much national security wisdom and real-world experience as the members of this panel. Between the three of you, you have more than 115 years of military experience, much of it at the most senior levels of our military. We look forward to hearing your best advice on how the Federal Government can fulfill its most important responsibility to the American people, and that is protecting the security of the United States of America.

Thank you very much.

And I would like to turn it over to Senator Reed.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Ayotte.

Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses, extraordinary individuals who have served the Nation with great distinction and great courage, never broke faith with the men and women they led, which is the highest tribute that anyone can make to a soldier, sailor, and marine. Thank you very much.

Let me also thank Chairman McCain for pulling together this series of hearings and briefings to examine the U.S. global strategy. These discussions will help us inform our consideration of the administration's budget request, which will be coming to us in a few days.

Last week, two of the most prominent U.S. strategic thinkers, Dr. Brent Scowcroft—General Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Zbig Brzezinski, discussed a number of issues with the committee. Among these was the need to give multilateral negotiation on Iran's nuclear program sufficient time to reach a conclusion. They urged this body not to press forward with additional sanctions even if they are prospective in nature. This matter is being discussed at this very moment in the Banking Committee, only a few floors above us, and, indeed, I have to leave here and go there, because I'm a senior member of that committee also. And my colleagues will be taking up the slack, particularly Senator King. I want to thank him. I will return, I hope, to ask questions of the panelists.

Much of last week's discussion revolved around the administration's strategy in Iraq and Syria for confronting the regional and global terror threat posed by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, or ISIL. General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski stressed that efforts to take on ISIL require a comprehensive approach, which includes both political and military elements.

We also received testimony last week from the Department of Defense on the administration's program to train and equip the vetted opposition in Syria. This is just one aspect of the administration's approach to the ISIL threat in Iraq and Syria which is built upon an international coalition, including regional Arab and Muslim states using economic tools to go after ISIL's financing and a sustained campaign of airstrikes against ISIL leadership and facilities.

This morning's hearing provides an opportunity, in particular, to examine the military respects of our strategy of addressing the ISIL threat. All three of you have been thoughtful and outspoken in your recommendations to that strategy, some of the aspects of which are reflected in the actions the administration has taken to date. As of January, United States and coalition aircraft have flown 16,000 sorties over Iraq and Syria, of which 5,866 have involved kinetic strikes against targets. President Obama has authorized the deployment of over 3,000 military personnel to Iraq to advise and assist Iraq and Kurdish security forces.

At the administration's request, the fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included \$5.6 billion in overseas contingency operations funding for DOD activities in Iraq and Syria, including \$1.6 billion for the Iraq train-and-equip program.

Also in their testimony last week, General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski emphasized the need to work with and through regional

partners in the international community to address the ISIL threat so that the United States does, in their words, end up owning the problem itself. So, I hope that our witnesses can bring their perspectives on this very challenging issue of strategy, as Senator Ayotte said, in both Syria, Iraq, and in the region. And again, I think it's appropriate to focus on not only just the military aspect, but political and diplomatic initiatives, as well as economic initiatives.

I want to, again, thank the witnesses. And I particularly want to thank Admiral Fallon, who made a tremendous effort to rearrange his schedule to join us. Thank you, sir, for your efforts.

And, with that, Madam Chairwoman, thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, Senator Reed.

I would like to start with General Mattis. General Mattis served 42 years in the Marine Corps, including time as Commander of Central Command. We're very glad that you're here today. Thank you so much for being here.

General Mattis.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC (RET.),
FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**

General MATTIS. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Senators of the committee.

I have submitted a statement, and request it be accepted for the record.

Senator AYOTTE. It will be.

General MATTIS. During my Active Duty years, I testified many times before this committee and gained the highest regard for the manner in which you carried out your duties. Through good times and bad, I remain grateful for the support you've provided our military.

I commend the committee for holding these hearings. As former Secretary of State George Schultz has commented, the world is awash in change. The international order, so painstakingly put together by the Greatest Generation coming home from mankind's bloodiest conflict, that international order is under increasing stress. It was created with elements we take for granted today: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods, and more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those World War II veterans who recognized: no nation lived as an island, and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that, for better or worse, impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger world, and we must carry out our part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here, or it will be too late.

The international order, built on the state system, is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the freedoms each of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from our reactive crouch and take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values. While we recognize that we owe future generations the same freedoms that we enjoy, the challenge lies in how to carry out that responsibility.

To do so, America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a key role in crafting a coherent strategy with bipartisan support. Doing so requires us to look beyond the events that are currently consuming the executive branch. There's an urgent need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. Such response often creates unanticipated second-order effects and even more problems for us.

The Senate Armed Services Committee is uniquely placed in our system of government to guide, oversee, and ensure that we act strategically and morally using America's ability to inspire, as well as its ability to intimidate, to ensure freedom for future generations. I suggest the best way to get to the essence of these issues and to help you crafting America's response to a rapidly changing security environment is simply to ask the right questions. If I were in your shoes, these are some of the questions I would ask:

What are the key threats to our vital interests? The intelligence community should delineate and provide an initial prioritization of these threats for your consideration. By rigorously defining the problems we face, you will enable a more intelligent and focused use of the resources allocated for national defense.

Is our intelligence community fit for the—for its expanding purpose? Today, ladies and gentlemen, we have less military shock absorber in our smaller military, so less ability to take surprise in stride and fewer forward-deployed forces overseas to act as sentinels. Accordingly, we need more early warning. Working with the intel community, you should question if we are adequately funding the intel agencies to reduce the chance of our defenses being caught flatfooted. We know that the foreseeable is not foreseeable.

Incorporating the broadest issues into your assessments, you should consider what we must do if the National debt is assessed to be the biggest national security threat we face. As President Eisenhower noted, the foundation of military strength is our economic strength. In a few short years, however, we will be paying interest on our debt, and it will be a bigger bill than what we pay today for defense. Much of that interest money is destined to leave America for overseas. If we refuse to reduce our debt or pay down our deficit, what is the impact on the National security for future generations, who will inherit this irresponsible debt and the taxes to service it? No nation in history has maintained its military power if it failed to keep its fiscal house in order.

How do you urgently halt the damage caused by sequestration? No foe in the field can wreak such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving today. Congress passed it because it was viewed as so injurious that it would force wise choices. It has failed in that regard, and today we use arithmetic, vice sound thinking, to run our government, despite the emerging enemy threats. This committee must lead the effort to repeal sequestration that is costing military readiness and long-term capability while sapping our troops' morale. Without predictability in budget matters, no strategy can be implemented by your military leaders.

In our approach to the world, we must be willing to ask strategic questions. In the Middle East, where our influence is at its lowest point in four decades, we see a region erupting in crisis. We need a new security architecture for the Mideast, built on sound policy,

one that permits us to take our own side in this fight. Crafting such a policy starts with asking a fundamental question, and then the follow-on questions.

The fundamental question, I believe: Is political Islam in our best interest? If not, What is our policy to authoritatively support the countervailing forces? Violent jihadist terrorists cannot be permitted to take refuge behind false religious garb and leave us unwilling to define this threat with the clarity it deserves. We have many potential allies around the world and in the Middle East who will rally to us, but we have not been clear about where we stand in defining or dealing with the growing violent jihadist terrorist threat.

Iran is a special case that must be dealt with as a threat to regional stability, nuclear and otherwise. I believe that you should question the value of Congress adding new sanctions while international negotiations are ongoing, vice having them ready, should the negotiations for preventing their nuclear weapons capability and implementing stringent monitoring break down.

Further question now, if we have the right policies in place, when Iran creates more mischief in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere in the region, recognizing that regional counterweights, like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council can reinforce us if they understand our policy.

In Afghanistan, we need to consider if we're asking for the same outcome there as we saw last summer in Iraq, should we pull out all our troops on the administration's proposed timeline. Echoing the same military advice given on this same issue about Iraq when we pulled the troops out, the gains achieved at great cost against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. We should recognize that we may not want this fight, but the barbarity of an enemy that kills women and children and has refused to break with al-Qaeda needs to be fought.

More broadly, Is the U.S. military being developed to fight across the spectrum of combat? Knowing that enemies always will move against our perceived weakness, our forces must be capable of missions from nuclear deterrence to counterinsurgency and everything in between, now including the pervasive cyber domain. While surprise is always a factor, this committee can ensure that we have the fewest big regrets when the next surprise occurs. While we don't want or need a military that is at the same time dominant and irrelevant, you must sort this out and deny funding for bases or capabilities no longer needed.

The nuclear stockpile must be tended to, and fundamental questions must be asked and answered. We must clearly establish the role of our nuclear weapons. Do they serve solely to deter nuclear war? If so, we should say so. And the resulting clarity will help to determine the number we need.

I think, too, you should ask, Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This would also reduce the false-alarm danger.

Could we reenergize the arms-control effort by only counting warheads, vice launchers? Was the Russian test violating the INF

Treaty simply a blunder on their part, or a change in policy? And what is our appropriate response?

The reduced size of our military drives the need to ask different questions. Our military is uniquely capable and the envy of the world, but are we resourcing it to ensure we have the highest-quality troops, the best equipment, and the toughest training?

With a smaller military comes the need for troops kept at the top of their game. When we next put them in harm's way, it must be the enemy's longest day and worst day. Tiered readiness with a smaller force must be closely scrutinized to ensure we aren't merely hollowing out the military.

While sequestration is the nearest threat to this national treasure that is the U.S. military, sustaining it as the world's best when it's smaller will need your critical oversight.

Are the Navy and our expeditionary forces receiving the support they need in a world where America's naval role is more pronounced because we have fewer forces posted overseas? With the cutbacks to the Army and Air Force and fewer forces around the world, military aspects of our strategy will inevitably become more naval in character. This will provide the decision time for political leaders considering employment of additional forms of military power. Your resourcing of our naval and expeditionary forces will need to take this development into account.

Today, I question if our shipbuilding budget is sufficient, especially in light of the situation in the South China Sea. While our efforts in the Pacific to keep positive relations with China are well and good, these efforts must be paralleled by a policy to build the counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea and elsewhere. That counterbalance must deny China veto power over territorial, security, and economic conditions in the Pacific, building support for our diplomatic efforts to maintain stability and economic prosperity so critical to our economy.

In light of the worldwide challenges to the international order, we are, nonetheless, shrinking our military. We have to then ask, Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced role for that shrunken military? Strategy connects ends, ways, and means. With less military available, we must reduce our appetite for using it. Prioritization is needed if we are to remain capable of the most critical mission for which we have a military, to fight on short notice and defend the country.

We have to ask, Does our strategy and associated military planning, as Senator Reed pointed out, take into account our Nation's increased need for allies? The need for stronger alliances comes more sharply into focus as we shrink the military. No nation can on its own do all that is necessary for its own security. Further, history reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those without allies. As Churchill intimated, however, the only thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. This committee should track closely an increased military capability to work with allies, the NATO Alliance being foremost, but not our only focus.

In reference to NATO, and in light of the Russian violations of international borders, we must ask if the NATO Alliance efforts

have adjusted to the unfortunate and dangerous mode the Russian leadership has slipped into.

With regard to tightening the bond between our smaller military and those other militaries we may need at our side in future fights, the convoluted foreign military sales system needs your challenge. Hopefully, it can be put in order before we drive more potential partners to equip themselves with foreign equipment, a move that makes it harder to achieve needed interoperability with our allies and undercuts America's industrial base. Currently, the system fails to reach its potential.

As we attempt to restore stability to the state system and international order, a critical question will be, Is America good for its word? When we make clear a position or give our word about something, our friends, and even our enemies, must recognize that we are good for it. Otherwise, dangerous miscalculations can occur.

When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat by the Commander in Chief, the committee should still ask, Is the military being employed with the proper authority? For example, are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable? Murky or quixotic political end states condemn us to entering wars we don't know how to end. Notifying the enemy in advance of our withdrawal dates or reassuring the enemy that we will not use certain capabilities, like our ground forces, should be avoided. Such announcements do not take the place of mature, well-defined end states, nor do they contribute to ending wars as rapidly as possible on favorable terms.

You should ask, Is the theater of war, itself, sufficient for effective prosecution? We have witnessed safe havens prolonging war. If the defined theater is insufficient, the plan itself needs to be challenged.

Ask, Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war appropriate for the enemy and type war we are fighting? We have observed the perplexing lack of detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile.

We have to also ask, Are America's diplomatic, economic, and other assets aligned for the war aims? We have experienced the military, alone, trying to achieve tasks outside its expertise. When we take the serious decision to fight, we must bring to bear all our Nation's resources. And you should question how the diplomatic and development efforts will be employed to build momentum for victory. And our Nation's strategy demands that comprehensive approach.

Finally, the culture of our military and its rules are designed to bring about battlefield success in the most atavistic environment on Earth. No matter how laudable, in terms of our progressive country's instincts, this committee needs to consider carefully any proposed changes to military rules, traditions, and standards that bring noncombat emphasis to combat units. There is a great difference between military service in dangerous circumstances and serving in a combat unit whose role is to search out, close with, and kill the enemy at close quarters. This committee has a responsibility for imposing reason over impulse when proposed changes

could reduce the combat capability of our forces at the point of contact with the enemy.

Ultimately, we need the foresight of this committee, acting in its sentinel and oversight role, to draw us out of our reactive stance that we've fallen into and chart a strategic way ahead. Our national security strategy needs your bipartisan direction. In some cases, you may need to change our processes for developing integrated national strategy, because mixing capable people with their good ideas and bad processes results in the bad processes defeating good people's ideas 9 times out of 10. This is an urgent matter, because, in an interconnected age, when opportunistic adversaries can work in tandem to destroy stability and prosperity, our country needs to regain its strategic footing. We need to bring the clarity to our efforts before we lose the confidence of the American people and the support of potential allies. This committee, I believe, can play in a central strategic role in this regard.

Thank you, Madam.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, distinguished Senators of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I request that my statement be accepted for the record.

During my active duty years I testified many times before this committee and gained the highest regard for the manner in which you carried out your role. I also recall with gratitude your support for our armed forces through good times and bad and I'm honored to return here today.

I commend the committee for holding these hearings. As former Secretary of State George Shultz has commented, the world is awash in change. The international order, so painstakingly put together by the greatest generation coming home from mankind's bloodiest conflict, is under increasing stress. It was created with elements we take for granted: the United Nations, NATO, the Marshall Plan, Bretton Woods and more. The constructed order reflected the wisdom of those who recognized no nation lived as an island and we needed new ways to deal with challenges that for better or worse impacted all nations. Like it or not, today we are part of this larger world and must carry out our part. We cannot wait for problems to arrive here or it will be too late; rather we must remain strongly engaged in this complex world.

The international order built on the state system is not self-sustaining. It demands tending by an America that leads wisely, standing unapologetically for the freedoms each of us in this room have enjoyed. The hearing today addresses the need for America to adapt to changing circumstances, to come out now from its reactive crouch and to take a firm strategic stance in defense of our values. While we recognize that we owe future generations the same freedoms we enjoy, the challenge lies in how to carry out our responsibility. For certain we have lived too long now in a strategy-free mode.

To do so America needs a refreshed national strategy. The Congress can play a key role in crafting a coherent strategy with bi-partisan support. Doing so requires us to look beyond events currently consuming the executive branch. There is an urgent need to stop reacting to each immediate vexing issue in isolation. Such response often creates unanticipated second order effects and more problems for us. The Senate Armed Services Committee is uniquely placed in our system of government to guide, oversee and ensure that we act strategically and morally, using America's ability to inspire as well as its ability to intimidate to ensure freedom for future generations. I suggest that the best way to cut to the essence of these issues and to help you in crafting America's response to a rapidly changing security environment is to ask the right questions. If I were in your shoes these are some that I would ask:

What are the key threats to our vital interests?

- The intelligence community should delineate and provide an initial prioritization of those threats for your consideration. By rigorously defining the problems we face you will enable a more intelligent and focused use of the resources allocated for national defense.

Is our intelligence community fit for its expanding purpose?

- Today we have less of a military shock absorber to take surprise in stride, and fewer forward-deployed military forces overseas to act as sentinels. Accordingly we need more early warning. Working with the intell committee you should question if we are adequately funding the intell agencies to reduce the chance of our defenses being caught flat-footed. We know that the “foreseeable future” is not foreseeable; your review must incorporate unpredictability, recognizing risk while avoiding gambling with our nation’s security.

Incorporating the broadest issues in your assessments, you should consider what we must do if the national debt is assessed to be the biggest national security threat we face?

- As President Eisenhower noted, the foundation of military strength is our economic strength. In a few short years paying interest on our debt will be a bigger bill than what we pay for defense. Much of that interest money is destined to leave America for overseas. If we refuse to reduce our debt/pay down our deficit, what is the impact on national security for future generations who will inherit this irresponsible debt and the taxes to service it? No nation in history has maintained its military power if it failed to keep its fiscal house in order.

How do you urgently halt the damage caused by sequestration?

- No foe in the field can wreck such havoc on our security that mindless sequestration is achieving. Congress passed it because it was viewed as so injurious that it would force wise choices. It has failed and today we use arithmetic vice sound thinking to run our government, despite emerging enemy threats. This committee must lead the effort to repeal the sequestration that is costing military readiness and long term capability while sapping troop morale. Without predictability in budget matters no strategy can be implemented by your military leaders. Your immediate leadership is needed to avert further damage.

In our approach to the world we must be willing to ask strategic questions. In the Middle East where our influence is at its lowest point in four decades we see a region erupting in crises. We need a new security architecture for the Mid-East built on sound policy, one that permits us to take our own side in this fight. Crafting such a policy starts with asking a fundamental question and then others:

Is political Islam in our best interest? If not what is our policy to support the countervailing forces?

- Violent terrorists cannot be permitted to take refuge behind false religious garb and leave us unwilling to define this threat with the clarity it deserves.
- We have potential allies around the world and in the Middle East who will rally to us but we have not been clear about where we stand in defining or dealing with the growing violent jihadist terrorist threat.

Iran is a special case that must be dealt with as a threat to regional stability, nuclear and otherwise. I believe that you should question the value of Congress adding new sanctions while international negotiations are ongoing, vice having them ready should the negotiations for preventing their nuclear weapons capability and stringent monitoring break down. Further question now if we have the right policies in place when Iran creates more mischief in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region, recognizing that regional counterweights like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council can reinforce us if they understand our policies, clarify our foreign policy goals beyond Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

In Afghanistan we need to consider if we’re asking for the same outcome there as we saw last summer in Iraq if we pull out all our troops on the Administration’s proposed timeline. Echoing the military advice given on the same issue in Iraq, gains achieved at great cost against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. We should recognize that we may not want this fight but the barbarity of an enemy that kills women and children and has refused to break with al-Qaeda needs to be fought.

More broadly, is the U.S. military being developed to fight across the spectrum of combat?

- Knowing that enemies always move against perceived weakness, our forces must be capable of missions from nuclear deterrence to counter-insurgency and everything in between, now including the pervasive cyber domain. While surprise is always a factor, this committee can ensure that we have the fewest big regrets when the next surprise occurs. We don’t want or need a military that is at the same time dominant and irrelevant, so you must sort this out and deny funding for bases or capabilities no longer needed.

The nuclear stockpile must be tended to and fundamental questions must be asked and answered:

- We must clearly establish the role of our nuclear weapons: do they serve solely to deter nuclear war? If so we should say so, and the resulting clarity will help to determine the number we need.
- Is it time to reduce the Triad to a Diad, removing the land-based missiles? This would reduce the false alarm danger.
- Could we re-energize the arms control effort by only counting warheads vice launchers?
- Was the Russian test violating the INF treaty simply a blunder or a change in policy, and what is our appropriate response?

The reduced size of our military drives the need to ask other questions:

Our military is uniquely capable and the envy of the world, but are we resourcing it to ensure we have the highest quality troops, the best equipment and the toughest training?

- With a smaller military comes the need for troops kept at the top of their game. When we next put them in harm's way it must be the enemy's longest day and worst day. Tiered readiness with a smaller force must be closely scrutinized to ensure we aren't merely hollowing out the force. While sequestration is the nearest threat to this national treasure that is the U.S. military, sustaining it as the world's best when smaller will need your critical oversight.

Are the Navy and our expeditionary forces receiving the support they need in a world where America's naval role is more pronounced because we have fewer forces posted overseas?

- With the cutbacks to the Army and Air Force and fewer forces around the world, military aspects of our strategy will inevitably become more naval in character. This will provide decision time for political leaders considering employment of additional forms of military power. Your resourcing of our naval and expeditionary forces will need to take this development into account. Because we will need to swiftly move ready forces to act against nascent threats, nipping them in the bud, the agility to reassure friends and temper adversary activities will be critical to America's effectiveness for keeping a stable and prosperous world. Today I question if our shipbuilding budget is sufficient, especially in light of the situation in the South China Sea.
- While our efforts in the Pacific to keep positive relations with China are well and good, these efforts must be paralleled by a policy to build the counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea and elsewhere. That counterbalance must deny China veto power over territorial, security and economic conditions in the Pacific, building support for our diplomatic efforts to maintain stability and economic prosperity so critical to our economy.

In light of worldwide challenges to the international order we are nonetheless shrinking our military. Are we adjusting our strategy and taking into account a reduced role for that shrunken military?

- Strategy connects ends, ways and means. With less military available, we must reduce our appetite for using it. Connecting the dots is appropriate for this committee. Absent growing our military, there must come a time when moral outrage, serious humanitarian plight, or lesser threats cannot be militarily addressed. Prioritization is needed if we are to remain capable of the most critical mission for which we have a military: to fight on short notice and defend the country. In this regard we must recognize we should not and need not carry this military burden solely on our own:

Does our strategy and associated military planning take into account our nation's increased need for allies?

- The need for stronger alliances comes more sharply into focus as we shrink the military. No nation can do on its own all that is necessary for its security. Further, history reminds us that countries with allies generally defeat those without. A capable U.S. military, reinforcing our political will to lead from the front, is the bedrock on which we draw together those nations that stand with us against threats to the international order. Our strategy must adapt to and accommodate this reality. As Churchill intimated, the only thing harder than fighting with allies is fighting without them. This committee should track closely an increased military capability to work with allies, the NATO alliance being foremost but not our sole focus. We must also enlist non-traditional partners where we have common foes or common interests.
- In reference to NATO and in light of the Russian violations of international borders, we must ask if the Alliance's efforts have adjusted to the unfortunate and dangerous mode the Russian leadership has slipped into?
- With regard to tightening the bond between our smaller military and those we may need at our side in future fights, the convoluted foreign military sales sys-

tem needs your challenge. Hopefully it can be put in order before we drive more potential partners to equip themselves with foreign equipment, a move that makes it harder to achieve needed interoperability with our allies and undercuts America's industrial base. Currently the system fails to reach its potential to support our foreign policy.

As we attempt to restore stability to the state system and international order, a critical question will be, Is America good for its word?

- When we make clear our position or give our word about something, our friends (and even our foes) must recognize that we are good for it. Otherwise dangerous miscalculations can occur. This means that the military instrument must be fit for purpose and that once a political position is taken, our position is backed up by a capable military making clear that we will stand on our word.

When the decision is made to employ our forces in combat, the committee should ask if the military is being employed with the proper authority. I believe you should examine answers to fundamental questions like the following:

- Are the political objectives clearly defined and achievable? Murky or quixotic political end states can condemn us to entering wars we don't know how to end. Notifying the enemy in advance of our withdrawal dates or reassuring the enemy that we will not use certain capabilities like our ground forces should be avoided. Such announcements do not take the place of mature, well-defined end-states, nor do they contribute to ending wars as rapidly as possible on favorable terms.
- Is the theater of war itself sufficient for effective prosecution? We have witnessed safe havens prolonging war. If the defined theater of war is insufficient, the plan itself needs to be challenged to determine feasibility of its success or the need for its modification.
- Is the authority for detaining prisoners of war (POs) appropriate for the enemy and type war that we are fighting? We have observed the perplexing lack of detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile.
- Are America's diplomatic, economic and other assets aligned to the war aims, with the intent of ending the conflict as rapidly as possible? We have experienced the military alone trying achieve tasks outside its expertise. When we take the serious decision to fight, we must bring to bear all our nation's resources. You should question how the diplomatic and development efforts will be employed to build momentum for victory and our nation's strategy needs that integration.

Finally the culture of our military and its rules are designed to bring about battlefield success in the most atavistic environment on earth. No matter how laudable in terms of a progressive country's instincts, this committee needs to consider carefully any proposed changes to military rules, traditions and standards that bring non-combat emphasis to combat units. There is a great difference between military service in dangerous circumstances and serving in a combat unit whose role is to search out and kill the enemy at close quarters. This committee has a responsibility for imposing reason over impulse when proposed changes could reduce the combat capability of our forces at the point of contact with the enemy.

Ultimately we need the foresight of this committee, acting in its sentinel and oversight role, to draw us out of the reactive stance we've fallen into and chart a strategic way ahead. Our national security strategy needs your bi-partisan direction. In some cases you may need to change our processes for developing an integrated national strategy, because mixing capable people and their good ideas with bad processes results in the bad processes defeating good peoples' ideas nine times out of ten. This is an urgent matter, because in an interconnected age when opportunistic adversaries can work in tandem to destroy stability and prosperity, our country needs to regain its strategic footing. We need to bring clarity to our efforts before we lose the confidence of the American people and the support of our potential allies. This committee can play an essential strategic role in this regard.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General Mattis.

Next, I would like to introduce General Keane. General Keane is a Vietnam combat veteran, the former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, one of the architects of the successful surge in Iraq, and the current chairman of the Institute for the Study of War.

General Keane?

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, USA (RET.),
FORMER VICE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY**

General KEANE. Madam Chairman, Senator Ayotte, and Ranking Minority, Senator Reed, members of this distinguished committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue as America's global security challenges.

It's always a privilege to be with this committee—been 15-plus-years in association for me—and whose reputation for tackling tough issues has always been appreciated. I'm honored to be here with General Jim Mattis and Admiral "Fox" Fallon, both highly respected military leaders who I have known for years.

Listen, I don't know what the criteria for panel selection was, but obviously we have something in common: we're all getting older and we're four-stars, retired. But, the thing that we also have in common, we are very direct, we are very straightforward, and we sure as hell are opinionated. So, I'm usually sitting next to somebody's who's nuanced, circumspect, et cetera. You're not going to get that from the three of us today. We don't always agree, but you're going to know what we're thinking.

Please accept my written testimony for the record, and I will briefly outline those remarks. I put some extra in there, because—congratulation to the new members who have joined this committee. There's some background information in there that you may feel helpful to you.

And I appreciate Senator McCain giving us a little extra time this morning on such a complex subject.

You know, the United States is confronting emerging security challenges on a scale not seen since the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status following World War II, with radical Islam morphing into a global jihad, Iran seeking regional hegemony and revisionist powers, Russia and China capable of employing varying degrees of sophistication, disruptive methods of war that will severely test the United States military's traditional methods of projecting and sustaining power abroad. Given U.S. defense budget projections, the United States will have to confront these challenges without its longstanding decided advantage in the scale of resources it is able to devote to the competition. Indeed, the Budget Control Act, or sequestration, is not only irresponsible in the face of these emerging challenges, it is downright reckless.

Let me briefly outline the major security challenges and what we can do about them:

Radical Islam. As much as Naziism and Communism—both geopolitical movements, ideologically driven—were the major security challenges of the 20th century, radical Islam is the major security challenge of our generation. Radical Islam, as I'm defining it for today's discussion, consists of three distinct movements who share a radical fundamentalist ideology, use jihad or terror to achieve objectives, yet compete with each other for influence and power. I've provided some maps at—behind my testimony, that you can use, and there's also the—some display maps, here in the committee room, which you may be challenged to be able to see.

First, the Shi'a-based Iranian-sponsored radical Islamic movement that began in 1979 with the formation of the Islamic of Iran. In 1980, Iran declared the United States as a strategic enemy, and

its goal is to drive the United States out of the region, achieve regional hegemony and destroy the state of Israel. It uses proxies primarily as the world's number-one state sponsoring terrorism. Thirty-plus years, Iran has used these proxies to attack the United States. To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, while Iran has direct influence and some control over Beirut, Lebanon, Gaza, Damascus, Syria, Baghdad, Iraq, and now Sana'a, Yemen, as you can see on the map. Is there any doubt that Iran is on the march and is systematically moving toward their regional hegemonic objective? Iran has been a—Iran has been on a 20-year journey to acquire nuclear weapons, simply because they know it guarantees preservation of the regime and makes them, along with their partners, the dominant power in the region, thereby capable of expanding their control and influence. Add to this their ballistic missile delivery system and Iran is not only a threat to the region, but to Europe, as well, and, as they increase missile range, eventually a threat to the United States. And as we know, a nuclear arms race, because of their nuclear ambition, is on the horizon for the Middle East.

Second, the al-Qaeda Sunni-based movement declared war on the United States in the early '90s, desires to drive the United States out of the region, dominate all Muslim lands and, as the most ambitious radical Islamic movement, eventually achieve world domination. As you can see on the map, al-Qaeda and its affiliates exceeds Iran in beginning to dominate multiple country. In fact, al-Qaeda has grown fourfold in the last 5 years.

Third, the Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham, ISIS, is an outgrowth from al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. After United States troops pulled out of Iraq in 2011, ISIS re-emerged as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 2012, and began seizing towns and villages from the Syria-Iraq border all the way to the western Syria, from Aleppo to Damascus. After many terrorist attacks and assassinations in Mosul and Anbar Province in 2013, to set the conditions for follow-on operations, ISIS launched a conventional attack back into Iraq, beginning in 2014, with the seizure of Fallujah and culminating in the seizure of Mosul and many other towns and villages.

Is it possible to look at that map in front of you and claim that the United States policy and strategy is working or that al-Qaeda is on the run? It is unmistakable that our policies have failed. And the unequivocal explanation is, United States policy has focused on disengaging from the Middle East, while our stated policy is pivoting to the East.

United States policymakers choose to ignore the very harsh realities of the rise of radical Islam. In my view, we became paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences in the Middle East after fighting two wars. Moreover, as we sit here this morning in the face of radical Islam, United States policymakers refuse to accurately name the movement as radical Islam. We further choose not to define it, nor explain its ideology. And, most critical, we have no comprehensive strategy to stop it or defeat it. We are reduced to a very piecemeal effort, using drones in Yemen and Pakistan—a vital tactic, but not a strategy—and air power in Iraq and Syria, while insisting an unproven indigenous ground force. Our partnering pro-

gram with other nations is fragmented, with no overall strategy. This approach almost certainly guarantees we will be incrementally engaged against one radical group after another, with no end in sight. What can we do?

To stop and defeat a global radical Islamic movement and Iranian regional hegemony requires a broad, long-term, comprehensive strategic approach with the strategic objectives, both near and long term, supporting that strategy. World leaders understood how formidable the—how formidable Communist ideology and the Soviet threat was to the world order, and formed political and military alliances. Forming similar alliances today offers the opportunity by member nations to develop a comprehensive strategy to discuss and set goals for necessary political and social reforms, and to share intelligence, technology, equipment, and training. The alliance is mostly about supporting countries in the region, to make internal changes, and to assist comprehensively encountering radical Islam.

We should rely on some of the thoughtful leaders in and outside the region to assist in forming this alliance. This is not about major military intervention by the United States. It is about assisting alliance members with training their counterterrorism force and their conventional military and counterinsurgency, and, yes, conducting counterterrorism operations, as required. While killing and capturing terrorists is key, so is the strategy to organize an alliance-wide effort to undermine the radical Islamist ideology, to counter its narrative, to counter recruiting, and to target outside financing.

On Iran—excuse me—on Iraq and Syria, the ISIS advance is stalled in Iraq, due to effective air power, with modest gains in retaking lost territory. However, a successful counteroffensive to retake Mosul and Anbar Province is a very real challenge. No one knows for certain how the indigenous force, consisting of the Iraqi Army, Peshmerga, Sunni tribes, and Shi'a militia, will perform. The United States should plan now to have U.S./coalition advisors accompany front-line troops with the added capability to call in airstrikes. Direct-action special-operation forces, both ground and air, should assist by targeting ISIS leaders. United States and coalition combat brigades should be designated for deployment and moved to Kuwait to be ready for employment if the counteroffensive stalls or is defeated. The alternative? We wait another couple of years and try again.

The Syria policy is a failure. ISIS is continued to advance throughout Syria and is gaining ground, taking new territory. You can see that on the other map. And even approaching Damascus in attacking south of Damascus. The plans for training and assisting the Free Syrian Army is not robust enough—5,000 in one year—I know you received a classified briefing on it, so you know more about it than I—and permitting Assad to bomb the FSA faster than new members are trained makes no sense. The United States should heed the advice of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, and Turkey to establish a no-fly zone and to shut down Assad's air power, and a buffer zone to protect refugees.

On Iran, the long-term goal for any alliance that is formed should be Iran's regime change or at least a collapse of the existing

government framework, similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the reason is clear. Iran's stated regional hegemonic objectives are incongruous with the peace, prosperity, and stability of the Middle East. Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon or threshold capability allowing rapid nuclear development. Sadly, we are already about there.

Congress should do two things now in reference to Iran: one, authorize increased sanctions now, with automatic implementation if talks are extended or fail; and, two, legislate ratification of any deal by the Senate.

On Afghanistan, the political situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably with the reform leadership of Ashraf Ghani, but the security situation remains at risk. While the security situation in the south is relatively stable, the situation in the east is not. The problem is, the area generally from Kabul to the Pakistani border is a domain of the Haqqani Network. Haqqani Network has not been rooted out of their support zones and safe areas in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for the ANSF. It follows that the ANSF needs the funding support to support as current troop levels of 352,000 and much needed U.S. and coalition troops to conduct counterterrorism and to advise, train, and assist the ANSF beyond 2016. We also need to target the Haqqani Network in its sanctuary in Pakistan, in the vicinity of Miramshah and the FATA.

All we accomplished in Afghanistan will be at risk, as it was in Iraq, if the troops are pulled out not based on the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the obvious and painful lesson from Iraq?

The security challenges posed by revisionist Eurasian nations, Russia and China. In Europe, Russia's recent behavior, I think, suggests that its 2008 military campaign against Georgia was not an aberration, but, rather, an initial effort to overturn the prevailing regional order. By seizing the Crimea, supporting trumped-up rebel forces in eastern Ukraine, and engaging in military deployments that directly threaten its Baltic neighbors, Moscow has made it clear that it does not accept the political map of post-cold-war Europe. I believe we need to realistically conclude that Moscow is also willing to challenge the very existence of NATO.

What can be done? Given the dramatic drop in oil prices, Russia is beginning to suffer, economically, and is likely headed toward a recession, if not already there. Additional tough sanctions should be back on the table to coerce Russia to stop the Ukraine aggression. It is a disgrace that, once again, we have refused to assist the people being oppressed, when all they ask for is the weapons to fight. We should robustly arm and assist Ukraine.

Additionally, NATO military presence in Central Europe—excuse me—NATO military presence from Central Europe should be significantly shifted to the Baltics and Eastern Europe, with plans for permanent bases. A clear signal of Article 5 intent must be sent to Moscow. These action—will strengthen our diplomatic efforts, which, to date, have failed.

China's continuing economic growth has fueled a major conventional buildup that is beginning to shift the local balance of power in its favor. As a result, Beijing has been emboldened to act more assertively toward its neighbors, especially in expanding its terri-

torial claims, which include not only Taiwan, but also most of the South China Sea islands and Japan's Senkaku islands. China has embarked on a strategy of regional domination at the expense of United States interests as a Pacific nation and decades of partnership with allied countries in the region.

What can be done? Develop a regional strategy with our allies to counter China's desire for dominant control and influence. Recognize that China's military strategy to defeat United States reliance on military information networks, which they believe, alone, may defeat the United States, militarily, which is quite interesting, and their exploding precision-strike capability threatens ground and naval forces, forward staging bases, and air and seaports of debarkation. The United States no longer enjoys the commanding position in the precision-strike regime that it occupied in the two decades following the cold war. We should stress-test United States regional military defense to counter China's threat and recognize that a change in regional defense strategy and capabilities is likely.

Lastly, sequestration. It must be repealed and reasonable resources restored to meet the emerging security challenges. All the services have a need to capitalize their investment accounts and to maintain readiness, which is rapidly eroding.

In conclusion, given the emerging security challenges and limited resources, the need for well-crafted regional defense strategy in an overall integrated national security and defense strategy posture is clear, more so now than anytime, I believe, since World War II. Yet, this is not what we do. What we do is the QDR, every 4 years, which is largely driven by process and far too focused on the budget.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE

Mr. Chairman, ranking minority and members of this distinguished committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on such a critical issue as America's global security challenges. Am honored to be here today with General Jim Mattis and Admiral Fox Fallon, both highly respected military leaders who I have known for years.

The United States is confronting emerging security challenges on a scale it has not seen since the rise of the Soviet Union to superpower status following WWII, with radical Islam morphing into a global jihad, Iran seeking regional hegemony and revisionist powers capable of employing, in varying degrees of sophistication, disruptive methods of war that will severely test the United States military's traditional methods of projecting and sustaining power abroad. Given U.S. defense budget projections, the U.S. will have to confront these challenges without its long standing decided advantage in the scale of resources it is able to devote to the competition. Indeed the Budget Control Act (BCA), or sequestration, is not only irresponsible, in the face of emerging challenges, it is downright reckless.

Let me briefly outline the major security challenges and what can be done about them.

1. RADICAL ISLAM

As much as nazism and communism both geopolitical movements, ideologically driven, were the major security challenges of the 20th century, radical Islam is the major security challenge of our generation. Nazism was defeated by overwhelming brute force and communism was defeated by better ideas. Radical Islam will take a combination of force and better ideas to ultimately add it to the trash heap of unrealized and unfulfilled ideological movements.

Radical Islam as I am defining it for today's discussion consists of 3 distinct movements, who share a radical fundamentalist ideology, use jihad or terror to achieve objectives yet compete with each other for influence and power.

- First, the Shia based, Iranian sponsored radical Islamist movement that began in 1979 with the formation of the Islamic State of Iran. In 1980 Iran declared the United States as a strategic enemy and its goal is to drive the United States out of the region, achieve regional hegemony and destroy the state of Israel. It uses proxies, primarily, as the world's number one state sponsoring terrorism. Beginning in the early 1980's it began jihad against the United States by bombing the Marine barracks, the United States Embassy and the United States Embassy Annex in Lebanon, the United States Embassy in Kuwait, the AF barracks , Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and attacking the United States military in Iraq using Shia militias trained in Iran with advanced IEDs developed by Iranian engineers. To date, the result is, United States troops left Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Iraq while Iran has direct influence and some control over Beirut, Lebanon, Gaza, Damascus, Syria, Baghdad, Iraq and now Sana'a, Yemen (as you can see on the map.)

Is there any doubt that Iran, is on the march and is systematically moving toward their regional hegemonic objectives. Iran has armed Hezbollah and Hamas with thousands of rockets and missiles in order to attack Israel, has propped up the Assad regime with Quds force advisors and fighters plus tons of military supplies, was the first to come to the assistance of the beleaguered Iraq government after the ISIS invasion and today has hundreds of Quds force advisors on the ground in Iraq, backing Iranian trained Shia militias, with Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds force, a frequent visitor and now using the Houthis, has managed to topple the Yemen government, an ally in the fight against al-Qaeda.

The Iranian strategy of using proxies to conduct jihad and to launch conventional military attacks while propping up countries it desires to influence is a winning strategy. Despite 30 years of proxy attacks against American interests in the region and an almost 10 year kidnapping campaign in the 80's resulting in the death of CIA station chief Buckley not a single American president, republican or democrat has ever countered.

Iran also has been on a 20 year journey to acquire nuclear weapons, simply because they know it guarantees preservation of the regime and makes them along with their partners the dominant power in the region thereby capable of expanding their control and influence. Add to this their ballistic missile delivery system and Iran is not only a threat to the region but to Europe as well, and as they increase missile range, eventually a threat to the United States

- Second, the al-Qaeda (AQ), Sunni based movement, declared war on the U.S. in the early 90's, desires to drive the U.S. out of the region, dominate all Muslim lands, and as the most ambitious radical Islamist movement, eventually achieve world domination. The United States has a 20 year history with AQ who began its jihad in the early 90's with the attack on the WTC, United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the USS Cole, the 9/11 attacks and a number of planned attacks since 9/11 that were either thwarted or bungled. As you can see on the map, AQ and its affiliates, exceeds Iran in beginning to dominate multiple countries. AQ has grown fourfold in the last 5 years. Unable to project power out of the region due to US drone attacks, in

Pakistan, AQ central franchised out to AQAP in Yemen, by providing some key leaders, the responsibility to conduct out of region attacks e.g. in the United States and Paris, France. No one is suggesting that the red on that map is under the direct control and influence of AQ central. They are not. But what binds them together is a shared and common ideology using jihad to accomplish their political objective, which is the overthrow of their host governments.

- Third, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is an outgrowth from al-Qaeda in Iraq which was defeated in Iraq by 2009. Conducting assessment visits for GEN Petraeus many times in Iraq, on one occasion in late 2008 I was shown a number of AQ message intercepts where AQ admitted defeat and was advising AQ central not to send any more "brothers" because it is "over." In 2011 the U.S. unplugged its sophisticated intelligence capability, and pulled out the CT force whose main task was to hunt down AQ leaders. A week after the last troops left, General Caslen, then U.S. commander indicated, the first suicide bomb in over 6 months went off in Baghdad. And so it began the beginnings of ISIS as a terrorist organization in Iraq, moved into Syria in 2012, and began seizing towns and villages from the Syria/Iraq border all the way to western Syria from Aleppo to Damascus. We tracked this by day and by week at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) providing briefings to CIA, DIA, CJCS, DOS, congressional intelligence committees and to members of this committee.

After many terrorist attacks and assassinations in Mosul and Anbar province in 2013 to set the conditions for follow on operations, ISIS launched a conventional at-

tack back into Iraq beginning in 2014 with the seizure of Falujah and culminating in the seizure of Mosul and many other towns and villages.

- *Why Are We Failing:* Is it possible to look at the map and claim that U.S. policy and strategy is working or that “AQ is on the run.” It is unmistakable that our policies have failed and the unequivocal explanation is United States policy has focused on disengaging from the Middle East. The Arab Spring, a strategic surprise, began in 2010 in a region where democracy does not exist in the Arab world, as the people in the streets were seeking political reform, social justice and economic opportunity. No one was in the streets advocating radical Islam or jihad but the radical Islamists saw political upheaval as an opportunity to gain control and influence. Meanwhile the U.S. in terms of policy emphasis was conducting the so called “pivot” to the east. We failed to see the Arab Spring as a United States opportunity to influence political reform and social justice. The radicals filled that vacuum as the Arab Spring became an accelerant for them. As such ISIS reemerged in Iraq, then Syria, after United States troops pulled out, the White House announced a similar pullout of all troops in Afghanistan. In Libya, the moderate regime, friendly to the United States, that replaced Qaddafi requested assistance to form an effective security force to safeguard the government and protect the people from the armed militant groups. We refused and the radical Islamists (AAS) tried to kill the UK Ambassador, burned down the United States consulate and killed Ambassador Stephens, and, now, the country is being taken over by the radical Islamists, forcing the shutdown of the U.S. Embassy. In Syria, in 2010, moderate rebels (now, the FSA) had the initial momentum against the Assad regime, many believed the regime was about to fall. Then Iran, Hezbollah and the Russians assisted the Assad regime thereby forcing the FSA to request arms and training assistance. They never requested any U.S. “boots on the ground” or even, at the time, any use of air power. As late as the summer of 2012 Director Petraeus, Secretaries Clinton and Panetta and General Dempsey recommended we assist the FSA, who the CIA vetted. The President of the United States refused and ISIS and other radical groups to include AQ moved into Syria while the Assad regime was systematically killing 200,000 Syrians and displacing more than 13 million from their homes, a human catastrophe by any definition. Even after the Assad regime used chemical weapons (CW) to kill Syrians by the thousands, thereby crossing the infamous United States “red line,” the U.S. failed to engage. Our allies in the region lost confidence in U.S. leadership and question, to this day, U.S. resolve. U.S. policy makers chose to ignore the very harsh realities of the rise of radical Islam. In my view, we became paralyzed by the fear of adverse consequences in the Middle East after fighting two wars. Moreover, as we sit here this morning in the face of radical Islam, US policy makers will not only accurately name the movement as radical Islam, we further choose not to define it, nor explain its ideology and most critical, we have no comprehensive strategy to stop it or defeat it. We are reduced to a very piecemeal effort using drones in Yemen and Pakistan, a vital tactic but not a strategy and air power in Iraq and Syria, while assisting an indigenous ground force. This approach almost certainly guarantees we will be incrementally engaged against one radical group after another, with no end in sight.
- *What Can Be Done:* To stop and defeat a global radical Islamist movement and Iranian regional hegemony requires a broad, long term, comprehensive strategic approach with strategic objectives both near and long term supporting the strategy. We should be informed by the successful defeat and collapse of another ideology, communism. World leaders understood how formidable the communist, Soviet threat was to the world order and formed political and military alliances i.e., NATO and SEATO to counter it. The power and influence of countries working together against a common enemy is the preferred way to achieve a comprehensive and synergistic outcome. Forming political and military alliances or using a combination of existing alliances offers the opportunity by member nations to develop a comprehensive strategy to discuss and set goals for necessary political and social reforms, and to share intelligence, technology, equipment and training. The alliance is mostly about supporting countries in the region to make internal changes and to assist comprehensively in countering radical Islam. This is not about major military intervention by the U.S., it is about assisting alliance members with training their counter-terrorism force and their conventional military in counterinsurgency and yes conducting U.S. CT operations as required. While killing and capturing terrorists is key, so is the strategy to organize an alliance wide effort to undermine the radical Islamist ideology, to counter its narrative, to counter recruiting and to target outside financing.
- *ISIS/ AQ/ Iran in Iraq/ Syria:* The ISIS advance is stalled in Iraq due to effective air power with modest gains in retaking lost territory. However, a successful

counter offensive to retake Mosul and Anbar province is a very real challenge. No one knows for certain how the indigenous force consisting of IA, Peshmerga, Sunni tribes and Shia militia will perform. The U.S. should plan now to have U.S./coalition advisors accompany front line troops with the added capability to call in air strikes. Direct action SOFs both ground and air should assist by targeting ISIS leaders. United States and coalition combat brigades should be designated for deployment and moved to Kuwait to be ready for employment if the counter offensive stalls or is defeated.

The Syria policy is a failure. There is wide disagreement in DOD, DOS, and the NSC over the current Syrian policy. ISIS is continuing to advance throughout Syria and is gaining ground, taking new territory. The plans for training and assisting the FSA, is not robust enough, 5,000 in one year, and permitting Assad to continue to bomb the FSA faster than new members are trained makes no sense. The United States should heed the advice of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Turkey to establish a No Fly Zone (NFZ) to shut down Assad's air power and a buffer zone to protect refugees.

ISIS, AQ and Iran are competing in Iraq and Syria. Their competition raises the stakes for all of them. They do not cancel each other out. They make each other stronger and induce them to act with greater impunity. Their competition risks hijacking the internal struggles within Iraq and Syria. The longer these wars go on, the better off they will do. Their struggle will also raise the stakes for Saudi Arabia and disrupt the regional balance of power in the Middle East.

The wars in Iraq and Syria cannot be contained. ISIS and AQ are trying to bring them to Europe. Not just through terrorist attacks, but through polarizing identity. They are deliberately working to radicalize sympathizers. Providing security against terrorism and stopping radicalization is a rising challenge for our European allies, and, fortunately, less for the United States. This is a war of ideas, but it is also a war in which military might matters. These groups have laid down stakes in Iraq and Syria. They will be very hard to lose without tipping the region into a sectarian war. The barriers to their entry have to hold.

We are living through a time when the regional refugee crisis is out of control. 13 million Syrians displaced. That's well over 60 percent of Syria's pre-war population displaced or killed. Iraq is on the rise with 3 million Iraqis internally displaced as of late 2014. This is not a stable system, and the chaos favors these three groups.

- *Iran*: The long term goal for any alliance should be Iran's regime change or a collapse of the existing government framework, similar to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And the reason is clear; Iran's stated regional hegemonic objectives are incongruous with the peace, prosperity and stability of the Middle East.

Iran cannot be permitted to acquire a nuclear weapon or a threshold capability allowing rapid nuclear development. Sadly, we are already about there! Congress should do 2 things now in reference to Iran. 1) authorize increased sanctions now with automatic implementation if talks are extended or fail 2) legislate ratification of any deal by the Senate.

- *Afghanistan*: The political situation in Afghanistan has improved considerably with the reform leadership of Ashraf Ghani but the security situation remains at risk. While the security situation in the South is relatively stable with some exceptions, the situation in the East is not satisfactory. The problem is the area generally from Kabul to the Pakistan border which is the domain of the Haqqani network (HQN). Because the White House provided 25 percent less surge forces than requested and then pulled the surge forces out prematurely, these forces were never applied to the East as they were, successfully, in the South. As such HQN has not been rooted out of their support zones and safe areas in Afghanistan. This is a serious problem for the ANSF. It follows that the ANSF needs the funding to support its current troop levels of 352K and much needed U.S. and coalition troops to conduct CT and to advise, train and assist the ANSF beyond 2016. All we accomplished will be at risk, as it was in Iraq, if the troops are pulled out not based on the conditions on the ground. How can we not learn the obvious and painful lesson from Iraq?

2. SECURITY CHALLENGES POSED BY REVISIONIST EUROASIAN NATIONS I.E. RUSSIA AND CHINA

- *Russia*: In Europe, Russia's recent behavior suggests that its 2008 military campaign against Georgia was not an aberration but rather an initial effort to overturn the prevailing regional order. By seizing the Crimea, supporting trumped up rebel forces in eastern Ukraine and engaging in military deployments that directly threaten its Baltic neighbors, Moscow has made it clear that it does not

accept the political map of post-Cold War Europe. I believe we need to realistically conclude that Moscow is also willing to challenge the very existence of NATO.

- *What Can Be Done:* Given the dramatic drop in oil prices, Russia is beginning to suffer economically and is likely heading toward a recession if not already there. Additional tough sanctions should be put back on the table to coerce Russia to stop the Ukraine aggression. It is a disgrace that once again we have refused to assist a people being oppressed when all they asked for is the weapons to fight; that policy decision which the White House states could lead to an escalation in the conflict, makes no sense. We should robustly arm and assist Ukraine. Additionally, NATO military presence should be significantly shifted to the Baltics and Eastern Europe with plans for permanent bases. A clear signal of Article 5 intent must be sent to Moscow. These actions will strengthen our diplomatic efforts which to date have failed.
- *China:* China's continuing economic growth has fueled a major conventional military buildup that is beginning to shift the local balance of power in its favor. As a result Beijing has been emboldened to act more assertively toward its neighbors, especially in expanding its territorial claims, which include not only Taiwan, but also most of the South China sea islands and Japan's Senkaku Islands. China has embarked on a strategy of regional domination at the expense of United States interests, as a pacific nation, and decades of partnership with allied countries in the region.
- *What Can Be Done:* Develop a regional strategy with our allies to counter China's desire for dominant control and influence. Recognize that China's military strategy to defeat United States reliance on military information networks which they believe alone may defeat the U.S. militarily and their exploding precision strike capability threatens surface and naval forces, forward staging bases, and air and sea ports of debarkation. The U.S. no longer enjoys the commanding position in the precision strike regime that it occupied in the two decades following the Cold War. We should stress test United States regional military defense to counter China's threat and recognize that a change in regional defense strategy is likely.

3. SEQUESTRATION:

It must be repealed and reasonable resources restored to meet the emerging security challenges. All the services have a need to capitalize their investment accounts and to maintain readiness which is rapidly eroding.

In conclusion, given the emerging security challenges and limited resources, the need for well crafted regional defense strategies in an overall integrated defense strategy and posture is clear. Yet this is not what we do. What we do is the QDR, every four years, which is largely driven by process and far too focused on the budget.

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, General Keane.

Admiral Fallon—thank you, Admiral Fallon, for being here—Admiral Fallon is a Vietnam veteran who served 40 years in the Navy, including as Commander of U.S. Central Command.

Thank you for being here today, Admiral Fallon.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator.

Madam Chairwoman, Senator Reed, members of the committee, thank you, first of all, for your essential and enduring support of our men and women in uniform, certainly for the many years in which I was honored to serve with them, and continuing today. And thank you for the opportunity to address this distinguished body and offer my perspectives on current threats to national security, American foreign policy, and national defense topics.

There are certainly many areas of concern around the world. We see them most spectacularly highlighted regularly by the media,

and you've heard a long litany of these things mentioned already today.

First of all, I believe that a coherent national security strategy requires a long-term focus with well-thought-out objectives. We should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near-term fixes to popup issues, which are going to arise continuously and compete for attention with what we should determine are the highest-priority national interests.

In surveying the worldscape today, I'd suggest that we focus on where we, as a nation, want to be in the future. My vote would be for improving world security and stability, with more people around the world enjoying a better life in conditions of their choosing, with responsible elected leaders providing good governance and respect for human dignity. This scenario, clearly in our better national interest, is not going to happen without lots of hard work informed and guided by an effective national security strategy.

The United States Government has provided, and must continue to provide, leadership, good example, and active political, economic, and military security assistance in working towards these desired objectives. The fundamental prerequisite for any successful U.S. national security strategy is a sound and strong domestic foundation. Our credibility in the world is based on the example of our actions and how people perceive we might act in current and future situations. It's fair to wonder if people in other parts of the world take us seriously when they observe partisan political bickering that precludes agreement on fundamental issues like a national operating budget or cyber policies, and seemingly ever-changing policies and priorities.

Our military capability is an essential element of national power and one of many key tools, which include diplomatic, development, economic, financial, political, and certainly moral leadership. We face tough choices today about if, when, and where to employ our military forces. We also face some tough choices on what to do, how to equip them, and what capabilities ought to be priorities. We can't have everything. Some people would propose an endless list of things that we could never afford. We've got to make the choices.

As we contemplate the myriad challenges to world stability and U.S. security, we should first acknowledge, distasteful as it might be, the reality that nuclear weapons and aspirations for them continue to proliferate. In this regard, it's discouraging to note that, after more than two decades of counter—of nuclear counterproliferation progress, fueled in large measure by the Nunn-Lugar Initiative, Russian-United States cooperation appears to have ground to a halt in the wake of dangerous Russian bad behavior. United States strategy in dealing with the potential use of these weapons of mass destruction has been heretofore successful with our National strategic deterrent force. But, the critical components of this force have been aging, without significant upgrade. Modernization of the force, particularly the survivability of the sea-based deterrent, should be a top-priority consideration for us to remain credible in deterring the worst-case scenarios. In my view, one of our most important strategic interests, with huge implications for national security and the stability of the vast Asia-Pacific region, is our long-term relationship with China. Mutually beneficial in many

respects, it has other dimensions, noticeably—notably in the areas of cybersecurity, military expansion, and regional disputes with neighboring countries which are a cause for concern and need to be addressed.

The key focal point of this hearing is conflict in the Middle East and the spread of violent extremism in the region, and from it to other places in the world. The Middle East is an area of high interest for us, for many reasons, and continue to be buffeted by challenges which have vexed years of U.S. attempts to improve stability in the area. Nonetheless, I believe we should continue to engage in this region, using all aspects of national power, but with the understanding that we are not likely to be successful by mandating U.S. solutions. People in the region are, sooner or later, going to have to step up and address the issues which torment and divide them. We can and should assist, but we are not going to resolve their problems.

Some recommendations for addressing the current challenges from the so-called Dayesh in Iraq and Syria, from my perspective, include, first, recognition that, in Iraq, success will rest on the ability of the new government of Haider al-Abadi to convince the majority of his countrymen and -women, particularly the Sunni minority, that they will get a fair shake, going forward. Absent this political foundation, nothing we do is going to be effective in the long term.

Second, getting Islamic leaders, the elites of the Arab countries, to actively counter the extremist ideology, and to cut funding for Dayesh and other extremists. On a positive note, here, I would highlight the recent remarks by Egyptian leader, Abdel al-Sisi.

And third, I think we should continue United States military efforts to work closely with the Iraqi military to enhance their capabilities, increase their combat effectiveness, and to support them with training, air power, and SOF, as required, to defeat Dayesh and to reclaim areas that were overrun last summer, simultaneously pressing Dayesh in rear areas to degrade and deny their ability to expand and to sustain operations in Iraq.

No single one of these actions is going to result in success, but collectively we have a chance to achieve our general objectives. Combating violent extremism worldwide is going to be a long-term effort requiring close cooperation with allies and willing nations, especially in areas of intelligence-sharing, U.S. military training and assistance for our less capable colleagues.

In summary, strategic coherence and foreign policy and national security would benefit from strong, credible, and consistent domestic policies and actions to return this great nation to a position of exemplary leadership that's earned and kept for many years in the eyes of people around the world. Building on this position of domestic strength, a thoughtful, focused, and collaborative strategy formulation process to agree on a relatively few high-priority national security goals and objectives should set us on a fair course.

At the international level, active engagement using all aspects of national power, underpinned with a strong forward presence by U.S. military forces with credible capabilities, is our best deterrent and response to security threats worldwide.

Thank you very much, and I'm pleased to address any specific questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Fallon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN (RETIRED)

Madame Chairwoman, Senator Reed, members of the Committee. Thank you for your essential and enduring support for our men and women in uniform and the opportunity to address this distinguished body and to offer my perspective on current threats to national security, American Foreign Policy and National Defense topics.

There are certainly many areas of concern around the world and we see the most spectacular and troubling highlighted regularly in the media. I believe that a coherent national security strategy requires a long term focus with well thought out objectives. We should resist reactive responses and attempts to find near term fixes for pop up issues which arise continuously and compete for attention with what we should determine are higher priority interests.

In surveying the worldscape today, I would suggest that we focus on where we, as a nation, want to be in the future. My vote would be for improving world security and stability with more people around the world enjoying a better life in conditions of their choosing, with responsible elected leaders providing good governance and respect for human dignity. This scenario, clearly in our better national interest, is not going to happen without lots of hard work, informed and guided by an effective national security strategy.

The United States government has provided, and must continue to provide; leadership, good example and active political, economic and military security assistance in working toward these desired objectives.

The fundamental prerequisite for any successful national security strategy is a sound and strong domestic foundation. Our credibility in the world is based on the example of our actions and how people perceive we might act in current and future situations. It is fair to wonder if people in other parts of the world take us seriously when they observe partisan political bickering preclude agreement on fundamental issues like national operating budgets or cyber policies, and seemingly ever changing policies and priorities.

Our military capability is an essential element of national power but only one of many key tools which include diplomacy, development, economic, financial and political and certainly, moral leadership. We face tough choices ahead, about when, where and if to engage our forces. We also face tough choices about capabilities and what to acquire. We cannot afford everything.

As we contemplate myriad challenges to world stability and U.S. security, we should first acknowledge, distasteful as it might be, the reality that nuclear weapons, and aspirations for them, continue to proliferate. In this regard, it is discouraging to note that after more than two decades of nuclear counter proliferation progress, fueled in large measure by the Nunn-Lugar initiative, Russian-U.S. cooperation appears to have ground to a halt in the wake of dangerous Russian bad behavior.

U.S. strategy for dealing with the potential use of these weapons of mass destruction has been our heretofore successful National Strategic Deterrent Force. But the critical components of this force have been aging without significant upgrade. Modernization of the force, particularly the survivability of the sea based deterrent, should be a top priority consideration for us to remain credible in deterring worst case scenarios.

In my view, one of our most important strategic interests, with huge implications for national security and the stability of the vast Asia-Pacific region, is our long term relationship with China. Mutually beneficial in many respects, it has other dimensions, notably in the areas of cyber security, military expansion and regional disputes with neighboring countries, which are a cause for concern and need to be addressed.

A key focal point of this hearing is conflict in the Middle East and the spread of violent extremism in the region, and from it, to other places in the world. The Middle East, an area of high interest to us for many reasons, continues to be buffeted by challenges which have vexed years of U.S. attempts to improve stability in the area. Nonetheless, we should continue to engage in the region, using all aspects of national power, but with the understanding that we are not likely to be successful by mandating U.S. solutions. People in the region are sooner or later going to have to step up and address the issues which torment and divide them. We can and should assist but we are not going to resolve their problems.

Some recommendations for addressing the current challenge from the so called Daesh in Iraq and Syria include; (1) Recognition that success in Iraq will rest on the ability of the new government of Haider al Abadi to convince the majority of his countrymen, particularly the Sunni minority, that they will get a fair shake going forward. Absent this political foundation, nothing we do will be effective in the long term. (2) Getting Islamic leaders, the elites of the Arab countries, to actively counter the extremist ideology and cut funding to Daesh and other extremists. In a positive note here, I would highlight recent remarks by Egyptian leader Abdel al Sisi. And (3) Continue U.S. military efforts to work closely with the Iraqi military to enhance capabilities, increase combat effectiveness and support them with training, airpower and SOF as required to defeat Daesh and reclaim areas overrun last summer. Simultaneously pressing Daesh rear areas in Syria to degrade and deny their ability to expand or sustain operations in Iraq. No single one of these actions will defeat the threat. All need to occur.

Combating violent extremism worldwide will be a long term effort requiring close cooperation with allies and willing nations, especially in areas of intelligence sharing and U.S. military training and assistance for less capable colleagues.

In summary, strategic coherence in foreign policy and national security would benefit from strong, credible and consistent domestic policies and actions to return this great nation to the position of exemplary leadership it earned and enjoyed not that long ago. Building on this position of domestic strength, a thoughtful, focused and collaborative strategy formulation process to agree on a relatively few high priority national security goals and objectives should set us on a fair course.

At the international level, active engagement using all aspects of national power underpinned with a strong forward presence by U.S. military forces, with credible capabilities, is our best deterrent and response to security threats.

Thank you. I will be pleased to address specific questions you may have.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you so much, Admiral Fallon.

I want to thank each of the members of this panel.

And I would like to, first of all, start with, General Keane, a question to you about the fight we face against radical Islam. You had said, in your testimony, that you believed that our policy has failed, that essentially al-Qaeda has grown fourfold in the last 5 years. Can you help us understand what you think would be the strongest strategy, in terms of defeating radical Islam? And also, can you speak to the situation in Yemen and what you believe our strategy should be there?

General KEANE. Yes.

Well, as you noted, radical Islam is clearly on the rise. And, as I said in my testimony, I think our policy of disengagement from the Middle East has contributed to that rise. Obviously, this is a very ambitious movement, and they would be making moves in that direction regardless of our actions.

Now, given the scale of it, which I tried to display on the map, which goes from northern and western Africa all the way to South Asia, as you look at all of that red on that map, al-Qaeda Central does not control all of those affiliates, but what they have in common, what their connective tissue is, is that they share a common geopolitical belief driven by a religious ideology to dominate their host-country governments which they are conducting an insurgency at. And as al-Qaeda Central, I indicated in my testimony, has a very ambitious geopolitical objective, and that is to dominate Muslim lands, initially, and then world domination. Given that, and given where they are and the swath of territory and countries that they're involved in, there's no way that the United States, in of itself, can deal with the scale of this problem. Nor should it.

So, in my judgment—that's why I'd look to—how did we deal with Communist ideology, which was a very similar movement—ambitious geopolitical movement, world domination? And we dealt

with it, I think, in a very wise fashion. We brought countries together who shared values, who shared political beliefs, and formed a political and military alliance.

There is no other way, I believe, that you can cope with this scale of a problem without bringing the countries involved together, whether they're in the region or have interests outside of the region, as many do because of the export of terrorism to their countries, and develop a strategy to deal with it. This isn't about the United States driving a strategy. This is about bringing countries together, because much of what has to be done in the region where the radical Islamists are growing has to do with those countries themselves, has to do with the conditions that exist in those countries.

The issues simply are—and what the Arab Spring was about, if you recall, it was about seeking political reform, social justice, and economic opportunity. Nobody was demonstrating in the streets for radical Islam, but the radical Islamists saw the Arab Spring as an opportunity, and it became an accelerant for them, because they saw political and social upheaval, and they could take advantage of it. So, using that as a backdrop, it drives you—those issues are still there—political reform, social injustice, and lack of economic opportunity. We have to bring those countries together to recognize some of those problems. Those are long-term answers.

And then the near-term problems deal with what General Mattis was pointing out, as well. We have to share intelligence, we have to share technology, we have to share training. We can help a lot. We have been fighting this enemy for 13 years. We have learned a lot, and so have many of our allies.

There's much that we can do if we take a comprehensive, strategic approach to it, as opposed to what I think is a fragmented approach now, and it doesn't get at the long-term problem. You have to see the long-term solution and then start approaching it with near-term and midterm objectives to accomplish it. That, I think, is the only answer that's possible, given what we're facing. Otherwise, we're just going to protract this thing and take these things on—what, after ISIS? Will there be something after ISIS we'll have to deal with? You betcha, if we don't take a comprehensive approach to deal with it.

In terms of Yemen, I mean, it's very frustrating to watch what's happened. We have been working with a host-country government in Yemen. We've been conducting direct-action missions with them against an insurgency in their country. This is AQAP [al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], as we well know. This is the organization—given the pressure that the previous administration and this administration put on al-Qaeda Central, they knew that they were no—they no longer had global reach. And al-Qaeda Central always, always wanted to take the jihad to Europe and to the United States so they could drive us out of the region and, most importantly, drive our ideas out of the region, which are democracy and capitalism, which is an anathema to them.

The fact is, they franchised out to AQAP, and they gave them some leaders to do it. And this is a force that's not only conducting an insurgency to overthrow a government, but put together capa-

bilities to conduct out-of-region attacks in the United States and, most recently, in Paris, France.

I think we've got a big question mark on where we're going forward. This is going to have to play out in front of us. There's—there are serious challenges in Yemen, given what's taken place with the Iranian-imposed overthrow of the government. They are also opposed to AQAP, but they are also fundamentally opposed to America and its interests. So, I think it begs the question whether we're going to be able to have the kind of cooperation with the new government in Yemen that we had with the old government.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General Keane.

I would call on Senator Reed right now.

Thank you.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

General Mattis, you've made it very clear that we have capabilities, particularly with respect to the Middle East, in terms of military solutions, but you've also, last July in Aspen, pointed out that there are very high costs there. And if we choose to use military, we have to—you know, as you've said out there, if Americans take ownership of this, referring to Syria, this is going to be a full-throated, very, very serious war, with large costs. That's still your view, I assume?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, it is.

Senator REED. And can you give us an idea of the scale of those costs, I mean, in terms of forces and just the top line? Because, you know, we—I think your point's very well made, which is, basically, if we're going to go into something, we've got to go into it with the idea of—it's going to be difficult and costly.

General MATTIS. Senator, what you just quoted was something I had said in response to a question, as you recall. I think, in this case, we have to get to a very detailed level of understanding. What is the political objective we are out to accomplish? And, frankly, I don't know what it is right now. Once we define that, I'd say, to a Jesuit's level of definition, a very strict definition, at that point we then allocate the means. Those means would be covert, diplomatic, educational, economic, and military. And if we orchestrate this correctly, as has been pointed out by the other members of the panel, with allies, the clarity and the commitment of the United States can draw in the full commitment of others. We should not think that a tentative or halfhearted commitment on our part, or saying we are willing to go in, but we're not willing to really do the fighting, would draw a full commitment from others. They're going to be willing to match us, but, when you live right next to this terrible threat, they have to assume that we're in fully, or they're going to have to moderate their response. Once we show, I think, that level of commitment, our requirement would actually go down, because others would be willing to come in full-throated in our support. But, it would be a serious operation, no doubt, Senator.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General Keane, do you agree with Admiral Fallon's point that, unless there's a political cohesion in Iraq, that the government recognizes and integrates the various sectarian groups, that military efforts will be probably ineffectual?

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely. I think we can—we can be a little bit encouraged by Abadi and his movements. I had some people from the Institute for the Study of War just return from Baghdad, meeting with government officials and military officials. Abadi is moving in the right direction. That's good news.

But, look it, let's be honest here, that what—Maliki's malfeasance and nefarious character and the way he undermined political inclusion, despite his rhetoric, in Iraq, particularly after we pulled out of there, was tragic. The Sunni tribes are key, as Fox pointed out. And right now, while some of them are fighting against ISIS, most of them are not. And the harsh reality is, to get them to move, actually to take ISIS on, they will have to be convinced that there is reckoning for long-term political inclusion in this new government. It is a major issue for us.

Anbar Province will be largely Sunni tribes, with some Iraqi army assisting, to retake that river valley. Peshmerga will not participate. Sunni tribes will also be needed to participate in a counteroffensive to retake Mosul. While they will not be the main force, they will be a—they will need to be a supporting force because of the tribes that are up in that region.

So, yes, it's key. And I think we've known that from the outset.

Senator REED. So, in effect, the politics will drive the military operations. I mean, if—without effective political reconciliation or signals from Baghdad, our military efforts, as strenuous as we may mount, are not—won't be particularly successful. No?

General KEANE. Yeah, I just—

Senator REED. Let me—

General KEANE. It would be hard to visualize a scenario with a successful counteroffensive to retake the territory that's been lost without significant Sunni tribe participation in that.

Senator REED. Let me switch gear again to Admiral Fallon.

Thank you once again for making yourself available. But, you know, one of the points that was raised in the course of the testimony was the radical Islam. But, one of the complicating factors is, within this radical Islam, you have Sunni radicals—jihadists—and then you have Shi'a radicals. And they have a mutual animosity, which is—might be argued, is even greater than their animosity towards other groups. The Sunni—Shi'a—Sunni believe that Shi'a are apostates, et cetera. How do you reconcile that, in terms of our operations in the Middle East, particularly in terms of Iran? Right now, Iranian forces—or Shi'a militias, let me say, are paralleling our activities in Iraq, in terms of going after ISIL. How do we—you know, that complicates an already complicated situation. Any comments you have.

Admiral FALLON. Piece of cake.

Senator REED. Yes.

Admiral FALLON. So—we wish.

All right, I think the reality here, Senator, is that these things are really complex. There are a host of issues and interests in every one of these conflicts. You pick the country, pick the region. And I think that we might consider a couple of things. First of all, that in these really particularly vexing things that have so many aspects, we probably ought to step back and take a look at, again, our long-term large interests. So, Iran.

Iran has been a problem for us for decades. It's exacerbated by the fact that we've had no interaction to speak of until very recently for these many decades. We find their activities extremely distasteful. We, basically, detest many of the things they've done and continue to do. They promote a brand of radicalism that has spread well beyond their borders. And we've been at our wits' end to try to figure out what to do.

And my thought here is that, sooner or later, we're going to have to seriously sit down, as I think we're trying to start, and have a dialogue with these guys. We're not going to—we could. One option would be to invade Iraq. That's—or Iran, rather. That's been proposed before. At what cost? I mean, anybody here want to push that idea forward in a meaningful way? I doubt it.

So, at some time, we're going to have to figure out how to come to grips with this. So, how do you do that? You recognize that everybody's got a dog in the fight, they all want something. And we ought to, I think, decide what things that we might accept—some role for them in the region, I would think—but some things we're not going to accept. We don't want any part of the nuclear weapons program that they seem to be embarked on.

But, their time, I think, is being stressed right now. Certainly, the economic conditions. There has been a—apparently, a pretty notable effect of sanctions working against them. And, of course, the people that usually take the brunt of this are the common folk, not the leaders. But, nonetheless, they've had a dramatic impact on that country. I think the price of oil clearly is a detriment to them. And, frankly, they haven't been particularly successful of late in other places of—where their surrogates are engaged in the region.

I think that we can't expect that we're going to have one solution that's going to solve all these problems. So, back to the—first things first. Let's decide what we want for the long term. Can we accept Iran playing some kind of role in this region? If so, how do we get from where we are today to there?

At the tactical level, allowing them to get away with instigations and things like they have done in the past in Iraq and Afghanistan, other places, we shouldn't permit. Tactically, I think we act to block those things when we can.

The fact that you've got Sunnis and Shi'as at each others' throats in many places here, something that we're not going to go in and say, "Okay, guys, sit down, stop this"—we're not going to solve it. But, I think we act strategically in trying to decide where we want our place to be in the region, and then we work hard against those things that—at the tactical level, that are real problems.

So, Iraq today is a real problem. I think to let it just go isn't going to be acceptable. We're going to have to continue to do what we're doing to try to take back the territory that they've lost.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Ernst.

Senator ERNST. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. I certainly appreciate your service on this panel today as well as your many years of service to the United States. We are very grateful for that.

I do agree that we have to have a national security strategy. And this is very important. What we have seen, all of you have mentioned, that, with sequestration, our effects, globally, have been diminished, and we are reacting in a knee-jerk way to threats as they come visible. So, we don't have an overarching strategy anywhere today. And I think that's a great detriment to all of the citizens here in the United States.

But, what I'd like to focus on is, with what we have seen in Iraq—I served in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, at a very low, company level—but, we invested so much effort in that region, and we withdrew from that region before many of our military leaders believed we should withdraw. And I do believe we are seeing that in Afghanistan now, also. These are areas, especially when it comes to Afghanistan—it's not talked about so much in the media anymore. Again, we seem to focus just on one issue at a time rather than looking at threats globally.

With Afghanistan, we see that we have a proposed timeline for withdrawal. And, General Keane, you stated that perhaps we won't be ready by 2016 to withdraw our troops. I just sent, on Saturday—was at a sendoff ceremony for the 361st Medical Logistics Company. They're deploying to Afghanistan, and their mission is to assist in the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. How long, General Keane, do you believe that it will take for us, realistically—forget the timeline that's proposed right now—for the Afghan National Security Forces to fill a role and be able to sustain and keep open those lines of communication, to maintain security within Afghanistan? Or are we repeating what's happening in Iraq?

General KEANE. Yeah. Well, that's a tough question.

Listen, I'm very empathetic to the American people's frustration and many—maybe many of you here in the room today, as well. Look it, we've been at this thing for 13 years. And in 13 years, given the United States, you would think we'd be able to resolve this on favorable terms for ourselves and our National interests. Well, it hasn't happened. The facts are, policy decisions drove the 13-year war. It was policy that drove us to a war in Iraq and put Afghanistan on a diet for over 8 years. We never got back to it again until 2009, when the current President made a decision to increase the forces in Afghanistan.

But, the—here's the problem we've got, Senator. When we increased those forces in Afghanistan, the so-called "Afghanistan surge," McChrystal and Petraeus got 25 percent less than what they needed to do the job. As a result of that, we were never able to apply the surge forces in the eastern part of Afghanistan as we did so successfully in the south. Another policy decision pulled those forces out, over the objection of then-General Petraeus serving in Afghanistan, in our judgment, prematurely, and no application of surge forces whatsoever dealt with the Haqqani Network in the east. The facts are, the Haqqani Network is in those safe havens in the east, they're embedded in there, and the Afghan National Security Forces—this is my judgment—does not have the capability, currently, to be able to deal with that harsh reality.

What makes this so serious strategically inside Afghanistan is Kabul's presence to the Haqqani Network. Everything that gets lit

up in Kabul is done by the Haqqani Network, and they are in the environs right now with support infrastructure surrounding Kabul.

The only thing that we can do to change that dimension is, one, increase the capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces—and, by God, we've got to hold them at 352-. Anybody coming to you and telling you that we should put the Afghan National Security Forces on a decline after 2016 is absolutely foolish and irresponsible in that recommendation. So, we have to hold to that line, and this Congress has got to fund it. It's got to probably fund it for at least 4 or 5 more years after we pull out of there. Otherwise, we really don't have a chance.

Second, we have got to step up to what two Presidents have failed to do, and that is deal with these sanctuaries in Pakistan from which intelligence, support, and training for operations inside Afghanistan comes. This is Afghan Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan. And specifically, the Haqqani Network should be targeted just like al-Qaeda. We will—in targeting them, we will disrupt it, disrupt their command and control, and disrupt their operations. Then we begin to have a chance.

Second, we cannot pull out our counterterrorism forces at 2016. These are the guys who chased down high-value targets. When we did that in Iraq in 2011, it was a disaster. When al-Qaeda began to rise because we pulled out the intelligence capability to see it, we didn't have—we couldn't see it, and we couldn't hit it. If we do that in Afghanistan, I think it's a death knell for Afghanistan.

Yes, 13 years is a very long time to be there. But, to squander those gains in the face of what we're dealing with makes no sense to me. I don't know how long we would need to keep those troops there. Right now, the plan is to pull them out after 2016. We are talking, likely, a number around 10,000 troops. Most of them would be in the train, assist, and advise role, which means they're not in combat. A very small portion of them would be in combat, and that is our direct-action forces.

I think if we educate and explain to the American people what this really is, I think they could possibly support it, and I would hope the Congress of the United States would support it.

What drives their departure should be conditions on the ground and on the commanders' assessment, as well.

Senator ERNST. Thank you. I do agree. And many sacrifices have been made there, and I think that we are falling into those same mistakes. I would rather see us fully engaged and defeat these threats rather than half-step, which is why we need an all-encompassing national security.

So, thank you, gentlemen, very much.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thanks, to the witnesses, for the excellent testimony. I heard a lot I agreed with, a lot I disagreed with; and, as you say, that's why you're here, to provoke our thinking.

It seems that there are two very solid points of agreement among the three sets of testimony—first, that we are taking a fragmented, reactive approach to global challenges now; and second, that that fragmented approach may be driven, or at least exacerbated, by

budgetary dysfunction and decision—indecision here in Washington. You know, ideally, we would have a strategy, and then we would build a budget to support the strategy. Secondly, we would allow budget to drive strategy. But, we've been letting budgetary indecision drive strategy, which is, by far, the worst thing to do. So, I appreciate your comments about both. And I agree with you, I think our approach is a fragmented one, and I think it's exacerbated by budgetary indecision.

We had a overarching national security strategy, beginning with President Truman deciding to support Greece after World War II, the Truman Doctrine, and it explained a lot of what we did, even things like the creation of the Peace Corps or the race to the Moon. You might like the strategy, or not, but it was a unified strategy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, we went to a reactive, case-by-case. After 9/11, we had a strategy again, which was the war on terror. But, over time, that strategy was not a magnanimous enough, big enough strategy for a nation like us, and I think we've devolved, after 13 years of war and some fatigue, back into the case-by-case approach that is reactive and that is hard for our allies and even our citizens to understand.

It seems like, in the world now, if you look at it in analogy to the post-World War II, it's not a bipolar competition, it's a tripolar one. There are the democracies of the world, led by the United States, but other democracies—India, where the President is visiting now, European nations, South American nations—there are many democracies, and we're the leader. There are the authoritarian nations, with Russia and China chief among them, but North Korea and Iran and other nations in that category. And then there's the jihadists. And the jihadists, some are nations, but many are nonstate actors. And that is a new challenge. So, the competition today is between democracies, authoritarian regimes, and nonstate jihadism, and that makes the challenge of forging a strategy critical. It's difficult, but it's critical. And you've raised important questions for us to grapple with.

One of the things I'd like to ask you is, in tackling the jihadism threat that we have, each of you have been active in battling this threat using military means, but I think we all understand that part of the jihadism accelerant is disaffected young people and the allure of young people into a—kind of a nihilistic jihadist element because of the lack of their own opportunities. What should we be doing to try to counter the radicalization of young people in the region? How can we assist regional actors and others in doing that so that we can shut off the allure and the foreign fighters that are flocking to groups like ISIL?

General MATTIS. Senator, I think that what you have to look at is a definition of the problem that is so rigorous that some of the solutions start coming forward. For example, there are two basic brands of jihadist terrorists. One comes out of Tehran. We know it as Lebanese Hezbollah, declared war on us back in 1983, blew up our Embassy in Beirut, blew up the French paratrooper barracks, the marine barracks, and we've seen them continue to march on basically unchecked by our counterterrorism efforts. The other brand comes from the Sunni. We know it as al-Qaeda and associated movements. And so, as we define these, we don't lump them

together, we don't give them any inadvertent support by giving them a cloak of legitimacy, and then we determine, if they're not—this is not in our best interest, and what is feeding it is not in our best interests—political Islam—then how do we support the countervailing forces?

President al-Sisi's speech on the 1st of January at al-Azar University, where he said, "This has got to end"—he's talking to his own clerics, now—"This has—we've got to quit doing this to the world with—and dressing it up in the guise of Islam." There are people out there—United Arab Emirates, what we in the military call "little Sparta," because they always stuck with us through everything—Jordan—there are countervailing people in the region, leaders in the region, thought leaders in the region, and we should be full—fully in support of them, not—but, if we don't define this threat, break it out, identify the countervailing forces and come up with a strategy that supports exactly what you're talking about, then we'll continue to be spectators as this mutates and grows.

Senator KAINE. Let me ask you this. I think you all are on the same page on another item, which is—Do you all agree that it is a mistake to use a calendar to determine the end date of our Afghanistani involvement rather than an assessment of the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan? Are you all in the same position on that?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir.

General KEANE. Yes, sir.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, I'd like to—certainly, that's the case.

Senator KAINE. Right.

Admiral FALLON. But, I think the—we need a little clarity and definition again, just like Jim tried to draw, between the Iranian-inspired revolutionary—

Senator KAINE. Versus the Sunni.

Admiral FALLON.—jihadists, versus disaffected bubbas, here, who—looking for help.

So, we talk about withdrawal from Afghanistan—and I saw this, at least from my view—we got into the same morass in Iraq a few years ago—so it was this idea that we're in or we're out. You know, we're going to withdraw we're not going to withdraw. I think that the reality is, our best interests are served, not by withdrawing from many places in this world, but from continuing engagement.

So, what we ought to be talking about is—what's already, I believe, put in place—our major combat engagements have ceased and are not likely to be reengaged. However, we ought to be continually engaged with them in assisting them in training and supporting them and, in some areas, using Special Forces in areas that we have capabilities and they do not, when we see things that challenge our interests. So, I think we—we just need to be clear about this. It isn't just "we're in or we're out." We ought to be in, in my opinion, to do certain things, to continue to help this government to move along. And those things are not going to be successful on their own. But, if taken in concert with economic steps and political steps on the government, we may have a chance to actually see a long-term good outcome, here.

Senator KAINE. Right.

Admiral FALLON. But, I think it's this clarity in talk. Just stop the, you know, "blah, blah, blah." Everybody gets confused, we get—end up with nothing. And the media just fuels this, because they'll pick on a specific word somewhere, and here you go.

Senator KAINE. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, thank you. I've really enjoyed this and have gotten a lot out of it, and it's given me a lot to think about, quite frankly.

I just regret—to our media friends who are here, thank you for coming. Maybe if we had Tom Brady, we'd fill up the room. But, that's the world in which we live in. We're talking about consequential things, and we've got a couple of reporters here.

At the end of the day, let's see what we do agree on. This is a generational struggle when it comes to radical Islam, Sunni, and Shi'a. Do you all agree? Somebody will be dealing with this long after most of us are gone. But, over time, we win, they lose, right?

Admiral FALLON. If we can come up with a strategy for—

Senator GRAHAM. Let me tell you why I think they lose. What they're selling, very few people actually want to buy. The ace in the hole for all of us, ladies and gentlemen, is that the radical Islamic view of life is not embraced by most people in the religion. We just need to provide them the capacity to fight back over there so we can be protected here. Does that make sense? Now, how do you do that?

Sequestration. Do you all agree that it should be, if not repealed, replaced?

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. All agree. If we don't replace sequestration, our capability to deal with the National security threats you've described is greatly diminished. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. The enemy is on the rise, and our capabilities are going down. Is that a correct assessment?

General MATTIS. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree that our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies are on a path to reduce their capability, not increase it?

General KEANE. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. So, we've got two things going on. We've got the enemy on the rise, we've got America cutting her budget, and we've got our NATO allies reducing theirs—budgets to help us as partners. Is that a formula for disaster?

Admiral FALLON. Pretty close.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The 150 account. General Mattis, you said, if we cut State Department funding in our developmental accounts under the 150 account, Foreign Assistance, you'd better—you'll need more ammunition. Do you still agree with that?

General MATTIS. I do, sir. We need a comprehensive approach.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you agree with that, General Keane?

General KEANE. Yeah.

Senator GRAHAM. Admiral Fallon?

Admiral FALLON. For sure. Can I give you an example of something?

Senator GRAHAM. Sure, please.

Admiral FALLON. Back when I was at CENTCOM, one of my frustrations was an inability to delegate enough time to engage in Central Asia. And what I saw, back in those times there, about a half-dozen years ago, was that we had people who were looking for something other than what they had—the Soviet Union. They were concerned about being in a squeeze between a resurgent Russia and China, and we were kind of a lifeline. And we had almost no engagement, because we didn't have the resources, the interest, the time to devote to things like telling people what things are really like in America. You know, we used to have these——

Senator GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

Admiral FALLON.—kind of storefront shops that——

Senator GRAHAM. Well, I——

Admiral FALLON.—used diplomatic engagement. That's all disappeared.

Senator GRAHAM. I don't—I couldn't agree with you more, but Africa—we have a very light military footprint in Africa. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. Very much so.

Senator GRAHAM. It's a continent very much up in the air, in terms of how it will turn out with the 21st century.

I just want the members of the committee to know that I am the chairman of the Foreign Operations Account. And if you think sequestration is bad for the military, you ought to see what it does to our capability to engage the world peacefully. It absolutely destroys it, which is insane. We've—on the verge of eradicating malaria, not—well, we're making great progress in AIDS and malaria and polio; and all this stuff really does matter, in my view.

Iraq. General Mattis, how many marines did we have in the second battle of Fallujah to retake Fallujah, do you remember?

General MATTIS. In the second battle, sir, it probably would have been somewhere around—including the supporting elements, firing and support, that sort of thing—probably around 10,000.

Senator GRAHAM. So, we had Army personnel to assist in there, is that correct?

General MATTIS. Absolutely. They were significant Army support.

Senator GRAHAM. So, Fallujah is one-tenth the size of Mosul. Is that right, General Keane? Fallujah is about one-tenth——

How in the world do we go into Fallujah—excuse me—Mosul—if the past is any indication of the future, if we had 10,000 marines—and I think it was about 9,000, actually—engaged in helping the Iraqi Security Forces liberate Fallujah from al-Qaeda in Iraq, who I think is weaker than ISIL—how in the world do we do this in Mosul without a larger American component? Can you envision that being successful without more American help, General Keane?

General KEANE. I don't know for sure. I mean, as I said in my remarks, we are advising, training, and assisting an indigenous force. We made a policy decision not to commit ground combat force to do that. I basically agree with that decision.

Senator GRAHAM. I'm not saying that we need—you said we need brigades in the ready in Kuwait.

General KEANE. I believe——

Senator GRAHAM. You said——

General KEANE. I——

Senator GRAHAM. Excuse me.

General KEANE. If——

Senator GRAHAM. You said we needed people on the front lines, embedded in Iraqi units. Is that correct?

General KEANE. Absolutely.

Senator GRAHAM. What number does that come out to, in your mind?

General KEANE. Well, I think we get very close to a number, in train and assist and advising, something close to 10,000.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.

General KEANE. And——

Senator GRAHAM. I just——

General KEANE.—not the few hundred that we're currently doing. I'm talking about front-line advisors with companies and battalions——

Senator GRAHAM. I got you, and I've got 30 seconds left.

So, we've got 3,000 on the ground today. We need 10,000, in your view. I think that's correct. If we lose in Mosul—if we take ISIL on and lose, that's a bad day for all of us. Do you agree? You've got to take these guys on and win. All of you agree? Don't take them on if you can't win.

Syria. Do you all—how many of you support a no-fly zone, a buffer zone to allow the Free Syrian Army——

General KEANE. I do.

Senator GRAHAM. General Mattis, no?

General MATTIS. Not until we figure out what we want the end state to look like.

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough.

Admiral?

Admiral FALLON. No, I've been a part of a 10-year effort in Iraq that ended up being——

Senator GRAHAM. So——

Admiral FALLON.—basically, wasted.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Let me just ask this simple question. One of the reasons that ISIL was defeated in Khobani—and I want to tip my hat to the Kurds and to our coalition forces—is that you had the Kurds fighting ISIL on the ground, and you had American air power. What happens if we send the Free Syrian Army, trained up, into Syria to fight ISIL and we don't neutralize Assad's air power? Do you not believe that he will engage the Free Syrian Army through the air? How do they survive if he does that?

General KEANE. Well, the facts are, he's engaging the Free Syrian Army right now. The Free Syrian Army today, on the ground——

You know what's so frustrating about this? When the moderate rebels took on Assad's regime, back in 2010—do you remember this? They had the momentum. There were many predicting that the regime was about to fall. What happened? What happened? This is what happened. The Iranians jumped in with 5,000 Hezbollah out of Lebanon. They jumped in with 3,000 Quds Force, plus they had top leaders on the ground to assist, and Russian air-

planes flying in with Iranian airplanes with military supplies, every single day. The Free Syrian Army came to us, the momentum shifted, and they said, "What?" And many of you were on their dance card when they came to town here. I—even I was on it, as probably my two colleagues? What did they want? They wanted simply this, "We need arms to be able to stop anti—tank systems and antiaircraft systems to shoot down those airplanes. We don't need your troops, we don't even need your air power. Let us fight this war ourselves. We think we can win it." And we said no. We have never recovered from that decision.

That decision was revisited again with strong feelings by Petraeus, Clinton, Panetta, and Dempsey in 2012. Took it to the White House, said, "This is what we've got to do." Petraeus vetted that force as the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] Director. The President said no. We have never recovered from that decision.

General MATTIS. I think we may have missed the opportunity to work with the Free Syrian Army. They've been ground down between——

Senator GRAHAM. Right.

General MATTIS.—al-Nusra and——

Senator GRAHAM. Right.

General MATTIS.—ISIS, on one side, Assad on the other. I—we may—we're going to have to really look at what options we have, sir.

Admiral FALLON. The only comment I'd make is that we can sit here and wring our hands and bemoan the past in lots of situations. We need to deal with the present. So, for now, forget the past, except for lessons learned for new strategies, but we need to figure out what it's going to take right now to move forward.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, let me tell you what I think the presence is—present—is that Syria and Iraq are great platforms to attack the United States. And if we keep screwing around with this, and these guys get stronger and, a year from now, they're still in place, we're going to get hit. It's time to put these guys on the run with a regional force that we complement.

Because let me tell you about the end game, General Mattis. The end game is, America's going to get attacked if we don't deal with the threat in Iraq and Syria. That—do you agree with that?

General MATTIS. One-hundred percent, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Donnelly.

Senator DONNELLY. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And I want to thank all of you for your extraordinary service. We are so much in your debt.

And America has already been attacked, in that we have lost a number of our young people already to ISIL. Tragically, in my home State. And this is—they've said they're a caliphate, which means they either grow or they go. And in Iraq, I would like to get your best ideas. General Keane, you're—you were really influential in working with the Sunni community there and in trying to push back, before. How do we coordinate with them, work with them, to push ISIS out of Iraq and then to get them in Syria? And then I'd like to, obviously, hear from General Mattis and Admiral Fallon, because of your hard work in this, as well.

General KEANE. Well, you know, when you think about the Sunnis, I mean, the Sunni tribes are not a homogeneous organization, to say the least, and all of us are very familiar with it at this table.

Senator DONNELLY. Right.

General KEANE. So, we have irreconcilable Sunni tribes—many of them are part of the former Saddam Hussein regime elements—who are fighting with ISIS, and they will continue to fight with ISIS. The rest of them, by and large, are reconcilable. And what happened before in Iraq informs of this. When they pushed back against al-Qaeda, beginning in Anbar Province, and moved into Diyala Province and other places where Sunnis lived—they know they have made a bed with strange fellows, here. They know that it's not in their interest to support the long-term objective of ISIS, which—ISIS wants to govern the populations it controls, and impose seventh-century Talibanism on it.

Right now in Mosul—this is what life is like—all universities and school systems are shut down. The only schools that are operating are the madrassas, indoctrinating radical Islamists, ISIS believes, and a medical school that they—they're forcing students into to become doctors to take care of their wounded.

Second, they do not run government services very well. Garbage is on the streets. Other government services aren't provided. The people in Mosul are not recreating at all, they're not even socializing with extended family members who don't live in their immediate vicinity. Life as they knew it—teeming marketplaces, traffic jams, a thriving community—is gone.

Senator DONNELLY. So, how would you push them——

General KEANE. So, what we know——

Senator DONNELLY. And I apologize if you already answered——

General KEANE. We know that that exists. We know that ISIS and reconcilable Sunnis are on a collision course. What we have to do is incentivize them more than what we are doing now, to get at your question.

One of the things we can do. Obviously, Abadi is key to this, as Admiral Fallon laid out. And I strongly support that.

Second, where—we need to go into Anbar Province—and we have some plans for this—to train and arm the Sunni tribes. But, we've got to take another step with that. We've got to be willing to be on the ground with them when they take the fight to ISIS. We need advisors with them. We need people to help coordinate fire support and close air support with them. That will incentivize them. We need to help to accelerate that timetable for them.

The thing that we have working for us—again, to emphasize this—is ISIS itself. But, here's the problem we have. The political leadership in Iraq does not want to wait, because the pressure they have on them from the people in Mosul—and the conditions that I am describing to you are very real, and they are accountable to those conditions—they want to go faster. The United States is pulling back and saying we're not ready. The military in Iraq wants to go faster, because it's answering to its national leadership. We're not ready to do this yet. I'm not certain we're going to be ready to do it by the summer. And——

Senator DONNELLY. Well——

General KEANE.—the reason is, we're not applying enough resources to it, Senator.

Senator DONNELLY. I was just going to ask you. Are we not ready because we don't have the ability to do it or because we don't have the plan to do what's necessary?

General KEANE. Well, mostly, I believe—listen, we can craft a counteroffensive plan to take back Mosul and also to take back Anbar Province. We know how to do that. That's tacking up the two great biblical river valleys. Most of this is about resources and dealing with what most of us believe is a relatively weak indigenous hand on the ground that we're playing. If you've got a weak hand, then we should be strengthening that hand, not with the minimum amount of resources, but with all the resources it takes to strengthen that hand. And we're not doing that.

Senator DONNELLY. Well, here's my fear, is that this is a hotbed. This is where they are communicating with people in our country to attack us, in Syria and in Iraq and with ISIS. And if we have resources, they ought to be used in this area, it seems to me, that we either eliminate them or there's going to be a catastrophe in our own country.

I would like to hear what you think about how we start to go on the move in Syria, as well.

General Mattis?

General MATTIS. Senator, the first thing—we don't lack military capability. It's been—sequestration has stressed it. What we lack is the political will and the definition of the political end state. If we get—if we figure out whose side we're on, here, then when you look at what Maliki did to break trust with those tribes, I think the new Prime Minister has probably got a 50–50 chance of restoring that trust. It's hard. Putting in the Sunni Minister of Defense was a great step, I think. But, we're going to have to decide if—what the end state is, and then we're going to have to commit resources that we've not committed yet.

Senator DONNELLY. I am out of time, but I just want to thank all of you for coming here today, for continuing your service, because the people of our country continue to need your help. Thank you very much.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Sullivan.

Senator SULLIVAN. I, also, want to thank you, gentlemen, for your—for being here today, your great service, tremendous service to our country.

So, I think there's broad agreement that seems, certainly among the three of you, I think among all the panelists here, on the importance of a comprehensive strategy that integrates all elements of American power, all of our resources. And we've talked about economic, we've talked about diplomatic, we've talked about finance. Certainly, we are focused on military.

One instrument of American power, though, that we haven't really discussed, hasn't really come up in the conversations yet—and maybe it's because, 10 years ago, it didn't exist as an instrument of power—is American energy. As you know, we are once again on the verge, if we haven't already gotten there, on being the world's energy superpower, a position that we used to occupy, several decades ago. And now we're back. Oil, gas, renewables.

And, from the perspective of dealing with long-term national security threats, whether it's Iran, whether it's Russia, whether it's China, whether it's ISIS—I just want to start with two questions for you, General Keane. How critical and beneficial do you think it is, in dealing with these longer-term threats, that we now have a tremendous resource in America, which is energy, that—not only for our own citizens, but that we can be exporting to our allies? And do you think it undermines America's security when we undertake policies, as the current administration does on a regular basis—this weekend is another example—where we undermine policies that enable us to responsibly develop our own energy resources that can benefit us as a nation and our National security?

General KEANE. Well, certainly, energy independence for the United States and the rapid growth that's taken place, you know, most recently, is certainly an added measure of our National security. And I'm delighted to see it. And my own view of it—I'm not an energy expert—is that certainly we should do whatever we can to ensure that independence—and I'm convinced we can still protect the environment while we're doing it.

Its relationship to the world is significant. I mean, you hit on it. Europeans are tied like an umbilical cord to Putin and Russia because of the energy dependence. We can help with that if we changed our policies, in terms of particularly exporting natural gas, as you know.

But, also we have to be realistic. Radical Islam and what is taking place in these countries, laid out on this map, is a fundamental geopolitical movement, and they're operating in countries where there are not democracies and where there are significant conditions that have—providing a groundswell for this kind of activity. They would be doing that, regardless of Saudi oil, or not. That—we've got to understand that. So, if we pull the plug of any dependence in the Middle East on oil, which we're on the way to doing, it doesn't change the harsh reality of Iran's march to regional domination and radical Islamist march to geopolitical control of Muslim countries. That's still there, and that threat to Europe and to the United States as a result of it would exist, regardless.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.

I'd like to move from the strategic to the tactical. I've had the honor, the last 18 months, as serving as a commanding officer of 6 ANGLICO in the Marine Corps Forces Reserves. In fact, I was just out with some of my ANGLICO marines, Fort Lewis, Washington, this past weekend.

General Mattis, the marines of 6 ANGLICO send their greetings.

As you know, that mission is—of the ANGLICO units is to deploying small forces with foreign armies, calling airstrikes, other supporting arms.

General Mattis, this question is for you. To make progress on the ground against ISIL, is there any scenario that you could see that would not include integrated supporting arms firepower? And are there foreign forces that can do that, or is that something that is an area that is pretty much needed to have American troops, whether ANGLICO units or Special Forces units, doing that kind of mission?

General MATTIS. Senator, there are other forces—the Australians, Canadians, British, French—that can do the close-air coordination integration, but no one has the capacity or probably the frequency of training that permits us to do it best. I would only suggest that, as you look at this and the kind of forces that can work with allies, this committee should prioritize them, whether they be the Army Green Berets, the Marines ANGLICO, and even to the point of looking at our Army brigades today, our Marine battalions, differently than we looked at them as just conventional warfighters 10 years ago. They have capabilities to do much of this and to give a—kind of steel the spine of the allied forces if we have the political will to put them in.

Senator SULLIVAN. Great. Thank you very much.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Hirono.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

And I want to thank all three of you for your very substantive and provocative testimony.

General Keane, you described life in Mosul, where schools are just set up to radicalize the population, where just everyday life has changed. And one wonders how long ISIL can so-called “govern” in this way. So, you’re indicating that we need to be—“we,” the United States—should have people on the ground, not in—boots on the ground, when the people in Iraq finally get to the point where they want to fight ISIL. Now, the question becomes, then, When is that time? And would you say that that is perhaps a major role for our intelligence community, to inform us as to when that critical point is that we need to be there to help the people fight back?

And I’d also like to ask that question of General Keane, because, General Keane, you noted the importance of our intelligence community in establishing priorities.

General KEANE. Yeah, the—listen, that’s a very tough question, Senator. The only thing I can—in helping you with that, is just look back a little bit.

We had an insurgency begin in Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003. The al-Qaeda—led by Saddam Hussein and his people—the al-Qaeda fell in on that very quickly. And then in 2006, some 2 and a half, 3 years later, Sunni tribes began to—who were aligned with them initially—began to push back. And much of it was literally driven by women, frankly, because the women were putting pressure on the tribal leaders, that they did not want their children and their grandchildren to live like this for generations to come, with seventh-century Talibanism, under the foot of what al-Qaeda was doing, controlling every aspect of their life, from diet to costume, behavior, Shari’ah law, et cetera.

That frustration is already there. I do believe that, given the fact that, particularly in Anbar Province, this has existed before, the accelerant will be faster and not take 3 years.

I’m going to make an assumption that our intelligence community, with the use of informants and others, are monitoring what is taking place, and we have some sense of what the conditions are, and, more importantly, what the attitude and behavior are of the people, themselves.

But, let's also be honest, that there's just so much those people in Mosul will be able to do against a well-armed and well-equipped force, as ISIS is, in Mosul and in its suburbs. To eject them out of there will take a conventional military force to do that, supported by air power and some pretty good intelligence on where people are.

The attitude and support of the people will be a factor, but I don't believe, in of itself, it will be decisive. What will be decisive is the use of military force to defeat that military organization that's there.

Senator HIRONO. And the conventional military force should be the Iraqi military, themselves, with——

General KEANE. Yes.

Senator HIRONO.—possible air support from——

General KEANE. Yes——

Senator HIRONO.—from allies.

General KEANE.—very much so. Well, it's—Peshmerga, as you know, who is the militia from Kurdistan, who have the will to fight, and the skill—they don't have all the weapons they need—Iraqi Army—and, by the way, the Iraqi Army probably is in a little bit better shape, based on some recent reports I just got this week-end from people who returned, than many of the media reports are suggesting. But, second—and thirdly would be the Sunni tribes.

Now, the Shi'a militia are a part of this, and they have strengthened the Iraqi Army very considerably. The best fighters in the Shi'a militia are Iranian-backed Shi'a militia.

Senator HIRONO. General, I'm sorry to cut you off.

General KEANE. Go ahead, I'll stop.

Senator HIRONO. I have a couple of other questions, particularly with reference to the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific.

And, General Mattis, I think you indicated in your testimony the importance of the Navy. And clearly, Admiral Fallon, you have a familiarity with what's going on in the Asia-Pacific area, because of your previous position.

So, the Navy is intending to put 60 percent of our ships in the Asia-Pacific area. So, for the two of you, I'd like to know, How is this viewed by China? How is it—how is this kind of resource placement, due to our rebalance, seen by our allies and by our enemies? Just very briefly, if—please comment.

General MATTIS. Senator, I think, very briefly—this is a little bit speculative, now—I think 60 percent of too few is probably still too few. But, I think that anything we can do to reassure our ally that their economic, territorial future is not going to be under the veto of the Chinese would be welcome out in the Pacific.

Senator HIRONO. Admiral Fallon?

Admiral FALLON. Aloha, Senator.

Senator HIRONO. Aloha.

Admiral FALLON. I think this whole discussion of the pivot has been distorted and not handled particularly well at all. So, just a couple of facts:

So, 60 percent versus 50 percent, which is what we in the Navy—and we'll just stick to the Navy now—the Navy was pretty well split 50–50 during the cold war. As soon as the cold war ended, internal Navy leadership started to press to rebalance, way

before this became a recent political slogan, and—because it made sense, because of the vast size of the Pacific, and so forth. But, that 10 percent, if you just take one denomination—aircraft carriers—that’s one aircraft carrier, based on today’s fleet. And, by the way, that carrier is already in the Pacific. So, much of this is just chatter, pretty mindless. Again, take another measure, the entire fleet, at 280 ships, 10 percent of that’s 28. So, what are we really talking about? Not a whole lot.

But, the perceptions are all over the place. And, depending on who you are and in what country you are in Asia—if you’re Chinese, you use this as a great example of, “See? We knew that you guys are coming to, you know, encircle us. It’s yet another blah, blah, blah,” and a justification, in some respects, for them to push to increase their military capabilities.

So, I think it’s a—it’s overblown. The reality is, we need to be engaged in the Far East, in the Asia-Pacific. And, given the size and scope of the place, it makes all the sense in the world to have our fleet tilted that way, given the realities in the world. We need to work very closely with our long-term allies out there—the Japanese, the Australians, and others, and those who support us. But, at the same time, we have got to work this difficult task of trying to figure out how we collaborate, in ways that make sense, with the Chinese for the long term. It’s a huge country, huge impact, blah, blah, blah. You know the impact economically in this country.

And so, we don’t need to have another cold war. We don’t need to have another road to conflict with these guys. We have very interesting, deep relationships in every aspect, except the military-to-military. That’s where the emphasis needs to be. I think our leadership, particularly the military leadership in our country, is working this right now, and we need to continue it.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much.

My time is up.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Tillis.

Senator TILLIS. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership and your extraordinary record of service.

General Mattis, you made a comment that we seem to be at about a low point with our Middle East policy or effectiveness over the last four decades. Can you point to anything, say, over the last 6 or 8 years, that you think is something positive that we’ve done that we should build on, and in the context of the number of things that you’ve said that are not working?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I can. We’ve been somewhat in a strategy-free environment for quite some time. It didn’t start with this administration. And so, we’ve been wandering. We have policies that go on and come off. But, I think if you were to look at the fact that Maliki was pushed out of office, with our full support there inside Baghdad, I think that was a positive step. We cannot get Iraq to fight this enemy when they have a Prime Minister who’s basically declared Kurds and Sunni persona non grata in their own country. I think the engagement—the President going to Saudi Arabia as we speak is certainly a positive point.

You know, I’d have to think more, Senator, but I’ll take it for the record. If I think of something more, I’ll get back to you. We’ve dis-

appointed a lot of friends out there, from Tel Aviv to Riyadh, from Abu Dhabi to Cairo.

Senator TILLIS. General Keane, you mentioned the need to equate, I think, radical Islamists to Nazis and Communists of the past. Why do you think it's important to use those words? And why do you think it's dangerous not to?

General KEANE. Well, I use it because it's something we coped with in the past rather successfully, and they were ideologies, themselves, you know, that another generation had to deal with. We built—we beat Naziism with brute force. And I think Communist ideology that expresses simplistically—it's only more sophisticated than that—but, simplistically, I think we beat it with better ideas. I think it's a combination of both of those that we need, to deal with radical Islam. We obviously need to use force. But, that alone will not solve this problem.

And it—the ideology also has to be dealt with. After all, what they are running from and why they do not want the United States in the region, it's not because—just because of our guns. It's because of our ideas. It's democracy and capitalism that is an anathema to them, and they don't want our ideas polluting those governments that they're attempting to overthrow so that they move in a direction of those ideas.

So, that's why I used that, because we want to run from the ideological aspect of this thing, and you have to face it, and you have to explain it, and you have to undermine it, and you have to counter it.

Senator TILLIS. Admiral Fallon?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I think that one of the problems today with this radical jihadist stuff is that we give it unmerited credibility. I don't view this problem in the same context as I view, for example, the need to make sure this country is fundamentally sound in its political, economic, and other aspects going forward for our future, nor do I think that it's in the same relative merit as our long-term relationship with China.

And the extent to which we hype everything that seems to happen with these characters, I think, is one of the reasons why they're attractive to the disenfranchised and the folks who are struggling in other countries that see this as a chance to gain glory and go help out the crusade.

So, I think we'd be well served to try to tamp this stuff down. This army, if you would, in Iraq and Syria is certainly not the 82nd Airborne or the 1st Marine Division, by any means. It's a pickup band of jihadists that share blah, blah, blah—we've gone through that. They are not in the same league with our capabilities. And I think the extent to which we continue to hype them is really counterproductive to what we're doing, or what we should be doing.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you.

You know, there's been a lot of discussion in the Middle East. Some of you touched, in your opening statements, on Russia's incursions. What more attention should we focus on, and what should we expect, if you had a crystal ball, to see in the Ukraine and other areas in that region if we don't act? What specific steps should we be taking, beyond what we've done, to send the message—we talked about economic actions, but other actions—to send the mes-

sage to the Russians that what they're doing is unacceptable and that we're better positioned to react to them?

General KEANE. Well, I said—mentioned some of those in my remarks. I think we have to admit that—to ourselves, that our diplomatic efforts, using sanctions as the mainstream, have certainly not dissuaded Putin from what he's attempting to achieve, what I think is a new political order in Eastern Europe, post-cold war. You know, whether he's a strategic thinker or a tactical thinker and he's impulsive and he reacts to sort of current events, I think, is beside the point. I don't think we should waste a lot of time about that. I mean, the fact of the matter is, he is acting, and he is taking advantage of the situation. It is a huge opportunity for him. He senses that Europe has feckless leadership and is probably not going to respond. And he also puts the United States in that category. And he's advantaging himself as a result of it.

What do we have to do? We have to convince him that we're serious, that NATO really matters to us, that Eastern Europe does really matter to us. Otherwise, I think he keeps coming. And certainly, we want to avoid a military conflict with them. And I think there are steps that we can prudently take to do that. One is what was discussed before about helping with energy and removing some of the energy dependence that the Europeans have on them. But, second, listen, the threat has shifted. So, we have a threat in Eastern Europe, on NATO's eastern flank. Let's shift NATO forces to that area, not just temporarily in and out, but let's put some permanent bases there and demonstrate to him that Article 5 really does matter.

I'm absolutely convinced, in his conference room, he has people sitting around the table with him saying, "Do we really believe that Anglo-America will respond to a threat that we impose with disguised soldiers in Estonia?" And they're answering that question. But, we don't want that question on the table. We want to take that question off the table. And I think we can do that.

Now, whether we put the missile defense back into where we took it out at the beginning of this administration, I think that needs to be relooked. I'm not confident that that was all right, to begin with, dealing with what that threat was. It was the Iranian ballistic missile threat. So, I think that needs to be relooked, in terms of where we place it.

But, certainly, it is a disgrace that we haven't been able to provide arms to the Ukrainians, who want to push back and have a history of courageous military interaction to protect their own people. They're not asking for anything else. They're not asking for our troops, they're not asking for air power. All they wanted was some weapons. And we've stiffed them on it. Makes no sense to me whatsoever. What a message that sends to Putin. It's not surprising he's on the move again in eastern Ukraine.

The—our diplomatic efforts have not worked, because they don't have anything behind it. We need to put some things on the table that will strengthen our diplomatic efforts, and we haven't been doing that.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Manchin.

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you very much.

Let me thank all three of you for your service, but, more importantly, for the testimonies you've given today. You've been very frank and direct.

I think that what General Fallon said—Admiral Fallon said, basically, is, we have to deal with the future in what we're doing today and what we're going to do in the future. But, hindsight being 20–20, you know, you look at the All-Volunteer military that we have today—I run into an awful lot of people in our little State of West Virginia who have served because they were drafted or because they enlisted, but they were serving. Today, that's less likely, with the volunteer, and they all believe that if we had had some intermingling of a volunteer versus draft, that we wouldn't have had a 13-year war, we've had better decisions, better direction, if you will, because the people would have demanded it.

Hindsight being 20–20—I get this question asked a lot—we took out Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Should we have ever entered Iraq? Should we have declared war on Iraq? And we went in and took him out. Is Iraq better, safer than it was before? Qadhafi, we took Qadhafi out. Is Libya in better shape than it was before? And now we're in this thrones of Syria. What do we do in Syria? Do we take out Assad? And what would that leave in Syria?

Also, we're going to be dealing the fact—do we sign on with the sanctions of Iran, double down? Do we give the President the ability to negotiate up to March 24th, then double down?

And you all have been forthright with some of your comments, and I'd love to know what you think about the—first of all, Iraq. Should we, or should we have not? Should we in Syria? And how much effect do you think we'll have trying to find people that'll fight. ISIL will then turn and fight Assad. And our commitment—as I'm understanding it, the Saudis and the Turks and everybody else want us to commit to fighting and taking out Assad if they're going to help us fight and take out ISIL.

So, with that, I'll open the door and see where you all go with it. And we'll just start down the row—down the aisle—we'll start with you, Admiral Fallon, first.

Admiral FALLON. Well, Senator, I would not go back and speculate on the merits of how good or how bad each of those decisions were, based on where we are, except to say that—

Senator MANCHIN. Well, the reason I've asked that, sir, is because we have to make a decision of—Syria is close to making that same decision. Do you learn from whatever we've done?

Admiral FALLON. So—

Senator MANCHIN. Okay.

Admiral FALLON. So, I think the lesson I would take is, okay, we made a decision, and where are we now?

Senator MANCHIN. Gotcha.

Admiral FALLON. And, you know, what are the chances that we're going to be in a different place if we take a similar decision, whatever.

But, I'd like to go back, if I could, to your opening comment, because I think it's the most important thing, to me, that—maybe not the most important—the thing that concerns me the most for the long term as I look at our country and our ability to address national security issues and the future health of this nation. And that

is the very, very small percentage of this population that is in any way, shape, or form actively engaged with the uniformed services. So, we got a lot of rhetoric in the last, you know, half-dozen years or so about this, but, as we go forward, what I see that really concerns me is that there's a growing gap between the few that are actively engaged in this—and I get the feeling that a lot of people kind of think, "That's just—it's a job. You know, this is their job. They're going to go fight this thing." So, is that what we really want to have in this country? And are—do you think we're going to make better decisions if we have that view, that we have this paid professional army that goes off and takes care of business while everybody else does their own thing? I think that's a huge problem, and we ignore it at our peril.

Thank you, sir.

Senator MANCHIN. General Keane?

General KEANE. Yeah. Starting with the All-Volunteer Force, I served, as Jim and Fox did also, in a draft military, and transitioned to our Volunteer Force, post-Vietnam. And, as a result of that, I think, by anybody's judgment, that force is probably the best this country has ever put together, and there's nothing quite like it anywhere else in the world. I attribute that to a couple of reasons. One, the force looks like America in its diversity, ethnicity, et cetera. And, two, they want to be there, and they want to accept the burden and the responsibility that goes with it.

In that draft military, we had so many there that didn't want to be there, it was frustrating to deal with them. We did a lot of social rehabilitation for people. I don't believe that's what a global power is about, frankly. I think the skills that are needed of the military today, it's a prerequisite that we have the kind of people in the organization that are willing to make the sacrifice.

I accept what Fox is saying. I have similar concerns. One percent are involved, and, you know, we've grown apart from the American people as a result of a Volunteer Force. But, nonetheless, I don't think going back to revisit the draft and conscription is the answer to that.

Second, on Iraq and Syria, Iraq itself—I was a four-star at the time. I didn't think we should—I was shocked that, in the first week in December of 2001, we had made the decision to go to war in Iraq. Just after we toppled the Taliban, I was asking the question, "Why?" and "When?"—et cetera. I could see the need for it, at some point, certainly, because of the WMD issue, but I—my view at that time was to stay on top of the al-Qaeda, which was the reason we were in Afghanistan, and run these guys into every hole that they're in until we get rid of them. That's kind of where I was. And if that meant dealing with Pakistan and their resistance, so what? But, after what took place here, that was my motivation.

In Syria, listen, Syria is as complex a thing as we've had on our plate. And you can be on any side of this issue and make reasonable sense. The only thing that concerns me about this—and I respect Jim when he says, "I want to know what the political end state is." I think what we try to achieve in Syria is, Assad goes, some form of that government stays, in partnership with moderate forces, to help run that country. So, you're looking towards a political solution.

But, I just know that we're on a collision course that—right now in Syria, with ISIS expanding control and dominance inside the country at the same time we're trying to push back on them with our ground forces that's being pounded by the Assad regime. And if we continue to let that happen, the Free Syrian Army and the force that we're trying to support is going to go away. And that's the reality of it. Do you do something about that? Do you try to make some attempts to do that, dealing with all of the geopolitical complications that that entails? My answer to that is yes. I think we should try.

And listen, it is hard. I'm not suggesting it's not. But, like most human endeavors, it's not hopeless, either.

Senator MANCHIN. Madam Chair, may I just indulge and ask the—General Mattis if he would—

General MATTIS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MANCHIN.—on the volunteer versus the—

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Sir, I think the Volunteer Force has been good for the military. I think it's been bad for the country.

I would only add, on the decision to invade a country, to go into a—I don't know what our policy is on Syria, I don't know what the political end state is that people want to accomplish. And if you wander into a war without knowing that, you're probably going to get lost on your way to somewhere.

I would just tell you that the—we should never go into these countries unless we have a reasonable chance of a better outcome. And war is fundamentally unpredictable, so that means a long-term commitment with a clear political end state and a fully resourced, sound strategy to get there. And otherwise, don't go in and then look at Libya in your rearview mirrors, anywhere else, and wonder what you've done.

Senator MANCHIN. Thanks, Madam Chair.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, could—I don't want to leave this with the impression that I endorse a return to conscription. I don't, at all. But, I think that we ought to be seriously considering how we motivate people for service in this country, not just in the military, but in a range of things. But, the way we're headed right now causes me a lot of concern.

Senator MANCHIN. I keep thinking it can be a blend between the volunteer that we have now, with a pool of—draft, if you will—or—

Admiral FALLON. If we had a—an atmosphere in which we encouraged service in this country, I think we'd have no difficulty filling the ranks of the Armed Forces with people that would volunteer. If that were the mindset of the majority of the people in this country.

Senator MANCHIN. Well, people have just said that, basically, if we had—if we showed the volunteer—if we had an All-Volunteer Army during Vietnam, we'd still be in Vietnam.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator King.

Senator KING. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Somebody asked me, up in Maine recently, what my job consisted of. And I thought for a minute, and I said, "It's applied history with a minor in communications." And your testimony today has been ample evidence that this is really all about history. And I've got a lot of favorite quotes from Mark Twain, but my alltime favorite is

that, "History doesn't always repeat itself, but it usually rhymes." And that's what we're talking about here today.

Talking about history. Would you all agree—and I don't need lengthy answers—that leaving Afghanistan prematurely would be a major strategic mistake for this country?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir.

General KEANE. Yes.

Senator KING. Admiral Fallon? You agree?

Admiral FALLON. Yes.

Senator KING. I—to me, it's—given all the progress—and I don't think the American people realize the amount of progress that's been made in Afghanistan, in terms of the lives of the people. It's fumbling the ball on the 5 yardline. And a modest additional commitment, in terms of people and treasure, would maintain those benefits. And I think—General Keane, you testified—without that, it's lost.

Admiral FALLON. I think one of our problems—the legacy in Afghanistan is that we've already done this twice, been there and bailed out. And there's a lot of concern that we could do it again.

Senator KING. Well, particularly when we finally have a leader in the country that we can work with and has some hope of real political leadership in the country.

Second question. I couldn't help but hear echos—General Keane, particularly in your testimony—we're talking about ISIS, we're talking about radical Islam, and the—all the language could be applied to the Communists in the 1940s and 1950s—a radical ideology that was bent on world domination, putting America out of business, all of those kinds of things. The strategy then was essentially containment. We never invaded Russia. We didn't have direct military confrontation. But, the—George Kennan's famous strategy was containment until eventually it imploded because of—its ideas weren't as good as ours. Isn't that a guide, anyway, for a strategy with regard to this threat that we're facing today?

General KEANE. Well, I definitely agree with the—what a broad strategy and the political and military alliances that we form to deal with it. But, the facts are, this movement has attacked us, and it's crushing our interests in the region, as well, by physical means. So, that has changed the dimension of it quite a bit.

Senator KING. General Mattis?

General MATTIS. Senator, I think that, in a globalized world today, where there—we're perhaps one airline seat away from somebody exporting this right into Paris or wherever else—we have to be very, very careful thinking that we can contain this without having ramifications on our economy, on our friends. For example, we may be energy independent in North America, or will be very soon, but the global price of oil on a globally traded commodity will be set out of the Middle East. The world's economy would—and it would immediately impact from Maine to California if it got, you know, the oil cut off there. The fact that we are oil independent, energy independent, would not change. So, the idea we could contain this in that region and let all hell break loose there, you know, I don't think that would work in this case, even though you—I do agree with you that the internal contradictions inside Communism and the internal contradictions inside Islamic—political Islamic

jihadist thinking will rot them from the inside out, just like with the Communists.

Senator KING. But, I—I think you're right, the—where the historic parallel breaks down is the nonstate-actor piece of this, and also communications and—I think you mentioned seventh-century. I don't know which century it is, but the danger we're in now is that we're dealing with people with seventh-century ethics and 21st-century weapons. It strikes me that intelligence is absolutely one of the key elements in this battle, perhaps more so than ever.

Let me conclude with a couple of questions about Iran. What are—what do you—we're engaged in this negotiation that's going to come to some kind of conclusion, we believe, in the next 2 or 3 months. I don't think there's much likelihood of an additional extension. What if those negotiations fail? What are our next steps if we end up with either no deal or a deal that is just not acceptable, in terms of containing Iran's ambitions?

General MATTIS. Senator, we have to limit their ability to enrich fuel. That's critical. And we have to have an—a rigorous inspection regime that ensures that we have confidence in it, knowing the denial and deceit they've used to hide this weapons program in the past.

If it fails, I think we would have to reenergize and elevate the economic sanctions, perhaps even to the point of a blockade, to—and then we should move strongly against the situation with Lebanese Hezbollah and Syria. I think that a defeat of Iranian interests in that area could reverberate right back into Tehran, and the Iranian people would be in a position, like with the Green Revolution, perhaps to come out in the streets. But, the oppressive powers are strong, and the alternative to the economic and some of these peripheral efforts working would be—would probably end up being war.

Senator KING. It was interesting—I was just in the Middle East last weekend, and—in talking with people in the Gulf states—it was interesting to me—again, in history—we know that we're dealing, in some ways, with a—an ancient civil war between Sunnis and Shi'ites, but it—in—the Gulf states are very worried about Iran's expansionism, even outside of the nuclear area. And we're now talking about an ancient civil war between Persians and Arabs. I think many people don't realize that Iranians are not Arabs and that this is—this goes back to Darius. I mean, you've got—in some ways, you've got people trying to recreate the Ottoman Empire, and other people trying to create the Persian Empire. And here we are, trying to wend our way through 2,000-year-old disputes.

That's not really a question, but, General Keane, your thoughts.

General KEANE. Well, I think our behavior with Iran through the years has been pretty atrocious. Frankly, you know, they bombed our marine barracks, as Jim mentioned, using proxies. They took down our Embassy in Lebanon. They took down the Annex. They took down the Kuwait Embassy. They took down Air Force barracks in Khobar Towers. General Lloyd Austin, who commands CENTCOM, believes that Iranian-trained militia by battalion commanders in—from Hezbollah, who did it at two training bases in Iran—we knew where those bases were—are responsible for killing

close to 2,000 of the 4400 Americans killed in Iraq, because they developed an IED exclusively to be used only against Americans, not against Iraqi military and not against the Iraqi people.

These are the things that we have already accepted. Not a single—

Senator KING. Through a whole series of—

General KEANE.—Republican or Democratic President has ever counted any of that.

Senator KING. Yeah, I was going to make the point that it's a nonpartisan nonresponse. A bipartisan nonresponse.

General KEANE. It is a bipartisan nonresponse.

So, here we go into negotiations by a regime that—whose stated objective is to dominate the region. They are beginning to do that. And they want nuclear weapons to guarantee their preservation and also to help in their geopolitical objectives. The beginning of these negotiations—we've already given up too much. We're permitting the highly enriched uranium and thousands and thousands of centrifuges as the going-in deal. We're already behind. The only negotiation that should have been done was, "Dismantle the program and we'll take off the sanctions." But, that's not where we are.

So, I believe, if it fails, we go back to tough, crippling economic sanctions, bring in the National Security Agency, have the Director there lay down in front of them what they could do to get after Iran to change its behavior. We're on a collision course with them. I don't agree with Fox, that we can sit down and have more dialogue with these guys and somehow we'll work towards mutual interests in the region, when their stated interests are truly regional domination and we have already given up too much to them as we speak.

Thank you.

Senator KING. I want to thank these gentlemen, Madam Chair. This has been one of the most informative, provocative, and, I think, helpful hearings that I've participated in since I've been here.

Thank you so much for your direct and honest testimony.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Senator AYOTTE. I couldn't agree more with what Senator King just said. And appreciate all of you. I think we've got a couple of second-round questions, and appreciate all of you staying here.

I wanted to follow up, General Mattis, on testimony that you gave about our detention policy. You had said, "We've observed the perplexing lack of detention—detainee policy that has resulted in the return of released prisoners to the battlefield. We should not engage in another fight without resolving this issue up front, treating hostile forces, in fact, as hostile."

Could you help us understand, What are the consequences of a lack of detention policy, in terms of our National security? And, as I count it, we know we've confirmed at least 107 terrorists, that were formerly detained at Guantanamo, have now been confirmed to have reengaged in terrorist activity, and an additional 77 are suspected of doing so. So, what are the implications of this lack of detention policy? Why does it matter to us? And also, what does it impact us, in terms of gathering intelligence, as it relates to interrogation policy?

General MATTIS. Ma'am, the implication, first and foremost, I believe, is that we go into a fight and we're not even certain of ourselves enough to hold as prisoners the people that we've taken in the fight. For example, in 1944, we didn't take Rommel's troops, who were in POW camps in Texas, and let them go back and get another shot at us at Normandy. We kept them until the war was over. We didn't start this war. And if an enemy wants to fight or be a truckdriver, we didn't say his radio operators could be released because they didn't have a significant role. If you sign up with this enemy, they should know, "We're coming after you" if the President, the Commander in Chief, sends us out there, and, "If taken prisoner, you'll be prisoner until the war is over." I mean, this is pretty—this is not Warfighting 301 or Advanced Warfighting. This is kind of 101, ma'am.

The biggest concern I have, having been in the infantry for many years—if our troops find that they are taking someone prisoner a second time and they have just scraped one of their buddies off the pavement and zipped him into a bag, the potential for maintaining the ethical imperative we expect of our Armed Forces is going to be undercut if, in fact, the integrity of our war effort does not take those people off the battlefield permanently if taken prisoner. In other words, they will take things into their own hands under the pressures of warfare.

So, I think that what we have to do is have a repeatable detainee policy so that, when we take them, we hold them, and there's no confusion about their future, not among the enemies' minds, certainly not among our own. I would go by the Geneva Convention and maintain them, with Red Cross oversight, until the war was over.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, General.

I wanted to follow up. Let me just say, General Keane, I fully agree with what you have said about providing defensive arms to Ukraine. I think that it absolutely is a disgrace, and I can't understand why this administration has not provided these arms so that they can defend themselves against Russian aggression. And I think we're sending the wrong message there.

And I think the other consideration for all of us in this is: In signing the Budapest Memorandum, why would any nation, again, give up its nuclear weapons when we won't provide basic defensive arms when they are faced with aggression on their own territory? And I would like you to comment on, you know, What are the implications of that, as we ask, for example, other nations to give up their nuclear weapons? I don't understand why they would do it, when they see our behavior here.

General KEANE. Well, I totally agree. I mean, we went back on an agreement, we went back on our word. I believe that's one of the reasons that Putin is looking at NATO, itself, and he's saying to himself, "Is this still the organization that helped force the collapse of the Soviet Union back in '91, or is—has this organization lost its moral fiber?" So, I think when we break agreements like that, even though Ukraine was not a member of NATO, clearly the deal that was made was in their interest as well as the world's interest, and we foreclosed on it. And shame on us, you know, for doing that. And I do believe it has significant implications, not just

to the—to other countries who we're—we believe are our friends, but because it does embolden and encourage Vladimir Putin. I mean, common sense tells you it does, and his behavior certainly underscores that.

Senator AYOTTE. Wanted to follow up on the discussion on Iran. And looking at their behavior—I think, General Keane, you had said that we've already—we're already behind on this deal, in terms of what we've agreed to. So, as we look at this, the negotiations that are going on, what does a good deal look like? And, given the implications of this for our National security, I firmly believe that Congress should have a say in that agreement and what is a result. But, what does a good deal look like, one that we can ensure that they can't immediately gear up their nuclear weapons program again?

And finally, I don't see, in any of these negotiations, any resolution whatsoever to their missile program, their seeking IBM—ICBM capability that, obviously, can hit our East Coast, and also their activities as the largest state sponsor of terrorism.

So, can you help us understand, What should we be looking for? And what about those two other issues that I think are very important to us, as well, in terms of their activities?

General KEANE. Well, as I've said, I don't think there is a good deal, here, at all, because what we're arguing over is the technology that will drive the time to develop a weapon. So, our negotiators are trying to pull out some of those technologies to extend the amount of time it will take to develop a weapon.

But, we've been in this dance step before with the Iranians, going back 15 years in these negotiations, and it's always two steps forwards and one step back. And that's where we are. I have absolutely no confidence that, if we made a deal, that the Iranians will not undermine that and move fast-forward to be able to develop a nuclear weapon much faster than what we think. And I think history is on the side of that argument, frankly.

So, I am not optimistic at all about this. The—I will give the administration credit for well-intentioned motivations, because—I don't want to get into that. And I can't, because you have to get into people's heads. But, the fact of the matter is, we should be very concerned about a bad deal, here, because I believe we're on the path—on a path to it.

Let's be honest with ourselves. This regime is—the Supreme Leader is not giving up on having a nuclear weapon. Anybody that thinks that is incredibly delusional and naive. He is on a path to it. He will achieve it. He has got in charge now, not Ahmadinejad, you know, who most people had no respect for, even inside his own country. He has got a sophisticated leader that is working this very well to achieve his objectives, geopolitically. And I believe he is on that path.

So, I'm not confident at all. And the only deal that makes any sense to me is, dismantle the program and verify it's dismantled, and pull the sanctions. But, we're not there. We will—this administration will not do that. We are already past that.

Senator AYOTTE. I wanted to—yes, go ahead.

General MATTIS. Madam Chair, I think the economic sanctions that drove them to the negotiating table worked better than I ever

anticipated, and the administration had to try. It gave us credibility with the international community. There wasn't a rush to war. It also, I think, puts us in a position to define what a good deal is, which goes to the heart of your question. I think it's a rigorous inspection regime that gives us confidence that they will not have a breakout capability and no ability to enrich uranium, beyond peaceful purposes, at all. Now, if that cannot be achieved, then we've got a bad deal.

Senator AYOTTE. Admiral Fallon?

Admiral FALLON. Somebody made the point earlier that history doesn't exactly repeat itself. But, during the cold war, we were squared off against a Communist ideology that was based in the Soviet Union that was diametrically opposed to everything we believed and the political and economic and individual freedoms that we held very dear to ourselves. And yet, we recognized that we had interests to try to ensure that we didn't get plunged into yet another conflict with staggering potential consequences in the negative. And so, we ended up negotiating with the Soviets. We didn't trust them, they didn't trust us, and—but, we thought that there were some longer-term higher objectives that needed to be achieved.

And I think we're not in a dissimilar situation, here. It's not the Soviet Union. We shouldn't give them that credibility. But, it's a problem that we just can't keep ignoring. If we come up with an agreement that the negotiators feel is reasonable, then the key thing is going to be an ability to verify the key aspects of that, to the best of our ability. And I think that's what's really important.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Reed.

Thank you.

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.

And I will echo Senator King's remarks. This has been extremely useful. And thank you, gentlemen.

One of the thoughts I had, listening to Senator King's question, was that, you know, this—that history always sort of drives us. And in the cold war, we had an existential enemy, the Soviet Union. They were engaged and doing a lot of provocative activities, sponsoring national liberation movements here and there, they invaded Hungary in the 1950s, they were attempting to establish offensive nuclear missiles 90 miles from our shore in the 1960s, et cetera. And yet, we continued to negotiate with them. And again, I think Admiral Fallon pointed out, we did it with the same kind of skepticism that we all have towards the Iranians. So, no one, I think, trusted Khrushchev that much and trusted his successors, et cetera.

But, I think it's important, as has been suggested by some—I think all of you—that we follow through on these negotiations with the Iranians until we get to a conclusion. I think General Mattis made a very excellent point. We've positioned ourselves now where we really are on the high road. You know, we've defined what the good solution is, we have international support. And if they cannot make that standard, then we're in a much stronger position to move, collectively. I think that is important to note.

But, let me ask a question which—it goes to this notion of what I think you said, General Mattis, that we've got to be very clear-

eyed of when we start something, you know, where it's going go, which, since you raised the issue of escalation, the notion that if we take a step, it's going to—it's the solution, we've solved the problem; when, in fact, many—in every situation I can think of, the first step will prompt a counter-response by—the other side will respond, counter-response by us, et cetera.

So, with respect to the Ukraine, a simple question. If we were to give defensive weapons to the Ukrainians, which is something that's being seriously considered, what do you think Putin would do? Simply pull his troops out and say, "Okay, you've seen—you know, I raised you, you saw me, I—and I fold?" Or do you think it would be something else? And again, will we get into an escalatory situation, where we find ourselves in a much more precarious position?

And I'll just ask all, and then I'll yield to Senator Shaheen.

General MATTIS. Senator Reed, every action has a reaction. It's a fundamentally unpredictable situation, but we have to wargame it, look ahead. I think that, in light of the worsening economic situation, Putin's ability to act independently with some of the things he's been doing are going to start becoming circumscribed. But, they can take a lot more stoic view of this inside Russia, as I understand it.

And so, I would—I believe that it may very well lead to a higher level of violence. But, at the same time, I think that it could become akin to Napoleon's bleeding ulcer in Spain. The Ukraine could become the—kind of the—a fulcrum on which his foreign policy is now hammered back in line with the international order of respect for state boundaries and that sort of thing as he starts having a higher physical cost, more troops coming home dead from this sort of thing.

But, it's going to be a tragedy, so long as Russia decides to continue what they're doing. And we're just asking ourselves, "Are we willing to support the Ukrainian people, who want to defend themselves?" And on that one, I'm pretty one-way about it. Of course we support them.

Senator REED. General Keane.

General KEANE. Yes, I'm—and I think, you know, the Putin strategy is quite clever, and maybe even brilliant, when you think about it. You know, he's using soldiers in disguise as special operations forces. They come in, in civilian clothes, they create an uprising that's not even there. And then they appeal for more military assistance, and he provides people who don't identify them—in uniform, but they don't identify themselves as what country they come from, so-called soldiers in disguise. So, he's trumped up everything, to include the requirement for a military response. And he puts the onus then on us, that it's up to us to escalate, because this is really only this is—it's an uprising. And it's an interesting phenomenon, and I think we're going to continue to see it again and again.

So, one is, we need to deal with this strategy that he's using, and what should we do about it? And, number two, I think the harsh reality is that Putin has done all of the escalation, himself. And he is the one that brought paramilitary forces in, he is the one that brought conventional military forces in. Very sophisticated equipment. He's the one that brought multiple armor and mechanized

divisions and put them on the border, and then rushed them across the border—tanks, BMPs, artillery, antiaircraft. It is his forces that shot down an airliner—his weapon systems, at least. So, all of the escalation has really been done by him.

And I believe that providing some assistance to the Ukrainians, as much as that would be material assistance, because I always believe that conflict is fundamentally a test of wills—and Sun Tzu taught us that, the ultimate objective of war is to break your opponent's will—I'd give arms and assistance to the Ukrainians, not just for the physical capability that a—it enhances them, but also to demonstrate that we're behind them, to help them with their will and their spine. And they have this natural fortitude, knowing their history, to stand up to it.

So, that's where I am on it. And I—and I'm not concerned about escalation, because Putin has done all of that already.

Senator REED. Admiral Fallon, can you comment, please? My time is running out, but please.

Admiral FALLON. Shortly.

When we think about Russia, I think it's a great example of a place where we ought to be thinking a little more strategically and not be channeling ourselves into, "He did this, and so we're going to have to do this." Sounds like the guy is very opportunistic. He took advantage of an interesting situation. He's aggressive. He's got ego. You could—whatever.

But, what else might we do to get this guy's attention? First of all, remember that this country has some very significant internal problems. Look at birth rates, look at health and longevity, look at the reality that it's a one-trick economic pony, and right now the trends are not going in the right direction.

So, it was highlighted earlier, we've got a phenomenal new energy card in our National capabilities, here. What—how might we think about using that, that might get this guy's attention and get him to back it off? He thought he was pretty clever. He went to the Chinese and said, "Well, let's go make a deal," and the Chinese, "Hey, you know, it's a way to play off the Americans." So, again, we might think about coming around and working things with the Chinese.

So, I think there's more than one way to skin the cat, here. Yes, we stand up for things that we think are important. But, I don't think that the only solution, here, is just to go—to throw troops at it. We may think it's in our—decide it's in our best interest to give support to the Ukrainians. I think we might think very seriously about support to our other Eastern European NATO allies as a priority task. But, I think we ought to be thinking a little bit bigger in dealing with Russia, and a little bit longer-term.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, thank you all. And I was able to hear all of your opening statements. And I think there's—a finer group of statements we've had here in a long time, and it goes to the core of decisions this Congress needs to make and, really, the administration, our Commander in Chief, needs to be making. And we are on a path that's—it's not going to be successful at the path we're

on. And I want to thank you for your honest and direct statements about that.

I am more hopeful than some, and I think we can make some progress here. General Keane, I think you acknowledged that it's important that Iraq get its act together with regard to the Shi'a and the Sunni and the Kurds, and be more effective in working together. And that's a critical part of it. But, I don't take that to be a statement that we should not seek to be offensive as soon as possible, even right now. It seems to me that—you talked about will. I see a recent article by Major General Scales, who talks about will and diminishing hope, showing ISIS and ISIL that they're not going to be successful. What are the prospects of us, in your opinion, beginning to retake more territory in Iraq and removing this hope that's out there that seems to be attracting more soldiers from around the region to the ISIS cause?

General KEANE. Well—I think I understand what you're saying. I certainly agree with the policy that we should use local ground indigenous forces, as well as coalition air, to attempt to retake lost territory. There has been some modest retaking of territory already, but nowhere near what needs to be done to return the integrity and sovereignty to Iraq. That will only take place by a counter-offensive campaign up those two river valleys, one to the west and one to the north, to retake Mosul and Fallujah and Anbar Province.

All that said, I do think it's prudent to do that with those indigenous forces, but to be robustly assisted, not in the way we are planning to do now, with front-line advisors who will be down where the fighting takes place, which means they are at risk. They're not in direct combat, but they're in combat units that will be fighting. And that's a given.

Senator SESSIONS. So, that's what you think has got to be done.

General KEANE. Yes. I think that's a prudent measure. Look it, can we retake Mosul and Anbar Province if we put combat brigades on the ground with some coalition brigades now? Can we do that? Yes. Yes, we can do that. But, here's the problem with that. One is, I have great difficulty looking U.S. soldiers in the face again to go do something like that after what happened after 2011 and we pulled out of there, because policy decisions squandered the gains. Two, it's not just the issue of retaking Mosul and Fallujah. It's the issue of being able to hold it. ISIS will not stand down after we drive them out of there. We have known enough about this war in Iraq and Afghanistan. You drive an enemy out. That's one thing. And then we have to make certain we hold it and prevent that enemy from coming back.

And so, that is why I do believe it's the right thing to try to use these local forces, even though we know that's not a strong a hand as we would like. Strengthen that hand to the maximum capability we can without introducing ground combat forces, and then put emphasis on, once we clear it out, holding what is there. That will be the challenge, because ISIS will come back and undermine it.

And that's why I don't think combat forces now is the right answer—United States combat forces. But, if we have any lack of confidence that we're going to be able to retake that lost territory, and we still believe it's strategically important for us in Iraq to do that, then I would have combat brigades on Reserve in Kuwait as a

backup to accomplish the mission if the mission does fail. And that would be coalition brigades, as well.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, the three of you have commanded CENTCOM. It just strikes me as—let's compare this to Libya—it strikes me, we've got a—quite a different situation. We stood shoulder-to-shoulder with the Iraqis. We lost thousands of American troops in this effort. And, to me, to say that we won't even embed a few soldiers, not in the front of the advance, at this point, to preserve what I think you agree is possible, and to oust ISIL, would be a colossal mistake.

General Mattis, do you feel a special strategic bond with the Iraqis that we worked with for over a decade?

General MATTIS. Senator, I do. However, in giving you strategic advice, I try to divorce myself from it. We have to be very pragmatic about this. I would tell you that the military—the senior military officers, we all explained that the successes we had achieved by 2010–2011 were—and this is a quote—“reversible,” that the democratic processes and the military capability were too nascent to pull everyone out at one time. What has happened here was foreseeable. The intelligence community was actually very blunt about this potential.

And so, what we have to look at now is, we play the ball where it lies. And right now, I believe we should embed our forward air controllers and our—those who can help plan these operations. We're going to have to put them together—

Senator SESSIONS. And that could present gains? I mean, doing that would, in your professional opinion, allow us to see gains occur from that. It's not a—

General MATTIS. I would, sir, because you're—

Senator SESSIONS.—hopeless effort.

General MATTIS.—because you're integrating the air and ground effort right at the point of contact, so you would see a much faster decision process. So, yes, sir, it would.

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up, thank you. And I certainly share the view that it was a colossal error in 2011 to completely withdraw. And this was predictable, as Senator McCain and others predicted.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Blumenthal.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thanks, Madam Chairwoman.

And I want to join in my thanking Senator McCain for convening this hearing, which I think has been extremely valuable. I've been following it while here and then while in a variety of meetings away. And I think your insights and experience reflect your—each of your extraordinary service to our Nation. And I thank you for what you've done to make sure that we are strong and that our security is as robust as possible.

And I agree with the point that's been made, I think, fairly repeatedly, that we should be doing more to assist Ukraine. The Congress agrees, as well, because we passed, and the President signed, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014, which as yet, to my knowledge, really has not been implemented.

So, my question to each of you, because this act is very broad in what it authorizes by way of weaponry and defensive services and training, using that \$350 million, what specifically do you think

would be most helpful to the Ukrainians? You know, there's a lot of artillery that's being used against them. You've made reference to the Russian troops disguised as civilians. What specifically can we provide? Is it antitank missiles? Is it more body armor? Can you be more specific as to what you would advise the President to provide?

General MATTIS. Senator, I cannot—I am not familiar enough with the specifics on that battlefield. I think that something that gives them more intelligence about where they're being fired from—counterartillery radar, for example—might be very helpful. But, I'm not the right person to answer that, I'm sorry.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. General Keane?

General KEANE. What they have been asking for is, they want more intelligence than what they currently have. And I believe we have begun to help them with some of that. They do want antitank weapons. And those are shoulder-fired missiles, essentially. And they also want heavy crew-served weapons.

One of the problems we have here is, under the previous regime in Ukraine, because of the significant amount of corruption that took place in all the agencies of government, what took place inside the Ukraine military is outrageous, in terms of the rip-off of funding and the capabilities that they used to have and no longer have. I mean, they're a mere shadow of their former self, to be frank about it.

So, while I know some of their desires, I don't know the entire list of what they want.

Admiral FALLON. Nor do I, Senator. I have no idea what the laundry list is or what really makes sense. I would just caution that, again, whatever we decide to do, here, will be effective or not, in large measure based on what the people in the Ukraine do. And what they do is going to be based on the confidence they have, and the leadership. It's been abysmal up to now. I'm not sure where they are. But, absent that, we could dump stuff in there all day long, and we're probably not going to be successful. So, understanding what's really going on in that country at the political level is really an essential prerequisite to any of this stuff.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Admiral, I'd like to ask you, on a different area—and the premise of my question is that you've done a fair amount of work on climate change and environmental issues. But, in light of your experience—and I'd open this question to others, as well—how big a threat to our National security is, potentially, what we see happening in climate disruption, the impacts on the availability of sea lanes and water resources in the Middle East, and food resources in Africa? To what extent is climate disruption a national security threat?

Admiral FALLON. I think it's a very, very important national security issue. It's one that we understand very little about, in my opinion. Ramifications of the continuation of the current trends provide all kinds of interesting scenarios. So—and one that we've talked about here, the revanchist Russia and Putin's opportunism and what the Russians—what Putin may have in mind for us. He's going to have some significant options pretty soon. When the Arctic continues to lose its icepack and become, basically, accessible 12 months of the year, it gives them very, very interesting opportuni-

ties to move things around and act in ways that they were significantly inhibited in, in the past. It may give them some other opportunities, economically, who knows?

The melting of the icecaps, rising sea levels, you pick your scenario here, but the trends are pretty clear that water's coming up and land's going to disappear, and the implications for us in this country—more importantly, probably, for those that are really in danger, places like Bangladesh that are marginally above sea level right now—and the turmoil that that—because—

So, all these problems we deal with, almost every single one of them, has its roots in instability and insecurity at a very basic level—not armies, not ISIS running around, and pick-me-up trucks with 50-caliber guns. It's what people feel very close to them. And so, if they feel threatened in their livelihoods, in their families, in their ability to—then things start to get unraveled. And that's the potential that I think we face.

I don't want to, you know, lie awake at night, wringing my hands over all this stuff. However, are there things we could be doing, I think, to try to reverse the trends that appear to be moving on pretty strongly? So, that's probably another topic for hours' discussion.

But, it gets back to one of my points about credibility, our credibility as a country. As the world grapples with these things that apply to all of us, I think that U.S. leadership ought to be paramount, ought to be in the forefront. And, in fact, sometimes we're not there. We're not there. We're not voting, we're—you know, whether we're denying or avoiding or just defaulting to somebody else. And, despite the sometimes incessant gnawing of people, "Well, the U.S. is always trying to get into this and push"—on another hand, they really need—the world needs our leadership and involvement. And this is an area where we could actually probably do some good if we put our minds to it.

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you very much for that answer, and to all of you for being here today. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you all very much. I know that you've been here a long morning. And so, we very much appreciate that.

I have just one fundamental question for each of you. And I had a chance to hear your opening statements, but not—was not here for most of the questioning. So, I don't think anybody has covered this aspect of my question.

You all are probably aware that DOD recently released a study, done by the RAND Corporation, that is titled "Improving Strategic Competence: Lessons from 13 Years of War." And there have been a number of fairly high-profile articles that have addressed this question, as well. And one of the conclusions from the study, as you all know, is that the types of war that the U.S. has fought since World War II have changed. They're no longer conventional combat wars against state actors, but they're more unconventional, irregular warfare by joint forces against nonstate actors.

And the report—one of the statements in the report says, and I quote, that, "The joint force and the U.S. Government as a whole

have displayed an ongoing ambivalence about, and a lack of proficiency in, the noncombat and unconventional aspects of war and conflict against nonstate actors.” The report goes on to point out seven lessons from its review, and I won’t go through all of them, but the first two seem particularly relevant, I think, to today’s discussion. One is that the U.S. Government displays a persistent weakness in formulating national security strategies, and that this weakness is due, in part, to the lack of an effective civilian/military process for effective national security policymaking.

So, I wonder if each of you could comment on whether you agree with this conclusion and whether this is something that can be addressed by changing personalities, or do we really need to improve our process for national security decisionmaking? And if you have thoughts about how to do that.

Admiral Fallon, you want to go first?

Admiral FALLON. Sure, I’ll throw myself in front of this train.

I agree with it. And I think that—my observation of several changes in Washington—you get to be this old, you hang around for enough time, you see a lot of transitions—and one of the weaknesses, I believe, is a belief that an effective national security policy can be created after things are settled down and people get in their places. And, you know, it all sounds nice. Let’s get a Secretary of State, let’s get a Secretary of Defense, and get it in there. But, my experience is, it’s too late. There’s no way you’re going to be able to come up with—that I’ve seen—to come up with comprehensive, long-term, thoughtful, effective policies once the gun goes off and that—once the inauguration starts, you’re off and running. And the reality is, something happens all the time, every single day. Look at all these things, in the communication, blah, blah, blah. So, all these pressures make it virtually impossible to think strategically, in my observation, once you get in the game.

And so, a prerequisite for this is a very thoughtful process in advance, using whatever resources are available. A lot of smart people around this country and the world that can inform some pretty good decisions. Again, can’t solve everything, but pick a few big ones, decide they’re the ones you’re going to focus on, would be my advice, and go for it.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

General Keane?

General KEANE. Yes, sure.

Well, there’s a couple of things that aren’t correct. First of all, the most predominant form of warfare since war started is unconventional warfare. And that’s been well documented. And, interesting enough, the prosecutors of unconventional warfare usually lose far more than they win. That is best documented, if you want to see the best reference on it, by Max Boot’s sort of history of all of this. He’s out of the Council on Foreign Relations and is a prolific, articulate, thoughtful writer.

In terms of your comment in dealing with the application of force and also government, dealing with this kind of experience that we’re facing today, I agree that we have not taken a whole-of-government approach in dealing with some of the challenges we face. What is—what I observed, in countless visits over the 13-year experience, you know, in Iraq and Afghanistan, that much of the non-

kinetic things that needed to be done in dealing with an unconventional enemy defaulted, not to other parts of our government, but largely to the United States military. Even though they—while they're intelligent and have enormous personal attributes and skill sets that they can apply against anything to be successful, it's not something they were trained and necessarily had experience in. But, they became very good at it. And we would always be looking around, Where is the rest of our government, here, to help us do some of these things?

So, in that regard, I do believe there's much that we can learn from this 13-year experience, in how to take a more comprehensive approach and to recognize, while kinetic actions have a value all of their own, certainly—and that's blatantly obvious—nonkinetic actions do, as well. And we can do much better at that than what we have done.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

General Mattis, I—my time is up, but do you have anything you want to add to that?

General MATTIS. Just very quickly, Senator. I would just point out that we have to improve the process, assuming there is a process. I've been unable to identify one recently. I think it starts with the essential—we must develop a sound strategy or we're going to waste lives and our treasury and our country's future.

I think, two, we need to move authority back to the Senate-confirmed Secretaries of State and Defense, and not concentrate it in a small, but mushrooming at the same time, national security staff that does not have the Foreign Service officers and the trained military officers who can actually develop what you're looking for, here.

I don't think we can adopt one preclusive form of warfare. And here—my point is, the enemy will always try the kind of warfare they think we're less—least ready for. One of the reasons you can say—or the RAND study can say we did not have state-on-state warfare is because we probably prevented it. That's a pretty great war, from my point of view, the one that never happened, because we were ready for it.

And last, I would just point out that unconventional warfare always takes a long time. The United States Cavalry against the American Indian, from 1850 to 1905, was decades long. And this sense of rushing things—for example, setting withdrawal dates and telling the enemy in advance when we're leaving—probably contributes to the endless wars that we get into. And we're engaged in a violent political argument with political Islam right now, and we need the diplomatic and developmental tools alongside our military. And for a country that could put up Voice of America and send the truth right inside the Iron Curtain, we're not fighting the war anywhere near as smartly as we did back during the cold war. I think you're—you should aggressively go after these areas that you're bringing up, ma'am.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you all very much.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

You all have really probably—we probably have violated the Geneva Convention, when it comes to the three of you all. But, you’ve been terrific. I’ve really enjoyed this.

Back to Iraq, looking forward. Let’s assume that we can get a more cohesive government, that the new Prime Minister is better than the old, that we can get a Iraqi-trained force, the Kurds help us, eventually we take back Mosul, Anbar Province gets solidified once again. That’s a big “if.” If they ask us, in the future, to leave a residual force, would you recommend that we honor that request?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. Oh, absolutely.

General KEANE. Absolutely.

Admiral FALLON. I mean, they’re going to ask, for sure, Senator. And how could we say no to that, given the circumstance?

Senator GRAHAM. And what I want to tell the American people, the best I can, it’s in our interest for Iraq to turn out well. Do you all agree with that? Whether we should—going in or not is behind us. We’re there. And I guess my theory of all of this is—a line of defense for America is best achieved by having allies in the region that we can work with, that will fight this radical ideology at its core. And the hardest part of getting this war won, I believe, is just the patience—strategic patience that comes from investing in others. As unreliable as they are and as frustrating as they are, the alternative is fortress America, and I just don’t believe that works.

Now, as we get ready to go into Mosul, I think, General Keane, you said that the Iraqi timetable is probably different than ours. Just imagine for a moment, as an American politician, that there was a town in your State occupied by a foreign force, and the Federal Government was telling you, or some outside entity was telling you, that it may be a year or two before you can go back in. I think the new Sunni Defense Minister is in a real spot, here. How long is he going to allow his people in Mosul to suffer under the hands of a vicious enemy?

So, we have to realize, politically, that an Iraqi politician has a different calculation than an American political leader, here. But, it is in our advantage, don’t you—in our interest—to make sure the Iraqis do this right. Is that correct?

General KEANE. Yes.

Senator GRAHAM. They’re not ready by this spring, are they?

General KEANE. I’m not on the ground, but, talking to people who are, I don’t think so. Not even close.

Senator GRAHAM. Admiral Fallon, would you be worried about a spring offensive?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know what the timing is, because I haven’t been in dialogue with these guys. But, my sense is, there are probably things we can do in advance if you accept—

Senator GRAHAM. Sure.

Admiral FALLON.—that they’re not ready in a large force.

Senator GRAHAM. Right.

Admiral FALLON. I think there are some things we can continue to do. And, just last week, it’s—the sense is that the—you know, we’re starting to go back and claw back. When I say “we,” our allies over there. So, maybe they’re not ready for the big thing. But, then again, I have a hard time, frankly, envisioning the kind of activity that we saw when we had to retake Fallujah for the second

and third times, going in there, street-to-street. I'm not sure that's what's—that's a scenario that makes a lot of sense.

Senator GRAHAM. Yeah. I agree. But, somebody's going to have to take Mosul back, right? And we want it to be Iraqis.

Do you agree with the idea of—maybe 10,000 is the right number to have, in terms of support? General Mattis, does that make sense to you?

General MATTIS. I'd look more at the capabilities, sir. But, we've got to have enough forward air controllers, enough trainers, enough advisors—

Senator GRAHAM. Okay.

General MATTIS.—to actually make a difference.

Senator GRAHAM. Does that make sense to you, Admiral Fallon, whatever—

Admiral FALLON. Yeah, I have—

Senator GRAHAM.—“enough” is?

Admiral FALLON.—no idea what the exact number is, but you've got have people with the right skill sets to—

Senator GRAHAM. So, just—to the American people, we're going to have some boots on the ground if we want to get this right. The hope is that we don't have to have the 82nd Airborne going back in.

Real quickly with Syria. I can understand how we get there in Iraq. I really don't understand how we're going to get there in Syria, unless we have a regional force to supplement whatever Free Syrian Army we can muster. Very quickly, how do we dislodge ISIL from Syria? And, if you don't, how can you sustain your gains in Iraq?

And finally, the end game is a real problematic situation in Syria. How do you salvage a Syria with Assad still in power?

So, how do you go in and get them out on the ground? Who does it? And should we leave Assad in power as an end state? And, if we do, what can we expect from that?

General KEANE. Well—I'll try to answer that as—we've tried to answer it in the past, and—and this is tough, complicated, and very uncertain. But, here's what I believe.

First of all, the mission that we have right now is not to destroy ISIS in Syria. It is to degrade it, but to destroy ISIS in Iraq and retake lost territory. I believe that is not a very good mission, because I don't think you separate Syria and Iraq. I think you see them as a whole cloth, in terms of what you have to do against that enemy.

All that said, if you—if our intent is to destroy ISIS in Syria, the only way that can be done will be with ground force supported by air power. And there is no ground force in sight with the capability to do that. And you know better than I, because of the briefing you got from General Nagata, at the pace we're doing that, 5,000 or so a year, we're not going to get there. We're not even close.

So, in my mind, you have to push back on Assad, because of what he's doing to the—what exists of the Free Syrian Army. That brings in the coalition very strongly in support of what's taking place in Syria. Then you bring Turkey to the table, you bring UAE to the table, you bring Jordan to the table, and you bring Saudi Arabia to the table. Now they're at the table, and you've got their

interest. They have got to be the coalition force that's going to drive ISIS out of there, with our assistance.

Senator GRAHAM. Do the other—do the two of you agree with that?

Admiral FALLON. The question is, How do you convince these people to actually go do that—

Senator GRAHAM. Right, right.

Admiral FALLON.—is going to be the real challenge.

Senator GRAHAM. General Mattis, do you agree with that concept?

General MATTIS. I do, Senator. But, the devil's in the details. And we have got to figure out what it looks like, or what we want it to look like at the end. Is Assad still there, or not? There are some who say we can't put Syria back together if Assad's part of it. There's others who say he's the best of the worst options. We've got to get this straight in our heads first, and then we can give you a lot of answers, sir, about how best to accomplish it.

Senator AYOTTE. Senator King.

Senator KING. I'm fine, thank you.

Senator AYOTTE. You're all set? Thank you.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

And this has been an extraordinarily useful hearing.

I just have one comment to make. And we have repeatedly talked about the need for residual forces in a condition-based situation in Afghanistan and other places when we commit ourselves. And, in looking at 2011—we're all looking back—and I think it's important to note that the stage was probably set in 2008, when the United States and the Government of Iraq entered into a formal agreement to remove all troops by 2011. That was signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki. And it was signed under the threat that, if they didn't, our troops would be out even sooner. I think, December 31st of 2008, our international protections expired. And it goes to General Mattis' point, is—when we sign something formally saying, you know, "We're out," even though there was an expectation that we might be able to negotiate, it's awful tough, once you get a deal between the U.S., our President, their Prime Minister, signed by—ratified by their Parliament, to reverse. Also particularly difficult if we signed in '08 with 100,000 troops on the ground and we're already down to a much smaller figure by 2011.

And I think it's important to put this in context, because this issue of residual forces with a condition-based sort of level is something we have to, you know, consider as we look—again, as Senator Graham suggested—going forward in Iraq, and also going forward in Afghanistan.

And I want to thank you. I don't necessarily need a comment. You can write me—mail me, email me.

I want to thank the chairwoman for running an excellent hearing.

Senator AYOTTE. I want to thank Senator Reed.

And I appreciate all three of you being here today. I think it was evident, your tremendous military experience. And all of us appreciated a very substantive hearing and your best advice, and we

really appreciate everything that you've done and continue to do for our country. So, thank you all. And thank you all—we're very impressed with your endurance, as well.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

THURSDAY, JANUARY 29, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Graham, Cruz, Reed, Nelson, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, and Kaine.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman MCCAIN. Good morning, all.

[Audience disruption.]

Chairman MCCAIN. The committee will stand in recess until the Capitol Police can restore order. I ask the police to restore order. Could I ask our Capitol Police to help restore order here? Can someone find out where the Capitol Hill Police is?

I would like to say to my colleagues and to our distinguished witnesses this morning that I have been a member of this committee for many years, and I have never seen anything as disgraceful and outrageous and despicable as the last demonstration that just took place about—you know, you are going to have to shut up or I am going to have you arrested. If we cannot get the Capitol Hill Police in here immediately—get out of here you low-life scum.

[Applause.]

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, I hope on behalf of all of the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle—in fact, from all of my colleagues, I would like to apologize for allowing such disgraceful behavior towards a man who served his country with the greatest distinction. I apologize profusely.

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to receive testimony on global challenges and U.S. national security strategy. This is the third hearing in a series designed to examine the strategic context in which we find ourselves, one characterized by multiplying and accumulating threats to our National security, and how that should inform the work of this committee and Congress.

We have had previous testimony from General Brent Scowcroft, Dr. Brzezinski, General Mattis, General Keane, and Admiral William Fallon, and we have heard consistent themes:

Our foreign policy is reactive.

We need to repeal sequestration.

We should not withdraw from Afghanistan on an arbitrary, calendar-based timeline.

We need a strategy that matches military means to the President's stated goal of degrading and destroying the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS].

We will explore these topics and many more with today's outstanding panel of witnesses. I am honored to welcome three former Secretaries of State, among our Nation's most admired diplomats and public servants: Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr. George Shultz, and Dr. Madeleine Albright.

Our Nation owes each of these statesmen a debt of gratitude for their years of service advancing our National interests. Secretary Shultz has held nearly every senior position of importance in our Federal Government during his illustrious career. Dr. Albright was an instrumental leader during key points in our Nation's history, influencing policies in the Balkans and the Middle East.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the personal debt of gratitude that I owe to Dr. Kissinger. When Henry came to Hanoi to conclude the agreement that would end America's war in Vietnam, the Vietnamese told him they would send me home with him. He refused the offer. "Commander McCain will return in the same order as the others," he told them. He knew my early release would be seen as favoritism to my father and a violation of our code of conduct. By rejecting this last attempt to suborn a dereliction of duty, Henry saved one of my important possessions, my honor. For that, Henry, I am eternally grateful.

Thank you again to all of our witnesses for being here today and I look forward to your testimony.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join you in welcoming Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Shultz, and Secretary Albright. You have provided extraordinary leadership to this Nation in so many different capacities, and we are deeply appreciative that you are joining us this morning. It is an extraordinary opportunity to hear from individuals who have witnessed and shaped history over the course of many, many years, and thank you again for joining us.

I also want to commend Senator McCain for this series of hearings that have allowed us to look very carefully at the strategy of the United States in view of many complex problems that face us today. You all have done so much. Again, let me reiterate our appreciation and our thanks.

Each of you throughout your careers have demonstrated an in-depth understanding of the historical, economic, religious, ethnic, and political factors affecting foreign policy and international security. Each of you emphasized the need to use all instruments of national power, not just military power, but also diplomacy and economic power, to address the challenges facing the United States.

The breadth and complexity of challenges to the international order and the United States today seem as complex and vexing as any we have faced previously. We would be interested in your per-

spective on these challenges and the principles that should guide our security strategy.

On Iran, in a recent hearing that Senator McCain mentioned with General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski, both of them urged Congress to hold off on additional sanctions in order to give multilateral negotiations on Iran's nuclear program sufficient time to reach a conclusion. Indeed, the Senate Banking Committee is considering that issue in a few moments, and I will have to depart and participate in that markup. But we would certainly be interested in your perspectives on this critical issue.

Regarding the Middle East, during a hearing Tuesday on the military aspects of the United States security strategy, General Mattis emphasized the need to have a clear understanding of what our political objectives are in the region. He also made clear that any attempt to impose a purely military solution to these conflicts would come at a very high cost. General Scowcroft and Dr. Brzezinski talked about the importance of the region but also warned against the United States, in their words, "owning it." We have to be very careful going forward.

All of these issues and many, many more from Russia's behavior in Crimea to the impact of cyber on national security policy—I think we would benefit immensely from your advice and from your wisdom. Thank you very, very much.

Again, thank you, Senator McCain.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you. We will begin with Dr. Albright. Welcome, Dr. Albright, and thank you for being here today.

STATEMENT OF DR. MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT, CHAIR, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I am delighted to be here, Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, and members of the committee. Thank you very much for inviting me to participate in this important series of hearings. I am very pleased to be here alongside with my distinguished colleagues and very dear friends, Secretaries Kissinger and Shultz.

I want to commend this committee for initiating this timely discussion of U.S. national security strategy because these hearings embody this chamber's best traditions of bipartisanship and foreign policy, and I think they can be tremendously helpful in framing the issues facing our country.

As someone who began her career in public service working as chief legislative assistant to the great Senator from Maine, Ed Muskie, I have long believed that Congress has a critical role to play in our National security. When I became Secretary of State, I valued my regular appearances before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, then headed by Senator Jesse Helms. He and I did disagree on many things, but we respected each other and built an effective partnership because we both believed America had a unique role to play in the world. That belief still shapes my worldview and informs the perspectives that I bring to our discussion today.

It does not take a seasoned observer of international relations to point out that we are living through a time of monumental change across the world. We are reckoning with new forces that are push-

ing humanity down the path of progress while also unleashing new contradictions on the world scene.

One of these forces is globalization, which has made the world more interconnected than ever before but also added new layers of complexity to the challenges of statecraft. With globalization, it is impossible for any single nation to insulate itself from the world's problems or to act as the lone global problem-solver.

Another force is technology, which has unleashed unprecedented innovation and benefited people the world over while also amplifying their frustrations and empowering networks of criminals and terrorists.

Globalization and technology are reshaping and disrupting the international system which is struggling to keep pace with change. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the Middle East where century-old state boundaries are unraveling, a rising wave of violence and sectarianism is producing the world's largest refugee crisis in 70 years, and a dangerous competition is playing out between Iran and Saudi Arabia for regional primacy.

Another key test lies in Europe where Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed security calculations on the continent and marked the first time since World War II that European borders have been altered by force. Events of recent days have shown that what many have assumed would become a frozen conflict is still in fact red hot.

Meanwhile, in Asia, the region's growth and the rise of new powers are creating new opportunities for the United States in areas such as trade, but these developments are also testing security arrangements that have ensured peace and stability since the end of World War II.

None of these challenges pose an existential threat to the United States, but the intensity and complexity of them can seem daunting, particularly after we have been through more than 13 years of protracted war and threats such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, disease, and food and water shortages also looming on the horizon.

Still, they cannot be ignored. The American people may be tired, but we must avoid another danger lurking in this new era, the temptation to turn inward, because for all the turmoil this young century has brought, America remains by far the world's mightiest economic and military power with a resurgent economy and an energy revolution giving us newfound confidence in our future. We are the only nation with not just the capacity and will to lead but also the ideals to do so in a direction that most of the world would prefer to go towards liberty, justice, peace, and economic opportunity for all.

As the President said last week, the question is not whether America should lead but how it should lead. That in many ways is the focus of today's hearing. Let me just suggest a few basic principles that might help guide this discussion.

First, we are the world's indispensable nation, but nothing about the word "indispensable" requires us to act alone. Alliances and partnerships matter, enhancing our power and the legitimacy of our actions. Our national security strategy must always encompass

the security of others and, where possible, we should work through coalitions of friends and allies.

Second, given the fluid nature of today's threats, we must make wise use of every foreign policy option from quiet diplomacy to military force to protect America's national interests.

Third, the foundation of American leadership must remain what it has been for generations: our belief in the fundamental dignity and importance of every human being. We should not be shy about promoting these values, and that is why I am proud to be chairman of the National Democratic Institute. I know you, Mr. Chairman, are very proud of your leadership of the International Republican Institute and the things that we do together. Working with allies and partners, balancing our diplomatic, economic, and military tools of national power, staying true to our ideals, these will all be critical in navigating today's challenges. This means in the Middle East, we must continue working with European and regional allies to apply direct military pressure against the Islamic State while making clear that these violent extremists are guilty not of Islamic terrorism but of crimes that are profoundly un-Islamic. We must aid the millions of innocent refugees in Syria and its neighbors that have fled both the terror of ISIS and the depravity of the Assad regime.

Another key challenge in the region remains Iran. The President has rightly made it the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He has taken no options off the table to achieve that goal, and the administration is exploring a diplomatic resolution. If these negotiations fail or if Iran does not honor its commitments, then the United States should—and I believe will—impose additional costs on Tehran with strong support internationally. But I believe it would be a mistake to do so before the negotiations run their course.

In Europe, we must reinforce our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and stand united and firm against Putin's aggression even as we continue to engage Russia as a global power on issues of shared interest. But until Russia honors its commitments and withdraws its forces from Ukraine, there can be no sanctions relief. If Russia continues its pattern of destabilizing actions, it must face even more severe consequences.

On economic reforms, the administration has made strong pledges with Ukraine to work with our allies, however, to secure more commitments in the areas on banking and energy, but we do have to help them in terms of military assistance so that they can defend themselves. We should not make the road forward harder by suggesting that we see Ukraine's future subject to Russia's veto.

I have many other comments but I would like to Reserve the rest to put in the record. I thank you very much for your kindness in asking all of us to come and speak.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY MADELINE K. ALBRIGHT

Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of the committee: thank you for inviting me to participate in this important series of hearings.

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Second, given the fluid nature of the today's threats, we must make wise use of every foreign policy option—from quiet diplomacy to military force—to protect America's national interests.

Third, the foundation of American leadership must remain what it has been for generations—our belief in the fundamental dignity and importance of every human being. We should not be shy about promoting these values, and that is why I am

proud to be the Chairman of the National Democratic Institute, and I know that you, Chairman McCain, are equally proud of your leadership of the International Republican Institute.

Working with allies and partners; balancing our diplomatic, economic, and military tools of national power; staying true to our ideals—these will all be critical in navigating today's challenges.

That means in the Middle East, we must continue working with European and regional allies to apply direct military pressure against the Islamic State, while making clear that these violent extremists are guilty not of Islamic terrorism but of crimes that are profoundly un-Islamic.

We need to help the people of the region build governing institutions that offer legitimacy and an alternative to violence. That includes continuing to support the people of Afghanistan through NATO's *Resolute Support* mission. And we must aid the millions of innocent refugees in Syria and its neighbors that have fled both the terror of ISIS and the depravity of the Assad regime.

Another key challenge in the region remains Iran. The President has rightly made it the policy of the United States to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. He has taken no options off the table to achieve that goal, and the Administration is exploring a diplomatic resolution.

If these negotiations fail, or if Iran does not honor its commitments, then the United States should—and I believe will—impose additional costs on Tehran, with strong support internationally. But it would be a mistake to do so before the negotiations run their course.

That would fracture the international coalition and let Iran avoid its responsibility, leaving the United States and our closest allies isolated.

In Europe, we must reinforce our NATO Allies and stand united and firm against Putin's aggression, even as we continue to engage Russia as a global power on issues of shared interest. But until Russia honors its commitments and withdraws its forces from Ukraine, there can be no sanctions relief. And if Russia continues its pattern of destabilizing actions, it must face even more severe consequences.

Our support for Ukraine must enhance its security capabilities and support the new government's ambitious reforms, because Ukraine will need to restore security and implement dramatic economic changes to emerge from the current crisis.

On economic reforms, the Administration has made strong pledges and worked with our allies to secure more commitments in areas such as banking and energy. However, we must remember the lessons we learned in the Balkans and in other post-conflict states: aid and technical help in good governance must be accompanied by political guidance to avoid side deals that can subvert reform.

Ukraine has chosen to make its own path. It wants a future with Europe, while maintaining a relationship with its neighbor. We should not make its road forward harder by suggesting that we see Ukraine's future as subject to Russia's veto.

The United States should also stay vigorously engaged in Asia, where the administration's rebalance has reinforced commitments to allies such as Japan and the Republic of Korea, built stronger partnerships with India and the nations of Southeast Asia, created new opportunities for regional trade, and helped expand engagement with China on economic, diplomatic, and military issues. The President's historic trip to India this week cemented the positive progress we are making in strengthening another vital relationship in the region.

In Africa we should help nations such as Nigeria and Cameroon deal with the challenges of terrorism, and invest in the continent's unmatched potential for growth and opportunity. And in Latin America, we should pursue the opening to Cuba but keep issues of human rights and democracy front and center in all discussions with the regime, while expanding our partnerships throughout the hemisphere in order to deal with threats to human security such as transnational crime.

On a global level, the United States must also seize the opportunity of this year's UN Conference in Paris to assert our leadership on the issue of climate change, which the Pentagon recently highlighted as an urgent national security threat. While more tough work lies ahead, the agreements reached with China and India have laid the groundwork for global action on this defining challenge of our time.

Trade presents another area of enormous opportunity for the United States. The agreements under negotiation by the administration in the Pacific and in Europe would not only benefit our economy, they would strengthen our national security and should be viewed through that lens as well.

In his speech to the nation last week, the President appealed to the American people not to let our fears blind us to the opportunities that this young century presents.

For all the anxieties and turmoil that surround us, I must say that I remain an optimist—though I am an optimist who worries a lot.

Around the world, America remains the brightest beacon of human liberty. We are diverse, we are entrepreneurial, and we are resilient. No other country is in a better position to succeed in this new era than we are—but to succeed, we must stay globally engaged.

The greatest danger is becoming so intent on enjoying our freedom, that we neglect our responsibility to defend it.

That brings me to an area of special concern to this committee—the steep cuts to defense spending that will take place under the sequester mechanism later this year, jeopardizing our military's global reach.

The President, military leaders, and congressional leaders of both parties have all said that these cuts would cause undue harm to our national security.

I agree, and so I urge Congress to repeal these cuts.

But I would be remiss if I did not also mention the troubling gap in funding between military and non-military foreign affairs programs that have persisted for far too long.

For any strategy to be successful, we must provide all elements of our national security establishment—defense, diplomacy, development, and democracy promotion—with sufficient resources. Both the administration and Congress must come together and make the tough compromises necessary to renew and revitalize all of our instruments of power. A close partnership between the executive and legislative branches of government is the only way to protect our interests and sustain our leadership in this dangerous world.

Thank you again for the invitation to be here today. I look forward to your questions.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Secretary Shultz?

STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, THOMAS W. AND SUSAN B. FORD DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

Dr. SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. I think you have to push the button.

Dr. SHULTZ. I appreciate the privilege of being here. You can see I am out of practice.

[Laughter.]

Dr. SHULTZ. I have not been here for 25 years. I used to appear a lot. We had the idea when I was in office, if you want me with you on the landing, include me in the takeoff. We did lots of consultation, and I found I always learned from it. I appreciate the chance to appear.

What I thought I would do is start by setting out basic ideas that we used and President Reagan used in thinking out his foreign policy and defense policy and then try to apply those ideas to four areas that are important right now.

First of all is the idea of execution. You have to arrange yourself and the way you go about things so that you execute the ideas that you have in mind, make them effective.

I remember when I returned to California after serving. President Reagan knew I had served as Secretary of Labor and Director of the Budget and Secretary of Treasury. I knew him somewhat, and I got a phone call inviting me to Sacramento. He was Governor then. I got a 2 and a half hour drilling on how the Federal Government worked. How do you get something to happen? How does the President set up his policy? How does he get people to follow that policy? How does the budget get put together? What does the President do? What do the cabinet officers do? What does the budget di-

rector do and so on? I came away feeling this guy wants to be President but he wants to do the job and make things work.

I remember not long after he took office, you may recall the air controllers went on strike—the air traffic controllers. People came running into the Oval Office saying, Mr. President, Mr. President, this is very complicated. He said, it is not complicated. It is simple. They took an oath of office and they violated it. They are out. All over the world, people said, is he crazy firing the air traffic controllers? But he had surrounded himself and he had over in the Transportation Department a man named Drew Lewis who had been the chief executive of a large transportation company and Drew knew how to keep the planes flying, which happened. So all over the world, the message went, hey, the guy plays for keeps. You better pay attention. But it was execution.

The second thing in his playbook was always be realistic. Do not kid yourself. No rose-colored glasses. Describe the situation as it is. That does not mean you are afraid to recognize an opening when you see it, but do not kid yourself. A very important principle.

Then next, be strong. The military, of course. I do not know, sequestration seems to me like legislative insanity. You cannot run anything on a percentage basis. You have to be able to pick and choose. You better get rid of that.

But at any rate, we need a strong military, but we need a strong economy, something vibrant, something going to draw on. We need to have that kind of self-confidence that Madeleine talked about. Do we have the winning hand? Do we have the right ideas? All of that adds to your strength.

The next thing, of course, is to think through your agenda so when you get to negotiating, you know you are negotiating from your own agenda not the other guy's agenda. Do not spend any time thinking about what he might accept or she might accept. Stick to your agenda. Figure it out what it is and that is what you are after.

I remember when President Reagan proposed the so-called zero option on the the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). People said you are crazy. The Soviets have 1,500 missiles deployed. We have none. You are out of your mind. We went through a lot of pain and agony, but we wound up with 0–0. Our agenda won. We stuck to it.

I think it is very important to be very careful with your words. Mean what you say. Say what you mean. I remember, Mr. Chairman, at the start of World War II, I was in Marine Corps boot camp. The sergeant hands me my rifle. He says take good care of this rifle. This is your best friend. Remember one thing: never point this rifle at anybody unless you are willing to pull the trigger. Senator Sullivan, you went through the same experience, I am sure, in boot camp. No empty threats. You can translate that into when you say you will do something, do it. If you have that pattern of behavior, people trust you. They can deal with you. If you do not do what you say you are going to do, they cannot deal with it. They do not trust you. I think this has been a very important principle.

Then once you have all these things in place, negotiate, engage with people. Do not be afraid to engage with your adversaries, but do it on your agenda and from your strengths. That is the outline.

Now, let me turn first to something that I do not know whether it is really on your agenda or not but I think it should be and that is our neighborhood. I always felt and President Reagan felt that our policies start in our neighborhood. This is where we live. Canada and Mexico. It is worth pointing out that since the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed 20 years ago, trade between these three countries has blossomed. Canada is our biggest trading partner. Mexico is third. We are their biggest trading partner. Listen to this, our imports from Canada are 25 percent United States content, and our imports from Mexico are 40 percent United States content. There is an integrated process going on here.

Furthermore, in terms of people, there are a million Canadians living in California. That is fine. There is no problem.

Fertility in Mexico now is down to a little below replacement level. When we had that crisis not long ago with all these kids showing up on our border, none of them were Mexican. It only underlines the point that the border that we need to be worrying about is Mexico's southern border, and we need to be worrying about how can we help them. Why is it that conditions are so bad in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala that parents send their children north to see if they cannot get something better? We have to pay attention down there. That is all a part of this problem of illegal immigration. It is not just ranting about our border. It is much more diverse than that.

I want to turn to Iran. What is the reality? Let us start with reality. The first point to remember is Iran is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. It started right away when they took people in our embassy hostage for close to a year. One of their first acts also was to try to blow up the Grand Mosque in Mecca. They act directly. They act indirectly through Hezbollah. I think it is probably a fair statement to say that if it were not for Hezbollah, Assad would not be in Syria right now. But Hezbollah is an Iranian entity, and we should not kid ourselves about that. They perpetrate terror. That is point number one about what they are like.

Point number two, they are developing ballistic missiles. They are pretty advanced in that as far as I can figure out. That is a menacing military item.

Number three, internally there is a lot to be desired in the way they run themselves. There are lots of political executions in Iran and that continues.

Fourth, they are trying to develop nuclear weapons. There is no sensible explanation for the extent, the money, the talent they have devoted to their nuclear thing other than that they want a nuclear weapon. It cannot be explained any other way. We are negotiating with them. At least as far as I can see, they have not the table set yet. There is nothing going on about ballistic missiles, nothing going on about terrorism, let alone their internal affairs. It is just about the nuclear business. We had innumerable United Nations (UN) resolutions in the Security Council calling on Iran to dismantle its nuclear capabilities. Now we seem to have granted that. As I say, we have granted the right to enrich. Already they pocketed that and we are just talking about how much.

I think it is also the case if you said to yourself what is their agenda, their agenda is to get rid of the sanctions, and they are doing pretty well. The sanctions are eroding. The more you kick the can down the road, the more the sanctions erode. They are not so easy to put back. I hear people talk about snap-back. There is very little snap-back. If you have ever tried to get sanctions imposed on somebody, you know how hard it is. You are trying to persuade people who are making a perfectly good living out of trade with somebody to stop doing it, and it is not easy.

I am very uneasy about the way our negotiations with Iran are going on. I think it is not a bad thing if they are reminded that sanctions can be put on and will be tough.

Then let me just say a word. Madeleine has covered it already well about Russia. I think, in addition to the obvious things about it, Russia is showing a lack of concern about borders. It is, in a sense, an attack on a state system. It is an attack on agreements. Remember when Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons, there was an agreement with us, with the Russians, and with the British that they would respect the borders of Ukraine. You do not even hear about that agreement anymore. It does not mean a thing. All their neighbors are nervous. Why? Because they are showing a disrespect for borders.

I want to come back to this issue because—and let me just turn to the question of terrorism and ISIS because it is related in an odd way to what Russia is doing. I think the ISIS development is not simply about terrorism. It is about a different view about how the world should work. They are against the state system. They say, we do not believe in countries. In that sense, there is an odd kind of relationship with what Russia is doing and what they are doing.

What do we do about it? First of all, I think we do have to understand the scope of it. It is the scope that matters.

We had at the Hoover Institution at Stanford where I work the other day the guy who is the head military person in Pakistan. He was more worried about terrorism than he was about India. He was worried about ISIS establishing itself in Pakistan. It was not just the Middle East. This idea of no countries is something that is their ideology. They are trying to pursue it.

So what do we do? I think we, obviously, need to recognize that this has been around a long time. I brought along—perhaps I could put it in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman McCAIN. Without objection.

Dr. SHULTZ. A speech I gave in 1984 just to make the point that terrorism has been around a while. In this speech—I will read a couple of things from it.

“The terrorists profit from the anarchy caused by their violence. They succeed when governments change their policies out of intimidation. But the terrorist can even be satisfied if a government responds to terror by clamping down on individual rights and freedoms. Governments that overreact, even in self-defense, may only undermine their own legitimacy.”

I am saying we have to figure out how to react but not give away the store in the process.

I say, “The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and

poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes untreated.”

“We cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond.”

But we have to be ready to respond. What should we do?

A pretty good set of proposals is by your friend, Mr. Chairman, former Senator Joseph Lieberman. I do not know whether you saw the piece he had in “The Wall Street Journal?” recently.

Chairman MCCAIN. I did.

Dr. SHULTZ. It was a very good piece.

Chairman MCCAIN. We will include it in the record.

Dr. SHULTZ. He sets out things that we should do, which I agree. If you could put this in the record, I think that would be helpful.

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection.

Dr. SHULTZ. But in addition to military things that we should be doing, I think we also have to ask ourselves how do we encourage members of the Islamic faith to disavow these efforts. The President of Egypt made reportedly a very important speech that we need to build on.

But I would like to call your attention to something that has come out of San Francisco. Of course, I am a little oriented that way. I know you people on the East Coast think we are a bunch of nut balls, but we have a good time.

[Laughter.]

Dr. SHULTZ. But there is a man in San Francisco named Bill Swing. He is the retired Episcopal bishop of California. He started something called the United Religion Initiative. His idea is to get people—he found it was hard to get the people running these religions, but if you get the people together and getting them to talk together about subjects of interest to them, they basically forget about their religion and they try to get somewhere with these subjects. By this time, he has what he calls cooperation circles in 85 countries. He got millions of people involved. He has a big list of religions involved. The most important in numbers are Christians and Islam, and that is followed by Hinduism and Jewish, but a whole bunch of others. The kind of things they talk about are like economic development, education, health care, nuclear disarmament, refugee and displacement issues, and so on.

I think things like this are to be encouraged because they get people from different religions and say there are things you can get together on and work on together, and that tends to break things down.

He has given me a little handout on it, and I would like to put that in the record also, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Without objection.

Dr. SHULTZ. So thank you for the opportunity to present some views.

[The information follows:]

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Secretary Shultz

Terrorism and the Modern World

October 25, 1984



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the Park Avenue Synagogue, New York, October 25, 1984.

Someday terrorism will no longer be a timely subject for a speech, but that day has not arrived. Less than 2 weeks ago, one of the oldest and greatest nations of the Western world almost lost its Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, to the modern barbarism that we call terrorism. A month ago the American Embassy Annex in East Beirut was nearly destroyed by a terrorist truck bomb, the third major attack on Americans in Lebanon within the past 2 years. To list all the other acts of brutality that terrorists have visited upon civilized society in recent years would be impossible here because that list is too long. It is too long to name and too long to tolerate.

But I am here to talk about terrorism as a phenomenon in our modern world—about what terrorism is and what it is not. We have learned a great deal about terrorism in recent years. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals. What once may have seemed the random, senseless, violent acts of a few crazed individuals has come into clearer focus. A pattern of terrorist violence has emerged. It is an alarming pattern, but it is something that we can identify and, therefore, a threat that we can devise concrete measures to combat. The

knowledge we have accumulated about terrorism over the years can provide the basis for a coherent strategy to deal with the phenomenon, if we have the will to turn our understanding into action.

The Meaning of Terrorism

We have learned that terrorism is, above all, a form of political violence. It is neither random nor without purpose. Today, we are confronted with a wide assortment of terrorist groups which, alone or in concert, orchestrate acts of violence to achieve distinctly political ends. Their stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. Their methods may be just as diverse: from planting homemade explosives in public places to suicide car bombings to kidnappings and political assassinations. But the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: they are trying to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. The horrors they inflict are not simply a new manifestation of traditional social conflict; they are depraved opponents of civilization itself, aided by the technology of modern weaponry. The terrorists want people to feel helpless and defenseless; they want people to lose faith in their government's capacity to protect them and thereby to undermine the legitimacy of the government itself, or its policies, or both.

The terrorists profit from the anarchy caused by their violence. They succeed when governments change their policies out of intimidation. But the terrorist can even be satisfied if a government responds to terror by clamping down on individual rights and freedoms. Governments that overreact, even in self-defense, may only undermine their own legitimacy, as they unwittingly serve the terrorists' goals. The terrorist succeeds if a government responds to violence with repressive, polarizing behavior that alienates the government from the people.

The Threat to Democracy

We must understand, however, that terrorism, wherever it takes place, is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies—against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests. Because terrorism relies on brutal violence as its only tool, it will always be the enemy of democracy. For democracy rejects the indiscriminate or improper use of force and relies instead on the peaceful settlement of disputes through legitimate political processes.

The moral bases of democracy—the principles of individual rights, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of religion—are powerful barriers against those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies, or their religious beliefs by force. Whether in Israel or Lebanon or Turkey or Italy or West Germany or Northern Ireland, a terrorist has no patience for the orderly processes of democratic society, and, therefore, he seeks to destroy it. Indeed, terrorism seeks to destroy what all of us here are seeking to build.

The United States and the other democracies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. Nor is our vision limited to within our borders. In our foreign policies, as well, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes beneficial change. We do not practice terrorism, and we seek to build a world which holds no place for terrorist violence, a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law.

And there is yet another reason why we are attacked. If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally.

The number of terrorist incidents in totalitarian states is minimal, and those against their personnel abroad are markedly fewer than against the West. And this is not only because police states offer less room for terrorists to carry out acts of violence. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80% of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. Terrorism in this context is not just criminal activity but an unbridled form of warfare.

Today, international links among terrorist groups are more clearly understood. And Soviet and Soviet-bloc support is also more clearly understood. We face a diverse family of dangers. Iran and the Soviet Union are hardly allies, but they both share a fundamental hostility to the West. When Libya and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] provide arms and training to the communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of communist ideology, they hope to shake the West's self-confidence, unity, and will to resist intimidation. The terrorists who assault Israel—and, indeed, the Marxist Provisional IRA [Irish Republican Army] in Northern Ireland—are ideological enemies of the United States. We cannot and we will not succumb to the likes of Khomeini and Qadhafi.

We also now see a close connection between terrorism and international narcotics trafficking. Cuba and Nicaragua, in particular, have used narcotics smugglers to funnel guns and money to terrorists and insurgents in Colombia. Other communist countries, like Bulgaria, have also been part of the growing link between drugs and terrorism.

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups can exist in almost any society.

But in many countries, terrorism would long since have withered away had it not been for significant support from outside. When Israel forces uncovered irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union had been arming and training the PLO and other groups. Today, there is no reason to think that Soviet support for terrorist groups around the world has diminished. Here as elsewhere, there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet deeds, a gap that is very clear, for instance, when you put Soviet support for terrorist groups up against the empty rhetoric of the resolution against the so-called "state terrorism" which the U.S.S.R. has submitted to this year's UN General Assembly. The Soviets condemn terrorism, but in practice they connive with terrorist groups when they think it serves their own purposes, and their goal is always the same: to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

The Moral and Strategic Stakes

The stakes in our war against terrorism, therefore, are high. We have already seen the horrible cost in innocent lives that terrorist violence has incurred. But perhaps even more horrible is the damage that terrorism threatens to wreak on our modern civilization. For centuries mankind has strived to build a world in which the highest human aspirations can be fulfilled.

We have pulled ourselves out of a state of barbarism and removed the affronts to human freedom and dignity that are inherent to that condition. We have sought to free ourselves from that primitive existence described by Hobbes where life is lived in "continual fear and danger of violent death . . . nasty, brutish, and short." We have sought to create, instead, a world where universal respect for human rights and democratic values makes a better life possible. We in the democracies can attest to all that man is capable of achieving if he renounces violence and brute force, if he is free to think, write, vote, and worship as he pleases. Yet all of these hard-won gains are threatened by terrorism.

Terrorism is a step backward; it is a step toward anarchy and decay. In the broadest sense, terrorism represents a return to barbarism in the modern age. If the modern world cannot face up to the challenge, then terrorism, and the

lawlessness and inhumanity that come with it, will gradually undermine all that the modern world has achieved and make further progress impossible.

Obstacles to Meeting the Challenge

The magnitude of the threat posed by terrorism is so great that we cannot afford to confront it with half-hearted and poorly organized measures. Terrorism is a contagious disease that will inevitably spread if it goes untreated. We need a strategy to cope with terrorism in all of its varied manifestations. We need to summon the necessary resources and determination to fight it and, with international cooperation, eventually stamp it out. And we have to recognize that the burden falls on us, the democracies—no one else will cure the disease for us.

Yet clearly we face obstacles, some of which arise precisely because we are democracies. The nature of the terrorist assault is, in many ways, alien to us. Democracies like to act on the basis of known facts and shared knowledge. Terrorism is clandestine and mysterious by nature. Terrorists rely on secrecy, and, therefore, it is hard to know for certain who has committed an atrocity.

Democracies also rely on reason and persuasive logic to make decisions. It is hard for us to understand the fanaticism and apparent irrationality of many terrorists, especially those who kill and commit suicide in the belief that they will be rewarded in the afterlife. The psychopathic ruthlessness and brutality of terrorism is an aberration in our culture and alien to our heritage.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists—our respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual—also make us particularly vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike at us. Terrorists seek to make democracies embattled and afraid, to break down democratic accountability, due process, and order; they hope we will turn toward repression or succumb to chaos.

These are the challenges we must live with. We will certainly not alter the democratic values that we so cherish in order to fight terrorism. We will have to find ways to fight back without undermining everything we stand for.

Combating Moral Confusion

There is another obstacle that we have created for ourselves that we should overcome—that we must overcome—if we are to fight terrorism effectively. The obstacle I am referring to is confusion.

We cannot begin to address this monumental challenge to decent, civilized society until we clear our heads of the confusion about terrorism, in many ways the moral confusion, that still seems to plague us. Confusion can lead to paralysis, and it is a luxury that we simply cannot afford.

The confusion about terrorism has taken many forms. In recent years, we have heard some ridiculous distortions, even about what the word "terrorism" means. The idea, for instance, that denying food stamps to some is a form of terrorism cannot be entertained by serious people. And those who would argue, as recently some in Great Britain have, that physical violence by strikers can be equated with "the violence of unemployment" are, in the words of *The Economist*, "a menace to democracy everywhere." In a real democracy, violence is unequivocally bad. Such distortions are dangerous, because words are important. When we distort our language, we may distort our thinking, and we hamper our efforts to find solutions to the grave problems we face.

There has been, however, a more serious kind of confusion surrounding the issue of terrorism: the confusion between the terrorist act itself and the political goals that the terrorists claim to seek.

The grievances that terrorists supposedly seek to redress through acts of violence may or may not be legitimate. The terrorist acts themselves, however, can never be legitimate. And legitimate causes can never justify or excuse terrorism. Terrorist means discredit their ends.

We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." When I spoke on the subject of terrorism this past June, I quoted the powerful rebuttal to this kind of moral relativism made by the late Senator Henry Jackson. His statement bears repeating today: "The idea that one person's 'terrorist' is another's 'freedom fighter,' he said, 'cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist

murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent businessmen, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word 'freedom' to be associated with acts of terrorists." So spoke Scoop Jackson.

We cannot afford to let an Orwellian corruption of language obscure our understanding of terrorism. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, and as we look around the world, we have no trouble telling one from the other.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers the opportunity for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. We must oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

And we must not fall into the deadly trap of giving justification to the unacceptable acts of terrorists by acknowledging the worthy-sounding motives they may claim. Organizations such as the Provisional IRA, for instance, play on popular grievances, and political and religious emotions, to disguise their deadly purpose. They find ways to work through local political and religious leaders to enlist support for their brutal actions. As a result, we even find Americans contributing, we hope unwittingly, to an organization which has killed—in cold blood and without the slightest remorse—hundreds of innocent men, women, and children in Great Britain and Ireland; an organization which has assassinated senior officials and tried to assassinate the British Prime Minister and her entire cabinet; a professed Marxist organization which also gets support from Libya's Qadhafi and has close links with other international terrorists. The Government of the United States stands firmly with the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland in opposing any action that lends aid or support to the Provisional IRA.

Moral confusion about terrorism can take many forms. When 2 Americans and 12 Lebanese were killed at our Embassy Annex in East Beirut last month, for instance, we were told by some that this mass murder was an expression, albeit an extreme expression, of Arab hostility to American policy in the Middle East. We were told that this bombing happened because of a vote we cast in the United Nations, or because of our policies in Lebanon, or because of the overall state of our relations with the Arab nations, or because of our support for Israel.

We were advised by some that if we want to stop terrorism—if we want to put an end to these vicious murders—then what we need to do is change our policies. In effect, we have been told that terrorism is in some measure our own fault, and we deserved to be bombed. I can tell you here and now that the United States will not be driven off or stayed from our course or change our policy by terrorist brutality.

We cannot permit ourselves any uncertainty as to the real meaning of terrorist violence in the Middle East or anywhere else. Those who truly seek peace in the Middle East know that war and violence are no answer. Those who oppose radicalism and support negotiation are themselves the target of terrorism, whether they are Arabs or Israelis. One of the great tragedies of the Middle East, in fact, is that the many moderates on the Arab side—who are ready to live in peace with Israel—are threatened by the radicals and their terrorist henchmen and are thus stymied in their own efforts for peace.

The terrorists' principal goal in the Middle East is to destroy any progress toward a negotiated peace. And the more our policies succeed, the closer we come toward achieving our goals in the Middle East, the harder terrorists will try to stop us. The simple fact is, the terrorists are more upset about *progress* in the Middle East than they are about any alleged failures to achieve progress. Let us not forget that President Sadat was murdered because he made peace, and that threats continue to be issued daily in that region because of the fear—yes, fear—that others might favor a negotiated path toward peace.

Whom would we serve by changing our policies in the Middle East in the face of the terrorist threat? Not Israel, not the moderate Arabs, not the Palestinian people, and certainly not the cause for peace. Indeed, the worst thing we could do is change our principled policies under the threat of violence. What we *must* do is support our friends and remain firm in our goals.

We have to rid ourselves of this moral confusion which lays the blame for terrorist actions on us or on our policies. We are attacked not because of what we are doing wrong but because of what we are doing right. We are right to support the security of Israel, and there is no terrorist act or threat that will change that firm determination. We are attacked not because of some mistake we are making but because of who we are and what we believe in. We must not abandon our principles, or our role in the world, or our responsibilities as the champion of freedom and peace.

The Response to Terrorism

While terrorism threatens many countries, the United States has a special responsibility. It is time for this country to make a broad national commitment to treat the challenge of terrorism with the sense of urgency and priority it deserves.

The essence of our response is simple to state: violence and aggression must be met by firm resistance. This principle holds true whether we are responding to full-scale military attacks or to the kinds of low-level conflicts that are more common in the modern world.

We are on the way to being well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our principal allies; that is why these are the least likely contingencies. It is not self-evident that we are as well prepared and organized to deter and counter the "gray area" of intermediate challenges that we are more likely to face—the low-intensity conflict of which terrorism is a part.

We have worked hard to deter large-scale aggression by strengthening our strategic and conventional defenses, by restoring the pride and confidence of the men and women in our military and by displaying the kind of national resolve to confront aggression that can deter potential adversaries. We have been

more successful than in the past in dealing with many forms of low-level aggression. We have checked communist aggression and subversion in Central America and the Caribbean and opened the way for peaceful, democratic processes in that region. And we successfully liberated Grenada from Marxist control and returned that tiny island to freedom and self-determination.

But terrorism, which is also a form of low-level aggression, has so far posed an even more difficult challenge, for the technology of security has been outstripped by the technology of murder. And, of course, the United States is not the only nation that faces difficulties in responding to terrorism. To update President Reagan's report in the debate last Sunday, since September 1, 41 acts of terrorism have been perpetrated by no less than 14 terrorist groups against the people and property of 21 countries. Even Israel has not rid itself of the terrorist threat, despite its brave and prodigious efforts.

But no nation had more experience with terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it. By supporting organizations like the Jonathan Institute, named after the brave Israeli soldier who led and died at Entebbe, the Israeli people have helped raise international awareness of the global scope of the terrorist threat.

And Israel's contribution goes beyond the theoretical. Israel has won major battles in the war against terrorism in actions across its borders, in other continents, and in the land of Israel itself. To its great credit, the Israeli Government has moved within Israel to apprehend and bring to trial its own citizens accused of terrorism.

Much of Israel's success in fighting terrorism has been due to broad public support for Israel's antiterrorist policies. Israel's people have shown the will, and they have provided their government the resources, to fight terrorism. They entertain no illusions about the meaning or the danger of terrorism. Perhaps because they confront the threat every day, they recognize that they are at war with terrorism. The rest of us would do well to follow Israel's example.

But part of our problem here in the United States has been our seeming inability to understand terrorism clearly. Each successive terrorist incident has brought too much self-condemnation and dismay, accompanied by calls for a change in our policies or our principles or calls for withdrawal and retreat. We should be alarmed. We should be outraged. We should investigate and strive to improve. But widespread public anguish and self-condemnation only convince the terrorists that they are on the right track. It only encourages them to commit more acts of barbarism in the hope that American resolve will weaken.

This is a particular danger in the period before our election. If our reaction to terrorist acts is to turn on ourselves instead of against the perpetrators, we give them redoubled incentive to do it again and to try to influence our political processes.

We have to be stronger, steadier, determined, and united in the face of the terrorist threat. We must not reward the terrorists by changing our policies or questioning our own principles or wallowing in self-flagellation or self-doubt. Instead, we should understand that terrorism is aggression and, like all aggression, must be forcefully resisted.

The Requirements for in Active Strategy

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation. Our goal must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts, and experience has taught us over the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it. We should take steps toward carrying out such measures. There should be no moral confusion on this issue. Our aim is not to seek revenge but to put an end to violent attacks against innocent people, to make the world a safer place to live for all of us. Clearly, the democracies have a moral right, indeed a duty, to defend themselves.

A successful strategy for combating terrorism will require us to face up to

some hard questions and to come up with some clear-cut answers. The questions involve our intelligence capability, the doctrine under which we would employ force, and, most important of all, our public's attitude toward this challenge. Our nation cannot summon the will to act without firm public understanding and support.

First, our intelligence capabilities, particularly our human intelligence, are being strengthened. Determination and capacity to act are of little value unless we can come close to answering the questions: who, where, and when. We have to do a better job of finding out who the terrorists are; where they are; and the nature, composition, and patterns of behavior of terrorist organizations. Our intelligence services are organizing themselves to do the job, and they must be given the mandate and the flexibility to develop techniques of detection and contribute to deterrence and response.

Second, there is no question about our ability to use force where and when it is needed to counter terrorism. Our nation has forces prepared for action—from small teams able to operate virtually undetected, to the full weight of our conventional military might. But serious issues are involved—questions that need to be debated, understood, and agreed if we are to be able to utilize our forces wisely and effectively.

If terrorists strike here at home, it is a matter for police action and domestic law enforcement. In most cases overseas, acts of terrorism against our people and installations can be dealt with best by the host government and its forces. It is worth remembering that just as it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to provide security for foreign Embassies in Washington, so the internationally agreed doctrine is that the security of our Embassies abroad in the first instance is the duty of the host government, and we work with those governments cooperatively and with considerable success. The ultimate responsibility of course is ours, and we will carry it out with total determination and all the resources available to us. Congress, in a bipartisan effort, is giving us the legislative tools and the resources to strengthen the protection of our facilities and our people overseas—and

they must continue to do so. But while we strengthen our defenses, defense alone is not enough.

The heart of the challenge lies in those cases where international rules and traditional practices do not apply. Terrorists will strike from areas where no governmental authority exists, or they will base themselves behind what they expect will be the sanctuary of an international border. And they will design their attacks to take place in precisely those "gray areas" where the full facts cannot be known, where the challenge will not bring with it an obvious or clear-cut choice of response.

In such cases we must use our intelligence resources carefully and completely. We will have to examine the full range of measures available to us to take. The outcome may be that we will face a choice between doing nothing or employing military force. We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare. It is no aberration. We can expect more terrorism directed at our strategic interests around the world in the years ahead. To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.

What will be required, however, is public understanding *before the fact* of the risks involved in combating terrorism with overt power.

- The public must understand *before the fact* that there is potential for loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some innocent people.
- The public must understand *before the fact* that some will seek to cast any preemptive or retaliatory action by us in the worst light and will attempt to make our military and our policymakers—rather than the terrorists—appear to be the culprits.
- The public must understand *before the fact* that occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known—and the decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls.

Public support for U.S. military actions to stop terrorists before they commit some hideous act or in retaliation for an attack on our people is crucial if we are to deal with this challenge.

Our military has the capability and the techniques to use power to fight the war against terrorism. This capability will be used judiciously. To be successful over the long term, it will require solid support from the American people.

I can assure you that in this Administration our actions will be governed by the rule of law; and the rule of law is congenial to action against terrorists. We will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in a variety of ways, at times and places of our own choosing. Clearly, we will not respond in the same manner to every terrorist act. Indeed, we will want to avoid engaging in a policy of automatic retaliation which might create a cycle of escalating violence beyond our control.

If we are going to respond or preempt effectively, our policies will have to have an element of unpredictability and surprise. And the prerequisite for such a policy must be a broad public consensus on the moral and strategic necessity of action. We will need the capability to act on a moment's notice. There will not be time for a renewed national debate after every terrorist attack. We may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court of law. But we cannot allow ourselves to become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond. A great nation with global responsibilities cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and indecisiveness. Fighting terrorism will not be a clean or pleasant contest, but we have no choice but to play it.

We will also need a broader international effort. If terrorism is truly a threat to Western moral values, our morality must not paralyze us; it must give us the courage to face up to the

threat. And if the enemies of these values are united, so, too, must the democratic countries be united in defending them. The leaders of the industrial democracies, meeting at the London summit in June, agreed in a joint declaration that they must redouble their cooperation against terrorism. There has been followup to that initial meeting, and the United States is committed to advance the process in every way possible. Since we, the democracies, are the most vulnerable, and our strategic interests are the most at stake, we must act together in the face of common dangers. For our part, we will work whenever possible in close cooperation with our friends in the democracies.

Sanctions, when exercised in concert with other nations, can help to isolate, weaken, or punish states that sponsor terrorism against us. Too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking a bully. Economic sanctions and other forms of countervailing pressure impose costs and risks on the nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are not to suffer even greater costs down the road. Some countries are clearly more vulnerable to extortion than others, surely this is an argument for banding together in mutual support, not an argument for appeasement.

If we truly believe in the values of our civilization, we have a duty to defend them. The democracies must have the self-confidence to tackle this menacing problem or else they will not be in much of a position to tackle other kinds of problems. If we are not willing to set limits to what kinds of behavior are tolerable, then our adversaries will con-

clude that there are no limits. As Thomas Jefferson once said, when we were confronted with the problem of piracy, "an insult unpunished is the parent of others." In a basic way, the democracies must show whether they believe in themselves.

We must confront the terrorist threat with the same resolve and determination that this nation has shown time and again throughout our history. There is no room for guilt or self-doubt about our right to defend a way of life that offers all nations hope for peace, progress, and human dignity. The sage Hillel expressed it well: "If I am not for myself, who will be? If I am for myself alone, who am I?"

As we fight this battle against terrorism, we must always keep in mind the values and way of life we are trying to protect. Clearly, we will not allow ourselves to descend to the level of barbarism that terrorism represents. We will not abandon our democratic traditions, our respect for individual rights, and freedom, for these are precisely what we are struggling to preserve and promote. Our values and our principles will give us the strength and the confidence to meet the great challenge posed by terrorism. If we show the courage and the will to protect our freedom and our way of life, we will prove ourselves again worthy of these blessings. ■

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The Wall Street Journal

A Global War on Radical Islam

Atrocities like those in Paris won't stop until the civilized world mobilizes to wipe out the forces of violent jihad.

By
JOSEPH LIEBERMAN
Jan. 13, 2015

A few important questions, following the terrorist atrocities in Paris last week: We are all Charlie now, but are we ready to fight to protect freedom of expression before another cartoonist is killed by Islamist extremists? Are we ready to do what is necessary to stop the killing of another police officer just because she is a police officer, and more Jews just because they are Jews?

In other words, can the inspiring unity that filled the streets of Paris on Sunday in defense of freedom be transformed into the mighty unity that is necessary now to defeat radical Islam before it kills more people and takes away more freedom?

In rapid order, the three attacks in France last week showed more clearly than ever that the international movement of violent Islamist extremism has declared war on Western civilization's foundational values, which are embraced by so many people throughout the world. The murders of police officers, cartoonists and Jews were attacks against the West's most central values and aspirations—the rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Radical Islam will continue to threaten what we hold dear unless it is fought and eventually defeated.

Since 9/11, the U.S. has inflicted severe damage on Osama bin Laden 's al Qaeda. But al Qaeda has divided and reconstituted itself throughout the world under groups with new names like Islamic State, but with the same evil purposes.



Protesters during the march of the republic on the Place de la Nation in Paris on Sunday. PHOTO: ZUMA PRESS

The truth is that the enemy is stronger today in more places than it was on 9/11 and is gaining more ground than ever. It is also true that homeland defenses are significantly better in the U.S. and elsewhere, which has helped thwart many planned terrorist attacks. But wars aren't won on defense.

After the three attacks in France, which so touched the hearts and fears of people everywhere, the world must go on the offensive. The radical Islamists long ago declared war on the West, but most of the nations targeted or threatened have not yet declared war against them.

The spirit that brought millions together in France on Sunday in support of the values of freedom and law should now bring those millions and tens of

millions like them in other countries together to support a program like the following:

First, the civilized nations of the world must acknowledge that we are at war with violent Islamist extremism and that as long as these extremists continue to recruit, attack and expand territorially, the civilized world will continue to lose and the number and frequency of attacks like those in France will increase.

Second, every nation whose government or people have been attacked or threatened by Islamist terrorists should formally declare war against them. Congress should update the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed in the wake of 9/11 to grant the president broad authority to take action.

Third, the U.S., along with the world's other great powers, should form and lead a global alliance against radical Islam. That alliance must include leading Islamic nations—Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, to name a few—because Muslims who do not share the extremist views of the terrorists constitute the largest number of its victims.

Combining military, intelligence, economic and diplomatic assets, the goal of this Alliance Against Islamist Extremism should be nothing less than total destruction of the enemy—beginning with Islamic State, AQAP in Yemen, al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. These groups are not interested in accommodation; they will not be diplomatically contained. They must be eliminated. As long as they exist, they will continue to radicalize followers, in person and online. They will provide training for terrorists who will attack us where we live, work and worship. That will stop only when they are destroyed.

Fourth, we must use our values as a weapon instead of allowing the enemy to exploit and target those values. The world war against Islamist terrorism

is as much an ideological conflict as were the world wars against fascism and communism. The rule of law and the freedom of expression and religion that were attacked in France last week should be championed and spread by the alliance because where there is law and freedom, radical Islamists cannot flourish.

In the aftermath of the Paris attacks, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls on Saturday declared that France was “at war” with radical Islam. If that conclusion takes root, there is every reason for confidence that the civilized world can defeat the latest threat to its existence.

The White House has now admitted that it made a mistake on Sunday by not sending a high-ranking representative to the remarkable march in Paris. But a much greater, history-changing opportunity still awaits President Obama : to lead a global alliance to destroy violent Islamist extremism.

Mr. Lieberman, a former four-term U.S. senator from Connecticut, is senior counsel at Kasowitz, Benson, Torres & Friedman.



For George Shultz

The United Religions Initiative (URI) envisions a world at peace, sustained by engaged and interconnected communities committed to respect for diversity, nonviolent resolution of conflict, human rights, and social and environmental justice. **The purpose of the United Religions Initiative as a global grassroots interfaith network is to promote enduring, daily interfaith cooperation, to end religiously motivated violence and to create cultures of peace, justice and healing for the Earth and all living beings.** URI accomplishes this purpose by building bridges among people of different religious and cultural traditions, inviting them to form engaged grassroots social action groups called Cooperation Circles.

Founded in June of 2000, URI has grown to include **668 Cooperation Circles in 85 countries** in what is now the largest grassroots interfaith network in the world. An **approximate breakdown of religions represented in our Cooperation Circles** are as follows:

Religious/Spiritual/ Indigenous Tradition	# CCs with this tradition	% of CCs with this tradition
Agnostic/Atheist	20	3%
Baha'i	108	16%
Buddhist	152	23%
✓ Christians*	654	98%
Confucian	11	2%
✓ Hinduism	303	46%
Humanist/UU	35	5%
Indigenous	157	24%
✓ Islam**	583	88%
Jaiy	31	5%
✓ Jewish	132	20%
Shinto	4	1%
Sikh	97	15%
Spiritual	105	16%
Taoist	12	2%
Zoroastrian	12	2%

***Details regarding Christians**

Christian - Catholics	219
Christian - Orthodox	61
Christian - Protestants	158
Christian - Other	108

****Details regarding Muslims**

Islam - Shi'a	23
Islam Sufi	26
Islam Sunni	46
Islam Other	488

The figures above represent the number of Cooperation Circles by the religious affiliation of their members. For instance, 98% of the Cooperation Circles have members that are Christians. 88% of the Cooperation Circles have members that are Muslims. Each Cooperation Circle is required to have a membership diversity of at least three religions, spiritual expressions, or indigenous traditions.



For George Shultz

Cooperation Circles determine the modality they will use for building bridges and creating peace between people of different religions. Examples of work being done include:

- In India, Cooperation Circles are weaving in **interfaith understanding and peace-building education** into the daily curriculum of schools. This includes schools that are primarily Muslim and Hindu and where students come from communities that deeply mistrust each other. URI's work in schools is building bridges between students and their communities.
- In Pakistan, **leadership and capacity-building training is being conducted for Pakistani youth** in different provinces. Pakistan youth programs focus on **peace-building and non-violent communication**, and are working with the same population that the Taliban and other radicalizing forces are actively recruiting. In the front lines of terror and in the face of rampant youth unemployment, URI is **offering young people viable alternatives to violence and communities of sustained support**.
- In Rwanda, Cooperation Circles are working tirelessly on **reconciling Hutus and Tutsis**, focusing on ensuring the next generation does not repeat the mistakes of the past. This is happening through **programs that teach tolerance and inter-cultural understanding among youth**, among others.
- In Austria, URI unites Muslims, Catholics, Baha'is, Orthodox, Protestants, and various traditions from Africa and Asia. Some towns have seen an increase in new immigrants who bring diverse traditions and religious practices, including Muslims. One Cooperation Circle is **organizing exhibitions on world religions, constructing interfaith prayers, and providing resources and support for refugees**. This is helping to bridge important differences between locals and diverse groups in the area.
- In Israel last year, more than 100 Jews, Christians and Muslims gathered in Nazareth to pray and exchange perspectives on the possibilities for peace in the region. One Cooperation Circle member referred to this coming together as his **"Jihad for peace."** At the same time, another URI Cooperation Circle helped organize **"We refuse to be enemies: a Vision Camp for Israel-Palestine"** in the West Bank. Participants from different religions shared stories and their personal pain, engaged the larger worldwide community through social media and crafted a public statement decrying the ongoing violence.
- In the Mindanao, Philippines, one Cooperation Circle has spent years working within this conflict, leading **workshops on intercultural and interreligious understanding and violence prevention**, including coordinating the Church–Masjid Visitation Program. This program was crucial in building bridges and empathy between the government, military and rebel leaders within the region.



For George Shultz

OTHER EXAMPLES OF COOPERATION CIRCLE FOCI (outside of direct conflict transformation)

- In Cambodia, a Cooperation Circle has been able to unite Christians and Buddhists to collaborate and find sensible solutions to deal with **farming practices and population displacement induced by global warming**. They provide resources, programs, and training to farmers from diverse faith backgrounds. They also bring people of different religions together and by providing a space to address their common problems caused by challenges of climate change and poverty.
- In Kenya, a Cooperation Circle focuses their interfaith community service projects by **working against cultural and religious stereotypes associated with blood transfusions**.
- In Uganda, another Cooperation Circle convenes Latter Day Saints, Pentecostals, Muslims and local and regional ethnic groups to promote **developmental, cultural, moral and spiritual values through book clubs and access to reading materials**, specifically among the primary school children, their head teachers and families. By empowering children through the lifelong dream of reading, they hope to facilitate a culture of learning and peaceful coexistence in Uganda.
- In Latin America, 14 Cooperation Circles formed by Indigenous Peoples from different ethnic groups are working to **overcome stereotypes and prejudices** regarding different religious affiliations. Through community engagement and ongoing projects, they aim to **repair internal divisions** within their communities and to **contribute Indigenous wisdom and practices** for a healthier, more peaceful world.

URI has over 600,000 people working in 85 countries of the world.

URI Cooperation Circles deal with on a daily basis on the following issues:

- Conflict transformation and reconciliation
- Economic development
- Education
- Environmental sustainability
- Health care
- Human rights
- Human trafficking
- Indigenous rights
- Nuclear disarmament
- Refugee and displacement issues
- Women's empowerment
- Youth leadership

In February, Bill Swing will be the guest of the Prince of Wales and King Abdullah, II of Jordan. Forty interfaith and religious leaders will work with them on two matters:

(1) A resolution to come before the United Nations in April and having to do with "religicide, "or killing innocent people in the name of God.

(2) Attempting to come up with a Global Covenant of Religions that would make it possible for legitimate religious bodies to collaborate around common values and to allow the rest of the world to recognize illegitimate religions. URI strongly senses that the subject of religion is going to be central to life, tragedy and possibility in the 21st century. Paying attention to religion is going to be key to making progress for the human enterprise.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Kissinger?

**STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, CHAIRMAN OF
KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE**

Dr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this invitation and to appear together with my friend of 50 years, George Shultz, from whom I have learned so much, and with Madeleine, with whom I have shared common concerns for many decades and who put me in my place when she was appointed as Secretary of State. I introduced her at a dinner in New York, and I said, welcome to the fraternity. And she said, the first thing you have to learn that it is no longer a fraternity.

[Laughter.]

Dr. KISSINGER. Now a sorority.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty—I agree with the policy recommendations that my colleagues have put forward—to try to put forward the conception statement of the overall situation, and I will be happy in the question period to go into specific policy issues.

The United States finds itself in a paradoxical situation. By any standard of national capacity, we are in a favorable position to achieve our traditional objectives and to shape international relations.

Yet, as we look around the world, we encounter upheaval and conflict and chaos.

[Audience disruption.]

Dr. SHULTZ. Mr. Chairman, I salute Henry Kissinger for his many efforts at peace and security.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you, Doctor.

[Standing ovation.]

Dr. KISSINGER. Thank you very much.

The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War. One reason is that the nature of strategy has shifted from an emphasis on objective power to include also psychological contests and asymmetric war. The existing international order is in the process of being redefined.

First, the concept of order within every region of the world is being challenged.

Second, the relationship between different regions of the world is being redefined.

Third, for the first time in history, every region now interacts in real time and affects each other simultaneously.

The problem of peace was historically posed by the accumulation of power, the emergence of a potentially dominant country threatening the security of its neighbors. In our period, peace is often threatened by the disintegration of power, the collapse of authority into non-governed spaces spreading violence beyond their borders and their region. This has led to the broadening of the challenge of terrorism from a threat organized essentially from beyond borders to a threat with domestic networks and origins in many countries of the world.

The current international order, based on respect for sovereignty, rejection of territorial conquest, open trade, and encouragement of human rights is primarily a creation of the West. It originated as a mechanism to end Europe's religious wars over 3 centuries ago. It spread as European states advanced technologically and territorially. It evolved in the decades since World War II, as the United States became its guarantor and its indispensable component.

In key regions of the world, that order is in the process of change. In Europe, after two cataclysmic wars, the leading states set out to pool their sovereignty, and crises cast the question of Europe's identity and world role into sharper relief and, along with it, the definition of the transatlantic partnership, which in all the post-World War II period has been the keystone of American foreign policy. Europe is suspended between a past that it is determined to overcome and a future still in the process of redefinition, with a willingness to contribute to so-called soft power and a reluctance to play a role in the other aspects of security. The Atlantic partnership faces the challenge of adapting from an essentially regional grouping to an alliance based on congruent global views.

Russia, meanwhile, is challenging the strategic orientation of states once constrained in its satellite orbit. The West has an interest in vindicating the independence and vitality of these states that ended their satellite status. But Russia is now mounting an offensive on the border on which paradoxically it is least inherently threatened. On many issues, especially Islamist extremism, American and Russian interests should prove compatible. We face a dual challenge to overcome the immediate threats that are posed along the borders, especially of Ukraine, but to do so in a manner that leaves open a context for Russia's long-term role in international relations where it is needed to play an essential role.

In Asia, many economies and societies are flourishing. At the same time, there exist local conflicts for which there is no formal arrangement to constrain the rivalries. This introduces a measure of volatility to seemingly local disputes.

A special aspect of any Asian system will be the relationship between the United States and China. It is often described as one between a rising power and an established power analogous to the relationship between Germany and Britain before the war. Two successive American and Chinese presidents have announced their joint aim to deal with this matter on the basis of cooperation. Yet, it is also true that significant spokesmen have stressed the adversarial aspect in both countries.

Now, India is entering this equation. With its vast economic potential, a vibrant democracy, and cultural links to Asia, the Middle East, and the West, India plays a growing role that the United States will naturally welcome. The emphasis should be on social and political alignments, not strategic groupings.

In the Middle East, multiple upheavals are unfolding simultaneously. There is a struggle for power within states, a conflict between states, a conflict between ethnic and religious groups, and an assault on the international system as it was constituted. These various conflicts often merge, and they have produced the phenomenon of ISIS, which challenges all established institutions and

which in the name of a caliphate is establishing a territorial base explicitly designed to undermine all the existing patterns of legitimacy. The continuation of a territory under terrorist control that avows its aim the overthrow of all existing institutions is a threat to security, and the conflict with ISIS must be viewed within that context and not within the context of individual episodes and the ability to overcome that.

Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of power within other countries beyond the control of national authorities and sometimes constituting a state within a state, for example, in Lebanon and Iraq and elsewhere, and all this while developing a nuclear program of potentially global consequences. Nuclear talks with Iran, which I welcome, began as an international effort by three European countries buttressed by six UN resolutions. The United States joined in only in 2006. Their avowed purpose has been of all these countries, together with the six resolutions of the Security Council, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option.

These negotiations have now become an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability, not its existence, through an agreement that sets a hypothetical limit of 1 year on an assumed breakout. The impact of the exchange will be to transform the negotiations from preventing proliferation to managing it and from the avoidance of proliferation to its limitations. These stages need to be considered in assessing whatever agreement emerges.

In all of these regions, the old order is in flux while its replacement is uncertain.

The role of the United States is indispensable. In a time of global upheaval, the consequence of American disengagement is magnified and requires larger intervention later. The United States, working together with Mexico and Canada in an economic partnership and with its other allies, can help shape the emerging world in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions.

All this calls for a long-term bipartisan definition, and we should ask ourselves the following questions. What is it we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone? What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort? What do we seek to achieve or prevent only if supported by an alliance? What should we not engage in, even if it is urged by other groups? What is the nature of the values we seek to advance? The answers require a process of public debate and education. But we must understand that the answers will be determined by the quality of the questions we ask.

American military power has and will continue to play an essential role in upholding a favorable international balance, restraining destabilizing rivalries and providing a shield for economic growth and international trade to follow. The sense of basic security that a strong and consistent American political presence provides has made possible many of the great strides of the post-World War II era. It is even more important today.

The United States, as your chairman has often pointed out, should have a strategy-driven budget, not a budget-driven strategy.

In that context, attention must be given to the modernization of our strategic forces.

America has played in its history a role as stabilizer and it is a vision for the future. All great ideas and achievements are a vision before they become a reality. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, for conducting hearings that hopefully lead us in this direction.

I am happy to answer your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed:

Thank you for this invitation to address the Committee as a new Congress begins.

The United States finds itself in a paradoxical situation. By any standard of national capacity, we are in a position to achieve our objectives and to shape international affairs.

Yet as we look around the world, we encounter upheaval and conflict. The United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.

One reason is that the nature of strategy has shifted—from an emphasis on objective strength, to include a major component defined by psychological contests and asymmetric war. A second reason is that the existing international order itself is being redefined:

- First, the concept of order *within* every region of the world is being challenged or revised.
- Second, the relationships *between* the different regions of the world are being redefined.
- Third, for the first time in history, every region now interacts in real time and affects each other simultaneously.
- And finally, the nature of security threats has expanded and become more fluid. The problem of peace was historically posed by the accumulation of power—the emergence of a potentially dominant country threatening the security of its neighbors. In our period, peace is often threatened by the disintegration of power—the collapse of authority into “non-governed spaces” spreading violence beyond their borders and their region. This has led to the broadening of the challenge of terrorism—from a threat organized essentially from beyond borders, to a threat with domestic networks and origins.

The current international order—based on respect for sovereignty, rejection of territorial conquest, open trade, and encouragement of human rights—is primarily a creation of the West. It originated as a mechanism to end Europe’s religious wars over three centuries ago. It spread as European states advanced technologically and territorially. And it evolved in the decades since World War II, as the United States became its guarantor.

Yet for most of history, the other regions of the world were ordered by different patterns. Their experience was central empire (such as classical China), or universal theocracy (as in the Islamic caliphate), or a hybrid system of authoritarianism (for example, czarist Russia).

In key regions of the world, the present order is in the process of change:

- In Europe, after two cataclysmic wars the leading states reconceived their objective. They set out to pool their sovereignty and turned to tasks of internal construction. Now crises cast the question of Europe’s identity and world role into sharper relief—and along with it, the definition of transatlantic partnership. Europe is suspended between a past it is determined to overcome and a future still in the process of redefinition. The Atlantic partnership faces the challenge of adapting from an essentially regional grouping to an alliance based on congruent global views.
- Russia meanwhile is challenging the strategic orientation of states once constrained in its satellite orbit. The West has an interest in vindicating their independence and vitality. Still, Russia is mounting an offensive on the border on which, paradoxically, it is least inherently threatened. On many other issues—for example, Islamist extremism—American and Russian interests may prove compatible. We need to address the immediate challenges Russia poses while also defining a context for its long-term role in the international equilibrium.

- In Asia, many economies and societies are flourishing. At the same time, a number of these countries are contesting with each other over territorial claims, so far without clear limits or arrangements to constrain their rivalries. This introduces a measure of volatility to even seemingly local disputes.

A special aspect of any Asian system will be the relationship between the United States and China. It is often described as one between a rising power and an established power. Two successive American and Chinese presidents have announced their joint aim to deal with this matter on the basis of cooperation. Significant spokesmen in both countries have stressed the adversarial aspect. The direction taken will play a defining role in our period.

Now India is entering this equation. With vast economic potential, a vibrant democracy, and cultural links to Asia, the Middle East, and the West, India plays a growing role that the United States will naturally welcome. The emphasis should be on social and political alignments, not strategic groupings.

- In the Middle East, multiple upheavals are unfolding simultaneously. There is a struggle for power within states; a contest between states; a conflict between ethnic and sectarian groups; and an assault on the international state system. One result is that significant geographic spaces have become ungovernable, or at least ungoverned.

Iran has exploited this turmoil to pursue positions of power within other countries beyond the control of national authorities, such as in Lebanon and Iraq, and while developing a nuclear program of potentially global consequences. Nuclear talks with Iran began as an international effort, buttressed by six UN resolutions, to deny Iran the capability to develop a military nuclear option. They are now an essentially bilateral negotiation over the scope of that capability through an agreement that sets a hypothetical limit of one year on an assumed breakout. The impact of this approach will be to move from preventing proliferation to managing it.

In each of these critical regions, the old order is in flux while the shape of the replacement is uncertain.

The role of the United States is indispensable. Especially in a time of global upheaval, the consequence of American disengagement is greater turmoil. This tends to require intervention later, but as an emergency measure and at heavier cost. The United States, especially working together with Mexico and Canada in an economic partnership, can help shape the emerging world in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions.

All this calls for a long-term, bipartisan definition of the American national interest and world role. So we should ask ourselves:

- What do we seek to prevent, no matter how it happens, and if necessary alone?
- What do we seek to achieve, even if not supported by any multilateral effort?
- What do we seek to achieve, or prevent, only if supported by an alliance?
- What should we not engage in, even if urged by a multilateral group or an alliance?
- And what is the nature of the values we seek to advance? Which applications of them are absolute, and which depend in part on circumstance?

The answers require a process of public debate and education. But we must recognize that the answers will be determined by the quality of the questions we ask.

Let me close with a few words on a topic at the heart of this Committee's mission.

American military power plays an essential role in upholding a favorable international balance, restraining destabilizing rivalries, and providing a shield for economic growth and international trade to flourish. The sense of basic security that a strong and consistent American political presence provides has made possible many of the great strides of the post-World War II era. It is no less important now.

Therefore the United States should have a strategy-driven budget, not budget-driven strategy, as your Chairman has emphasized. And serious attention must be given to the lagging modernization of our strategic forces.

I know that this Committee will make important contributions to the understanding of these issues, and to the strong American defense that underpins so many of our great aspirations and achievements. Thank you, and I welcome any questions you may have.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Doctor. Thank you for your compelling statement. I thank all the witnesses.

I will be brief so that my colleagues can have a chance to answer questions. We will probably have to break within about a half hour or so since we have votes on the floor of the Senate.

Secretary Albright, should we be providing defensive weapons to the Ukrainian Government?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we should. I think that they are moving forward with a reform process, which I think can be healthy, but their security needs to also be ensured. I do believe that countries have a right to defend themselves. We should be careful about a confrontation ourselves, but I do think that we should be providing defensive weapons to the Ukrainians.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger, you described it—you and Secretary Shultz—rather well. But I am not sure that the average American understands the Iranian ambitions, and maybe both of you could explain perhaps to the committee and to, frankly, the American people what are the Iranian ambitions and why should we care? Maybe beginning with you, Secretary Shultz.

Dr. SHULTZ. Their ambitions are to have a dominant role at least in the Middle East to continue their pattern of terrorism directly and through Hezbollah and to enhance their position by the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They give every indication, Mr. Chairman, that they do not want a nuclear weapon for deterrence. They want a nuclear weapon to use it on Israel. It is a very threatening situation, I think. Actually a nuclear weapon used anywhere would dramatically change the world. Everybody would say we have to do something about these awful things. But it can wipe out a state like Israel.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. KISSINGER. Every country is in part a result of its history, and there are three strengths in Iranian history. As a national state in the region, in this capacity its interests and those of the United States are quite parallel, and the United States and previous Iranian governments found a reliable partner and that is a goal towards which one can strive.

Secondly, Iran reflects a history of empire that spreads across the entire Middle East and that was one of the major themes of its history, extending into the 19th century.

Third, Iran was the first state advocate of the Islamic jihad uprising that sweeps away national borders and based its foreign policy on the domination of the particular interpretation of religion. Iranian foreign policy since the event of the Ayatollah regime has been a combination of the religious and imperial element and has asserted a dominant position towards neighboring states and towards states well beyond it, and of course, with respect to the eradication of Israel.

With respect to the current negotiations, insofar as they are state-to-state negotiations, they have a positive basis, but the existing Iranian regime has never disavowed its policies that include Persian imperial and religious domination. It is supporting now groups like the Hezbollah which are states within the state in other countries. We have just heard this week of a Hezbollah attack from Syrian territory into an Israel border patrol.

When one speaks of political cooperation, the question is whether the political orientation of that regime has been altered. It cannot

be judged alone by the nuclear agreement in which the removal of sanctions is a great Iranian interest. That is the challenge we face and that we can only assess when we know the terms of the outcome of the negotiations.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Shaheen?

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all very much for your service to the country and for being here today.

I want to begin with a report that was asked to be done by the Department of Defense that the RAND Corporation did looking at the last 13 years of war and what lessons we have learned from those 13 years. The report draws a number of conclusions. I will not go through all of them.

But first it suggests that the U.S. Government has displayed a weakness in formulating national security strategies and that the weakness is really due to a lack of effective civilian-military process for national security policymaking. You all talked about the need to have a clear strategy for what we are doing.

I wonder if you could comment on whether you think those conclusions are going in the right direction in thinking about how we address future foreign and military policy or if you think that is totally off base. Secretary Albright, do you want to begin?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you very much. It is a pleasure to be here.

Let me just say I have not read the RAND report, but I do think that one of the bases of our Government are civilian-military relations, the control of the civilian controlling the military. I think that the decision-making process is one in which the military has to be heard, in which there may be different opinions, but the whole basis of the National security system in the United States is that different voices are heard. I think that there needs to be a process whereby—and I agree in this in terms of what George Shultz said—is there have to be ideas and then execution. While there may be voices at times that disagree, ultimately it is important to get a common policy.

I do think the last 13 years have been particularly difficult in terms of determining why we were in two wars and try to figure out what the decision-making process really was in getting into those wars, not in terms of rehashing them but in terms of trying to figure out what the appropriate decision-making process is, what the channels are. Are there those that operate outside the channels? I do think I am very much in favor of a process where civilian and military opinions are both regarded, but ultimately civilian control over the military.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

Dr. Shultz?

Dr. SHULTZ. I recall a time when President George H.W. Bush deployed forces, along with coalition forces, to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. That was a clear mission, endorsed by votes in Congress, as well as in the UN. When that had happened, he stopped. It was one of the most dramatic examples of not allowing mission creep to control what you are doing. There was a mission. It was accomplished and he stopped. He took a lot of heat for that. Oh, you should have gone on to Baghdad or you should have done

this or should have done that. But I thought it was a very important moment.

If you take Afghanistan, I think after 9/11 it was practically a no-brainer that we should go and try to do something there. We did and we succeeded brilliantly. Then our mission changed and we are there forever because of mission creep. I think to a certain extent we failed to take some advice on Iraq of some of the generals who said you have to have a greater amount of manpower there so that you have some control. If there is looting, it shows you are not in control, and there was a lot of looting. I think that was a case of we would have been better off if we had taken more military advice.

But in terms of the decision to go ahead in both cases, it would seem to be very well taken because the evidence, at least—it turned out not to be so, but the evidence seemed to be clear that Iraq was moving on weapons of mass destruction and we had, of course, 9/11 in Afghanistan.

I think we have to be very careful in these things. I sat in the situation room many times and there is a mission and the military say you have to tell me more precisely what the mission is. Then I can tell you what it takes to do it. That gets decided and then you go and you are successful. Then you have to be careful that the mission does not change into something that you did not provide for to begin with.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

My time has ended. I do not know, Dr. Kissinger, if you had anything you wanted to add to that.

Dr. KISSINGER. The question has two aspects. Is the organization adequate to give every significant group an opportunity to express itself?

But the second challenge we have faced in defining a national strategy is that we in our National experience have had a different experience than most other nations. We have been secured behind two great oceans. For Americans, security presented itself as a series of individual issues for which there could be a pragmatic solution, after which there was no need for further engagement until the next crisis came along. But for most nations and for us now more than ever, the need is for a continuing concept of national strategy. We think of foreign policy as a series of pragmatic issues. Other countries, for example, the Chinese, do not think in terms of solutions because they think every solution is an admissions ticket to another problem.

It is a question of national education in answering the question, what are our objectives. What are the best means to achieve these objectives? How can we sustain them over a period of time?

I have lived now so long that I have experienced six wars, and in the five wars after World War II, we began them with great enthusiasm and then had great national difficulty in ending them. In a number of them, including the last two especially, withdrawing became the only definition of strategy or the principal definition of strategy. We have to avoid that in the future. We must know the objective when we start and the political strategy with which to culminate it. That I think is our biggest challenge.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I just have to say I am just overwhelmed to be before the three of you. There is nothing I can say that would thank you enough for all that you have done. Thank you so much.

The only major thing I wanted to accomplish at this hearing was to try to describe to the American people, because they do not know. You probably assume they do know the current condition of our military. Now, I am going to read something that you will remember, and this is going to be to Dr. Shultz and Dr. Kissinger.

This is 1983. It was Ronald Reagan. He was talking about how we should budget for our National security. I am going to quote him. "We start by considering what must be done to maintain peace and review all of the possible threats against our security. Then a strategy for strengthening peace, defending against those threats must be agreed upon. Finally, our defense establishment must evaluate to see what is necessary to protect against any and all potential threats. The cost of achieving these ends is totaled up and the result is the budget for national defense."

Does that sound good to you?

Dr. SHULTZ. Right on the mark.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the statement in 1983 of President Reagan?

Dr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you.

The problem we are having right now is we have watched what is happening to our force structure and people do not realize. In a minute, I do want to ask you about the Ukraine. But when you think about the places where we should be and we could be and all of that, we have to consider that we do not have the capability that we have had in the past. We have always had that capability.

Our policy has been to be able to defend America on two regional fronts—roughly that. They changed the words around a little bit—at the same time, two regional conflicts at the same time. We are not where we can do it right now.

I would like to ask the two of you how you evaluate our current condition of our military capability, starting with you, Dr. Kissinger.

Dr. KISSINGER. With respect to Ukraine?

Senator INHOFE. No, no. Our overall military capability of our United States military. End strength.

Dr. KISSINGER. I think our capability is not adequate to deal with all the challenges that I see and which some of the commitments into which we may be moving and needs to be reassessed carefully in the light of the shrinkage that has taken place on budgetary grounds in the recent decade.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Shultz, do you agree with that?

Dr. SHULTZ. I think you have to recognize that a prime responsibility of the Federal Government is to provide for our security. That is number one. As you read from Ronald Reagan, one of the things he did was build up our military. He got a lot of objections from his budget director. But he said this is the number one thing. As our economy improved, things got better budgetarily. But still,

let us build up our military. When he took office, we had the Vietnam syndrome, and our people were not even wearing their uniforms into the Pentagon. He said stand up straight, be proud of yourself, wear your uniform. Then we had a military buildup of considerable size. The statement was peace through strength. We actually did not use our forces very much because it was obvious to everybody that if we did, we would win. So you better be careful. Do not mess with us.

Senator INHOFE. An excellent statement.

Dr. Albright, I do agree with your position on Ukraine for probably a different reason. I happened to be there at the time of the election in November. A lot of people do not realize what really happened, not just Poroshenko but Yatsenyuk and the rest celebrating the first time in 96 years that they have rejected any Communist seat in the parliament. It has never happened before.

Now, in light of that, the free world is looking at what is happening in Ukraine. What effect do you think that has on many of our allies, the action that we have not taken there?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I think that we do need to help them defend themselves. Senator Ayotte and I were there also for elections, and they took very many brave steps. The people of Ukraine had been disappointed by what had happened after the Orange Revolution in terms of their capability of being able to bring reforms into place.

I think that generally—and the larger question—people do look at how we react when one country invades another and takes a piece of territory. As both my colleagues here have said, it is breaking the international system. Therefore, I do think that it is important to take a strong stand there by providing capability of Ukrainians to defend themselves, but also that NATO, in fact, can and is taking steps in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe of providing some forces that move around, and NATO has been a very important part.

I do think, if I might say to the questions that you asked the others, that I am very concerned about sequestration and the deep cuts that have been taken, and I hope very much that this committee really moves on that because I do think it jeopardizes America's military reach.

As somebody who worked for Senator Muskie at the beginning of the budget process, I do know about function 150 and 050, having defended 150 a long time. I also admire what Secretary Gates had said about the importance of providing some money for the foreign policy aspect of our budget because in answer to many questions here, I think we are in the Middle East for a long time. The military part of this is important, but we also have to recognize—and it is a little bit to what you said, George—in terms of longer-term aspects there where we need to figure out what the environment is that has created this particular mess and be able to use other tools of our policy to deal with that.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

If I could just ask one question for the record from Dr. Shultz. You outlined, I thought, a very good course of behavior for us in the United States. I would like for the record for you to submit how we are doing relative to that course of behavior that you recommend. Thank you very much.

Dr. KISSINGER. Could I say a word about the military? In considering the Ukraine issue, in my view we should begin with the definition of the objective we are trying to reach and then see which measures are the most suitable. I am uneasy about beginning a process of military engagement without knowing where it will lead us and what we are willing to do to sustain it in order to avoid the experience that I mentioned before. Ukraine should be an independent state, free to develop its own relationships with perhaps a special aspect with respect to NATO membership. It should be maintained within its existing borders, and Russian troops should be withdrawn as part of a settlement.

But I believe we should avoid taking incremental steps before we know how far we are willing to go. This is a territory 300 miles from Moscow and therefore has special security implications. That does not change my view of the outcome, which must be a free Ukraine. It may include military measures as part of it, but I am uneasy when one speaks of military measures alone without having the strategy fully put forward.

Chairman MCCAIN. Dr. Shultz, do you want to add to that?

Dr. SHULTZ. Yes, I would like to add to that. I am totally with Henry's statement of where we want it to wind up as a free, independent Ukraine. But I think we have to be active in trying to help that come about, and I would point to two particular things that we should be doing.

Number one, we should be organizing an energy effort to see to it that the countries around Russia are not totally dependent on Russian oil and gas, which has been used as a weapon. I am interested to know that there is an LNG receiving ship in a port in Lithuania, and I think they are getting their LNG from Norway. But we have a lot of gas in this country. We should be ready to have LNG and get it there. There is plenty of oil around that should get there. We want to relieve those countries of this dependence on Russian oil and gas, and maybe it would teach them a little bit of lesson because, in addition to the low oil prices, they will lost market share probably permanently.

Then I would not hesitate—I think I am here in Madeleine's camp. Let us do everything we can to train and equip decently the Ukrainian armed forces. They have boots on the ground. They are their boots, but let us help them be effective because there are Russian boots on the ground. Don't anybody kid themselves about what is going on.

Chairman MCCAIN. Thank you.

Dr. Albright, I will suggest that you become a member of the Budget Committee again. We can use your expertise and experience.

[Laughter.]

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Manchin?

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this outstanding hearing.

Thank you for attending, the three of you. It is just such an honor to have you all here with your expertise and your knowledge and the history of where we are as a country and hopefully help us get to the place we need to be.

With that, Dr. Kissinger, you said in your testimony the United States has not faced a more diverse and complex array of crises since the end of World War II. I look around at all of our generations. My generation is Vietnam. The generation of today is 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq. It has kind of gone into another direction of concern that we all have.

I would like to hear from the three of you. I think you all have touched on it and about how we would approach it. But when you start looking at where is the United States of America truly willing to spend its treasure and contribute its blood, which is a horrible thing for any of us to have to ask Americans to do, but if we are going to be doing treasure and blood of where we are going to be addressing the greatest threats that we have and we are limited in such an array of complex problems that we have, which ones would you identify first?

I would ask simply this, we had gone to Afghanistan because of 9/11. We turned left and went to Iraq, and we can talk about that all day. We have Iraq that did not do what we thought it would do, and we have ISIS in Syria. We have all of that going on right now and we have Ukraine and Russia. Do we try to do a little bit of everything, or should we really be pinpointing something that we should be focused on right now? Whoever would like to start. Dr. Kissinger, if you would like to start on just pinpointing what you think our greatest concerns may be and where our efforts should be put.

Dr. KISSINGER. My thinking on international relations was formed during the Cold War. In terms of danger, the conflict between a nuclear-armed Russia and a nuclear-armed America was greater than any single danger we face today. The most anguishing problem one could face was what happens if the strategic plans of both sides had to be implemented or were implemented by accident or whatever. But it was a relatively less complex issue than we face today where we have a Middle East whose entire structure is in flux.

As late as the 1973 Middle East war, American policy could be based on existing states in the region and achieve considerable successes in maneuvering between them. Today Middle East policy requires an understanding of the states, of the alternatives to these states, of the various forces within the states, a situation like Syria where the two main contenders are violently opposed to America, violently opposed to each other, and a victory for either of them is not in our interest.

The rise of China, apart even from motivations of leaders, presents a whole new set of problems, an economic competitor of great capacity, a state that is used in its tradition of being the central kingdom of the world as they knew it, that by its very existence we and they are bound to step on each other's toes, and the management of this—but it is a different problem from the Middle East problem.

Senator MANCHIN. The Middle East is the most dangerous one that you think we are facing right now, a nuclear Iran?

Dr. KISSINGER. And then we have nuclear Iran. I would say the most immediate, short-term problem is to get rid of a terror-based

state that controls territory. That is ISIS. We must not let that degenerate into another war that we do not know how to end.

But more long-term problems also exist. The challenge to our country is not to switch from region to region but to understand the things we must do and separate them from the things we probably cannot do. There is a novel challenge in that magnitude for the current generation.

Senator MANCHIN. Mr. Chairman, would it be possible that Dr. Shultz might answer? Dr. Shultz, would you just give us your idea of what you think our most greatest concerns are right now?

Dr. SHULTZ. Of course, I agree with what Henry has said, but let me put some additional points in it.

I think we tend to underestimate the impact of the information in the communication age. It changes the problem of government because people know what is going on everywhere. They can communicate with each other and organize, and they do. You have diversity everywhere, and it has been ignored or suppressed but it is asserting itself.

Remember in Iraq with Maliki was he had to govern over diversity, but he wanted to stamp it out. He did not understand at all how you govern over diversity.

You have that problem which tends to fragment populations and make governments a little weaker, just as that is happening, the problems that demand international attention are escalating.

I think as Henry said, as I said in my initial testimony, there is an attack on the state system going on. The attack on Ukraine is part of it. ISIS is a major part of it. They are a major challenger to the state system. They want a different system.

I have a sense, Henry, that China is drifting into a kind of sphere of influence and way of thinking. That is different from the state system. So that is a challenge.

I see nuclear weapon proliferation coming about. That is devastating. A nuclear weapon goes off somewhere. Even my physicist friends say that the Hiroshima weapon was just a little play thing. Look at the damage it did. A thermonuclear weapon would incinerate the Washington area totally. The spread of nuclear weapons is a really big threat. We were making progress but that has been derailed and we are going the wrong way right now.

I think and I gather in Washington it is very controversial, but I have a friend at Hoover who is a retired Chief of Naval Operations, Gary Roughead. We have started a project on the Arctic. Senator Sullivan knows about the Arctic. There is a new ocean being created there. That has not happened since the last Ice Age. There are big melts all over the world taking place. The climate is changing. There are consequences. So that is happening. We will never get anywhere with it unless we are able to somehow have actions that take hold on a global basis.

I might say sort of parenthetically I have the privilege of chairing the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) advisory board on their big energy initiative, more or less the same thing at Stanford. I see what these guys doing research and development (R&D) and girls doing R&D are doing, and it is really breathtaking. We had an MIT scientist come to Hoover the other day, and I think he has cracked the code on large-scale storage of electricity.

That is a game-changer because it takes the intermittency problem out of solar and wind. Also, we must know how vulnerable our grid is, and if you have some energy stored where you can use it, you are much safer. At any rate, I think these energy R&D things are beginning to get somewhere. But that is a big threat.

These three things are huge concerns of ours, and we need to have a strong military. We need to have a strong economy, and we need a strength of purpose in our country.

We have probably done the best job with all our problems of dealing with diversity because we started out that way. We are the most diverse country in the world, and our Constitution provided that. I have been reading Lynn Cheney's book on Madison. It is a wonderful book. It is clear that George Washington, having suffered because the Continental Congress would not give him the money to pay his troops, wanted a strong government. But he and his colleagues saw that they would never get the Constitution ratified unless they provided a lot of role for States and communities. So our Federal structure emerged, and it is a structure that allows for diversity. It is very ingenious. You can do something in Alaska. We do not have to do it in San Francisco, and they certainly do not want to do the same thing in New Mexico. There is a difference. Let the differences prevail.

We have these big problems, and then in a sense you look at them and say tactically how do we handle Iran, how do we handle Ukraine, how do we handle ISIS. It falls within this broader framework.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. Can I just say a word? I do think the biggest threat is climate change and its national security aspects, as has been described. It leads me to say the following thing. Our problem is that not everything can be handled militarily and that we also have a short attention span. These are very long-term problems. Also, Americans do not like the word "multilateralism". It has too many syllables and ends in an "ism". But basically it is a matter of cooperating, and if you look at these issues, it will require American leadership within a system that other countries play a part in. Otherwise, I agree with everything that both Henry and George have said. But I do think short attention span and multilateral ways of dealing with it.

Senator MANCHIN. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN. Not at all.

Senator SESSIONS?

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Thank you all.

It is time for us to think about our role, what our strategy will be, and what we can realistically accomplish in the future. The longer I have been around these issues, the more less dreamy I become.

Dr. Kissinger, I am reading "World Order," and thank you for your contribution to the world with that book. I think you quote Bismarck. Maybe you can get it correctly. Unhappy is the statesman who is not as happy after the war as he was before the war, something to that effect. We just have to be careful about power and how we use it. Sometimes long-term thinking can avoid short-term problems. I thank all of you for contributing to that.

Our subcommittee, the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, deals with nuclear weapons. I am very concerned about proliferation, Dr. Shultz, as you indicated. I am worried that our allies are losing confidence in our umbrella and they may expand. Of course, Iran will clearly likely kick off proliferation if they achieve a weapon. As one of you noted, I think Dr. Kissinger, you have indicated we move from Iran not having a nuclear weapon to Iran could get close to having a nuclear weapon but not have one. You expressed some concern about that. Would you expand on that a little bit? Yes, Dr. Kissinger?

Dr. KISSINGER. I am concerned, as I pointed out, the shift of the focus of negotiations from preventing Iran from having the capability of building a nuclear weapon to a negotiation which seeks to limit the use of their capability in the space of 1 year. That will create huge inspection problems. But I will Reserve my comment on that until I see the agreement.

But I would also emphasize the issue of proliferation. Assuming one accepts the inspection as valid and takes account of the stockpile of nuclear material that already exists, the question is what do the other countries in the region do. If the other countries in the region conclude that America has approved the development of an enrichment capability within 1 year of a nuclear weapon and if they then insist on building the same capability, we will live in a proliferated world in which everybody, even if that agreement is maintained, will be very close to the trigger point. I hope and I would wish that this proliferating issue be carefully examined because it is a different problem from not having a capability at all to having a capability that is within 1 year of building a weapon, especially if it then spreads to all the other countries in the region and they have to live with that fear of each other that will produce a substantially different world from the one that we knew and from the one in which the negotiations were begun.

Dr. SHULTZ. It should be pointed out that a bomb made from enriched uranium is much easier to make. The Hiroshima bomb was an uranium enrichment bomb. It was not even tested. The Nagasaki bomb was a plutonium bomb. That was tested. But you can make an unsophisticated bomb from enriched uranium fairly easily. That is not a big trick. The enrichment process is key.

Senator SESSIONS. In the short term then, Dr. Kissinger, I think I hear you saying—short term being the next several years—this could be one of the most dangerous points in our foreign policy, this Iranian nuclear weapon, because it goes beyond their capability to creating proliferation within the area, the threat to Israel, and a danger that we do not need to be facing, if we can possibly avoid it.

Dr. KISSINGER. I respect the administration's effort to overcome that problem, but I am troubled by some of the implications of what is now publicly available of the implications of the objective on the future evolution of nuclear weapons in the region and the impact of all of this on an international system where everybody is within a very short period of getting a nuclear weapon. Nobody can really fully trust the inspection system, or at least some may not. That is something that I would hope gets carefully examined before a final solution is achieved.

Dr. SHULTZ. We have historically tried to draw a strong line between access to the technology to produce a nuclear power plant and access to enrichment technology. We have tried to put that line in there very strongly. We have cast that line already in the Iran negotiations.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Kaine?

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses for the very instructive testimony.

Really just one question. A week from Sunday, we begin the seventh month of a war, the war on ISIS, as described by the President and by others in the administration. American service personnel have lost their lives in Operation Inherent Resolve and those from coalition partners have as well. There has been no congressional debate or vote upon this war. I think all agree that it will likely last for some period of time. It was justified by the administration based on two authorizations for use of military force that were passed at different times under different circumstances under slightly different geographies under a different administration and under a vastly different Congress.

As former Secretaries of State, would you agree with me that it is more likely that the Nation will sustainably support a war if there is a full debate on it before Congress and if Congress, in fact, weighs in as constitutionally contemplated with respect to any war being waged by this country?

Dr. SHULTZ. My experience is, as an administration official, you get a much better policy and you get a much better ability to execute that policy if it is discussed and there is consultation between the administration and Congress. As I said in my testimony, our watchword was if you want me with you on the landing, include me in the takeoff. I think the consultation will provide a better policy and a better execution.

But I would say this war that we are now talking about—it started a long time ago. I read testimony from 1984. That is 30 years ago. I think this is a deep problem that goes beyond terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. The object is to change the state system. We need to understand what these people are up to, and that will help us design the kind of policies that are needed.

Dr. ALBRIGHT. The President has asked in his State of the Union message that there be an authorization of the use of military force. I do agree that there needs to be discussion of it and consultation. I think it is very important for there to be more education of the American public as to what the stakes are.

Dr. KISSINGER. I agree with what my colleagues said. Congressional authorization should be sought. But I want to reemphasize the point I made earlier. We should not let this conflict with ISIS slide into the pattern of the previous wars which start with support and after a while degenerate into a debate about withdrawal, especially since the existence of a territorial base for terrorists, which has not existed before. A country that asserts that its global objective is the eradication of the state system—once America has engaged itself, victory is really an important objective.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the witnesses.

Chairman MCCAIN. Senator Ayotte?

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank each of you for all that you have done for the country and your leadership.

Secretary Albright, it was a privilege to be in Ukraine with you during the presidential elections. So thank you.

I wanted to follow up to ask you about NATO presence in the Baltics. We had Dr. Brzezinski before the committee the other day, and he had talked about putting a small number of United States ground combat forces, in conjunction with NATO obviously as part of a NATO contingency, in the Baltics to ensure that there would be a trip wire, but the force would obviously be of a size that would not be one where we are trying to send a conflict message. I wanted to ask you what you thought about that in terms of NATO's presence in the Baltics and what you think we should be doing in addition to providing defensive arms to Ukraine to help buttress NATO?

Dr. ALBRIGHT. I do think that when we were in Kiev and Ukraine generally together, I think we understood, as we together met with the leadership, the importance of American support for what they are doing there.

On NATO in the Baltics, I agree with Dr. Brzezinski. I do think that it is important, the Baltic countries are members of NATO, and I think it is very important to show that kind of support. The question is whether they are kind of rotating troops or there permanently. I do think that the United States needs to be a part of a grouping which also requires other countries from NATO to be there. I know Dr. Brzezinski spoke about the importance of the Germans, the Brits, et cetera also being there. I do think that it is an important aspect of our common approach to this through NATO.

I also do think that NATO is at a stage where—we were talking about organizations that have been started many years ago—that our support for NATO and getting the other NATO countries to pay up what they are obligated to do under the 2 percent of the GDP for activities. But I think, as I have understood the new Secretary-General, he is talking a lot about the necessity of this rapid reaction force really making NATO more capable to deal with the kinds of problems that are evident in the region.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you.

Secretary Shultz, I wanted to follow up on what you said about Iran's program, particularly their intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) program. I wrote a letter with others on this committee to ask the President to include in the negotiations the missile program because our estimates are that they will have ICBM capabilities—what we have heard from our defense intelligence leaders—perhaps by this year. I wanted to get your thoughts. As we look at these Iran negotiations, do you believe that their missile program, their ICBM capability, should be included as part of a result that is important in terms of our National security interests?

Dr. SHULTZ. Certainly. I think their support for terrorism should also be on the table because you get a weapon and you are going to use it.

Senator AYOTTE. As I look at these negotiations, those two pieces are missing, and they are very important.

I was also very interested to hear what both you and Secretary Kissinger have said in terms of concessions that have already been made on enrichment that make, I think, a very difficult outcome for a good result that does not lead to some kind of race within the Middle East, a Sunni-Shia race, in terms of a nuclear arms race if we are going to allow a certain amount of enrichment.

Dr. SHULTZ. You have to remember the Iranians are not known as rug merchants for nothing. They are good bargainers. They have already crossed lines. They have already out-maneuvered us in my opinion. We have to watch out.

Senator AYOTTE. Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to follow up on something that you had testified before the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and you had called attention to the disparity between Russian and American tactical nuclear weapons at the time. I wanted to get your thoughts on what we have learned.

According to the State Department, Russia is developing a new mobile nuclear ground-launched cruise missile in direct violation of the 1987 INF Treaty that, of course, Secretary Shultz has referenced as well, and that this missile was likely in development even during these New START negotiations, if you look back in the time window. I wanted to get your thoughts on what our response should be to the development of this ground-launched cruise missile.

As I look at this, in our response, it is not just a response of a treaty violation, but what are the Russians' interests in developing this type of cruise missile.

Dr. KISSINGER. The direction, motivation for developing this weapon is that—as I said in my statement, I have said that the western border is the least threatened border of Russia paradoxically, but it has a long border with China with a huge inequality of population and a long border with the jihadis' regions of the world. The motivation undoubtedly is to use nuclear weapons to balance the numerical inferiority of Russian forces along many of its borders.

But to the extent that it is incompatible with signed agreements, the United States, even if it theoretically understands the motivation, cannot accept that nuclear arms control treaties are violated because a new strategic opportunity develops. I believe that we have to be very firm in insisting on carrying out these agreements.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all.

Chairman MCCAIN. I want to say to the witnesses—I have asked you to stay longer than I originally bargained for, and I apologize for that. This has been a very important hearing not only for this committee but also for the Members of Congress and the American people. With the benefit of your many years of wisdom and experience, you have provided us with important not only information but guidance as to how we should conduct not only this hearing but our National security policy. We are honored by your presence, and we thank you.

This hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

GLOBAL CHALLENGES, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY, AND DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 2015

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and King.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN, CHAIRMAN

Senator MCCAIN. Well, good morning.

The Senate Armed Services Committee meets today to build upon the major oversight initiative we have begun on the future of defense reform.

Yesterday, Dr. Robert Gates provided an excellent overview of the many issues we intend to cover in this series of hearings.

Today, we will start at the highest level with a geopolitical outlook and net assessment that can help to establish the strategic context for our inquiry. We will assess America's enduring national interests and role in the world, the long-term threats and opportunities we face and how they should be prioritized, the roles and missions of the U.S. military in achieving these priorities, how to mobilize our ways and means to achieve our policy ends, and perhaps most importantly, how well our current defense organization is positioned to achieve our objectives now and in the future.

These are the fundamental questions that must be considered before there can be a meaningful discussion of defense reform. If we do not understand what we need a military and defense organization to do for our Nation, it is impossible to know how to set them up to be maximally successful. Our witnesses are ideally suited to help us better understand the strategic predicament we now confront and what it means for our defense policy, strategy, and organization.

Professor Eliot Cohen, a military historian at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and former Counselor to the United States Department of State from 2007 to 2009, is one of the Nation's foremost experts on civil-military relations and military strategy.

Professor Walter Russell Mead of Bard College, the Hudson Institute, and The American Interest, is one of the keenest observers

of geopolitics today and has written eloquently about U.S. national security policy for decades.

Professor Thomas Mahnken is Senior Research Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from 2006 to 2009, where he supervised the Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Strategy for Secretary Gates.

Finally, Dr. Kathleen Hicks, Senior Vice President and the Henry A. Kissinger Chair of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served from 2009 to 2013 as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Forces where she led the development of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

Yesterday, Dr. Gates noted that while today's national security threats are incredibly complex and daunting, such threats have been the norm rather than an aberration in our Nation's history since World War II. He also observed that any coherent strategy to address the threats must begin with an assessment of our interests, what we must protect, what we must choose to do without, and how we balance today's urgent requirements and tomorrow's strategic imperatives.

Unfortunately, the United States is not succeeding in this basic task. This is certainly true today. But as Dr. Gates also observed, it is also largely true that our country has not had a coherent national security strategy since the Cold War.

Part of this failure is material, the imposition of arbitrary caps on our national defense spending through the Budget Control Act and sequestration, a flawed acquisition system, and a defense organization that has grown bloated with overhead and bureaucracy while its war-fighting capacity has steadily reduced.

We are also challenged, however, at the level of ideas and imagination. Part of this is what Dr. Gates mentioned yesterday, our Nation's perfect track record of failure in predicting the type and location of the next war, but worse than that, our cyclical belief that, having finished with a present conflict, we can take a holiday from history, pull back from the world, slash our spending on and preparations for our own defense, and that somehow disaster will not seek us out yet again.

In addition, there is the problem that plagues us now, the seeming inability or unwillingness to think about our national security challenges as anything other than a litany of individual crises requiring ad hoc, micro managed responses. Indeed, as our witnesses all make clear in their prepared testimony, the major challenges we face, Russian aggression and expansionism, an increasingly assertive China, the collapse of order in the Middle East, the rise of an even more virulent form of violent Islamist extremism, escalating cyber attacks from state and non-state actors, none of these challenges are limited to individual regions of the world, and they are becoming entangled in dangerous ways.

Three decades ago, this committee led a comprehensive review of our national defense organization that resulted in one of the most sweeping reforms of the Department of Defense in its history. Much about our world and our country has changed since then. We must ensure that the Department of Defense is positioned to be the

most agile, innovative, effective, and efficient organization it can be now and in the future. That is the purpose of our work now.

We thank our witnesses for graciously offering us the benefit of their thoughts today.

Senator Reed?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank you for scheduling this important hearing to discuss the global strategic environment, the challenges facing the United States, and the appropriate role of the Defense Department in addressing these challenges. The committee will be conducting a series of similar hearings throughout the fall to gain greater insight and understanding on these critical issues. I believe these are questions that we must ask ourselves regularly, and I look forward to working with the chairman and his staff and this committee on this extraordinarily important endeavor.

I would also like to thank our witnesses for their participation in today's hearing. You all are superbly prepared as national security scholars and practitioners, and I welcome your ideas and your insights today very much.

Yesterday, as the chairman pointed out, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before this committee. As always, his astute assessment of the current state of our Department of Defense was insightful and candid. His thoughtful observations for how to streamline and reform defense structures and processes have merit, and I know the committee will give them careful consideration in the months ahead.

As General Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor, testified earlier this year, again at the invitation of the chairman, the international security environment has changed significantly since the end of the Cold War. The centuries-old nation-state structure and the international institutional order, which the United States helped put in place following World War II, are increasingly challenged by the forces of globalization, the flow of goods, people, and most importantly, communications and technology across borders.

In the last few years, we have seen how the ability of people to connect using social media has empowered individuals on the street to express their desire for democratic social change, whether in the Maidan in Ukraine, in Dara'a, Syria, or across the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, we have also seen that in the absence of capable institutions at the nation-state level, these upheavals have resulted in massive instability and insecurity, as in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere.

We have also seen how these forces of globalization have been harnessed by violent extremist organizations to promote their destructive agendas and carry out attacks against the United States, our allies, and our respective interests. Non-state actors like al Qaeda and the Islamic State have been able to take advantage of ungoverned or under-governed spaces in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa to seize territory and control the population through brutality and an extreme ideology promoted through the Internet.

In Iraq and Syria, the breakdown of the nation-state system has allowed the reemergence of centuries-old divisions, creating a vastly complex situation. Syria presents us with a series of intermingled conflicts, including the counter-ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] fight, a Syrian civil war, a regional proxy war between the Gulf States and Iran, a sectarian Sunni-Shia conflict, and with the intervention of Russia, a great powers struggle. Our top priority must be ensuring that ISIL's expansion and external plotting is halted. Of course, I would welcome the witnesses' recommendations and insights regarding this very complex situation in Syria and throughout the Middle East.

Probably no country has been more destabilizing to the international security environment than Russia, not only in Europe but also in the Middle East, the Arctic, and elsewhere. Russia continues its provocative behavior in Europe while at the same time deploying Russian troops and military equipment to Syria to directly support the failing Assad regime. Putin has shown his willingness to use all the tools at his disposal, including economic pressure, an intensive propaganda machine, and military power to achieve his goals. We would, of course, be interested in hearing from the witnesses on this important topic also.

China presents a number of strategic challenges. Again, your insights would be extremely appreciated, as it asserts itself in the South China Sea and many other areas, including cyber operations.

We are also in the age of nuclear proliferation. Regional nuclear arms races in South and East Asia threaten to increase instability globally. Of course, at the same time, North Korea has demonstrated its capacity at least to detonate a nuclear device. That is another issue of concern.

Cyber complicates our lives dramatically, and again, we would expect you are able to weave all of these into a coherent response to our perhaps less than coherent questions.

We are all facing these challenges. We have to face them together and thoughtfully. That is why the chairman's plan, so far extraordinarily successful, to bring scholars first and then to bring practitioners and then to think creatively together is very important. I look forward to working with you on this important task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator McCAIN. Thank you.

I welcome the witnesses. Professor Cohen, welcome back before the committee.

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR ELIOT A. COHEN, ROBERT E. OSGOOD PROFESSOR OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator McCain. Thank you for inviting me here, Senator Reed. It is really an honor to be at a set of hearings which I think have the potential to be at least as consequential as those of, say, the Jackson committee in 1960 or the hearings that led to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.

I have a longer written testimony which I would like to submit. I just thought I would touch on some of the highlights.

Senator McCAIN. Without objection. All written statements will be made part of the record.

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, sir.

I would like to start a little bit differently in some ways than Secretary Gates suggested, and that is by starting with the nature of the military that we have today because I think understanding just how deeply geopolitical assumptions from years past are embedded in that military is really indispensable if we are then going to think about how do we adjust to the challenges of today and tomorrow.

I would say that today's military is the product chiefly of 75 years of history in three phases: the first, World War II; the Cold War; and then the relatively brief period of uncontested American supremacy.

World War II is still with us. It is why we have the Pentagon. It is why we have a Marine Corps which is much larger than any other comparable organization in any other military.

But I think it is primarily the 45 years of the Cold War and the period thereafter, the period of unchallenged American preeminence, that have most left their mark.

Our military hardware is, as you know, platforms that were largely acquired during the Cold War or designed in it. That is, of course, even true of platforms such as the F-35, whose design parameters reflected assumptions about a very different world than the world in which we now find ourselves.

I think even deeper than that are certain assumptions about what war is and how it should be waged. The Cold War military was largely, obviously not entirely, a deterrent military. Its conventional tasks, in particular, were assumed to be extremely intense but short, nothing like the multiyear wars of the mid-20th century. Our conception of naval power is very different from what it will probably be in the future in a world in which the United States Navy was really unquestionably supreme around the world.

When the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union fell apart, a period of unchallenged supremacy began, which lasted about 15 years. It too has left legacies chiefly of thought and of action but also of organization, the rise, for example, of our special operations forces.

Somewhat more troubling to my mind are a set of mind sets on the part of senior military commanders to include a tremendous amount of emphasis on military diplomacy and what the military sometimes calls phase 0 as opposed to phase III, war. I think to some of the mind sets that were developed during that period, we can attribute what were to my mind very poor decisions such as importing a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] command structure into Afghanistan when it was clearly not suited for it.

So I think we need to be quite self-conscious about the extent to which we are dealing with a legacy military whose technology and in many ways whose ideas are very much rooted in our recent past. Most of those assumptions I think have to be cast aside. Instead of the Cold War when we faced one major enemy with a set of clients and supporters, we face four major strategic challenges today.

The first is China because the sheer size and dynamism of its economy causes it to pose a challenge utterly unlike that of the Soviet Union and in a very different environment than in Europe.

Secondly, our jihadist enemies in the shape of al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and similar movements have been at war with us for at least a decade and a half and they will be at war with us for decades to come. We will be operating in a state of chronic war I think through the rest of my lifetime, and that is very different from where we have been in the past.

Our third set of challenges emerge from the states that are hostile to us, hostile to our interests, and often in a visceral way to our institutions, and that would include at the moment countries like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, all of which have or will have, I believe, nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.

Our fourth strategic challenge is securing, as the great naval historian and naval theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan once said, “the great commons,” the ungoverned spaces. Now, those are no longer just the physically ungoverned spaces in places like Yemen but includes outer space, cyberspace, the High North. Our ability to control or at least exercise some sort of benign influence over those ungoverned spaces has really been critical to world order.

This means that our strategic problems are quite unlike those of the previous two periods in a profound way. For example, I think we now live in a world, we will be living in a world in which we cannot assume that the United States itself, the continental United States, will not be at risk from conventional attack and certainly from terrorist attack.

We live in an era when our old strategic partners are in many cases getting much more weak. You have only to look at the case of Great Britain, whose military has been in a sad state of decline for quite some years now.

Of course, our domestic politics is even more deeply divided than it has been—in some ways than it has since the Vietnam War.

I could extend this analysis indefinitely but will not. After the Cold War, there was a resizing of the military, a reconfiguring of its basing structure and some realignment, but the sheer busyness of that period of American preeminence when we were doing many things in the world in many ways deferred a fundamental rethinking of what kind of military we need and to what ends. Now, it seems to me, is really the time for that.

Well, let me offer just four thoughts about directions that the committee might go. I know you will have a very wide set of hearings, and what I want to do is just emphasize those which do not involve a lot of money. Naturally, of course, most of the focus, quite understandably, in both government and outside of it is on the big-ticket items. I would like to suggest that the real importance may also lie in some things that do not cost much money at all. So I have four thoughts.

One is that we review our system for selecting and promoting general officers. When we look at the great periods of military creativity in our past—think, for example, of the early Cold War—we think of people like Arleigh Burke or Bernard Schriever or Jim Gavin. Our problem today is that our promotion systems, partly because of the natural tendencies of bureaucracies and partly because of the wickets that we ourselves have created, to include Congress, make it much harder than it was in the past to find exceptional general and flag officers and promote them rapidly. Think of it.

General Curtis LeMay, who, whatever one thinks of his politics, was a great military leader, became head of Strategic Air Command at the age of 42. I recall, as I am sure many here do how President Carter was able to pass over the heads of scores of generals in the United States Army to promote General Edward C. "Shy" Meyer to the position of Chief of Staff in 1979. I am not sure that we could do those things today. I am not sure that we could find, for example, a Hyman Rickover to design a completely different approach to naval power. So I think that would be one thing to look closely at, what kind of general officers and flag officers are we growing and how do we bring them up.

My second thought is it would be a very good thing to overhaul, in fact, to scrap, our current system for producing strategy documents on a regular basis. I say this knowing that at least two of my colleagues seated to my left bore direct responsibility for this. But I believe as an outside observer that the Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] system, which consumes vast amounts of labor and emotional energy, is pretty much worthless. The reason why it is worthless is because the world does not cooperate with our planning cycle. The year 2000 QDR was obsolete as soon as it hit the streets because of 9/11. I think a much more useful system would be to imitate the Australian or, dare I say it, the French white paper system, which is much more irregular in terms of its scheduling but much more in depth and much more thoughtful, and those documents really repay a look and a thought about whether we might be able to do that.

A third thought, the rediscovery of mobilization. When one looks back at the grand sweep of American history back to colonial times, we have always understood that the military that would wage the next war would not be a simple minor, plussed-up version of what we already had. We understood that we would need not only to grow more of what we had, we would have to grow different kinds of forces. Mobilization thinking in that sense died pretty much in the 1950s. We encountered a great success and Secretary Gates by sheer force of personality was able to increase the production of MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected]. That is not mobilization or adding a couple of brigade combat teams to the United States Army. That is not mobilization. I think there is room to think much more creatively about how we bring different kinds of people into the military and intelligence system once a crisis occurs, how we grow new and different kinds of organizations. But it really requires an art that we have not really practiced, although we did until, as I said, the 1950s.

Finally, I would like to suggest that you look closely at our system for professional military education at the very top. I have taught, as has my colleague, Dr. Mahnken, at the Naval War College. I lecture regularly at the others. Our war colleges do a capable job at the mission of broadly educating senior officers at the O-5 and O-6 levels and helping to create a network of foreign officers who have been exposed to our system. But they do not create a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners from all the services in the civilian world.

To do that, you would need a different educational system, or at least a different insert into the current educational system. You

would have to do things that would be anathema to the current military personnel system. For example, something that we do at Johns Hopkins and indeed any decent university, competitive examinations to get in, small class size, no foreign presence.

I think does this point in the direction that people have always shied away from, the idea of a joint general staff of some sort? Perhaps it gets closer to it than some might wish. But the fact is that our current professional military education system, with some notable exceptions, produces extremely able tacticians. It produces well-rounded military officers. But it has not produced in significant numbers officers who have made their name as deep thinkers about the nature of modern war. Yet, surely that is at the heart of the military profession. While it is flattering to think that academics or think tanks can fill that void, the fact is that we cannot.

These are but preliminary thoughts. I just want to conclude by saying that I am quite convinced that although we have always faced uncertainty, our country faces a much more turbulent international environment than at any time since the end of World War II. It is in some ways a more dangerous world in which our children or grandchildren may live to see nuclear weapons used in anger, terrorism that paralyzes great societies, war in new guises brought to the territory of the United States, as has indeed already happened, the shattering of states, and the seizure of large territories by force.

As in the last century, the United States will be called upon to play a unique role in preventing those things from happening, maintaining some sort of standards of order and decency and leading a coalition of like minded nations. We have and we will have a strong hand because of the Government under which we live and the spirit of the American people. But that does not mean that we can take our military power for granted or neglect thinking hard and creatively about how to mold it in the interval of peace that we now have, such as it is.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cohen follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ELIOT A. COHEN*

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for inviting me here today. It is an honor to be asked to speak at these hearings, which have the potential to be at least as consequential as those held by Senator Henry Jackson in 1960 on national security organization, or those which gave birth to previous major legislation such as the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.

Our task on this panel, as I understand it, is to bring together three things: a view of our international circumstances and American foreign policy; an assessment of the adequacy of our defense organization; and suggestions for directions this committee might pursue in exploring the possibilities of reform. This is a daunting assignment: I will do my best to approach it from the point of view of someone who has studied and worked with the American military in various settings for over thirty five years, drawing on what I know as a military historian and what I have seen during service at senior levels in government.

*Eliot A. Cohen is Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins SAIS. In addition to having taught at Harvard University and the Naval War College, he has served in various government positions including as Counselor of the Department of State, 2007–2009. His books include *Supreme Command* (2003) and *Conquered into Liberty* (2011); *The Big Stick*, a study of military power and American foreign policy will appear in 2016.

THE ROOTS OF OUR CURRENT DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGIC POSTURE

The theory taught at our war colleges—and I have taught at them myself—would say that we should begin by looking at our interests and policies, and then design a military to meet them. I am going to start the other way, with what kind of forces we have, for two reasons. First, as we all know, you do not get to redesign your forces afresh unless you experience utter calamity, and some times not even then. Secondly, because it is important to recognize the ways in which the military experiences and geopolitical assumptions of the past shape even seemingly technical questions today. It will be helpful to begin by appreciating how peculiar, from an historical point of view, many of the features of the armed forces that we take for granted, really are.

Today's military is the product chiefly of seventy-five years of history. World War II, of course, not only provided a great deal of its physical infrastructure, to include the Pentagon, but has left organizational legacies. No other country in the world, to take the most striking example, has a Marine Corps remotely sized like ours—today, it is larger than the entire British army, navy, and air force put together. That is a result of the Marines' performance in World War II, and the legacy of raising a force six divisions strong for that conflict.

But it is primarily the roughly forty five years of the Cold War, and some fifteen years of unchallenged American preeminence thereafter, that have most left their mark.

The Cold War has left us many, indeed most of the platforms that equip the military today, M-1 tanks, B-2 or B-1 bombers, or AEGIS class cruisers. Even weapon systems coming into service today such as the F-35 reflect Cold War assumptions about which theaters we planned to fight in, what kind of enemies we thought we might encounter, what kind of missions we would be required to conduct. From the Cold War as well emerged our highly professional career military built on the ruins of the draft military of the Vietnam war. Our weaving together of reserve and National Guard units with the active duty military reflects ideas first expressed in the late 1970's.

Even deeper than these things go certain assumptions about what war is, and how it should be waged. The Cold War military was largely a deterrent military, designed to put up a credible defense against Soviet aggression, while taking on lesser included tasks such as peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention.

The conventional tasks were assumed to be extremely intense but short—nothing like the multi-year wars of the mid-twentieth century. The result was an Army, for example, that honed its skills in armored warfare at installations like the National Training Center to a level never seen in a peacetime military, even as it shunted aside the tasks of military governance that had characterized it through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this world, a large nuclear arsenal was designed for deterrence of more than use against the USSR. Naval power was to be used chiefly to protect the sea lanes to Europe and to project power abroad, not to contest command of the seas with a major naval power.

When the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, a period of unchallenged supremacy began: it has lasted barely fifteen years, and although the United States is still the world's strongest power, that supremacy is now contested. I doubt we will ever get it back. But it too has left legacies of thought and action. With great reluctance, a military that had pledged to itself after Vietnam that it would not do counterinsurgency again (as it similarly pledged to itself after Korea that it would not do land war in Asia) embarked on a mission that it found strange and distasteful in Afghanistan and Iraq. It learned, or rather re-learned old lessons, but at a cost.

One organizational legacy of this period has been the rise of special operations forces, particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing conflicts. Others include the tremendous emphasis placed by combatant commanders on the conduct of military diplomacy, giving rise to multinational exercises that are less substantive than political in nature. Similarly, today's senior officers often dwell on the importance of what they call Phase 0 operations—acts of military diplomacy to set the conditions where we might fight. I believe that much of this focus has come at the expense of hard thinking about Phase III—war.

From the transitional period between Cold War and the age of supremacy arose strategic doctrines too, characterized by terms such as “end state” and “exit strategy” that previous generations would have found meaningless and that today are downright dangerous. In this period, as in the past, the heart of America's strategic alliance system was to be found in Europe. Thus, it was (absurdly) with a NATO command structure that we have attempted to fight a war in Afghanistan. Thus too, it was that officers dismayed by the unfamiliar challenges of irregular warfare came to blame all other departments of government for failing to be able to understand

problems and provide capabilities that, history should have taught them, would have to be found within the military itself.

THE NEW WORLD DISORDER

The assumptions of both the Cold War, and the brief period of American supremacy must now be cast aside. Instead of one major enemy, the Soviet Union, and its various clients and supporters, we face four major strategic challenges.

1. China, because of the sheer size and dynamism of its economy poses a challenge utterly different than that of the USSR, and, unlike the Soviet Union, that challenge will take place in the Pacific, in an air, sea, and space environment unlike that of Europe.
2. Our jihadist enemies, in the shape of al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and like movements, are at war with us, and we with them. This will last at least a generation, and is quite unlike any other war that we have fought.
3. We face as well an array of states that are hostile to our interests and often, in a visceral way, to our political system as well: these include, most notably Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but others may emerge. All of these states are, or will be, armed with nuclear weapons that can reach the United States.
4. Finally, while our policy in the past has been to secure "the great commons," as Alfred Thayer Mahan once put it, for the use of humanity, today ungoverned space—to include outer space, the high North, and cyberspace—poses new and deepening problems for us.

This means that our strategic problems are quite unlike those of the previous two periods. We can imagine, for example, conventional conflict with China that might not end after a few days, or be capped by nuclear threats. We are, right now, engaged in protracted unconventional warfare that is likely to spread rather than be contained. New technologies, from cyber-weapons to long range cruise and ballistic missiles and unmanned aerial and maritime vehicles mean that defending the homeland against conventional, or semi-conventional attack must again be a mission for the armed forces.

We live in an era when our old strategic partners are weakening. One need only look at the appalling decline of the British military—the Royal Navy, which struggles to man the ships it does have, has a fleet less than half the size of semi-pacifist Japan's just now—to measure the self-inflicted weakness of old allies. At the same time, new partners are emerging, particularly in Asia, with Japan, Australia, and even India coming into closer association with us.

It is not just the external politics of security that has changed: our domestic politics is more deeply divided by questions of the use of force today than at any time since the worst periods of the Vietnam War. On the one hand, every President from now into the indefinite future has to accept that he or she will be a war President, ordering the pinpoint killing of terrorists in far corners of the earth, and probably sending our armed forces into harm's way every few months. On the other, at no time since the 1970's have the American people been so reluctant to commit large forces abroad, or rather, so uncertain about the purposes that would justify it.

I could extend this analysis indefinitely, but will not. After the Cold War there was a resizing of the military, a reconfiguring of its basing structure, and some realignment, but the sheer busyness of the post 1989 period has in many ways deferred a fundamental rethinking of what kind of military we need, and to what ends. Now is the time for such a rethinking.

NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

The time, then, is ripe for what you are undertaking. Of course, one scholar can only offer so much by way of recommendations, but I would like to suggest four, which flow from this fundamental diagnosis: that our problems will be so complex, so large, and so different from the past that we need to design a system that is much better at redesigning and reinventing itself than what we have got. It will not do, in other words, to conceive a new pattern of organization and impose it upon the Department of Defense. We will assuredly fail to foresee the crises and opportunities to come. We need, rather, to recover the creativity and institutional adaptability that produced in astonishingly short time the riverine flotillas of the Civil War, the massed bomber and amphibious fleets of World War II, the Polaris program and espionage from space of the early Cold War.

Here, then, are four ideas.

First, remake our system for selecting and promoting general officers. Nothing, but nothing is more important than senior leadership—the creative leaders like Arleigh Burke or Bernard Schriever in the early Cold War. Our problem is that our promotion systems, in part because of the natural tendency of bureaucracies to rep-

licate themselves, and in part because of the wickets (including joint service) all have to pass through, is making it hard to reach deep and promote exceptional talent to the very top.

We take it for granted that some of the best leaders of World War II were field grade officers when it began. For some reason, however, it does not occur to us that maybe there was something good about such a system that we should be able to imitate. Other large organizations—businesses and universities, among others—can seek out exceptional young leaders and bring them to the top quickly. We are long past the day when General Curtis LeMay could become head of Strategic Air Command at age 42, after having led one of the most important campaigns of World War II in his late thirties. It was a minor miracle when President Carter passed over scores of Army generals to make General Edward C. “Shy” Meyer Chief of Staff of the Army in 1979—I am not sure whether we could even do that today. Moreover, we need to find ways to promote and retain general and flag officers who are so unorthodox, so off the usual career path, that the system left to its own devices would crush them. Where would the nuclear Navy be without that unique, exceptionally difficult man, Hyman Rickover, for example? And where will the next one come from?

Second, overhaul the current system for producing strategy documents on a regular basis. The Quadrennial Defense Review system, which consumes vast quantities of labor in the Pentagon and much wasted emotional energy as well, seems to be predicated on the notion that the world will cooperate with our four year review cycle. It does not. The 2000 QDR, to take one example, was invalidated as soon as it hit the streets by 9/11. So too will any document that has a fixed schedule. Moreover, most public documents, to include the National Security Strategy of the United States are the vapid products of committees. A much better system would be something like the White Papers produced by the Australian and French systems, not on a regular basis but in reaction to major international developments, and composed by small, special commissions that include outsiders as well as bureaucrats.

Third, re-discover mobilization. Throughout most of the history of the United States, and into its colonial past, a key assumption was that the forces we would have at the outbreak of war would be insufficient in number and composition for the challenges ahead. Since the 1950's, mobilization thinking and planning has languished. To be sure, under pressure from an active Secretary of Defense the Department can acquire mine-resistant vehicles or speed up the production of some critical guided weapon, but that is hardly the same thing.

Serious military planning not only for expansion of the existing force, but for the creation of new capabilities in event of emergency, would be a worth while effort. For example, had serious thought been given before 2003 to identifying civilians who might contribute to military government in an occupied country, and thinking through the organizations needed, the Iraq war might have looked very different in 2004 and 2005 than it did. Mobilization thinking and preparation would require a willingness to contemplate unorthodox measures (direct commissioning, for example) on a scale that the Department is unwilling to consider in peacetime. Worse yet, it would require some brave thinking about the kinds of crises that might require such measures.

Fourth, renew professional military education at the top. Our war colleges do a capable job at the mission of broadly educating senior officers at the O-5 and O-6 level, even as they help create a network of foreign officers who have been exposed to our system. But they do not create an elite cadre of strategic thinkers and planners from all the services and the civilian world. To do that, measures would have to be taken that would be anathema to personnel systems today: competitive application to attend a school, rather an assignment to do so as a kind of reward; extremely small class sizes; no foreign presence, or only that of our closest allies; work on projects that are directly relevant to existing war planning problems. A two year institution would graduate no more than thirty or forty top notch officers a year who would, in all but name, help constitute a real joint general staff. Of course, to manage the careers of such officers would require further departures from our current personnel system.

Our current professional military education system produces extremely able tacticians and unit leaders; it does not produce, at least not in large numbers, officers who make their names as deep thinkers about the nature of modern war. Yet surely that is the heart of the military profession. You will see very few books or even deeply serious articles on modern war written by serving officers; fewer yet that transcend a service perspective. That is a pity, and a deficiency.

While it is flattering to think that academics or think tanks can fill that void, the truth is that they can only do so much without the current knowledge, exposure to the most sensitive secrets, and sense of professional responsibility of top notch offi-

cers. In the long run, a revitalized American armed forces requires that senior leadership, in Congress as well as the executive branch, pay a great deal of attention to military education, whose budget is trivial, but whose impact is, potentially tremendous.

These are, inevitably, but preliminary thoughts which will not be welcome in some quarters. But of this I am quite convinced: our country faces a more turbulent world than it has at any time since the end of World War II. It is, in many ways, a more dangerous world, in which our children or grandchildren may live to see nuclear weapons used in anger, terrorism that paralyzes great societies, war in new guises brought to the continental United States, the shattering of states and seizure of large territories by force. As in the last century, the United States will be called upon to play a unique role in preventing those things from happening, maintaining some general standards of order and decency, and leading a coalition of like minded nations. As ever, we will have a strong hand, thanks to the institutions of government under which we live, and the spirit of the American people. But that does not mean that we should take our military power for granted, or neglect thinking hard and creatively about how to mold it in the interval of peace that we have, such as is. New crises await, and alas, may not be far off.

Senator McCAIN. Professor Mahnken?

**STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR THOMAS G. MAHNKEN, SENIOR
RESEARCH PROFESSOR AND DIRECTOR OF THE ADVANCED
STRATEGY PROGRAM, JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOOL OF AD-
VANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Dr. MAHNKEN. Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the committee today. You are embarked on an important effort, and I am honored to be a part of it.

As with Professor Cohen, I have longer written remarks, but I really want to, in the time I have, focus on three things.

First, I would like to address the challenges that the United States faces in an increasingly contested global environment, and these include not only the threats posed by adversaries and competitors, but also the structural impediments that we must overcome if we are to develop an effective strategy to safeguard U.S. interests in an increasingly threatening world.

I would also like to talk for a few minutes about some of the United States' enduring strengths—and I think they are considerable—and the opportunities that they provide us.

Then I would like to conclude by offering some thoughts on what we might do to improve our strategic position.

First, as to challenges, the United States faces a growing and increasingly capable set of adversaries and competitors, including great powers such as China and Russia, as well as regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. United States defense strategy needs to take into account the need to compete with these powers over the long term and in peacetime, as well as to plan for the possibility of conflict with them.

Great powers. The tide of great power competition is rising whether we like it or not. China and Russia possess growing ambitions and, increasingly, the means to back them up. They possess sizeable and modernizing nuclear arsenals and are investing in new ways of war that have been tailored, at least in part, to challenge the United States. I think the challenges posed by these powers are only likely to grow over time.

We also face regional challenges, challenges from states such as Iran and North Korea. North Korea appears to be developing a

sizeable nuclear arsenal and the ability to deliver it against the United States. Pyongyang has also demonstrated a willingness to sell nuclear technology to other states such as Syria. Iran has growing reach and influence in the Middle East, and its nuclear program is at best frozen. Its missile program continues apace.

Third, we face a long war with al Qaeda and its affiliates. We remain engaged in a war, whether we choose to call it that or not, with al Qaeda, its affiliates, and other jihadist groups that threaten the United States and its allies. I agree with Professor Cohen. It is a war that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Then finally, we face the challenge of an uncertain future, threats to our security that we either do not see or cannot recognize today. History is a strong antidote to those who confidently predict the contours of the future.

As if these global challenges were not enough, we face a series of internal, structural barriers that will need to be addressed if we are to have the resources to shape and respond to an increasingly challenging security environment. These barriers include a sharpening tradeoff between guns and butter. The tradeoff between national security and social spending is already painfully apparent and is likely to become even more acute over time as the U.S. population ages.

As if that were not enough, we face cost growth in weapon systems. Most new weapon systems provide increased capability but often at increasing cost. As a result, we can afford fewer of them for a given expenditure.

This is further magnified by long-term cost growth in personnel. As I need not remind the members of this committee, we face long-term growth in personnel costs, which further exacerbates these other trends.

So even as the international environment is becoming more threatening, we face real constraints, internal constraints, on our abilities to meet it.

Now, all is not beyond hope, however. The United States has a series of enduring advantages. If I have a criticism here, it is in our imperfect ability to tap into what are some substantial advantages. These include our strategic geography. As an insular power, we have enjoyed security from attack throughout most of our history. With friendly powers to the north and south, we have not had to worry about the threat of invasion for 2 centuries. Our alliances compound this advantage, allowing us to work together with our friends to meet the threats that we face far from our shores.

We also possess great economic strength, the world's largest economy and the world leader in innovation.

American society is also the source of great advantage. For example, we possess demographic strengths that are nearly unique in the world. Our population includes immigrants from literally every country in the world who speak the full breadth of the world's languages. More importantly, ours is one of only a handful of states that has the ability to bring new immigrants to its shores, weave them into the fabric of our society, and make them full members of that society within an individual's lifetime. That gives us unique advantages.

Our military power remains a source of strength, the world's largest nuclear force, and the world's most capable army, navy, marine corps and air force, a combination that is historically unique, I would point out. Great powers in the past have had strong navies but weak armies or strong armies but weak navies. We have the world's best army, navy, marine corps, and air force.

Last, but certainly not least, our alliances and our partnerships. Our allies include some of the most prosperous and militarily capable states in the world in Europe and in Asia.

All too often, however, we fail to exploit these strengths to the extent that we could or we should. Rather, we have focused on how others, including our adversaries, can leverage their strengths against our weaknesses rather than how we can best use our strengths to exploit the weaknesses of our competitors.

Well, where does that take me in terms of implications? I have three implications I would like to draw from this.

First, given both the increasingly threatening security environment and the limits that we face at home, we need to think more seriously about risk than we have in recent years. Strategy is all about how to mitigate and manage risk. However, over the past quarter century, we have grown unused to having to take risks and bear costs. We have become risk averse. All too often, however, the failure to demonstrate a willingness to accept risk in the short term has yielded even more risk in the long term. As a result, our competitors increasingly view us as weak and feckless.

Among other things we need a serious discussion of risk within the United States Government and with the American people because I think we are entering a period where we are going to have to begin to take actions that are risky and costly both to demonstrate to our competitors that we are serious but also to demonstrate our resolve to our allies. We need to start having that discussion about risk now.

Second, as I noted at the beginning of my remarks, we face a series of long-term competitions with great powers and regional powers. China and Russia, Iran and North Korea have been competing with us for some time. We have not been competing with them. As a result, we find our options constrained and we find ourselves reacting to their initiatives.

If we hope to achieve our aims over the long term, we first need to clarify what those aims are and to develop a strategy to achieve them. Such a strategy should seek to expand the menu of options available to us and constrain those that are available to our competitors. It should seek to impose costs upon our competitors and mitigate their ability to impose costs upon us. It should give us the initiative, forcing them to respond to our actions, not the other way around. Now, that is, of course, easier said than done in Washington in 2015, but it must be done if we are to gain maximum leverage with our considerable but limited resources.

As part of this effort, we need to do a better job of understanding our competitors. To take just two examples, the Chinese military publishes a vast number of books and articles on how it thinks about modern war, strategy, and operations. These books are freely available for purchase in Chinese bookstores and can be ordered on the Chinese version of Amazon.com, but they remain beyond the

reach of scholars and officers who do not read Mandarin Chinese because the United States Government has yet to make translations of them broadly available.

Similarly, in past decades, the United States Government invested vast sums in building intellectual capacity on Russia and the Russian military. Today it is painfully apparent that that capital has been drawn to dangerously low levels. So we are surprised or misunderstand Russian actions that should be neither surprising nor mysterious. Additional investments in this area are sorely needed.

Finally—and here, some of my comments will echo what Professor Cohen has said—we need to take seriously the possibility of great power competition and potentially great power conflict. This means that we need to think seriously about a host of national security topics that we have ignored or neglected for a generation or more. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy. It includes how best to mobilize the Nation's resources for the long term and the need to wage political warfare and to counter the propaganda of our competitors. We will also—again, I agree with Professor Cohen—need to rethink the educational requirements of an officer corps that has experienced little but counterinsurgency throughout its career and to reeducate policymakers who came of age after the Cold War.

In short, we face mounting challenges but we also have great opportunities if we can only seize them. Part of the answer, no doubt, will consist of acquiring new capabilities, but a substantial part of it will lie in developing intellectual capital and formulating and implementing an effective strategy to harness the considerable strengths that we possess in the service of our aims.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mahnken follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY THOMAS G. MAHNKEN*

Senator McCain, Senator Reed, thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Committee today. In the time I have I would like to address the challenges that the United States faces in an increasingly contested global environment. These include not only the threats posed by adversaries and competitors, but also the structural impediments that we must overcome if we are to develop an effective strategy to safeguard U.S. interests in an increasingly threatening world. I would also like to examine some of the United States' enduring strengths and the opportunities that they provide us. I would like to conclude by offering some thoughts on what we might do to improve our strategic position.

I. CHALLENGES

The United States faces a growing and increasingly capable set of adversaries and competitors, including great powers such as China and Russia as well as regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. United States defense strategy should take into account the need to compete with these powers over the long term in peacetime, as well as plan for the possibility of conflict with them.

*The views that follow are mine and mine alone and do not reflect those of any organization with which I am affiliated.

Great Powers

The tide of great power competition is rising. China and Russia possess growing ambitions and, increasingly, the means to back them up. They possess sizeable and modernizing nuclear arsenals and are investing in new ways of war that have been tailored, at least in part, to challenge the United States.

Regional Powers

Iran and North Korea. North Korea appears to be developing a sizeable nuclear arsenal and the ability to deliver nuclear weapons against the United States. P'yongyang has also demonstrated a willingness to sell nuclear technology to other states, such as Syria. Iran has growing reach and influence in the Middle East. Its nuclear program is at best frozen; its missile program continues apace.

The War with al-Qaeda and its Affiliates

We also remain engaged in a war, whether we choose to call it that or not, with al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other jihadist groups that threaten the United States and its allies. That war is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

An Uncertain Future

Finally, we will face threats to our security that we either do not see or cannot recognize today. History is a strong antidote to those who confidently predict the contours of the future.

As if the global challenges we face were not enough, we also face a series of internal, structural barriers that will need to be addressed if we are to have the resources to shape and respond to an increasingly challenging security environment.

- *A sharpening tradeoff between guns and butter:* The tradeoff between national security and social spending is already painfully apparent, and is likely to become even more acute as the U.S. population ages.
- *Cost growth in weapon systems:* Most new weapon systems provide increased capability, but often at increasing cost. As a result, we can afford fewer of them.
- *Cost growth in personnel:* Similarly, as I need not remind the members of this committee, we face long-term cost growth in personnel, which further exacerbates the trends I have outlined above.

II. ENDURING ADVANTAGES

All is not beyond hope, however. The United States enjoys a series of enduring advantages, including those provided by our strategic geography, economic strength, society, military power, and alliances and partnerships.

Strategic geography

As an insular power, the United States has enjoyed security from attack throughout much of our history. With friendly powers to the north and south, we have not had to worry about the threat of invasion for two centuries. Our alliances compound this advantage, allowing us to work together with our friends to meet threats far from our shores.

Economic strength

We possess the world's largest economy and are also the world leader in innovation. We produce culture that much of the rest of the world finds attractive.

American society

American society is the source of other advantages. For example, we possess demographic strengths that are nearly unique in the world. Our population includes emigrants from literally every country in the world who speak the full breadth of the world's languages. More importantly, ours is one of only a handful of states that has the ability to bring new immigrants to its shores, weave them into the fabric of the society, and make them full members of that society within an individual's lifetime.

Military Power

We possess the world's largest nuclear force, the world's most capable Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force—a historically unique combination. We have been able to exploit space for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance; communications; and precision navigation and timing. The US space capability has multiplied the effectiveness of US ground, sea, and air forces. We are also the world leader in exploiting the cyber dimension to support military operations.

Alliances and partnerships

U.S. allies include some of the most prosperous and militarily capable states in the world. These include the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in North America and Europe as well as Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand in the Pacific. Beyond formal allies, the United States also possesses friendly relationships with a number of key states.

All too often, however, we have failed to exploit these strengths to the extent we could or should. We have focused on how others can leverage their strengths against our weaknesses rather than how we can best use our strengths to exploit the weaknesses of our competitors.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEFENSE POLICY AND ORGANIZATION

Three main implications flow from this assessment. First, *we need to think more seriously about risk than we have in recent years*. Strategy is all about how to mitigate and manage risk. However, over the past quarter century, we have grown unused to having to take risks and bear costs. We have become risk averse. All too often, however, the failure to demonstrate a willingness to accept risk in the short term yields even more risk in the long term. As a result, our competitors increasingly view us as weak and feckless.

Among other things, we need to have a serious discussion about risk within the United States Government and with the American people. And we are going to have to begin to take actions that are risky and costly to us to demonstrate our resolve to both our allies and our adversaries.

Second, *we face a series of long-term competitions with great powers and regional powers*. China and Russia, Iran and North Korea have been competing with us for sometime; we have not been competing with them. As a result, we find our options constrained, and we find ourselves reacting to their initiatives.

To achieve our aims over the long term, we first need to clarify what our aims are and then develop a strategy to achieve them. Such a strategy should seek to expand the menu of options available to us and constrain those that are available to our competitors. It should seek to impose costs upon our competitors and mitigate their ability to impose costs upon us. And it should give us the initiative, forcing them to respond to our actions and not the other way round. That is, of course, easier said than done in 2015 Washington, but it must be done if we are to gain maximum leverage from our considerable but limited resources.

We need to do a better job of understanding our competitors. For example, the Chinese military publishes a vast number of books and articles how it thinks about modern war, strategy, and operations. These books are freely available for purchase in Chinese book stores and on the Chinese version of Amazon.com, but remain beyond the reach of scholars and officers who do not read Mandarin Chinese because the United States Government has yet to make translations of them broadly available. Similarly, in past decades the United States Government invested vast sums in building intellectual capital on the Russian military. Today that capital has been drawn down to dangerously low levels, so that we are surprised by or misunderstand Russian actions that should be neither surprising nor mysterious. Additional investments in this area are sorely needed.

Finally, *we need to take seriously the possibility of great power competition and conflict*. This means that we need to think seriously about a host of national security topics that we have ignored or neglected for ages or more. These include the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy, how best to mobilize the nation's resources for war, and the need to wage political warfare and counter its use by our competitors. We will also need to re-think the educational requirements of an officer corps that has experienced little but counter-insurgency and policymakers who came of age after the Cold War.

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In short, we face mounting challenges, but also have great opportunities, if we can only seize them. Part of the answer, no doubt, will consist of acquiring new capabilities, but a substantial part of it will lie in developing intellectual capital, and formulating and implementing an effective strategy, to harness the considerable strengths that we possess in the service of our aims.

Senator McCain. Professor Mead?

STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR WALTER RUSSELL MEAD, DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR IN AMERICAN STRATEGY, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. MEAD. Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed, thanks for the invitation to appear before this committee. The work that the Senators on this committee do is of immense consequence not only to the safety, the security, the prosperity, and the liberty of people in this country but to hundreds of millions and billions of people outside our borders. The hard work and dedication that this committee puts into its tasks is a real inspiration. It is an honor to be here again before you today.

When I think about the American strategic debate since the end of the Cold War, I am reminded of an old hymn that I used to sing in church as a kid in the South, "Shall I be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease while others fought to win the prize and sail through bloody seas?" Since 1990 in the United States, that has no longer been a question. Many people in our intellectual and policy worlds have thought, "I shall be carried to the skies on flowery beds of ease." All of that difficult defense of liberty, all of those risks, all of those painful tradeoffs—that is in the past. In the future, the inexorable laws of history, the spread of prosperity and democratic institutions will smoothly carry us to the skies. We can kick back, sip on a margarita as the rising tide lifts us on up to paradise. That has been one side of our strategic debate.

The other side has been it is all over, we are in decline. The world of the 21st century is too complex, the challengers too aggressive, the threats face too dire, and so we really have to scale back our commitments, settle for less. The old ambitions of trying to build a world order are too much.

If you have followed a lot of our political debates over the last 25 years, I think you will just see a rapid oscillation between those two extremes that says more about the mood swings of our political and intellectual elite than it does about realities on the ground.

It seems to me the truth is actually less dramatic, in some ways perhaps more hardening, though there are perhaps bloody seas ahead. That is, at the end of the Second World War, the United States rather reluctantly came to the conclusion that we needed to replace Great Britain, what Woodrow Wilson's friend, Colonel House, once called the gyroscope of world order. We were not doing this as some kind of philanthropic project, though it is philanthropic, it is beneficial to many people who are not Americans. We were doing it because a sober assessment of American economic and security interests told people in both political parties that we need—for our economy to prosper, we needed an open global trading and investment system where we could enjoy the benefits of trading with people all over the world. Particularly in a nuclear era, our security interests required we could no longer ignore threats overseas until they reached some kind of critical mass and then intervene. We had to take a more forward-leaning posture, try to nip problems in the bud before they became global threats.

That I think remains the case. Those still are our interests. It is not, again, because we seek some kind of global power. Most Americans would be only too happy to spend less time worrying about, thinking about, spending money on, and taking risks over

things that are happening beyond our frontiers. But it is still the case that the prosperity of the American economy and the security of the American people are intimately bound up with events overseas. Let me take one example.

We have heard some talk in the last few years, particularly as the situation in the Middle East has grown, as Senator Reed I think very explicitly and wisely pointed out, far more complex and dangerous than in the past. There has been some talk, well, do we really need to pay so much attention to the Middle East, in part because with United States unconventional gas and shale resources we seem to be becoming more energy independent, and that is true. But I would say to the committee so far we have been able to watch war spread in the Middle East and the price of oil is \$45 a barrel because the war has been in some parts of the Middle East and, by and large, the oil has been in other parts.

But it is not written in any heavenly books that I am aware of that that is going to remain the case. If the security situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate, the supply of oil not so much that we physically depend on but our allies in Europe and Japan and others around the world depend on, our trading partners—and I ask this committee what would happen to all of our economic and security problems if instability in the Middle East pushed the price of oil up to \$200 a barrel, if instability in some of the large oil-producing countries interrupted either the production or the supply, or if, for example, the Saudi Government, losing faith in our willingness to defend it, decided it would not have a better bargain by reaching an agreement with Russia and Iran on production cutbacks in order to raise the price.

For those who wonder why is Putin in the Middle East? What possible objective could he have other than propaganda victories at home and making Russia look like a great power? Think what it would mean for Putin's prospects and Russia's prospects, short- and medium-term, if his foreign policy could engineer a substantial increase in oil.

I am not prophesying that these things are going to happen tomorrow, but I am trying to remind the committee and others who will follow these hearings that we cannot write off regions of the world simply because they are inconvenient or difficult or it is hard to know exactly what to do. American foreign policy planning, American strategic planning has to keep these unpleasant but very real facts in mind.

So if the situation is in fact so difficult and we are still committed to this global foreign policy, global strategic vision, why am I confident that the United States retains the ability to act, that we do not have to resign ourselves to an inevitable decline in the face of competition, in the face of growing complexity? My colleagues on the panel have noted some of these, but American society remains extraordinarily inventive and adaptive. Our technology continues to lead the world. Our resource base is unmatched. No country in the history of the world has had the kind of network of alliances and bilateral relationships that the United States does. No country has had military forces of such a high capacity. No country has had the ability to integrate people who come to us from all over the world into a united body of citizens. The strengths of

this country are immense. In fact, the conditions of the 21st century, the rapid transformation of social and economic institutions in the face of unprecedented technological change are uniquely favorable to the classic strengths of the United States. For 200 years, we have been a country which prospers and adapts to change, even difficult change, in a way that other countries find it difficult to do. With 50 different States, we explore 50 different avenues into the future. We reform. We change our institutions as conditions change. Over time, this means the United States somehow manages to stay ahead. I do not see any sign in this country that we have lost the ability or the will to do that.

Well, what could we do given the painful reality that we can no longer count on being carried gently to the skies on flowery beds of ease? How do we raise our game? How do we develop the ways of thinking? How do we organize our military, our foreign policy in order to adjust and adapt to these changes?

I would leave the committee, which I know is at the beginning of a long process of deliberation, with three things to think about that I hope you will add into your thoughts.

First, we do need to invest in the future. We need to continue to renew our military. The technology and the acceleration of technology around the world forces us to continue to invest. We cannot get locked into a model where we are simply trying to hold onto what we have.

Second, the thought about the future cannot just be about technology. Societies around the world are changing. People are online. They are connecting to each other. People around the world, as their own economies are disrupted by the force of changes, as migrant flows change the makeup of countries—societies change. Conflict is a social act, and changing in society will force us to think about new kinds of conflicts, new strategies, new tactics. Again, we have to keep investing in understanding and preparing for the future.

Finally, we should look at our military and realize the immense variety of missions that we ask our armed services to carry on. At one and the same time, our military may be working with Nigerian armed forces in trying to deal with Boko Haram. Maybe on the next tour of duty, an officer will go from the back country of Nigeria to the halls of Brussels or Paris or Berlin working in a completely different context or be in Okinawa or preparing to face the Chinese navy in a very high-tech and high-stakes competition. What kind of organization, what kind of training—it will not look very much like the World War II Army, like the Cold War Army, like the Army that we developed in the last few years with counterinsurgencies. Our armed forces are going to continue to need to evolve. This committee will have a great deal to do with that.

The second large area is we need to think—again, as some of my colleagues have pointed out, the spaces between have historically been key to our strength and the strength of Great Britain before us. Think of Great Britain in the 18th century assuring the safe communication of trade and goods across the seas and the role of the British navy. In the 19th century, the British add to that the development of a world economic system under the gold standard

based in London, of a world communications system based on international undersea cables with instantaneous telegraphic communication. In the 20th century, there is a further proliferation in the complexity of these spaces between and in their importance to international life.

The fact that we cannot pick up the paper today without reading about some new unbelievable and hideous breach of security of some of this country's most important secrets suggests that at the moment we are not doing an adequate job of protecting some of the spaces in between, and we need to think very hard. These challenges are not going away and the cost of failing to address these challenges is not diminishing.

Finally, let me close by suggesting to this committee that the United States Congress in the 21st century is going to need to equip itself with a much stronger capacity for oversight and engagement in the realm of strategic policy. I have suggested the formation of something almost analogous to the Congressional Budget Office [CBO], a congressional office of strategic assessment where Congress can get the kind of depth of analysis and reflection—a nonpartisan, may I say, analysis and reflection—access to the best advice, deepest knowledge in a way that even a committee staff and certainly the individual staff of Senators and Members just cannot do. Given the complexity of the issues that you must engage with the executive with, given the vast disparity in the size of the executive branch activities that you are expected to oversee, and the thin resources, and as you are all much more familiar than me, the many demands on the time of Members and staff, it is well worth thinking about how can Congress do a more effective job of oversight. How can Congress provide itself with the resources and the depth of expertise and knowledge that could make, I think, restore the ability of the legislature to play its role.

The legislature plays an immense role not simply by opposing the executive on this or that issue. But the public debate on American strategic policy, on American foreign policy is carried primarily by the Representatives and the Senators, not simply a speech from the President. It is your communication with the American people, with your constituents that helps build the public opinion, the consensus that allows the United States to undertake some of the very significant investments that need to be done for the common good and security. Deepening the Congress' capacity to play this role I think can result in the construction of a stronger, deeper, and more effective consensus behind a smarter, more effective policy.

But thank you again, Senators, for offering me the opportunity to speak today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY WALTER RUSSELL MEAD

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, and members of the committee:

It's a great honor to be invited to testify again before this august committee and its distinguished members. It is also encouraging to know that in a time of decreasing attention spans and in a political climate increasingly focused on "winning the news cycle", members of both parties are taking seriously the long-term strategic planning needs of the Republic. My aim today will be to clarify the geopolitical situation we face in the early 21st century, the challenges and opportunities that are

likely to arise going forward, and the grand strategy concerns of the United States that derive from these.

BACKGROUND

After the Second World War, the United States replaced Great Britain as, in Col. House's phrase, the "gyroscope of world order." The U.S. assumed the burdens of global leadership not because we desired power—in fact, we had spent twenty years before the war, and two after it, trying to avoid global responsibilities—but because Americans needed the benefits of a stable world order to be safe and prosperous at home. Maintaining an open global economic system is vital to continued American prosperity. Maintaining a stable geopolitical order is vital to continued American security. And promoting values of freedom and self-determination worldwide is a critical element of these two missions.

These realities are still the basis of American foreign policy and national strategy today. While there are many disagreements about how these principles should be translated into policy, and while some Americans seek to turn their backs on the difficult tasks of global engagement, on the whole, the commitment to the principles of liberal world order building that have framed American foreign policy since the Truman administration continues to shape our thinking today. As the world becomes more integrated economically, and as new threats like cyberwar and jihadi terrorism combine with old fashioned geopolitical challenges to create a more dangerous environment, this postwar American foreign policy tradition is more important than ever, but we must think long and hard about how we address our vital interests in an increasingly turbulent and dynamic world.

The question before us today is whether we can continue to afford and manage the global commitments this policy requires. If, as I believe, the answer is that we can, we must then address questions of strategy. How do we harness the means we possess to secure the ends we seek, what priorities do we need to establish, what capabilities do we need to cultivate, and to what allies can we look for help as we seek to promote a peaceful and prosperous world amid the challenges of the 21st century?

We can begin by examining some of the advantages and disadvantages that the United States and its allies have as we consider how to adapt a 20th century strategy to the needs of the contemporary world.

DISADVANTAGES & ADVANTAGES

Surveying the global landscape, we can see several disadvantages that make it difficult to maintain the global system we've built into the 21st century. At the most basic level, one of the chief disadvantages facing the U.S. is the never-ending nature of our task. America's work is never done. Militarily, whenever the United States innovates to gain an advantage, others quickly mimic our developments. It is not enough for us to be ahead today; we have to continue to innovate so we are ready for tomorrow and the day after.

The U.S. is challenged by the products of its own successes in ways that extend far beyond weapons systems. The liberal capitalist order that the United States supports and promotes is an engine of revolutionary change in world affairs. The economic and technological progress that has so greatly benefitted America also introduces new and complicating factors into world politics. The rise of China was driven by the American-led information technology revolution that made global supply chains possible and by the Anglo-American development of an open international economic system that enabled China to participate on equal terms. The threat of cyberwar exists because of the extraordinary development of the "Born in the U.S.A." internet, and the revolutionary advances that it represents.

In this way, American foreign policy is like a video game in which the player keeps advancing to new and more challenging levels. "Winning" doesn't mean the end of the game; it means the game is becoming more complex and demanding. This means that simply in order to perform at the same level, the United States needs to keep upping its game, reforming its institutions, improving its strategies, and otherwise preparing itself to address more complex and challenging issues—often at a faster pace than before, and with higher penalties for getting things wrong.

America's competitors are becoming more capable and dynamic as they master technology and refine their own strategies in response to global change. The world of Islamic jihad, for instance, has been transformed by both the adaptation of information technology and adaptation to previous American victories. In both these regards, al-Qaeda represented a great advance over earlier movements, al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia yet another advance, and ISIS a further step forward.

In the world of international geopolitics, Russia has also made much of information control and its current leadership possesses a keen eye for the weaknesses of American-fostered successes such as the European Union. And China is also emerging as new kind of challenge, one that on the one hand plays “within” the rules much more than Russia or ISIS, but on the other, is still willing to break the rules—viz. the OPM hack or industrial espionage—when Beijing feels it is necessary. Far more than America’s other competitors, China has used this combination to develop its own economy and to lay the foundations for long-term power.

Meanwhile, many of America’s traditional allies in Europe are losing ground in the global economic race, and NATO, the most successful military alliance in world history and the keystone of the worldwide American alliance network, is in trouble. Many of Europe’s leading economies—which is to say, many of the top-ten economies of the world by GDP—are stagnating, and have been for some time. This has corrosive, follow-on effects on the social fabric of nations like France, Italy, and Spain. Further, the EU’s organizational mechanisms have proven inadequate to both the euro monetary crisis and the current refugee crisis, and secession movements (whether from the EU itself, as in “Brexit”, or within EU nations, e.g. Scotland or Catalonia) are likely to strain them even more going forward. Finally, prospects for European adaptation to the 21st century tech economy are dimmer than one would like. Entrenched interests are using the force of government to repress innovation, start-ups are thin on the ground, and major new tech companies—“European Googles”—are nowhere to be seen.

Since the Great Recession, the European members of NATO cut the equivalent of the entire German military budget from their combined defense expenditures. Many of our mainland European allies are also at least somewhat ambivalent about the extent of their commitment to defend other NATO members, particularly the new member-states in the Baltics—a fact that has not escaped Russia’s notice.

More broadly, the international security system promoted by the United States is based on two principles, alliance and deterrence, that greatly amplify our military capacity—and which we have undermined in recent years. Our alliances allow us to do more with less; they also repress competition between our allies. For instance, mutual alliances with America help to keep Japanese-South Korean tensions in check today just as the American presence helped France and Germany establish closer relations based on mutual trust in the past. Deterrence is key to the alliance system and also to minimizing the loss of U.S. lives as we fulfill our commitments around the world.

Recent events in the Middle East demonstrate what happens when alliances fray and deterrence loses its force. Iranian and Russian adventurism across the region has undermined the confidence of American allies and increased the risks of war. American allies, like Saudi Arabia, who fear American abandonment, have grown increasingly insecure. Saudi freelancing in Syria and Yemen may lead to great trouble down the road; Riyadh is not institutionally equipped to take on the burdens it is attempting to shoulder.

Another significant disadvantage facing U.S. policymakers is that the international order is based on institutions (like the UN) that are both cumbersome to work with and difficult to reform. As we get further and further from the circumstances in which many of these institutions were founded, they grow more unwieldy, but for similar reasons, nations who were more powerful then than now grow more deeply opposed to change. The defects of the world’s institutions of governance and cooperation are particularly problematic for an order-building, alliance-minded power like the U.S.

Meanwhile, many of our domestic institutions relating to foreign policy are not well structured for the emerging challenges. From the educational institutions that prepare Americans for careers in international affairs (and that provide basic education about world politics to many more) to large organizations like the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Pentagon, the core institutions on which we need to rely are not well suited to the tasks they face.

In the Cold War era, the challenges were relatively easy to understand, even if developing policies to deal with the threats was often hard. Today, the policy challenges are no less difficult, but the threats themselves are more diverse. A revanchist Russia, competing radical Sunni and Shia jihadist movements, and a rising China all represent important challenges, but they cannot be addressed in the same way or with the same tools. Americans, particularly those in public service but also the engaged citizens whose votes and opinions sway foreign policy, will have to be more nimble and nuanced in their understanding of the problems we’re facing than ever before.

In spite of these serious disadvantages and problems, the United States is much better positioned than any other country to maintain, defend, extend and improve

the international system in the 21st century. We should be sober about the tremendous challenges facing us, but we should not be pessimistic. We cannot do everything, and we will not do everything right, but we can be more right, more often than our adversaries.

The United States remains an adaptable society that embraces change, likes innovation, and adjusts to new realities with enthusiasm (and often, an eye to enlightened self-interest). Indeed, in many ways, these truisms are more true now than ever. We remain on the cutting edge of technological development. We're better suited than our global competitors to weather demographic shifts and absorb new immigrants. And despite significant resistance to change among some segments of society (in particular, ironically, the "public-service" sector), we are already starting to re-engineer our institutions for the 21st century.

One of the United States' greatest advantages is our exceptional array of natural resources. We possess a tremendous resource base with energy, agriculture, and mineral wealth that can rival any nation on earth. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal well drilling have fundamentally transformed the American energy landscape overnight. Oil production is up 75 percent since 2008, and new supplies of shale gas have millions of Americans heating their homes cheaply each winter. New U.S. oil production has been a big part of the global fall in oil prices, and shale producers continue to surprise the world with their ability to keep up output, even in a bearish market. In 2014, the U.S. was the world's largest producer of oil and gas, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration. Energy policy debates have shifted from issues of scarcity to those of abundance: we're now discussing what to do with our bounty. Do we sell LNG abroad? End the ban on crude oil exports? These are good problems to have.

The United States also retains the most advantageous geographical position of any of the world's great powers. We have friendly, resource-rich neighbors; Canada is a rising power with enormous potential, and Mexico and many other countries in Latin America have made substantial progress. We face both of the world's great oceans, which allow us to engage in trade while still insulating us from many of the world's ills.

The United States has an unprecedented network of alliances that gives us unmatched global reach and resilience. The vast majority of the world's developed nations are U.S. allies. In fact, of the top 50 nations by GDP according to the World Bank, only four—China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran—are adversaries. Likewise, only two of the top fifteen military spenders are not friendly to the U.S. Largely, we have the kind of friends one hopes to have.

Moreover, the world can see that The United States stands for something more than its own power and wealth. The democratic ideals we honor (even if we do not always succeed in living up to them) resonate far beyond our frontiers. The bedrock belief of American society that every woman and every man possesses an innate and inalienable dignity, and our commitment to ground our institutions and our laws on that truth inspire people around the world. The American creed is one that can be shared by people of all faiths and indeed of no faith; our society's principles stand on common ground with the world's great religious and ethical traditions. This American heritage gives us a unique ability to reach out to people in every land and to work together to build a more peaceful and prosperous world.

The United States also has a favorable climate for investment and business that ensures we will remain (if we don't screw up) a major destination for investment. These factors include: America's traditional devotion to the rule of law; long, stable constitutional history; excellent credit rating; large internal market; 50 competing states offering a range of investment possibilities; rich science and R&D communities; deep financial markets adept at helping new companies grow; stable energy supplies (likely to be below world costs given the advantages of pipeline gas compared to LNG); and an educated workforce. We're not at the top of every one of these measures globally, but no country can or likely will match our broad strength across them.

This might not be the most popular thing I've ever told a room full of politicians, but one of the biggest ways in which America is fortunate is that, as I've written elsewhere, "the ultimate sources of American power—the economic dynamism of its culture, the pro-business tilt of its political system, its secure geographical location, its rich natural resource base and its profound constitutional stability—don't depend on the whims of political leaders. Thankfully, the American system is often smarter and more capable than the people in office at any given time."

One way to look at our position is this: at the peak of its global power and influence in the 1870s, the United Kingdom is estimated to have had about nine percent of the global GDP. America's share today is more than double that—and likely to remain at or close to that level for some time to come.

American power today rests on strong foundations. Those who argue that the United States must accept the inevitability of decline, and that the United States can no longer pursue our global interests do not understand America's strengths. The United States, in association with its growing and dynamic global alliance system, is better placed than any other country or combination of countries to shape the century that lies before us.

OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES

The U.S. has several opportunities in the coming years to significantly advance its interests around the world. In Asia, a large group of countries want the same kind of future we do: peaceful, full of opportunities for economic growth, and with no one country dominating the rest. Two generations ago, this was a poor, dictatorship-ridden region; today, it's full of advanced, high-income economies and contains many more stable democratic states than in the past. The regional response to China's assertive policies in the East and South China Seas demonstrated that many countries are willing and indeed eager to work with the United States and with each other to preserve the way of life they have created from regional hegemonic threats.

In Europe, despite some quarrels and abrasions, our longstanding allies have worked together to build the kind of zone of democratic, peaceful prosperity that the U.S. hopes the whole world will someday enjoy. But what we're finding, not for the first time in our history, is that Europe works best when America remains engaged with it. While it's tempting to think that a bunch of first-world, prosperous democracies can handle their own corner of the world (and perhaps some of the neighboring bits, please?), America is the secret ingredient that keeps this historically contentious, rivalry-ridden area, full of states of differing size and capacity, with different attitudes toward economics, defense, social organization, and much else, working together. When Europe works well, it's the best advertisement for the American vision to the rest of the world. It offers us the chance to work together with partners who share our belief in rule of law and human rights. And fortunately, the fixes that our relationships with European nations need are relatively cheap, easy, and even pleasant: more time, more engagement, more mutual cooperation.

Perhaps the biggest opportunity in the 21st century is not geopolitical, however, but economic and social. The tech revolution has the potential to boost standards of human happiness and prosperity as much as the Industrial Revolution did. It will likely give our grandchildren a higher standard of living than most of us today can imagine.

We should not underestimate either the extent of this coming transformation, or the enormous power it has to make our lives better. Take, for instance, the environment: 21st-century technology is moving the economy into a more sustainable mode. The information service-driven economy is rising even as the manufacturing economy becomes less environmentally problematic and shrinks as a portion of the total economy. From telework to autonomous cars, innovations are likely to cut down on emissions in the new economy, even while improving standards of living across the world.

The information economy will be more prosperous, more environmentally friendly, and more globally interconnected than what came before it. The U.S. can lead this transition—not by hampering economic growth or by instituting expensive subsidies, but by promoting and accelerating the shift toward a greener but richer and more satisfying economy.

Filled with opportunity as it is, the new century also contains threats: conventional threats like classic geopolitical rivals struggling against the world order favored by the United States and its allies, unconventional threats like terror movements spurred by jihadi ideology, regional crises like the implosion of much of the Middle East and a proliferation of failed and failing states, emerging threats like the danger of cyber war, and systemic problems like the crises in some of the major institutions on which the global order depends—NATO, the EU, and the UN for example. The United States government itself is not exempt from this problem; whether one looks at the Pentagon, the Department of Homeland Security or the State Department one sees organizations seeking to carry out 21st-century missions with 20th or even 19th-century bureaucratic structures and practices.

Additionally, the United States faces a challenge of strategy. While the United States has enough resources to advance its vital interests in world affairs, it does not have the money, the military power, the know how or the willpower to address every problem, intervene in every dispute, or to dissipate its energies in futile pursuits.

The United States faces an array of conventional and unconventional threats, as well as several systemic dangers. Our three principal conventional challengers are China, Russia, and Iran. All aim to revise the current global geopolitical order to some extent. In the years to come, we must expect that revisionist powers will continue to challenge the existing status quo in various ways. Moreover, the continuing development of “second generation” nuclear weapons states like Pakistan ensures that geopolitical competition between regional powers can trigger global crises.

Meanwhile, we are also confronted by an array of unconventional threats. Despite the fondest hopes of many Americans, Sunni jihadism has not proven to be a passing phase or fringe movement. Al-Qaeda was more resourceful and ambitious than the previous generation of radical salafi groups; its Mesopotamian offshoot (AQIM) was still more effective; today, ISIS has leaped ahead to develop capabilities and nourish ambitions that earlier jihadi groups saw only in their dreams. Unfortunately, the radical movements have lost inhibitions as they gained capacities. Wholesale slaughter, enslavement, barbaric and spectacular forms of execution: these testify to a movement that becomes more depraved, more lost in the pornography of violence, even as it acquires more resources and more fighters. This movement could become significantly more dangerous before it begins to burn out.

Yet radical jihadis may well prove to be less of a threat than the emerging dangers of the cybersphere. Cyber conflict is a new arena of action, one in which non-state, quasi-state and state actors are all present. With almost every day bringing stories of utterly lamentable failures of American cyber security, it must be clearly said that the United States Government has allowed itself to be made into a global laughingstock even as some of our most vital national security (and corporate and personal) information is captured by adversaries with, apparently, impunity.

But problems like these are pinpricks compared to the damage that cyber war can cause. Not only can industrial sabotage disrupt vital systems, including military command and control systems as well as, for example, the utilities on which millions of Americans depend for their daily necessities, cyberwar can be waged anonymously. Threats of retaliation lose their deterrent power when the attacker is unknown. Worse, the potential for destabilizing first strikes by cyber attacks will complicate the delicate balance of terror, and leaders could find themselves propelled into conflict. Cyber war could accelerate the diplomatic timetable of the 21st century much as railroad schedules and mobilization timetables forced the hands of diplomats in 1914.

Beyond that, one can dimly grasp the possibility of biologically based weapons as a new frontier in human conflict. It is far too soon to know what these will be like or how they will be used; nevertheless one must postulate the steady arrival of new kinds of weapons, both offensive and defensive, as the acceleration of human scientific understanding gives us greater access to the wonders of the life sciences.

Finally, there are systemic or generic threats, which is to say, dangers that are not created by hostile design, but emerge as byproducts from existing and otherwise benign trends that are likely to pose significant challenges to the United States’ interests and security in coming decades. We do not usually think of these as security problems, but they can create or exacerbate security threats and they can degrade our abilities to respond effectively.

For all its promise, the tech revolution entails an accelerating rate of change in human communities that has destabilizing effects. In the United States, and especially in Europe, these take the relatively benign, but still problematic, form of the breakdown of what I have called the “blue social model”—a tightly integrated economic-social model built during the 21st century that linked lifetime employment and fixed pensions into a socio-economic safety net. Now, the structures that were designed to secure prosperity and economic safety in the 20th century are often constraining it in the 21st.

But elsewhere, the strains of the modern economy may yet be worse, and produce more malign results. In the Middle East and North Africa, government institutions and systems of belief are overwhelmed by the onslaught of modernity. For better or worse, the pressures of modernity will increase on societies all around the world as we move deeper into the 21st century. To date, the United States has demonstrated very little ability to help failed or failing states find their feet. Failing states provide a fertile environment for ethnic and religious conflict, the rise of terrorist ideologies, and mass migration. The United States will need to be ready to deal with the fallout—fallout that in some cases could be more than metaphorical.

Finally, the United States and its allies must recognize and overcome a crisis of confidence. The West’s indecision, weak responses, mirror imaging of strategic competitors who do not share our values, and our tendency to rely upon process-oriented “solutions” in the face of growing, violent threats have encouraged a paradox: our enemies and challengers have become more emboldened, and disruptive to the world

order, exploiting the opportunities that the open order supported by the United States and its allies provides.

Western societies have turned inward, susceptible to “there’s nothing we can do” and “it’s not our problem” political rhetoric. As history shows, the combination can carry a very high cost and take many years to unwind. Grand strategy has to take this into account: American leadership is critical to highlighting and thwarting problems that may fester into major global threats. Even the best strategic planning and the best procurement of equipment to meet serious strategic threats is insufficient should current Western leaders lack the wit to recognize and the will to meet challenges as they arise.

RECOMMENDATIONS

What can the United States Congress and the armed services do to prepare the country for the strategic challenges of the future? The Committee invited me to look beyond the day to day problems and to take a longer view. Here are some thoughts:

1. Invest in the future.

The apparently inexorable acceleration of technological and social change has many implications for the armed services of the United States. It is not just that weapons and weapon platforms must change with the times, and that we must continue to invest in the research and development that will enable the United States to field the most advanced and effective forces in the world. Technological change drives social change, and conflict is above all a social activity. Military forces must develop new ways of organizing themselves, learn to operate in different dimensions, understand rapidly-changing cultural and political forces and generally remain innovative and outward focused.

New tech does not just mean new equipment on the battlefield. As tech moves into civil life, the structure of societies change. Insurgencies mutate as new forms of communication and social organization transform the ways that people interact and communicate.

The need for flexibility is heightened by the diversity of the world in which the Armed Forces of the United States, given our country’s global interests, must operate. American forces must be ready to work with Nigerian allies against Boko Haram, maintain a base presence in Okinawa while minimizing friction with the locals, operate effectively in the institutional and bureaucratic culture of the European alliance system, while killing ruthless enemies in the world’s badlands. Our combat troops must work in a high tech electronic battlefield of the utmost sophistication even as they work to win the hearts and minds of illiterate villagers.

The armed services must continue to reinvent themselves to fit changing times and changing missions, and they must be given the resources and the flexibility necessary to evolve with the world around them. The bureaucratic routines of Pentagon business as usual will be poorly adapted the kind of world that is growing up around us. A focus on re-imagining and re-engineering bureaucratic institutions is part of investing in the future. Private business has often moved more quickly than government bureaucracy to develop new staffing and management patterns for a more flexible and rapidly changing environment. Government generally, and the Pentagon in particular, will need aggressive prodding from Congress to adapt new methods of management and organization. Investment in better management and organizational reform will be vital.

2. Address the interstitial spaces and the invisible realms.

The United States, like Great Britain, is a power that flourishes in the ‘spaces between’. In the 18th century, think of sea power and the world markets that sea power guaranteed. Britain rose to world power by mastering the ‘spaces between’ the world’s major economic zones. In the 19th century Britain added telegraph and cable communications to its portfolio, developing and defending the world’s most extensive network of instantaneous communications. Similarly, the British build a global financial system around the gold standard, the pound, and the Bank of England. Again, the focus was less on dominating and ruling large land masses than on facilitating trade, communications and investment among them.

In the 20th century, the nature of this space changed again: air power, radio and television broadcasting, satellites and, in the century’s closing years, the internet created new zones of communication. The United States was able to retain a unique place in world affairs in large part because it moved quickly and effectively to gain a commanding position in the development and civil and military use of these forms of communication. Whether it is the movement of goods or of information or of both, Anglo-American power for more than three centuries has been less about controlling

large theaters of land than about securing and expediting trade and communication in the 'spaces between'.

This type of power, most evidently present today in the world of cyberspace, remains key not only to American power but to prosperity and security in the world. Information is becoming the decisive building block of both economic and military power.

American defense policy must remain riveted on the developments in communications and information processing that are creating the contemporary equivalent of the sea lanes of the 18th century and the cable lines of the 19th. The recent series of high profile hacker attacks against key American government and corporate targets suggests that we have lost ground in one of the most vital arenas of international competition.

This needs to change; cyber security is national security today and at the moment, we don't have it.

3. Establish a Congressional Office of Strategic Assessment.

In order to perform its oversight functions more effectively, the Congress should consider establishing a professional, nonpartisan agency that can be a source for independent strategic research and advice, and which can evaluate executive branch policies in a more systematic and thorough way than current resources allow. Similar in some ways to the CBO, a COSA would provide in-depth analysis and other resources to members and staff. Such an office would ideally be able to analyze anything from the strategic consequences of a given trade agreement to the utility of a proposed weapons system. This office would also allow a much more sustained and effective form of Congressional oversight, restoring a better balance to the relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches of government.

The intersection of military, political, social, technological and economic issues in our world is constantly creating a more complex environment for both military and political strategic policy and thought. Even the most dedicated members with the hardest working staff cannot fully keep up with the range of problems around the world and their impact on American interests and policy. Yet effective Congressional oversight is necessary if the American system of government is to reach its full potential in the vital field of national security policy.

A non-partisan office under Congressional control that had a strong staff and the ability to engage the best minds in the country on questions of national strategy would help Congress fulfill its responsibilities in this new and challenging environment.

Senator McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Hicks?

STATEMENT OF DR. KATHLEEN HICKS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT; HENRY A. KISSINGER CHAIR; DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Dr. Hicks. Good morning. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today.

The scope of this hearing, to discuss the global security environment, the national security strategy, and defense organization, is a daunting one. I will focus my opening statement on the implications of a changing U.S. role in the world, on our national security strategy, and our general strategic approach. I think you will find a remarkable degree of consistency between my remarks and thoughts and those expressed already.

Every day it seems Americans awaken to a new international crisis or other sign of a world out of their control. In Europe, our allies and partners are coping with Russian aggression, which is taking forms as diverse as cyber attacks, energy coercion, political subversion, all the way to conventional military might and a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons.

At the same time, Europeans grapple with the world's most significant migration crisis since World War II.

In Asia, satellite images of China's aggressive island-building activities are widely viewed as corroborating that nation's designs to control the air and sea space far from its shores.

Meanwhile, Kim Jung-un continues his family's legacy of dangerous provocations and nuclear ambition.

As significant as the security situation is in these two regions, no area of the world is in greater turmoil than the Middle East. From the destabilizing role of Iran, to the chaos of Libya, to the complete destruction of Syria and its implications for Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and beyond, the upheaval seems endless.

The international system is shifting and in ways not yet fully understood. The well-worn frames of "the unipolar moment," "the post-9/11 era," or even "globalization" cannot singularly explain the seeming growth of coercive tactics from major powers, manifest as provocations that fall short of conventional war, or the upheaval and appeal of a quasi-state espousing militant Islamist ideology. Indeed, no single compelling frame may exist that adequately captures the complexity and breadth of the challenges that we face. As we seek to understand more fully the implications of changes now underway, however, we can already identify several important insights that should help guide policymakers devising a national security strategy and the structure that supports it, and I will talk about five today.

The first key factor is the paradox of enduring super power status combined with lessening global influence. The United States will likely remain the world's sole super power for at least the next 15 years. As has already been stated by several others, the Nation boasts enviable demographics, economic and innovative capacity, natural resources, cultural reach, and of course, military power. At the same time, our Nation's ability to shape the behavior of other actors is lessening. How well the United States can wield power and how much it chooses to do so will vary by region, issue, and leadership. Non-state problems, for instance, are particularly difficult to tackle with existing U.S. foreign policy tools.

A second factor that shapes the likely U.S. role in the world is the constancy of American public support for international engagement. If there is one theme in American grand strategy that has persisted for at least the past 70 years, it is that taking a leading role in the world is generally to the benefit of U.S. interests. Those U.S. interests have themselves remained remarkably constant: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding treaty commitments, to include the security of allies; ensuring a liberal economic order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; and upholding the rule of law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each presidential administration has framed these interests somewhat differently, and of course, each has pursued its own particular path in seeking to secure them. But the core tenets have not varied significantly. An isolationist sentiment will always exist in American politics, but in the near future, it is unlikely to upend the basic consensus view that what happens elsewhere in the world can affect us at home and therefore requires our attention.

Equally important is a third factor that policymakers should take into account when thinking through the U.S. role in the world: a selective engagement approach to U.S. foreign policy is almost unavoidable. Despite the enduring, modern American consensus for international engagement, the United States has never had the wherewithal nor the desire to act everywhere in the world, all the time, or with the same tools of power. We have always had to weigh risks and opportunity costs and prioritize, and the current budget environment makes this problem even harder. Realizing greater security and military investment through increased budgets and/or more aggressive institutional reforms and infrastructure cost cuts should be pursued. I am encouraged by this committee's attention to the connection between reform and realizing strategic ends.

Another imperative for U.S. national security strategy is to pursue an engagement and prevention approach. Driving long-term solutions, such as improved governance capacity in places like Iraq, takes a generational investment and typically a whole-of-government and multinational approach. Problems are seldom solvable in one sphere nor by one nation alone. The United States needs all instruments of power, diplomatic, economic, informational, and military, to advance its interests. It also needs to work closely with the private sector, NGOs [non-governmental organizations], as well as allies and partners abroad. The United States has proven neither particularly patient nor adept at such lengthy and multilateral strategies in part because it is difficult to measure the success of such approaches in ways that can assure taxpayers and their representatives of their value. Our national security strategy needs to put action behind a preventative approach, to include developing ways to measure the results of such efforts.

A fifth insight we are learning about the security environment is that opportunism by nations and other actors is alive and well. Although we have an excellent record of deterring existential threats to the United States, we face the deterrent challenge for so-called "grey area" threats. The United States must be better able to shape the calculus of states and actors that wish to test our response to ambiguous challenges. This will mean clearly communicating our interests and our willingness and capacity to act in defense of them. It also means carrying out threats when deterrence fails. Without that commitment, the value of deterrence will continue to erode and the risk of great power conflict will rise.

The five insights I list here are realities that American policymakers would be wise to take into account. They create imperatives for national security strategy and for the tools of foreign policy. Discerning the shifting nature of the international system and designing an effective set of American security tools within it are monumental tasks, but they are not unprecedented. It is the same task that faced the so-called "wise men" who helped shape the U.S. approach to world affairs at the end of World War II. Our circumstances today are equally challenging, requiring a similar reexamination of our strategies and capabilities for securing U.S. interests. Self-imposed burdens, especially sequestration, threaten to undermine our defense policy from within. Ensuring the Nation is prepared to lead effectively and selectively will require adequately

resourcing any strategy we choose to pursue. Finally, successful national security strategy necessitates leadership from Washington and partnership with like minded nations and entities around the world.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hicks follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KATHLEEN H. HICKS

Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. The scope of this hearing—to review the global security challenges, the national security strategy, and defense organization—is a daunting one. I will focus this written statement on the key challenges to the international security environment, the implications of a changing US role in the world, and the key takeaways for national security strategy development. I will end by emphasizing that whatever strategy the United States chooses to pursue, it must resource that strategy.

KEY CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Every day, it seems Americans awaken to a new crisis signifying a world out of their control. In Europe, our Allies and partners are coping with Russian aggression, ranging from cyberattacks and energy coercion to conventional military might and a renewed emphasis on nuclear weapons. There are two important doctrinal trends occurring in Russian military thought. First, it has shifted its doctrine over the past five years to the high-risk proposition of relying on its significant strategic capabilities—nuclear, cyber, and space—at the outset of conflicts. Its goal is to deter US and NATO intervention by adopting an early escalation strategy. In short, Russia may seek to de-escalate conflicts quickly by escalating them to the strategic realm at the outset. Second, Russia has been steadily improving its means for unconventional warfare, as we saw in Crimea. This includes extensive information operations capabilities, development and use of proxy forces, and funding for sympathetic local movements. The seeming goal, successful in the case of Crimea, is to achieve Russian security objectives without need for a costly and domestically divisive traditional military campaign.

At the same time, Europe grapples with the world's most significant migration crisis since World War II. The prospects for European political cohesion are uncertain. The debt crisis has fueled popular support for extremist political parties, including some with strong ties to Moscow. Freedom House's 2014 Nations in Transit report found that only two out of ten Eastern and Central European countries (Latvia and the Czech Republic), which joined to the EU in 2004 and 2007, have improved their overall democracy "score card" since their accession.* Russia's annexation of Crimea to NATO's east and its military maneuvers in Europe's north compete with the threats posed by ISIS and others to NATO's south for priority. All this is occurring in an overall environment of declining resources, although since NATO's Wales Summit, there have been modest defense spending increases among some allies. NATO leaders hope that the Alliance can "walk and chew gum"—attending to disparate threats in various geographical regions—but the real test for European cohesion is occurring over migration, which is less directly a NATO issue and more centrally a test for the European Union.

In Asia, satellite images of China's aggressive island building activities are widely viewed as corroborating that nation's designs to control the air and sea space far from its shores. These efforts by China are significant. China has been schooling the United States about its territorial interests in East Asia for some time and has slowly eroded international norms regarding freedom of the air and seas along its periphery. It has also embarked on an extensive military improvement plan, focused largely on air and maritime capabilities. China will be the pacing challenge for the United States in most areas of high-end military capability over the coming decades, although Russia is likely to be at least an equal challenges in nuclear, cyber, and space capabilities. Meanwhile, Kim Jung Un appears to be building on his family's

*Sylvana Habdank-Kolaczowska, Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia's Rupture with Democracy (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2014) 19. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2014%20booklet_WEBSITE.pdf

legacy of dangerous force provocations and nuclear ambition. Although North Korea's large conventional military is probably no match for South Korean combined armed forces, and certainly no match for the United States military, the North Korean threat today is worrisome not because of its sizable manpower but because of its increasing missile capability, emergent nuclear technology, special operations forces, and likely reliance on chemical and biological weapons.

As significant as the security situation is in these two regions, no area of the world is in greater tumult than the Middle East. From the destabilizing role of Iran, to the chaos of Libya, to the complete destruction of Syria and its implications for Iraq, Jordan, Turkey, and beyond, the upheaval is dramatic. Iran has some impressive conventional military capabilities, especially with regard to conventional missiles, but they are currently not on par with the United States.

The most concerning threat posed by Iran today is instead its use of unconventional capabilities, manifest largely in its support for terrorist groups, to threaten US interests throughout the greater Middle East and beyond, and its ability to create a crisis in the Arabian Gulf due to its strategic position along the Strait of Hormuz.

Beyond those regional challenges, the global interconnectedness of peoples will continue to grow. However, the very tools that support globalization, especially social media, will also facilitate increasing segmentation along ideological, religious, familial, and other lines that individuals and small groups may choose to create. Moreover, individuals and small groups who are bent on using violence will more easily be able to acquire the means to do so, with militarily-relevant technology increasingly coming from the commercial sector, in accessible ways, and at accessible prices.

Moreover, we should expect to see some national security effects from climate change by the middle of this century, particularly the potential for conflict over changing natural resources and food and attendant migration patterns as well as worsening natural disasters. The growth of megacities on the littorals is a particular concern in this regard, as they are more at risk from disasters. The United States will also need to address challenges that arise when the Arctic begins to experience greater commercial, scientific, and military traffic.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As this brief recitation of the international security environment demonstrates, the international system itself is shifting in ways not yet fully understood. The well-worn frameworks of "the unipolar moment," "the post-9/11 era," or even "globalization" cannot singularly explain the seeming growth of coercive tactics from major powers—manifest as provocations that fall short of traditional war—or the appeal of a quasi-state espousing militant Islamist ideology. Indeed, no single, compelling frame may exist that adequately captures the complexity and breadth of the challenges we face. As we seek to understand more fully the implications of changes now underway, we can already identify five important insights that should help guide policymakers devising a national security strategy.

Changing Power Dynamics The first key factor shaping the role of the United States today is the paradox of enduring superpower status combined with lessening global influence. The United States will likely remain the world's sole superpower for at least the next fifteen years. The nation boasts enviable demographics, economic and innovative capacity, natural resources, cultural reach, and of course military power. At the same time, its ability to shape the behavior of other actors is lessening. How well the United States can wield power, and how much it chooses to do so, will vary by region and issue. Non-state problems, for instance, are particularly difficult to tackle with existing United States foreign policy tools. On the other hand, where there is an assertive nation-state competitor—such as Iran, Russia, North Korea or China—traditional United States security strengths tend to be more influential. Even in these cases, however, the United States has had difficulty deterring a wide range of provocations and coercive actions that run counter to its security interests.

Enduring American Support for Engagement A second factor that shapes the likely U.S. role in the world is the constancy of American public support for international engagement. If there is a theme in American grand strategy that has persisted for the past seventy years, it is that taking a leading role in the world is generally to the benefit of U.S. interests. Those interests have themselves remained remarkably consistent: ensuring the security of U.S. territory and citizens; upholding treaty commitments, to include the security of Allies; ensuring a liberal economic order in which American enterprise can compete fairly; and upholding the rule of law in international affairs, including respect for human rights. Each presidential

administration has framed these interests somewhat differently, and of course each has pursued its own particular path in seeking to secure them, but the core tenets have not varied significantly. An isolationist sentiment will always exist in American politics, but it is unlikely to upend the basic consensus view that what happens elsewhere in the world can affect us at home and, therefore, requires our attention.

The Reality of Selective Engagement Equally important is a third factor that policy-makers should take into account when thinking through the U.S. role in the world: a selective engagement approach to U.S. foreign policy is unavoidable. Despite the enduring, modern American consensus for international engagement, the United States has never had the wherewithal nor the desire to act everywhere in the world, all the time, or with the same tools of power. We have always had to weigh risks and opportunity costs and prioritize. The current budget environment makes this problem harder. Realizing greater security and military investment, through increased budgets and/or more aggressive institutional reforms and infrastructure cost cuts, should be pursued. Nevertheless, when it comes to the use of American force to achieve our ends, we should be prepared to surprise ourselves. As Robert Gates famously quipped in 2011, we have a perfect record in predicting our next crisis—we've never once got it right. Democracies, including the United States, can prove remarkably unpredictable. Policy-makers need to understand this reality and not lead the public to expect a universal template that governs when and where the nation may act in support of its interests.

IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTATIVE APPROACHES

Another imperative for US national security strategy is to pursue an engagement and prevention approach. Driving long-term solutions, such as improved governance capacity in places like Iraq, takes a generational investment and typically a whole-of-government and multinational approach. Problems are seldom solvable in one sphere nor by one nation alone. The United States needs all instruments of power—diplomatic, economic, informational, and military—to advance its interests. It also needs to work closely with the private sector and non-governmental partners as well as allies and partners abroad. The United States has proven neither particularly patient nor adept at such lengthy and multilateral strategies. It is also difficult to measure the success of such approaches in ways that can assure taxpayers and their representatives of their value. Our national security strategy needs to put action behind a preventative approach, to include developing ways to measure the results of such efforts. Importantly, a whole-of-government approach also means ensuring sufficient funding for intelligence, diplomacy, and development. This is why the uniformed military is often the most vocal proponent for adequately resourcing the intelligence community, United States State Department, USAID, and other non-military foreign policy tools.

CHALLENGES TO DETERRENCE

The March 2014 events in Ukraine were a stark reminder that state-based opportunism is alive and well. If the United States ignores the challenges posed by major powers such as Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, it does so at its own peril. Although we have an excellent record of deterring existential threats to the United States, we face a deterrence challenge for so-called “grey area” threats. The United States must better shape the calculus of those states that wish to test our response to ambiguous challenges. This will mean clearly communicating those interests and our willingness and capability to act in defense of them. It also means carrying out threats when deterrence fails. Without that commitment, the value of deterrence will continue to erode, and the risk of great power conflict will rise.

CONCLUSION

The paradox of superpower status yet lessening influence, the American inclination toward international engagement, and the near-inevitability of selective engagement are realities that American policy-makers and prospective presidents would be wise to understand. They create imperatives for national security strategy and for the tools of foreign policy. Discerning the shifting nature of the international system, and designing an effective set of American security tools within it, are monumental tasks, but they are not unprecedented. It is the same task that faced “the wise men” who helped shape the U.S. approach to world affairs at the end of World War II. Our circumstances today are equally daunting, requiring a similar re-examination of our strategies and capabilities for securing U.S. interests. Self-imposed burdens, especially sequestration, threaten to undermine our defense policy from within. Ensuring the nation is prepared to lead effectively—and selectively—will require adequately resourcing any strategy we chose to pursue. Finally, successful na-

tional security strategy necessitates leadership from Washington and partnership with likeminded nations and entities around the world.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

I guess to pick up on what you just said, Dr. Hicks and members of the committee, sequestration is doing not irreparable but would you say most serious harm to our ability to address the challenges which you all have described? Would you agree, Dr. Hicks?

Dr. HICKS. I do agree. I enjoyed Professor Cohen's comments on the QDR. I actually agree with them mostly. But the biggest problem with strategic planning today is not the failure of our QDR process, it is the inability to have any stability of foresight on what that funding profile looks like to create a strategy against it. It is paralyzing this Nation's ability to plan.

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mead?

Mr. MEAD. I would agree. It is very difficult to think of any positive things on sequestration. I would also emphasize that countries around the world are looking at that as a—you know, can the Americans govern themselves? Can they actually adopt a serious strategy? How seriously should we take them? The message that we are sending by this paralysis is the worst possible one.

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mahnken?

Dr. MAHNKEN. I completely agree. It is not just the budget cuts but also the consciously thoughtless way in which they are structured almost to cause the greatest damage to the Department as possible.

Dr. COHEN. Without question. My colleagues have put it better than I could.

Senator MCCAIN. Before the committee, several witnesses were asked an interesting question. I have forgotten which Senator asked General Dunford, our new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, what is our greatest area of risk or challenge. Some of us were interested to hear General Dunford, not the first one, saying Russia. I wonder, beginning with you, Professor Cohen, if you would agree with that.

Dr. COHEN. I would say Russia is a big problem, but I do not think you can actually do that. In fact, I would say the fundamental challenge that we have is that we have got multiple, major strategic challenges, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, and the jihadists in particular, and not all the forces that we have to bring to bear on one are fungible against the other. I think coming to terms with that fundamental fact that we are not really going to be able to say this is absolutely the number one is going to be particularly helpful.

I think I would probably say actually as problematic as Russia is, I worry even more about China in terms of a great power competitor. But my main point would be we have got a bunch of problems.

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think it is a difficult question to answer in a succinct manner. Russia remains the only country capable of annihilating the United States with its nuclear arsenal. So that qualifies. But Russia's power is waning, not waxing. So I would agree. Over the mid- to long-term, I think China is a much greater challenge, a much greater multidimensional challenge to American power than Russia.

Then there is the growing rank of lesser actors that are, nonetheless, going to be able to do us great harm and may face much lower inhibitions to harming us, whether it is al Qaeda, its affiliates, a nuclear-armed North Korea with ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], or Iran through its various proxies. So they are varied threats and they require varied responses.

Senator MCCAIN. Professor Mead?

Mr. MEAD. Well, long-term I think I would agree that China certainly has greater power potential. But the very fact that Russia is a waning power means that I am afraid that President Putin is a man in a hurry. For him, the clock is ticking. China can look at any unresolved issue and say, you know, we can come back to this in 10 years or 20 years and be in a better position. The Russians—I do not feel that they have that luxury and also for President Putin himself and the security of his regime, I think there is a closer connection between foreign policy success and the stability of the regime. So that while Russia is not in potential the greatest threat to the United States, at the moment Russia is the great power which is devoting the most time and attention and is on the most aggressive timetable to try to compete with American power and displace it where possible.

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Hicks?

Dr. HICKS. I think that is a very good way to put it. China clearly has the most power potential over the long term, but the actions, the intent being displayed by Russia currently is a far greater concern in the near term even though there are things that the Chinese are doing that are problematic to say the least. What Russia is doing in the near term creates significant problems for the United States with regard to its interests, particularly in terms of Article 5 commitments to NATO, but then also beyond that in the Middle East.

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Reed?

Senator REED. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me thank the panel for an extraordinarily thoughtful presentation. Thank you very much.

Professor Cohen, one of the comments you made intrigued me. It is about the need or the ability to mobilize, and let me tie that to something else, which is, you know, phase III operations were incredibly effective. No one, I think, does it as well. Phase IV, putting things together again, is where we see to fall down dramatically, and that is the longest and maybe most expensive part of the operation.

So when you are talking about mobilization, is that a subtle reference to the draft? Is it in the context of going forward, not individual soldiers and sailors, it is technicians, cyber specialists, engineers, all those people that can do phase III?

Dr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator. I do not think we are going to need a draft. I do not think it would be practicable.

But I think you have hit on a very good example of what difference mobilization thinking might have made. I think we should have clearly anticipated before the Iraq War that we were going to need major capacity in terms of military government. You know, during World War II, we did a wonderful job of getting city managers, politicians, even future Senators into uniform in pretty short

order, you know, 3 months, 6 months of training, and then they were out there doing it. There is no reason why you could not have done it in 2003-2004.

You know, I was struck right after 9/11. After that crisis, there is no question in my mind the United States Government could have tapped the service of just about any citizen in this country. As Dr. Mahnken pointed out, we have got an amazing array, unparalleled array, of talents. Our system was just incapable of doing that in the intelligence community, in the military. It is not as though we have not done it before. We did it in World War II.

Senator REED. Dr. Mahnken, Professor Mead, then Dr. Hicks, any comments?

Dr. MAHNKEN. No. I would agree. I think historically our military has been based on a relatively small active component and the ability to expand as needed. But in recent years, we have gone to a highly proficient, highly capable standing capability with not much behind it. That is true when it comes to phase IV, as you talked about. It is also true with the industrial base. Just think about when we needed to mobilize in World War II, all the industry that we were able to tap into to build tanks, to build bombers, to build ships. I hazard a guess that if we had to do that today, if we had to mobilize for an era of a protracted war involving precision weapons and cyber, we would have a much more difficult time doing it. We have just gotten out of the habit of thinking in those terms. For better or worse, we are going to need to get back into that habit.

Senator REED. I would love to entertain comments, but my time is short.

One point that you raised, Professor Mead—and I will get Dr. Hicks' comments also—is that you made the comment, you know, what would be the consequences of the \$200 a barrel oil? One would be that President Putin would be in much better shape. So that sort of drives the other side of the argument, bluntly how do we keep oil at \$45 so his aspirations are not funded by huge oil. That raises the issue of part of the national security policy has to be a whole-of-government, including energy policy, proactive diplomacy, et cetera. If you and Dr. Hicks would comment on the general themes I would appreciate it.

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, Senator. I think there is a connection in a way between the first part of your questions and this part, that the strength of the United States has been the strength of our society which, through a representative system of government, is not completely separate from what the government wants or does. This is the American people speaking and acting through many different institutions.

But absolutely the success of American energy policy, of regenerating our position as a major world producer of oil and gas, is an extraordinary example of the kind of strength that the United States brings to this multilevel, multifaceted strength. We do need to think consciously what is the connection between our energy policy and our foreign policy. How do we, for example, ensure that some of our allies in Europe and Asia can rely on North America? We talk about our Canadian and Mexican friends also. North America is really positioned to be the swing producer in hydro-

carbons for the 21st century. This can be an extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical reality. But our Government needs to be thinking together about what are the policies that make that possible. This is partly, sir, why I think some kind of office of strategic assessment in Congress that could pull together these very disparate ideas and considerations would be of enormous benefit.

Senator REED. Could I ask for a quick comment from Dr. Hicks?

Dr. HICKS. Sure. I also think there is a lot of consistency both with your first question in framing it about phase IV, which is one of the clearest examples of how inadequate we are as a Nation pulling together the different threads of capability because phase IV operations are the place where you are trying to bring together the military instrument with development, diplomacy, one of those places where we try to do that. We really struggle.

Similarly, we really struggle anytime the issue set demands that we cross our traditional stovepipe cultures inside either the executive branch or even committee structures and try to build coherent, integrated approaches.

It is a real challenge for us and it is getting worse, as I tried to point out in my statement, because the problem sets are increasingly testing us in those areas. We are not fast at it, and we are also not great at it even over a long period of time. But it is what the future will require.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Inhofe?

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, with this committee's—I would say the chairman—I compliment him on the quality of people coming forth. My gosh, we had the very best minds in Kissinger, yesterday Bob Gates, the four of you. I have to say this about your opening statements. Confession is good for the soul I guess. It is the first time that I have ever started reading opening statements and I could not put them down. It was like a scary but true novel. I appreciate the straightforwardness in which you have done this.

It is very clear I think to me—and I will not ask you—well, I will ask you to respond. We are in a weakened condition right now that we have not been in relative to the threat that is out there, at least in the 20-plus years that I have been here, when you have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff talking about how the risk is so great and we are so unready that it would be immoral to use force and you have the Vice Chairman saying that for the first time in my career, we could be met with a crisis and we would have to say we cannot. So these things are going on now, and I really believe it is true.

I like one of the quotes, many of the quotes, of President Reagan. One of them is none of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we are too strong. It is weakness that invites adventurous adversaries to make mistaken judgments.

Going across from you, Professor Cohen, do you agree with that statement?

Dr. COHEN. I certainly would. The only thing, though, I would say, unfortunately, is President Reagan did an extraordinary job presiding over a major defense buildup and very clearly and powerfully articulating American values.

Senator INHOFE. The question is strength.

Dr. COHEN. Right.

The one caution I would add is although I am very much of a view that we need some major plus-ups in the defense budget and I am very much in favor of Presidents articulating American values, we are not going to have something like the Reagan recovery.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much. I will not ask the rest of you that.

Professor Mead, you wrote back in 2013—I mentioned this to you before—that Putin and Khamenei believe—and the quote was—they are dealing with a dithering and indecisive American leader. That was 2 years ago. Do you still think they believe that? Is that still true today?

Mr. MEAD. Senator, I am afraid they do believe that, and that I think is a factor in some of the risks they have been willing to run.

Senator INHOFE. Well, I think so too.

Dr. Kissinger, when he was here, he said the role of the United States is indispensable. At a time of global upheaval, the consequences of American disengagement magnifies and requires larger intervention later.

Professor Mead, are you not saying about the same thing in your statement when you said America is the secret ingredient that keeps this historically contentious rivalry-ridden area full of states of differing size, capacity, with different attitudes toward economics, defense, social organizations, and much less working together. Is that not simply what—you are agreeing with Dr. Kissinger?

Mr. MEAD. I am agreeing with Dr. Kissinger. I think if we look back at the 20th century, sir, we can see that even if we look at times the United States intervened and perhaps it was unwise and the results were not successful, overall far more people die, far more damage is done when the United States evades responsibility than when it moves forward.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you also for bringing up in your statement and restating it verbally when you talk about one of the United States' greatest advantages is our exceptional array of natural resources. You go on and talk about our shale revolution, things that we are in the middle of right now, and horizontal fracturing—hydraulic fracturing and horizontal well drilling. By the way, the first hydraulic fracturing was 1948 in my State of Oklahoma. You probably knew that.

But with that being significant—and then you end up that statement by saying do we sell LNG [liquid natural gas] abroad. Do we end the ban on crude oil exports? I say resoundingly yes, because we want to keep this thing going. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir. I think it is good national economic policy and good strategic policy.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Professor Mahnken, my time is running out here. You talked about sharpening the tradeoff between guns and butter. I like that statement. I like the way you are saying that because that is exactly what we are doing right now with sequestration. Yesterday when Gates was in here, he talked about in 1961 defense consumed 51 percent of the budget in 1961. Today it is 15. Now, when we try

to do something about sequestration, there is a demand by this administration that you are not going put one more nickel back into defense unless you also put it into the social programs.

So I would ask each one of you the question. Do you think we have too much butter and not enough guns? Let us start with you, Professor Mahnken.

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think one of the core duties of the Government is to provide for the common defense. Nobody else can do that.

Senator INHOFE. That is what the Constitution says.

Dr. MAHNKEN. So I think national security spending is key. Now, we can try to get more bang for our buck, and we can do that also on the butter side as well through reform. But it is an inescapable responsibility of the United States Government to defend the United States and its people.

Senator INHOFE. Professor Cohen?

Dr. COHEN. I do not know whether or not we are spending the right amount of money on butter, but I am quite sure we are not spending enough on guns.

Senator INHOFE. A good way of putting it.

Professor Mead?

Mr. MEAD. I think Professor Cohen had it exactly right, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Dr. Hicks?

Dr. HICKS. I agree with that. Dr. Gates also had a saying he liked to use both here on the Hill and also with his staff, which is we are a rich Nation. We are a capable Nation. We should be able to provide for the common defense at the same time we are providing for the citizens' needs at home.

Senator INHOFE. I thank all four of you.

Senator REED [presiding]. Thank you.

On behalf of Senator McCain, Senator Hirono?

Senator HIRONO. Thank you very much.

Secretary Gates yesterday and the panel today both acknowledged I think the elephant in the room, which is basically congressional dysfunction and our inability to eliminate sequester and to provide the kind of long-term decisions with regard to the budget that enable good planning to be done both on the defense and non-defense side. So that is our responsibility.

I was interested in Dr. Cohen's suggestion that we overhaul the current system for producing strategy documents because, as you all indicated today in your testimony, we are really living in an unpredictable environment and lots of things happen. If we are just relying on a Quadrennial Review and those kinds of approaches, that may not be the best way to go.

So I would like to start with Dr. Hicks because I believe that you were involved in crafting the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2010 QDR. So would you agree that we should create a more flexible way to develop strategic documents to enable all of us to make better decisions?

Dr. HICKS. The Department absolutely needs a flexible way to plan.

I would say that the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance process was an example of essentially what Dr. Cohen is arguing for, which is an incident- or situation-dependent desire and then creation of a strategy and associated budget outside of the QDR process. So

the QDR process can keep going along if it is helpful for it to exist, but it cannot constrain strategic thinking in the Department. In point of fact, it does not. I think the key question is what is most useful in terms of documents or processes that the Hill would like to mandate upon the Department for its use. But in terms of the Department's own agility and ability, it needs to be doing that, and the DSG I think was an example of where it recognized that it could not wait for the next QDR to do a major strategy review. So it did one.

Senator HIRONO. Well, that was in 2012. We are in 2015 now and lots of other things have happened. So has there been an update of the Defense Strategic Guidance?

Dr. HICKS. There has. There was a 2014 QDR. So you had a 2010 QDR, a 2012 DSG, and a 2014 QDR. So basically at this point, we are on an every 2-year schedule.

Senator HIRONO. Dr. Cohen, do you think that that is adequate?

Dr. COHEN. No. First, I think it is actually good to get rid of reports that consume an enormous amount of time and energy from people like my very talented colleagues, Dr. Hicks and Dr. Mahnken.

But also, I think there is a lot to be said for a white paper kind of system for two reasons. First, if you look at both the Australian and the French examples that I mentioned, they do a very good job of integrating both civilians and military together as opposed to having a process that is much more divided. The French, in particular, also do a much better job of holding some open hearings, getting some outside experts involved, and then producing a large and really quite serious document. The Australians have done this as well. I think it is important some part of this be an open process, some part of it be a closed process. You probably need something that would force the Government to do it at least once every—I do not know—5 or 7 years, something like that. But I would be in favor of a much radical restructuring of how we do this.

Senator HIRONO. So that relates to external to Congress? ability to engage in this kind of strategic assessment, although that is what this hearing and hearings like this are supposed to do.

Dr. Cohen, do you have any response to the idea that we should establish a congressional office of strategic assessment as a tool for us?

Dr. COHEN. That is hard for me to say. You have the Congressional Research Service, which I have got a lot of respect for, and the CBO as well. I suppose the one thing I would be somewhat concerned about is how do you really keep things like that truly nonpartisan. Now, in some ways, just this very panel, which includes both a former Obama administration official, two former Bush administration officials, and one genuinely nonpartisan expert—and there is a lot of consensus here—might be encouraging. But I think if I was in your shoes, that would be one concern that I would have.

Senator HIRONO. I am running out of time. But I was very interested in all of you acknowledging that while Russia is moving ahead right now, maybe in the long term they are not as much of a challenge or concern for us as China. Although I am running out

of time, I perhaps would like to ask you all, what do you think is the long-term strategy for China? Because if their intention is to become the preeminent power in the world from a multidimensional standpoint, diplomatically, economically, militarily, how long is it going to take them to overtake the United States? If I can frame it in that way. Very briefly.

Dr. COHEN. Well, just real quickly, we need to remember the Chinese have some great weaknesses as well as strengths, demographic, economic, societal and so forth. But I would say the key for us is really three things. One, we really do need a robust military presence in Asia. You cannot substitute for things like gray hulls.

Secondly, it is working on a different set of alliance relationships than in the past to include developing a relationship particularly with India but also deepening the relationship with Japan and Australia.

I think, thirdly—and this gets to something that Dr. Mahnken said earlier—it is very important to articulate American values. I am not sure whether the phrase “political warfare” is right or something like that. We need to be much more forceful, I believe, than we have been in laying out those basic values of human rights and representative government and rule of law that everybody, Democrats and Republicans alike, really believe in. That is a very important part of our power in the world, and we should never forget that.

Senator HIRONO. Well, if you do not mind, Mr. Chairman, can I have at least one other panel member just respond? Who? Dr. Mahnken.

Dr. MAHNKEN. First off, I am not willing to concede that China is going to surpass the United States. I think we have had in our past all sorts of predictions along these lines that have not come true. But I think we should focus on what the aspects of China’s rise are that really do concern us. I actually do not think it is economic growth per se. I think it is the fact that China is a non-status quo power. It is the fact that China has expanded to its maritime littorals and threatened our territory and that of our allies. It is a whole pattern of behavior, and ultimately it is an authoritarian political system. I think if you were to get China to buy into major aspects of the status quo, to focus much more of its attention on the Asian continent rather than offshore Asia, and to be more pluralistic, the economic part of it would not matter nearly as much. So if I am thinking about United States strategy for addressing China, I would be focused on those aspects of Chinese behavior and not merely China’s rise or Chinese growth.

Senator REED. Thank you.

On behalf of the chairman, Senator Ayotte.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you very much, Chair.

I want to thank you all of you for being here. This is very helpful and especially your written statements as well.

Professor Cohen, I was struck in not only your testimony here today but in your prepared statement that you predict that Iran will be armed with nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. So can you explain to me why you believe that conclusion is in light of what we have been told, that there has been a deal

entered into that somehow is going to prevent Iran from having that capacity?

Dr. COHEN. Senator Ayotte, when I was at the State Department, I kept on my desk a 50,000 rial note, an Iranian bank note. When you hold it up to the light, what you see is the watermark. The watermark is the sign of an atom right over the center of the country, which tells you something about the nature of their commitment.

I think everything that we know about the Iranian program is they have had not just a very active enrichment program—we all know about that, including clandestine dimensions—but a very active warhead development program at Parchin and, of course, a very active ballistic missile program. I understand the different positions people have taken on the current agreement. But under the best circumstances—under the best circumstances—15 years from now, they really are out there free. They will be able to build a nuclear arsenal. I believe that is what they will do. All of their behavior supports only that interpretation. That is under the best set of assumptions. We can have a long discussion, of course, about the agreement. I think that is the optimistic assumption.

Senator AYOTTE. Can I also follow up with you, Professor Mahnken, related to Iran based on a statement that you have in your testimony that essentially says that Iran's missile program continues apace? One thing I have been very interested in and focused on is the recent October 10th test by Iran of the ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear weapon. Of course, that has also been confirmed by Ambassador Power, our U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, as a clear violation of UN [United Nations] Security Council 1929.

I have written the President about this, along with Senator Kirk. I wanted to get your thought on their testing. If they do not believe that there are any consequences for currently violating UN resolutions on this topic that under this agreement apparently will not be lifted till 8 years, what are your thoughts on this violation and how should it be addressed?

Dr. MAHNKEN. Well, in a way the violation is not surprising. It is part of an ongoing pattern of behavior by Iran. We could extend this and talk about North Korea as well. They are both building intercontinental ballistic missile capability. In the case of North Korea, they have the nuclear weapons, and in the case of Iran, they will at some point likely get the warheads to go atop—

Senator AYOTTE. I mean, just so we are clear, they want ICBM capability—right—because “I” is “intercontinental,” as Secretary Carter shared with us, so they can hit us.

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes.

Senator AYOTTE. Or Europe.

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes.

Senator AYOTTE. They do not even need that to hit Europe.

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. They can already hit Europe.

Iran and North Korea have a pattern of cooperation on a variety of matters as well.

So, yes, whether they get the warheads now or a few years from now, they will have the means.

Senator AYOTTE. So here is my question I guess to everyone on the panel. Should there not be some consequences for if they are

already testing in violation of the UN resolutions, which, I mean, there was—I disagreed with the administration lifting the missile resolutions whatsoever in the 8 years. In fact, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that this should not be done under any circumstances. But there does not seem to be any response from the administration. Should we not have a response? I would like to get everyone's thought on this.

Dr. HICKS. I will start on that. Obviously, I do not represent the administration.

But I think there is absolutely no doubt, whether it is Iran or others that we are trying to prevent from proliferating to nuclear weapons, we have to demonstrate that they are better off without nuclear weapons. In the case of North Korea, I think that has failed. I think the fact of the matter is North Koreans believe they are better off with nuclear weapons. That makes the challenge with Iran that much harder.

So putting aside the deal—I am happy to talk about that, but putting that aside for the moment, I am in favor of the deal, but I do think there needs to be absolutely consequences to demonstrate that Iran sticking to its agreement and staying, if you will, inside parameters that are non-nuclear are very important to the United States and are important to Iran's own security.

Senator AYOTTE. Other thoughts? Also, I do not view the ICBM issue as non-nuclear. Let me just say that.

Dr. COHEN. The Supreme Leader was very clever. He just announced that any kind of sanctions of any sort would invalidate the deal. So clearly, what the Iranians would like to do is to kind of be able to engage not just in this but in other nefarious activities without any consequences whatsoever. So I think even as a symbolic statement that we are not going to accept that construction of this agreement, we need to do something.

Senator AYOTTE. Any other comments on that? I know my time is up, but I know it is an important issue.

Mr. MEAD. Well, I do think that in a sense the problem with the nuclear deal is that it does not solve our most urgent problem with Iran, which is its geopolitical ambitions in the region and, in fact, may provide Iran with more economic resources to pursue a destabilizing policy in the region, which it is clearly doing. If we add then that we do not, at the moment, seem to have an active strategy of containing or offsetting or checking Iran in the region and then we add to that that we seem unable to come up with a response to a violation of a UN Security Council resolution, we are really inviting the kind of behavior from Iran that is very dangerous and would be very unwelcome.

Dr. MAHNKEN. I agree.

Senator AYOTTE. Thank you all.

Senator REED. On behalf of the chairman, Senator Shaheen.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all very much for your very thought-provoking testimony this morning.

I just wanted to follow up a little bit on some of the budget uncertainty concerns that have been raised. Most of you talked about it in the context of sequestration and the potential impact that that has on our defense budget. But do you agree that the current uncertainty around a budget in general for the country and uncer-

tainty about our willingness to raise the debt ceiling and to invest in things like our infrastructure and our research and development, our educational system also contributes to our ability to address national security threats to the country? Professor Cohen?

Dr. COHEN. I guess I would say two things.

One, I think it is generally—first, I think the core issues in some ways, in addition to the specific damage to defense planning, it is the reputational cost abroad, which I think is very real. Most people do not understand our system of divided powers. So they are frequently baffled by that. But I think, to the extent that there is a national security issue, what they are focused on, what they really notice is our inability to really have defense budgets and make long-term decisions. As a citizen, do I care about the nature of the political deadlock that we have here at home? Absolutely. But I think if you were to ask me in terms of the reputational issue abroad, that I am not as sure about.

Dr. MAHNKEN. Yes. What I get when I am abroad when I am speaking to allies and friends is that this reflects poorly on—appears to reflect poorly on our ability to get things done. Now, historically we have been able to get a bipartisan consensus on defense, even when there have been very profound disagreements on other things. I think if we are unable to do that, if we are unable to push a defense budget forward and get it signed, that will be yet another distressing sign to many of our allies and maybe comforting to those who wish us ill.

Senator SHAHEEN. Do either of you disagree with that?

Dr. HICKS. I do not disagree. I just wanted to add that the—which I think will be shared by others, that the long-term security of the country also relies on having strong education systems and innovation and a tech sector that is vibrant, infrastructure that functions and is above a D grade level for the Nation. All those things also matter in the long term, as does the debt ceiling, the national debt.

Senator SHAHEEN. Professor Mead?

Mr. MEAD. Yes. I think there is a certain reputational damage internationally that we seem—you know, if we are unable to agree on a basic budget, but it becomes much more focused when defense is part of that general imbroglio. So we need to think about how do we—well, we may also need to sort of try to carve up the defense budget a little bit. There are sort of payment of past wars, which would be veterans benefits and pensions and things like that, and then what do we need to do to fulfill our needs right now and possibly there are ways to think about those things in budget terms. I am not sure.

But in any case, there is a reputational damage to us and to the idea of democracy when the United States appears unable to manage its own affairs well, but it is exacerbated when our defense budget is made a kind of a political football.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you.

The 2015 National security Strategy states that—and I am quoting—climate change is an urgent and growing threat to our national security, contributing to increased natural disasters, refugee flows, and conflicts over basic resources like food and water. Do you all agree? I was surprised that nobody mentioned this as

part of potential threats to not only our national security but to the global world order. Does anyone wish to comment? Dr. Hicks?

Dr. HICKS. Thank you. It is in my written statement. I did not highlight it in my brief oral statement. But in my written statement, I do talk about the effects of climate change increasingly as a national security issue. I might use different adjectives than were used in the National Security Strategy, but for certain, there will be increasing conflicts over natural resources. Of course, we have the effects on the Arctic, especially as it becomes ice-free over the summers by mid-century as predicted. That creates a whole new challenge space with scientific and commercial vessels and, of course, military—the possibilities of military use in the Arctic.

Then to the extent that you have at the same time the effects of mega-city growth and urbanization happening, which is largely happening along waterways—on the littorals is where those mega-cities are going. To the extent that countries and states are not able to control and govern those areas well when disaster hits, I do think it greatly increases some of the risks in areas that the United States may decide it needs to care about with military force.

Dr. COHEN. If I could, I think I actually disagree in that not all really important issues are national security issues. Environmental degradation is important. Climate change is important. Education is important. But I think there is a real danger—we can end up just diluting what we mean by national security and take our eye off the ball.

I remember when the Commander of Pacific Command got up and said climate change is the most important national security threat we have got, my reaction was, you know, your job is really to be focused on China and let other people deal with climate change.

So I think particularly if this committee is going to stay focused on the central task, I think it should be focused on issues which really involve the use or potential use of force. Although they may be indirect connections between climate change and use of force, I think we run the risk of blurring our focus if we extend it too widely.

Senator SHAHEEN. I am out of time, but I would respectfully disagree with you. I think when we have reports that come out that show that China is losing its wetlands at a rate that means that it is no longer going to be able to feed its population, that it is going to look elsewhere to do that and that that will have significant security risks. So while I appreciate what you are saying, I think if we are talking about a national security strategy that focuses on things like energy, that we certainly ought to be focused also on the impact of the threats to our climate.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MCCAIN [presiding]. Senator Sullivan?

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, panelists. It is a really, really impressive display of knowledge here.

Professor Cohen, just to be clear, you mentioned what the Supreme Leader had recently said. It is actually in the agreement that any type of reimposition of sanctions allows Iran to walk away from the deal. That is in the agreement. So our administration ne-

gotiated that. The Senators who voted for this agreement agreed with that. I think it is outrageous, but it is in the agreement. It is not just what they are saying. So I just wanted to be clear on that.

I really appreciated all of you talking about the advantages that we have, the comparative advantages that we have. I do not think that is emphasized enough.

Professor Mead and others, your focus on energy is also one. You know, we have had General Jones, former NATO Commander, Commandant of the Marine Corps. Even Secretary Carter has come here and talked about how important energy is. Yet, we cannot put together an energy strategy at all with this administration because I just think they do not like hydrocarbons. They do not like talking about exporting LNG and oil. It is not only a way to create jobs and energy security in America but to dramatically increase our national security. So I think we need to do that. I appreciate all of you talking about that.

You know, the other issue that I was surprised did not come up at all—as a matter of it, it is something that as a new Senator I do not think we talk about nearly enough—is economic growth and the importance of that. You know, we have had this recovery which is by any historical measure the most anemic recovery in U.S. history, about 1.5 percent, maybe 2 percent GDP [gross domestic product] growth if we are lucky. They call it the “new normal” here in Washington, which I think is a very dangerous comment, dangerous idea that we should be satisfied with growth that is so traditionally off the 4 percent GDP growth standard that we have had for at least 100 years in this country.

How much better would our national security be if we were able to bust out of this 1.5 percent growth and get back to traditional levels of American growth, 3.5-4 percent GDP growth?

Dr. MAHNKEN. Quite honestly, Senator, at those levels of growth, many of the discussions that we are having in

Washington, D.C. right now about guns versus butter would not exactly go away, but would become much less pressing. I mean, what has enabled China’s tremendous military buildup? It has been a booming Chinese economy. What has stymied the Russian military since the end of the Cold War? It has been variable economic growth. So you get economic growth up. It is a lot more resources, including for national security.

Senator SULLIVAN. I am going to address a much more specific issue. We have been talking a lot about China, and we have had a number of—the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] Commander and Secretary Carter talking about the importance of being able to sail, fly anywhere we want. The Secretary gave a very good speech in Singapore. The chairman and the ranking member and I were there at the Shangri-La Dialogue where he talked about that submerged rocks do not provide sovereignty that we need to respect.

So there has been a lot of discussion about sending Navy ships within the 12-mile zone of these islands. As a matter of fact, you probably saw last week a lot of leaks in the paper—I am not sure where they are from—saying we are going to do this any moment. Yet, we are here—and I at least heard a rumor that maybe Sec-

retary Kerry vetoed that because they want to get better negotiations in the climate change negotiations with China.

If that is true, if we are saying we are going to do this, we are going to do this, we are going to do this—the military clearly wants to do this Admiral Harris pretty much implied in testimony here. Then they leak it. We are going to do it any minute. Then we do not. What is that going to do to our credibility in Asia and what is that going to do with our credibility with regard to the Chinese? But importantly, what is that going to do to our credibility with regard to our allies in the region who, to be honest, are quite supportive of a little more American leadership in the South China Sea? I open that up to everybody.

Dr. COHEN. I completely agree with that. It is going to be very important for us to sail within 12 miles of those new Chinese bases. I think what your comment brings out is there are really two dimensions to think about these strategic issues. You know, there is the material side, how many ships were deployed, war plans, that sort of stuff. But there is also a reputational side. I think we need to understand that reputational dimension of our national security posture and pay attention to it because it has taken a beating in recent years.

Dr. MAHNKEN. I agree. You know, whether we should be trumpeting the fact or not, we should be doing it. We should have been doing it all along. The United States has a decades-long commitment to freedom of navigation, and the United States has during that period undertaken objectively must riskier operations to demonstrate freedom of navigation, including against the Soviet navy in the height of the Cold War. The fact that we appear unwilling to do it under these circumstances does not serve us well.

Senator SULLIVAN. Professor Mead?

Mr. MEAD. Certainly freedom of navigation is a key to America's global position, to our vital interests, to those of our allies. We cannot leave anybody in doubt around the world about how seriously we take this. If you look at the history of American wars, the single largest cost of America entering into foreign wars historically has been a tax on our shipping abroad, really going back to the War of 1812. If we seem uncertain or hesitant about this, people overseas may well conclude that we are hesitant about many other things. It is a bad signal to send.

Dr. HICKS. I completely agree, and I would particularly associate myself with the way that Dr. Mahnken formulated it. You do not wait for a crisis. You need to be routinely exercising this freedom of the seas.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCAIN. We have a couple of our members who are on their way back as well, including one of the more older and senile members. So we want to keep this open.

But in the meantime, Senator Kaine.

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thanks to all of you. Your written testimony was very, very good. Because of other committee hearings, I missed a lot of the Q and A.

But I just kind of wanted to get you all to address an issue. Sunday, this Sunday, is the 70th anniversary of one of my favorite moments in presidential history. Harry Truman, who was a great wartime President, nobody's softy by any means, on the 25th of October 1945 called the press corps into his office, and he showed them that he had redesigned the seal of the presidency of the United States. The seal had changed over time, but the basic features of the seal were the eagle with the olive branches of diplomacy and peace in one claw and the arrows of war in the other. FDR had actually started the project, but he had completed it to create a seal where the eagle faces to the position of honor to the right but faces the olive branches of diplomacy and peace instead of the arrows of war. That was a change from earlier tradition.

Now, Harry Truman was nobody's softy. He had fought in World War I. He had made very difficult decisions, especially maybe the most momentous single decision a President has had to make, which is whether to use the atomic bomb with respect to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But he definitely believed that America is the kind of nation that should always lead with diplomacy, that strong diplomacy actually increases your moral authority if you have to use military action. But he also believed it the other way too, that strong military power increased your ability to find diplomacy.

I would wonder if each of you would just address—and then Truman, you know, true to form—and other Presidents since this have done that—have really viewed the levers of American power to include in a significant way multilateral diplomacy, whether it was his role moving forward with the UN or the creation of NATO or the creation of the International Monetary Fund. We see issues today. We go up to the Trans-Pacific Partnership or a deal with Iran that is a multilateral deal. The U.S. has been the principal architect of the post-World War II edifice of rules, norms, and institutions. We have benefited from that, but the whole world has benefited from it. I sometimes worry that our commitment to these sort of multilateral, broadly diplomatic efforts is either fraying or maybe we do not completely get the benefits that we have achieved by it.

But I would just like as an element of kind of the way we should look at the challenges that you each laid out in our National Security Strategy, if you would talk about the role of the U.S. plain leadership in kind of broad, multilateral—this post-World War II, multilateral, diplomatic effort.

Dr. COHEN. Senator, if I could add a little gloss to that story. Winston Churchill traveled with President Truman across the United States in the presidential train to give the Fulton Address. President Truman showed him the redesigned seal, and Winston Churchill's response was, I see the point but I think the eagle's head should be mounted on a swivel—

[Laughter.]

Dr. COHEN.—to point either to the arrows or to the olive branch as required. I think actually that is really the right approach.

Diplomacy is a very important tool. It is a tool of foreign policy, as indeed is military power.

More immediately to your point, I think it is really important to remember that multilateral diplomacy is not an end in itself. That

is all it is, a tool. I think a kind of reflexive multilateralism could get us in trouble. Again, I would cite, as I did in my testimony, the example of introducing NATO into Afghanistan, which was a big mistake.

The challenge I think we are going to have, particularly in Asia, is going to be knitting together a different set of multilateral relationships particularly with partners that we have not worked as closely with before, and the key one is India. That is a matter of personal interest. So I think there are going to be a lot of challenges for American diplomats ahead, working very much in conjunction with the American military.

Dr. MAHNKEN. I think multilateral diplomacy is most effective and has been most effective historically when it is backed by military strength. I am concerned today that the fraying of multilateral diplomacy I think can be traced back to some of the erosion of our military strength. Look at NATO today. Is NATO more healthy today with or without strong U.S. support? We were talking about the South China Sea just a minute ago. We support multilateral resolution of competing claims in the South China Sea. Is that more likely if we choose not to challenge China's creation of artificial features, or is it more likely if we do respond vigorously? I think the latter is the case.

Mr. MEAD. Well, Senator, when I think about this and actually that image of the eagle and the two claws with different offerings, it struck me earlier in this hearing this morning that if we think about the American position vis-a-vis China, to take one of the issues we have discussed, I think we need to be presenting as a country to China the idea that there are two choices. There is the olive branch, that is, if China chooses a path of peaceful integration, trade with the world, becoming more and more a responsible member of the international system, the door is open to a kind of continued growth of prosperity, security, respect, influence that is extraordinary for China in the same way, say, for Germany and Japan after World War II. The option of integration and cooperation gave them a future brighter than could have been imagined. Then, on the other hand, there is the other choice, and that other choice is risky, dangerous, costly, ugly.

The eagle needs to make both of those statements as clearly as possible, not letting one overshadow the other, but the Chinese and others need to understand cooperation with the United States will make your life significantly better for you, your people, your country's place in the world. Opposition will make no one happy. As long as we can send that message, then I think we have a reasonable chance that things may go well.

Dr. HICKS. So I am not willing to give up any tools of national power. I do not think any of the other folks are either. I want as many as possible. So I put as many arrows and I would pull those claws together more frequently so that they are integrated and we are thinking through how the various instruments can operate together.

To draw on Dr. Cohen's comment, we really do have to be thinking about the multilateral structures that we have developed under U.S. leadership, adapting them where we can, but also going beyond them where we need to. Asia is a place where we can start

to build, I think, some new approaches with our allies and partners, and we do need to have a strong NATO in Europe but think through how that transatlantic relationship might have to go beyond simply the NATO piece which is confined somewhat to the military sphere.

So I would rather have all the instruments together, and they do mutually reinforce one another, as you suggest.

Senator MCCAIN. Senator Cotton?

Senator COTTON. Thank you all very much for your very important and quite interesting testimony this morning.

Professor Mead, I want to go back to an answer you gave in response to Chairman McCain's question about our gravest threat in the world. Many generals and admirals, as you know, have said that Russia is our number one enemy and that is in part, implicitly they have said, explicitly they have said, because of Russia's nuclear arsenal also because of Putin's highly personalized source of autocratic power. Many of the witnesses this morning said that it is China that is the rising power, that China is going to be the long-term challenge that we face.

I heard a little bit of a dissent from you, that Russia, because of the highly personalized power, because of their nuclear arsenal, but also they are a declining power actually poses a more immediate threat to the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, Senator. You know, it is that Russia is in a hurry. A power that can afford to be patient, can delay provocative actions, can time its strategy, and can actually sort of temporize and make agreements, but a country that feels it does not have time on its side is a country that is going to move quickly. For President Putin, I think he feels if he does not act now, when can he act. When he began this process, the price of oil was much higher. He sees the European Union in disarray because of the euro crisis and other things. He sees the United States perhaps turning away, at least temporarily, from some of the global engagement that we saw in the past. So I believe he saw an opportunity and felt he had no choice but to seize it.

While the Chinese might—for example, suppose we are successful in demonstrating our commitment to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. They might move away. We have seen actually the Chinese have moderated vis-a-vis Japan and have stopped being quite so provocative in the north, even as they continue to push in the south. So there is a little bit more flexibility there.

Senator COTTON. You said that he has got a limited amount of time. He is in his early 60s. The last time I watched him playing hockey or riding a tiger in a judo outfit, he seemed to be in pretty good health. Given the longevity of dictators, maybe we can be looking at another 20 to 25 years of Vladimir Putin. So could you say a little bit more what you mean about a limited amount time?

Mr. MEAD. He is not worried about term limits curtailing his period in the Kremlin, no, or his own old age. But his concern is actually for Russian national power. Russia, since the Cold War, has failed to develop an effective modern economy. It remains a gas station rather than an integrated economy. Without hydrocarbons, it does not have levers.

At the same time—and we should not forget that the rise of China is a much more worrisome thing for Russia than it is for the United States. We can think about historical claims that China has to Russian territory in the Far East. We can think just in general about an empty Siberia facing a rising China that Russia is concerned. The rise of jihadi ideology is a much greater threat to Russia with not only a large internal minority of sometimes alienated Sunni Muslims, but also its interest in Central Asia, its historical concerns there.

So Russia looks at a threatening international environment. From Putin's point of view, if you are going to have a kind of a center of geopolitical power somewhere between Berlin and Beijing, he feels he has a limited amount of time to build this. The odds are not in his favor. He needs to move quickly. He needs to move aggressively. One could compare him in some ways to General Lee in the American Civil War who felt that in a long war, his side would lose. So even though he was strategically on the defensive, he had to try things like the attacks at Antietam and Gettysburg to have a hope of winning the war. He had to be a dazzling tactician to overcome the balance of forces which was not in his favor. I think President Putin is thinking in those terms, Senator.

Senator COTTON. The long-term confrontation that we have with Russia—today we have it. We had it throughout the Cold War. But the clash of interests has been clear. I mean, Tocqueville wrote at the end of the first book of "Democracy in America" that because of our modes of thought and our social organization and points of departure, it is inevitable that we would each hold half the world's hands in our futures.

Given that long-term rivalry, what would an ultimate integration of Russia into the world system look like? How might the United States help bring that about?

Mr. MEAD. Well, I think the most interesting possibility is that if we can help the people in Ukraine who want to modernize and build a modern, law-based, commercial free state in Ukraine and free society, that would demonstrate to millions of people inside Russia that Orthodox Slavs do not have to accept dictatorship, poverty, hostility, that kind of thing, that in fact the ideas that have created prosperity in France and Germany, Poland can also work in Russia. There is a place where we could show the Russian people that they have a different choice. The future can be different. I think it is in Ukraine. I think it would be a tragedy if we do not do what we can to help the Ukrainian people build the kind of future they seem to want.

Senator McCAIN. Senator King?

Senator KING. I want to welcome you as unpaid faculty members of McCain University.

[Laughter.]

Senator KING. I want to compliment the chair, seriously. Abraham Lincoln was once asked what he would do if he were given an hour to split a cord of wood, and his answer was I would spend the first 15 minutes sharpening my axe. These hearings have been the sharpening of our intellectual axes rather than just doing and voting and working on the details to give us a chance to reflect and think with you on some of these larger issues. Secretary Gates,

Henry Kissinger, Madeleine Albright, Brzezinski—has been really illuminating and very helpful.

Mr. Mead, I want to take off on something you just said, which I think is incredibly important, and it goes to this issue of sequester and how we balance the relief from sequester. It has been characterized that it is defense or social programs. I do not consider the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] a social program or the Department of Homeland Security or NIH [National Institutes of Health] or the infrastructure of our country, law enforcement across the country. You made the point that ultimately the power is in the strength of the economy and the strength of the society, not just in guns and jet airplanes. Would you agree with that?

Mr. MEAD. Yes, sir, I would. I think, though, you are going to have to—in Congress you have to think about this, that we might talk about there are essential costs. I do not think all of those essential costs are necessarily defense costs. But are we going to say that every dollar the Federal Government spends is of equal importance to every other dollar, that there is nothing that cannot be treated—

Senator KING. Of course, not, and I do not think anyone asserts that.

But Dr. Hicks used one of the most wonderful phrases. It is going to become part of my lexicon, that the sequester was consciously thoughtless. “Consciously thoughtless.” What a wonderful phrase. We need to go back to the history of the sequester. It was designed because in 2011, they could not figure out where to get the last trillion dollars of deficit reduction. So they said you, Congress, through the special committee, will find the solution, and if you do not, we will give you this consciously thoughtless, really stupid alternative that no one will want to have happen, and therefore, you will find a solution. Somehow over the years, it has metamorphosed into holy writ that somehow the sequester is part of the deficit reduction strategy when in fact it was a part of the incentive to drive us to a better solution involving all sides of the equation. That was why it was developed that way.

But I think the idea that we have to choose between defense and non-defense—and the point I was making about the FBI and Homeland Security is there are national security items that will be affected by the sequester.

Dr. Hicks, you talked about migration in Europe as being a national security threat, the greatest migration. I worry that looking into the future, migration, not necessarily because of Syria but because of economic conditions in the developing world, can be a huge national security problem for this country and for Europe. People are going to want to get from poor places to rich places. We dealt with this on the Mexican border a year or so ago with these undocumented immigrants from Central America trying to escape dangerous, hopeless places.

Do you see this as a long-term issue? I just see pressure building up as people can see how much better it is and they look around and they say my government does not work and it is hopeless and there are no jobs and I am going to get out of here.

Dr. HICKS. I do think it is a long-term issue. It has also obviously been an issue throughout the course of human history. So we

should not expect that the future will be better in this regard. It depends so much on the strength of the societies into which these migrants are moving and, of course, the strength of the societies to keep them from wanting to move. That gets to the point I was trying to make in my statement about having these long-term approaches, to be able to think long-term about where you might see such an impetus and how the United States, along with likeminded nations, can help nations strengthen themselves against that kind of tendency or current of migrants is important and then on the receiving end.

Senator KING. Interestingly, illegal immigration from Mexico has declined over the last several years, mostly because of improving economic conditions in Mexico. I think that is exactly the point that you are making.

I have to mention that I recently learned—we talked about China, a lot of talk about China and what their society is like—that their government will not allow the Magna Carta to be publicly displayed, and to fear an 800-year-old document written in medieval Latin strikes me as a real indictment of their confidence in their system.

I want to thank you all again for your testimony. Very illuminating, very helpful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Senator King.

I would just like to ask one kind of mechanical question. As you know from your testimony today, many of these challenges transcend international boundaries. I think it was much simpler 30-40 years ago when we set up these various combatant commands [COCOMs]. Do you think that that is now applicable? Should we look at a reorganization of this kind of situation, which was really far more effective in the days of the Cold War when we had a European Command, a Pacific Command. Now we have a proliferation of commands actually. Every time there seems to be a crisis, we create another command and, by the way, another four-star general. But maybe we could ask if you have specific thoughts on that, beginning with you, Dr. Hicks.

Dr. HICKS. Sure. As I know you know, no less than every 2 years, there is an effort inside DOD [Department of Defense] to look at the unified command plan. But the effort that goes into the strategic piece of that, I would say, is not—I guess the word “anemic” might come to mind, which is a little unfair. But I think it is very good for you to think about this issue strategically. Too often people think of this as a budget cutting issue, and there is not a lot of money to be made on the combatant command side. So coming at it from the strategic perspective of what is the presence that the United States needs in the world and what is the role and responsibility of the unified commands is important.

Having said that, every time we have played with changing the UCP [Unified Command Plan] tremendously in a way to take down commands, I think there has always been a little bit of a regret factor. This goes overall with any kind of structural changes that you think through, you always have to be thinking to second and third order effects, you know, what are the downstream consequences that break more value than I gain by the rework.

So we did things like stand up, of course, U.S. Northern Command. There has been talk over time about taking that down. We have talked about taking down AFRICOM [U.S. African Command] or even merging EUCOM [U.S. European Command], because Europe was not important, into AFRICOM, and then suddenly the Russians are important, and in the case of NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] or SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], the same type of thing can happen.

So I do not have a particular change I would recommend right now. I think it is important to always be thinking about it, to be open to changes, but to be thinking about, much as I think Professor Mead said about not being able to discount a region of the world—you know, life is going to surprise us. We should have combatant command structures that are flexible and adaptable to the future.

Senator McCAIN. Well, thank you.

Before you answer, Professor Mead, I think probably the most graphic example of this is NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. When we have an immigration problem or a drug problem that begins in Colombia, should the problem be handed off from the Guatemalan-Mexican border to those that look at Mexico, I mean, and Canada? That to me is a graphic example of redundancy. Maybe I am wrong.

Go ahead, Professor.

Mr. MEAD. Well, Senator, I am no expert on military organization, but I just would say that when the world is changing as quickly as it is and the kinds of issues that we face are becoming more difficult, more complicated all the time, it would be unusual if we had invented in the past a structure of organization that never needed to be reformed. I also think that from inside a bureaucracy, it is unlikely that the kind of reform that one would seek would naturally emerge. So I think without committees like this one and external reviews, I think it is unlikely that our military structure would be suitable to what we need. So I wish you every success as you think about this.

Senator McCAIN. Professor?

Dr. MAHNKEN. Like Dr. Hicks, I am the grizzled veteran of multiple unified command plan revisions, and I am also a survivor of the creation of AFRICOM. I would actually urge you, I think, and the committee that it might be worthwhile to take a look at the birth and the growth of AFRICOM because that was a command that was intended from birth to be different, to be small, light footprint, and yet I think as it has evolved—and I think this is a very understandable tendency—it has come to be much more of a command just like any other. So I think there are very real tendencies that drive these commands to be bigger, more expansive.

Senator McCAIN. More staff.

Dr. MAHNKEN. Exactly. More aircraft flying around various places. So any reform effort I think really needs to take those very real considerations into account.

Look, I think the challenges that we have outlined—many of them are truly global challenges. Our concerns about China are not solely focused in the USPACOM AOR [area of responsibility]. They extend to Africa. They extend to the Central Command region.

They extend to EUCOM, also to NORTHCOM as well. The same thing with Russia. It is worth remembering that in the Cold War, when we were focused on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union itself was not part of a combatant command.

So I think we do need to rethink these things, and I would certainly commend you and the committee for their efforts to do that.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much.

Professor Cohen?

Dr. COHEN. I would agree that one of the sure indicators of military sclerosis is a multiplication of headquarters. Just look at NATO. Every time there is a crisis, including the recent crisis, the response is let us create another headquarters. You know, what is at the point of the spear may be an armored company going on a driving holiday somewhere in Eastern Europe, but it is not generating real military power.

I would add a couple of things. One is we are increasingly moving into a world in which regional powers have global reach, and this segmentation actually gets in our way. This is not new. Think about the Iranians and the Buenos Aires bombing. But this is just going to get worse. So we are going to be dealing with regional actors who will be operating across multiple commands.

The third point I would make—and I am sorry Senator Kaine is not here—the multiplication of these COCOMs with rather grandiose headquarters and fleets of G-5s and so forth actually diminishes in many ways the potency of our diplomacy because the assistant secretary gets kind of dumped out of tourist class in the back of a commercial flight. The COCOM comes in with a fleet of airplanes, you know, a vast retinue. Guess who the locals pay more attention to? So I think that is a third issue.

The last thing I would say is, as you can tell, I think this is very much worth looking into. DOD will flinch from this because of all the equities involved. So this is something that really needs to be looked at from the outside. It would have to be a very, very serious look. It would not, I think, be the kind of thing you could do in this setting, but something that would be really worth commissioning a hard look at, perhaps coming up with multiple options. Absolutely, I think it would be a great idea.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. I want to apologize to the witnesses that we are having votes on the floor, which accounts for the rotating presence here.

It has been very helpful, and we will continue these series of hearings. At some point probably I would imagine, maybe in the month of December, we will start floating some proposals on this whole issue of reform, and we will be calling on you to give us your best advice and counsel.

It is my intention—and I am happy to tell you that this committee, as you know, has a long tradition of bipartisan behavior—that we will be working together to try to address these issues that cry out for reform. When we look at the numbers, the hearing that we had with Secretary Gates showed some very interesting trends, decreases in brigade combat teams, increases in staff, personnel costs, all of those things. It is a little bit like in some ways our entitlement programs overall. We all know that by 2035, or whatever it is, we will be paying for the entitlement programs and interest

on the debt. If we do not stop this dramatic increase in non-essential, non-warfighting costs, we are going to be facing a similar situation.

By the way, I also have been and will be working closely with Chairman Thornberry in the House. Despite our superior feelings, we do have to work in a bicameral fashion.

So I thank all of you for being here. It has been very helpful, and we will be calling on you in the future. Thank you.

This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

