[Senate Hearing 114-677]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-677
TERROR IN EUROPE: SAFEGUARDING U.S. CITIZENS AT HOME AND ABROAD
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2016
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director
Elizabeth E. McWhorter, Professional Staff Member
Lexia M. Littlejohn, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 2
Senator Ayotte............................................... 18
Senator Ernst................................................ 21
Senator Peters............................................... 24
Senator Booker............................................... 27
Senator Portman.............................................. 30
Senator Tester............................................... 40
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 49
Senator Carper............................................... 51
WITNESS
Tuesday, April 5, 2016
Hon. Juan C. Zarate, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 4
Julianne Smith, Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and
Statecraft Program, Center for a New American Security......... 6
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 8
Clinton Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy Research
Institute...................................................... 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Smith, Julianne:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 68
Watts, Clinton:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 87
Zarate, Hon. Juan C.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 53
APPENDIX
Response to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Zarate................................................... 94
Ms. Smith.................................................... 99
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross......................................... 104
Mr. Watts.................................................... 110
TERROR IN EUROPE: SAFEGUARDING U.S. CITIZENS AT HOME AND ABROAD
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TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Ayotte,
Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Booker, and
Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON\1\
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 49.
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I want to welcome the witnesses. Certainly, thank you for
your thoughtful testimonies. We are looking forward to hearing
those and having the opportunity to ask a number of questions.
When this hearing originally was planned, we were going to
be talking about an issue that Senator Carper and I are also
very concerned about: biosecurity and the threats that we face
in that respect. With the unfortunate tragedy in Brussels, we
thought we would, maybe, expand it. We, maybe, can still pick
up on some of those biothreats, as well, but we thought we
would like to hold a hearing to really take a look at the root
causes that are driving this activity in Europe as well as to
discuss the implications for us here in America.
In January 2016, there was a foiled plot in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin against the Masonic Temple by an individual named
Samy Mohamed Hamzeh. Now, I would say this is a real success
story on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and those individuals--the informants--that worked to foil that
plot. In the complaint filed against Samy Mohamed Hamzeh--I
just have four little sentences. They are disconnected, but it,
certainly, reveals what is going on in the minds--or in the
mind of an individual that actually plots to slaughter innocent
human beings. This is what he was quoted as saying:
``I am telling you, if this is executed, it will be known
all over the world. The people will be scared and the
operations will increase. This way, we will be igniting it. I
mean, we are marching at the front of the war and we will
eliminate everyone.''
Now, in his plotting, he was trying to accomplish the
killing of 100 people. And, in the complaint, he also said he
would be 100 percent happy if he was able to kill 30 people.
These threats that Europe is facing--these threats that America
is facing because of Islamic terrorists are real and they are
growing. And, the purpose of this hearing is really to--again,
to take a look at the root causes of those problems and to see
what we can do here, in America, to try and keep this Nation--
our homeland--as safe and secure as possible.
I also do have to say, on March 22, we did reach out, the
day after the Brussels attack, to the FBI, to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and to the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) to have witnesses appear before this Committee
today. Unfortunately, nobody from any of those Departments or
Agencies agreed to testify, which is disappointing to me. I
know Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson is on the Hill
today having a press conference on additional funding for DHS,
which--listen, we want to support the Department by giving it
the tools and the resources it needs to keep this Nation safe.
I think, probably, a pretty good way to try and secure those
resources would be to come before a Committee like this to lay
out the reality of the problem. So, I am disappointed that we
do not have a government witness--or witnesses--today, but I
certainly appreciate the fact that you all have come here today
and are willing to testify.
So, with that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER\1\
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
pulling this together today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the
Appendix on page 51.
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To each of our witnesses, it is good to see you and I want
to thank you for your preparation and for joining us on this
occasion.
Our thoughts and prayers remain with the families--and with
the victims--of those who died 2 weeks ago. And, my hope is
that something good can emerge from something awful--and this
hearing is part of that process.
As with the terrorist attacks in Paris, the similar attacks
in places around the world--like Pakistan and Turkey--as well
as the attacks in our own country--at the Boston Marathon and
in San Bernadino--it exposes, yet again, the vulnerabilies that
we face in public places--places that are hard to defend--
malls, trains, train stations, airports, and the like.
With today's 24-hour news cycle, Americans are seeing these
attacks unfold, literally, in real time. From our living rooms,
we can see the devastation that these attacks cause and the
pain that they inflict on the victims and on their loved ones.
So, Americans are understandably uneasy and they are concerned
for their own safety and for the safety of their families,
friends, and neighbors.
I think that it is important for us to remember that fear
is the most potent weapon that terrorists--like those who
committed these attacks--have. They want to scare us into
turning against one another and turning against our neighbors
in this country. They want to make us afraid to go about our
everyday lives.
We might feel a little bit safer if we saw more obvious
security at every single public place we visit--even if that
were possible--but those measures come at a very high price and
do not necessarily deter terrorists, who do not value other
lives or even value their own lives. And, many would argue--I
believe, correctly--that turning every public place into a
heavily guarded fortress would restrict Americans' own personal
freedom--even if we could afford to do so.
Instead, we need to be smart about how we combat these
ever-evolving terror threats. We must continuously sharpen our
ability to predict and prevent terrorist plots through the use
of our robust intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and
through our ability to share information.
Refining these tools and ensuring that we keep pace with
the evolving threats we face are important responsibilities for
our Federal agencies, for Congress, and for the folks at the
local level as well. We have a responsibility, along with our
international partners, to continue to take the fight to the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)--and to many other
places.
ISIS's recent losses have been severe. It has lost at least
40 percent of the territory that it once held in Iraq.
Coalition forces have killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters and
20 key ISIS leaders in recent months, including ISIS's chief
propagandist and executioner. And, just over a week ago,
American forces carried out a strike that led to the death of
ISIS's finance chief and second in command.
Simultaneously, we continue to enhance the capabilities of
the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. Iraqi forces captured Ramadi
from ISIS just 2 months ago. And, a battle to seize the ISIS
stronghold in Mosul is well underway. And, with the cease-fire
in Syria holding so far, more guns are being turned on ISIS.
ISIS is being pushed back on its heels in Iraq and in Syria.
Consequences may very well be that the group, out of
desperation, will seek to project the facade of power and
momentum by directly inspiring terrorist attacks against
unprotected targets in Europe, in the United States, and in
other places around the world. We must not let these cowardly
acts deter our resolve. To the contrary, we must redouble our
efforts to destroy ISIS and to take away its safe havens. We
must also learn from the Brussels terror attack to ensure that
our intelligence and law enforcement authorities, at all levels
of government, are ready and able to identify and stop similar
attacks--both here at home and in other places--before they are
set in motion.
I just want to mention one last thing. There are lessons to
be learned from what happened--the tragedy in Brussels--lessons
for people who live there, for people who live in Belgium, for
people who live in the European Union (E.U.), and for people
who live in other places--and there are lessons for us to learn
too. And, for us, this means the need to better understand what
happened there and to figure out what we can do to deter
attacks--not just here in this country, but to help them better
defend their own people in their own places.
Thank you so much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
witnesses, so if you will all stand and raise your right hand.
Do you swear the testimony you will give before this
Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Zarate. I do.
Ms. Smith. I do.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I do.
Mr. Watts. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
Our first witness is Juan Zarate. Mr. Zarate is chairman of
the Financial Integrity Network (FIN), chairman of the Center
on Sanctions and Illicit Finance for the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies (FDD), Senior Advisor at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Senior National
Security Analyst for CBS News. Mr. Zarate.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JUAN C. ZARATE,\1\ SENIOR ADVISOR,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Zarate. Chairman Johnson, thank you very much for that
introduction. Ranking Member Carper and distinguished Members
of this Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.
I am honored to be here with my fellow panelists to discuss the
current terrorist threat environment in Europe and the security
implications for the United States.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate appears in the Appendix on
page 53.
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In the wake of the horrific attacks in Brussels and Paris,
this is a critical moment to take stock of, what I consider to
be, the quickening terrorist threat and adaptation spurred by
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, along with the continued
threat from and intent by, al-Qaeda and its affiliates to hit
the West.
The rise and reach of ISIS has continued to outpace
expectations and surprise authorities. Dangerously, failing to
understand and anticipate ISIS's intent and capabilities has
led to some misguided assumptions that have now been shattered
in the wake of the recent attacks in Europe. ISIS has intended
to confront the West. It has used Western operatives, flowing
into the conflict zone by the thousands, and it has attempted
to inspire singular attacks by sympathetic radicals in Western
societies. It has built these capabilities over time and has
taken advantage of intelligence and security gaps to implant
operatives in Europe.
This should not have come as a surprise. Over 2 years ago,
my colleague at CSIS, Tom Sanderson, witnessed parts of the
foreign fighter pipeline when he visited a shabby cafe at a
Turkish-Syrian border crossing. This was a final stop for those
slipping into Syria to join terrorist groups. Passports were
for sale and such fighters could exchange their passports for
cash. At that time, a Belgian passport was for sale for $8,000.
A buyer could have it
altered--and new passport photos were being snapped in the
parking lot.
European authorities are now coming to grips with the
realization that ISIS is targeting the heart of Europe with
dozens of operatives. But, unfortunately, Europe suffers from
three fundamental and interrelated terrorist problems. First,
there is the immediate threat of ISIS's European networks. ISIS
has trained and deployed Europeans back into the heart of
Europe to perpetrate sophisticated attacks.
Second, ISIS and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of
longstanding radicalized networks in Europe as a baseline for
recruitment and plotting in the heart of Europe, relying on a
lineage of radical Islamic terrorism to tap into criminal,
prison, and other radical networks for their purposes.
Third, Europe suffers from longstanding deep pockets of
radicalization affecting their nationals and embedded in
particular communities and neighborhoods. Throughout Europe,
such nodes of radicalization have served as micro-safe havens
and they persist in particular prisons, universities, and
apartment blocks.
Now, ISIS has been able to take advantage of the weaknesses
and seams in the European system. Even the best authorities in
Europe are overwhelmed by the number of new and historical
terrorists and radicalized individuals for whom they need to
account. Fortunately, the United States has not faced the same
kinds of threats from ISIS and al-Qaeda that Europe does--but
these threats are real for U.S. citizens and for interests
abroad and in the homeland. Let me just describe them quickly.
The most immediate threats to the United States are to our
citizens and interests in Europe. ISIS would like to target
Americans wherever possible. The visa-free travel permitted for
Europeans and others creates a gap that could, unknowingly,
allow an
ISIS or an al-Qaeda operative into the country. The lack of
information--and real-time information--sharing are major
impediments to Western security. The United States also has to
be concerned about the demonstration effects of successful or
attempted terrorist attacks--especially in the West.
And, new technologies and methodologies could spur
innovation in how terrorists and operatives operate in the
United States--to include new technologies that allow lone
wolves to act as packs to attack the homeland.
And, finally, the most strategic impact of the European
threat, perhaps, is whether it, ultimately, weakens or
strengthens European resolve and capability to counter the
terrorist threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as the
radicalized citizens from within.
We need a strong Europe and we need to work together with
them. We are facing a common enemy and we are all at war
together. The United States must, therefore, work closely with
its European partners to enable, support, and lead where
necessary. We must also work to disrupt ISIS's and al-Qaeda's
safe havens, gather and share intelligence, disrupt terrorist
networks and plots, and continue to build layers of defense
with our Western partners.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, this is
an important moment to reflect on our counterterrorism
capabilities--and we need to do this in concert with our
European partners. And, we should never underestimate the
ability of our terrorist adversaries to innovate and to adapt--
especially when they have time and space to plot and to plan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Zarate.
Our next witness is Julie Smith. Ms. Smith is a senior
fellow and the director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program
at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously,
she served as the Deputy national security advisor to the Vice
President. Before her post at the White House, she served as a
principal director for European and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Policy in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense in the Pentagon. Ms. Smith.
TESTIMONY OF JULIANNE SMITH,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF
THE STRATEGY AND STATECRAFT PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
SECURITY
Ms. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Carper, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify this morning. It is an honor to be here.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Smith appears in the Appendix on
page 68.
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The Brussels attacks revealed a number of worrisome trends
and policy gaps inside Belgium, across Europe, and among the
transatlantic partners. Any successful strategy moving forward
is going to require changes in all three of those categories
and I want to address each of them, one by one, over the course
of the next few minutes.
Let me start with Belgium. The attacks, as Juan pointed
out, have confirmed what experts have been stating for years--
and that is that Belgium has one of the largest home-grown
extremist problems in the West. Five hundred Belgians have
traveled to Iraq and Syria in recent years and 20 percent of
those individuals now have returned to European soil with
sophisticated training and unknown intentions.
The Brussels and Paris attacks also revealed a number of
intelligence and law enforcement shortfalls and failures. These
are, primarily, rooted--in part--in incompetence, but also in
crippling budgetary constraints and severe personnel shortages.
Belgium also has not had a functioning Federal system for some
time now, so its ability to uncover and dismantle jihadist
networks has been severely hampered.
In terms of wider Europe, Belgium, of course, is not facing
this challenge alone. Preventing the radicalization of Muslim
minorities across Europe has become a priority for a number of
European countries over the years. But, the tools with which
national capitals can actually counter radicalization, slow
recruitment, or arrest terrorist operatives has suffered from a
chronic lack of investment over the years.
Europe's most glaring problem, though, is its inability to
share information among its member states. This was highlighted
by the fact that one of the three bombers in the Brussels
attacks was someone that Turkey had actually warned the
Belgians about, in advance, as they were deporting him to the
Netherlands. Unfortunately--and rather tragically--that
information was not followed up on and it was, certainly, not
disseminated across the European continent.
From a transatlantic perspective, we also need to
strengthen our transatlantic cooperation with the E.U. and
other European countries. We have done a lot since the attacks
on September 11, 2001 (9/11). We have done a lot to ensure that
we can halt terrorist financing. We have worked together to
enhance our intelligence sharing. We have worked to safeguard
border controls. But, serious gaps remain.
Most notably, the primary obstacle surrounds the
differences that we have over privacy, data sharing, and data
privacy. These concerns, obviously, were more pronounced after
the 2013 revelations that the National Security Administration
(NSA) had been tracking a number of world leaders--most
notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel--and these differences
have hampered the E.U.-wide implementation of the Passenger
Name Recognition System, which would enable us to enhance our
intelligence sharing.
Going forward, obviously, Belgium is going to have to make
a lot of changes--Europe, as well, but we also have to focus on
the transatlantic relationship. From a Belgian perspective,
they are going to have to undertake a complete audit of their
security procedures. They are going to have to overhaul their
surveillance laws. I think they need to review the security
staff at major transportation hubs. And, certainly, they are
going to have to invest more in their very small security
budget.
Europe also is going to have to do more, from an E.U.
perspective, but the individual member states that make up
Europe--all of them are going to have to do more to invest in
their own security and they are also going to have to address
the grievances and the isolation of the Muslim minorities
inside of their borders.
But, I would also urge our European friends not to view
this strictly as an internal challenge. They tend to focus on
homeland security measures and counter-radicalization efforts,
but we have to ensure that Europeans are working with us in far
away places, like the Middle East and North Africa, which, by
the way, are not that far away from European soil. So, for that
reason, I would urge more Europeans to join us in the anti-ISIS
coalition. Some are already doing so over Iraq and Syria. But,
they should also think about how they can do more to invest in
the future of the region.
Lastly, in terms of E.U.-U.S. cooperation, we have to get
past our differences on data protection and privacy. I think,
as Juan pointed out, this is going to require significant U.S.
leadership. I know some, occasionally, urge the United States
to pull back and withdraw from Europe, but, to be frank, this
is a threat that we face together and the biggest card we have
to play is E.U.-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Smith.
Our next witness is Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. Mr.
Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for
Defense of Democracies, an adjunct professor in Georgetown
University's Security Studies Program, and a lecturer at the
Catholic University of America. He is also the Chief Executive
Officer (CEO) of Valens Global, a consulting firm focused on
the challenges posed by violent non-state actors. Mr.
Gartenstein-Ross.
TESTIMONY OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, for that
introduction. Ranking Member Carper and distinguished Members
of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you at this
very grave time.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross appears in the
Appendix on page 74.
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We have had, obviously, in a span of about 4 months, two
major attacks strike Europe. It is a watershed for a variety of
reasons, one of which is that this is the first time that a
European jihadist network has succeeded in, not only carrying
out one major attack, but then bearing the brunt of the law
enforcement resources being drawn down upon it to then succeed
in carrying out a second major attack.
If you look at what has been said following the Brussels
attack--about the scale of the network--it is striking. You
have investigators saying that only now, 4 months after Paris,
are they starting to get their heads wrapped around this
network. You have, according to recent Wall Street Journal
reports, about 22 members of this network who are still at
large. Now, other media outlets have not been able to verify
that specific number, but it seems to be roughly accurate.
One analogy I use a lot to describe the problem of trying
to combat terrorist and militant groups, is that of start-up
firms versus legacy industries in the economic sphere. I use
this not to be cute or trite, but because I think it explains
something about the ability to innovate, the ability to adapt,
and the problems that we have in dealing with these kinds of
organizations.
Today, it is very clear that start-up firms have some
inherent advantages over their larger competitors. They are de-
bureaucratized. They are able to innovate quickly. They are
able to shift their strategy very quickly, while larger firms
are often encumbered by their own weight, have too much
bureaucracy, and are unable to maneuver at the same kind of
speed as their smaller adversaries.
Julie, I think, did a very good job of talking about the
kinds of incompetence and problems that occurred and helped to
allow the Brussels attackers to succeed. When we go back
through
them--and it is important to do so--one thing that looms large
is bureaucracy--the lack of internal coordination--an
organizational structure that is not suited well for the
challenges of the 21st Century.
According to open source reporting, one thing that may have
allowed Salah Abdeslam to be free as long as he was, was
Belgian restrictions on what time raids can occur. You had
other instances where intelligence was not acted upon, like the
fact that Ibrahim El Bakraoui--one of the suicide attackers at
the Brussels airport--was not picked up after Turkish
authorities revealed that he had been arrested in Gaziantep,
which is a major entryway into Syria that foreign fighters
frequently use. That, obviously, as the European officials now
indicate, should have raised a red flag.
So, what to do about this? In the short term, Europe needs
to deal with the scale of the problem that it has--not just
this one network, but authorities have been all but waving
their hands around and saying that they are overextended. In
Belgium, just before this attack, basically, all of their
resources amongst investigators and detectives were used to try
to deal with their jihadist problem. Likewise, in France.
Likewise, in Britain. There are many indications that this
problem has overwhelmed the system.
In the short term, Europe should be encouraged to undertake
a much more disruptive policing model. A good example is from
the United States and our own experience with the mob. Al
Capone, who was the U.S.'s first celebrity criminal, was
ultimately arrested, indicted, and convicted, not for being a
mobster, not for being a killer, and not for being a
bootlegger, but, rather, for not paying taxes on his illegal
income. It was said that, under Robert Kennedy's Department of
Justice (DOJ), they would arrest a mobster for spitting on the
sidewalk.
Ultimately, finding lesser offenses is important. And,
within European jihadist networks, which are identifiable and
under surveillance, there is often financial fraud and other
small crimes that they can pick people up for. This is not,
ultimately, a perfect solution, but, in the short term, where
we have had these two major attacks and have more would-be
attackers--who are at large right now--I think that it is very
important to disrupt and then bring down the networks that you
are trying to monitor.
In the longer term, looking at the problems I raised with
bureaucracy are very important. There need to be reforms within
the E.U., including within countries. And, we also need to be
very much apprised of those that affect the United States. This
is a very unique time, because the Schengen Agreement has all
but fell apart. And, in the past, the Europeans' interpretation
of Schengen has detracted from and served as a barrier to our
own measures, which we have tried to take to uphold our own
border security.
We need to understand just how much the system is in play
right now. We need to recognize, as Senator Carper said, that,
perhaps, something good can come from something awful--and that
something good can be us pushing for the necessary reforms--
both within Europe and also in the transatlantic relationship--
to better protect our own homeland.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
Our final witness is Clint Watts. Mr. Watts is a Robert A.
Fox fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's (FPRI's)
Program on the Middle East and a senior fellow with its Program
on National Security. Mr. Watts has served as a U.S. Army
Infantry Officer, an FBI Special Agent on the Joint Terrorism
Task Force (JTTF), and as the executive officer of the
Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.
First of all, thank you for your service and thank you for
your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF CLINTON WATTS,\1\ ROBERT A. FOX FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Mr. Watts. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking
Member Carper, and Members of the Committee.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Watts appears in the Appendix on
page 87.
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In 2012, many researchers and I watched as thousands of
young men flocked to Syria to join the ranks of those fighting
against the regime of Bashar al-Assad--and most of those
eventually coalesced around the Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria. I, personally, along with others, flew with lists of
names of Europeans that we knew were operating there--because
all you had to do was watch them on Twitter. They told you they
were there. Not only did they tell you, they flaunted it. They
would turn on their location beacon as soon as they got to
those countries, to let everybody know they were there.
We have known that these boys were there for a long time.
And, we should have known--and we did know--they were always
going to come home. This problem was not probable--it was
inevitable. And so, we are now flat on our face. And, while we
talk about disrupting ISIS recruitment, it has already
happened. It is over.
We are now on the defense. We are reacting, rather than
preempting--and that is a position we never want to be in.
So, today, the situation in Europe is such that we have
terrorists operating without borders and we have
counterterrorists operating with all borders. ISIS has done, in
Europe, what al-Qaeda never did. In one year, they have
achieved a level of violence al-Qaeda could not achieve in 10--
and they can do that because they have a volume of foreign
fighters, passport holders, E.U. citizens--or people who have
resided there--who have traveled together and cemented the
longstanding relationships they had in their homelands in
disparate communities. And, they have traveled to Syria and
Iraq and gained unprecedented combat experience. We always heap
credit on old al-Qaeda members. They did not see nearly the
same number of battles that these new ISIS boys have seen--and
they have brought that experience home.
Not only are they more connected socially than
ideologically, they are more criminal than they are pious. And
so, they have fewer reservations about committing violence and
they operate with an autonomy we never saw with al-Qaeda. al-
Qaeda tends to micromanage their recruits. ISIS does not. They
issue a little bit of what we in the military, call commanders'
intent. They pick targets that they know well. They do not pick
large symbolic targets. They hit a soccer stadium or a
transportation hub they know. And, they plan those plots and
put them together almost--it seems like--at random--and they do
it aggressively and quickly.
They move faster and communicate more freely than our
counterterrorists do in Europe. And so, when we look at the
situation we have today, with the counterterrorists, we have
them operating on all borders. They are way over capacity. They
cannot follow all of the leads for every ISIS member that might
be returning to Europe.
Not only that, but they also have uneven capability.
France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and Germany--they all have
significant experience and a lot of specialty, in terms of
counterterrorism and intelligence, but that is not shared with
a lot of these smaller countries. Belgium is the prime example,
but many others have had foreign fighter recruits, like they
have never seen, come from their country. And, at the same
time, they have much more of a limited capacity to deal with
these. They do not have specialties. They have a lot of rules
around intelligence sharing, information sharing, and data
privacy that prevent them from doing both technical collection
and human intelligence the way we would do it here in the
United States.
So, when you look at this patchwork that we have, in terms
of the bureaucracy, there is no ``heavy.'' There is no FBI-type
apparatus. Europol and Interpol are great and they do excellent
coordination and research, but they cannot step across borders
as fast as the terrorists can. And so, the terrorists have run
wild through Europe today.
My fellow panelists up here today have talked about the
dangers to Americans abroad, but I would tell you that the most
dangerous result, really, of this situation is that every
success that ISIS has in Europe breeds more success here at
home. A successful attack in Paris, Istanbul, or Brussels
inspires an adherent here in the United States, who maybe has
no connection to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, to start to
move forward. We have seen that with San Bernadino, a
Philadelphia police shooting, and, maybe, even with the 50
plots that our FBI has disrupted since then. Success breeds
success. And so, every time we stand by and watch Europe suffer
an attack, it only inspires people at home.
So, while we should look at a lot of defensive measures, in
terms of what we can do to protect American citizens abroad, I
would tell you we have to go on the offense, in Europe, the way
we did, here, after 9/11. I would push to help the European
Union put together a counterterrorism task force--not a
committee, not a hearing, and not another bureaucracy, but an
aggressive approach--now. We are looking at what I call the
``iceberg theory'' of terrorist plots. For every eight you see
participating in a plot, there are three or four times as many
that are helping support it or are somewhere in that network.
We saw that with Paris and then it extended to Brussels.
The other thing we can really help out Europe with, is
intelligence sharing--both pushing them and then helping them
to integrate their own systems.
And, the last part, I would say, is better risk assessment
and travel warnings for our American citizens. We tend to issue
travel warnings after an attack happens. But, we could sit
right now and tell you where the foreign fighters are that are
in these European countries, where are the targets that have
been hit, and which ones are most likely to be hit--and I think
that is a service we should make sure to provide to our
citizens.
Thank you for having me.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Watts.
I want to start with you because you mentioned, I think--
the key point here is most of the testimony has been talking
about being on defense. You talked about going on offense. But,
even in talking about going on offense, you are talking about
having America go on offense to help Europe be on defense. I
want to talk about actually going on offense.
I want to talk about the fact that you said that this has
been building in Syria and Iraq and that it was inevitable.
And, as we watch the events unfold here--and yes, we are
pushing ISIS back in Iraq, but they are gaining territory in
Syria. They are setting up a stronger base in Libya. They are
getting into Afghanistan. We are having Boko Haram and other
terrorist organizations affiliate themselves with ISIS. This is
growing.
I want to talk about an effective offense--and again, I
want to just give some evidence here. There is a Department of
State (DOS) report called the Study of Terrorism and Response
to Terrorism (START) Report. And, let me issue this caveat: I
realize these statistics are very uneven. But, if you take a
look at the years prior to 9/11, on average--and this is the
largest measure, on average--there were less than 5,000
fatalities due to terrorism prior to 9/11. In 2012, that report
shows there were about 15,000. In 2014, there were about
43,000. Again, I realize the measurement is very difficult on
this, but it gives us some indication that global terrorism is
a growing threat.
And so, if we are all going to just be on defense, I do not
see how we can succeed. I mean, just speak about what
constitutes a real offense to wipe out this threat and how long
is it going to take to do so.
Mr. Watts. What I would say is that I do like how we are
approaching counterterrorism with a lot of these affiliates
already. We have already started to take action against the
ISIS in Libya. That is the second most important affiliate that
is out there.
We will have to pursue special operations force attacks,
aggressive Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations here in
the States, and robust intelligence sharing across Europe,
North Africa, and the Middle East for as long as we live.
Everybody in here will have to do that. We will have to watch
that. This will not go away. There is no beginning and there is
no end. There is only degrees of winning and losing.
So, I think the notion that we need to put forth, both in
our country and, particularly, in Europe--who seems to only
react to these situations--is that a constant offense is the
only way to keep terrorists on the defense.
I would say that foreign fighter task force tracking is the
most essential thing we should be doing--and that we should
have done. This is what I call countering terrorism now from
the third foreign fighter glut. We had a massive ingress of
foreign fighters to Afghanistan. That later mutated into al-
Qaeda 20 years ago. We then had a massive ingress into Iraq and
Afghanistan in the last decade. That, eventually, mutated to
become the al-Qaeda/ISIS split.
And now, we are looking at ISIS being squelched in Iraq and
Syria. There will always be some sort of militant organization
there, because we cannot restore any sort of governance--or we
have no plan for it. And, therefore, this will mutate into what
could be a more dangerous scenario--one which is not al-Qaeda
or ISIS. Those are just Washington terms we sort of throw
around on the Cable News Network (CNN) because it gives people
a label to use to understand it.
We very well may be facing five to seven regional terrorist
nodes across the entire world that have varying degrees of
connection. They communicate and cooperate when they need to--
and then they do not. They may choose different parts of the
ideology to pursue, mostly based on local political
environments.
But, the one thing that you can look at, across all of
these regions, is a lack of governance. We thought the Arab
Spring would bring about an opportunity for democracy to grow--
and as a
democratic nation, for some reason, we really helped everyone
to vote, but we never helped them after they voted. And so, we
have safe havens stretched all of the way from Western Africa
to Southeast Asia, at this point, where they can operate.
The ISIS label--they will pick up that label and use it
whenever it is convenient for them. If they think they can pull
in money or recruits, they will. But, they will pursue their
own objectives. The dangerous part for us is when they pursue
their own objectives, it creates a capacity and capability
problem for us, in the United States, and for the globe as an
entirety. How do we track that many threats, which are out
there, if they spread?
Chairman Johnson. When we witnessed ISIS just roll up the
cities in Iraq, that to me indicated an organization that is
pretty strategic.
Mr. Watts. Absolutely.
Chairman Johnson. It had a game plan and they were able to
execute that game plan. That is no fly by night operation. That
is just no junior varsity (JV) team. Now, they are setting up
training centers. And, they are training youth and they are
training the next generation. Can anybody speak to the real
danger there?
Mr. Watts. What I would say is that this is going to happen
routinely, because there is a lack of governance. There is no
opposing force. And so, we have gotten into a situation where
we did clear, hold, and build--let us deploy massive military
force in the last decade at great expense, which, ultimately,
created a security vacuum in itself--and we have retreated to
the other end, which is hoping that drones and special
operations forces will keep everyone down and sort of keep this
problem at bay.
In between--in the middle--is the question of how we work
with foreign nations and proxies. And, if you look at our
competitors around the world, they are picking their proxies as
they see fit to pursue the interests they want. Our greatest
problem in the United States, in terms of counterterrorism, is
we do not really know what we want. All we know is that we do
not want anything bad to happen. And, if all you know is what
you do not want, you will never get what you do want--and we
have not picked out
what our strategic objectives are. So, we are constantly in a
patchwork--moving and chasing.
The one thing I do like is that we are pursuing the threat.
I think that it is a great testament to our counterterrorists,
who, over the past 15 years, have gone where the threat is. Our
special operations forces have pulled off amazing feats in
recent months. But, that alone will not get us there. We will
always be vulnerable until we pick out where we want the focus
to be.
Right now, I think that Libya--and North Africa,
generally--are places that we need to be very concerned about.
That will be a natural expansion point for them. I think that
Yemen is another big area of concern as well.
Chairman Johnson. Mr. Zarate, very quickly--Mr.
Gartenstein-Ross talked about the difference between big
bureaucratic organizations and small start-up companies. I am
from one of those small start-up companies and know exactly
what you are talking about. It was easy to compete against big
companies.
In your testimony, you talked about the innovation of
ISIS----
Mr. Zarate. Yes.
Chairman Johnson [continuing]. And, one of my concerns--and
I want you to speak to this--is we know that two of the
terrorists involved in Brussels--in their apartment we found
surveillance videos of a nuclear facility. Can you speak to the
dangers of that and what might be on their minds there?
Mr. Zarate. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the
dangers that you see with the ISIS is that they have been
adapting new methodologies very quickly. And so, in the field--
in places like Iraq and Syria--this includes the use of tunnels
and multiple sophisticated attack prongs as part of their
attack vectors. It also includes the use of chemical weapons,
with reports just today of another chemical attack against some
of our allies on the ground. And, certainly, there is a real
question as to whether or not they have ambitions to engage in
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The reality is
that they have set up a unit to develop chemical weapons
capabilities. They are obviously using it, now multiple times--
--
Chairman Johnson. They have the labs--really sophisticated
labs at universities to access----
Mr. Zarate. That is right. And, Mr. Chairman, just to touch
on the conversation you were just having, I think that one of
the major differences between the safe havens of today and the
safe havens of the past is that we are not talking about the
jungles, mountains, deserts, and the hinterlands of the safe
havens of old that we worried about. We are talking about real
cities--real urban environments--the second largest city in
Iraq and Mukalla in Yemen, which is controlled by al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula. These are real cities with real
resources, real populations, and real financial systems--all of
which they are taking advantage of--to include universities'
labs, scientists, and experts--much of which we are blind to.
And, I think one of the major dangers we have to keep in
mind is that the safe havens and the ink blots that are
emerging that are tied to the ISIS are qualitatively
different--and that is leading to strategic innovation. And,
you have seen this, not just in the context of WMDs,
potentially, but you have also seen it with even naval attacks
in Egypt. You saw it with the attack on the civilian aircraft
out of the Sinai. And so, you are going to continue to see
adaptations to the extent that they have fighters to train,
resources to apply, space in which to plan, and leadership that
is intent on attacking the West.
Chairman Johnson. And, by the way, that is the offense that
I was talking about--taking those resources--that territory--
away from them. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much.
This is an exceptional panel of witnesses. Thank you so
much for joining us. And, some of you have been before us
before, but we are delighted that you are here today.
I spent a number of the years of my life in the Navy. I
remember being in Southeast Asia. In the office of the
commanding officer of our squadron, there was a cartoon up on
the wall and the cartoon was a depiction of a man on a very
small island trying to climb up a single tree surrounded by
alligators. And, the caption under the cartoon was, ``It's hard
to remember that your job was to drain the swamp when you are
up to your eyeballs in alligators.''
Our friends in Europe are up to their eyeballs in
alligators and we are trying to help them help themselves. How
do we go about draining the swamp? Root causes--just spend a
minute, each of you--a minute discussing root causes, please.
Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator Carper, I think, first and foremost, we
should be very open and honest about where these pockets
of radicalization have existed. These are not new in Europe.
Neighborhoods like Molenbeek--neighborhoods in the U.K., like
Luton--have developed radicalized environments and ecosystems
that have allowed radical clerics to recruit and have allowed
pipelines of generations of radicals to continue to be enlisted
and mobilized.
And so, first and foremost, identifying what are the those
hot spots--because, if you look at a map, whether it is in
Europe or even in North Africa, you will see that there are
particular--not just countries and not just regions--but also
neighborhoods or particular segments of communities that are
the most at risk. If you look at the neighborhood of Tetouan,
out of Morocco, it has produced the bulk of foreign fighters
over the years, dating back to the Iraq War. And so, there are
these pockets that need to be identified--and, in many ways,
then, focused on for law enforcement and intervention purposes.
Then, you have the general problem of integration and
assimilation. This is a problem that is only going to grow
worse in Europe, given the refugee crisis. And so, working with
European authorities to understand how they can best--and how
we can help them--integrate these populations better, so that
you do not have a new generation of radicals emerging out of
these refugee populations.
Senator Carper. OK. I am going to ask you to hold it there,
just so the other witnesses have a chance to respond.
About one minute, if you will, Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith. The integration challenge is enormous. A lot of
these Muslims, in Europe--there are about 13 million--came in
the 1960s and 1970s to respond to a labor shortage. Many of
them did not expect to stay. They have. Now, we have second and
third generations in these communities. They have several
grievances. They do not have access to educational
opportunities. They face discrimination. Unemployment is very
high in their communities. And so, the nature of the challenge
is enormous--and this is not just, as I noted, in Belgium, but
in several countries across Europe.
What makes this particularly challenging right now is the
fact that European public opinion of Muslims is worsening.
European citizens, as you well know, are incredibly worried
about their own employment numbers and about their own
opportunities. They have had a complete loss of faith in
institutions like the European Union. And so, you have seen the
rise of these populist parties that are actually more
discriminatory. They are more anti-immigrant.
So, just as European governments need to double down on
these integration programs, you are finding a resistance and
pushback from European society. I cannot stress how challenging
this is going to be.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I find that, when looking to answer
questions like this, it is often useful to look at it through
the eyes of the adversary. So, if we take an enemy-centric
perspective, if I am ISIS or al-Qaeda, and I am trying to grow
larger and stronger in Europe--the first thing this panel has
remarked on is weak law enforcement, which allows me to operate
transnationally and to operate fairly openly. They do not have
the surveillance resources to cover the network.
Second, given the integration problem that was just
mentioned and this massive influx of migrants, who will also
have trouble integrating, just as the problem already exists,
there is the potential for recruitment there--especially if you
can trigger a nativist backlash. We are, of course, already
seeing that nativist backlash. Every time you carry out an
attack, that increases hostility toward the Muslim population.
And, as ISIS has said, they want to destroy what they regard as
the gray zone--that zone between ISIS and the European
population where European Muslims can exist.
The final thing I will mention about looking over at
European politics is--one of the things that is happening with
the rise of far-right parties is that other parties are not
addressing these issues. When you see the discursive
environment to the worst of the worst, they are the ones who
are going to seem like they speak to people's concerns. So, I
think, understanding why they are rising is an important part
of understanding this very dangerous environment that exists
within Europe.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. I would say that we cannot fix European politics
or the integration problem. And so, I would, instead, focus on
why it is attractive to these young men--and some women--to
join ISIS. And, I would focus on two messages. One, can you
turn the ISIS and its leaders into villains, rather than
martyrs? And, that really is about how you change the
narrative, in terms of how they are perceived by those people
that are seeing it.
The second one is the message that the leading killer of an
ISIS member is a fellow ISIS member. Right now, we are watching
defectors flee from Syria and Iraq. They are killing the
defectors, internal spies, or people that are starting to ask
questions about the direction of the group. I think it is
important to put that into the minds of those young people.
They are believing one narrative. You need to offer them
another one, which is more full of truth.
So, I would instead focus on the Iraqi allegiants that are
within ISIS, who are very much pushing away the foreign
fighters now and not giving much respect and fellow rights to
their foreign fighter brothers. The question is, how can you
drive a wedge between them?
I would focus on defectors and their messages, when they
come back from the Islamic State. There are a lot of them right
now talking about what happened to them when they were in Iraq
and Syria. It was not the fantasy that they had had in their
minds.
And then, I would absolutely publish the silly and
pointless deaths of every European foreign fighter. They use
them to settle personal scores and for suicide bombings against
local adversaries. That would not be a Google search that would
happen in one of those hotspot communities.
And, I would add to that, 80 percent of the towns that
foreign fighters come from, today, are the same towns that
produced foreign fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in
Afghanistan and Iraq 10 years ago. I have them on my own
computer. I could tell you what those 20 towns are. So, it is
not a matter of, like, not knowing where to go for the hotspots
in Europe. It is just about whether we are actually going to
push to do something in those places.
Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I just want to
ask a yes or no question to each of the panelists.
Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has been before us.
And, one of the initiatives that he is pushing is a
partnership, really, with Muslim communities to counter violent
extremism (CVE) in our country. Our Committee has reported out
legislation--bipartisan legislation--to support this issue. Is
this, in terms of responding to, potentially, the root cause in
this country--is this a smart policy to pursue or not? Mr.
Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. I think, absolutely, and, in fact, we have
established a commission at CSIS, led by former UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair and former Secretary of Defense Leon
Panetta, to look at precisely this issue and to provide policy
guidance on it for the next administration. So, it is
absolutely right. These are issues--not just of safe haven
abroad, but also questions of identity and dislocation.
And, one thing we need to look at--and this was something I
was going to mention with your last question--the last element
is family and networks. We find that family and networks are
critical to the support of extremism as well as to counter it.
And, it is often family members that are able to intervene and
we are not finding ways of enlisting them aggressively enough.
Senator Carper. My time has expired. Ms. Smith, just
briefly.
Ms. Smith. Absolutely. I think it is critical for us to
pursue those types of programs here in the United States--but
we also need to work with our European partners. We face
different challenges, but we can share lessons learned and see
what works and what does not.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, with the caveat that a lot of
the early efforts will certainly be awkward and faltering. So,
some of the benefit will be learning from what does not work.
Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. I would not put much effort into it, to be
honest. I have worked on a lot of those programs over the past
10 years. There is some value in building trust with the
communities--that I do respect. But, I do not think they are
going to be a great weapon in thwarting recruitment.
Communities--these people are already disenfranchised from it.
And, parents are the worst ones when it comes to knowing what
their teenage kids do. That is true whether you are in the
United States or Europe. So, I think it is good for community
policing purposes, just in general, but I do not think it
really will get at the problem. I think it is a tangential
effort.
Senator Carper. Thank you so much. Thank you all.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Ayotte.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman. This is an
excellent panel.
But, let me just say, the fact that we had a major
terrorist attack in Europe and we cannot get, before this
Committee, an official from the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, or the NCTC, to me, speaks volumes. If this
Administration thinks they are doing a good job fighting ISIS,
then come and make the case before this Committee. So, I want
to back the Chairman up on the point that he made, I think,
very respectfully, earlier.
I would like to ask each of you--one of the things that I
heard coming from you all, loud and clear, is about the lack of
intelligence sharing in Europe and the problems we have as a
result of that lack of intelligence sharing. As you know, we
have 38 countries that are a part of our Visa Waiver Program
(VWP). And, to be part of that program, you have to,
essentially, meet certain basic standards of information
sharing. You have to enter into an agreement with the United
States to report lost or stolen passports and, most
importantly, you have to have an agreement with the United
States to share information regarding whether a national of
that country, traveling to the United States, represents a
threat to U.S. security.
As I hear your testimony today, I see a huge, glaring red
flag, because, at the end of December, we passed a law here--
which I was glad we did--that, essentially, said that
individuals who had traveled to Iraq, Syria, and Iran--and
also, now the Homeland Security Secretary has added some other
countries, like Libya, to that list, which I support--but here
is the problem.
If we do not have good information sharing, as highlighted
by what happened in Belgium, we can put that in place all that
we want, but, if we do not know that someone traveled to Iraq
and Syria--in fact, if you look at what happened with Paris,
obviously, one of the individuals had come over from Greece and
had a fake passport. We also know now, with the situation in
Belgium that, in fact, the information that came from Turkish
authorities was not properly acted upon. So, I would have to
think that they were not exactly sharing that information with
us, if they were not acting upon it fully, themselves.
So, what does this mean, in terms of what we should be
doing to protect our citizens, with the lack of information
sharing? Obviously, it needs to be a priority for us to start
information sharing between us--and the transatlantic
relationship--and to promote better information sharing among
Europe. But, I think our citizens need to understand--what do
we need to do to protect our citizens to make sure that someone
does not travel to Iraq and Syria and we are unaware of it
because the information has not been shared--and then, is able
to travel to the United States without a visa?
Mr. Zarate, do you want to comment on that.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, those are great questions and very
important concerns. I think, as you mentioned, you have the
problem of the lack of information sharing, the lack of real
time information sharing, the lack of details of the
information, as well as gaps of information just generally.
And, I think you have seen that the terrorists have adapted
around this and they understand it. So, they are infiltrating
some of the refugee flows. You have seen, from some of the
plotters in recent attacks, that they have used methodologies--
returning into Europe using backpacker routes, so as to avoid
connections back to the countries of concern.
So, I think there are really two things we need to do. One,
is we have to engage in self-help. We have to gain more
intelligence on our own. We have to be aggressive about what we
are doing, on the ground, in these places, as well as along the
routes that we expect the foreign fighter pipelines to be
operating. The Turkish-Syrian border--we know exactly where
that strand of border is, where they continue to move in and
out. I am hoping and expecting that we are on that like hawks,
trying to get as much information as possible about people
moving in and out of there and understanding, then, where else
they are flowing to.
Second, I think we need to spur the Europeans to work more
closely together. And, I think that means we have to collect
them together--whether it is at a clinch point in a task force
model or in some other fashion.
Senator Ayotte. One of the things I called upon--when this
happened, is I asked President Obama to bring NATO together. Do
you not think NATO could be a helpful avenue to, at least,
bring the NATO members together?
Mr. Zarate. NATO could be, but what you need are the
intelligence services that focus on counterterrorism. And,
again, the French and the British are very good at this. The
Germans are very good. What you need is some mechanism to knock
heads--and there is something to the fact that passenger name
records, in a transatlantic way, are shared on a real time
basis, but passenger name records are not shared within the
European Union. So, just think about that. We have developed a
protocol to understand where there are suspect actors trying to
access the commercial aviation system. Europe does not even
have that internally.
So, in a sense, we are going to have to catalyze a lot of
this innovation and a lot of what my fellow panelists have
talked about. We are going to have to do it--and we have to
take a leadership role--frankly, like it or not, because we
have vulnerabilities of the type that you describe, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Yes, Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith. Senator, that is an excellent question. I would
just add to that that the United States has a number of
bilateral relationships. So, the cooperation we have with
Europe is completely uneven. There are some that are wonderful
and others that are in complete disrepair--and we have to bring
everybody up to the same standard.
There are improvements that need to be made to our
intelligence sharing with Europe. The emphasis should be put on
Europe and sharing inside of the continent. The fact that they
are not going to move forward with an E.U.-wide implementation
of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive until our election
is ridiculous. They are waiting to see who the next President
will be in order to get our views on intelligence, when they
need to move out on this, yesterday. And so, we should push
them not to wait for our election, but to advance this agenda
as soon as possible.
I mean, journalist David Ignatius, in a recent piece,
really put it best. The Europeans are very interested in our
intelligence, for all of the obvious reasons, but they have
this real distaste for collection--and we have to break past
this and break through it to say, ``enough is enough.'' We need
to make progress on these issues and to work through these
issues on data privacy and data sharing.
Senator Ayotte. I see Mr. Watts wanting to comment over
there--and you also made a statement, in your testimony, about
how you believe we need better warnings, as well, based on what
we know.
Mr. Watts. Yes. I think one thing the United States can do
for the European Union is--we just spent a decade building the
National Counterterrorism Center with all of these integration
functions and doing intelligence sharing both up and across.
So, we do it from the Federal level, to the State level, to the
local level and we know how to manage that and push it--and we
know how to do that with partners and in the interagency
context.
I think that is something that we can help them to do--and
I think it is how we develop those relationships. They are all
bilateral. So, why should we, as the United States, provide the
French and the British the same intelligence individually? They
need to, somehow, synchronize their systems. Maybe, we can
offer a way for them to do that or provide support to them, in
a way, to do that.
My fear is that European countries do not want to deal with
their data privacy issues and their collection issues until
they have an attack. So, how do we communicate that to them? Is
there a way we can say, ``Look, this is the risk profile for
you, Denmark, as a smaller country.'' I am speaking
hypothetically. ``This is what you are facing. Do you want to
wait to see what happens? Or, do you want to come into this
intelligence? ''
So, I think, is there a way we can work with all of those
countries--Germany, Denmark, and all of those--to come up with
a brokered way to get to the solution? I do not know that that
can be achieved, but that is what has to happen, because, right
now, they are just having one-off exchanges based on one piece
of intelligence and that never will allow you to put together
the full picture. We saw that with Belgium and France.
Senator Ayotte. I know my time is up. I did not want to
leave the Doctor out. Is it OK for him to----
Chairman Johnson. Yes.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Since the question was about the Visa
Waiver Program and ensuring our own borders, I would just point
out that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is,
ultimately, the last line of defense. When you have a situation
where the search of somebody does not correlate with Iraq,
Syria, and Libya, etc. it, ultimately, comes down to the
counterterrorism response team.
So, one thing I would put some focus on is whether or not
the counterterrorism response teams that CBP has have enough
resources. Do they have the training that they need to
undertake the kind of human intelligence collection that they
are performing at the border to see if somebody is suspicious?
And, moreover, do you have enough professionalization and
enough incentives to get the best and the brightest to stay in
that program, as opposed to going to another Agency? That, I
think, is something that is entirely appropriate for Congress
to look into.
Senator Ayotte. I thank you all for your answers and I
would just say, based on what you said, I think that we have to
take the leadership role here. I do not know of another country
that will be able to bring everyone together and get them to
act.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
While we are on this topic, I just want to quickly ask a
very simple question, because, the theory is that, under the
Visa Waiver Program--there are 38 countries that are a part of
that program right now--that there is a threshold level of
information sharing that should be sufficient. Does anybody
want to express an opinion--are all of those 38 countries--are
they at that threshold level or should we be really seriously
taking a look at putting some of them on probation--or really
evaluate that? Just very quickly.
Mr. Zarate. I think it is worth reviewing--especially in
light of the recent attacks. I think we should look at Belgium.
There is no question about that, given that the highest level,
per capita, of foreign fighters are coming from Belgium--with
their own difficulties with information sharing internally--and
some of the deficits. I think it is wholly appropriate to look
at some of these countries--without prejudice, obviously--being
sure to understand the deep economic, social, and diplomatic
importance of the Visa Waiver Program. But, I think, a healthy
review--and some skepticism--is worth it.
Chairman Johnson. Does anybody else want to quickly chime
in on that?
Mr. Watts. I would agree. And, I do not know what the level
of all three countries are, but, I would say that we should
start with the countries that have the most foreign fighters
per capita. That is right where I would begin--and then, move
down the list from there.
Chairman Johnson. OK. Thank you. Senator Ernst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
all of you for joining our panel today. This has been very
helpful, I think, for all of us.
As I have noted before in my capacity on the Senate Armed
Services Committee, I do share the concerns that have been
expressed by General Philip Breedlove, as well, about the lack
of support for force protection measures for servicemembers,
the Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and their families--
and just a couple of examples of that. The U.S. military
recently ordered military family members to exit Turkey. We
have a State Department that ordered the departure of family
members of staff at a U.S. Consulate. And, recently, the wife
of an Air Force officer was killed in the Brussels attack.
So, if we can focus just on Belgium for a moment, reports
are suggesting that the DOD has about 1,300 military personnel
and dependents as well as about 600 civilian employees in
Belgium, which, of course, we all know, is home to NATO. And, I
would like to start with you, Mr. Watts, please, and then, if
the rest of the panel could answer, as well. Do you share my
concern--and General Breedlove's--about U.S. force protection
in Europe? And, what do we need to do to make sure that force
protection is adequate? And, how do we move forward on that?
Mr. Watts. I would start off--in terms of concern, I am
concerned, in particular, for one big reason. So, we have seen
two big attacks in Paris and Brussels. And so, now,
counterterrorism forces are out aggressively. We also know that
there are, as Daveed mentioned, other parts of the network that
are still at large. And so, if you are a terrorist and you
believe that you are being closed in on, what do you do? Well,
you rapidly put together a hasty attack. There is no target
better than a military person deployed overseas--and we saw
that with, I believe that it was two airmen that were killed in
Germany at an airport. That is a target of opportunity.
And so, if you are either an inspired recruit or someone in
the network that knows that you are on your last few minutes,
this is a great target of opportunity. The same is true for
embassies and consulates. So, I think there is a huge risk for
that, as these investigations progress. If they cannot operate
as cells or as groups the way they have in the past, they are
going to pick targets of opportunity. Maybe, they pick
Europeans, but the most vulnerable, I think, the most targeted
U.S. people, are going to be State Department employees and
Department of Defense employees. So, I think it is a concern--
and we know the network is there and we know they are going to
look for targets of opportunity as things get tougher.
In terms of how you protect them, it is extremely
challenging. You really have one of two options. You can try
and protect them in place--which is very difficult to do--and
so, you put more active defense measures in place. This means
increasing diplomatic security, surveillance, and those sorts
of things. It is very tough to do.
The other option is that you remove them from those
countries. And so, when you talk about removing 1,300
servicemember's families from those countries--that is a major
signal and it also has impacts in Europe. We believe, then,
that Europe is insecure. And, it creates a ripple effect.
So, I do not know that I have the right answer as to what
to do, but I do think we can start risk forecasting much better
than we are doing currently. Now, we kind of wait for an attack
to happen and then we say, ``Oh, OK. There is, like, something
bad out there. Travel warning.'' It is, like, ``Great. I am
already here.''
In a lot of these countries, we know where these foreign
fighters are coming from. Like, we could map that out as a risk
forecast and, literally, put it out and say, ``Here is the risk
of traveling in these nations based on the number of foreign
fighters, the capacity we assess the European countries at, in
terms of counterterrorism and law enforcement''--which also
sends a signal to them--and then where we have seen attacks--
what are high-traffic attack locations? We have seen the
subways. We have seen popular Western venues. This looks a lot
more like what we used to see in the Middle East or North
Africa--hitting targets of opportunity where there are lots of
Westerners.
I think we can, indirectly, send some signals to Europe by
setting up our own assessment--and I would make it public. I
would have a map that says--just like you see with disease
control maps. It would be, like, ``These are the places that we
are worried about the most.'' And then, the Europeans will
figure out, on their own, that they have their own problems as
well.
Senator Ernst. That is very good. And, I would like to hear
from the other panelists, as well, if you would.
Yes, Mr. Zarate, please.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, thank you. I would look--to Clint's
point, I would look, not just at risk mapping, but also at
intelligence gathering around surveillance of family members
and soft targets that are tied to military personnel, because,
I think I would not worry so much about the hardened bases and
other sites around which we have security that we can flex
aggressively if we need to. Those are always targets--but
terrorists have a hard time executing attacks against those.
I worry more about the soft targets outside of those rings
of security. And, understanding where the terrorists may be
surveilling and doing a lot of counterintelligence in some of
these locations, I think, is really important in order to
understand the specific risks around personnel and family
members.
One other note. Keep in mind that, from a cyber
perspective, what some of the followers and adherents of ISIS
have tried to do is to expose military personnel and their
family members with personal data, addresses, etc. And so,
there is a very real effort underway to at least threaten, if
not put at risk, family members and personnel outside of the
bounds of classic security. So, we have to be quite conscious
of that and counter it if we can.
Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you.
Does anyone else wish to respond?
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes. I would echo these concerns.
And, piggybacking on what Juan said, I think that one of the
emerging tactics that ISIS, in particular, is trying to use is
stalking and killing its foes--especially those who are
affiliated with governments--basically taking them out of the
government sphere, making them individuals who can easily be
tracked.
And, when I was in Germany, fairly recently, at the base in
Stuttgart, I saw servicemembers in contravention to regulations
leaving the base still wearing their uniforms. That is a
concern.
I think that making family members and members of the
military aware of a few things is important. One, is just basic
online security, something which is definitely drilled in
within these institutions. Making them aware of how much
information they are giving off on social media. A lot of the
information ISIS had when it put out addresses of the
servicemembers on their kill lists was just easily gleaned, not
from hacking, but by going to people's social media accounts
and finding out this information about them.
But, ultimately, I think this is a very high-level concern
that fits both with what the organization has done and also the
direction that it is moving, in terms of its evolving tactics.
Senator Ernst. Well, I appreciate that very much.
I know my time is expiring. When my husband was serving in
Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, he was considered a combatant
commander--or, excuse me, part of a combatant command. And,
members of those--or those family members could not live in
Saudi Arabia at that time. However, he had, next door, in the
next set of quarters over, a non-combatant commander. But,
those families could live there and it was ironic to us. I do
not think terrorists distinguish between who is a combatant and
who is a non-combatant in situations like that.
But, I do think this is something the United States needs
to take very seriously and we need to make sure that we are
protecting our servicemembers as well as our civilians serving
overseas. So, thank you very much for being here today.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
the panelists. I found, so far--and I am sure I will continue
to find--this hearing very interesting and we appreciate your
expertise.
I would like to pick up on some questions that Senator
Carper relayed, regarding the community. And, what we have
seen, certainly, in the attacks in Paris and Brussels, is that
the individuals that are involved were homegrown. These folks
were radicalized in their own country, went off, in some cases,
to be foreign fighters, and came back. You have already talked
about some of the conditions in those European neighborhoods
that these individuals are exposed to.
Given the fact that we also have very vibrant Muslim-
American and Arab-American communities here in the United
States--in Michigan, my State, in particular--could you comment
on what you see as the differences between the United States
and Europe? And, what lessons--because we, thankfully, have not
seen those types of incidents here in our country--what lessons
can be learned from the United States that may be helpful to
the Europeans? What is happening here? Is it different? And,
elaborate on why that could be a good lesson for others.
Let us start with Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, thank you. Fortunately, I do think
there is a difference. First, there is a difference in numbers.
If you look at the per capita number of radicalized
individuals, be it cases brought by the FBI or foreign fighters
who have gone to fight in a variety of foreign terrorist
conflicts, the numbers are quite low per capita, in terms of
the United States.
In terms of foreign fighters in the most recent context of
Syria and Iraq, we are looking at probably 200 or so. Now,
given that we do not have full information about foreign
fighters--and, in fact, that American who recently turned
himself in to the Kurdish authorities and who was then played
on video, I think, was not known to U.S. authorities. And so, I
think we do not have a full picture, but the numbers are much
smaller than the number that we see in Europe, which is in the
thousands.
Second, our Muslim-American communities are incredibly
diverse, they are spread geographically, they are well
integrated, and, historically, they have done incredibly well
socially and economically. If you look at the figures, in terms
of per capita income, the numbers are very high. And, in
general, the notion of integration has been very natural and
organic in the American context.
The last thing I would note is that the very notion of an
American identity as a common form of definition of individuals
and communities--the fact that anyone from any race, creed, or
religion can call themselves an American--be they first
generation or 12th generation--that is incredibly powerful.
And, the notion, I think--and several social scientists have
pointed this out--that there is actually sort of gravity to the
idea of the American dream--the American ideal is actually a
counterweight to the counter narratives of these terrorist
groups and even the dream of the Islamic caliphate, which is
animating so many to fight in Iraq and Syria.
And so, the one thing I would argue for America is that we
make sure we recognize that--that we embrace our diversity and
we tackle the challenges in communities, like the Somali-
American community, where you have seen a higher percentage of
individuals going to fight. And, we ensure that we do not have
the ghettoization--or even the sense of targeting and the
ghettoization of the Muslim-American community or any other
community. That is a bedrock of American power and identity
and, frankly, it will hold us in good stead against this
ideology.
Senator Peters. Thank you. Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith. Thank you, Senator, for that very good question.
Juan is exactly right. I agree with him 100 percent. Just to
stress one point on identity, we benefit here, in the United
States, from the fact that it is very easy to have a hyphenated
existence. You can be Irish-American, Muslim-American,
Scottish-American, whatever it might be.
And in Europe, the problem is that these migrants that have
arrived--many from North Africa--feel neither French nor
Moroccan, for example. So, they have been in this country--many
of them were born there--but they do not feel a part of society
and there is no path for them forward to integrate into these
societies.
So, it makes them very susceptible to someone who comes
along, either over social media or in a coffeehouse, to say,
``I have an identity for you. This is where you belong. Come
join us in the Islamic State. This will be your home, because
France is not your home and you are not going to go to Morocco,
either--or Algeria or wherever it might be. And so, let us
provide that sense of identity to you.'' And, that is an
entirely different challenge than what we have here in the
United States.
That is not to say that we do not have folks that are
susceptible to radicalization, but it is a very different
challenge than what we see on the other side of the Atlantic
Ocean.
Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. And, you can see some of this bear
out, statistically. It has been a few years since I looked at
statistics about demographics within the Muslim-American
community, so this might be a little bit dated, but the last
time I looked into this, the average Muslim had a higher level
of education than the average American. The average Muslim in
the United States also had a higher level of employment and
socioeconomic status, which speaks to relative levels of
integration.
I would also caution--I mean, I think that there are
lessons that Europe can learn from the United States, but the
United States is fairly unique in its identity as being a
nation of immigrants. I mean, I travel the world a lot--as does
everyone on this panel--and I cannot think of many other
societies--other than Canada, where you do not have integration
problems--and I do not mean Muslim integration problems, but
from any sort of class. Just, in general, throughout the world,
you have a much more rigid set of identity than we have in the
United States.
And so, I would not think of it as there being a quick fix,
in terms of lessons from America. Rather, I see this as being a
systemic problem that will be with us, I think, for decades to
come--that most countries do not integrate new populations the
way the United States has been successful in doing.
Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. I would like to shift just a little bit to show
why Europe's problem is now worse than ever and then compare it
to us. So, the best recruiter of a foreign fighter is a former
foreign fighter. And, that is about the physical relationship--
the way you recruit people in your ranks. It is the same in the
States. They always say the best recruiter of a Marine is a
former Marine. There is that indirect channel that you come
through and that is built on physical relationships. That
motivates you. That gets you going.
And, right now, Europe has what is called ``bleed out,''
foreign fighters leaving Syria and Iraq that are ``bleeding''
back into Europe. At the same time, they have this other
problem with the inspired folks, who I call ``bottled up.'' So,
they want to go to Syria and Iraq, but they can no longer do
that. And, you have these catalysts--former foreign fighters
working with inspired recruits--and we see this in the Paris
and Belgium attacks. It is almost half and half. You have some
foreign fighter veterans and some inspired recruits that are
working together--and that is the worst case scenario. They are
in these disenfranchised communities.
We are lucky here in the States. We do not have the foreign
fighters coming back the way that we see in Europe, and most of
our recruits are virtual recruits. Probably 90 percent of them
are online. They do not have a direct connection with it. They
work to build a connection with the group. That takes longer,
it is more difficult, and you get a different style of recruit.
They are more ideological in recruitment, whereas those
neighborhoods are more social in terms of their recruitment--
and this is a different dynamic that plays out.
So, we are lucky that--with the exception, possibly, of
Minneapolis, which was mentioned before--we do not have that
same dynamic here. This allows us to detect them online as well
as on the ground much faster. They send off signals that are
easier to detect in many ways, whereas, in Europe, they have a
huge problem. A lot of the recruitment is never seen by law
enforcement or intelligence because it is happening face to
face on a one-on-one basis.
Senator Peters. Alright. Well, thank you. I appreciate all
of your responses. If I could summarize it, it sounds as if we,
certainly, have to be vigilant. We have to have strong
intelligence and make sure that we are being offensive in our
actions. But, ultimately, the strongest shield we have are our
American values and the special place we hold as a nation of
immigrants, where everyone can come and have the opportunity to
pursue the American dream. If we ever let that slip, then we
truly are vulnerable. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER
Senator Booker. Thank you. Again, thank you for this
hearing.
Mr. Watts, I am a little--you said something that seemed
like you were sort of downplaying the effectiveness of CVE--of
efforts to counter the propaganda. Do you think that that is
not the most fruitful of pathways?
Mr. Watts. I do not believe that most of the CVE efforts
that I have seen, at least--comparing the States and Europe is
a little bit challenging, but, I believe, it is an indirect way
to sort of get at the motivations that are driving these young
people. Part of the reason, I believe, they can be recruited is
because they are living in disenfranchised communities. They
are not connected to the community. And, they are not connected
socially--or at least not with their parents. They are not
listening to what their parents are saying a lot of the time.
We just saw, I think, 2 weeks ago, a situation where a
mother in Europe found out that her son was in ISIS because the
records were divulged online. She did not know until a
newspaper essentially contacted her. So, parents are not really
good at knowing what their children are doing. That is just
normal.
And also, these communities, they seem to not be aware--or
they are not on board--in terms of preventing this. So, I think
it is a good effort for a lot of reasons--regarding violent
extremism, but also just building relationships with
communities to break down those borders between them. But, if
you want to get at the problem of radicalization and
recruitment right now, you have to change--and this is where we
come to the communications part of it--the sort of mindsets and
the narratives. You have to change how they view opportunities
to become a jihadist. Jihadists are fickle. Foreign fighters
are extremely fickle recruits.
We watched al-Qaeda recruits online for years. They heard,
``You should go to Yemen.'' They would go to Yemen until things
were going well in Yemen. Then, we saw Mali. It was, ``You
should go to Mali.'' That lasted about 3 days, until the French
invaded. Most recently, it was, ``You should go to Syria.''
That has gone on for 4 years because ISIS had been successful.
That narrative was not propaganda, it was truth. ``We are
advancing on these cities in the way our strategy said we
would. We are achieving success. We are building the State.''
As soon as we start to erode that--and I think that is
happening now--you start to see fewer recruits and less
affinity for it.
But, I think the key is to focus on the individuals and why
they want to join, rather than trying to go through the
community. I am not sure they are the best lever for it. I
would rather change the image than the method.
Senator Booker. So, I have a couple of thoughts. So,
clearly, we are eroding territory in Syria----
Mr. Watts. Yes.
Senator Booker [continuing]. And, in Iraq right now, which
is undermining some recruitment efforts.
You are really taking CVE efforts and separating them into
two buckets. The first bucket is this communication with family
members, trying to create better networks within Muslim
communities--as opposed to just the propaganda that they are
feeding these young people--trying to make sure that we are
countering that propaganda with our own--exposing them for the
frauds and the shams that they are.
Mr. Watts. Yes.
Senator Booker. Is that right?
Mr. Watts. Yes, I think of it as a funnel. So, usually, we
talk about vulnerable, radicalizing, and committed recruits.
There are many more at the vulnerable stage. These are the
communities we want to reach out to. That is where a community
program, like you suggested, might be focused.
There are the radicalizing recruits. These are people we
know are already connected to foreign fighters. They look like
they are mobilizing. They are taking on the image and the talk
of those that they want to join.
And, then, there are the committed recruits. These are guys
that are either trying to carry-out an attack at home or are
trying to make their way to Syria and Iraq.
I would focus more effort at the bottom of the funnel.
Senator Booker. Right. So, that is law enforcement--and I
agree that that is where most of our resources are. But, you
are telling me that you do not have much confidence in the
efforts of former freedom fighters--excuse me, former
radicalized folks--who have come back and who have now
converted back to sanity--in engaging them to tell the truth to
others who are in the second part of that funnel.
Mr. Watts. I am a big fan of them. And, that is why I would
focus those efforts toward the radicalizing members. What I am
not so interested in is engaging this massive vulnerable
audience, where we try and--I call it pushing the ``Let us buy
the world a Coke'' message--where we try and say, ``Let us
reach out to you. We will build stronger communities. We can
integrate and we can solve some of your problems.'' I feel like
those are good programs to have regardless, but it is important
to focus on defectors, to focus on atrocities, to focus on
crimes that are happening in Iraq and Syria, and to focus this
toward the radicalizing audience.
Sometimes, we get one part right, but we are not focusing
it in the right place. So, I would rather look at those that
are closely connected to foreign fighters and their
communities. And, that is where I would aim that message.
Senator Booker. Ms. Smith, do you want to add to that?
Ms. Smith. I would just note, I guess, I have a slightly
different view. You need multiple lines of effort, obviously.
You have the military angle. You have law enforcement. But, I
think we do have to invest in some of these CVE measures.
Ultimately, the research shows that, to pull someone off of the
path of radicalization, you have to give them an alternative
path. They have to have a network of individuals that they
trust and a mom, a teacher, a parent, or a neighbor that can
persuade them to make the right choice. And, they have to,
obviously, have some element of doubt about going down this
path.
But, I think some of the CVE measures that have been
launched to date are trying to do just that--to provide a
network of individuals that can lay a hand on someone as they
are wavering. Obviously, some folks are too far along to pull
back from radicalization. But, for the young kids that are kind
of on the brink of packing it in and taking a flight to Turkey
that will--and then crossing the border into Syria--I think we
have to look at some of these programs.
To be sure, not all of them produce real results and we
have to definitely scrub--understand what is working and what
is not. But, I think we have to keep trying and working with
our allies, whether it is the folks in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)--some of the work we have done there on CVE--or our
European allies. I think it is an important component of the
wider strategy.
Senator Booker. And, programs like ``Think Again, Turn
Away,'' were not really successful. So, really finding the ones
that are working, investing in those, obviously--not
undermining the law enforcement efforts and the like, but
finding the ones that are targeted.
And, just out of curiosity, in the few minutes I have
left--on National Public Radio (NPR), there was a good article
my staff sent me about why some neighborhoods are very
radicalized, but some are not. You have a Moroccan neighborhood
where they are and then you have a Turkish neighborhood that is
not, but yet, they have some of the same characteristics, in
terms of challenges to integration. Why would you say that is
the case? Mr. Zarate or Ms. Smith, if you have thoughts on that
please share them.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, it is a great question and one that
actually bears a lot more investigation, because we have had
these hot spots of radicalization. We also have the situation,
Senator--and this is part of the difficulty of the CVE
efforts--and, as one who bears the scars of doing work in this
space for a number of years, I can attest to it. But, the
reality is, you have family members who, themselves, grew up in
the same home and the same neighborhood. One goes off to fight.
The other does not and does not fall prey to the ideology. And,
the question is: why? And, I think, sociologists,
archaeologists, and anthropologists are all looking at this.
There is sort of the social scientist surge on this to figure
out what the difference is.
And, one of the things, to Clint's point earlier, is the
personal connection between the radicalizers, the ideologues,
and the lineage of both ideological and operational networks. I
think where you have seen these groups continue to persist and
where they continue to produce radicalized individuals and
foreign fighters, conflict after conflict and year after year,
is in these communities where there are people who are actively
trying to recruit as a part of their mission. You have seen it
with Mullah Krekar in Norway. You have seen it with preachers
in the U.K. You have seen it, obviously, in France and Belgium,
where you have this ideological lineage that embeds in
communities. That, then, becomes a hotbed.
So, I think that is one factor, but I think scientists are
trying to figure this out, because not even within families
themselves can we figure out exactly what radicalized one
individual and not another.
Senator Booker. And, the external timberline--and I will
stop here--of sort of the radical right that is growing in
Europe is actually creating more combustible fuel for
radicalization. And, does that concern you, in terms of
rhetoric here in the United States, which might be,
potentially, doing the same?
Ms. Smith. I am very worried about political developments
inside Europe, where we have seen the rise of anti-immigrant
and anti-E.U. parties in countless countries across the
European continent and what they are doing to then fuel the
grievances that these Muslim communities have against the
societies in which they live. I think, similarly, we have to be
careful here about our own rhetoric, acts of discrimination,
and alienation. We want to be as inclusive as possible. We have
to recognize that we are also dealing with a very small
percentage--even in Europe--of the Muslim community. And, it is
not fair to say that all of the Muslims inside of Europe are
susceptible to radicalization. We have to keep that type of
thinking in check.
So, most importantly, I think, I am watching developments
inside of Europe very closely and trying to figure out how this
is going to unfold and change their approach in the coming
months and years. But, I think we have to watch ourselves, as
well, on this side of the Atlantic Ocean.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, we cannot move to a position where, in
this country, we are propagating and echoing the narrative of
the other, right? We are Americans--all Americans--Muslim,
Christian, Jewish, and agnostic, right? We are all Americans.
And to the extent that our political discourse drives a sense
of alienation and divide, that is not only destructive, but it
is dangerous.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker. Senator
Portman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Carper, for holding this hearing. Of course, you once again had
a great panel. I am sorry we did not have Administration
officials here, because, when we have had them before us, we
have learned a lot about what is going on--and, frankly, I
think, we have been constructive in giving them ideas about
what should be happening in addition to what is already
happening--both on the international side, on the global threat
here at home, in terms of the protection of the homeland, and,
certainly, on winning the hearts and minds, which we have had a
good conversation about today.
In Ohio, people are worried. I mean, they see what happened
in Brussels. They remember Paris. They remember San Bernadino.
And, we are told by the national security experts here in
Washington that the threat has increased--that here, in the
United States, we face an increased threat today.
In listening to the conversations, I wonder whether you
agree with that. Some of you seem to be saying that, maybe,
recruitment is down and that ISIS is not being as successful
because of some of the military victories--by the way, someone
said they are victories by us. I mean, a lot of the military
victories are by the Syrian Army right now. We have to remember
that--and there are some consequences to that that may create
even additional refugee flows--if that makes any sense, which I
think it does.
So, my question to you, I guess, is, one, do you think
that, somehow, the threat has ebbed? I do not sense that.
And, two, I would like to dig a little deeper into this
issue of the ideology--and I think there is more consensus--
even though it is not a complete consensus--as to what we ought
to do globally. There is more consensus about what we ought to
do, in terms of protecting the homeland. There is less about
how you actually get at the hearts and minds.
One data point that has been reported to us--and maybe you
would dispute this--but it is very interesting, as it relates
to our conversation about what is happening here in Muslim
communities and how we can thwart young people--the recruits--
in joining a misguided cause, is that 38 percent of U.S.
citizens who have been charged with ISIS-related offenses are
converts. So, we sometimes talk about the lone wolf. Sometimes,
the lone wolf is a Muslim and sometimes it is a convert, but,
often, it is a convert.
So, I mean, I could not agree more that we need to do more
in the Muslim community. I understand Mr. Watts's point about
priorities. But, I will tell you, the first foreign fighter, I
believe, who came back and was arrested here in the United
States was from Columbus, Ohio. He was Somali. I have talked to
the police officers there. I have talked to the Somali
community. Part of the reason that we were able to apprehend
him was because of a cooperation between the police and the
Somali community. So, that is very important.
But, is this figure accurate--that almost 40 percent of
those who have been arrested here, on ISIS-related charges, are
converts? And, what does that mean, in terms of dealing with
this issue? Is it even broader than the importance of going
into these Muslim communities, having that relationship, and
having the leadership in those communities provide that
alternative path and let people know that--as Mr. Watts said, I
thought--these people are villains rather than heroes?
So, those are my two questions, I guess. One, what do you
think about the threat, overall, and, second, what do you think
about dealing with the challenge we have here in this country
with people who are becoming radicalized--and, particularly,
those who are converts to Islam becoming radicalized.
And, Juan, I will start with you.
Mr. Zarate. Senator Portman, thank you. They are great
questions, as always.
First, I think the scope, scale, and sophistication of
terrorist threats are more significant now than ever before.
Part of this has to do with the diversification of the
nationalities of individuals involved. Part of it has to do
with the expanse of the geographies--with ISIS establishing
these provinces--these wilayats--with several of these,
geographically, now applying to ISIS to be a part of it. We
have seen attacks in Southeast Asia as a part of the
application process. And so, the geographic scope, the
diversity, and the numbers are still there, while the
sophistication of the operations are increasing.
In addition, this is a group that is thinking about the
next generation. And so, you have seen the recruitment of women
and the attempts to engage in education and schooling--all as a
way of breeding a new generation of jihadis and radicals as,
perhaps, part of an ``ISIS 2.0.''
Finally, the idea of the caliphate--even though it is
diminishing in Iraq--the fact that it is beginning to spread in
other parts of the world--and the very notion of it being a
reality and persisting continues to animate the movement in
some very dangerous ways. And so, I mentioned Southeast Asia.
You have seen the reanimation of terrorist networks that we had
worked so hard with our Southeast Asian partners and the
Australians to suppress now resurrecting because the idea and
the animation of the caliphate are driving some of these
things. So, I think we are in a more dangerous, animated time
for global terrorism.
Senator Portman. How about the threat here in the United
States? How would you respond to that? Maybe, Mr. Watts, you
could take a crack at that.
Mr. Watts. I would first note that we have a lot more
``ones and twos'', rather than community recruitment, here in
the States. And, of those ``ones and twos''--as you pointed
to--many of them have deep psychological issues and were,
maybe, not part of this radical ideology for very long. And so,
how do you detect them if they are not a part of a community
and they are new to this movement?
Many of the converts find Islam, then go to the extreme
form of Islam, and then mobilize to support ISIS--that can
happen in months or years--and that is a tip-off that there is
something else going on there. So, the only real way to do that
is online electronic surveillance. That is your best bet to
pick those people up. They are self-radicalizing. They are
becoming motivated in ways that are very hard to detect. You do
not have a community that can help you detect them. You do not
have a law enforcement entity, possibly, that can detect them.
So, how do you do that? Your best chance is online--and then
that comes down to how comfortable Americans are with seeing
that.
I am upset that I am no longer in government. I can sit at
my house and watch extremists online and know that they are
mobilizing toward al-Qaeda, ISIS, or whatever group, but, yet,
law enforcement, in many ways, has many more hurdles to hop
over in order to monitor that sort of information. Oftentimes,
I can provide it to them easier than they can get it
themselves.
So, I think it is about how we work through this system.
That 40 percent worries me more because I also feel like they
have a propensity to violence that is higher than the rate of
many of the others--especially in the homeland.
Senator Portman. Yes, I think those are good points. Our
time is expiring here, but one thing that we did not get into
earlier, in terms of the CVE issue, is what is going on online.
And, our inability to counter that narrative in an effective
way is a real concern. Even at our fusion center in Ohio, which
I visited recently, we are doing some of this--and that is very
important. But, it seems to me we should be increasing our
efforts.
As you know, this Committee has talked a lot about this,
again, with Administration officials. And, I think we have
helped to construct a way to nudge them toward more of this, in
a more sophisticated way, to go online, where those
individuals--who are, maybe, converts or, maybe, lone wolves--
are finding this information. It is not a physical contact. The
young man from Cincinnati that intended to come here to this
Capitol, for instance--who was a convert--was working online to
become not just a convert, but to become radicalized. And, I
think this is an area where we have, unfortunately, a real gap,
in terms of our ability to project.
Ms. Smith, you have some background in that, I think. Do
you have any thoughts on that--on our online messaging and how
to countermessage?
Ms. Smith. Well, I would just note that we have seen
different stages of how ISIS has kind of taken the fight away
from the region and into Europe--and, now, elsewhere--including
the United States. They first wanted to inspire attacks. Then,
they tried very hard to enable them. And now, they are working
to actually direct the attacks.
And so, our efforts to counter their efforts have to be
driven toward every single one of those efforts--through law
enforcement, through the use of our military to get them back
home, in the place--the safe haven--where they exist, but also
through the CVE efforts that we talked about.
But, you are exactly right. The online presence as well as
their ability and their sophistication online is something that
should worry all of us a great deal.
Senator Portman. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. If I could add one thing--because I failed to
mention it earlier with Senator Booker's question--it is that
there are online CVE programs that I have seen, which I do
think have merit. One is called ``One-to-One Online
Interventions.'' They have done that in the U.K. Moonshot is a
group that has done it. It sits outside of the government. I
think that is an effective example of how you can have CVE in
the online space. What tends to happen with investments,
though, is that these are more expensive, because you are
talking about using resources for a one-on-one approach. And,
we tend to think, ``Well, if we do this program with 10 people,
it might reach 1,000.''
I would rather go heavier--I guess my response is--heavier
on those that we know are the closest to getting on that
airplane or showing up here with an explosive device--and
investing a little heavier in those CVE programs. So, maybe
that is a better answer to the question.
Senator Portman. You have to identify those individuals
first----
Mr. Watts. Yes.
Senator Portman [continuing]. You say--and that is one of
our challenges--to identify them. I could not agree more about
having more of a targeted focus and a more laser-like approach.
Thank you all very much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Portman.
Mr. Watts, I want to quickly go back, because you indicated
that as a private citizen, you can do more to identify these
individuals than government officials can. Talk about the
handcuffs that are actually on government officials and are
keeping them from trying to do what we need to do.
Mr. Watts. I think it is twofold. For example, I teach with
the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) a lot and do a lot of
programs with intelligence-led policing and counterterrorism.
And so, you can show them these accounts that are out there--
wide open. It comes down to two issues. What are the rules
around collecting this information on private citizens? Law
enforcement, intelligence, and the Federal system all have a
different level of comfort with it. So, they are not sure
whether they should pursue it.
The second part is the capacity to do it. State and local
entities could benefit a lot from detecting people online, but
they have the least capacity to do so. The Federal Government
has the most capacity and the best technology--those sorts of
assets--but may have trouble communicating that information
down to the State and local levels.
The other part that I would tell you is, if I have to go
into a government location and do a briefing, it is almost
impossible to use the technology just to access the
information. This is all for good reasons--cybersecurity,
physical security, and things like that. But, you almost cannot
get on the Internet to even observe it. It becomes a barrier
and you start to look for other ways to do it. On the other
hand, at my house, I can open up my doors. I can just watch
what is going on. Or, I can collaborate with people like Daveed
and other people online that are watching this and we can set
up, basically, our own databases where we tag and track people.
As soon as that gets introduced into the government--
whether it is due to bureaucracy, capability, access, or data
privacy reasons--everything tends to go sideways. It becomes
very archaic or very difficult to do.
Chairman Johnson. Do you see a solution to that that still
protects American civil liberties?
Mr. Watts. I do. I think that there just needs to be some
sort of legislation or regulation put forth that says, ``If I,
as a private citizen, can observe this activity online, then,
as the Federal Government, we are going to observe that
activity online.'' The Snowden leaks did nothing for us, in
terms of helping the government to access that information.
But, I think the more straightforward approach is saying,
``Look, the best way we can secure our Nation and safeguard you
is if we watch what is going on online.'' And, when people are
talking about committing violence or mobilizing toward
violence, then we need to go out and talk to them. But, if you
cannot see that information or if it is coming to you very
delayed, it is really hard to take a preemptive law enforcement
approach.
Chairman Johnson. Mr. Zarate, you talked a little bit
about, really, what the goal is. We held a hearing, really,
based on Graeme Wood's article, in the Atlantic, ``What ISIS
Really Wants.'' My conclusion is that it is really two things:
world domination and to set up this apocalyptic final battle--
these are somewhat conflicting goals.
I just want to ask all of the panelists--what is behind
this? This is what is just baffling, I think, to Americans. al-
Qaeda's narrative was that they just wanted the West out of the
Middle East. This is different. So, can you first speak to
that? And, I just want to go down the panel. What do you think
they are after?
Mr. Zarate. Chairman, I think it is the next evolution of
the violent Sunni extremist ideology. And, they have given life
and manifestation to what had once been the mythology of
reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. And so, first and
foremost, they want to establish, not only this caliphate, but
to demonstrate that they can govern and, actually, that this is
a place--and this is part of the narrative--that it is the only
place where you can practice true Islam. This is part of the
attractiveness.
And so, they have morphed the al-Qaeda narrative--which is
that the West is at war with Islam and that Muslims have a
religious obligation to defend it--into this caliphate and
said, ``The way we are governing it makes it the only place
where you can actually live as a true Muslim.'' And so, it is
that, in and of itself, that is the core of their message.
That, then, animates outward, because their job, then, is to
kill and convert infidels and to project out. And, they
understand that the West--along with our allies and proxies--
will not allow them to do this long term.
Chairman Johnson. You also talked about how, again, as long
as that caliphate exists, it inspires and it actually prompts
additional types of action. I was interested in you talking
about the application process. It kind of sounds like a gang
initiation. Can you just quickly speak to that and give us some
examples?
Mr. Zarate. Well, what you have seen is, different
terrorist groups--the moment that the caliphate was announced,
there was a moment of strategic decision-making for al-Qaeda as
well as the al-Qaeda affiliates and other violent extremist
groups. And so, they had to determine, ``Are we going to be a
part of this? Do we believe in it? '' This is part of the
strategic renting and division you have seen between the al-
Qaeda core and ISIS.
What a number of groups have done--to include Boko Haram,
which was long allied with al-Qaeda--was to then send messages
to ISIS initiating membership--in essence, pledging allegiance
in the first instance, and then, applying to actually be an
official province of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This
is a reality for them. They see this as a governing reality.
And so, you have seen this emerge in Libya, in Egypt, in
Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Saudi Arabia, and in Yemen. These
are very real individuals thinking that they are part of
something bigger than themselves--and that has dangerous
implications because they have to prove that they are worthy,
which is why you have seen these attacks in the hinterlands of
places, like Jakarta, with people trying to be a part of this
broader caliphate. It is animating the movement and it is
resurrecting these networks--both funding and operational--that
we had long ago suppressed.
Chairman Johnson. So, the inescapable conclusion to this,
from my standpoint is, if you really want to go on offense as
opposed to continue to stay on defense--where defense is
incredibly difficult and almost impossible--do you not have to
destroy that caliphate? Do you not have to deny them that
territory? Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, I agree with that. And, it has
been mentioned--including by Clint earlier in the hearing--that
messaging that diffuses their image--their image, which I call
a winner's message--is very important. And, the ammunition is
there to do that. Absolutely, if they lose their caliphate,
they have some explaining to do, as one would say. You have at
least a couple of different kinds of people who are recruited
to ISIS--those who are heavily ideological and those who are
more aligned with the criminal elements, as it was framed
before.
But, for both of them, if the caliphate is lost--those who
are more ideological will understand that that quick loss of
the caliphate really destroys ISIS's interpretation of Islamic
prophecy. Those who are more aligned with the criminal element
will just see them as losers. And, ultimately, they have
experienced a lot of losses.
Now--right now--they are not weak in terms of messaging.
They just carried out a couple of major attacks in 4 months.
But, one thing that our messaging apparatus has done poorly is
the broadcasting of those losses--losses that they have
experienced in the Sahal region, in Afghanistan, and in
Algeria, where their entire branch got wiped out--and
elsewhere--and a lot of that comes back to the bureaucracy
question, which we have raised, which is that, sometimes, when
you look at our messaging apparatus--for some parts of the
messaging apparatus--it is highly bureaucratized--even how you
have a tweet approved. For others, there are theater
limitations, where they cannot go--and go beyond their
immediate theater, which hinders the strategy of our messaging.
Chairman Johnson. But, again, messaging is all about
reality. And, the reality is that the caliphate remains. Sure,
we have been nibbling away at it. But, as has been described,
the network is growing. They have actually gone from inspiring
to directing. So, the reality is that they are not losing yet.
They have not lost. They have not lost yet.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Oh, absolutely.
Chairman Johnson. And, I would argue that, until they are
overtly losing, where the reality is such, they are going to
continue to inspire, they will continue to direct, and the
threat will continue to grow.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, I agree with you entirely, but I
would add one thing. Ultimately, ISIS has understood, in
particular, the potential of social media to mobilize people to
carry out attacks--and part of that is a rooted image of
strength. They have, and have had, more of an image of strength
in certain theaters than is justified. I mean, if you look back
at how they convinced Boko Haram to join their network, a part
of that story is convincing people--contrary to the actual
facts on the ground--that they controlled the city of Derna in
Libya, which they never did.
Ultimately, as they start to lose more, I think it is in
our interest to be able to amplify that message of their
losses, because that will hit them doubly hard. In addition to
losses on the ground, they will have more trouble drawing in
recruits--and that is why I think we need to think about
getting our messaging right--not because it is a panacea now,
but because, as you say, when they do start to lose the
caliphate, we want to be able to put that out using a method
that is effective.
Chairman Johnson. OK. I will give you all a chance to give
some final thoughts at the end of this, but I want to be
respectful of my Ranking Member's time.
Senator Carper. I am very much interested in the line of
questioning that we just had with the Chairman. I was going to
pursue that myself, but I think you have responded to it very
well here.
One of the things we have not touched on today is the issue
of rail security in this country. I was in China with a bunch
of our colleagues in the last week and had an opportunity to
ride on some of the most beautiful, comfortable, attractive,
and timely trains that I have ridden on in quite a while. I
ride the train a lot, as some of you know. And, riding on
Amtrak's Northeast Regional coming from New York City down to
Washington today was--compared to what I was used to in China--
was eye opening and it was not encouraging, let me just say.
They are doing a pretty good job over there investing in
infrastructure and we are not.
Speaking of rail, though, I want to ask if you all would
just help us to rate the security of our rail system, relative
to the security of, maybe, our aviation system--and what
lessons do you think we might learn from the Brussels attack
that might relate to rail security.
Mr. Watts, do you want to go first?
Mr. Watts. I would say rail, as compared to air, is always
going to be far less secure. We have always had a very open
system with rail, as do almost all countries. And, I think it
is a logical place--and when I say rail, I do not even just
mean Amtrak. The subway systems of the United States--the
vulnerabilities there are impossible, really, to defend
against. And, the best defense is an active defense. It is the
offense. It is the investigations. It is running down leads.
I am not sure that, even if we wanted to secure it, there
is a good way that we could do it. I think it is a feasibility
issue--just in terms of the access that anyone, really, can get
to the Amtrak system or the subway systems--whatever rail
system that it might be.
Yes. I do not have a good answer for it, but I see it as a
vulnerability, worldwide--not just here in the United States.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. So, I think there are two problems,
in terms of trying to put more rail security into place--with
one exception and I will talk about that measure at the end.
But, the problem is, first, the more you harden it, like with
checkpoints and the like, the more you defeat the purpose. The
reason why subways are so effective is because you can hop on.
It does not take you hours to get across town. You do not have
to wait in a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) line.
If you had to, then far fewer people would take the subway.
The second thing is the very problem we saw in the Brussels
airport, which is that, even if you have a checkpoint,
terrorists can attack right outside of the checkpoint--and that
is just an insoluble problem, because, if you move the
checkpoint outside, for example, then you just have a line of
waiting passengers outside--and that actually puts cars into
play. Car bombs can be used.
The one exception is good human policing--and that is what
Amtrak tries to do. You have the teams with dogs who will be
going around Amtrak trains to try to make sure nothing is
amiss. It is far from being as effective as airline security,
but that is the last line of defense for our rail security.
Ms. Smith. I would just note that I was in Brussels 2 days
before the attacks. And, in addition to being in Brussels, I
took the train over to London. They have hardened their rail
security because of the differences that exist between the U.K.
and mainland Europe. But, it did create an incredible
chokepoint and a level of vulnerability. And, I was aware, as I
stood there--not knowing what was coming days later, of
course--that you had this huge mass of people waiting to go
through security to get on a train to go through the tunnel
over to London. So, I agree with the point that, in some ways,
some of these fixes can make a bad situation worse.
The only other point I would add is that, in Europe, on the
aviation security point, we have a pretty dire situation in
that, past the security checkpoint, those areas are regulated
and mandated to meet a certain level of aviation security
standards. But, before the checkpoint, each individual country
can handle security as they wish, which, as you can imagine,
creates a whole array of standards and levels of security
across European airports. And, I think Europeans are going to
have to have some sort of discussion on how they want to,
collectively, set standards for how they handle those areas
before the checkpoints.
Senator Carper. OK. Thank you. Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, I wanted to point out just one thing.
I think deploying more behavioral analysts is important in an
open system. I think TSA and DHS have tried to do that at
airports and, certainly, at train stations.
The other thing I would say is that there are new
technologies coming online that allow for better detection, to
a certain extent, as you mentioned earlier, Senator--even
prediction around anomaly and anomaly detection. Some of this
is still in formation. DHS has invested in some of this, as you
know. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
done so, as well, for DOD. And so, some of these technologies,
if applied in addition to these other layers of security and
behavioral analysis, could, perhaps, give you a better sense of
what the threats may be.
But, the long pole in the tent is intelligence, targeting,
and risk mitigation in an open system--and that is what we have
in our train system.
Senator Carper. Thank you. The last thing I want to ask you
all is if you could just quickly give me one particularly
important issue for our consideration that you think there is
near unanimous agreement on--or, maybe, unanimous agreement.
Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, I will give two issues, if you will
give me the indulgence. One is a point you made earlier, which
is that the prediction and prevention paradigm, which has
really defined the post-9/11 environment for the United States,
really has to be operationally applied in the European context.
They talk about it. French President Francois Hollande has
talked about Europe being at war. But, they have to move to an
operationally preventative mindset and we have to help them get
there.
A second thing, if I could, sir, for DHS's purposes--moving
toward systemic defense of key critical infrastructure--you
just asked about the train system--water, the electrical grid,
and financial systems--we need to build resiliency and
redundancy around those systems, because we know that, not only
terrorists, but cyber actors--State and non-State actors--are
looking for vulnerabilities in those systems. And, I think that
is something that only DHS can help to drive in this country.
Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you.
Ms. Smith, the same question.
Ms. Smith. Europol recently, in the wake of the Paris
attacks, created this new European Counter Terrorism Centre
(ECTC). What happens often with these new initiatives, inside
the E.U. or Europol, is that they become largely informational
and we have to work with them to ensure that this new
counterterrorism center is, in fact, operational.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Same question.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think there is near unanimous
agreement that the sanctity of our intelligence processes is
important in the fight against ISIS--and that, as Senator
Johnson said, depriving ISIS of territory is the best way to
craft a safer future from their mass-casualty attacks.
To that extent, I think that it is extraordinarily
disturbing to read the new report in the Daily Beast by Shane
Harris and Nancy Youssef. You have, now, not only allegations
by numerous analysts--dozens of them--about the politicization
of intelligence at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), but also
a credible report of retaliation. It is very disturbing to me
to see that Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James
Clapper downplayed the concerns of whistleblowers. And, I think
that, if our intelligence processes are falling apart and if
you have actual retaliation going on, where the leadership is
not acting on it, then we have a tremendous problem in our own
system.
Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you.
Mr. Watts, the last word.
Mr. Watts. There is more talk than action. We saw Paris. We
saw Brussels 4 months later. These were some of the same
attackers. It was the same network. Nothing has happened. And,
I think anything short of moving forward--not a working group
or a committee in Europe--I am talking about putting together
actual resources and a plan with stated objectives, in Europe,
about how they are going to deal with the threat of ISIS. It
has to happen within 30 days--within 2 weeks. It is obvious
that this problem is not going to go away. It is going to be
around for a while.
Senator Carper. You have been an exceptional panel. I
mentioned to our Chairman that there is going to be another
panel, I think, in a couple of weeks, where we actually will
have representatives from the Department of Homeland Security
and others in on behalf of the Administration. And, in a way,
this panel and each panelist's testimony actually sets up the
next panel very well. Thank you so much.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
And, by the way, I want to clarify what I said at the
opening. I did not invite Homeland Security Secretary Jeh
Johnson. I guess that has been misreported. We just invited
some senior officials from DHS, the FBI, and the National
Counterterrorism Center--not Secretary Johnson. Senator Tester.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank
you--it hurts me to say this--but, thank you, Senator Booker,
for allowing me to go.
I would just say that the FBI is not here because they are
in the middle of an investigation. And, I think, on the 26th,
you are going to have a hearing, which should be a very good
hearing--and I think that DHS and the NCTC are not here because
the FBI could not be here. But, we will get to that--but I
think it is important that they are able to do their jobs.
Look, Secretary Johnson is going to be pushing--and, by the
way, thank you all for your testimony. Thank you for being
here. Secretary Johnson is going to be pushing for new airport
security provisions to be added to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) reauthorization legislation that is going
to be coming to the Senate.
There has been a lot of conversation today about the E.U.
and how certain countries are not doing what they need to do,
getting the information they need, sharing that information,
and all of that, which is a problem that I do not know how to
solve, by the way, without writing a big old fat check that is
not going to help us out with our debt here. But, security is
important--make no mistake about it. But, those folks have to
step up in a way.
And, by the way, the visa question that was brought up,
about taking potential countries off of that list--Mr.
Chairman, you asked that question. I appreciate you asking that
question and, maybe, we ought to bring some folks in here who
know what is reasonable and what is not--who is not cutting the
mustard--and can make some recommendations. I think that is
entirely appropriate, when it comes to the security of this
country.
But, I want to talk about airport security--and you get to
tell me your opinion. Is the security we have in the airports,
in this country, where it needs to be? Go ahead, Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, I think it can always be better, but I
think our security is better than most places around the world.
Senator Tester. So, let me ask you this--and I agree with
you. We have full body scanners and we have magnetometers. Can
any of you tell me why we have full body scanners? Are
magnetometers not good enough?
Mr. Zarate. Well, I think the full body scanners allow you
to determine if there are other types of explosives or things
on the body of the person----
Senator Tester. Thank you.
Mr. Zarate [continuing]. That is trying to evade the
magnetometer.
Senator Tester. Good answer. So, if we have airports that
do not have full body scanners in them--if they just have
magnetometers--are we opening ourselves up to a security risk?
Mr. Zarate. Potentially. And, I think what TSA has tried to
do under the former Director, and now, under this Director, is
to apply a risk-based model and approach, saying, ``We have
limited resources. Where do we apply them? And, which airports
are the most vulnerable.''
Senator Tester. And so, that risk-based approach, I assume,
is based on population--the number of people going through. Do
you not think the terrorists would know that?
Mr. Zarate. They would--and they are constantly probing for
vulnerabilities. As Daveed mentioned earlier, they are working
outside of the rings of security. They are trying to infiltrate
through them. And, they are trying to get access through
insiders into the system--as we have seen, in the past, with
radicalized individuals who work on the tarmac or within
industry layers.
Senator Tester. That is good. And, that is exactly the
point I have made to TSA Administrator Peter Neffinger and
others--that they will go to where the weakest link is--and
they will find it and, eventually, go there. And so, even
though you base it, initially, on volume, the end goal is to
make sure we have them there and that we have them there as
soon as possible (ASAP). Otherwise, why would we have the
scanners?
Let me ask you about perimeter security. What happened in
Belgium did not happen on the other side of the TSA
checkpoint--if that is what they call them in Belgium. It
happened outside, where there are lots of people. Can you see a
solution for that, in our system, that would not be cost
prohibitive?
Mr. Zarate. Well, Senator, I was just in Rome and saw post-
Brussels--and saw some of the measures that they were employing
for the terminals where American carriers are and where
Americans are likely to travel--and they had deployed a couple
of key checkpoints--in essence, chokepoints for vehicles and
passengers moving into the terminal. And then, they had a lot
of visible security, both on the ground and overhead.
I can imagine you seeing this, in major U.S. airports, at
times of heightened threat--where you can apply vehicular
searches and checks at particular sites without causing too
much commercial or vehicular disruption--and traffic
disruption--more random checks around points of, for example,
check-in--and, perhaps, even more behavioral analysis, canines,
and others deployed in key airports. But, it is difficult. It
is difficult without disrupting traffic and commercial
activities.
Senator Tester. And, look, I think there is some merit to
doing that. I guess the question is: does anybody know what
kind of appropriation it would take to, maybe, not have it all
of the time, but to have it enough of the time, so that you
would not know?
Mr. Zarate. I do not know, Senator. I think part of this
has to do with local authorities, port authorities, and others
that have to deploy resources--as well as the Federal
Government. So, I do not know what those numbers look like.
Senator Tester. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think you could, probably, do it
with relatively little appropriation if you took the behavioral
detection teams that, right now, are past the checkpoint or at
the checkpoint and moved them in front of the checkpoint in
some airports. I mean, the fact is, we have these behavioral
detection teams--and they are a good idea--but what they do is,
by design, pretty limited.
Senator Tester. OK. OK. That is good.
Mr. Watts. Senator, I would only add one thing, which is
that we go all out on passengers, in terms of screening, but
the real vulnerabilities that we have seen, in the last two
terrorist attacks involving airport security, are really about
whether they can blow up an airplane in flight.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Mr. Watts. So, we saw al-Qaeda, in the Sinai, do that
through an insider.
Senator Tester. Yes.
Mr. Watts. We also saw an explosive device used in Somalia,
which seems to--it is not really clear--through an insider. So,
I think, if I was going to invest, now, in airport security, I
would not look so much at rehardening the passenger security
lines, but look at other vantage points that extremists might
use.
Senator Tester. OK. So, that gets to my next question. That
is, are we certifying--are we testing--however you want to put
it--the folks who work with the baggage, who work for the
airlines, and who work in security? Are we doing enough there?
Mr. Watts. I honestly, sir, have no idea. But, I think that
really gets at what our risk portfolio is and, really, the
offense part of it, which involves investigations, preemptive
intelligence, and that sort of thing.
Senator Tester. Well, I certainly appreciate your
testimonies and I appreciate you being here for the questions.
And, thank you very much for what you do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Tester, thank you.
Coming back--I do not know, did you attend the ``Dogs of
DHS'' hearing we had?
Senator Tester. Which one?
Chairman Johnson. ``Dogs of DHS.'' You might have missed
that. It was an excellent hearing. I am a big supporter of
having more canine units, in terms of that layer of defense--
particularly, for luggage--outside of the perimeter. That would
be, I think, money very well spent. Senator Booker.
Senator Booker. I just wanted to drill down one more time,
because, obviously, we are attacking al-Qaeda and their
affiliates, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations. I am glad
in Syria and in Iraq we are sort of shrinking the territory and
starting to make some considerable gains. I love that you said
it is a matter of when--not if--and I do believe that that is
the case. So, that is one level. Obviously, we are looking at
places like Libya and Algeria--far flung--where they are
starting to set up other outposts.
Then, the second level--equally important--is to start to
undermine the terrorist network--and this is a lot of what we
talked about today, which to me, clearly--I agree with what, I
think, is the sentiment of the panel, which is that we need to
be a lot more aggressive and hold to task our European
partners. It is outrageous, to me, that they are sharing
communication across the Atlantic Ocean, but not within Europe.
And, even within their countries, they have sort of pre-9/11-
America problems that they have not worked through.
Clearly, there is a lot more work to do and I believe that
we are very vulnerable because of the Visa Waiver Program--far
more so, I think, than with a refugee program, where the
process takes a year to 2 years. The Visa Waiver Program, to
me, is something we should be a lot more aggressive with, in
terms of our posture with the VWP countries. So, I think that
that, obviously, is something we have a lot of work to do on.
But, I just want to get back to, in my final few minutes,
the efforts for CVE, which I now realize means so many
different things to so many different people. So, let me just
say what I think it means. It is not dealing with the work of
law enforcement, but, really, the other efforts going on to
stop people from falling prey. I am concerned about what is
happening in the field of battle. I am concerned about the Visa
Waiver Program. I am also concerned, though, about homegrown
radicalization right here in the United States.
And, I do agree, again, as was said by the panel, that this
is not something that is a matter of when. I think, Mr. Watts,
you were saying that this is something we are going to be
dealing with for a very long time. So, our ability to prevent
the radicalization of people is critical as a tool--in addition
to detecting them, thwarting them, and the like--but also as a
defensive tool to create stronger ways to counter violent
extremism within our communities.
And, I am just curious, if you had to distill--and I open
it up to the panel--here, we have the Administration launching
their CVE task force and the Global Engagement Center. As these
get off of the ground, could you just distill one more time,
perhaps, for the panel, what specific recommendations you would
have the Administration focus on? What are sort of the top
bolded--``you better, you should, you must do this? ''
And, we can start with you, Mr. Watts, and go to my left,
which is something, as a Democrat, I often do. [Laughter.]
Mr. Watts. The first thing I would address is where--where
to focus it. In my experience, over the past decade, we have
done a lot of CVE programs. It has sort of broadly been
applied. I would focus on those very few communities--if it is
in the United States or in Europe--where we know there are a
lot of people being recruited from and where there is strong
sentiment.
Then, the next thing I would focus on is where to focus it
online. Those two sometimes overlap, but, sometimes, they are
divergent. So, can we determine where? So, putting more
investment in--pinpointing where we want to focus those
programs. Before, we were just applying programs, but they were
sort of all over the place.
The next thing is how we are going to apply them--and that
really comes down to where on the spectrum of extremists we
want to apply it. I think a better way to bring up what I was
talking about earlier is, we have a pyramid--vulnerable,
radicalized, and mobilized--but your investment should be in
the reverse order. We start to invest more heavily on those
one-to-one CVE engagements, which means, maybe, an imam or a
cleric that does that, physically, or is online, via Facebook,
in a one-to-one program.
Then, the radicalizing population. How do we undermine that
message? And, that is that we make villains--not martyrs--and
we explain that the leading killer of a foreign fighter is
another foreign fighter. And, that is that radicalizing
population--and that is where we use defectors and peers sort
of to do that.
And, our lowest investment is at the broad, sort of,
``winning over the community'' focus. And, I feel like, 10
years ago, we were operating in the reverse. We were really
focused on getting out into the communities and making people
feel good about our counterterrorism approach--more like public
affairs. I would rather see better engagement between those
programs and those who are mobilized or are radicalizing.
Senator Booker. OK. Thank you very much.
Really quickly, the two bold recommendations--and please go
as quickly as you can, because Juan over there is hoping he
gets off. [Laughter.]
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. So, I have two quick recommendations.
The first is for fast and deep, bureaucratized messaging with
metrics for success. That means figuring out what is working
and what is not.
The second thing--the big idea I will put out is that I
would pay attention to self-image and what makes a hero in
multiple parts of the world. I was just talking to a colleague
in East Africa who said, somewhat hyperbolically, that, ``To be
a hero here, you can be a rapper, you can be, like, a
businessman, and you can be an ISIS fighter. You cannot be a
member of the Armed Forces. They are not heroic.''
The thing about the United States--if you think about the
way Hollywood shapes all of our images--anyone can be a hero. A
soccer coach can be a hero. A Senator can be a hero. A member
of the Armed Forces is a hero. A policeman is a hero. A
firefighter is a hero. In the rest of the world, that is not,
necessarily, the case.
So, I would think about self-image, because ISIS and other
extremist groups are definitely tapping into people's self-
image and giving them a route to become a hero. Do other routes
exist?
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith. Well, as we all know, DOD has invested in this
new office out in California--in Silicon Valley--and the idea
is to try and tap existing technology to throw at a lot of
conventional military problems and challenges that our
servicemen and servicewomen are facing all over the world.
The State Department is also going to have a very tiny
presence in Silicon Valley--and I think they are utilizing this
office to do the same thing--but to use existing technology and
to challenge all of the amazing ``whiz kids'' out in California
to apply some of this technology and know-how to the challenge
of CVE is probably one of the better ways that you can use this
little--I think it is a two-man office at this point. But,
trying to use that State Department presence to tap into what
already exists and applying it to the sophistication that we
are seeing, in terms of encryption, surveillance, and document
forgery--I mean, the list goes on and on--I think that would be
a very wise investment.
Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
Mr. Zarate. Senator, I am happy to sit on the right for
this one. [Laughter.]
I have three things, Senator--and I would just commend the
Department for naming George Selim as the head of this CVE task
force, because he is a real professional in this space. I have
worked with him. A lot of us have. He understands the
challenges ahead and I think he is great for this major
challenge that we have. But, I have three ideas.
One is that we need a network of networks. This is
something that the U.S. Government--and government Agencies
unto themselves--cannot do. You need the ex-jihadis. You need
the Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE). You need the
technology companies. You need the media companies. You need
the clerics and the entrepreneurs in Muslim communities all to
be a part of, not only creating a sense of heroism, but also a
sense of identity, in the 21st Century, for these individuals
and communities.
So, we need to figure out how we animate this network of
networks--and, it is a huge challenge for the U.S. Government,
because we do not like to give up control. It is hard on the
funding side. How do you give micro-grants to these one-on-one
kind of efforts? And so, that is a challenge, but we have to
figure that out, because it is really at the grassroots level
that you are going to deal with this.
Two, we have to figure out where the manifestations--the
precursors to this ideology--begin to take root. Ultimately, we
have to make sure that we have an inhospitable ecosystem for
this ideology. We can never find ourselves in a position where,
in the United States, you have a Molenbeek, a Luton, or a
Birmingham, where these radical ideologues--or these
ideologies--take root. It cannot happen. And so, where are the
manifestations? How do you counter online recruitment? How do
you create off-ramps for susceptible individuals? How do you
deradicalize people who have come back, perhaps? And, how do
you leverage them?
Third, and finally--and I think this is where the community
engagement piece becomes so important--how do you define
identity and opportunity in these communities and for
individuals--whether they are disaffected or otherwise? The
government cannot define that. Families, friends, and
communities have to play a role in defining that, because, at
the end of the day, the problem of radicalization is often a
problem of identity.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that
time.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker.
Listen, I want to second what Senator Carper was saying.
This has just been an exceptional panel and an exceptional
discussion. The goal of every hearing, from my standpoint, is
to lay out a reality--defining the problem, so we can take the
first step in solving it, which is really that definition of
the problem and admitting we have a problem. So, I want to
commend my colleagues for asking very good questions and to
thank the staff for assembling the panel. So, this has been,
really, I think, an extremely good hearing.
I will give you all a chance to make a concluding comment.
Try and keep it brief. One question I did not get answered--I
alluded to it, in terms of the concerns about nuclear
surveillance--or the surveillance of nuclear facilities. So, if
anybody wants to address critical infrastructure, I am highly
concerned about it. We saw the cyber attack against Ukraine. We
saw the physical terrorist attack against Metcalf, California.
I am highly concerned about that. So, by all means, if you have
something to add there--but do not feel obligated. But,
otherwise, please just give a concluding comment before we
close the hearing.
I will start with you, Mr. Zarate.
Mr. Zarate. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the
privilege of being here and I am really honored to be with this
expert panel.
Let me just reiterate, on the DHS mission, because I think
it is more critical, now, than at any time since 9/11--and it
has less to do with attacking or dealing with particular groups
or individuals--and it is the role of DHS to ensure that our
critical national systems and infrastructure are not only
secure, but that they are resilient and redundant. I think,
again, there is no other agency in government that has that
mission--and I think DHS has a critical role--whether it is
online or physically--to make sure that our systems are secure
and redundant. And, that goes a long way in, frankly, making us
strong and in deterring terrorist attacks.
The second point I would make, Senator--which I did not
make earlier--which is that I do not think we can downplay the
strategic impact of the smaller attacks that ISIS perpetrates.
We have seen the effect of this in places like Paris and
Brussels and I think we run the risk--if we define the threat
through the current lens of whether or not it is existential
and directed to the homeland--we run the risk of missing the
adaptations in this threat and the strategic impact over time
of what these groups can do to our societies, to our laws, and
to the functioning of our economies.
Chairman Johnson. By the way, I could not agree more. I
mean, I do not want to give anybody any ideas, but, certainly,
in my mind, a bunch of coordinated smaller attacks could have a
devastating impact on our economy, for example. Ms. Smith.
Ms. Smith. Let me just say, briefly, that these attacks in
Europe--in Brussels and in Paris--could not have come at a
worse time for Brussels, for the European Union, and for Europe
as a whole. Not only are they facing very severe
counterterrorism threats, but, as you well know, they are under
the weight of a migration crisis. They are facing a resurgent
Russia that is actively trying to destabilize the continent.
They have weak economies. They have the potential exit of one
of their largest members.
And so, I believe that it is in America's interest to help
fortify the European project. We are not a member of the
European Union. We cannot do everything for them. But, it is in
our interest to support the European project that, in many
ways, is an American project. We helped provide the foundation
upon which they built the European Union. I think, rather than
pulling away, we have to invest in this relationship and do
what we can to help them with these very real security
challenges.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Smith. Mr. Gartenstein-
Ross.
Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Since you specifically raised the
issue of nuclear security, I will start there. I think that one
area that we should look to, in general, is where, in our
security apparatus, are there obvious vulnerabilities? There
are at least two, with respect to nuclear security in Europe--
and in Belgium, in particular. One is that guards at Belgian
nuclear facilities are still, by Belgian law, prohibited from
carrying weapons--meaning that these facilities are vulnerable
to a coordinated, armed attack.
The second thing is, I think, that there are significant
questions about whether they are doing enough to screen their
personnel. A man named Ilyass Boughalab, who I highlight in my
testimony--my written testimony--went to Syria as a foreign
fighter. He died in 2014 and he had been a technician at a
nuclear power plant from 2009 to 2012. He had access to
sensitive areas of the reactor. This clearly calls into
question whether their screening of personnel who have access
to sensitive areas is sufficient.
Overall, what this hearing has put its finger on is the
question of whether we are well suited to the challenges of the
21st century--and, in particular, I think, I would focus on
system design. When you look at the European security
apparatus, we have put our fingers, collectively, on a number
of problems that occur there. And, the problem is, really, of a
patchwork of systems and the lack of a central law enforcement
body, as Clint mentioned. And, it means that terrorists who
operate transnationally are, inherently, at an advantage.
Overall, the U.S. system is better than the European
system, but it also has its problems. And, we put our finger on
messaging being one of those problems.
The question, I would say, is whether our bureaucracy--is
our internal system designed to keep up with these small nimble
foes? Are we, as a legacy industry, ready to keep up with the
start-ups that are going to be challenging us and trying to
kill our citizens?
Chairman Johnson. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
Mr. Watts. My final points would be--what do we want, in
terms of counterterrorism? This comes and goes. We had al-
Qaeda. Before them--or after them, we now have ISIS. Today, we
are talking about Europe. I think we are likely to be talking
about North Africa, maybe, 6 months or a year from now. Yemen
is definitely on the horizon, I think, as well. And, we go
through these accelerated peaks and valleys where we get really
mobilized around counterterrorism, we go flush it out, and
then, we get upset again a year later when it comes back.
And so, what is our objective? And, what is our tolerance
for risk with terrorism? I do not think we have a good handle
on that, so we get to these emotional points, like now, where
we react strongly and we take aggressive action. But, what are
the four or five things we can do in counterterrorism, over the
horizon, to sort of get this to a steadier state? I do not
think there is any end to ISIS, because, I think, it will just
be called something else 5 to 10 years from now--just like we
were talking about al-Qaeda 10 years ago.
And so, what do we want to achieve over the horizon? I
would love to see the U.S. Government, holistically, come to
terms with that. I feel, at a practitioner level, the NCTC, the
FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are all pursuing
counterterrorism on a day-to-day basis. But, what sort of
steady state do we want to achieve, I think, is the question.
And, that is why we are reacting to Europe now and why we will
react wherever it happens next.
Chairman Johnson. Well, first of all, I could not agree
more. We have to have a commitment to offense and to being
relentless. We cannot ever back off--and this is going to be a
generational problem. But, I think you have to do it step by
step. As we were pointing out earlier, the fact that the
caliphate exists--the fact that they hold that territory is
incredibly dangerous. And, that is, certainly, one of the--
among many--first steps. We have to defeat that caliphate. We
have to defeat ISIS.
But, I agree with you, it already has metastasized. It
already has spread. But, you have to cut it off at the head
right now and then, continue to be relentless--not back off--
because it is going to be a long-term struggle.
Again, I just want to thank all of you. This has been an
extremely good hearing.
The hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until
April 20 at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements and
questions for the record.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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