    [Senate Hearing 114-677]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                             S. Hrg. 114-677

        TERROR IN EUROPE: SAFEGUARDING U.S. CITIZENS AT HOME AND ABROAD

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 5, 2016

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                        RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                      Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                        Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director
               Elizabeth E. McWhorter, Professional Staff Member
                 Lexia M. Littlejohn, U.S. Coast Guard Detailee
                  Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
               John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
           Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Johnson..............................................     1
        Senator Carper...............................................     2
        Senator Ayotte...............................................    18
        Senator Ernst................................................    21
        Senator Peters...............................................    24
        Senator Booker...............................................    27
        Senator Portman..............................................    30
        Senator Tester...............................................    40
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Johnson..............................................    49
        Senator Carper...............................................    51

                                    WITNESS
                             Tuesday, April 5, 2016

    Hon. Juan C. Zarate, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and
      International Studies..........................................     4
    Julianne Smith, Senior Fellow and Director of the Strategy and
      Statecraft Program, Center for a New American Security.........     6
    Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
      Democracies....................................................     8
    Clinton Watts, Robert A. Fox Fellow, Foreign Policy Research
      Institute......................................................    10

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed:
        Testimony....................................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................    74
    Smith, Julianne:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    68
    Watts, Clinton:
        Testimony....................................................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    87
    Zarate, Hon. Juan C.:
        Testimony....................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................    53

                                    APPENDIX

    Response to post-hearing questions for the Record:
        Mr. Zarate...................................................    94
        Ms. Smith....................................................    99
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.........................................   104
        Mr. Watts....................................................   110

        TERROR IN EUROPE: SAFEGUARDING U.S. CITIZENS AT HOME AND ABROAD

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2016

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
    room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Johnson, Portman, Lankford, Ayotte,
    Ernst, Sasse, Carper, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Booker, and
    Peters.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON\1\

        Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to
    order.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
    Appendix on page 49.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I want to welcome the witnesses. Certainly, thank you for
    your thoughtful testimonies. We are looking forward to hearing
    those and having the opportunity to ask a number of questions.
        When this hearing originally was planned, we were going to
    be talking about an issue that Senator Carper and I are also
    very concerned about: biosecurity and the threats that we face
    in that respect. With the unfortunate tragedy in Brussels, we
    thought we would, maybe, expand it. We, maybe, can still pick
    up on some of those biothreats, as well, but we thought we
    would like to hold a hearing to really take a look at the root
    causes that are driving this activity in Europe as well as to
    discuss the implications for us here in America.
        In January 2016, there was a foiled plot in Milwaukee,
    Wisconsin against the Masonic Temple by an individual named
    Samy Mohamed Hamzeh. Now, I would say this is a real success
    story on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
    and those individuals--the informants--that worked to foil that
    plot. In the complaint filed against Samy Mohamed Hamzeh--I
    just have four little sentences. They are disconnected, but it,
    certainly, reveals what is going on in the minds--or in the
    mind of an individual that actually plots to slaughter innocent
    human beings. This is what he was quoted as saying:
        ``I am telling you, if this is executed, it will be known
    all over the world. The people will be scared and the
    operations will increase. This way, we will be igniting it. I
    mean, we are marching at the front of the war and we will
    eliminate everyone.''
        Now, in his plotting, he was trying to accomplish the
    killing of 100 people. And, in the complaint, he also said he
    would be 100 percent happy if he was able to kill 30 people.
    These threats that Europe is facing--these threats that America
    is facing because of Islamic terrorists are real and they are
    growing. And, the purpose of this hearing is really to--again,
    to take a look at the root causes of those problems and to see
    what we can do here, in America, to try and keep this Nation--
    our homeland--as safe and secure as possible.
        I also do have to say, on March 22, we did reach out, the
    day after the Brussels attack, to the FBI, to the Department of
    Homeland Security (DHS) and to the National Counterterrorism
    Center (NCTC) to have witnesses appear before this Committee
    today. Unfortunately, nobody from any of those Departments or
    Agencies agreed to testify, which is disappointing to me. I
    know Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson is on the Hill
    today having a press conference on additional funding for DHS,
    which--listen, we want to support the Department by giving it
    the tools and the resources it needs to keep this Nation safe.
    I think, probably, a pretty good way to try and secure those
    resources would be to come before a Committee like this to lay
    out the reality of the problem. So, I am disappointed that we
    do not have a government witness--or witnesses--today, but I
    certainly appreciate the fact that you all have come here today
    and are willing to testify.
        So, with that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER\1\

        Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    pulling this together today.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Carper appears in the
    Appendix on page 51.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To each of our witnesses, it is good to see you and I want
    to thank you for your preparation and for joining us on this
    occasion.
        Our thoughts and prayers remain with the families--and with
    the victims--of those who died 2 weeks ago. And, my hope is
    that something good can emerge from something awful--and this
    hearing is part of that process.
        As with the terrorist attacks in Paris, the similar attacks
    in places around the world--like Pakistan and Turkey--as well
    as the attacks in our own country--at the Boston Marathon and
    in San Bernadino--it exposes, yet again, the vulnerabilies that
    we face in public places--places that are hard to defend--
    malls, trains, train stations, airports, and the like.
        With today's 24-hour news cycle, Americans are seeing these
    attacks unfold, literally, in real time. From our living rooms,
    we can see the devastation that these attacks cause and the
    pain that they inflict on the victims and on their loved ones.
    So, Americans are understandably uneasy and they are concerned
    for their own safety and for the safety of their families,
    friends, and neighbors.
        I think that it is important for us to remember that fear
    is the most potent weapon that terrorists--like those who
    committed these attacks--have. They want to scare us into
    turning against one another and turning against our neighbors
    in this country. They want to make us afraid to go about our
    everyday lives.
        We might feel a little bit safer if we saw more obvious
    security at every single public place we visit--even if that
    were possible--but those measures come at a very high price and
    do not necessarily deter terrorists, who do not value other
    lives or even value their own lives. And, many would argue--I
    believe, correctly--that turning every public place into a
    heavily guarded fortress would restrict Americans' own personal
    freedom--even if we could afford to do so.
        Instead, we need to be smart about how we combat these
    ever-evolving terror threats. We must continuously sharpen our
    ability to predict and prevent terrorist plots through the use
    of our robust intelligence and law enforcement capabilities and
    through our ability to share information.
        Refining these tools and ensuring that we keep pace with
    the evolving threats we face are important responsibilities for
    our Federal agencies, for Congress, and for the folks at the
    local level as well. We have a responsibility, along with our
    international partners, to continue to take the fight to the
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)--and to many other
    places.
        ISIS's recent losses have been severe. It has lost at least
    40 percent of the territory that it once held in Iraq.
    Coalition forces have killed more than 10,000 ISIS fighters and
    20 key ISIS leaders in recent months, including ISIS's chief
    propagandist and executioner. And, just over a week ago,
    American forces carried out a strike that led to the death of
    ISIS's finance chief and second in command.
        Simultaneously, we continue to enhance the capabilities of
    the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. Iraqi forces captured Ramadi
    from ISIS just 2 months ago. And, a battle to seize the ISIS
    stronghold in Mosul is well underway. And, with the cease-fire
    in Syria holding so far, more guns are being turned on ISIS.
    ISIS is being pushed back on its heels in Iraq and in Syria.
        Consequences may very well be that the group, out of
    desperation, will seek to project the facade of power and
    momentum by directly inspiring terrorist attacks against
    unprotected targets in Europe, in the United States, and in
    other places around the world. We must not let these cowardly
    acts deter our resolve. To the contrary, we must redouble our
    efforts to destroy ISIS and to take away its safe havens. We
    must also learn from the Brussels terror attack to ensure that
    our intelligence and law enforcement authorities, at all levels
    of government, are ready and able to identify and stop similar
    attacks--both here at home and in other places--before they are
    set in motion.
        I just want to mention one last thing. There are lessons to
    be learned from what happened--the tragedy in Brussels--lessons
    for people who live there, for people who live in Belgium, for
    people who live in the European Union (E.U.), and for people
    who live in other places--and there are lessons for us to learn
    too. And, for us, this means the need to better understand what
    happened there and to figure out what we can do to deter
    attacks--not just here in this country, but to help them better
    defend their own people in their own places.
        Thank you so much.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
        It is the tradition of this Committee to swear in
    witnesses, so if you will all stand and raise your right hand.
        Do you swear the testimony you will give before this
    Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
    the truth, so help you, God?
        Mr. Zarate. I do.
        Ms. Smith. I do.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I do.
        Mr. Watts. I do.
        Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
        Our first witness is Juan Zarate. Mr. Zarate is chairman of
    the Financial Integrity Network (FIN), chairman of the Center
    on Sanctions and Illicit Finance for the Foundation for Defense
    of Democracies (FDD), Senior Advisor at the Center for
    Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and Senior National
    Security Analyst for CBS News. Mr. Zarate.

     TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JUAN C. ZARATE,\1\ SENIOR ADVISOR,
             CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Mr. Zarate. Chairman Johnson, thank you very much for that
    introduction. Ranking Member Carper and distinguished Members
    of this Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today.
    I am honored to be here with my fellow panelists to discuss the
    current terrorist threat environment in Europe and the security
    implications for the United States.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Zarate appears in the Appendix on
    page 53.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In the wake of the horrific attacks in Brussels and Paris,
    this is a critical moment to take stock of, what I consider to
    be, the quickening terrorist threat and adaptation spurred by
    the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, along with the continued
    threat from and intent by, al-Qaeda and its affiliates to hit
    the West.
        The rise and reach of ISIS has continued to outpace
    expectations and surprise authorities. Dangerously, failing to
    understand and anticipate ISIS's intent and capabilities has
    led to some misguided assumptions that have now been shattered
    in the wake of the recent attacks in Europe. ISIS has intended
    to confront the West. It has used Western operatives, flowing
    into the conflict zone by the thousands, and it has attempted
    to inspire singular attacks by sympathetic radicals in Western
    societies. It has built these capabilities over time and has
    taken advantage of intelligence and security gaps to implant
    operatives in Europe.
        This should not have come as a surprise. Over 2 years ago,
    my colleague at CSIS, Tom Sanderson, witnessed parts of the
    foreign fighter pipeline when he visited a shabby cafe at a
    Turkish-Syrian border crossing. This was a final stop for those
    slipping into Syria to join terrorist groups. Passports were
    for sale and such fighters could exchange their passports for
    cash. At that time, a Belgian passport was for sale for $8,000.
    A buyer could have it
    altered--and new passport photos were being snapped in the
    parking lot.
        European authorities are now coming to grips with the
    realization that ISIS is targeting the heart of Europe with
    dozens of operatives. But, unfortunately, Europe suffers from
    three fundamental and interrelated terrorist problems. First,
    there is the immediate threat of ISIS's European networks. ISIS
    has trained and deployed Europeans back into the heart of
    Europe to perpetrate sophisticated attacks.
        Second, ISIS and al-Qaeda have taken advantage of
    longstanding radicalized networks in Europe as a baseline for
    recruitment and plotting in the heart of Europe, relying on a
    lineage of radical Islamic terrorism to tap into criminal,
    prison, and other radical networks for their purposes.
        Third, Europe suffers from longstanding deep pockets of
    radicalization affecting their nationals and embedded in
    particular communities and neighborhoods. Throughout Europe,
    such nodes of radicalization have served as micro-safe havens
    and they persist in particular prisons, universities, and
    apartment blocks.
        Now, ISIS has been able to take advantage of the weaknesses
    and seams in the European system. Even the best authorities in
    Europe are overwhelmed by the number of new and historical
    terrorists and radicalized individuals for whom they need to
    account. Fortunately, the United States has not faced the same
    kinds of threats from ISIS and al-Qaeda that Europe does--but
    these threats are real for U.S. citizens and for interests
    abroad and in the homeland. Let me just describe them quickly.
        The most immediate threats to the United States are to our
    citizens and interests in Europe. ISIS would like to target
    Americans wherever possible. The visa-free travel permitted for
    Europeans and others creates a gap that could, unknowingly,
    allow an
    ISIS or an al-Qaeda operative into the country. The lack of
    information--and real-time information--sharing are major
    impediments to Western security. The United States also has to
    be concerned about the demonstration effects of successful or
    attempted terrorist attacks--especially in the West.
        And, new technologies and methodologies could spur
    innovation in how terrorists and operatives operate in the
    United States--to include new technologies that allow lone
    wolves to act as packs to attack the homeland.
        And, finally, the most strategic impact of the European
    threat, perhaps, is whether it, ultimately, weakens or
    strengthens European resolve and capability to counter the
    terrorist threat from ISIS and al-Qaeda as well as the
    radicalized citizens from within.
        We need a strong Europe and we need to work together with
    them. We are facing a common enemy and we are all at war
    together. The United States must, therefore, work closely with
    its European partners to enable, support, and lead where
    necessary. We must also work to disrupt ISIS's and al-Qaeda's
    safe havens, gather and share intelligence, disrupt terrorist
    networks and plots, and continue to build layers of defense
    with our Western partners.
        In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Brussels, this is
    an important moment to reflect on our counterterrorism
    capabilities--and we need to do this in concert with our
    European partners. And, we should never underestimate the
    ability of our terrorist adversaries to innovate and to adapt--
    especially when they have time and space to plot and to plan.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Zarate.
        Our next witness is Julie Smith. Ms. Smith is a senior
    fellow and the director of the Strategy and Statecraft Program
    at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously,
    she served as the Deputy national security advisor to the Vice
    President. Before her post at the White House, she served as a
    principal director for European and the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization (NATO) Policy in the Office of the Secretary of
    Defense in the Pentagon. Ms. Smith.

     TESTIMONY OF JULIANNE SMITH,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR OF
    THE STRATEGY AND STATECRAFT PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN
                                SECURITY

        Ms. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
    Carper, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
    opportunity to testify this morning. It is an honor to be here.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Smith appears in the Appendix on
    page 68.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Brussels attacks revealed a number of worrisome trends
    and policy gaps inside Belgium, across Europe, and among the
    transatlantic partners. Any successful strategy moving forward
    is going to require changes in all three of those categories
    and I want to address each of them, one by one, over the course
    of the next few minutes.
        Let me start with Belgium. The attacks, as Juan pointed
    out, have confirmed what experts have been stating for years--
    and that is that Belgium has one of the largest home-grown
    extremist problems in the West. Five hundred Belgians have
    traveled to Iraq and Syria in recent years and 20 percent of
    those individuals now have returned to European soil with
    sophisticated training and unknown intentions.
        The Brussels and Paris attacks also revealed a number of
    intelligence and law enforcement shortfalls and failures. These
    are, primarily, rooted--in part--in incompetence, but also in
    crippling budgetary constraints and severe personnel shortages.
    Belgium also has not had a functioning Federal system for some
    time now, so its ability to uncover and dismantle jihadist
    networks has been severely hampered.
        In terms of wider Europe, Belgium, of course, is not facing
    this challenge alone. Preventing the radicalization of Muslim
    minorities across Europe has become a priority for a number of
    European countries over the years. But, the tools with which
    national capitals can actually counter radicalization, slow
    recruitment, or arrest terrorist operatives has suffered from a
    chronic lack of investment over the years.
        Europe's most glaring problem, though, is its inability to
    share information among its member states. This was highlighted
    by the fact that one of the three bombers in the Brussels
    attacks was someone that Turkey had actually warned the
    Belgians about, in advance, as they were deporting him to the
    Netherlands. Unfortunately--and rather tragically--that
    information was not followed up on and it was, certainly, not
    disseminated across the European continent.
        From a transatlantic perspective, we also need to
    strengthen our transatlantic cooperation with the E.U. and
    other European countries. We have done a lot since the attacks
    on September 11, 2001 (9/11). We have done a lot to ensure that
    we can halt terrorist financing. We have worked together to
    enhance our intelligence sharing. We have worked to safeguard
    border controls. But, serious gaps remain.
        Most notably, the primary obstacle surrounds the
    differences that we have over privacy, data sharing, and data
    privacy. These concerns, obviously, were more pronounced after
    the 2013 revelations that the National Security Administration
    (NSA) had been tracking a number of world leaders--most
    notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel--and these differences
    have hampered the E.U.-wide implementation of the Passenger
    Name Recognition System, which would enable us to enhance our
    intelligence sharing.
        Going forward, obviously, Belgium is going to have to make
    a lot of changes--Europe, as well, but we also have to focus on
    the transatlantic relationship. From a Belgian perspective,
    they are going to have to undertake a complete audit of their
    security procedures. They are going to have to overhaul their
    surveillance laws. I think they need to review the security
    staff at major transportation hubs. And, certainly, they are
    going to have to invest more in their very small security
    budget.
        Europe also is going to have to do more, from an E.U.
    perspective, but the individual member states that make up
    Europe--all of them are going to have to do more to invest in
    their own security and they are also going to have to address
    the grievances and the isolation of the Muslim minorities
    inside of their borders.
        But, I would also urge our European friends not to view
    this strictly as an internal challenge. They tend to focus on
    homeland security measures and counter-radicalization efforts,
    but we have to ensure that Europeans are working with us in far
    away places, like the Middle East and North Africa, which, by
    the way, are not that far away from European soil. So, for that
    reason, I would urge more Europeans to join us in the anti-ISIS
    coalition. Some are already doing so over Iraq and Syria. But,
    they should also think about how they can do more to invest in
    the future of the region.
        Lastly, in terms of E.U.-U.S. cooperation, we have to get
    past our differences on data protection and privacy. I think,
    as Juan pointed out, this is going to require significant U.S.
    leadership. I know some, occasionally, urge the United States
    to pull back and withdraw from Europe, but, to be frank, this
    is a threat that we face together and the biggest card we have
    to play is E.U.-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation.
        Thank you very much.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Smith.
        Our next witness is Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. Mr.
    Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for
    Defense of Democracies, an adjunct professor in Georgetown
    University's Security Studies Program, and a lecturer at the
    Catholic University of America. He is also the Chief Executive
    Officer (CEO) of Valens Global, a consulting firm focused on
    the challenges posed by violent non-state actors. Mr.
    Gartenstein-Ross.

        TESTIMONY OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS,\1\ SENIOR FELLOW,
                 FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, for that
    introduction. Ranking Member Carper and distinguished Members
    of the Committee, it is an honor to appear before you at this
    very grave time.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross appears in the
    Appendix on page 74.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We have had, obviously, in a span of about 4 months, two
    major attacks strike Europe. It is a watershed for a variety of
    reasons, one of which is that this is the first time that a
    European jihadist network has succeeded in, not only carrying
    out one major attack, but then bearing the brunt of the law
    enforcement resources being drawn down upon it to then succeed
    in carrying out a second major attack.
        If you look at what has been said following the Brussels
    attack--about the scale of the network--it is striking. You
    have investigators saying that only now, 4 months after Paris,
    are they starting to get their heads wrapped around this
    network. You have, according to recent Wall Street Journal
    reports, about 22 members of this network who are still at
    large. Now, other media outlets have not been able to verify
    that specific number, but it seems to be roughly accurate.
        One analogy I use a lot to describe the problem of trying
    to combat terrorist and militant groups, is that of start-up
    firms versus legacy industries in the economic sphere. I use
    this not to be cute or trite, but because I think it explains
    something about the ability to innovate, the ability to adapt,
    and the problems that we have in dealing with these kinds of
    organizations.
        Today, it is very clear that start-up firms have some
    inherent advantages over their larger competitors. They are de-
    bureaucratized. They are able to innovate quickly. They are
    able to shift their strategy very quickly, while larger firms
    are often encumbered by their own weight, have too much
    bureaucracy, and are unable to maneuver at the same kind of
    speed as their smaller adversaries.
        Julie, I think, did a very good job of talking about the
    kinds of incompetence and problems that occurred and helped to
    allow the Brussels attackers to succeed. When we go back
    through
    them--and it is important to do so--one thing that looms large
    is bureaucracy--the lack of internal coordination--an
    organizational structure that is not suited well for the
    challenges of the 21st Century.
        According to open source reporting, one thing that may have
    allowed Salah Abdeslam to be free as long as he was, was
    Belgian restrictions on what time raids can occur. You had
    other instances where intelligence was not acted upon, like the
    fact that Ibrahim El Bakraoui--one of the suicide attackers at
    the Brussels airport--was not picked up after Turkish
    authorities revealed that he had been arrested in Gaziantep,
    which is a major entryway into Syria that foreign fighters
    frequently use. That, obviously, as the European officials now
    indicate, should have raised a red flag.
        So, what to do about this? In the short term, Europe needs
    to deal with the scale of the problem that it has--not just
    this one network, but authorities have been all but waving
    their hands around and saying that they are overextended. In
    Belgium, just before this attack, basically, all of their
    resources amongst investigators and detectives were used to try
    to deal with their jihadist problem. Likewise, in France.
    Likewise, in Britain. There are many indications that this
    problem has overwhelmed the system.
        In the short term, Europe should be encouraged to undertake
    a much more disruptive policing model. A good example is from
    the United States and our own experience with the mob. Al
    Capone, who was the U.S.'s first celebrity criminal, was
    ultimately arrested, indicted, and convicted, not for being a
    mobster, not for being a killer, and not for being a
    bootlegger, but, rather, for not paying taxes on his illegal
    income. It was said that, under Robert Kennedy's Department of
    Justice (DOJ), they would arrest a mobster for spitting on the
    sidewalk.
        Ultimately, finding lesser offenses is important. And,
    within European jihadist networks, which are identifiable and
    under surveillance, there is often financial fraud and other
    small crimes that they can pick people up for. This is not,
    ultimately, a perfect solution, but, in the short term, where
    we have had these two major attacks and have more would-be
    attackers--who are at large right now--I think that it is very
    important to disrupt and then bring down the networks that you
    are trying to monitor.
        In the longer term, looking at the problems I raised with
    bureaucracy are very important. There need to be reforms within
    the E.U., including within countries. And, we also need to be
    very much apprised of those that affect the United States. This
    is a very unique time, because the Schengen Agreement has all
    but fell apart. And, in the past, the Europeans' interpretation
    of Schengen has detracted from and served as a barrier to our
    own measures, which we have tried to take to uphold our own
    border security.
        We need to understand just how much the system is in play
    right now. We need to recognize, as Senator Carper said, that,
    perhaps, something good can come from something awful--and that
    something good can be us pushing for the necessary reforms--
    both within Europe and also in the transatlantic relationship--
    to better protect our own homeland.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
        Our final witness is Clint Watts. Mr. Watts is a Robert A.
    Fox fellow in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's (FPRI's)
    Program on the Middle East and a senior fellow with its Program
    on National Security. Mr. Watts has served as a U.S. Army
    Infantry Officer, an FBI Special Agent on the Joint Terrorism
    Task Force (JTTF), and as the executive officer of the
    Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point.
        First of all, thank you for your service and thank you for
    your testimony.

     TESTIMONY OF CLINTON WATTS,\1\ ROBERT A. FOX FELLOW, FOREIGN
                       POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

        Mr. Watts. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Johnson, Ranking
    Member Carper, and Members of the Committee.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Watts appears in the Appendix on
    page 87.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2012, many researchers and I watched as thousands of
    young men flocked to Syria to join the ranks of those fighting
    against the regime of Bashar al-Assad--and most of those
    eventually coalesced around the Islamic State of Iraq and
    Syria. I, personally, along with others, flew with lists of
    names of Europeans that we knew were operating there--because
    all you had to do was watch them on Twitter. They told you they
    were there. Not only did they tell you, they flaunted it. They
    would turn on their location beacon as soon as they got to
    those countries, to let everybody know they were there.
        We have known that these boys were there for a long time.
    And, we should have known--and we did know--they were always
    going to come home. This problem was not probable--it was
    inevitable. And so, we are now flat on our face. And, while we
    talk about disrupting ISIS recruitment, it has already
    happened. It is over.
    We are now on the defense. We are reacting, rather than
    preempting--and that is a position we never want to be in.
        So, today, the situation in Europe is such that we have
    terrorists operating without borders and we have
    counterterrorists operating with all borders. ISIS has done, in
    Europe, what al-Qaeda never did. In one year, they have
    achieved a level of violence al-Qaeda could not achieve in 10--
    and they can do that because they have a volume of foreign
    fighters, passport holders, E.U. citizens--or people who have
    resided there--who have traveled together and cemented the
    longstanding relationships they had in their homelands in
    disparate communities. And, they have traveled to Syria and
    Iraq and gained unprecedented combat experience. We always heap
    credit on old al-Qaeda members. They did not see nearly the
    same number of battles that these new ISIS boys have seen--and
    they have brought that experience home.
        Not only are they more connected socially than
    ideologically, they are more criminal than they are pious. And
    so, they have fewer reservations about committing violence and
    they operate with an autonomy we never saw with al-Qaeda. al-
    Qaeda tends to micromanage their recruits. ISIS does not. They
    issue a little bit of what we in the military, call commanders'
    intent. They pick targets that they know well. They do not pick
    large symbolic targets. They hit a soccer stadium or a
    transportation hub they know. And, they plan those plots and
    put them together almost--it seems like--at random--and they do
    it aggressively and quickly.
        They move faster and communicate more freely than our
    counterterrorists do in Europe. And so, when we look at the
    situation we have today, with the counterterrorists, we have
    them operating on all borders. They are way over capacity. They
    cannot follow all of the leads for every ISIS member that might
    be returning to Europe.
        Not only that, but they also have uneven capability.
    France, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and Germany--they all have
    significant experience and a lot of specialty, in terms of
    counterterrorism and intelligence, but that is not shared with
    a lot of these smaller countries. Belgium is the prime example,
    but many others have had foreign fighter recruits, like they
    have never seen, come from their country. And, at the same
    time, they have much more of a limited capacity to deal with
    these. They do not have specialties. They have a lot of rules
    around intelligence sharing, information sharing, and data
    privacy that prevent them from doing both technical collection
    and human intelligence the way we would do it here in the
    United States.
        So, when you look at this patchwork that we have, in terms
    of the bureaucracy, there is no ``heavy.'' There is no FBI-type
    apparatus. Europol and Interpol are great and they do excellent
    coordination and research, but they cannot step across borders
    as fast as the terrorists can. And so, the terrorists have run
    wild through Europe today.
        My fellow panelists up here today have talked about the
    dangers to Americans abroad, but I would tell you that the most
    dangerous result, really, of this situation is that every
    success that ISIS has in Europe breeds more success here at
    home. A successful attack in Paris, Istanbul, or Brussels
    inspires an adherent here in the United States, who maybe has
    no connection to the Islamic State or al-Qaeda, to start to
    move forward. We have seen that with San Bernadino, a
    Philadelphia police shooting, and, maybe, even with the 50
    plots that our FBI has disrupted since then. Success breeds
    success. And so, every time we stand by and watch Europe suffer
    an attack, it only inspires people at home.
        So, while we should look at a lot of defensive measures, in
    terms of what we can do to protect American citizens abroad, I
    would tell you we have to go on the offense, in Europe, the way
    we did, here, after 9/11. I would push to help the European
    Union put together a counterterrorism task force--not a
    committee, not a hearing, and not another bureaucracy, but an
    aggressive approach--now. We are looking at what I call the
    ``iceberg theory'' of terrorist plots. For every eight you see
    participating in a plot, there are three or four times as many
    that are helping support it or are somewhere in that network.
    We saw that with Paris and then it extended to Brussels.
        The other thing we can really help out Europe with, is
    intelligence sharing--both pushing them and then helping them
    to integrate their own systems.
        And, the last part, I would say, is better risk assessment
    and travel warnings for our American citizens. We tend to issue
    travel warnings after an attack happens. But, we could sit
    right now and tell you where the foreign fighters are that are
    in these European countries, where are the targets that have
    been hit, and which ones are most likely to be hit--and I think
    that is a service we should make sure to provide to our
    citizens.
        Thank you for having me.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Watts.
        I want to start with you because you mentioned, I think--
    the key point here is most of the testimony has been talking
    about being on defense. You talked about going on offense. But,
    even in talking about going on offense, you are talking about
    having America go on offense to help Europe be on defense. I
    want to talk about actually going on offense.
        I want to talk about the fact that you said that this has
    been building in Syria and Iraq and that it was inevitable.
    And, as we watch the events unfold here--and yes, we are
    pushing ISIS back in Iraq, but they are gaining territory in
    Syria. They are setting up a stronger base in Libya. They are
    getting into Afghanistan. We are having Boko Haram and other
    terrorist organizations affiliate themselves with ISIS. This is
    growing.
        I want to talk about an effective offense--and again, I
    want to just give some evidence here. There is a Department of
    State (DOS) report called the Study of Terrorism and Response
    to Terrorism (START) Report. And, let me issue this caveat: I
    realize these statistics are very uneven. But, if you take a
    look at the years prior to 9/11, on average--and this is the
    largest measure, on average--there were less than 5,000
    fatalities due to terrorism prior to 9/11. In 2012, that report
    shows there were about 15,000. In 2014, there were about
    43,000. Again, I realize the measurement is very difficult on
    this, but it gives us some indication that global terrorism is
    a growing threat.
        And so, if we are all going to just be on defense, I do not
    see how we can succeed. I mean, just speak about what
    constitutes a real offense to wipe out this threat and how long
    is it going to take to do so.
        Mr. Watts. What I would say is that I do like how we are
    approaching counterterrorism with a lot of these affiliates
    already. We have already started to take action against the
    ISIS in Libya. That is the second most important affiliate that
    is out there.
        We will have to pursue special operations force attacks,
    aggressive Joint Terrorism Task Force investigations here in
    the States, and robust intelligence sharing across Europe,
    North Africa, and the Middle East for as long as we live.
    Everybody in here will have to do that. We will have to watch
    that. This will not go away. There is no beginning and there is
    no end. There is only degrees of winning and losing.
        So, I think the notion that we need to put forth, both in
    our country and, particularly, in Europe--who seems to only
    react to these situations--is that a constant offense is the
    only way to keep terrorists on the defense.
        I would say that foreign fighter task force tracking is the
    most essential thing we should be doing--and that we should
    have done. This is what I call countering terrorism now from
    the third foreign fighter glut. We had a massive ingress of
    foreign fighters to Afghanistan. That later mutated into al-
    Qaeda 20 years ago. We then had a massive ingress into Iraq and
    Afghanistan in the last decade. That, eventually, mutated to
    become the al-Qaeda/ISIS split.
        And now, we are looking at ISIS being squelched in Iraq and
    Syria. There will always be some sort of militant organization
    there, because we cannot restore any sort of governance--or we
    have no plan for it. And, therefore, this will mutate into what
    could be a more dangerous scenario--one which is not al-Qaeda
    or ISIS. Those are just Washington terms we sort of throw
    around on the Cable News Network (CNN) because it gives people
    a label to use to understand it.
        We very well may be facing five to seven regional terrorist
    nodes across the entire world that have varying degrees of
    connection. They communicate and cooperate when they need to--
    and then they do not. They may choose different parts of the
    ideology to pursue, mostly based on local political
    environments.
        But, the one thing that you can look at, across all of
    these regions, is a lack of governance. We thought the Arab
    Spring would bring about an opportunity for democracy to grow--
    and as a
    democratic nation, for some reason, we really helped everyone
    to vote, but we never helped them after they voted. And so, we
    have safe havens stretched all of the way from Western Africa
    to Southeast Asia, at this point, where they can operate.
        The ISIS label--they will pick up that label and use it
    whenever it is convenient for them. If they think they can pull
    in money or recruits, they will. But, they will pursue their
    own objectives. The dangerous part for us is when they pursue
    their own objectives, it creates a capacity and capability
    problem for us, in the United States, and for the globe as an
    entirety. How do we track that many threats, which are out
    there, if they spread?
        Chairman Johnson. When we witnessed ISIS just roll up the
    cities in Iraq, that to me indicated an organization that is
    pretty strategic.
        Mr. Watts. Absolutely.
        Chairman Johnson. It had a game plan and they were able to
    execute that game plan. That is no fly by night operation. That
    is just no junior varsity (JV) team. Now, they are setting up
    training centers. And, they are training youth and they are
    training the next generation. Can anybody speak to the real
    danger there?
        Mr. Watts. What I would say is that this is going to happen
    routinely, because there is a lack of governance. There is no
    opposing force. And so, we have gotten into a situation where
    we did clear, hold, and build--let us deploy massive military
    force in the last decade at great expense, which, ultimately,
    created a security vacuum in itself--and we have retreated to
    the other end, which is hoping that drones and special
    operations forces will keep everyone down and sort of keep this
    problem at bay.
        In between--in the middle--is the question of how we work
    with foreign nations and proxies. And, if you look at our
    competitors around the world, they are picking their proxies as
    they see fit to pursue the interests they want. Our greatest
    problem in the United States, in terms of counterterrorism, is
    we do not really know what we want. All we know is that we do
    not want anything bad to happen. And, if all you know is what
    you do not want, you will never get what you do want--and we
    have not picked out
    what our strategic objectives are. So, we are constantly in a
    patchwork--moving and chasing.
        The one thing I do like is that we are pursuing the threat.
    I think that it is a great testament to our counterterrorists,
    who, over the past 15 years, have gone where the threat is. Our
    special operations forces have pulled off amazing feats in
    recent months. But, that alone will not get us there. We will
    always be vulnerable until we pick out where we want the focus
    to be.
        Right now, I think that Libya--and North Africa,
    generally--are places that we need to be very concerned about.
    That will be a natural expansion point for them. I think that
    Yemen is another big area of concern as well.
        Chairman Johnson. Mr. Zarate, very quickly--Mr.
    Gartenstein-Ross talked about the difference between big
    bureaucratic organizations and small start-up companies. I am
    from one of those small start-up companies and know exactly
    what you are talking about. It was easy to compete against big
    companies.
        In your testimony, you talked about the innovation of
    ISIS----
        Mr. Zarate. Yes.
        Chairman Johnson [continuing]. And, one of my concerns--and
    I want you to speak to this--is we know that two of the
    terrorists involved in Brussels--in their apartment we found
    surveillance videos of a nuclear facility. Can you speak to the
    dangers of that and what might be on their minds there?
        Mr. Zarate. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think one of the
    dangers that you see with the ISIS is that they have been
    adapting new methodologies very quickly. And so, in the field--
    in places like Iraq and Syria--this includes the use of tunnels
    and multiple sophisticated attack prongs as part of their
    attack vectors. It also includes the use of chemical weapons,
    with reports just today of another chemical attack against some
    of our allies on the ground. And, certainly, there is a real
    question as to whether or not they have ambitions to engage in
    weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism. The reality is
    that they have set up a unit to develop chemical weapons
    capabilities. They are obviously using it, now multiple times--
    --
        Chairman Johnson. They have the labs--really sophisticated
    labs at universities to access----
        Mr. Zarate. That is right. And, Mr. Chairman, just to touch
    on the conversation you were just having, I think that one of
    the major differences between the safe havens of today and the
    safe havens of the past is that we are not talking about the
    jungles, mountains, deserts, and the hinterlands of the safe
    havens of old that we worried about. We are talking about real
    cities--real urban environments--the second largest city in
    Iraq and Mukalla in Yemen, which is controlled by al-Qaeda in
    the Arabian Peninsula. These are real cities with real
    resources, real populations, and real financial systems--all of
    which they are taking advantage of--to include universities'
    labs, scientists, and experts--much of which we are blind to.
        And, I think one of the major dangers we have to keep in
    mind is that the safe havens and the ink blots that are
    emerging that are tied to the ISIS are qualitatively
    different--and that is leading to strategic innovation. And,
    you have seen this, not just in the context of WMDs,
    potentially, but you have also seen it with even naval attacks
    in Egypt. You saw it with the attack on the civilian aircraft
    out of the Sinai. And so, you are going to continue to see
    adaptations to the extent that they have fighters to train,
    resources to apply, space in which to plan, and leadership that
    is intent on attacking the West.
        Chairman Johnson. And, by the way, that is the offense that
    I was talking about--taking those resources--that territory--
    away from them. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Thank you so much.
        This is an exceptional panel of witnesses. Thank you so
    much for joining us. And, some of you have been before us
    before, but we are delighted that you are here today.
        I spent a number of the years of my life in the Navy. I
    remember being in Southeast Asia. In the office of the
    commanding officer of our squadron, there was a cartoon up on
    the wall and the cartoon was a depiction of a man on a very
    small island trying to climb up a single tree surrounded by
    alligators. And, the caption under the cartoon was, ``It's hard
    to remember that your job was to drain the swamp when you are
    up to your eyeballs in alligators.''
        Our friends in Europe are up to their eyeballs in
    alligators and we are trying to help them help themselves. How
    do we go about draining the swamp? Root causes--just spend a
    minute, each of you--a minute discussing root causes, please.
    Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator Carper, I think, first and foremost, we
    should be very open and honest about where these pockets
    of radicalization have existed. These are not new in Europe.
    Neighborhoods like Molenbeek--neighborhoods in the U.K., like
    Luton--have developed radicalized environments and ecosystems
    that have allowed radical clerics to recruit and have allowed
    pipelines of generations of radicals to continue to be enlisted
    and mobilized.
        And so, first and foremost, identifying what are the those
    hot spots--because, if you look at a map, whether it is in
    Europe or even in North Africa, you will see that there are
    particular--not just countries and not just regions--but also
    neighborhoods or particular segments of communities that are
    the most at risk. If you look at the neighborhood of Tetouan,
    out of Morocco, it has produced the bulk of foreign fighters
    over the years, dating back to the Iraq War. And so, there are
    these pockets that need to be identified--and, in many ways,
    then, focused on for law enforcement and intervention purposes.
        Then, you have the general problem of integration and
    assimilation. This is a problem that is only going to grow
    worse in Europe, given the refugee crisis. And so, working with
    European authorities to understand how they can best--and how
    we can help them--integrate these populations better, so that
    you do not have a new generation of radicals emerging out of
    these refugee populations.
        Senator Carper. OK. I am going to ask you to hold it there,
    just so the other witnesses have a chance to respond.
        About one minute, if you will, Ms. Smith.
        Ms. Smith. The integration challenge is enormous. A lot of
    these Muslims, in Europe--there are about 13 million--came in
    the 1960s and 1970s to respond to a labor shortage. Many of
    them did not expect to stay. They have. Now, we have second and
    third generations in these communities. They have several
    grievances. They do not have access to educational
    opportunities. They face discrimination. Unemployment is very
    high in their communities. And so, the nature of the challenge
    is enormous--and this is not just, as I noted, in Belgium, but
    in several countries across Europe.
        What makes this particularly challenging right now is the
    fact that European public opinion of Muslims is worsening.
    European citizens, as you well know, are incredibly worried
    about their own employment numbers and about their own
    opportunities. They have had a complete loss of faith in
    institutions like the European Union. And so, you have seen the
    rise of these populist parties that are actually more
    discriminatory. They are more anti-immigrant.
        So, just as European governments need to double down on
    these integration programs, you are finding a resistance and
    pushback from European society. I cannot stress how challenging
    this is going to be.
        Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I find that, when looking to answer
    questions like this, it is often useful to look at it through
    the eyes of the adversary. So, if we take an enemy-centric
    perspective, if I am ISIS or al-Qaeda, and I am trying to grow
    larger and stronger in Europe--the first thing this panel has
    remarked on is weak law enforcement, which allows me to operate
    transnationally and to operate fairly openly. They do not have
    the surveillance resources to cover the network.
        Second, given the integration problem that was just
    mentioned and this massive influx of migrants, who will also
    have trouble integrating, just as the problem already exists,
    there is the potential for recruitment there--especially if you
    can trigger a nativist backlash. We are, of course, already
    seeing that nativist backlash. Every time you carry out an
    attack, that increases hostility toward the Muslim population.
    And, as ISIS has said, they want to destroy what they regard as
    the gray zone--that zone between ISIS and the European
    population where European Muslims can exist.
        The final thing I will mention about looking over at
    European politics is--one of the things that is happening with
    the rise of far-right parties is that other parties are not
    addressing these issues. When you see the discursive
    environment to the worst of the worst, they are the ones who
    are going to seem like they speak to people's concerns. So, I
    think, understanding why they are rising is an important part
    of understanding this very dangerous environment that exists
    within Europe.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. I would say that we cannot fix European politics
    or the integration problem. And so, I would, instead, focus on
    why it is attractive to these young men--and some women--to
    join ISIS. And, I would focus on two messages. One, can you
    turn the ISIS and its leaders into villains, rather than
    martyrs? And, that really is about how you change the
    narrative, in terms of how they are perceived by those people
    that are seeing it.
        The second one is the message that the leading killer of an
    ISIS member is a fellow ISIS member. Right now, we are watching
    defectors flee from Syria and Iraq. They are killing the
    defectors, internal spies, or people that are starting to ask
    questions about the direction of the group. I think it is
    important to put that into the minds of those young people.
    They are believing one narrative. You need to offer them
    another one, which is more full of truth.
        So, I would instead focus on the Iraqi allegiants that are
    within ISIS, who are very much pushing away the foreign
    fighters now and not giving much respect and fellow rights to
    their foreign fighter brothers. The question is, how can you
    drive a wedge between them?
        I would focus on defectors and their messages, when they
    come back from the Islamic State. There are a lot of them right
    now talking about what happened to them when they were in Iraq
    and Syria. It was not the fantasy that they had had in their
    minds.
        And then, I would absolutely publish the silly and
    pointless deaths of every European foreign fighter. They use
    them to settle personal scores and for suicide bombings against
    local adversaries. That would not be a Google search that would
    happen in one of those hotspot communities.
        And, I would add to that, 80 percent of the towns that
    foreign fighters come from, today, are the same towns that
    produced foreign fighters in Afghanistan in the 1980s and in
    Afghanistan and Iraq 10 years ago. I have them on my own
    computer. I could tell you what those 20 towns are. So, it is
    not a matter of, like, not knowing where to go for the hotspots
    in Europe. It is just about whether we are actually going to
    push to do something in those places.
        Senator Carper. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I just want to
    ask a yes or no question to each of the panelists.
        Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson has been before us.
    And, one of the initiatives that he is pushing is a
    partnership, really, with Muslim communities to counter violent
    extremism (CVE) in our country. Our Committee has reported out
    legislation--bipartisan legislation--to support this issue. Is
    this, in terms of responding to, potentially, the root cause in
    this country--is this a smart policy to pursue or not? Mr.
    Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. I think, absolutely, and, in fact, we have
    established a commission at CSIS, led by former UK Prime
    Minister Tony Blair and former Secretary of Defense Leon
    Panetta, to look at precisely this issue and to provide policy
    guidance on it for the next administration. So, it is
    absolutely right. These are issues--not just of safe haven
    abroad, but also questions of identity and dislocation.
        And, one thing we need to look at--and this was something I
    was going to mention with your last question--the last element
    is family and networks. We find that family and networks are
    critical to the support of extremism as well as to counter it.
    And, it is often family members that are able to intervene and
    we are not finding ways of enlisting them aggressively enough.
        Senator Carper. My time has expired. Ms. Smith, just
    briefly.
        Ms. Smith. Absolutely. I think it is critical for us to
    pursue those types of programs here in the United States--but
    we also need to work with our European partners. We face
    different challenges, but we can share lessons learned and see
    what works and what does not.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, with the caveat that a lot of
    the early efforts will certainly be awkward and faltering. So,
    some of the benefit will be learning from what does not work.
        Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. I would not put much effort into it, to be
    honest. I have worked on a lot of those programs over the past
    10 years. There is some value in building trust with the
    communities--that I do respect. But, I do not think they are
    going to be a great weapon in thwarting recruitment.
    Communities--these people are already disenfranchised from it.
    And, parents are the worst ones when it comes to knowing what
    their teenage kids do. That is true whether you are in the
    United States or Europe. So, I think it is good for community
    policing purposes, just in general, but I do not think it
    really will get at the problem. I think it is a tangential
    effort.
        Senator Carper. Thank you so much. Thank you all.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Ayotte.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE

        Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman. This is an
    excellent panel.
        But, let me just say, the fact that we had a major
    terrorist attack in Europe and we cannot get, before this
    Committee, an official from the Department of Homeland
    Security, the FBI, or the NCTC, to me, speaks volumes. If this
    Administration thinks they are doing a good job fighting ISIS,
    then come and make the case before this Committee. So, I want
    to back the Chairman up on the point that he made, I think,
    very respectfully, earlier.
        I would like to ask each of you--one of the things that I
    heard coming from you all, loud and clear, is about the lack of
    intelligence sharing in Europe and the problems we have as a
    result of that lack of intelligence sharing. As you know, we
    have 38 countries that are a part of our Visa Waiver Program
    (VWP). And, to be part of that program, you have to,
    essentially, meet certain basic standards of information
    sharing. You have to enter into an agreement with the United
    States to report lost or stolen passports and, most
    importantly, you have to have an agreement with the United
    States to share information regarding whether a national of
    that country, traveling to the United States, represents a
    threat to U.S. security.
        As I hear your testimony today, I see a huge, glaring red
    flag, because, at the end of December, we passed a law here--
    which I was glad we did--that, essentially, said that
    individuals who had traveled to Iraq, Syria, and Iran--and
    also, now the Homeland Security Secretary has added some other
    countries, like Libya, to that list, which I support--but here
    is the problem.
        If we do not have good information sharing, as highlighted
    by what happened in Belgium, we can put that in place all that
    we want, but, if we do not know that someone traveled to Iraq
    and Syria--in fact, if you look at what happened with Paris,
    obviously, one of the individuals had come over from Greece and
    had a fake passport. We also know now, with the situation in
    Belgium that, in fact, the information that came from Turkish
    authorities was not properly acted upon. So, I would have to
    think that they were not exactly sharing that information with
    us, if they were not acting upon it fully, themselves.
        So, what does this mean, in terms of what we should be
    doing to protect our citizens, with the lack of information
    sharing? Obviously, it needs to be a priority for us to start
    information sharing between us--and the transatlantic
    relationship--and to promote better information sharing among
    Europe. But, I think our citizens need to understand--what do
    we need to do to protect our citizens to make sure that someone
    does not travel to Iraq and Syria and we are unaware of it
    because the information has not been shared--and then, is able
    to travel to the United States without a visa?
        Mr. Zarate, do you want to comment on that.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, those are great questions and very
    important concerns. I think, as you mentioned, you have the
    problem of the lack of information sharing, the lack of real
    time information sharing, the lack of details of the
    information, as well as gaps of information just generally.
    And, I think you have seen that the terrorists have adapted
    around this and they understand it. So, they are infiltrating
    some of the refugee flows. You have seen, from some of the
    plotters in recent attacks, that they have used methodologies--
    returning into Europe using backpacker routes, so as to avoid
    connections back to the countries of concern.
        So, I think there are really two things we need to do. One,
    is we have to engage in self-help. We have to gain more
    intelligence on our own. We have to be aggressive about what we
    are doing, on the ground, in these places, as well as along the
    routes that we expect the foreign fighter pipelines to be
    operating. The Turkish-Syrian border--we know exactly where
    that strand of border is, where they continue to move in and
    out. I am hoping and expecting that we are on that like hawks,
    trying to get as much information as possible about people
    moving in and out of there and understanding, then, where else
    they are flowing to.
        Second, I think we need to spur the Europeans to work more
    closely together. And, I think that means we have to collect
    them together--whether it is at a clinch point in a task force
    model or in some other fashion.
        Senator Ayotte. One of the things I called upon--when this
    happened, is I asked President Obama to bring NATO together. Do
    you not think NATO could be a helpful avenue to, at least,
    bring the NATO members together?
        Mr. Zarate. NATO could be, but what you need are the
    intelligence services that focus on counterterrorism. And,
    again, the French and the British are very good at this. The
    Germans are very good. What you need is some mechanism to knock
    heads--and there is something to the fact that passenger name
    records, in a transatlantic way, are shared on a real time
    basis, but passenger name records are not shared within the
    European Union. So, just think about that. We have developed a
    protocol to understand where there are suspect actors trying to
    access the commercial aviation system. Europe does not even
    have that internally.
        So, in a sense, we are going to have to catalyze a lot of
    this innovation and a lot of what my fellow panelists have
    talked about. We are going to have to do it--and we have to
    take a leadership role--frankly, like it or not, because we
    have vulnerabilities of the type that you describe, Senator.
        Senator Ayotte. Yes, Ms. Smith.
        Ms. Smith. Senator, that is an excellent question. I would
    just add to that that the United States has a number of
    bilateral relationships. So, the cooperation we have with
    Europe is completely uneven. There are some that are wonderful
    and others that are in complete disrepair--and we have to bring
    everybody up to the same standard.
        There are improvements that need to be made to our
    intelligence sharing with Europe. The emphasis should be put on
    Europe and sharing inside of the continent. The fact that they
    are not going to move forward with an E.U.-wide implementation
    of the Passenger Name Record (PNR) directive until our election
    is ridiculous. They are waiting to see who the next President
    will be in order to get our views on intelligence, when they
    need to move out on this, yesterday. And so, we should push
    them not to wait for our election, but to advance this agenda
    as soon as possible.
        I mean, journalist David Ignatius, in a recent piece,
    really put it best. The Europeans are very interested in our
    intelligence, for all of the obvious reasons, but they have
    this real distaste for collection--and we have to break past
    this and break through it to say, ``enough is enough.'' We need
    to make progress on these issues and to work through these
    issues on data privacy and data sharing.
        Senator Ayotte. I see Mr. Watts wanting to comment over
    there--and you also made a statement, in your testimony, about
    how you believe we need better warnings, as well, based on what
    we know.
        Mr. Watts. Yes. I think one thing the United States can do
    for the European Union is--we just spent a decade building the
    National Counterterrorism Center with all of these integration
    functions and doing intelligence sharing both up and across.
    So, we do it from the Federal level, to the State level, to the
    local level and we know how to manage that and push it--and we
    know how to do that with partners and in the interagency
    context.
        I think that is something that we can help them to do--and
    I think it is how we develop those relationships. They are all
    bilateral. So, why should we, as the United States, provide the
    French and the British the same intelligence individually? They
    need to, somehow, synchronize their systems. Maybe, we can
    offer a way for them to do that or provide support to them, in
    a way, to do that.
        My fear is that European countries do not want to deal with
    their data privacy issues and their collection issues until
    they have an attack. So, how do we communicate that to them? Is
    there a way we can say, ``Look, this is the risk profile for
    you, Denmark, as a smaller country.'' I am speaking
    hypothetically. ``This is what you are facing. Do you want to
    wait to see what happens? Or, do you want to come into this
    intelligence? ''
        So, I think, is there a way we can work with all of those
    countries--Germany, Denmark, and all of those--to come up with
    a brokered way to get to the solution? I do not know that that
    can be achieved, but that is what has to happen, because, right
    now, they are just having one-off exchanges based on one piece
    of intelligence and that never will allow you to put together
    the full picture. We saw that with Belgium and France.
        Senator Ayotte. I know my time is up. I did not want to
    leave the Doctor out. Is it OK for him to----
        Chairman Johnson. Yes.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Since the question was about the Visa
    Waiver Program and ensuring our own borders, I would just point
    out that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is,
    ultimately, the last line of defense. When you have a situation
    where the search of somebody does not correlate with Iraq,
    Syria, and Libya, etc. it, ultimately, comes down to the
    counterterrorism response team.
        So, one thing I would put some focus on is whether or not
    the counterterrorism response teams that CBP has have enough
    resources. Do they have the training that they need to
    undertake the kind of human intelligence collection that they
    are performing at the border to see if somebody is suspicious?
    And, moreover, do you have enough professionalization and
    enough incentives to get the best and the brightest to stay in
    that program, as opposed to going to another Agency? That, I
    think, is something that is entirely appropriate for Congress
    to look into.
        Senator Ayotte. I thank you all for your answers and I
    would just say, based on what you said, I think that we have to
    take the leadership role here. I do not know of another country
    that will be able to bring everyone together and get them to
    act.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        While we are on this topic, I just want to quickly ask a
    very simple question, because, the theory is that, under the
    Visa Waiver Program--there are 38 countries that are a part of
    that program right now--that there is a threshold level of
    information sharing that should be sufficient. Does anybody
    want to express an opinion--are all of those 38 countries--are
    they at that threshold level or should we be really seriously
    taking a look at putting some of them on probation--or really
    evaluate that? Just very quickly.
        Mr. Zarate. I think it is worth reviewing--especially in
    light of the recent attacks. I think we should look at Belgium.
    There is no question about that, given that the highest level,
    per capita, of foreign fighters are coming from Belgium--with
    their own difficulties with information sharing internally--and
    some of the deficits. I think it is wholly appropriate to look
    at some of these countries--without prejudice, obviously--being
    sure to understand the deep economic, social, and diplomatic
    importance of the Visa Waiver Program. But, I think, a healthy
    review--and some skepticism--is worth it.
        Chairman Johnson. Does anybody else want to quickly chime
    in on that?
        Mr. Watts. I would agree. And, I do not know what the level
    of all three countries are, but, I would say that we should
    start with the countries that have the most foreign fighters
    per capita. That is right where I would begin--and then, move
    down the list from there.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Thank you. Senator Ernst.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST

        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
    all of you for joining our panel today. This has been very
    helpful, I think, for all of us.
        As I have noted before in my capacity on the Senate Armed
    Services Committee, I do share the concerns that have been
    expressed by General Philip Breedlove, as well, about the lack
    of support for force protection measures for servicemembers,
    the Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and their families--
    and just a couple of examples of that. The U.S. military
    recently ordered military family members to exit Turkey. We
    have a State Department that ordered the departure of family
    members of staff at a U.S. Consulate. And, recently, the wife
    of an Air Force officer was killed in the Brussels attack.
        So, if we can focus just on Belgium for a moment, reports
    are suggesting that the DOD has about 1,300 military personnel
    and dependents as well as about 600 civilian employees in
    Belgium, which, of course, we all know, is home to NATO. And, I
    would like to start with you, Mr. Watts, please, and then, if
    the rest of the panel could answer, as well. Do you share my
    concern--and General Breedlove's--about U.S. force protection
    in Europe? And, what do we need to do to make sure that force
    protection is adequate? And, how do we move forward on that?
        Mr. Watts. I would start off--in terms of concern, I am
    concerned, in particular, for one big reason. So, we have seen
    two big attacks in Paris and Brussels. And so, now,
    counterterrorism forces are out aggressively. We also know that
    there are, as Daveed mentioned, other parts of the network that
    are still at large. And so, if you are a terrorist and you
    believe that you are being closed in on, what do you do? Well,
    you rapidly put together a hasty attack. There is no target
    better than a military person deployed overseas--and we saw
    that with, I believe that it was two airmen that were killed in
    Germany at an airport. That is a target of opportunity.
        And so, if you are either an inspired recruit or someone in
    the network that knows that you are on your last few minutes,
    this is a great target of opportunity. The same is true for
    embassies and consulates. So, I think there is a huge risk for
    that, as these investigations progress. If they cannot operate
    as cells or as groups the way they have in the past, they are
    going to pick targets of opportunity. Maybe, they pick
    Europeans, but the most vulnerable, I think, the most targeted
    U.S. people, are going to be State Department employees and
    Department of Defense employees. So, I think it is a concern--
    and we know the network is there and we know they are going to
    look for targets of opportunity as things get tougher.
        In terms of how you protect them, it is extremely
    challenging. You really have one of two options. You can try
    and protect them in place--which is very difficult to do--and
    so, you put more active defense measures in place. This means
    increasing diplomatic security, surveillance, and those sorts
    of things. It is very tough to do.
        The other option is that you remove them from those
    countries. And so, when you talk about removing 1,300
    servicemember's families from those countries--that is a major
    signal and it also has impacts in Europe. We believe, then,
    that Europe is insecure. And, it creates a ripple effect.
        So, I do not know that I have the right answer as to what
    to do, but I do think we can start risk forecasting much better
    than we are doing currently. Now, we kind of wait for an attack
    to happen and then we say, ``Oh, OK. There is, like, something
    bad out there. Travel warning.'' It is, like, ``Great. I am
    already here.''
        In a lot of these countries, we know where these foreign
    fighters are coming from. Like, we could map that out as a risk
    forecast and, literally, put it out and say, ``Here is the risk
    of traveling in these nations based on the number of foreign
    fighters, the capacity we assess the European countries at, in
    terms of counterterrorism and law enforcement''--which also
    sends a signal to them--and then where we have seen attacks--
    what are high-traffic attack locations? We have seen the
    subways. We have seen popular Western venues. This looks a lot
    more like what we used to see in the Middle East or North
    Africa--hitting targets of opportunity where there are lots of
    Westerners.
        I think we can, indirectly, send some signals to Europe by
    setting up our own assessment--and I would make it public. I
    would have a map that says--just like you see with disease
    control maps. It would be, like, ``These are the places that we
    are worried about the most.'' And then, the Europeans will
    figure out, on their own, that they have their own problems as
    well.
        Senator Ernst. That is very good. And, I would like to hear
    from the other panelists, as well, if you would.
        Yes, Mr. Zarate, please.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, thank you. I would look--to Clint's
    point, I would look, not just at risk mapping, but also at
    intelligence gathering around surveillance of family members
    and soft targets that are tied to military personnel, because,
    I think I would not worry so much about the hardened bases and
    other sites around which we have security that we can flex
    aggressively if we need to. Those are always targets--but
    terrorists have a hard time executing attacks against those.
        I worry more about the soft targets outside of those rings
    of security. And, understanding where the terrorists may be
    surveilling and doing a lot of counterintelligence in some of
    these locations, I think, is really important in order to
    understand the specific risks around personnel and family
    members.
        One other note. Keep in mind that, from a cyber
    perspective, what some of the followers and adherents of ISIS
    have tried to do is to expose military personnel and their
    family members with personal data, addresses, etc. And so,
    there is a very real effort underway to at least threaten, if
    not put at risk, family members and personnel outside of the
    bounds of classic security. So, we have to be quite conscious
    of that and counter it if we can.
        Senator Ernst. Very good. Thank you.
        Does anyone else wish to respond?
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes. I would echo these concerns.
    And, piggybacking on what Juan said, I think that one of the
    emerging tactics that ISIS, in particular, is trying to use is
    stalking and killing its foes--especially those who are
    affiliated with governments--basically taking them out of the
    government sphere, making them individuals who can easily be
    tracked.
        And, when I was in Germany, fairly recently, at the base in
    Stuttgart, I saw servicemembers in contravention to regulations
    leaving the base still wearing their uniforms. That is a
    concern.
        I think that making family members and members of the
    military aware of a few things is important. One, is just basic
    online security, something which is definitely drilled in
    within these institutions. Making them aware of how much
    information they are giving off on social media. A lot of the
    information ISIS had when it put out addresses of the
    servicemembers on their kill lists was just easily gleaned, not
    from hacking, but by going to people's social media accounts
    and finding out this information about them.
        But, ultimately, I think this is a very high-level concern
    that fits both with what the organization has done and also the
    direction that it is moving, in terms of its evolving tactics.
        Senator Ernst. Well, I appreciate that very much.
        I know my time is expiring. When my husband was serving in
    Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, he was considered a combatant
    commander--or, excuse me, part of a combatant command. And,
    members of those--or those family members could not live in
    Saudi Arabia at that time. However, he had, next door, in the
    next set of quarters over, a non-combatant commander. But,
    those families could live there and it was ironic to us. I do
    not think terrorists distinguish between who is a combatant and
    who is a non-combatant in situations like that.
        But, I do think this is something the United States needs
    to take very seriously and we need to make sure that we are
    protecting our servicemembers as well as our civilians serving
    overseas. So, thank you very much for being here today.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Peters.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PETERS

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you to
    the panelists. I found, so far--and I am sure I will continue
    to find--this hearing very interesting and we appreciate your
    expertise.
        I would like to pick up on some questions that Senator
    Carper relayed, regarding the community. And, what we have
    seen, certainly, in the attacks in Paris and Brussels, is that
    the individuals that are involved were homegrown. These folks
    were radicalized in their own country, went off, in some cases,
    to be foreign fighters, and came back. You have already talked
    about some of the conditions in those European neighborhoods
    that these individuals are exposed to.
        Given the fact that we also have very vibrant Muslim-
    American and Arab-American communities here in the United
    States--in Michigan, my State, in particular--could you comment
    on what you see as the differences between the United States
    and Europe? And, what lessons--because we, thankfully, have not
    seen those types of incidents here in our country--what lessons
    can be learned from the United States that may be helpful to
    the Europeans? What is happening here? Is it different? And,
    elaborate on why that could be a good lesson for others.
        Let us start with Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, thank you. Fortunately, I do think
    there is a difference. First, there is a difference in numbers.
    If you look at the per capita number of radicalized
    individuals, be it cases brought by the FBI or foreign fighters
    who have gone to fight in a variety of foreign terrorist
    conflicts, the numbers are quite low per capita, in terms of
    the United States.
        In terms of foreign fighters in the most recent context of
    Syria and Iraq, we are looking at probably 200 or so. Now,
    given that we do not have full information about foreign
    fighters--and, in fact, that American who recently turned
    himself in to the Kurdish authorities and who was then played
    on video, I think, was not known to U.S. authorities. And so, I
    think we do not have a full picture, but the numbers are much
    smaller than the number that we see in Europe, which is in the
    thousands.
        Second, our Muslim-American communities are incredibly
    diverse, they are spread geographically, they are well
    integrated, and, historically, they have done incredibly well
    socially and economically. If you look at the figures, in terms
    of per capita income, the numbers are very high. And, in
    general, the notion of integration has been very natural and
    organic in the American context.
        The last thing I would note is that the very notion of an
    American identity as a common form of definition of individuals
    and communities--the fact that anyone from any race, creed, or
    religion can call themselves an American--be they first
    generation or 12th generation--that is incredibly powerful.
    And, the notion, I think--and several social scientists have
    pointed this out--that there is actually sort of gravity to the
    idea of the American dream--the American ideal is actually a
    counterweight to the counter narratives of these terrorist
    groups and even the dream of the Islamic caliphate, which is
    animating so many to fight in Iraq and Syria.
        And so, the one thing I would argue for America is that we
    make sure we recognize that--that we embrace our diversity and
    we tackle the challenges in communities, like the Somali-
    American community, where you have seen a higher percentage of
    individuals going to fight. And, we ensure that we do not have
    the ghettoization--or even the sense of targeting and the
    ghettoization of the Muslim-American community or any other
    community. That is a bedrock of American power and identity
    and, frankly, it will hold us in good stead against this
    ideology.
        Senator Peters. Thank you. Ms. Smith.
        Ms. Smith. Thank you, Senator, for that very good question.
    Juan is exactly right. I agree with him 100 percent. Just to
    stress one point on identity, we benefit here, in the United
    States, from the fact that it is very easy to have a hyphenated
    existence. You can be Irish-American, Muslim-American,
    Scottish-American, whatever it might be.
        And in Europe, the problem is that these migrants that have
    arrived--many from North Africa--feel neither French nor
    Moroccan, for example. So, they have been in this country--many
    of them were born there--but they do not feel a part of society
    and there is no path for them forward to integrate into these
    societies.
        So, it makes them very susceptible to someone who comes
    along, either over social media or in a coffeehouse, to say,
    ``I have an identity for you. This is where you belong. Come
    join us in the Islamic State. This will be your home, because
    France is not your home and you are not going to go to Morocco,
    either--or Algeria or wherever it might be. And so, let us
    provide that sense of identity to you.'' And, that is an
    entirely different challenge than what we have here in the
    United States.
        That is not to say that we do not have folks that are
    susceptible to radicalization, but it is a very different
    challenge than what we see on the other side of the Atlantic
    Ocean.
        Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. And, you can see some of this bear
    out, statistically. It has been a few years since I looked at
    statistics about demographics within the Muslim-American
    community, so this might be a little bit dated, but the last
    time I looked into this, the average Muslim had a higher level
    of education than the average American. The average Muslim in
    the United States also had a higher level of employment and
    socioeconomic status, which speaks to relative levels of
    integration.
        I would also caution--I mean, I think that there are
    lessons that Europe can learn from the United States, but the
    United States is fairly unique in its identity as being a
    nation of immigrants. I mean, I travel the world a lot--as does
    everyone on this panel--and I cannot think of many other
    societies--other than Canada, where you do not have integration
    problems--and I do not mean Muslim integration problems, but
    from any sort of class. Just, in general, throughout the world,
    you have a much more rigid set of identity than we have in the
    United States.
        And so, I would not think of it as there being a quick fix,
    in terms of lessons from America. Rather, I see this as being a
    systemic problem that will be with us, I think, for decades to
    come--that most countries do not integrate new populations the
    way the United States has been successful in doing.
        Senator Peters. Alright. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. I would like to shift just a little bit to show
    why Europe's problem is now worse than ever and then compare it
    to us. So, the best recruiter of a foreign fighter is a former
    foreign fighter. And, that is about the physical relationship--
    the way you recruit people in your ranks. It is the same in the
    States. They always say the best recruiter of a Marine is a
    former Marine. There is that indirect channel that you come
    through and that is built on physical relationships. That
    motivates you. That gets you going.
        And, right now, Europe has what is called ``bleed out,''
    foreign fighters leaving Syria and Iraq that are ``bleeding''
    back into Europe. At the same time, they have this other
    problem with the inspired folks, who I call ``bottled up.'' So,
    they want to go to Syria and Iraq, but they can no longer do
    that. And, you have these catalysts--former foreign fighters
    working with inspired recruits--and we see this in the Paris
    and Belgium attacks. It is almost half and half. You have some
    foreign fighter veterans and some inspired recruits that are
    working together--and that is the worst case scenario. They are
    in these disenfranchised communities.
        We are lucky here in the States. We do not have the foreign
    fighters coming back the way that we see in Europe, and most of
    our recruits are virtual recruits. Probably 90 percent of them
    are online. They do not have a direct connection with it. They
    work to build a connection with the group. That takes longer,
    it is more difficult, and you get a different style of recruit.
    They are more ideological in recruitment, whereas those
    neighborhoods are more social in terms of their recruitment--
    and this is a different dynamic that plays out.
        So, we are lucky that--with the exception, possibly, of
    Minneapolis, which was mentioned before--we do not have that
    same dynamic here. This allows us to detect them online as well
    as on the ground much faster. They send off signals that are
    easier to detect in many ways, whereas, in Europe, they have a
    huge problem. A lot of the recruitment is never seen by law
    enforcement or intelligence because it is happening face to
    face on a one-on-one basis.
        Senator Peters. Alright. Well, thank you. I appreciate all
    of your responses. If I could summarize it, it sounds as if we,
    certainly, have to be vigilant. We have to have strong
    intelligence and make sure that we are being offensive in our
    actions. But, ultimately, the strongest shield we have are our
    American values and the special place we hold as a nation of
    immigrants, where everyone can come and have the opportunity to
    pursue the American dream. If we ever let that slip, then we
    truly are vulnerable. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER

        Senator Booker. Thank you. Again, thank you for this
    hearing.
        Mr. Watts, I am a little--you said something that seemed
    like you were sort of downplaying the effectiveness of CVE--of
    efforts to counter the propaganda. Do you think that that is
    not the most fruitful of pathways?
        Mr. Watts. I do not believe that most of the CVE efforts
    that I have seen, at least--comparing the States and Europe is
    a little bit challenging, but, I believe, it is an indirect way
    to sort of get at the motivations that are driving these young
    people. Part of the reason, I believe, they can be recruited is
    because they are living in disenfranchised communities. They
    are not connected to the community. And, they are not connected
    socially--or at least not with their parents. They are not
    listening to what their parents are saying a lot of the time.
        We just saw, I think, 2 weeks ago, a situation where a
    mother in Europe found out that her son was in ISIS because the
    records were divulged online. She did not know until a
    newspaper essentially contacted her. So, parents are not really
    good at knowing what their children are doing. That is just
    normal.
        And also, these communities, they seem to not be aware--or
    they are not on board--in terms of preventing this. So, I think
    it is a good effort for a lot of reasons--regarding violent
    extremism, but also just building relationships with
    communities to break down those borders between them. But, if
    you want to get at the problem of radicalization and
    recruitment right now, you have to change--and this is where we
    come to the communications part of it--the sort of mindsets and
    the narratives. You have to change how they view opportunities
    to become a jihadist. Jihadists are fickle. Foreign fighters
    are extremely fickle recruits.
        We watched al-Qaeda recruits online for years. They heard,
    ``You should go to Yemen.'' They would go to Yemen until things
    were going well in Yemen. Then, we saw Mali. It was, ``You
    should go to Mali.'' That lasted about 3 days, until the French
    invaded. Most recently, it was, ``You should go to Syria.''
    That has gone on for 4 years because ISIS had been successful.
    That narrative was not propaganda, it was truth. ``We are
    advancing on these cities in the way our strategy said we
    would. We are achieving success. We are building the State.''
    As soon as we start to erode that--and I think that is
    happening now--you start to see fewer recruits and less
    affinity for it.
        But, I think the key is to focus on the individuals and why
    they want to join, rather than trying to go through the
    community. I am not sure they are the best lever for it. I
    would rather change the image than the method.
        Senator Booker. So, I have a couple of thoughts. So,
    clearly, we are eroding territory in Syria----
        Mr. Watts. Yes.
        Senator Booker [continuing]. And, in Iraq right now, which
    is undermining some recruitment efforts.
        You are really taking CVE efforts and separating them into
    two buckets. The first bucket is this communication with family
    members, trying to create better networks within Muslim
    communities--as opposed to just the propaganda that they are
    feeding these young people--trying to make sure that we are
    countering that propaganda with our own--exposing them for the
    frauds and the shams that they are.
        Mr. Watts. Yes.
        Senator Booker. Is that right?
        Mr. Watts. Yes, I think of it as a funnel. So, usually, we
    talk about vulnerable, radicalizing, and committed recruits.
    There are many more at the vulnerable stage. These are the
    communities we want to reach out to. That is where a community
    program, like you suggested, might be focused.
        There are the radicalizing recruits. These are people we
    know are already connected to foreign fighters. They look like
    they are mobilizing. They are taking on the image and the talk
    of those that they want to join.
        And, then, there are the committed recruits. These are guys
    that are either trying to carry-out an attack at home or are
    trying to make their way to Syria and Iraq.
        I would focus more effort at the bottom of the funnel.
        Senator Booker. Right. So, that is law enforcement--and I
    agree that that is where most of our resources are. But, you
    are telling me that you do not have much confidence in the
    efforts of former freedom fighters--excuse me, former
    radicalized folks--who have come back and who have now
    converted back to sanity--in engaging them to tell the truth to
    others who are in the second part of that funnel.
        Mr. Watts. I am a big fan of them. And, that is why I would
    focus those efforts toward the radicalizing members. What I am
    not so interested in is engaging this massive vulnerable
    audience, where we try and--I call it pushing the ``Let us buy
    the world a Coke'' message--where we try and say, ``Let us
    reach out to you. We will build stronger communities. We can
    integrate and we can solve some of your problems.'' I feel like
    those are good programs to have regardless, but it is important
    to focus on defectors, to focus on atrocities, to focus on
    crimes that are happening in Iraq and Syria, and to focus this
    toward the radicalizing audience.
        Sometimes, we get one part right, but we are not focusing
    it in the right place. So, I would rather look at those that
    are closely connected to foreign fighters and their
    communities. And, that is where I would aim that message.
        Senator Booker. Ms. Smith, do you want to add to that?
        Ms. Smith. I would just note, I guess, I have a slightly
    different view. You need multiple lines of effort, obviously.
    You have the military angle. You have law enforcement. But, I
    think we do have to invest in some of these CVE measures.
    Ultimately, the research shows that, to pull someone off of the
    path of radicalization, you have to give them an alternative
    path. They have to have a network of individuals that they
    trust and a mom, a teacher, a parent, or a neighbor that can
    persuade them to make the right choice. And, they have to,
    obviously, have some element of doubt about going down this
    path.
        But, I think some of the CVE measures that have been
    launched to date are trying to do just that--to provide a
    network of individuals that can lay a hand on someone as they
    are wavering. Obviously, some folks are too far along to pull
    back from radicalization. But, for the young kids that are kind
    of on the brink of packing it in and taking a flight to Turkey
    that will--and then crossing the border into Syria--I think we
    have to look at some of these programs.
        To be sure, not all of them produce real results and we
    have to definitely scrub--understand what is working and what
    is not. But, I think we have to keep trying and working with
    our allies, whether it is the folks in the United Arab Emirates
    (UAE)--some of the work we have done there on CVE--or our
    European allies. I think it is an important component of the
    wider strategy.
        Senator Booker. And, programs like ``Think Again, Turn
    Away,'' were not really successful. So, really finding the ones
    that are working, investing in those, obviously--not
    undermining the law enforcement efforts and the like, but
    finding the ones that are targeted.
        And, just out of curiosity, in the few minutes I have
    left--on National Public Radio (NPR), there was a good article
    my staff sent me about why some neighborhoods are very
    radicalized, but some are not. You have a Moroccan neighborhood
    where they are and then you have a Turkish neighborhood that is
    not, but yet, they have some of the same characteristics, in
    terms of challenges to integration. Why would you say that is
    the case? Mr. Zarate or Ms. Smith, if you have thoughts on that
    please share them.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, it is a great question and one that
    actually bears a lot more investigation, because we have had
    these hot spots of radicalization. We also have the situation,
    Senator--and this is part of the difficulty of the CVE
    efforts--and, as one who bears the scars of doing work in this
    space for a number of years, I can attest to it. But, the
    reality is, you have family members who, themselves, grew up in
    the same home and the same neighborhood. One goes off to fight.
    The other does not and does not fall prey to the ideology. And,
    the question is: why? And, I think, sociologists,
    archaeologists, and anthropologists are all looking at this.
    There is sort of the social scientist surge on this to figure
    out what the difference is.
        And, one of the things, to Clint's point earlier, is the
    personal connection between the radicalizers, the ideologues,
    and the lineage of both ideological and operational networks. I
    think where you have seen these groups continue to persist and
    where they continue to produce radicalized individuals and
    foreign fighters, conflict after conflict and year after year,
    is in these communities where there are people who are actively
    trying to recruit as a part of their mission. You have seen it
    with Mullah Krekar in Norway. You have seen it with preachers
    in the U.K. You have seen it, obviously, in France and Belgium,
    where you have this ideological lineage that embeds in
    communities. That, then, becomes a hotbed.
        So, I think that is one factor, but I think scientists are
    trying to figure this out, because not even within families
    themselves can we figure out exactly what radicalized one
    individual and not another.
        Senator Booker. And, the external timberline--and I will
    stop here--of sort of the radical right that is growing in
    Europe is actually creating more combustible fuel for
    radicalization. And, does that concern you, in terms of
    rhetoric here in the United States, which might be,
    potentially, doing the same?
        Ms. Smith. I am very worried about political developments
    inside Europe, where we have seen the rise of anti-immigrant
    and anti-E.U. parties in countless countries across the
    European continent and what they are doing to then fuel the
    grievances that these Muslim communities have against the
    societies in which they live. I think, similarly, we have to be
    careful here about our own rhetoric, acts of discrimination,
    and alienation. We want to be as inclusive as possible. We have
    to recognize that we are also dealing with a very small
    percentage--even in Europe--of the Muslim community. And, it is
    not fair to say that all of the Muslims inside of Europe are
    susceptible to radicalization. We have to keep that type of
    thinking in check.
        So, most importantly, I think, I am watching developments
    inside of Europe very closely and trying to figure out how this
    is going to unfold and change their approach in the coming
    months and years. But, I think we have to watch ourselves, as
    well, on this side of the Atlantic Ocean.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, we cannot move to a position where, in
    this country, we are propagating and echoing the narrative of
    the other, right? We are Americans--all Americans--Muslim,
    Christian, Jewish, and agnostic, right? We are all Americans.
    And to the extent that our political discourse drives a sense
    of alienation and divide, that is not only destructive, but it
    is dangerous.
        Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker. Senator
    Portman.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN

        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator
    Carper, for holding this hearing. Of course, you once again had
    a great panel. I am sorry we did not have Administration
    officials here, because, when we have had them before us, we
    have learned a lot about what is going on--and, frankly, I
    think, we have been constructive in giving them ideas about
    what should be happening in addition to what is already
    happening--both on the international side, on the global threat
    here at home, in terms of the protection of the homeland, and,
    certainly, on winning the hearts and minds, which we have had a
    good conversation about today.
        In Ohio, people are worried. I mean, they see what happened
    in Brussels. They remember Paris. They remember San Bernadino.
    And, we are told by the national security experts here in
    Washington that the threat has increased--that here, in the
    United States, we face an increased threat today.
        In listening to the conversations, I wonder whether you
    agree with that. Some of you seem to be saying that, maybe,
    recruitment is down and that ISIS is not being as successful
    because of some of the military victories--by the way, someone
    said they are victories by us. I mean, a lot of the military
    victories are by the Syrian Army right now. We have to remember
    that--and there are some consequences to that that may create
    even additional refugee flows--if that makes any sense, which I
    think it does.
        So, my question to you, I guess, is, one, do you think
    that, somehow, the threat has ebbed? I do not sense that.
        And, two, I would like to dig a little deeper into this
    issue of the ideology--and I think there is more consensus--
    even though it is not a complete consensus--as to what we ought
    to do globally. There is more consensus about what we ought to
    do, in terms of protecting the homeland. There is less about
    how you actually get at the hearts and minds.
        One data point that has been reported to us--and maybe you
    would dispute this--but it is very interesting, as it relates
    to our conversation about what is happening here in Muslim
    communities and how we can thwart young people--the recruits--
    in joining a misguided cause, is that 38 percent of U.S.
    citizens who have been charged with ISIS-related offenses are
    converts. So, we sometimes talk about the lone wolf. Sometimes,
    the lone wolf is a Muslim and sometimes it is a convert, but,
    often, it is a convert.
        So, I mean, I could not agree more that we need to do more
    in the Muslim community. I understand Mr. Watts's point about
    priorities. But, I will tell you, the first foreign fighter, I
    believe, who came back and was arrested here in the United
    States was from Columbus, Ohio. He was Somali. I have talked to
    the police officers there. I have talked to the Somali
    community. Part of the reason that we were able to apprehend
    him was because of a cooperation between the police and the
    Somali community. So, that is very important.
        But, is this figure accurate--that almost 40 percent of
    those who have been arrested here, on ISIS-related charges, are
    converts? And, what does that mean, in terms of dealing with
    this issue? Is it even broader than the importance of going
    into these Muslim communities, having that relationship, and
    having the leadership in those communities provide that
    alternative path and let people know that--as Mr. Watts said, I
    thought--these people are villains rather than heroes?
        So, those are my two questions, I guess. One, what do you
    think about the threat, overall, and, second, what do you think
    about dealing with the challenge we have here in this country
    with people who are becoming radicalized--and, particularly,
    those who are converts to Islam becoming radicalized.
        And, Juan, I will start with you.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator Portman, thank you. They are great
    questions, as always.
        First, I think the scope, scale, and sophistication of
    terrorist threats are more significant now than ever before.
    Part of this has to do with the diversification of the
    nationalities of individuals involved. Part of it has to do
    with the expanse of the geographies--with ISIS establishing
    these provinces--these wilayats--with several of these,
    geographically, now applying to ISIS to be a part of it. We
    have seen attacks in Southeast Asia as a part of the
    application process. And so, the geographic scope, the
    diversity, and the numbers are still there, while the
    sophistication of the operations are increasing.
        In addition, this is a group that is thinking about the
    next generation. And so, you have seen the recruitment of women
    and the attempts to engage in education and schooling--all as a
    way of breeding a new generation of jihadis and radicals as,
    perhaps, part of an ``ISIS 2.0.''
        Finally, the idea of the caliphate--even though it is
    diminishing in Iraq--the fact that it is beginning to spread in
    other parts of the world--and the very notion of it being a
    reality and persisting continues to animate the movement in
    some very dangerous ways. And so, I mentioned Southeast Asia.
    You have seen the reanimation of terrorist networks that we had
    worked so hard with our Southeast Asian partners and the
    Australians to suppress now resurrecting because the idea and
    the animation of the caliphate are driving some of these
    things. So, I think we are in a more dangerous, animated time
    for global terrorism.
        Senator Portman. How about the threat here in the United
    States? How would you respond to that? Maybe, Mr. Watts, you
    could take a crack at that.
        Mr. Watts. I would first note that we have a lot more
    ``ones and twos'', rather than community recruitment, here in
    the States. And, of those ``ones and twos''--as you pointed
    to--many of them have deep psychological issues and were,
    maybe, not part of this radical ideology for very long. And so,
    how do you detect them if they are not a part of a community
    and they are new to this movement?
        Many of the converts find Islam, then go to the extreme
    form of Islam, and then mobilize to support ISIS--that can
    happen in months or years--and that is a tip-off that there is
    something else going on there. So, the only real way to do that
    is online electronic surveillance. That is your best bet to
    pick those people up. They are self-radicalizing. They are
    becoming motivated in ways that are very hard to detect. You do
    not have a community that can help you detect them. You do not
    have a law enforcement entity, possibly, that can detect them.
    So, how do you do that? Your best chance is online--and then
    that comes down to how comfortable Americans are with seeing
    that.
        I am upset that I am no longer in government. I can sit at
    my house and watch extremists online and know that they are
    mobilizing toward al-Qaeda, ISIS, or whatever group, but, yet,
    law enforcement, in many ways, has many more hurdles to hop
    over in order to monitor that sort of information. Oftentimes,
    I can provide it to them easier than they can get it
    themselves.
        So, I think it is about how we work through this system.
    That 40 percent worries me more because I also feel like they
    have a propensity to violence that is higher than the rate of
    many of the others--especially in the homeland.
        Senator Portman. Yes, I think those are good points. Our
    time is expiring here, but one thing that we did not get into
    earlier, in terms of the CVE issue, is what is going on online.
    And, our inability to counter that narrative in an effective
    way is a real concern. Even at our fusion center in Ohio, which
    I visited recently, we are doing some of this--and that is very
    important. But, it seems to me we should be increasing our
    efforts.
        As you know, this Committee has talked a lot about this,
    again, with Administration officials. And, I think we have
    helped to construct a way to nudge them toward more of this, in
    a more sophisticated way, to go online, where those
    individuals--who are, maybe, converts or, maybe, lone wolves--
    are finding this information. It is not a physical contact. The
    young man from Cincinnati that intended to come here to this
    Capitol, for instance--who was a convert--was working online to
    become not just a convert, but to become radicalized. And, I
    think this is an area where we have, unfortunately, a real gap,
    in terms of our ability to project.
        Ms. Smith, you have some background in that, I think. Do
    you have any thoughts on that--on our online messaging and how
    to countermessage?
        Ms. Smith. Well, I would just note that we have seen
    different stages of how ISIS has kind of taken the fight away
    from the region and into Europe--and, now, elsewhere--including
    the United States. They first wanted to inspire attacks. Then,
    they tried very hard to enable them. And now, they are working
    to actually direct the attacks.
        And so, our efforts to counter their efforts have to be
    driven toward every single one of those efforts--through law
    enforcement, through the use of our military to get them back
    home, in the place--the safe haven--where they exist, but also
    through the CVE efforts that we talked about.
        But, you are exactly right. The online presence as well as
    their ability and their sophistication online is something that
    should worry all of us a great deal.
        Senator Portman. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. If I could add one thing--because I failed to
    mention it earlier with Senator Booker's question--it is that
    there are online CVE programs that I have seen, which I do
    think have merit. One is called ``One-to-One Online
    Interventions.'' They have done that in the U.K. Moonshot is a
    group that has done it. It sits outside of the government. I
    think that is an effective example of how you can have CVE in
    the online space. What tends to happen with investments,
    though, is that these are more expensive, because you are
    talking about using resources for a one-on-one approach. And,
    we tend to think, ``Well, if we do this program with 10 people,
    it might reach 1,000.''
        I would rather go heavier--I guess my response is--heavier
    on those that we know are the closest to getting on that
    airplane or showing up here with an explosive device--and
    investing a little heavier in those CVE programs. So, maybe
    that is a better answer to the question.
        Senator Portman. You have to identify those individuals
    first----
        Mr. Watts. Yes.
        Senator Portman [continuing]. You say--and that is one of
    our challenges--to identify them. I could not agree more about
    having more of a targeted focus and a more laser-like approach.
        Thank you all very much.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Portman.
        Mr. Watts, I want to quickly go back, because you indicated
    that as a private citizen, you can do more to identify these
    individuals than government officials can. Talk about the
    handcuffs that are actually on government officials and are
    keeping them from trying to do what we need to do.
        Mr. Watts. I think it is twofold. For example, I teach with
    the New Jersey State Police (NJSP) a lot and do a lot of
    programs with intelligence-led policing and counterterrorism.
    And so, you can show them these accounts that are out there--
    wide open. It comes down to two issues. What are the rules
    around collecting this information on private citizens? Law
    enforcement, intelligence, and the Federal system all have a
    different level of comfort with it. So, they are not sure
    whether they should pursue it.
        The second part is the capacity to do it. State and local
    entities could benefit a lot from detecting people online, but
    they have the least capacity to do so. The Federal Government
    has the most capacity and the best technology--those sorts of
    assets--but may have trouble communicating that information
    down to the State and local levels.
        The other part that I would tell you is, if I have to go
    into a government location and do a briefing, it is almost
    impossible to use the technology just to access the
    information. This is all for good reasons--cybersecurity,
    physical security, and things like that. But, you almost cannot
    get on the Internet to even observe it. It becomes a barrier
    and you start to look for other ways to do it. On the other
    hand, at my house, I can open up my doors. I can just watch
    what is going on. Or, I can collaborate with people like Daveed
    and other people online that are watching this and we can set
    up, basically, our own databases where we tag and track people.
        As soon as that gets introduced into the government--
    whether it is due to bureaucracy, capability, access, or data
    privacy reasons--everything tends to go sideways. It becomes
    very archaic or very difficult to do.
        Chairman Johnson. Do you see a solution to that that still
    protects American civil liberties?
        Mr. Watts. I do. I think that there just needs to be some
    sort of legislation or regulation put forth that says, ``If I,
    as a private citizen, can observe this activity online, then,
    as the Federal Government, we are going to observe that
    activity online.'' The Snowden leaks did nothing for us, in
    terms of helping the government to access that information.
    But, I think the more straightforward approach is saying,
    ``Look, the best way we can secure our Nation and safeguard you
    is if we watch what is going on online.'' And, when people are
    talking about committing violence or mobilizing toward
    violence, then we need to go out and talk to them. But, if you
    cannot see that information or if it is coming to you very
    delayed, it is really hard to take a preemptive law enforcement
    approach.
        Chairman Johnson. Mr. Zarate, you talked a little bit
    about, really, what the goal is. We held a hearing, really,
    based on Graeme Wood's article, in the Atlantic, ``What ISIS
    Really Wants.'' My conclusion is that it is really two things:
    world domination and to set up this apocalyptic final battle--
    these are somewhat conflicting goals.
        I just want to ask all of the panelists--what is behind
    this? This is what is just baffling, I think, to Americans. al-
    Qaeda's narrative was that they just wanted the West out of the
    Middle East. This is different. So, can you first speak to
    that? And, I just want to go down the panel. What do you think
    they are after?
        Mr. Zarate. Chairman, I think it is the next evolution of
    the violent Sunni extremist ideology. And, they have given life
    and manifestation to what had once been the mythology of
    reestablishing the Islamic caliphate. And so, first and
    foremost, they want to establish, not only this caliphate, but
    to demonstrate that they can govern and, actually, that this is
    a place--and this is part of the narrative--that it is the only
    place where you can practice true Islam. This is part of the
    attractiveness.
        And so, they have morphed the al-Qaeda narrative--which is
    that the West is at war with Islam and that Muslims have a
    religious obligation to defend it--into this caliphate and
    said, ``The way we are governing it makes it the only place
    where you can actually live as a true Muslim.'' And so, it is
    that, in and of itself, that is the core of their message.
    That, then, animates outward, because their job, then, is to
    kill and convert infidels and to project out. And, they
    understand that the West--along with our allies and proxies--
    will not allow them to do this long term.
        Chairman Johnson. You also talked about how, again, as long
    as that caliphate exists, it inspires and it actually prompts
    additional types of action. I was interested in you talking
    about the application process. It kind of sounds like a gang
    initiation. Can you just quickly speak to that and give us some
    examples?
        Mr. Zarate. Well, what you have seen is, different
    terrorist groups--the moment that the caliphate was announced,
    there was a moment of strategic decision-making for al-Qaeda as
    well as the al-Qaeda affiliates and other violent extremist
    groups. And so, they had to determine, ``Are we going to be a
    part of this? Do we believe in it? '' This is part of the
    strategic renting and division you have seen between the al-
    Qaeda core and ISIS.
        What a number of groups have done--to include Boko Haram,
    which was long allied with al-Qaeda--was to then send messages
    to ISIS initiating membership--in essence, pledging allegiance
    in the first instance, and then, applying to actually be an
    official province of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. This
    is a reality for them. They see this as a governing reality.
        And so, you have seen this emerge in Libya, in Egypt, in
    Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Saudi Arabia, and in Yemen. These
    are very real individuals thinking that they are part of
    something bigger than themselves--and that has dangerous
    implications because they have to prove that they are worthy,
    which is why you have seen these attacks in the hinterlands of
    places, like Jakarta, with people trying to be a part of this
    broader caliphate. It is animating the movement and it is
    resurrecting these networks--both funding and operational--that
    we had long ago suppressed.
        Chairman Johnson. So, the inescapable conclusion to this,
    from my standpoint is, if you really want to go on offense as
    opposed to continue to stay on defense--where defense is
    incredibly difficult and almost impossible--do you not have to
    destroy that caliphate? Do you not have to deny them that
    territory? Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Yes, I agree with that. And, it has
    been mentioned--including by Clint earlier in the hearing--that
    messaging that diffuses their image--their image, which I call
    a winner's message--is very important. And, the ammunition is
    there to do that. Absolutely, if they lose their caliphate,
    they have some explaining to do, as one would say. You have at
    least a couple of different kinds of people who are recruited
    to ISIS--those who are heavily ideological and those who are
    more aligned with the criminal elements, as it was framed
    before.
        But, for both of them, if the caliphate is lost--those who
    are more ideological will understand that that quick loss of
    the caliphate really destroys ISIS's interpretation of Islamic
    prophecy. Those who are more aligned with the criminal element
    will just see them as losers. And, ultimately, they have
    experienced a lot of losses.
        Now--right now--they are not weak in terms of messaging.
    They just carried out a couple of major attacks in 4 months.
    But, one thing that our messaging apparatus has done poorly is
    the broadcasting of those losses--losses that they have
    experienced in the Sahal region, in Afghanistan, and in
    Algeria, where their entire branch got wiped out--and
    elsewhere--and a lot of that comes back to the bureaucracy
    question, which we have raised, which is that, sometimes, when
    you look at our messaging apparatus--for some parts of the
    messaging apparatus--it is highly bureaucratized--even how you
    have a tweet approved. For others, there are theater
    limitations, where they cannot go--and go beyond their
    immediate theater, which hinders the strategy of our messaging.
        Chairman Johnson. But, again, messaging is all about
    reality. And, the reality is that the caliphate remains. Sure,
    we have been nibbling away at it. But, as has been described,
    the network is growing. They have actually gone from inspiring
    to directing. So, the reality is that they are not losing yet.
    They have not lost. They have not lost yet.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Oh, absolutely.
        Chairman Johnson. And, I would argue that, until they are
    overtly losing, where the reality is such, they are going to
    continue to inspire, they will continue to direct, and the
    threat will continue to grow.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Sir, I agree with you entirely, but I
    would add one thing. Ultimately, ISIS has understood, in
    particular, the potential of social media to mobilize people to
    carry out attacks--and part of that is a rooted image of
    strength. They have, and have had, more of an image of strength
    in certain theaters than is justified. I mean, if you look back
    at how they convinced Boko Haram to join their network, a part
    of that story is convincing people--contrary to the actual
    facts on the ground--that they controlled the city of Derna in
    Libya, which they never did.
        Ultimately, as they start to lose more, I think it is in
    our interest to be able to amplify that message of their
    losses, because that will hit them doubly hard. In addition to
    losses on the ground, they will have more trouble drawing in
    recruits--and that is why I think we need to think about
    getting our messaging right--not because it is a panacea now,
    but because, as you say, when they do start to lose the
    caliphate, we want to be able to put that out using a method
    that is effective.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. I will give you all a chance to give
    some final thoughts at the end of this, but I want to be
    respectful of my Ranking Member's time.
        Senator Carper. I am very much interested in the line of
    questioning that we just had with the Chairman. I was going to
    pursue that myself, but I think you have responded to it very
    well here.
        One of the things we have not touched on today is the issue
    of rail security in this country. I was in China with a bunch
    of our colleagues in the last week and had an opportunity to
    ride on some of the most beautiful, comfortable, attractive,
    and timely trains that I have ridden on in quite a while. I
    ride the train a lot, as some of you know. And, riding on
    Amtrak's Northeast Regional coming from New York City down to
    Washington today was--compared to what I was used to in China--
    was eye opening and it was not encouraging, let me just say.
    They are doing a pretty good job over there investing in
    infrastructure and we are not.
        Speaking of rail, though, I want to ask if you all would
    just help us to rate the security of our rail system, relative
    to the security of, maybe, our aviation system--and what
    lessons do you think we might learn from the Brussels attack
    that might relate to rail security.
        Mr. Watts, do you want to go first?
        Mr. Watts. I would say rail, as compared to air, is always
    going to be far less secure. We have always had a very open
    system with rail, as do almost all countries. And, I think it
    is a logical place--and when I say rail, I do not even just
    mean Amtrak. The subway systems of the United States--the
    vulnerabilities there are impossible, really, to defend
    against. And, the best defense is an active defense. It is the
    offense. It is the investigations. It is running down leads.
        I am not sure that, even if we wanted to secure it, there
    is a good way that we could do it. I think it is a feasibility
    issue--just in terms of the access that anyone, really, can get
    to the Amtrak system or the subway systems--whatever rail
    system that it might be.
        Yes. I do not have a good answer for it, but I see it as a
    vulnerability, worldwide--not just here in the United States.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Mr. Gartenstein-Ross.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. So, I think there are two problems,
    in terms of trying to put more rail security into place--with
    one exception and I will talk about that measure at the end.
    But, the problem is, first, the more you harden it, like with
    checkpoints and the like, the more you defeat the purpose. The
    reason why subways are so effective is because you can hop on.
    It does not take you hours to get across town. You do not have
    to wait in a Transportation Security Administration (TSA) line.
    If you had to, then far fewer people would take the subway.
        The second thing is the very problem we saw in the Brussels
    airport, which is that, even if you have a checkpoint,
    terrorists can attack right outside of the checkpoint--and that
    is just an insoluble problem, because, if you move the
    checkpoint outside, for example, then you just have a line of
    waiting passengers outside--and that actually puts cars into
    play. Car bombs can be used.
        The one exception is good human policing--and that is what
    Amtrak tries to do. You have the teams with dogs who will be
    going around Amtrak trains to try to make sure nothing is
    amiss. It is far from being as effective as airline security,
    but that is the last line of defense for our rail security.
        Ms. Smith. I would just note that I was in Brussels 2 days
    before the attacks. And, in addition to being in Brussels, I
    took the train over to London. They have hardened their rail
    security because of the differences that exist between the U.K.
    and mainland Europe. But, it did create an incredible
    chokepoint and a level of vulnerability. And, I was aware, as I
    stood there--not knowing what was coming days later, of
    course--that you had this huge mass of people waiting to go
    through security to get on a train to go through the tunnel
    over to London. So, I agree with the point that, in some ways,
    some of these fixes can make a bad situation worse.
        The only other point I would add is that, in Europe, on the
    aviation security point, we have a pretty dire situation in
    that, past the security checkpoint, those areas are regulated
    and mandated to meet a certain level of aviation security
    standards. But, before the checkpoint, each individual country
    can handle security as they wish, which, as you can imagine,
    creates a whole array of standards and levels of security
    across European airports. And, I think Europeans are going to
    have to have some sort of discussion on how they want to,
    collectively, set standards for how they handle those areas
    before the checkpoints.
        Senator Carper. OK. Thank you. Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, I wanted to point out just one thing.
    I think deploying more behavioral analysts is important in an
    open system. I think TSA and DHS have tried to do that at
    airports and, certainly, at train stations.
        The other thing I would say is that there are new
    technologies coming online that allow for better detection, to
    a certain extent, as you mentioned earlier, Senator--even
    prediction around anomaly and anomaly detection. Some of this
    is still in formation. DHS has invested in some of this, as you
    know. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has
    done so, as well, for DOD. And so, some of these technologies,
    if applied in addition to these other layers of security and
    behavioral analysis, could, perhaps, give you a better sense of
    what the threats may be.
        But, the long pole in the tent is intelligence, targeting,
    and risk mitigation in an open system--and that is what we have
    in our train system.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. The last thing I want to ask you
    all is if you could just quickly give me one particularly
    important issue for our consideration that you think there is
    near unanimous agreement on--or, maybe, unanimous agreement.
    Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, I will give two issues, if you will
    give me the indulgence. One is a point you made earlier, which
    is that the prediction and prevention paradigm, which has
    really defined the post-9/11 environment for the United States,
    really has to be operationally applied in the European context.
    They talk about it. French President Francois Hollande has
    talked about Europe being at war. But, they have to move to an
    operationally preventative mindset and we have to help them get
    there.
        A second thing, if I could, sir, for DHS's purposes--moving
    toward systemic defense of key critical infrastructure--you
    just asked about the train system--water, the electrical grid,
    and financial systems--we need to build resiliency and
    redundancy around those systems, because we know that, not only
    terrorists, but cyber actors--State and non-State actors--are
    looking for vulnerabilities in those systems. And, I think that
    is something that only DHS can help to drive in this country.
        Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you.
        Ms. Smith, the same question.
        Ms. Smith. Europol recently, in the wake of the Paris
    attacks, created this new European Counter Terrorism Centre
    (ECTC). What happens often with these new initiatives, inside
    the E.U. or Europol, is that they become largely informational
    and we have to work with them to ensure that this new
    counterterrorism center is, in fact, operational.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Same question.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think there is near unanimous
    agreement that the sanctity of our intelligence processes is
    important in the fight against ISIS--and that, as Senator
    Johnson said, depriving ISIS of territory is the best way to
    craft a safer future from their mass-casualty attacks.
        To that extent, I think that it is extraordinarily
    disturbing to read the new report in the Daily Beast by Shane
    Harris and Nancy Youssef. You have, now, not only allegations
    by numerous analysts--dozens of them--about the politicization
    of intelligence at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), but also
    a credible report of retaliation. It is very disturbing to me
    to see that Director of National Intelligence (DNI) James
    Clapper downplayed the concerns of whistleblowers. And, I think
    that, if our intelligence processes are falling apart and if
    you have actual retaliation going on, where the leadership is
    not acting on it, then we have a tremendous problem in our own
    system.
        Senator Carper. Alright. Thank you.
        Mr. Watts, the last word.
        Mr. Watts. There is more talk than action. We saw Paris. We
    saw Brussels 4 months later. These were some of the same
    attackers. It was the same network. Nothing has happened. And,
    I think anything short of moving forward--not a working group
    or a committee in Europe--I am talking about putting together
    actual resources and a plan with stated objectives, in Europe,
    about how they are going to deal with the threat of ISIS. It
    has to happen within 30 days--within 2 weeks. It is obvious
    that this problem is not going to go away. It is going to be
    around for a while.
        Senator Carper. You have been an exceptional panel. I
    mentioned to our Chairman that there is going to be another
    panel, I think, in a couple of weeks, where we actually will
    have representatives from the Department of Homeland Security
    and others in on behalf of the Administration. And, in a way,
    this panel and each panelist's testimony actually sets up the
    next panel very well. Thank you so much.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
        And, by the way, I want to clarify what I said at the
    opening. I did not invite Homeland Security Secretary Jeh
    Johnson. I guess that has been misreported. We just invited
    some senior officials from DHS, the FBI, and the National
    Counterterrorism Center--not Secretary Johnson. Senator Tester.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER

        Senator Tester. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank
    you--it hurts me to say this--but, thank you, Senator Booker,
    for allowing me to go.
        I would just say that the FBI is not here because they are
    in the middle of an investigation. And, I think, on the 26th,
    you are going to have a hearing, which should be a very good
    hearing--and I think that DHS and the NCTC are not here because
    the FBI could not be here. But, we will get to that--but I
    think it is important that they are able to do their jobs.
        Look, Secretary Johnson is going to be pushing--and, by the
    way, thank you all for your testimony. Thank you for being
    here. Secretary Johnson is going to be pushing for new airport
    security provisions to be added to the Federal Aviation
    Administration (FAA) reauthorization legislation that is going
    to be coming to the Senate.
        There has been a lot of conversation today about the E.U.
    and how certain countries are not doing what they need to do,
    getting the information they need, sharing that information,
    and all of that, which is a problem that I do not know how to
    solve, by the way, without writing a big old fat check that is
    not going to help us out with our debt here. But, security is
    important--make no mistake about it. But, those folks have to
    step up in a way.
        And, by the way, the visa question that was brought up,
    about taking potential countries off of that list--Mr.
    Chairman, you asked that question. I appreciate you asking that
    question and, maybe, we ought to bring some folks in here who
    know what is reasonable and what is not--who is not cutting the
    mustard--and can make some recommendations. I think that is
    entirely appropriate, when it comes to the security of this
    country.
        But, I want to talk about airport security--and you get to
    tell me your opinion. Is the security we have in the airports,
    in this country, where it needs to be? Go ahead, Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, I think it can always be better, but I
    think our security is better than most places around the world.
        Senator Tester. So, let me ask you this--and I agree with
    you. We have full body scanners and we have magnetometers. Can
    any of you tell me why we have full body scanners? Are
    magnetometers not good enough?
        Mr. Zarate. Well, I think the full body scanners allow you
    to determine if there are other types of explosives or things
    on the body of the person----
        Senator Tester. Thank you.
        Mr. Zarate [continuing]. That is trying to evade the
    magnetometer.
        Senator Tester. Good answer. So, if we have airports that
    do not have full body scanners in them--if they just have
    magnetometers--are we opening ourselves up to a security risk?
        Mr. Zarate. Potentially. And, I think what TSA has tried to
    do under the former Director, and now, under this Director, is
    to apply a risk-based model and approach, saying, ``We have
    limited resources. Where do we apply them? And, which airports
    are the most vulnerable.''
        Senator Tester. And so, that risk-based approach, I assume,
    is based on population--the number of people going through. Do
    you not think the terrorists would know that?
        Mr. Zarate. They would--and they are constantly probing for
    vulnerabilities. As Daveed mentioned earlier, they are working
    outside of the rings of security. They are trying to infiltrate
    through them. And, they are trying to get access through
    insiders into the system--as we have seen, in the past, with
    radicalized individuals who work on the tarmac or within
    industry layers.
        Senator Tester. That is good. And, that is exactly the
    point I have made to TSA Administrator Peter Neffinger and
    others--that they will go to where the weakest link is--and
    they will find it and, eventually, go there. And so, even
    though you base it, initially, on volume, the end goal is to
    make sure we have them there and that we have them there as
    soon as possible (ASAP). Otherwise, why would we have the
    scanners?
        Let me ask you about perimeter security. What happened in
    Belgium did not happen on the other side of the TSA
    checkpoint--if that is what they call them in Belgium. It
    happened outside, where there are lots of people. Can you see a
    solution for that, in our system, that would not be cost
    prohibitive?
        Mr. Zarate. Well, Senator, I was just in Rome and saw post-
    Brussels--and saw some of the measures that they were employing
    for the terminals where American carriers are and where
    Americans are likely to travel--and they had deployed a couple
    of key checkpoints--in essence, chokepoints for vehicles and
    passengers moving into the terminal. And then, they had a lot
    of visible security, both on the ground and overhead.
        I can imagine you seeing this, in major U.S. airports, at
    times of heightened threat--where you can apply vehicular
    searches and checks at particular sites without causing too
    much commercial or vehicular disruption--and traffic
    disruption--more random checks around points of, for example,
    check-in--and, perhaps, even more behavioral analysis, canines,
    and others deployed in key airports. But, it is difficult. It
    is difficult without disrupting traffic and commercial
    activities.
        Senator Tester. And, look, I think there is some merit to
    doing that. I guess the question is: does anybody know what
    kind of appropriation it would take to, maybe, not have it all
    of the time, but to have it enough of the time, so that you
    would not know?
        Mr. Zarate. I do not know, Senator. I think part of this
    has to do with local authorities, port authorities, and others
    that have to deploy resources--as well as the Federal
    Government. So, I do not know what those numbers look like.
        Senator Tester. Yes, go ahead.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. I think you could, probably, do it
    with relatively little appropriation if you took the behavioral
    detection teams that, right now, are past the checkpoint or at
    the checkpoint and moved them in front of the checkpoint in
    some airports. I mean, the fact is, we have these behavioral
    detection teams--and they are a good idea--but what they do is,
    by design, pretty limited.
        Senator Tester. OK. OK. That is good.
        Mr. Watts. Senator, I would only add one thing, which is
    that we go all out on passengers, in terms of screening, but
    the real vulnerabilities that we have seen, in the last two
    terrorist attacks involving airport security, are really about
    whether they can blow up an airplane in flight.
        Senator Tester. Yes.
        Mr. Watts. So, we saw al-Qaeda, in the Sinai, do that
    through an insider.
        Senator Tester. Yes.
        Mr. Watts. We also saw an explosive device used in Somalia,
    which seems to--it is not really clear--through an insider. So,
    I think, if I was going to invest, now, in airport security, I
    would not look so much at rehardening the passenger security
    lines, but look at other vantage points that extremists might
    use.
        Senator Tester. OK. So, that gets to my next question. That
    is, are we certifying--are we testing--however you want to put
    it--the folks who work with the baggage, who work for the
    airlines, and who work in security? Are we doing enough there?
        Mr. Watts. I honestly, sir, have no idea. But, I think that
    really gets at what our risk portfolio is and, really, the
    offense part of it, which involves investigations, preemptive
    intelligence, and that sort of thing.
        Senator Tester. Well, I certainly appreciate your
    testimonies and I appreciate you being here for the questions.
    And, thank you very much for what you do.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Tester, thank you.
        Coming back--I do not know, did you attend the ``Dogs of
    DHS'' hearing we had?
        Senator Tester. Which one?
        Chairman Johnson. ``Dogs of DHS.'' You might have missed
    that. It was an excellent hearing. I am a big supporter of
    having more canine units, in terms of that layer of defense--
    particularly, for luggage--outside of the perimeter. That would
    be, I think, money very well spent. Senator Booker.
        Senator Booker. I just wanted to drill down one more time,
    because, obviously, we are attacking al-Qaeda and their
    affiliates, ISIS, and other terrorist organizations. I am glad
    in Syria and in Iraq we are sort of shrinking the territory and
    starting to make some considerable gains. I love that you said
    it is a matter of when--not if--and I do believe that that is
    the case. So, that is one level. Obviously, we are looking at
    places like Libya and Algeria--far flung--where they are
    starting to set up other outposts.
        Then, the second level--equally important--is to start to
    undermine the terrorist network--and this is a lot of what we
    talked about today, which to me, clearly--I agree with what, I
    think, is the sentiment of the panel, which is that we need to
    be a lot more aggressive and hold to task our European
    partners. It is outrageous, to me, that they are sharing
    communication across the Atlantic Ocean, but not within Europe.
    And, even within their countries, they have sort of pre-9/11-
    America problems that they have not worked through.
        Clearly, there is a lot more work to do and I believe that
    we are very vulnerable because of the Visa Waiver Program--far
    more so, I think, than with a refugee program, where the
    process takes a year to 2 years. The Visa Waiver Program, to
    me, is something we should be a lot more aggressive with, in
    terms of our posture with the VWP countries. So, I think that
    that, obviously, is something we have a lot of work to do on.
        But, I just want to get back to, in my final few minutes,
    the efforts for CVE, which I now realize means so many
    different things to so many different people. So, let me just
    say what I think it means. It is not dealing with the work of
    law enforcement, but, really, the other efforts going on to
    stop people from falling prey. I am concerned about what is
    happening in the field of battle. I am concerned about the Visa
    Waiver Program. I am also concerned, though, about homegrown
    radicalization right here in the United States.
        And, I do agree, again, as was said by the panel, that this
    is not something that is a matter of when. I think, Mr. Watts,
    you were saying that this is something we are going to be
    dealing with for a very long time. So, our ability to prevent
    the radicalization of people is critical as a tool--in addition
    to detecting them, thwarting them, and the like--but also as a
    defensive tool to create stronger ways to counter violent
    extremism within our communities.
        And, I am just curious, if you had to distill--and I open
    it up to the panel--here, we have the Administration launching
    their CVE task force and the Global Engagement Center. As these
    get off of the ground, could you just distill one more time,
    perhaps, for the panel, what specific recommendations you would
    have the Administration focus on? What are sort of the top
    bolded--``you better, you should, you must do this? ''
        And, we can start with you, Mr. Watts, and go to my left,
    which is something, as a Democrat, I often do. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Watts. The first thing I would address is where--where
    to focus it. In my experience, over the past decade, we have
    done a lot of CVE programs. It has sort of broadly been
    applied. I would focus on those very few communities--if it is
    in the United States or in Europe--where we know there are a
    lot of people being recruited from and where there is strong
    sentiment.
        Then, the next thing I would focus on is where to focus it
    online. Those two sometimes overlap, but, sometimes, they are
    divergent. So, can we determine where? So, putting more
    investment in--pinpointing where we want to focus those
    programs. Before, we were just applying programs, but they were
    sort of all over the place.
        The next thing is how we are going to apply them--and that
    really comes down to where on the spectrum of extremists we
    want to apply it. I think a better way to bring up what I was
    talking about earlier is, we have a pyramid--vulnerable,
    radicalized, and mobilized--but your investment should be in
    the reverse order. We start to invest more heavily on those
    one-to-one CVE engagements, which means, maybe, an imam or a
    cleric that does that, physically, or is online, via Facebook,
    in a one-to-one program.
        Then, the radicalizing population. How do we undermine that
    message? And, that is that we make villains--not martyrs--and
    we explain that the leading killer of a foreign fighter is
    another foreign fighter. And, that is that radicalizing
    population--and that is where we use defectors and peers sort
    of to do that.
        And, our lowest investment is at the broad, sort of,
    ``winning over the community'' focus. And, I feel like, 10
    years ago, we were operating in the reverse. We were really
    focused on getting out into the communities and making people
    feel good about our counterterrorism approach--more like public
    affairs. I would rather see better engagement between those
    programs and those who are mobilized or are radicalizing.
        Senator Booker. OK. Thank you very much.
        Really quickly, the two bold recommendations--and please go
    as quickly as you can, because Juan over there is hoping he
    gets off. [Laughter.]
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. So, I have two quick recommendations.
    The first is for fast and deep, bureaucratized messaging with
    metrics for success. That means figuring out what is working
    and what is not.
        The second thing--the big idea I will put out is that I
    would pay attention to self-image and what makes a hero in
    multiple parts of the world. I was just talking to a colleague
    in East Africa who said, somewhat hyperbolically, that, ``To be
    a hero here, you can be a rapper, you can be, like, a
    businessman, and you can be an ISIS fighter. You cannot be a
    member of the Armed Forces. They are not heroic.''
        The thing about the United States--if you think about the
    way Hollywood shapes all of our images--anyone can be a hero. A
    soccer coach can be a hero. A Senator can be a hero. A member
    of the Armed Forces is a hero. A policeman is a hero. A
    firefighter is a hero. In the rest of the world, that is not,
    necessarily, the case.
        So, I would think about self-image, because ISIS and other
    extremist groups are definitely tapping into people's self-
    image and giving them a route to become a hero. Do other routes
    exist?
        Senator Booker. Thank you very much. Ms. Smith.
        Ms. Smith. Well, as we all know, DOD has invested in this
    new office out in California--in Silicon Valley--and the idea
    is to try and tap existing technology to throw at a lot of
    conventional military problems and challenges that our
    servicemen and servicewomen are facing all over the world.
        The State Department is also going to have a very tiny
    presence in Silicon Valley--and I think they are utilizing this
    office to do the same thing--but to use existing technology and
    to challenge all of the amazing ``whiz kids'' out in California
    to apply some of this technology and know-how to the challenge
    of CVE is probably one of the better ways that you can use this
    little--I think it is a two-man office at this point. But,
    trying to use that State Department presence to tap into what
    already exists and applying it to the sophistication that we
    are seeing, in terms of encryption, surveillance, and document
    forgery--I mean, the list goes on and on--I think that would be
    a very wise investment.
        Senator Booker. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Zarate. Senator, I am happy to sit on the right for
    this one. [Laughter.]
        I have three things, Senator--and I would just commend the
    Department for naming George Selim as the head of this CVE task
    force, because he is a real professional in this space. I have
    worked with him. A lot of us have. He understands the
    challenges ahead and I think he is great for this major
    challenge that we have. But, I have three ideas.
        One is that we need a network of networks. This is
    something that the U.S. Government--and government Agencies
    unto themselves--cannot do. You need the ex-jihadis. You need
    the Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE). You need the
    technology companies. You need the media companies. You need
    the clerics and the entrepreneurs in Muslim communities all to
    be a part of, not only creating a sense of heroism, but also a
    sense of identity, in the 21st Century, for these individuals
    and communities.
        So, we need to figure out how we animate this network of
    networks--and, it is a huge challenge for the U.S. Government,
    because we do not like to give up control. It is hard on the
    funding side. How do you give micro-grants to these one-on-one
    kind of efforts? And so, that is a challenge, but we have to
    figure that out, because it is really at the grassroots level
    that you are going to deal with this.
        Two, we have to figure out where the manifestations--the
    precursors to this ideology--begin to take root. Ultimately, we
    have to make sure that we have an inhospitable ecosystem for
    this ideology. We can never find ourselves in a position where,
    in the United States, you have a Molenbeek, a Luton, or a
    Birmingham, where these radical ideologues--or these
    ideologies--take root. It cannot happen. And so, where are the
    manifestations? How do you counter online recruitment? How do
    you create off-ramps for susceptible individuals? How do you
    deradicalize people who have come back, perhaps? And, how do
    you leverage them?
        Third, and finally--and I think this is where the community
    engagement piece becomes so important--how do you define
    identity and opportunity in these communities and for
    individuals--whether they are disaffected or otherwise? The
    government cannot define that. Families, friends, and
    communities have to play a role in defining that, because, at
    the end of the day, the problem of radicalization is often a
    problem of identity.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that
    time.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker.
        Listen, I want to second what Senator Carper was saying.
    This has just been an exceptional panel and an exceptional
    discussion. The goal of every hearing, from my standpoint, is
    to lay out a reality--defining the problem, so we can take the
    first step in solving it, which is really that definition of
    the problem and admitting we have a problem. So, I want to
    commend my colleagues for asking very good questions and to
    thank the staff for assembling the panel. So, this has been,
    really, I think, an extremely good hearing.
        I will give you all a chance to make a concluding comment.
    Try and keep it brief. One question I did not get answered--I
    alluded to it, in terms of the concerns about nuclear
    surveillance--or the surveillance of nuclear facilities. So, if
    anybody wants to address critical infrastructure, I am highly
    concerned about it. We saw the cyber attack against Ukraine. We
    saw the physical terrorist attack against Metcalf, California.
    I am highly concerned about that. So, by all means, if you have
    something to add there--but do not feel obligated. But,
    otherwise, please just give a concluding comment before we
    close the hearing.
        I will start with you, Mr. Zarate.
        Mr. Zarate. Mr. Chairman, again, thank you for the
    privilege of being here and I am really honored to be with this
    expert panel.
        Let me just reiterate, on the DHS mission, because I think
    it is more critical, now, than at any time since 9/11--and it
    has less to do with attacking or dealing with particular groups
    or individuals--and it is the role of DHS to ensure that our
    critical national systems and infrastructure are not only
    secure, but that they are resilient and redundant. I think,
    again, there is no other agency in government that has that
    mission--and I think DHS has a critical role--whether it is
    online or physically--to make sure that our systems are secure
    and redundant. And, that goes a long way in, frankly, making us
    strong and in deterring terrorist attacks.
        The second point I would make, Senator--which I did not
    make earlier--which is that I do not think we can downplay the
    strategic impact of the smaller attacks that ISIS perpetrates.
    We have seen the effect of this in places like Paris and
    Brussels and I think we run the risk--if we define the threat
    through the current lens of whether or not it is existential
    and directed to the homeland--we run the risk of missing the
    adaptations in this threat and the strategic impact over time
    of what these groups can do to our societies, to our laws, and
    to the functioning of our economies.
        Chairman Johnson. By the way, I could not agree more. I
    mean, I do not want to give anybody any ideas, but, certainly,
    in my mind, a bunch of coordinated smaller attacks could have a
    devastating impact on our economy, for example. Ms. Smith.
        Ms. Smith. Let me just say, briefly, that these attacks in
    Europe--in Brussels and in Paris--could not have come at a
    worse time for Brussels, for the European Union, and for Europe
    as a whole. Not only are they facing very severe
    counterterrorism threats, but, as you well know, they are under
    the weight of a migration crisis. They are facing a resurgent
    Russia that is actively trying to destabilize the continent.
    They have weak economies. They have the potential exit of one
    of their largest members.
        And so, I believe that it is in America's interest to help
    fortify the European project. We are not a member of the
    European Union. We cannot do everything for them. But, it is in
    our interest to support the European project that, in many
    ways, is an American project. We helped provide the foundation
    upon which they built the European Union. I think, rather than
    pulling away, we have to invest in this relationship and do
    what we can to help them with these very real security
    challenges.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Ms. Smith. Mr. Gartenstein-
    Ross.
        Mr. Gartenstein-Ross. Since you specifically raised the
    issue of nuclear security, I will start there. I think that one
    area that we should look to, in general, is where, in our
    security apparatus, are there obvious vulnerabilities? There
    are at least two, with respect to nuclear security in Europe--
    and in Belgium, in particular. One is that guards at Belgian
    nuclear facilities are still, by Belgian law, prohibited from
    carrying weapons--meaning that these facilities are vulnerable
    to a coordinated, armed attack.
        The second thing is, I think, that there are significant
    questions about whether they are doing enough to screen their
    personnel. A man named Ilyass Boughalab, who I highlight in my
    testimony--my written testimony--went to Syria as a foreign
    fighter. He died in 2014 and he had been a technician at a
    nuclear power plant from 2009 to 2012. He had access to
    sensitive areas of the reactor. This clearly calls into
    question whether their screening of personnel who have access
    to sensitive areas is sufficient.
        Overall, what this hearing has put its finger on is the
    question of whether we are well suited to the challenges of the
    21st century--and, in particular, I think, I would focus on
    system design. When you look at the European security
    apparatus, we have put our fingers, collectively, on a number
    of problems that occur there. And, the problem is, really, of a
    patchwork of systems and the lack of a central law enforcement
    body, as Clint mentioned. And, it means that terrorists who
    operate transnationally are, inherently, at an advantage.
        Overall, the U.S. system is better than the European
    system, but it also has its problems. And, we put our finger on
    messaging being one of those problems.
        The question, I would say, is whether our bureaucracy--is
    our internal system designed to keep up with these small nimble
    foes? Are we, as a legacy industry, ready to keep up with the
    start-ups that are going to be challenging us and trying to
    kill our citizens?
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you. Mr. Watts.
        Mr. Watts. My final points would be--what do we want, in
    terms of counterterrorism? This comes and goes. We had al-
    Qaeda. Before them--or after them, we now have ISIS. Today, we
    are talking about Europe. I think we are likely to be talking
    about North Africa, maybe, 6 months or a year from now. Yemen
    is definitely on the horizon, I think, as well. And, we go
    through these accelerated peaks and valleys where we get really
    mobilized around counterterrorism, we go flush it out, and
    then, we get upset again a year later when it comes back.
        And so, what is our objective? And, what is our tolerance
    for risk with terrorism? I do not think we have a good handle
    on that, so we get to these emotional points, like now, where
    we react strongly and we take aggressive action. But, what are
    the four or five things we can do in counterterrorism, over the
    horizon, to sort of get this to a steadier state? I do not
    think there is any end to ISIS, because, I think, it will just
    be called something else 5 to 10 years from now--just like we
    were talking about al-Qaeda 10 years ago.
        And so, what do we want to achieve over the horizon? I
    would love to see the U.S. Government, holistically, come to
    terms with that. I feel, at a practitioner level, the NCTC, the
    FBI, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are all pursuing
    counterterrorism on a day-to-day basis. But, what sort of
    steady state do we want to achieve, I think, is the question.
    And, that is why we are reacting to Europe now and why we will
    react wherever it happens next.
        Chairman Johnson. Well, first of all, I could not agree
    more. We have to have a commitment to offense and to being
    relentless. We cannot ever back off--and this is going to be a
    generational problem. But, I think you have to do it step by
    step. As we were pointing out earlier, the fact that the
    caliphate exists--the fact that they hold that territory is
    incredibly dangerous. And, that is, certainly, one of the--
    among many--first steps. We have to defeat that caliphate. We
    have to defeat ISIS.
        But, I agree with you, it already has metastasized. It
    already has spread. But, you have to cut it off at the head
    right now and then, continue to be relentless--not back off--
    because it is going to be a long-term struggle.
        Again, I just want to thank all of you. This has been an
    extremely good hearing.
        The hearing record will remain open for 15 days, until
    April 20 at 5 p.m., for the submission of statements and
    questions for the record.
        This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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