[Senate Hearing 114-662]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-662
THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2016
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
22-768 PDF WASHINGTON : 2017
____________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
Internet:bookstore.gpo.gov. Phone:toll free (866)512-1800;DC area (202)512-1800
Fax:(202) 512-2104 Mail:Stop IDCC,Washington,DC 20402-001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
RAND PAUL, Kentucky JON TESTER, Montana
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
JONI ERNST, Iowa GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
BEN SASSE, Nebraska
Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director
Brooke N. Ericson, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member
Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Holly A. Idelson, Minority Senior Counsel
Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Johnson.............................................. 1
Senator Carper............................................... 2
Senator Tester............................................... 3
Senator Sasse................................................ 17
Senator Booker............................................... 22
Senator Ernst................................................ 26
Prepared statements:
Senator Johnson.............................................. 35
Senator Carper............................................... 37
WITNESS
Tuesday, March 15, 2016
David Donahue, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular
Affairs, U.S. Department of State.............................. 4
Hon. Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................. 6
Hon. Sarah R. Saldana, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.............. 8
Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 10
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Donahue, David:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Rodriguez, Hon. Leon:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Roth, Hon. John:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Saldana, Hon. Sarah R.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 54
APPENDIX
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) statement submitted for the
Record......................................................... 80
Response to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Mr. Donahue.................................................. 86
Mr. Rodriguez................................................ 122
Ms. Saldana.................................................. 169
Mr. Roth..................................................... 192
THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse,
Carper, Tester, Booker, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON
Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order.
I want to, first of all, thank the witnesses for your time
and your testimony and for appearing here before us today. We
do have representatives from the State Department (DOS), the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). You will be hearing
those acronyms. There are a lot of acronyms in this business.
And then, we also have Mr. John Roth, the Inspector General
(IG) for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
This hearing is about the security of our U.S. visa systems
and programs. I think the potential vulnerabilities came to
light, certainly, in the public's awareness, with the attack on
September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the fact that so many of the
terrorists that killed so many Americans were here on student
visas. And then, we also understood--or became aware of--the
reality of visa overstays. So, we started understanding the
vulnerabilities there.
Back then, we, obviously, had the State Department involved
in the acceptance and granting of visas, but we also had
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). You basically had
one agency.
After 9/11, then we kind of took that apart and set up the
Department of Homeland Security. Now, we have different
agencies. And, I think it is legitimate to ask: Are these
agencies working together? Do we have a shared purpose, a
shared goal, and a shared mission to, literally, keep this
Nation safe? Allow for travel and allow for commerce, but--at
the heart of it--are we making sure we can do everything, in an
imperfect world, to keep our Nation safe and secure?
So, that is really my primary question and the main purpose
of this hearing. Are we doing all that we can to screen and vet
visa applicants before they enter the country? And, second, how
effectively are Federal agencies managing their
responsibilities and working together--including sharing
information--through each step of the visa and immigration
process to ensure our security?
I would ask that my written opening remarks be entered into
the record with consent.\1\ And, it has been very kindly
granted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
Appendix on page 35.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER:
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
everybody. Thank you for holding the hearing. Thank you all for
joining us. Three of the folks sitting in front of us are folks
who came before us a year or two ago to be confirmed for
confirmation hearings. And, we very much appreciate your
service. And, that is not taking anything away from you, Mr.
Donahue, but we do not have jurisdiction over the Department of
State. We are working on it, but---- [Laughter.]
We are not quite there yet.
But, this hearing is the third in a series we have held to
explore whether we are doing enough to address concerns that
terrorists might try to exploit international travel to
infiltrate our country.
In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, this
Committee first scrutinized the process in place to screen and
vet Syrian refugees escaping from the carnage in the Middle
East. And, we learned that the U.S. refugee resettlement
process involves extensive security screening. Syrian refugees,
we were told, undergo multiple rounds of screening over an
average period of 18 to 24 months--including in-person
interviews by immigration analysts and counterterrorism
officials trained in spotting fraud and trained in spotting
deception.
The Committee next looked at our Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
which allows citizens of certain nations to travel to the
United States for a visit without a visa. And, once it became
clear that the Paris terrorists held passports from European
countries whose citizens enjoy visa waiver privileges, fears,
understandably, arose that this program could pose a security
threat.
We learned that visa waiver travelers seeking to come to
the United States endure nearly the same level of scrutiny and
vetting as all other travelers. We also learned that, when it
comes to security, nothing is being ``waived,'' as the name of
the program incorrectly suggests. And, we learned that, in
return for their entry into the Visa Waiver Program,
countries--and there are about 38 of them--must share
intelligence with the United States, they must open up their
counterterrorism and aviation security systems to our
inspectors, and they must abide by our standards for aviation
and passport security.
As a result, the Visa Waiver Program has now become a key
counterterrorism tool. And, what started off as a travel
facilitation program has ended up having enormous advantages to
us, in terms of protecting our security.
Today, we are going to continue to look at our screening
systems for foreigners entering our country. We will examine
the depth of security for all forms of visas--whether they
happen to be for students, for tourists, for people here on
business, or for those seeking to make America their permanent
home.
It is a daunting undertaking, given the volume of
international travel to the United States. It also involves the
coordination of multiple government entities, including the
State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and
others that are not represented here today.
Since the 9/11 attacks against our country, there have been
notable changes to strengthen our visa security--including
recent adjustments made following the attacks in Paris and,
more recently, in San Bernardino. For example, amid the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS's) growing online presence, the
Department of Homeland Security is exploring ways to expand its
use of social media to screen travelers seeking to enter the
United States.
I look forward to hearing more about these efforts and also
about the contribution of ICE's Visa Security Program (VSP)
that may help to identify threats posed by potential travelers
early on. We need to know if this program is adding real
security and, if so, how to expand its reach.
As with all of our recent hearings, I expect that we will
find elements of our visa security that we can improve upon
today--understanding that we can never eliminate all risks and
should not turn our back on the many benefits of trade, travel,
and immigration. Yet, as we continuously improve the security
of our immigration system, we must also keep our eye on,
perhaps, the even more pressing threat of homegrown terrorism.
For all that we do to strengthen our borders and our
immigration security, groups, like ISIS, know all too well that
they may bypass our multiple layers of homeland security by
using online propaganda to recruit people already inside of our
borders--maybe born here--to carry out attacks against the
United States. And, in this respect, preventing ISIS's twisted
propaganda from mobilizing our young people to carry out
terrorist violence may help to combat the long-term terrorist
threats to the homeland in ways that aviation screening and
watchlist checks can never do.
We look forward to our continued work on this Committee,
both on combating homegrown terrorism and on strengthening the
security of our immigration systems. And, I hope we can use
today's hearing to identify some common-sense improvements to
the security of visas.
Thank you all for being here. We look forward to this
conversation. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
Senator Tester can only be with us for a short period.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER
Senator Tester. I will make this very short. And, thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the flexibility.
The Visa Waiver Program, as the Chairman and the Ranking
Member have pointed out--they are important programs--important
for our economy--but, they are also of concern. In your opening
statements, if you could address: the security of the programs
you have, first; whether you need additional tools that you do
not have that would require this Committee--or another
committee--to take action, second; and the third thing is
manpower. Do you have the manpower to carry out the job to make
sure that our country is not threatened by the visa program we
have now? If you can do that, you will have answered all of my
questions.
Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. That was under a minute.
It is the tradition of our Committee to swear in witnesses,
so if you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear
that the testimony you will give before this Committee will be
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you, God?
Mr. Donahue. I do.
Mr. Rodriguez. I do.
Ms. Saldana. I do.
Mr. Roth. I do.
Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
Our first witness is David Donahue. He is the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs at the U.S.
Department of State. Mr. Donahue has also served as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services in the Bureau of
Consular Affairs and as Coordinator for Interagency Provincial
Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Secretary
Donahue.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID DONAHUE,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Donahue. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify, today, on the topic of U.S.
visa program security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue appears in the Appendix
on page 39.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of State and our partner agencies throughout
the Federal Government take our commitment to protect American
borders and citizens seriously. And, we constantly analyze and
update our clearance procedures. My written statement, which I
request be put into the record, describes the rigorous
screening regimen that applies to all visa categories.
Let me begin by saying that the visa program is a layered,
interagency program focused on national security, beginning
with the petition to USCIS, my colleagues here, or a visa
application submitted directly to a consular section abroad.
During the interview, prior to travel, upon arrival in the
United States, and while the traveler is in the United States,
our national law enforcement and intelligence communities work
together to protect our borders. The vast majority of visa
applicants--and all immigrants and fiance visa applicants--are
interviewed by a consular officer. Each consular officer
completes extensive training, which has a strong emphasis on
border security, fraud prevention, interagency coordination,
and interviewing techniques.
One hundred and twenty-two diplomatic security assistant
regional security officer investigators at 107 posts worldwide
bring additional law enforcement and anti-terrorism expertise
to the visa process. All of this applicant data is vetted
against databases--including terrorist identity databases that
contain millions of records of individuals found ineligible for
visas or regarding whom potentially derogatory information
exists.
We collect 10 fingerprint scans from nearly all visa
applicants and screen them against DHS and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) databases of known and suspected
terrorists, wanted persons, immigration violators, and
criminals. All visa applicants are screened against photos of
known and suspected terrorists or prior visa applicants.
When an interview raises concerns that an applicant may be
a threat to national security or when the interagency screening
process shows potentially disqualifying derogatory information,
the consular officer suspends processing and submits a request
for a Washington-based interagency security advisory opinion
review conducted by Federal law enforcement, intelligence
agencies, and the Department of State.
The Department of Homeland Security's Pre-Adjudicated
Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT)
program and Visa Security Program, managed by our USCIS
colleagues or ICE colleagues, provide additional protections in
certain overseas posts. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement
special agents, who are assigned to more than 20 embassies and
consulates in high-threat locations, provide on-site vetting of
visa applications as well as other law enforcement support and
training for our officers.
Security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The
Department and the partner agency continuously match new threat
information with our record of existing visas and will use our
authority to revoke visas.
We refuse more than a million applications a year for
visas. Since 2001, the Department has revoked more than 122,000
visas based on information that surfaced after issuance of the
visas. This includes nearly 10,000 revoked for suspected links
to terrorism, again, based on information that surfaced after
issuance. Notice of these revocations is shared across the
interagency in near real time.
I noticed that you also wanted to talk about our view of
the security of the VWP. While that is managed by the
Department of Homeland Security, we believe that it does really
enhance our national security. It allows us to focus on those
places--to have the staffing and the resources in places where
we really do need to look deeply into the threat from
travelers. It also provides, as was mentioned by Senator
Carper, these cooperative agreements with the nations that are
sending these travelers to the United States. Therefore, we
have better access and a better understanding of the threats
they are seeing. They are sharing with us and we are sharing
with them. An advanced stage of that, while it is not part of
the Visa Waiver Program, is in Canada, where we have a very
close relationship in sharing derogatory information back and
forth across the border to make sure we have a strong outer
border for the United States.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee,
the Department of State has no higher priority than the safety
of our fellow citizens at home and overseas as well as the
security of the traveling public. Every visa decision is a
national security decision. We appreciate the support that
Congress has given us as we constantly work to strengthen our
defenses. I encourage you, when you are traveling overseas, to
visit our consular sections to see, firsthand, the good work
that our officers are doing around the world. I look forward to
your questions.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Donahue.
Our next witness is Leon Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is the
Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this position,
Mr. Rodriguez served as the Director of the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) at the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for
Civil Rights at the Department of Justice (DOJ). Director
Rodriguez.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE LEON RODRIGUEZ,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Rodriguez. Good morning, Chairman, good morning,
Ranking Member, and good morning, Members of the Committee.
This is my second time before this Committee to talk about this
subject matter and the seventh time that I have testified
before some Congressional committee in this fiscal year (FY) on
this subject matter. I should hasten to say that this Committee
has become one of my favorites, particularly because the level
of discourse has always been a civil and intelligent one--not
that the questions are easy. I think the questions we are asked
are hard questions that we need to be able to answer for the
benefit of the American people--but I really do appreciate the
tone that you both have set here. Thank you for that.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez appears in the Appendix
on page 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I believe, as an article of faith, that a healthy and
robust immigration and travel system is critical to our
economy, critical to the stability of our families, and
critical, actually, to the successful conduct of our foreign
policy and national security.
I also believe that the most fundamental responsibility of
government is to protect the public safety. I have spent a fair
part of my career working at the local level and have learned
that every time that we issue a driver's license, we need to
make sure that we are not issuing that license to someone who
may become a drunk driver. Every time we issue a building
permit, we need to ensure that that is not a building that will
collapse. And, every time we issue some sort of immigration
benefit, we need to do everything we can to ensure the security
of our country and to ensure that those who mean us harm or who
will become threats to our public safety do not exploit the
immigration system.
In particular, USCIS, my agency, bears responsibility for
screening refugees who are seeking admission to the United
States. Since 9/11, we have admitted nearly 790,000 refugees--
and I would hasten to add that about 120,000 of those have come
from Iraq. In that time, not a single admitted refugee has
actually engaged in an act of terrorist violence against the
United States. There have been a number--a relatively small
number--of terrorist plots or attempts to affiliate with
terrorist organizations that have been successfully disrupted
by United States law enforcement.
The reason why we have been successful is the robust
screening process that already exists to screen those who are
coming to the United States. It is a multi-layered process
involving a multitude of Cabinet agencies, law enforcement
agencies, and intelligence agencies. It involves intensive
interviews conducted by several agencies, in particular by my
officers, who are intensively trained and briefed to do the
work that they do.
Nonetheless, recognizing evolving threats--particularly
those posed by lone wolves inspired by terrorist
organizations--we continue to look for opportunities to
intensify and strengthen the quality of the work that we do.
An area of particular recent focus has been our review of
social media--particularly of those seeking admission as
refugees--in order to determine whether there is any derogatory
information contained therein. We have undertaken,
simultaneously, several pilots to identify automated tools and
processes which will further enable us to do this work. But, we
have not waited for the conclusion of those pilots to, in fact,
begin actively using that as part of our work. And, in those
cases where individuals have been flagged as of concern, being
particularly among certain refugee streams, we have already
been analyzing social media to determine whether any such
information exists. We will continue to add capacity in this
area. We will continue to strengthen our ability to do that.
And, we will add more volume based on our assessment and our
intelligence community (IC) partners' assessment of where the
highest levels of risk are.
Now, to respond in particular to your question, Senator
Tester, we are working to get to the point where we actually
can answer your question--where we can identify the resources
and personnel that we need. Needless to say, our agency is a
fee-funded agency, so the majority of this work is actually
funded by our fee-paying customers. But, a lot of that work is
also done in concert with various tax-based partners in the law
enforcement and intelligence communities--and we will be
looking forward to a further conversation should we identify
needs as we develop these processes.
Finally, I look forward to addressing the concerns raised
in the IG's report. I would like to note a couple of particular
findings. First, 93 percent of our customers in the early going
of our I-90--that is, our replacement green card--launch
reported that they were quite satisfied with the service that
we provided. I would also like to note that the IG recognizes
that, after July 2015, the conclusion of the audit window, we
undertook a number of improvements. And, what I would ask is
both for the IG to come back, but also to be able to engage
with this Committee about those improvements, so that we can
give you the confidence that, in fact, our automation process
is successful and is poised for even greater success in the
future.
Thank you again for having me here today.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Rodriguez.
Our next witness is Director Sarah Saldana. Director
Saldana is the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Director Saldana previously served as United States Attorney
for the Northern District of Texas. Director Saldana.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE SARAH R. SALDANA,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Saldana. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson,
Ranking Member Carper, and other Members of this Committee.
Senator Tester, I am still having nightmares from seeing that--
was it a buffalo or a bison?--the head in your office.
[Laughter.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Saldana appears in the Appendix
on page 54.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am sure I will get over it.
I will say, in all seriousness, that I appreciate the
opportunity to talk, today, about this very important subject.
I absolutely agree with my colleagues here, with respect to the
importance of this issue and these issues. I appreciate what we
will hear from the Inspector General, with respect to our
programs and the improvements that are recommended--and,
obviously, to your questions and suggestions, with respect to
how we can do our jobs better.
As you know, Congress authorized our role in this process
back in 2002, where we were told, first, to assign agents in
diplomatic posts to review visa security activities and,
second, to provide training and other assistance to our State
Department colleagues. This effort is led by the investigative
side of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Homeland Security
Investigations (HSI), with the involvement of our Enforcement
and Removal Operations (ERO) folks, and it is accomplished
through the program that has been referred to as the Visa
Security Program.
Under this program, we have analysts and agents working at
26 visa-issuing posts in 20 countries to identify terrorists,
criminals, and other individuals who are ineligible for visas
prior to their travel or application for admission to the
United States. This fits right in with ICE's larger
responsibility to detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational
criminal organizations. But, in the visa security context,
obviously, we are trying to stop threats--deter threats--before
they reach our nation's borders.
As a result of the additional Ccongressional funding in FY
2015, for which we are very thankful, ICE was able to expand
VSP operations to six new issuing posts--the largest expansion
in the program's history. We are looking forward to adding four
more posts before the end of this fiscal year.
As my colleagues have said, the process begins and ends,
obviously, with the Department of State, along with the
significant involvement of USCIS. But, this process also
presents the first opportunity to assess whether a potential
visitor or immigrant poses a threat to our country--and that is
where ICE comes in--our law enforcement folks. ICE's actions
complement the consular officers' screenings, applicant
interviews, and reviews of applications and supporting
documentation.
PATRIOT, which the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
just mentioned, begins our visa screening mission by conducting
a first take--an automated screening of visa application
information against our vast DHS holdings--all of the
information we have, not only from DHS agencies, but from the
intelligence community as well. This step occurs before the
applicant is even interviewed for the first time. PATRIOT takes
a risk-based approach and uses interagency resources from ICE,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the State
Department to identify potential national security and public
safety threats.
Where VSP differs from most other government screening
efforts is that it leverages the fact that we have agents
posted at those visa-screening sites--at the visa sites that
the State Department has--and those agents are able to
investigate the information that comes up in the applications--
to actually supplement the Department of State's interviews of
those applicants and to identify previously unknown threats.
So, we are very pleased to have those people actually onsite in
those 20 different countries.
In FY 2015, VSP--our agents--reviewed over 2 million visa
applications--over 2 million--and we determined they identified
64,000 of them for further review. This is a flag that goes up
that, perhaps, something there is indicating something to the
agent, who is very well trained and versed in intelligence and
criminal activity as well as other derogatory information.
After in-depth vetting, the next step, we determined the
existence of a little over 7,000 of 23,000 cases in which we
saw derogatory information to have some nexus to terrorism,
resulting in our recommendation to the Department of State to
refuse visas to approximately 8,600 individuals last year.
Approximately 850 terrorist database records were created or
enhanced. That is the other complement to this mission--and
that is, the intelligence gathering that we are able to do
through our in-depth vetting and screening.
While I am extremely proud of what our ICE personnel do to
screen the visa applicants on the front side, we also actively
work to identify and initiate action against overstay
violators, which Senator Johnson mentioned earlier. This
vetting helps to determine if an individual has overstayed or
departed the U.S. In the last 2 years, ICE has dedicated
approximately 650,000 special agent hours a year to overstay
enforcement.
ICE prioritizes immigrant overstay cases using risk-based
analysis through our Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
Unit (CTCEU). The CTCEU reviews many leads and further
investigates them, referring them to others on the ERO side if
we are unable to do anything with them on the investigative
side.
We are very proud to include both sides of our house in
this effort. I believe we have actually, as a side note,
increased the investigative responsibilities of our ERO folks.
I look forward to working with this Committee and with our
Appropriations Committee to discuss some pay reform with
respect to our entire ICE workforce. And, I stand ready to
answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Saldana.
Our final witness is Inspector General John Roth, who is
the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. Mr. Roth most recently served as the Director of the
Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Prior to this, he had a 25-year career as
a Federal prosecutor and senior leader at the Department of
Justice. Inspector General Roth.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Roth. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
Carper, and Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting
me here, today, to discuss my office's oversight of DHS visa
programs. Our recent work has involved a number of audits and
investigations, and I will discuss some of our audit results
this morning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on
page 65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deciding and administering immigration benefits, including
visas, is a massive enterprise. USCIS employs about 19,000
people to process millions of applications for immigration
benefits. They are required to enforce what are, sometimes,
highly complex laws, regulations, and internal policies that
can be subject to differing interpretations. They are rightly
expected to process decisions within a reasonable timeframe.
USCIS and the rest of DHS accomplish their mission while
working with an antiquated system of paper-based files more
suited to an office environment from 1950 than 2016. This
system creates inefficiencies and risks to the program. To give
you an idea of the scope of the problem, USCIS spends more than
$300 million per year shipping, storing, and handling over 20
million immigrant files.
This week, we published our sixth report on USCIS' efforts
to transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and
automated system.
We undertook this audit to answer a relatively simple
question: After 11 years and considerable expense, what has
been the outcome of USCIS' efforts to automate benefits
processing? We focused on the progress that was made and the
performance outcomes. We interviewed dozens of individuals,
including by traveling to the local field locations and talking
to over 60 end users who are using Electronic Immigration
System (ELIS). And, we literally stood next to them and watched
as they struggled with the system.
We found that USCIS has made little progress in
transforming its paper-based process into an automated system.
Previous efforts, which have cost approximately $500 million to
implement, had to be abandoned, recently, in favor of a new
system. USCIS now estimates that it will take more than 3 years
and an additional $1 billion to automate benefit processing.
This delay will prevent USCIS from achieving its workload
processing, national security, and customer service goals.
Currently, only 2 of about 90 different types of application
forms are online for filing.
We found, for example, that the time to process immigration
benefits was twice that of the metrics that USCIS had
established. Our earlier report on USCIS information technology
(IT) systems, published in July 2014, reported that using the
electronic files in use at the time actually took twice as long
as using paper files. That report reflected user
dissatisfaction with a system that often took between 100 and
150 mouse clicks to move among sub-levels to complete a
specific process.
As Director Rodriguez said, we acknowledge that DHS has
recently taken significant steps to improve the process by
which new information technology--including moving from a
traditional development methodology to a new incremental
approach, called Agile, will assist. Implementation of
automation is very much a moving target, and USCIS may have
subsequently made progress on the problem since the time our
field work ended in July 2015. We will obviously continue to
monitor the situation and report back to the Committee as
necessary.
Separately, in a second, earlier audit, we compared
databases belonging to ICE and to USCIS and found that known
human traffickers were using work, fiance, and other family
reunification visas to bring their victims into the country. An
important finding we made is that the data systems that USCIS
uses do not electronically capture important information which
would be valuable in investigating human trafficking. Again,
this poses risks to the system. We made three recommendations
to improve these programs. ICE and USCIS are taking actions to
resolve these recommendations and we are satisfied with their
progress thus far.
Finally, corrupt and criminal activity on the part of DHS
personnel can present a risk to the integrity of the visa
process. My written testimony illustrates several examples in
which employees or contractors, who are in a position of trust,
were able to compromise the system to provide immigration
benefits to those who are not entitled to them. This type of
insider threat presents significant risks that can only be
countered through continual vigilance.
In summary, the size and complexity of the mission, coupled
with an archaic method of processing applications, brings
significant risk. There is risk to operations in that it makes
it more difficult for USCIS to accomplish its mission. There is
also risk to our national security in that we may be admitting
individuals who do not meet the requirements for a visa. Basic
information on visa applicants is not captured in an electronic
format and, thus, cannot be used to perform basic investigative
steps.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I am
happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of the
Committee may have.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
In my opening comments, I was talking a little bit about
missions--the goals of the different agencies. In this
Committee we have a pretty simple one: to enhance the economic
and national security of America. Pretty all-encompassing. I
think a problem we have, in terms of our visa programs, is that
you, literally, have the tension of conflicting goals. We want
to facilitate travel, commerce, and customer service, as
Director Rodriguez was talking about. On the other hand, we
want to ensure the security of our homeland and keep Americans
safe. There is tension there.
So, I want to first go to Director Rodriguez. Does your
agency have a pretty simple mission statement like this
Committee does? And, can you tell us what it is?
Mr. Rodriguez. We have a number of different ways, but,
certainly, I have been very clear with our staff--in
communications to the entire staff that, in fact, to articulate
a set of simple principles--and that is, where an individual
qualifies for an immigration benefit, they should get that
benefit in an efficient and appropriate manner, subject to,
first and foremost, national security and fraud prevention.
That is a key element of our draft strategic plan--subject,
again, to the legal requirements that I mentioned before and
subject to operational feasibility of whatever initiatives we
are taking.
Chairman Johnson. But, just the way you describe that, the
first thing you talked about was providing benefits to your
customer. So, I guess, the way I would interpret that is that
that is really the first part of your mission--customer
service, providing benefits to immigrants to this country,
again, subject to security.
Mr. Rodriguez. Right. And, subject to, and in no small way,
to be given to national security and public safety. In other
words, our staff clearly understands this, which is evidenced
by the fact that roughly 900 of our staff members are,
specifically, dedicated to the Fraud Detection and National
Security Directorate (FDNS)--that if an individual poses a
threat, they are denied the benefit--to be very clear about
that.
Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, do you have a
relatively simple mission statement for your Agency?
Ms. Saldana. It is comparable to this Committee's, and that
is: to ensure the national security and public safety of our
country through the enforcement of immigration and customs
laws. Huge. Over 400 statutes are implicated by that, but we
are game.
Chairman Johnson. It is a big mission. It is a serious
undertaking. The results of 9/11 and the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 9/11 Commission, and
what they were talking about--the stovepipes--that continues to
be a concern of mine. So, you have these cross-purposes. You
have two different agencies now split--and I think you were
always somewhat split under INS as well. But, I am concerned
about that.
Director Rodriguez, are you aware of what happened at the
USCIS office in San Bernardino on December 3 following the San
Bernardino attack? Are you aware of the events that occurred
there?
Mr. Rodriguez. At the USCIS office in San Bernardino.
Chairman Johnson. In San Bernardino.
Mr. Rodriguez. I am not, honestly. No, I am not aware that
anything occurred at our office.
Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, are you aware of it?
Ms. Saldana. I think you are referring to our HSI office,
Senator Johnson.
Chairman Johnson. Correct.
Ms. Saldana. The subject of a letter that you have sent, I
believe, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which has been
sent to me for response. I am aware of it.
Chairman Johnson. Can you describe what happened from the
standpoint--because HSI is under your jurisdiction. Can you
just describe, from your standpoint, what you are aware of with
respect to that incident?
Ms. Saldana. Well, with respect to the whole San Bernardino
incident----
Chairman Johnson. No. I am just talking about your HSI
agents showing up at the office of USCIS because they were made
aware of the fact that Enrique Marquez was, potentially, there
for an interview the day after the San Bernardino attack. You
are not aware of that?
Ms. Saldana. That I am not aware of. He showed up at USCIS?
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Senator, now I am remembering the
incident. I believe, if I understand correctly, there was a
concern about the manner in which we were providing information
about the individuals involved in the attack to HSI. In fact,
the intent all along among our staff was to provide that
information. It was just a matter of completing a very short
process.
Chairman Johnson. So, let me just describe--this is from an
internal memo written by somebody who contacted our Committee.
``At approximately 12:00 p.m. on December 3, the FBI informed
HSI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that FBI field
interview agents learned that Marquez and his wife, Maria
Chernykh, were scheduled for a meeting at the U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services office in San Bernardino for noon on
December 3. HSI contacted the HSI special agent division
requesting a team of armed agents to respond to the San
Bernardino USCIS office in order to detain Marquez until an FBI
interview team could be dispatched. The special agent division
informed the HSI team that the officer in charge of USCIS would
not let HSI agents in the building.''
So, HSI had a special team show up trying to, potentially,
apprehend somebody who, at that point in time, they thought
might have been a part of a terrorist plot, and the officer in
charge of the USCIS office would not allow those agents in the
building.
``The special agent division learned that Marquez and
Chernykh did not show up for the meeting. The special agent
division requested copies of the Alien Registration File (A
File), which USCIS refused. The special agent division was
allowed to take a photo of Chernykh's photo, which was
contained in that A file.''
So, what happened on December 3--and this is kind of
getting me to the cross-purposes. So, we had a team, armed up
and, potentially, dealing with a terrorist. They had a tip from
the FBI that Mr. Marquez might be at the USCIS office and the
officer in charge of USCIS--the officers would not allow HSI
into the building and would not give them the A file. That is
not indicating a great deal of cooperation between two
different agencies under DHS, whose supposedly top concern is
the security of this Nation. Director Rodriguez, can you
explain that?
By the way, we have been told during the gathering of
information process that the decision not to let HSI in came
from higher up.
Mr. Rodriguez. That much is not correct, in the sense that,
once field leadership had consulted with higher-ups, the
instruction was, in fact, to facilitate the actions that HSI
wanted to take. Unfortunately, this was all--as these
situations do--evolving very quickly. Ordinarily, we do not
have situations where law enforcement comes into a USCIS office
to effect an arrest.
Chairman Johnson. But, how can you explain that the officer
in charge of USCIS would not allow HSI agents in there when
they are saying, ``Listen, you could have a potential terrorist
here-- somebody who was involved in what just happened
yesterday, in the slaughter of 14 Americans.'' And, they do not
even allow them in the office? How could that possibly happen?
Mr. Rodriguez. Again, Chairman, I think the point here is
that we operate according to certain protocols. That individual
was seeking guidance from higher-ups. The guidance was to
facilitate what HSI was trying to accomplish. Unfortunately, it
all happened so quickly that it was, incorrectly, perceived as
our folks trying to, in some way, obstruct what ICE was trying
to do.
Do we need to look at our protocols to make sure that those
misunderstandings do not occur? That may well be something that
we need to do. But, there was never an actual intent to prevent
them from doing what they needed to do.
Chairman Johnson. It sounds like they were prevented.
Director Saldana, can you explain this? And, what do you
now know about it with, maybe, your memory refreshed?
Ms. Saldana. I will say, in all honesty, Senator, that I
had a similar reaction when I first heard about the incident.
But, we do forget the number of law enforcement and other
people involved in this incident and the confusion and the
chaos that was going on in San Bernardino. We had immediate
conversations when it came to my attention--and I am having a
hard time, right now, remembering exactly. I believe it was the
same day, and it was taken care of and clarified immediately.
And, we did get the information we needed.
But, I am with the Director. We can always do things
better. And, if we do not, as I tell my son, learn lessons from
the mistakes we make, then shame on us. But, I believe--he and
I meet very often.
Chairman Johnson. Coming from the private sector--I am just
putting myself in the position of individuals at USCIS. The day
after a terrorist attack, if I had a team, armed, coming into
my office and saying, ``We believe somebody who was involved in
that terrorist incident is in your building, we want to come
in,'' I would say, ``Come on in.'' There would not have been a
question in my mind. And, yet that is not what happened. It is
quite puzzling. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. My first question is for you, Ms. Saldana.
Over your right shoulder is a gentleman sitting in the crowd
right behind you--in the row right behind you. He looks very
familiar--right over your right shoulder in the front row. It
looks like his first name might be Jason, and I think he used
to work here. He used to sit right behind us here on this dais.
Ms. Saldana. We have spent a lot of time together.
Senator Carper. It is nice to see you, Jason. Welcome back.
Thank you for your service.
A couple of you alluded to one of my favorite aphorisms,
that, if it is not perfect, make it better. And, one of those
is how we move from a paper process to an electronic process.
And, I think the Inspector General and, I think, Mr. Rodriguez
both have touched on this--and the IG talked about a project
that was abandoned, maybe, within the last year--I think after
an investment of, I think you said, $500 million--and you
thought that there had been some progress since the July 2015
audit. And, I heard the word ``Agile'' mentioned, a term
describing something. Just help and make some sense of it for
me. I think we know that, to the extent that we can take a
paperwork process--paper processes and make them electronic,
oftentimes that provides better service and better security.
How would this have done that? Where did we go wrong? And, how
are we fixing it now? Mr. Rodriguez, lead us off.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes. So, the question is first to me. Is
that correct, Senator?
Senator Carper. Please.
Mr. Rodriguez. I think it is well known to just about
everybody here, including this Committee, that, in fact, there
were a number of quite serious and quite protracted false
starts with respect to our automation process. We were using
what was sort of an antiquated development process, the
Waterfall development process, which was directed by an outside
entity. We have since migrated to this Agile process, which,
essentially, involves multiple contractors competing against
each other and also shrinks the development steps in such a way
that we can develop a particular item, test it, try it out in
the field, make corrections as we need to, and then move on to
the next item--instead of trying to do everything all at once.
To understand the timelines here, the first generation was
the Waterfall generation. There was a second generation called
ELIS. We began, really, the third generation, live, in March of
last year, which, in other words, was about a month before the
Inspector General's audit began. We launched the I-90, which is
our replacement Green Card. That, already, incorporates a
number of critical functionalities, which are then going to be
used for other applications in the future. We have now
processed approximately 300,000 I-90 applications through there
and we have also added the Immigrant Visa (IV) payment since
that time.
So, we now have, approximately, 16 percent of our overall
business on ELIS. What we have done so far, certainly, from a
customer perspective, is working quite well. A number of the
concerns that our internal employees had either reflected the
older generation of ELIS or are things that reflected that
early time when we first launched the I-90 application. Many of
those issues have since been, not only resolved, but resolved
well. Again, that is why I would like to invite the IG to come
back and to invite the Committee to scrutinize further what we
are doing.
By the end of this year, we will have 30 percent of the
business on ELIS, including some of our most complex forms.
And, this is where----
Senator Carper. I am going to ask you to hold it right
there because I have some other questions. But, thank you for
that explanation.
Inspector General Roth, a quick reaction to what you are
hearing from Leon Redbone--excuse me, Leon Rodriguez.
[Laughter.]
That is my favorite nickname for him.
Mr. Roth. I mean, certainly, what we simply did was we went
out to where the work is being done and we talked to the USCIS
employees who were actually confronted with the system that
they had. And, the level of frustration, which is reflected by
the glitches and the hiccups in the rollout of the ELIS report,
were significant. And, we were able to isolate that and to
uncover a few root causes, including that there was a lack of
user engagement--that is, the folks in the field did not
particularly feel that they were being engaged and listened to
in the development of the software. Second, that the testing
was not done on an end-to-end basis--in other words, that the
testing of certain elements of the software was done
sporadically--but it was not done in a complete way. And,
third, that the technical support was lacking.
Now, the Agile development process means that you put out a
minimum viable product and then you improve that product as you
go. You basically fix the car while it is running, to use an
analogy. Here, we thought that the testing, though, was
insufficient, that the rollout was too soon, and that the user
experience--the folks who were actually using it were highly
frustrated with the system.
Those issues--that is, user engagement, testing, and
technical support--were the same things that we had seen in the
previous version of ELIS--the $500 million one that ultimately
had to be scrapped.
Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Rodriguez has extended an
invitation for your folks to come back and revisit them. I
would urge you to do that and to do it soon.
Mr. Roth. That is part of our audit process. We will,
obviously, continue to sort of monitor this situation. We have
made specific recommendations--some of which they have agreed
with and some of which they have not--and we will continue to
monitor and report as appropriate.
Senator Carper. OK. Good. We will continue to monitor this.
Thank you for the update.
Director Saldana and Mr. Donahue, how do your agencies use
social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what
challenges have you encountered in doing so?
Ms. Saldana. I will begin with our portion of the
responsibility here with respect to the vetting and screening.
We are, first and foremost, a law enforcement agency--and HSI
is an investigative agency. In all of our investigations and
reviews, we use social media to the extent that the evidence
leads us there.
So, in the visa screening process, in particular, there is
no bar to our use of it. There are occasions where we do. As I
mentioned, we go through PATRIOT first. There is a preliminary
assessment as to whether there are some indicators for further
review. Where there is further review, we might actually use
social media--review a person's social media in order to
determine whether we should have a further study or whether we
should recommend a negative result to the Department of State.
So, we have that under our current authorities--and we have
no problem using it when the case indicates we need to.
Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Donahue--same question. How do
your folks use social media when you vet and screen visa
applicants? And, what challenges have you encountered as you do
that?
Mr. Donahue. Sure. In Consular Affairs, we have used social
media for a while. We have it in our regulations. In fact, we
just updated our social media regulations. We use it when we
see that there is a reason to look further into the case. We
are now doing a pilot program in countries of concern to find
out how effective it can be. It is a studied program where we
are using social media on our IR1--our immigrant visa for
spouses--and our K cases to see what kind of especially
terrorist-related information we can find in the process. We do
not have the results yet, but we have used it for a long time
on the fraud side of the house.
Senator Carper. OK. Thank you everyone.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Sasse.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE
Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Saldana, in January, 21-year-old Sarah Root was
killed in Omaha by an illegal alien named Eswin Mejia. He was
street driving while drunk. This is not the first time that
local police had arrested Mr. Mejia for driving drunk. And,
after he was arrested for the incident, he posted bail. Prior
to being released from jail, however, local police contacted
ICE and requested that he be detained because of his
immigration status. ICE, however, refused and said that that
would not be consistent with the President's Executive Actions
on immigration. Mejia was released and disappeared.
Do you think someone who street races while driving drunk
and kills another person is a threat to public safety?
Ms. Saldana. Yes.
Senator Sasse. If an illegal alien kills an American
citizen, should ICE let that person go free?
Ms. Saldana. Go free? Well, there will be----
Senator Sasse. Which is what happened here.
Ms. Saldana. There will be criminal consequences.
Senator Sasse. We do not know where the man is.
Ms. Saldana. Right. And, sir, I do not understand where you
got the information, with respect to our refusing to deal with
this individual. That is not my understanding of the facts.
Senator Sasse. This is ICE's public comment. ICE has said
this in response to Omaha law enforcement, who said they
requested that ICE detain him.
Ms. Saldana. I am ICE and I do not recall making that
statement. I would not have said that. What we did do was--we
look at every individual case, like we did here with Mr. Mejia,
and we determine whether a detainer to recommend to local law
enforcement is appropriate. As you know, that has been a
subject of much conversation. We are working very hard to get
all local law enforcement offices to work with us on it--and we
have made some great strides. But, in this case--there is not a
single injury or death that occurs at the hands of an illegal
immigrant that does not weigh heavily on me, Senator.
Senator Sasse. I believe that. I am going to interrupt
because I am quoting your agency here. This is my letter to
you, dated February 29. I am quoting your Agency's public
statement. This is footnote 4 in my letter. Do you have the
letter from February 29? Your agency said in response, ``At the
time of his January 2016 arrest in Omaha--and local criminal
charges, Eswin Mejia, 19, of Honduras, did not meet ICE's
enforcement priorities, as stated by the November 20, 2014
civil enforcement memo issued by Secretary Johnson.''
Ms. Saldana. Oh, I understood you to be saying that we told
local law enforcement we were not going to do anything about
him because he did not meet our priorities. That is a statement
of fact in one person's interpretation. Quite frankly, sir, it
is very easy to look back and say that that person's judgment
was incorrect--and I have some concerns about that.
As I said earlier, for every situation we have that results
in something as horrific as this, we always try to learn from
it. And, I will be following up to look at the specific
individuals involved, how the judgment was formed, and why that
was done. But, I misunderstood your question. I understood your
question to mean that we told law enforcement that we are not
going to do that.
Senator Sasse. Well, the rest of your statement says--your
Agency's statement, not you personally--that Mejia is scheduled
to go before an immigration judge on March 23, 2017--but he was
released by the police once he posted bail. They contacted your
agency and asked you to detain him. ICE did not act. How do you
explain that to the family?
Ms. Saldana. We tried to act, sir, but I believe it was a
matter of hours between the time that we were contacted and the
actual release. It is very hard for us to get to every inquiry
that is made by law enforcement, and, unfortunately, it had a
horrible consequence here. But, we try very hard to respond as
quickly as possible. We just cannot get to every site within a
matter of hours. I think it was 4 hours, if I am not----
Senator Sasse. I do not know that fact.
Ms. Saldana. If I am remembering correctly. But, that is a
fact--that we try very hard to get to and to respond to local
law enforcement. It does not do us any good to tell them to
cooperate with us if we are not going to respond.
Senator Sasse. My letter to you is from 16 days ago. Can
you tell me when I will receive a reply? Because it has details
on all of these questions.
Ms. Saldana. Yes, I think we will get you a reply within a
couple of weeks--if that is satisfactory. And, if you need it
sooner, I will certainly work to try to get that.
Senator Sasse. Could we have that by the end of next week?
Ms. Saldana. Yes, you can.
Senator Sasse. Thank you, ma'am.
General Roth, in November 2014, Secretary Johnson issued a
number of memos changing DHS's policies on immigration known
collectively as ``the President's immigration Executive
Aactions.'' One of these memos addressed changes to ICE's
detention policy for illegal aliens. DHS said in that memo that
it was designed to identify threats to public safety.
Specifically, it says that, unless an illegal alien has been
charged with a serious crime, ICE will not likely detain that
person. Does this policy mean that ICE does not consider
someone a threat to public safety unless they have already been
convicted?
Mr. Roth. Frankly, I was not involved in writing that memo
or in developing that policy, so it is difficult for me to
respond to that.
Senator Sasse. To your knowledge, though, are ICE officials
required to strictly follow the new policy, or is it used as
guidance and then there is discretion on a case-by-case basis?
Mr. Roth. Again, we have not looked at that in any kind of
audit or investigation, so I think that question is best
directed to members of the administration or to ICE.
Senator Sasse. Does the IG's office have any plans or any
current studies of the President's Executive Actions on
immigration?
Mr. Roth. We do not.
Senator Sasse. Director Saldana, how should ICE officials
implement the new detention policies that were put in place in
November 2014 with regard to cases like this? You mentioned the
timing. Can you give us a broad sense of how you exercise your
discretion?
Ms. Saldana. Well, generally speaking--and let me just
respond to the tail end of that question that you had, and that
is the requirement of conviction. I am happy to share with you
this card that we have, which we provide to our ICE officers
who are involved in this activity. But, there are many
categories here where a conviction is not necessary. If this is
a person with a gang affiliation, no conviction is necessary.
If there is a person with terrorist ties, no conviction is
necessary. There are several that do involve a conviction, but
let me point out to you, sir--and I have met with all of our
field office directors to specify, clearly, to them that there
is always this category--which is kind of an umbrella
category--that says that if this does not fit a specific case,
but you, as an informed and well-trained officer of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement believe that that person presents a
public safety threat, you are free to exercise your judgment in
the manner consistent with that judgment.
Senator Sasse. But, in this case, Sarah Root is dead. So,
what if someone kills a U.S. citizen? That does not meet the
threshold?
Ms. Saldana. That was after the fact, sir. What you are
saying, as I understand it, is that that person was injured and
had
not--when that 4-hour period of time--seriously injured, but
had not passed away until later. Again, sir, it is easy to look
back and say that that judgment was poorly exercised. And, as I
said earlier, I intend to learn from this particular incident.
I feel terrible for the Root family and--but I can say, I wish
I had a 100-percent foolproof method to ensure and--to look in
the future and ensure whether somebody is going to commit a
crime or not. And, it is very difficult to do that. I hope you
take my word that we do the best we can.
Senator Sasse. I hear you. But, it is not the case that he
was released and then went and had another drunk-driving,
street-racing case. This was drunk-driving, street-racing that
killed someone. Then, he posted bond. Then, the Omaha police
asked that he be detained. ICE did not detain him and now he
has fled.
Ms. Saldana. And, I intend to use this--again, I am going
to look further into this and use it for lessons learned if I
find that there were serious errors of judgment here. But, many
times prosecutorial discretion is just that. It is a judgment
that is being exercised by the person based on what they see at
the time.
Senator Sasse. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I also want
to join to thank our witnesses today for your work. There is no
question that the most important duty that we have as members
of the Federal Government is to ensure the security of our
borders and to ensure the security of the citizens of this
country. So, I appreciate all of your efforts in doing that
each and every day. And, I know that it is a difficult job that
you all have.
I am very proud to represent, as all of you know, a very
large and vibrant Arab-American and Muslim community in the
State of Michigan. And, I heard, from a number of my
constituents, some concerns about the impact that the dual
national provisions could have on their families as they are
traveling to other Visa Waiver Program countries around the
world.
We know that Syria and Iran deem individuals to be
nationals of those countries, regardless of where someone was
born or whether they have even set foot in that country, simply
because their fathers were citizens of those countries. Because
the Visa Waiver Program is based on reciprocity, it is possible
that a Visa Waiver Program country could impose the same
requirements on dual national Syrian and Iranian Americans. So,
I would like a response. Is the Administration--it can be from
anyone on the panel. Is the Administration concerned that other
Visa Waiver Program countries could impose restrictions on
American citizens limiting their ability to travel to
participating VWP countries without a visa?
Mr. Donahue. Thank you for your question, Senator. It
certainly is a concern, I think, for the State Department and
the Department of Homeland Security. Our Secretaries have been
working together on the new legislation regarding dual
nationals. We are certainly concerned that citizens who have
non-meaningful citizenship that they cannot remove--about the
effects that that has on their life. They certainly can apply
for a visa and travel to the United States. We are still
reviewing that--and, certainly, we are concerned that there
could be reciprocity from other countries.
Senator Peters. Would anybody else like to comment? No?
[No response.]
Also, for the panel, I would like to know--I would like to
just get a better sense of how the United States makes dual
national determinations. So, for example, would a German
citizen who was born and raised in Germany and has never
traveled outside of the country, but whose father was Iranian,
would he be considered a dual German-Iranian national by the
United States?
Mr. Donahue. Again, I think we are looking at that. We have
not made a final decision on how we are going to manage the
dual citizenship.
Senator Peters. OK. I would love to work with you on that
as we go forward. Obviously, we have a situation where a number
of folks are going to be in that category and they are just
concerned about how the process will work. And, we need to know
how the process will work.
Also, Mr. Donahue, given some of your concerns, are there
waivers that the State Department would recommend for classes
such as journalists, non-governmental organization (NGO)
employees, and, perhaps, certain dual nationals that you could
offer?
Mr. Donahue. Yes, the Secretary of State recommended to
Secretary Johnson that there--and Secretary Johnson agreed that
that was a reasonable interpretation of the law and that there
be waivers for those who are helping us in the work that we are
doing. I think, particularly, we think about aid workers who
are providing food and sustenance to the millions of people who
are in camps in countries of concern--Syria, for example--going
forward.
Again, while these travelers can travel with a visa--it
does not affect their travel--it could deter people who want to
help us in our work. For example, people who are working for
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) going to Iran to
ensure implementation or people who are in business in Northern
Iraq and are helping that country develop.
So, we are very concerned about that. We are working
together. We are looking at those cases. DHS has been building
questions as part of the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA) program that screens visa waiver
travelers, and no decisions have been made--or no waivers have
been granted thus far--but, we do believe that the law was
written to allow for waivers.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
The other area that I think we need to focus on--as a
country, we are, but I was just hoping to get some response
from the panel as to how your agencies work on an interagency
basis with other parts of the Federal Government. A key area is
trying to stem the financing of terror networks and focus on
stopping the flow of money back and forth. And, I am just
curious as to how the interagency visa vetting process works--
how it incorporates information about financial crimes that may
have been conducted by individuals who may be part of a terror
financing network. The Department of Treasury is very active
with this issue. I am just curious as to how you work with the
Department of Treasury to identify those individuals who may be
engaged in activities that are seeking to move around the world
to continue to further those activities.
Ms. Saldana. Well, I will say that our agency, Homeland
Security Investigations--that is exactly up our wheelhouse. We
are concerned about illicit trafficking--illicit financial
transactions across transnational boundaries.
So, what we do is we build databases to share information
with the Department of State and USCIS, specifically, to
communicate information that we may have regarding a target in
an investigation or someone who has actually been convicted of
a crime, which is available to them. We communicate through--
obviously, the PATRIOT system is that first line of defense
with respect to the visa screening process, but what I am
talking about is, not only the visa screening process, but
criminal investigations, in general, worldwide. That is exactly
what Homeland Security Investigations does.
Mr. Rodriguez. The one thing that I would add is that we
have strong relationships running in both directions with our
law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Beginning
with our law enforcement partners within DHS, like ICE and CBP,
it is critical that we receive information from them when we
adjudicate immigration benefits. We get that information as we
need it. At the same time, we, occasionally, in the course of
our work, identify information that is either of law
enforcement or intelligence value, and we have well-developed
pathways to make sure that that information is shared.
One example is, during the course of refugee screening, if
we learn information that is potentially of intelligence value,
that information is, in fact, shared with the intelligence
community.
Senator Peters. Thank you.
Mr. Donahue. And, we work very closely with the Department
of Treasury. When they make a designation, as part of the
announcement of that designation, anyone who is designated--and
quite often their family members or anyone who benefits from
these actions--they pass those to us and we immediately enter
them into our Lookout system, review any visas, and we can do
prudential revocations of the visas of anyone who is found by
the Department of Treasury to be in that class.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to say, first and foremost, how grateful I am
for the dedication, the work, and the service that the four of
you render to our Nation. We have an incredible country, the
oldest constitutional democracy. We were founded in a different
way than any other nation in the history of the Earth at that
time. We were founded not because we all prayed the same, not
because we all looked the same, and not because we all heralded
from the same genealogy, but rather because we were a nation of
ideals. And, every generation in this country has aspired to
make more real those ideals.
One of the things that has sourced the richness and the
greatness of this country has been the fact that we are a
Nation that has people from all over the planet Earth who have
brought such strength to our economy--growth. Our diversity has
yielded diversity of thought, diversity of innovation,
diversity of accomplishment, and, I think, that is one of the
things that makes America great. And, you all, every day
grapple in an incredibly difficult space where you are
balancing our values and our ideals with the urgencies of our
time. First and foremost amongst them is to keep us safe.
So, I know how difficult your work is and I just want to
say thank you. I know these hearings, as, I think, the
Honorable Mr. Rodriguez was hinting at, can often be difficult,
but please know I am one of those Senators that just
appreciates your work.
I want to just dive in where Senator Peters left off. I
have a lot of concerns about the issues that face what was
brought forth in the omnibus last year, when Congress passed a
provision that would bar dual nationals from Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Sudan from using the Visa Waiver Program. I am very happy
that, in a bipartisan way, Senators Flake, Durbin, and I
introduced bipartisan legislation, the Equal Protection and
Travel Act, repealing--seeking to repeal the restrictions on
dual nationals while, obviously, leaving the other changes to
the Visa Waiver Program intact.
I just find it very disturbing that the prohibition on dual
nationals applies to individuals who were born in Visa Waiver
Program countries, but who have never even traveled to Iraq,
Iran, Sudan, or Syria. But, they are nationals of those
countries solely because of their ancestry. It seems to
violate, in my opinion, really the values of this country that
we have seen throughout our history.
And so, my colleagues and I support the tightening of the
Visa Waiver Program, but singling out people based solely on
their ancestry or national origin does not, I believe, make us
safer. And, it is inconsistent with what I love about our
country and our interests--and it invites, in my opinion,
retaliation or discrimination against American citizens who are
also dual nationals.
So my question--and maybe I will start with you, Mr.
Donahue--is just very plain: do you believe that the dual
national restrictions that I just described enhance our
national security?
Mr. Donahue. We certainly are always reviewing where we
need to put more emphasis and we want to be sure that every
visa interview is used effectively to protect our borders. But,
we also realize that the Visa Waiver Program, by its very
nature, has allowed us to move resources to those places where
we need to look more closely.
Senator Booker. So, does it make us safer that somebody
from Britain or France who has Iranian, Syrian, or Sudanese
ancestry--does barring them from the Visa Waiver Program make
us safer, in your opinion?
Mr. Donahue. I think, all things being equal, not knowing
the individual--not knowing--you always try to do these on a
case-by-case basis. But, I agree with you that that is not, in
and of itself, an indicator----
Senator Booker. I appreciate that.
Mr. Donahue [continuing]. That this person is a higher
threat.
Senator Booker. In the Senate, whenever I hear those words
``I agree with you,'' I get very happy--and I appreciate that.
And so, Mr. Rodriguez or the Honorable Ms. Saldana, do you
think we gain any additional security benefits by barring
individuals based on their national origin or heritage?
Ms. Saldana. Well, as a general proposition, no.
Senator Booker. OK. Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Let me be very clear. No, we do not. And no,
we do not do that. We scrutinize people, perhaps, differently
in situations where they come from conflict zones,
particularly, conflict zones where there are organizations that
are actively promoting violence against the United States.
Senator Booker. Clearly.
Mr. Rodriguez. But no, we do not--and I would never operate
an Agency that operated that way.
Senator Booker. But, the omnibus that passed last year
called for us to do those things. And, I am very happy that,
again, a bipartisan group of Senators is saying that we should
not do those things. And, you are saying to me that we do not
do them now, or--does it add to our national----
Mr. Rodriguez. Certainly not in the manner in which my
agency does any of its work. I do not operate the Visa Waiver
Program. My agency does not operate that. We do other things
where we make decisions based on----
Senator Booker. Right, but you do not think that what I
described and what was in that omnibus enhances national
security?
Mr. Rodriguez. Again, not my lane, so I would not be
opining on the Visa Waiver Program.
Senator Booker. You are a smart man to stay in your lane.
[Laughter.]
But, a rule, I think, is very important. But, the Honorable
Ms. Saldana, you do not think it makes us any safer?
Ms. Saldana. As I said, as a general proposition--again, in
our role as investigators, we look at every aspect of the facts
and circumstances pertaining to an individual's application--
and there may be some reason to explore further. But, as a
general proposition, of course not--not just solely based on a
remote relationship with someone from a particular country.
Senator Booker. I am grateful for that response.
Let me shift into your lane, sir. It was very clear to me,
after the horrific attacks in France, that many of the people
who participated in that could have used the Visa Waiver
Program to come to our country and, by the way, walk into a gun
show, buy a trunk full of weapons, and commit those crimes here
just as easily. And so, one of the aspects of the Visa Waiver
Program that is important to me is our coordination and
cooperation with our European allies, specifically, in sharing
information and working against terrorism. So, my final
question in my remaining few seconds is: I worry that our
European allies and others might not be doing enough to help
strengthen our security--to share information and to up their
procedures and policies to the point where we could effectively
rely on them. And so, what are we doing to help Europe
strengthen its border security entry procedures, so that they
are effectively documenting the refugees coming into their
countries?
And, if that is a new signal for my time almost being up,
it is very effective. [Laughter.]
Go ahead.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, what I do know is that we work on those
issues, primarily, through our U.S. intelligence community and
law enforcement partners. I do know that they are actively
engaged with their counterparts in Europe and throughout the
English-speaking world. Just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I spent a lot of
time with our partners from Australia, England, and Canada
exchanging information and talking about our common goals in
this area. We are going to continue doing that on a
multilateral basis to make sure that we are supporting one
another in what is really a very critical mission.
Senator Booker. Mr. Roth, are you satisfied that we are
doing enough in partnership with our European allies to
strengthen their policies and procedures to make our country
safer?
Mr. Roth. We have not looked at that specific issue of
information sharing with our foreign partners. I would say,
though, that anytime that you have a risk-based system,
particularly in the current terrorist environment, in which you
have functionally pop-up terrorists--people who are not on
anybody's list and who are unknown--that the kind of individual
scrutiny that is required with the Visa Waiver Program really
is sort of the stop-gap for that.
Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, thank you for
holding such an important hearing.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker.
I want to talk a little bit about the problem of overstays.
I do not quite understand it. I mean, I do but I do not. We are
often cited the statistic about how 40 percent of the people in
this country illegally are here on overstays. Of the best
estimate--11 to 12 million people in this country illegally--
that puts the number somewhere between 4.4 and 4.8 million
people here that are overstaying a visa.
Let me start by asking, does anybody know which visas are
primarily abused? I will start with Director Saldana.
Ms. Saldana. I would defer that to the State Department,
with respect to the overall picture.
Chairman Johnson. Secretary Donahue, you got the football
thrown to you.
Mr. Donahue. I am not sure I have seen a figure on any
particular area. I really do not know.
Chairman Johnson. I mean, why would we not know that? The
article I am looking at says there are still, today, about--
what does it say?--523,000 visa overstays per year. Why would
we not be tracking that?
Mr. Donahue. We do track at all of our posts and we do this
through a validation study. We will check to see, for instance,
if people from a certain country are coming to the United
States and staying on a certain type of visa. And, different
kinds of visas are harder to track. For instance, a visitor,
admitted for a certain amount of time, 6 months usually--or 3
months if they are eligible for a visa waiver. A student--that
is a long-term admission and it is hard to determine at what
point they become----
Chairman Johnson. But, are we not working with the schools,
and are there not requirements of the schools to keep us up to
date if somebody drops out, is not paying tuition, or something
like that--that we can report that and then are aware of it, so
that ICE can potentially enforce?
Ms. Saldana. Yes. And, of course, with respect to a
category, this is an educated, I think, guess and that is, the
most visas we have are B1s or B2s--travelers for business or
pleasure. So, I would think there would be some correlation
between that and the number of overstays.
But, absolutely, we are responsible for the Student
Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) and we have the database of
information in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS) database that relates to all 8,000 universities
that have students placed there. And, we do have leads that are
provided to the CTCEU, which I mentioned earlier, with respect
to overstays. Once again, so much of what we do is risk-based,
so we are looking at the large universe of overstays and trying
to determine which of these folks could potentially pose a
danger or a public safety threat. And, the information we
have--at least I can give you this, sir: we have about half a
million--489,579--leads that were provided to CTCEU, where
there is a flag with respect to business and pleasure
travelers--the B1 and B2 visas. That is the largest category of
individuals that we are running down, so I think that
correlation is supported by that number.
Chairman Johnson. I realize there are millions--tens of
millions--of people that come and go out of the United States.
In today's information technology age, I do not understand what
is so hard about keeping track of this. Everybody that comes
here, legally, has a passport that has a number attached,
correct?
Ms. Saldana. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. That goes into a database. What is so
hard to then have that passport attached to a particular visa?
Should we not just have the information on this thing? Again, I
am an accountant, so I am kind of into numbers and I am kind of
into information. But, when we take a look at what we can do in
other areas of our economy, whether it is tracking numbers with
shipments--that type of thing--what has been so hard about us
developing that database, so we know exactly who has come in,
who has not gone, and can tie it to a visa--and just know, with
a great deal of certainty, by pretty much a push of a button on
a computer all of that information? Why is that?
Ms. Saldana. Well, we do know, with some degree of
certainty, what the Principal Deputy was mentioning earlier----
Chairman Johnson. You were not able to tell me how many--
under what visa program--again, I understand the vast majority
of visas are in certain categories, so you assume. But, it is
not like you have ready information, in terms of, ``No, this is
exactly how many people were granted a visa and have not
checked out on time--there is an overstay that should be,
potentially, subject to enforcement.''
Inspector General Roth, can you speak to this?
Mr. Roth. What you are referring to really is a biometric
system for exits, so you can understand who it is that has left
the country, so you are able to compare those two sets of data.
Chairman Johnson. First of all, let me--it is just numbers.
It is actually easier than that. Again, unless I am missing
something, in terms of people coming in with a passport and a
visa--that is numerical information and can be easily loaded
into a database with a set time that a visa expires. We do not
have a record of this person leaving. To me, that is an
incredibly simple database to manage. Why do we not do it?
Mr. Roth. Well, as my most recent report shows, the
challenges, in the Federal Government, for building these kinds
of information systems is very difficult. I think there has
been some effort to try to get an exit system that has not been
successful. So, I think, as a Federal Government, we are aware
of the problem, but we have not been able to implement a
solution.
Chairman Johnson. Would you agree with me that, in the
private sector, this would almost be like falling off of a
log----
Mr. Roth. Yes.
Chairman Johnson [continuing]. In terms of developing a
database like this?
Mr. Roth. Yes.
Chairman Johnson. Which begs the question: why can we not
do this after 10 years in the Federal Government? Unbelievable.
I will go to Senator Ernst.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, for the ICE
Director, please, a number of my colleagues have already spoken
on this--Senator Grassley, in a floor speech and last night,
and also Senator Sasse here, in this forum, this morning asked
a question and raised the case of the tragic death of Iowan
Sarah Root, who was killed by a drunk driver who was,
reportedly, in the country illegally and has since posted bail
and absconded. If it is the case that ICE refrained from
lodging a detainer on Mejia because his arrest for felony
vehicular homicide ``did not meet ICE's enforcement
priorities,'' would you agree with me that ICE needs to take
another look at its so-called enforcement policies?
Ms. Saldana. Well, we do that every day. We train and we
respond to evolving situations on the basis of things we have
experienced and seen. So, that prosecutorial discretion, as I
said a little earlier, is just that. It is a person's judgment
in looking at all of the information in front of them as to
whether or not they lodge a detainer or not. We do it on a
case-by-case basis. And, as I said earlier, Senator, this is a
terrible instance where we will look at it and learn from that
situation. But, prosecutorial discretion could have been
exercised a different way here. That is us looking back. I want
to look forward, so that we do not have that situation arise
again.
Senator Ernst. Well, except that the way we look forward,
though, Director, is also by learning from mistakes of the
past--and this is not an isolated incident by any means. And,
the priority should be to ensure that people who enter our
country illegally and kill American citizens are deported and
never allowed to return. And, unfortunately, in this situation,
we have a gentleman who has done exactly that--and I am
guessing he is still here in the United States somewhere.
Ms. Saldana. And, we will be looking for him, Senator. This
does not end there.
Senator Ernst. I certainly hope so. There is a family that
demands answers--as do we. And, just to be clear, if he is
apprehended, today, would Mr. Mejia fit the President's
enforcement priorities?
Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
Senator Ernst. OK. I look forward to continuing the
discussion on this. This is important. But, again, it is not an
isolated incident and we have to make sure that all of our
agencies--local and Federal--are working together on these
issues. And, I think we all can learn from this incident.
Ms. Saldana. I agree.
Senator Ernst. Thank you for your time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Johnson. Senator Carper.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to visa overstays. Every State has its
own Medicaid program. We are told that one of the cost drivers
for Medicaid is that people have an appointment, but sometimes
do not show up--oftentimes these are moms, dads, and young
children--and so, they do a lot of things to try to make sure
people show up.
One of the things that we do in Delaware--and in some other
States as well--and I think we got this idea from Johnson &
Johnson (J&J)--the other Johnson.
Chairman Johnson. A good name.
Senator Carper. And, it is called ``Text for Baby.'' And,
text messages are sent to parents, who need to make sure that
their child has an appointment and actually shows up. And, they
do this maybe a week before or they do it like a day before.
They may even do it the day of, I think. And, it seems to me
that that is an idea that--and it has actually helped. It makes
it more certain that people actually show up for their
appointments. It saves some money for Medicaid and makes sure
people get the health care they need.
I am just wondering if a similar approach might be helpful
for folks that come to this country--most of the people that
come to this country come here legally--overwhelmingly so--but
a bunch of them overstay their visas, as you know. And, I think
it might be helpful if they were just getting pinged with the
countdown to the date that their visa expires, saying, ``You
have 2 weeks to go,'' ``You have 1 week to go,'' ``You have 2
days to go,'' or ``You have 12 hours to go.'' It is the kind of
thing that is easily automated and most people who come to this
country have cell phones. And, I think I always like to look to
the private sector for a solution that might work for a public
purpose. Actually, the other is sort of a public purpose as
well. Just react to that, please.
Ms. Saldana. It is a very interesting idea, Senator.
Obviously, everything that we hear here we take back and talk
to our folks about.
We have a massive number of students in the system and, as
the Principal Deputy said earlier, they are on different
programs. I understand what you are saying--to do the ping at
the end of the term of the visa, whether or not they are
finished with their program. So, right now, as I said earlier,
we are using a risk-based analysis with respect to these
overstays--who presents a risk in those overstays. It is a
matter of resources and trying to direct them to the area where
the greatest risk is. But, that is certainly an interesting
idea. I think it would require a tremendous number of
additional resources than we have now to ping millions of
people. But, that is certainly something I can study further.
Senator Carper. I was sitting here listening to Senator
Johnson. He is shaking his head and he said, ``No, it would
not.''
Ms. Saldana. No, it would not require additional resources?
Is that what you are saying, sir?
Chairman Johnson. Not a tremendous amount.
Senator Carper. Just think about it, OK? And, I am going to
ask you to do more than just think about it.
Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
Senator Carper. We will put you in touch with the ``Text
for Baby'' people and your folks can figure out how they do it.
Ms. Saldana. Are you saying ``baby''?
Senator Carper. B-A-B-Y.
Ms. Saldana. B-A-B-Y, OK.
Senator Carper. ``Bring back my baby to me.''
All right. This is a question for Director Saldana and Mr.
Donahue. You are a good couple here. As I understand it, ICE
uses an automated system--we talked about it here a little bit
earlier today--called PATRIOT to conduct the screening of visa
applicants for all visas that are processed at overseas posts
where ICE's visa security teams are present.
What is holding ICE and the State Department back from
requiring this automated system to be used for all incoming
visas? Is it simply a matter of resources?
Ms. Saldana. I would not say ``simply,'' but that is
certainly a factor. And, actually, Senator, we are undergoing a
pilot right now under PATRIOT--a PATRIOT expansion pilot--that
is looking at three additional countries to try to do all--that
are not necessarily among these 20 or 26 posts where we have
visa screening--but looking at expanding that and what it would
take and how much time would be consumed. So, we are actually
undertaking an evaluation and study of that because, if it is
possible, it is certainly something we would like to do. But,
right now, I am not in a position to tell you, ``Absolutely,
that can happen.'' I think our study wraps up in May, so I will
be able to report back to you my thoughts and ideas based on
what we have learned from that expanded PATRIOT project.
Senator Carper. Would you do that?
Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Mr. Donahue, any thoughts on this one?
Mr. Donahue. I think we are also working with ICE in
countries where the physical presence would be good, but is not
possible because of resources or other reasons, to have some of
the PATRIOT functions--the computerized functions--done
domestically and then advising posts of the response to the
PATRIOT checks. So, that will also expand their ability to
expand it to more countries.
Senator Carper. OK. This is a question for everybody--and
then I am done. Since 9/11, one of the key themes of our
homeland security efforts has been information sharing. The
testimony today references a lot of different programs and
different databases used to screen applicants before they come
to the United States.
Can each of you just take a moment to reflect on how well
integrated these resources are and what barriers remain? And,
how much of this sharing is automated and how much requires
time and initiative by an individual officer?
Mr. Donahue. I can begin from our side.
Senator Carper. Please.
Mr. Donahue. I have seen a revolution in the realm of
information sharing since 9/11--and, especially, in my 32 years
of doing this kind of work. I think one of the most remarkable
things is that, today, someone can be interviewing an applicant
for a visa in Mali. That person's visa will be checked by my
colleagues and the interagency--law enforcement and the
intelligence community--response will come back to that
officer--whether there is anything to be concerned about--in
addition to whatever he or she has been able to find out in the
interview.
Then that person is issued a visa. A person can get on a
plane today, arrive in Atlanta, and, at the port of entry, the
officer there will have all of the information that was used in
making that decision back in Mali--just in less time than the
flight. So, that kind of information sharing, where we can look
into--for instance, our database--our major database--there are
more DHS users than there are State Department users, so that
people know why we issued a passport or why we issued a visa.
And, I think that has made us all much more effective.
Senator Carper. OK. Anyone else? Just very briefly, Mr.
Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Sure. I think, as this Committee knows, I
spent most of my career in law enforcement and, very early on,
I was an organized crime prosecutor. I remember, back in the
late 1980s and early 1990s, where what was considered our
organized crime database was actually rows and rows of filing
cabinets that would fill this room.
We have certainly come a long way from that time. We now
have, at USCIS, a very well automated process to ping law
enforcement and intelligence community databases to determine
whether an individual seeking an immigration benefit presents a
threat to the United States. That will never, in my view, be a
substitute for the human judgment that is required on both
ends--to make an intelligence community judgment and then for
us to make an immigration judgment with that information. So,
that will always continue to be part of it.
But, in terms of the information moving, we really have
reached a pretty good point these days.
Senator Carper. Good. Thank you.
Ms. Saldana, the same question, just briefly.
Ms. Saldana. And, I agree, we can always improve and we can
always do better--we have heard of one or two instances where
the information--the sharing broke down a little bit. But, the
Visa Security Program, itself, is an extraordinary example of
that information sharing. We have our DHS holdings that we
bounce the PATRIOT inquiry against and it has so many different
contributors--FBI, obviously the State Department, and other
law enforcement--and that is an example of the progress that we
have made.
We are always working on this to make it better--and
internationally with our allies and the countries out there
that we are in.
Senator Carper. OK. Thank you.
General Roth, the last word.
Mr. Roth. Well, thank you, and my apologies for being the
contrarian or the skeptic in the room. I will have to say
that----
Senator Carper. No, no. Be yourself. Be yourself.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Roth. It is an occupational hazard, Senator. Several of
our audits note sort of the difficulty with the paper-based
system. So, for example, when we compared ICE data with USCIS
data, in regard to human-trafficking victims, what we found was
that the perpetrators of human trafficking, who people at ICE
had investigated, were, in fact, using the visa system to bring
their victims into the country. And, one of the reasons that
has occurred is because USCIS still has a paper-based system--
and I am sympathetic to Director Rodriguez's challenges in this
area. But, for example, an individual who applies for a T
visa--which is the individual who is a victim of human
trafficking--submits a statement as to what occurred to that
person that allows them to receive a T visa. That is not
digitized in any way, so there can be names and identifiers of
perpetrators of human trafficking that simply get lost in the
system.
So, while I agree that, in many ways, there are systems in
place that allow for this kind of information sharing, there is
much that can be done to improve that.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Thank you for being
the contrarian in the room. And, thank you to each of you for
your testimony, your efforts, and your leadership. Thank you.
Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper. I think we
should work together on some piece of legislation to facilitate
using the private sector skills that are out there--and
technologies. Go to any business involved in logistics, whether
it is FedEx, UPS, or any trucking company. These programs exist
for tracking. It is a similar type of process--almost off of
the shelf. I would suggest, maybe, getting some of their IT
experts in your agencies and let us get this program done. It
should not take years and years or billions and billions of
dollars. We have done it in the private sector. It is
unbelievable what they can really track. And, the information,
just from a desktop, that a customer can obtain, in terms of a
package being transferred from this truck to another truck--we
ought to be able to do the same thing, in terms of tracking
visa overstays.
I do want to ask a couple more questions about resource
capabilities. This is kind of going to what Senator Tester was
talking about. I will go to you, Mr. Donahue. Again, I am an
accountant, so I like numbers. As best I can determine,
somewhere between 20 million and 32 to 33 million people go to
consulates, go to embassies, and have to do an interview to get
a visa to come to the United States on an annual basis. Is that
kind of roughly about the right number? Does that sound about
right to you?
Mr. Donahue. It is closer to about 13 million that come in
and 13.5 million that come in for a visa. The Visa Waiver
Program is additional to that.
Chairman Johnson. Something different, OK. You have about
1,800 foreign service officers that do those interviews, so,
based on the 13 million number, it is going to be less. But, if
you talk about 13 million people divided by 1,800, we are
talking about just a few minutes--probably less than 15 minutes
per interview. That is not a whole lot of time, is it?
Mr. Donahue. Well, I think if you take into account the
entire package, that the person has already gone through
biometric and biographic database checks and that they have
completed a very long visa application form that asks a lot of
information that we check against--we do have fraud units and
we do have our ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs). And, like any
other business--you are a businessman--you expedite the easy
and you spend time on what needs to have time spent on it. So,
when a person walks in and everything is clear, you do a quick
interview. You believe the person because of your training and
knowledge that this person--just as you see at the ports of
entry--that this person is doing what they say they are doing.
If the next person comes in and you have concerns, you can stop
the interview and send it to your fraud unit or go to one of
our colleagues in DHS. You can continue the interview as long
as you need to. So, while one may take one minute, another may
not be cleared for weeks.
Chairman Johnson. So, it is your sense from around the
world, really, that the foreign service officers who are in
charge of this do not feel pressure. You feel that they feel
they are adequately resourced for the task at hand?
Mr. Donahue. Certainly people would always like to have a
few more officers, but I think we have used business practices
to make this as organized as possible and to make sure that the
time they spend at the window is the most effective. We would
certainly like to keep all of our fees--because we are a fee-
based organization--so that we could plow all of that into
making our business work more efficiently for our customers and
make sure that we have all of the security checks there. But, I
think most officers are using good business practices and their
training. They are putting the work in with those few people
who come to the United States to do us harm. Really focusing on
that has proved effective.
Chairman Johnson. By the way, you talked about a fee-based
service. It is, again, that tension between security and
customer service. I come from a business background.
Mr. Donahue. Right.
Chairman Johnson. You are generating revenue for your
organization. You have an incentive for generating more
revenue, which is somewhat at cross-purpose--trying to run more
people through to generate the revenue versus ensuring the
security. So, it does concern me.
Director Rodriguez, I know President Obama announced the
granting of--or allowing about 10,000 additional Syrians into
the country. That is about a 20-percent increase in the number
of refugees. Again, I am concerned a little bit about taking
any shortcuts in the process. It normally takes 18 to 24 months
to review those files. Do you believe you are adequately
resourced to have a 20-percent increase in the number of
refugees you fully vet?
Mr. Rodriguez. I would point out that that is still--even
that increase is a relatively small part of our overall
business. We have 8 million cases that we handle in any given
year across our 19,000 employees.
Let me also be very clear that we will do our job with
respect to the refugees that we screen. No corners will be cut.
Chairman Johnson. Good.
Mr. Rodriguez. We will do what we need to do.
Chairman Johnson. That is really what I view our
responsibility as a Committee to be: to make sure that we do
not take any shortcuts. So, I appreciate your comments there.
Let me just wrap up. There are a number of points we did
want to make--and I want to be respectful of people's time. I
mentioned that December 3 incident at the office of USCIS in
San Bernardino. Inspector General Roth, I would appreciate it
if you would investigate exactly what happened there. That does
show the potential breakdown of inter-agency cooperation.
Again, I find it pretty disconcerting, to say the least.
The K1 visa--ICE is really responsible for verifying those
marriages. If you come in on a K1 visa, you are supposed to be
married within 90 days. Again, I do not think we have a
system--I do not think we are really verifying those things,
which is a potential vulnerability.
Inspector General Roth, you talked about the poor data
collection and information sharing that resulted in human
trafficking coming across our borders. I would appreciate you
keeping an eye on that and everybody being aware of that.
I have not yet received an answer for a letter I have
written. We had ICE Agent Taylor Johnson in for one of our
hearings involving government whistleblowers and the
retaliation against them, which is really prevalent in the
Federal Government. It is really jaw-dropping. So, Director
Saldana, I would really appreciate it if you would respond to
that, because now, apparently, Agent Johnson has been
terminated--and the process has not really gone through the
Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the Inspector General. I am
really concerned about that particular case.
Ms. Saldana. And, we have that letter. We are preparing a
response, sir.
Chairman Johnson. OK. Again, the oversight of student
visas--the overstays is a significant issue. I really will work
with Ranking Member Carper in trying--if we have to produce
some legislation to facilitate the computer systems, the IT
systems, to do this--again, coming from the private sector and
knowing what is available out there, this should not be that
hard. And, I think it is a critical step we have to take.
So, again, I do want to thank all of you for your service
to this Nation. I realize this is tough. There is no perfect
system. You have a serious responsibility. I know you take
those responsibilities seriously. So, thank you for your
service to this Nation, for providing thoughtful testimonies,
and for taking the time to answer our questions.
With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days,
until March 30 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]