    [Senate Hearing 114-662]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-662

                       THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 15, 2016

                                   __________

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                        RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                      Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                        Daniel P. Lips, Policy Director
         Brooke N. Ericson, Deputy Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
                  Jose J. Bautista, Professional Staff Member
                  Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
               John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
                   Holly A. Idelson, Minority Senior Counsel
         Stephen R. Vina, Minority Chief Counsel for Homeland Security
           Harlan C. Geer, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Johnson..............................................     1
        Senator Carper...............................................     2
        Senator Tester...............................................     3
        Senator Sasse................................................    17
        Senator Booker...............................................    22
        Senator Ernst................................................    26
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Johnson..............................................    35
        Senator Carper...............................................    37

                                    WITNESS
                            Tuesday, March 15, 2016

    David Donahue, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular
      Affairs, U.S. Department of State..............................     4
    Hon. Leon Rodriguez, Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
      Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.................     6
    Hon. Sarah R. Saldana, Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
      Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security..............     8
    Hon. John Roth, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
      Security.......................................................    10

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Donahue, David:
        Testimony....................................................     4
        Prepared statement...........................................    39
    Rodriguez, Hon. Leon:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    49
    Roth, Hon. John:
        Testimony....................................................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    65
    Saldana, Hon. Sarah R.:
        Testimony....................................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................    54

                                    APPENDIX

    American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) statement submitted for the
      Record.........................................................    80
    Response to post-hearing questions for the Record:
        Mr. Donahue..................................................    86
        Mr. Rodriguez................................................   122
        Ms. Saldana..................................................   169
        Mr. Roth.....................................................   192

                       THE SECURITY OF U.S. VISA PROGRAMS

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016

                                         U.S. Senate,
                               Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ron Johnson,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Johnson, Lankford, Ayotte, Ernst, Sasse,
    Carper, Tester, Booker, and Peters.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN JOHNSON

        Chairman Johnson. Good morning. This hearing will come to
    order.
        I want to, first of all, thank the witnesses for your time
    and your testimony and for appearing here before us today. We
    do have representatives from the State Department (DOS), the
    U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the U.S.
    Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). You will be hearing
    those acronyms. There are a lot of acronyms in this business.
    And then, we also have Mr. John Roth, the Inspector General
    (IG) for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
        This hearing is about the security of our U.S. visa systems
    and programs. I think the potential vulnerabilities came to
    light, certainly, in the public's awareness, with the attack on
    September 11, 2001 (9/11), and the fact that so many of the
    terrorists that killed so many Americans were here on student
    visas. And then, we also understood--or became aware of--the
    reality of visa overstays. So, we started understanding the
    vulnerabilities there.
        Back then, we, obviously, had the State Department involved
    in the acceptance and granting of visas, but we also had
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). You basically had
    one agency.
        After 9/11, then we kind of took that apart and set up the
    Department of Homeland Security. Now, we have different
    agencies. And, I think it is legitimate to ask: Are these
    agencies working together? Do we have a shared purpose, a
    shared goal, and a shared mission to, literally, keep this
    Nation safe? Allow for travel and allow for commerce, but--at
    the heart of it--are we making sure we can do everything, in an
    imperfect world, to keep our Nation safe and secure?
        So, that is really my primary question and the main purpose
    of this hearing. Are we doing all that we can to screen and vet
    visa applicants before they enter the country? And, second, how
    effectively are Federal agencies managing their
    responsibilities and working together--including sharing
    information--through each step of the visa and immigration
    process to ensure our security?
        I would ask that my written opening remarks be entered into
    the record with consent.\1\ And, it has been very kindly
    granted.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Senator Johnson appears in the
    Appendix on page 35.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With that, I will turn it over to Senator Carper.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER:

        Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome
    everybody. Thank you for holding the hearing. Thank you all for
    joining us. Three of the folks sitting in front of us are folks
    who came before us a year or two ago to be confirmed for
    confirmation hearings. And, we very much appreciate your
    service. And, that is not taking anything away from you, Mr.
    Donahue, but we do not have jurisdiction over the Department of
    State. We are working on it, but---- [Laughter.]
        We are not quite there yet.
        But, this hearing is the third in a series we have held to
    explore whether we are doing enough to address concerns that
    terrorists might try to exploit international travel to
    infiltrate our country.
        In the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks, this
    Committee first scrutinized the process in place to screen and
    vet Syrian refugees escaping from the carnage in the Middle
    East. And, we learned that the U.S. refugee resettlement
    process involves extensive security screening. Syrian refugees,
    we were told, undergo multiple rounds of screening over an
    average period of 18 to 24 months--including in-person
    interviews by immigration analysts and counterterrorism
    officials trained in spotting fraud and trained in spotting
    deception.
        The Committee next looked at our Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
    which allows citizens of certain nations to travel to the
    United States for a visit without a visa. And, once it became
    clear that the Paris terrorists held passports from European
    countries whose citizens enjoy visa waiver privileges, fears,
    understandably, arose that this program could pose a security
    threat.
        We learned that visa waiver travelers seeking to come to
    the United States endure nearly the same level of scrutiny and
    vetting as all other travelers. We also learned that, when it
    comes to security, nothing is being ``waived,'' as the name of
    the program incorrectly suggests. And, we learned that, in
    return for their entry into the Visa Waiver Program,
    countries--and there are about 38 of them--must share
    intelligence with the United States, they must open up their
    counterterrorism and aviation security systems to our
    inspectors, and they must abide by our standards for aviation
    and passport security.
        As a result, the Visa Waiver Program has now become a key
    counterterrorism tool. And, what started off as a travel
    facilitation program has ended up having enormous advantages to
    us, in terms of protecting our security.
        Today, we are going to continue to look at our screening
    systems for foreigners entering our country. We will examine
    the depth of security for all forms of visas--whether they
    happen to be for students, for tourists, for people here on
    business, or for those seeking to make America their permanent
    home.
        It is a daunting undertaking, given the volume of
    international travel to the United States. It also involves the
    coordination of multiple government entities, including the
    State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, and
    others that are not represented here today.
        Since the 9/11 attacks against our country, there have been
    notable changes to strengthen our visa security--including
    recent adjustments made following the attacks in Paris and,
    more recently, in San Bernardino. For example, amid the Islamic
    State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS's) growing online presence, the
    Department of Homeland Security is exploring ways to expand its
    use of social media to screen travelers seeking to enter the
    United States.
        I look forward to hearing more about these efforts and also
    about the contribution of ICE's Visa Security Program (VSP)
    that may help to identify threats posed by potential travelers
    early on. We need to know if this program is adding real
    security and, if so, how to expand its reach.
        As with all of our recent hearings, I expect that we will
    find elements of our visa security that we can improve upon
    today--understanding that we can never eliminate all risks and
    should not turn our back on the many benefits of trade, travel,
    and immigration. Yet, as we continuously improve the security
    of our immigration system, we must also keep our eye on,
    perhaps, the even more pressing threat of homegrown terrorism.
        For all that we do to strengthen our borders and our
    immigration security, groups, like ISIS, know all too well that
    they may bypass our multiple layers of homeland security by
    using online propaganda to recruit people already inside of our
    borders--maybe born here--to carry out attacks against the
    United States. And, in this respect, preventing ISIS's twisted
    propaganda from mobilizing our young people to carry out
    terrorist violence may help to combat the long-term terrorist
    threats to the homeland in ways that aviation screening and
    watchlist checks can never do.
        We look forward to our continued work on this Committee,
    both on combating homegrown terrorism and on strengthening the
    security of our immigration systems. And, I hope we can use
    today's hearing to identify some common-sense improvements to
    the security of visas.
        Thank you all for being here. We look forward to this
    conversation. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper.
        Senator Tester can only be with us for a short period.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER

        Senator Tester. I will make this very short. And, thank
    you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the flexibility.
        The Visa Waiver Program, as the Chairman and the Ranking
    Member have pointed out--they are important programs--important
    for our economy--but, they are also of concern. In your opening
    statements, if you could address: the security of the programs
    you have, first; whether you need additional tools that you do
    not have that would require this Committee--or another
    committee--to take action, second; and the third thing is
    manpower. Do you have the manpower to carry out the job to make
    sure that our country is not threatened by the visa program we
    have now? If you can do that, you will have answered all of my
    questions.
        Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. That was under a minute.
        It is the tradition of our Committee to swear in witnesses,
    so if you will all rise and raise your right hand. Do you swear
    that the testimony you will give before this Committee will be
    the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
    you, God?
        Mr. Donahue. I do.
        Mr. Rodriguez. I do.
        Ms. Saldana. I do.
        Mr. Roth. I do.
        Chairman Johnson. Please be seated.
        Our first witness is David Donahue. He is the Principal
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs at the U.S.
    Department of State. Mr. Donahue has also served as Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of State for Visa Services in the Bureau of
    Consular Affairs and as Coordinator for Interagency Provincial
    Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Secretary
    Donahue.

       TESTIMONY OF DAVID DONAHUE,\1\ PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
        SECRETARY FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Donahue. Good morning, Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
    Carper, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to testify, today, on the topic of U.S.
    visa program security.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Donahue appears in the Appendix
    on page 39.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Department of State and our partner agencies throughout
    the Federal Government take our commitment to protect American
    borders and citizens seriously. And, we constantly analyze and
    update our clearance procedures. My written statement, which I
    request be put into the record, describes the rigorous
    screening regimen that applies to all visa categories.
        Let me begin by saying that the visa program is a layered,
    interagency program focused on national security, beginning
    with the petition to USCIS, my colleagues here, or a visa
    application submitted directly to a consular section abroad.
    During the interview, prior to travel, upon arrival in the
    United States, and while the traveler is in the United States,
    our national law enforcement and intelligence communities work
    together to protect our borders. The vast majority of visa
    applicants--and all immigrants and fiance visa applicants--are
    interviewed by a consular officer. Each consular officer
    completes extensive training, which has a strong emphasis on
    border security, fraud prevention, interagency coordination,
    and interviewing techniques.
        One hundred and twenty-two diplomatic security assistant
    regional security officer investigators at 107 posts worldwide
    bring additional law enforcement and anti-terrorism expertise
    to the visa process. All of this applicant data is vetted
    against databases--including terrorist identity databases that
    contain millions of records of individuals found ineligible for
    visas or regarding whom potentially derogatory information
    exists.
        We collect 10 fingerprint scans from nearly all visa
    applicants and screen them against DHS and the Federal Bureau
    of Investigation (FBI) databases of known and suspected
    terrorists, wanted persons, immigration violators, and
    criminals. All visa applicants are screened against photos of
    known and suspected terrorists or prior visa applicants.
        When an interview raises concerns that an applicant may be
    a threat to national security or when the interagency screening
    process shows potentially disqualifying derogatory information,
    the consular officer suspends processing and submits a request
    for a Washington-based interagency security advisory opinion
    review conducted by Federal law enforcement, intelligence
    agencies, and the Department of State.
        The Department of Homeland Security's Pre-Adjudicated
    Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT)
    program and Visa Security Program, managed by our USCIS
    colleagues or ICE colleagues, provide additional protections in
    certain overseas posts. DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement
    special agents, who are assigned to more than 20 embassies and
    consulates in high-threat locations, provide on-site vetting of
    visa applications as well as other law enforcement support and
    training for our officers.
        Security reviews do not stop when the visa is issued. The
    Department and the partner agency continuously match new threat
    information with our record of existing visas and will use our
    authority to revoke visas.
        We refuse more than a million applications a year for
    visas. Since 2001, the Department has revoked more than 122,000
    visas based on information that surfaced after issuance of the
    visas. This includes nearly 10,000 revoked for suspected links
    to terrorism, again, based on information that surfaced after
    issuance. Notice of these revocations is shared across the
    interagency in near real time.
        I noticed that you also wanted to talk about our view of
    the security of the VWP. While that is managed by the
    Department of Homeland Security, we believe that it does really
    enhance our national security. It allows us to focus on those
    places--to have the staffing and the resources in places where
    we really do need to look deeply into the threat from
    travelers. It also provides, as was mentioned by Senator
    Carper, these cooperative agreements with the nations that are
    sending these travelers to the United States. Therefore, we
    have better access and a better understanding of the threats
    they are seeing. They are sharing with us and we are sharing
    with them. An advanced stage of that, while it is not part of
    the Visa Waiver Program, is in Canada, where we have a very
    close relationship in sharing derogatory information back and
    forth across the border to make sure we have a strong outer
    border for the United States.
        Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee,
    the Department of State has no higher priority than the safety
    of our fellow citizens at home and overseas as well as the
    security of the traveling public. Every visa decision is a
    national security decision. We appreciate the support that
    Congress has given us as we constantly work to strengthen our
    defenses. I encourage you, when you are traveling overseas, to
    visit our consular sections to see, firsthand, the good work
    that our officers are doing around the world. I look forward to
    your questions.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Secretary Donahue.
        Our next witness is Leon Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is the
    Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services at the
    U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Prior to this position,
    Mr. Rodriguez served as the Director of the Office for Civil
    Rights (OCR) at the Department of Health and Human Services
    (HHS) and as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General (AAG) for
    Civil Rights at the Department of Justice (DOJ). Director
    Rodriguez.

     TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE LEON RODRIGUEZ,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S.
       CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                           HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Rodriguez. Good morning, Chairman, good morning,
    Ranking Member, and good morning, Members of the Committee.
    This is my second time before this Committee to talk about this
    subject matter and the seventh time that I have testified
    before some Congressional committee in this fiscal year (FY) on
    this subject matter. I should hasten to say that this Committee
    has become one of my favorites, particularly because the level
    of discourse has always been a civil and intelligent one--not
    that the questions are easy. I think the questions we are asked
    are hard questions that we need to be able to answer for the
    benefit of the American people--but I really do appreciate the
    tone that you both have set here. Thank you for that.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Rodriguez appears in the Appendix
    on page 49.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I believe, as an article of faith, that a healthy and
    robust immigration and travel system is critical to our
    economy, critical to the stability of our families, and
    critical, actually, to the successful conduct of our foreign
    policy and national security.
        I also believe that the most fundamental responsibility of
    government is to protect the public safety. I have spent a fair
    part of my career working at the local level and have learned
    that every time that we issue a driver's license, we need to
    make sure that we are not issuing that license to someone who
    may become a drunk driver. Every time we issue a building
    permit, we need to ensure that that is not a building that will
    collapse. And, every time we issue some sort of immigration
    benefit, we need to do everything we can to ensure the security
    of our country and to ensure that those who mean us harm or who
    will become threats to our public safety do not exploit the
    immigration system.
        In particular, USCIS, my agency, bears responsibility for
    screening refugees who are seeking admission to the United
    States. Since 9/11, we have admitted nearly 790,000 refugees--
    and I would hasten to add that about 120,000 of those have come
    from Iraq. In that time, not a single admitted refugee has
    actually engaged in an act of terrorist violence against the
    United States. There have been a number--a relatively small
    number--of terrorist plots or attempts to affiliate with
    terrorist organizations that have been successfully disrupted
    by United States law enforcement.
        The reason why we have been successful is the robust
    screening process that already exists to screen those who are
    coming to the United States. It is a multi-layered process
    involving a multitude of Cabinet agencies, law enforcement
    agencies, and intelligence agencies. It involves intensive
    interviews conducted by several agencies, in particular by my
    officers, who are intensively trained and briefed to do the
    work that they do.
        Nonetheless, recognizing evolving threats--particularly
    those posed by lone wolves inspired by terrorist
    organizations--we continue to look for opportunities to
    intensify and strengthen the quality of the work that we do.
        An area of particular recent focus has been our review of
    social media--particularly of those seeking admission as
    refugees--in order to determine whether there is any derogatory
    information contained therein. We have undertaken,
    simultaneously, several pilots to identify automated tools and
    processes which will further enable us to do this work. But, we
    have not waited for the conclusion of those pilots to, in fact,
    begin actively using that as part of our work. And, in those
    cases where individuals have been flagged as of concern, being
    particularly among certain refugee streams, we have already
    been analyzing social media to determine whether any such
    information exists. We will continue to add capacity in this
    area. We will continue to strengthen our ability to do that.
    And, we will add more volume based on our assessment and our
    intelligence community (IC) partners' assessment of where the
    highest levels of risk are.
        Now, to respond in particular to your question, Senator
    Tester, we are working to get to the point where we actually
    can answer your question--where we can identify the resources
    and personnel that we need. Needless to say, our agency is a
    fee-funded agency, so the majority of this work is actually
    funded by our fee-paying customers. But, a lot of that work is
    also done in concert with various tax-based partners in the law
    enforcement and intelligence communities--and we will be
    looking forward to a further conversation should we identify
    needs as we develop these processes.
        Finally, I look forward to addressing the concerns raised
    in the IG's report. I would like to note a couple of particular
    findings. First, 93 percent of our customers in the early going
    of our I-90--that is, our replacement green card--launch
    reported that they were quite satisfied with the service that
    we provided. I would also like to note that the IG recognizes
    that, after July 2015, the conclusion of the audit window, we
    undertook a number of improvements. And, what I would ask is
    both for the IG to come back, but also to be able to engage
    with this Committee about those improvements, so that we can
    give you the confidence that, in fact, our automation process
    is successful and is poised for even greater success in the
    future.
        Thank you again for having me here today.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Rodriguez.
        Our next witness is Director Sarah Saldana. Director
    Saldana is the Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs
    Enforcement at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
    Director Saldana previously served as United States Attorney
    for the Northern District of Texas. Director Saldana.

    TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE SARAH R. SALDANA,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S.
        IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                           HOMELAND SECURITY

        Ms. Saldana. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Johnson,
    Ranking Member Carper, and other Members of this Committee.
    Senator Tester, I am still having nightmares from seeing that--
    was it a buffalo or a bison?--the head in your office.
    [Laughter.]
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Saldana appears in the Appendix
    on page 54.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am sure I will get over it.
        I will say, in all seriousness, that I appreciate the
    opportunity to talk, today, about this very important subject.
    I absolutely agree with my colleagues here, with respect to the
    importance of this issue and these issues. I appreciate what we
    will hear from the Inspector General, with respect to our
    programs and the improvements that are recommended--and,
    obviously, to your questions and suggestions, with respect to
    how we can do our jobs better.
        As you know, Congress authorized our role in this process
    back in 2002, where we were told, first, to assign agents in
    diplomatic posts to review visa security activities and,
    second, to provide training and other assistance to our State
    Department colleagues. This effort is led by the investigative
    side of Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Homeland Security
    Investigations (HSI), with the involvement of our Enforcement
    and Removal Operations (ERO) folks, and it is accomplished
    through the program that has been referred to as the Visa
    Security Program.
        Under this program, we have analysts and agents working at
    26 visa-issuing posts in 20 countries to identify terrorists,
    criminals, and other individuals who are ineligible for visas
    prior to their travel or application for admission to the
    United States. This fits right in with ICE's larger
    responsibility to detect, disrupt, and dismantle transnational
    criminal organizations. But, in the visa security context,
    obviously, we are trying to stop threats--deter threats--before
    they reach our nation's borders.
        As a result of the additional Ccongressional funding in FY
    2015, for which we are very thankful, ICE was able to expand
    VSP operations to six new issuing posts--the largest expansion
    in the program's history. We are looking forward to adding four
    more posts before the end of this fiscal year.
        As my colleagues have said, the process begins and ends,
    obviously, with the Department of State, along with the
    significant involvement of USCIS. But, this process also
    presents the first opportunity to assess whether a potential
    visitor or immigrant poses a threat to our country--and that is
    where ICE comes in--our law enforcement folks. ICE's actions
    complement the consular officers' screenings, applicant
    interviews, and reviews of applications and supporting
    documentation.
        PATRIOT, which the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
    just mentioned, begins our visa screening mission by conducting
    a first take--an automated screening of visa application
    information against our vast DHS holdings--all of the
    information we have, not only from DHS agencies, but from the
    intelligence community as well. This step occurs before the
    applicant is even interviewed for the first time. PATRIOT takes
    a risk-based approach and uses interagency resources from ICE,
    U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the State
    Department to identify potential national security and public
    safety threats.
        Where VSP differs from most other government screening
    efforts is that it leverages the fact that we have agents
    posted at those visa-screening sites--at the visa sites that
    the State Department has--and those agents are able to
    investigate the information that comes up in the applications--
    to actually supplement the Department of State's interviews of
    those applicants and to identify previously unknown threats.
    So, we are very pleased to have those people actually onsite in
    those 20 different countries.
        In FY 2015, VSP--our agents--reviewed over 2 million visa
    applications--over 2 million--and we determined they identified
    64,000 of them for further review. This is a flag that goes up
    that, perhaps, something there is indicating something to the
    agent, who is very well trained and versed in intelligence and
    criminal activity as well as other derogatory information.
        After in-depth vetting, the next step, we determined the
    existence of a little over 7,000 of 23,000 cases in which we
    saw derogatory information to have some nexus to terrorism,
    resulting in our recommendation to the Department of State to
    refuse visas to approximately 8,600 individuals last year.
    Approximately 850 terrorist database records were created or
    enhanced. That is the other complement to this mission--and
    that is, the intelligence gathering that we are able to do
    through our in-depth vetting and screening.
        While I am extremely proud of what our ICE personnel do to
    screen the visa applicants on the front side, we also actively
    work to identify and initiate action against overstay
    violators, which Senator Johnson mentioned earlier. This
    vetting helps to determine if an individual has overstayed or
    departed the U.S. In the last 2 years, ICE has dedicated
    approximately 650,000 special agent hours a year to overstay
    enforcement.
        ICE prioritizes immigrant overstay cases using risk-based
    analysis through our Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
    Unit (CTCEU). The CTCEU reviews many leads and further
    investigates them, referring them to others on the ERO side if
    we are unable to do anything with them on the investigative
    side.
        We are very proud to include both sides of our house in
    this effort. I believe we have actually, as a side note,
    increased the investigative responsibilities of our ERO folks.
    I look forward to working with this Committee and with our
    Appropriations Committee to discuss some pay reform with
    respect to our entire ICE workforce. And, I stand ready to
    answer any questions you may have.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Director Saldana.
        Our final witness is Inspector General John Roth, who is
    the Inspector General for the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security. Mr. Roth most recently served as the Director of the
    Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI) at the Food and Drug
    Administration (FDA). Prior to this, he had a 25-year career as
    a Federal prosecutor and senior leader at the Department of
    Justice. Inspector General Roth.

      TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN ROTH,\1\ INSPECTOR GENERAL,
                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Roth. Thank you. Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member
    Carper, and Members of this Committee, thank you for inviting
    me here, today, to discuss my office's oversight of DHS visa
    programs. Our recent work has involved a number of audits and
    investigations, and I will discuss some of our audit results
    this morning.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Roth appears in the Appendix on
    page 65.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Deciding and administering immigration benefits, including
    visas, is a massive enterprise. USCIS employs about 19,000
    people to process millions of applications for immigration
    benefits. They are required to enforce what are, sometimes,
    highly complex laws, regulations, and internal policies that
    can be subject to differing interpretations. They are rightly
    expected to process decisions within a reasonable timeframe.
    USCIS and the rest of DHS accomplish their mission while
    working with an antiquated system of paper-based files more
    suited to an office environment from 1950 than 2016. This
    system creates inefficiencies and risks to the program. To give
    you an idea of the scope of the problem, USCIS spends more than
    $300 million per year shipping, storing, and handling over 20
    million immigrant files.
        This week, we published our sixth report on USCIS' efforts
    to transform its paper-based processes into an integrated and
    automated system.
        We undertook this audit to answer a relatively simple
    question: After 11 years and considerable expense, what has
    been the outcome of USCIS' efforts to automate benefits
    processing? We focused on the progress that was made and the
    performance outcomes. We interviewed dozens of individuals,
    including by traveling to the local field locations and talking
    to over 60 end users who are using Electronic Immigration
    System (ELIS). And, we literally stood next to them and watched
    as they struggled with the system.
        We found that USCIS has made little progress in
    transforming its paper-based process into an automated system.
    Previous efforts, which have cost approximately $500 million to
    implement, had to be abandoned, recently, in favor of a new
    system. USCIS now estimates that it will take more than 3 years
    and an additional $1 billion to automate benefit processing.
    This delay will prevent USCIS from achieving its workload
    processing, national security, and customer service goals.
    Currently, only 2 of about 90 different types of application
    forms are online for filing.
        We found, for example, that the time to process immigration
    benefits was twice that of the metrics that USCIS had
    established. Our earlier report on USCIS information technology
    (IT) systems, published in July 2014, reported that using the
    electronic files in use at the time actually took twice as long
    as using paper files. That report reflected user
    dissatisfaction with a system that often took between 100 and
    150 mouse clicks to move among sub-levels to complete a
    specific process.
        As Director Rodriguez said, we acknowledge that DHS has
    recently taken significant steps to improve the process by
    which new information technology--including moving from a
    traditional development methodology to a new incremental
    approach, called Agile, will assist. Implementation of
    automation is very much a moving target, and USCIS may have
    subsequently made progress on the problem since the time our
    field work ended in July 2015. We will obviously continue to
    monitor the situation and report back to the Committee as
    necessary.
        Separately, in a second, earlier audit, we compared
    databases belonging to ICE and to USCIS and found that known
    human traffickers were using work, fiance, and other family
    reunification visas to bring their victims into the country. An
    important finding we made is that the data systems that USCIS
    uses do not electronically capture important information which
    would be valuable in investigating human trafficking. Again,
    this poses risks to the system. We made three recommendations
    to improve these programs. ICE and USCIS are taking actions to
    resolve these recommendations and we are satisfied with their
    progress thus far.
        Finally, corrupt and criminal activity on the part of DHS
    personnel can present a risk to the integrity of the visa
    process. My written testimony illustrates several examples in
    which employees or contractors, who are in a position of trust,
    were able to compromise the system to provide immigration
    benefits to those who are not entitled to them. This type of
    insider threat presents significant risks that can only be
    countered through continual vigilance.
        In summary, the size and complexity of the mission, coupled
    with an archaic method of processing applications, brings
    significant risk. There is risk to operations in that it makes
    it more difficult for USCIS to accomplish its mission. There is
    also risk to our national security in that we may be admitting
    individuals who do not meet the requirements for a visa. Basic
    information on visa applicants is not captured in an electronic
    format and, thus, cannot be used to perform basic investigative
    steps.
        Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I am
    happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of the
    Committee may have.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Roth.
        In my opening comments, I was talking a little bit about
    missions--the goals of the different agencies. In this
    Committee we have a pretty simple one: to enhance the economic
    and national security of America. Pretty all-encompassing. I
    think a problem we have, in terms of our visa programs, is that
    you, literally, have the tension of conflicting goals. We want
    to facilitate travel, commerce, and customer service, as
    Director Rodriguez was talking about. On the other hand, we
    want to ensure the security of our homeland and keep Americans
    safe. There is tension there.
        So, I want to first go to Director Rodriguez. Does your
    agency have a pretty simple mission statement like this
    Committee does? And, can you tell us what it is?
        Mr. Rodriguez. We have a number of different ways, but,
    certainly, I have been very clear with our staff--in
    communications to the entire staff that, in fact, to articulate
    a set of simple principles--and that is, where an individual
    qualifies for an immigration benefit, they should get that
    benefit in an efficient and appropriate manner, subject to,
    first and foremost, national security and fraud prevention.
    That is a key element of our draft strategic plan--subject,
    again, to the legal requirements that I mentioned before and
    subject to operational feasibility of whatever initiatives we
    are taking.
        Chairman Johnson. But, just the way you describe that, the
    first thing you talked about was providing benefits to your
    customer. So, I guess, the way I would interpret that is that
    that is really the first part of your mission--customer
    service, providing benefits to immigrants to this country,
    again, subject to security.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Right. And, subject to, and in no small way,
    to be given to national security and public safety. In other
    words, our staff clearly understands this, which is evidenced
    by the fact that roughly 900 of our staff members are,
    specifically, dedicated to the Fraud Detection and National
    Security Directorate (FDNS)--that if an individual poses a
    threat, they are denied the benefit--to be very clear about
    that.
        Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, do you have a
    relatively simple mission statement for your Agency?
        Ms. Saldana. It is comparable to this Committee's, and that
    is: to ensure the national security and public safety of our
    country through the enforcement of immigration and customs
    laws. Huge. Over 400 statutes are implicated by that, but we
    are game.
        Chairman Johnson. It is a big mission. It is a serious
    undertaking. The results of 9/11 and the National Commission on
    Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 9/11 Commission, and
    what they were talking about--the stovepipes--that continues to
    be a concern of mine. So, you have these cross-purposes. You
    have two different agencies now split--and I think you were
    always somewhat split under INS as well. But, I am concerned
    about that.
        Director Rodriguez, are you aware of what happened at the
    USCIS office in San Bernardino on December 3 following the San
    Bernardino attack? Are you aware of the events that occurred
    there?
        Mr. Rodriguez. At the USCIS office in San Bernardino.
        Chairman Johnson. In San Bernardino.
        Mr. Rodriguez. I am not, honestly. No, I am not aware that
    anything occurred at our office.
        Chairman Johnson. Director Saldana, are you aware of it?
        Ms. Saldana. I think you are referring to our HSI office,
    Senator Johnson.
        Chairman Johnson. Correct.
        Ms. Saldana. The subject of a letter that you have sent, I
    believe, to the Secretary of Homeland Security, which has been
    sent to me for response. I am aware of it.
        Chairman Johnson. Can you describe what happened from the
    standpoint--because HSI is under your jurisdiction. Can you
    just describe, from your standpoint, what you are aware of with
    respect to that incident?
        Ms. Saldana. Well, with respect to the whole San Bernardino
    incident----
        Chairman Johnson. No. I am just talking about your HSI
    agents showing up at the office of USCIS because they were made
    aware of the fact that Enrique Marquez was, potentially, there
    for an interview the day after the San Bernardino attack. You
    are not aware of that?
        Ms. Saldana. That I am not aware of. He showed up at USCIS?
        Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, Senator, now I am remembering the
    incident. I believe, if I understand correctly, there was a
    concern about the manner in which we were providing information
    about the individuals involved in the attack to HSI. In fact,
    the intent all along among our staff was to provide that
    information. It was just a matter of completing a very short
    process.
        Chairman Johnson. So, let me just describe--this is from an
    internal memo written by somebody who contacted our Committee.
    ``At approximately 12:00 p.m. on December 3, the FBI informed
    HSI and the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) that FBI field
    interview agents learned that Marquez and his wife, Maria
    Chernykh, were scheduled for a meeting at the U.S. Citizenship
    and Immigration Services office in San Bernardino for noon on
    December 3. HSI contacted the HSI special agent division
    requesting a team of armed agents to respond to the San
    Bernardino USCIS office in order to detain Marquez until an FBI
    interview team could be dispatched. The special agent division
    informed the HSI team that the officer in charge of USCIS would
    not let HSI agents in the building.''
        So, HSI had a special team show up trying to, potentially,
    apprehend somebody who, at that point in time, they thought
    might have been a part of a terrorist plot, and the officer in
    charge of the USCIS office would not allow those agents in the
    building.
        ``The special agent division learned that Marquez and
    Chernykh did not show up for the meeting. The special agent
    division requested copies of the Alien Registration File (A
    File), which USCIS refused. The special agent division was
    allowed to take a photo of Chernykh's photo, which was
    contained in that A file.''
        So, what happened on December 3--and this is kind of
    getting me to the cross-purposes. So, we had a team, armed up
    and, potentially, dealing with a terrorist. They had a tip from
    the FBI that Mr. Marquez might be at the USCIS office and the
    officer in charge of USCIS--the officers would not allow HSI
    into the building and would not give them the A file. That is
    not indicating a great deal of cooperation between two
    different agencies under DHS, whose supposedly top concern is
    the security of this Nation. Director Rodriguez, can you
    explain that?
        By the way, we have been told during the gathering of
    information process that the decision not to let HSI in came
    from higher up.
        Mr. Rodriguez. That much is not correct, in the sense that,
    once field leadership had consulted with higher-ups, the
    instruction was, in fact, to facilitate the actions that HSI
    wanted to take. Unfortunately, this was all--as these
    situations do--evolving very quickly. Ordinarily, we do not
    have situations where law enforcement comes into a USCIS office
    to effect an arrest.
        Chairman Johnson. But, how can you explain that the officer
    in charge of USCIS would not allow HSI agents in there when
    they are saying, ``Listen, you could have a potential terrorist
    here-- somebody who was involved in what just happened
    yesterday, in the slaughter of 14 Americans.'' And, they do not
    even allow them in the office? How could that possibly happen?
        Mr. Rodriguez. Again, Chairman, I think the point here is
    that we operate according to certain protocols. That individual
    was seeking guidance from higher-ups. The guidance was to
    facilitate what HSI was trying to accomplish. Unfortunately, it
    all happened so quickly that it was, incorrectly, perceived as
    our folks trying to, in some way, obstruct what ICE was trying
    to do.
        Do we need to look at our protocols to make sure that those
    misunderstandings do not occur? That may well be something that
    we need to do. But, there was never an actual intent to prevent
    them from doing what they needed to do.
        Chairman Johnson. It sounds like they were prevented.
        Director Saldana, can you explain this? And, what do you
    now know about it with, maybe, your memory refreshed?
        Ms. Saldana. I will say, in all honesty, Senator, that I
    had a similar reaction when I first heard about the incident.
    But, we do forget the number of law enforcement and other
    people involved in this incident and the confusion and the
    chaos that was going on in San Bernardino. We had immediate
    conversations when it came to my attention--and I am having a
    hard time, right now, remembering exactly. I believe it was the
    same day, and it was taken care of and clarified immediately.
    And, we did get the information we needed.
        But, I am with the Director. We can always do things
    better. And, if we do not, as I tell my son, learn lessons from
    the mistakes we make, then shame on us. But, I believe--he and
    I meet very often.
        Chairman Johnson. Coming from the private sector--I am just
    putting myself in the position of individuals at USCIS. The day
    after a terrorist attack, if I had a team, armed, coming into
    my office and saying, ``We believe somebody who was involved in
    that terrorist incident is in your building, we want to come
    in,'' I would say, ``Come on in.'' There would not have been a
    question in my mind. And, yet that is not what happened. It is
    quite puzzling. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. My first question is for you, Ms. Saldana.
    Over your right shoulder is a gentleman sitting in the crowd
    right behind you--in the row right behind you. He looks very
    familiar--right over your right shoulder in the front row. It
    looks like his first name might be Jason, and I think he used
    to work here. He used to sit right behind us here on this dais.
        Ms. Saldana. We have spent a lot of time together.
        Senator Carper. It is nice to see you, Jason. Welcome back.
    Thank you for your service.
        A couple of you alluded to one of my favorite aphorisms,
    that, if it is not perfect, make it better. And, one of those
    is how we move from a paper process to an electronic process.
    And, I think the Inspector General and, I think, Mr. Rodriguez
    both have touched on this--and the IG talked about a project
    that was abandoned, maybe, within the last year--I think after
    an investment of, I think you said, $500 million--and you
    thought that there had been some progress since the July 2015
    audit. And, I heard the word ``Agile'' mentioned, a term
    describing something. Just help and make some sense of it for
    me. I think we know that, to the extent that we can take a
    paperwork process--paper processes and make them electronic,
    oftentimes that provides better service and better security.
    How would this have done that? Where did we go wrong? And, how
    are we fixing it now? Mr. Rodriguez, lead us off.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Yes. So, the question is first to me. Is
    that correct, Senator?
        Senator Carper. Please.
        Mr. Rodriguez. I think it is well known to just about
    everybody here, including this Committee, that, in fact, there
    were a number of quite serious and quite protracted false
    starts with respect to our automation process. We were using
    what was sort of an antiquated development process, the
    Waterfall development process, which was directed by an outside
    entity. We have since migrated to this Agile process, which,
    essentially, involves multiple contractors competing against
    each other and also shrinks the development steps in such a way
    that we can develop a particular item, test it, try it out in
    the field, make corrections as we need to, and then move on to
    the next item--instead of trying to do everything all at once.
        To understand the timelines here, the first generation was
    the Waterfall generation. There was a second generation called
    ELIS. We began, really, the third generation, live, in March of
    last year, which, in other words, was about a month before the
    Inspector General's audit began. We launched the I-90, which is
    our replacement Green Card. That, already, incorporates a
    number of critical functionalities, which are then going to be
    used for other applications in the future. We have now
    processed approximately 300,000 I-90 applications through there
    and we have also added the Immigrant Visa (IV) payment since
    that time.
        So, we now have, approximately, 16 percent of our overall
    business on ELIS. What we have done so far, certainly, from a
    customer perspective, is working quite well. A number of the
    concerns that our internal employees had either reflected the
    older generation of ELIS or are things that reflected that
    early time when we first launched the I-90 application. Many of
    those issues have since been, not only resolved, but resolved
    well. Again, that is why I would like to invite the IG to come
    back and to invite the Committee to scrutinize further what we
    are doing.
        By the end of this year, we will have 30 percent of the
    business on ELIS, including some of our most complex forms.
    And, this is where----
        Senator Carper. I am going to ask you to hold it right
    there because I have some other questions. But, thank you for
    that explanation.
        Inspector General Roth, a quick reaction to what you are
    hearing from Leon Redbone--excuse me, Leon Rodriguez.
    [Laughter.]
        That is my favorite nickname for him.
        Mr. Roth. I mean, certainly, what we simply did was we went
    out to where the work is being done and we talked to the USCIS
    employees who were actually confronted with the system that
    they had. And, the level of frustration, which is reflected by
    the glitches and the hiccups in the rollout of the ELIS report,
    were significant. And, we were able to isolate that and to
    uncover a few root causes, including that there was a lack of
    user engagement--that is, the folks in the field did not
    particularly feel that they were being engaged and listened to
    in the development of the software. Second, that the testing
    was not done on an end-to-end basis--in other words, that the
    testing of certain elements of the software was done
    sporadically--but it was not done in a complete way. And,
    third, that the technical support was lacking.
        Now, the Agile development process means that you put out a
    minimum viable product and then you improve that product as you
    go. You basically fix the car while it is running, to use an
    analogy. Here, we thought that the testing, though, was
    insufficient, that the rollout was too soon, and that the user
    experience--the folks who were actually using it were highly
    frustrated with the system.
        Those issues--that is, user engagement, testing, and
    technical support--were the same things that we had seen in the
    previous version of ELIS--the $500 million one that ultimately
    had to be scrapped.
        Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Rodriguez has extended an
    invitation for your folks to come back and revisit them. I
    would urge you to do that and to do it soon.
        Mr. Roth. That is part of our audit process. We will,
    obviously, continue to sort of monitor this situation. We have
    made specific recommendations--some of which they have agreed
    with and some of which they have not--and we will continue to
    monitor and report as appropriate.
        Senator Carper. OK. Good. We will continue to monitor this.
    Thank you for the update.
        Director Saldana and Mr. Donahue, how do your agencies use
    social media when you vet and screen visa applicants? And, what
    challenges have you encountered in doing so?
        Ms. Saldana. I will begin with our portion of the
    responsibility here with respect to the vetting and screening.
    We are, first and foremost, a law enforcement agency--and HSI
    is an investigative agency. In all of our investigations and
    reviews, we use social media to the extent that the evidence
    leads us there.
        So, in the visa screening process, in particular, there is
    no bar to our use of it. There are occasions where we do. As I
    mentioned, we go through PATRIOT first. There is a preliminary
    assessment as to whether there are some indicators for further
    review. Where there is further review, we might actually use
    social media--review a person's social media in order to
    determine whether we should have a further study or whether we
    should recommend a negative result to the Department of State.
        So, we have that under our current authorities--and we have
    no problem using it when the case indicates we need to.
        Senator Carper. Alright. Mr. Donahue--same question. How do
    your folks use social media when you vet and screen visa
    applicants? And, what challenges have you encountered as you do
    that?
        Mr. Donahue. Sure. In Consular Affairs, we have used social
    media for a while. We have it in our regulations. In fact, we
    just updated our social media regulations. We use it when we
    see that there is a reason to look further into the case. We
    are now doing a pilot program in countries of concern to find
    out how effective it can be. It is a studied program where we
    are using social media on our IR1--our immigrant visa for
    spouses--and our K cases to see what kind of especially
    terrorist-related information we can find in the process. We do
    not have the results yet, but we have used it for a long time
    on the fraud side of the house.
        Senator Carper. OK. Thank you everyone.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Sasse.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SASSE

        Senator Sasse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Director Saldana, in January, 21-year-old Sarah Root was
    killed in Omaha by an illegal alien named Eswin Mejia. He was
    street driving while drunk. This is not the first time that
    local police had arrested Mr. Mejia for driving drunk. And,
    after he was arrested for the incident, he posted bail. Prior
    to being released from jail, however, local police contacted
    ICE and requested that he be detained because of his
    immigration status. ICE, however, refused and said that that
    would not be consistent with the President's Executive Actions
    on immigration. Mejia was released and disappeared.
        Do you think someone who street races while driving drunk
    and kills another person is a threat to public safety?
        Ms. Saldana. Yes.
        Senator Sasse. If an illegal alien kills an American
    citizen, should ICE let that person go free?
        Ms. Saldana. Go free? Well, there will be----
        Senator Sasse. Which is what happened here.
        Ms. Saldana. There will be criminal consequences.
        Senator Sasse. We do not know where the man is.
        Ms. Saldana. Right. And, sir, I do not understand where you
    got the information, with respect to our refusing to deal with
    this individual. That is not my understanding of the facts.
        Senator Sasse. This is ICE's public comment. ICE has said
    this in response to Omaha law enforcement, who said they
    requested that ICE detain him.
        Ms. Saldana. I am ICE and I do not recall making that
    statement. I would not have said that. What we did do was--we
    look at every individual case, like we did here with Mr. Mejia,
    and we determine whether a detainer to recommend to local law
    enforcement is appropriate. As you know, that has been a
    subject of much conversation. We are working very hard to get
    all local law enforcement offices to work with us on it--and we
    have made some great strides. But, in this case--there is not a
    single injury or death that occurs at the hands of an illegal
    immigrant that does not weigh heavily on me, Senator.
        Senator Sasse. I believe that. I am going to interrupt
    because I am quoting your agency here. This is my letter to
    you, dated February 29. I am quoting your Agency's public
    statement. This is footnote 4 in my letter. Do you have the
    letter from February 29? Your agency said in response, ``At the
    time of his January 2016 arrest in Omaha--and local criminal
    charges, Eswin Mejia, 19, of Honduras, did not meet ICE's
    enforcement priorities, as stated by the November 20, 2014
    civil enforcement memo issued by Secretary Johnson.''
        Ms. Saldana. Oh, I understood you to be saying that we told
    local law enforcement we were not going to do anything about
    him because he did not meet our priorities. That is a statement
    of fact in one person's interpretation. Quite frankly, sir, it
    is very easy to look back and say that that person's judgment
    was incorrect--and I have some concerns about that.
        As I said earlier, for every situation we have that results
    in something as horrific as this, we always try to learn from
    it. And, I will be following up to look at the specific
    individuals involved, how the judgment was formed, and why that
    was done. But, I misunderstood your question. I understood your
    question to mean that we told law enforcement that we are not
    going to do that.
        Senator Sasse. Well, the rest of your statement says--your
    Agency's statement, not you personally--that Mejia is scheduled
    to go before an immigration judge on March 23, 2017--but he was
    released by the police once he posted bail. They contacted your
    agency and asked you to detain him. ICE did not act. How do you
    explain that to the family?
        Ms. Saldana. We tried to act, sir, but I believe it was a
    matter of hours between the time that we were contacted and the
    actual release. It is very hard for us to get to every inquiry
    that is made by law enforcement, and, unfortunately, it had a
    horrible consequence here. But, we try very hard to respond as
    quickly as possible. We just cannot get to every site within a
    matter of hours. I think it was 4 hours, if I am not----
        Senator Sasse. I do not know that fact.
        Ms. Saldana. If I am remembering correctly. But, that is a
    fact--that we try very hard to get to and to respond to local
    law enforcement. It does not do us any good to tell them to
    cooperate with us if we are not going to respond.
        Senator Sasse. My letter to you is from 16 days ago. Can
    you tell me when I will receive a reply? Because it has details
    on all of these questions.
        Ms. Saldana. Yes, I think we will get you a reply within a
    couple of weeks--if that is satisfactory. And, if you need it
    sooner, I will certainly work to try to get that.
        Senator Sasse. Could we have that by the end of next week?
        Ms. Saldana. Yes, you can.
        Senator Sasse. Thank you, ma'am.
        General Roth, in November 2014, Secretary Johnson issued a
    number of memos changing DHS's policies on immigration known
    collectively as ``the President's immigration Executive
    Aactions.'' One of these memos addressed changes to ICE's
    detention policy for illegal aliens. DHS said in that memo that
    it was designed to identify threats to public safety.
    Specifically, it says that, unless an illegal alien has been
    charged with a serious crime, ICE will not likely detain that
    person. Does this policy mean that ICE does not consider
    someone a threat to public safety unless they have already been
    convicted?
        Mr. Roth. Frankly, I was not involved in writing that memo
    or in developing that policy, so it is difficult for me to
    respond to that.
        Senator Sasse. To your knowledge, though, are ICE officials
    required to strictly follow the new policy, or is it used as
    guidance and then there is discretion on a case-by-case basis?
        Mr. Roth. Again, we have not looked at that in any kind of
    audit or investigation, so I think that question is best
    directed to members of the administration or to ICE.
        Senator Sasse. Does the IG's office have any plans or any
    current studies of the President's Executive Actions on
    immigration?
        Mr. Roth. We do not.
        Senator Sasse. Director Saldana, how should ICE officials
    implement the new detention policies that were put in place in
    November 2014 with regard to cases like this? You mentioned the
    timing. Can you give us a broad sense of how you exercise your
    discretion?
        Ms. Saldana. Well, generally speaking--and let me just
    respond to the tail end of that question that you had, and that
    is the requirement of conviction. I am happy to share with you
    this card that we have, which we provide to our ICE officers
    who are involved in this activity. But, there are many
    categories here where a conviction is not necessary. If this is
    a person with a gang affiliation, no conviction is necessary.
    If there is a person with terrorist ties, no conviction is
    necessary. There are several that do involve a conviction, but
    let me point out to you, sir--and I have met with all of our
    field office directors to specify, clearly, to them that there
    is always this category--which is kind of an umbrella
    category--that says that if this does not fit a specific case,
    but you, as an informed and well-trained officer of Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement believe that that person presents a
    public safety threat, you are free to exercise your judgment in
    the manner consistent with that judgment.
        Senator Sasse. But, in this case, Sarah Root is dead. So,
    what if someone kills a U.S. citizen? That does not meet the
    threshold?
        Ms. Saldana. That was after the fact, sir. What you are
    saying, as I understand it, is that that person was injured and
    had
    not--when that 4-hour period of time--seriously injured, but
    had not passed away until later. Again, sir, it is easy to look
    back and say that that judgment was poorly exercised. And, as I
    said earlier, I intend to learn from this particular incident.
    I feel terrible for the Root family and--but I can say, I wish
    I had a 100-percent foolproof method to ensure and--to look in
    the future and ensure whether somebody is going to commit a
    crime or not. And, it is very difficult to do that. I hope you
    take my word that we do the best we can.
        Senator Sasse. I hear you. But, it is not the case that he
    was released and then went and had another drunk-driving,
    street-racing case. This was drunk-driving, street-racing that
    killed someone. Then, he posted bond. Then, the Omaha police
    asked that he be detained. ICE did not detain him and now he
    has fled.
        Ms. Saldana. And, I intend to use this--again, I am going
    to look further into this and use it for lessons learned if I
    find that there were serious errors of judgment here. But, many
    times prosecutorial discretion is just that. It is a judgment
    that is being exercised by the person based on what they see at
    the time.
        Senator Sasse. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Peters.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I also want
    to join to thank our witnesses today for your work. There is no
    question that the most important duty that we have as members
    of the Federal Government is to ensure the security of our
    borders and to ensure the security of the citizens of this
    country. So, I appreciate all of your efforts in doing that
    each and every day. And, I know that it is a difficult job that
    you all have.
        I am very proud to represent, as all of you know, a very
    large and vibrant Arab-American and Muslim community in the
    State of Michigan. And, I heard, from a number of my
    constituents, some concerns about the impact that the dual
    national provisions could have on their families as they are
    traveling to other Visa Waiver Program countries around the
    world.
        We know that Syria and Iran deem individuals to be
    nationals of those countries, regardless of where someone was
    born or whether they have even set foot in that country, simply
    because their fathers were citizens of those countries. Because
    the Visa Waiver Program is based on reciprocity, it is possible
    that a Visa Waiver Program country could impose the same
    requirements on dual national Syrian and Iranian Americans. So,
    I would like a response. Is the Administration--it can be from
    anyone on the panel. Is the Administration concerned that other
    Visa Waiver Program countries could impose restrictions on
    American citizens limiting their ability to travel to
    participating VWP countries without a visa?
        Mr. Donahue. Thank you for your question, Senator. It
    certainly is a concern, I think, for the State Department and
    the Department of Homeland Security. Our Secretaries have been
    working together on the new legislation regarding dual
    nationals. We are certainly concerned that citizens who have
    non-meaningful citizenship that they cannot remove--about the
    effects that that has on their life. They certainly can apply
    for a visa and travel to the United States. We are still
    reviewing that--and, certainly, we are concerned that there
    could be reciprocity from other countries.
        Senator Peters. Would anybody else like to comment? No?
        [No response.]
        Also, for the panel, I would like to know--I would like to
    just get a better sense of how the United States makes dual
    national determinations. So, for example, would a German
    citizen who was born and raised in Germany and has never
    traveled outside of the country, but whose father was Iranian,
    would he be considered a dual German-Iranian national by the
    United States?
        Mr. Donahue. Again, I think we are looking at that. We have
    not made a final decision on how we are going to manage the
    dual citizenship.
        Senator Peters. OK. I would love to work with you on that
    as we go forward. Obviously, we have a situation where a number
    of folks are going to be in that category and they are just
    concerned about how the process will work. And, we need to know
    how the process will work.
        Also, Mr. Donahue, given some of your concerns, are there
    waivers that the State Department would recommend for classes
    such as journalists, non-governmental organization (NGO)
    employees, and, perhaps, certain dual nationals that you could
    offer?
        Mr. Donahue. Yes, the Secretary of State recommended to
    Secretary Johnson that there--and Secretary Johnson agreed that
    that was a reasonable interpretation of the law and that there
    be waivers for those who are helping us in the work that we are
    doing. I think, particularly, we think about aid workers who
    are providing food and sustenance to the millions of people who
    are in camps in countries of concern--Syria, for example--going
    forward.
        Again, while these travelers can travel with a visa--it
    does not affect their travel--it could deter people who want to
    help us in our work. For example, people who are working for
    the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) going to Iran to
    ensure implementation or people who are in business in Northern
    Iraq and are helping that country develop.
        So, we are very concerned about that. We are working
    together. We are looking at those cases. DHS has been building
    questions as part of the Electronic System for Travel
    Authorization (ESTA) program that screens visa waiver
    travelers, and no decisions have been made--or no waivers have
    been granted thus far--but, we do believe that the law was
    written to allow for waivers.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        The other area that I think we need to focus on--as a
    country, we are, but I was just hoping to get some response
    from the panel as to how your agencies work on an interagency
    basis with other parts of the Federal Government. A key area is
    trying to stem the financing of terror networks and focus on
    stopping the flow of money back and forth. And, I am just
    curious as to how the interagency visa vetting process works--
    how it incorporates information about financial crimes that may
    have been conducted by individuals who may be part of a terror
    financing network. The Department of Treasury is very active
    with this issue. I am just curious as to how you work with the
    Department of Treasury to identify those individuals who may be
    engaged in activities that are seeking to move around the world
    to continue to further those activities.
        Ms. Saldana. Well, I will say that our agency, Homeland
    Security Investigations--that is exactly up our wheelhouse. We
    are concerned about illicit trafficking--illicit financial
    transactions across transnational boundaries.
        So, what we do is we build databases to share information
    with the Department of State and USCIS, specifically, to
    communicate information that we may have regarding a target in
    an investigation or someone who has actually been convicted of
    a crime, which is available to them. We communicate through--
    obviously, the PATRIOT system is that first line of defense
    with respect to the visa screening process, but what I am
    talking about is, not only the visa screening process, but
    criminal investigations, in general, worldwide. That is exactly
    what Homeland Security Investigations does.
        Mr. Rodriguez. The one thing that I would add is that we
    have strong relationships running in both directions with our
    law enforcement and intelligence community partners. Beginning
    with our law enforcement partners within DHS, like ICE and CBP,
    it is critical that we receive information from them when we
    adjudicate immigration benefits. We get that information as we
    need it. At the same time, we, occasionally, in the course of
    our work, identify information that is either of law
    enforcement or intelligence value, and we have well-developed
    pathways to make sure that that information is shared.
        One example is, during the course of refugee screening, if
    we learn information that is potentially of intelligence value,
    that information is, in fact, shared with the intelligence
    community.
        Senator Peters. Thank you.
        Mr. Donahue. And, we work very closely with the Department
    of Treasury. When they make a designation, as part of the
    announcement of that designation, anyone who is designated--and
    quite often their family members or anyone who benefits from
    these actions--they pass those to us and we immediately enter
    them into our Lookout system, review any visas, and we can do
    prudential revocations of the visas of anyone who is found by
    the Department of Treasury to be in that class.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Booker.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BOOKER

        Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just want to say, first and foremost, how grateful I am
    for the dedication, the work, and the service that the four of
    you render to our Nation. We have an incredible country, the
    oldest constitutional democracy. We were founded in a different
    way than any other nation in the history of the Earth at that
    time. We were founded not because we all prayed the same, not
    because we all looked the same, and not because we all heralded
    from the same genealogy, but rather because we were a nation of
    ideals. And, every generation in this country has aspired to
    make more real those ideals.
        One of the things that has sourced the richness and the
    greatness of this country has been the fact that we are a
    Nation that has people from all over the planet Earth who have
    brought such strength to our economy--growth. Our diversity has
    yielded diversity of thought, diversity of innovation,
    diversity of accomplishment, and, I think, that is one of the
    things that makes America great. And, you all, every day
    grapple in an incredibly difficult space where you are
    balancing our values and our ideals with the urgencies of our
    time. First and foremost amongst them is to keep us safe.
        So, I know how difficult your work is and I just want to
    say thank you. I know these hearings, as, I think, the
    Honorable Mr. Rodriguez was hinting at, can often be difficult,
    but please know I am one of those Senators that just
    appreciates your work.
        I want to just dive in where Senator Peters left off. I
    have a lot of concerns about the issues that face what was
    brought forth in the omnibus last year, when Congress passed a
    provision that would bar dual nationals from Iran, Iraq, Syria,
    and Sudan from using the Visa Waiver Program. I am very happy
    that, in a bipartisan way, Senators Flake, Durbin, and I
    introduced bipartisan legislation, the Equal Protection and
    Travel Act, repealing--seeking to repeal the restrictions on
    dual nationals while, obviously, leaving the other changes to
    the Visa Waiver Program intact.
        I just find it very disturbing that the prohibition on dual
    nationals applies to individuals who were born in Visa Waiver
    Program countries, but who have never even traveled to Iraq,
    Iran, Sudan, or Syria. But, they are nationals of those
    countries solely because of their ancestry. It seems to
    violate, in my opinion, really the values of this country that
    we have seen throughout our history.
        And so, my colleagues and I support the tightening of the
    Visa Waiver Program, but singling out people based solely on
    their ancestry or national origin does not, I believe, make us
    safer. And, it is inconsistent with what I love about our
    country and our interests--and it invites, in my opinion,
    retaliation or discrimination against American citizens who are
    also dual nationals.
        So my question--and maybe I will start with you, Mr.
    Donahue--is just very plain: do you believe that the dual
    national restrictions that I just described enhance our
    national security?
        Mr. Donahue. We certainly are always reviewing where we
    need to put more emphasis and we want to be sure that every
    visa interview is used effectively to protect our borders. But,
    we also realize that the Visa Waiver Program, by its very
    nature, has allowed us to move resources to those places where
    we need to look more closely.
        Senator Booker. So, does it make us safer that somebody
    from Britain or France who has Iranian, Syrian, or Sudanese
    ancestry--does barring them from the Visa Waiver Program make
    us safer, in your opinion?
        Mr. Donahue. I think, all things being equal, not knowing
    the individual--not knowing--you always try to do these on a
    case-by-case basis. But, I agree with you that that is not, in
    and of itself, an indicator----
        Senator Booker. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Donahue [continuing]. That this person is a higher
    threat.
        Senator Booker. In the Senate, whenever I hear those words
    ``I agree with you,'' I get very happy--and I appreciate that.
        And so, Mr. Rodriguez or the Honorable Ms. Saldana, do you
    think we gain any additional security benefits by barring
    individuals based on their national origin or heritage?
        Ms. Saldana. Well, as a general proposition, no.
        Senator Booker. OK. Thank you, Mr. Rodriguez.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Let me be very clear. No, we do not. And no,
    we do not do that. We scrutinize people, perhaps, differently
    in situations where they come from conflict zones,
    particularly, conflict zones where there are organizations that
    are actively promoting violence against the United States.
        Senator Booker. Clearly.
        Mr. Rodriguez. But no, we do not--and I would never operate
    an Agency that operated that way.
        Senator Booker. But, the omnibus that passed last year
    called for us to do those things. And, I am very happy that,
    again, a bipartisan group of Senators is saying that we should
    not do those things. And, you are saying to me that we do not
    do them now, or--does it add to our national----
        Mr. Rodriguez. Certainly not in the manner in which my
    agency does any of its work. I do not operate the Visa Waiver
    Program. My agency does not operate that. We do other things
    where we make decisions based on----
        Senator Booker. Right, but you do not think that what I
    described and what was in that omnibus enhances national
    security?
        Mr. Rodriguez. Again, not my lane, so I would not be
    opining on the Visa Waiver Program.
        Senator Booker. You are a smart man to stay in your lane.
    [Laughter.]
        But, a rule, I think, is very important. But, the Honorable
    Ms. Saldana, you do not think it makes us any safer?
        Ms. Saldana. As I said, as a general proposition--again, in
    our role as investigators, we look at every aspect of the facts
    and circumstances pertaining to an individual's application--
    and there may be some reason to explore further. But, as a
    general proposition, of course not--not just solely based on a
    remote relationship with someone from a particular country.
        Senator Booker. I am grateful for that response.
        Let me shift into your lane, sir. It was very clear to me,
    after the horrific attacks in France, that many of the people
    who participated in that could have used the Visa Waiver
    Program to come to our country and, by the way, walk into a gun
    show, buy a trunk full of weapons, and commit those crimes here
    just as easily. And so, one of the aspects of the Visa Waiver
    Program that is important to me is our coordination and
    cooperation with our European allies, specifically, in sharing
    information and working against terrorism. So, my final
    question in my remaining few seconds is: I worry that our
    European allies and others might not be doing enough to help
    strengthen our security--to share information and to up their
    procedures and policies to the point where we could effectively
    rely on them. And so, what are we doing to help Europe
    strengthen its border security entry procedures, so that they
    are effectively documenting the refugees coming into their
    countries?
        And, if that is a new signal for my time almost being up,
    it is very effective. [Laughter.]
        Go ahead.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, what I do know is that we work on those
    issues, primarily, through our U.S. intelligence community and
    law enforcement partners. I do know that they are actively
    engaged with their counterparts in Europe and throughout the
    English-speaking world. Just 2 or 3 weeks ago, I spent a lot of
    time with our partners from Australia, England, and Canada
    exchanging information and talking about our common goals in
    this area. We are going to continue doing that on a
    multilateral basis to make sure that we are supporting one
    another in what is really a very critical mission.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Roth, are you satisfied that we are
    doing enough in partnership with our European allies to
    strengthen their policies and procedures to make our country
    safer?
        Mr. Roth. We have not looked at that specific issue of
    information sharing with our foreign partners. I would say,
    though, that anytime that you have a risk-based system,
    particularly in the current terrorist environment, in which you
    have functionally pop-up terrorists--people who are not on
    anybody's list and who are unknown--that the kind of individual
    scrutiny that is required with the Visa Waiver Program really
    is sort of the stop-gap for that.
        Senator Booker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And, thank you for
    holding such an important hearing.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Booker.
        I want to talk a little bit about the problem of overstays.
    I do not quite understand it. I mean, I do but I do not. We are
    often cited the statistic about how 40 percent of the people in
    this country illegally are here on overstays. Of the best
    estimate--11 to 12 million people in this country illegally--
    that puts the number somewhere between 4.4 and 4.8 million
    people here that are overstaying a visa.
        Let me start by asking, does anybody know which visas are
    primarily abused? I will start with Director Saldana.
        Ms. Saldana. I would defer that to the State Department,
    with respect to the overall picture.
        Chairman Johnson. Secretary Donahue, you got the football
    thrown to you.
        Mr. Donahue. I am not sure I have seen a figure on any
    particular area. I really do not know.
        Chairman Johnson. I mean, why would we not know that? The
    article I am looking at says there are still, today, about--
    what does it say?--523,000 visa overstays per year. Why would
    we not be tracking that?
        Mr. Donahue. We do track at all of our posts and we do this
    through a validation study. We will check to see, for instance,
    if people from a certain country are coming to the United
    States and staying on a certain type of visa. And, different
    kinds of visas are harder to track. For instance, a visitor,
    admitted for a certain amount of time, 6 months usually--or 3
    months if they are eligible for a visa waiver. A student--that
    is a long-term admission and it is hard to determine at what
    point they become----
        Chairman Johnson. But, are we not working with the schools,
    and are there not requirements of the schools to keep us up to
    date if somebody drops out, is not paying tuition, or something
    like that--that we can report that and then are aware of it, so
    that ICE can potentially enforce?
        Ms. Saldana. Yes. And, of course, with respect to a
    category, this is an educated, I think, guess and that is, the
    most visas we have are B1s or B2s--travelers for business or
    pleasure. So, I would think there would be some correlation
    between that and the number of overstays.
        But, absolutely, we are responsible for the Student
    Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) and we have the database of
    information in the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
    System (SEVIS) database that relates to all 8,000 universities
    that have students placed there. And, we do have leads that are
    provided to the CTCEU, which I mentioned earlier, with respect
    to overstays. Once again, so much of what we do is risk-based,
    so we are looking at the large universe of overstays and trying
    to determine which of these folks could potentially pose a
    danger or a public safety threat. And, the information we
    have--at least I can give you this, sir: we have about half a
    million--489,579--leads that were provided to CTCEU, where
    there is a flag with respect to business and pleasure
    travelers--the B1 and B2 visas. That is the largest category of
    individuals that we are running down, so I think that
    correlation is supported by that number.
        Chairman Johnson. I realize there are millions--tens of
    millions--of people that come and go out of the United States.
    In today's information technology age, I do not understand what
    is so hard about keeping track of this. Everybody that comes
    here, legally, has a passport that has a number attached,
    correct?
        Ms. Saldana. Yes.
        Chairman Johnson. That goes into a database. What is so
    hard to then have that passport attached to a particular visa?
    Should we not just have the information on this thing? Again, I
    am an accountant, so I am kind of into numbers and I am kind of
    into information. But, when we take a look at what we can do in
    other areas of our economy, whether it is tracking numbers with
    shipments--that type of thing--what has been so hard about us
    developing that database, so we know exactly who has come in,
    who has not gone, and can tie it to a visa--and just know, with
    a great deal of certainty, by pretty much a push of a button on
    a computer all of that information? Why is that?
        Ms. Saldana. Well, we do know, with some degree of
    certainty, what the Principal Deputy was mentioning earlier----
        Chairman Johnson. You were not able to tell me how many--
    under what visa program--again, I understand the vast majority
    of visas are in certain categories, so you assume. But, it is
    not like you have ready information, in terms of, ``No, this is
    exactly how many people were granted a visa and have not
    checked out on time--there is an overstay that should be,
    potentially, subject to enforcement.''
        Inspector General Roth, can you speak to this?
        Mr. Roth. What you are referring to really is a biometric
    system for exits, so you can understand who it is that has left
    the country, so you are able to compare those two sets of data.
        Chairman Johnson. First of all, let me--it is just numbers.
    It is actually easier than that. Again, unless I am missing
    something, in terms of people coming in with a passport and a
    visa--that is numerical information and can be easily loaded
    into a database with a set time that a visa expires. We do not
    have a record of this person leaving. To me, that is an
    incredibly simple database to manage. Why do we not do it?
        Mr. Roth. Well, as my most recent report shows, the
    challenges, in the Federal Government, for building these kinds
    of information systems is very difficult. I think there has
    been some effort to try to get an exit system that has not been
    successful. So, I think, as a Federal Government, we are aware
    of the problem, but we have not been able to implement a
    solution.
        Chairman Johnson. Would you agree with me that, in the
    private sector, this would almost be like falling off of a
    log----
        Mr. Roth. Yes.
        Chairman Johnson [continuing]. In terms of developing a
    database like this?
        Mr. Roth. Yes.
        Chairman Johnson. Which begs the question: why can we not
    do this after 10 years in the Federal Government? Unbelievable.
        I will go to Senator Ernst.

                   OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ERNST

        Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, for the ICE
    Director, please, a number of my colleagues have already spoken
    on this--Senator Grassley, in a floor speech and last night,
    and also Senator Sasse here, in this forum, this morning asked
    a question and raised the case of the tragic death of Iowan
    Sarah Root, who was killed by a drunk driver who was,
    reportedly, in the country illegally and has since posted bail
    and absconded. If it is the case that ICE refrained from
    lodging a detainer on Mejia because his arrest for felony
    vehicular homicide ``did not meet ICE's enforcement
    priorities,'' would you agree with me that ICE needs to take
    another look at its so-called enforcement policies?
        Ms. Saldana. Well, we do that every day. We train and we
    respond to evolving situations on the basis of things we have
    experienced and seen. So, that prosecutorial discretion, as I
    said a little earlier, is just that. It is a person's judgment
    in looking at all of the information in front of them as to
    whether or not they lodge a detainer or not. We do it on a
    case-by-case basis. And, as I said earlier, Senator, this is a
    terrible instance where we will look at it and learn from that
    situation. But, prosecutorial discretion could have been
    exercised a different way here. That is us looking back. I want
    to look forward, so that we do not have that situation arise
    again.
        Senator Ernst. Well, except that the way we look forward,
    though, Director, is also by learning from mistakes of the
    past--and this is not an isolated incident by any means. And,
    the priority should be to ensure that people who enter our
    country illegally and kill American citizens are deported and
    never allowed to return. And, unfortunately, in this situation,
    we have a gentleman who has done exactly that--and I am
    guessing he is still here in the United States somewhere.
        Ms. Saldana. And, we will be looking for him, Senator. This
    does not end there.
        Senator Ernst. I certainly hope so. There is a family that
    demands answers--as do we. And, just to be clear, if he is
    apprehended, today, would Mr. Mejia fit the President's
    enforcement priorities?
        Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
        Senator Ernst. OK. I look forward to continuing the
    discussion on this. This is important. But, again, it is not an
    isolated incident and we have to make sure that all of our
    agencies--local and Federal--are working together on these
    issues. And, I think we all can learn from this incident.
        Ms. Saldana. I agree.
        Senator Ernst. Thank you for your time.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Johnson. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to go back to visa overstays. Every State has its
    own Medicaid program. We are told that one of the cost drivers
    for Medicaid is that people have an appointment, but sometimes
    do not show up--oftentimes these are moms, dads, and young
    children--and so, they do a lot of things to try to make sure
    people show up.
        One of the things that we do in Delaware--and in some other
    States as well--and I think we got this idea from Johnson &
    Johnson (J&J)--the other Johnson.
        Chairman Johnson. A good name.
        Senator Carper. And, it is called ``Text for Baby.'' And,
    text messages are sent to parents, who need to make sure that
    their child has an appointment and actually shows up. And, they
    do this maybe a week before or they do it like a day before.
    They may even do it the day of, I think. And, it seems to me
    that that is an idea that--and it has actually helped. It makes
    it more certain that people actually show up for their
    appointments. It saves some money for Medicaid and makes sure
    people get the health care they need.
        I am just wondering if a similar approach might be helpful
    for folks that come to this country--most of the people that
    come to this country come here legally--overwhelmingly so--but
    a bunch of them overstay their visas, as you know. And, I think
    it might be helpful if they were just getting pinged with the
    countdown to the date that their visa expires, saying, ``You
    have 2 weeks to go,'' ``You have 1 week to go,'' ``You have 2
    days to go,'' or ``You have 12 hours to go.'' It is the kind of
    thing that is easily automated and most people who come to this
    country have cell phones. And, I think I always like to look to
    the private sector for a solution that might work for a public
    purpose. Actually, the other is sort of a public purpose as
    well. Just react to that, please.
        Ms. Saldana. It is a very interesting idea, Senator.
    Obviously, everything that we hear here we take back and talk
    to our folks about.
        We have a massive number of students in the system and, as
    the Principal Deputy said earlier, they are on different
    programs. I understand what you are saying--to do the ping at
    the end of the term of the visa, whether or not they are
    finished with their program. So, right now, as I said earlier,
    we are using a risk-based analysis with respect to these
    overstays--who presents a risk in those overstays. It is a
    matter of resources and trying to direct them to the area where
    the greatest risk is. But, that is certainly an interesting
    idea. I think it would require a tremendous number of
    additional resources than we have now to ping millions of
    people. But, that is certainly something I can study further.
        Senator Carper. I was sitting here listening to Senator
    Johnson. He is shaking his head and he said, ``No, it would
    not.''
        Ms. Saldana. No, it would not require additional resources?
    Is that what you are saying, sir?
        Chairman Johnson. Not a tremendous amount.
        Senator Carper. Just think about it, OK? And, I am going to
    ask you to do more than just think about it.
        Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
        Senator Carper. We will put you in touch with the ``Text
    for Baby'' people and your folks can figure out how they do it.
        Ms. Saldana. Are you saying ``baby''?
        Senator Carper. B-A-B-Y.
        Ms. Saldana. B-A-B-Y, OK.
        Senator Carper. ``Bring back my baby to me.''
        All right. This is a question for Director Saldana and Mr.
    Donahue. You are a good couple here. As I understand it, ICE
    uses an automated system--we talked about it here a little bit
    earlier today--called PATRIOT to conduct the screening of visa
    applicants for all visas that are processed at overseas posts
    where ICE's visa security teams are present.
        What is holding ICE and the State Department back from
    requiring this automated system to be used for all incoming
    visas? Is it simply a matter of resources?
        Ms. Saldana. I would not say ``simply,'' but that is
    certainly a factor. And, actually, Senator, we are undergoing a
    pilot right now under PATRIOT--a PATRIOT expansion pilot--that
    is looking at three additional countries to try to do all--that
    are not necessarily among these 20 or 26 posts where we have
    visa screening--but looking at expanding that and what it would
    take and how much time would be consumed. So, we are actually
    undertaking an evaluation and study of that because, if it is
    possible, it is certainly something we would like to do. But,
    right now, I am not in a position to tell you, ``Absolutely,
    that can happen.'' I think our study wraps up in May, so I will
    be able to report back to you my thoughts and ideas based on
    what we have learned from that expanded PATRIOT project.
        Senator Carper. Would you do that?
        Ms. Saldana. Absolutely.
        Senator Carper. Thank you.
        Mr. Donahue, any thoughts on this one?
        Mr. Donahue. I think we are also working with ICE in
    countries where the physical presence would be good, but is not
    possible because of resources or other reasons, to have some of
    the PATRIOT functions--the computerized functions--done
    domestically and then advising posts of the response to the
    PATRIOT checks. So, that will also expand their ability to
    expand it to more countries.
        Senator Carper. OK. This is a question for everybody--and
    then I am done. Since 9/11, one of the key themes of our
    homeland security efforts has been information sharing. The
    testimony today references a lot of different programs and
    different databases used to screen applicants before they come
    to the United States.
        Can each of you just take a moment to reflect on how well
    integrated these resources are and what barriers remain? And,
    how much of this sharing is automated and how much requires
    time and initiative by an individual officer?
        Mr. Donahue. I can begin from our side.
        Senator Carper. Please.
        Mr. Donahue. I have seen a revolution in the realm of
    information sharing since 9/11--and, especially, in my 32 years
    of doing this kind of work. I think one of the most remarkable
    things is that, today, someone can be interviewing an applicant
    for a visa in Mali. That person's visa will be checked by my
    colleagues and the interagency--law enforcement and the
    intelligence community--response will come back to that
    officer--whether there is anything to be concerned about--in
    addition to whatever he or she has been able to find out in the
    interview.
        Then that person is issued a visa. A person can get on a
    plane today, arrive in Atlanta, and, at the port of entry, the
    officer there will have all of the information that was used in
    making that decision back in Mali--just in less time than the
    flight. So, that kind of information sharing, where we can look
    into--for instance, our database--our major database--there are
    more DHS users than there are State Department users, so that
    people know why we issued a passport or why we issued a visa.
    And, I think that has made us all much more effective.
        Senator Carper. OK. Anyone else? Just very briefly, Mr.
    Rodriguez.
        Mr. Rodriguez. Sure. I think, as this Committee knows, I
    spent most of my career in law enforcement and, very early on,
    I was an organized crime prosecutor. I remember, back in the
    late 1980s and early 1990s, where what was considered our
    organized crime database was actually rows and rows of filing
    cabinets that would fill this room.
        We have certainly come a long way from that time. We now
    have, at USCIS, a very well automated process to ping law
    enforcement and intelligence community databases to determine
    whether an individual seeking an immigration benefit presents a
    threat to the United States. That will never, in my view, be a
    substitute for the human judgment that is required on both
    ends--to make an intelligence community judgment and then for
    us to make an immigration judgment with that information. So,
    that will always continue to be part of it.
        But, in terms of the information moving, we really have
    reached a pretty good point these days.
        Senator Carper. Good. Thank you.
        Ms. Saldana, the same question, just briefly.
        Ms. Saldana. And, I agree, we can always improve and we can
    always do better--we have heard of one or two instances where
    the information--the sharing broke down a little bit. But, the
    Visa Security Program, itself, is an extraordinary example of
    that information sharing. We have our DHS holdings that we
    bounce the PATRIOT inquiry against and it has so many different
    contributors--FBI, obviously the State Department, and other
    law enforcement--and that is an example of the progress that we
    have made.
        We are always working on this to make it better--and
    internationally with our allies and the countries out there
    that we are in.
        Senator Carper. OK. Thank you.
        General Roth, the last word.
        Mr. Roth. Well, thank you, and my apologies for being the
    contrarian or the skeptic in the room. I will have to say
    that----
        Senator Carper. No, no. Be yourself. Be yourself.
    [Laughter.]
        Mr. Roth. It is an occupational hazard, Senator. Several of
    our audits note sort of the difficulty with the paper-based
    system. So, for example, when we compared ICE data with USCIS
    data, in regard to human-trafficking victims, what we found was
    that the perpetrators of human trafficking, who people at ICE
    had investigated, were, in fact, using the visa system to bring
    their victims into the country. And, one of the reasons that
    has occurred is because USCIS still has a paper-based system--
    and I am sympathetic to Director Rodriguez's challenges in this
    area. But, for example, an individual who applies for a T
    visa--which is the individual who is a victim of human
    trafficking--submits a statement as to what occurred to that
    person that allows them to receive a T visa. That is not
    digitized in any way, so there can be names and identifiers of
    perpetrators of human trafficking that simply get lost in the
    system.
        So, while I agree that, in many ways, there are systems in
    place that allow for this kind of information sharing, there is
    much that can be done to improve that.
        Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. Thank you for being
    the contrarian in the room. And, thank you to each of you for
    your testimony, your efforts, and your leadership. Thank you.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Senator Carper. I think we
    should work together on some piece of legislation to facilitate
    using the private sector skills that are out there--and
    technologies. Go to any business involved in logistics, whether
    it is FedEx, UPS, or any trucking company. These programs exist
    for tracking. It is a similar type of process--almost off of
    the shelf. I would suggest, maybe, getting some of their IT
    experts in your agencies and let us get this program done. It
    should not take years and years or billions and billions of
    dollars. We have done it in the private sector. It is
    unbelievable what they can really track. And, the information,
    just from a desktop, that a customer can obtain, in terms of a
    package being transferred from this truck to another truck--we
    ought to be able to do the same thing, in terms of tracking
    visa overstays.
        I do want to ask a couple more questions about resource
    capabilities. This is kind of going to what Senator Tester was
    talking about. I will go to you, Mr. Donahue. Again, I am an
    accountant, so I like numbers. As best I can determine,
    somewhere between 20 million and 32 to 33 million people go to
    consulates, go to embassies, and have to do an interview to get
    a visa to come to the United States on an annual basis. Is that
    kind of roughly about the right number? Does that sound about
    right to you?
        Mr. Donahue. It is closer to about 13 million that come in
    and 13.5 million that come in for a visa. The Visa Waiver
    Program is additional to that.
        Chairman Johnson. Something different, OK. You have about
    1,800 foreign service officers that do those interviews, so,
    based on the 13 million number, it is going to be less. But, if
    you talk about 13 million people divided by 1,800, we are
    talking about just a few minutes--probably less than 15 minutes
    per interview. That is not a whole lot of time, is it?
        Mr. Donahue. Well, I think if you take into account the
    entire package, that the person has already gone through
    biometric and biographic database checks and that they have
    completed a very long visa application form that asks a lot of
    information that we check against--we do have fraud units and
    we do have our ICE Visa Security Units (VSUs). And, like any
    other business--you are a businessman--you expedite the easy
    and you spend time on what needs to have time spent on it. So,
    when a person walks in and everything is clear, you do a quick
    interview. You believe the person because of your training and
    knowledge that this person--just as you see at the ports of
    entry--that this person is doing what they say they are doing.
    If the next person comes in and you have concerns, you can stop
    the interview and send it to your fraud unit or go to one of
    our colleagues in DHS. You can continue the interview as long
    as you need to. So, while one may take one minute, another may
    not be cleared for weeks.
        Chairman Johnson. So, it is your sense from around the
    world, really, that the foreign service officers who are in
    charge of this do not feel pressure. You feel that they feel
    they are adequately resourced for the task at hand?
        Mr. Donahue. Certainly people would always like to have a
    few more officers, but I think we have used business practices
    to make this as organized as possible and to make sure that the
    time they spend at the window is the most effective. We would
    certainly like to keep all of our fees--because we are a fee-
    based organization--so that we could plow all of that into
    making our business work more efficiently for our customers and
    make sure that we have all of the security checks there. But, I
    think most officers are using good business practices and their
    training. They are putting the work in with those few people
    who come to the United States to do us harm. Really focusing on
    that has proved effective.
        Chairman Johnson. By the way, you talked about a fee-based
    service. It is, again, that tension between security and
    customer service. I come from a business background.
        Mr. Donahue. Right.
        Chairman Johnson. You are generating revenue for your
    organization. You have an incentive for generating more
    revenue, which is somewhat at cross-purpose--trying to run more
    people through to generate the revenue versus ensuring the
    security. So, it does concern me.
        Director Rodriguez, I know President Obama announced the
    granting of--or allowing about 10,000 additional Syrians into
    the country. That is about a 20-percent increase in the number
    of refugees. Again, I am concerned a little bit about taking
    any shortcuts in the process. It normally takes 18 to 24 months
    to review those files. Do you believe you are adequately
    resourced to have a 20-percent increase in the number of
    refugees you fully vet?
        Mr. Rodriguez. I would point out that that is still--even
    that increase is a relatively small part of our overall
    business. We have 8 million cases that we handle in any given
    year across our 19,000 employees.
        Let me also be very clear that we will do our job with
    respect to the refugees that we screen. No corners will be cut.
        Chairman Johnson. Good.
        Mr. Rodriguez. We will do what we need to do.
        Chairman Johnson. That is really what I view our
    responsibility as a Committee to be: to make sure that we do
    not take any shortcuts. So, I appreciate your comments there.
        Let me just wrap up. There are a number of points we did
    want to make--and I want to be respectful of people's time. I
    mentioned that December 3 incident at the office of USCIS in
    San Bernardino. Inspector General Roth, I would appreciate it
    if you would investigate exactly what happened there. That does
    show the potential breakdown of inter-agency cooperation.
    Again, I find it pretty disconcerting, to say the least.
        The K1 visa--ICE is really responsible for verifying those
    marriages. If you come in on a K1 visa, you are supposed to be
    married within 90 days. Again, I do not think we have a
    system--I do not think we are really verifying those things,
    which is a potential vulnerability.
        Inspector General Roth, you talked about the poor data
    collection and information sharing that resulted in human
    trafficking coming across our borders. I would appreciate you
    keeping an eye on that and everybody being aware of that.
        I have not yet received an answer for a letter I have
    written. We had ICE Agent Taylor Johnson in for one of our
    hearings involving government whistleblowers and the
    retaliation against them, which is really prevalent in the
    Federal Government. It is really jaw-dropping. So, Director
    Saldana, I would really appreciate it if you would respond to
    that, because now, apparently, Agent Johnson has been
    terminated--and the process has not really gone through the
    Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the Inspector General. I am
    really concerned about that particular case.
        Ms. Saldana. And, we have that letter. We are preparing a
    response, sir.
        Chairman Johnson. OK. Again, the oversight of student
    visas--the overstays is a significant issue. I really will work
    with Ranking Member Carper in trying--if we have to produce
    some legislation to facilitate the computer systems, the IT
    systems, to do this--again, coming from the private sector and
    knowing what is available out there, this should not be that
    hard. And, I think it is a critical step we have to take.
        So, again, I do want to thank all of you for your service
    to this Nation. I realize this is tough. There is no perfect
    system. You have a serious responsibility. I know you take
    those responsibilities seriously. So, thank you for your
    service to this Nation, for providing thoughtful testimonies,
    and for taking the time to answer our questions.
        With that, the hearing record will remain open for 15 days,
    until March 30 at 5 p.m. for the submission of statements and
    questions for the record. This hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

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