    [Senate Hearing 114-453]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-453

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                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                    PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                   HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   ----------

                                  JULY 6, 2016

                                   ----------

            Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/

                           Printed for the use of the
            Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

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            COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

                        RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin, Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming             HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey
    JONI ERNST, Iowa                     GARY C. PETERS, Michigan
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

                      Christopher R. Hixon, Staff Director
                  Gabrielle A. Batkin, Minority Staff Director
               John P. Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
                         Laura W. Kilbride, Chief Clerk
                       Benjamin C. Grazda, Hearing Clerk

                    PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

                           ROB PORTMAN, Ohio Chairman
    JOHN McCAIN, Arizona                 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    RAND PAUL, Kentucky                  JON TESTER, Montana
    JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma             TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          HEIDI HEITKAMP, North Dakota
    BEN SASSE, Nebraska

               Brian Callanan, Staff Director and General Counsel
            Margaret Daum, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
                           Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                     ------
    Opening statements:
                                                                       Page
        Senator Portman..............................................     1
        Senator McCaskill............................................     4
        Senator Ayotte...............................................    15
        Senator Lankford.............................................    17
        Senator Heitkamp.............................................    19
        Senator Baldwin..............................................    20
    Prepared statements:
        Senator Portman..............................................    45

                                   WITNESSES
                            Wednesday, July 6, 2016

    Michael Steinbach, Executive Assistant Director, National
      Security Branch, Federal Bureau of Investigation...............     6
    George Selim, Director, Office of Community Partnerships, U.S.
      Department of Homeland Security, and Director, Interagency Task
      Force on Countering Violent Extremism..........................     8
    Meagan M. LaGraffe, Chief of Staff to the Coordinator and Special
      Envoy, Global Engagement Center, U.S. Department of State......    10
    Peter Bergen, Vice President, New America Foundation.............    33
    Alberto M. Fernandez, Vice President, Middle East Media Research
      Institute......................................................    35

                         Alphabetical List of Witnesses

    Bergen, Peter:
        Testimony....................................................    33
        Prepared statement...........................................    64
    Fernandez, Alberto M.:
        Testimony....................................................    35
        Prepared statement...........................................    82
    LaGraffe, Meagan M.:
        Testimony....................................................    10
        Prepared statement...........................................    59
    Selim, George:
        Testimony....................................................     8
        Prepared statement...........................................    54
    Steinbach, Michael:
        Testimony....................................................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................    51

                                    APPENDIX

    Images submitted by Senator Portman..............................    49
    Statement submitted for the Record by American-Arab Anti-
      Discrimination Committee.......................................    95
    Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record
        Mr. Selim....................................................   100
        Ms. LaGraffe.................................................   109

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                            WEDNESDAY, JULY 6, 2016

                                       U.S. Senate,
                  Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
                        of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                      and Governmental Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in
    room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rob Portman,
    Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Portman, Lankford, Ayotte, Sasse,
    Johnson, McCaskill, Tester, Baldwin, Heitkamp, and Carper.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN

        Senator Portman. This hearing will come to order. We are
    here to talk about an incredibly important issue, a critical
    issue that affects the security of our country and the security
    of our families.
        When the Subcommittee first began planning this hearing, of
    course, we did not know it would fall just 3 weeks after the
    most deadly terrorist attack on American soil since September
    11th. The evil terrorist attack in Orlando last month that
    targeted the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT)
    community was yet another reminder of the urgent need to
    reexamine and redouble our government's efforts to combat
    violent Islamic jihadism both at home and abroad--and
    particularly to disrupt and ultimately destroy the so-called
    Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). There is no room for
    complacency on this issue. It warrants continuous scrutiny and
    oversight from Congress as our government's understanding of
    the enemy evolves. And we will hear some about that today.
        ISIS, of course, specializes in savagery--violence inspired
    by delusions of sectarian conquest from another age. Yet it has
    effectively deployed modern technology of the information age
    to spread its propaganda and recruit killers to its cause. ISIS
    has developed a sophisticated information warfare capability.
    It has pioneered a distinctive strategy of targeted online
    recruitment, while disseminating sleek viral videos and
    messages, primarily from two media centers--Al-Hayat and Al-
    Furqan--through a constantly evolving set of online platforms.
    As the Federal Bureau or Investigation (FBI) Director James
    Comey has noted, even if we were able to keep foreign
    terrorists physically out of the United States, online
    communication and social media allow ISIS to, as he said,
    ``enter as a photon and radicalize somebody in Wichita,
    Kansas.'' ISIS has weaponized online propaganda in a new and
    very lethal way.
        The damage wrought by that weapon is considerable: Orlando,
    49 dead; San Bernardino, 14; Fort Hood, 13 dead; the Boston
    Marathon, 3 dead and hundreds wounded. Each of these killers
    was reportedly radicalized to some degree by online jihadist
    content. And so many other attacks inspired by means of social
    media have, thank God, been thwarted. Indeed, experts tell us
    that throughout last year, social media played some part in the
    radicalization of all of the 60 people arrested in the United
    States for criminal acts in support of ISIS. Again, we may hear
    more about that today. Most recently, of course, the FBI has
    publicly stated that it is ``highly confident'' that the
    Orlando killer, Omar Mateen, was ``radicalized at least in part
    through the Internet.''
        One longstanding aim of the ISIS propaganda machine is to
    attract foreign fighters to ISIS-controlled territory. Often
    ISIS tells its recruits tales of high adventure, joined with
    false narratives of Islamic extremism as a utopia. The bizarre
    images behind me over here,\1\ for example, appear in a ISIS
    film exhorting Muslims around the world to join the Islamic
    State; rather than show ISIS fighters for what they are--
    murderers of innocent victims who are themselves overwhelmingly
    Muslim--they are shown playing with laughing children and
    shopping in local marketplaces.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The images referenced by Senator Portman appears in the
    Appendix on page 49.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Appeals like these have helped draw an estimated 30,000
    foreign fighters, including at least 6,000 Westerners, to take
    up arms with ISIS. The good news is that the Defense Department
    (DOD) reports a significant decrease in the flow of foreign
    fighters to ISIS territory. At the same time, however, ISIS has
    increasingly shifted its propaganda efforts to inciting
    sympathizers to commit acts of terror in the West--including
    right here in the United States.
        Online propaganda, amplified by social media and Peer-2-
    Peer (P2P) communication, is now a key weapon in ISIS' arsenal.
    We should, of course, resist oversimplifying the problem. Not
    all radicalization in the United States occurs online, and in-
    person interaction often reinforces the process. But unlike the
    more common European pattern of jihadist radicalization in
    clusters, neighborhoods, or in prison, the U.S. threat so far
    is predominantly that of the lone-wolf terrorist--an individual
    radicalized on his own, often in front of his computer screen
    with access to online jihadist content and videos that create a
    sort of virtual training camp.
        In addition to a clear military strategy and vigilant law
    enforcement efforts here at home, the United States and our
    allies need a more robust, coordinated strategy to expose the
    enemy's lies, counter its false narratives, and encourage
    credible voices to tell the truth to those most susceptible or
    receptive to the ISIS lies. And that is true both of foreign
    and U.S. audiences. Although the ISIS online radicalization
    threat is well recognized, there is a range of opinion on how
    best to combat it, and the U.S. Government's efforts are still
    in their early stages, as we will hear about today. Today we
    are going to examine the countermessaging initiatives that show
    promise--and where the government has fallen short and could
    accelerate those efforts.
        In January, the State Department began a revamp of its
    counterterrorism messaging and coordination efforts with the
    launch of what is called the ``Global Engagement Center''--a
    better funded and, at least on paper, more empowered version of
    its predecessor, the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications. We have had testimony in this room before
    regarding the Global Engagement Center, and we look forward to
    getting deeper into that today.
        Previous efforts to address this threat have struggled to
    overcome bureaucratic hurdles, unclear authorities, and a lack
    of interagency communication and a unity of effort. These
    structural deficiencies will continue to hinder future
    administrations--both Republican and Democrat--unless they are
    addressed. That is why I recently introduced legislation with
    Senator Murphy to help resolve some of these issues and the
    impact they have on our ability not only to counter propaganda
    and disinformation from extremist groups like ISIS but also the
    equally pressing challenges posed by some nation States and
    their sponsored propaganda.
        The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also recently
    consolidated its countering-violent-extremism (CVE), efforts in
    a new office call the ``Office of Community Partnerships
    (OCP).'' Again, we have heard about this in this hearing room.
    We look forward to digging deeper today. We will be hearing
    more about these efforts, and I will be interested in exploring
    whether these initiatives are backed by sufficient authorities
    and sufficient resources.
        In addition, social media firms including Facebook and
    Twitter have stepped up their voluntary efforts to police their
    own terms of service, which prohibit incitements to terrorism.
    Twitter has closed more than 100,000 ISIS-linked accounts, for
    instance, and Facebook has actively worked to remove offending
    users while working in various ways to promote content to
    counter jihadist propaganda. These actions have helped to
    degrade ISIS' social media megaphone, according to the Middle
    East Media Research Institute, but its online presence remains
    strong.
        So let us be very clear: To defeat ISIS, it is necessary to
    destroy the enemy where they live and prosper--in Iraq and in
    Syria and elsewhere--in their major cells around the world.
    Online countermessaging is no substitute for a clearly defined
    and vigorously executed military strategy. But a military
    strategy must be reinforced by a coordinated effort to
    undermine and disrupt the powerful disinformation spread by
    Islamic jihadists. Today we are going to hear from three
    Federal agencies involved in that effort, and I appreciate our
    three witnesses before us today. We are also going to hear from
    some distinguished experts who have been engaged on these
    issues for many years.
        With that, I will turn to my colleague Senator McCaskill
    for her opening statement.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Chairman Portman.
        I think the topic of today's hearing is extremely
    important. Figuring out how to stop the Islamic State of Iraq
    and the Levant (ISIL)-inspired attacks at home and abroad is
    vital to our national security, and it is a topic on which the
    Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has an
    important role.
        I would like to particularly note the efforts by Chairman
    Johnson and Ranking Member Carper who have held a number of
    oversight hearings in this Committee on this very topic and who
    have worked on relevant legislation during this Congress.
        This Subcommittee has a long and proud tradition of the
    finest investigative work Congress has ever done, from work on
    war profiteering and Mafia racketeering to the U.N. Oil for
    Food Program and the financial crisis. And contrary to Senator
    Rand Paul's assertion at our cable hearing last month, during
    this Congress the Chairman and I have conducted many in-depth
    bipartisan investigations of government agencies as well as the
    private sector.
        But today's hearing is not a typical PSI hearing. Because
    of the short timeframe of planning for this hearing, we were
    unable to speak with some of the people who I would like to see
    participate in our discussion: social media companies, local
    law enforcement groups, and those, importantly, directly
    involved on the ground with the pilot programs that we are
    currently funding through the Department of Homeland Security.
    Having the opportunity to hear from these other groups is
    especially important because, as today's government witnesses
    will point out, we still have a lot to learn about how to best
    counter the messages of violent extremism in this country from
    ISIL and otherwise.
        The efforts being undertaken by the Department of Homeland
    Security's Office of Community Partnerships and the Department
    of State's Global Engagement Center are just getting off the
    ground. I hope to hear today what their plans are; how they are
    specifically working with the private sector, whether through
    grants, contracts, or other agreements; and how we can best
    support them going forward, while also keeping taxpayers and
    our oversight obligations in mind. This is a chance for
    Congress to do oversight on the front end rather than the back
    end after something has already gone wrong and massive amounts
    of taxpayer dollars maybe have been wasted.
        Further, as we will hear from our witnesses today, it is
    absolutely vital that any effort our government undertakes to
    counter violent extremism is done in partnership with and with
    the full engagement of the Muslim community. After all, this
    was one of the core rationales for establishing the DHS Office
    of Community Partnerships in the first place. In order to
    combat ISIL's propaganda, we must have a healthy, inclusive
    dialogue with Muslim and other community leaders as well as
    ensure that resources are available to families and friends
    that may have concerns about loved ones who have become
    attracted to extremist rhetoric.
        Unfortunately, some of the rhetoric we hear from
    politicians, including the national leader of the Republican
    Party and their presumptive nominee for President, is
    completely and utterly at odds with this policy approach.
    Instead of inclusivity, the presumptive Republican candidate
    for President is proposing that we bar all Muslims from
    immigrating to the United States, even those who are trying to
    escape the horrors of ISIL abroad. He also campaigns on the
    suggestion that the entire Muslim community is complicit in
    violent extremism, going so far as to suggest that Muslim
    neighborhoods must be ``policed'' and subjected to special
    surveillance for no other reason than their religious belief.
        Not only is this strategy in opposition to recommendations
    from every expert that our staffs have spoken with, it is also
    in complete conflict with American principles and values. And,
    most importantly, it would actually make the United States of
    America less safe.
        This extremist rhetoric plays right into ISIL's hands and
    supports its propaganda's key message that this country hates
    Muslims, making it more difficult for the government partners
    we have today in this country to work with the Muslim community
    to combat extremism.
        Finally, as the mass shootings we hear about on a far too
    regular basis remind us, we also need to make sure guns stay
    out of the hands of terrorists and mentally unstable
    individuals from all political and religious backgrounds. This
    is a simple, common-sense idea that nearly all Americans
    support.
        Regrettably, we are still not ready to pass small steps,
    reasonable and sensible, to keep guns out of the hands of
    terrorists and making sure terrorists are not exploiting the
    online and gun show loopholes for background checks. So if we
    really want to counter violent extremism, we also need to spend
    less time stirring up anti-Muslim rhetoric and more time
    working on these issues and working with the majority of the
    Muslims who are peaceful in this country and around the world.
        Although the work of the agencies represented at this
    hearing is important and is one part of the strategy to defeat
    extremism in this country, there are steps we can take
    immediately to make us safer starting today.
        I thank the witnesses for being here, and I look forward to
    their testimony.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        We will now call our first panel of witnesses for this
    afternoon's hearing.
        Michael Steinbach is the Executive Assistant Director of
    the National Security Branch of the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation. Previously, Mr. Steinbach held multiple
    positions with the FBI, including serving in Afghanistan as the
    FBI's deputy on-scene commander for operations and as the
    assistant section chief for international terrorism operations
    in the Counterterrorism Division. Thank you for being here.
        George Selim some of you know from his exposure to the
    Committee through his work at the Department of Homeland
    Security. He is Director of the Office of Community
    Partnerships at DHS. He also leads the Countering Violent
    Extremism Task Force. Prior to his time at DHS, Mr. Selim
    worked at the White House on the National Security Council
    staff as Director for Community Policing, where he was
    responsible for policies related to domestic and global
    security threats. Before the White House, Mr. Selim was a
    Senior Policy Adviser at DHS' Office for Civil Rights and Civil
    Liberties. Thank you for being here.
        Meagen LaGraffe is the Chief of Staff for the Global
    Engagement Center at the State Department, which was developed
    to disrupt and undermine extremism propaganda, as we talked
    about. Prior to joining the State Department, she was Chief of
    Staff for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict in the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense. Ms. LaGraffe previously
    served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Homeland
    Security and as an aide to Senator Ted Kennedy.
        I appreciate all of you for being here this afternoon and
    look forward to your testimony. It is the custom of this
    Subcommittee to swear in all of our witnesses, so at this time
    I would like you to stand and raise your right hand. Please
    repeat after me. Do you swear that the testimony you are about
    to give before the Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole
    truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
        Mr. Steinbach. I do.
        Mr. Selim. I do.
        Ms. LaGraffe. I do.
        Senator Portman. Great. Let the record reflect that the
    witnesses answered in the affirmative. And to our witnesses,
    all of your written testimony will be printed in the record in
    its entirety. I would ask you to keep your comments to 5
    minutes so that we will have a good opportunity for some
    questions and answers. Mr. Steinbach.

        TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL STEINBACH,\1\ EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT
         DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY BRANCH, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
                             INVESTIGATION

        Mr. Steinbach. Good afternoon, Chairman Portman, Ranking
    Member McCaskill, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
    challenge of combating the widespread reach of terrorist
    propaganda.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Steinbach appears in the Appendix
    on page 51.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Preventing terrorist attacks remains the FBI's top
    priority. In today's hyperconnected world, this mission is
    tightly intertwined with technology and the ability it provides
    to reach out to anyone, anywhere, anytime.
        Just as we use technology throughout the course of our day,
    so do the bad guys. The widespread use of technology propagates
    the persistent terrorist message to attack U.S. interests,
    whether in the homeland or abroad.
        Many foreign terrorist organizations use various digital
    communication platforms in an effort to reach individuals they
    believe may be susceptible and sympathetic to the message. But
    no group has been as successful at drawing people into its
    message as ISIL. ISIL's extensive reach through the Internet
    and social media is most concerning as the group continues to
    aggressively employ the latest technology as part of its
    nefarious strategy.
        ISIL's messaging blends both officially endorsed
    sophisticated propaganda with that of informal peer-to-peer
    recruitment through digital communication platforms. No matter
    the format, the message of radicalization spreads faster than
    we imagined just a few years ago. Like never before, social
    media allows for overseas terrorists to reach into our local
    communities to target our citizens as well as to radicalize and
    recruit.
        From a threat perspective, we are concerned with three
    areas: those who are inspired by terrorist propaganda and feel
    empowered to act out and support; those who are directed by
    members of foreign terrorist organizations to commit a specific
    directed act in support of a group's ideology or cause; and
    those who are enabled to act after gaining inspiration from
    extremist propaganda and communicating with members of foreign
    terrorist organizations who provide guidance on method or
    target.
        A bad actor can fall into any of the above categories or
    span the spectrum, but in the end the result is the same:
    innocent men, women, and children killed, and families,
    friends, and whole communities left to struggle in the
    aftermath.
        To identify and disrupt these bad actors, we must overcome
    two challenges: volume and encryption.
        The issue of volume is no surprise to those of you who have
    heard Director Comey's remarks over the last year and a half.
    The digital world knows no bounds. We do not just look at a
    person's physical associates, but now we must, too, look to
    their digital connections and from that assess who is a passive
    connection versus an active connection.
        The digital world has fostered a global neighborhood of new
    people to meet and new ideas to follow. It is up to us to sort
    through the noise and identify those signals that are most
    concerning. Sifting through the numerous online monikers and
    communication platforms is not a light lift. It requires both
    technical capabilities and eyes-on analysis. This takes time--
    time we do not always have.
        Not only do we face the overwhelming volume of information
    we have uncovered; the second challenge is the lack of
    accessible information when a person is using encrypted
    communications. Encryption takes many forms. Encryption hides
    stored digital communications, sometimes it masks the trail of
    communications, and at other times it erases the content. In
    many cases, we have seen concerning individuals connect via
    publicly available communication platforms and then switch to
    private encrypted applications. These apps make conversations
    more secret than ever before. We know that bad actors have used
    encrypted communication platforms prior to conducting attacks,
    as was the case in Garland, Texas, in May 2015, where to this
    day we still do not know the content of the pre-attack text
    messaging.
        To successfully combat today's threats, we must adapt and
    confront these challenges. We are not in this alone. We rely
    heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, and local
    partners as well as our international partnerships. The key
    part of these partnerships includes an emphasis on streamlining
    information sharing. In today's threat environment, it is not
    sufficient to say information sharing is important. It is the
    speed of information sharing which is critical to our success.
    Law enforcement and the U.S. intelligence community (IC) will
    continue to utilize the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) and
    the fusion centers to do just that. There is not a body of
    people more unified and more dedicated to the singular mission
    of protecting our communities. Having all member agencies
    collocated, working the same threats, and bringing their
    agency's skills and resources collectively to work the
    investigations is powerful. We must now work to develop the
    same success internationally.
        Chairman Portman, Ranking Member McCaskill, and members of
    the Subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify
    concerning terrorists' use of the Internet and social media. I
    am happy to answer questions you may have.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Steinbach. Mr. Selim.

     TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SELIM,\1\ DIRECTOR, OFFICE FOR COMMUNITY
        PARTNERSHIPS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, AND
        DIRECTOR, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON COUNTERING VIOLENT
                               EXTREMISM

        Mr. Selim. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Portman,
    Ranking Member McCaskill, and distinguished Members of the
    Subcommittee, for the opportunity to testify here today. I
    welcome the opportunity to appear before you to discuss
    priorities and key actions that the Department of Homeland
    Security is conducting to address ISIL and other terrorist's
    attempts at online recruitment and radicalization to violence.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Selim appears in the Appendix on
    page 54.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I have considerable personal and professional equities in
    protecting our homeland. By way of background, I have spent
    over a decade as a civil servant at the Department of Homeland
    Security. I have also served as the Department of Justice (DOJ)
    and on the National Security Council staff at the White House.
    In addition, I am a commissioned officer in the United States
    Navy Reserve and view the call to public service as one of the
    greatest honors our country offers all people, regardless of
    race, religion, or nationality.
        As Secretary Johnson has stated, we are in a new phase of
    the global terrorist threat. The threat today is more
    decentralized, more complex, and difficult to detect. We have
    moved from a world of terrorist-directed attacks to a world of
    increasingly terrorist-inspired attacks. ISIL and other
    terrorist groups are turning to the Internet to inspire lone
    offenders. This is a pattern we saw last December in San
    Bernardino and most recently in Orlando.
        By their nature, attacks involving self-radicalized
    individuals are harder for intelligence and law enforcement
    officers to detect, and they could occur with almost little or
    no warning. So what are we doing about it?
        The threat from homegrown violent extremism requires going
    beyond traditional counterterrorism approaches and focusing not
    just on mitigation efforts but also on preventing and
    intervening in the process of radicalization. This prevention
    framework is known as ``countering violent extremism,'' or the
    acronym CVE.
        In 2015, Secretary Johnson announced the creation of the
    Office for Community Partnerships at DHS. This is the office
    that I lead and is focused on the Department's efforts in
    countering violent extremism and working to build effective
    partnerships with communities across the country for that
    explicit purpose. Our CVE efforts depend on working in a
    unified and cohesive manner across the U.S. Government. That is
    why we have established the CVE Task Force, currently
    headquartered at DHS, to organize all CVE Efforts across the
    U.S. domestically. This new task force could not be possible
    without the strong partnership from the Department of Justice
    who have appointed my Deputy Director and several key staff on
    the task force.
        A unified efforts is necessary given the threat environment
    we face today. Terrorist groups such as ISIL have undertaken a
    deliberate strategy of using social media to reach individuals
    susceptible to their message and recruit and inspire them to
    violence. The Office of Community Partnerships and the CVE Task
    Force depend on our stakeholder partners to reach these
    individuals before they become radicalized.
        Our partners in Federal, State, and local governments and
    law enforcement, civic and faith-based organizations,
    educators, social service organizations, mental health
    providers, and the private sector are essential to this
    mission. Our efforts are federally driven, but they are locally
    focused. Our goal is to empower credible voices within
    communities that are targeted by violent extremists.
        Research has proven that young people, Millennials, victims
    of terrorists, and community-based organizations are the most
    credible voices to discourage those in danger of being
    radicalized to violence, and our role in the Federal Government
    should be to give those community partners the tools and
    support to raise their voices. Some of those tools can be
    provided by key technology companies. We are engaging with the
    private sector to encourage efforts to counter ISIL online as
    well as other groups.
        The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
    Justice, including Secretary Johnson and Attorney General
    Lynch, have also engaged with social media industry
    representatives in the past year-plus. One of our efforts, the
    Peer-2-Peer Challenging Extremism competition, empowers
    university students around the world to develop their own
    authentic narratives to counter violent extremist recruitment
    through social media.
        Facebook became the first technology partner to join the
    Peer-2-Peer project in the summer of 2015. Facebook's
    participation has allowed the initiative to expand to many more
    international schools. In addition to the Peer-2-Peer program,
    the CVE Task Force will include a dedicated communications and
    digital strategy team. We hope to continue to work with the
    private sector to ensure our country's most transformative
    technologies and innovations can be harnessed to promote and
    enable civil society messages of tolerance, inclusion, and
    pluralism as a means of degrading the appeal of the ISIL brand.
        Our efforts to develop locally driven, prevention-based CVE
    frameworks incorporate both online and in-person efforts. Thank
    you for the $10 million of CVE grant funding that Congress has
    appropriated and the fiscal year (FY) 2016 Omnibus
    Appropriations Act. We can now take our CVE efforts across the
    country to the next level.
        Just this morning, Secretary Johnson announced that just
    today the fiscal year 2016 CVE grant program has been
    officially launched and the Notice of Funding has been issued
    this morning. This is the first Federal assistance program
    devoted exclusively to providing local communities with
    resources to counter violent extremism in our homeland. This
    grant program was developed by the DHS Office of Community
    Partnerships in conjunction with our partners at the Federal
    Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This grant opportunity is
    an important part of our ongoing work to build a comprehensive
    CVE model that incorporates both cyberspace and community
    spaces.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak here
    today and for your continued support at DHS. I look forward to
    any questions you and the Committee may have.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Selim. Ms. LaGraffe.

       TESTIMONY OF MEAGEN M. LAGRAFFE,\1\ CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE
     COORDINATOR AND SPECIAL ENVOY, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER, U.S.
                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Ms. LaGraffe. Chairman Portman, Ranking Member McCaskill,
    Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify and answer your questions today.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Lagraffe appears in the Appendix
    on page 59.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        I am here to discuss our government's international efforts
    to counter violent extremist propaganda, online, in social
    media, as well as in traditional media. This is a critical
    effort, especially when it comes to our whole-of-government
    efforts to degrade and destroy ISIL because it is clear that,
    to our enemy, the information battlespace is as important as
    the physical battlespace.
        Prior to March of this year, I served as the Chief of Staff
    in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
    at the Pentagon. I feel confident that our U.S. military and
    coalition has significant capabilities to eliminate militants
    from the battlefield and is doing so each and every day. Daesh
    has already lost nearly half of its territory in Iraq and 20
    percent in Syria.
        At the same time, we must also confront the messages that
    these groups push out daily to recruit people and inspire them
    to violence. Addressing radicalization to violence and
    recruitment in the information battlespace is a key piece of
    any serious, meaningful, and enduring approach to countering
    violent extremism long-term.
        To meet that challenge, President Obama signed an Executive
    Order in March which created the Global Engagement Center,
    revamping our countermessaging strategy.
        Prioritizing countermessaging is nothing new in the
    national security arena, and, in fact, it is not even new in
    this administration. The Center's predecessor organization, the
    Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC),
    focused on al-Qaeda propaganda. But while al-Qaeda was
    producing videos that took months to get out, our adversary
    today is using social media in ways not seen before.
        The quality and volume of violent extremist messaging has
    advanced dramatically since our predecessor organization was
    established 5 years ago, or even from the time when Daesh began
    metastasizing into its current form 3 years ago.
        The Global Engagement Center is charged with coordinating
    integrating, and synchronizing all government communications
    directed at foreign audiences abroad used to diminish the
    influence of violent extremists.
        The Center is designed to be as agile and as adaptive as
    our adversary. We are armed with new authorities, new
    personnel, and cutting-edge technology.
        The Center is using state-of-the-art digital analytics
    tools from the intelligence community, from the Defense
    Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and from the private
    sector. These tools and technologies help us tailor our
    messages to our audience as well as measure those messages'
    effectiveness.
        Importantly, the President's Executive Order grants the
    Center expanded hiring authorities as well, allowing us to hire
    leaders and experts from the private sector to join us in this
    effort.
        When fully operational, the Center will comprise staff from
    the private sector as well as the Departments of Defense,
    Treasury, Justice, State, Homeland Security, and the
    intelligence community. Working across these agencies, the
    Center is already identifying efficiencies and opportunities in
    the messaging space.
        Even more substantial than changes to personnel or to
    budgets, the Center is taking a fundamentally new approach in
    the information battlespace. We have pivoted toward partner-
    driven messaging and partner-driven content. While the U.S.
    Government has a good message to tell, we are not always the
    most credible voice to tell it.
        Instead, there is an abundance of credible and diverse
    voices across the Middle East, Africa and Europe, their
    governments, non-governmental organization (NGO's), and civil
    society groups, all of whom we are now leveraging in this
    fight. We are not publicizing who many of our partners are, of
    course, so that we do not undermine their credibility, but I
    would like to give you one example.
        In Kosovo, we recently completed a training program with
    local NGO's, designed to amplify credible voices there. We ran
    workshops to train local influencers about designing and
    executing their own messaging campaigns. Kosovo is a compelling
    location for this kind of work because it has not only the
    highest number of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe, it also
    has an active NGO community focused on this very issue.
        Using a partners-first, data-driven approach, the Center is
    particularly focused on changing audience behavior rather than
    changing attitudes and beliefs. While we may have less success
    altering what an individual thinks, we can certainly be more
    effective at preventing individuals from turning those beliefs
    into violence.
        I appreciate this Committee's oversight and continued
    support as we revamped our fight against violent extremism in
    the information battlespace. As you all know, any long-term
    success in this space cannot focus exclusively on killing
    terrorists. We also have to stem the recruitment of new ones.
        Thank you very much for your time, and I am happy to answer
    any questions.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Ms. LaGraffe, and good point.
    And I appreciate the testimony from all three witnesses and
    look forward to the opportunity to get into a more in-depth
    discussion in questions and answers.
        We have one business item we need to dispose of here, so I
    apologize for this interruption. We are going to take a quick
    break and report a nomination to the floor. I want to thank the
    Chairman of the full Committee, Senator Johnson, who is with us
    here today, for his courtesy in providing us this hearing room
    today for our important hearing. This will just take a minute,
    so everybody please keep their seats.
        With that, the Subcommittee will be in recess subject to
    the call of the Chair.
        [Recess.]
        This hearing is now back in session, and, again, I thank
    the witnesses very much for their testimony, and we look
    forward to having a good back-and-forth.
        We have a number of Members here, so I am going to be very
    short, knowing that I am going to be around until the end of
    this hearing and have a chance to ask you questions. But let me
    just start, if I could, with you, Mr. Steinbach, just very
    briefly.
        Your boss, the Director of the FBI, said last October that
    he believes the main threat facing the United States comes from
    lone-wolf terrorists who are radicalized online. Is that still
    the FBI's assessment?
        Mr. Steinbach. Yes, sir, it is.
        Senator Portman. Thank you. I think that is important to
    lay that as a predicate for our questions. Senator McCaskill.
        Senator McCaskill. I just also have some questions for Ms.
    LaGraffe. Part of the problem we face from a messaging
    standpoint is the efforts of our government to message and
    realizing that our government is probably not the right
    messenger if we are going to combat an ideology that sees our
    country as part of the problem, not part of the solution. They
    see that wrongly, I might add, but nonetheless that is what
    they see.
        There is a built-in bias against truthfulness about
    anything that comes from the U.S. Government. So to get around
    that, I understand that you and your predecessor are developing
    partnerships with voices perceived as more credible to
    disseminate the counter violent extremism message. What I am
    trying to understand is how this works from an oversight
    perspective. Are we pushing money out to groups? Are we sending
    them checks? Are we in a contractual relationship with them as
    contractors? How is this actually working in terms of how money
    is being passed along to messengers that we think would be more
    effective?
        Ms. LaGraffe. Thank you, Senator, for your question. You
    are absolutely correct. The Global Engagement Center is focused
    on building a network of partners around the world, and as I
    mentioned, those partnerships take many forms. We partner with
    foreign governments; we partner with NGO's; we partner with
    local civil society groups as well.
        With that in mind, the partnerships we currently have, we
    use a variety of different funding streams in order to make
    sure that these groups are empowered and armed with the right
    tools and resources to get these messages out. For example, if
    I may, we have a foreign government partnership called the
    ``Sawab Center.'' It is a joint message----
        Senator McCaskill. UAE.
        Ms. LaGraffe. Exactly, and that is a partnership where we
    have provided technical assistance and staff so that the
    government can then provide their own content and their own
    messaging across nearly two dozen countries in the region. That
    is one example.
        Senator McCaskill. That is a government. But aren't we also
    partnering with private groups and NGO's?
        Ms. LaGraffe. We absolutely do.
        Senator McCaskill. How do we get them money?
        Ms. LaGraffe. I think one of the benefits of having the
    Global Engagement Center as an interagency group, we work very
    closely with not only our colleagues within the State
    Department but more broadly within the broader interagency to
    identify funding streams for potential projects and shared
    priorities. So the Global Engagement Center is not a
    grantmaking organization. We work very closely with the
    interagency to identify appropriate funding streams.
        Senator McCaskill. So the money you are getting is not
    going to partners?
        Ms. LaGraffe. Not exclusively. I would like to get you the
    numbers of how exactly our budget breaks down in terms of what
    money we give out via contracts. But, again, the Global
    Engagement Center itself does not offer grants.
        Senator McCaskill. I understand, but I am trying to figure
    out how we are funding this, and we cannot get a straight
    answer.
        Ms. LaGraffe. OK.
        Senator McCaskill. Our staff has tried.
        Ms. LaGraffe. OK.
        Senator McCaskill. I have watched money go for good causes,
    and it disappeared. And I am trying to get a handle on how we
    are actually doing this. I mean, it all sounds great, and I
    want it to be great. But I also know that if we are not paying
    attention as to who we are paying and how, that is how money
    walks away.
        Now, the second part of my question is performance metrics.
    You said you were data driven. Do you have data you can share
    with us? Have you set up performance metrics for these various
    groups that we are partnering with on messaging? How are we
    ever going to figure out if what they are doing is effective?
    Because it is very hard to quantify what you prevent.
        Ms. LaGraffe. We are currently building our data analytics
    shop so that we cannot only do measuring on the front end of
    any messaging campaign to identify what particular messages
    might resonate with a particular audience, but also on the back
    end of any campaign measure our effectiveness. So thus far,
    what that looks like is making sure we know the potential reach
    for a particular message and how that message plays out over
    time.
        For each campaign, we sort of build in, we bake in an
    expectation for analysis on the back end so we can continue to
    refine our messages each and every time we----
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I would love to see the data. I
    would love to see how that data is actually being set up and
    how it is being collected.
        Ms. LaGraffe. OK.
        Senator McCaskill. So there are two assignments: one, how
    are we funding these efforts, where is the money coming from,
    who is getting it, and what form is it taking; and, second, the
    data that will help us figure out if this money is doing any
    good.
        Ms. LaGraffe. Absolutely.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
        Senator Portman. Senator Johnson.
        Chairman Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. LaGraffe, you talked about the progress we have been
    making on the ground in Iraq and Syria, 50 percent territory
    reclaimed in Iraq, 20 percent in Syria. And yet the Central
    Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Brennan testified before the
    Senate Intelligence Committee a couple of weeks ago and said
    that ISIS remains a formidable, resilient, and largely cohesive
    enemy and that we have not reduce their terrorist capability
    and global reach. Do you agree with that assessment?
        Ms. LaGraffe. Senator, I can only speak from the messaging
    perspective, and if we are using the number of foreign
    terrorist fighters as a measure of efficacy of policy, I would
    say that we see promising signs of having an effect in the
    messaging space against the enemy in Iraq and Syria.
        Chairman Johnson. Mr. Steinbach, do you agree with CIA
    Director Brennan's assessment that we have not reduced their
    terrorism capability and global reach?
        Mr. Steinbach. I agree with that assessment completely.
    While we have reduced the space in Syria in Iraq, their reach
    globally with their affiliates is just as devastating, if not
    more so.
        Chairman Johnson. We talk about lone wolves. Now we are
    starting to see wolf packs, correct? We have witnessed not only
    the inspiration, these attacks being inspired by ISIS, but now
    we have evidence of them actually directing, for example, the
    attack in Brussels and probably in Istanbul. Is that correct?
        Mr. Steinbach. I think ISIL has for some time now focused
    on an external piece, which includes directed attacks in Europe
    and in other places, so yes.
        Chairman Johnson. Do you believe that increased activity in
    the 22 months since President Obama declared our goal toward
    ISIS was to degrade and defeat them? That was 22 months ago.
    Have they increased their ability using social media?
        Mr. Steinbach. So I think from my perspective--and I stated
    this before--that as we squeeze ISIL in space in Syria and
    Iraq, they will seek to reach out and lash out where they can.
    So my perspective is that as we have success on the ground in
    Syria and Iraq, we may see a more dangerous world in the short
    term because they will try to message that to their advantage
    by conducting attacks worldwide.
        Chairman Johnson. The analogy I have been using is that of
    a beehive. Let us say you have a beehive of killer bees in your
    back yard. I think the solution is obvious. You take out the
    hive, you kill the bees. But what we have been doing is we have
    been poking it with a stick. We have maybe been damaging the
    hives, but the problem is we have stirred up the bees, and they
    are leaving the hive, and they are setting up new hives in
    Libya, Afghanistan, and other places. Correct? Is that a
    relatively accurate analogy and assessment?
        Mr. Steinbach. I would say that they are definitely pushing
    out a campaign to develop more affiliates, like you mentioned,
    all those places you mentioned--Afghanistan, Indonesia, and
    other places. They continue to expand globally.
        Chairman Johnson. So we have not reduced their capability.
    There was an interesting article in the New York Times last
    week, a pretty good analysis that said since September 2014,
    again, the month that President Obama declared our goal to
    defeat ISIS, there have been 97 ISIS-inspired or--directed
    attacks outside of Syria and Libya--or Syria and Iraq, over
    1,200 innocents killed in those attacks. That is a pretty
    frightening assessment, is it not?
        Mr. Steinbach. I would agree. Yes, sir.
        Chairman Johnson. I really have no further questions.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Chairman Johnson.
        Senator Carper has left us. Senator Ayotte.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AYOTTE

        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman.
        Mr. Steinbach, to the point that Senator Johnson was
    making, as we look at the metastasizing essentially of ISIS,
    you see them in Libya, Philippines, Sinai, Somalia, and
    branching out in other areas. And then you see the pattern of
    attacks. You see Istanbul, Brussels, Paris, Saudi Arabia,
    obviously our own country, San Bernardino, Orlando. Aren't they
    just expanding the battlefield?
        Mr. Steinbach. I think they are expanding the battlefield,
    but I think they are doing it because of the lack of success
    they felt in Syria and Iraq. And I think they will continue--if
    we squeeze them in Syria and Iraq, they will continue to seek
    other places where ungoverned space or places where they can
    thrive and conduct attacks.
        Senator Ayotte. And what I wanted to ask you, in terms of
    the tools that the FBI needs, as we look at the use of
    social media--and you talked about this a little bit in your
    testimony--as we look at the use of the Internet, some of the
    basic tools, I would imagine that in every terrorism
    investigation now not only in the preventative context of
    knowing what is happening online, but also, unfortunately, when
    we have had an event, it is critical that the FBI also has
    those tools in advance to prevent terrorism attacks and if we
    have one, God forbid, that you can investigate them. And,
    recently, on the Senate floor, we had a vote on an amendment
    offered by Senator McCain which would have given the FBI
    National Security Letter authority with respect to electronic
    communications, transactional records, and terrorism
    investigations. And, unfortunately, that vote failed, as I
    understand, 58-38.
        How important is it that you have that ability to do that?
    Because having been a prosecutor myself, and was surprised to
    learn of what I understand was an oversight in leaving this
    language out of the statute, that we could not even get that
    passed on the Senate floor, because in your basic online
    investigation of a child predator, I could get that information
    as a prosecutor in a criminal case. And right now regarding the
    FBI, we are making it difficult for you to get it in a
    terrorism investigation. So how important is it that we give
    you tools like that?
        Mr. Steinbach. So as you stated, ma'am, I think that the
    world that we live in today, the threat starts online in many
    cases. So we need a robust set of tools to focus on the online
    space. We need open-source tools as well as high-side data
    sets. We need to lay those over each other to fully identify
    what we have. Tools like the National Security Letter (NSLs)
    and the ECTR fix allow us to very agilely identify not only the
    bad guy but the bad guy's network. Twenty years ago, we had
    telephones, and you looked at the telephone, you looked at the
    to-from to see who the bad guy was communicating with. Now, in
    today's world, with the spread of social media, with the spread
    of the online threat, we need those tools in the online space
    to identify who the bad guys are contacting.
        Senator Ayotte. And right now essentially where you are is
    you can get the telephone records, you can get the financial
    records, but you cannot get the basic Internet records--which
    do not involve content, by the way, but that I could get if I
    were prosecuting a basic criminal case. So I hope we take this
    back up because I know that this is Director Comey's No. 1
    priority, and, this is one where it is kind of hard to believe
    in the context that we live in that the Senate did not pass
    this. So I hope we do this again and take it back up and pass
    it in light of what we are hearing today.
        I wanted to also follow-up, as you think about the tools
    that you need, and looking at what happened recently in
    Orlando, can you share with us at all in terms of how the
    Internet played in the terrorism attack that occurred in
    Orlando and what lessons we have learned in terms of
    investigative tools that would be helpful in the context of
    that? And also in San Bernardino? I think one of the challenges
    we are facing here is we obviously want to engage people online
    to prevent this, but also have good intelligence up front if an
    attack is coming to be able to stop it before it happens.
        Mr. Steinbach. So I think the challenge we face today is
    that we start in a place where people are passively consuming
    content, which, of course, is not against the law. So our
    challenges, as I mentioned in my opening comments, is to look
    through the volume of individuals who are online consuming,
    passively consuming this material, and look for those
    individuals who are doing more than just passively consuming
    that online content who have expressed an intent to do harm.
        So when we go through this volume, we have to have tools
    that help us identify trends, patterns, so that we can then lay
    over our deeper-dive analytics to reach into those particular
    cases, to figure out what the noise is and what the signals
    are, to identify the subjects away from just people exercising
    their constitutional right to consume and repost material. That
    is the challenge we are in, and the tools we have are a set of
    tools that will need to be continually expanding as technology
    changes. We need to, on a regular basis, reassess exactly what
    tools we have, both in open source and on the high side, and
    make sure they are robust enough to address the threat.
        Senator Ayotte. My time is up, but just to be clear, the
    individual in Orlando was consuming this type of information,
    as I understand it.
        Mr. Steinbach. The individual in Orlando was consuming
    material, yes.
        Senator Portman. Senator Lankford.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANKFORD

        Senator Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. LaGraffe, can I pick up where Senator McCaskill left
    off on this? It is extremely important to us to get some kind
    of data analytics, the metrics for how the different outside
    sites are evaluated, and we are all for trying to get multiple
    hooks in the water to be able to help other people, help us
    with our messaging and to make it clear. Trying to determine
    where those dollars go and how they are being well spent by the
    taxpayer is extremely important.
        With that, you had mentioned a lot about outside sources
    and mentioned a lot about--I am sorry, a little bit about some
    of the things the State Department is doing specifically. I
    want to ask you about how you are evaluating the ``Think Again
    Turn Away'' Twitter page and some of those internal sites that
    the State Department is running, compare that to some of the
    outside--because my understanding that ``Think Again Turn
    Away'' site is about a $5 million investment to be able to do
    that Twitter page. So help me understand value in metrics and
    evaluation.
        Ms. LaGraffe. ``Think Again Turn Away'' was a product that
    was produced by our predecessor organization. We no longer use
    ``Think Again Turn Away.'' As I mentioned in my opening
    statement----
        Senator Lankford. Why? Because that had to be a metric-
    driven piece, too, that helps us understand how things were
    evaluated.
        Ms. LaGraffe. As I mentioned in my opening statement, when
    the CSCC, our predecessor organization, was stood up, it was
    designed to fight a different enemy in a different time. We as
    the Global Engagement Center (GEC) are now fighting a more
    agile enemy, Daesh, in a social media space. So we have moved
    away from some of the direct online engagement of our
    predecessor organization.
        I think that that is a reflection of the kind of analysis
    we are trying to build into our organization. Inevitably, there
    will be things that we do not do well and we want to adjust, be
    agile, move on, and get better.
        Senator Lankford. So tell me the process of how you
    evaluated, for instance, that site, other sites, things that
    were internal, to make the decision we are going to turn this
    off and not do this, we are going to turn in a different
    direction? Tell me about the process of how that decision is
    made.
        Ms. LaGraffe. For the Global Engagement Center, when we are
    preparing our proposed messaging, as I mentioned, we do
    analytics on the front end to assess the target audience
    susceptibility as well as doing analytics on the back end of
    every campaign to see the reach and resonance of what we are
    doing.
        Senator Lankford. That will help us. We want to get a look
    at some of those analytics and see how things are evaluated so
    we can also participate just in that conversation, just as good
    stewards with it.
        Mr. Steinbach, good to see you again. Thank you for all
    your work. Thank you for all of your work in this area, by the
    way.
        Mr. Steinbach, I want to just run back through the past 5
    days and some of the things that are happening internationally
    and here in the United States, because social media played a
    part in all of these, or at least had some connection with an
    ISIS threat.
        In Indonesia, in the last 24 hours, in Saudi Arabia, 48
    hours ago, three different, separate attacks there. In Iraq,
    250 people dead in one attack in Baghdad. In Bangladesh, 20
    people at least that we know of that are dead. And then, on
    Friday, something that I know you did not miss but a lot of
    Americans missed, the FBI picked up a gentleman names Mohamed
    Jalloh, and he was a person plotting an attack similar to a
    Fort Hood attack here in the United States that seems to be
    self-radicalized online by watching videos of Anwar al-Awlaki.
    That could have been a very different day for America, Friday,
    but the FBI was engaged.
        What can we learn just about the engagement of that
    particular or things like what happened with Mohamed Jalloh and
    ways that social media or outside sources help influence him?
        Mr. Steinbach. Thank you, sir. So as I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, in general, we have three types of attacks--or
    three types of plots: directed, enabled, and inspired. And, of
    course, the largest threat to the United States is that HVE
    subset, the group that is inspired or enabled to conduct an
    attack and that are, quite frankly, the hardest because they
    are not communicating. So as Director Comey has spoken in the
    past, we have roughly 1,000 of these HVE cases across the
    country. They are difficult at times, and we need to use social
    media to the extent possible. As was mentioned, the majority of
    our cases last year, the arrest, all had significant aspects in
    social media. Many of the cases began with an anonymous online
    moniker, and so we need to understand that that is the dynamic
    of the world we live in.
        So as we focus on the HVE threat, we need to focus on the
    online space so that we can properly identify and predicate
    investigations and then use all the tools that we are afforded,
    all the tools in our tool chest to quickly act on individuals
    who have the intent and stop them before they obtain that
    capability to conduct an attack.
        Senator Lankford. So a way to be able to guess at this
    point for the FBI, cases like Mohamed Jalloh, that have
    happened in the past year where the FBI learns about this
    individual, self-radicalized online, preparing to actually
    carry out an attack, and then there is an engagement by the
    FBI.
        Mr. Steinbach. So I think the most concerning trend that we
    have seen in the past year when we identify these individuals
    online is the speed with which they mobilize. So that flash-to-
    bang effect you have heard us talk about is going now in days,
    even weeks, as opposed to months and years. That for us is a
    very concerning fact. We have to quickly identify and work to
    mitigate the threat faster than we had to do even 2 years ago.
        Senator Lankford. Thank you.
        Senator Portman. Thank you, Senator Lankford.
        We have a vote that has been called, and so we have a short
    amount of time. We are going to try to get three people in here
    quickly. We have Senator Carper and then Senator Heitkamp and
    then Senator Baldwin. And if any member wants to run over and
    vote and come back, we will keep this going. Otherwise, we will
    recess briefly, have the votes, and come back. Senator Carper.
        Senator Carper. Let me yield to the other Senators. Thanks.
        Senator Portman. Senator Heitkamp.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR HEITKAMP

        Senator Heitkamp. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Two issues, and I want to thank you for coming over to my
    office, Mr. Selim, and briefing us on the kinds of efforts that
    we can engage in locally, with local law enforcement, with
    local communities, the need to have--what I would call it--a
    ``force multiplier.'' There are not enough of you to actually
    be out there when we are talking about volume. Obviously,
    encryption is a unique issue, but certainly we can do more to
    multiply the force. And I think the other piece of this is best
    practices, what I would call a ``best practice kind of model.''
    When we did training on school shootings when I was Attorney
    General (AG), we did trainings and did major initiatives on
    fighting methamphetamines. We are in the process now on
    opioids. We need to have the ability to, No. 1, say these are
    tactics and strategies that work, this is what we are going to
    request of and engage with local law enforcement and local
    communities, faith-based communities. We talked a little bit
    about the information that we know of in Canada and how Canada
    engages in anti-radicalization kinds of efforts.
        And so, No. 1, what are we doing, George, in terms of
    multiplying the force by working with local law enforcement,
    working with local communities? And what message should we all
    take back to our hometowns, to our law enforcement communities,
    in terms of what role DHS is going to play?
        Mr. Selim. Senator, thank you for those questions, and I
    appreciate you and your staff making time to really get engaged
    on these issues and understand the message that we are trying
    to communicate and taking that back to your constituents as
    well.
        Your first question in terms of multiplying the efforts,
    two immediate thoughts. The business model of the Office for
    Community Partnerships at DHS is to supply products and
    services to a range of stakeholders across the country. Our
    three major sets of stakeholders are: State and local law
    enforcement, first responders, homeland security professionals
    across the country. Our second major set of stakeholders is
    municipal officials--mayors, county council members, people in
    elected or appointed local positions, whether they be security
    or not security related. And the third real set of constituents
    we have is civic leaders, civil organizations, not-for-profit
    organizations and so on.
        So in terms of getting out the message for the products and
    services DHS is offering and further taking advantage of the
    grant opportunity that we announced today to multiply and
    expand efforts across the country at this, our ultimate goal
    here is to create a much broader prevention framework in cities
    and municipalities----
        Senator Heitkamp. My concern is that you can give people
    tools, but if they do not see how they fit into a broader
    strategy of anti-radicalization, it may be difficult for them
    to utilize those tools. But I think the more that we get out
    there with grants, the more we work with communities, the more
    we will establish a pattern of best practices, which I think is
    the kind of critical development that we need here, and it
    really is incumbent, I think, on a community policing model
    where you really look at the entire community. Obviously,
    tensions in communities can lead to stress and can lead to bad
    outcomes. And so how do we avoid polarization which could lead
    to isolation which could lead to radicalization? How do we
    avoid that? And what are you looking for--in 2 years, what do
    you hope you have learned from all of the grants and all of the
    resources that you have provided?
        Mr. Selim. Senator, fundamental to the work of countering
    or preventing violent extremism in the homeland is community
    inclusiveness and those types of interpersonal relationships
    that you are referring to. That is foundational in this
    business. The ability for individuals who sense someone's
    behavior may be changing, there might be something they are
    concerned about, having the ability to say something to someone
    if they do not trust law enforcement to do so, having the right
    mental health, social service, and education providers to do
    so.
        At the end of the next 2 years, for example, the impact
    that we are trying to develop is creating a more integrated
    approach in cities and municipalities across the country where
    not just a community policing model exists but a more
    integrated approach of mental health, social service, and
    education providers are part of this prevention framework.
        Senator Heitkamp. Thank you so much. I look forward to
    hearing more about the grant applications and understanding
    more what the overall strategy is.
        Senator Portman. Senator Baldwin.

                  OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BALDWIN

        Senator Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We often do not hear about the good news or the encouraging
    news, but earlier this year, Mr. Steinbach, the FBI prevented a
    terrorist attack in my home State of Wisconsin. It reached the
    newspapers that a 23-year-old man had a vicious plan to kill at
    least 30 people at a Masonic temple in downtown Milwaukee.
        In my conversations with the FBI, officials indicated that
    fusion centers and FBI databases, such as eGuardian, which
    allow law enforcement to share intelligence were particularly
    useful. I know that FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces can be
    critical in sharing time-sensitive information, gathering
    evidence, and making arrests.
        So I want to hear from you about how we can expand and
    support these sort of law enforcement-coordinated efforts while
    also ensuring privacy protections and how we can better utilize
    coordination tools such as fusion centers and FBI databases to
    continue to prevent attacks like the one that was thwarted in
    my home State?
        Mr. Steinbach. Yes, ma'am, thank you. So I think it begins
    with all of those tools. The threat is changing. It is dynamic,
    and it is much faster. So it is not just--as I mentioned in my
    opening remarks, it is not just sharing information. It is how
    quickly--the speed of information sharing. So having fusion
    centers and Joint Terrorism Task Forces with multiple agency
    participation in them, active participation, as the information
    or the intelligence comes in, whether it is through eGuardian,
    through a tip, through foreign partners, when we get that
    information, we very quickly assess it using databases to
    identify the totality of what we know and then quickly act and
    use all of the tools that we are allowed to use, understanding
    that the individual's right to privacy is paramount to how we
    do things.
        So we quickly assess the information with our partners,
    State and local. As you know, State and local are force
    multipliers for us, and we quickly act within the limits of our
    authority to mitigate that. And the case that you refer to was
    an example of that that we try to replicate over and over
    again.
        Senator Baldwin. And then, quickly--I know our time is
    running out--thank you, Mr. Selim, for being here. And if you
    covered this before I arrived, I apologize for the repetition,
    but, obviously, as a part of this effort that you lead, it is
    critical that no group is targeted or discriminated against on
    the basis of religion or national origin. And it is also
    important that CVE grants are not used to perpetuate the
    alienation of any group or population.
        And so what I want to hear from you is, if you could speak
    to any specific training that your staff receives, civil
    liberty training that your office receives, and also oversight
    mechanisms that will be in place after the grants are awarded.
        Mr. Selim. Thank you, Senator, for that question. It is
    really important to underscore the civil rights, civil
    liberties, and privacy protections that are in place on all CVE
    initiatives across government domestically.
        The first point I would add is of my 10 years at DHS, 6 of
    those years were spent worked in the Office for Civil Rights
    and Civil Liberties, so I appreciate the spirit of your
    question.
        On the CVE grants question, we have built into the Notice
    of Funding which was released this morning a comprehensive
    scoring and evaluation that we have for any potential applicant
    who applies for those grants that has to demonstrate, the
    intent of what the money will go towards, partnerships that
    have been developed, and a whole range of options. If we see
    any applications submitted that are in any way, infringing on
    an individual's or group's civil rights, civil liberties, or
    privacy, we are not even going to score those applications.
        Within the Department, part of the evaluation of those
    applications, the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
    provides outstanding oversight to my office on all our
    programs, and they are partners with us on the oversight of
    this grant initiative as well. So that is built in and baked
    into everything we do.
        And the last point I would mention, Senator, is that the
    programs that we are administering, whether they are grants or
    initiatives we take in other places in the country, are
    completely voluntary. We are being responsive to community
    requests for CVE-related programming. And it may not be termed
    ``CVE.'' It might be ``building or enhancing community
    resilience'' or ``preventing extremism'' or some other title.
    And so our job is to supply the product services or technical
    assistance irrespective of what a locality might call it, but
    be responsive to their needs, and we are not imposing a DHS
    model per se. We are responding and helping customize localized
    approaches.
        Senator Portman. Mr. Selim, thank you for that answer.
        We are going to now recess subject to the call of the
    Chair. I apologize. Again, I ask the indulgence of the panel if
    you would not mind hanging around for a little while longer. I
    am going to be playing tag team with Senator McCaskill as we
    run back and forth and vote. But we do have some additional
    questions for you that I was not able to ask earlier in order
    to allow some of my colleagues to ask questions.
        So we will now recess subject to the call of the Chair, and
    we will be right back.
        [Recess.]
        The hearing will come to order. Again, I appreciate the
    indulgence of our two--now three distinguished witnesses who
    have come back to the table. I do not know if I am going to be
    joined by any of my colleagues because we have another at least
    two votes coming up. I am going to run back and forth. I will
    let you all go after my questions, of course, and then we will
    take another recess and ask the second panel if they would be
    willing to stick around, because I know Senator McCaskill is
    coming back, and I assume some of my colleagues are as well.
    But I thought we got into a lot of good back-and-forth with the
    previous questions that were asked, and, again, going back to
    how we started, Mr. Steinbach talked about the fact that he
    agrees with the assessment from last year, which is that the
    lone-wolf terrorist radicalized online is the main threat
    facing the United States. And we talked a lot about the two
    programs that are represented here today: one is the new
    program at the Department of Homeland Security called the
    ``Global Engagement Center''--I am sorry, the ``Office of
    Community Partnership,'' and then, of course, the State
    Department's Global Engagement Center. So what I would like to
    focus on a little bit is whether you feel you have the
    authorities you need to be able to do your job right.
        On the domestic side, Mr. Selim, you are not as aggressive
    as they are on the global side, in part because of some legal
    challenges that you face. They can do and say some things that
    you cannot. You also have not had the amount of time they have
    had to put together your digital effort. I think that is fair
    to say. By the same token, I think it is clear, including from
    some of the back-and-forth you had with some of my colleagues,
    that there is an enormous opportunity here domestically to be
    able to develop a message that is more compelling than the ones
    we currently have out there. We talked earlier about some of
    the messages coming from the jihadists, and, in fact, we had
    some photographs here earlier of sort of a romanticized version
    of jihad.
        And so I guess my first question to you would be: Are you
    happy with the progress that the Department has made,
    particularly on the digital counterterrorism communications
    front? And, specifically, how many online campaigns has DHS,
    particularly your office, devised or funded or launched, even
    through third parties, over the past year? What is the scale
    and composition of the audiences you have reached? How do you
    measure your results? Do you feel as though on the domestic
    side we are beginning to catch up?
        Mr. Selim. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your question. In
    terms of the first point you made regarding the authorities
    that we have, we have looked at this issue. Our current posture
    in the programs that we are implementing, we do not see any
    immediate impediments in terms of regulations or authorities
    for promoting and really taking to scale the programs that we
    have just started. The program----
        Senator Portman. Let me interrupt you there just for a
    second. I was going to get into this further with regard to the
    Global Engagement Center, but one of the things that, of
    course, this Committee is interested in is to ensure that you
    have the authority to be able to be an effective interagency
    leader, and that requires you to be able to direct and task
    people. We talked earlier about the FBI's role in this, which
    is a law enforcement role, but obviously, there is some
    interaction between your role as the communications person in
    the law enforcement side.
        Do you feel specifically that you have the tasking
    authority you need to be able to be an effective interagency
    leader?
        Mr. Selim. As of today, I can say that I do. I have been
    fully empowered by the Secretary and in my role as the Director
    of the CVE Task Force. Deputies across departments and
    agencies, including the FBI, the Department of Justice, the
    National Counterterrorism Center, and a range of other agencies
    came together to affirm this body come together and help
    coordinate and synchronize our domestic CVE efforts. So I feel
    like I do have those authorities, sir.
        Senator Portman. Good. Well, that is something that
    certainly was the intent of this Committee to support you in
    that, to be able to have that tasking authority, which,
    frankly, your predecessor organization I am not sure felt like
    they had in terms of that interagency cooperation. So if you do
    not mind, go ahead and I will let you answer the question about
    the digital communications efforts, the campaigns.
        Mr. Selim. Yes. In terms of the campaigns that we have
    initiated, the methodology that we are currently implementing
    is not for the Department or Department personnel to issue or
    to create campaigns and then implement them via social media or
    some other means. We are really utilizing the methodology
    behind prizes, challenges, competitions, and engaging young
    people and Millennials on these issues. So the effort that I
    mentioned in my beginning statement and in my written
    statement, the Peer-2-Peer Challenge Extremism competition,
    what we have done is essentially we have created a 15-week
    academic curriculum for college and university students both in
    the United States and across the globe to, in a 15-week
    academic semester, identify a target audience for challenging
    extremism, create a campaign, implement the campaign, and
    measure the effectiveness of that campaign on a 15-week
    academic semester.
        Mr. Chairman, you asked for some statistics. Roughly, to
    date we have run this program for about three academic
    semesters with approximately 150 colleges and universities
    across the globe. This coming fall, we are interested in
    scaling that effort significantly with up to 200 colleges and
    universities across the globe. And our metrics for assessment
    are on an individual university-based program and then on an
    aggregate, the level of impressions and influence that each of
    those campaigns are having.
        To date, of the programs that we have implemented, we have
    anywhere between 30,000 and a million social media impressions
    and campaigns that have made micro impressions on various
    social media platforms that have attempted to counter or negate
    the message of ISIL in terms of recruitment and radicalization.
    I think this is one of the initiatives that we can take to
    scale significantly in the semesters to come, and the program
    has the flexibility to allow us to scale or tweak or adjust our
    measurements, our assessments, and the number of universities
    we are implementing on a semester-by-semester basis.
        Senator Portman. On the composition of the audience, what
    kind of metrics do you have and what kind of information do you
    have to share with us today? In other words, who are you
    reaching?
        Mr. Selim. So there are several different criteria of
    audiences, audience criteria that we are assessing. At-risk
    individuals on the fence are those that can be amplifiers of
    positive or alternative narratives. And each of the campaigns
    that is initiated is required to assess how to best target or
    communicate with that audience and then implement the campaign
    to effectively do so.
        Senator Portman. Do you have metrics?
        Mr. Selim. We do. Again, on a university-by-university
    assessment we do, and then as an aggregate we do overall.
        Senator Portman. But not in terms of the audiences that are
    being reached, the composition of the audiences who you are
    reaching?
        Mr. Selim. We do, and I will share with you one set of data
    and analytics as an anecdote. Just a few weeks ago, at the
    State Department we launched the completion of our third
    successful semester of this competition. One of the finalist
    universities from the United States was the Rochester Institute
    of Technology from New York. They had one specific statistic
    that was worth mentioning. Prior to the implementation of their
    campaign, roughly 87 percent of respondents of a 300-person
    survey they conducted associated Islam with terrorism and had a
    negative interpretation of the religion or of Muslims writ
    large.
        After the implementation of their campaign, 97 percent or
    98 percent of the respondents of that same survey understood
    the distinction between Islam, Muslims, and terrorism and had a
    positive or favorable view in terms of both the Middle East,
    American Muslims, and American Arabs and felt the need to be
    compelled to do proactive work with their communities in terms
    of reaching out to Arab, Muslim, and South Asian communities.
        Senator Portman. Well, again, I think we are catching up.
    The jihadists we talked about earlier have been at this really
    for 3 years, I would say it is fair to say. It has been an
    evolution but in a very sophisticated way online. You talked
    about three semesters. That is good that we have gotten
    started, but we have a lot to catch up on. And I think having
    this data on the composition is important. It is important that
    we are distinguishing between the Muslim community and the
    terrorist community, as you just said. It is also important,
    though, we are meeting some of these vulnerable people online
    where they live and communicating that message. And I guess
    that would be what I and I think the Committee would be very
    interested in, is to know how can we come up with a better
    metric to judge that. Every marketing department in practically
    every company in the United States, certainly every online
    company, is focused on this. How do you reach your audience?
    And that is certainly something that--Peer-2-Peer is a good
    start in my view. I support it. But I think it needs to be even
    broader than that and we need to have better data coming back.
        I would say, Mr. Steinbach, as a general matter, it seems
    to me there is both a public and an encrypted part of this
    communication strategy on the public part, as I understand, and
    you correct me. There is a wide net being cast by the jihadists
    who are online to create this sense of interest or excitement
    in the jihad or the mission, and that is very public. And we
    see it, you see it. Mr. Selim, your people see it. That is what
    you are countering, I hope, with these messages, is telling the
    truth, dealing with the disinformation.
        Then there becomes, once those people make contact, I
    assume that is when what you talked about earlier occurs, which
    is the encrypted part of the communication, which is more
    challenging. Is that an accurate assessment of what is going
    on?
        Mr. Steinbach. I think that is a very simple but accurate
    model. We see the volume piece, the initial piece, public
    information pushed out through a variety of means of social
    media, the hundreds and hundreds of companies casting a wide
    net, trying to identify individuals who are like-minded, who
    are willing to act, who are willing to travel. And then once
    they identify somebody who raises their hand and says yes, then
    the conversation switches to mobile messaging apps that are
    encrypted so that there is complete secrecy.
        Senator Portman. And this is the challenge you talked about
    earlier and Director Comey has talked about in this Committee
    publicly, is how do we deal with that second stage. Is there
    anything you can tell us today about any attempts that you are
    making to be able to break through on that second tier? And
    what is the way in which we can intervene there as well?
        Mr. Steinbach. So I think it is important to understand
    that the FBI looks at this as an important issue for the
    American public to vigorously discuss, and that really is
    privacy versus national security, encryption versus national
    security. I think all of us as citizens, myself included, want
    strong encryption. But we need to continue to have
    conversations about where the limits of that are, and we would
    argue that strong encryption, although important, must be
    balanced with national security interests so that when a judge
    or a magistrate provides authority, we have the ability, law
    enforcement has the ability to see those unencrypted
    communications or have access to that. We feel that is an
    appropriate balance.
        Ultimately, it is a decision for the American public
    through Congress, but that for us is fundamental. We see today
    more and more of our bad actors using encrypted communications
    in a variety of ways. Without the ability to see those
    encrypted communications, we are dark, we are blind as to their
    operational intent. So we try to identify workarounds, but
    those are few and far between.
        Senator Portman. Well, I appreciate that, and that is not
    really the topic so much of this conversation. And, in fact, a
    lot of that is better, I guess, undertaken in a classified
    setting. But the reality is that the funnel starts in a more
    broad and public way, and to keep people from going into that
    funnel, I would say the funnel of darkness, we have an
    opportunity on the public side. And I think that is where Mr.
    Selim and Ms. LaGraffe have an opportunity of working with you
    to try to avoid so many people going into that place where it
    is much more difficult for you to be able to understand what
    their communications are.
        Are there any models, to you, Mr. Steinbach, or you, Mr.
    Selim, that you look at globally that you think are working
    better in terms of dealing with this challenge of online
    recruitment and online propaganda and disinformation?
        Mr. Selim. I would say as we think about countering violent
    extremism domestically, it needs to be a blend of both online
    and offline programs. While the radicalization and recruitment
    can start online, what we have seen and what the data has shown
    us are primarily from closed and processed FBI investigations
    is that individuals around someone who is being radicalized--
    friends, neighbors, peers, associates--see some type of
    behavior that may be out of place, but do not report it for one
    reason or another.
        So to the extent that radicalization and recruitment starts
    online, it can end offline, like we have seen tragically happen
    in several American cities. And so we are really working
    diligently toward an integrated approach where there are
    countermessages online and there is a prevention framework
    offline as well. And it is really that combination that we are
    working toward.
        Senator Portman. And I assume a prevention framework online
    as well.
        Mr. Selim. Correct.
        Senator Portman. In other words, part of the audience we
    talked about earlier is the vulnerable potential jihadists, but
    it is also to the friend and the co-worker and the neighbor.
        Mr. Selim. Correct.
        Senator Portman. And the family member, and San Bernardino
    being perhaps the most recent tragic example of that, where
    there are people who after the fact said, ``Something seemed
    strange, but I felt that I was constrained, I could not report
    it,'' for some reason. And that is part of your effort, I
    assume.
        Mr. Selim. It is to raise awareness. The three primary----
        Senator Portman. And you empower people to step forward.
        Mr. Selim. Exactly. The three primary objectives of our
    office are: No. 1, really raise awareness as to the nature and
    scope of threat of radicalization and recruitment, online and
    offline, and we have discovered, dozens of cases where
    community-based groups are not aware to the extent that
    radicalization is happening online. We need them to come in and
    provide tools and resources to those communities and help
    develop and sustain long-term partnerships for them, whether
    they be with Federal, State, and local law enforcement or other
    trusted community institutions--mental health, social service,
    and education providers.
        Senator Portman. When I was looking for a model, I was
    hoping you would talk about the British Research Information
    and Communications Unit (RICU), which has gotten some good
    plaudits internationally for being very aggressive in pumping
    out messaging, being very aggressive online, using third
    parties, as you are now doing with Peer-2-Peer. They use
    traditional media as well as social media, as you know.
        I think we have some legal constraints the British do not
    have in this regard, so we cannot do exactly what they are
    doing. But what do you know about what they are up to? And why
    have they been successful and what can we learn from them? For
    either one of you.
        Mr. Steinbach. I am not familiar with that, sir.
        Senator Portman. OK. George?
        Mr. Selim. I am pretty familiar with the British model on
    this. I was recently there would Deputy Secretary Mayorkas,
    General Taylor, and a senior leadership team from DHS. They
    provided a deep dive in terms of their program, their analytics
    and so on. Senator, as you pointed out, their legal structure
    affords them a number of different flexibilities that we do not
    have here in the homeland, and from my perspective as the
    Director of the CVE Task Force, it is important to have a
    comparative understanding of what is happening not just in the
    U.K. but in Germany, France, other Western European and,
    frankly, other coalition countries outside of Europe. The RICU
    model is an interesting model. They have some interesting data
    and analytics that has proven effective so far. And it is
    important that both the U.S., the U.K., and other partner
    countries keep in close contact with not just best practices
    but really promising practices that are showing effectiveness.
        Senator Portman. This brings us really to the global
    effort, and, again, if you do not mind providing more
    information to us as to what you think we can learn from them
    and with regard to the legal constraints, just to be sure we
    are all on the same page, we understand what constraints you
    feel you might have. I know you also likely are going to tell
    us today that you have some resource constraints. You would not
    be doing your job if you did not. And, that is another issue
    that I think maybe the British have put a greater emphasis on
    this in terms of their resource allocation, as I understand it,
    within their budget.
        But on the global side--I do not want to leave Ms. LaGraffe
    out of this conversation--do you think that the Global
    Engagement Center, which is also aimed at changing attitudes
    over the long term, is adequately using the data analytics
    tools we talked about here to focus on those who are most
    vulnerable to radicalization? And to the extent you can, can
    you give us one or two examples of where the Center has done
    that kind of micro targeting?
        Ms. LaGraffe. Thank you, Senator. To answer your first
    question, the data analytics shop within the Global Engagement
    Center, as you know, is in its sort of early stages, and we are
    working very closely with the State Department Office of the
    Legal Adviser to make sure the analytics tools we identify to
    be potentially most appropriate for our organization are in
    keeping with the regulations specifically related to the
    Privacy Act.
        Thus far, what that has looked like in practice is that we
    have identified tools that give us access to aggregate data, so
    we are able to see in near-realtime trends on social media
    platforms to really assess what messages and what themes are
    resonating most with potential target audiences.
        Senator Portman. Yes, I think it would be good, to the
    extent you are able, to explain what you are talking about to
    the Committee today. You are talking about the Privacy Act, I
    assume.
        Ms. LaGraffe. Yes.
        Senator Portman. Which you mentioned the Office of Legal
    Adviser at the State Department giving you advice on this. My
    understanding is that the Privacy Act prevents the government
    from collecting certain information about Americans or lawful
    permanent residents but not about foreigners. Is that accurate?
        Ms. LaGraffe. I am not an attorney. I think the way you
    characterized it is accurate. My understanding of the challenge
    we face at the Global Engagement Center is, as you have said,
    we are not a law enforcement agency, nor are we an intelligence
    agency and, therefore, have restrictions related to the Privacy
    Act. These restrictions mostly focus around what is called
    ``user-level data,'' so we have worked, as I mentioned, closely
    with the legal adviser's office to determine what tools we need
    to get aggregate-level data, but the user-level analysis is
    something that we as the Global Engagement Center do not have
    authority to access.
        Senator Portman. I think we should have further discussion
    of this because I think it is in all of our interest that you
    do micro target. Again, as I mentioned, every company in the
    United States practically, as well as those online companies,
    are doing this--and wouldn't it be ironic if our own State
    Department is not able to do that to fight terrorism?--to be
    able to understand who the people are who are most vulnerable
    to these potential disinformation campaigns and then provide
    them the countermessaging.
        So I am concerned about the way in which the State
    Department has interpreted the act. I think what they would
    say--and, I am a recovering lawyer so I have to be careful
    here, and did work at one point during law school at the legal
    adviser's office. But I think what they are saying is that it
    could inadvertently collect information about Americans. So it
    is not that you are unable to collect information about
    foreigners or, again, this vulnerable overseas group we are
    talking about. It is that apparently they think that there
    could be information collected about Americans inadvertently.
    Is that your understanding?
        Ms. LaGraffe. It is.
        Senator Portman. OK. What are you losing by not being able
    to do that kind of micro targeting?
        Ms. LaGraffe. I do not think we as an organization have yet
    fully fleshed out what missed opportunities there may be in
    either lack of analysis in this realm or any other. Frankly, it
    is so early days for the Global Engagement Center--we have been
    up and running for just a few months--that we are focused more
    on what opportunities we can identify to actually start having
    a result in the aggregate.
        Senator Portman. Well, again, I think we are in a crisis
    mode in the sense that, as Mr. Steinbach has talked about
    today, this online messaging is a huge part of the
    radicalization effort, and certainly this relates both to
    domestic and overseas. So I would want to be sure that, as hard
    as your task is, it is not made harder by constraints that keep
    us from targeting the very population that is most vulnerable
    or more predisposed to accepting the disinformation and the
    message from the jihadists.
        So I would just say, as one member of the Committee, I
    would like to follow-up on that further with you all and to get
    some information about how the State Department is interpreting
    the privacy rule as it relates to foreigners and what that
    keeps us from doing in terms of being able to target these
    groups.
        Senator McCaskill has now returned, so I am going to turn
    to her for her questions. And, again, we are going to sort of
    tag team here. I may not have the opportunity to speak to the
    three of you again, so thank you very much for your service to
    our country And I know each of you has a distinguished
    background of service in various law enforcement and State
    Department and now communications areas, and we need you very
    badly right now to be able to have an effective countermessage
    out there. I think it is as important as anything else that is
    being done, and everything else, as I said at the outset of the
    hearing, can be done successfully, the military side,
    protecting the homeland in other ways, and still, if we do not
    deal with this threat of the disinformation online and the
    radicalization that is going on, we will not be successful. So
    we thank you for your hard work and for your willingness to
    continue to work harder to do even better to redouble our
    efforts to be more successful. Senator McCaskill.
        [Pause.]
        Senator McCaskill. Sorry. We are trying to figure out how
    we can vote and do this hearing at the same time.
        Senator Portman. Call the second panel whenever you want.
        Senator McCaskill [Presiding.] OK. A couple of things.
        Mr. Steinbach, I was the elected DA in Kansas City in the
    1990s, and we had an awful lot of work that the Justice
    Department did through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
    and other parts of Justice about gangs and how did we stop
    somebody from being radicalized into a group that was intent on
    violence. And there were millions and millions and millions of
    dollars spent on how we gain cooperation of the community, how
    we identify young men--and sometimes young women but primarily
    young men--from entering gangs.
        I am reading a lot of things in preparation for this
    hearing, and so much of it began to take on a ring of
    familiarity. And I am wondering to what extent have we taken
    out the volumes of research and work that were done in terms of
    accessing communities, getting the help of communities,
    identifying someone who is being radicalized to a life of
    violence. The only clear difference I see here is that
    obviously this is being clothed in a false costume of religion,
    and it is convincing people that they should die for this,
    although the young gang members at the time would say, they
    were proud of going--I do not know if you remember. You
    probably do remember this. You were probably working as an
    agent at that point. I am guessing. Were you or are you too
    young to have worked as an agent in the 1990s?
        Mr. Steinbach. No. I was an agent.
        Senator McCaskill. OK. So you know that one of the saddest
    things that law enforcement encountered were some of these
    young men that were 12 and 13 years old going with their first
    pile of cash to buy caskets and to plan their funerals. So they
    were anticipating their death.
        Has there been any work--I mean, Homeland Security was not
    around then, but has there been any work at Justice to try to
    pull off some of the strategies that proved to be effective in
    fighting the gang wars of the 1990s as it applies to radical
    extremism that we are working with now?
        Mr. Steinbach. Yes, ma'am. I think you are right on. I
    think at the core, the reasons for disaffected youth joining
    something they can belong to, whether it is a gang or radical
    Islam, there is something to that. So in partnership with all
    these agencies at the table, we look to the communities to
    answer our questions. So just as we used the communities and
    developed trust within the neighborhoods, we do the same thing
    with the communities of interest now. We work with the
    communities, focusing our efforts, empowering them to
    identify--because once an individual comes to the FBI's
    attention and we have predicated an investigation, it is too
    far down the road. It is gone. It is too late. We need to
    identify those individuals as they start down that path of
    radicalization, and the key to that, quite frankly, is in the
    communities. The only difference between the 1990s and today is
    the online space and working within the online arena, which is
    where I think George's efforts are focusing on.
        Senator McCaskill. And have we looked at--I mean, I know
    that we are talking about calling in psychologists and
    psychiatrists and paying money to contractors. I mean, what I
    am really wanting to make sure is we are not reinventing a
    wheel that we have already spent a lot of taxpayer dollars
    researching since the problems are so similar. Is anybody
    pulling out any of the work that was done by professionals? Are
    any of you familiar with any of that work that was done by
    professionals back when we were dealing with extremism in the
    form of gangs?
        Mr. Selim. Senator, if I may, we are indeed very familiar
    with a great body of that work, which is the wealth of
    information that the Justice Department as our partners and the
    Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys, many of whom have been
    prosecutors at the State, local, and now at the Federal level
    for the past several decades, bring to bear in this regard. I
    think when we are thinking about prevention models, whether it
    be gang prevention, we have looked at the model of the National
    Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), how does
    that public-private partnership with law enforcement and NGO
    work, how do you prevent whether it is human trafficking and
    smuggling, prevent recruitment and radicalization to
    transnational gangs and other models like that, we have
    definitely pulled heavily from that body, and that has helped
    inform the models that we apply today.
        Senator McCaskill. Mr. Steinbach, I know that you all are
    engaging in the Muslim community in the United States. Can you
    give us anything in this setting as to what percentage of the
    leads that you all work actually are generated by Muslims who
    are concerned about someone at their mosque or someone in their
    community that they believe might be subjected to some kind of
    radicalization of their faith?
        Mr. Steinbach. Yes, ma'am, and the answer is no, I do not
    have those numbers with me. And part of the problem is when
    incoming tips come in, we are not cataloguing them by the type
    of person that provides it. But I will say that every field
    office commander through all 56 field offices of the FBI works
    closely in partnership with the communities of interest, with
    the mosques, the churches, the temples, and develops strong
    relationships for a number of reasons. They recognize, those
    field office commanders, that the leaders of those communities
    do not want that bad apple, those bad apples affecting their
    children or impacting in a negative way their areas of worship,
    their places of worship, their communities. And so there is
    quite a bit of communication back and forth at the foundational
    level in the communities. I could not give you a number on the
    number of tips. I will say that we get a lot of information and
    assistance from those communities, however.
        Senator McCaskill. Is it your sense from talking to your
    SACs that are out there in the field and that are working with
    these communities, do you sense a frustration with them that
    these communities are failing to cooperate? What is your
    overall impression about the willingness of the Muslim
    community in the United States to try to be helpful as opposed
    to the way they are sometimes categorized in the media or by
    other politicians?
        Mr. Steinbach. I would say overwhelmingly the religious
    communities across the United States are very helpful to us in
    identifying sources of radicalization, whether that is Islam,
    Christianity, Judaism. We could not do our job without them. So
    I would not characterize it as an adversarial relationship or a
    negative relationship at all. It is a very positive
    relationship.
        Senator McCaskill. I am usually here preaching about
    interagency cooperation, and now I am going to ask a question
    that I did not really anticipate that I would ever be asking.
    But we now have the National Counterterrorism Center, the DHS-
    led Interagency Task Force, and the Global Engagement Center,
    and there are probably a few others. Now we are in danger of
    the interagency groups not coordinating with other interagency
    groups because we have a plethora of interagency groups.
        Can any of you speak to any sense you have of how well we
    are cooperating with these various interagency groups that are
    all ostensibly driving towards the same purpose?
        Mr. Selim. I will start, and I will ask my co-panelists to
    join in. From where I sit at the Director of this Task Force,
    what we have done by creating the Global Engagement Center, the
    CVE Task Force, and other models across the Federal Government,
    including the National Counterterrorism Center, we have really
    honed in and specialized in what the key tasks and objectives
    are. So the National Counterterrorism Center is a part of the
    intelligence community, and they cannot play the same role that
    a DHS or a Justice Department official has due to their
    authorities and regulations and so on.
        In terms of cooperation with my colleagues at the State
    Department on the Global Engagement Center, the Department of
    Homeland Security has a full-time detailee at the Global
    Engagement Center, again, a very discrete mission set different
    from ours, and we meet regularly. If not several times a month,
    every few weeks we get together, our leadership gets together
    to figure out how we can better coordinate or integrate our
    efforts abroad and domestically.
        And so I think what you have identified, Senator, is a
    number of interagency bodies that have been really honed in on
    a specific set of tasks rather than aggregated overall to a
    department or agency's mission.
        Senator McCaskill. It would be really helpful, to the
    extent that you can in a nonclassified setting, not for
    testimony today but if somebody would put on paper how you
    would diagram this in terms of responsibilities. The thing I am
    most concerned about is being sure who is accountable for a
    situation. That is the other thing that happens sometimes when
    you have more than one group in charge. I have seen it. I will
    not give specific examples, but I could, bunches of them. If
    you just look at contracting in Iraq, it was a big old quagmire
    of a mess between United States Agency for International
    Development (USAID) and the Comprehensive Everglades
    Restoration Plan (CERP) funds and, there were just a lot of
    things that there was not really--it was not clear who was
    watching all the money.
        And so I would love a diagram as to what are the different
    responsibilities between these different interagency task
    forces and who is reporting to whom and who is ultimately
    accountable--besides the President, who obviously is ultimately
    accountable.
        I am sure I will have other questions for the record.
        I really appreciate all of your work, your dedication. I
    like to remind people that are so cynical about their
    government, I have not met any of you types that came into this
    line of work for money. And, frankly, for the vast majority of
    you and your colleagues, it is not for glory either. So it is a
    sense of purpose and a sense of serving the public and a sense
    of accomplishment. So please convey to all of your colleagues
    how appreciative we are. Even though you do not get probably
    enough love day in and day out other than from your families,
    what you do is really important, and I respect it very much.
    And we will call the next panel.
        [Pause.]
        Thank you all for being here.
        Peter Bergen is vice president of New America where he
    directs the international security program which conducts
    research and analysis on extremist groups, homeland security,
    and other things. He is a contributing editor at Foreign Policy
    Magazine, a professor at Arizona State University, and writes a
    weekly column for CNN. Mr. Bergen is also a member of the Aspen
    Security Group and a documentary producer and author.
        Alberto Fernandez is the vice president of the Middle East
    Media Research Institute and a member of the board at the
    Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington
    University. From 2012 to 2015, he served as the State
    Department's Coordinator for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications and prior to that was a Foreign Service Officer
    for over 30 years.
        Thank you both for being here today. It is the custom of
    this Subcommittee to swear in all witnesses, so at this time I
    would ask both of you to please stand and raise your right
    hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give
    before the Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and
    nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
        Mr. Bergen. I do.
        Mr. Fernandez. I do.
        Senator McCaskill. Let the record reflect the witnesses
    have answered in the affirmative.
        All of your written testimony will be printed in the
    record, and we would ask that you try to limit your oral
    testimony to 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bergen, we will hear from you first.

       TESTIMONY OF PETER BERGEN,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, NEW AMERICA
                               FOUNDATION

        Mr. Bergen. Senator McCaskill and other Members of the
    Committee, thanks for this opportunity.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen appears in the Appendix on
    page 64.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        You asked a question of Michael Steinbach, and I think I
    have an answer. He did not have an answer for the reasons he
    laid out, but we looked at more than 330 jihadi terrorist cases
    since 9/11. We found based on the public record that a third of
    them, a third of those cases were generated either by community
    tips or family member tips. So there is a high degree of
    cooperation amongst the community.
        Turning to just my overall comments, on Friday we saw
    something that I think is indicative of something we need to be
    concerned about, which is terrorists are now the media. Maggie
    Thatcher, when she was Prime Minister, famously said that
    terrorists were--the ``oxygen of publicity'' is terrorism. She
    said that in 1985. Well, what if terrorists themselves control
    the media, they completely bypass the traditional media? We saw
    on Friday, for instance, that the attackers in Bangladesh
    murdered the people in the cafe. They immediately posted it all
    to Amaq, which is effectively ISIS' news agency, which then in
    turn published it.
        So now we have an interesting situation where the
    terrorists are the perpetrators, the producers of the media
    around this, and the propagators. And this is something new.
        We saw in Paris the ISIS-inspired militant last month who
    killed the French police official and his partner. He
    immediately posted pictures and videotape a whole disquisition
    about his allegiance to ISIS on Facebook.
        In the Orlando case and in the San Bernardino case, as you
    know, the perpetrators immediately pledged their allegiance to
    Facebook in the middle of the attack.
        So one big idea is terrorists are now the media, and that
    is something that is new. They have always tried to influence
    the media.
        The second, I think, big idea is that ISIS is effectively
    crowdsourcing jihad, and we have had a lot of testimony today
    about that fact. But there are obviously results. In the United
    States, in the last 2 years we have had six ISIS-inspired
    attacks, two of them lethal in San Bernardino and Orlando, four
    of them luckily not lethal in places like Garland, Texas, in
    New York City, in Philadelphia, and in California. But even in
    the nonlethal cases, people were severely wounded in a couple
    of these cases.
        So who is ISIS appealing to in the West? At New America,
    where I work, we looked at--and also in the United States, we
    looked at 715 cases, again, based on public records and trials,
    and we found that one in eight were women, which is
    unprecedented. In previous jihads we had never seen that. The
    average age is 25. The average age for the females is 22. Many
    of them had family ties to jihad. A third of them had family
    ties to jihad, a brother or father who went, they got married
    over there. And we found that the profile of the Americans who
    joined the jihad or tried--either succeeded or attempted to
    join ISIS was very similar. So one in seven were women, the
    average age was just under 25, a fifth of them had family ties
    to jihadism; and, crucially, more than three-quarters were very
    active online, meaning not that they were just sending emails
    but they were posting jihadi material on Facebook or Twitter.
    So I think none of that is necessarily surprising, but I think
    that has implications for how you try and contest this.
        What are ISIS' messages? Again, if we understand what the
    message is, we can contest them. One is they are victorious,
    and, at one point they controlled territory the size of the
    United Kingdom and a population the size of Switzerland. That
    is now going down. They created a utopian society, it is the
    caliphate. There is a cool factor, there is a romanticist
    factor. The message shifted in early 2015 from joining the
    caliphate to attacking the West if you look at their kind of
    messaging.
        What to do? In the 1 minute I have left, I have a few
    ideas.
        One is I think with CVE there has been kind of a rather
    crucial conceptual confusion between countering radicalization
    and countering recruitment. And these things are related. But
    at the end of the day, what we are trying to do is stop people
    joining the gangs in the 1990s or joining ISIS, and trying to
    stop radicalization. It is not illegal in this country to have
    bad ideas, and it is a very hard task. Tens of millions of
    people probably have militant ideas. Very few of them join
    ISIS. Maybe 60,000 over the last 2 years have actually--30,000
    from around the world have joined ISIS.
        So employing defectors is useful. Employing clerics like
    Imam Magid, who works not far from here, who has personally
    intervened with a number of cases in Northern Virginia. Twitter
    obviously enforcing its terms of use. The military campaign has
    had some success.
        Finally, just to round it up, what we should not do is ban
    immigration from Muslim countries, as is being proposed. That
    would have absolutely no effect on this issue. Every lethal
    terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 has been
    carried out by an American citizen or American legal permanent
    resident. And so I will leave it at that.
        Senator McCaskill. I will certainly give you time for any
    other ideas in a minute as soon as Mr. Fernandez finishes his
    testimony. Mr. Fernandez.

     TESTIMONY OF ALBERTO M. FERNANDEZ,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, MIDDLE
                     EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

        Mr. Fernandez. Thank you, Senator. I am happy to be here.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez appears in the Appendix
    on page 82.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If we look at the space that the Islamic State and its
    rivals and colleagues occupy, we do see over the past couple of
    years some small measures of incipient progress. Certainly, the
    military campaign has begun a little bit to dent the victory
    narrative that the Islamic State has propagated.
        Social media companies, government, and the private sector,
    civil society groups have begun to at the very least dismantle
    the diffuse online networks that the Islamic State had for many
    years.
        In 2014, none of this stuff was being taken down. In 2016,
    the stuff is being taken down more rapidly. When people return,
    they return with less followers. So the space of the fan boys,
    the space of the online networks is being shrunken and being
    contested, has been contested, there is more material, there is
    more messages of defectors. There is a really good NGO, the
    International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism which
    is producing defector videos, which I highly recommend. So
    there is more stuff happening.
        However, the ISIS brand has to a large extent been
    internalized and metastasized to a large extent of the
    population. Now, of course, we are talking about minorities. We
    are not talking about 1.5 billion Muslims. We are talking about
    a small percentage of the population where the ISIS message has
    been internalized. It does not even need new material. It is
    old material that functions. It is old things that work. It is
    not the latest thing.
        By the way, in the time that this session has taken place,
    the Islamic State Al-Furqan released a 15-minute high-quality
    video talking about itself, talking about how great it is,
    which they announced on social media ahead of time this morning
    that they were going to do. I think it underscores Peter
    Bergen's point, that they are able to get--despite the pressure
    that we put on them, despite the fact that we are taking stuff
    down quickly, they are able to surge and get their message out
    at will when and where they want.
        Now, what has not been touched? I think there are several
    points that we need to think about when we think about what we
    have done and what has not been done. We still have not gotten
    the full benefit we have out of the slow but real military
    progress we are making on the ground.
        We should be talking in the last few days about ISIS'
    defeat at Fallujah and ISIS' near defeat at Mambij. And instead
    what are we talking about? Orlando, Istanbul, Medina,
    Bangladesh, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. They have
    succeeded in changing the narrative. Instead of talking about
    how they are physically under great pressure in the field, we
    are seeing how the digital caliphate and the work that they do
    overseas is kind of serving as a substitute for military
    victory. So that is an area where they are still undented.
        The other area where they are still undented and something
    that almost no one either in the United States or overseas
    touches is the ideology, the building blocks of the ISIS
    message. The Salafi jihadist world view which empowers it and
    generates it is largely untouched. I can understand the
    government not wanting to do this. This is something that the
    U.S. Government is probably not very good about talking about,
    the intersection of politics and religion. But this is not
    something that is happening anywhere.
        As a thought process, when I was writing my testimony, I
    went on YouTube, and I put in some of the key terms that Salafi
    jihadists like ISIS use to radicalize people. I put them in
    English on YouTube. I thought, ``What if I was a 17-year-old
    boy, I am confused, I do not know what is what,'' and I put in
    these terms. And every single time the immediate return you got
    on YouTube was that of extremists, not of humanistic, tolerant,
    good people that we have in the Muslim community in the United
    States or overseas.
        One of the key terms, ``Al-Wala wal-Bara,'' which is about
    loyalty to radical Islam and hating the West and hating the
    country you are in, the No. 1 person that returned to it was
    Anwar al-Awlaki. So Anwar al-Awlaki 5 years after his death is
    still helping to radicalize people.
        So the ideological challenge of the Islamic State has not
    been challenged yet, and the sectarian dimension, even our
    victories in the region, are tainted by the sectarian
    dimension. So while we are making real progress on the ground
    against the Islamic State and even in cyberspace, some of the
    key building blocks for the Islamic State of today and of
    tomorrow are actually untouched or even enhanced by events on
    the ground.
        Thank you.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, and I have 2 minutes left to
    go, and Senator Portman has not returned. So I am going to ask
    you to sit tight. I am going to run to vote. He will be back I
    am sure before I will, but we will be back in--and I apologize
    for this, but it cannot be helped.
        Senator Portman [Presiding.] Thank you, and I assume we did
    not recess. OK. Thank you all very much for your patience. I
    apologize. I have gotten my exercise for the day literally
    running back and forth. We think we are done voting. We may
    have one more, but we will not ask you to stay if we leave
    again. I promise you.
        First of all, I apologize not to be here to hear your
    testimony, but I got a chance to review your testimony, and as
    I said at the outset, I really appreciate both of you being
    here and your distinguished backgrounds in this area trying to
    figure out, what the best things are to do. The government
    panel we heard from a little while ago told us that--and the
    FBI Director had said this late last year--the lone-wolf
    radicalization online he believes is the biggest threat to our
    national security here at home. And we now know the nature of
    that threat, but we need to get a deeper understanding of some
    of the trends that we are seeing. That is where you guys can be
    really helpful.
        In these attacks here, in all but one, I think there was no
    what you would consider, I suppose, direct contact between the
    terrorists and an ISIS cell overseas. Is that accurate, Mr.
    Bergen?
        Mr. Bergen. Yes. The only case is the Garland, Texas, case,
    where there was an actual attack in motion where they had
    communicated with ISIS.
        Senator Portman. Why do you think there has not been an
    overseas element in most of these U.S. attacks? Either one of
    you.
        Mr. Bergen. Let me try to answer that. On 9/11 there were
    16 people on the no-fly list. Now there are 47,000. There are
    like a million and a half people on the Terrorist Identities
    Datamart Environment (TIDE) list. On 9/11, the FBI and the CIA
    barely talked to each other. On 9/11, there was no NCTC, TSA,
    DHS. We have tripled our intelligence budget, and we are a much
    harder target. In fact, the last time a foreign terrorist
    organization tried to attack us unsuccessfully was May 1, 2010,
    with the Faisal Shahzad Pakistani Taliban attack. So the point
    is the reason we are talking about lone wolves is because we
    have erected these very large defenses against foreign
    terrorist organizations directing somebody, training somebody,
    sending them to us.
        Senator Portman. You note in your testimony that about 20
    percent of American ISIS members had a familial connection to
    jihad. That was your quote.
        Mr. Bergen. Yes.
        Senator Portman. Can you elaborate on that point? I ask
    because I think it implies that even here in the U.S. there
    might be a strong in-person element to radicalization, which is
    an interesting wrinkle to the story, in addition to what
    happens online.
        Mr. Bergen. Well, an example of that is the Khan family
    from Chicago, three teenagers, 19, 17, and 16, they have kind
    of radicalized together, two boys and one girl. They were all
    planning to join ISIS. They were arrested at O'Hare airport.
    That is one kind of example.
        Another kind of example is people go to join ISIS, of which
    there have not been that many Americans who have succeeded, but
    sometimes they marry somebody in ISIS or associated with ISIS
    when they get there.
        Senator Portman. And the content of the ISIS propaganda and
    how it is uniquely suited to the Internet is something you both
    have addressed. Ambassador Fernandez, you have noticed that
    this brand can be all things to all extremists. Mr. Bergen, you
    have also commented on this, and you have noted that the thrust
    of the ISIS message is that it offers a sense of purpose and
    community--we talked about this earlier--to the vulnerable, the
    disillusioned, the alienated.
        To both of you guys, what kind of countermessaging
    challenges and opportunities does that present for us?
        Mr. Fernandez. Well, a couple of things. No. 1, of course,
    is the most effective countermessaging are people that know the
    Islamic State best, and those are defectors, those are families
    of victims. The Islamic State is essentially a Sunni Arab
    Muslim organization. Yes, it has thousands of non-Arabs in it,
    but in terms of its world view, it is a Sunni Arab Muslim
    organization. That is where the issue comes from. That is the
    heart of its core. Those are the voices that are most useful.
    We often focus on many of the victims who are not Sunni Arab
    Muslims. Obviously, we care about all the victims, including
    Americans. But it is that core audience that it appeals to that
    we need to work on.
        The other thing, of course, is that the ideological
    dimension of the ISIS appeal is rarely touched. What are these
    elements that mobilize people, concepts of jihad, of kufr, of
    shirk, of Al-Wala wal-Bara, of taghut? These terms which are
    complicated, nuanced terms in Islamic history which ISIS uses
    as bumper stickers to kill. It is not Islam for Dummies. It is
    Salafi jihadism for Dummies. And so those are two of the
    challenges that we face in that space.
        Senator Portman. In some of your testimony, you talk about
    the fact that our messaging can be more effective, and we
    talked a little bit about that yesterday at the staff level
    about, what works and what does not work. You mentioned
    defectors, for instance. That seems to be more effective, for
    instance, than, as you say, someone who is not connected.
        You also talk about the victory narrative and that that is
    something that we need to respond to because that victory
    narrative encourages more people to feel as though they are
    part of something that is working.
        In your written testimony, you contrast our message that
    you thought was relatively ineffective after retaking Fallujah
    with that of a more productive messaging after taking a
    different Iraqi city. From a message perspective, can you talk
    about the difference between those two and just elaborate on
    your comments on what is most effective in terms of messaging?
        Mr. Fernandez. Sure. Both the taking of Fallujah and the
    taking of Mambij in Syria are good. They are good because you
    are taking something from ISIS. You are defeating them. So
    there is benefit even in a flawed retelling of military
    victory. So even Fallujah, which has been controversial in the
    pan Arab media and the Sunni Arab media--these are, Iranian
    militias and Shia death squads. That is some of the rhetoric
    out there. But even the way it has turned out, taking it from
    the Islamic State is a good thing.
        The point I make is that it could have been a better thing.
    It could have been a victory of a united Iraq, a united
    multiethnic, multireligious Iraq against the Islamic State. And
    that is not exactly how it was portrayed.
        In contrast, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Kurdish
    Allied Forces in northern Syria that we support took a
    different tack. What they did is they put up front Sunni Arab
    Muslims who were allied with the Kurds in the taking of Mambij,
    and this is what is called the ``Mambij Military Council.'' So
    they took a back seat. They had the Arab Muslims take a front
    seat. That presented a less sectarian, less provocative way of
    doing things. They were both good. Victory in Fallujah is good,
    and victory in Mambij is good. Any defeat of the Islamic State
    is good. But you want to wring all the benefit that you can out
    of military victory, and we are not doing that. We are talking
    too much about what they are doing and not what we are doing to
    them.
        Senator Portman. Well, thank you. I have some additional
    questions for you both about the narrative and specifically
    what we ought to be doing better. But I would like to give my
    colleague an opportunity to ask questions. Senator Ayotte was
    here earlier. She has a background as a prosecutor and is on
    the Armed Services Committee and has spent a lot of time on
    these issues, and I would like her to have a chance to ask some
    questions.
        Senator Ayotte. Thank you so much, Chairman.
        Mr. Bergen, when you testified before the Committee before
    and I see it again in your written testimony, the discussion
    about--unlike prior terrorist groups that we have dealt with,
    that they have been--that there are many women involved, and
    you and I had an exchange on that.
        As I read your testimony today from where we were before,
    that continues, I think, to be the case, no diminishment in
    that, and obviously we saw with the San Bernardino situation,
    while that was more of a radicalization here, still, obviously,
    she was a big driver in this.
        So have you seen any diminishment in that and what we
    should be doing in terms of, as we are thinking about
    individuals that were involved in ISIS--and in your steps of
    recommendations, you say--and I think that Mr. Fernandez just
    talked about that as well. If you have been a member of ISIS,
    get people who have been part of it, and then also get them to
    go out online and obviously talk about the real experience.
    What about with women? Are we having any success with how we
    are going to engage women who join ISIS and why it is so
    attractive to women as well?
        Mr. Bergen. I mean, Senator, yes, I think they are still
    recruiting women. Part of it is sort of a romantic message,
    that you can marry the man of your dreams in part, which has
    been reinforced by people who get married there. What the
    countermessaging is to that I am not really sure, except I
    think I completely agree with Ambassador Fernandez that
    defectors are the most effective approach. And, the New York
    Times ran a very interesting massive piece with two women who
    defected. They gave them pseudonyms. They painted a very bleak
    picture.
        I think the United States faces an interesting question,
    which is we have a guy in Alexandria, Virginia, Mohamad Khweis,
    who is 26, who has defected. He could face 20 years in prison.
    He has obviously defected because he thinks ISIS is against
    Islam. So, the kind of bigger question is: What do we do with
    people who are defectors, American defectors? Do we throw them
    in prison for 20 years, or do we come up with something more
    creative?
        Senator Ayotte. Ambassador, did you want to comment on
    that?
        Mr. Fernandez. Yes. One of the problems we have, even when
    we have defectors, I am sure you have seen the images. The ISIS
    spokesman is looking at you, unmasked, telling you about his
    life, telling you about his personal testimony. He is
    unashamed, unembarrassed. And then we have all too often the
    defector, and what does the defector look like? The defector is
    masked or covered, obviously----
        Senator Ayotte. Because they are afraid.
        Mr. Fernandez [continuing]. For security reasons. So this
    is the disadvantage that we have with them.
        Senator Ayotte. Right.
        Mr. Fernandez. Their personal testimony is more powerful
    than ours, and it is more numerous than ours. So this is the
    challenge that we face, kind of a technical basic problem that
    we face.
        Senator Ayotte. I was interested also, Mr. Bergen, as I
    looked at your action items, this idea that you had about a
    database of foreign fighters, because we do know obviously that
    there are a number of individuals who have flown back and
    forth, especially fewer Americans, significant, a couple
    hundred Americans, but also with the Europeans, thousands. And
    as you raise the issue, it seemed clear to me that we still
    have significant information-sharing issues across our allies
    in Europe, and even with countries like Turkey, and that we
    probably do not know all are collecting in one place, people
    that we do know, in fact, have joined. And I think that is a
    significant issue that you point out that we should address.
        Mr. Bergen. Yes, I mean, Interpol has 5,000 names. We have
    30,000 people who have joined from around the world.
        Senator Ayotte. Right.
        Mr. Bergen. So we are 25,000 short. And my intuition is we
    had no idea about any of these people who blew themselves up
    over the past month in Bangladesh and Turkey. I think with the
    British and other European partners there is pretty good
    information sharing, but clearly a lot more has to be done.
        Senator Ayotte. And even if you look at countries like what
    happened in Belgium, with the deficiencies there, with some of
    the law enforcement deficiencies there in terms of compiling
    that, that seems something in terms of an intelligence tool
    that would be helpful to all of us.
        What other things, if you think about the intelligence
    front, that you think, the two of you think that we should be
    focusing on?
        Mr. Bergen. Well, one thing I would look at is if Amaq is
    ISIS' new service--and there are a couple of other entities
    that put out ISIS' message--why aren't we taking them down? I
    mean, I am not saying----
        Senator Ayotte. Right.
        Mr. Bergen. I mean literally taking out their production
    facilities. They must exist.
        Senator Ayotte. Exactly. It makes logical sense that we
    would do that, and that is something we should be asking our
    officials. Why aren't we just taking them down? I know it is a
    Whack-A-Mole situation.
        Mr. Bergen. Well, you whack enough moles----
        Senator Ayotte. Exactly, and you make it harder enough to
    do something, then they are--it is not that it will not come
    back, but why would you let it continue if you know it is
    there.
        Mr. Fernandez. And one thing we have seen, we have seen
    with the--initially people were skeptical about, well, taking
    stuff down on the Internet, right? They are just going to come
    back. And, yes, there are individuals who have been taken down
    500 times and are back for the 501st time. But what we have
    seen is that many, many of the maybe less motivated people drop
    off. So the Whack-A-Mole work on social media does pay
    dividends over time.
        Recently at MEMRI, we saw that, they have been driven
    mostly off of Twitter, and they are on Telegram, which is this
    German-Russian site, and we recently saw--just 2 days ago, we
    saw an ISIS message calling for people to return to Twitter,
    because even though Telegram is very useful and is a safe haven
    for them, nothing is as good as mobilizing, getting your
    message out very broadly as Twitter. So we need to continue to
    be mowing the lawn on Twitter because they will come back if
    they are given the space to do so.
        Senator Ayotte. And the other issue is, as you heard
    Director Steinbach testify--and it is replete in your testimony
    as well--that they are consuming this extremist material. Now,
    there is line of, obviously, what can you consume without
    taking action in terms of where you can take legal action. But
    it is a strong indicator, if somebody is consuming this
    extremist material, that this is something that we have to be
    focused on, obviously not just eliminating the ability to push
    this out on the Internet, but we have seen it over a series of
    attacks, that that is one of the components of an individual
    who ends up being radicalized, or self-radicalized.
        Mr. Fernandez. At the very least, you want to give the
    potential consumer in the United States the same ability to
    access material that is not going to radicalize them, that is
    going to counter that as the radicalization material. To me, it
    is unconscionable that you go on YouTube, which is an American
    company, and you put in a term, an Islamic term, which is not
    necessarily an ISIS term, and the No. 1 thing you get is the
    algorithm gives you basically a well-known American terrorist
    that we killed.
        There has to be ways that, you do the algorithms or
    whatever you do to make sure that the voices of tolerance, the
    voices of reason, the voices of humanity are there, at least to
    compete with the extremists if you cannot take them down.
        Senator Ayotte. It seems to me that, of course, we can do
    that, and we know that not only what the government activity
    and responsibilities but the private sector responsibility in
    terms of how these sites are being used. And we know that they
    are taking some steps that are important, but I think further
    engaging on that is critical.
        Well, I appreciate both of you being here today, and thank
    you, Chairman. I know you have more questions.
        Senator Portman. I just have a couple more questions.
        One, building on what you just said, Ambassador Fernandez--
    and, Mr. Bergen, I would like to hear your view on this--you
    mentioned the Twitter work. I said in my opening statement they
    have closed down more than 100,000 ISIS-linked accounts, and
    you have to assume a lot of that comes back. But you were
    saying also, ``mowing the grass'' I think is the analogy you
    used, it is important to keep that up. I hope Twitter,
    Facebook, and others are continuing that effort. Do you think
    what Facebook has done, which is apparently worked to remove
    offending users but also to help promote counter-jihadist
    propaganda, has also been effective?
        Mr. Fernandez. I believe that there has been progress
    across the board by the Big Three--by Twitter, YouTube, and
    Facebook. So there has been tremendous progress if we are
    looking at 2 years ago or even 1 year ago. That is a good
    thing.
        Facebook has been particularly effective or particularly
    aggressive in taking material down and shutting things down. So
    we want to encourage that. We want to encourage all of them to
    do that.
        And then we want to focus on these other safe havens where
    they are jumping to, so Telegram, JustPaste.it, Archives.org,
    what can be done with these companies, these entities that are
    in the West, to at least make life a little more difficult for
    the extremists? Realizing that in the end the message is going
    to get out, and the message has to be countered, it has to be
    answered. But we certainly do not want to give them a free ride
    in our own space.
        Senator Portman. I think that is very sensible, and, this
    Subcommittee has worked hard on this issue in some other
    contexts with human trafficking where there is a challenge, the
    ``dark side of the Internet,'' as I call it, and that same dark
    side unfortunately is being utilized by some of these
    radicalized elements.
        Something that struck me in your testimony, Mr. Bergen, was
    about women and the fact that ISIS has had luck in attracting
    more women to its ranks, and this is remarkable to me because
    of how poorly they treat women. As one example, ISIS has women
    marry fighters, and if a woman's husband dies, she is quickly
    married off again, I am told, sometimes in violation of Islamic
    law. You talked a little about that earlier. But what accounts
    for this phenomenon? Why are women feeling compelled to sign up
    given the reality?
        Mr. Bergen. I do not have a good answer to that, but I
    think in the 1970s they might have joined the Weather
    Underground or the Black Panthers or some other utopian group
    that promised utopia through revolutionary violence, and this
    is one of the last revolutionary ideologies left standing. And
    so, I mean, that is an attempt at answering the question, but,
    given their ultra misogyny, it is really a mystery.
        Senator Portman. And, again, the counternarrative needs to
    be out there, defectors included, and there are women who have
    defected who have come forward, and that seems to me to be, one
    of our opportunities given the phenomenon.
        On the Global Engagement Center and the work that we talked
    about earlier with the previous panel, Ambassador Fernandez, of
    course, you have lots of experience with the predecessor, the
    head of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications. I know it is early--the Global Engagement
    Center is really only a few months old--but what are you
    encouraged by so far? What are you discouraged by? In your
    written statement, you talk about the Global Engagement Center
    not having a dedicated line item budget appropriation, the
    funding issue that I mentioned earlier; emphasis on building
    out a professional staff, they need to still do that; too much
    emphasis on transitory events rather than building out
    something that is focused on combating the threat long-term.
    Can you elaborate on your concerns and any suggestions you have
    for improvement?
        Mr. Fernandez. Well, I am encouraged in the work that they
    are doing with recanters, with defectors. That is good. I am
    encouraged with the idea of building proxies, building a
    network of proxies across the world that do stuff. So that is
    the good stuff.
        The areas where I am concerned is a lot of what the work of
    proxies are doing is not very impressive. It is just churning
    stuff out. It is not well aligned. It is material that--``Do
    not do drugs,'' right? That kind of stuff. Of course, yes, do
    not become a terrorist. But it does not go deep. It is not as
    personal. It is not as powerful as one would want it to be.
        Now, it is early days, but there is a lot of movement and
    not necessarily progress yet. So I think they need to--they
    need some more time. I see some good things, and I see some
    things which are a little concerning.
        Senator Portman. Part of what I am hearing you say is that
    we need to target the message more precisely. This is the
    analytics point that we were making earlier, and I talked about
    this particular issue of the legal constraint of the Privacy
    Act. You had to deal with that as well, I assume.
        Do you have thoughts on that? To me it just does not make
    sense that we would not be able to target those most
    vulnerable, susceptible who are foreigners, not American
    citizens, not permanent residents. Do you have thoughts on
    that?
        Mr. Fernandez. Well, we assumed, sir, when I headed CSCC,
    that if we are messaging in Arabic, Urdu, and Somali in
    platforms that we know are outside the United States, we are
    going to assume that the overwhelming majority of the people
    that we are messaging against or with or to are not Americans.
    Yes, some guy in Minneapolis could see what we are doing, but
    we are assuming that if we are messaging or looking at a Yemeni
    tribal forum, which is one of the places that we looked at,
    most of the people there are not Americans.
        So that was actually not a concern of ours at all. I was
    actually kind of very surprised by that testimony myself.
        Senator Portman. Well, we are going to be digging into that
    further, as you know from my questions there. We have an
    opportunity here online, in addition to the other things we
    talked about earlier that need to be done on the military side
    or, protecting the homeland through law enforcement and so on.
    But we have an opportunity here to step up our game, don't we?
    And not that there is any one silver bullet, but to me this is
    the most difficult and perhaps, therefore, the most important
    part of the entire effort to better protect our homeland and
    better protect the free world from this terrorist threat.
        So we thank you for your expertise on it. You want us to
    keep writing about it. What is the book that you have next to
    your microphone there?
        Mr. Fernandez. I mentioned the International Center for the
    Study of Violent Extremism, Dr. Anne Speckhard of Georgetown
    University, and this is actually the book that just came out as
    part of their work, and it actually collates the testimony of
    defectors.
        Senator Portman. OK.
        Mr. Fernandez. And it has a recommendation by Peter Bergen
    and Alberto Fernandez on the back.
        Senator Portman. Wow. You are on the book cover. So Bergen
    has a book, too. He has a 1-800 number for his book.
    [Laughter.]
        What is your new book, Peter?
        Mr. Bergen. ``United States of Jihad: Investigating
    America's Homegrown Terrorists,'' and it is an attempt to look
    at many of the issues we just discussed.
        Senator Portman. Well, you get to talk about your book
    because you were kind enough to come here and testify before
    us, spend your day with us. Sorry about the interruptions, and
    thank you for your expertise and your willingness to help us to
    be more effective in our fight against terrorism, specifically
    this countermessaging online.
        The hearing record will remain open for 15 days for
    additional comments or questions by any of the Subcommittee
    members.
        This hearing will now be adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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