[Senate Hearing 114-406]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-406
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: PROTECTING PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 6, 2016
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
ROY BLUNT, Missouri MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
MARCO RUBIO, Florida CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
TED CRUZ, Texas RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
JERRY MORAN, Kansas EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin TOM UDALL, New Mexico
DEAN HELLER, Nevada JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
CORY GARDNER, Colorado GARY PETERS, Michigan
STEVE DAINES, Montana
Nick Rossi, Staff Director
Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 6, 2016.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Thune....................................... 1
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 3
Statement of Senator Ayotte...................................... 29
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 31
Statement of Senator McCaskill................................... 33
Statement of Senator Heller...................................... 35
Statement of Senator Gardner..................................... 37
Letter dated March 25, 2016 to Hon. Cory Gardner from Kim
Day, Chief Executive Officer, Denver International Airport. 37
Statement of Senator Peters...................................... 40
Statement of Senator Daines...................................... 42
Witnesses
Hon. Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security........... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Appendix
Hon. Richard Blumenthal, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared
statement...................................................... 47
Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Peter Neffenger
by:
Hon. Deb Fischer............................................. 47
Hon. Amy Klobuchar........................................... 53
Hon. Richard Blumenthal...................................... 54
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: PROTECTING PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2016
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt, Ayotte,
Fischer, Moran, Heller, Gardner, Daines, Johnson, Nelson,
Schatz, Cantwell, McCaskill, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Markey,
Booker, Manchin, and Peters.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
The Chairman. Let's get this hearing underway. We'll be
joined momentarily by Senator Nelson, who is en route. But let
me start by welcoming Administrator Neffenger here today.
Thank you so much for making time for us.
On March 22, terrorists associated with ISIS detonated
three bombs in Brussels, two at an airport and one in a busy
metro car. Thirty-five people, including four Americans, were
killed in this cowardly attack. The victims of these attacks
remain in our thoughts and prayers. The threat from ISIS, Al
Qaeda, and their sympathizers is real, and we must ensure that
sound policies are in place to enhance security and prevent
these deadly attacks.
This hearing will focus on the efforts of the
Transportation Security Administration to secure surface
transportation modes. In light of the attacks in Brussels,
however, we will also address the related challenge of
safeguarding the areas of airports outside passenger screening
checkpoints.
Administrator Neffenger, I understand that you were, by
chance, in the Brussels airport at the time of the attacks, and
I hope that you will share your thoughts on the horrific events
there and how we can prevent and prepare for similar threats. I
understand your written testimony focuses on rail transit and
pipeline security, but I hope that you will also share with us
additional information on how we can improve airport security.
The TSA must learn from past attacks and also look forward
to new and emerging threats. Sadly, it is clear that terrorists
associated with Al Qaeda and ISIS have identified passenger
rail and transit systems as soft targets. It is critical that
we not neglect these vital parts of our transportation system
as we look for ways to improve security.
Understandably, these open systems cannot be secured in the
same way as our aviation network. Nevertheless, some of the
techniques we utilize in the aviation network apply to surface
assets, as well as areas of the airport on the street side of
the checkpoint.
While our best tool in combating terrorist attacks
continues to be good intelligence, TSA has adopted a multi-
layer process to identify threats and mitigate security
concerns. Former Administrator John Pistole strongly promoted
the risk-based allocation of TSA's resources. I look forward to
hearing from the Administrator today about his views on the
risk-based analysis of threats. TSA cannot and should not be at
every bus stop or every train station. The agency must leverage
its relationships with state and local officials and address
the most significant threats with its limited resources.
Visible security efforts can also make a difference.
Explosives detection canines and police presence can deter both
terrorist threats and criminal activity. TSA's support of these
programs is invaluable. I'd like to hear more about how these
teams are allocated among airports and other transportation
systems.
TSA is also charged with protecting freight transportation
networks, including ports, freight railroads, and pipeline
infrastructure. These critical infrastructure networks are
crucial components of our nation's economy. TSA receives high
marks from railroad and pipeline operators who work with the
agency to identify and mitigate threats. Public-private
security partnerships between the agency and operators have
been valuable in hardening these networks.
On the aviation front, Ranking Member Nelson and I have
been leading oversight of the Commerce Committee of problems
some airports have had in successfully managing security
credentials. This oversight led the Committee to approve
bipartisan legislation, Senate Bill 2361, the Airport Security
Enhancement and Oversight Act, to tighten vetting of airport
workers so that those with ties to terrorists and histories of
serious criminal activity and behavior do not access sensitive
airport areas.
Unfortunately, in the current system, such individuals are
not always captured. Some of the perpetrators in the deadly
attacks in Brussels were previously known to authorities as
criminals, and U.S. terrorism experts believe that ISIS is
recruiting criminals to join its ranks in Europe.
As we work to address the threat of an aviation insider
helping terrorists, criminals who break laws for financial gain
and those with histories of violence are a good place to start.
Ensuring that airport workers with security credentials are
trustworthy is especially important, considering that an ISIS
affiliate is believed to have killed 224 people on a Russian
passenger plane leaving Egypt with, experts suspect, the help
of an airport employee.
The Committee has also approved legislation, H.R. 2843, the
TSA PreCheck Expansion Act, which would help expand
participation in the TSA PreCheck application program by
developing private sector partnerships and capabilities to vet
and enroll more individuals. As a result, more vetted
passengers would receive expedited airport screening, which
would get passengers through security checkpoints more quickly
and ensure that they do not pose the kind of easy target that
ISIS suicide bombers exploited at the Brussels airport. I
believe both of these important measures can and should advance
in the full Senate this week.
Administrator Neffenger, thank you for being here today. We
need strong leadership and decisive action to address this
terrorist threat. You are faced with a great challenge of
getting it right every time, when a terrorist just needs one
opportunity. I look forward to hearing from you about how TSA
is working to meet that challenge.
With that, I'd like to recognize our Ranking Member,
Senator Nelson, for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the last 10 years, right after 9/11, 1,900 attacks were
carried out against transit systems around the world, resulting
in 4,000 deaths and 14,000 injuries. In aviation, almost 15
years after 9/11, terrorists are still finding those
vulnerabilities which the Chairman has noted.
We have two types of vulnerabilities before us. We have the
vulnerability of the perimeter of the airport, which was
addressed in legislation passed last year sponsored by the two
members at the front of the dais; that allows an Egyptian
airport employee to sneak in a bomb. Same thing with the gun
running scheme in Atlanta 2 years ago, that, unbelievably, over
3 months, 153 firearms were smuggled onto 17 flights, and that
was in December, the last quarter of 2014. We addressed that in
this committee in the Airport Security Enhancement and
Oversight Act of 2015. Hopefully, that is going to be attached
to the FAA bill.
But now we have this additional security problem, and that
is where passengers are bunched up in a soft area, like the
queued-up lines going through TSA, like the crowded lines at an
airport check-in counter, like the lines in a bus or train
station, where people are all huddled up trying to get through
the security.
In 2016, less than 2 percent of TSA's total budget and full
time employees are dedicated to protecting surface
transportation networks, the bus, the trains, et cetera. And
while we have yet to suffer a recent attack on a mass transit
system in the U.S., Brussels is just another reminder of what
they did in the transit station there.
TSA can take immediate action by completing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which were enacted into
law in 2007. And, additionally, we have an opportunity to
improve the law coming up in this current FAA bill with regard
to the soft targets outside of the security perimeter. So it's
time to reexamine our transportation security strategy and
refocus our efforts.
Mr. Administrator, we thank you for being here today, and
we look forward to it.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Administrator Neffenger, thanks again for being here, and
we look forward to hearing your opening remarks, and then we'll
look forward to asking some questions. So please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER NEFFENGER, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Neffenger. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Thune,
Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of the
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss TSA's critical mission to ensure security of
our Nation's transportation systems.
First, let me add my condolences and those of all of the
professionals at TSA to the victims of the Brussels attacks. As
you noted, Mr. Chairman, I was at the Brussels airport on the
day of the bombings. I was there for meetings with a number of
my European counterparts. We arrived right as the bombs
detonated. And I will tell you, being there on that day, seeing
the devastation, and seeing the chaos of the airport
environment and the evil behind it was a stark reminder of the
importance of the work that we do at TSA every day to protect
travelers.
I've been on the job now for 9 months. When I arrived, I
was confronted with the disturbing results of the Inspector
General's covert testing, and I found an organization in
crisis. But what I also found was an organization of nearly
60,000 dedicated professionals who are committed to our
national security mission.
It was immediately clear to me that while we needed to
tackle what was wrong, the ingredients and the commitment were
there to build and evolve what was right. We've come a long way
in a short time. We've determined the root causes of the
testing failures. We have retrained our entire work force. We
have established the first ever full time TSA Academy, and
we've begun a deep examination of processes and practices
across the agency.
Of course, there are challenges we must continue to
address, both immediate and longer term, but I can assure you
and the public that we serve that we are focused on our
counterterrorism mission and are committed to delivering
excellence in every aspect of what we do. As an integral member
of a much larger counterterrorism network, TSA employs a range
of capabilities to understand and track threats to
transportation; continuously vet travelers and credentialed
employees; and to deter, detect, and disrupt potential enemies.
At our checkpoints, for example, we screen an average of 2
million passengers each day at nearly 440 airports. To improve,
we are investing heavily in our work force. All of our people
are being trained with a better understanding of why we do what
we do and the nature of the threats that we face. And we have
shifted our focus to security effectiveness and have instituted
comprehensive training at that new TSA Academy at the Federal
Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia, an academy that has
already helped to build a connection to our mission, enhance
morale, and ensure our employees better understand their role
in fighting terrorism.
But recent attacks remind us that terrorist organizations
remain committed to attacking the global transportation system.
At present, we have no specific credible intelligence of any
plot to conduct a similar attack in the United States, but we
must remain vigilant. These events highlight the important work
we do with international partners to mitigate risks at last
point of departure airports, to inspect and assess compliance
with international standards, and to build international
capacity in securing passenger and cargo flights bound to the
United States.
The attacks in Brussels further highlight the imperative to
address security beyond airport checkpoints. That's where our
shared responsibility with partners makes a difference. We work
with Federal, state, local, and tribal partners to provide law
enforcement presence throughout airports and surface
transportation hubs across the nation.
The resources of countless agencies deliver thousands of
officers who help to secure our national transportation
network. TSA's Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program
provides approximately $45 million each year to law enforcement
agencies for enhanced law enforcement presence. TSA also
deploys Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or VIPR,
teams of integrated TSA and local law enforcement specialists
to patrol public areas to provide a visible deterrent and
response capability.
We are also focused on the insider threat posed by
employees with access to transportation facilities and
infrastructure. And in collaboration with stakeholders,
including the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, we have
taken a number of actions to enhance security, including
requiring enhanced criminal history records checks of aviation
workers, piloting the FBI's Rap Back capability which provides
continuous criminal background checks, and conducting a
nationwide vulnerability assessment airport by airport to
create an expectation that every employee could be stopped and
inspected every day.
Securing surface transportation systems is a complex
undertaking that requires extensive collaboration among
transportation operators. We support these owners and operators
in threat awareness, information sharing, the identification of
vulnerabilities, development of security programs to address
risks, exercises to assess and improve readiness, and the
implementation of those security programs. They, in turn,
invest millions of their own funds to maintain and enhance
system security.
Recent attacks remind us that the threat to transportation
is very real and that our work to ensure freedom and protect
our Nation is never done. While challenges remain, I can
confidently and without reservation tell you that we at TSA are
on the job and intensely focused on protecting the public.
I will end with a note about the summer travel. The good
news is a strong economy means more people than ever are
traveling. This economic health, however, places enormous
pressure on our transportation systems. In my written testimony
and our communications with this committee, we've identified
the immediate steps we are taking to hire, train, and field
additional frontline workforce and to collaborate with airlines
and airports to address the expected high volume of travel this
summer.
Two key points: Travelers' security comes first, and we
cannot compromise on protecting travelers. Second, the expected
volume means there will be longer waits during peak periods,
and travelers need to be prepared. We will continue to identify
ways to immediately improve efficiency without compromising
security.
Thank you again for your continued support and advocacy for
TSA and for the men and women on TSA's front lines. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss my vision for the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) role in surface transportation
security.
The surface transportation network, consisting of mass transit
systems, passenger and freight railroads, highways, motor carrier
operators, pipelines, and maritime facilities, is immense. The New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) alone transports over 11
million passengers daily--and represents just one of the more than
6,800 U.S. public transit agencies for which TSA has oversight.
Securing surface transportation systems in a society that depends upon
the free movement of people and commerce is a complex undertaking and
one that requires extensive collaboration with surface transportation
operators. I have personally witnessed the complex nature of the
surface transportation network. Recently, I visited the Conrail
facility in Oak Island, NJ, the New Jersey Transit system, the VIA
Metropolitan Transit system in San Antonio, TX and the Metropolitan
Atlanta Regional Transportation Authority system in Atlanta, GA.
Recent terror attacks on mass transit and passenger rail carriers
in France and Belgium provide a compelling reminder of the need to
remain vigilant. While there is no specific, credible terrorist threat
to the U.S. passenger rail system, the August 2015 incident in France
and the recent Brussels attacks underscore the need to continue to
build upon our surface transportation successes through stakeholder
communication, coordination, and collaboration. Surface transportation
systems are, by nature, open systems. In the face of a decentralized,
diffuse, complex, and evolving terrorist threat, TSA responds in a
nimble fashion, employing cooperative and collaborative relationships
with key stakeholders to develop best practices, share information, and
execute security measures to strengthen and enhance the security of
surface transportation networks.
Unlike the aviation mode of transportation, direct responsibility
to secure surface transportation systems falls primarily on the system
owners and operators. TSA's role in surface transportation security is
focused on program oversight, system assessments, operator compliance
with voluntary industry standards, collaborative law enforcement and
security operations, and regulations. TSA could not accomplish its
essential counterterrorism security mission without our partners
voluntarily adopting security improvements and sharing best practices.
Security and emergency response planning is not new to our surface
stakeholders; they have been working under Department of Transportation
(DOT) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) programs and regulations for many
years. Although DOT's regulations relate primarily to safety, many
safety activities and programs also benefit security and help to reduce
risk. In the surface environment, TSA has built upon these standards to
improve security programs with minimal regulations.
Federal, State, Local, and Private Capabilities and Operations
The Nation's surface transportation systems affect the daily life
of many Americans. Tens of thousands of individual companies and
agencies operate within the five modes of the surface transportation
landscape. More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on nearly
140,000 miles of track carrying essential goods. Eight million large
capacity commercial trucks and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies
travel on the four million miles of roadway in the United States and on
more than 600,000 highway bridges and through 350 tunnels greater than
300 feet in length. As previously noted, in the mass transit and
passenger rail mode, more than 6,800 transit agencies represent a wide
range of systems from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to
very large multi-modal systems in urban areas. Surface transportation
operators carry approximately 750 million intercity bus passengers and
10 billion passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline
industry consists of approximately 3,000 private companies who own and
operate more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines transporting natural
gas, refined petroleum products, and other commercial products that are
critical to the economy and the security of the United States.
Securing this vast network requires a group effort. TSA oversees
the development and implementation of risk-based security initiatives
for surface transportation in coordination with our security partners.
TSA, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a
co-Sector Specific Agency alongside DOT and USCG for the transportation
sector. DOT and TSA work together to integrate safety and security
priorities. As part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, TSA, DOT and the USCG co-chair
Government Coordinating Councils to facilitate information sharing and
coordinate on activities including security assessments, training and
exercises. Additionally, TSA leverages its core competencies in
credentialing, explosives detection, and intermodal security to support
the USCG as lead agency for maritime security.
TSA is directly responsible for security at our Nation's airports
through our checkpoint operations, personnel, and technology. However,
direct responsibility for securing surface transportation systems falls
on the owners and operators of those systems. TSA's role is to support
these owners and operators in the identification of risk, develop
security programs to address that risk, and help the owners and
operators implement those security programs.
TSA's spending on surface transportation realizes a massive return
on its budgetary investment. TSA's funding resources and personnel
directly support ongoing security programs by committed security
partners who, in turn, spend millions of their own funds to secure
critical infrastructure, provide uniformed law enforcement and
specialty security teams, and conduct operational activities and
deterrence efforts. Industry's efforts are fueled by the resources that
TSA's funding provides. We have invested our resources to help our
security partners identify vulnerabilities and risk in their agencies.
Surface transportation entities know their facilities and their
operational challenges and with their knowledge and our assistance,
they are able to more accurately direct their own resources in addition
to the hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal security grant
funding, to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. I will go into
greater detail on the resources and programs that TSA provides later in
this testimony, but some highlights include facilitating security
exercises that identify vulnerabilities that can then be addressed
before an actual event occurs; developing security training programs
for surface transportation employees; engaging with industry in the
development of security policy and programs such as best practices and
security guidelines, which inform and influence industry on how and
where to spend their security dollars; providing thorough security
system and program assessments to identify areas that need attention,
and working with those systems to address those deficient areas to
raise their security baselines; developing the framework for awarding
security grant funds, which have totaled over $2.3 billion since Fiscal
Year (FY) 2006; augmenting local operational deterrence capabilities
with Federal teams and support; and sharing actionable information in a
timely fashion, including guidance on ways in which industry can
enhance their security posture in response to potential threats. TSA
has achieved these successes by spending approximately 3 percent of its
budget on surface transportation security. These programs demonstrate
the collaborative effort among Federal, state, local, and private
entities to secure surface transportation systems and assets.
TSA works with state, local, and industry partners to assess risk,
reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative
efforts. Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily
interaction and engagement, as well as through formal structures
including the DHS-led CIPAC framework, Sector Coordinating Councils,
and other industry-centric organizations such as the Mass Transit
Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. TSA, security agencies, and
the corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator
stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems,
including implementation of exercises and training, physical and cyber
hardening measures, and operational deterrence activities.
Regional Alliance Including Local, State, and Federal Efforts
(RAILSAFE)
TSA coordinates with Amtrak and NY MTA to support RAILSAFE
operations, in which Amtrak police and law enforcement officers from
Federal, state, local, rail, and transit agencies deploy at passenger
rail and transit stations and along the railroad rights-of-way to
exercise counterterrorism and incident-response capabilities. This
coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and
right-of-way patrols, increased security presence onboard trains,
explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections,
and counter-surveillance. RAILSAFE operations are conducted several
times a year to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable security
activities. On average, more than 40 states and Canada, and over 200
agencies participate in RAILSAFE operations. The most recent RAILSAFE
operation was conducted on March 11, 2016, with more than 1,100
officers across 180 agencies representing 41 states and Canada
participating.
Exercises and Training
TSA has developed several training and exercise programs to assist
industry operators in directing their resources and efforts towards
effectively reducing risk. With the support of Congress, TSA developed
the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). TSA
facilitates I-STEP exercises across all surface modes to help
transportation entities test and evaluate their security plans,
including prevention and preparedness capabilities, ability to respond
to threats, and cooperation with first responders from other entities.
TSA uses a risk-informed process to select the entities that receive I-
STEP exercises and updates I-STEP scenarios as new threats emerge to
ensure industry partners are prepared to exercise the most appropriate
countermeasures. Since FY 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 I-STEP
exercises throughout 40 High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs), including
eight conducted so far this fiscal year, such as motorcoach exercises
in Los Angeles and Myrtle Beach; mass transit exercises in Houston and
San Antonio; and maritime exercises in New York City and Washington,
D.C. Additionally, TSA conducted an I-STEP exercise in Philadelphia in
August 2015 to help that region prepare for the Papal visit.
In FY 2015, TSA developed and began utilizing the Exercise
Information System (EXIS) tool, which examines a surface transportation
operator's implementation of security measures in the areas of
prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. EXIS helps
transportation operators identify areas of strength in an operator's
security program, as well as those areas that need attention where they
can then focus or redirect resources, such as security grant funding.
TSA also is able to provide operators with several resources that can
improve capability in areas such as training, public awareness
campaigns, and best practices that other systems have implemented to
address security concerns. Since program inception, TSA has facilitated
16 EXIS exercises with stakeholders in HTUAs.
TSA disseminates training materials and information to stakeholders
through several avenues. Through the Security Measures and Resources
Toolbox (SMARToolbox) and other security and public awareness training
materials, TSA provides surface transportation professionals relevant
insights into security practices used by peers throughout the industry
and mode-specific recommendations for enhancing an entity's security
posture. TSA developed the Surface Compliance Analysis Network (SCAN)
to analyze daily incidents reported to the Transportation Security
Operations Center to identify security-related trends or patterns. TSA
disseminates SCAN trend reports to affected entities, as well as to the
broader industry for situational awareness. SCAN reports have been able
to identify incidents that when taken individually may not seem like an
issue or threat, but when compiled over time and analyzed locally,
regionally, and nationally, present activities that may be pre-
operational activity aimed at detecting the response methods and/or
capabilities of surface transportation systems. The number of similar
incidents reported in relatively short periods of time indicates the
intent of a perpetrator(s) to disrupt operations and potentially cause
damage and injuries. These SCAN trend reports provide insight into
those potential threats and operations.
TSA's First ObserverTM security domain awareness program
delivers web-based training to surface transportation professionals,
encouraging frontline workers to ``Observe, Assess and Report''
suspicious activities. Approximately 100,000 individuals have been
trained on the First ObserverTM Program. Operators have
credited First ObserverTM Program training in their ability
to disrupt a potential Greyhound bus hijacking situation in February
2011. Also in February 2011, a concerned Con-way employee followed
principles he received from the Program's training to alert authorities
about inconsistencies regarding chemicals shipped and their intended
use, which led to the arrest of an individual who was then charged with
attempting to bomb nuclear power plants and dams along the West Coast,
as well as the home of former President George W. Bush.
TSA strongly encourages the use of the If You See Something, Say
SomethingTM public awareness campaign--which the NY MTA
created using DHS security grant funding--to make the traveling public
the ``eyes and ears'' of the transportation systems. Similarly, TSA's
Not On My Watch program is directed at the surface transportation
community and designed to make employees of surface transportation
systems part of awareness programs intended to safeguard national
transportation systems against terrorism and other threats. TSA also
works with industry to identify emerging security training needs,
develop new training modules, and refresh existing training.
In September 2014, TSA began a program to provide senior-level
transportation security officials with a detailed exposure to TSA's
surface security programs and policies. Once a quarter, a senior
executive from a transportation entity is invited to spend four to six
weeks at TSA to gain firsthand experience in TSA's counterterrorism and
risk reduction efforts and foster beneficial relationships between TSA
and industry stakeholders. Participants in the program have included
Amtrak, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NY MTA, and
the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. Executives from these agencies
were given a broad exposure to TSA operations in the surface and
aviation modes, and left with a better appreciation for the scope and
breadth of the services TSA provides for all modes of transportation.
The program also allows TSA to use the senior executives as sounding
boards for potential security programs and policies, to ensure that our
initiatives not only address their greatest security concerns, but are
feasible from an operational perspective at the local levels of
transportation.
Sector-Specific Programs, Assessments, and Inspections
TSA performs regulatory inspections on railroad operations, and
voluntary assessments of systems and operations within all of the
surface transportation modes to ensure operator compliance with
security regulations and adoption of voluntary security practices. TSA
deploys 260 Transportation Security Inspectors for Surface (TSI-S) to
assess and inspect the security posture of surface entities.
TSA and its partners in the freight rail industry have
significantly reduced the vulnerability of rail security-sensitive and
Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials transported through populous
areas by reducing urban dwell time. The national rate of observed
attendance for TIH shipments is greater than 91 percent, with a
regulatory compliance rate above 99 percent.
In 2006, TSA established the Baseline Assessment for Security
Enhancement (BASE) program, through which TSA Inspectors conduct a
thorough security program assessment of mass transit and passenger rail
agencies as well as over-the-road bus operators. These inspectors help
local transit systems develop a ``path forward'' to remediate
vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessments, and
identify resources that TSA or other areas of the Federal Government
can provide to help transit systems raise their security baseline. The
results of these assessments are analyzed to influence TSA policy and
development of voluntary guidelines to ensure that our voluntary
policies and programs are addressing the most critical vulnerabilities
from a security perspective. TSA performs these voluntary BASE
assessments with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger
railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over
95 percent of all users of public transportation. TSA has conducted
over 430 assessments on mass transit and passenger rail systems since
2006. In FY 2015, TSA Inspectors completed 117 BASE assessments on mass
transit and passenger rail agencies, of which 13 resulted in Gold
Standard Awards for those entities achieving overall security program
management excellence. In 2012, TSA expanded the BASE program to the
highway and motor carrier mode and has since conducted over 400 reviews
of highway and motor carrier operators, with 98 reviews conducted in FY
2015. On average, approximately 150 reviews are conducted on mass
transit and highway and motor carrier operators each year, with
numerous reviews in various stages of completion for FY 2016.
TSA also regularly engages transit and passenger rail partners
through the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG),
which represents 24 of the largest public transportation systems in the
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and through regular
monthly and as-needed industry-wide information sharing calls, such as
calls conducted after the attacks in Paris and Brussels. Our
participation in forums such as the annual Mass Transit and Passenger
Rail Security and Emergency Management Roundtable, and our continuing
work with the PAG enable us to understand the security needs of our
domestic and international security partners to collaboratively develop
programs and resources to meet critical needs. We use the PAG as a
sounding board, in an advisory capacity, as we develop surface
transportation policies, guidelines, and best practices. Through our
work with the PAG and the Roundtables, we have restructured how
security grant funds are awarded to high-risk transportation entities,
ensuring that the funding priorities address the current threat and
risks that our transportation providers face. We also developed a list
of nationally critical infrastructure assets in order to better direct
Federal and local resources to implement security measures to protect
those assets. Since FY 2006, over $565 million in Transit Security
Grant Program funding has been awarded for security projects
specifically to harden these critical assets. We have also been able to
enhance and refine the ways and timeframes in which we share threat and
intelligence information, through mechanisms such as Security Awareness
Messages, and regular as-needed industry information sharing and
intelligence conference calls. TSA also hosts classified briefings for
cleared industry stakeholders when warranted.
TSA has established a productive public-private partnership with
the pipeline industry to secure the transport of natural gas,
petroleum, and other products. TSA conducts both physical and corporate
security reviews (CSR) within the pipeline sector, with over 400
physical security reviews of critical facilities of the highest risk
pipeline systems completed since 2008 and over 140 corporate security
reviews of high-risk systems since 2002. TSA completed six CSRs in FY
2015; four have been completed in FY 2016 with an additional four
scheduled for completion by the end of the fiscal year. The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (110-
53) required TSA to develop and implement a plan for inspecting the
critical facilities of the top 100 pipeline systems in the Nation. TSA
conducted these required inspections between 2008 and 2011 through the
Critical Facility Inspection program and is now focused on regular
recurring reviews through TSA's Critical Facility Security Review
(CFSR) program. TSA completed 46 CFSRs in FY 2015; 21 have been
completed in FY 2016 with 16 more expected to be completed by the end
of the fiscal year.
TSA has developed pipeline security guidance with the assistance of
pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline industry trade
association representatives, and government partners. Widespread
implementation of this guidance by the pipeline industry has enhanced
critical infrastructure security throughout the country. TSA is
currently working with stakeholders to update these guidelines. There
has been an increase in the quality of the company corporate security
programs reviewed during CSRs, as the guidance has served as a template
for establishing a corporate security program including a Corporate
Security Plan. For pipeline critical facilities reviewed during CFSRs,
there has been an increase in the number of facilities conducting
security drills and exercises, an increase in coordination with local
law enforcement agencies, and an increase in the number of facilities
conducting security vulnerability assessments, all of which are
recommended practices in the Guidelines.
The United States imports more petroleum from Canada than any other
nation, much of it through pipelines. TSA has worked closely with
Canadian security counterparts to develop an effective capability to
secure the U.S.-Canadian pipeline network. TSA and the Canadian
National Energy Board coordinate closely on pipeline security matters
to include the exchange of information on assessment procedures,
exercises, and security incidents. Since 2005, TSA and Natural
Resources Canada have cosponsored the International Pipeline Security
Forum, an annual two-day conference that enhances the security domain
awareness of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators and
provides opportunities for discussion of major domestic and
international pipeline security issues. The Forum enhances government
and industry pipeline security domain awareness, increases information
sharing including industry threat information, provides opportunities
for discussion of major domestic and international pipeline security
issues, and improves effectiveness of TSA stakeholder outreach efforts
promoting agency pipeline security initiatives including physical and
cyber security, security exercises, and other best practices. It
presents a unique opportunity for TSA to directly engage with a large
number of hazardous liquids and natural gas pipeline industry personnel
as well as key government and law enforcement partners. Approximately
160 attendees, including pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline
related trade associations, representatives and officials from the U.S.
and Canadian governments, and members of the security, intelligence and
law enforcement communities from the U.S., Canada, and abroad,
participate in the Pipeline Security Forum.
Beginning in 2004, and also with Congressional support and
authorization, TSA expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
Team Program to include mass transit/passenger rail systems and
ferries. Currently, 172 surface and intermodal canine teams are
deployed to high-risk systems.
TSA and the USCG jointly administer the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which provides a uniform,
industry-wide, biometric, tamper-resistant credential issued following
successful completion of a TSA-conducted security threat assessment
(STA). Following successful completion of the STA and payment of
relevant fees, eligible maritime workers are provided a tamper-
resistant biometric credential that permits unescorted access to secure
areas of port facilities and vessels regulated by the USCG. These
security benefits are most fully realized when the credential is used
in conjunction with readers that can provide electronic verification.
TSA is responsible for enrollment, STAs, systems operations and
maintenance related to TWICs, and inspections to ensure TWICs used for
access are valid and offered by the person to whom the credential was
issued. The USCG is responsible for establishing and enforcing access
control standards including requirements for TWIC readers at regulated
facilities and vessels. Since deployment of the TWIC program in 2007,
TSA has conducted comprehensive STAs and issued TWICs to over 3.5
million workers while identifying and preventing approximately 50,000
TWIC applicants who did not meet the required security standards from
receiving a TWIC. In 2014, TSA implemented TWIC ``OneVisit,'' which
allows workers to be able to enroll for a TWIC and have their TWIC
issued to them via mail without returning to the enrollment center.
This was a significant accomplishment to alleviate the burden to
industry and workers while maintaining security of the biometric
credential.
Securing Surface through Grants
TSA provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with
subject matter expertise to assist in the development of the Notice of
Funding Opportunities for Surface Transportation Security Grant
Programs. These FEMA grants support surface transportation risk
mitigation by applying Federal funding to critical security projects
with the greatest security effects. Between FY 2006 and 2015, over $2.3
billion in transportation security grant funding was awarded to freight
railroad carriers and operators, over-the-road bus operators, the
trucking community, and public mass transit owners and operators,
including Amtrak, and their dedicated law enforcement providers. One-
hundred million dollars was appropriated in FY 2016 for mass transit,
passenger rail, and motor coach security grants, which are currently in
the application process. Applications are due April 25, 2016, and DHS
expects to announce final award allocations on June 29, 2016.
TSA reviews the grant program framework and makes recommendations
to FEMA, ensuring funding priorities are based on identified or
potential threat and vulnerabilities identified through TSA assessment
programs such as the BASE program, together with consideration of
potential consequences. For instance, in 2007, TSA's review of the
industry scores in the training category of the BASE assessments
indicated a potential vulnerability, and TSA addressed the
vulnerability by modifying the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to
prioritize frontline employee training. In FY 2011, TSA's review of
BASE scores and discussions with industry revealed that vulnerabilities
at nationally critical infrastructure assets were not being addressed
at all, or as quickly as they could be. TSA worked with FEMA to
overhaul the TSGP framework to prioritize these assets (``Top Transit
Asset List'') for funding through a wholly competitive process. As a
result over $565 million has been awarded to protect these assets,
resulting in over 80 percent of them being considered secure from a
preventative standpoint.
As a result of information gained from TSA activities, DHS is able
to direct grant funds to activities that have the highest efficacy in
reducing the greatest risk, such as critical infrastructure
vulnerability remediation, equipment purchases, anti-terrorism teams,
mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams, training,
drills and exercises, and public awareness campaigns. For example, the
NY MTA has received $17 million in public awareness funding that helped
create the If You See Something, Say SomethingTM campaign,
which was credited with preventing a potential terrorist event in Times
Square in New York City. Over $276 million in grant funds have been
used to hire over 520 specialty transit law enforcement officers in the
forms of K-9 teams, mobile explosives detection screening teams, and
Anti-Terrorism Teams. Transit systems in major cities including New
York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles use these grant-
funded teams and patrols not only to conduct regular operations, but
also to provide extra local security and deterrence in response to
attacks across the world, including the recent attack in Brussels.
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations
promote confidence in and protect the Nation's transportation systems
through targeted deployment of integrated TSA assets, utilizing
screening and law enforcement capabilities in coordinated activities to
augment security of any mode of transportation. VIPR teams consist of
Federal Air Marshals, Behavior Detection Officers, Transportation
Security Specialists-Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors and
canine teams who work closely with Federal, state, and local law
enforcement partners and stakeholders in the aviation and surface
transportation sectors. TSA VIPR Teams are deployed at the request of
and in coordination with stakeholder partners. Deployments are
coordinated with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement and
industry security partners throughout the United States to augment the
visible presence of these law enforcement stakeholders who exercise
primary jurisdiction in responding to transportation security needs.
Following the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, Belgium, the
capability was invaluable to the surface transportation sector in
providing a visible deterrent, as well as an armed response capability.
Since the November 2013 shooting at the Los Angeles International
Airport in which a Transportation Security Officer was killed, TSA has
deployed VIPR teams 60 percent of the time in the aviation mode and 40
percent in surface modes. In FY 2015, TSA VIPR teams conducted 12,024
operations, including 7,257 (60 percent) in aviation mode venues and
4,757 (40 percent) in surface mode venues. The VIPR program has a
nationwide footprint, with the 31 VIPR teams based in 20 Office of Law
Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service field offices.
The VIPR program has updated its concept of operations to establish
and implement a framework for risk-based assessment of potential
deployment locations, allow for flexibility based upon the most current
intelligence and threat, provide scheduling parameters to enhance risk
mitigation, and further enable measurement of performance and
effectiveness. The VIPR program is an excellent example of
collaboration among Federal, state, local, and industry partners,
leveraging existing resources to provide enhanced detection
capabilities and a visible deterrent to terrorist activity.
Cybersecurity
TSA supports DHS cybersecurity efforts based on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework,
including within surface modes. The cybersecurity framework is designed
to provide a foundation industry can implement to sustain robust
cybersecurity programs, and TSA shares information and resources with
industry to support adoption of the framework. TSA also provides a
cybersecurity toolkit designed to offer the surface transportation
industry an array of available no cost resources, recommendations, and
practices. Additionally, within the pipeline sector, TSA is
coordinating a voluntary cyber-assessment program with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to conduct cybersecurity assessments of
pipeline entities. TSA works closely with the pipeline industry to
identify and reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including through
classified briefings to increase awareness of the threat. TSA's efforts
in cybersecurity are critical to securing surface transportation modes
from cyber intrusions.
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
TSA has worked diligently to implement the requirements of the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
Law 110-53). Under my leadership, TSA has prioritized the few remaining
outstanding requirements of the Act. These mandates include the
issuance of regulations relating to security training (Sections 1408,
1517, and 1534) and security planning and vulnerability assessments
(Sections 1405, 1512, 1531), as well as establishment of a program to
complete name-based background and immigration checks for public
transportation and railroad employees (Sections 1411 and 1520). TSA is
making significant progress on all of these rulemakings and continues
to dedicate substantial time and resources towards this effort. TSA
will continue its prioritization of these rules notwithstanding the
complexity and time consuming nature of the rulemaking process.
Conclusion
TSA is dedicated to securing the Nation's transportation systems
from terrorist activities and attacks. Through its voluntary programs
and minimal regulations, TSA mitigates security challenges faced by an
open-by-nature surface transportation system in collaboration with our
industry and government partners. I am focused on improving surface
transportation security through the development and implementation of
intelligence-driven, risk-based policies and plans, and I appreciate
the Committee's support of TSA's goals. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss these important issues.
The Chairman. Thank you, Administrator Neffenger. As you
mentioned--and, of course, you were there--the Brussels attack
was directed at aviation infrastructure, but it wasn't just an
attack on that. It was also the metro car, as we mentioned,
between stations which killed 13 people and injured a lot more.
Rail and transit are very open systems, much like the non-
sterile areas of airports, and could easily be perceived as
soft targets.
How have you communicated with surface transportation
operators about the potential for a Brussels-like attack on a
U.S. transportation system, and do you believe that transit
systems and passenger railroads, in particular, are prepared
for an attack like the tragic events in Brussels?
Mr. Neffenger. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
That's a question that's been on everyone's minds, certainly
since the Brussels attacks. But I will tell you it has been on
our minds for a long time, and it's one of the fundamental
questions that we've asked ourselves across the surface
transportation world for quite a number of years.
I will tell you that there's a--it starts, really, with
good intelligence. And, as you know from the briefing that we
gave this committee earlier this month, there's an extensive
network of intelligence professionals focused on the
transportation threats on all modes of transportation. So it
really begins with an assessment of what we think the current
threats are, who the potential groups are that would deliver
those threats, and, more importantly, who the individuals are
that might be moving through the system that might provide a
particular threat.
The next step, of course, is to identify the
vulnerabilities across the system, and we've worked very
closely with our partners across the systems. I've spent quite
a bit of time over the 9 months I've been on board meeting with
police chiefs, transit professionals, transit authority
directors to look at the types of systems that we have in
place.
I've been very encouraged by what I've seen. There is an
extensive network of law enforcement professionals and security
professionals arrayed across the system that really leverage
the investment that we make from TSA to establish a very high
level of security standards across the system, an awareness of
what's going on. There's a great deal of shared intelligence
and a lot of sharing of best practices, and we help facilitate
many of the groups and teams that get together to do that.
So while any open system is by definition at risk, I think
that there is a great deal being done to ensure that we reduce
that risk and we understand how that risk might present itself.
The Chairman. Just as a follow up to that, less than 2
percent of the president's budget request for TSA was directed
to the security of surface transportation. I know we all
understand that the threats to the aviation sector are very
real. But as a follow up, do you believe in terms of the
resource allocation that the TSA is doing enough to ensure the
security of passengers on our railroads and transit systems?
Mr. Neffenger. I think that we've been able to, as I said,
leverage thousands of professionals across the country, and you
have some superb local and state law enforcement entities that
are doing work in that sector, whether it's the Amtrak Police,
the New York City Transit Police, the New Jersey Transit
Police, and so forth. There are more than I can mention. So
we've done that.
I think that if you're asking an operator if he would put
more resources to use, yes, I would. And what I would do is I
would put them to use in support of those entities that are
doing really good efforts out there. We coordinate with them,
we integrate our teams with their teams, and we work to
increase our ability to understand what might be happening out
there, understanding the threats and the vulnerabilities, and
then share that information in a way that allows us to deploy
our resources most effectively.
The Chairman. Yesterday, Homeland Security Secretary
Johnson endorsed a new proposal by Senate Democrats to double
the number of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or
VIPR, teams nationwide from 30 to 60. By contrast, the
president's Fiscal Year 2016 budget request called for the
elimination of two VIPR teams and 23 related positions. In your
written testimony, you note that TSA's VIPR program, which
operates in both aviation and surface transportation venues,
has updated its concept of operations to focus on risk-based
deployments.
The question is: Have the events of the last two months
since the budget was released convinced the administration that
doubling of the VIPR program is needed to address current
threats?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I appreciate the attention that
Congress is giving to TSA resources, and I will tell you this,
Mr. Chairman. If I were to receive more VIPR teams, I would be
able to put them to use, and I would put them to use across the
transportation system. I would be able to deploy them more
effectively with our partners in the surface world and would
deploy them to more public areas of our aviation environment.
The Chairman. Let me just ask one last question here. In
the past year and a half, we have seen repeated abuses of
airport SIDA badges that grant airport workers access to the
secure areas of the airport. These are badges that are used by
airport and airline workers to bypass TSA screening checkpoints
and, in this case, facilitate criminal activities like gun and
drug smuggling. These incidents have raised a lot of questions
about whether our airports are vulnerable to an insider threat.
As I mentioned earlier, in response, along with our
committee members, Senators Nelson, Ayotte, Cantwell, Johnson,
and Klobuchar, we have introduced the Airport Security
Enhancement and Oversight Act to help counter some of these
aviation insider threats by improving the vetting,
credentialing, and inspections of airport workers. Do you think
it's important to update and expand the criminal background
checks and random inspections of airport workers that have
access to the secure areas of an airport?
Mr. Neffenger. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. As
you know, that's been a big concern over the time that I've
been here and as I came in. It was on the heels of the incident
in Atlanta and some other concerns. As you noted in your
opening statement, we've had some of those same concerns with
respect to the attacks overseas.
So I'm very pleased and happy that Congress has given us
the support that they have. So I think you're right to focus on
that. The additional access--I know this committee, in
particular, was very supportive of our access to additional
TIDE categories. That's made a huge difference for us in terms
of recurrent vetting. I'd like to see us fully implement the
FBI Rap Back program before the end of this Fiscal Year so that
we can do continuous recurrent criminal vetting, and I think
anything we can do to tighten the oversight of the insider
population to verify their trusted status, I think, is worth
doing.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the
opportunity, particularly, to tell our Democratic members of
the Committee that, apparently, we just received word that
there has been an agreement on the tax issue, and, therefore,
if that is true, when we get to the floor in just 35 minutes,
it looks like we're going to be able to proceed without that
controversy that previously we had known about. So we ought to
be able to get on to the bill.
I want to just piggy back on a couple of the points raised
by the Chairman. The gun running scheme showed tremendous
vulnerability, especially in 300 airports in the country, and
lo and behold, only two up to that point, only two, had a
perimeter security where they had reduced to a handful the
number of entry points and had the adequate checking of the
badges to make sure the airport employee was who they said they
were, as well as checking in machines the stuff that they
brought in, things that were not done in Atlanta that allowed
over 100 guns to be transported into the airport. Then the
employee goes up into the sterile area, into the men's
restroom, and transfers the weapons to a passenger who has come
through security.
Atlanta has now complied, so that's Atlanta, Miami,
Orlando. What about the rest of the 297 airports nationwide?
Mr. Neffenger. Senator, I had exactly the same question. It
was a wake-up call for Atlanta, and, as you noted, they've put
a lot of measures in place, both the private sector----
Senator Nelson. But what about the other 297?
Mr. Neffenger. So earlier this year, I ordered a detailed
vulnerability assessment across the entire system for those
other airports that you mentioned. The results of that
assessment are coming in this month. The purpose of that
assessment was to answer that very specific question: First and
foremost, what have you done, but what's the nature of your
insider population? Who are the employers? What are they doing?
Senator Nelson. Right. That's the question. What's the
answer?
Mr. Neffenger. The answer is that there has been a lot of
movement in terms of reducing security access points across the
system. There's been a lot of movement to greatly enhance the
oversight of that insider population, both by TSA as well as by
the employers.
Senator Nelson. A lot of movement. Such as?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, what I'm going to have to provide to
you in the report is--once we evaluate all of these that are
in, then that's going to drive us to add requirements into the
aviation security, airport security plans, for each of those
airports to take the best practices that we're finding from
Miami, from Orlando, from Atlanta and to drive those into the
other airports across the country. I was concerned that we
hadn't had a lot of specifics on that.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, the best practices are
obvious. You have to check the airport employees. So is your
testimony today that nothing has been done?
Mr. Neffenger. No, sir. That's not my testimony. We have
done quite a bit. We are checking. TSA itself has increased the
number of inspections of employees by fivefold just in the past
5 months, and we do that ourselves, which is consistent----
Senator Nelson. But you don't have enough resources.
Mr. Neffenger. And then the airports themselves----
Senator Nelson. You've got to get the airports to do it.
Mr. Neffenger. And they are doing that, airport by airport.
Senator Nelson. Well, then give us the report.
Mr. Neffenger. That's coming your way, sir, because we're
evaluating--I wanted to give you good specifics from the
vulnerability assessments that we conducted so that I could
give you specific answers airport by airport to exactly the
question you're asking. And those are all due--this week is the
deadline for getting those in, and we'll compile that report,
and we'll get it to the Committee so that you have it.
Senator Nelson. Why couldn't that have been done in time to
report to this committee, since that was such an obvious
question that you were going to be asked?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think the answer I would have to
that is that I didn't have, I felt, adequate specifics to
satisfy this committee on the specific measures taken. So
that's why we went back, and I ordered a very specific
vulnerability assessment airport by airport. It was done on a
very short timeframe. It was done in conjunction with the
recommendations from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee,
and it was done in a way that ensured that I could give very
specific answers and, more importantly, provide very specific
direction with respect to the requirements that we're going to
put in place.
That said, we have greatly enhanced the oversight, and
airports have greatly enhanced their oversight already. So it's
not as if nothing has been done. I just wanted to know exactly
what it has been so that we can ensure consistency across the
entire system.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, you have a sterile--
sterling reputation. It's not sterile. It's sterling. You have
a sterling reputation. But that's an insufficient answer to a
problem that has been begging now for two years. And the only
person who's going to get the airports off their duff to limit
the access into their airports is going to be you and your
administration.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. And I realize that you can say you have a
specific jurisdiction of requiring security checks on who's
going on the plane, but what about the stuff that may be going
on the plane, which is getting at the same thing? And,
therefore, you've got to go a different perimeter.
Mr. Neffenger. And we do that. I'm sorry if I've given the
impression that nothing is happening. That's not at all true.
We have greatly enhanced our oversight of cargo screening
facilities, of the catering facilities. So there are a number
of measures--quite a few measures that have been put in place.
I'll provide a specific outline of those for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
TSA Catering Security Measures
Catering security measures require inspection of catering
carts, materials, and supplies, either prior to being loaded on
the aircraft, or prior to be loaded on a sterile delivery
vehicle that will service the aircraft.
At non-U.S. locations, these TSA catering measures are
layered on top of measures required by the host government. At
certain higher risk locations, TSA requires a more stringent
inspection of all catering carts, materials, and supplies,
which must be continuously monitored from the time they are
assembled for a particular flight until they are loaded onboard
the aircraft.
Any individual performing a TSA-required catering security
measure must be either a direct employee or an authorized
representative of the air carrier, and cannot be an employee of
the catering company.
Any individual performing any TSA-required catering
security measure for a U.S. air carrier must have an airport
Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) ID at a U.S.
locations, or a Security Restricted Area (SRA) ID at a non-U.S.
location. This requirement ensures the individual has received
a stringent background check. Additionally, each individual's
name must be compared to the most recent No Fly and Selectee
Lists.
Any individual performing any TSA-required catering
security measure for a foreign air carrier must have a 10-year
employment history check, with the most recent 5 years of
employment verified by the foreign air carrier.
TSA issued a change to the Aircraft Operator Standard
Security Program (AOSSP) in August 2015. This change added
additional measures that cover provisioning of aircraft with
beverages and supplies that come from airline storage areas
rather than catering faculties.
TSA issued an Information Circular (IC) in May of 2016
advising all air carriers to implement increased monitoring and
oversight of personnel conducting catering security measures to
ensure they comply with proper procedure.
______
Air Cargo 101 Briefing
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Mr. Neffenger. But it's oversight of the caterers, the
catering facilities, and the way in which they inspect the
catering carts. It's oversight of the cargo, the way in which
that cargo is inspected, the multiple steps by which we're now
inspecting cargo that wasn't done before, the amount of
security perimeter checks that are being done that weren't done
before, the reduction in the security perimeter entrances into
each of those airports that are covered by airport security
plans. So a lot has been done.
What I was referring to was I wanted to give a very
specific detail of that to you airport by airport, and I went
back and asked for much more detail so that I could outline it
specifically and then move that into the required security
plans in an official and directed way.
Senator Nelson. All right. I'll just close, Mr. Chairman,
by saying this. It's pretty simple. You lessen the number of
entry points like Atlanta had, over 100, down to a handful, and
you check the employees going through. You can't do that just
as TSA. You've got to get the airports to do that, and that's
the report that we want to see in our oversight capacity.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. How many airports of the 300 following the
lead of Miami, which did it 10 years ago, have done this, to
watch so that something like Egypt and the Russian airliner
doesn't happen here?
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson. I couldn't agree
more, and I think it points out the need for Senate Bill 2361,
which I hope we can move. But as you can tell, this is an
issue; we screen passengers getting on planes, but there are so
many examples now of airport workers with badges that are
committing criminal acts, and this is an area that I think
we've just got to shore up. So thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Ayotte?
STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman, and I, too, want to
add that I hope that with the FAA reauthorization on the floor
that we will get the Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight
Act perhaps added to that, because I think it makes a lot of
sense to do that in light of some of the concerns that we have
in this committee and the broad support in this committee for
that bill.
But I wanted to follow up on this issue as well, on the
angle of--we know that one of the things that came to light
that was of deep concern as we thought about the airport
workforce was that there were 73 individuals that the Inspector
General had identified with reported--some ties to terrorism or
issues of concern. And as a result of that, we learned that, in
fact, TSA was not getting access to the real-time information
from the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE,
data to help inform your vetting of these employees that were
having access to the airport.
So I wanted to get an update on where we are in terms of
you getting access to the information that you need, not only,
as Senator Nelson has identified, the materials that are being
brought, to make sure people are inspected, but what
information you have access to that you know about these
individuals who have access at the airport that your average
person doesn't have, obviously.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, Senator, thank you for the question.
As I noted earlier, this committee was very supportive in
asking for that access, and I'm pleased to report that we now
have access to all of the categories that we need to ensure
that we're vetting people continuously against those TIDE
categories. That's allowed us to more effectively screen the
credentialed population on a daily basis.
Senator Ayotte. And so that's going smoothly?
Mr. Neffenger. It is, yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Very good. I'm glad to hear that. I wanted
to ask about a bill that Congress passed in December of 2014. I
also serve on the Homeland Security Committee, and this bill
was one that I supported, the Transportation Security
Acquisition Reform Act. This is legislation that required TSA
to implement best practices and improve transparency with
regard to technology acquisition programs, because there have
been a number of difficulties, challenges, and failed programs
that haven't come to fruition that prompted Congress to pass
this bill.
So I wanted to get an update on where you were in terms of
greater accountability on TSA's acquisition practices as well
today.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, that was a particular interest of mine
as well when I came in, and I had dealt with acquisition reform
in the Coast Guard before coming to TSA. So I wanted to pay
particular attention to the way in which we conducted
acquisition. One of the first things I did when I came on board
last July was to ask the Defense Acquisition University to come
in and do a top to bottom review of our acquisition programs
and the way in which we conduct them and to look, particularly,
for any gaps or process improvements that we could make.
They've just provided that report to me. It took them about
four and a half months or so to do that. I'm very pleased with
that report. We're now comparing those requirements against the
requirements of the Acquisition Reform Act, and we're making
process improvements as we go.
What I'd like to do is--I've got a report that we're
compiling now for the Committee that will show the steps that
we can take, I think, that will dramatically improve our
accountability, our oversight, as well as the ability to
actually field capability when we need it.
Senator Ayotte. Right. I mean, obviously, that's the key
because a lot of the work before wasn't fielding capability
and----
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, and that's my big concern.
Senator Ayotte.--and of spending dollars with no result.
And so I would love for us to receive that report so that we
can understand where we stand with it and what further action
that we can support you on to really improve the acquisition
process, because that's critical as you think about your
mission and making sure that we have everything functioning
with our security system.
I also wanted to just ask about the Managed Inclusion
issue. As I understand it--and I'm pleased that this has
happened--you've discontinued Managed Inclusion 2----
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I have.
Senator Ayotte.--which is, I think, very smart and logical
in light of the purpose of your agency and security concerns. I
just wanted to follow up that the app that was being used that
certainly came under some criticism was an app that--I
understand this app essentially was--some reports that it was
$1.4 million for using it. So I'm assuming you don't need this
app anymore now that you've discontinued the Managed Inclusion
2. ` Mr. Neffenger: We are not using that app.
Senator Ayotte. Was that one of those which would be an
example where maybe we shouldn't have purchased that? It seems
like a waste of dollars to me.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I've looked at that, and it wasn't--
there was a lot more involved in that contract. It apparently
was an IBM contract from 2013, and that covered--that $1.4
million apparently covered quite a few components or things. So
the actual app was significantly less costly than that,
somewhere in the thousands. Nonetheless----
Senator Ayotte. We didn't need it.
Mr. Neffenger. Nonetheless, it is not an app we're using
anymore, and what I will tell you is that I have great concern
over the way in which we are spending our contracting dollars,
the way in which we are spending our acquisition money. That's
why I did a complete review of the acquisition program. I think
we can build more controls and more process improvements into
it so that I can get capability out there that is at the lowest
cost to the taxpayer but actually produces things that we
really need.
Senator Ayotte. Well, good. I appreciate your focus on
this, because to me, this is critical as we think about the
things we do need to do at our airports that require resources
and so not to waste resources on things we don't need.
Mr. Neffenger. I couldn't agree more.
Senator Ayotte. So I appreciate it. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
Senator Cantwell?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Neffenger, it's good to see you again. Many of us
participated in a closed door briefing that you gave us prior
to the Brussels attack, and I thought it was a pretty poignant
briefing. I think that even post-Brussels, it probably is
important, Mr. Chairman, to do another one of those maybe in
conjunction with Homeland Security or separate as the focus on
aviation needs to continue.
I wanted to ask you, Mr. Neffenger--you know, I come from a
border state, and a lot of traffic moves between the U.S. and
Canada, and we've always held the position that we have to have
incredible security. In fact, one of our border agents caught
the millennial bomber as he was on his way to come to the
United States to either blow up LAX or whatever his mission
was. But a Customs border person caught that individual.
So we're very well aware of security, but we're also very
poignantly aware of efficiency. We need both. We need both in
our system, and we know that as a border state because of the
amount of slowdown. So my point is that Sea-Tac is the fastest
growing hub in the country and has experienced growth rates of
7 percent in 2014, and 13 percent in 2015. We've had this map
of planning for Sea-Tac which was to handle 19 million
passengers, and last year, we had 42 million passengers. So we
had a plan for 19, and we just had 42, so we have a problem at
Sea-Tac.
My first question to you is, one, will you allow for
localized regional training? Because part of the issue is with
this new requirement of TSA officer training systems where
people are going to--I'm not----
Mr. Neffenger. To FLETC down at Glynco in Georgia.
Senator Cantwell. In Georgia. But you've allowed other
airports to do regional training. Will you allow---- because
we're about to hit spring and summer, and we have cruise ships
that greatly impact the flow in the Northwest. Will you allow
for localized training so that those individuals can be
trained?
Second, what information sharing do you think that we now
need to do? You know that we were successful in getting the
Cantwell-Collins bill, which is to move Customs border security
to overseas airports, and that allowed us to do that pre----
Mr. Neffenger. Preclearance, right.
Senator Cantwell.--the checking of those passengers over
there. I'm fully supportive of that, and we're so glad we got
that into the Customs bill. But now what else do we need to do?
Are you for the machine reading-sharing, helping those airport
facilities have better machine capabilities? What lists should
we share? Do you--I would assume, having a past role in the
Coast Guard--the Coast Guard's dogs have played a significant
role in protecting our ferry system. Do you think that we
should be making a larger investment in that? So that's a lot
to answer.
I really do have concerns about this app. I really think
that you need a coalition of constant input on how to get
efficiency. You know, paying this much for an app that we
shouldn't have--but if you'll focus on those first questions.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, ma'am. So with respect to the training,
we are going to do local training. The idea behind----
Senator Cantwell. At Sea-Tac?
Mr. Neffenger. At Sea-Tac, yes, ma'am. So we'll address
that. But we have to mitigate what is going to be a very
challenging summer season by pushing as many new hires as we
can into the system, directing them to the airports of greatest
need--Sea-Tac is one of those--and then ensuring that we're
working as much as we can with the local airports and the
airlines that service those airports to identify the most
efficient means of moving it through. That has to do with
working with the airlines to understand their travel plan,
their flight loading----
Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you for that commitment. That
is very important to Sea-Tac.
Mr. Neffenger. So we're going to do that as we build
capacity in the training center so that we don't have to do
this in the future. Second, with respect to Seattle, I'll be
out there, as a matter of fact, next week. I'm going to be
meeting with the airport director and then local officials as
well to look at the issues and just see how well this is going.
So I've been trying to do this with each of the major airports
around the country.
With respect to other resources that we might need, it
really falls into the category of people, training, and
technology. I'm very interested in the way we do acquisition,
because I need to evolve my technology faster than the threat
is evolving, and I think that there are things that we can do
to ensure that happens.
Training--I want to continue to build the TSA Academy out
so that I can effectively train people to do what they do. And
on the people side, I think we----
Senator Cantwell. And are you for--just because I only have
20 seconds. Are you for more list sharing and machine sharing
with our overseas partners?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, ma'am, I am.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
This is something, Mr. Chairman, I think the Committee
needs to spend a lot of time on. So thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Good points.
Senator McCaskill?
STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator McCaskill. Thank you. We have spent an awful lot of
time and money and energy focusing on the security of our
aviation and airports, and I am not critical of that
whatsoever. But there remains, I believe, a gaping hole in our
security which has to do with foreign repair stations.
I don't think most Americans realize--and, by the way, I've
been talking about this since 2007--Congress wanted FAA, wanted
TSA to create security rules applicable to foreign repair
stations. It took 10 years, but we got a rule in 2014. There's
shared jurisdiction here. FAA is supposed to be certifying the
safety of the foreign repair stations. You are supposed to be
certifying and overseeing the security of the foreign repair
stations.
I don't think most Americans know that almost every
domestic plane they're in is cared for, repaired, overhauled in
foreign repair stations, including foreign repair stations in
countries that are listed by the State Department as countries
that can be a haven for terrorists. Now, I don't understand--
since we have been talking about this since 2007, since I came
to the Senate, chaired a hearing on this in 2007--that the rule
that you issued didn't even require background checks of people
who work at foreign repair stations. There's no perimeter
security at foreign repair stations. There's no alcohol and
drug testing at foreign repair stations.
So we've got one standard for machinists and others who
work on airplanes in the United States, but if you want to take
those jobs overseas, then all of a sudden, it is like a sieve.
I am grateful that there has not been an incident, but I can't
imagine why your agency has not---- and I know you've not been
there, but I can't imagine why in this rule there would not be
background checks of people working in countries like Egypt on
airplanes that are flying American passengers around the world.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, Senator, I recently spoke to the
Aircraft Repair Association. They had one of their meetings
here in the last couple of months. And we talked about the
rule, and we talked about what we do. Just so you know, all of
those people hold FAA credentials, which means they're
automatically vetted by us every day through terrorist
screening data bases, and we vet them against the criminal data
bases as well. So we vet them against the combined terrorist
screening database that looks at all of the people of interest
and concern around the world, and we vet them against the
criminal data base.
Senator McCaskill. Before they're hired? Right now, when
you're hired as a mechanic on domestic American airlines, and
you're working on a plane in Egypt, you have a background check
before you get on the premises?
Mr. Neffenger. I can't speak to what exactly every
individual employer does. I can tell you that if you get a
credential from the FAA or if you apply for a credential from
the FAA, we're going to screen you before you can get that
credential, and we'll determine whether or not you can be
issued that credential. So in my opinion, that is the last step
before you're actually hired, before you can actually work on
an aircraft that belongs to a U.S. flight carrier.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I would be thrilled to be proven
wrong on this. But it is my impression that you can get into
these facilities and get near airplanes without a background
check right now. Who is inspecting these facilities? Who is
actually physically going to the Philippines and to Egypt and--
--
Mr. Neffenger. TSA does. We have our aviation inspector
cadre, and they make regular and periodic rounds to each of
these locations to ensure that they're complying with the
standards.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I would love to see that schedule,
because I know if you had a repair station in the United
States, there was an FAA person almost onsite 24/7.
Mr. Neffenger. That's right, and FAA also does the same.
Senator McCaskill. And when I did this hearing before, most
of this was being done by phone. They were not physically going
to the facilities. So if that has changed, I would be really
thrilled to hear that. I would love to know how often we're
inspecting, and I would also like to know--because at the point
in time that we looked at this before, there was no effort even
made on perimeter security at these facilities in these other
countries.
You know, Americans are pretty upset about jobs going
overseas. I understand this is a global economy and we can't
put a gun to companies' heads and say, ``You must keep jobs in
America.'' On the other hand, if we have certain standards for
safety and security for our flying public, and the
responsibility lies with your agency and the FAA to make sure
that the standards are just as rigorous--you know, without a
foreign agreement being in the way, they need to be just as
rigorous in the locations where people are working on these
airplanes on foreign soil. My sense is that that has not been
the case.
So if you've got information that will reassure me in that
regard as to inspections, the ability of somebody to get on the
premises and near airplanes, the ability to actually work
hands-on in an airplane, and if you can reassure me of the
thoroughness of that--10 years to make the rule was not a
confidence builder for me. So I would like to be reassured that
we are in a better place than we were when we started down this
road when I arrived in the Senate.
Mr. Neffenger. So let me get you a fuller answer to those
questions.
Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. Thank you very
much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Heller?
STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN HELLER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Heller. Mr. Chairman, thank you to you and the
ranking member for holding this hearing today, and I want to
thank the Administrator also for being here and answering our
questions.
I want to go back to this allocation of personnel and ask
you a couple of questions. The first question I have is: When
was the last time that you flew into the Las Vegas airport?
Mr. Neffenger. It has not been since I've been
administrator.
Senator Heller. Recent, though, within the last couple of
years?
Mr. Neffenger. Within the last year.
Senator Heller. Would you agree with me that it's one of
the fastest growing and busiest airports in the world?
Mr. Neffenger. It is a very fast growing airport, and
you've seen some huge growth in passenger volume.
Senator Heller. We have. We had 3.4 million passengers go
through McCarran in February of this year. In fact, it was
almost a 9 percent growth from February, previously, 2015, and
we anticipate that we're going to continue to see this growth.
Can you explain to me why TSA reduced the number of agents at
that airport by 110?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, you know, I got that report, and we've
actually increased the allocation there. So I'm not sure how
that information got presented. But I went back and checked,
because I was concerned by the same number, and what I found is
that we've actually increased the staffing allocation. We've
not reduced the numbers there. We've had some attrition there
that we have to backfill, and sometimes it takes us a while to
get people hired in.
But let me get you the exact numbers. I think if I laid it
out, I think I can see why that report was there. But it was
really that--you know, we have higher attrition rates in some
locations than I'd like to see, and sometimes it takes time to
backfill those positions. But I don't believe we've actually
reduced the numbers there. But let me get you what I show for
numbers and see if it's the same.
Senator Heller. If I can ask another question, it was
promised that it would maintain 10 canine units at that
airport. Today, there's only one. I think there's one that's
actually borrowed. But can you explain to me why there's a lack
of the canine units that were promised to that airport?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, we have an allocation staffing model
that we have for canines. I can't meet all of the staffing that
I'd like to see. I've said before this committee and others of
Congress that I will take more canine teams because I can put
them to use. I think it's one of the most effective
technologies we have out there.
Where I use them most effectively right now--and Las Vegas
is one of these locations--is to very effectively move
passengers through the screening environment. It's one of the
best tools we have for moving people efficiently through the
lines. It's what we're trying to do at all of the large
airports.
Let me look specifically at Las Vegas with respect to the
team. I don't have the numbers right off the top of my head.
I'd like to get back to you with whatever rationale we're using
currently to deploy teams there.
Senator Heller. I just want to make sure it was not a
hollow promise, the 10 canine units.
Mr. Neffenger. From my perspective, I'd like--as I said,
I'd like to grow the canine capability across the system,
because I think it's a hugely effective tool, both for
detection, but deterrence as well.
Senator Heller. So if I'm hearing correctly that you
would--I can go back to the administrators of that particular
airport and say that those 110 TSA personnel will be backfilled
or for whatever reason?
Mr. Neffenger. That is my understanding. But I'll verify
that----
Senator Heller. And that they will receive the 10 canine
units.
Mr. Neffenger. As I have them available, yes, sir. The
challenge right now is the availability--is the number of----
Senator Heller. What would you anticipate would be a
timeline to get 10 new canines?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, what we're doing right now--we
currently have--there are about 1,000 total canines operating
across the country. About 670 or so of those are deployed to
local law enforcement. So that means there are about a little
over 300 teams that the TSA has itself. Of those--when I came
on board last July, we had only 112 trained to do passenger
screening. We're converting the rest of those dogs to passenger
screening.
We should be up to about 270 or so by the end of this
fiscal year of converted dogs. These are dogs that can both do
regular cargo screening and then do the passenger screening.
I'd like to get all 320 teams converted by the end of the year.
That will give me the ability to start moving teams back into
locations that don't currently have them, that are without
them.
Senator Heller. What do the majority of those teams do? Do
they sniff for drugs, or do they sniff for----
Mr. Neffenger. They're explosive sniffing canines, and
they're trained to sniff for a large range of explosives. It
takes about 10 months to train a dog team. But once they're
trained, they're incredibly effective in what they do. If
you've noticed them in the airports, they move up and down the
passenger lines, and they sniff for vapor, and then they trace
the vapor back to its source.
Senator Heller. Yes. Thank you for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heller. There are not many
places that you can get direct flights from Sioux Falls, South
Dakota, but one of them is to Vegas. So my constituents were
adding to that number coming into and out of your airport this
year.
Yes?
Senator McCaskill. Would you give me 1 second to put
something on the record that clarifies the previous testimony,
because I'm going to go vote. It's my understanding from
talking to my staff that has researched this that the only
certification at the foreign repair stations are supervisors
and people who have authority to move the aircraft, which is
only a fraction of the people that are working on these
aircraft at foreign repair stations.
My belief is--and you correct me after this hearing if I'm
wrong, and we'll correct the record. My belief is the vast
majority of the people working on these airplanes in foreign
repair stations have not had a background check.
Mr. Neffenger. I'll follow up with you, Senator.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Administrator.
The Chairman. Senator Gardner?
STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both,
Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, for holding this hearing
today.
Thank you, Administrator Neffenger, for your time and
testimony today and the service that you provide to our
country. I wanted to just ask a couple of questions. I
understand you were in Denver recently at the international
airport.
Mr. Neffenger. I was.
Senator Gardner. A couple of weeks ago, we received a
letter from Denver International Airport--my office did--and it
talks about the attacks in Brussels and underscoring the need
to address the location of the TSA screening checkpoints at
Denver International Airport. I think most people have had an
opportunity to have a final departure from--a destination of
Denver or have a layover in Denver and understand that this is
the fifth busiest airport in the country, the 18th busiest in
the world. So this is a significant concern that they are
sharing on the screening checkpoints in the great hall at DIA.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that I be able to submit
this letter for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
Denver International Airport
Denver, CO, March 25, 2016
Hon. Cory Gardner,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Sen. Gardner,
I am writing to you in the wake of the latest terrorist attack,
which, once again, targeted an airport. It served as a sobering
reminder of the threats we face. The attack in Brussels has underscored
the need to address the location of TSA screening checkpoints in our
Great Hall at Denver International Airport, the fifth busiest airport
in America.
Relocating the checkpoints to reduce the exposure of travelers and
personnel is this airport's highest priority. TSA--from the local
Federal Security Director to Administrator Neffenger--shares this same
resolve. We have been working on plans for our Great Hall for some
time. The primary motivation for that project is relocation of our
security screening areas. I am writing to you today to ask for your
help in obtaining Federal funding for this initiative, and I welcome
the opportunity to discuss DEN's unique situation.
We have space where our ticket lobbies are currently located to
accommodate screening. Doing so would significantly reduce the exposure
of waiting travelers and TSA personnel. We will need to compress our
airline ticket counters (into 2/3 of the 6th floor area), relocate the
TSA operations (into the remaining 1/3), and make major modifications
to our baggage system to address the relocated baggage ingestion
points. A more efficient checked baggage screening operation for TSA
will need to be created by consolidating nine baggage reconciliation
areas into two.
Concurrently, TSA has begun its Innovative Task Force Initiative to
create a new screening experience that improves the passenger
experience and the security margin. This innovative and collaborative
approach provides an opportunity to bridge the future of checkpoint
screening. We are taking the first steps in a public-private
partnership that can redefine for our Nation how we protect the
American people from threats to aviation. We have begun planning with
TSA to have our airport security improvements serve as TSA's initial
prototype for this new approach. TSA Administrator Neffenger has
committed his support and we are moving forward to make Denver the
national prototype.
He views Denver as a carte blanche opportunity to develop a
screening process that is more effective, while offering a better
passenger experience. He is excited to partner with us to develop a
process that uses his team more effectively to focus on risk, to
implement new technology to speed up the process, and to improve the
passenger interaction. The new prototype created in Denver would be a
model to be emulated across the country.
This request comes at a time when we are growing; fielding gate
requests from airlines that are requiring us to expand faster than we
planned. At the same time, DEN is now 21years old and an aging
facility. Our capital is being used to replace chillers, runway
pavement segments, failing escalators while simultaneously expanding
our concourses, and soon Pena Boulevard. We are not without competing
needs for capital and that is what makes Federal funding of the
passenger and baggage screening relocation so necessary.
We are asking for your help to protect what we have, while allowing
us to grow. I know we ask a lot of you, but I have never asked you for
anything more important than this.
We will be scheduling time with your staff (and of course you if
you are available) in the next few weeks to discuss this further.
Hopefully, we will be able to jointly develop a strategy to get this
important task accomplished. In the meantime, thank you for continued
support of us and our mission.
Sincerely,
Kim Day,
Chief Executive Officer.
Senator Gardner. I just wanted to talk to you a little bit
about the Innovation Task Force initiative that's aimed at
crafting a modernized passenger screening process with the goal
of improving service and the passenger experience. Last week--I
believe it was last week--it toured Denver International
Airport and talked about partnering perhaps with the TSA to
serve--and Denver International Airport as a prototype--to
modernize security screening.
Earlier this week, I had the opportunity to tour the
facility as well with the management leadership of Denver
International Airport to learn about the details of the
proposal. Could you provide a little bit more information on
TSA's plans with Denver International Airport?
Mr. Neffenger. Senator, thanks for that question, and we're
very excited at what we can potentially do there. We're seeing,
as you know, huge travel volumes right now, and at some point,
we reach capacity, no matter what we do, with the current
system. So while we have to address today's problem right now--
and we're working hard to mitigate it, using passenger
screening canines and pushing staff and saving overtime hours
and the like--I'm convinced that we need to find a more
efficient means of moving people through screening, both to
reduce the pressure outside the checkpoints as well as to
improve the efficiency, while not changing the effectiveness of
the program.
So when Kim Day, the airport director, approached TSA and
said, ``We'd like to move the passenger screening checkpoints
from the main hall floor up to what used to be the ticket
counter area,'' it looked like it presented an opportunity to
address that. So that initial conversation turned into an
opportunity to rethink the security environment of the airport
and, for lack of a better term, think curb-to-gate--what can we
do?
It's as simple as just putting automated conveyor belts and
RFID tags into the bins that you use so that you can more
effectively track carry-on baggage coming through the system
and more efficiently move the baggage into the screen--it's
astonishing how slow the line becomes just because someone has
to push their stuff down the conveyor belt--presenting multiple
stations at which you can stand to put your stuff into a bin so
that you're not just standing behind the guy who wore the
combat boots today and you're waiting forever to take your
time. So that's one aspect of it. So there's an evolution that
has to happen. I mean, we're not going to get to sort of the
checkpoint of the future right away. But we have an
opportunity, I think, there.
So what we did is we worked with the Denver airport to
bring in the airline partners at that airport so all of the
airlines that service that airport are members of this team. We
brought in the manufacturers' teams, as well as even the FAA
and then local authorities, to put together what we call the
Innovation Task Force to really do a whiteboard on how you
would recreate the screening environment to reduce friction to
the traveler and improve efficiency and effectiveness of the
system. So in its biggest sense, that's what the idea is,
recognizing that there are incremental steps to getting there.
But it gives us an opportunity to try some things, and Denver
has been very forward-leaning in terms of their willingness to
pilot some new ideas.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And what steps could Congress
take to assist with the implementation of the Innovative Task
Force initiative both at DIA and across the country?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, this committee will get a report on
what we're doing there, and that's part of the plan, to outline
the status. There may be some opportunity to create some
authorities for public-private partnerships that we don't
currently have, for the ability to do spiral test and
development of new technologies so that you can feel the
technology before you go through the long, drawn-out
acquisition process and to reduce the potential cost penalty on
the other end to do that.
So I think that there are some things that we will be
presenting to you as we learn more about how we might go
forward that could provide some opportunity to open up some
pilot legislation that would allow us to try something
different there that may, in fact, allow us to transform more
of the system, as we're addressing what is the real problem
right now.
Senator Gardner. Thank you. And I think in the visit that I
was able to take last week to see this entire empty floor space
that they have as part of the redevelopment of the hotel right
next to the airport--I think it presents an incredible sort of
blank slate of opportunity to innovate, to test, to create sort
of this laboratory of security that we need, really, at a major
airport, a major U.S. airport, to find the kinds of techniques,
technologies, and security innovations to really move us
forward over the next decade and beyond as we see more
passengers move through the system.
Mr. Neffenger. Well, I agree, and it's a wonderful
opportunity, and it solves some very real security problems in
Denver, and it points to how we could solve those elsewhere as
well. So we're very excited about that, and we see it as an
opportunity to do something very different.
Senator Gardner. Administrator, thank you very much for
your time.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
Senator Peters?
STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator, thank you for your testimony here as well,
and thank you for the work that you do each and every day to
keep us safe. My question follows up on a comment that you
made, but something that was troubling to me when I had an
opportunity to tour one of our large airports in the state of
Michigan as a potential vulnerability.
We've talked a great deal about screening airport
employees, making sure they have security checks, screening
what they may be bringing in. But a concern is that there is an
awful lot of material that goes into the airport, into the
sterile area, for the catering services, the restaurants, the
newspaper stores--to have a stack of newspapers and put a
weapon in between a stack of newspapers or whatever it may be.
My understanding is there is little or no screening of that
happening, and yet there's a great deal of material going in.
You mentioned that you are stepping up some of your
catering security service protocols, I believe, in some earlier
comments you made during this hearing. Could you give me a
sense of what is done now, and why have we not done more, given
the fact that that's a lot of stuff coming in? An employee
could screen clear and then be waiting for a packet of
newspapers to come with contraband in the middle of it,
whatever that contraband may be.
Mr. Neffenger. There has actually been a lot going on for
quite some time. The stepping-up piece was adding additional
layers of that. But all of those items, all of that stuff that
comes into an airport, all the things you see in the stores in
the airport are all examined in some manner at some point
before they enter the sterile area of the airport.
What I can do is give you some specifics, exactly how--you
know, how do you inspect newspapers, magazines, water bottles,
and the like, in addition to the catering and the things that
find their way onto the aircraft directly. What we've added in
the past 9 months or so is additional times at which that's
done and additional randomness associated with how that's done
so that somebody can't get through a predicted layer of
screening only to find a way around it later on.
So what I wanted to do was add a significant amount of
random unpredictability into the system so that at any given
moment at any given part of a day, if you're an employee and
you're handling something, or you have things that you're
bringing in, that we create an expectation that somebody's
going to stop and take a look at what you have. So we've done
that both with TSA personnel as well as with airport security
personnel and other folks.
Senator Peters. So you've implemented that now for material
that's coming in?
Mr. Neffenger. Right. And we actually have been doing that
for some number of months now. But that is an ongoing, and that
will stay ongoing, because we find it to be a useful additional
measure of uncertainty that you introduce into the system that
will help us to deter, detect, and disrupt anybody who would
attempt to do what they did in Atlanta or other places.
Senator Peters. And the report that you're in the process
of drafting now--you will address that specifically and whether
or not it is robust enough in your report?
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, we will.
Senator Peters. And your report does--obviously, more
inspection also has a resource implication, and that may be
something we have to look at here in Congress.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
Senator Peters. I appreciate that. I've heard from airports
in my state that they want to have an opportunity to comment on
some proposed TSA security regulations or directives before
they're implemented. It has been their experience, at least
from what they're telling me, that there's a disconnect between
TSA officials crafting regulation and then the airports that
actually have to implement or at least assist you in
implementing a lot of these regulations.
They either think that the TSA has taken a one-size-fits-
all approach without regard to different levels of security
threats that are experienced at different airports and
different sized airports, or they believe that certain security
regulations or directives have the effect of assigning TSA
responsibilities to airports without providing any additional
funding to those airports, which can be a burden for them.
To what extent are airports currently able to comment on
proposed security regulations or directives, and how is that
feedback taken by your agency, and can we do a better job in
the future so I don't hear this from my airport managers?
Mr. Neffenger. I'm going to say yes to all your questions.
Senator Peters. Good. That's good.
Mr. Neffenger. Because I do think that we can do a better
job. I think we have done a better job recently, and I'll speak
to one example of that. But I think that's a valid complaint. I
think it's very easy for any government agency to get so
focused on its mission it forgets some of the impact that the
discussions have.
So I like this idea of full collaboration. This is a
system. My job is to ensure that the system operates
consistently and in a coordinated fashion. But some of the best
information about security is held by the people who are
running the system every day. That's the airports, it's the
airlines, it's the people who operate in and around those
airports. It's all those things that come together into an
airport environment.
So I'd be very interested in expanding our collaboration.
The Aviation Security Advisory Committee is a good entry point
for me on that. They gave me a lot of that criticism when I
first came on board, and I think it was--from my perspective, I
take it well, because that's what I'm here to do. I see myself
as the ultimate public service agency. We're probably the face
of public service for the government.
So long story short, when I discussed with Senator Nelson
the work that we're doing to do the vulnerability assessments,
we actually worked very collaboratively with the airports and
the airport associations that represent the airports to craft
that directive in a way that was implementable, that was
understandable, and we actually took a lot of their advice in
terms of how we did that. In fact, the first attempt I put out
came back at me, and we adjusted accordingly.
So I think we've made good progress. I think there's a lot
more we can do. It's a constant challenge to make sure that
you're including and involving, but that's the approach that I
like to take.
Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate
your efforts on that. Thank you so much for your time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Daines?
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Daines. Thank you, Chairman Thune.
And thank you, Administrator Neffenger, for testifying
today. It's a pleasure to see you again, as always.
Mr. Neffenger. Good to see you.
Senator Daines. Unfortunately, you've not had a quiet nine
months on the job. Terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, I
think, clearly highlight the vulnerabilities at home.
Transportation systems will remain a target, and we must remain
vigilant. So thank you for what you're doing to secure our
Nation.
I know many ideas are being discussed to modify TSA's
practices, to extend perimeters, increase canine presence,
amongst other proposals. Ultimately, TSA needs to deploy
resources in a fashion that will maximize our nation's
security. It also includes protecting rural access points to
transportation networks. Speaking as somebody from Montana, I
want to talk a little about rural access points.
The Screening Partnership Program is an effective way for
TSA to leverage its limited resources, especially at some of
our smaller airports. In fact, out of the 21 participating
airports nationally, nine are actually in Montana. As a
voluntary program, how does TSA handle airports that may want
to opt back to TSA screening?
Mr. Neffenger. Well, you know, they have that option, if
they'd like to. If an airport is currently under the Screening
Partnership Program with a private contractor and they wish to
come back to Federal screening, from my perspective, we have to
work with them to ensure that that happens. And we try to
ensure a smooth handoff from contractor to TSA.
Senator Daines. Yes, and I appreciate that commitment. I
have an e-mail from the Montana Department of Transportation.
At the Butte airport, they formally requested to go back to TSA
screening. And the response we got back from TSA was that
passenger screening would cease at Butte. Reverse screening
would be conducted upon arrival at Salt Lake. So I think they
were questioning how would eliminating screening at a
commercial airport actually increase the safety of the national
airspace.
Mr. Neffenger. So let me look at that, and I apologize for
not having that information in front of me.
Senator Daines. And I think they're starting to get some
verbal commitments now, because they pushed back strong on that
recommendation. But I want to get your commitment to ensure
that whether they're TSA or SPP, we can always maintain the
level of security at these rural airports.
Mr. Neffenger, in 2013, the Inspector General reported that
the nearly $900 million spent on screening of passengers by
observation techniques, the SPOT program, was unsuccessful. I
recognize this was before your time on the job, and, again, I'm
grateful that you're in this job and working to secure our
Nation as well as spend our dollars efficiently.
Last month, the GAO reported cost-saving opportunities in
the canine program. Three days ago, we read about TSA spending
over $300,000 on a randomizer iPad to tell passengers which
lane to stand in, left or right. How is TSA reforming to be
good stewards and gain the taxpayers' trust?
Mr. Neffenger. Those are good questions and the exact
questions I've been asking since I came on board. With respect
to that randomizer app, that was part of a larger contract so
that not all of that was spent on a randomizer. But,
nonetheless, it points to some need for oversight.
So a couple of things we've done. One of the first things I
did after coming on board was to look at our acquisition
program, and I brought in an outside independent agency, the
Defense Acquisition University, just to look top to bottom and
tell me if they saw any gaps, and process improvements that we
needed, and so forth. My concern is best capability at lowest
price and then best value to the taxpayer.
So that's one of the things we're doing, and we're working
very hard on improving our oversight, our controls, and the
like. And I'm looking across every contract that we have to
ensure that the contract is appropriate, that the money is
going to what we think it is, that it's actually providing the
capability that we're asking for. So I think that's very
important, because it's about making sure that we take the
limited resources we have and get some results for it.
Senator Daines. Thanks for that very granular review that
you're leading the efforts on. It's appreciated.
As you know, our security is as strong as our weakest link.
Enhancements at rural airports strengthen security of the
entire national airspace. You know, the bad guys are going to
find the weak places to come in. At your confirmation hearing,
I asked about the AIT scanners that were to be installed in
2012, and Montana airports are still without them. In response,
you committed to evaluate plans to deploy the scanners. This is
a specific question to Montana, but, again, we're as good as
our weakest link.
Do you know what the status is of procuring this necessary
security equipment for airports in Montana that don't have
them?
Mr. Neffenger. This is a problem, as you know, across the
system. We don't have advanced imaging machines at all in the
small airports that I'd like to see them in. So from my
perspective, I'd like to see them deployed 100 percent across
the system. It's really a funding issue at this point.
So the first thing I had to do was look at where we were on
funding, what our current procurement schedule was, and what
the deployment schedule was for those. That includes upgrading
to the current software technology on board and making sure
that they meet our standards.
So we put together a technology plan. It's a 5-year plan
for getting those on board. If I could accelerate that plan,
depending upon how we can redeploy our resources--part of the
reason for doing the acquisition study was to determine whether
we had funding internally that we could reallocate to a greater
need such as AIT machines.
Senator Daines. There are two, specifically, and they're
two important communities in our state. One is Helena, which is
our state capital, that airport. They've been waiting for 4
years for the deployment of the technology.
The second is Great Falls. Let me highlight the importance
of Great Falls. The Malmstrom Air Force Base is in Great Falls.
That is where we control one-third of the nation's ICBMs. We
make sure a lot of our security processes are hardened for
obvious reasons.
But those would be two airports that have been waiting for
4 years, our state's capital as well as Great Falls, again, the
front door entrance to our ICBM capabilities here for the
country. So I'd appreciate it if you'd look at that and let us
know how that looks.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. Will do.
Senator Daines. OK. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Daines.
Senator Nelson, I think, has another question, and then we
may have a couple of members returning from the vote on the
floor.
So, Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, some real promise is
being made by government scientists at NIST. They're working on
a new detection system that mimics a dog's nose, dogs being so
effective in this attempt that is the bottom line for your
agency. So what do you see as the possible future of the use of
such systems that mimic a dog's nose?
Mr. Neffenger. If they can be effective, I think it would
be wonderful. I know that they're a long way from deploying a
system like that. We're aware of that. In fact, we have some of
our folks working with those scientists to see what's the
nature of its capability. So I think what it shows us is that
we have to be thinking about the future of screening, because
you have to continually evolve the technology that we have.
So I'm a big fan of that, and I think we need to do that,
and then wherever possible, pilot it in limited controlled
situations to determine whether it actually works in the real-
world environment. So I'm intrigued by it. I think there's some
potential there. If it works, it could perhaps significantly
augment our capability that we currently have.
Senator Nelson. Do you know any of the data and the science
behind this device?
Mr. Neffenger. I know a little bit of it, but not enough to
not get myself in trouble if I try to speak about it publicly.
But I can promise you a deeper dye for the record on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
The NIST dog's nose project was an effort to enhance explosives
trace detection (ETD) capabilities by emulating the air flow in a dog's
nose thereby potentially improving sensitivity in ETDs. This was an
exploratory scientific study and not an effort to develop an improved
ETD for TSA operational use. In short, the NIST researchers did a 3D x-
ray scan of a dog's nose then built a 3-D printed model of the canine
nose so that they could model and test the air flow through the canine
nose.
Senator Nelson. We'll ask the Administrator at NIST as
well.
Mr. Neffenger. OK.
The Chairman. Over and out? All right. Well, we don't have
any further questions. Unless somebody breaks through the door
momentarily, I think we may be off the hook.
But, Admiral, thank you for your time and for your
responsiveness. We will have some questions for the record that
we'll follow up with and ask that members who do want to submit
questions for the record do that within 2 weeks and that you be
as responsive as you can in getting back on those.
Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. We'll look forward to continuing the
discussion. These are issues, of course, that are of great
importance to our country, our national security, our homeland
security. You have an enormous responsibility, but we want to
support you in every way that we can and make sure that we get
the job done right. So thank you for being here today.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard Blumenthal,
U.S. Senator from Connecticut
I thank the Committee for having this important hearing.
Many members of this committee have raised grave concerns about the
terror attacks in Brussels on March 22. Those horrendous events took
place at the Brussels airport--which has been widely covered--but also
at a Brussels subway station. In light of these attacks, I want to note
several things.
First, it is critical we remember the importance of our surface
transportation system in the context of any discussion on security. The
Commission investigating 9/11 urged us to vigilantly protect the
``neglected parts of our transportation security system'' like and rail
and transit--just as much as we protect aviation. Our country's public
transportation and passenger rail systems are used by tens of millions
of people every day. They carry nearly five times as many people per
day as our airlines do. Penn Station in New York City handles half a
million passengers a day--making it busier than all three New York City
regional airports combined, and the busiest transportation hub in our
country. It is imperative that we ensure that rail and transit systems
are safe and secure for all who rely on them. That much is clear after
major attacks in London, Madrid, Moscow and now Brussels. We need to
ensure we're protecting our surface transportation network--and that
includes freight and ports--as vigorously as our skies.
Second, it is clear we need to work to shore up any ``soft''
targets. This is clearly a vulnerability that existed in Brussels, and
to the extent such targets exist here at home we need to do everything
we can to ensure our homeland security and transportation officials and
first responders have the resources necessary to plan for and prevent
such terrorism from being carried out in a similar way on our shores.
I'm proud to have joined several of my colleagues to advance such a
measure in the pending FAA legislation--providing airports with more
resources to make us safer.
Finally, it is also evident that providing security here and abroad
is an ongoing and evolving process. We must be on the lookout and work
vigorously to detect and deter threats to every transportation mode. As
we learn more about the Brussels attacks, I look forward to working
with my colleagues to find any other solutions toward protecting
passengers and freight.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
Hon. Peter Neffenger
Question 1. As you may know, my SAFE PIPES Act, which passed the
Senate unanimously earlier last month, included provisions to require
GAO to assess and report on TSA's pipeline security programs. In 2007,
officials thwarted an attempt to attack aviation fuel pipelines at JFK
International Airport in New York. Do you have staff in the field, and
how often does TSA connect with companies to review security plans?
Answer. Yes, onsite field reviews are conducted on pipelines by
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel. Additionally,
TSA maintains field personnel assigned as Transportation Security
Inspectors and to Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams.
Employing a risk-based approach, TSA has reviewed the security
plans of the operators of all of the Nation's most critical pipeline
systems through its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program. Each
Fiscal Year, TSA's goal is to conduct ten CSRs on pipeline companies
operating multiple critical systems to review their corporate security
plans. Additionally, facility security measures and plans are reviewed
as part of TSA's Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) effort. TSA's
goal is to conduct 40 CFSRs each Fiscal Year.
Question 2. Do you believe TSA should dedicate more resources
towards pipeline security as opposed to other modes?
Answer. TSA constantly evaluates the threats and vulnerabilities of
all transportation modes. TSA believes that pipeline and the other
surface modes are appropriately funded.
Question 3. As a follow up, in your testimony you mentioned strong
coordination between the pipeline industry and TSA on security measures
(page 11). What events or initiatives do you believe have led to
stronger collaboration with pipeline operators? How could similar
approaches be applied to other transportation entities, such as ports
or railroads?
Answer. TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives in the pipeline
mode that have led to a highly effective public-private partnership.
Close coordination with the Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council,
information sharing activities such as monthly pipeline stakeholder
conference calls and the International Pipeline Security Forum, and
full engagement with industry representatives in developing the
Pipeline Security Guidelines are some of the initiatives resulting from
effective collaboration between TSA and pipeline operators.
TSA conducts similar industry engagement activities for the other
transportation modes tailored to the needs of that industry. For
example, each mode has a Sector Coordinating Council, conducts monthly
information sharing teleconferences, disseminates Security Awareness
Messages, participates in Intermodal Security Training and Exercise
Program (I-STEP) table-top exercises and I-STEP regional surface
transportation workshops.
Question 4. As you mentioned in your testimony, TSA is in the
process of updating security guidelines for pipeline owners and
operators (page 12). When do you expect the guidance to be completed?
What kind of updates do you expect to see?
Answer. The review and update process for the TSA Pipeline Security
Guidelines has been initiated. The revision effort will be accomplished
with the full participation of TSA's government partners, pipeline
industry owners and operators, pipeline trade associations, and other
interested parties. TSA's goal is to complete the update to the
Guidelines by the end of the calendar year 2016.
The primary area of revision will likely be to the cybersecurity
section of the Guidelines. The focus of this part of the revision will
be to ensure the provisions of the Pipeline Security Guidelines are
consistent with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
Additional revisions are possible in the listing of facility physical
security measures.
Question 5. Admiral Neffenger, what is the message you would like
to send to the American flying public and mass transit riders in the
aftermath of the horrific Brussels terror attacks? Would you also share
with us some of the additional work that TSA is doing to strengthen
security on our public and commercial transportation systems?
Answer. The attacks in Brussels remind us that terrorists remain
intent on attacking transportation systems. Although there is no
credible intelligence of any plot to conduct similar attacks here in
the United States, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
working diligently to make travel as safe and secure as possible. With
an unprecedentedly high volume summer travel period around the corner,
TSA will continue to deploy measures to enhance the security on the
public sides of airports.
Following the attack, TSA immediately deployed additional security
at airports in the United States, and at various rail and transit
stations throughout the country. These efforts included enhanced
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams' presence in
and around checkpoints and public areas nationwide, and working closely
with state and local law enforcement, airport and transit authorities,
and the aviation industry in order to augment security measures
nationwide.
In addition, TSA has implemented more safety and security efforts
following the November 1, 2013 shooting at Los Angeles International
Airport, including: mandated active shooter training and required
practical training exercises for all TSA employees; installation of
duress alarms at checkpoints where gaps were identified; adoption of
standards for law enforcement officer presence at checkpoints and
ticket counters during peak travel times for airports that do not
presently employ a fixed post plan; established minimum recommended
standards for airport operators to conduct bi-annual active shooter
training and exercises; and explicitly incorporated maximum response
times in all Airport Security Programs utilizing flexible response
options.
Additionally, while there is no specific, credible terrorist threat
to the U.S. passenger rail or public transportation systems, the recent
Brussels attacks underscore the need to continue to build upon our
surface transportation successes through stakeholder communication,
coordination, and collaboration. Within public transportation systems,
TSA engages with state and local partners to identify ways to assess
risk, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security efforts through the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement program. These assessments
are emphasized on the Nation's 100 largest mass transit and passenger
railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over
95 percent of all users of public transportation.
Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 security
exercises within all surface modes through the Intermodal Security
Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP), including eight conducted so
far this Fiscal Year. TSA facilitates I-STEP exercises across public
and commercial transportation systems to help entities test and
evaluate their security plans, including prevention and preparedness
capabilities, ability to respond to threats, and cooperation with first
responders from other entities.
Between FY 2006 and FY 2015, over $2.3 billion in transportation
security grant funding was awarded to freight railroad carriers and
operators, over-the-road bus operators, the trucking community, and
public mass transit owners and operators, including Amtrak. These
grants were awarded to assist entities and their dedicated law
enforcement providers in enhancing security through operational
activities such as counterterrorism teams, mobile screening teams,
explosive detection canine teams, training, drills and exercises and
public awareness campaigns.
Question 6. I understand that some transportation facilities would
like to use TWIC as part of their security plans. What do you think
about the voluntary use of TWIC for other modes of transportation, such
as pipelines, for facility security plans?
Answer. Since the introduction of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC), TSA has had suggestions from
transportation stakeholders that TWIC could serve as a trusted and
valuable security credential well beyond its statutory maritime
origins. In recent months some within the surface transportation
industries such as pipeline companies and explosive manufacturers, have
renewed their interest in having employees undergo the vetting
associated with the TWIC program.
However, absent a statutory mandate for specified workers to
undergo a security threat assessment, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and employers face limitations on requiring such
workers to undergo TSA vetting. From an institutional standpoint, TSA
would welcome the vetting of more professionals in the transportation
system. Just as the TSA Pre3 program has done for aviation travelers,
vetting additional transportation workers would increase the level of
confidence and decrease TSA's concern about insider threats. TSA
continues to discuss these issues with stakeholders, and will do
whatever it can to meet the best security needs of stakeholders and the
Nation.
Question 7. During your confirmation hearing last year, you
mentioned that evolving threats to our transportation systems is one of
the top three challenges facing the TSA today. Given the fact that DHS
IG John Roth, has previously expressed concern with TSA's ability to
meet these challenges as a result of deficiencies in workforce
integrity and management oversight, how have you in the last year,
tackled existing weaknesses in TSA's security mission in order to
address these evolving security threats?
Answer. TSA's intelligence and information analysis and
dissemination has been an integral driver in the development of
employable countermeasures to evolving security threats. This
information-driven focus on mission is a primary centerpiece of TSA's
response to the covert testing failures as well as TSA's response to
2015 and 2016 attacks against aviation in Egypt, Somalia, and, most
recently, Brussels. TSA's focus on mission activities include
retraining the entire workforce, correcting security processes and
procedures, improving technology capabilities, and analyzing systemic
issues to ensure past deficiencies are not repeated while remaining
agile enough to quickly identify and address new security gaps as they
develop.
Question 8. How has the TSA assessed the threats and adapted
accordingly, especially in response to recent events in Brussels?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
analyzed the terrorist network, tactics, and techniques used in the
recent attacks in Brussels. In analyzing the terrorist networks
involved to improve attack detection and warning, TSA's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) has developed advanced analytical
capabilities that have proven very effective in identifying networks of
individuals linked to terrorist operations. OIA has also played a
pivotal role in alerting the intelligence and security community to
emerging aviation events through the monitoring of its social media
software to provide real-time situational awareness of events. In
countering the myriad threats, TSA's intelligence, information
analysis, and dissemination has been an integral driver in the
development of employable countermeasures. This is not limited to only
detecting insider threat actors but also disseminating vital
information on how attacks (successful and failed) were conducted so
TSA operations can deploy the most impactful counterterrorism and
security capabilities. Of particular importance, in light of the recent
insider gun-smuggling incident in Atlanta and the possible insider
assistance in the downing of the MetroJet in Egypt, are TSA's efforts
to counter the insider threat posed by employees with privileged access
to transportation facilities and infrastructure. Working in
collaboration with stakeholders, including the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance
security by reducing the insider threat: requiring more frequent
criminal history records checks of aviation workers; piloting the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Next Generation of
Identification (NGI) Rap-Back Service (which provides continuous
vetting of aviation workers through a fingerprint-based database); and
conducting a nationwide vulnerability assessment; airport-by-airport,
to create an expectation that every employee could be stopped and
inspected.
In addition to these actions, TSA works with federal, state, local
and tribal partners to provide a law enforcement presence throughout
airports and surface transportation hubs across the nation, deploying
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. These teams
use TSA assets in coordination with local law enforcement and
stakeholders to patrol public areas and to provide a visible deterrent
and response capability.
TSA's intelligence-driven security operations also assist to
improve the security of international inbound travel. TSA's Office of
Global Strategies works with international partners to assess and
mitigate threats to passenger and cargo flights at last point of
departure airports bound for the United States. TSA also promotes
continued information sharing and aligning of security standards with
its international counterparts as it relates to global threats to
aviation.
Question 9. TSA serves as the principle force in making sure
travelers and their luggage are properly screened prior to embarking,
and that passengers travel from point A to point B safely. What are
some of the current screening methods in the vetting process for TSA
employees that ensure that those responsible for maintaining security,
are in fact, not a security risk themselves?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Personnel
Security Section conducts Enter on Duty Determinations prior to
beginning work and Final Fitness Determinations for continued
employment on all populations. All of the actions directed in the
Secretary's 10-Point Plan are currently on-schedule or completed. TSA
corrected numerous immediate problems revealed by the covert testing.
TSA established a more aggressive training plan and retrained the
entire workforce with focused Mission Essentials. TSA has completed two
rounds of Mission Essentials and is currently executing Mission
Essentials III, which will last through the summer. TSA also
implemented rapid improvement events for its screening equipment to
include development of improved detection algorithms. All standard
operating procedures were rewritten to reduce and focus checkpoint
operations, and the Administrator's Intent was released to ensure the
organization's main effort remains its transportation security mission.
TSA's Enter on Duty and Fitness Determinations are an initial
review of the applicant's credit, fingerprint record, and electronic
Questionnaire for Investigation Processing and other required elements.
A favorable determination of these factors affords a risk based
decision allowing the Federal employee/applicant to commence work
before the required background investigation is completed.
Title 49 of the U.S. Code establishes vetting criteria under which
any one of 28 convictions automatically disqualifies an applicant
hiring. In addition, Department of Homeland Security, Chief Security
Officer Memorandum dated March 10, 2009, states that applicants who
have one or both of the following will not be offered employment: (1)
Cumulative ``bad debt'' over $7,500, or (2) Any amount of outstanding
debt associated with a Federal, State, or local tax lien, delinquent
student loans, delinquent child support payments, or unsatisfied court
judgment(s). Individuals receiving an unfavorable determination are
notified of such, provided the details of the finding, and afforded the
opportunity to respond to the decision.
TSA has implemented a recurrent vetting program for all employees,
which includes conducting fingerprint-based criminal history record
checks on an annual basis to detect criminal activity that may not have
been self-reported or disclosed as well as recurrent checks against the
Terrorist Watch List. TSA also has initiated the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Next Generation of Identification (NGI) Rap-Back
Services pilot program at two major airports and with one major
airline, whereby aviation workers are continuously vetted through a
fingerprint-based database.
TSA's Final Adjudication is the resolution of the completed
background investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM). Using Federal and OPM standards for employment
suitability, fitness, and security clearance eligibility, a favorable
adjudication would allow continued employment and access to classified
information.
Question 10. Following the terrorist attack at Brussels Airport,
how is TSA mitigating the security vulnerability associated with long
lines of passengers waiting to be screened at security checkpoints?
Answer. First and foremost, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has made it a priority to deploy measures to
mitigate passenger volume at checkpoints while maintaining our security
effectiveness. TSA has established four lines of effort focused on
maximizing workforce resources: hiring and training to full staffing
levels; partnering with key stakeholders; and expanding TSA Pre3
enrollment in order to mitigate operational impacts over the summer
travel period. Specific efforts include: conserving and strategically
distributing overtime budgets; utilizing additional overtime funding to
support peak operations; seeking Congressional concurrence to
reallocate funding from within TSA to support additional staffing;
aligning and managing staffing to passenger volume; optimizing canine
resources; and hiring and training at an aggressive pace to ensure that
increased staffing levels are reached and maintained for the summer
travel period.
During times of heavy passenger volume, TSA has additional measures
in place to screen passengers waiting in the queue. For example, canine
teams are able to screen passengers in the queue for explosives.
Additionally, Behavior Detection Officers are trained to observe
passengers for suspicious behaviors in line and throughout the public
areas of airports. If these behaviors are observed, law enforcement is
notified for resolution.
Further, following the Brussels attacks, TSA enhanced its Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response presence in and around checkpoints
and public areas nationwide. TSA works closely with state and local law
enforcement, airport authorities, and the aviation industry in order to
augment these types of security measures.
Question 11. Florida is a gateway to the U.S. for visitors from all
over the world and one of America's favorite destinations for family
vacations. Many of these travelers are first time flyers and currently
our airports are experiencing double digit growth. It seems like the
staffing levels are not keeping up with our growth--our security lines
are backing up and creating havoc in our airports. Aside from the
current staffing model, what other resources and technology is your
agency looking to leverage to better manage passenger processing and
wait times to better address efficiency for passengers while at the
same time mitigating national security threats? Has TSA solicited input
from airports and airlines on ways to increase the efficiency of the
screening process, again, to better address efficiency for passengers
while at the same time mitigating national security threats?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
with airline and airport stakeholders to address the wait time issue
without sacrificing security effectiveness. On April 8, TSA hosted the
Chief Operating Officers from the top seven airlines (United, Delta,
American, Southwest, Alaska, JetBlue, and Hawaiian) to collaboratively
understand the threat and TSA volume initiatives, and to develop a
joint mitigation plan for summer volume. Additionally, TSA is
collaborating with airports and airlines to support non-security
screening operations, such as returning bins to the front of waiting
lines, and other non-security related tasks. TSA has formed
Optimization Teams and closely partnered with airlines, airport
authorities, and industry to deliver these types of innovative
measures. TSA is working with the aviation industry to develop airport-
specific actions plans for the Nation's busiest airports.
TSA understands that travel is an important economic driver in the
State of Florida, and we have taken action to mitigate summer volume
issues as much as possible. For example, Miami International Airport
(MIA) is receiving approximately 50 additional new employees, which
they hope to have in place by July. MIA has been authorized to conduct
local training to more quickly onboard the new employees. TSA has also
increased the amount of overtime available to employees at MIA to more
fully staff checkpoints during peak travel times.
Additionally, TSA continues to implement four lines of effort
focused on maximizing workforce resources: hiring and training to
maximum staffing levels, partnering with key stakeholders, and
expanding TSA Pre3 enrollment in order to mitigate operational impacts
over the summer travel period. Specific efforts include: conserving and
strategically distributing overtime budgets, utilizing additional
overtime funding to support peak operations, seeking Congressional
concurrence to reallocate funding from within TSA to support additional
screener resources, aligning and managing staffing to passenger volume,
optimizing canine resources, and hiring and training at an aggressive
pace to ensure that full staffing levels are reached and maintained for
the summer travel period.
For the longer term, TSA is also evaluating the current
technologies available and identifying viable solutions, such as
automated bin return systems, multi-station divesting, and other
technologies, which may increase checkpoint effectiveness and
efficiency. TSA looks forward to working with industry partners to
strengthen security, increase operational efficiency, and improve the
passenger experience.
Question 12. Rather than sending all new hires to the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Georgia, does TSA plan to permit
local training of Transportation Security Officers at their assigned
airports during the busy summer travel season?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains
committed to the centralized delivery of training for all newly hired
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at the TSA Academy, located at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia, as a long-term
strategic objective. However, TSA recognizes that the record passenger
volume anticipated for the upcoming peak summer travel period requires
some flexibility. Therefore, TSA has authorized a limited number of
local new hire training classes for those airports with the greatest
need for additional staff. Simultaneously, TSA will continue to deliver
its new hire training at the TSA Academy to ensure that the maximum
numbers of new hire TSOs are trained. The airports conducting local new
hire training are:
Denver International Airport
LaGuardia International Airport
Detroit Wayne County International Airport
Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
Boston Logan International Airport
Chicago-O'Hare International Airport
Miami International Airport
Honolulu International Airport
JFK International Airport
Las Vegas International Airport
Chicago-Midway International Airport
Los Angeles International Airport
Newark-Liberty International Airport
Guam International Airport
Kona International Airport
Kahului Airport
Lihue International Airport
John Wayne (Santa Ana) Airport
Burbank International Airport
In some cases, new hire classes have been consolidated for
neighboring airports (for example, Los Angeles and Burbank candidates
are attending the same new hire classes). TSA expects to have these
classes complete with 768 locally trained new hire employees in place
by the end of June.
Question 13. As you know, the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001 required that airports invest in explosive detections
system (EDS) security equipment, with the understanding that TSA would
provide reimbursement for airports that complied. While the specific
circumstances vary, in each instance the airports shouldered the
financial burden with the expectation they would be reimbursed for up
to 90 or 95 percent of the allowable costs. More than fifteen years
later, airports across the country remain burdened by the debt incurred
from these purchases, and as a result are unable to invest in other
important projects. Follow up. In the FY 2016 Omnibus Appropriations
legislation, Congress included a provision directing TSA to develop a
process to review and validate reimbursement claims from airports for
in-line baggage screening systems installed prior to 2008 and to submit
a plan, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act,
for reimbursement of validated claims. What is the status of this plan?
Follow up. It is my understanding that the Department's FY 2017 budget
request did not include sufficient funding for creating a reimbursement
plan. Why wasn't this funding request included? Follow up. Can you
ensure that any future reimbursement plan will not negatively impact
other national security priorities?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
currently developing a reimbursement review and validation plan for the
In-Line Baggage Systems constructed without a funding agreement with
the government, as directed by legislation. If the plan is initiated,
TSA estimates a time-frame of up to nine months from receipt of airport
documentation to validate the project cost information and the claim
for reasonable expectation of reimbursement. Future requests for
funding for this plan will be made in concert with the development of
annual budget requests.
In compliance with the requirements established in the 9/11 Act,
TSA prioritizes limited available funding for TSA projects according to
the strength of their contribution towards fulfilling the agency's
mission to protect the Nation's transportation systems. Funding is
allocated within this schedule based on the project's security and
operational benefit, the reduction of risk, and the availability of
funds. TSA has created a funding prioritization schedule for mission
critical projects, while ensuring core functions and prior commitments
are sufficiently funded as the primary driver.
Question 14. Due to a combination of factors, such as long hang-
time and inefficient security screening thru-put, operational costs for
air carriers at small airports in Montana and throughout the Nation are
quite high. These high costs make it difficult for small airports to
attract and retain air service, leading to an overall decline in
accessibility and customer service. Given the existing issues of
maintaining cost-effective air service and sufficient security
screening, what efforts are being taken to account for the additional
costs of implementing 100 percent employee screening, when resources at
small airports are already spread thin?
Answer. Currently, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
has not implemented a requirement for 100-percent employee screening at
any airport, large or small. However, TSA has issued guidance to
airports that employee screening protocols should put employees on
notice that on any given day, any one of them may be subjected to an
inspection.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
Hon. Peter Neffenger
Question 1. At the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, the
security line at peak travel times took an average of 45 minutes and
people were missing their flights. The issues that contributed to this
long wait time were multifaceted: an increase in travel volume, the
consolidated lines at the North Terminal, and training of screeners and
K-9 units. Given the increase in volume and the necessary increase in
security protocols after the findings of the IG report, how is TSA
adapting to ensure that passengers can safely and efficiently go
through screening processes?
Answer. We have made significant changes to our operations at MSP,
and we are seeing results. We filled two additional passenger screening
canine team vacancies in March, bringing their total allocation to six
teams. We have also adjusted our staffing levels during peak times,
converted frontline Transportation Security Officers from part-time to
full-time, authorized additional overtime, and appropriately limited
the number of staff on annual leave during the peak travel season. We
have also given the Federal Security Director the flexibility to use
Behavior Detection Officers to perform other screening functions.
Nationwide, in concert with the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) main focus on maintaining security effectiveness
and resolving all alarms at the checkpoint, a wide variety of
initiatives have been undertaken so that passengers can safely and
efficiently transit the screening process. These initiatives include:
Hiring and training additional Transportation Security
Officers (TSO) at an aggressive pace to staff the Nation's
busiest airports.
Optimizing the use of overtime hours, so that more of the
TSA's budgeted overtime for TSOs is available this summer. TSA
will realign funds from within TSA in order to increase the
resources available for summer overtime.
Deploying Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams to support
peak volumes. TSA is also converting some cargo screening teams
to passenger screening, which will support expedited screening
through the remainder of the year.
Working with airports and airlines to increase throughput at
passenger checkpoints by reducing the number and size of carry-
on items.
Partnering with airports and airlines to conduct flight
scheduling optimization visits at the highest volume airports.
This will allow checkpoint staffing schedules to be better
aligned with airline flight schedules so that passenger volume
is distributed better over time. TSA is also collaborating with
airports and airlines to support non-security screening
operations, such as returning bins to the front of waiting
lines and other non-security related tasks.
Longer term efforts may include:
Partnering with industry and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science & Technology Directorate to develop
innovative solutions to improve passenger flow, queue design,
and increase security effectiveness.
Broadening marketing and outreach efforts for TSA Pre3, to
include:
Media advertising, with a focus on top travel markets,
hotels, rental cars, credit cards, in-flight magazines, in-
flight Wi-Fi, and airport signage.
Targeted messages to frequent travelers who are not yet
enrolled in a Trusted Traveler program.
Offering TSA Pre3 through airline and other corporate
rewards and benefits programs.
Major corporate travel convention presence.
Social media efforts.
Additional corporate and airport mobile and long-term
enrollment centers, including TSA-sponsored events.
Question 2. I understand that TSA is authorized to hire more part-
time screeners, but there is a cap on full time screeners. I know the
number of screeners at MSP has gone down over the last few years as
travel volume has increased. How does the cap impact the TSA's ability
to meet the current demands of airport security and why has there been
a reduction in the number of screeners?
Answer. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) is
currently allocated 630 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) positions, and as
part of the $34 million Congress recently approved TSA to reprogram,
they have been approved for an additional 10 FTE to be used for
increased overtime, or they can hire more Transportation Security
Officers in place of the additional overtime.
The FTE limitation contained in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016
appropriations bill does not affect the ability of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to hire Transportation Security Officers
(TSO). The limitation of 45,000 FTE does not apply to screeners hired
as part-time, and there is no restriction on part-time TSOs moving to
full-time as those positions become available. Rather, the limitation
comes from the amount of available resources--the FY 2016
appropriations bill provides funding sufficient for 42,525 TSOs, which
was above the FY 2016 President's Request, and TSA gained Congressional
approval to realign $34 million from other TSA funding to support
additional screening hours to meet this year's unprecedented summer
surge in passenger traffic.
TSA's budget for the past two years had proposed reductions in TSO
FTE as savings accrued from the implementation of TSA Pre3 and other
risk-based expedited screening programs. These budgets relied on
earlier projections that did not adequately anticipate the recent
passenger growth.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
Hon. Peter Neffenger
Question 1. On March 22 in Brussels, the world was reminded of the
essential, non-negotiable need to protect our airports, subways, and
other critical infrastructure from cowardly, evil acts of destruction.
Congress was fully aware of such threats in August 2007, when it passed
landmark legislation requiring the Department of Homeland Security to
take rigorous, robust action to stem the tide of terrorist threats to
transportation on our shores--including our surface transportation
network. These calls for action required TSA to complete a number of
critical security mandates by August 2008. But now, almost eight years
since the deadline for these efforts, TSA is nowhere near completion of
the necessary actions.
The Implementing Recommendations Act of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 required TSA to take three important actions: (1) ensure all high-
risk target railroads have strong, sufficient security plans; (2)
ensure public transportation agencies, railroads and bus providers have
training standards on security threats and conditions for frontline
employees; and (3) ensure public transportation agencies and railroads
conduct rigorous, name-based security background checks and immigration
status checks on all frontline employees. Unfortunately, TSA has not
met these statutory requirements.
I raised this issue last year at your nomination hearing, but TSA
failed to provide definitive timelines. I raised this issue again in
August after an averted terrorist catastrophe on a train in Europe, and
TSA informed me that the proposed security-planning rule and the
training rule were ``in the final stages of regulatory development''
and were on track to be published ``by the end of Fiscal Year 2016.''
The vetting rule was given a projected time-frame after completion of
the first two rules--which could be years from now. I received a
follow-up response from your office last month, informing me that all
three rules were further delayed: TSA had yet to formally collect
information and data on how to develop a proposed security-planning
rule; the proposed training rule would be published ``in 2016''--which
could be later than the Fiscal Year time-frame I was told in September;
and the vetting and the background check rule remained ``on a slower
track.'' All of these timelines concern proposed rules--not even final
rules.
Overall, it appears the responsibility for completing these rules
will fall on the next administration. This is inexcusable. I recognize
there are some collaborative, consensus-led efforts to achieve the
goals of the 9/11 Act short of actual rules. But Congress required
rules, and after a distressing, disheartening decade of foot dragging
and delay, these rules are nowhere near done. Although many associate
TSA with aviation, whereas these rules concern surface transportation,
our passenger rail systems carry five times as many passengers as
airlines, through a massive nationwide network. It is no less urgent--
and no less within your agency's statutory mandate--that this critical
infrastructure receive attention and protection immediately.
Why has TSA failed so dramatically in carrying out these
requirements? When will TSA finally achieve the results Congress sought
almost a decade ago?
Answer. Please be assured that I share your concern and have asked
my staff for continued updates regarding our work with stakeholders to
ensure the security of the Nation's surface transportation systems. As
you noted, notice and comment rulemaking is a complex, time consuming
process influenced by many factors, including those that are outside of
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) control.
Notwithstanding these challenges, TSA is making progress in meeting the
outstanding 9/11 Act requirements and is currently on track to publish
the security training Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) before the
end of the Fiscal Year. TSA also continues to prioritize the security
plans and vulnerability assessments, proposed regulation and the
security background and immigration checks for frontline employees, and
has identified a path forward that will best position both rules to
satisfy the stringent standards established by the Office of Management
and Budget under Executive Order 12866.
In the interim, TSA has taken numerous actions to ensure that our
transportation hubs have robust security measures in place to protect
the public. Based on continued voluntary compliance by our
stakeholders, we believe the security landscape for high-risk surface
transportation providers is consistent with anticipated future
regulatory requirements. These measures are outlined in detail below.
1. Leveraging grant funding and thorough assessments, TSA has ensured
that high-risk railroads have strong, sufficient security plans.
The 9/11 Act included requirements for security enhancement grants
that are applicable to high-risk public transportation agencies
(including commuter railroads) and Amtrak (secs. 1406 and 1514). Under
the 9/11 Act's requirements, applicants for funding under the Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP) are required to have a current security
plan in order to be eligible to apply for TSGP funds. The act of
applying for a grant serves as the transit system's way of attesting it
has a current security plan, meaning a security plan that has been
updated within the past three years. Additionally, the grant Notice of
Funding Opportunity requires that projects for transit systems that are
seeking funding must be linked back to vulnerabilities identified in
their security plans; otherwise, the project will not be recommended
for funding. Of the 114 eligible transit systems (non-ferry) in the
TSGP including Amtrak, 103 (89 percent) have met these standards as
they have applied for grants. The same requirements have been
consistently applied to the other surface modal grant programs as
required by the 9/11 Act (see sec. 1513 for railroads other than Amtrak
and sec. 1532 for over-the-road bus security assistance).
Between Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and FY 2015, almost $47 million was
awarded through the TSGP and Amtrak grants specifically for security
planning efforts and more than $2.2 million for security planning
efforts through Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP/OTRB).
Between FY 2008 and FY 2011, $4.2 million was awarded through the
Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP) for security planning
efforts. The FRSGP has not been funded since FY 2011.
Our assessments indicate that this funding has resulted in a
significant improvement in security planning efforts. Of the 114
eligible transit (non-ferry) systems eligible under the TSGP, there are
92 systems that have been assessed at least twice through TSA's
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. Security
plans are one of the 17 Security Action Items (SAIs) that TSA assesses
as part of the BASE. As part of the BASE review, a score is derived
from a checklist. Each category is then scored and the BASE score is an
average of all categories. The total aggregate scores for the 92
transit system security plans that have been assessed more than once
have increased by 15 percentage points.
2. With TSA funding and sharing of best practices, TSA has ensured that
public transportation agencies, railroads, and over-the-road bus
providers have training standards on security threats and conditions
for frontline employees.
TSA has ensured that public transportation agencies, railroads, and
over-the-road bus providers have established training standards to
enhance security awareness for frontline employees. For example,
through funding and other support provided by TSA, the American Public
Transportation Association (APTA) has promulgated standards for
security awareness training for transit employees. Both the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
Transportation have funded courses that can be used to meet these
standards. TSA maintains an open discussion with the management of
freight railroads regarding the scope and content of security awareness
training for frontline employees. In addition, TSA has provided
training materials to railroads and allied industries on subjects such
as recognition and identification of improvised explosive devices in
the freight rail environment and how to detect and react to signs of
potential sabotage on and about railroad infrastructure. TSA also
provided guidance to the railroads in January of 2016 during meetings
of the Rail Sector Coordinating Council about suggested training
program content that would comply with the training program elements
outlined in section 1517 of 9/11 Act. TSA's First
ObserverTM security domain awareness program delivers web-
based training to highway professionals, including over-the-road bus
operators, encouraging frontline workers to ``Observe, Assess and
Report'' suspicious activities.
From FY 2006-FY 2015, almost $145 million was awarded through the
TSGP and Amtrak grants specifically for security training and $5.5
million was awarded through the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program
(IBSGP/OTRB). Similarly, from FY 2008-FY 2011, through the FRSGP, $7
million was awarded to support security training conducted by transit
agencies. This funding included a grant awarded to short line railroads
for the expressed purposes of developing interactive security training
programs for frontline employees. Approximately 100,000 individuals
have been trained on the First ObserverTM Program.
Our assessments indicate that the above-referenced grant program
has resulted in a significant improvement in security training. Of the
92 transit systems eligible under the TSGP that have been assessed at
least twice as part of TSA's BASE program, 72 percent (66) have seen
improvements in their training scores, or maintained their current
level of achievement. Additionally, 67 have security training scores
greater than 70 percent. The total average security training scores for
TSGP-eligible systems assessed more than once have increased by 10
percentage points. Class I freight railroads and many of the Class II
railroads have made modifications to their employee security awareness
training programs consistent with requirements under the 9/11 Act.
TSA has also worked directly to improve the security of key
transportation facilities and systems serving commuters in your
congressional district. In addition to providing funding and other
support to rail systems operated by surrounding jurisdictions that
serve Connecticut commuters, both CTtransit and the Connecticut
Department of Transportation (CT DOT) have been eligible for funding
under the TSGP and have received the following allocations based on
their requests:
CTtransit: $720,500 since FY 2009
$483,500 for public awareness
$237,000 for CCTV on buses
CT DOT: $29 million since FY 2006
$2.9 million for K-9 teams
$3.2 million for critical infrastructure protection
$6.7 million for public awareness
$0.5 million for security planning
$1.2 million for interoperable communications
$0.7 million for rail yard security
$13.8 million for fiber optic cable
In addition, TSA has conducted assessments specifically for systems
providing service in Connecticut. Both CTtransit and the Metro-North
Railroad Company have been assessed three times. Both systems have
received Gold Standard awards for achieving overall scores greater than
90 percent during their last assessments. Specific score information is
protected as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). TSA can provide this
information under separate cover upon request.
3. TSA has developed standards for public transportation agencies and
railroads to conduct rigorous, named-based security background checks
and immigration status checks.
In cooperation with the relevant associations (the American Public
Transportation Association and Association of American Railroads), TSA
has developed standards for public transportation agencies and
railroads to conduct named-based background checks. Promulgated in
2011, APTA's recommended practices for ``conducting background
investigations'' reflect the requirements for the scope of background
checks in section 1414 of the 9/11 Act, including redress. Of note, as
publicly owned systems, transit systems are likely to have access to
information for criminal history record checks of public employees that
may not be available to the private industries covered by TSA's
security threat assessment programs. In addition, since enactment of
the 9/11 Act, the E-Verify system has become available to all employers
as a free resource to validate citizenship information on their
employees. Several states require use of E-Verify for all public
employees and contractors, which would include employees of public
transportation systems. BASE data indicates that the average score for
conducting background investigations of employees and contractors has
risen from 87 percent in FY 2010 to 94 percent in FY 2015.
TSA has consistently worked to enhance and maintain the security of
surface transportation and will continue to do so while simultaneously
moving forward with promulgation of the regulatory requirements imposed
under the 9/11 Act.
Question 2. In 2008, with fuel prices soaring, airlines began
imposing new surcharges and ``ancillary'' fees to customers. The most
notable of these fees is the ``bag fee,'' in which airlines charge
customers a $25 or $50 to bring their bag with them--on top of the
fare. Not surprising, savvy customers balked at this nickel and diming
and quickly realized they could avoid the airlines unscrupulous fees
and fares by simply bringing their bag with them on the plane--just
carrying it on.
It appears the airlines' anti-consumer effort could also undermine
security. More passengers carrying on their bags means more bag
screening, which leads to longer lines, more ``soft'' targets, greater
stress on TSA personnel and equipment and resources. I filed an
amendment in this committee in March to require GAO conduct a study of
the impact of bag fees on aviation security--including the economic
losses incurred by waiting in line and whether airlines are paying
their fair share for these increased costs. I am pursuing that in the
FAA bill as well. It may seem like a small issue, but airlines are
making tens of billions from these fees--mostly tax-free--and it
appears we the taxpayers are picking up the tab for the long lines they
have caused.
Do you think the rise of baggage fees could have had an impact on
longer lines and strain on TSA resources?
Answer. Looking at the last nine years of TSA data, the average
ratio of checked bags per passenger declined from a high of 0.81
checked bags per passenger in 2007, prior to the institution of checked
baggage fees, to a low of 0.65 checked bags per passenger in 2015. This
equates to a 20 percent reduction in the amount of checked bags from
2007 to 2015. In 2015, TSA conducted a small scale study of Southwest
Airlines passengers and legacy airline passengers. Data from this study
indicated that Southwest Airlines passengers presented fewer carry-on
items per person for screening than legacy airline passengers and had a
correlating increase in the checked baggage ratio.
Question 3. Last year we saw a major, massive scandal in which it
was revealed how easy it was for undercover TSA teams to get weapons
past TSA screeners.
It was revealed that TSA airport screeners failed to find fake
explosives and weapons in 67 out of 70 tests that were conducted by
undercover Federal agents known as a Red Team--a failure rate of 95
percent.
What reforms have you carried out to ensure this never happens
again?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
implemented a number of near-term steps to address the issues raised by
the covert testing, which is aligned with the 10-Point Plan directed by
Secretary Johnson. These steps include initiatives to ensure leadership
accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase effectiveness and
deterrence, increase threat testing to sharpen officer performance,
strengthen operating procedures and technology, and enhance training.
This included a root cause analysis that identified multiple areas for
improvement, and TSA is mitigating those areas through program action
plans. All of the actions directed in the Secretary's 10-Point Plan are
currently on-schedule or completed.
Most importantly, TSA corrected numerous immediate problems
revealed by the covert testing. TSA established a more aggressive
training plan and retrained the entire workforce with focused Mission
Essentials. TSA has completed two rounds of Mission Essentials and is
currently executing Mission Essentials III, which will last through the
summer. TSA also implemented rapid improvement events for its screening
equipment to include development of improved detection algorithms. All
standard operating procedures were rewritten to reduce and focus
checkpoint operations, and the Administrator's Intent was released to
ensure the organization's main effort remains its transportation
security mission.
[all]
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