    [Senate Hearing 114-406]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-406

           TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: PROTECTING PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT

    =======================================================================

                                     HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 6, 2016

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                       JOHN THUNE, South Dakota, Chairman
    ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi         BILL NELSON, Florida, Ranking
    ROY BLUNT, Missouri                  MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
    MARCO RUBIO, Florida                 CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
    KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire          AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota
    TED CRUZ, Texas                      RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
    DEB FISCHER, Nebraska                BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii
    JERRY MORAN, Kansas                  EDWARD MARKEY, Massachusetts
    DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska                 CORY BOOKER, New Jersey
    RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin               TOM UDALL, New Mexico
    DEAN HELLER, Nevada                  JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               GARY PETERS, Michigan
    STEVE DAINES, Montana
                           Nick Rossi, Staff Director
                     Adrian Arnakis, Deputy Staff Director
                        Rebecca Seidel, General Counsel
                     Jason Van Beek, Deputy General Counsel
                     Kim Lipsky, Democratic Staff Director
                  Chris Day, Democratic Deputy Staff Director
           Clint Odom, Democratic General Counsel and Policy Director

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on April 6, 2016....................................     1
    Statement of Senator Thune.......................................     1
    Statement of Senator Nelson......................................     3
    Statement of Senator Ayotte......................................    29
    Statement of Senator Cantwell....................................    31
    Statement of Senator McCaskill...................................    33
    Statement of Senator Heller......................................    35
    Statement of Senator Gardner.....................................    37
        Letter dated March 25, 2016 to Hon. Cory Gardner from Kim
          Day, Chief Executive Officer, Denver International Airport.    37
    Statement of Senator Peters......................................    40
    Statement of Senator Daines......................................    42

                                   Witnesses

    Hon. Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation Security
      Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security...........     4
        Prepared statement...........................................     6

                                    Appendix

    Hon. Richard Blumenthal, U.S. Senator from Connecticut, prepared
      statement......................................................    47
    Response to written questions submitted to Hon. Peter Neffenger
      by:
        Hon. Deb Fischer.............................................    47
        Hon. Amy Klobuchar...........................................    53
        Hon. Richard Blumenthal......................................    54

           TRANSPORTATION SECURITY: PROTECTING PASSENGERS AND FREIGHT

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2016

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in
    room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Thune,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
        Present: Senators Thune [presiding], Wicker, Blunt, Ayotte,
    Fischer, Moran, Heller, Gardner, Daines, Johnson, Nelson,
    Schatz, Cantwell, McCaskill, Klobuchar, Blumenthal, Markey,
    Booker, Manchin, and Peters.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN THUNE,
                     U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA

        The Chairman. Let's get this hearing underway. We'll be
    joined momentarily by Senator Nelson, who is en route. But let
    me start by welcoming Administrator Neffenger here today.
        Thank you so much for making time for us.
        On March 22, terrorists associated with ISIS detonated
    three bombs in Brussels, two at an airport and one in a busy
    metro car. Thirty-five people, including four Americans, were
    killed in this cowardly attack. The victims of these attacks
    remain in our thoughts and prayers. The threat from ISIS, Al
    Qaeda, and their sympathizers is real, and we must ensure that
    sound policies are in place to enhance security and prevent
    these deadly attacks.
        This hearing will focus on the efforts of the
    Transportation Security Administration to secure surface
    transportation modes. In light of the attacks in Brussels,
    however, we will also address the related challenge of
    safeguarding the areas of airports outside passenger screening
    checkpoints.
        Administrator Neffenger, I understand that you were, by
    chance, in the Brussels airport at the time of the attacks, and
    I hope that you will share your thoughts on the horrific events
    there and how we can prevent and prepare for similar threats. I
    understand your written testimony focuses on rail transit and
    pipeline security, but I hope that you will also share with us
    additional information on how we can improve airport security.
        The TSA must learn from past attacks and also look forward
    to new and emerging threats. Sadly, it is clear that terrorists
    associated with Al Qaeda and ISIS have identified passenger
    rail and transit systems as soft targets. It is critical that
    we not neglect these vital parts of our transportation system
    as we look for ways to improve security.
        Understandably, these open systems cannot be secured in the
    same way as our aviation network. Nevertheless, some of the
    techniques we utilize in the aviation network apply to surface
    assets, as well as areas of the airport on the street side of
    the checkpoint.
        While our best tool in combating terrorist attacks
    continues to be good intelligence, TSA has adopted a multi-
    layer process to identify threats and mitigate security
    concerns. Former Administrator John Pistole strongly promoted
    the risk-based allocation of TSA's resources. I look forward to
    hearing from the Administrator today about his views on the
    risk-based analysis of threats. TSA cannot and should not be at
    every bus stop or every train station. The agency must leverage
    its relationships with state and local officials and address
    the most significant threats with its limited resources.
        Visible security efforts can also make a difference.
    Explosives detection canines and police presence can deter both
    terrorist threats and criminal activity. TSA's support of these
    programs is invaluable. I'd like to hear more about how these
    teams are allocated among airports and other transportation
    systems.
        TSA is also charged with protecting freight transportation
    networks, including ports, freight railroads, and pipeline
    infrastructure. These critical infrastructure networks are
    crucial components of our nation's economy. TSA receives high
    marks from railroad and pipeline operators who work with the
    agency to identify and mitigate threats. Public-private
    security partnerships between the agency and operators have
    been valuable in hardening these networks.
        On the aviation front, Ranking Member Nelson and I have
    been leading oversight of the Commerce Committee of problems
    some airports have had in successfully managing security
    credentials. This oversight led the Committee to approve
    bipartisan legislation, Senate Bill 2361, the Airport Security
    Enhancement and Oversight Act, to tighten vetting of airport
    workers so that those with ties to terrorists and histories of
    serious criminal activity and behavior do not access sensitive
    airport areas.
        Unfortunately, in the current system, such individuals are
    not always captured. Some of the perpetrators in the deadly
    attacks in Brussels were previously known to authorities as
    criminals, and U.S. terrorism experts believe that ISIS is
    recruiting criminals to join its ranks in Europe.
        As we work to address the threat of an aviation insider
    helping terrorists, criminals who break laws for financial gain
    and those with histories of violence are a good place to start.
    Ensuring that airport workers with security credentials are
    trustworthy is especially important, considering that an ISIS
    affiliate is believed to have killed 224 people on a Russian
    passenger plane leaving Egypt with, experts suspect, the help
    of an airport employee.
        The Committee has also approved legislation, H.R. 2843, the
    TSA PreCheck Expansion Act, which would help expand
    participation in the TSA PreCheck application program by
    developing private sector partnerships and capabilities to vet
    and enroll more individuals. As a result, more vetted
    passengers would receive expedited airport screening, which
    would get passengers through security checkpoints more quickly
    and ensure that they do not pose the kind of easy target that
    ISIS suicide bombers exploited at the Brussels airport. I
    believe both of these important measures can and should advance
    in the full Senate this week.
        Administrator Neffenger, thank you for being here today. We
    need strong leadership and decisive action to address this
    terrorist threat. You are faced with a great challenge of
    getting it right every time, when a terrorist just needs one
    opportunity. I look forward to hearing from you about how TSA
    is working to meet that challenge.
        With that, I'd like to recognize our Ranking Member,
    Senator Nelson, for his opening statement.

                    STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In the last 10 years, right after 9/11, 1,900 attacks were
    carried out against transit systems around the world, resulting
    in 4,000 deaths and 14,000 injuries. In aviation, almost 15
    years after 9/11, terrorists are still finding those
    vulnerabilities which the Chairman has noted.
        We have two types of vulnerabilities before us. We have the
    vulnerability of the perimeter of the airport, which was
    addressed in legislation passed last year sponsored by the two
    members at the front of the dais; that allows an Egyptian
    airport employee to sneak in a bomb. Same thing with the gun
    running scheme in Atlanta 2 years ago, that, unbelievably, over
    3 months, 153 firearms were smuggled onto 17 flights, and that
    was in December, the last quarter of 2014. We addressed that in
    this committee in the Airport Security Enhancement and
    Oversight Act of 2015. Hopefully, that is going to be attached
    to the FAA bill.
        But now we have this additional security problem, and that
    is where passengers are bunched up in a soft area, like the
    queued-up lines going through TSA, like the crowded lines at an
    airport check-in counter, like the lines in a bus or train
    station, where people are all huddled up trying to get through
    the security.
        In 2016, less than 2 percent of TSA's total budget and full
    time employees are dedicated to protecting surface
    transportation networks, the bus, the trains, et cetera. And
    while we have yet to suffer a recent attack on a mass transit
    system in the U.S., Brussels is just another reminder of what
    they did in the transit station there.
        TSA can take immediate action by completing the
    recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, which were enacted into
    law in 2007. And, additionally, we have an opportunity to
    improve the law coming up in this current FAA bill with regard
    to the soft targets outside of the security perimeter. So it's
    time to reexamine our transportation security strategy and
    refocus our efforts.
        Mr. Administrator, we thank you for being here today, and
    we look forward to it.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Administrator Neffenger, thanks again for being here, and
    we look forward to hearing your opening remarks, and then we'll
    look forward to asking some questions. So please proceed.

           STATEMENT OF HON. PETER NEFFENGER, ADMINISTRATOR,

                TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

                  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

        Mr. Neffenger. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Thune,
    Ranking Member Nelson, and distinguished members of the
    Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
    today to discuss TSA's critical mission to ensure security of
    our Nation's transportation systems.
        First, let me add my condolences and those of all of the
    professionals at TSA to the victims of the Brussels attacks. As
    you noted, Mr. Chairman, I was at the Brussels airport on the
    day of the bombings. I was there for meetings with a number of
    my European counterparts. We arrived right as the bombs
    detonated. And I will tell you, being there on that day, seeing
    the devastation, and seeing the chaos of the airport
    environment and the evil behind it was a stark reminder of the
    importance of the work that we do at TSA every day to protect
    travelers.
        I've been on the job now for 9 months. When I arrived, I
    was confronted with the disturbing results of the Inspector
    General's covert testing, and I found an organization in
    crisis. But what I also found was an organization of nearly
    60,000 dedicated professionals who are committed to our
    national security mission.
        It was immediately clear to me that while we needed to
    tackle what was wrong, the ingredients and the commitment were
    there to build and evolve what was right. We've come a long way
    in a short time. We've determined the root causes of the
    testing failures. We have retrained our entire work force. We
    have established the first ever full time TSA Academy, and
    we've begun a deep examination of processes and practices
    across the agency.
        Of course, there are challenges we must continue to
    address, both immediate and longer term, but I can assure you
    and the public that we serve that we are focused on our
    counterterrorism mission and are committed to delivering
    excellence in every aspect of what we do. As an integral member
    of a much larger counterterrorism network, TSA employs a range
    of capabilities to understand and track threats to
    transportation; continuously vet travelers and credentialed
    employees; and to deter, detect, and disrupt potential enemies.
        At our checkpoints, for example, we screen an average of 2
    million passengers each day at nearly 440 airports. To improve,
    we are investing heavily in our work force. All of our people
    are being trained with a better understanding of why we do what
    we do and the nature of the threats that we face. And we have
    shifted our focus to security effectiveness and have instituted
    comprehensive training at that new TSA Academy at the Federal
    Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia, an academy that has
    already helped to build a connection to our mission, enhance
    morale, and ensure our employees better understand their role
    in fighting terrorism.
        But recent attacks remind us that terrorist organizations
    remain committed to attacking the global transportation system.
    At present, we have no specific credible intelligence of any
    plot to conduct a similar attack in the United States, but we
    must remain vigilant. These events highlight the important work
    we do with international partners to mitigate risks at last
    point of departure airports, to inspect and assess compliance
    with international standards, and to build international
    capacity in securing passenger and cargo flights bound to the
    United States.
        The attacks in Brussels further highlight the imperative to
    address security beyond airport checkpoints. That's where our
    shared responsibility with partners makes a difference. We work
    with Federal, state, local, and tribal partners to provide law
    enforcement presence throughout airports and surface
    transportation hubs across the nation.
        The resources of countless agencies deliver thousands of
    officers who help to secure our national transportation
    network. TSA's Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program
    provides approximately $45 million each year to law enforcement
    agencies for enhanced law enforcement presence. TSA also
    deploys Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or VIPR,
    teams of integrated TSA and local law enforcement specialists
    to patrol public areas to provide a visible deterrent and
    response capability.
        We are also focused on the insider threat posed by
    employees with access to transportation facilities and
    infrastructure. And in collaboration with stakeholders,
    including the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, we have
    taken a number of actions to enhance security, including
    requiring enhanced criminal history records checks of aviation
    workers, piloting the FBI's Rap Back capability which provides
    continuous criminal background checks, and conducting a
    nationwide vulnerability assessment airport by airport to
    create an expectation that every employee could be stopped and
    inspected every day.
        Securing surface transportation systems is a complex
    undertaking that requires extensive collaboration among
    transportation operators. We support these owners and operators
    in threat awareness, information sharing, the identification of
    vulnerabilities, development of security programs to address
    risks, exercises to assess and improve readiness, and the
    implementation of those security programs. They, in turn,
    invest millions of their own funds to maintain and enhance
    system security.
        Recent attacks remind us that the threat to transportation
    is very real and that our work to ensure freedom and protect
    our Nation is never done. While challenges remain, I can
    confidently and without reservation tell you that we at TSA are
    on the job and intensely focused on protecting the public.
        I will end with a note about the summer travel. The good
    news is a strong economy means more people than ever are
    traveling. This economic health, however, places enormous
    pressure on our transportation systems. In my written testimony
    and our communications with this committee, we've identified
    the immediate steps we are taking to hire, train, and field
    additional frontline workforce and to collaborate with airlines
    and airports to address the expected high volume of travel this
    summer.
        Two key points: Travelers' security comes first, and we
    cannot compromise on protecting travelers. Second, the expected
    volume means there will be longer waits during peak periods,
    and travelers need to be prepared. We will continue to identify
    ways to immediately improve efficiency without compromising
    security.
        Thank you again for your continued support and advocacy for
    TSA and for the men and women on TSA's front lines. I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Neffenger follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Peter Neffenger, Administrator, Transportation
         Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
        Good morning, Chairman Thune, Ranking Member Nelson, and
    distinguished Members of the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
    appear before you today to discuss my vision for the Transportation
    Security Administration's (TSA) role in surface transportation
    security.
        The surface transportation network, consisting of mass transit
    systems, passenger and freight railroads, highways, motor carrier
    operators, pipelines, and maritime facilities, is immense. The New York
    Metropolitan Transportation Authority (NY MTA) alone transports over 11
    million passengers daily--and represents just one of the more than
    6,800 U.S. public transit agencies for which TSA has oversight.
    Securing surface transportation systems in a society that depends upon
    the free movement of people and commerce is a complex undertaking and
    one that requires extensive collaboration with surface transportation
    operators. I have personally witnessed the complex nature of the
    surface transportation network. Recently, I visited the Conrail
    facility in Oak Island, NJ, the New Jersey Transit system, the VIA
    Metropolitan Transit system in San Antonio, TX and the Metropolitan
    Atlanta Regional Transportation Authority system in Atlanta, GA.
        Recent terror attacks on mass transit and passenger rail carriers
    in France and Belgium provide a compelling reminder of the need to
    remain vigilant. While there is no specific, credible terrorist threat
    to the U.S. passenger rail system, the August 2015 incident in France
    and the recent Brussels attacks underscore the need to continue to
    build upon our surface transportation successes through stakeholder
    communication, coordination, and collaboration. Surface transportation
    systems are, by nature, open systems. In the face of a decentralized,
    diffuse, complex, and evolving terrorist threat, TSA responds in a
    nimble fashion, employing cooperative and collaborative relationships
    with key stakeholders to develop best practices, share information, and
    execute security measures to strengthen and enhance the security of
    surface transportation networks.
        Unlike the aviation mode of transportation, direct responsibility
    to secure surface transportation systems falls primarily on the system
    owners and operators. TSA's role in surface transportation security is
    focused on program oversight, system assessments, operator compliance
    with voluntary industry standards, collaborative law enforcement and
    security operations, and regulations. TSA could not accomplish its
    essential counterterrorism security mission without our partners
    voluntarily adopting security improvements and sharing best practices.
    Security and emergency response planning is not new to our surface
    stakeholders; they have been working under Department of Transportation
    (DOT) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) programs and regulations for many
    years. Although DOT's regulations relate primarily to safety, many
    safety activities and programs also benefit security and help to reduce
    risk. In the surface environment, TSA has built upon these standards to
    improve security programs with minimal regulations.
    Federal, State, Local, and Private Capabilities and Operations
        The Nation's surface transportation systems affect the daily life
    of many Americans. Tens of thousands of individual companies and
    agencies operate within the five modes of the surface transportation
    landscape. More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on nearly
    140,000 miles of track carrying essential goods. Eight million large
    capacity commercial trucks and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies
    travel on the four million miles of roadway in the United States and on
    more than 600,000 highway bridges and through 350 tunnels greater than
    300 feet in length. As previously noted, in the mass transit and
    passenger rail mode, more than 6,800 transit agencies represent a wide
    range of systems from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to
    very large multi-modal systems in urban areas. Surface transportation
    operators carry approximately 750 million intercity bus passengers and
    10 billion passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline
    industry consists of approximately 3,000 private companies who own and
    operate more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines transporting natural
    gas, refined petroleum products, and other commercial products that are
    critical to the economy and the security of the United States.
        Securing this vast network requires a group effort. TSA oversees
    the development and implementation of risk-based security initiatives
    for surface transportation in coordination with our security partners.
        TSA, on behalf of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is a
    co-Sector Specific Agency alongside DOT and USCG for the transportation
    sector. DOT and TSA work together to integrate safety and security
    priorities. As part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership
    Advisory Council (CIPAC) framework, TSA, DOT and the USCG co-chair
    Government Coordinating Councils to facilitate information sharing and
    coordinate on activities including security assessments, training and
    exercises. Additionally, TSA leverages its core competencies in
    credentialing, explosives detection, and intermodal security to support
    the USCG as lead agency for maritime security.
        TSA is directly responsible for security at our Nation's airports
    through our checkpoint operations, personnel, and technology. However,
    direct responsibility for securing surface transportation systems falls
    on the owners and operators of those systems. TSA's role is to support
    these owners and operators in the identification of risk, develop
    security programs to address that risk, and help the owners and
    operators implement those security programs.
        TSA's spending on surface transportation realizes a massive return
    on its budgetary investment. TSA's funding resources and personnel
    directly support ongoing security programs by committed security
    partners who, in turn, spend millions of their own funds to secure
    critical infrastructure, provide uniformed law enforcement and
    specialty security teams, and conduct operational activities and
    deterrence efforts. Industry's efforts are fueled by the resources that
    TSA's funding provides. We have invested our resources to help our
    security partners identify vulnerabilities and risk in their agencies.
    Surface transportation entities know their facilities and their
    operational challenges and with their knowledge and our assistance,
    they are able to more accurately direct their own resources in addition
    to the hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal security grant
    funding, to reduce the risk of a terrorist attack. I will go into
    greater detail on the resources and programs that TSA provides later in
    this testimony, but some highlights include facilitating security
    exercises that identify vulnerabilities that can then be addressed
    before an actual event occurs; developing security training programs
    for surface transportation employees; engaging with industry in the
    development of security policy and programs such as best practices and
    security guidelines, which inform and influence industry on how and
    where to spend their security dollars; providing thorough security
    system and program assessments to identify areas that need attention,
    and working with those systems to address those deficient areas to
    raise their security baselines; developing the framework for awarding
    security grant funds, which have totaled over $2.3 billion since Fiscal
    Year (FY) 2006; augmenting local operational deterrence capabilities
    with Federal teams and support; and sharing actionable information in a
    timely fashion, including guidance on ways in which industry can
    enhance their security posture in response to potential threats. TSA
    has achieved these successes by spending approximately 3 percent of its
    budget on surface transportation security. These programs demonstrate
    the collaborative effort among Federal, state, local, and private
    entities to secure surface transportation systems and assets.
        TSA works with state, local, and industry partners to assess risk,
    reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security through collaborative
    efforts. Collaboration between TSA and industry occurs through daily
    interaction and engagement, as well as through formal structures
    including the DHS-led CIPAC framework, Sector Coordinating Councils,
    and other industry-centric organizations such as the Mass Transit
    Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group. TSA, security agencies, and
    the corporate leadership of industry and municipal operator
    stakeholders jointly pursue policies to secure surface systems,
    including implementation of exercises and training, physical and cyber
    hardening measures, and operational deterrence activities.
    Regional Alliance Including Local, State, and Federal Efforts
            (RAILSAFE)
        TSA coordinates with Amtrak and NY MTA to support RAILSAFE
    operations, in which Amtrak police and law enforcement officers from
    Federal, state, local, rail, and transit agencies deploy at passenger
    rail and transit stations and along the railroad rights-of-way to
    exercise counterterrorism and incident-response capabilities. This
    coordinated effort involves activities such as heightened station and
    right-of-way patrols, increased security presence onboard trains,
    explosives detection canine sweeps, random passenger bag inspections,
    and counter-surveillance. RAILSAFE operations are conducted several
    times a year to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable security
    activities. On average, more than 40 states and Canada, and over 200
    agencies participate in RAILSAFE operations. The most recent RAILSAFE
    operation was conducted on March 11, 2016, with more than 1,100
    officers across 180 agencies representing 41 states and Canada
    participating.
    Exercises and Training
        TSA has developed several training and exercise programs to assist
    industry operators in directing their resources and efforts towards
    effectively reducing risk. With the support of Congress, TSA developed
    the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP). TSA
    facilitates I-STEP exercises across all surface modes to help
    transportation entities test and evaluate their security plans,
    including prevention and preparedness capabilities, ability to respond
    to threats, and cooperation with first responders from other entities.
    TSA uses a risk-informed process to select the entities that receive I-
    STEP exercises and updates I-STEP scenarios as new threats emerge to
    ensure industry partners are prepared to exercise the most appropriate
    countermeasures. Since FY 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 I-STEP
    exercises throughout 40 High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs), including
    eight conducted so far this fiscal year, such as motorcoach exercises
    in Los Angeles and Myrtle Beach; mass transit exercises in Houston and
    San Antonio; and maritime exercises in New York City and Washington,
    D.C. Additionally, TSA conducted an I-STEP exercise in Philadelphia in
    August 2015 to help that region prepare for the Papal visit.
        In FY 2015, TSA developed and began utilizing the Exercise
    Information System (EXIS) tool, which examines a surface transportation
    operator's implementation of security measures in the areas of
    prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. EXIS helps
    transportation operators identify areas of strength in an operator's
    security program, as well as those areas that need attention where they
    can then focus or redirect resources, such as security grant funding.
    TSA also is able to provide operators with several resources that can
    improve capability in areas such as training, public awareness
    campaigns, and best practices that other systems have implemented to
    address security concerns. Since program inception, TSA has facilitated
    16 EXIS exercises with stakeholders in HTUAs.
        TSA disseminates training materials and information to stakeholders
    through several avenues. Through the Security Measures and Resources
    Toolbox (SMARToolbox) and other security and public awareness training
    materials, TSA provides surface transportation professionals relevant
    insights into security practices used by peers throughout the industry
    and mode-specific recommendations for enhancing an entity's security
    posture. TSA developed the Surface Compliance Analysis Network (SCAN)
    to analyze daily incidents reported to the Transportation Security
    Operations Center to identify security-related trends or patterns. TSA
    disseminates SCAN trend reports to affected entities, as well as to the
    broader industry for situational awareness. SCAN reports have been able
    to identify incidents that when taken individually may not seem like an
    issue or threat, but when compiled over time and analyzed locally,
    regionally, and nationally, present activities that may be pre-
    operational activity aimed at detecting the response methods and/or
    capabilities of surface transportation systems. The number of similar
    incidents reported in relatively short periods of time indicates the
    intent of a perpetrator(s) to disrupt operations and potentially cause
    damage and injuries. These SCAN trend reports provide insight into
    those potential threats and operations.
        TSA's First ObserverTM security domain awareness program
    delivers web-based training to surface transportation professionals,
    encouraging frontline workers to ``Observe, Assess and Report''
    suspicious activities. Approximately 100,000 individuals have been
    trained on the First ObserverTM Program. Operators have
    credited First ObserverTM Program training in their ability
    to disrupt a potential Greyhound bus hijacking situation in February
    2011. Also in February 2011, a concerned Con-way employee followed
    principles he received from the Program's training to alert authorities
    about inconsistencies regarding chemicals shipped and their intended
    use, which led to the arrest of an individual who was then charged with
    attempting to bomb nuclear power plants and dams along the West Coast,
    as well as the home of former President George W. Bush.
        TSA strongly encourages the use of the If You See Something, Say
    SomethingTM public awareness campaign--which the NY MTA
    created using DHS security grant funding--to make the traveling public
    the ``eyes and ears'' of the transportation systems. Similarly, TSA's
    Not On My Watch program is directed at the surface transportation
    community and designed to make employees of surface transportation
    systems part of awareness programs intended to safeguard national
    transportation systems against terrorism and other threats. TSA also
    works with industry to identify emerging security training needs,
    develop new training modules, and refresh existing training.
        In September 2014, TSA began a program to provide senior-level
    transportation security officials with a detailed exposure to TSA's
    surface security programs and policies. Once a quarter, a senior
    executive from a transportation entity is invited to spend four to six
    weeks at TSA to gain firsthand experience in TSA's counterterrorism and
    risk reduction efforts and foster beneficial relationships between TSA
    and industry stakeholders. Participants in the program have included
    Amtrak, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, NY MTA, and
    the Bay Area Rapid Transit District. Executives from these agencies
    were given a broad exposure to TSA operations in the surface and
    aviation modes, and left with a better appreciation for the scope and
    breadth of the services TSA provides for all modes of transportation.
    The program also allows TSA to use the senior executives as sounding
    boards for potential security programs and policies, to ensure that our
    initiatives not only address their greatest security concerns, but are
    feasible from an operational perspective at the local levels of
    transportation.
    Sector-Specific Programs, Assessments, and Inspections
        TSA performs regulatory inspections on railroad operations, and
    voluntary assessments of systems and operations within all of the
    surface transportation modes to ensure operator compliance with
    security regulations and adoption of voluntary security practices. TSA
    deploys 260 Transportation Security Inspectors for Surface (TSI-S) to
    assess and inspect the security posture of surface entities.
        TSA and its partners in the freight rail industry have
    significantly reduced the vulnerability of rail security-sensitive and
    Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials transported through populous
    areas by reducing urban dwell time. The national rate of observed
    attendance for TIH shipments is greater than 91 percent, with a
    regulatory compliance rate above 99 percent.
        In 2006, TSA established the Baseline Assessment for Security
    Enhancement (BASE) program, through which TSA Inspectors conduct a
    thorough security program assessment of mass transit and passenger rail
    agencies as well as over-the-road bus operators. These inspectors help
    local transit systems develop a ``path forward'' to remediate
    vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessments, and
    identify resources that TSA or other areas of the Federal Government
    can provide to help transit systems raise their security baseline. The
    results of these assessments are analyzed to influence TSA policy and
    development of voluntary guidelines to ensure that our voluntary
    policies and programs are addressing the most critical vulnerabilities
    from a security perspective. TSA performs these voluntary BASE
    assessments with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger
    railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over
    95 percent of all users of public transportation. TSA has conducted
    over 430 assessments on mass transit and passenger rail systems since
    2006. In FY 2015, TSA Inspectors completed 117 BASE assessments on mass
    transit and passenger rail agencies, of which 13 resulted in Gold
    Standard Awards for those entities achieving overall security program
    management excellence. In 2012, TSA expanded the BASE program to the
    highway and motor carrier mode and has since conducted over 400 reviews
    of highway and motor carrier operators, with 98 reviews conducted in FY
    2015. On average, approximately 150 reviews are conducted on mass
    transit and highway and motor carrier operators each year, with
    numerous reviews in various stages of completion for FY 2016.
        TSA also regularly engages transit and passenger rail partners
    through the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG),
    which represents 24 of the largest public transportation systems in the
    United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, and through regular
    monthly and as-needed industry-wide information sharing calls, such as
    calls conducted after the attacks in Paris and Brussels. Our
    participation in forums such as the annual Mass Transit and Passenger
    Rail Security and Emergency Management Roundtable, and our continuing
    work with the PAG enable us to understand the security needs of our
    domestic and international security partners to collaboratively develop
    programs and resources to meet critical needs. We use the PAG as a
    sounding board, in an advisory capacity, as we develop surface
    transportation policies, guidelines, and best practices. Through our
    work with the PAG and the Roundtables, we have restructured how
    security grant funds are awarded to high-risk transportation entities,
    ensuring that the funding priorities address the current threat and
    risks that our transportation providers face. We also developed a list
    of nationally critical infrastructure assets in order to better direct
    Federal and local resources to implement security measures to protect
    those assets. Since FY 2006, over $565 million in Transit Security
    Grant Program funding has been awarded for security projects
    specifically to harden these critical assets. We have also been able to
    enhance and refine the ways and timeframes in which we share threat and
    intelligence information, through mechanisms such as Security Awareness
    Messages, and regular as-needed industry information sharing and
    intelligence conference calls. TSA also hosts classified briefings for
    cleared industry stakeholders when warranted.
        TSA has established a productive public-private partnership with
    the pipeline industry to secure the transport of natural gas,
    petroleum, and other products. TSA conducts both physical and corporate
    security reviews (CSR) within the pipeline sector, with over 400
    physical security reviews of critical facilities of the highest risk
    pipeline systems completed since 2008 and over 140 corporate security
    reviews of high-risk systems since 2002. TSA completed six CSRs in FY
    2015; four have been completed in FY 2016 with an additional four
    scheduled for completion by the end of the fiscal year. The
    Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (110-
    53) required TSA to develop and implement a plan for inspecting the
    critical facilities of the top 100 pipeline systems in the Nation. TSA
    conducted these required inspections between 2008 and 2011 through the
    Critical Facility Inspection program and is now focused on regular
    recurring reviews through TSA's Critical Facility Security Review
    (CFSR) program. TSA completed 46 CFSRs in FY 2015; 21 have been
    completed in FY 2016 with 16 more expected to be completed by the end
    of the fiscal year.
        TSA has developed pipeline security guidance with the assistance of
    pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline industry trade
    association representatives, and government partners. Widespread
    implementation of this guidance by the pipeline industry has enhanced
    critical infrastructure security throughout the country. TSA is
    currently working with stakeholders to update these guidelines. There
    has been an increase in the quality of the company corporate security
    programs reviewed during CSRs, as the guidance has served as a template
    for establishing a corporate security program including a Corporate
    Security Plan. For pipeline critical facilities reviewed during CFSRs,
    there has been an increase in the number of facilities conducting
    security drills and exercises, an increase in coordination with local
    law enforcement agencies, and an increase in the number of facilities
    conducting security vulnerability assessments, all of which are
    recommended practices in the Guidelines.
        The United States imports more petroleum from Canada than any other
    nation, much of it through pipelines. TSA has worked closely with
    Canadian security counterparts to develop an effective capability to
    secure the U.S.-Canadian pipeline network. TSA and the Canadian
    National Energy Board coordinate closely on pipeline security matters
    to include the exchange of information on assessment procedures,
    exercises, and security incidents. Since 2005, TSA and Natural
    Resources Canada have cosponsored the International Pipeline Security
    Forum, an annual two-day conference that enhances the security domain
    awareness of hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators and
    provides opportunities for discussion of major domestic and
    international pipeline security issues. The Forum enhances government
    and industry pipeline security domain awareness, increases information
    sharing including industry threat information, provides opportunities
    for discussion of major domestic and international pipeline security
    issues, and improves effectiveness of TSA stakeholder outreach efforts
    promoting agency pipeline security initiatives including physical and
    cyber security, security exercises, and other best practices. It
    presents a unique opportunity for TSA to directly engage with a large
    number of hazardous liquids and natural gas pipeline industry personnel
    as well as key government and law enforcement partners. Approximately
    160 attendees, including pipeline system owners and operators, pipeline
    related trade associations, representatives and officials from the U.S.
    and Canadian governments, and members of the security, intelligence and
    law enforcement communities from the U.S., Canada, and abroad,
    participate in the Pipeline Security Forum.
        Beginning in 2004, and also with Congressional support and
    authorization, TSA expanded the National Explosives Detection Canine
    Team Program to include mass transit/passenger rail systems and
    ferries. Currently, 172 surface and intermodal canine teams are
    deployed to high-risk systems.
        TSA and the USCG jointly administer the Transportation Worker
    Identification Credential (TWIC) program, which provides a uniform,
    industry-wide, biometric, tamper-resistant credential issued following
    successful completion of a TSA-conducted security threat assessment
    (STA). Following successful completion of the STA and payment of
    relevant fees, eligible maritime workers are provided a tamper-
    resistant biometric credential that permits unescorted access to secure
    areas of port facilities and vessels regulated by the USCG. These
    security benefits are most fully realized when the credential is used
    in conjunction with readers that can provide electronic verification.
        TSA is responsible for enrollment, STAs, systems operations and
    maintenance related to TWICs, and inspections to ensure TWICs used for
    access are valid and offered by the person to whom the credential was
    issued. The USCG is responsible for establishing and enforcing access
    control standards including requirements for TWIC readers at regulated
    facilities and vessels. Since deployment of the TWIC program in 2007,
    TSA has conducted comprehensive STAs and issued TWICs to over 3.5
    million workers while identifying and preventing approximately 50,000
    TWIC applicants who did not meet the required security standards from
    receiving a TWIC. In 2014, TSA implemented TWIC ``OneVisit,'' which
    allows workers to be able to enroll for a TWIC and have their TWIC
    issued to them via mail without returning to the enrollment center.
    This was a significant accomplishment to alleviate the burden to
    industry and workers while maintaining security of the biometric
    credential.
    Securing Surface through Grants
        TSA provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with
    subject matter expertise to assist in the development of the Notice of
    Funding Opportunities for Surface Transportation Security Grant
    Programs. These FEMA grants support surface transportation risk
    mitigation by applying Federal funding to critical security projects
    with the greatest security effects. Between FY 2006 and 2015, over $2.3
    billion in transportation security grant funding was awarded to freight
    railroad carriers and operators, over-the-road bus operators, the
    trucking community, and public mass transit owners and operators,
    including Amtrak, and their dedicated law enforcement providers. One-
    hundred million dollars was appropriated in FY 2016 for mass transit,
    passenger rail, and motor coach security grants, which are currently in
    the application process. Applications are due April 25, 2016, and DHS
    expects to announce final award allocations on June 29, 2016.
        TSA reviews the grant program framework and makes recommendations
    to FEMA, ensuring funding priorities are based on identified or
    potential threat and vulnerabilities identified through TSA assessment
    programs such as the BASE program, together with consideration of
    potential consequences. For instance, in 2007, TSA's review of the
    industry scores in the training category of the BASE assessments
    indicated a potential vulnerability, and TSA addressed the
    vulnerability by modifying the Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) to
    prioritize frontline employee training. In FY 2011, TSA's review of
    BASE scores and discussions with industry revealed that vulnerabilities
    at nationally critical infrastructure assets were not being addressed
    at all, or as quickly as they could be. TSA worked with FEMA to
    overhaul the TSGP framework to prioritize these assets (``Top Transit
    Asset List'') for funding through a wholly competitive process. As a
    result over $565 million has been awarded to protect these assets,
    resulting in over 80 percent of them being considered secure from a
    preventative standpoint.
        As a result of information gained from TSA activities, DHS is able
    to direct grant funds to activities that have the highest efficacy in
    reducing the greatest risk, such as critical infrastructure
    vulnerability remediation, equipment purchases, anti-terrorism teams,
    mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams, training,
    drills and exercises, and public awareness campaigns. For example, the
    NY MTA has received $17 million in public awareness funding that helped
    create the If You See Something, Say SomethingTM campaign,
    which was credited with preventing a potential terrorist event in Times
    Square in New York City. Over $276 million in grant funds have been
    used to hire over 520 specialty transit law enforcement officers in the
    forms of K-9 teams, mobile explosives detection screening teams, and
    Anti-Terrorism Teams. Transit systems in major cities including New
    York City, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles use these grant-
    funded teams and patrols not only to conduct regular operations, but
    also to provide extra local security and deterrence in response to
    attacks across the world, including the recent attack in Brussels.
    Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) Teams
        Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) operations
    promote confidence in and protect the Nation's transportation systems
    through targeted deployment of integrated TSA assets, utilizing
    screening and law enforcement capabilities in coordinated activities to
    augment security of any mode of transportation. VIPR teams consist of
    Federal Air Marshals, Behavior Detection Officers, Transportation
    Security Specialists-Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors and
    canine teams who work closely with Federal, state, and local law
    enforcement partners and stakeholders in the aviation and surface
    transportation sectors. TSA VIPR Teams are deployed at the request of
    and in coordination with stakeholder partners. Deployments are
    coordinated with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement and
    industry security partners throughout the United States to augment the
    visible presence of these law enforcement stakeholders who exercise
    primary jurisdiction in responding to transportation security needs.
    Following the recent terrorist attacks in Brussels, Belgium, the
    capability was invaluable to the surface transportation sector in
    providing a visible deterrent, as well as an armed response capability.
        Since the November 2013 shooting at the Los Angeles International
    Airport in which a Transportation Security Officer was killed, TSA has
    deployed VIPR teams 60 percent of the time in the aviation mode and 40
    percent in surface modes. In FY 2015, TSA VIPR teams conducted 12,024
    operations, including 7,257 (60 percent) in aviation mode venues and
    4,757 (40 percent) in surface mode venues. The VIPR program has a
    nationwide footprint, with the 31 VIPR teams based in 20 Office of Law
    Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service field offices.
        The VIPR program has updated its concept of operations to establish
    and implement a framework for risk-based assessment of potential
    deployment locations, allow for flexibility based upon the most current
    intelligence and threat, provide scheduling parameters to enhance risk
    mitigation, and further enable measurement of performance and
    effectiveness. The VIPR program is an excellent example of
    collaboration among Federal, state, local, and industry partners,
    leveraging existing resources to provide enhanced detection
    capabilities and a visible deterrent to terrorist activity.
    Cybersecurity
        TSA supports DHS cybersecurity efforts based on the National
    Institute of Standards and Technology cybersecurity framework,
    including within surface modes. The cybersecurity framework is designed
    to provide a foundation industry can implement to sustain robust
    cybersecurity programs, and TSA shares information and resources with
    industry to support adoption of the framework. TSA also provides a
    cybersecurity toolkit designed to offer the surface transportation
    industry an array of available no cost resources, recommendations, and
    practices. Additionally, within the pipeline sector, TSA is
    coordinating a voluntary cyber-assessment program with the Federal
    Energy Regulatory Commission to conduct cybersecurity assessments of
    pipeline entities. TSA works closely with the pipeline industry to
    identify and reduce cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including through
    classified briefings to increase awareness of the threat. TSA's efforts
    in cybersecurity are critical to securing surface transportation modes
    from cyber intrusions.
    Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
        TSA has worked diligently to implement the requirements of the
    Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Public
    Law 110-53). Under my leadership, TSA has prioritized the few remaining
    outstanding requirements of the Act. These mandates include the
    issuance of regulations relating to security training (Sections 1408,
    1517, and 1534) and security planning and vulnerability assessments
    (Sections 1405, 1512, 1531), as well as establishment of a program to
    complete name-based background and immigration checks for public
    transportation and railroad employees (Sections 1411 and 1520). TSA is
    making significant progress on all of these rulemakings and continues
    to dedicate substantial time and resources towards this effort. TSA
    will continue its prioritization of these rules notwithstanding the
    complexity and time consuming nature of the rulemaking process.
    Conclusion
        TSA is dedicated to securing the Nation's transportation systems
    from terrorist activities and attacks. Through its voluntary programs
    and minimal regulations, TSA mitigates security challenges faced by an
    open-by-nature surface transportation system in collaboration with our
    industry and government partners. I am focused on improving surface
    transportation security through the development and implementation of
    intelligence-driven, risk-based policies and plans, and I appreciate
    the Committee's support of TSA's goals. Thank you for the opportunity
    to discuss these important issues.

        The Chairman. Thank you, Administrator Neffenger. As you
    mentioned--and, of course, you were there--the Brussels attack
    was directed at aviation infrastructure, but it wasn't just an
    attack on that. It was also the metro car, as we mentioned,
    between stations which killed 13 people and injured a lot more.
    Rail and transit are very open systems, much like the non-
    sterile areas of airports, and could easily be perceived as
    soft targets.
        How have you communicated with surface transportation
    operators about the potential for a Brussels-like attack on a
    U.S. transportation system, and do you believe that transit
    systems and passenger railroads, in particular, are prepared
    for an attack like the tragic events in Brussels?
        Mr. Neffenger. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question.
    That's a question that's been on everyone's minds, certainly
    since the Brussels attacks. But I will tell you it has been on
    our minds for a long time, and it's one of the fundamental
    questions that we've asked ourselves across the surface
    transportation world for quite a number of years.
        I will tell you that there's a--it starts, really, with
    good intelligence. And, as you know from the briefing that we
    gave this committee earlier this month, there's an extensive
    network of intelligence professionals focused on the
    transportation threats on all modes of transportation. So it
    really begins with an assessment of what we think the current
    threats are, who the potential groups are that would deliver
    those threats, and, more importantly, who the individuals are
    that might be moving through the system that might provide a
    particular threat.
        The next step, of course, is to identify the
    vulnerabilities across the system, and we've worked very
    closely with our partners across the systems. I've spent quite
    a bit of time over the 9 months I've been on board meeting with
    police chiefs, transit professionals, transit authority
    directors to look at the types of systems that we have in
    place.
        I've been very encouraged by what I've seen. There is an
    extensive network of law enforcement professionals and security
    professionals arrayed across the system that really leverage
    the investment that we make from TSA to establish a very high
    level of security standards across the system, an awareness of
    what's going on. There's a great deal of shared intelligence
    and a lot of sharing of best practices, and we help facilitate
    many of the groups and teams that get together to do that.
        So while any open system is by definition at risk, I think
    that there is a great deal being done to ensure that we reduce
    that risk and we understand how that risk might present itself.
        The Chairman. Just as a follow up to that, less than 2
    percent of the president's budget request for TSA was directed
    to the security of surface transportation. I know we all
    understand that the threats to the aviation sector are very
    real. But as a follow up, do you believe in terms of the
    resource allocation that the TSA is doing enough to ensure the
    security of passengers on our railroads and transit systems?
        Mr. Neffenger. I think that we've been able to, as I said,
    leverage thousands of professionals across the country, and you
    have some superb local and state law enforcement entities that
    are doing work in that sector, whether it's the Amtrak Police,
    the New York City Transit Police, the New Jersey Transit
    Police, and so forth. There are more than I can mention. So
    we've done that.
        I think that if you're asking an operator if he would put
    more resources to use, yes, I would. And what I would do is I
    would put them to use in support of those entities that are
    doing really good efforts out there. We coordinate with them,
    we integrate our teams with their teams, and we work to
    increase our ability to understand what might be happening out
    there, understanding the threats and the vulnerabilities, and
    then share that information in a way that allows us to deploy
    our resources most effectively.
        The Chairman. Yesterday, Homeland Security Secretary
    Johnson endorsed a new proposal by Senate Democrats to double
    the number of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or
    VIPR, teams nationwide from 30 to 60. By contrast, the
    president's Fiscal Year 2016 budget request called for the
    elimination of two VIPR teams and 23 related positions. In your
    written testimony, you note that TSA's VIPR program, which
    operates in both aviation and surface transportation venues,
    has updated its concept of operations to focus on risk-based
    deployments.
        The question is: Have the events of the last two months
    since the budget was released convinced the administration that
    doubling of the VIPR program is needed to address current
    threats?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I appreciate the attention that
    Congress is giving to TSA resources, and I will tell you this,
    Mr. Chairman. If I were to receive more VIPR teams, I would be
    able to put them to use, and I would put them to use across the
    transportation system. I would be able to deploy them more
    effectively with our partners in the surface world and would
    deploy them to more public areas of our aviation environment.
        The Chairman. Let me just ask one last question here. In
    the past year and a half, we have seen repeated abuses of
    airport SIDA badges that grant airport workers access to the
    secure areas of the airport. These are badges that are used by
    airport and airline workers to bypass TSA screening checkpoints
    and, in this case, facilitate criminal activities like gun and
    drug smuggling. These incidents have raised a lot of questions
    about whether our airports are vulnerable to an insider threat.
        As I mentioned earlier, in response, along with our
    committee members, Senators Nelson, Ayotte, Cantwell, Johnson,
    and Klobuchar, we have introduced the Airport Security
    Enhancement and Oversight Act to help counter some of these
    aviation insider threats by improving the vetting,
    credentialing, and inspections of airport workers. Do you think
    it's important to update and expand the criminal background
    checks and random inspections of airport workers that have
    access to the secure areas of an airport?
        Mr. Neffenger. Mr. Chairman, thanks for that question. As
    you know, that's been a big concern over the time that I've
    been here and as I came in. It was on the heels of the incident
    in Atlanta and some other concerns. As you noted in your
    opening statement, we've had some of those same concerns with
    respect to the attacks overseas.
        So I'm very pleased and happy that Congress has given us
    the support that they have. So I think you're right to focus on
    that. The additional access--I know this committee, in
    particular, was very supportive of our access to additional
    TIDE categories. That's made a huge difference for us in terms
    of recurrent vetting. I'd like to see us fully implement the
    FBI Rap Back program before the end of this Fiscal Year so that
    we can do continuous recurrent criminal vetting, and I think
    anything we can do to tighten the oversight of the insider
    population to verify their trusted status, I think, is worth
    doing.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I want to take the
    opportunity, particularly, to tell our Democratic members of
    the Committee that, apparently, we just received word that
    there has been an agreement on the tax issue, and, therefore,
    if that is true, when we get to the floor in just 35 minutes,
    it looks like we're going to be able to proceed without that
    controversy that previously we had known about. So we ought to
    be able to get on to the bill.
        I want to just piggy back on a couple of the points raised
    by the Chairman. The gun running scheme showed tremendous
    vulnerability, especially in 300 airports in the country, and
    lo and behold, only two up to that point, only two, had a
    perimeter security where they had reduced to a handful the
    number of entry points and had the adequate checking of the
    badges to make sure the airport employee was who they said they
    were, as well as checking in machines the stuff that they
    brought in, things that were not done in Atlanta that allowed
    over 100 guns to be transported into the airport. Then the
    employee goes up into the sterile area, into the men's
    restroom, and transfers the weapons to a passenger who has come
    through security.
        Atlanta has now complied, so that's Atlanta, Miami,
    Orlando. What about the rest of the 297 airports nationwide?
        Mr. Neffenger. Senator, I had exactly the same question. It
    was a wake-up call for Atlanta, and, as you noted, they've put
    a lot of measures in place, both the private sector----
        Senator Nelson. But what about the other 297?
        Mr. Neffenger. So earlier this year, I ordered a detailed
    vulnerability assessment across the entire system for those
    other airports that you mentioned. The results of that
    assessment are coming in this month. The purpose of that
    assessment was to answer that very specific question: First and
    foremost, what have you done, but what's the nature of your
    insider population? Who are the employers? What are they doing?
        Senator Nelson. Right. That's the question. What's the
    answer?
        Mr. Neffenger. The answer is that there has been a lot of
    movement in terms of reducing security access points across the
    system. There's been a lot of movement to greatly enhance the
    oversight of that insider population, both by TSA as well as by
    the employers.
        Senator Nelson. A lot of movement. Such as?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, what I'm going to have to provide to
    you in the report is--once we evaluate all of these that are
    in, then that's going to drive us to add requirements into the
    aviation security, airport security plans, for each of those
    airports to take the best practices that we're finding from
    Miami, from Orlando, from Atlanta and to drive those into the
    other airports across the country. I was concerned that we
    hadn't had a lot of specifics on that.
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, the best practices are
    obvious. You have to check the airport employees. So is your
    testimony today that nothing has been done?
        Mr. Neffenger. No, sir. That's not my testimony. We have
    done quite a bit. We are checking. TSA itself has increased the
    number of inspections of employees by fivefold just in the past
    5 months, and we do that ourselves, which is consistent----
        Senator Nelson. But you don't have enough resources.
        Mr. Neffenger. And then the airports themselves----
        Senator Nelson. You've got to get the airports to do it.
        Mr. Neffenger. And they are doing that, airport by airport.
        Senator Nelson. Well, then give us the report.
        Mr. Neffenger. That's coming your way, sir, because we're
    evaluating--I wanted to give you good specifics from the
    vulnerability assessments that we conducted so that I could
    give you specific answers airport by airport to exactly the
    question you're asking. And those are all due--this week is the
    deadline for getting those in, and we'll compile that report,
    and we'll get it to the Committee so that you have it.
        Senator Nelson. Why couldn't that have been done in time to
    report to this committee, since that was such an obvious
    question that you were going to be asked?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I think the answer I would have to
    that is that I didn't have, I felt, adequate specifics to
    satisfy this committee on the specific measures taken. So
    that's why we went back, and I ordered a very specific
    vulnerability assessment airport by airport. It was done on a
    very short timeframe. It was done in conjunction with the
    recommendations from the Aviation Security Advisory Committee,
    and it was done in a way that ensured that I could give very
    specific answers and, more importantly, provide very specific
    direction with respect to the requirements that we're going to
    put in place.
        That said, we have greatly enhanced the oversight, and
    airports have greatly enhanced their oversight already. So it's
    not as if nothing has been done. I just wanted to know exactly
    what it has been so that we can ensure consistency across the
    entire system.
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, you have a sterile--
    sterling reputation. It's not sterile. It's sterling. You have
    a sterling reputation. But that's an insufficient answer to a
    problem that has been begging now for two years. And the only
    person who's going to get the airports off their duff to limit
    the access into their airports is going to be you and your
    administration.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. And I realize that you can say you have a
    specific jurisdiction of requiring security checks on who's
    going on the plane, but what about the stuff that may be going
    on the plane, which is getting at the same thing? And,
    therefore, you've got to go a different perimeter.
        Mr. Neffenger. And we do that. I'm sorry if I've given the
    impression that nothing is happening. That's not at all true.
    We have greatly enhanced our oversight of cargo screening
    facilities, of the catering facilities. So there are a number
    of measures--quite a few measures that have been put in place.
    I'll provide a specific outline of those for the record.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                         TSA Catering Security Measures
        Catering security measures require inspection of catering
            carts, materials, and supplies, either prior to being loaded on
            the aircraft, or prior to be loaded on a sterile delivery
            vehicle that will service the aircraft.

        At non-U.S. locations, these TSA catering measures are
            layered on top of measures required by the host government. At
            certain higher risk locations, TSA requires a more stringent
            inspection of all catering carts, materials, and supplies,
            which must be continuously monitored from the time they are
            assembled for a particular flight until they are loaded onboard
            the aircraft.

        Any individual performing a TSA-required catering security
            measure must be either a direct employee or an authorized
            representative of the air carrier, and cannot be an employee of
            the catering company.

        Any individual performing any TSA-required catering
            security measure for a U.S. air carrier must have an airport
            Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) ID at a U.S.
            locations, or a Security Restricted Area (SRA) ID at a non-U.S.
            location. This requirement ensures the individual has received
            a stringent background check. Additionally, each individual's
            name must be compared to the most recent No Fly and Selectee
            Lists.

        Any individual performing any TSA-required catering
            security measure for a foreign air carrier must have a 10-year
            employment history check, with the most recent 5 years of
            employment verified by the foreign air carrier.

        TSA issued a change to the Aircraft Operator Standard
            Security Program (AOSSP) in August 2015. This change added
            additional measures that cover provisioning of aircraft with
            beverages and supplies that come from airline storage areas
            rather than catering faculties.

        TSA issued an Information Circular (IC) in May of 2016
            advising all air carriers to implement increased monitoring and
            oversight of personnel conducting catering security measures to
            ensure they comply with proper procedure.
                                     ______

                             Air Cargo 101 Briefing
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        Mr. Neffenger. But it's oversight of the caterers, the
    catering facilities, and the way in which they inspect the
    catering carts. It's oversight of the cargo, the way in which
    that cargo is inspected, the multiple steps by which we're now
    inspecting cargo that wasn't done before, the amount of
    security perimeter checks that are being done that weren't done
    before, the reduction in the security perimeter entrances into
    each of those airports that are covered by airport security
    plans. So a lot has been done.
        What I was referring to was I wanted to give a very
    specific detail of that to you airport by airport, and I went
    back and asked for much more detail so that I could outline it
    specifically and then move that into the required security
    plans in an official and directed way.
        Senator Nelson. All right. I'll just close, Mr. Chairman,
    by saying this. It's pretty simple. You lessen the number of
    entry points like Atlanta had, over 100, down to a handful, and
    you check the employees going through. You can't do that just
    as TSA. You've got to get the airports to do that, and that's
    the report that we want to see in our oversight capacity.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        Senator Nelson. How many airports of the 300 following the
    lead of Miami, which did it 10 years ago, have done this, to
    watch so that something like Egypt and the Russian airliner
    doesn't happen here?
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson. I couldn't agree
    more, and I think it points out the need for Senate Bill 2361,
    which I hope we can move. But as you can tell, this is an
    issue; we screen passengers getting on planes, but there are so
    many examples now of airport workers with badges that are
    committing criminal acts, and this is an area that I think
    we've just got to shore up. So thank you, Senator Nelson.
        Senator Ayotte?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. KELLY AYOTTE,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE

        Senator Ayotte. Thank you, Chairman, and I, too, want to
    add that I hope that with the FAA reauthorization on the floor
    that we will get the Airport Security Enhancement and Oversight
    Act perhaps added to that, because I think it makes a lot of
    sense to do that in light of some of the concerns that we have
    in this committee and the broad support in this committee for
    that bill.
        But I wanted to follow up on this issue as well, on the
    angle of--we know that one of the things that came to light
    that was of deep concern as we thought about the airport
    workforce was that there were 73 individuals that the Inspector
    General had identified with reported--some ties to terrorism or
    issues of concern. And as a result of that, we learned that, in
    fact, TSA was not getting access to the real-time information
    from the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, or TIDE,
    data to help inform your vetting of these employees that were
    having access to the airport.
        So I wanted to get an update on where we are in terms of
    you getting access to the information that you need, not only,
    as Senator Nelson has identified, the materials that are being
    brought, to make sure people are inspected, but what
    information you have access to that you know about these
    individuals who have access at the airport that your average
    person doesn't have, obviously.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, Senator, thank you for the question.
    As I noted earlier, this committee was very supportive in
    asking for that access, and I'm pleased to report that we now
    have access to all of the categories that we need to ensure
    that we're vetting people continuously against those TIDE
    categories. That's allowed us to more effectively screen the
    credentialed population on a daily basis.
        Senator Ayotte. And so that's going smoothly?
        Mr. Neffenger. It is, yes, ma'am.
        Senator Ayotte. Very good. I'm glad to hear that. I wanted
    to ask about a bill that Congress passed in December of 2014. I
    also serve on the Homeland Security Committee, and this bill
    was one that I supported, the Transportation Security
    Acquisition Reform Act. This is legislation that required TSA
    to implement best practices and improve transparency with
    regard to technology acquisition programs, because there have
    been a number of difficulties, challenges, and failed programs
    that haven't come to fruition that prompted Congress to pass
    this bill.
        So I wanted to get an update on where you were in terms of
    greater accountability on TSA's acquisition practices as well
    today.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, that was a particular interest of mine
    as well when I came in, and I had dealt with acquisition reform
    in the Coast Guard before coming to TSA. So I wanted to pay
    particular attention to the way in which we conducted
    acquisition. One of the first things I did when I came on board
    last July was to ask the Defense Acquisition University to come
    in and do a top to bottom review of our acquisition programs
    and the way in which we conduct them and to look, particularly,
    for any gaps or process improvements that we could make.
        They've just provided that report to me. It took them about
    four and a half months or so to do that. I'm very pleased with
    that report. We're now comparing those requirements against the
    requirements of the Acquisition Reform Act, and we're making
    process improvements as we go.
        What I'd like to do is--I've got a report that we're
    compiling now for the Committee that will show the steps that
    we can take, I think, that will dramatically improve our
    accountability, our oversight, as well as the ability to
    actually field capability when we need it.
        Senator Ayotte. Right. I mean, obviously, that's the key
    because a lot of the work before wasn't fielding capability
    and----
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, and that's my big concern.
        Senator Ayotte.--and of spending dollars with no result.
    And so I would love for us to receive that report so that we
    can understand where we stand with it and what further action
    that we can support you on to really improve the acquisition
    process, because that's critical as you think about your
    mission and making sure that we have everything functioning
    with our security system.
        I also wanted to just ask about the Managed Inclusion
    issue. As I understand it--and I'm pleased that this has
    happened--you've discontinued Managed Inclusion 2----
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, I have.
        Senator Ayotte.--which is, I think, very smart and logical
    in light of the purpose of your agency and security concerns. I
    just wanted to follow up that the app that was being used that
    certainly came under some criticism was an app that--I
    understand this app essentially was--some reports that it was
    $1.4 million for using it. So I'm assuming you don't need this
    app anymore now that you've discontinued the Managed Inclusion
    2. ` Mr. Neffenger: We are not using that app.
        Senator Ayotte. Was that one of those which would be an
    example where maybe we shouldn't have purchased that? It seems
    like a waste of dollars to me.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I've looked at that, and it wasn't--
    there was a lot more involved in that contract. It apparently
    was an IBM contract from 2013, and that covered--that $1.4
    million apparently covered quite a few components or things. So
    the actual app was significantly less costly than that,
    somewhere in the thousands. Nonetheless----
        Senator Ayotte. We didn't need it.
        Mr. Neffenger. Nonetheless, it is not an app we're using
    anymore, and what I will tell you is that I have great concern
    over the way in which we are spending our contracting dollars,
    the way in which we are spending our acquisition money. That's
    why I did a complete review of the acquisition program. I think
    we can build more controls and more process improvements into
    it so that I can get capability out there that is at the lowest
    cost to the taxpayer but actually produces things that we
    really need.
        Senator Ayotte. Well, good. I appreciate your focus on
    this, because to me, this is critical as we think about the
    things we do need to do at our airports that require resources
    and so not to waste resources on things we don't need.
        Mr. Neffenger. I couldn't agree more.
        Senator Ayotte. So I appreciate it. Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Ayotte.
        Senator Cantwell?

                   STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
                      U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Neffenger, it's good to see you again. Many of us
    participated in a closed door briefing that you gave us prior
    to the Brussels attack, and I thought it was a pretty poignant
    briefing. I think that even post-Brussels, it probably is
    important, Mr. Chairman, to do another one of those maybe in
    conjunction with Homeland Security or separate as the focus on
    aviation needs to continue.
        I wanted to ask you, Mr. Neffenger--you know, I come from a
    border state, and a lot of traffic moves between the U.S. and
    Canada, and we've always held the position that we have to have
    incredible security. In fact, one of our border agents caught
    the millennial bomber as he was on his way to come to the
    United States to either blow up LAX or whatever his mission
    was. But a Customs border person caught that individual.
        So we're very well aware of security, but we're also very
    poignantly aware of efficiency. We need both. We need both in
    our system, and we know that as a border state because of the
    amount of slowdown. So my point is that Sea-Tac is the fastest
    growing hub in the country and has experienced growth rates of
    7 percent in 2014, and 13 percent in 2015. We've had this map
    of planning for Sea-Tac which was to handle 19 million
    passengers, and last year, we had 42 million passengers. So we
    had a plan for 19, and we just had 42, so we have a problem at
    Sea-Tac.
        My first question to you is, one, will you allow for
    localized regional training? Because part of the issue is with
    this new requirement of TSA officer training systems where
    people are going to--I'm not----
        Mr. Neffenger. To FLETC down at Glynco in Georgia.
        Senator Cantwell. In Georgia. But you've allowed other
    airports to do regional training. Will you allow---- because
    we're about to hit spring and summer, and we have cruise ships
    that greatly impact the flow in the Northwest. Will you allow
    for localized training so that those individuals can be
    trained?
        Second, what information sharing do you think that we now
    need to do? You know that we were successful in getting the
    Cantwell-Collins bill, which is to move Customs border security
    to overseas airports, and that allowed us to do that pre----
        Mr. Neffenger. Preclearance, right.
        Senator Cantwell.--the checking of those passengers over
    there. I'm fully supportive of that, and we're so glad we got
    that into the Customs bill. But now what else do we need to do?
    Are you for the machine reading-sharing, helping those airport
    facilities have better machine capabilities? What lists should
    we share? Do you--I would assume, having a past role in the
    Coast Guard--the Coast Guard's dogs have played a significant
    role in protecting our ferry system. Do you think that we
    should be making a larger investment in that? So that's a lot
    to answer.
        I really do have concerns about this app. I really think
    that you need a coalition of constant input on how to get
    efficiency. You know, paying this much for an app that we
    shouldn't have--but if you'll focus on those first questions.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, ma'am. So with respect to the training,
    we are going to do local training. The idea behind----
        Senator Cantwell. At Sea-Tac?
        Mr. Neffenger. At Sea-Tac, yes, ma'am. So we'll address
    that. But we have to mitigate what is going to be a very
    challenging summer season by pushing as many new hires as we
    can into the system, directing them to the airports of greatest
    need--Sea-Tac is one of those--and then ensuring that we're
    working as much as we can with the local airports and the
    airlines that service those airports to identify the most
    efficient means of moving it through. That has to do with
    working with the airlines to understand their travel plan,
    their flight loading----
        Senator Cantwell. Well, thank you for that commitment. That
    is very important to Sea-Tac.
        Mr. Neffenger. So we're going to do that as we build
    capacity in the training center so that we don't have to do
    this in the future. Second, with respect to Seattle, I'll be
    out there, as a matter of fact, next week. I'm going to be
    meeting with the airport director and then local officials as
    well to look at the issues and just see how well this is going.
    So I've been trying to do this with each of the major airports
    around the country.
        With respect to other resources that we might need, it
    really falls into the category of people, training, and
    technology. I'm very interested in the way we do acquisition,
    because I need to evolve my technology faster than the threat
    is evolving, and I think that there are things that we can do
    to ensure that happens.
        Training--I want to continue to build the TSA Academy out
    so that I can effectively train people to do what they do. And
    on the people side, I think we----
        Senator Cantwell. And are you for--just because I only have
    20 seconds. Are you for more list sharing and machine sharing
    with our overseas partners?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, ma'am, I am.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        This is something, Mr. Chairman, I think the Committee
    needs to spend a lot of time on. So thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cantwell. Good points.
        Senator McCaskill?

                  STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE McCASKILL,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI

        Senator McCaskill. Thank you. We have spent an awful lot of
    time and money and energy focusing on the security of our
    aviation and airports, and I am not critical of that
    whatsoever. But there remains, I believe, a gaping hole in our
    security which has to do with foreign repair stations.
        I don't think most Americans realize--and, by the way, I've
    been talking about this since 2007--Congress wanted FAA, wanted
    TSA to create security rules applicable to foreign repair
    stations. It took 10 years, but we got a rule in 2014. There's
    shared jurisdiction here. FAA is supposed to be certifying the
    safety of the foreign repair stations. You are supposed to be
    certifying and overseeing the security of the foreign repair
    stations.
        I don't think most Americans know that almost every
    domestic plane they're in is cared for, repaired, overhauled in
    foreign repair stations, including foreign repair stations in
    countries that are listed by the State Department as countries
    that can be a haven for terrorists. Now, I don't understand--
    since we have been talking about this since 2007, since I came
    to the Senate, chaired a hearing on this in 2007--that the rule
    that you issued didn't even require background checks of people
    who work at foreign repair stations. There's no perimeter
    security at foreign repair stations. There's no alcohol and
    drug testing at foreign repair stations.
        So we've got one standard for machinists and others who
    work on airplanes in the United States, but if you want to take
    those jobs overseas, then all of a sudden, it is like a sieve.
    I am grateful that there has not been an incident, but I can't
    imagine why your agency has not---- and I know you've not been
    there, but I can't imagine why in this rule there would not be
    background checks of people working in countries like Egypt on
    airplanes that are flying American passengers around the world.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, Senator, I recently spoke to the
    Aircraft Repair Association. They had one of their meetings
    here in the last couple of months. And we talked about the
    rule, and we talked about what we do. Just so you know, all of
    those people hold FAA credentials, which means they're
    automatically vetted by us every day through terrorist
    screening data bases, and we vet them against the criminal data
    bases as well. So we vet them against the combined terrorist
    screening database that looks at all of the people of interest
    and concern around the world, and we vet them against the
    criminal data base.
        Senator McCaskill. Before they're hired? Right now, when
    you're hired as a mechanic on domestic American airlines, and
    you're working on a plane in Egypt, you have a background check
    before you get on the premises?
        Mr. Neffenger. I can't speak to what exactly every
    individual employer does. I can tell you that if you get a
    credential from the FAA or if you apply for a credential from
    the FAA, we're going to screen you before you can get that
    credential, and we'll determine whether or not you can be
    issued that credential. So in my opinion, that is the last step
    before you're actually hired, before you can actually work on
    an aircraft that belongs to a U.S. flight carrier.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I would be thrilled to be proven
    wrong on this. But it is my impression that you can get into
    these facilities and get near airplanes without a background
    check right now. Who is inspecting these facilities? Who is
    actually physically going to the Philippines and to Egypt and--
    --
        Mr. Neffenger. TSA does. We have our aviation inspector
    cadre, and they make regular and periodic rounds to each of
    these locations to ensure that they're complying with the
    standards.
        Senator McCaskill. Well, I would love to see that schedule,
    because I know if you had a repair station in the United
    States, there was an FAA person almost onsite 24/7.
        Mr. Neffenger. That's right, and FAA also does the same.
        Senator McCaskill. And when I did this hearing before, most
    of this was being done by phone. They were not physically going
    to the facilities. So if that has changed, I would be really
    thrilled to hear that. I would love to know how often we're
    inspecting, and I would also like to know--because at the point
    in time that we looked at this before, there was no effort even
    made on perimeter security at these facilities in these other
    countries.
        You know, Americans are pretty upset about jobs going
    overseas. I understand this is a global economy and we can't
    put a gun to companies' heads and say, ``You must keep jobs in
    America.'' On the other hand, if we have certain standards for
    safety and security for our flying public, and the
    responsibility lies with your agency and the FAA to make sure
    that the standards are just as rigorous--you know, without a
    foreign agreement being in the way, they need to be just as
    rigorous in the locations where people are working on these
    airplanes on foreign soil. My sense is that that has not been
    the case.
        So if you've got information that will reassure me in that
    regard as to inspections, the ability of somebody to get on the
    premises and near airplanes, the ability to actually work
    hands-on in an airplane, and if you can reassure me of the
    thoroughness of that--10 years to make the rule was not a
    confidence builder for me. So I would like to be reassured that
    we are in a better place than we were when we started down this
    road when I arrived in the Senate.
        Mr. Neffenger. So let me get you a fuller answer to those
    questions.
        Senator McCaskill. That would be terrific. Thank you very
    much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
        Senator Heller?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN HELLER,
                        U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA

        Senator Heller. Mr. Chairman, thank you to you and the
    ranking member for holding this hearing today, and I want to
    thank the Administrator also for being here and answering our
    questions.
        I want to go back to this allocation of personnel and ask
    you a couple of questions. The first question I have is: When
    was the last time that you flew into the Las Vegas airport?
        Mr. Neffenger. It has not been since I've been
    administrator.
        Senator Heller. Recent, though, within the last couple of
    years?
        Mr. Neffenger. Within the last year.
        Senator Heller. Would you agree with me that it's one of
    the fastest growing and busiest airports in the world?
        Mr. Neffenger. It is a very fast growing airport, and
    you've seen some huge growth in passenger volume.
        Senator Heller. We have. We had 3.4 million passengers go
    through McCarran in February of this year. In fact, it was
    almost a 9 percent growth from February, previously, 2015, and
    we anticipate that we're going to continue to see this growth.
    Can you explain to me why TSA reduced the number of agents at
    that airport by 110?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, you know, I got that report, and we've
    actually increased the allocation there. So I'm not sure how
    that information got presented. But I went back and checked,
    because I was concerned by the same number, and what I found is
    that we've actually increased the staffing allocation. We've
    not reduced the numbers there. We've had some attrition there
    that we have to backfill, and sometimes it takes us a while to
    get people hired in.
        But let me get you the exact numbers. I think if I laid it
    out, I think I can see why that report was there. But it was
    really that--you know, we have higher attrition rates in some
    locations than I'd like to see, and sometimes it takes time to
    backfill those positions. But I don't believe we've actually
    reduced the numbers there. But let me get you what I show for
    numbers and see if it's the same.
        Senator Heller. If I can ask another question, it was
    promised that it would maintain 10 canine units at that
    airport. Today, there's only one. I think there's one that's
    actually borrowed. But can you explain to me why there's a lack
    of the canine units that were promised to that airport?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, we have an allocation staffing model
    that we have for canines. I can't meet all of the staffing that
    I'd like to see. I've said before this committee and others of
    Congress that I will take more canine teams because I can put
    them to use. I think it's one of the most effective
    technologies we have out there.
        Where I use them most effectively right now--and Las Vegas
    is one of these locations--is to very effectively move
    passengers through the screening environment. It's one of the
    best tools we have for moving people efficiently through the
    lines. It's what we're trying to do at all of the large
    airports.
        Let me look specifically at Las Vegas with respect to the
    team. I don't have the numbers right off the top of my head.
    I'd like to get back to you with whatever rationale we're using
    currently to deploy teams there.
        Senator Heller. I just want to make sure it was not a
    hollow promise, the 10 canine units.
        Mr. Neffenger. From my perspective, I'd like--as I said,
    I'd like to grow the canine capability across the system,
    because I think it's a hugely effective tool, both for
    detection, but deterrence as well.
        Senator Heller. So if I'm hearing correctly that you
    would--I can go back to the administrators of that particular
    airport and say that those 110 TSA personnel will be backfilled
    or for whatever reason?
        Mr. Neffenger. That is my understanding. But I'll verify
    that----
        Senator Heller. And that they will receive the 10 canine
    units.
        Mr. Neffenger. As I have them available, yes, sir. The
    challenge right now is the availability--is the number of----
        Senator Heller. What would you anticipate would be a
    timeline to get 10 new canines?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, what we're doing right now--we
    currently have--there are about 1,000 total canines operating
    across the country. About 670 or so of those are deployed to
    local law enforcement. So that means there are about a little
    over 300 teams that the TSA has itself. Of those--when I came
    on board last July, we had only 112 trained to do passenger
    screening. We're converting the rest of those dogs to passenger
    screening.
        We should be up to about 270 or so by the end of this
    fiscal year of converted dogs. These are dogs that can both do
    regular cargo screening and then do the passenger screening.
    I'd like to get all 320 teams converted by the end of the year.
    That will give me the ability to start moving teams back into
    locations that don't currently have them, that are without
    them.
        Senator Heller. What do the majority of those teams do? Do
    they sniff for drugs, or do they sniff for----
        Mr. Neffenger. They're explosive sniffing canines, and
    they're trained to sniff for a large range of explosives. It
    takes about 10 months to train a dog team. But once they're
    trained, they're incredibly effective in what they do. If
    you've noticed them in the airports, they move up and down the
    passenger lines, and they sniff for vapor, and then they trace
    the vapor back to its source.
        Senator Heller. Yes. Thank you for being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Heller. There are not many
    places that you can get direct flights from Sioux Falls, South
    Dakota, but one of them is to Vegas. So my constituents were
    adding to that number coming into and out of your airport this
    year.
        Yes?
        Senator McCaskill. Would you give me 1 second to put
    something on the record that clarifies the previous testimony,
    because I'm going to go vote. It's my understanding from
    talking to my staff that has researched this that the only
    certification at the foreign repair stations are supervisors
    and people who have authority to move the aircraft, which is
    only a fraction of the people that are working on these
    aircraft at foreign repair stations.
        My belief is--and you correct me after this hearing if I'm
    wrong, and we'll correct the record. My belief is the vast
    majority of the people working on these airplanes in foreign
    repair stations have not had a background check.
        Mr. Neffenger. I'll follow up with you, Senator.
        Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Administrator.
        The Chairman. Senator Gardner?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. CORY GARDNER,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both,
    Mr. Chairman and Senator Nelson, for holding this hearing
    today.
        Thank you, Administrator Neffenger, for your time and
    testimony today and the service that you provide to our
    country. I wanted to just ask a couple of questions. I
    understand you were in Denver recently at the international
    airport.
        Mr. Neffenger. I was.
        Senator Gardner. A couple of weeks ago, we received a
    letter from Denver International Airport--my office did--and it
    talks about the attacks in Brussels and underscoring the need
    to address the location of the TSA screening checkpoints at
    Denver International Airport. I think most people have had an
    opportunity to have a final departure from--a destination of
    Denver or have a layover in Denver and understand that this is
    the fifth busiest airport in the country, the 18th busiest in
    the world. So this is a significant concern that they are
    sharing on the screening checkpoints in the great hall at DIA.
        And, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that I be able to submit
    this letter for the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The information referred to follows:]

                                   Denver International Airport
                                             Denver, CO, March 25, 2016

    Hon. Cory Gardner,
    United States Senate,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Sen. Gardner,

        I am writing to you in the wake of the latest terrorist attack,
    which, once again, targeted an airport. It served as a sobering
    reminder of the threats we face. The attack in Brussels has underscored
    the need to address the location of TSA screening checkpoints in our
    Great Hall at Denver International Airport, the fifth busiest airport
    in America.
        Relocating the checkpoints to reduce the exposure of travelers and
    personnel is this airport's highest priority. TSA--from the local
    Federal Security Director to Administrator Neffenger--shares this same
    resolve. We have been working on plans for our Great Hall for some
    time. The primary motivation for that project is relocation of our
    security screening areas. I am writing to you today to ask for your
    help in obtaining Federal funding for this initiative, and I welcome
    the opportunity to discuss DEN's unique situation.
        We have space where our ticket lobbies are currently located to
    accommodate screening. Doing so would significantly reduce the exposure
    of waiting travelers and TSA personnel. We will need to compress our
    airline ticket counters (into 2/3 of the 6th floor area), relocate the
    TSA operations (into the remaining 1/3), and make major modifications
    to our baggage system to address the relocated baggage ingestion
    points. A more efficient checked baggage screening operation for TSA
    will need to be created by consolidating nine baggage reconciliation
    areas into two.
        Concurrently, TSA has begun its Innovative Task Force Initiative to
    create a new screening experience that improves the passenger
    experience and the security margin. This innovative and collaborative
    approach provides an opportunity to bridge the future of checkpoint
    screening. We are taking the first steps in a public-private
    partnership that can redefine for our Nation how we protect the
    American people from threats to aviation. We have begun planning with
    TSA to have our airport security improvements serve as TSA's initial
    prototype for this new approach. TSA Administrator Neffenger has
    committed his support and we are moving forward to make Denver the
    national prototype.
        He views Denver as a carte blanche opportunity to develop a
    screening process that is more effective, while offering a better
    passenger experience. He is excited to partner with us to develop a
    process that uses his team more effectively to focus on risk, to
    implement new technology to speed up the process, and to improve the
    passenger interaction. The new prototype created in Denver would be a
    model to be emulated across the country.
        This request comes at a time when we are growing; fielding gate
    requests from airlines that are requiring us to expand faster than we
    planned. At the same time, DEN is now 21years old and an aging
    facility. Our capital is being used to replace chillers, runway
    pavement segments, failing escalators while simultaneously expanding
    our concourses, and soon Pena Boulevard. We are not without competing
    needs for capital and that is what makes Federal funding of the
    passenger and baggage screening relocation so necessary.
        We are asking for your help to protect what we have, while allowing
    us to grow. I know we ask a lot of you, but I have never asked you for
    anything more important than this.
        We will be scheduling time with your staff (and of course you if
    you are available) in the next few weeks to discuss this further.
    Hopefully, we will be able to jointly develop a strategy to get this
    important task accomplished. In the meantime, thank you for continued
    support of us and our mission.
                Sincerely,
                                                       Kim Day,
                                               Chief Executive Officer.

        Senator Gardner. I just wanted to talk to you a little bit
    about the Innovation Task Force initiative that's aimed at
    crafting a modernized passenger screening process with the goal
    of improving service and the passenger experience. Last week--I
    believe it was last week--it toured Denver International
    Airport and talked about partnering perhaps with the TSA to
    serve--and Denver International Airport as a prototype--to
    modernize security screening.
        Earlier this week, I had the opportunity to tour the
    facility as well with the management leadership of Denver
    International Airport to learn about the details of the
    proposal. Could you provide a little bit more information on
    TSA's plans with Denver International Airport?
        Mr. Neffenger. Senator, thanks for that question, and we're
    very excited at what we can potentially do there. We're seeing,
    as you know, huge travel volumes right now, and at some point,
    we reach capacity, no matter what we do, with the current
    system. So while we have to address today's problem right now--
    and we're working hard to mitigate it, using passenger
    screening canines and pushing staff and saving overtime hours
    and the like--I'm convinced that we need to find a more
    efficient means of moving people through screening, both to
    reduce the pressure outside the checkpoints as well as to
    improve the efficiency, while not changing the effectiveness of
    the program.
        So when Kim Day, the airport director, approached TSA and
    said, ``We'd like to move the passenger screening checkpoints
    from the main hall floor up to what used to be the ticket
    counter area,'' it looked like it presented an opportunity to
    address that. So that initial conversation turned into an
    opportunity to rethink the security environment of the airport
    and, for lack of a better term, think curb-to-gate--what can we
    do?
        It's as simple as just putting automated conveyor belts and
    RFID tags into the bins that you use so that you can more
    effectively track carry-on baggage coming through the system
    and more efficiently move the baggage into the screen--it's
    astonishing how slow the line becomes just because someone has
    to push their stuff down the conveyor belt--presenting multiple
    stations at which you can stand to put your stuff into a bin so
    that you're not just standing behind the guy who wore the
    combat boots today and you're waiting forever to take your
    time. So that's one aspect of it. So there's an evolution that
    has to happen. I mean, we're not going to get to sort of the
    checkpoint of the future right away. But we have an
    opportunity, I think, there.
        So what we did is we worked with the Denver airport to
    bring in the airline partners at that airport so all of the
    airlines that service that airport are members of this team. We
    brought in the manufacturers' teams, as well as even the FAA
    and then local authorities, to put together what we call the
    Innovation Task Force to really do a whiteboard on how you
    would recreate the screening environment to reduce friction to
    the traveler and improve efficiency and effectiveness of the
    system. So in its biggest sense, that's what the idea is,
    recognizing that there are incremental steps to getting there.
    But it gives us an opportunity to try some things, and Denver
    has been very forward-leaning in terms of their willingness to
    pilot some new ideas.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you. And what steps could Congress
    take to assist with the implementation of the Innovative Task
    Force initiative both at DIA and across the country?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, this committee will get a report on
    what we're doing there, and that's part of the plan, to outline
    the status. There may be some opportunity to create some
    authorities for public-private partnerships that we don't
    currently have, for the ability to do spiral test and
    development of new technologies so that you can feel the
    technology before you go through the long, drawn-out
    acquisition process and to reduce the potential cost penalty on
    the other end to do that.
        So I think that there are some things that we will be
    presenting to you as we learn more about how we might go
    forward that could provide some opportunity to open up some
    pilot legislation that would allow us to try something
    different there that may, in fact, allow us to transform more
    of the system, as we're addressing what is the real problem
    right now.
        Senator Gardner. Thank you. And I think in the visit that I
    was able to take last week to see this entire empty floor space
    that they have as part of the redevelopment of the hotel right
    next to the airport--I think it presents an incredible sort of
    blank slate of opportunity to innovate, to test, to create sort
    of this laboratory of security that we need, really, at a major
    airport, a major U.S. airport, to find the kinds of techniques,
    technologies, and security innovations to really move us
    forward over the next decade and beyond as we see more
    passengers move through the system.
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, I agree, and it's a wonderful
    opportunity, and it solves some very real security problems in
    Denver, and it points to how we could solve those elsewhere as
    well. So we're very excited about that, and we see it as an
    opportunity to do something very different.
        Senator Gardner. Administrator, thank you very much for
    your time.
        Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Gardner.
        Senator Peters?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. GARY PETERS,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Administrator, thank you for your testimony here as well,
    and thank you for the work that you do each and every day to
    keep us safe. My question follows up on a comment that you
    made, but something that was troubling to me when I had an
    opportunity to tour one of our large airports in the state of
    Michigan as a potential vulnerability.
        We've talked a great deal about screening airport
    employees, making sure they have security checks, screening
    what they may be bringing in. But a concern is that there is an
    awful lot of material that goes into the airport, into the
    sterile area, for the catering services, the restaurants, the
    newspaper stores--to have a stack of newspapers and put a
    weapon in between a stack of newspapers or whatever it may be.
    My understanding is there is little or no screening of that
    happening, and yet there's a great deal of material going in.
        You mentioned that you are stepping up some of your
    catering security service protocols, I believe, in some earlier
    comments you made during this hearing. Could you give me a
    sense of what is done now, and why have we not done more, given
    the fact that that's a lot of stuff coming in? An employee
    could screen clear and then be waiting for a packet of
    newspapers to come with contraband in the middle of it,
    whatever that contraband may be.
        Mr. Neffenger. There has actually been a lot going on for
    quite some time. The stepping-up piece was adding additional
    layers of that. But all of those items, all of that stuff that
    comes into an airport, all the things you see in the stores in
    the airport are all examined in some manner at some point
    before they enter the sterile area of the airport.
        What I can do is give you some specifics, exactly how--you
    know, how do you inspect newspapers, magazines, water bottles,
    and the like, in addition to the catering and the things that
    find their way onto the aircraft directly. What we've added in
    the past 9 months or so is additional times at which that's
    done and additional randomness associated with how that's done
    so that somebody can't get through a predicted layer of
    screening only to find a way around it later on.
        So what I wanted to do was add a significant amount of
    random unpredictability into the system so that at any given
    moment at any given part of a day, if you're an employee and
    you're handling something, or you have things that you're
    bringing in, that we create an expectation that somebody's
    going to stop and take a look at what you have. So we've done
    that both with TSA personnel as well as with airport security
    personnel and other folks.
        Senator Peters. So you've implemented that now for material
    that's coming in?
        Mr. Neffenger. Right. And we actually have been doing that
    for some number of months now. But that is an ongoing, and that
    will stay ongoing, because we find it to be a useful additional
    measure of uncertainty that you introduce into the system that
    will help us to deter, detect, and disrupt anybody who would
    attempt to do what they did in Atlanta or other places.
        Senator Peters. And the report that you're in the process
    of drafting now--you will address that specifically and whether
    or not it is robust enough in your report?
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir, we will.
        Senator Peters. And your report does--obviously, more
    inspection also has a resource implication, and that may be
    something we have to look at here in Congress.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        Senator Peters. I appreciate that. I've heard from airports
    in my state that they want to have an opportunity to comment on
    some proposed TSA security regulations or directives before
    they're implemented. It has been their experience, at least
    from what they're telling me, that there's a disconnect between
    TSA officials crafting regulation and then the airports that
    actually have to implement or at least assist you in
    implementing a lot of these regulations.
        They either think that the TSA has taken a one-size-fits-
    all approach without regard to different levels of security
    threats that are experienced at different airports and
    different sized airports, or they believe that certain security
    regulations or directives have the effect of assigning TSA
    responsibilities to airports without providing any additional
    funding to those airports, which can be a burden for them.
        To what extent are airports currently able to comment on
    proposed security regulations or directives, and how is that
    feedback taken by your agency, and can we do a better job in
    the future so I don't hear this from my airport managers?
        Mr. Neffenger. I'm going to say yes to all your questions.
        Senator Peters. Good. That's good.
        Mr. Neffenger. Because I do think that we can do a better
    job. I think we have done a better job recently, and I'll speak
    to one example of that. But I think that's a valid complaint. I
    think it's very easy for any government agency to get so
    focused on its mission it forgets some of the impact that the
    discussions have.
        So I like this idea of full collaboration. This is a
    system. My job is to ensure that the system operates
    consistently and in a coordinated fashion. But some of the best
    information about security is held by the people who are
    running the system every day. That's the airports, it's the
    airlines, it's the people who operate in and around those
    airports. It's all those things that come together into an
    airport environment.
        So I'd be very interested in expanding our collaboration.
    The Aviation Security Advisory Committee is a good entry point
    for me on that. They gave me a lot of that criticism when I
    first came on board, and I think it was--from my perspective, I
    take it well, because that's what I'm here to do. I see myself
    as the ultimate public service agency. We're probably the face
    of public service for the government.
        So long story short, when I discussed with Senator Nelson
    the work that we're doing to do the vulnerability assessments,
    we actually worked very collaboratively with the airports and
    the airport associations that represent the airports to craft
    that directive in a way that was implementable, that was
    understandable, and we actually took a lot of their advice in
    terms of how we did that. In fact, the first attempt I put out
    came back at me, and we adjusted accordingly.
        So I think we've made good progress. I think there's a lot
    more we can do. It's a constant challenge to make sure that
    you're including and involving, but that's the approach that I
    like to take.
        Senator Peters. Well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate
    your efforts on that. Thank you so much for your time.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Daines?

                    STATEMENT OF HON. STEVE DAINES,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA

        Senator Daines. Thank you, Chairman Thune.
        And thank you, Administrator Neffenger, for testifying
    today. It's a pleasure to see you again, as always.
        Mr. Neffenger. Good to see you.
        Senator Daines. Unfortunately, you've not had a quiet nine
    months on the job. Terrorist attacks in Brussels and Paris, I
    think, clearly highlight the vulnerabilities at home.
    Transportation systems will remain a target, and we must remain
    vigilant. So thank you for what you're doing to secure our
    Nation.
        I know many ideas are being discussed to modify TSA's
    practices, to extend perimeters, increase canine presence,
    amongst other proposals. Ultimately, TSA needs to deploy
    resources in a fashion that will maximize our nation's
    security. It also includes protecting rural access points to
    transportation networks. Speaking as somebody from Montana, I
    want to talk a little about rural access points.
        The Screening Partnership Program is an effective way for
    TSA to leverage its limited resources, especially at some of
    our smaller airports. In fact, out of the 21 participating
    airports nationally, nine are actually in Montana. As a
    voluntary program, how does TSA handle airports that may want
    to opt back to TSA screening?
        Mr. Neffenger. Well, you know, they have that option, if
    they'd like to. If an airport is currently under the Screening
    Partnership Program with a private contractor and they wish to
    come back to Federal screening, from my perspective, we have to
    work with them to ensure that that happens. And we try to
    ensure a smooth handoff from contractor to TSA.
        Senator Daines. Yes, and I appreciate that commitment. I
    have an e-mail from the Montana Department of Transportation.
    At the Butte airport, they formally requested to go back to TSA
    screening. And the response we got back from TSA was that
    passenger screening would cease at Butte. Reverse screening
    would be conducted upon arrival at Salt Lake. So I think they
    were questioning how would eliminating screening at a
    commercial airport actually increase the safety of the national
    airspace.
        Mr. Neffenger. So let me look at that, and I apologize for
    not having that information in front of me.
        Senator Daines. And I think they're starting to get some
    verbal commitments now, because they pushed back strong on that
    recommendation. But I want to get your commitment to ensure
    that whether they're TSA or SPP, we can always maintain the
    level of security at these rural airports.
        Mr. Neffenger, in 2013, the Inspector General reported that
    the nearly $900 million spent on screening of passengers by
    observation techniques, the SPOT program, was unsuccessful. I
    recognize this was before your time on the job, and, again, I'm
    grateful that you're in this job and working to secure our
    Nation as well as spend our dollars efficiently.
        Last month, the GAO reported cost-saving opportunities in
    the canine program. Three days ago, we read about TSA spending
    over $300,000 on a randomizer iPad to tell passengers which
    lane to stand in, left or right. How is TSA reforming to be
    good stewards and gain the taxpayers' trust?
        Mr. Neffenger. Those are good questions and the exact
    questions I've been asking since I came on board. With respect
    to that randomizer app, that was part of a larger contract so
    that not all of that was spent on a randomizer. But,
    nonetheless, it points to some need for oversight.
        So a couple of things we've done. One of the first things I
    did after coming on board was to look at our acquisition
    program, and I brought in an outside independent agency, the
    Defense Acquisition University, just to look top to bottom and
    tell me if they saw any gaps, and process improvements that we
    needed, and so forth. My concern is best capability at lowest
    price and then best value to the taxpayer.
        So that's one of the things we're doing, and we're working
    very hard on improving our oversight, our controls, and the
    like. And I'm looking across every contract that we have to
    ensure that the contract is appropriate, that the money is
    going to what we think it is, that it's actually providing the
    capability that we're asking for. So I think that's very
    important, because it's about making sure that we take the
    limited resources we have and get some results for it.
        Senator Daines. Thanks for that very granular review that
    you're leading the efforts on. It's appreciated.
        As you know, our security is as strong as our weakest link.
    Enhancements at rural airports strengthen security of the
    entire national airspace. You know, the bad guys are going to
    find the weak places to come in. At your confirmation hearing,
    I asked about the AIT scanners that were to be installed in
    2012, and Montana airports are still without them. In response,
    you committed to evaluate plans to deploy the scanners. This is
    a specific question to Montana, but, again, we're as good as
    our weakest link.
        Do you know what the status is of procuring this necessary
    security equipment for airports in Montana that don't have
    them?
        Mr. Neffenger. This is a problem, as you know, across the
    system. We don't have advanced imaging machines at all in the
    small airports that I'd like to see them in. So from my
    perspective, I'd like to see them deployed 100 percent across
    the system. It's really a funding issue at this point.
        So the first thing I had to do was look at where we were on
    funding, what our current procurement schedule was, and what
    the deployment schedule was for those. That includes upgrading
    to the current software technology on board and making sure
    that they meet our standards.
        So we put together a technology plan. It's a 5-year plan
    for getting those on board. If I could accelerate that plan,
    depending upon how we can redeploy our resources--part of the
    reason for doing the acquisition study was to determine whether
    we had funding internally that we could reallocate to a greater
    need such as AIT machines.
        Senator Daines. There are two, specifically, and they're
    two important communities in our state. One is Helena, which is
    our state capital, that airport. They've been waiting for 4
    years for the deployment of the technology.
        The second is Great Falls. Let me highlight the importance
    of Great Falls. The Malmstrom Air Force Base is in Great Falls.
    That is where we control one-third of the nation's ICBMs. We
    make sure a lot of our security processes are hardened for
    obvious reasons.
        But those would be two airports that have been waiting for
    4 years, our state's capital as well as Great Falls, again, the
    front door entrance to our ICBM capabilities here for the
    country. So I'd appreciate it if you'd look at that and let us
    know how that looks.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir. Will do.
        Senator Daines. OK. Thank you very much.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Daines.
        Senator Nelson, I think, has another question, and then we
    may have a couple of members returning from the vote on the
    floor.
        So, Senator Nelson?
        Senator Nelson. Mr. Administrator, some real promise is
    being made by government scientists at NIST. They're working on
    a new detection system that mimics a dog's nose, dogs being so
    effective in this attempt that is the bottom line for your
    agency. So what do you see as the possible future of the use of
    such systems that mimic a dog's nose?
        Mr. Neffenger. If they can be effective, I think it would
    be wonderful. I know that they're a long way from deploying a
    system like that. We're aware of that. In fact, we have some of
    our folks working with those scientists to see what's the
    nature of its capability. So I think what it shows us is that
    we have to be thinking about the future of screening, because
    you have to continually evolve the technology that we have.
        So I'm a big fan of that, and I think we need to do that,
    and then wherever possible, pilot it in limited controlled
    situations to determine whether it actually works in the real-
    world environment. So I'm intrigued by it. I think there's some
    potential there. If it works, it could perhaps significantly
    augment our capability that we currently have.
        Senator Nelson. Do you know any of the data and the science
    behind this device?
        Mr. Neffenger. I know a little bit of it, but not enough to
    not get myself in trouble if I try to speak about it publicly.
    But I can promise you a deeper dye for the record on that.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        The NIST dog's nose project was an effort to enhance explosives
    trace detection (ETD) capabilities by emulating the air flow in a dog's
    nose thereby potentially improving sensitivity in ETDs. This was an
    exploratory scientific study and not an effort to develop an improved
    ETD for TSA operational use. In short, the NIST researchers did a 3D x-
    ray scan of a dog's nose then built a 3-D printed model of the canine
    nose so that they could model and test the air flow through the canine
    nose.

        Senator Nelson. We'll ask the Administrator at NIST as
    well.
        Mr. Neffenger. OK.
        The Chairman. Over and out? All right. Well, we don't have
    any further questions. Unless somebody breaks through the door
    momentarily, I think we may be off the hook.
        But, Admiral, thank you for your time and for your
    responsiveness. We will have some questions for the record that
    we'll follow up with and ask that members who do want to submit
    questions for the record do that within 2 weeks and that you be
    as responsive as you can in getting back on those.
        Mr. Neffenger. Yes, sir.
        The Chairman. We'll look forward to continuing the
    discussion. These are issues, of course, that are of great
    importance to our country, our national security, our homeland
    security. You have an enormous responsibility, but we want to
    support you in every way that we can and make sure that we get
    the job done right. So thank you for being here today.
        With that, this hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard Blumenthal,
                         U.S. Senator from Connecticut
        I thank the Committee for having this important hearing.
        Many members of this committee have raised grave concerns about the
    terror attacks in Brussels on March 22. Those horrendous events took
    place at the Brussels airport--which has been widely covered--but also
    at a Brussels subway station. In light of these attacks, I want to note
    several things.
        First, it is critical we remember the importance of our surface
    transportation system in the context of any discussion on security. The
    Commission investigating 9/11 urged us to vigilantly protect the
    ``neglected parts of our transportation security system'' like and rail
    and transit--just as much as we protect aviation. Our country's public
    transportation and passenger rail systems are used by tens of millions
    of people every day. They carry nearly five times as many people per
    day as our airlines do. Penn Station in New York City handles half a
    million passengers a day--making it busier than all three New York City
    regional airports combined, and the busiest transportation hub in our
    country. It is imperative that we ensure that rail and transit systems
    are safe and secure for all who rely on them. That much is clear after
    major attacks in London, Madrid, Moscow and now Brussels. We need to
    ensure we're protecting our surface transportation network--and that
    includes freight and ports--as vigorously as our skies.
        Second, it is clear we need to work to shore up any ``soft''
    targets. This is clearly a vulnerability that existed in Brussels, and
    to the extent such targets exist here at home we need to do everything
    we can to ensure our homeland security and transportation officials and
    first responders have the resources necessary to plan for and prevent
    such terrorism from being carried out in a similar way on our shores.
    I'm proud to have joined several of my colleagues to advance such a
    measure in the pending FAA legislation--providing airports with more
    resources to make us safer.
        Finally, it is also evident that providing security here and abroad
    is an ongoing and evolving process. We must be on the lookout and work
    vigorously to detect and deter threats to every transportation mode. As
    we learn more about the Brussels attacks, I look forward to working
    with my colleagues to find any other solutions toward protecting
    passengers and freight.
                                     ______

        Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Deb Fischer to
                              Hon. Peter Neffenger
        Question 1. As you may know, my SAFE PIPES Act, which passed the
    Senate unanimously earlier last month, included provisions to require
    GAO to assess and report on TSA's pipeline security programs. In 2007,
    officials thwarted an attempt to attack aviation fuel pipelines at JFK
    International Airport in New York. Do you have staff in the field, and
    how often does TSA connect with companies to review security plans?
        Answer. Yes, onsite field reviews are conducted on pipelines by
    Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel. Additionally,
    TSA maintains field personnel assigned as Transportation Security
    Inspectors and to Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams.
        Employing a risk-based approach, TSA has reviewed the security
    plans of the operators of all of the Nation's most critical pipeline
    systems through its Corporate Security Review (CSR) program. Each
    Fiscal Year, TSA's goal is to conduct ten CSRs on pipeline companies
    operating multiple critical systems to review their corporate security
    plans. Additionally, facility security measures and plans are reviewed
    as part of TSA's Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) effort. TSA's
    goal is to conduct 40 CFSRs each Fiscal Year.

        Question 2. Do you believe TSA should dedicate more resources
    towards pipeline security as opposed to other modes?
        Answer. TSA constantly evaluates the threats and vulnerabilities of
    all transportation modes. TSA believes that pipeline and the other
    surface modes are appropriately funded.

        Question 3. As a follow up, in your testimony you mentioned strong
    coordination between the pipeline industry and TSA on security measures
    (page 11). What events or initiatives do you believe have led to
    stronger collaboration with pipeline operators? How could similar
    approaches be applied to other transportation entities, such as ports
    or railroads?
        Answer. TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives in the pipeline
    mode that have led to a highly effective public-private partnership.
    Close coordination with the Pipeline Sector Coordinating Council,
    information sharing activities such as monthly pipeline stakeholder
    conference calls and the International Pipeline Security Forum, and
    full engagement with industry representatives in developing the
    Pipeline Security Guidelines are some of the initiatives resulting from
    effective collaboration between TSA and pipeline operators.
        TSA conducts similar industry engagement activities for the other
    transportation modes tailored to the needs of that industry. For
    example, each mode has a Sector Coordinating Council, conducts monthly
    information sharing teleconferences, disseminates Security Awareness
    Messages, participates in Intermodal Security Training and Exercise
    Program (I-STEP) table-top exercises and I-STEP regional surface
    transportation workshops.

        Question 4. As you mentioned in your testimony, TSA is in the
    process of updating security guidelines for pipeline owners and
    operators (page 12). When do you expect the guidance to be completed?
    What kind of updates do you expect to see?
        Answer. The review and update process for the TSA Pipeline Security
    Guidelines has been initiated. The revision effort will be accomplished
    with the full participation of TSA's government partners, pipeline
    industry owners and operators, pipeline trade associations, and other
    interested parties. TSA's goal is to complete the update to the
    Guidelines by the end of the calendar year 2016.
        The primary area of revision will likely be to the cybersecurity
    section of the Guidelines. The focus of this part of the revision will
    be to ensure the provisions of the Pipeline Security Guidelines are
    consistent with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
    Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity.
    Additional revisions are possible in the listing of facility physical
    security measures.

        Question 5. Admiral Neffenger, what is the message you would like
    to send to the American flying public and mass transit riders in the
    aftermath of the horrific Brussels terror attacks? Would you also share
    with us some of the additional work that TSA is doing to strengthen
    security on our public and commercial transportation systems?
        Answer. The attacks in Brussels remind us that terrorists remain
    intent on attacking transportation systems. Although there is no
    credible intelligence of any plot to conduct similar attacks here in
    the United States, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    working diligently to make travel as safe and secure as possible. With
    an unprecedentedly high volume summer travel period around the corner,
    TSA will continue to deploy measures to enhance the security on the
    public sides of airports.
        Following the attack, TSA immediately deployed additional security
    at airports in the United States, and at various rail and transit
    stations throughout the country. These efforts included enhanced
    Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams' presence in
    and around checkpoints and public areas nationwide, and working closely
    with state and local law enforcement, airport and transit authorities,
    and the aviation industry in order to augment security measures
    nationwide.
        In addition, TSA has implemented more safety and security efforts
    following the November 1, 2013 shooting at Los Angeles International
    Airport, including: mandated active shooter training and required
    practical training exercises for all TSA employees; installation of
    duress alarms at checkpoints where gaps were identified; adoption of
    standards for law enforcement officer presence at checkpoints and
    ticket counters during peak travel times for airports that do not
    presently employ a fixed post plan; established minimum recommended
    standards for airport operators to conduct bi-annual active shooter
    training and exercises; and explicitly incorporated maximum response
    times in all Airport Security Programs utilizing flexible response
    options.
        Additionally, while there is no specific, credible terrorist threat
    to the U.S. passenger rail or public transportation systems, the recent
    Brussels attacks underscore the need to continue to build upon our
    surface transportation successes through stakeholder communication,
    coordination, and collaboration. Within public transportation systems,
    TSA engages with state and local partners to identify ways to assess
    risk, reduce vulnerabilities, and improve security efforts through the
    Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement program. These assessments
    are emphasized on the Nation's 100 largest mass transit and passenger
    railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which account for over
    95 percent of all users of public transportation.
        Since Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, TSA has conducted over 105 security
    exercises within all surface modes through the Intermodal Security
    Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP), including eight conducted so
    far this Fiscal Year. TSA facilitates I-STEP exercises across public
    and commercial transportation systems to help entities test and
    evaluate their security plans, including prevention and preparedness
    capabilities, ability to respond to threats, and cooperation with first
    responders from other entities.
        Between FY 2006 and FY 2015, over $2.3 billion in transportation
    security grant funding was awarded to freight railroad carriers and
    operators, over-the-road bus operators, the trucking community, and
    public mass transit owners and operators, including Amtrak. These
    grants were awarded to assist entities and their dedicated law
    enforcement providers in enhancing security through operational
    activities such as counterterrorism teams, mobile screening teams,
    explosive detection canine teams, training, drills and exercises and
    public awareness campaigns.

        Question 6. I understand that some transportation facilities would
    like to use TWIC as part of their security plans. What do you think
    about the voluntary use of TWIC for other modes of transportation, such
    as pipelines, for facility security plans?
        Answer. Since the introduction of the Transportation Worker
    Identification Credential (TWIC), TSA has had suggestions from
    transportation stakeholders that TWIC could serve as a trusted and
    valuable security credential well beyond its statutory maritime
    origins. In recent months some within the surface transportation
    industries such as pipeline companies and explosive manufacturers, have
    renewed their interest in having employees undergo the vetting
    associated with the TWIC program.
        However, absent a statutory mandate for specified workers to
    undergo a security threat assessment, the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) and employers face limitations on requiring such
    workers to undergo TSA vetting. From an institutional standpoint, TSA
    would welcome the vetting of more professionals in the transportation
    system. Just as the TSA Pre3 program has done for aviation travelers,
    vetting additional transportation workers would increase the level of
    confidence and decrease TSA's concern about insider threats. TSA
    continues to discuss these issues with stakeholders, and will do
    whatever it can to meet the best security needs of stakeholders and the
    Nation.

        Question 7. During your confirmation hearing last year, you
    mentioned that evolving threats to our transportation systems is one of
    the top three challenges facing the TSA today. Given the fact that DHS
    IG John Roth, has previously expressed concern with TSA's ability to
    meet these challenges as a result of deficiencies in workforce
    integrity and management oversight, how have you in the last year,
    tackled existing weaknesses in TSA's security mission in order to
    address these evolving security threats?
        Answer. TSA's intelligence and information analysis and
    dissemination has been an integral driver in the development of
    employable countermeasures to evolving security threats. This
    information-driven focus on mission is a primary centerpiece of TSA's
    response to the covert testing failures as well as TSA's response to
    2015 and 2016 attacks against aviation in Egypt, Somalia, and, most
    recently, Brussels. TSA's focus on mission activities include
    retraining the entire workforce, correcting security processes and
    procedures, improving technology capabilities, and analyzing systemic
    issues to ensure past deficiencies are not repeated while remaining
    agile enough to quickly identify and address new security gaps as they
    develop.

        Question 8. How has the TSA assessed the threats and adapted
    accordingly, especially in response to recent events in Brussels?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    analyzed the terrorist network, tactics, and techniques used in the
    recent attacks in Brussels. In analyzing the terrorist networks
    involved to improve attack detection and warning, TSA's Office of
    Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) has developed advanced analytical
    capabilities that have proven very effective in identifying networks of
    individuals linked to terrorist operations. OIA has also played a
    pivotal role in alerting the intelligence and security community to
    emerging aviation events through the monitoring of its social media
    software to provide real-time situational awareness of events. In
    countering the myriad threats, TSA's intelligence, information
    analysis, and dissemination has been an integral driver in the
    development of employable countermeasures. This is not limited to only
    detecting insider threat actors but also disseminating vital
    information on how attacks (successful and failed) were conducted so
    TSA operations can deploy the most impactful counterterrorism and
    security capabilities. Of particular importance, in light of the recent
    insider gun-smuggling incident in Atlanta and the possible insider
    assistance in the downing of the MetroJet in Egypt, are TSA's efforts
    to counter the insider threat posed by employees with privileged access
    to transportation facilities and infrastructure. Working in
    collaboration with stakeholders, including the Aviation Security
    Advisory Committee, TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance
    security by reducing the insider threat: requiring more frequent
    criminal history records checks of aviation workers; piloting the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Next Generation of
    Identification (NGI) Rap-Back Service (which provides continuous
    vetting of aviation workers through a fingerprint-based database); and
    conducting a nationwide vulnerability assessment; airport-by-airport,
    to create an expectation that every employee could be stopped and
    inspected.
        In addition to these actions, TSA works with federal, state, local
    and tribal partners to provide a law enforcement presence throughout
    airports and surface transportation hubs across the nation, deploying
    Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams. These teams
    use TSA assets in coordination with local law enforcement and
    stakeholders to patrol public areas and to provide a visible deterrent
    and response capability.
        TSA's intelligence-driven security operations also assist to
    improve the security of international inbound travel. TSA's Office of
    Global Strategies works with international partners to assess and
    mitigate threats to passenger and cargo flights at last point of
    departure airports bound for the United States. TSA also promotes
    continued information sharing and aligning of security standards with
    its international counterparts as it relates to global threats to
    aviation.

        Question 9. TSA serves as the principle force in making sure
    travelers and their luggage are properly screened prior to embarking,
    and that passengers travel from point A to point B safely. What are
    some of the current screening methods in the vetting process for TSA
    employees that ensure that those responsible for maintaining security,
    are in fact, not a security risk themselves?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Personnel
    Security Section conducts Enter on Duty Determinations prior to
    beginning work and Final Fitness Determinations for continued
    employment on all populations. All of the actions directed in the
    Secretary's 10-Point Plan are currently on-schedule or completed. TSA
    corrected numerous immediate problems revealed by the covert testing.
    TSA established a more aggressive training plan and retrained the
    entire workforce with focused Mission Essentials. TSA has completed two
    rounds of Mission Essentials and is currently executing Mission
    Essentials III, which will last through the summer. TSA also
    implemented rapid improvement events for its screening equipment to
    include development of improved detection algorithms. All standard
    operating procedures were rewritten to reduce and focus checkpoint
    operations, and the Administrator's Intent was released to ensure the
    organization's main effort remains its transportation security mission.
        TSA's Enter on Duty and Fitness Determinations are an initial
    review of the applicant's credit, fingerprint record, and electronic
    Questionnaire for Investigation Processing and other required elements.
    A favorable determination of these factors affords a risk based
    decision allowing the Federal employee/applicant to commence work
    before the required background investigation is completed.
        Title 49 of the U.S. Code establishes vetting criteria under which
    any one of 28 convictions automatically disqualifies an applicant
    hiring. In addition, Department of Homeland Security, Chief Security
    Officer Memorandum dated March 10, 2009, states that applicants who
    have one or both of the following will not be offered employment: (1)
    Cumulative ``bad debt'' over $7,500, or (2) Any amount of outstanding
    debt associated with a Federal, State, or local tax lien, delinquent
    student loans, delinquent child support payments, or unsatisfied court
    judgment(s). Individuals receiving an unfavorable determination are
    notified of such, provided the details of the finding, and afforded the
    opportunity to respond to the decision.
        TSA has implemented a recurrent vetting program for all employees,
    which includes conducting fingerprint-based criminal history record
    checks on an annual basis to detect criminal activity that may not have
    been self-reported or disclosed as well as recurrent checks against the
    Terrorist Watch List. TSA also has initiated the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation's (FBI) Next Generation of Identification (NGI) Rap-Back
    Services pilot program at two major airports and with one major
    airline, whereby aviation workers are continuously vetted through a
    fingerprint-based database.
        TSA's Final Adjudication is the resolution of the completed
    background investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM). Using Federal and OPM standards for employment
    suitability, fitness, and security clearance eligibility, a favorable
    adjudication would allow continued employment and access to classified
    information.

        Question 10. Following the terrorist attack at Brussels Airport,
    how is TSA mitigating the security vulnerability associated with long
    lines of passengers waiting to be screened at security checkpoints?
        Answer. First and foremost, the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) has made it a priority to deploy measures to
    mitigate passenger volume at checkpoints while maintaining our security
    effectiveness. TSA has established four lines of effort focused on
    maximizing workforce resources: hiring and training to full staffing
    levels; partnering with key stakeholders; and expanding TSA Pre3
    enrollment in order to mitigate operational impacts over the summer
    travel period. Specific efforts include: conserving and strategically
    distributing overtime budgets; utilizing additional overtime funding to
    support peak operations; seeking Congressional concurrence to
    reallocate funding from within TSA to support additional staffing;
    aligning and managing staffing to passenger volume; optimizing canine
    resources; and hiring and training at an aggressive pace to ensure that
    increased staffing levels are reached and maintained for the summer
    travel period.
        During times of heavy passenger volume, TSA has additional measures
    in place to screen passengers waiting in the queue. For example, canine
    teams are able to screen passengers in the queue for explosives.
    Additionally, Behavior Detection Officers are trained to observe
    passengers for suspicious behaviors in line and throughout the public
    areas of airports. If these behaviors are observed, law enforcement is
    notified for resolution.
        Further, following the Brussels attacks, TSA enhanced its Visible
    Intermodal Prevention and Response presence in and around checkpoints
    and public areas nationwide. TSA works closely with state and local law
    enforcement, airport authorities, and the aviation industry in order to
    augment these types of security measures.

        Question 11. Florida is a gateway to the U.S. for visitors from all
    over the world and one of America's favorite destinations for family
    vacations. Many of these travelers are first time flyers and currently
    our airports are experiencing double digit growth. It seems like the
    staffing levels are not keeping up with our growth--our security lines
    are backing up and creating havoc in our airports. Aside from the
    current staffing model, what other resources and technology is your
    agency looking to leverage to better manage passenger processing and
    wait times to better address efficiency for passengers while at the
    same time mitigating national security threats? Has TSA solicited input
    from airports and airlines on ways to increase the efficiency of the
    screening process, again, to better address efficiency for passengers
    while at the same time mitigating national security threats?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
    with airline and airport stakeholders to address the wait time issue
    without sacrificing security effectiveness. On April 8, TSA hosted the
    Chief Operating Officers from the top seven airlines (United, Delta,
    American, Southwest, Alaska, JetBlue, and Hawaiian) to collaboratively
    understand the threat and TSA volume initiatives, and to develop a
    joint mitigation plan for summer volume. Additionally, TSA is
    collaborating with airports and airlines to support non-security
    screening operations, such as returning bins to the front of waiting
    lines, and other non-security related tasks. TSA has formed
    Optimization Teams and closely partnered with airlines, airport
    authorities, and industry to deliver these types of innovative
    measures. TSA is working with the aviation industry to develop airport-
    specific actions plans for the Nation's busiest airports.
        TSA understands that travel is an important economic driver in the
    State of Florida, and we have taken action to mitigate summer volume
    issues as much as possible. For example, Miami International Airport
    (MIA) is receiving approximately 50 additional new employees, which
    they hope to have in place by July. MIA has been authorized to conduct
    local training to more quickly onboard the new employees. TSA has also
    increased the amount of overtime available to employees at MIA to more
    fully staff checkpoints during peak travel times.
        Additionally, TSA continues to implement four lines of effort
    focused on maximizing workforce resources: hiring and training to
    maximum staffing levels, partnering with key stakeholders, and
    expanding TSA Pre3 enrollment in order to mitigate operational impacts
    over the summer travel period. Specific efforts include: conserving and
    strategically distributing overtime budgets, utilizing additional
    overtime funding to support peak operations, seeking Congressional
    concurrence to reallocate funding from within TSA to support additional
    screener resources, aligning and managing staffing to passenger volume,
    optimizing canine resources, and hiring and training at an aggressive
    pace to ensure that full staffing levels are reached and maintained for
    the summer travel period.
        For the longer term, TSA is also evaluating the current
    technologies available and identifying viable solutions, such as
    automated bin return systems, multi-station divesting, and other
    technologies, which may increase checkpoint effectiveness and
    efficiency. TSA looks forward to working with industry partners to
    strengthen security, increase operational efficiency, and improve the
    passenger experience.

        Question 12. Rather than sending all new hires to the Federal Law
    Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in Georgia, does TSA plan to permit
    local training of Transportation Security Officers at their assigned
    airports during the busy summer travel season?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) remains
    committed to the centralized delivery of training for all newly hired
    Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at the TSA Academy, located at
    the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Georgia, as a long-term
    strategic objective. However, TSA recognizes that the record passenger
    volume anticipated for the upcoming peak summer travel period requires
    some flexibility. Therefore, TSA has authorized a limited number of
    local new hire training classes for those airports with the greatest
    need for additional staff. Simultaneously, TSA will continue to deliver
    its new hire training at the TSA Academy to ensure that the maximum
    numbers of new hire TSOs are trained. The airports conducting local new
    hire training are:

       Denver International Airport

       LaGuardia International Airport

       Detroit Wayne County International Airport

       Seattle-Tacoma International Airport

       Boston Logan International Airport

       Chicago-O'Hare International Airport

       Miami International Airport

       Honolulu International Airport

       JFK International Airport

       Las Vegas International Airport

       Chicago-Midway International Airport

       Los Angeles International Airport

       Newark-Liberty International Airport

       Guam International Airport

       Kona International Airport

       Kahului Airport

       Lihue International Airport

       John Wayne (Santa Ana) Airport

       Burbank International Airport

        In some cases, new hire classes have been consolidated for
    neighboring airports (for example, Los Angeles and Burbank candidates
    are attending the same new hire classes). TSA expects to have these
    classes complete with 768 locally trained new hire employees in place
    by the end of June.

        Question 13. As you know, the Aviation and Transportation Security
    Act of 2001 required that airports invest in explosive detections
    system (EDS) security equipment, with the understanding that TSA would
    provide reimbursement for airports that complied. While the specific
    circumstances vary, in each instance the airports shouldered the
    financial burden with the expectation they would be reimbursed for up
    to 90 or 95 percent of the allowable costs. More than fifteen years
    later, airports across the country remain burdened by the debt incurred
    from these purchases, and as a result are unable to invest in other
    important projects. Follow up. In the FY 2016 Omnibus Appropriations
    legislation, Congress included a provision directing TSA to develop a
    process to review and validate reimbursement claims from airports for
    in-line baggage screening systems installed prior to 2008 and to submit
    a plan, not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act,
    for reimbursement of validated claims. What is the status of this plan?
    Follow up. It is my understanding that the Department's FY 2017 budget
    request did not include sufficient funding for creating a reimbursement
    plan. Why wasn't this funding request included? Follow up. Can you
    ensure that any future reimbursement plan will not negatively impact
    other national security priorities?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
    currently developing a reimbursement review and validation plan for the
    In-Line Baggage Systems constructed without a funding agreement with
    the government, as directed by legislation. If the plan is initiated,
    TSA estimates a time-frame of up to nine months from receipt of airport
    documentation to validate the project cost information and the claim
    for reasonable expectation of reimbursement. Future requests for
    funding for this plan will be made in concert with the development of
    annual budget requests.
        In compliance with the requirements established in the 9/11 Act,
    TSA prioritizes limited available funding for TSA projects according to
    the strength of their contribution towards fulfilling the agency's
    mission to protect the Nation's transportation systems. Funding is
    allocated within this schedule based on the project's security and
    operational benefit, the reduction of risk, and the availability of
    funds. TSA has created a funding prioritization schedule for mission
    critical projects, while ensuring core functions and prior commitments
    are sufficiently funded as the primary driver.

        Question 14. Due to a combination of factors, such as long hang-
    time and inefficient security screening thru-put, operational costs for
    air carriers at small airports in Montana and throughout the Nation are
    quite high. These high costs make it difficult for small airports to
    attract and retain air service, leading to an overall decline in
    accessibility and customer service. Given the existing issues of
    maintaining cost-effective air service and sufficient security
    screening, what efforts are being taken to account for the additional
    costs of implementing 100 percent employee screening, when resources at
    small airports are already spread thin?
        Answer. Currently, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
    has not implemented a requirement for 100-percent employee screening at
    any airport, large or small. However, TSA has issued guidance to
    airports that employee screening protocols should put employees on
    notice that on any given day, any one of them may be subjected to an
    inspection.
                                     ______

       Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Amy Klobuchar to
                              Hon. Peter Neffenger
        Question 1. At the Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, the
    security line at peak travel times took an average of 45 minutes and
    people were missing their flights. The issues that contributed to this
    long wait time were multifaceted: an increase in travel volume, the
    consolidated lines at the North Terminal, and training of screeners and
    K-9 units. Given the increase in volume and the necessary increase in
    security protocols after the findings of the IG report, how is TSA
    adapting to ensure that passengers can safely and efficiently go
    through screening processes?
        Answer. We have made significant changes to our operations at MSP,
    and we are seeing results. We filled two additional passenger screening
    canine team vacancies in March, bringing their total allocation to six
    teams. We have also adjusted our staffing levels during peak times,
    converted frontline Transportation Security Officers from part-time to
    full-time, authorized additional overtime, and appropriately limited
    the number of staff on annual leave during the peak travel season. We
    have also given the Federal Security Director the flexibility to use
    Behavior Detection Officers to perform other screening functions.
        Nationwide, in concert with the Transportation Security
    Administration's (TSA) main focus on maintaining security effectiveness
    and resolving all alarms at the checkpoint, a wide variety of
    initiatives have been undertaken so that passengers can safely and
    efficiently transit the screening process. These initiatives include:

       Hiring and training additional Transportation Security
            Officers (TSO) at an aggressive pace to staff the Nation's
            busiest airports.

       Optimizing the use of overtime hours, so that more of the
            TSA's budgeted overtime for TSOs is available this summer. TSA
            will realign funds from within TSA in order to increase the
            resources available for summer overtime.

       Deploying Passenger Screening Canine (PSC) teams to support
            peak volumes. TSA is also converting some cargo screening teams
            to passenger screening, which will support expedited screening
            through the remainder of the year.

       Working with airports and airlines to increase throughput at
            passenger checkpoints by reducing the number and size of carry-
            on items.

       Partnering with airports and airlines to conduct flight
            scheduling optimization visits at the highest volume airports.
            This will allow checkpoint staffing schedules to be better
            aligned with airline flight schedules so that passenger volume
            is distributed better over time. TSA is also collaborating with
            airports and airlines to support non-security screening
            operations, such as returning bins to the front of waiting
            lines and other non-security related tasks.

        Longer term efforts may include:

       Partnering with industry and the Department of Homeland
            Security (DHS) Science & Technology Directorate to develop
            innovative solutions to improve passenger flow, queue design,
            and increase security effectiveness.

       Broadening marketing and outreach efforts for TSA Pre3, to
            include:

       Media advertising, with a focus on top travel markets,
            hotels, rental cars, credit cards, in-flight magazines, in-
            flight Wi-Fi, and airport signage.

       Targeted messages to frequent travelers who are not yet
            enrolled in a Trusted Traveler program.

       Offering TSA Pre3 through airline and other corporate
            rewards and benefits programs.

       Major corporate travel convention presence.

       Social media efforts.

       Additional corporate and airport mobile and long-term
            enrollment centers, including TSA-sponsored events.

        Question 2. I understand that TSA is authorized to hire more part-
    time screeners, but there is a cap on full time screeners. I know the
    number of screeners at MSP has gone down over the last few years as
    travel volume has increased. How does the cap impact the TSA's ability
    to meet the current demands of airport security and why has there been
    a reduction in the number of screeners?
        Answer. Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) is
    currently allocated 630 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) positions, and as
    part of the $34 million Congress recently approved TSA to reprogram,
    they have been approved for an additional 10 FTE to be used for
    increased overtime, or they can hire more Transportation Security
    Officers in place of the additional overtime.
        The FTE limitation contained in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2016
    appropriations bill does not affect the ability of the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) to hire Transportation Security Officers
    (TSO). The limitation of 45,000 FTE does not apply to screeners hired
    as part-time, and there is no restriction on part-time TSOs moving to
    full-time as those positions become available. Rather, the limitation
    comes from the amount of available resources--the FY 2016
    appropriations bill provides funding sufficient for 42,525 TSOs, which
    was above the FY 2016 President's Request, and TSA gained Congressional
    approval to realign $34 million from other TSA funding to support
    additional screening hours to meet this year's unprecedented summer
    surge in passenger traffic.
        TSA's budget for the past two years had proposed reductions in TSO
    FTE as savings accrued from the implementation of TSA Pre3 and other
    risk-based expedited screening programs. These budgets relied on
    earlier projections that did not adequately anticipate the recent
    passenger growth.
                                     ______

     Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Richard Blumenthal to
                              Hon. Peter Neffenger
        Question 1. On March 22 in Brussels, the world was reminded of the
    essential, non-negotiable need to protect our airports, subways, and
    other critical infrastructure from cowardly, evil acts of destruction.
    Congress was fully aware of such threats in August 2007, when it passed
    landmark legislation requiring the Department of Homeland Security to
    take rigorous, robust action to stem the tide of terrorist threats to
    transportation on our shores--including our surface transportation
    network. These calls for action required TSA to complete a number of
    critical security mandates by August 2008. But now, almost eight years
    since the deadline for these efforts, TSA is nowhere near completion of
    the necessary actions.
        The Implementing Recommendations Act of the 9/11 Commission Act of
    2007 required TSA to take three important actions: (1) ensure all high-
    risk target railroads have strong, sufficient security plans; (2)
    ensure public transportation agencies, railroads and bus providers have
    training standards on security threats and conditions for frontline
    employees; and (3) ensure public transportation agencies and railroads
    conduct rigorous, name-based security background checks and immigration
    status checks on all frontline employees. Unfortunately, TSA has not
    met these statutory requirements.
        I raised this issue last year at your nomination hearing, but TSA
    failed to provide definitive timelines. I raised this issue again in
    August after an averted terrorist catastrophe on a train in Europe, and
    TSA informed me that the proposed security-planning rule and the
    training rule were ``in the final stages of regulatory development''
    and were on track to be published ``by the end of Fiscal Year 2016.''
    The vetting rule was given a projected time-frame after completion of
    the first two rules--which could be years from now. I received a
    follow-up response from your office last month, informing me that all
    three rules were further delayed: TSA had yet to formally collect
    information and data on how to develop a proposed security-planning
    rule; the proposed training rule would be published ``in 2016''--which
    could be later than the Fiscal Year time-frame I was told in September;
    and the vetting and the background check rule remained ``on a slower
    track.'' All of these timelines concern proposed rules--not even final
    rules.
        Overall, it appears the responsibility for completing these rules
    will fall on the next administration. This is inexcusable. I recognize
    there are some collaborative, consensus-led efforts to achieve the
    goals of the 9/11 Act short of actual rules. But Congress required
    rules, and after a distressing, disheartening decade of foot dragging
    and delay, these rules are nowhere near done. Although many associate
    TSA with aviation, whereas these rules concern surface transportation,
    our passenger rail systems carry five times as many passengers as
    airlines, through a massive nationwide network. It is no less urgent--
    and no less within your agency's statutory mandate--that this critical
    infrastructure receive attention and protection immediately.
        Why has TSA failed so dramatically in carrying out these
    requirements? When will TSA finally achieve the results Congress sought
    almost a decade ago?
        Answer. Please be assured that I share your concern and have asked
    my staff for continued updates regarding our work with stakeholders to
    ensure the security of the Nation's surface transportation systems. As
    you noted, notice and comment rulemaking is a complex, time consuming
    process influenced by many factors, including those that are outside of
    the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) control.
    Notwithstanding these challenges, TSA is making progress in meeting the
    outstanding 9/11 Act requirements and is currently on track to publish
    the security training Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) before the
    end of the Fiscal Year. TSA also continues to prioritize the security
    plans and vulnerability assessments, proposed regulation and the
    security background and immigration checks for frontline employees, and
    has identified a path forward that will best position both rules to
    satisfy the stringent standards established by the Office of Management
    and Budget under Executive Order 12866.
        In the interim, TSA has taken numerous actions to ensure that our
    transportation hubs have robust security measures in place to protect
    the public. Based on continued voluntary compliance by our
    stakeholders, we believe the security landscape for high-risk surface
    transportation providers is consistent with anticipated future
    regulatory requirements. These measures are outlined in detail below.

    1. Leveraging grant funding and thorough assessments, TSA has ensured
    that high-risk railroads have strong, sufficient security plans.

        The 9/11 Act included requirements for security enhancement grants
    that are applicable to high-risk public transportation agencies
    (including commuter railroads) and Amtrak (secs. 1406 and 1514). Under
    the 9/11 Act's requirements, applicants for funding under the Transit
    Security Grant Program (TSGP) are required to have a current security
    plan in order to be eligible to apply for TSGP funds. The act of
    applying for a grant serves as the transit system's way of attesting it
    has a current security plan, meaning a security plan that has been
    updated within the past three years. Additionally, the grant Notice of
    Funding Opportunity requires that projects for transit systems that are
    seeking funding must be linked back to vulnerabilities identified in
    their security plans; otherwise, the project will not be recommended
    for funding. Of the 114 eligible transit systems (non-ferry) in the
    TSGP including Amtrak, 103 (89 percent) have met these standards as
    they have applied for grants. The same requirements have been
    consistently applied to the other surface modal grant programs as
    required by the 9/11 Act (see sec. 1513 for railroads other than Amtrak
    and sec. 1532 for over-the-road bus security assistance).
        Between Fiscal Year (FY) 2006 and FY 2015, almost $47 million was
    awarded through the TSGP and Amtrak grants specifically for security
    planning efforts and more than $2.2 million for security planning
    efforts through Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP/OTRB).
    Between FY 2008 and FY 2011, $4.2 million was awarded through the
    Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRSGP) for security planning
    efforts. The FRSGP has not been funded since FY 2011.
        Our assessments indicate that this funding has resulted in a
    significant improvement in security planning efforts. Of the 114
    eligible transit (non-ferry) systems eligible under the TSGP, there are
    92 systems that have been assessed at least twice through TSA's
    Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program. Security
    plans are one of the 17 Security Action Items (SAIs) that TSA assesses
    as part of the BASE. As part of the BASE review, a score is derived
    from a checklist. Each category is then scored and the BASE score is an
    average of all categories. The total aggregate scores for the 92
    transit system security plans that have been assessed more than once
    have increased by 15 percentage points.

    2. With TSA funding and sharing of best practices, TSA has ensured that
    public transportation agencies, railroads, and over-the-road bus
    providers have training standards on security threats and conditions
    for frontline employees.

        TSA has ensured that public transportation agencies, railroads, and
    over-the-road bus providers have established training standards to
    enhance security awareness for frontline employees. For example,
    through funding and other support provided by TSA, the American Public
    Transportation Association (APTA) has promulgated standards for
    security awareness training for transit employees. Both the U.S.
    Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of
    Transportation have funded courses that can be used to meet these
    standards. TSA maintains an open discussion with the management of
    freight railroads regarding the scope and content of security awareness
    training for frontline employees. In addition, TSA has provided
    training materials to railroads and allied industries on subjects such
    as recognition and identification of improvised explosive devices in
    the freight rail environment and how to detect and react to signs of
    potential sabotage on and about railroad infrastructure. TSA also
    provided guidance to the railroads in January of 2016 during meetings
    of the Rail Sector Coordinating Council about suggested training
    program content that would comply with the training program elements
    outlined in section 1517 of 9/11 Act. TSA's First
    ObserverTM security domain awareness program delivers web-
    based training to highway professionals, including over-the-road bus
    operators, encouraging frontline workers to ``Observe, Assess and
    Report'' suspicious activities.
        From FY 2006-FY 2015, almost $145 million was awarded through the
    TSGP and Amtrak grants specifically for security training and $5.5
    million was awarded through the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program
    (IBSGP/OTRB). Similarly, from FY 2008-FY 2011, through the FRSGP, $7
    million was awarded to support security training conducted by transit
    agencies. This funding included a grant awarded to short line railroads
    for the expressed purposes of developing interactive security training
    programs for frontline employees. Approximately 100,000 individuals
    have been trained on the First ObserverTM Program.
        Our assessments indicate that the above-referenced grant program
    has resulted in a significant improvement in security training. Of the
    92 transit systems eligible under the TSGP that have been assessed at
    least twice as part of TSA's BASE program, 72 percent (66) have seen
    improvements in their training scores, or maintained their current
    level of achievement. Additionally, 67 have security training scores
    greater than 70 percent. The total average security training scores for
    TSGP-eligible systems assessed more than once have increased by 10
    percentage points. Class I freight railroads and many of the Class II
    railroads have made modifications to their employee security awareness
    training programs consistent with requirements under the 9/11 Act.
        TSA has also worked directly to improve the security of key
    transportation facilities and systems serving commuters in your
    congressional district. In addition to providing funding and other
    support to rail systems operated by surrounding jurisdictions that
    serve Connecticut commuters, both CTtransit and the Connecticut
    Department of Transportation (CT DOT) have been eligible for funding
    under the TSGP and have received the following allocations based on
    their requests:

       CTtransit: $720,500 since FY 2009

         $483,500 for public awareness

         $237,000 for CCTV on buses

       CT DOT: $29 million since FY 2006

         $2.9 million for K-9 teams

         $3.2 million for critical infrastructure protection

         $6.7 million for public awareness

         $0.5 million for security planning

         $1.2 million for interoperable communications

         $0.7 million for rail yard security

         $13.8 million for fiber optic cable

        In addition, TSA has conducted assessments specifically for systems
    providing service in Connecticut. Both CTtransit and the Metro-North
    Railroad Company have been assessed three times. Both systems have
    received Gold Standard awards for achieving overall scores greater than
    90 percent during their last assessments. Specific score information is
    protected as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). TSA can provide this
    information under separate cover upon request.

    3. TSA has developed standards for public transportation agencies and
    railroads to conduct rigorous, named-based security background checks
    and immigration status checks.

        In cooperation with the relevant associations (the American Public
    Transportation Association and Association of American Railroads), TSA
    has developed standards for public transportation agencies and
    railroads to conduct named-based background checks. Promulgated in
    2011, APTA's recommended practices for ``conducting background
    investigations'' reflect the requirements for the scope of background
    checks in section 1414 of the 9/11 Act, including redress. Of note, as
    publicly owned systems, transit systems are likely to have access to
    information for criminal history record checks of public employees that
    may not be available to the private industries covered by TSA's
    security threat assessment programs. In addition, since enactment of
    the 9/11 Act, the E-Verify system has become available to all employers
    as a free resource to validate citizenship information on their
    employees. Several states require use of E-Verify for all public
    employees and contractors, which would include employees of public
    transportation systems. BASE data indicates that the average score for
    conducting background investigations of employees and contractors has
    risen from 87 percent in FY 2010 to 94 percent in FY 2015.
        TSA has consistently worked to enhance and maintain the security of
    surface transportation and will continue to do so while simultaneously
    moving forward with promulgation of the regulatory requirements imposed
    under the 9/11 Act.

        Question 2. In 2008, with fuel prices soaring, airlines began
    imposing new surcharges and ``ancillary'' fees to customers. The most
    notable of these fees is the ``bag fee,'' in which airlines charge
    customers a $25 or $50 to bring their bag with them--on top of the
    fare. Not surprising, savvy customers balked at this nickel and diming
    and quickly realized they could avoid the airlines unscrupulous fees
    and fares by simply bringing their bag with them on the plane--just
    carrying it on.
        It appears the airlines' anti-consumer effort could also undermine
    security. More passengers carrying on their bags means more bag
    screening, which leads to longer lines, more ``soft'' targets, greater
    stress on TSA personnel and equipment and resources. I filed an
    amendment in this committee in March to require GAO conduct a study of
    the impact of bag fees on aviation security--including the economic
    losses incurred by waiting in line and whether airlines are paying
    their fair share for these increased costs. I am pursuing that in the
    FAA bill as well. It may seem like a small issue, but airlines are
    making tens of billions from these fees--mostly tax-free--and it
    appears we the taxpayers are picking up the tab for the long lines they
    have caused.
        Do you think the rise of baggage fees could have had an impact on
    longer lines and strain on TSA resources?
        Answer. Looking at the last nine years of TSA data, the average
    ratio of checked bags per passenger declined from a high of 0.81
    checked bags per passenger in 2007, prior to the institution of checked
    baggage fees, to a low of 0.65 checked bags per passenger in 2015. This
    equates to a 20 percent reduction in the amount of checked bags from
    2007 to 2015. In 2015, TSA conducted a small scale study of Southwest
    Airlines passengers and legacy airline passengers. Data from this study
    indicated that Southwest Airlines passengers presented fewer carry-on
    items per person for screening than legacy airline passengers and had a
    correlating increase in the checked baggage ratio.

        Question 3. Last year we saw a major, massive scandal in which it
    was revealed how easy it was for undercover TSA teams to get weapons
    past TSA screeners.
        It was revealed that TSA airport screeners failed to find fake
    explosives and weapons in 67 out of 70 tests that were conducted by
    undercover Federal agents known as a Red Team--a failure rate of 95
    percent.
        What reforms have you carried out to ensure this never happens
    again?
        Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
    implemented a number of near-term steps to address the issues raised by
    the covert testing, which is aligned with the 10-Point Plan directed by
    Secretary Johnson. These steps include initiatives to ensure leadership
    accountability, improve alarm resolution, increase effectiveness and
    deterrence, increase threat testing to sharpen officer performance,
    strengthen operating procedures and technology, and enhance training.
    This included a root cause analysis that identified multiple areas for
    improvement, and TSA is mitigating those areas through program action
    plans. All of the actions directed in the Secretary's 10-Point Plan are
    currently on-schedule or completed.
        Most importantly, TSA corrected numerous immediate problems
    revealed by the covert testing. TSA established a more aggressive
    training plan and retrained the entire workforce with focused Mission
    Essentials. TSA has completed two rounds of Mission Essentials and is
    currently executing Mission Essentials III, which will last through the
    summer. TSA also implemented rapid improvement events for its screening
    equipment to include development of improved detection algorithms. All
    standard operating procedures were rewritten to reduce and focus
    checkpoint operations, and the Administrator's Intent was released to
    ensure the organization's main effort remains its transportation
    security mission.

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