    [Senate Hearing 114-506]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                            S. Hrg. 114-506

                    THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S FUNCTIONS AND
                   CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO ENERGY-RELATED
                   EMERGENCIES, INCLUDING IMPACTS TO CRITICAL
                             ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

    =======================================================================

                                  FIELD HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                          ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                AUGUST 15, 2016

                                   __________

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                   COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

                        LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska, Chairman
    JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming               MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
    JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho                RON WYDEN, Oregon
    MIKE LEE, Utah                       BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JEFF FLAKE, Arizona                  DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                AL FRANKEN, Minnesota
    BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana              JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
    ROB PORTMAN, Ohio                    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
    JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota            ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
    LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee           ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia
                          Colin Hayes, Staff Director
                    Patrick J. McCormick III, Chief Counsel
                Tristan Abbey, Senior Professional Staff Member
                   Brianne Miller, Professional Staff Member
                Angela Becker-Dippman, Democratic Staff Director
                    Sam E. Fowler, Democratic Chief Counsel
                     Rich Glick, Democratic General Counsel
             Brie Van Cleve, Democratic Science & Technology Fellow

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                               OPENING STATEMENTS

                                                                       Page
    Cantwell, Hon. Maria, Ranking Member and a U.S. Senator from
      Washington.....................................................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Moniz, Hon. Ernest, Secretary, U.S. Department of Energy.........     5
    Ezelle, Robert, Director, Washington State Emergency Management
      Division.......................................................    51
    Bowman, Stephanie, Commissioner, Port of Seattle (Washington)....    58
    Hairston, John, Chief Administrative Officer, Bonneville Power
      Administration, U.S. Department of Energy......................    63
    Rogers, Scot, Executive Vice President & General Counsel, F5
      Networks, Inc..................................................    73
    Imhoff, Carl, Manager, Grid Research Program, Pacific Northwest
      National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy.................    78
    Best, Dr. Lynn, Chief Environmental Officer, Seattle City Light..    87

              ALPHABETICAL LISTING AND APPENDIX MATERIAL SUBMITTED

    Best, Dr. Lynn:
        Opening Statement............................................    87
        Written Testimony............................................    90
    BNSF Railway:
        Statement for the Record.....................................   110
    Bowman, Stephanie:
        Opening Statement............................................    58
        Written Testimony............................................    60
    Cantwell, Hon. Maria:
        Opening Statement............................................     1
        Chart entitled ``Oil trains moving through Washington''......    47
    Ezelle, Robert:
        Opening Statement............................................    51
        Written Testimony............................................    54
    Hairston, John:
        Opening Statement............................................    63
        Written Testimony............................................    65
    Imhoff, Carl:
        Opening Statement............................................    78
        Written Testimony............................................    82
    Moniz, Hon. Ernest:
        Opening Statement............................................     5
        Clear Path IV: Energy-Focused Disaster Response Exercise
          Summary Report, April 19-20, 2016..........................     9
        Written Testimony............................................    24
    Rogers, Scot:
        Opening Statement............................................    73
        Written Testimony............................................    76

      THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY'S FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES TO RESPOND TO
       ENERGY-RELATED EMERGENCIES, INCLUDING IMPACTS TO CRITICAL ENERGY
                                 INFRASTRUCTURE

                                  ----------

                            MONDAY, AUGUST 15, 2016

                                           U.S. Senate,
                     Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
                                                   Seattle, Washington.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:30 a.m. PDT at
    the Campion Ballroom at Seattle University, Seattle,
    Washington, Hon. Maria Cantwell, presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM
                               WASHINGTON

        Senator Cantwell [presiding]: Today's meeting will come to
    order. I want to thank everyone for being here today. I
    especially want to thank Secretary Moniz for traveling to the
    Pacific Northwest to be part of this historic field hearing.
        I want to thank Seattle University and Father Sundborg, who
    I know is not here today, for hosting us again. We were here
    last year to discuss issues with Senator Barrasso related to
    the fire season and some great work came out of that hearing,
    so I expect the same out of this morning's discussion.
        First we are going to hear from Secretary Moniz and have a
    chance to discuss with him, for the official record, a variety
    of issues, mostly related to the Quadrennial Energy Review and
    updating our energy infrastructure.
        We will then hear from a group of Northwest experts on the
    second panel: Dr. Lynn Best, who is with Seattle City Light;
    Stephanie Bowman, from the Port of Seattle; Robert Ezelle, with
    the Washington Department Emergency Management; John Hairston,
    with the Bonneville Power Administration; Carl Imhoff, from
    Pacific Northwest National Lab; and Scot Rogers, with F5
    Networks. I look forward to hearing everyone's comments and to
    the discussion we are going to have today.
        I want to welcome the Secretary to the Pacific Northwest
    and thank him for coming to visit us. We are very proud of our
    history of innovation in the Northwest and the energy mix of
    our electricity grid.
        We have already had a busy morning. Secretary Moniz and I
    just recently visited the Bullet Foundation and discussed some
    of the smart building and zero energy building developments
    happening in the Northwest. Later, we will go over to the
    University of Washington to see more great innovation and then
    to the Tri-Cities tomorrow to look at the Hanford site and
    Hanford issues.
        It is not every day that an Energy Secretary makes two days
    available for a particular region of the country, but I think
    our region deserves to have that much attention because of the
    challenges and the level of innovation that is happening here.
        Mr. Secretary, before I begin my formal remarks, I want to
    thank you again for making so much time for us and for your
    great service to our country.
        Secretary Moniz. Thank you for hosting me.
        Senator Cantwell. With that, we will start the hearing
    which, as I said, is really a hearing to talk about updating
    and securing our critical infrastructure and energy resources.
        The United States is experiencing a very dramatic
    transformation in how we produce and transport energy. Many of
    these changes are positive. A more modern grid enables greater
    quantities of clean sources of energy. Consumers are able to
    more efficiently use energy and choose low cost alternatives to
    meet their needs.
        We also know that these changes can produce greater stress
    on our energy transportation infrastructure. For example, crude
    by rail or pipeline challenges.
        The energy industry and federal and state and local
    governments must work more closely together on these to update
    our energy infrastructure to satisfy demands for reliable, safe
    and affordable energy.
        As I mentioned, many of these issues are discussed in the
    Secretary of Energy's Quadrennial Energy Review, issued last
    year to communicate the many, many energy-related challenges we
    face. Today we are going to talk about three of those specific
    challenges, those that really concern us here in the Northwest.
        First, we are going to discuss the pressure that increased
    domestic production of oil has been placing on our rail system,
    everything from pushing commodities off the rails to issues of
    public security. The energy transformation the nation is
    experiencing is impacting the transportation infrastructure,
    and we, in the Northwest, know how much it is impacting us.
        Last year the Quadrennial Energy Review concluded that
    increased domestic oil production had altered transportation of
    liquid fuels and for us, in fact, from 2010 to 2015, rail
    shipments to the West have increased by 10,000 percent. That is
    almost a mind boggling statistic.
        We went from having almost no prior train oil traffic to
    having almost 20 trains a week going through every major
    population center in our state. Cities like Vancouver, Spokane
    and Seattle are very concerned about the safety of these oil
    trains and the high profile of incidents that have occurred
    across the nation including a recent derailment that happened
    in Mosier, Oregon. Twenty-six cities in our state have already
    passed resolutions expressing concern or just outright
    opposition to oil trains. This is something even the President,
    when he was here recently, heard about.
        The second issue we want to focus on, as it relates to our
    infrastructure, again called out in the Quadrennial Energy
    Review, is the need to enhance and prevent cyberattacks. A
    successful attack on our grid, as we know in the Northwest,
    could have catastrophic outcomes. According to the University
    of California, Berkeley, power disruptions already cost our
    U.S. economy $96 billion annually.
        Today's economy depends upon a well-functioning and robust
    electricity grid. As we continue to grow more reliant on the
    Internet to manage the grid and energy-consuming products,
    cybersecurity will become even more important.
        The Quadrennial Energy Review noted that in 2013, 151
    different cyber incidents involving the energy sector were
    reported to the Department of Homeland Security. I know there
    is an ongoing effort by the Secretary, working with our
    national labs and Homeland Security and various industry, to
    work on preventing cyberattacks in the future.
        But I think we are here today to discuss the ideas that we
    should be pursuing as our information age architecture
    continues to grow, that our investment in cybersecurity should
    continue to grow. Today almost everything and everyone relies
    on a well-functioning electricity grid. Our hospitals, our
    first responders, our water treatment facilities, fueling
    stations, transportation communications, everything will be
    impacted by a prolonged blackout.
        As we will hear from F5 this morning, most of our
    investment to date has been focused on protecting the security
    of our networks. Much more needs to be done to invest in the
    security of our software systems. Software attacks are growing.
    State agents, acting on behalf of foreign governments or
    terrorist organizations, have attempted almost on a daily basis
    to hack into our electricity grid.
        We have heard stories that maybe the Russians are behind
    the attacks on computers at the Democratic National Committee
    and that the North Koreans were involved or perhaps involved in
    the Sony system hack two years ago. We need to redouble our
    efforts to thwart not only cyber but physical attacks against
    the grid as well and to make sure we are continuing to make
    investments to upgrade our infrastructure.
        I think the Secretary may also have some announcements
    about that today as it relates to Northwest companies and
    continuing to make that investment. But we do have many, many
    Northwest companies that, from big data to Smart Grid, are
    trying to help build out the infrastructure that will keep us
    ahead of some of these attacks.
        Finally, as the climate continues to change, more attention
    needs to be paid to the impacts of that and natural disasters,
    severe weather, all of these things, also impact our energy
    infrastructure. We know in the Pacific Northwest what a one-
    degree change in temperature means for snow melt and what a big
    impact it has on our hydro system.
        Government has an obligation to coordinate with the private
    sector to reduce the impacts of natural disasters on our energy
    infrastructure. This is especially important for us in the
    Northwest where we are susceptible to earthquakes, fires,
    droughts, floods and landslides and getting the energy system
    up and operating again is critical.
        Secretary Moniz is going to, I believe, release a report
    today about the Department of Energy's (DOE) recent Clear Path
    IV exercise. This exercise examined how well the Pacific
    Northwest energy sector might respond to a massive earthquake
    associated with a tsunami. The findings suggest that we have
    more to do to enhance our energy security but clearly the
    Federal Government needs to play a role in helping us get that
    plan into action.
        We are sitting in the middle of the Cascadia subduction
    zone which can produce very strong earthquakes and
    corresponding tsunamis, and an event of this magnitude could
    wipe out the infrastructure that brings electricity and fuel
    for a very long time. The Department of Energy's findings from
    its Clear Path IV exercise are particularly illuminating.
        First, we need to help the energy sector assess the damage
    from natural disasters more quickly and more accurately to
    facilitate the restoration of service. The Pacific Northwest
    National Lab is developing technology on this that will help
    expedite those assessments.
        Second, the Federal Government needs to use its resources
    to enhance the effect of the state and local industry efforts
    to restore the energy infrastructure. We all know what happens
    when we have a storm and the amount of time we have tried to
    cut down on getting electricity grids back up and operational
    by coordinating with utilities all throughout the region.
    Imagine this on a much grander scale.
        Third, the Department of Defense and other agencies can
    provide aviation and maritime resources to transport and
    replace equipment such as electric transformers and hard hit
    areas not able to be reached by road. Federal agencies can also
    help make sure that we have enhanced infrastructure and
    coordination for the restoration of those energy sector areas.
        I look forward to hearing more about this report from the
    Secretary.
        We are already working on some of these ideas in Congress.
    We just recently passed out of the Senate a comprehensive
    energy bill, the first one in nine years, and this bill is now
    in conference. It includes important provisions for doubling
    our efforts on research for the grid and specifically targeting
    cyberattacks. It would fund modernization to make the grid more
    flexible in the cases of emergency. It also puts the Energy
    Secretary in charge of developing and implementing a response
    for energy emergencies. So I am so pleased that he is here
    today to discuss that. We also, in the bill, make sure that we
    continue to focus on upgrading our energy infrastructure as it
    relates to the grid and a workforce that it will take to
    accomplish that.
        Again, we want to welcome the Energy Secretary here today,
    and thank him for coming to the Northwest and looking at all
    the innovation that the Northwest has to offer. For example, we
    just toured a smart building. The Energy bill would upgrade our
    Smart building efforts through the Department of Energy's help
    and hopefully reduce the amount of energy used. About 40
    percent of all energy is consumed now in buildings.
        Mr. Secretary, again, thank you for being in the Pacific
    Northwest. Our hearing process is usually five minutes for
    opening statements, even for a Secretary, but today we are
    waving that rule. We are in the Northwest, and we are going to
    make our own rule.
        Please use whatever time you would like this morning to
    present your testimony and discuss any issues you think are
    relevant to today's subjects.

              STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY,
                       U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

        Secretary Moniz. Great.
        Well thank you, Senator Cantwell. I really appreciate the
    opportunity to address the Department of Energy's
    responsibilities for helping the energy sector prepare and
    respond to a wide range of threats and hazards at a time, as
    you said, of rapidly changing energy systems, dramatically
    increased oil and gas production, driving exports, engaging new
    geographies requiring infrastructure development. Market
    structures are shifting. Natural gas displacing coal. Dramatic
    renewables growth. Efficiency, challenging business models.
    It's really one of the most dynamic times, I think, we've ever
    seen in the energy system. And as you have said, that spills
    over into infrastructure challenges that we will discuss today.
        But I do want to take the opportunity, given the lack of a
    5-minute clock, to also thank you for collaboration and for
    your leadership in this and in other issues and particularly
    single out your commitment to innovation. I think we are very
    well aligned on that. And also your leadership in emphasizing
    the regional nature of innovation and our opportunities to
    improve regional ecosystems here in the Northwest, but also
    across the country. We're going to need that to succeed in our
    energy and climate goals. So again, thank you for all of that,
    not to mention a great time here in Seattle.
        So, as President Obama has pointed out, our energy and
    communication systems enable all other infrastructures to
    function. And of course, communications in turn, depend upon
    electricity. So, if we don't protect the energy sector, we're
    putting, essentially, every other sector in the economy in
    peril.
        When the DOE was established in 1977, the nation's energy
    vulnerability was perceived mainly to be the threat of physical
    disruption of oil supplies. Though DOE did inherit emergency
    authorities from precursor agencies, and I'll come back to
    those, the only reference to emergency response in the DOE
    Organization Act was direction for DOE to develop ``an
    effective strategy for distributing and allocating fuels in
    periods of short supply.'' So very, very narrow reference to
    the issues of those days.
        Now fast forward to this century, and we face a very
    different set of threats to our energy systems. In response
    there are now laws, actions and Presidential directives that
    are focused on threats such as severe weather, natural
    disasters, EMP, aging infrastructure, cyber and physical
    threats. So it's a considerably broadened threat spectrum that
    we need to consider.
        We need to make energy infrastructure investments
    commensurate to the critical role of that infrastructure and to
    today's threat environment. In particular, the reliance of all
    of our critical energy infrastructures on electricity places a
    very high premium on reliable, modern and hardened electric
    grid resistant to the continually evolving cyber threats.
        And, I'll come back to this later, that is why in the
    second installment of the Quadrennial Energy Review, that you
    referred to earlier, we are focusing on the electricity system,
    end-to-end, including the entire threat surface. So that is
    something that, I think, we get, we share an appreciation of
    that priority.
        Now DOE does have some long standing emergency authorities.
    During emergencies the Department has independent authority to
    order temporary electricity connections, to make exchanges of
    crude oil or petroleum products from our reserves, to assist
    entities in procuring necessary energy materials to maintain
    supply during an emergency and to control nuclear materials.
        We also have authorities that require a Presidential
    finding including orders to protect or restore the reliability
    of critical infrastructure, sales from the petroleum reserve,
    allocation of energy materials in the civilian market and
    allocation of natural gas and fuel switching in power plants.
    So those can all follow a Presidential determination.
        Finally, DOE has a consultative role for Jones Act waivers
    and a concurrence role for fuel waivers during emergencies. Now
    these authorities have been used many times. The Department has
    used its independent authority to connect temporary electricity
    lines, for example, to restore power after hurricanes like Ike,
    Katrina and Rita. After Super Storm Sandy, the Department
    loaned 120,000 barrels from the Northwest Home Heating Oil
    Reserve, NHHOR, to the Department of Defense for use in
    emergency responder vehicles, essentially low sulfur diesel
    fuel.
        DOE also has had legislation and directives related to new
    emergency response authorities. The California electricity
    crisis of 2000-2001 actually led to the use of multiple
    authorities deriving from the Federal Power Act, the Defense
    Production Act and the Natural Gas Policy Act.
        Now with regard to new authorities and responsibilities,
    the FAST Act that you referred to, the Transportation bill,
    provides DOE with a new authority to protect critical
    infrastructure against cyber, EMP, geomagnetic disturbance and
    physical attack threats. These authorities do not apply,
    however, to natural disasters other than geomagnetic storms. So
    while these authorities are welcome, they do create an
    asymmetric situation for authorities for natural disasters and
    malevolent attacks even though the outcomes could be similar.
        The 2015 Balanced Budget Act directs DOE to establish a
    strategic petroleum reserve modernization program to protect
    the U.S. economy from the impacts of emergency products supply
    disruptions, and I will return to this later.
        Finally, in terms of new responsibilities and authorities,
    President Obama has addressed these issues through Presidential
    Policy Directive 21 which identifies DOE as the sector-specific
    agency for energy infrastructure, making it the federal lead
    for the prioritization and coordination of activities to
    strengthen the security and resilience of critical energy
    infrastructure.
        The DOE also serves within the Administration as the lead
    agency for Emergency Support Function 12 which facilitates
    recovery from disruptions to energy infrastructure. During a
    response operation the Department works with industry and
    federal, state and local partners to assess disaster impacts on
    energy infrastructure, coordinate response to expedite
    restoration and to monitor and provide situational awareness of
    impacts to key decision-makers. The Department deploys
    responders who work directly with affected utilities and local
    officials on the ground during a disaster. Our response force
    is entirely voluntary and we are training right now nearly 100
    members of our staff to be prepared to deploy for all hazard
    contingencies.
        Over the past two years our Deputy Secretary and I have led
    a deliberate effort to strengthen our emergency response
    capabilities and our critical partnerships with the energy
    sector. With 90 percent of the nation's power infrastructure
    privately owned and operated, coordinating and aligning efforts
    between the government and the private sector is necessary to
    be effective in emergency response.
        Our challenge here is speed. If we have a government
    process that takes too long to share information about dynamic
    threats, then we're going to fail to protect our
    infrastructure. Our solution is to provide tools, information
    and practice so that companies are aware of risks as soon as
    they're identified. We can bring together information across
    the Department and across the government and then take action
    together. We also partnered with state, local and tribal
    governments with an updated Energy Emergency Assurance
    Coordinators MOU that I signed early this year. DOE will
    enhance robust training and exercising, bringing stakeholders
    together to plan for shared regional hazards, and I will come
    back to an example of that.
        One of DOE's core missions, and you've said it already
    several times which I appreciate, is to support innovation and
    that includes innovation to help our nation's energy security.
    So we are growing our partnerships with academia and the
    private sector and, of course, leveraging our 17 national
    laboratories in order to make our infrastructure more secure
    and resilient.
        At this time I will say that in this state we have one of
    our premier national laboratories, specific Northwest, East of
    the Cascades. You all should take a trip over the mountains and
    we will tomorrow, in fact, do that to visit that laboratory. Of
    course, it will require substantial additional investment over
    many years to expand transformational innovation that can
    outpace the dynamic threats that we face. And here I will say
    that across the board the President's Fiscal Year 2017 budget
    proposes the first increment of energy R and D funding to meet
    Mission Innovation goals, specifically a doubling of our energy
    related R and D over a five-year period. It also proposes
    regional innovation partnerships and again, Senator Cantwell
    has been a leader in advocating for this approach, no doubt
    helped by the fact that she anticipates this area would have a
    very robust regional response given all of the intellectual and
    other assets in this part of the country.
        This budget will provide a very strong foundation for
    addressing the infrastructure needs discussed here as well,
    again, as the broader clean energy investments needed for our
    economic, environmental and security goals.
        Today we are announcing $30 million of funding. That may
    actually have some additional funding added to it next year,
    but for today $30 million of funding for cybersecurity,
    including research and development and programs to develop
    energy professional education in cybersecurity. Two of the
    awards are in Washington State. They are the Schweitzer
    Engineering company in Pullman, Washington with a total of
    about $7.5 million for the company in developing its
    cybersecurity software products. That's a terrific development
    across the board but certainly as well here in Washington
    State.
        Now, robust exercises are also crucial to ensure industry
    and government are better prepared to work as a team during
    real world emergencies.
        In April 2016 DOE led Clear Path IV, an interagency
    exercise focused on testing and evaluating energy sector
    response plans in a scenario depicting a Cascadia Subduction
    Zone 9.0 earthquake and tsunami, the so-called really big one,
    made famous in the New Yorker article.
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        One outcome of that was the importance of accelerating
    damage assessments immediately. And as you said, PNNL, Pacific
    Northwest Laboratory, is right now developing imagery tools to
    do just that, to bring new technology to bear on making fast
    assessments of damage so that responders can prioritize where
    they have to go in order to get not only energy up but to
    provide all the other services to our displaced people.
        Clear Path served to elevate energy sector participation in
    the subsequent Cascadia Rising exercise which was government-
    wide in June. That really helped the entire Emergency
    Management Team to identify resource requirements for natural
    disaster.
        Today, as you said, we are announcing this is a summary,
    the Clear Path After Action report. I want to say that this
    Clear Path was very important. It was the first use of our, I
    mentioned earlier the Deputy Secretary and I have been
    reorganizing some of the response functions, that included
    putting together a unified command structure for emergency
    response. This was the first use of that command structure.
        To give you an idea of our complexity, it deals with
    operations, planning and logistics. But with the Office of
    Electricity, the emergency response activity in the Office of
    Electricity, our national Nuclear Security Administration, our
    Associate Under Secretary for Management Performance who deals
    with physical security, our CIO cyber activity, our
    intelligence activity and our management and administration
    activities which includes procurement. All of those offices
    which are spread out in the Department, have now, we're trying
    to, we are organizing under this unified command structure that
    was exercised for the first time in Clear Path IV.
        I might add that in addition, of course, to their
    participation, for the first time in the Clear Path series, we
    held it out in the field. This was headquartered out of
    Portland, in Bonneville, in the field but it was regional. And
    of course, that allowed us, really, to much more effectively
    bring in state and local responders into our exercise out here
    in the field. We also had the energy industry the first time,
    not only electricity, but the oil and gas sector. We had Canada
    involved and of course, multiple federal agencies.
        So this was a what you need to do so that we're not trying
    to do it for the first time in an emergency, very effective, as
    I said. It highlighted the importance of immediate assessment.
    But it also brought to the fore other things, for example,
    dealing with industry. The need for waivers. There can be anti-
    trust issues, particularly in the oil and gas sector. We have
    to be prepared in advance so that we can do those with speed.
    So that was really very important, and I believe we need to do
    much more of this in the future.
        Now I'll add that unique to DOE we actually own critical
    assets in the sector that we are supporting and particularly
    relevant in, again, this part of the country our preparedness
    and response activities for our power market administrations
    like Bonneville directly overlap with what we are trying to do,
    of course, with the broader energy sector.
        So, another important direction, we believe, that we are
    emphasizing over the last couple of years is to develop what we
    call enterprise-wide approaches. That unified command structure
    is an example of an enterprise-wide approach but the idea here,
    in general, is to bring all of our resources into play,
    including those at our national laboratories.
        Two examples, two additional examples, of that is we have
    formed an integrated Joint Cyber Coordination Center. It's a
    collaborative, intelligence-driven approach to cybersecurity to
    protect the entirety of the DOE attack surface including DMAs
    and we are working toward a consolidated emergency operations
    center to allow our unified command structure to operate out of
    a single facility.
        Finally, let me turn to the issue of managing our strategic
    energy resources, reserves. We already mentioned that the 2015
    Balanced Budget Act, drawing upon a recommendation of the
    Quadrennial Energy Review (QER), supports modernizing the
    petroleum reserve. The petroleum reserve physical assets date
    back many decades, need modernization and frankly, we should
    also, in my view, revisit some of the operating procedures of
    the petroleum reserve.
        But the Balanced Budget Act, again, following up our QER
    recommendation, has two phases. Life Extension Phase II will
    address unanticipated SPR (Strategic Petroleum Reserve) related
    equipment failures that have been impacting the reserves
    operational readiness capability. Second, marine terminal
    distribution capability enhancements will add dedicated marine
    terminals in each of the SPR's three distribution systems to
    address the impacts of changes in the U.S. midstream oil
    movement that have significantly reduced the effective
    distribution capacity of the SPR in an emergency.
        And just last Friday, again, these hearings have a way of
    focusing the mind. Just last Friday, the Department approved
    what's called CD-0, the first stage of project management
    protocols which establishes the mission need for the marine
    terminal distribution capability. CD-0 was already passed for
    the modernization, the life extension phase, and we will soon
    submit a report to Congress on DOE's long term strategic review
    of the SPR.
        So in conclusion, let me say that upon my return to DOE
    after a 13-year absence, I was struck by the imperatives of a
    new and complex mission for the Department. Almost nothing that
    I described in this testimony was present when I left the
    Department in January 2001. But ensuring resilience,
    reliability, security and emergency response with significant
    operational responsibilities is really a new and very important
    direction for the Department. And again, thank you for your
    support.
        The first installment of the QER, again, addressed these
    issues of infrastructure, resilience, reliability, safety and
    asset security. And again, many of those recommendations are in
    progress. Some of them require new statutory authority. We've
    received some statutory authority, and these will improve
    energy infrastructure resilience.
        The second installment, as I mentioned, is on the
    electricity system, end-to-end, and these are all critical for
    emergency response and for meeting our climate goals. However,
    the fragmentation of our current emergency responsibilities and
    assets within the Department, partly reflected in that unified
    command structure, does present a management challenge. And so,
    I want to say that we continue to analyze organizational
    options in light of these complex, cross-cutting and evolving
    requirements.
        The combination of increasing responsibilities and
    fragmented management arrangements creates some risk to the
    Department is not adequately resourced to effectively carry out
    its responsibilities, and that's an area where we look forward
    to working with this Committee and with Congress as a whole to
    provide an appropriately resourced energy emergency response
    capability as an essential component of a robust energy
    infrastructure supporting a 21st century economy.
        Thank you for your graciousness in affording me the time to
    provide somewhat longer testimony. But it really is a broad
    scope of activities, and again, we look forward to solidifying
    this going forward with your help and the Committee's.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Moniz follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for
    that testimony, and thank you for your work on the Quadrennial
    Energy Review--the plan for our energy infrastructure and where
    we are as a nation. That, I think, is a very good blueprint to
    start our discussions as a nation of where we need to go.
        I would like to unpack that a little bit with your
    testimony. To me, reading the report, which is voluminous and
    is available for people online, I think they can get access to
    it or at least the key recommendations. It seems to me that as
    you tried to allude in your testimony, coming back to DOE after
    some absence----
        Secretary Moniz. Thirteen years.
        Senator Cantwell. Thirteen years, that we have several
    phenomenons going on. One is just this issue of we wanted to
    get off of foreign oil. We said we wanted to produce our own,
    and basically we had an infrastructure through the Gulf for
    importing oil and delivering it.
        Now we are in a different situation and that, in and of
    itself, is causing competition on the rails, competition even
    between energy products. There are instances where oil is
    pushing off coal and coal and oil are pushing off agriculture
    products and a great deal of complexity. How would you
    characterize that shift in demand on our infrastructure?
    Significant? I mean, how would you characterize for the
    American people how big a challenge that change has meant to
    our infrastructure and some of these security issues?
        Secretary Moniz. Yes, and by the way, I'd like to, once
    again, thank you and congratulate you for reading the
    Quadrennial Energy Review on the floor of the Senate which was
    much appreciated.
        The increased production of oil and natural gas in the
    United States has obviously been a major story in terms of our
    economy and also environment in the sense that the natural gas
    boom, in particular, has led to a displacement of higher carbon
    coal with lower carbon natural gas producing less CO2
    emissions.
        However, I mean, the big story with regard to
    infrastructure is not simply the scale, it's the fact that it's
    happening in different parts of the country. And so, it has
    changed flows completely.
        I mentioned one example here already in terms of the
    petroleum reserve modernization. We have oil flowing in
    opposite directions in many of our distribution systems which
    is why we need to have a distribution system made for the
    current realities. Another is that it used to be that oil and
    products flowed from the Gulf elsewhere. Now we have
    considerable flows to the Gulf. Third, we have, still with oil,
    we have an addition, as you know very, very well, flows going
    east and west without established pipeline infrastructures and
    therefore, bringing in trains substantially.
        Now it is true that oil by train has gone down very
    substantially nationally in this last year but not necessarily
    regionally, particularly here. But the magnitude of these
    changes, you mentioned up to 20 trains here in the Northwest.
    Just recently I was visiting one of the largest, the largest
    refinery complex on the East Coast in Philadelphia. And the
    changes are--clearly stress the system.
        On the one hand, that one refinery was receiving four unit
    trains per day of Bakken oil. And now suddenly, it's dropped to
    one as they have resumed importing from Africa light oil. So,
    it's really hard to keep up with these major changes and of
    course, as you have different infrastructure we need to build
    out in different ways.
        I didn't mention natural gas but a similar thing there is
    that, again, all gas until a decade ago, fundamentally, flowed,
    you know, mostly out of the Gulf and some in the West in the
    Rockies, in New Mexico, in Colorado, et cetera. And now you
    have incredible production out of Pennsylvania, part of West
    Virginia and Ohio. The infrastructure, frankly, has not yet
    completely caught up to that. So these are big strains on the
    system, and we are feeling it.
        Senator Cantwell. I am glad that you characterize them as
    big strains because we definitely feel that way in the
    Northwest and this, in and of itself, I think, is a big shift.
    I also think that cyber is a big shift and change too, but we
    will get to that in a second.
        But on this issue, one of DOE's responsibilities is,
    obviously, helping us understand the properties and
    characteristics of some of these products.
        One of the things that you are working on is this issue of
    oil volatility. I am particularly concerned about the level of
    volatility in Bakken crude, because oil shipped from the Gulf
    basically doesn't have the same level of volatility when it is
    shipped. But with the advent of Bakken crude in the upper
    Midwest, we are seeing the volatility of the Reid Vapor
    Pressure, the pound per inch of pressure, well over 13 percent
    in some instances.
        Can you elaborate on what DOE is doing to measure that
    volatility and what we should be looking for to make sure that
    we have a vapor pressure that is not going to impact the level
    of explosions and derailments and things of that nature that we
    have seen in some other areas of our country?
        Secretary Moniz. Well I certainly wish I could give you the
    final results of the study today but that still is, probably,
    about a year away.
        Now, just again, to make, I mean, you know this, just to
    make it clear to everyone else that the, of course, the
    Department of Energy does not have the regulatory authorities
    but right at the beginning, and I think with a lot of
    encouragement as well from Congress, appropriately, we were
    asked to partner with the Department of Transportation, and we
    have, to explore the science involved in the transport of oil
    and frankly, it would apply as well to other flammable liquids
    because there are a lot of others that are transported as well
    and to try to understand the implications of that science for
    further steps that the Department of Transportation, for
    example, might take.
        So the study is being carried out, is being led by Sandia
    National Laboratory. It is looking at the characteristics of
    the oil, volatility, as you say. And basically, I think, it's a
    question of looking at this particular crude oil which has
    quite of bit of dissolved gasses in it. So looking at that, at
    the qualities is very important.
        However, it's also important to understand how and when,
    for example, the oil is sampled because as you go through
    different processes the characteristics can change so that's
    also part of what's being looked at. And this may be able to,
    hopefully, lead to some insights into how the sampling
    protocols are managed which then can impact whether further
    processing is required or not. North Dakota as a state has
    taken some steps in terms of processing certain of the tight
    oils. And so, I think----
        Senator Cantwell. Well I don't think anybody in the
    Northwest----
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. Wants to leave it up to the State of
    North Dakota.
        Secretary Moniz. No, no.
        Senator Cantwell. To figure out what the standard is, so--
    --
        Secretary Moniz. No, so our job is to, right now, try to do
    a thorough job on the science and engineering aspects. That
    will include going to combustion tests in this next phase at
    Sandia which has, by the way, a long history of doing
    combustion field tests and studies.
        And then I'd love to be able to accelerate it, but science
    takes time and it's probably going to be a year until we have
    the final results. Then those have to be translated at state
    and federal levels into further action.
        Senator Cantwell. I noticed that a Sandia National Lab
    report found that ``currently used methods for assigning crude
    oil classifications are often inaccurate'' and that there is
    not scientific agreement on the volatility of crude oils, like
    Bakken crude.
        How do you think we might be able to build scientific
    consensus, that we might be able to get more discussion going
    about this issue because clearly I view this as a resistance by
    those who think they can just ship Bakken crude on the cheap. I
    note that Wall Street will not finance a deal with Bakken crude
    at this level. They require that it has to be nine percent
    vapor pressure. As I said, other incidents of this kind of
    shipment never exceeded 13 percent. Now we are sitting here
    arguing over whether volatility matters or not. What can we do
    to get the rest of the scientific community, while we are doing
    this review, to help in the discussion so that we don't end up
    with your report and then we are still doing this leg work
    after that 12-month period of time?
        Secretary Moniz. Well first of all, I think the report
    you're referring to was the Phase One report from Sandia which
    was basically a literature review. It was not original work but
    bringing together literature. And again, I believe the focus
    there was on the fact of the large amount of dissolved, non-
    condensable gasses. So that was the characteristic, I think,
    they were seeing. And that's exactly what is driving now them
    in their actual scientific work in terms of the
    characterization.
        I just really can't give a clear answer in terms of what
    one might do in terms of the, you know, I mean, prior to having
    the results for you. I understand there's a tension between
    getting the science done right and doing it as fast as one can,
    but doing it right. Obviously the desire to take action clearly
    was not that long ago when the derailment in the Columbia Gorge
    happened just in June, I think it was.
        And so, again, nationally there's been a decrease in oil
    shipments by rail. That has not been the case in the Northwest.
        And it's also the case that, I think to be fair, I think
    the railroads, some of the railroads for sure, have made some
    pretty substantial investments really over the last year.
    Issues you referred to earlier, in fact, about commodity
    competition in the railroads, I mean, that was a very stressful
    period in 2014/2015 when the, I think, frankly the whole system
    was, again, taken by surprise at the rapid increase in the
    demand for trains for transporting oil.
        I think that's been somewhat sorted out in terms of the
    commodity issue. But your issue in terms of any intermediate
    regulation, I mean, the Department of Transportation clearly
    has taken some steps in terms of rail cars, speed, speeds in
    different places and the like. And yet, we still seem to have
    some of these derailments, presumably caused by track issues.
        Senator Cantwell. We are only going to ask you to swim in
    your lane today.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. As it relates to----
        Secretary Moniz. Right.
        Senator Cantwell. Helping us on the energy verification.
    But I will say that this issue, as it relates to commodities, I
    don't think is over, and I do think that your work on the
    Quadrennial Energy Review shows that our infrastructure cannot
    meet this level of demand in shipment without pushing product
    off.
        Again, this is probably not something that DOE can solve as
    it relates to----
        Secretary Moniz. Right.
        Senator Cantwell. These issues immediately. But this issue
    of----
        Secretary Moniz. Right.
        Senator Cantwell. Assessing our infrastructure, assessing
    our needs and, as you say, can shift at any moment as well.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah, it's----
        Senator Cantwell. As it relates to source.
        But I go back to what you commented on that this is a
    pretty big shift for the United States of America. We wanted
    energy independence. Well, we've got it. But now we have our
    own safety and security issues right here in the Northwest with
    a 10,000 percent increase in the amount of oil train traffic
    coming through here.
        When we have a city council in Spokane who is saying we are
    going to fine a train for coming through period, that is their
    ballot measure. We have a chart here.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1997.032

        Secretary Moniz. Yeah, I was going to say it's----
        Senator Cantwell. Just to take a second.
        So Bakken Oil comes from the upper Midwest, but it goes
    through every major metropolitan area. It goes through Spokane,
    down through the Gorge which is a very challenging, scenic area
    into the Columbia River. So the rescue operations are very
    challenged. Through Clark County, Vancouver and then up through
    here and all the way up to refineries. We have four refineries
    in the north part of our state. It is hitting every major city
    on those 20 trains per week.
        I am sure North Dakota producers probably think that they
    are going through a very remote, rural area of their state,
    across also very remote, rural parts of the North United
    States, but that is not what happens when they get to
    Washington because of the Cascades.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. They have to go through every major----
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. As somebody said on one of my recent
    trips to Spokane, just about everybody in Spokane lives two
    blocks from the railroad tracks. I mean, that is their view of
    how close the oil shipments are.
        This issue for us has become very front and center with
    every mayor, city council and community in our state as it
    relates to this safety and security issue. So we will leave
    this.
        Secretary Moniz. Yes.
        Senator Cantwell. To the next panel.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. And discuss it more with you later.
        Secretary Moniz. If I may just add?
        Senator Cantwell. Yes.
        Secretary Moniz. Just that first of all, I think, it's very
    clear and the President has certainly been very clear in saying
    that we need to invest in our infrastructure. I mean, and we
    need to invest in infrastructure that is reliable, safe and
    resilient for the 21st century and not for the 20th century.
        Secondly, in terms of the movement of commodities and,
    again, you know this very well from the Quadrennial Energy
    Review, it is also issues like inland waterways where
    tremendous investments are needed to move commodities around.
        Senator Cantwell. Well and I hope we can, with your work,
    we are separately pushing the Department of Transportation to
    make an interim finding about the volatility. We think they
    should be doing something about it now but we are also going to
    double our efforts working with you to make sure that we are
    getting as much scientific information as possible. As you
    said, the big shift means that we need to invest in
    infrastructure. But the big shift also means we need to stop
    and say, is this safe enough for transport?
        The 10,000 percent increase is voluminous throughout the
    West Coast. You could have this hearing in Oregon or California
    and you would have the same discussions. You would have the
    same city councils, the same people proposing resolutions on
    this.
        So I think we need to make sure that we are making it safe
    as well, and we will continue to work with your other cabinet
    partners to make sure that we are getting that message across.
        Before we invite the next panel up though, I do want to
    talk to you about the cyber issue, this whole issue of a
    unified command.
        I don't know how you would characterize this as a shift in
    our nation, but again, I would consider it a pretty big shift
    because now here we are, a big energy source. Electrification
    was always important, but now it is networks and handheld
    devices and smart appliances and all sorts of things, all
    connected to a grid that could, all of a sudden, be a target of
    a major attack.
        So when you talk about your unified command structure and
    the challenges of that, who are the partners? Where would the
    single entity be? How do you process information on a daily
    basis?
        Secretary Moniz. Well, the unified command structure is
    broader than cyber that was for the entire, our entire
    emergency response assets. And it's not a physical location,
    other than when there is an emergency in the emergency
    operations center control room that, again, we are trying to--
    which historically in the Department of Energy has always been
    run by the Nuclear Security people because of our long standing
    need to respond to nuclear incidents. But we think that we need
    to really integrate response across our threat spectrum. That
    would include nuclear but it includes energy infrastructure,
    cybersecurity and the like.
        Now within cybersecurity we now have this integrated Joint
    Cybersecurity Coordination Center. I may have missed a C, iJC3.
    And that has been--the point person, I'm putting them together,
    has been the CIO but working with all the cyber-relevant
    actors, and I want to emphasize that does include the
    intelligence activity.
        But very importantly, this involves bringing in the
    laboratory experts, the PMA experts. So the ideas that we are
    saying that the cybersecurity is really an enterprise-wide
    problem, and we need to have them all.
        It's a virtual team. It's not a physical center but it's a
    virtual team bringing together all the best assets to address a
    cyber challenge. And I think you alluded to it, the last data I
    saw in 2013, but over half of the cyber incidents reported were
    on energy infrastructure. So, it's a tremendous problem that we
    have.
        Senator Cantwell. Okay.
        Secretary Moniz. What we are doing is we are trying to
    bring together, again, all of our assets.
        Senator Cantwell. Okay.
        Secretary Moniz. It would be helpful to have this more
    unified operations center, yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. Because you are talking about both DOD, I
    am assuming, and our other federal agencies involved in
    security efforts working in coordination.
        Secretary Moniz. And DHS, we do a lot with DHS, in
    particular. Yeah, DHS has got a major role here. So we work
    with them.
        Senator Cantwell. Again, where would you characterize this
    as a shift in energy policy, this electrification of our
    economy and the challenge of cyber?
        Secretary Moniz. If we kind of change subjects, but
    relevant to this. If we think about our pathway toward deep de-
    carbonization, let's say on a midcentury time scale, there are
    two elements that, to me, are, kind of, part of any possible
    solution.
        One is real progress on the demand side, energy efficiency.
    We're not going to get there without real demand side progress.
    But we're also not going to get there without, essentially, a
    very deep de-carbonization of the electricity sector and
    therefore, an expansion of the electricity sector's role in
    other parts of the economy, like transportation, for example,
    because then it will be drawing upon an essentially carbon-free
    system.
        So, electricity is only going to become more and more
    central to all of these issues. And that, of course, brings us
    to the whole threat spectrum, including cyber which we know is
    a very, very significant issue. And frankly, as that system
    itself becomes more and more, I would say, technologically
    complex it's going to have increasing distances, for example,
    to bring, you know, renewables over large distances. It's going
    to have distributed generation; it's going to have storage;
    and, it's going to have a whole new layer of detectors,
    sensors, control systems, maybe distributed decision-making to
    be able to balance this entire system.
        That's all great. It offers new services. It can support
    the Internet of things with everything hooked up, but obviously
    it also opens up vulnerability, especially in the cyberspace.
        So I think that's what we're going to have to face and
    frankly, stay ahead of the attack spectrum. So it's a huge
    priority for us and I think for the country.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah.
        Senator Cantwell. Well thank you, Secretary Moniz. I think
    what I am going to ask you to do is come up and join me, if you
    will, up here and we will proceed to the second panel of
    witnesses. That will also give Secretary Moniz a chance to have
    a little opportunity on the other side of the dais here.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. And ask some questions of our witnesses
    on these subjects and maybe even get into more of a discussion
    on some of the challenges that we face.
        Secretary Moniz. Sure.
        Senator Cantwell. I see General Lowenberg out in the
    audience. Thank you for being here.
        There are many others who are here today in the audience
    who are responsible for these kinds of shifts and changes and
    are doing good work in the Northwest. So thank you all for
    coming and talking about how we, as a region, are developing
    some of the solution services and networks that are needed.
        I introduced the panel before, but I think we are going to
    start with Mr. Robert Ezelle, who is the Washington Military
    Department's Director of the Emergency Management Division. We
    will then go to Ms. Stephanie Bowman, who is with the Port of
    Seattle; Mr. John Hairston, who is with the Bonneville Power
    Administration; Mr. Scot Rogers from F5; Mr. Carl Imhoff from
    the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory; and Dr. Lynn Best,
    who is with Seattle City Light.
        With that, Mr. Ezelle, please lead us off.

        STATEMENT OF ROBERT EZELLE, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON STATE
                     EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT DIVISION

        Mr. Ezelle. Afternoon, Madam Chair and Secretary Moniz.
        For the record, my name is Robert Ezelle, and I'm the
    Washington Military Department's Director of the Emergency
    Management Division. I greatly appreciate the opportunity to
    speak with you today about two significant events that could
    impact our energy infrastructure.
        First are the impacts that could occur to Washington State
    and the Pacific Northwest following a magnitude 9.0 earthquake
    on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. Second, as we've already been
    hearing, are some potential consequences to the energy sector
    from a cyber event.
        A rupture of the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) will cause
    catastrophic damages all along the West Coast from British
    Columbia to Northern California. Damage from a CSZ rupture will
    greatly exceed damage from any natural disaster our nation has
    seen to date.
        Estimates are that our transportation infrastructure,
    communication systems, energy distribution, water, sewage and
    our health care system will be severely compromised or
    inoperative. Bridges will collapse, roadways will be rendered
    impassable, the coast will be cut off from the I-5 corridor and
    Western Washington will be cut off from Eastern Washington.
        We anticipate electric power failing across the region from
    significant impacts to both transmission and distribution
    systems. Restoration will be time consuming with urban areas
    being without power for weeks to months and outlying areas
    potentially requiring a couple of years before power is
    restored.
        Pipelines delivering fuel, oil and national natural gas
    will be compromised and possibly destroyed. This means we'll be
    left with only the fuel on hand in vehicles or storage tanks
    that have not ruptured. This has immediate implications to the
    response to a Cascadia event as fuel will be required for
    generators, response vehicles and a host of other needs.
        However, the most significant effect or impact of a CSZ
    rupture will be to the people themselves. Depending on the time
    of year we could see upwards of 10,000 fatalities from the
    resulting tsunami and from collapsed buildings and landslides.
    We estimate we will need to provide food and water to upwards
    of a million people immediately following the earthquake. That
    number will increase with each passing day as individual and
    family preparedness supplies are exhausted.
        We conducted a major exercise, Cascadia Rising 2016, from
    June 7th to June 10th of this year. We gained valuable lessons
    learned that will engage our preparation activities for years
    to come. But perhaps the most important thing we drew from the
    exercise was perspective.
        Our overarching priority immediately following a CSZ event
    will be to provide for the life safety and life sustaining
    needs of our populous. Each day that passes increases the
    vulnerability and the need of our residents. This puts a
    critical imperative on restoring our basic infrastructure
    starting with transportation, communications and electric power
    but it also greatly emphasizes the need for individual and
    family preparedness.
        Electric power is the enabling component of our 21st
    century lives. It also has key interdependencies with other
    critical infrastructure industries such as water and waste
    water services, natural gas supply and delivery and
    telecommunications technologies of all types. Without electric
    power our infrastructure cannot operate.
        The same goes for fuel distribution. A CSZ event will
    damage the major pipeline for delivery of jet fuel as well as
    natural gas pipelines and will, of course, disrupt
    transportation networks making fuel delivery by truck to
    existing depots all but impossible. And without fuel, our
    response efforts will grind to a halt.
        As I've emphasized, power and fuel are key to a successful
    response and recovery. Therefore, their provision and
    restoration has to be a top priority for us all.
        CR'16 emphasizes the need for detailed response or
    continuity of operations planning. This includes all levels of
    government from local through state to federal, non-
    governmental organizations and private industry so that
    essential services can continue to be provided in the event of
    a disaster.
        Additionally, our lifeline sectors whether publicly or
    privately owned must work toward building resiliency. A
    resilient infrastructure can either withstand a major disaster
    or can be quickly restored in days or weeks rather than months
    or years.
        We've been talking about the catastrophic and the need to
    develop strong plans to build resiliency into our critical
    infrastructure. I'd like to touch on a couple of hazards, and
    we've already spoken about them today, that are not perhaps at
    the scale of a catastrophic event, but could have severe local
    or widespread consequences.
        The first of these is the transport of the crude oil by
    rail. We've seen graphically what can go wrong if there's an
    incident involving an oil train. This highlights the need for
    detailed planning, again, at all levels of government so that
    communities and states are prepared to respond when an incident
    occurs, such as the one near the Town of Mosier back in June.
        The need for the same level of planning also is required
    for cyber threats. In Washington State we've been hard at work
    there as well conducting cyber planning across the community of
    stakeholders. Organic within the Washington National Guard
    structure is a cyber protection unit whose capabilities can
    assess or assist with assessment and recommendations concerning
    industrial control systems. They have the expertise,
    relationship, security clearances and the credibility to
    partner and collaborate with the ICS community toward cyber
    preparedness.
        Most recently in Washington State in a proof of concept
    demonstration, our National Guard worked successfully with the
    Snohomish County Utilities District to assess their systems and
    provide them key suggestions on how they can harden their
    infrastructure against cyber penetration and exploitation.
        Madam Chair, I'd like to close by just thanking you for
    your tremendous support for our National Guard, particularly
    the attempts to stand up at a schoolhouse to address some of
    the cyber vulnerabilities and then, of course, your long-term
    support of the National Guard.
        This concludes my testimony, and may I answer any
    questions?
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Ezelle follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, thank you.
        Ms. Bowman.

             STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE BOWMAN, COMMISSIONER,
                      PORT OF SEATTLE (WASHINGTON)

        Ms. Bowman. Good afternoon, Senator Cantwell and Secretary
    Moniz. My name is Stephanie Bowman, a Commissioner with the
    Port of Seattle. Thank you for the privilege of being here this
    afternoon.
        The Port of Seattle owns and operates facilities that play
    a critical role in facilitating the nation's trade. Our marine
    cargo facilities under the management of the Northwest Seaport
    Alliance are the fourth largest container load center in the
    country. Our port literally supplies goods to businesses and
    homes throughout the nation.
        On the aviation side, Seattle/Tacoma International Airport
    (SeaTac) served 42 million passengers in 2015 and is the
    fastest growing, large hub airport in the country.
    Additionally, SeaTac is a primary air cargo gateway for the
    Pacific Northwest facilitating the export of high value, time
    sensitive goods to Asia.
        The Port of Seattle facilitates--facilities serve as a
    lifeline to the residents of Alaska and Hawaii and any
    disruption in port operations due to a natural disaster would
    have serious consequences for those states.
        Alaska is especially dependent on our infrastructure with
    more than 80 percent of all water-borne containerized traffic
    that goes to Alaska moves across the terminals at the Port of
    Seattle.
        Given the critical role that the Port of Seattle plays in
    the regional and national economy ensuring that our facilities
    are resilient in the case of a disaster is a charge that my
    colleagues and I on the Port Commission take very seriously. A
    strong federal partnership is critical, and I'm grateful for
    the attention that you're giving to this issue today.
        Port infrastructure will be essential to the regional
    response in the event of a large scale emergency. SeaTac
    airport is anticipated to be a hub for relief efforts and our
    maritime facilities will also support the response and recovery
    missions assuming that they are still operable.
        Disruption of flight operations at SeaTac will send a
    ripple effect throughout the country's air transportation
    system given that our airport's role as a hub for both national
    and international flights, particularly our connection to Asia.
    Most importantly, it could cripple our collective ability to
    respond to disaster.
        I wanted to speak briefly about the Port of Seattle's
    emergency response planning. The Port of Seattle and our
    partners at the Port of Tacoma use nationally recognized best
    practices and utilize an all hazards approach to plan for and
    respond to any number of different emergency scenarios.
    Consistent application of these practices is reinforced through
    our robust and systemic training and exercise program that
    validates our ability to meet our responsibilities to the
    region.
        In the case of earthquakes our contingency planning is
    based on the risk associated with strong to major earthquakes.
    Our seaport facilities, as you know, Senator Cantwell, are at
    greater risk than the airport because they were built on
    liquefaction zones and are more susceptible to a tsunami.
        Given the strain that will be placed on the first
    responders in a disaster, we expect that we will need to be
    self-sufficient with our emergency response at the airport or
    seaport for at least 14 days.
        The airport, on the other hand, will be more likely capable
    of handling moderate to full disaster relief within 24 to 72
    hours, the level of operations at the airport with a focus of
    federal and military entities in the recent Cascadia Rising
    exercise that Mr. Ezelle just mentioned.
        Understandably, the magnitude of any quake will impact our
    ability to resume operations. A primary factor in successfully
    responding to an event is the effective coordination between
    the dozens of entities involved. That is why exercises such as
    Cascadia Rising are vital to enhancing the regional resilience.
    We are not going to be able to operate resilient airports and
    seaports without a strong partnership with the Federal
    Government.
        In addition to the critical role it will play in responding
    to a disaster, we are also dependent on the Federal Government
    to help fund our preparedness efforts and I wanted to speak to
    that very briefly. We ask that funding levels for these
    programs be maintained and that funding be awarded directly to
    local jurisdictions including ports. While there are few
    federal grant programs that focus on preparedness, the Port
    Security Grant Program is currently the main source of federal
    funding for all ports for an all hazards investments.
        However, many tyeps of projects necessary to support a
    comprehensive preparedness effort are ineligible under the Port
    Security Grant Program. Given this, the Federal Government, we
    hope, will--should consider creating critical infrastructure
    resiliency grant program and a national strategy to help
    funding decisions with prioritizing the nation's gateway ports
    which are at greater risk.
        Finally, I wanted to close, shift gears for just a few
    moments and close with a personal mention of my experience in
    Mosier, Oregon and just let you know that I was at Mosier in
    the--for the rail train derailment, and I'm happy to answer any
    questions. It had a pretty significant impact on my personal
    view in terms of both emergency preparedness but most
    importantly in terms of the response. And after the panel is
    through I'm happy to answer any questions about that
    experience.
        In closing, the Port of Seattle recognizes that our
    infrastructure impacts the national economy and has a unique
    role to play during a crisis. We stand ready to strengthen our
    partnership with the Federal Government, including the
    Department of Energy, to safeguard our critical infrastructure
    and protect our communities.
        I'm happy to answer any questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Bowman follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Commissioner.
        Mr. Hairston, thank you. Welcome.

           STATEMENT OF JOHN HAIRSTON, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE
     OFFICER, BONNEVILLE POWER ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 ENERGY

        Mr. Hairston. Thank you.
        Ranking Member Cantwell, Secretary Moniz, I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify today. My name is John Hairston. I'm the
    Chief Administrative Officer with Bonneville Power
    Administration.
        Bonneville is a federal power marketing administration
    within the United States of America Department of Energy which
    markets electric power from 31 federal hydroelectric projects
    and some non-federal projects in the Pacific Northwest.
    Bonneville operates and maintains an extensive high voltage
    electricity transmission system that integrates with every
    major electric utility in the Pacific Northwest as well as
    California and Canada.
        Bonneville plays a critical role in responding to disaster
    affecting the region's electricity grid. In my testimony today
    I will describe how Bonneville is protecting the electricity
    infrastructure and how it's preparing to respond to a
    potentially massive Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake.
        Bonneville has hardened its electricity transmission system
    and is investing in seismic related research for more than 20
    years. We began assessing which areas and components of the
    power system and most vulnerable to significant damage from the
    earthquake and other natural disasters. These comprehensive
    assessments from--having informed Bonneville's multifaceted,
    seismic mitigation strategy and has allowed it to prioritize
    where and when to upgrade and reinforce critical facilities and
    equipment.
        Electricity will be critical to the region's recovery in
    the event of a natural disaster. Whether continuing to harden
    facilities, protecting power system equipment or researching
    the latest seismic mitigation tools and technology, Bonneville
    takes this responsibility of shoring up its assets extremely
    serious.
        As Chief Administrative Officer I oversee Bonneville's
    Office of Security and Continuity of Operations which
    implements the Bonneville-wide program for physical, personnel,
    information and infrastructure security, emergency management
    and continuity of operations. This Office ensures Bonneville is
    resilient and able to quickly recover from events that cause
    operational impacts. With that goal in mind, Bonneville
    recently actively participated in two emergency planning
    activities.
        In April 2016 Bonneville participated in the previously
    mentioned Clear Path IV energy-focused disaster response
    exercise hosted by the Department of Energy, Office of
    Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability. The exercise
    scenario consisted of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and subsequent
    tsunami occurring along the 700-mile-long Cascadia Subduction
    Zone causing considerable damage to Washington, Oregon and
    Northern California. The exercise scenario was designed to test
    regional dependencies in the energy sector. The exercise was a
    positive step forward in developing the national energy
    response capability and served as an important forum for
    building and strengthening linkages between government and
    industry. The exercise also identified improvements that can be
    made with respect to coordination between critical components
    that must work together to quickly respond to a catastrophic
    event. Bonneville will continue to work with the DOE Office of
    Electricity and its regional energy partners to address gaps
    that were identified by participating in this exercise.
        In 2016, June 2016, Bonneville participated in the largest
    FEMA exercise ever conducted in the region. Building from the
    energy sector-specific Clear Path IV, Cascadia Rising also
    simulated a 9.4 magnitude earthquake. For our part Bonneville
    held a four-day exercise with its core emergency response
    personnel and table top exercises for field staff across the
    service territory. Bonneville tested its plan and transferred
    complete control of its electric grid to a site hundreds of
    miles from the potentially affected area.
        Cascadia Rising and Clear Path IV proved to be successful
    exercises for Bonneville in so far as they allowed employees
    and workers to practice their training and test our
    implementation plans. Bonneville will continue to participate
    in these types of emergency response exercises so we become
    well practiced and operationally ready to face real life
    situations.
        As the owner and operator of 75 percent of the region's
    high voltage electric transmission system, Bonneville knows
    investments in both physical security and cybersecurity is
    vitally important to safely and reliably operating the electric
    grid in a modern world.
        We recently embarked on a multi-million-dollar physical
    security program for critical substations concentrating on
    perimeter security. This effort includes upgrading fencing,
    lighting and improving detecting systems, cameras and alarms
    and has led to more comprehensive security design standards for
    wherever substation facilities are upgraded or new substations
    facilities are constructed.
        In the past two years we've increased our staffing around
    cybersecurity from 12 employees to over 40 employees and
    implemented a 24/7 cybersecurity operations and analysis
    center. Bonneville has two dedicated teams to cybersecurity.
    One team performs forensics and intelligence, incident response
    and 24 hours a day handling of these type of issues. The other
    team performs offensive research and security assessments.
    Bonneville even conducts offensive cyber operations against our
    own network to test, drill and improve our detection and
    response.
        In conclusion, our investments to make Bonneville a more
    resilient organization from hardening and protecting our
    infrastructure to the time that we spend to take, to prepare
    and practice how we respond to a disaster will ultimately help
    us limit damages to our electric power system and help the
    region more quickly recover from a major disaster.
        Ranking Member Cantwell, Secretary Moniz, thank you for
    this opportunity to testify. I happily submit my written
    testimony for the record and respond to any questions you may
    have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hairston follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers, welcome, and thank you for being here.

     STATEMENT OF SCOT ROGERS, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT & GENERAL
                       COUNSEL, F5 NETWORKS, INC.

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much for having me, Senator.
    Good afternoon.
        For the record my name is Scot Rogers. I'm the Executive
    Vice President and General Counsel of F5 Networks, Inc.
        Again, I want to thank the Senator and the Secretary for
    giving me this opportunity to testify and provide information
    to this Committee and be a part of this panel to discuss
    topics, we at F5 believe are of critical importance to the
    safety and prosperity of our country. But I'd first like to
    give you a little background on my employer, F5 Networks.
        We're a worldwide leading developer and provider of
    software-defined application services. We are based here in
    Seattle with over 4,300 employees worldwide and applications
    have become the gateway to critical and sensitive data and
    services. And our mission is to help organizations deliver the
    most secure, fast and reliable applications to anyone,
    anywhere, at any time.
        Our offerings include software products for network and
    application security, access management and a number of other
    network and application services. In conjunction with our
    customers and partners across a variety of fields and
    industries, we are closely watching the evolution of cyber
    threat landscape for organizations in the 21st century.
        As the Senator and the Secretary referred to repeatedly
    during their presentations that this concept of innovation and
    innovations driven here in the Northwest are creating new
    challenges for the energy infrastructure. Disruptive technology
    trends are dynamically altering the threat landscape for
    organizations operating in today's world. The explosion of new
    software applications, the emergence of cloud computing and the
    Internet of things, combined with an increasingly mobile
    workforce are leading to dissolution of the traditional
    security perimeter.
        Legacy security architectures are no longer adequate to
    protect against the evolving threats posed by cyber criminals,
    activists and state-sponsored espionage and sabotage. To borrow
    from a commonly used analogy, the traditional security
    architectures were akin to building a castle and a moat to
    secure the king. The castle architectural relies upon utilizing
    traditional network firewalls and other devices on the network
    perimeter to monitor and block suspicious traffic at the
    boundary of the network.
        In today's world envision the software application as a
    very mobile president traveling the world, who needs the
    protection of its Secret Service bodyguards as he travels. As
    the network perimeter or in this analogy, the castle walls,
    become more and more irrelevant industries need to focus on
    protecting the software applications that drive their business
    and manage their critical infrastructure as well as verifying
    the identities of those users who access those applications.
        The leading technology industry firm, Gardner, estimates
    that 90 percent of security investment is target at securing
    this network perimeter but only 28 percent of the attacks are
    focused there.
        Conversely, only ten percent of the security investment is
    focused on securing the software application itself while 72
    percent of attacks are from application vulnerabilities and
    stolen user credentials.
        Our U.S. energy sector is not immune to these types of
    evolving threats. In particular, the Internet of things with
    the inclusion of new Smart meters, home power generation
    devices with connections back into the power grid and the
    various interfaces of the scattered networks creating a unique
    set of challenges. All these new Smart devices are run by new
    and innovative software applications whose access needs to be
    managed and whose data needs to be protected.
        And where will the state of emerging energy applications be
    developed and reside as the world moves to a cloud centric
    model? Again, these applications are being built and hosted
    outside the castle walls.
        All of these unsecured new devices create new threat
    factors of attack that must be mitigated. The world of our
    energy infrastructure, it isn't the theft of data that is the
    biggest threat, but a disruption of service or destruction of
    its means of delivery.
        In December of last year hackers disabled portions of
    Ukraine's power grid leaving over 200,000 residents without
    power for several hours. In the attack on the Ukraine's power
    grid, the hackers used compromised user credentials to remotely
    log in to the SCADA network that controlled the grid. In this
    instance remote workers weren't required to use two factor
    authentication for remote log in which allowed the attackers to
    hijack their credentials and gain crucial access to the systems
    that control the breakers for the system.
        The Department of Energy has taken steps to help secure our
    nation's energy infrastructure with the issuance of its Energy
    Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance
    containing recommendations for implementation of the NIST
    framework for improving critical infrastructure of
    cybersecurity.
        In the ever evolving world of technology it is important
    that organizations stay vigilant to address these exponential
    threats presented by new technologies and to avoid complacency.
    A strong focus on protecting not just the networks
    interconnected to our infrastructure but the software
    applications that operate and support that infrastructure as
    well as the users accessing those software applications it's
    critical to the safety and security of our nation's energy
    sector.
        Through utilization of web application firewalls,
    multifactor authentication and identity federation for secure
    remote access, with consistent policy-based access controls and
    security data analytics on user behavior, the energy sector can
    evolve its security architecture to address the dissolution of
    the network perimeter.
        With that I would like to acknowledge the Committee and
    thank them for giving the opportunity to recognize these
    threats that are emerging and note that I'm happy to answer any
    questions that the Committee may have, as well as to provide
    any follow-up materials.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Imhoff, thank you so much for being here today.
    Hopefully we will see you tomorrow as well, but thank you for
    being here to testify at today's hearing.

       STATEMENT OF CARL IMHOFF, MANAGER, GRID RESEARCH PROGRAM,
       PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 ENERGY

        Mr. Imhoff. I will be there tomorrow.
        Thank you very much, Senator Cantwell, for the opportunity
    to appear. And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for joining us in the
    beautiful Pacific Northwest. My mission today is to discuss
    issues around grid resiliency and emergency response,
    particularly as they relate to grid modernization.
        My name is Carl Imhoff. I lead the Grid Research Program at
    the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), and I also
    co-chair the Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium which is
    a membership of 13 national laboratories and over 100 industry
    and academic partners supporting DOE's unified Grid
    Modernization Initiative.
        For more than two decades PNNL has supported power system
    resilience and innovation for the State of Washington, the
    Pacific Northwest and the nation. In that time, we lead in the
    delivery to the nation, a network of 2,000 high speed,
    synchrophasor monitors that monitor the nation 30 samples a
    second, 24/7.
        We've also delivered innovations in distributed control and
    demand response with the promise of delivering demand at scale
    and providing grid services faster, greener, cheaper and
    supported the nation's largest Smart Grid demonstration in
    doing so.
        We're delivering high performance computing that's taking
    security tools from days to seconds to converge and helping the
    operators, such as Bonneville, monitor the system and avoid
    outages and so we've had a phenomenal long record of support to
    the grid. And we'll continue to do so going forward.
        My assignment was to talk about the link between grid
    modernization and security and resilience, but before I do I
    have to frame my two key recommendations for the session. One,
    important to deliver next generation, real time tools for
    situational awareness, risk assessment and grid operations that
    transform our nation's capacity to assess risk in real time and
    help mitigate outages with assisted support for operators in
    real time. Secondly, to improve the emergency response
    capabilities leveraging new data sources and new analytic tools
    to enhance both regional and local planning but also then
    preparation for major extreme events.
        So let me start with the highlights of why is the grid
    important? What's changed in the landscape of the grid? And
    then comment on how can grid modernization enhance our
    resilience in emergency response?
        The future power system is facing substantially more
    complex conditions and risk going forward. Today we have
    increased storm frequency and intensity. We see increased
    interdependencies between grid systems and other critical
    infrastructure such as natural gas pipelines, communications
    and emerging market models.
        New digital technology is transforming the availability of
    new consumer services at the grid edge where it also increases
    the attack planning and increases the cybersecurity challenge.
    Overall, the grid faces increased complexity in supply, demand
    and business models, and this is a grid that today is very
    important to our economy but it's going to be more strategic
    into the future.
        Our current economy is increasingly digital but the
    consumers are looking for more benefits from IT and intelligent
    devices and all at the edge. Much of the past climate research
    is showing that electrification is a key to going in terms of
    de-carbonization. So the grid is essential today and it will
    become increasingly more strategic in the future.
        So how does a modernized grid support emergency response?
    Let me frame three options.
        First, it will deliver improved grid infrastructure
    resilience such as new distribution feeders that better resist
    natural and human threats and recover faster reducing the
    fundamental need for emergency response. An example is Avista
    Corp in Spokane which achieved 1.5 million avoided customer
    outage minutes in 2013 from its Smart Grid Investment Grant
    effort and advanced metering and distribution automation. They
    also shortened average outages by ten percent, experienced 21
    percent fewer outages and their participation in that
    partnership with DOE led to an accelerated full system
    modernization for Vista, accelerated by probably over a decade.
        Enhanced real time tools and system visibility will reduce
    the scope of outages, shorten the time utilities need to
    identify the outage locations and optimize restoration planning
    to get the lights back on more quickly. An example is the use
    of synchophasor monitoring that would have given the Ohio
    operators, had they had phasor measurement units, an hour and
    40-minute warning that Cleveland was pulling away from the rest
    of the system. The result would have been a much smaller
    blackout and much faster recovery at much lower cost to the
    taxpayers.
        Upgraded planning tools will better handle the complexity
    of variable generation and new markets and changing business
    models, improving emergency response planning, especially for
    extreme events such as seismic and major regional weather
    emergencies.
        So, how do we achieve these recommendations I offered?
    Delivering real time tools will help operators better
    understand risks and options to avoid outages with accuracy far
    beyond current practice.
        One promising opportunity is the delivery of near real time
    risk contingency analysis that's basically looking at the
    40,000 to 60,000 outlets and saying if we lose certain numbers
    of these what does that do to the security of our grid?
        Today operators conduct power flow to identify and rank all
    system risks. We've accelerated this analysis with advanced
    computing to take the computation from days to seconds. In the
    case of the Western interconnection, this method cut the
    computation run from 26 hours to 7 seconds. This improvement
    gives operators near real time situational awareness of risks
    and options to mitigate outages.
        Experiments at PNNL's control rooms, that you'll see
    tomorrow, with grid operators showed a 30 percent improvement
    in their ability to diagnose and respond to test cases of
    outages using these new tools.
        And an emergency--emerging advanced and planning tools is
    DOE's commission tool to assess the risk of extremely rare but
    large cascading events and outages. We, PNNL, worked with
    ERCOT, Siemens and EPRI to develop an extreme event tool that
    transformed the utility's ability to conduct such analyses and
    better prepares the industry to respond to the new NERC
    standards in terms of extreme events.
        An increasingly important element of improved resilience is
    grid flexibility. You get flexibility in two big ways.
        One is energy storage and also advanced distributed
    controls that the Secretary mentioned earlier. Widespread
    deployment of energy storage for multiple grid applications
    requires significant reduction of life cycle costs of energy
    storage and a validation of the value for the value
    propositions and multiple grid applications.
        To reduce storage costs while improving life cycle
    performance PNNL is actively engaged in research and the
    discovery and development of next generation materials and
    early PNNL R and D advances have been licensed to several
    companies including UniEnergy which is located in Washington
    State and is deploying stationary flow batteries for grid scale
    applications globally.
        Through DOE and Washington State Clean Energy funding we
    are partnered also with Avista, Snohomish, DUD, Puget Sound
    Energy, to validate the performance and use cases for field
    deployed grid storage.
        A second source of flexibility is advanced distributed
    control theory. Transactive control concepts, a blending of
    traditional controls and economic incentives to engage
    distributive resources at scale and beyond normal utility
    boundaries have been demonstrated in the Pacific Northwest
    Smart Grid Demonstration Project and are being extended in the
    Clean Energy Transactive Campus Project, a partnership between
    DOE and the Department of Commerce. This project will help
    demonstrate the benefit of demand side controls across multiple
    buildings and campuses that can provide load flexibility to
    reduce peak demand and manage renewable ramping.
        Turning to specific emergency response tools, PNNL supports
    DOE's Office of Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration
    (ISER) by developing technologies to aid emergency response.
    We're launching an effort to support ISER with automated
    analysis of digital satellite imagery to quickly assess
    infrastructure damage. It's at work today in the State of
    Louisiana.
        PNNL is also supporting ISER during national emergencies
    with real time visualization and communication platforms in
    partnership with HAMMER, the federal training center you'll see
    in Richland tomorrow.
        Finally, in terms of cybersecurity response, PNNL developed
    a program that, by the end of next month, will provide cyber
    support to the utilities that generate 75 percent of the
    nation's electricity. This is a DOE development concept in
    terms of cyber risk information sharing. It's now led by NERC
    and industry. The sensors and concepts came from PNNL and we
    continue to provide analytics for that very important exercise.
    The next step in that journey is to find ways to engage the
    small and mid-size utilities more effectively.
        So in conclusion, a modernized grid should substantially
    improve emergency response by delivering a more resilient
    system, providing new planning and real time tools to better
    identify and mitigate outage risks.
        Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments. Thank
    you for your long leadership in terms of Smart Grid and grid
    modernization.
        And thank you, Mr. Secretary, for delivering the first
    integrated grid strategy in my 30-year career in the national
    labs.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Imhoff follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Well thank you, Mr. Imhoff.
        I will note though, we've had several stops on this tour
    already and in each stop the Secretary has gone out of his way
    to emphasize how important the Pacific Northwest National
    Laboratory is to the country.
        Secretary Moniz. No, no, I didn't say that.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. And to the region.
        I just want to thank him, and thank you for being here as a
    representative of that.
        Secretary Moniz. He wants a raise.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. Well, give him one.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. So, Dr. Best, thank you so much. We have
    saved the best for last.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. So thank you----

       STATEMENT OF DR. LYNN BEST, CHIEF ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICER,
                           SEATTLE CITY LIGHT

        Dr. Best. Madam Chairwoman and Secretary Moniz, I want to
    thank you on behalf of Seattle City Light for the opportunity
    to testify today before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
    Committee.
        My name is Lynn Best, and I am the Environmental Officer
    for City Light. Seattle City Light provides reliable, renewable
    and environmentally responsible power to the residents of
    Seattle and neighboring communities. City Light has been
    greenhouse gas neutral since 2005, the first electric utility
    to achieve this distinction.
        My testimony today will focus on electric utility
    resilience in the face of climate change. I will cover City
    Lights' recently completed Climate Adaptation Plan, our
    participation in the Department of Energy's Partnership for
    Energy Sector Climate Resilience and two actual events that
    reflect the risks identified in the plan, the Oso mudslide and
    the Goodell Creek Fire.
        While City Light owns no fossil fuel resources and obtains
    90 percent of its power from hydroelectric resources it--we are
    affected by climate change.
        In 2013 as part of the resiliency strategy for our utility,
    City Light committed to researching the impacts of climate
    change on the utility and developing an adaptation plan
    including actions to minimize these impacts. City Light's
    Climate Adaptation Plan evaluates how City Light is at risk
    from climate change, the vulnerability from our operations and
    infrastructure to these risks and the potential magnitude of
    the impacts. It then uses this information to help prioritize
    potential adaptation strategies.
        Seattle City Light is also one of 18 electric utilities in
    the nation participating in Department of Energy's Partnership
    for Energy Sector Climate Resiliency. This partnership allows
    utilities to exchange knowledge and best practices as well as
    receive recognition for their achievements. This partnership
    also promotes investment in technologies and practices and
    policies that will enable resilient and modern energy system.
    City Light looks forward to our continued collaboration with
    DOE and other utilities as we work together in this
    partnership.
        The importance of taking action is illustrated by two
    recent events.
        On March 22, 2014 a 300-acre landslide occurred in Oso,
    Washington that killed 30 people and destroyed a local
    community. This happened during a March that was the wettest in
    history. The slide which occurred to the north of City Light's
    transmission line from the Skagit Hydro project caused minor
    damage to one tower and came within feet of causing significant
    damage to the line. The Oso slide is an example of the impacts
    that we are concerned about with climate change. As the
    frequency and intensity of heavy participation increases, these
    loose sedimentary soils are more likely to slide. If the Oso
    slide had happened on the south side of the valley our
    transmission lines would have been destroyed for about a mile,
    at a minimum and potentially more.
        In anticipation of this becoming an increasing risk, City
    Light has applied twice for Federal Emergency Management Act
    (FEMA) grants to retrofit six towers in this area to limit the
    amount of damage that could occur from a similar or smaller
    slide.
        While the proximity of Seattle City Light's transmission
    line constituted a significant risk to the utility, it also
    provided the opportunity for us to be of assistance to the
    community when the main arterial of Washington State, Route 530
    between the cities of Darrington and Arlington, was destroyed
    in the slide. A single lane, gravel access road that was our
    access road for our transmission line was used as a lifeline to
    bypass that section and reach the community of Darrington.
        The Goodell Creek fire started on August 10, 2015, and
    spread to the woods near the Skagit Hydroelectric Project a few
    days later. Seattle City Light operates three dams and power
    houses at Ross, Diablo and Gorge Reservoirs in this area. These
    facilities produce 20 percent of the power consumed by our
    customers.
        The fire changed direction suddenly and burned under the
    lines forcing the utility to shut down transmission lines that
    carry electricity from the project. Spill gates at all three
    dams were opened to maintain river flows to protect fish.
    Within 15 minutes--with 15 minutes of warning City Light needed
    to replace 20 percent of the power needed to serve our load.
        The inability to deliver electricity from the Skagit also
    cost us $100,000 per day. The company town of Diablo was
    evacuated quickly and Newhalem reduced to only essential
    personnel. City Light fire fighters worked to protect our
    assets, the power houses and residences and other structures.
    The total cost to utility was estimated at $5.3 million.
        Wildland fire risk is one that the utility's climate
    scientists had identified well before the Goodell Creek fire
    last August. More and longer lasting fires have been occurring
    on the West side of the Cascades over the past few years. City
    Light had already completed fire wise projects to protect
    buildings, and while the fire worked its way to the projects,
    it stopped before damaging buildings.
        The utility also is applying for mitigation funds from FEMA
    as part of the repairs following this fire to replace the
    timber saddles that were part of the Newhalem Creek plant
    penstock. In addition, we are training our fire fighters in
    wildfire fighting.
        In addition to the physical threat we had to move our
    balancing authority to our Boundary project. Unfortunately,
    Boundary has limited storage. It's a run of the river project.
    And as a result, there was fear that there would not be enough
    water available at Boundary and we would have to declare a
    capacity emergency.
        We were able to contact our fellow utilities upstream, and
    we want to thank Avista and Pend Oreille PUD for providing
    water to allow us to continue to keep Boundary as our balancing
    authority. This was an excellent example of utilities providing
    assistance under emergency situations.
        Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Best follows:]
        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Dr. Best.
        Again, thanks to all the witnesses today. You obviously
    represent the interests of our infrastructure across a variety
    of different areas in your testimony and help illuminate some
    of the challenges that we have been dealing with here in the
    Northwest. So thank you for that.
        I would like to begin with you, Mr. Ezelle, as it related
    to some of the things that you have mentioned, in regards to
    the National Guard. Obviously, you and I have worked together
    on Oso and on the two major fires that we have had in our
    state, so we have had a lot of chances to see the operations on
    the ground.
        In talking with you during some of those events and now
    hearing from Commissioner Bowman, I just want to ask you on
    this issue of rail response since I used to say Ports-R-Us, but
    I think we should say Ports-R-Us and Railroads-R-Us. If you
    have this many, if you are a state of our position and export
    opportunity, we have become central for pushing product.
    Obviously crude by rail, is a major shift change in what we
    have seen. How are you best preparing for the issues as it
    relates to the population centers across our state?
        Mr. Ezelle. Madam Chair, thanks for the opportunity to
    comment on that.
        The Washington State Legislature realized the criticality
    of this issue and in this biennium they allocated funding for
    four FTEs to the Washington Military Department and Emergency
    Management Division. Our specific purpose is to work with the
    counties and communities along these railroads, both the
    incoming rail route along the Columbia Gorge, but also,
    secondarily, the outgoing routes where the empties travel
    because the empties also have a hazard themselves.
        What we are doing is working with the local Emergency
    Planning Committees to build detailed response plans within the
    communities, within the counties so if there is an accident of
    the type that we saw in Mosier that our communities are ready
    and able to respond.
        Senator Cantwell. Commissioner Bowman, did you want to add
    something about your experience from Mosier?
        Ms. Bowman. Absolutely, thank you.
        Maybe to put a little bit of my remarks into context, I
    wasn't at the derailment but I was there within about three
    minutes of the derailment. And so I saw the first flames go up,
    and I was one of the first to call 911 in response.
        When after the derailment I ran down to the site, I got
    within about 200 yards of the derailment and the fire which, I
    think, as you know, Senator Cantwell, was about 300 feet from
    the local school.
        A couple of things that really stood out for me from that
    experience was, with all due respect to our first responders in
    those remote rural areas of the state, this is Oregon, but you
    know, it's right across the river from Bingen, Washington.
        With all due respect to the first responders, they're all
    volunteer fire fighters, they had no experience in dealing with
    oil fires and that was immediately evident. Obviously, a fire
    caused by oil is much different in terms of the way you fight
    it than is a fire caused by, excuse me, anything else. The
    first thing that I did was call Burlington Northern, and I
    wanted to call out the Burlington Northern for providing expert
    advice in terms of what the response would be.
        What I learned from the experience was that we would have
    foam trailers coming out to the site. Unfortunately, the foam
    trailers to deal with the fire didn't arrive. It was almost
    four hours before they arrived. That was probably the other big
    take away for me.
        I immediately called our CEO at the Port of Seattle and our
    CEO at the Port of Tacoma and our Fire Chief at the Port of
    Seattle and directed them to provide any and all resources to
    the fire that needed to be.
        I'm proud that the Port of Seattle provided resources to
    the Port of Portland who was unable to deploy the foam trailers
    that arrived about four hours after the fire started. You may
    have heard later that the foam--that the fire was burning so
    hot at that point that the foam was disintegrating before it
    could even get to the rail cars.
        So, I guess the biggest take away from this is that, as you
    probably know, Senator Cantwell, it would have been a wildfire
    of catastrophic proportion had there been any wind that day. It
    was an absolute miracle that there was no wind. That's what the
    Columbia Gorge is known for, is wind, and there was no wind
    that day.
        There's no way that anybody could have responded quickly
    enough. And so, the things that I would ask the Committee and
    the Federal Government to consider are a few things.
        Providing more resources in terms of training emergency
    responders in these rural communities. As you noted earlier,
    it's much different than in an urban area. Having foam trailers
    30 miles apart is not adequate. They can't get there in time.
        I would say that we need better evacuation plans. There was
    no plan in this community for evacuating. Literally, residents
    were sitting trying to figure out what to do. I was on the
    scene for about two hours. When the third car started to ignite
    I decided it's time to go home and pack and find a way out of
    town. By then the freeway was shut down. The only way to leave
    the town was through a rural, gravel road that is 12 miles back
    into the town of Hood River. Had there been a wildfire that
    route would have been closed off as well. So if we're going to
    have crude by rail we need to have better emergency response.
        Senator Cantwell. Thank you.
        As a Port of Seattle Commissioner familiar with our
    waterfront access, I know we have had the mayor on some of our
    hearings and briefings on this. He has said he would not direct
    first responders to respond to an incident in the tunnel in
    Seattle if such an incident happened. How do you look at that
    same incident happening anywhere in downtown Seattle?
        Ms. Bowman. Well certainly the Port of Seattle would offer,
    again, any and all resources. My understanding is that the
    Seattle Fire Department should be the first responder at that
    point. But I don't believe, I'm not sure that they've been
    trained adequately.
        Senator Cantwell. Do you, having witnessed that incident (I
    don't know exactly where to put it on a scale, but I would say
    it is not one of the most significant events that have
    happened), but can you imagine that not having catastrophic
    effects if the Mosier incident happened in Seattle? Is there a
    way that event could have happened without catastrophic effects
    to us?
        Ms. Bowman. No.
        You know, again, in the case of Mosier, it was only the
    fact that there was no wind that day. But in the city of
    Seattle for something like that to happen in a tunnel, but I
    don't know how you----
        Senator Cantwell. Or anywhere on the waterfront.
        Ms. Bowman. Or anywhere on the waterfront.
        But it is, given my experience in Mosier, it's something
    that the Port of Seattle is taking a much closer look at how we
    can better coordinate with the other local agencies because I
    don't think it's something that we've really adequately planned
    for in the past.
        We haven't--we don't export oil at the Port of Seattle or
    at the Port of Tacoma so we haven't had those immediate
    problems, but certainly the trains go through the city, and we
    want to work with the railroads to make sure that there is
    adequate response.
        Senator Cantwell. I think it could be greatly impacted by
    that because, obviously, the rail goes by your facilities. It
    is something I am glad you are looking at.
        On cyber I wanted to focus on Mr. Rogers. Thank you for
    your testimony. When you are talking about this perimeter issue
    versus the software attacks which I feel like is never
    changing. Someone is going to cook up a new tool a week.
        Mr. Rogers. Right.
        Senator Cantwell. So I get what you are saying. Instead of
    just protecting the perimeter, let's look at the overall
    structure and infrastructure and ways in.
        How do we create a strong defense? What are the steps and
    tools we should be taking to address this shift? And what would
    be the three or four things we should focus on?
        Mr. Rogers. Well, it's interesting. I picked up on Mr.
    Hairston's comments about some of the efforts that they're
    doing with their facilities. The implementation of their
    security operation center, for example, using some, I'm sure,
    using some of the advanced data analytics that are becoming
    common within the industry now for security purposes to track
    user behavior, to determine whether or not access controls are
    properly being utilized, to determine if a user is acting in a
    way or accessing an application they shouldn't be. I think that
    user access piece is one really important piece of that.
        Secondly, the follow up to that was the use of the security
    analytics through having a SOC, as we like to call it in the
    parlance of the industry, the Security Operations Center. To
    monitor that traffic is becoming increasingly important because
    you can't just have a static type of barrier to prevent attack.
    You need to have people monitoring and watching behavior on the
    network.
        I think actually focusing the strengths of your new
    perimeter around the application itself, wherever it may
    reside, increasingly it's knotting your own network. It may be
    in a cloud somewhere, it may be in a hosted environment, or it
    may reside on an application on a device somewhere. So the
    ability to protect that application through use of like a web
    application firewall and examining the vulnerabilities of the
    application itself and how you protect against manipulation of
    those vulnerabilities.
        The idea is while the moat still needs to be there for your
    traditional network and the wall still needs to be there, it's
    not enough anymore. You really need to focus on a deeper level
    of security with more analytics and a more proactive approach.
        I think in the past one of the things that's been discussed
    in a risk profile, particularly here in the U.S. with the risk
    from terrorism, there's been this concept of failure of
    imagination. If you can imagine the risk, then you should be
    able to try to find a way to defend against it. Where we run
    into problems is we lose that imagination about what the next,
    where the next attack could come from.
        Senator Cantwell. Well it is certainly asymmetric on all
    fronts.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. And certainly when it comes to cyber, it
    is asymmetric.
        I, again, want to thank our National Guard. The fact that
    we have a concentration of software and the Air Force and
    National Guard, they have really taken a lead on, and the
    University of Washington on this issue of creating, step by
    step, of really cyber hygiene that they believe that people
    should be following as well as helping to create a workforce
    that is focused on getting us the best and brightest in this
    area.
        Mr. Imhoff, what do you think about what Mr. Rogers is
    saying as it relates to approaching this more from a software
    perspective and what we need to do from the national laboratory
    to help with that effort?
        Mr. Imhoff. So I agree with him.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Imhoff. There's still some work to be done on the
    perimeters. We learned in the Smart Grid Investment Grants that
    made the small and mid-sized utilities just can make huge
    progress by learning basic good housekeeping in terms of
    maintaining your perimeter and doing training, et cetera. But
    we need to go beyond that. We need to deliver advanced
    analytics and part related to crisp that focuses on the
    business side of the systems.
        The other attack plan of interest is the control side of
    the grid. Part of it is design, next generation controls that
    are inherently resilient and have adaptive response to threats,
    all hazards, not just cyber, but the control system helps let
    the system down and keeps it from propagating throughout the
    control system. That's part of the strategy, the other part of
    anticipating where we're heading.
        We recently helped NERC put in place their first designed
    basic threat assessment, looking at cyber, which basically says
    who are the actors? What are their intentions? What tools do
    they have? What options might they deploy to help attack?
        It's really getting into the analytics figuring out where
    do you most need the analytics? How do you prioritize your
    defense inside the perimeter, if you will?
        And as you said, that game will never end. It will
    constantly go and go and go. But that scenario where we can
    create more distance between us and the adversaries in terms of
    being more strategic and more systematic from the electric
    industry standpoint in terms of how do we anticipate and
    prepare the defense of the analytics.
        Senator Cantwell. I am going to turn it over to the
    Secretary, but I do want to ask since you are looking at this
    from our national lab perspective. One of the things that we
    have discussed here locally is the notion that we need to
    continue to upgrade, that some of the security, as was said, is
    in that application and if we can just continue to get people
    to upgrade there are great securities in that. Now, of course,
    we are a software state, and we like upgrades.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. Well, let's just say we like upgrades
    when they work.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Cantwell. And work effectively.
        Should we be looking at this from a different mindset? I
    mean, is this a continual game of how fast can we run ahead of
    the hackers or is there some level that we should be trying to
    get people to adjust to as it relates to the software side of
    the equation? That good hygiene is an upgrade once a year or
    every two years or something of that nature because we are
    fixing so many of the identifiable problems.
        So any thoughts, Mr. Imhoff or Mr. Rogers, on that?
        Mr. Imhoff. That's a tough question.
        I think that the intent in the Grid Modernization
    Initiative is to build very strong relationships with the
    vendor community and try to embed best practice and more
    resilience to the point that Scot mentioned in the next
    generations of grid vendor tools that are deployed out to the
    systems. I think there's a lot of room for improvement in
    ensuring enhanced resilience in those software systems that get
    deployed out into the future.
        One big challenge we have is in the old days most of the
    grid upgrades were physical assets and going into the future
    they're going to be digital assets, very different lifetimes
    and the need for more frequent upgrade and transition, et
    cetera. So, that's going to be a really different world that we
    face going forward.
        One last comment I would offer is that to unleash the
    innovation in this space we need to have access to data. We
    need to preserve the privacy in that data. We need to preserve
    the security issues around that data.
        The Department, through ARPA-E, has been investing in
    several new grid programs looking at establishing data
    repositories that are anomalized such that basically you remove
    the privacy issues in the data but you maintain the physics
    that make that data useful for looking at innovations. I think
    this notion of data repositories that are safe and secure, that
    are available to the innovation community, is a big step
    forward to help us unleash the innovation but do it in a way
    that protects privacy and give them data sets that are safe.
        I think then, we can raise the bar in terms of the quality
    of these software upgrades, that the experience of the software
    engineers and control engineers market the utilities, et cetera
    and you'll see that tomorrow.
        Senator Cantwell. Before Mr. Rogers replies, I know the
    subject can seem very dry or very geeky in some ways, but I
    guarantee you, it's not.
        When our own data base in the Congress was hacked, the
    personnel system and the security clearance of every employee
    that had a security clearance was violated. You were putting
    the United States security at great risk, and this is going to
    continue, to say nothing of the personal side of each employee
    whose personal data and information was put at risk. We, as a
    nation, were undermined by those security clearances that were
    given to each of those individuals.
        That is something a foreign agent can act on or take
    advantage of so getting this right is very important. While I
    wish the Federal Government was an early adopter, let's just
    say, Mr. Secretary, they are not an early adopter. We are, kind
    of, a late adopter when it comes to technology. So I think we
    are a good example, if you will, in that regard of what is
    happening with a large sector of our society being very late to
    moving forward on the latest and greatest.
        So Mr. Rogers, my original question, how should we look at
    this? Is there a new timeframe we should be looking at to stay
    ahead of people just in the sense of good hygiene?
        Mr. Rogers. I think that brings up a couple of points.
        I think there are some opportunities for good hygiene. And
    I think, as Mr. Imhoff noted earlier, that just through their
    studies they found some low hanging fruit that some of the
    smaller producers and infrastructure providers could do to
    really help the resiliency.
        I think that one of the challenges that everybody faces is
    we have this innovation. We have these growing technologies,
    and it's the people to operate them.
        I think one of the areas, to the point of doing the
    upgrades, managing the infrastructure, managing the security
    operation centers and so forth, talent development is going to
    be critical as well. I think I know that there's some efforts
    that have been going on that have been mentioned earlier that
    were very important to get the talent within the area to help
    run these systems.
        I know that, for example, an initiative that F5 did, is
    we've reached out and have been pairing with the military for
    training on our products for military veterans as they leave
    the service.
        I think it's these kinds of joint public/private types of
    efforts that can really go a long ways toward, you know,
    developing the talent pool because you can have all the
    software in the systems in the world, but if you don't have the
    people to operate them or the people that work in the security
    operations centers to monitor them, then you're really behind
    the game.
        Secretary Moniz. Can I comment there?
        Senator Cantwell. Yes, so I will turn it over to you, Mr.
    Secretary.
        Secretary Moniz. Oh, okay.
        Senator Cantwell. You can have as much time as you would
    like.
        Secretary Moniz. Alright.
        Senator Cantwell. To ask any of the witnesses questions.
        Secretary Moniz. Okay, well first I want to comment on
    these last two comments a little bit in terms of your question
    about what steps need to be taken. Actually, Mr. Rogers
    mentioned earlier in the Ukraine context multifactor
    authentication is a nominally, straightforward, not always to
    implement approach that can help a lot in these situations.
        Also, Mr. Imhoff's comment, I just wanted to make a comment
    that goes, it's much more broad than this issue. It's a common
    issue. It applies here. And that is as we get more and more
    into a world where large scale computation, big data analytics,
    machine learning all become part of doing business here the
    data access is over and over again a big problem. It applies as
    much to cancer as it does to cybersecurity.
        So I think this question of data access is something that
    the Congress may need to, kind of, deal with in a very broad
    sense.
        Senator Cantwell. You mean in the repository suggestion
    that Mr.----
        Secretary Moniz. Well, yeah, I mean from the cancer issue,
    it's the same thing. There's a lot of data out there but it's
    hard to get it, proprietary, all kinds of issues how it's
    heterogeneous in editions. So it's a big problem, a broad
    problem, and certainly applies here as well.
        Well, if I have the floor?
        Senator Cantwell. Yes, go right ahead.
        Secretary Moniz. First of all, terrific panel and actually
    I have questions for everybody but I will not indulge myself in
    that. So maybe quick questions and quick answers. Maybe I'll
    just get three questions out.
        First, Mr. Ezelle, Cascadia Rising, you're Washington
    National Guard, dot, dot, dot. What's the first thing you think
    you're going to do if it actually happens?
        [Laughter.]
        Secretary Moniz. Number two, let me just ask the three
    questions, then go back.
        Mr. Hairston, maybe I should know this given Bonneville's
    relationship to the Department, but what would be your
    assessment from Bonneville about the security and ability to
    respond to a problem with large power transformers,
    particularly I don't mean just one goes out, but let's say a
    coordinated action taken against them?
        And third for Dr. Best, in your adaptation plan I believe
    one of the actions put in there is so-called retreating.
        Dr. Best. Yes.
        Secretary Moniz. Taking facilities away from at risk
    places. How big a challenge is that? I mean, are you talking
    about relocating everything or just very small number of
    keynotes.
        So those are my three questions.
        Mr. Ezelle. Well Mr. Secretary, I'll take a stab at the
    first one.
        I mentioned that probably the key thing that we took away
    from Cascadia Rising, at least in the emergency management
    division, was perspective. And it really, truly turned how we
    look at a catastrophic event on its head.
        And in terms of the first thing that we're going to do,
    obviously, for those of us who are in state government, I think
    the locals, the first thing is going to be to, essentially,
    take care of ourselves and our families. So, do I have to dig
    out of my house, has it collapsed on me, will I be able to get
    to work to function?
        And so, that really drove home to us the fact that we need
    to have extremely detailed response plans. So for every
    emergency support function whether it's transportation, whether
    it's communications, whether it's power, all integrated
    because, you know, what happens in transportation is going to
    affect what happens in ESF12. It's going to affect what happens
    in ESF6 and 8.
        And so all of our detailed planning needs to be to an
    extreme level of granularity but then the big take away that we
    have is that those plans need to be run by somebody else
    because a significant number of us, who are, we are, who the
    state may be planning on responding are going to be victors.
        And so, it's a case of really, truly putting together that
    planning, have somebody else outside of our area to be able to
    run those initial few days of the response until those of us
    who are in the area can dig out and then start establishing our
    capability and then starting to take it back.
        Hopefully that answers your question.
        Secretary Moniz. Yeah, interesting, yeah. I figure just
    chaos basically.
        Mr. Hairston. Alright, Mr. Secretary, in terms of the
    second question in respect to our ability to address an attack
    on a number of substations and subsequently the impact on
    transformers, it's interesting.
        I think we're growing in our ability to be able to respond.
    I think you might be aware the industry has done a lot of
    coordination on looking at spare transformer parts, what we can
    do to, maybe, leverage the number or the amount of inventory
    that's existing.
        But, you know, being able to respond or replace
    transformers is a difficult measure. It takes months, if not
    years sometimes, to get the replacement transformers. So that's
    why it is important for the industry to work together.
        The other thing is that and these are so expensive you're
    not going to make that type of capital investment and have
    those types of, you know, that type of inventory sitting on the
    bench, so to speak. So, you know, we've got what is called a
    Spare Transformer Equipment Program that's industry-wide, that
    would get a lot more involvement, and I think, positions us to
    be able to respond.
        I know there's been some thought of a, I want to say, the
    strategic transformer reserve program that's been, again, part
    of the FAST Act, that contemplates being able to respond in
    terms of a disruptive event. I think that would be a good
    complement to the existing program. So that's something that I
    think is worth definitely exploring for the industry.
        Secretary Moniz. Good. We'll have a report on that. You're
    probably working on it. Some people from BPA at least are
    working on it for Congress this year.
        Mr. Hairston. Yes.
        Dr. Best. Okay, retreating.
        So, I want to point out that retreating was the fourth of
    four different strategies that we put forward. We also said it
    was a strategy, sort of, of last resort because of the
    consequences of it.
        Mostly what we've looked at----
        Secretary Moniz. That's why I asked about it.
        Dr. Best. Yeah, yeah.
        So we've looked at hardening of infrastructure like we are
    looking at the Oso-type landslide situation. We're looking at
    increasing resilience, like fire wise, for our facilities.
        But we looked at retreating where you have a facility that
    is in, say, a flood plain that you know is going to be
    repeatedly at risk. And luckily for Seattle right now it
    doesn't look as if Seattle City Light has critical
    infrastructure in the areas that are going to be flooded in the
    city. And so, we're looking at the, what I would say, lesser
    infrastructure in those areas.
        But I think also this is a reason why it's so important to
    work on climate preparation now because the decisions utilities
    are making now will last for 20, 30, 40, sometimes 50 years.
    And if we do the, make the right decisions now we can greatly
    reduce the impacts on our customers, on the utility and also on
    the environment.
        And so, I would say that one of the reasons for
    highlighting that in the plan is to say we really don't want to
    be put in the position of having to move massive infrastructure
    or desert it and recreate it somewhere else.
        So I think that's one of the reasons that to be aware that
    you can't harden everything necessarily and you want to be
    careful about where you put things.
        Senator Cantwell. Well, I would just add to that, Dr. Best.
        I know we are going to wrap up here but if your other
    utility associates were here today they would be singing the
    same song as it relates to our wildfires and the amount of
    transmission that burned up and the costs that are now left
    with utilities to try to replace that in many parts of our
    state. Millions of dollars of infrastructure in an afternoon
    just gone. So figuring this out is really, really important for
    us.
        I just want to thank the panelists and again, the
    Secretary, for your testimony. You have given us some good
    ideas to think about.
        As a summation point from my side I definitely am hearing
    and sensing both from you, Mr. Secretary, but also from our
    witnesses, that we are both making preparatory plans and we are
    both thinking of these challenges but we need to somehow marry
    them together. The state and local and fed need to figure out
    how we continue to have this discussion and marry our solutions
    so we can give the American people our best efforts on these
    challenging new energy problems.
        I just thank everybody for being here today to give us that
    insight, and again, you, for traveling to the Northwest.
        Again, this subject is probably something we would like to
    put off to another day, but the realities of it are that they
    are affecting us right now. So I thank you for your willingness
    to come here and do that.
        I don't know if you have any concluding remarks you would
    like to make?
        Secretary Moniz. No, just to thank you for the hearing and
    thank the witnesses because there's some very interesting
    information there. We'll follow up.
        Senator Cantwell. Great.
        Thank you all very much.
        Secretary Moniz. Thank you.
        Senator Cantwell. We are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:39 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]

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