[Senate Hearing 114-354]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-354
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
FEBRUARY 11; FEBRUARY 12; OCTOBER 6, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 114-354
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11; FEBRUARY 12; OCTOBER 6, 2015
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
February 11, 2015
Page
The Situation in Afghanistan..................................... 1
Leiter, Hon. Michael E., Former Director, U.S. National
Counterterrorism Center........................................ 4
Olson, ADM Eric T., USN (Ret.), former Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command............................................. 5
Crocker, Hon. Ryan C., Dean and Executive Professor, The George
Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M
University; and Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.......... 7
Cunningham, Hon. James B., Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan. 9
February 12, 2015
The Situation in Afghanistan..................................... 41
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, Commander, Resolute Support Mission,
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............................. 43
Questions for the Record......................................... 96
October 6, 2015
The Situation in Afghanistan..................................... 105
Campbell, GEN John F., USA, Commander, Resolute Support Mission,
Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan............................. 109
Questions for the Record......................................... 160
(iii)
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Sessions,
Ayotte, Cotton, Ernst, Tillis, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono, Kaine, and
King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. The committee meets
today to receive testimony on Afghanistan and United States
efforts to sustain the gains that have been made over the past
13 years.
I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing before
us today: Ambassador James Cunningham, who was the United
States Ambassador to Afghanistan until he retired from the
Foreign Service last December; Ambassador Ryan Crocker, former
United States Ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq and many other
countries; Admiral Eric Olson, former Commander, United States
Special Operations Command; and Mr. Michael Leiter, former
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
All our professionals are--all our witnesses are national
security professionals who have served loyally and with the
highest distinction in both Democratic and Republican
administrations, including the current administration. All of
them also have years of experience working on, and often
serving in, Afghanistan.
And, on a personal note, could I just say that I--I've had
the great pleasure of knowing these four witnesses over the--
many years. And I don't know of four more honorable witnesses
who have ever appeared before this committee in the years that
I've on it. So, I consider this committee honored by your
presence today on an issue of crucial importance to our
country, the future, and the men and women who are serving in
the military.
More than 2,200 Americans have given their lives in
Afghanistan, and thousands more have been wounded. And the
progress they have enabled is extraordinary. The number of
Afghan children in school has increased tenfold since 2001,
from less than 1 million to almost 10 million today. Forty
percent of these students are girls, and 40 percent of Afghan
teachers today are women. Life expectancy has increased by over
20 years in less than a generation, an achievement unheard of
in modern history. Less than 10 percent of the Afghan
population supports the Taliban, while over 70 percent express
the confidence--express confidence in the Afghan military.
These gains and others are significant. But, as General
Mattis testified last month, the gains achieved at great cost
against our enemy in Afghanistan are reversible. Afghan
National Security Forces are now leading the fight and
responsible for safeguarding their country. They've made real
progress as a fighting force. The Afghan army and police
maintained their professionalism during the presidential runoff
last summer, upholding security and allowing the democratic
process to play out without armed intervention. And, while the
casualty rates of our Afghan partners in their fight against
the Taliban are high, there is no doubt--none whatsoever--about
the Afghan willingness to fight and die for their country.
But, like the Iraqi Security Forces at the end of 2011, the
Afghan National Security Forces are still developing some key
enabling capabilities, the shortfalls sounding eerily familiar:
intelligence, logistics, airlift, close air support, special
forces, and institutional development. Our commanders on the
ground in Afghanistan are developing plans to address these
shortfalls, but they need the time, resources, and authorities
to help our Afghan partners to develop these nascent
capabilities.
As I've said before, wars do not end just because
politicians say so. Indeed, in Afghanistan we've seen an
initial emergence of ISIS as well as the residual capabilities
of al-Qaeda wrapped in their support network of the Taliban
insurgency.
The world walked away from Afghanistan once, and it
descended into chaotic violence that became the platform for
the worst terrorist attack in history against our homeland. The
threats are real and the stakes are high. We can't let
Afghanistan become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda or ISIS. Failure in
this manner would destabilize the region, especially by
undermining the security of a nuclear-armed Pakistan. Worst
still, failure would condemn millions of Afghans, especially
women and girls, to live again under the tyranny of violent
radicals.
We can't turn the clock back in Iraq, but we can, and we
must, apply the tragic lesson that we learned in Iraq to
Afghanistan. To preserve the progress enabled by our troops and
the Afghan people, President Obama must replace his plan for
unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan with a conditions-
based drawdown and a clear commitment to maintain a limited
residual force. If the President repeats his mistakes from
Iraq, we can expect a similar disaster in Afghanistan: growing
instability, terrorist safe havens, horrific human rights
abuses, the rapid dissolution of the hard-won gains that our
men and women in uniform purchased at such high cost, and,
ultimately, direct threats to the United States.
I want to thank the witnesses again for testifying today,
and we look forward to hearing the views that they have
developed based on their many years of experience in the
region.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Crocker, Ambassador Cunningham, Admiral Olson,
and Mr. Leiter, welcome. This is an impressive panel, as the
Chairman has pointed out, and I want to thank you for serving
your country with distinction in so many different ways, and
also thank you for your--the advice and the support that you
have personally extended to me over many, many years. Thank
you, gentlemen, for what you've done.
And thank you, Chairman McCain, for holding this hearing on
the situation in Afghanistan ahead of tomorrow morning's
hearing with General Campbell, our Commander in Afghanistan.
The United States has devoted significant resources to the
Afghanistan campaign, both in the sacrifices of our military
and civilian officials and in America's financial resources.
So, it is important that we get this mission right. And this
hearing is useful for advancing that goal.
Afghanistan has successfully come through national
presidential elections and formed a new National Unity
Government with the leadership of President Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah. The hard-won gains of the past decade are
significant, but remain fragile. According to recent public
opinion surveys, a significant majority of the Afghan people
feel their country is moving in the right direction. Compared
to a decade ago, millions more students are in school, about 40
percent of which are girls. Dozens of new universities are
open. Health clinics are available to much of the population.
And life expectancy is up. And women are participating in
Afghanistan's political and civic life.
Afghan Security Forces have transitioned to having
responsibility for securing Afghanistan even as United States
and coalition forces have drawn down and shifted to the more
limited train, advise, and assist mission and conducting
counterterrorism operations.
Success in Afghanistan will depend on a number of factors,
including our partnership with the new government in Kabul, the
willingness of that government to improve governance and fight
corruption, the development of leadership within the Afghan
Security Forces, and the political support of the American
people for the mission in Afghanistan.
I hope our witnesses will give us their recommendations for
ensuring the success of that mission.
The President's fiscal year 2016 budget request includes
funding for training Afghan forces and counterterrorism
operations in Afghanistan, yet it remains to be seen whether
conditions on the ground in Afghanistan will improve
sufficiently by the end of 2016 to warrant the pace of further
reductions under the current plan.
During his nomination hearing, General Campbell assured
this committee that, if confirmed, he would provide his best
military advice on the requirements of the mission in
Afghanistan. To the extent our witnesses are in a position to
comment on the current conditions in Afghanistan or the mission
requirements going forward, we would welcome your views.
Again, let me thank you and thank the Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Mr. Leiter.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER, FORMER DIRECTOR, U.S.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Leiter. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, members
of the committee--first of all, I would like to thank the
committee for having us up here. And, as we face so many crises
in the world, that this committee is maintaining the focus on
Afghanistan, not thinking it is done, is greatly appreciated by
those of us who have spent more than a decade focused on issues
of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I'm going to speak, Mr. Chairman, from the perspective of
terrorism and the homeland threat of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And I do think that what we've done over the past 13 years is a
relative bright spot in the world of terrorism, especially as
compared to issues in Iraq and Syria. And the way we
accomplished that was from a cohesive effort between the United
States and our allies on the diplomatic, intelligence, and
military fronts to bring the fight to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
and the Pakistan border areas. And with that, I think we have
seen al-Qaeda at its absolute weakest since September 11 in the
region. With the death of bin Laden in 2011, Ayman al-Zawahiri
took over the core of al-Qaeda. But, since that time, the U.S.
military and Intelligence Community has continued to bring the
fight to al-Qaeda and, again, although it still aspires to
attack the West, is at its weakest position it has been in the
past 13 years.
That being said, I think the drawdown of U.S. and allied
forces, although not currently affecting al-Qaeda in a positive
way, does pose a real pivot point, where there could be real
danger. So, what you're obviously going to ask is, Will there
be an al-Qaeda renaissance with a further drawdown of U.S.
troops? And my short answer to this question, that, if done
properly--and I stress ``properly''--I believe that the United
States can withdraw more, but it has to be done based on
conditions on the ground. And in my view, we need to maintain
sufficient military and intelligence presence, based on those
circumstances on the ground, to support intelligence and
Special Forces Operations in the region to continue to target
groups that are organizing transnational plots and
simultaneously to continue to fund, train, and support, with
logistics and other specialized support, to the Afghan National
Security Forces. If we do that, we can maintain the pressure on
these groups and not allow them to actually spring back to
where they once were.
But, this is obviously not just about al-Qaeda. A lesser
U.S. presence will, of course, be greeted with significant
satisfaction, if not joy, by elements like the Haqqani Network
and the Taliban. Historically, the Haqqani Network has not
focused on attacking the far enemy, they have focused on their
interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I don't believe they
will automatically revert to a transnational threat with U.S.
withdrawal. But, the continued strength of the Haqqani Network
and the Taliban certainly provide a potentially fertile ground
for al-Qaeda to have some rejuvenation. Hence, my belief that
we need to maintain sufficient resources there to keep pressure
on those elements.
I think there is some possibility of violent jihadists
continuing to be attracted to the region, but, although this
isn't much of a silver lining broadly for United States
national security, frankly Syria and Yemen have become far
greater magnets for jihadists around the world, and especially
from the West, than had Afghanistan and Pakistan. And al-Qaeda
in Pakistan and Afghanistan have attempted to become and remain
central, most recently with a 2014 magazine known as
``Resurgence,'' which was focused on radicalizing Westerners
and attracted them to Zawahiri and al-Qaeda and the region.
But, frankly, it got very, very little attention in jihadi
circles and was largely drowned out, again, by the propaganda,
which is far more effective, emanating from Iraq and Syria.
Now, those are some potentially positive trends, but there
is a second generation of violent jihadists in the region which
is waiting for a U.S. withdrawal to release some of the
pressure that they have felt over the past several years. And,
although Zawahiri, I think, will remain largely incapable of
capturing the Western imagination, there are sufficient numbers
of jihadis globally that will still be attracted by his
message.
So, in my view, we can't simply declare victory and move
on. As I've said, it is a very fertile ground for transnational
terrorism, and, in my view, we will need continued weeding. And
that weeding has to be intelligence, special operations, and
support to our partners in the region. And that will be
increasingly difficult with a reduced footprint, because our
footprint in Afghanistan has been critical, of course, not just
to fighting these groups in Afghanistan, but also cross-border
into Pakistan.
So, what is currently missing for new recruits for al-Qaeda
in the region are new recruits, real operational
sophistication, and room to train and plan in a manner that
bred success in previous years. Now, these aspects are not in
short supply because of a lack of attraction in the region to
the ideology. They are in a lack of supply because of our U.S.
counterterrorism operations and, to a lesser extent, the
partnerships that we've forged with Pakistan and others.
So, in my view, a reduced U.S. presence in the region poses
a real risk that the success we have seen will become harder to
sustain. And, as a counterterrorism homeland guy, I can tell
you that only playing defense in this world will not lead to
continued success. We cannot stop all the shots if we are only
in a defensive posture in this region.
So, with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
inviting me to testify, and I look forward to continuing to
working with the committee and others on this very important
issue.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
Admiral Olson.
STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN (RET.), FORMER COMMANDER,
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Admiral Olson. Chairman McCain, Senator Reed, members of
the committee, thank you very much for your expressed interest
in the future of Afghanistan, and for convening this hearing.
And I'm proud to be here alongside such distinguished
colleagues from the world of intelligence and statecraft.
I recognize that I'm here primarily as a former military
planner and practitioner of the missions that are of special
interest in Afghanistan as we look forward. They are commonly
known as train, advise, and assist, and counterterrorism. I
should probably acknowledge that these are the two mission
areas in which Afghan National Security Forces need
comprehensive and enduring support.
I didn't submit a written statement, so I'll speak briefly
about each of these in some detail.
For the train, advise, and assist mission, I'll emphasize
that it is far more demanding than it may first appear. The
forces to be trained must be carefully selected, vetted,
matched to the appropriate skill areas, and prepared to receive
the training. In many cases, this requires such basic programs
as reading and physical readiness. And the scope and pace of
the training must be tailored to each of the trainees. The
concept of ``training the trainers'' is certainly appropriate,
and, if given enough time, it will raise Afghan National
Security Force instructors to a level where they can conduct
much more self-training. But, this must be carefully evaluated,
skill by skill, if we are to hand over responsibility with full
confidence that it will be sustained.
Current assessments are that the Afghans are ready to teach
themselves certain individual and unit-level skills, but it
will be some time, perhaps some years, before all necessary
soldier tasks and higher-level disciplines can be fully handed
over.
And training soldiers, policemen, and intelligence
specialists does not, by itself, create a meaningful
operational capability. Without corresponding quality in the
higher leadership skills, logistics, combat, administrative,
and communications support, the tactical units are placed at
higher risk of increased casualties and failed missions.
And, in any case, the train-and-equip mission is never
``once and done.'' The high attrition and casualty rate in the
Afghan National Security Forces means that, I believe, at least
30,000 new troopers enter the force each year, so it requires
not just sufficient capability and capacity to train, but an
acknowledgment that the task is never complete.
Before I go on, though, I do want to pay tribute to the
Afghan soldiers. The country has been at war for more than 30
years. They live in an atmosphere of poverty, corruption, and
dissension. In a tribe- and family-based culture, they are far
away from their roots for weeks or months on end. Some of them
are undermotivated, undisciplined, and even violently
traitorous, but many--most--are fierce and courageous, with an
admirable patriotism and enviable fighting spirit, and they are
suffering casualties at the high rate of close to 90 killed in
action per week.
As for the counterterrorism mission, it is a most complex
undertaking that requires a sophisticated choreography of
intelligence collection, information analysis, policy
development, operational capability and flexibility,
specialized equipment, and tactical proficiency. The
counterterrorism forces must be especially adept at offset
insertions, long-range foot patrols, achieving surprise on the
objective, instinctive target discrimination, adjustment to
countersurprise, site and document exploitation, treatment and
evacuation of casualties, monitoring the operation using remote
and overhead platforms and assets, and returning to base
through a hostile and now energized environment. So, the Afghan
counterterrorist forces must be extremely good, well led,
properly equipped, and thoroughly trained. And I'm told that
certain elements of the Afghan National Security Forces are up
to an acceptable tactical standard, but, absent continued
support and more experience in the advanced tactics and
techniques of this dangerous and demanding mission, the overall
counterterrorism capability in Afghanistan will be quite
limited. And if the enemies, such as the Haqqani Network, still
have safe havens across borders that allow them to enter and
leave Afghanistan at will, the operational challenge is
enormously more difficult.
Before I close, I'd like to share a couple of my
fundamental beliefs as they relate to Afghanistan:
First, surprise is an essential element in any competition
or conflict. Camouflage and concealment, deceit, deception, and
even denial, protection of exploitable information are
historically very basic to military operational planning. The
Russians call it ``maskirovka,'' and they used it very
effectively in seizing Crimea and occupying eastern Ukraine.
It's a military reality that exposure of units, locations,
intent, timelines, and force size and capabilities puts people
and missions at risk. And, in this regard, I applaud General
Campbell's recent decision to classify previously unclassified
information about the status and posture of United States and
Afghan forces in Afghanistan.
And, second, I am one who believes in developing as many
military options as possible, and keeping them open as long as
feasible, so the plans and operations can adjust to evolving
situations and conditions. The crafting of doctrine, templates,
and timelines is useful, but mostly for the purpose of
carefully thinking through a problem. They rarely apply
directly to any specific circumstances, but I think that we
still tend to fall too much in love with them as expedient
solutions. Actual war is too dynamic to accommodate fixed
models. So, I would urge strategic and operational flexibility
as we move forward in Afghanistan.
And I'll conclude by acknowledging that other emerging
crises may require additional U.S. troops, so I'm not
advocating a large and open-ended commitment to Afghanistan. I
simply believe that a total drawdown on a prestated timeline is
worth reconsidering so that we can reduce the odds of losing
the significant progress that has been achieved at such cost.
With that, I'll pass the microphone to my colleague on my
right and look forward to your comments and questions.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Admiral.
Ambassador Crocker.
STATEMENT OF HON. RYAN C. CROCKER, DEAN AND EXECUTIVE
PROFESSOR, THE GEORGE BUSH SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC
SERVICE, TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY; AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Reed,
Senators. Thank you for convening this important hearing on
Afghanistan and its future. To a marked degree, that future
touches on the future of U.S. national security interests and
goals.
I'm going to start by looking back. I spent almost 40 years
in the Foreign Service, almost all of it in the greater Middle
East. During those 40 years, I learned maybe two things--sort
of, one thing every couple of decades:
First thing I learned is: Be careful of what you get into.
Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan. It's an away game. We're playing on
somebody else's field and by somebody else's ground rules. We'd
better understand what they are and be prepared for the
advantages that do fall to the home team.
The second thing I learned was: Be at least as careful over
what you propose to get out of. The consequences of
disengagement can be as great or greater than the consequences
of engagement, intervention in the first place. I saw this in
Lebanon, back in the '80s. I am afraid we're seeing it now in
Iraq. I certainly don't want us to see it in Afghanistan.
Actions have consequences. We all know this. And I'd like
to just spend a minute on what you alluded to, Mr. Chairman, in
your opening statement: the Soviet experience in Afghanistan in
the 1980s, and, more particularly, what came after their
withdrawal in 1989. We withdrew, too. We weren't there
militarily, but we were certainly there in strong support of
the Mujahideen in their fight against the Soviets. We were
there as a major ally of Pakistan, where we staged, with their
cooperation, most of our support for the Mujahideen. But, once
the Soviets were gone, so were we. It didn't matter that we
could see the civil war coming, as the seven dominant
Mujahideen factions looked around and realized, well, they had
gotten the Soviets out, now it's a time for the run for the
roses, ``Who's going to control Kabul?'' And in the space of
just a few years, the Mujahideen factions did more damage to
Afghanistan, took more Afghan lives, than the Soviets and our
allies ever did. But, more fundamentally for U.S. security,
that vicious civil war opened the way for Taliban to take over
the country, which they did, of course, as we all remember, in
the mid-1990s.
Pakistan supported the Taliban. I was Ambassador to
Pakistan, and I heard it over and over and over for my 3 years
there, ``Well, you're back after 9/11. It's nice to have you.
We'll get what we can, but we're going to hedge our bets,
because we know how you operate. You'll be here for a while,
and then you'll leave. We live here. So, we're going to look to
our long-term needs, our own vital interests. And, where they
coincide with your short-term interests, that'll be great.
Where they diverge, we'll follow our own way, because we've
learned that what you lack is strategic patience.''
And so, I'm afraid we do, Mr. Chairman. I use it in a
different sense than the recent national security strategy
does. What our adversaries have learned to count on with United
States engagements in the Middle East, is that it won't be for
all that long. Apply some pain, extract a cost, and we'll go
home. Our allies have come to fear it, whether in Lebanon, in
Iraq, or Afghanistan.
So, moving very briefly to the present, my two colleagues
to my left, geographically speaking, have spoken to that. And
Ambassador Cunningham, who served a remarkable 3\1/2\ years in
Afghanistan, will address it from a political and diplomatic
perspective.
It is a long game, a long war. We have to understand that
wars don't end when we withdraw our troops. That is what our
adversaries are waiting for. Admiral Olson, Mr. Leiter, have
both referred to that in different ways. Al Qaeda is at a low
point, but they are not defeated, just as al-Qaeda in Iraq was
not defeated at the time I was there, 2007 to 2009. Badly
degraded, but not defeated. And now they're back. Version 4.0,
with the Islamic state. The Islamic state seems to be in
Afghanistan. We all saw yesterday's reports of the killing of a
former Guantanamo detainee, who, because of the splits within
the Taliban, has thrown--had thrown his lot in with the Islamic
state. I'm glad we got him. I hope we continue to get them. And
I hope that we maintain the requisite force levels to ensure
that we are supporting the Afghan military and police in their
development efforts, that we are supporting the Afghan state as
it seeks to assert a credible and more effective level of
governance and tackle, as you alluded to, Senator Reed, in your
remarks, problems of endemic corruption. All of these can lead
to state failure. What they need is time, and they need our
support.
And again, to give this perspective, in the roughly 100
years of the existence of the modern Afghan state, from the
ascent of Amanullah Khan in 1919, that state has always
required outside support--not necessarily boots on the ground,
but it has required train-and-assist for its military, it has
required economic support. This is, again, a long game and a
long war.
Our support and our leadership, going forward, are vital.
We cannot turn our backs on what happens in Afghanistan. We
paid the price for this before. We should not do so again. This
is America's national security.
It is also America's values, something I feel very deeply
about. My colleagues have alluded to the enormous progress that
young Afghans have made. Both you and Senator Reed have alluded
to the extraordinary increase in Afghan students in school. I
have seen the progress Afghan women have made. A precipitate
U.S. departure, military and political, could put all of those
gains and all of those lives at risk. That is not the set of
values that this country stands for.
So, in addition to the fundamental issues of national
security, Mr. Chairman, we have issues that touch on who we are
as a people. I hope we will take the right decisions on force
levels, going forward, based on conditions, not on calendars,
that will ensure we meet all of these American goals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Ambassador Cunningham.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. CUNNINGHAM, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR
TO AFGHANISTAN
Ambassador Cunningham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Reed, Senators.
Let me start by just saying how much I appreciate the
invitation to meet with you today, how much I appreciate the
many members of this committee who have come to see us in
Afghanistan; and, for those you who haven't, please do.
Chairman McCain. Did you always appreciate it, Ambassador?
Ambassador Cunningham. I always did.
[Laughter.]
Always. Even when there were some testy questions.
[Laughter.]
The United States has led the international community and
our Afghan partners in implementing a strategy that puts the
responsibility for securing the Afghan people where it properly
belongs, with the Afghan Government. The challenge now is to
afford the Afghan people and their new government the time and
space to cement the progress that's been made in preparing the
Afghan National Security Forces so that they can continue to
protect the country from the Taliban and violent Islamist
extremism.
It's that violent extremism embodied in a network of groups
operating in both Afghanistan and Pakistan which threatens both
countries and, ultimately, the United States and our partners.
That threat, first and foremost, to America is why we are
there: to protect Americans. An increasingly stable and secure
Afghanistan is the best way to do that.
We've made a tremendous investment in preventing the
international terrorist threat from reconstituting itself in
South Asia and in degrading al-Qaeda. Afghans now have a
historic opportunity to continue, with international support,
to build a better future, to contribute to stability and
progress in their region, to combat the Taliban, and to seek
peace for their country. With the agreement on the Government
of National Unity, which the United States played a major role
in forging in the Bilateral Security Agreement, which I was
privileged to sign, Afghanistan now has a chance to open a new
chapter in its history. It will be manifestly in our interest
if it is able to do so.
It was not at all preordained that we and the Afghans would
reach this point. And no one can guarantee the outcome over the
next several years. The performance of the Afghans themselves,
and particularly the Afghan political class, will be critical
and essential if Afghanistan is to earn the continued support
which is on offer from the international community. But, there
are certainly realistic prospects for continued progress. This
will also require the sustained support of this committee, the
Congress, and the American people, whose commitment has already
been extraordinary.
I am concerned when I hear suggestions that we have lost in
Afghanistan or that our continued support is unnecessary, too
expensive, or futile. Continued engagement is necessary in
order to protect the investment and the significant gains we
have already made and for Afghanistan to play its role in
contributing to the development of a sustained and effective
counterterrorism strategy, which must be global, multifaceted,
multinational, and, unfortunately, as others have noted, long
term.
This critical time in Afghanistan's history will determine
whether it becomes a positive element in defeating extremism or
a negative and dangerous one. With Islamist extremism now
morphing and moving across borders, it seems clear what the
future in Afghanistan will be if we do not make the effort. And
yes, it is expense, and the--but, the challenge is historic.
And we have many partners in sharing the burden, including new
Afghan leadership. Rather uniquely, we also have a common
understanding with our partners and with most Afghans about
what is required. Continued United States commitment is an
insurance policy at much lower cost against the harm that might
ultimately come from an Afghanistan once again open to hostile
actors.
From our long conversations, especially over the past year,
I believe President Ghani, Chief Executive Abdullah, and many
Afghans understand the unique opportunity which exists for
their country, and they understand that this will not come
again if they get it wrong. Afghans are undergoing
unprecedented security, political, and economic transitions
that would sorely stress any country, let alone one with
Afghanistan's difficulties and struggling institutions. The
elections and the ensuing long and difficult political debate
created massive uncertainty and the drift which is still felt
today.
But, Afghanistan is not a failed state. Its people are
resilient and proud and desirous of protecting what they have
achieved. Afghanistan democracy is imperfect, but last year
millions of people cast valid ballots twice, at personal risk.
The Afghan Security Forces have been tested, they fight and
will only get better, as long as they continue to receive the
support they need. In my view, under today's circumstances, the
goals of ensuring ANSF capability, maintaining an effective
counterterrorism effort, and of bolstering Afghan confidence in
this period of massive transition are more likely to be
achieved by a longer presence of the resolute support mission
and a longer regional presence of U.S. and partner forces than
is currently planned.
I hope Americans will have the foresight to view
Afghanistan in the context of the broader struggle against
violent extremism. As some of you know, I was the acting U.S.
Representative to the United Nations on September 11. I told my
staff, the next day, that history had changed and would demand
of us a generational struggle against ideological international
terrorism. I still believe that to be the case. And, as we are
seeing, we and our partners must learn to deal with the threat
on multiple fronts simultaneously, with multiple instruments.
In Afghanistan, we have entered a new phase of the conflict
against terror. We have a new government, an Islamic partner
eager to provide for its own security and committed to working
with us. It would be regrettable and very risky not to maximize
the prospects for the success of that partnership when we, the
Afghans, and the international community have sacrificed so
much and worked so hard to counter the negative forces which
will continue to challenge all of us.
Thank you for your time.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you all for the important
statements.
Could each of you give your views on the potential
consequences of the announced calendar-based plan, which is to
reduce to 5,500 troops before the end of 2015, and to a
``normal embassy presence'' in Kabul at the end of 2016?
Ambassador Cunningham?
Ambassador Cunningham. As I said in my statement, Senator,
I think that, under the circumstances, that timeline is
probably too short and the rate of withdrawal is too steep.
What those dates really mean is that, in order to withdraw
forces, you need to begin well before the time that's indicated
for the endpoint, which detracts from the missions that are
being undertaken, whether it's train, advise, and assist, or
counterterrorism. I know that my colleagues in the
administration are aware of this. And, as Secretary-designate
Carter said the other day, there is a plan, but it's a plan
that can be reviewed as circumstances change. And I think it
should be reviewed.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have believed, whether in Iraq or in Afghanistan, that
our force levels and drawdowns, or plus-ups, have to be
conditions-based, not based on a timeline. I clearly remember,
in testimony with General Petraeus in 2007 before this
committee, among others--many others--trying to make that
point, that conditions are what count out there, not calendars.
I would be further concerned, Mr. Chairman, that, as I
tried to suggest in my opening statement, that, by fixing a
date certain to draw down to a certain number, and then to
drawn down to, basically, an office in an embassy, simply tells
our adversaries how long they have to hold out before they have
the field to themselves. You know, I'm a diplomat, not a
warrior, but that never seemed to me particularly good
strategy.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Ambassador--Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, I agree that it does our force
a disservice to announce too precisely in advance what the
timeline for the drawdown will be. And, in any case, I--my
sense is that, in--2016 is too soon to assume that we--that the
Afghan National Security Forces will be capable enough that we
can afford to withdraw all of our forces from the field, from
training, mentoring, advising, supporting the Afghan forces at
a time that I believe they will still need the help.
Mr. Leiter. Mr. Chairman, I concur with all of my
colleagues. I'm not in a good position to judge whether it
should be 5,500 or 8500 immediately, but I absolutely agree
that simply an embassy force in 2016 will not be sufficient to
provide the intelligence, the direct action, and the advise-
and-assist to the ANSF to make sure that we are detecting and
disrupting transnational plots in the region.
Chairman McCain. And I think you would all agree, probably
there's many individuals and entities to rely on to make that
assessment, but the Ambassador in Kabul and the--our military
commander there are probably two of the people we would rely
on, obviously, the most.
I don't want to take the time of the committee. I know the
witnesses very well. I'll turn to Senator Reed.
Just to say, Ambassador Crocker, I will probably forget
many of the hearings that I've attended over the many years
that I've been a member of this committee, but one I will never
forget is yours and General Petraeus's appearance before this
committee in 2012--2007. I think it literally changed the
course of history.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your--again, your service to
the Nation and your excellent testimony.
As you've all pointed out, this is a combination of
military capacity and political capacity, on both sides--the
United States, NATO, and the Afghanis. It strikes me there's
three factors, here in Afghanistan, that were not present in
Iraq. One is, there is a Bilateral Security Agreement that
allows our forces to stay. So, we have the legal ability to
pull up or bring down our forces. Second, we seem to have a
government--a new government that is much more cooperative
with, and consistent with, our views and values, even though
they represent very staunchly the people of Afghanistan, as
they should. And then, third, we have a NATO element, also,
too. This is not a--just a U.S. mission.
So, can you, sort of, comment, Mr.--Ambassador Cunningham
and Crocker, on these three factors and how it sort of--it
supports or helps us to make the case, or not make the case,
with respect to increased forces or continued forces?
Ambassador Cunningham. I'll be glad to, Senator.
I think that this time in the history of Afghanistan and
our engagement in Afghanistan this--for the next couple of
years is really pivotal on both fronts, on the second front and
on the political front. As you know, I spent hours and hours
of--in discussion with Dr. Abdullah and President Ghani after
the elections, and then in the discussion that--in which we
were trying to help them form the National Unity Government.
This really is a fundamental shift in Afghan political life,
having created a Unity Government which really does effectively
represent the vast majority of Afghans, whatever happened in
the elections. It's going to be difficult, politically, for
this government to function. We all knew and understood that as
we were going through the process.
But, it--a page has turned in Afghan history now. They have
to decide whether to take advantage of that opportunity. I
think there's good--a good chance that they will. The
instruments are in place. The elections were held, a new
government has been established or is being established. We
have the Bilateral Security Agreement finally signed, a year
later than we originally thought it would be, but it is signed.
It reflects the will have the Afghan people. There's no huge
movement in Afghanistan that wants the United States out of
Afghanistan. And, indeed, to the extent that there is concern,
it's mostly over whether the withdrawal will take place, and
under what conditions.
I think that affords both the Afghans and us a great
opportunity, over the next 2 to 3 years, to cement this
relationship, this partnership in which the Afghans now have
the lead and are fighting and dying for their country in
providing security in a way that serves our interests because
it will contain the violent extremism that we're all concerned
with.
Senator Reed. Ambassador Crocker, any comments?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
Just very briefly. The three factors you note are very
important. I associate myself completely with Ambassador
Cunningham's remarks. This new government, in spite of the
difficulties it's faced--even because of the difficulties it
faced, because it is overcoming them--is an extraordinary step
for the Afghan nation and the people.
In terms of governance, the fight against corruption, I am
heartened, both by the President himself, with long experience
in financial matters from his time at the World Bank. He knows
how the world works, how nations succeed or fail. And I'm very
heartened by his choice of Ambassador Eklil Hakimi, who many of
you know, still, I guess, Ambassador to Washington for
Afghanistan, but who understands us and the world of finance
very well. They need our support in order to succeed.
I have spoken to senior Afghan officials over the last
week. Many of you have done the same. They all say the same
thing to me, ``Please continue your support. We know what we
have to do. We need you, to get it done.'' I haven't talked to
anybody out there who doesn't want us to stay, to stay
militarily and to stay at or near our current force levels, for
all sorts of reasons.
The final point I'd make, because you mentioned NATO, NATO
will stand, both as a military component of a force and in
providing critical economic backing and financial backing for
the Afghan National Security Forces, as long as we stand and as
long as we lead. It was our leadership, in May 2011 at the NATO
summit, that produced out-year commitments of financial support
to the Afghan National Security Forces. It was our leadership,
at the Tokyo Economic Ministerial, that produced international
pledges in excess of $16 million for economic support in the
out years. Without us, that evaporates. Without us, the Afghan
leadership, off to a very promising start, is going to have
increasing difficulty in overcoming the many hurdles they will
face, now and in the future. Our leadership is key, whether
military or perhaps as, or even more, important, politically,
to be engaged is crucial.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you very much.
And Senator McCain has had more experience than anybody in
the White House and most other places in this government in
dealing with this. He was right about Iraq. And I believe he's
calling us correctly, and the warnings he's given about
Afghanistan are correct and should be heeded.
Let me just briefly ask this. This is one thing I think
that worries the American people. Is this a hopeless effort?
Or, if we have a reasonable, smart application of American
assistance, can Afghanistan achieve, let us say, modestly, a
decent government that functions and that creates a nation
that's not a haven for people who would threaten us?
Just briefly--maybe, Ambassador Cunningham--do you--is this
a hopefully situation, or not?
Ambassador Cunningham. No, Senator, it's not hopeless.
Indeed, after 3 and a half years of experience there, I think
it's finally possible to see a future for Afghanistan that is
both possible and promising. Much will depend on what the
Afghans, themselves, do. And they provide their security, they
run their government, they are in charge of their politics. And
life is difficult there. There's no denying that. And they're
having a great deal of difficulty setting up the new
government, as one would expect, because they also have a
parliament that they need to deal with.
But, the elements are there for Afghanistan to continue
down the positive road that we've been helping them create over
the past several years. If the Afghans will seize the
opportunity and if our--by--and, by ``our,'' I mean
international support, not--we have to remember, there are many
nations who are contributing to Afghanistan, both militarily
and economically, not just the United States, although we are,
obviously, the leader, in every sense, as Ambassador Crocker
said. And that support will not be sustained without our
leadership and our commitment.
But, the road is there--you can see it--on security, on
economic development, even on relations with their neighbors,
where there is--are new opportunities for a better dialogue
with Pakistan, and better cooperation. So, I am actually
hopeful. As I said in my statement, I can't guarantee the
outcome, but I'm hopeful that the right outcome can be
achieved.
Senator Sessions. Well, the rest of you basically share
that view? I understand that from your testimony.
So, Ambassador Crocker, you're correct that we need to be
careful what we get into. And I, for one, am going to be more
humble about my understanding of what we can achieve in the
world. But, we've invested a tremendous amount in Afghanistan.
We have stood shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.
And, in my view, this is--and we are at a point where I think,
with a modest additional commitment of resources over a period
of time that creates confidence in the Afghan people and their
military, we may have a very good result in that area of the
world. It would be good for the world and good for us and good
for the people there.
Admiral Olson, you--you know, I know that Afghanistan has
to stand up, but, in my view, you can't ask them to do more
than they can do. Kabul has never ruled that country. They've
always had corruption. To expect it's going to be a perfect
government anytime soon is unrealistic.
Now, Admiral Olson, would you tell us what a lot of
military people have told me about why even a small amount of
American presence--embedded Special Forces, for example, with
Iraqi or Afghan military--why they can make an incredible
difference in their ability to be effective, their ability to
fight? Just give us some of your insights. You mentioned
several complex things that a good military has to have to be
successful. Give us your thoughts on that and why even a small
amount of forces can make a difference.
Admiral Olson. The forces that have the greatest impact are
the ones who have some experience, typically older than the
average soldier in the U.S. Army, who have more deployments,
typically, who have operated on teams with each other for
longer periods of time, and who then can help gel those around
them into more coherent, effective kind of units. The forces
that do this best have a cultural appreciation, maybe a minor
language capability so that communication is not always through
an interpreter, and they are willing to fight alongside the
forces that they are mentoring, when that's necessary.
Senator Sessions. Well, you commanded the----
Admiral Olson. And so, I think----
Senator Sessions.--you command our Special Operations
Command, and that's the kind of forces you're talking about. Is
that correct?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. But, not only Special Operations
Forces. I mean, there are elements within the U.S. military who
have stepped up to that task and performed very well.
Senator Sessions. But, will it make a difference in the
outcome? Is it a significant factor, that deployment of a
limited number of Special Forces? And----
Admiral Olson. Sir, the evidence to date is that it does.
The Afghan National Security Forces are far more capable than
they were just a few years ago, when these kinds of efforts
began in earnest, to put small numbers of United States troops
at remote locations, where they were a daily presence, a daily
part of the lives of the Afghan units. And it's not just the
training. Much of it is just sort of the example that they set
in how to think about conflict, how to prepare for a fight. And
that just can't help but rub off on the Afghan forces.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, if I could, very quickly. You've asked
the question, Should the American people think this is
hopeless? The last 13 years have showed us that the
counterterrorism fight and protecting the homeland in this
region is not hopeless. We've been very successful at stopping
attacks from the region.
And I would flip it around: From a homeland security
perspective, I think it is close to hopeless to think that we
can have that same success without some ongoing presence in the
region.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you for your service and for being here
today.
And Afghanistan is a troubling place. And I hear a lot from
the constituents, back in West Virginia. You know, we have an
awful lot of military, and we've rotated many, many times. And
I've been there a few times, myself. But, you know, people have
said, ``No one in history has had success in Afghanistan. Why
do we expect to be any different?'' So, you hear that playing
out. But, on the other hand, it's much different. We've been
attacked by people who planned and plotted from that part of
the world. And we try to explain that and try to get support
from the public.
I think I'm going to--I need--some questions, if you can
help me, on what size of support levels will be needed in
Afghanistan. Is it 5-, 10,000? What type special types? Is it
Special Ops, Black Ops? And also, Bagram Air Force Base, I see
that as a great asset. Are we determined to keep that as our
asset, or do you see any--I mean, as we've given everything
else away, are we planning on giving that away, too, to
somebody, whatever?
And I just--I'd like to know about the morale with the
training mission, with green-on-blue attacks. One of the most
atrocious things I've ever attended was a Wounded Warriors
dinner one night, and had a few of them tell me the horrific
stories of the attacks that they've seen and the attacks that
they were subject to from people they were training and had to
trust. So, I know that takes a toll on them.
And just really the developing economy. Is there ever going
to be an economy based on anything other than U.S. military
presence?
So, I--that's a big plate, and I would just--I know we are
limited on time, so--I guess we'll start with the size of
support you think we need.
And I agree with our Chairman, you know, Iraq didn't work.
So, if we learn from past mistakes, what--and I think the
people in West Virginia will support--we will maintain to make
sure that we're able to prevent that from happening again from
that part of the world. What does it take to do that?
Admiral?
Admiral Olson. If--that's a question for me, Senator? I
mean, I don't claim to be ``the'' expert on precise force
levels. I think that that's better addressed by General
Campbell in tomorrow's hearing. But, having seen how this has
developed, now, for so many years, I've held the opinion that
somewhere around 10,000, plus or minus----
Senator Manchin. Are they----
Admiral Olson.--is probably----
Senator Manchin.--going to be combat? I mean--or are they
going to be basically training strategic personnel?
Admiral Olson. It will be a split between those who are in
the field conducting the day-to-day training, mentorship,
advising, supporting----
Senator Manchin. So, we'll say approximately---
Admiral Olson.--providing the logistics support and the
other support that it takes. I mean, airspace---
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Admiral Olson.--management, medical care, those sorts of
things.
Senator Manchin. So, we're talking around 10,000. And right
now, we're--what's our level right now in Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. We--that's about where we are now, I think.
Senator Manchin. But, we're supposed to go down to 5 by the
end of the year?
Admiral Olson. Sir.
Senator Manchin. So, you think it'll be of critical mass,
if you will, going that low.
Admiral Olson. I won't say ``critical mass.'' I'll just say
that we ought to really very carefully----
Senator Manchin. I got it.
Admiral Olson.--get through all that.
Senator Manchin. Can anybody speak about the economy over
there, if you see any economy?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Cunningham. Yes. I'll address that. Let me just
add to your--to the point that Admiral Olson just made, though.
It's important to remember that the U.S. mission and force
level and our partners--our NATO allies and other partners'
presence and force level are organically connected. And that's
one of the--and that--as things now exist, that enables the
resolute support mission force to be present in Kabul and
Bagram and other parts of the country. As--if the U.S. forces
draw down to the--to 5,500 by the end of this year, that
presence won't--that regional presence will no longer be
possible, because our partners won't have the support and
connectivity to our forces that they would wish to have. So,
that's another factor to be looked at as this process goes
forward.
On the economic side, the economy last year took a huge
hit, both from the withdrawal of the international forces as
they drew down to their present levels, but also, very
importantly, from the political uncertainty that was created by
the elections, in the aftermath, and concern, among Afghans as
well as foreign investors, about what the outcome of that was
going to be and whether there would be a workable dispensation,
ultimately, that would allow economic activity to resume, and,
indeed, encourage it. That's now coming into place.
The removal of uncertainty is a huge goal for the new
Afghan government. As Ambassador Crocker said, President Ghani,
Dr. Ghani, is very experienced and well versed in economic
matters and finance, as are other people in his government.
And, again, from my conversations with him and with Dr.
Abdullah, they understand clearly that a high priority for this
new government has to be the regeneration of economic activity
within Afghanistan, by Afghan investors. There's a lot of money
available in Afghan hands to be used in business activity, but
it's been held or it's--or used outside the country because of
uncertainty inside the country. So, they need to find ways to
stimulate that activity, as well as ways to improve trade in
the region, which they are working on, and to encourage foreign
investment. So, that's as high on their agenda as anything, I
think it's safe to say.
Senator Manchin. Mr. Chairman, if I can just have one
second to just make one comment.
I have a hard time--you know, with the dependency they have
on the United States and our presence there, whether it be in
Afghanistan or in Iraq, and allow a person like Karzai or
Maliki to destroy that type of a relationship, and we're--take
us that far backwards--what's any assurance for us that we
wouldn't--I mean, we have--right now, we have a better--let's
say, a better relationship. We have people we have confidence
in, in Iraq and Afghanistan. But, it seems that we have no
large input and assurances that could continue.
Ambassador Crocker?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
It--for me, it comes down to U.S. engagement and leadership
as a key determinant. During my years in Iraq, 2007-2009, it
was the same Prime Minister, Maliki, and many of his colleagues
from other communities could be every bit as difficult. But, we
were constantly engaged, at my level, at the level of the
Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, at the level of the
President. I think that engagement is absolutely crucial.
These people, whether in Iraq or Afghanistan, have been
through a type of hell that's very hard for Americans to even
imagine. It reduces them to core identities and zero-sum
thinking, ``If you're not part of my clan, my party, my tribe,
I can't trust you. And not being able to trust you doesn't mean
losing an election, it means maybe losing my life.''
We can be the essential middleman. We did play that role in
Iraq, for a time. We are playing that role now in Afghanistan.
Ambassador Cunningham and Secretary Kerry, of course, were the
ones who essentially brought that compromise into place that
led to a National Unity Government between Dr. Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah. I would be as--so bold to suggest, I'm not at all
sure they could have done that without us. But, we were there,
we got it done. And the Afghan people now have a hope they
didn't have before. It takes our leadership.
Finally, because I do care very much about this, I got to
Kabul, on my first assignment, about 10 days after then-
Chairman Karzai arrived in Kabul from the Bonn Conference that
placed him as Chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority. I
worked closely with him during those initial months, when he
had nothing--no government, no police, no army, no resources--
absolutely nothing. I worked with him again when I returned to
Afghanistan in 2011. Yes, it was difficult. He had been through
a lot. We had been through a lot. But--Ambassador Cunningham
was with me--it was President Karzai who put the final seal of
approval on our Strategic Partnership Agreement that President
Obama came to Kabul to sign. We had that engagement.
So, you know, we all look for the day, whether in Iraq or
Afghanistan, when these peoples, these governments, are able to
stand on their own, dispensing good governance and justice
under law. They're not there yet. And our role, politically, I
think, is absolutely crucial to helping them get there.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I do appreciate
your service.
I apologize. I think there are several hearings going on
this morning.
Admiral Olson, you have mentioned, a couple of times, the
need for our combat troops, more counterterrorism, train-and-
assisters, to stay on beyond 2016. And I appreciate the fact
that you have also mentioned--I made note earlier--you
mentioned logistics, and you mentioned equipping the men and
women that we have serving over there. And I would like to
focus a little more on that, because I--I do believe--I am
hopeful--that we will be able to train the Afghani Security
Forces to continue with operations in Afghanistan, hopefully
after we have exited theater, whenever that point is. But, we
do need to know, beyond that, beyond any kinetic operations
that are going on, Will they be able to logistically support
themselves? Will they be able to maintain their equipment? What
do we have in place to make sure that they will continue in a
support role, also? What are those plans, if you know of any,
Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator.
I'm not expert on the current plans. And again, I think
that will be a question better asked of General Campbell
tomorrow.
But, our experience so far has been that, absent a
continued U.S. engagement in the nonkinetic sort of
disciplines--in the intelligence, in the administration, in the
logistics and the communications--then the capabilities do tend
to deteriorate. Those don't all have to be supported by U.S.
Active Duty soldiers. There's room for others to provide that
kind of training and support so that the soldier population can
be in the field, supporting the more direct fight.
But, I do think it is essential--I mean, I'll repeat myself
just a little bit--in that great shooters don't make a great
army. We--it takes much more than that. In fact, we saw, in
Iraq, in fact, a quite capable army that, absent the political,
logistics, et cetera, support, was unable to sustain the fight.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. I believe it's imperative that
those warfighters need to be supported, whether they're United
States forces, whether they are Afghani forces.
Do you see that this is a role that contractors could fill?
Or do you believe that it is better supported by a U.S.
military standpoint during any sort of transition period before
the United States hands off to Afghani forces?
Admiral Olson. Well, we already have a history of certain
contractors performing some of those roles. And we have a
generation of veterans, from Iraq and Afghanistan, many of whom
are willing to go perform those sorts of roles. So, I think
there is potential. I'm not, again, the expert on that. I think
it's a case-by-case evaluation. But, I do believe there's room
to reduce the active Duty presence by replacing some of them
with private contractors who would not be expected to be in the
fight.
Senator Ernst. Okay.
Any other thoughts, gentlemen, in that area? Okay.
Yes, Ambassador.
Ambassador Cunningham. If I just could add, briefly.
There's actually a very detailed plan for what the train,
advise, and assist process will consist of, with multiple lines
of effort, that General Campbell can outline and provide you in
writing. And most of that is built around things like logistics
and the nuts and bolts of how you run and support a military
force. And much--actually, most of it is on intel and
logistics.
Senator Ernst. Great.
Ambassador Cunningham. A very small part has to do with the
actual war--what we would think of as warfighting.
Senator Ernst. Great. I appreciate that.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all, both for your service and for being here
today.
I have had the opportunity to work with Senator McCain on
the Special Immigrant Visa Program, trying to extend the number
of visas that are available for Afghans coming to the United
States. I wonder, Ambassador Crocker, if you could talk about
why this program is important.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you very much, Senator, for your
support for the Special Immigrant Visa Program, and for the
question.
This is something I feel passionately about, whether in
Iraq or in Afghanistan. I worked very hard, in both countries,
to do everything I could to see that we did the right thing by
those who supported us and whose lives all too often were at
risk because of that support. We ramped up considerably in both
countries. In both countries, I think we have now fallen short,
not only of what I believed was the right thing to do, but
what, again, this Nation stands for.
These people stepped up to serve us, whether the civilian
presence or the military presence, not for a paycheck, but
because they believed it was the right thing to do. Almost all
of them had qualifications that could have landed them probably
better-paying jobs with substantially less risk. They believed
that we were there to help pull their country out of a dark
hole, and they wanted to support that effort. They run enormous
risk, and many of them have paid for their--paid for that with
their lives.
And I would just urge this committee, the Senate, the
Congress, to do everything they can to ensure that processing
is expedited and that the resources are available, once they
get to the United States, to support them. I have heard too
many stories of Afghan and Iraqi immigrants or refugees,
depending on the program, who have come here and have had to go
back to very uncertain fates because they simply could not
support their families. That is just wrong.
So, again, thank you, Senator Shaheen, for being our
conscience on this.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you very much. I certainly
share your view that we should do everything possible to make
sure that those people who helped our men and women on the
ground have a safe future and can come to the United States.
And we'll continue to work on that. And appreciate all of the
support from so many men and women who served with these
Afghans and Iraqis, because they've been the cheerleaders for
making sure that this program goes forward.
Ambassador Cunningham, you talked about the hours that you
spent with Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah. And one of the questions
that I have is looking at the partnership government that has
been formed, the potential challenges to that. As we all know,
it's always hard to have more than one person in charge. And I
wonder if you could give us some insights on how they're
dividing up responsibilities. I was curious to see that Dr.
Ghani, despite his understanding of economics, is really
focused more on the international aspects, the defense aspects
of things, and Dr. Abdullah is more focused on domestic. So, I
wonder if you could talk about how that partnership is working
and how you think it will continue to work in the future.
Ambassador Cunningham. Thank you, Senator.
I think the best way for me to respond to that is to
describe the National Unity Government as a work in progress.
This is a unique phenomenon in Afghanistan, which is much more
prone to a winner-take-all way of doing business and way of
doing politics, which is part of what led to the civil war that
Ambassador Crocker referred to.
One of the driving forces behind the effort to create the
National Unity Government was the realization that everything
that the Afghans had accomplished in the past decade was at
risk if they didn't figure out a way to overcome their very
bitter feelings about the elections, bitter feelings on both
sides. And that's one of the factors that is--that will make
the government a difficult proposition. The two leaders and
their teams fought a very bitter political competition in which
both sides sincerely believed that they had won. So, overcoming
that division, turning the page, as we kept saying, ``You know,
you have to turn the page. The political competition is over.
You have to realize that. Somebody's going to be named
President. That person needs to figure out a way to govern the
country under today's circumstances.'' That's what the National
Unity Government is an attempt to do.
I believe firmly that Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ghani are both
committed to making it work. That doesn't mean it's going to be
easy. And they don't have many members of--they don't have many
members of the government named yet, because--they've made
presentations to the parliament. Some of those people have
withdrawn their candidacies because of treatment that they
received in the parliament. Others were rejected. So, it's a
back-and-forth proposition. This also was to be expected. It
took President Karzai, who was completely in charge of his
government and his political affairs after the last election--
after his last election--it took him months to form a
government, just doing it by himself. Dr. Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah are trying to do this in a collaborative fashion, so
it's taking long--the whole process is taking longer than
anybody wants or would like, but it is moving forward. And I
think there is a real drive, on both sides, to make this work,
but we'll have to see.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
My time is ended, but thank you all, also, for your
continued support for a secure Afghanistan.
Chairman McCain. And I thank Senator Shaheen for her
efforts on behalf of these individuals, as Ambassador Crocker
described them, who virtually risked their lives on behalf of
the freedom of their country. And if there's additional
measures that need to be taken on this issue, we would be glad
to take it up in the defense authorization bill, Ambassador
Cunningham or Ambassador Crocker, if we need to take additional
measures to help these people come to the United States, if
necessary.
Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for your past, current, and
continued service.
Admiral Olson, you mentioned that surprise is an essential
part in playing out any strategy over in that area. The only
thing I find surprising about the President's strategy is how
transparent we've been in announcing timeline and definitive
troop withdrawals. It seems--I think Ambassador Crocker
mentioned--now that's sort of what our adversaries are waiting
for.
So, in the context of the current strategy, I'm also
concerned with this withdrawal creating a new place for
terrorist organizations to train and potentially develop a
capability that threatens the homeland. But, based on your
perspective of the terrorist threat, what kind of
counterterrorism strategies should we be thinking about or
putting into place to make it less likely that we go back to a
pre-September 11 threat in Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator.
The counterterrorism strategy has, in my view, got to be
some centralized command capability, with pods of forces that
are prepared to move on to terrorist targets as they develop,
with enough striking power to resolve that situation and keep
those terrorists from taking the actions that they intend to
take. Very much--very important that that's done in concert
with Afghan partners and colleagues, depending, in part,
certainly on Afghan-sourced intelligence, but it is still
sophisticated enough an operation that, in my view, it will
require some external support for some time.
Senator Tillis. And, Admiral Olson, I know that the--at
least some spokesman for the President characterized the
Taliban as an insurgency. Do you think that there is a
potential transition back to, once again, considering the
changes that will go on in Afghanistan if the current
administration's policies are carried forward, to where they
are actually viewed as a part of the terrorist organizations
that we may have to look at in Afghanistan?
Admiral Olson. I'm sure my colleague on my left, Mike
Leiter, will appreciate me passing this question to him,
because that's really more of an intelligence-based question
than a military question.
Senator Tillis. Mr. Leiter?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I do think that the Taliban has some
appreciation that their willingness to allow al-Qaeda to launch
transnational effect--attacks around September 11 were a very
bad thing for the Taliban. So, I think there is some
appreciation on their part that they would prefer al-Qaeda not
to do that.
Do I think that there are elements--not just in
Afghanistan--in Pakistan and elements within the Taliban that
are more open to that sort of training and launching attacks?
Absolutely. I believe the Haqqani Network is extremely
problematic.
And the only thing I would add to Admiral Olson's wise
vision on what those counterterrorism operations need to be to
protect the homeland, we need to continue to have the deep
engagement and strategic patience that Ryan Crocker talked
about with regards to Pakistan. You cannot separate these two
nations out yet. We have to understand that our presence is
required, not just to combat these forces in Afghanistan, but
continue to work with the Pakistanis and pressure the
Pakistanis to target those same groups.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Ambassador Crocker--again, I mentioned earlier that you
said that--I think, that the current timeline and troop
withdrawal is now something that some of our adversaries are
waiting for. And I know that you've dealt with the effect--or
the influence of Iran and Iraq and Afghanistan. If we follow
through with the current strategy, what different strategies do
you anticipate Iran may--or role may they play in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Crocker. It's a very important question,
Senator. We don't share very much in common with the Islamic
Republic. For most of the last 13 years, I would suggest that
we have objectively, on a very broad level, sought similar
outcomes in Afghanistan. Iran and Afghanistan almost went to
war, in the late 1990s, under Taliban rule. This is an
existential issue. There can only be one faith-based theocracy
in Islam. The Iranians claim it, and so do the Taliban. And it
was an existential fight. They do not want to see the Taliban
back.
That said, I would be concerned that, if they see us as
leaving the field, militarily and politically, they will ramp
up their own game. They have allies among some of the minority
groups in Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance was closely tied
to Iranian support during the Taliban years as a means of
keeping them--keeping the Taliban from running over the whole
country. Those linkages are still there.
So, if we pull out, I don't think we would see an Iraq-type
situation, but we would see more Iranian involvement. And,
based on the pattern of Iranian involvement in other countries,
I'm not sure we would like it.
Senator Tillis. Mr. Chair, if I may, the--just a followup
question. It's a little bit off the subject, but--with the ANSF
being an all-volunteer force, and with the current strategy
publicized by the administration, do we have any sense of what
effect that could have, in terms of their continued recruiting
and buildup of that force? Or is it even material to their
recruiting efforts?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Cunningham. Well, one of the good-news items
with regard to the ANSF is, as you said, it is a volunteer
force. And, despite the high level of casualties that they are
taking, levels of casualties that need to be reduced, and I
think will be reduced as the leadership gets better and better,
but there's no--they are not having any difficulty in
recruiting people to join the military or the police. I expect
that will remain the case.
As both institutions mature and continue to get better,
they will become more attractive. They're both making efforts
to recruit women, by the way, which is a very difficult
proposition. They are both doing that.
The determining factor in all of this is the sustained
international funding that's required. As part of our plan for
funding the ANSF, the Afghan government is committed to, over
time, increase its share of its own defense budget, with a
view, ultimately, to becoming self-sufficient. That's going to
take a while--quite a while. And, for the foreseeable future,
they will be highly dependent on the international funding that
we and our NATO and other allies have committed to provide.
That is the determining factor that makes everything else run.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Senator Reed [presiding]. Senator Donnelly, please.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you all. I apologize for having to step out for a
few minutes.
And this may have been asked, and I'm sorry if it has. In
regards to Pakistan, how big a percentage of getting Pakistan
right is getting Afghanistan right?
Ambassador Cunningham. That's--I'd like to ask Ambassador
Crocker also to respond to that--that's a very difficult
question. But, as Mr. Leiter said, the two are inextricably
linked. They have their own history that they need to overcome,
and the phenomenon that we're trying to deal with both the
Taliban and the--what I call the network of Islamist
extremism--exists on both sides of the border, and moves back
and forth across the border. That includes al-Qaeda, but it
also includes a host of other folks.
A long-term solution has to include dealing with the
presence of those folks on the--in the Pakistani side of the
border. For both countries. There's evidence that the awareness
of--a realistic awareness of that is growing in Pakistan. We
have been encouraging that relentlessly over the past couple of
years. And I hope the Pakistanis will come to realize,
genuinely, that they need to act in their own interests, as
well as in the regional interest.
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you for that question, Senator,
because it is central to the long-term stability of that region
and to our own long-term security.
Afghanistan is not just about Afghanistan. As both Mr.
Leiter and Ambassador Cunningham said, it's also about
Pakistan, and vice versa. The border between the two states is
an artificial one, drawn by the British at the end of the 19th
century, deliberately to divide the Pashtun community. There
are tribal and familial affinities that cross that border that
make this an extraordinarily complex situation.
As I noted in my opening remarks, the Pakistanis have
hedged their bets, based on their experience in the 1990s. They
supported the Taliban then as a vehicle to put an end to the
Afghan civil war and produce a government in Afghanistan that,
again, would stabilize the situation and with which they had
some purchase. That, over time, I think, has led them to some
strategies that I would hope they regret, like support for the
Haqqani Network.
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Ambassador Crocker. You know, going back almost 10 years, I
remember discussions with the Pakistani leadership--
intelligence, military, and presidential--that the Haqqanis
were really dangerous, not just to us, not just to the Afghan
state, but to the Pakistani state. Well, so it's proved. But,
it does raise a question, given the current challenges Pakistan
faces, whether they could really subdue the Haqqanis, or not.
And, you know, that is why long-term U.S. engagement and
leadership is so critical. It's 185 million people, with
nuclear weapons, that is facing a set of insurgencies that
could grow to threaten the state. Some of these, insurgencies
of their making that got out of control. But, the threat,
nonetheless, is there.
Senator Donnelly. I am--I apologize--I'm running out of
time. I just want to ask one other question, and that would be:
In places like Kunar and Nuristan and Helmand and Khost, as we
look forward to the next few years, how successful do you think
we'll be in those areas? And will the core--the Kabul area,
those areas--will it be a solid core, with continued challenges
in those areas, or how do you see this, if we work in a
flexible and conditions-based way?
Ambassador Cunningham. All of those--all of the areas that
you mentioned are already under--well under the responsibility
of the Afghan Security Forces, who are being tested--were
tested last year by the Taliban, particularly in places like
Helmand. They had some difficulty, but, where the Afghans lost
ground, they've quickly recovered it, recovered themselves and
then recovered the territory, and held their own last year. I
don't see any reason to think that the--that they will be less
effective this coming year and in the future. So, while they
will continue to be contested by the Taliban, I think they will
more than hold their own.
Kabul is, and has been, under Afghan security control for--
as far as I know. And that will remain the case. A critical
factor in all this is the continued counterterrorism effort
that some of our forces will continue to be involved in
directly in mentoring the Afghan Special Operations Forces, who
are already very good and, again, getting better all the time.
So, the--there will continue to be conflicts in the
countryside, and even parts of the countryside that the Taliban
controls but don't really matter very much, but I think the
main effort to secure most of the population as it is now will
be successful.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain [presiding]. Senator Hirono.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to all of you.
A stable Afghanistan is desired, not just by our country,
Pakistan, but apparently now China is stepping up in a much
more overt way. So, there was an article in a recent Wall
Street Journal talking about what China has been doing, and in
discussions with us, also. Would you all share what you think
about China's growing interest in the security of Afghanistan,
what you see as the positives, what concerns you think are
raised by their involvement?
Ambassador Cunningham. I'd be glad to, Senator.
I and a number of my colleagues in the administration have
felt for some time that the Chinese had a positive role to play
in Afghanistan, that their interests in Afghanistan and in the
region were coincident with ours, in both the stability of the
region and in stimulating economic activity and investment that
they could make on their own. So, we have been in discussions
with the Chinese government for some time about this, about how
we could better work together and how China could be a more
active and positive participant. And I think it's basically a
good thing that they are now slowly moving into a more forward-
leaning posture, both politically and economically, because
stability in that part of the world is in their interest, as
well as it is in ours.
Ambassador Crocker. I certainly would endorse Ambassador
Cunningham's remarks. I would note just a couple of additional
points.
I am not a huge supporter of Chinese activism outside its
borders, except maybe in this case, where there are, indeed,
common threats. The Chinese are worried about radicalization of
their Muslim population, primarily the Uyghurs, that can flow
through Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have a very close
relationship with Pakistan. I understand--I'm not sure how
valid it is--that the Chinese are now beginning to use that
relationship with Pakistan to get the Pakistanis to ensure that
there is not infiltration from Afghanistan through Pakistan up
into western China.
The Chinese have substantial economic interests in
Afghanistan, in the mineral sector. Ambassador Cunningham and I
both have argued that, well, if they're reaping the benefits,
they need to step up to help the state ensure security. I
understand they are now looking at police training. I'm not
sure that is the model I would uphold for the world's police
forces, necessarily. But, to the extent it suggests that the
Chinese are now engaged in trying to support a viable and
stable Afghanistan, then I think it gives us something to work
with.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. And if--Admiral and Mr. Leiter,
if you basically agree that this is a--this could lead to a
fruitful kind of an approach to civility in Afghanistan, we--I
can go on to my next question.
So, all of you have said that our withdrawal--our drawdown
in Afghanistan should be based on conditions rather than a
calendar. So, my question is, you know, What kind of conditions
do you--do we want in Afghanistan to enable us to draw down?
And do we have an agreed-upon, articulated goals between us and
the Afghans as to what should be--what kind of conditions would
occur, should occur, from our end, from their end, to enable us
to withdraw from Afghanistan?
Ambassador Cunningham. Senator, I think the discussion
about conditions and the timeline is something that not--is not
only a matter for us, it's also a matter for--of discussions
with the Afghans----
Senator Hirono. Yes.
Ambassador Cunningham.--themselves. And that----
Senator Hirono. That is--that was my----
Ambassador Cunningham.--that has been happening. It's been
part of--a regular feature of the transition that's taking
place over the past several years has been to do a--I don't
know, every couple of months, an assessment of how the
transition was evolving and what the status of the Afghan
Security Forces was, as going forward. That's the kind of
process that I think--not that I think--that will continue with
the new Afghan government and the new leadership. And it's on
the basis of that process and assessment of Afghan Security
Force capabilities, what they can do and what they need and
what kind of assistance they still require, that the timeline
and the drawdown should be measured against.
Senator Hirono. So, do the rest of you agree that it's
basically the capability of the Afghan Security Forces to
defend their own country that should be the primary basis on
which we withdraw?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think it's potentially the most
important, but I would put right up there, as well, the
potential for the Afghans not just to secure their own country,
but target terrorist networks which have transnational
aspirations. And this is something that I think is going to be
as hard as anything else for the Afghans to develop and
maintain, as compared to what we are used to after the past 14
years. And we will be critical in both informing them as to the
threats we see and also maintaining some of those high-end
capabilities which have been so critical beyond securing Kabul
and elsewhere into areas where the transnational threats have
tended to hide over the past decade.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
go over my time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. Thank you all again for your service to the
country, which I know has been long and distinguished, and
particularly in a tough and difficult place like Afghanistan
and, more broadly, in the Middle East and Central Asia.
I'd like to start out by asking a question about ongoing
political developments in Afghanistan. Obviously, we have new
partners at the senior levels of the government there. I--last
month, I think the parliament confirmed about a third of the
nominees for the new cabinet that President Ghani proposed.
Could I get your quick perspective on the prospects for further
confirmations so there would be a full working leadership at
the senior levels of the Afghan government?
Ambassador Cunningham. Senator, I know that President Ghani
and Dr. Abdullah are quite focused on filling out--fleshing out
the rest of the leadership positions in the government. I'm not
directly involved in conversations with them, but I know that
they are working hard to present both another list of
candidates for positions, as well as doing the necessary work
that needs to be done with the parliament, itself, to obtain
confirmations of their ministers.
It's to be expected that this is a difficult process. It's
a unique arrangement that they now have, working together on
the government and cooperating with each other as a
collaborative effort in identifying people for positions, as
well as trying to set the bar for capability higher than it may
have been in some cases in the past. So, it's taking longer
than anybody wants. It's certainly taking longer than either of
them want or the Afghan people want. But, they're working hard
at it, and I'm confident that they will succeed.
Senator Cotton. Ambassador Crocker?
Ambassador Crocker. Again, Senator, I look at this over a
longer timeline, having been in Afghanistan shortly after the
fall of the Taliban and seeing how little there was, including
any real basis for political understandings among factions who
had been on opposite sides of the fight in many cases. So, I
perhaps see more progress than those who are looking at
snapshots today.
The fact that Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah can sit down and
thrash through a slate of ministerial nominees, to me is the
important point, not that some of them ran into trouble with
the parliament, not unexpectedly. And we're now going through,
again, a second round, as Ambassador Cunningham said, as they
try to get nominees identified, vetted. Financial disclosure
statements do have their use, I can now acknowledge, no longer
having to do them. But, this is a slow, painful process. But,
it is a process that is working--frankly, far better than many
would have expected.
Senator Cotton. Does the Government of Afghanistan still--
the President still appoint the provincial and district
governors? That was the case when I was there on Active Duty in
2008 and 2009.
Ambassador Cunningham. Yes, that's still the case.
Senator Cotton. Have you seen the--have we seen the quality
of local government services and responsiveness increase over
what I saw in 2008-2009, when governors were understandably
responsive to their constituency of one in Kabul, as opposed to
the local population?
Ambassador Cunningham. I'd say it's mixed bag. The
provincial and district government works when there are good
people there and when they both know how to work Kabul and they
know how to cooperate with their security and other partners at
the provincial and district level. And there are places where
it still doesn't work very well. It's a high priority for both
President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah to improve the operations of
the Kabul/provincial/district relationship, both in terms of
the people who are appointed and in terms of reforming how
business is done. This is, again, one of the several reform
items that's being delayed by the delay in setting up the new
government. But, they and the people around them are aware of
the problem. And one of Ghani's driving principles, which
Abdullah has bought into quite completely, is, they need to
have better people in government.
Senator Cotton. Good.
Ambassador Cunningham. Period.
Senator Cotton. Good.
If I could squeeze in one more question. Admiral Olson,
could you give us your thoughts on the practical effect on our
counterterrorism efforts if we follow one course of action,
which is essentially to shut down every installation in
Regional Command East and Bagram Airfield and retrench back to
Kabul Airfield?
Admiral Olson. Effective counterterrorism requires a rapid
response capability. And I think withdrawing to a single
location in central/south-central Afghanistan will reduce the
capability to respond rapidly to emerging situations. And so, I
think that there would be--it would have a detrimental effect.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
compliment you for the series of very thoughtful hearings that
you've had early on in this Congress. It's been very, very
helpful.
Ambassador Crocker, I want to go to the subject of Syria. I
understand that you support the training of the Syrian
opposition and removal of Assad. Would you share with us your
thoughts?
Ambassador Crocker. Thank you, Senator.
I certainly would like to see a trained, effective, well-
equipped, moderate Syrian opposition force that could replace
Assad. However, I--admittedly some vast removed now from what's
going on, I don't think that either are very likely.
The Islamic radicals, be that al-Qaeda in Syria, the Nusra
Front, or even worse, the Islamic state, clearly have the
ascendancy in Syria now. I would be concerned that weapons be
very, very tightly controlled, lest they wind up in the hands
of these groups that clearly are our mortal enemies.
I have also said, and I have said it for some time, I don't
think President Assad is going anytime soon. I will spare this
committee yet another history lesson, but this has its roots in
the Hama rising in 1982, when Hafez al-Assad and his brother
Rifaat slaughtered the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and somewhere
north of 15,000 Syrian Sunnis. You know, that is why you have a
radicalized Sunni community in Syria. That is why you have a
regime that was ready for a day of reckoning.
You know, Assad should go. Okay. And what army is going to
remove him? If you set a policy, you'd better have the means to
carry it out.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Mr. Leiter----
And, by the way, thank all of you for your public service.
It's extraordinary. And it's good to see you, Admiral, again.
Mr. Leiter, you have expressed the concern that we
exchanged the Taliban five for Bergdahl. You want to elaborate?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I was concerned. First, I think it--I
hope that everyone who needed to be involved in that discussion
about the potential consequences was. I was not in the
administration, so I can't say it. But, I hope that there was a
full conversation about the consequences.
Second, there was much commentary as to whether the Qataris
would, in fact, control these five. I think there's some
reporting that at least one may not be under control. Frankly,
I was less concerned with that question and more concerned with
the timeline we put on the Qatari control of them, which I
believe now--I apologize--I believe it was only 2 years, or
potentially 3 years. It was not an extended period. And I
thought that was problematic, because it starts to undermine--
again, I think, a phrase that Ambassador Crocker brought up,
which I think is exactly right--that people in the region, our
allies and our enemies, must understand that we will have deep
engagement and strategic patience. And putting relatively short
timelines on controls of people who really have been central to
transnational threats, in my view, is deeply problematic and
shows a lack of patience, which our adversaries absolutely love
in the United States at times.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Let's continue the discussion. It's a good
discussion.
Do you think, if you were negotiating, you might have could
have gotten the Taliban to take three instead of five?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I apologized. I understand the----
Senator Graham. All--yeah----
Mr. Leiter. I think----
Senator Graham. My point is that they probably--what if we
insisted they take five?
On a scale of 1 to 10, what's the likelihood of these five
going back to the fight at the end of the 1 year in Qatar, not
3?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I actually--I tend to think the
Qataris have been a reasonably good partner in some ways.
Senator Graham. At the end of the year, these people can go
anywhere they want to go.
Mr. Leiter. I think, in some foreseeable amount of time,
where we still have very important strategic interests in the
region, they will be back in the fight.
Senator Graham. Is that within a year of when they can go
back?
Mr. Leiter. I think we have strategic interests within the
region for far more than a year.
Senator Graham. Yeah.
Mr. Leiter. So, anything even beyond a year----
Senator Graham. Right.
Mr. Leiter.--I'm still worried about.
Senator Graham. I couldn't agree with you more.
To the Ambassadors, we don't have a medal for dealing with
Karzai, but we should create one. I don't know where it would
fit into the scheme of medals, but, to all of you who have had
to deal with this problem in Afghanistan all these years, God
bless you. And I think each one of you, in your own way, did a
terrific job.
What happens, Ambassador Cunningham, if--well, what would
be losing in Afghanistan, very briefly? If you and Ambassador
Crocker could take a shot at describing, in a--just a little
bit of time, what losing would be, in your mind.
Ambassador Cunningham. In my mind, losing is the collapse
or incapacity of the Afghan state and the ability of the
Afghans to control security for most of the country, which
leads to Afghanistan again becoming a place where people whose
interests are hostile to ours return and begin to operate
again. That's what affects our interests. There are many other
negative implications of that, including for other countries in
the region and Pakistan. But, that's the main feature of loss.
Senator Graham. What about you, Ambassador Crocker?
Ambassador Crocker. I would fully endorse that. We--
Senator, as you know, we've seen this movie before, in the
early 1990s, up through September 11. We have enemies that
would, I am convinced, like to bring us another September 11.
And if they can get strategic space and depth, they will go to
work planning it. They may already be doing so, in the form of
the Islamic state that now doesn't have to worry about day-to-
day survival in large swaths of Syria and Iraq.
Senator Graham. So----
Ambassador Crocker. They and al-Qaeda would love to have
Afghanistan back.
Senator Graham. So----
Ambassador Crocker. We've seen what happens when they got
it.
Senator Graham. Sure. So, let's talk about how to prevent
that. A counterterrorism platform in Afghanistan would probably
be in our National security interest, to make sure they don't
regenerate. Does that make sense to both of you, all of you?
Yeah. A robust counterterrorism program.
Supporting the Afghan Security Forces to make sure they
don't fail makes sense, in terms of preventing the outcome you
both described? We're going to have to pay for their army, at
least in part, for a long time to come, because of their budget
problems. Do you all agree with that? Okay.
What's the likelihood of losing if we stick with the
current plan, which is to go down to 1,000 United States
soldiers, Kabul-centric, in a security cooperation agreement
environment? What's the likelihood of us losing if we follow
that plan, versus, say, keeping a force of around 10,000, based
on conditions-on-the-ground withdrawal? Could you start, from
Ambassador Cunningham, and go through the whole panel and give
me your evaluation?
Ambassador Cunningham. Senator, I've--as I've said, I think
the current projected timeline for the withdrawal and for the--
the timeline for withdrawal and the rate of withdrawal is--
under current circumstances, isn't the way to maximize the
prospects for success. I don't know at what point mission
failure kicks in.
But, there are two elements, as you've said and others have
noted, that need to be maintained. And they're related, but
they're different and have different functions. One is the
train, advise, and assist, which goes to ensuring that the
Afghan Security Forces remain capable of securing the country
and the Afghan people. And the second is the counterterrorism
mission, which also has an intelligence component, as well as a
military component. Both of those need to be effective until
such time as the Afghans are capable of doing more and more on
their own. And they are.
So, there will be--there will be periods when it is safe to
further withdraw U.S. support and resources and soldiers.
American forces are basically--they're not doing combat
operations now in Afghanistan. They haven't, for a while.
Mostly, they are doing counterterrorism and force protection,
and the train, advise, and assist, and occasionally helping the
Afghans, themselves. But, it's a question of----
Senator Graham. But, we're doing unilateral
counterterrorism operations today.
Ambassador Cunningham. Yes. But, the Afghans are also
increasingly developing----
Senator Graham. So, that's----
Ambassador Cunningham.--their own capability to do that.
And many of their operations are supported by us, but conducted
by them.
Senator Graham. Absolutely.
Ambassador Cunningham. So, that's the balance that needs to
be maintained in a way that is--provides the effect that needs
to be provided.
Senator Graham. I'm sorry, I'm over my time. Does--do the
rest of you generally agree with that statement? Anything you
would like to add? Okay.
Thank you all.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join
in thanking you for this series of very thoughtful hearings,
which have been, I think, a great advantage to us in drawing a
perspective for the rest of the congressional session and the
tasks that we have ahead.
And thank you, to our panel, each of you, for your
extraordinary, distinguished, and lengthy service to our
Nation, and, in particular, to Ambassadors Cunningham and
Crocker for your hospitality and graciousness to me on my
trips, which I was privileged to do three times, two of them
with our Chairman, and for your insight and information, then
and now.
I think that one of the points that is most important for
us and the American people to understand is how inextricably
bound, as you've said--I think, all of you, but, most recently,
Ambassador Crocker--Afghanistan and Pakistan are in their
futures, their pasts, and their fates come. And I know that one
of my areas of interest, on my trips and since then, has been
the flow of bombmaking materials from Pakistan into
Afghanistan, and the manufacturing of those fertilizers and
other bombmaking materials in Pakistan, which has been to their
sorrow and destruction as well as our troops and the people of
Afghanistan. So, I wonder, Ambassador Cunningham and Ambassador
Crocker, whether you can give us some idea of what's happening
on the ground. Has that problem been successfully addressed in
Pakistan, or even measurably addressed?
Ambassador Cunningham. To my knowledge, Senator, there
hasn't been any major progress in dealing with that particular
phenomenon up to this point, but there may be an opportunity
for doing so, now that the Pakistanis are embarked on a--their
own campaign to address the extremists that are operating in
northern Pakistan, and also to get them engaged in a--in more
practical cooperation. But, as I said, for a--at least as far
as I know, there hasn't been any major progress in that area,
so far.
Senator Blumenthal. Because, in a certain way, for me at
least, apart from its very practical destructive effects on
both sides of that border, it's also been a barometer of
whether the Pakistanis really are serious about combating
extremists and terrorists, in their own country, that do such
ravaging harm to their own people.
Admiral Olson, I wonder if there are, broadly, lessons that
we've learned from our very successful special operations in
Afghanistan that we could apply now to the fight against ISIS
and the state that, as you or others have said, now occupy such
large swaths of land in Iraq and Syria.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator.
Certainly, there are some. I think the lessons we've
learned about locating and tracking our adversaries, about
precision strikes on them when we do have that sort of
opportunity, the lessons we've learned about developing
counterpart counterterrorist forces and working with our allies
who have capable forces, all may apply at some level in the
fight against the Islamic state.
Senator Blumenthal. Is there the possibility of doing in
Iraq, do you think, what apparently is ongoing fairly
successfully in Afghanistan in having special operators trained
and then operating with the advice of American special
operators?
Admiral Olson. You mean Iraqi special operators operating
with the advice of Americans?
Senator Blumenthal. Correct.
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. We've been there before, and it--
several years ago, I would have told you that the Iraqi Special
Operations Forces were really quite capable and were performing
complex operations at a very high level.
Senator Blumenthal. And that's not so now.
Admiral Olson. I'm not there now, so I don't have firsthand
knowledge. I--if it doesn't exist, I do believe that, at some
level, it could be regenerated.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you.
My time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity.
Gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. I apologize, I had
to attend another hearing. I suspect that all the questions
have been asked and answered.
I heard your opening statements, to the effect that it
would be a grave mistake to withdraw from Afghanistan on an
arbitrary timeframe not based upon conditions on the ground,
that we would lose the benefits, the progress that's been made
in that country, and, at a modest additional investment, we
could achieve significant long-term success. And I would just
like to ask each of you to confirm. Is that an accurate
statement of your position?
Ambassador Cunningham. Yes, Senator, it's an accurate
description of what, I think in my statement, I called--I
called our continuing presence an insurance policy, at
relatively--it's--it will still cost, but at relatively low
cost, compared to the effort that we've made. And I think it's
one that we need to continue to make.
Senator King. I like the ``insurance policy'' image. Mine
is, ``Let's not fumble the ball on the 5 yardline.''
Ambassador Crocker?
Ambassador Crocker. That's--Senator, that was an excellent
summary. It reflects exactly what I believe. I, too, have used
the term ``insurance policy.'' You know, I think a--``let's not
fumble'' and ``let's not throw an interception'' are just as
good.
Senator King. Thank you.
Admiral?
Admiral Olson. Senator, I believe that continuous
evaluation of the status and conditions on the ground is
essential to making the right decisions. And I also believe
that, once those decisions are made, we ought to hold them a
little more closely to our vest.
Senator King. I would agree with that. And it seems to me
that the length of time it took to get through the Afghan
elections and the long period between the elections and the
installation of the President and Chief Executive give us a
readymade, perfectly defensible reason and rationale to extend
the clock, if you will. And I think that's just part of the
reality that we face there. Plus, we have--for the first time
in, I don't know, living memory, have a real partner that we
can work with who has a chance to make Afghanistan work. And to
pull the support out that they need at this moment would be
ironic and tragic, in my opinion.
Mr. Leiter. Senator, I think you captured my position well.
And I would just say, historically, although not perfect
analogies, we've seen this before. We have done it well after
World War II. We did it well after Korea. We made investments
to remain in those places where we were victorious to support a
long-term transition to other capabilities and security.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Ambassador Crocker, I'd like to ask one
additional question. Just this morning, I received a copy of
the administration's proposal on the AUMF, and the title of it
is ``Authorization for Use of Military Forces Against the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.'' Now, we are presently
setting up training for--in Saudi Arabia and other places, to
train and equip the Free Syrian Army to fight against Bashar
Assad. Have you got a view that this resolution makes no
mention whatsoever of Bashar Assad, who has slaughtered well
over 200,000 people? You know the statistics. Does--do you have
a view on that aspect of this request? And could it possibly
mean that we are not going to use any force to stymie Bashar
Assad's behavior?
Ambassador Crocker. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that
implicit in an effort to train and equip a moderate Syrian
opposition is that that opposition will go into a fight against
the forces of Bashar al-Assad, as well as, if they can handle
it, also to blunt the expansion of gains by the Nusra Front and
the Islamic state. Whether they're going to be able to do that
or not is another matter. But, certainly the effort is worth
making, as long as, as I said earlier, we can have reasonable
assurance that, when we get to the equip part of training
Syrian opposition, that that equipment will not wind up in the
hands of either the regime or forces that are our avowed enemy.
Chairman McCain. But, does it strike you that there is no
mention of Bashar Assad or an authorization to do anything in
opposition of Bashar Assad? In other words, isn't it
conspicuous, by its absent in the title of this authorization?
Ambassador Crocker. As I said in my earlier comment, if
you're going to have a policy, and you're going to articulate a
policy publicly, you'd better be sure you have the means to
carry it out. I think we articulated a policy, back in 2011,
that was based on a misreading of reality in Syria. Where we
will go--where the administration----
Chairman McCain. In other words, we articulated we were
going to get rid of Bashar Assad.
Ambassador Crocker. Without having the means to do it, and
without----
Chairman McCain. Yes.
Ambassador Crocker.--understanding that he was not Mubarak,
he was not Qaddafi, he was not bin Ali of Tunisia. He was an
Assad of Syria with a entirely different lineage and a ruthless
commitment to the endurance of his regime.
Chairman McCain. And with assistance from the Iranians, of
5,000 Hezbollah, arms supplies, equipment from Russia and from
Tehran, which then swung the momentum on his side.
Ambassador Cunningham, do you have a view on this?
Ambassador Cunningham. I have a personal view that's not
informed by any particular knowledge. But, I agree with
Ambassador Crocker, that we need a clear understanding of what
the realistic possibilities are and what the means are to carry
it out. And it doesn't seem very likely, to me, that a moderate
and effective Syrian fighting force is going to be able to be
constituted quickly or easily. But, if it is, it's also going
to require outside support, which doesn't necessarily have to
be just American; it probably--may not desirably be American.
But, they will--one of the things that we need to do in that
region, I think, is also broaden the effectiveness of the
coalition and the others who are participating in this. And, to
do that, you need clear goals and objectives.
Chairman McCain. Ambassador Olson or Mr. Leiter, do you
have a comment?
Mr. Leiter. Senator, not specific to Bashar al-Assad, but I
know, with several of the colleagues here at the table, I sat
through too many meetings in the White House Situation Room
discussing whether or not a terrorist group fit under a very
precise definition within an authorization of force. Frankly, I
thought some of that time could have been put to better use.
I understand the risk of having an overly broad
authorization, but I think any authorization limited to a
single group or a single name runs a real risk of not keeping
up with time as a terrorist threat morphs.
Admiral Olson. Sir, I would agree with Mr. Leiter, as well
as the Ambassadors. I think that, in general, the AUMF
authorizations ought to be more generally written. We did spend
much too much time parsing who fit within specific
authorizations, which delayed the decision to take some sort of
action--in some cases, costing us an opportunity.
Chairman McCain. Do you agree with that on the overall
authorization, Ambassador?
Ambassador Crocker. I certainly do. The broader they can be
written to allow their application to emerging threats without
having to drag through the whole process again, I think is very
important.
I would like to make one other point, Mr. Chairman, on
behalf of my former profession, the Foreign Service. I do
believe, and I have said so on a number of occasions, that
there was a period after 2011 in which, if we had chosen to
send in, not boots on the ground, but wingtips and pumps on the
ground, in the person of language-proficient, area-familiar
Foreign Service officers, we could have done, at that time,
under conditions of reasonable security, working with the Turks
and others, to make on-the-ground liaison with the non-Islamic
opposition, to evaluate them, to influence them, to assess
them, and to make cogent recommendations back to Washington. I
think of all the gaps that we may have in our Syria strategy,
not deploying Foreign Service officers into an admittedly risky
environment, but a manageable environment at that time, may be
our most egregious.
Chairman McCain. Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Are there going to be any more questions or
is this----
Chairman McCain. No.
Senator Reed. I just--I want to follow up with one
question, the Chairman's very thoughtful discussion about the
issue of the Authorized Use of Millitary Forces (AUMF), Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and Syria. Ambassador
Crocker and Ambassador Cunningham, do you feel that ISIL is an
imminent threat to the United States, in terms of what they
could do or what they might be planning to do?
Ambassador Cunningham. One of the principals that I've
brought to this kind of work, and especially dealing with
groups like that, is that, when they say they're going to do
something, you ought to think that they're serious about it. In
the case of ISIL, they've demonstrated that they'll do what
they say they're going to do.
Whether the threat is imminent, or not, I don't know. I
don't have access to intelligence. But, there's no doubt in my
mind that, over the long term, if they succeed in establishing
themselves, that they will both seek to expand to other parts
of the world, which they've said they will do, and they will
seek to take on us and our European allies directly--or, not
just the Europeans--others who are engaged against them.
I know it's difficult. I've been asked by my friends, ``Why
don't we just go away and leave them alone, let them fight it
out? Why make this our fight?'' I firmly believe we don't have
that option. We can decide not to do anything about it. That's
a policy choice. And you--we should have that debate. The
American people should understand what the choices are and what
the options are, and also what the likely outcomes are going to
be. But, we don't have the option of saying, ``The problem
doesn't exist.'' We can say, ``We're not going to deal with
it,'' and then we can absorb the consequences of that later on,
sometime--who knows how long. But, there will be consequences.
Senator Reed. Would you say the same thing about imminent
threat with respect to the Assad government, given their
history, given the experience that you've both had dealing with
them?
Ambassador Cunningham. I have had not very much experience
dealing with the Assad government, but my guess would be that
there--a line has been crossed in the region that is not going
to be easy to repair soon or if ever. And that will also have
consequences for our interests in the region. Negative
consequences.
Senator Reed. Ambassador Crocker, your comments on both,
sort of, the potential threats.
Ambassador Crocker. On the Islamic state, ISIS, ISIL, I
believe there is an imminent threat. I just saw the news report
this morning. I believe it was an NCTC estimate of 20,000
foreign fighters in ISIS ranks. A number of those--I think the
report I saw said 150--are American passport holders. Several
thousand others hold Western European passports. They don't
need visas. If they're not on a watch list, they just get on a
plane and they're here. That is an advantage al-Qaeda didn't
have. So, I know our security agencies are hard at work at
this, as they should be, but I think that danger is very, very
imminent.
I have had long experience--too long--with the Assad
regime, either as the recipient of their favors in Lebanon over
a 6-year period or in Damascus as Ambassador. Father and son,
it is an evil regime. And that evil could not be more manifest
than it is in the recent fighting with the barrel bombs,
deliberate attacks on civilians, over and over and over again.
Do they constitute a direct threat to American security? At
one point, they did. There was a Syrian hand behind the marine
barracks bombing of 1983 and, 6 months earlier, the American
embassy bombing. I was in it. The Syrian regime was tied to an
effort to blow up an El Al plane out of the United Kingdom in
the mid-1980s. We withdrew our Ambassador over that.
Are they still in that business? Certainly not now. Have
they been in that business? Not directly or, I think, even
indirectly, for some time. Might they go back to it? As
Ambassador Cunningham said, the region, for better or worse, is
never going to be the same again after what is happening in
Syria. And, while the Assad regime may endure in some form or
another, I don't think they're going to have the luxury to plan
outside operations anytime in the foreseeable future. That
doesn't mean you don't watch them.
Senator Reed. Right. Okay.
Ambassador Crocker. But, I would put them pretty far down
on the threat list.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Would you also agree that it's accurate to
depict Bashar Assad as the father of ISIS?
Ambassador Crocker. You drag me back into history, Mr.
Chairman.
[Laughter.]
I would say that the father of Bashar al-Assad, Hafez, is
the father of ISIS, or was the father of ISIS. What he did to
the Sunni population of Hama in 1982 is something no American
really remembers and no Syrian will ever forget.
Chairman McCain. And also, isn't there a principle about
the requirement to protect, when people are being slaughtered--
in this case, well over 200,000--150,000 in his prison,
millions of refugees that are destabilizing Lebanon, as well as
other countries in the region? I don't think there's--if you
ask the King of Jordan, I think he would say, absolutely, that
they have posed a threat to the stability of his country
because of Bashar Assad's actions. And also for--whether he's
right or wrong, or not, the President of Turkey views Bashar
Assad as a greater threat than ISIL.
So, my point is, to make no mention in this authorization
whatsoever of Bashar Assad, and, at the same time, training
young Americans to go in and--young Syrians to go in and fight
him is a contradiction and, in a way, immoral, if we're going
to subject them to being barrel bombed by Bashar Assad. And
that--the point that I was trying to make, here. And if were
Bashar Assad today, and I looked at this resolution, which says
only ISIL, I think I'd be pretty pleased this morning.
I thank the witnesses----
Senator Cotton. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. I'd like to ask a specific point about this
draft use-of-force resolution, that goes to the broader point
we've been discussing about deadline-driven operations.
The resolution also has a 3-year expiration date on it. Are
any of you aware of past use-of-force resolutions or
declarations of war, going back to the start of our country's
history, that had an explicit expiration date?
Ambassador Crocker. Senator, I am not--flipping through my
depleted memory banks in 30 seconds, cannot be considered the
definitive statement on that subject. But, I would just offer
the opinion--and I have not seen the draft authorization. It
goes back to our earlier conversation about calendar- versus
condition-based timelines. I--you know, in the world that I
have spent so much of my life in, it's all about conditions,
it's not about calendars. You all know the hackneyed mantra
attributed to the Taliban, ``You Americans may have the
watches, we have the time.'' Calendars work for our adversaries
more than they work for us. And again, I haven't seen the
language of the authorization, so I can't comment on it. In the
world that is the Middle East, having arbitrary timelines
generally does not serve U.S. interests.
Senator Cotton. And can you--you've all said that you take
the view that, in Afghanistan, we're sending the wrong message
by having a deadline-driven policy rather than a conditions-
driven policy. Would you agree with Ambassador Crocker's
statements that, more broadly, if we have deadline-driven
policies, if we pass resolutions authorizing the use of force
with explicit authorization dates, we're sending the same
signal to different adversaries all around the world?
Ambassador Cunningham. I think the issue is what--the issue
will be, What is the rationale behind having the deadline?
Again, I don't know if there's been any precedent for that, or
not. There may be. I don't remember what the Patriot Act said,
for instance. I remember it was repeatedly debated and updated
over the years.
If the purpose of this is to signal that that's only as
long as we're willing to make the effort, then I think that's
the wrong signal, because I think we're--as I said earlier,
before you came, Senator, this whole complex of issues, I
believe to be a generational challenge that we will be dealing
with for a long time. And we need to get smarter at dealing
with them.
But, if the purpose is to signal the importance of
maintaining political control in updating the provisions of the
use of force--and there will be a debate about that in the
Congress, I know--then that is--I think that's entirely
appropriate.
Chairman McCain. We can't close the hearing without an
Independent question.
Senator King. You mentioned that you hadn't seen the
authorization. I think it's important, in light of Senator
Cotton's questions that--it says, ``This authorization shall
terminate 3 years after the date of the enactment of this joint
resolution, unless reauthorized.'' In my view, this document is
trying to strike a balance between presidential authority and
congressional authority in the area of, particularly,
warmaking. And so, it's not--if it didn't say ``unless we--
reauthorized,'' I think your point would lie. But, I think the
fact that it leaves it within the discretion of Congress to
determine, in 3 years, whether it's in the National interest to
continue this legal authority of the President--I mean, I find
it somewhat ironic that we're all--you know, I'm the one
talking about asserting congressional and constitutional
authority, because I think there is a question, here. If it's
entirely open-ended, in terms of time, in terms of enemy, in
terms of geography, then we've written the war power out of the
Constitution, as far as I'm concerned, and the Congress has no
role.
The question that we're going to be wrestling with, Mr.
Chair--and I think it's going to be a vigorous debate--will be,
Where's the balance between the Commander in Chief and the
power to declare war? The framers clearly believed that there
was--the President did not have the unfettered power to commit
the Nation to war. They talked about it at the convention and
in the Federalist Papers. So, I think that's the--that's the
debate that we have to engage in.
And I haven't yet taken a position on this document. I
probably won't, for some time. But, I understand--I think it's
important that the Presidents come to us and ask for an
authorization. And it's now up to us to determine what the
nature of that authorization should be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Is a question in there somewhere?
[Laughter.]
Senator King. I'm sure the Chairman can find one, Senator.
Thank you.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCain. Could I say, this has been extremely
helpful.
I thank these great and outstanding Americans, who have
devoted their mature lives in service of the country. And I'm
honored and humbled to be in your presence.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:59 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. The committee meets today to
receive testimony on Afghanistan.
I want to thank General Campbell, the Commander of the
Resolute Support Mission in United States Forces-Afghanistan,
for appearing before us today about security conditions on the
ground, the development of the Afghan National Security Forces
(ANSF), and the way forward.
General, we've been blessed by a series of great military
leaders of our forces and allied forces in Afghanistan, and you
are a worthy successor to those outstanding leaders, in my
view.
According to a recent media report, the troop drawdown in
Afghanistan is now, ``under White House review.'' But, as the
White House deliberates, the current plan is set to reduce the
number of United States troops in Afghanistan to about 5,500,
beginning in the middle of this year's fighting season. The
plan was first announced by President Obama in May 2014, before
it was known that the Afghan presidential transition would
require almost 6 months to conclude, before the appearance of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on the Afghan
battlefield, and before Pakistan military operations sent
200,000 refugees from North Waziristan into Afghanistan. These
unforeseen circumstances illustrate the major liabilities of a
calendar-based approach, and highlight the need for a
conditions-based approach.
Like our national military strategy written in 2012,
President Obama's calendar-based troop drawdown planned for
Afghanistan no longer accurately reflects the facts and
conditions on the ground. Like the President's policy against
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the President's
Afghanistan policy wreaks of strategic disconnect, providing a
list of goals or preferences, but precluding the means
necessary to achieve them. Perhaps it is time for the President
to exercise strategic patience, not in the sense that he has
used the phrase, but as our witnesses yesterday unanimously
agreed. Former United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, James
Cunningham, having just served in Kabul, and left in December,
said, ``I think that, under the circumstances, the timeline is
probably too short and the rate of withdrawal is too steep.''
Former Ambassador to both Iraq and Afghanistan, Ryan
Crocker, said, ``I hope we will take the right decisions on
force levels, going forward, based on conditions, not on
calendars.''
Former Commander of Special Operations Command and the
first Navy SEAL to achieve the rank of four stars, Admiral Eric
Olson, said, ``Actual war is too dynamic to accommodate fixed
models, so I would urge strategic and operational flexibility
as we move forward in Afghanistan. At a force size of 5,500,
our presence in Afghanistan will essentially be reduced to
Kabul. Presently, in only one location, one that retreats from
the north, east and south of Afghanistan, we'll relinquish
Mazar-e Sharif to the drug runners, yield Herat to Iranian
influence, and abandon Kandahar to the Taliban. The lack of
presence creates a vacuum, and we've seen what fills that
vacuum in Syria and Iraq. The ungoverned spaces will allow
terrorists to foment the same disaster in Afghanistan as we
have seen in Iraq: growing instability, terrorist safe havens,
and direct threats to the United States.''
I think our former national counterterrorism director,
Michael Leiter, put it into perspective how we should look at
Afghanistan. I quote, ``Should the American people think this
is hopeless? The last 13 years have shown us that the
counterterrorism (CT) fight and protecting the homeland in this
region is not hopeless. We've been very successful at stopping
attacks from the region. I would flip it around: From a
homeland security perspective, I think it is close to hopeless
to think that we can have that same success without some
ongoing presence in the region.''
Reducing to a ``normal embassy presence'' at the end of
2016, and announcing it to the enemy, gives terrorists
breathing room to plot against the West. As Ambassador Crocker
put it, ``By fixing a date to draw down to a certain number,
and then to draw down to, basically, an office and an embassy,
simply tells our adversaries how long they have to hold out
before they have the field to themselves.'' By the way, I know
of no man more respected than Ambassador Ryan Crocker. ``If
we've learned anything from Iraq, it should be that wars do not
end just because politicians say so. We cannot let the Taliban,
al-Qaeda, and ISIS conquer Afghanistan. Failure in this manner
would destabilize the region, especially by undermining the
security of a nuclear-armed Pakistan.''
I want to thank General Campbell for testifying today. I
thank him for his leadership. I look forward to hearing his
assessment of conditions on the ground, development of Afghan
forces, and the plan for the way forward.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
join you in welcoming General Campbell.
Thank you, General, for your service to the Nation,
beginning in the 504th and continuing today.
General Campbell, since you took command of the United
States Forces in Afghanistan last August, Afghanistan has
entered what Ambassador Cunningham yesterday called ``a pivotal
period.'' The emergence of a National Unity Government under
President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) Abdullah Abdullah has had an immediate impact on security
in Afghanistan with the signing of the Bilateral Security
Agreement (BSA) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) Status of Forces Agreement.
In a recent public opinion survey, two-thirds of the
Afghans polled want United States and coalition troops to stay
to train the Afghan Security Forces. Your challenge is to
successfully lead the United States and coalition effort to
train, advise, and assist (TAA) Afghan Security Forces and
conduct counterterrorism operations even as United States and
coalition forces have drawn down to post-combat levels in
Afghanistan. We would be interested in your assessment whether
you currently have the forces you feel you need to carry out
these two missions.
We are also seeking your best military judgment this
morning on what further reductions, if any, you would recommend
for United States forces in Afghanistan, and under what
condition. At yesterday's hearing, referring again to
Ambassador Crocker, he warns that the consequences of
disengagement can be as great or greater than the consequences
of engagement, our intervention in the first place. I share the
concern of many on this committee that any future reductions in
United States force levels in Afghanistan should be based on
the security conditions at the time of the proposed reductions,
taking into account the capabilities of the Afghan Security
Forces and the status of the counterterrorism fight.
We would also be interested in your views on the full range
of challenges you face, including the progress of the Afghan
Security Forces in building key enablers, such as logistics,
special operations forces, intelligence, and airlift, the
Afghanistan/Pakistan security relationship, including border
coordination and counterterrorism efforts, and the reports of a
growing ISIS presence in Afghanistan.
Again, thank you, sir, for your service to the Nation.
Chairman McCain. General Campbell.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDER, RESOLUTE
SUPPORT MISSION, COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
General Campbell. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
the opportunity to appear before you today.
I'm honored to lead and represent the service men and women
of the United States Forces-Afghanistan.
I'd like to begin by thanking the committee for your
steadfast support of our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, our
marines, and our civilians. Due to your leadership and your
commitment, they're the best-trained and best-equipped force
our Nation has ever deployed. Their outstanding performance
bears testimony to your backing and the backing of the American
people.
I'd like to pay tribute to our military families, who are
the unsung heroes of the last 13-plus years of conflict. In
many ways, our frequent absences from home are harder on them
than on us. Without their love, strength, and support, we
couldn't succeed.
I'd also like to recognize the over-2,200 service men and
women who have been killed in action in Afghanistan, and the
over 20,000-plus who have been wounded. Each day, we strive to
bring meaning to their sacrifices. We honor their memories and
their loved ones by continuing to build a secure and stable
Afghanistan, and by protecting our own Homeland.
Over 13 years have passed since the September 11 attacks,
and we haven't forgotten why we first came to Afghanistan, and
why we remain. Since 2001, the extraordinary efforts and
courage of our forces have ensured that another terrorist
attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the
United States Homeland has not occurred.
It's been 7 months since I appeared before this committee,
and much has changed since then. Afghanistan, the region, the
enemy, and our coalition have undergone tremendous transitions.
Most of these have been extraordinarily positive for us. I'd
like to emphasize a few of these today in order to place our
current campaign in context and to reaffirm that the conditions
exist for us to achieve our strategic objectives.
In September, Afghanistan completed the first peaceful
democratic transition in history. Although prolonged, this
transition was still a monumental achievement. It represented
the Afghans' commitment to a democratic, open society. The
difference between a new National Unity Government and its
predecessor is night and day. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah
have embraced the international community, our coalition, and
the Afghan Security Forces. Our partnership is strong. We now
have a ratified Bilateral Security Agreement and a NATO Status
of Forces Agreement, which grant us the necessary authorities
to continue our mission.
Dynamics within the region continue to evolve, as well.
President Ghani has made regional engagement a top priority in
order to address the shared security and economic interests for
his country. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Pakistan-
Afghan relationship. The Pakistan Taliban's murderous attack in
Peshawar on 16 December may prove to be their September 11 and
a gamechanger for our future. Senior Pakistani officials
recognize that they can no longer make the distinction between
good and bad terrorists. In the wake of this tragedy, the blame
game between both countries has stopped.
I've witnessed, firsthand, substantive changes in the
interactions between the Afghan and Pakistan military
leadership in just the last couple of months. They're now
talking. Positive exchanges between corps commanders recently
occurred in Kandahar and Jalalabad. Last week, six Afghan army
cadets are now attending the Pakistan military academy. This
wasn't happening before.
We're doing everything we can to promote their closer
cooperation, particularly to address extremist sanctuaries on
both sides of the border. While we must temper our
expectations, I remain optimistic that both countries are
working towards a more productive relationship.
The enemy remains in a state of flux, too. The Taliban
failed to achieve any of their stated objectives in 2014.
Constantly pressured by the ANSF, suffering from dissension
within their own ranks, and lacking popular support, they
turned to high-profile terrorist attacks, particularly against
soft targets inside of Kabul. In their desperate attempt to
remain relevant, they're failing to win over the Afghan
population. They're killing innocent civilians and their fellow
Afghans, and it's now time for them to lay down their arms and
heed President Ghani's call to rebuild an Afghan nation.
The possible rise of Daesh, or ISIL, is also a new
development. Thus far, we believe that the nascent Daesh
presence in Afghanistan represents more of a rebranding of a
few marginalized Taliban, but we're still taking this potential
threat, with its dangerous rhetoric and ideology, very
seriously. We're working closely with the ANSF to evaluate and
understand the dynamic nature of this fledgling network.
The potential emergence of Daesh represents an additional
opportunity to bring the Afghans and the Pakistanis together to
confront this common threat, and we will continue to engage
with leaders from both countries on ways we can collaborate to
meet this challenge. We're all driven to prevent Daesh from
establishing a meaningful foothold in Central Asia.
United States Forces-Afghanistan and our coalition have
undergone tremendous changes, as well, since I assumed command.
On January 1, 2015, United States Forces-Afghanistan formally
ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, and we
commenced with our new mission, Operation Freedom Sentinel.
We've also ended all detainee operations. Simultaneously,
troops from over 40 nations, which comprise the new NATO
mission, Resolute Support, began executing their TAA mission in
order to build the capabilities and long-term sustainability of
the ANSF.
On January 1, 2015, the ANSF also assumed full security
responsibilities. They're ready, and it's time. In their second
fighting season in the lead, the ANSF were challenged and
tested, but they held their own against a determined enemy. On
the battlefield, the ANSF fought tenaciously and demonstrated
their increasing capabilities. Today, the Government of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan remains firmly in control of 34
potential capitals and all of its major cities. The ANSF
successfully protected 8 million Afghans who courageously
defied insurgent intimidation and voted in two rounds of
elections. The ANSF's professionalism and their nonpartisanship
enabled them to remain cohesive in the face of an extended
political impasse after the elections. All portions of the
Afghan Security Forces continue to respect and obey Afghan
authority.
The ANSF Special Forces, in particular, have proven to be
the most proficient in the entire region. They're consistently
executing unilateral direct-action missions against insurgent
leaders and facilitators. They're leveraging their own
intelligence, using their own special mission-wing helicopters
to carry out long-range insertions in low illumination. These
are a pretty remarkable capability for any military.
For both the ANSF and the coalition, Afghanistan continues
to be a dangerous place. Casualty rates for all the ANSF
increased in 2014, roughly 5 to 7 percent higher. However, this
must be viewed in light of the fact that their operational
tempo was four times greater in 2014 than it was in 2013, and
that over 100,000 coalition forces were no longer on the
battlefield.
Even considering these higher casualties, the ANSF
attrition rates, which account for all losses to the force,
have not impacted combat readiness too severely. The army and
the police recruiting has not been a problem. Afghan youths
continue to join the ranks of the ANSF. Service in the security
forces is widely respected and viewed as an honorable,
patriotic profession. The Afghan National Army remains the most
trusted institution in the country and the Afghan shield and
sword of an exceptionally proud people in a fledgling nation.
On balance, after watching the ANSF respond to a variety of
challenges over the past 6 months, I don't believe the
insurgents represent an existential threat to the Government of
Afghanistan. However, the ANSF still need a great deal of help
in developing the systems and processes necessary to run a
modern professional army and police force. They also need
sustained support in addressing their capability gaps in
aviation, intelligence, and special operations.
To address these gaps, our TAA mission and mentorship will
be vital. Our advisors at the security ministries, army corps,
and police zones are now our main effort. Although clear
challenges exist, I do believe that the ANSF capabilities or
capacity and the morale will be sufficient, backstopped by our
advisory efforts and limited enabler support. This will provide
Afghanistan the long-term security at the end of the Resolute
Support Mission.
President Ghani recently remarked, ``Compelled by tragedy
and cemented by mutual sacrifice, the partnership between
Afghanistan, NATO, and the United States has entered a new
phase.'' I believe that we're at a critical inflection point in
our campaign. Many challenges remain before us as the new
Afghan government forms. It's still finding its footing, and it
must do so while contending with a security threat, corruption,
and economic challenges. Yet, the myriad of changes and
transitions over the last 7 months offer us a tremendous
opening.
The Ghani administration offers us an extraordinary
opportunity to develop a meaningful strategic partnership that
will stabilize Afghanistan and, in turn, offer greater security
for the region and the United States Homeland. There's a new
spirit of cooperation in Kabul, something we didn't have
before. I firmly believe that our concurrent CT and TAA efforts
will reinforce and deepen our strategic partnership, and shape
conditions for a favorable outcome to this conflict. We could
offer no greater tribute to the American people, our fallen,
and their loved ones than by finishing this mission well.
If I could, I think the members have charts at your tables,
there. I'd like to just show you a couple of statistics. I'm
asked, what does progress mean? Have we had success? Has it
been worth it? I'd just offer you these two slides that lay out
2001 and 2014. Every measurable statistic, from roadways, cell
phone usage, schools, teachers, females in schools, literacy
rate, on and on and on, continues to go up. The one that's
quite striking is the life expectancy, on the bottom-right,
there. 2001, it was 43 years. Today, it stands at 64 years. If
you multiply that by about 35 million--we haven't had a census
in a while--that's 741 million life years of hope that the
coalition and the American people have provided to the Afghan
people.
The bottom two charts show Kabul, then and now--2001, 2014.
Scott (aide to General Campbell), if you can raise those up.
Then, on the right is present-day Kabul at night, the fifth
fastest-growing city in the world.
That's progress. That's success, and that could only happen
with the coalition and the security that is provided.
[The charts referred to follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
General Campbell. Finally, let me conclude by stating that
United States Forces-Afghanistan is currently involved with a
winter review of the Afghanistan campaign. This review is
looking at all of our lines of effort in Afghanistan, not just
the military. As I stated, President Ghani is a credible and
effective partner. He has asked for NATO and the United States
to provide some flexibility in our planning to account for the
fact that his government remains in transition. I have provided
options on adjusting our force posture through my chain of
command. The issue is how long we stay engaged at the regional
level in the transition year of 2015.
Once again, I express my profound gratitude to all the
committee members for your unfailing support of our mission and
our troops in Afghanistan. I'm humbled, and I'm privileged to
lead the men and women of their caliber and their courage.
Every day, they make us all proud.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement by GEN John F. Campbell, USA
afghanistan: what we've achieved
i. where we are--state of the campaign
In the wake of the tragic September 11 terrorist attacks against
the United States Homeland, United States military forces promptly
deployed to Afghanistan with the objective to eliminate the
international terrorist threat emanating from there. We were soon
joined by our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and
other international partners. Over 13 years later, we have not
forgotten the motivations for our mission in Afghanistan and why we
remain. Our primary focus continues to be on preventing Afghanistan
from becoming a safe haven again for al-Qaeda and other international
extremist groups. Since 2001, the extraordinary efforts of both our
conventional and Special Operations Forces have ensured that another
terrorist attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the
United States Homeland has not occurred. Today, United States Special
Operations Forces, alongside their Afghan counterparts, continue to
impose considerable pressure on the remaining fragments of the
terrorist networks that attacked us. Significantly, the Afghan National
Security Forces (ANSF) have also assumed full responsibility for
securing the Afghan people. Our Afghan partners have proven that they
can and will take the tactical fight from here. They are ready, and it
is time.
On 1 January 2015, United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
formally ended its combat mission, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF),
and commenced its new mission, Operation Freedom's Sentinel (FS).
Simultaneously, troops from over 40 nations, which comprise the new
NATO mission, Resolute Support (RS), began executing their Train,
Advise, and Assist (TAA) mission in order to build the capabilities and
long-term sustainability of the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) and
ANSF. U.S. Forces are now carrying out two well-defined missions: a
counterterrorism (CT) mission against the remnants of al-Qaeda and the
RS TAA mission in support of Afghan security forces.
Our CT and TAA efforts are concurrent and complementary. While we
continue to attack the remnants of al-Qaeda, we are also building the
ANSF so that they can secure the Afghan people and contribute to
stability throughout the region. Both of these efforts will contribute
to a more secure and productive Afghanistan and prevent the re-
emergence of terrorist safe havens.
In spite of considerable progress, it is clear that our campaign
will remain a challenging one. Last year's political impasse, delay in
signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) and NATO Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA), and setbacks in forming a new cabinet, have
created a period of comparative stagnation in ANSF institutional
development. In this environment of uncertainty, some incumbent Afghan
leaders have been hesitant to make necessary decisions. Many Alliance
members and operational partners understandably delayed fulfilling
their RS force commitments until a new administration was installed and
the BSA and SOFA were signed. Their deferrals resulted in advisors and
other forces either arriving just in time, or late, for the start of
RS.
The new Afghan National Unity Government will have to overcome
considerable political pressures and obstacles as President Ghani and
CEO Abdullah determine how they will distribute power and
responsibilities. Thus far, both leaders have demonstrated an admirable
willingness to cooperate and address these challenges. Both have
elevated the Afghan people's interests above their own.
The ANSF will surely be tested in Fighting Season 2015 as well. It
will also take time for us to evaluate the efficacy of our TAA efforts
and our regional approach at the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands
(TAACs). We will inevitably have to make adjustments. Additionally, we
will need to balance our short and long-term efforts and weigh
potential operational gains against U.S. strategic objectives in
Afghanistan. We will do all of this as we manage considerable risks to
our mission and force and contend with a myriad of lethal threats. Due
to all of these factors, we must be prepared and adapt as needed.
Likewise, we will need to evaluate and prioritize our efforts in light
of restricted resources and the limited time available to accomplish
our mission.
The next 2 years of the RS campaign will play a crucial role in
cementing our gains. While we strive to improve ANSF capabilities and
sustainability, we will continue to re-posture our forces and adjust
our footprint. As in the past, our drawdown will occur under enemy
pressure. We will need to manage our efforts to maximize the effects of
our TAACs and our continued consolidation toward a Kabul-centric
posture in 2016.
Historical Context & Framework for New USFOR-A/NATO Mission
Our transition to RS represents the natural evolution of our
maturing partnership with the increasingly capable ANSF. Back in 2011,
more than 140,000 coalition troops were distributed over 800 sites. Our
forces were then heavily engaged in combat and tactical-level advising.
We have now reduced our forces and footprint to about 13,000 coalition
troops at 21 bases throughout Afghanistan. With only a few exceptions,
we are no longer engaged in brigade-level and below advising. Instead,
we are now mentoring our Afghan counterparts at the corps headquarters
and security ministries. This significant shift in our mission-focus
has been complemented and driven by the rapid expansion and development
of the ANSF into a skilled and courageous force of approximately
350,000. During the past two fighting seasons, the Afghan National Army
(ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) have repeatedly shown that they
can win battles on their own. When they work together, they have also
proven that they can overmatch the insurgents wherever and whenever
they challenge them.
RS is not a continuation of the ISAF mission on a smaller scale.
While RS shares some similarities, it represents a significant paradigm
shift. In contrast to a few years ago, our Afghan partners are at the
forefront of combat operations and they are now bearing the brunt of
enemy attacks. Accordingly, U.S. and coalition casualties have
significantly dropped with combat fatalities in 2014 less than half of
what they were in 2013.
The designation of RS as a non-combat mission does not eliminate
the fact that we will still operate in a combat environment--our
personnel will be exposed to risks in 2015 and beyond. Afghanistan
remains a dangerous place. Even though U.S. and NATO personnel will
support combat operations indirectly, we can anticipate that we will be
targeted, and we will suffer casualties. Therefore, force protection
remains my priority concern, and we have the necessary authority to
take adequate measures to protect our forces.
The tragic death of Major General Harold Greene last August stands
as testament to the risks that our advisors continue to be exposed to
every day. Although insider attacks against U.S. and coalition forces
declined again in 2014, they remain a focus area of force protection.
Fortunately, these attacks have not significantly affected the strong
relationship between coalition and ANSF personnel. We continue to
implement mitigations to avoid patterns and prevent complacency. These
measures have reduced, but not eliminated, the threat. We will remain
vigilant to prevent future insider attacks.
Functionally-Based Security Force Assistance (FBSFA) will be the
cornerstone of RS and represents our unified effort to generate,
employ, and sustain the ANSF and ASI. FBSFA encompasses all RS
activities required to develop ANSF operational effectiveness and
includes partnering, advising, and supporting the ANSF at the corps-
level and above. The FBSFA framework concentrates on eight Essential
Functions (EFs):
EF 1: Plan, Program, Budget, and Execute (PPBE): generate
requirements, develop a resource informed budget, and execute a
spend plan
EF 2: Internal controls to assure Transparency,
Accountability, and Oversight (TAO)
EF 3: Civilian governance of the ASI, including adherence to
the Rule of Law (RoL)
EF 4: Force generate: recruit, train, retain, manage, and
develop professional ANSF (FORGEN)
EF 5: Sustain the force through effective facilities
management, maintenance, medical, and logistics systems
(FORSUST)
EF 6: Plan, resource, and execute effective security
campaigns and operations (C2):
Inter-ministerial and joint coordination
Command, control and employ Ground, Air, and Special
Operations Forces (SOF)
EF 7: Sufficient Intelligence capabilities and processes
(INT)
EF 8: Maintain internal and external strategic communications
capabilities (STRATCOM)
The execution of RS is based on a limited regional TAA approach and
located at the ``four spokes'' in coalition TAACs in the north, south,
east, and west, with one central ``hub'' in Kabul City. I view our
TAACs as the critical component of our FBSFA efforts in 2015. They
serve as our principal connection and touch point between the
ministries and fielded forces. Hence, they play a central role in our
ability to assess the efficacy of our ministerial efforts and how well
they support ongoing ANSF security operations.
ii. where we are--state of the ansf
2014 Fighting Season
In their second fighting season in the lead, the ANSF proved
proficient at securing the Afghan people, fighting their own battles,
and holding the gains achieved by ISAF over the last 13+ years. On the
battlefield, the ANSF fought tenaciously and demonstrated their
increasing capabilities. They independently planned, led, and executed
numerous combined-arms operations. Both ANA and ANP units demonstrated
increased tactical flexibility and endurance as well.
Of note, ANSF operational tempo (OPTEMPO) was four times higher in
2014 than in 2013. Not surprisingly, and regrettably, ANSF casualty
rates also increased last year. The combination of an increased
OPTEMPO; assumption of greater security responsibilities; the drawdown
of coalition forces; and the aggressive pursuit of the enemy, all
contributed to a moderate increase in casualty rates. This uptick was
borne primarily by the Afghan Local Police (ALP) who generally operates
in isolated areas and are not as well equipped or trained as other
ANSF. The insurgents also target the ALP more frequently because the
ALP are not centrally garrisoned and instead live in their villages,
among the Afghan people. Therefore, they present the most immediate
threat and challenge to insurgent efforts to control and intimidate the
populace.
A high ANSF attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all
other losses to the force, has had an impact on combat readiness. If
present rates continue, it will pose challenges to force development
over time. The main causes of ANSF attrition are assessed as poor
leadership; high operational tempo; inadequate soldier/police care; and
poor force management. We continue to help the Afghans reduce combat
casualties and address systemic causes of attrition in order to ensure
the long-term viability of their forces.
The ANSF successfully maintained control of all key terrain and
populated areas in 2014. The insurgents were only able to temporarily
overrun four district centers in isolated portions of the country.
Within 96 hours, the ANSF retook all of them. In sum, the insurgents
could not hold ground anywhere when challenged by the ANSF in force.
Today, the Afghan Government remains firmly in control of its 34
provincial capitals and all of its major cities.
Perhaps most importantly, the ANSF stayed above the fray throughout
the election dispute last summer. They maintained political neutrality
and exhibited no evidence of fracturing along ethnic or tribal lines.
They provided seamless security for two national elections and a
lengthy Independent Election Commission audit process. In spite of
expansive Taliban threats and determined efforts to disrupt the
democratic process, the ANSF provided superior protection for nearly 8
million Afghan citizens who courageously chose to defy insurgent
intimidation tactics and voted. ANSF professionalism and non-
partisanship stand in stark contrast to their Iraqi counterparts.
Regular polling reveals the vast majority of Afghans hold a favorable
view of their soldiers and police. The Afghan National Army (ANA)
remains the most trusted institution in the country with an approval
rating that regularly exceeds 85 percent.
The ANSF special operations forces, in particular, have
demonstrated improved proficiency. Their commando units are now
conducting night raids independently using their own intelligence to
drive their operations. The Special Mission Wing (SMW) is also
executing long-range, full-mission profiles in low illumination.
Working together, the commando units and SMW are consistently executing
unilateral direct action missions against insurgent leaders and
facilitators. These are remarkable achievements, which reflect the
maturation of their formidable capabilities.
While the conventional ANSF still have capability gaps and
shortfalls, they do possess significant assets to fight the
insurgents--e.g. heavy mortars, D-30s howitzers, armed Mi-17s, armored
vehicles, etc.--and dedicated training with these platforms. The
insurgents have none of these. However, the ANSF would greatly benefit
from improved leadership and increased confidence; ANSF soldiers and
police perform well when they are well led. ``There are no bad
soldiers, only bad leaders.'' That is why our insistence on sound
leadership and strict accountability remains our most important guiding
principle. Fortunately, the Afghan senior leadership concurs. Change in
Afghanistan comes from the top-down. President Ghani and CEO Abdullah
are the driving force behind meaningful transformation and merit-based
appointments in the ASI and ANSF. However, both must navigate a
political labyrinth as they move forward with their reform agenda.
On balance, after watching the ANSF respond to a variety of
challenges over the past 6 months, I do not believe the Taliban-led
insurgency represents an existential threat to the Government of
Afghanistan. The ANSF require less coalition assistance to conduct
security operations, but they still need support to develop the
systems, processes, and institutions necessary to run a professional,
self-sufficient, and self-sustaining army and police force.
ANSF Capability Gaps
ANSF performance in 2014 and early 2015 highlighted capability gaps
and shortfalls that will likely persist for years. Their most critical
gaps are found in aviation, intelligence, special operations, and the
ASI's emerging ability to conduct tasks such as planning, programming,
budgeting, and human resource management. At the security ministries,
our advisors are focusing on building ASI systems and processes. They
are also working to improve integration between the different security
pillars--army, police, and intelligence services. At the corps-level,
our advisors are concentrating on developing ANSF planning capacity,
command and control, and operational capabilities. Additionally, they
are addressing developmental shortfalls in the areas of logistics,
medical, and counter-improvised explosive devices (IED). At all levels,
our advisors continue to emphasize and enforce Afghan financial
transparency and accountability of donor resources.
Although clear challenges exist, I believe the ANSF's capabilities,
capacities, and morale will be sufficient--with our advisory efforts
and limited enabler support--to provide for Afghanistan's long-term
security. Our collective efforts are hardening the Afghan state and
giving it needed time to develop and mature. By improving security
conditions, we are also reducing the operating space for insurgents and
incentivizing their participation in the reconciliation process.
It is important that we continue to exercise strategic patience
with the ASI and ANSF. The U.S. Armed Forces have contended with
challenges such as force sustainment for 250 years. In contrast, the
ANSF have only existed for 13 years.
iii. where we are--state of the threat
With security responsibilities fully transitioned to the ANSF, al-
Qaeda, its Affiliates, and Adherents (AQAA), Taliban, Haqqani Network
(HQN), and other insurgent and extremist groups will undoubtedly
attempt to reestablish their authority and prominence in Afghanistan.
Collectively, the enemy will continue to present a formidable challenge
to the Afghan Government, USFOR-A, and the coalition in 2015.
Nevertheless, it is important not to view the enemy as a monolithic
entity. They represent disparate factions with different motivations
and capabilities. At times they may collaborate, and at other times
they may work against each other. One of our persistent challenges is
to identify these fissures and exploit them.
In 2015, AQAA will likely attempt to rebuild its support networks
and planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its
strike capabilities against Western interests. AQAA activities are now
more focused on survival than on planning and facilitating future
attacks. It will be critical that, in coordination with our Afghan
partners, our comprehensive CT efforts continue to apply pressure
against the AQAA network in order to prevent its regeneration.
The Taliban are also in a period of transition. They begin 2015
weakened, but not yet defeated. Politically, they have become
increasingly marginalized. However, the Taliban remain a resilient,
lethal force in spite of the fact that they accomplished none of their
major strategic or operational objectives in 2014 and suffered
considerable casualties. We see dissension within the movement. Senior
Taliban leaders disagree on how to prioritize their political and
military efforts. Many Taliban tactical units also continue to suffer
from acute resource shortfalls. Numerous junior Taliban fighters are
becoming increasingly resentful towards their leadership as they
continue to fight and die at high rates while their senior leaders
remain in safe havens in Pakistan.
The absence of coalition combat units on the battlefield has also
weakened one of the principal justifications for the Taliban armed
struggle: to rid Afghanistan of ``malevolent foreign influences.'' Now
they are fighting against and killing almost exclusively their fellow
Afghans. They will certainly feel emboldened by the coalition's
transition from direct combat operations to our TAA role and an
accompanying reduction of our combat enablers. As a result, the Taliban
will likely test the ANSF aggressively in 2015 as they did in 2014.
Taliban threats from indirect fire, insider attacks, and complex
attacks are projected to increase in the next fighting season.
It is unlikely that the Taliban will be able to overmatch the ANSF
on the battlefield in 2015. Nonetheless, the Taliban will still
endeavor to frame localized, tactical successes (albeit temporary) into
strategic victories through the media. The Taliban will most likely be
willing to absorb considerable casualties and physical losses in order
to gain psychological victories. They will maintain an adaptive
propaganda apparatus, which they will leverage to influence the Afghan
people, the international community, and their supporters. As we saw in
2014, the Taliban will strive to shape perceptions in the information
space, despite their mixed military performance and continued political
failures.
The Taliban have recently shifted their tactics to High Profile
Attacks against soft targets--especially in Kabul--in order to
undermine popular perceptions of improved security and increased public
confidence in the Afghan Government. These strikes garner considerable
media attention, while requiring minimal resources and entailing little
risk. What is not captured in the media, however, is that these tactics
reflect the bankruptcy of the enemy's message and strategy. They
continue to target innocent civilians and alienate the population with
their indiscriminate attacks. These are not the tactics of an insurgent
movement capable of overthrowing the Afghan Government.
The HQN remains the most virulent strain of the insurgency. It
presents one of the greatest risks to coalition forces, and it
continues to be a critical enabler of al-Qaeda. HQN shares the Afghan
Taliban goal of expelling coalition forces, overthrowing the Afghan
Government, and re-establishing an extremist state. They lead the
insurgency in several eastern Afghan provinces and have demonstrated
the capability and intent to launch and support high profile and
complex attacks against the coalition. In response to several dangerous
threat streams against coalition and Afghan personnel--particularly in
Kabul, ANSF and U.S. Special Operations Forces have stepped up security
operations against HQN. These operations have successfully disrupted
several dangerous threats streams that sought to inflict significant
casualties on the force.
We are also keeping our eye on the potential emergence of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Afghanistan. This has
become one of my Priority Intelligence Requirements. Thus far, we have
seen some evidence of limited recruiting efforts, and a few Taliban
have rebranded themselves as ISIL. This is most likely an attempt to
attract media attention, solicit greater resources, and increase
recruitment. The Taliban networks are well established, and significant
ideological and cultural differences exist between the movements. The
Taliban have already declared that they will not allow ISIL in
Afghanistan, but the potential emergence of ISIL has sharply focused
the ANSF, National Directorate of Security (NDS), and political
leadership. All are collaborating closely in order to prevent this
threat from expanding. Additionally, the budding presence of ISIL in
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas also offers another opportunity
for both countries to work together. For now, we assess that there is
only a low probability that ISIL can establish a large, credible
presence in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we remain cognizant of this
latent danger and we will continue to monitor it.
While insurgent and terrorist networks have proven to be resilient
and adaptive, coalition and ANSF operations have kept these groups at
bay. Continued pressure on core al-Qaeda and its supporters will be
required to prevent them from regenerating. Ultimately, the long-term
solution to extremists remains a capable and sustainable ANSF that can
secure the Nation.
iv. challenges and opportunities
Strategic Partnership with GIRoA
All aspects of Afghan society remain in a state of flux as we start
2015. Political and security transitions continue to occur
simultaneously. Last year's political uncertainty caused considerable
anxiety and threatened to undermine the progress made by the ANSF in
the security domain. Economic growth was similarly stymied by lack of
investor confidence in the Afghan Government and its prospects for the
future.
The National Unity Government presents both significant promise and
peril. On the positive side, President Ghani and CEO Abdullah have
proven to be amenable to working with the International Community,
NATO, and the United States. Both are also committed to addressing the
challenges of corruption and nepotism. Both are supportive of women's
rights and their empowerment in Afghan society, and most importantly,
both are committed to achieving an enduring peace for Afghanistan and
the region.
We now have a golden opportunity to deepen our partnership with
Afghanistan. However, the forward momentum of our campaign continues to
be stymied by delays in forming a new cabinet. We anticipate that
President Ghani and CEO Abdullah will contend with a few challenges as
they delineate their respective responsibilities. We will need to
weather any resulting uncertainty in the ensuing months as the two
resolve how they will address their respective supporters while still
promoting meritocratic governance. However, the very characteristics
that threaten gridlock in the current Afghan Government also promise
that, when policies are set, the vast majority of legitimate Afghan
political interests will be committed to support them.
Despite myriad challenges, the fundamental partnership between the
coalition and the Afghan Government, to include ASIs and ANSF, remains
strong. The difference between the Ghani administration and its
predecessor is night and day. I have personally developed close
professional relationships with nearly all senior Afghan leaders. At
all levels, coalition and Afghan leaders continue to work together in
pursuit of shared strategic objectives. Moreover, Afghan Government,
civil, and military leaders demonstrate a growing appreciation for the
coalition's efforts. Afghan leaders are genuine in their gratitude for
our shared sacrifice. I have also seen our Afghan partners develop a
sense of ownership and pride in their army and police force. Afghans
realize and appreciate that they now have credible, professional
security forces that can protect them.
Afghanistan-Pakistan Military to Military Relationship
The role of Pakistan remains critical to stability in Afghanistan.
Suspicions and competing interests have historically characterized
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations, and these are most likely to persist in
2015. However, recent high-level engagements between Afghan and
Pakistani leaders since President Ghani's election represent one
promising sign for regional security. The common threat of violent
extremism may serve as a catalyst for improved cooperation between the
two countries, and we have already seen progress in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan military-to-military relationship. Pakistan, just like
Afghanistan, has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists and
violent extremists. The recent Pakistani Taliban attack on a school in
Peshawar could mark an important shift for bilateral relations. Senior
Pakistani military officers have said that they can no longer
discriminate between ``good and bad'' terrorists. It is important that
their words are followed by action.
Taking advantage of this window of opportunity, RS plays a key
facilitator role in pursuit of a constructive and effective
relationship between the Afghan and Pakistan militaries. We continue to
actively encourage and enable the Afghan and Pakistani officers to meet
and coordinate their security efforts. Recent consultations between
Afghan and Pakistani corps commanders showed great promise. However, it
will take considerable time and effort to convince the Afghan and
Pakistani people to support this new spirit of accommodation. Afghan/
Pakistani political and military relations are likely to improve
incrementally and on a transactional basis. Ultimately, we will still
need to manage our expectations.
Other Regional Actors
Other regional actors such as Iran, India, China, Russia, and the
Central Asian States have a shared interest in supporting the continued
security and increased stability of Afghanistan. President Ghani has
shown true leadership and vision by engaging with regional leadership
and on the wider global stage. While many of these countries will
continue to compete both openly and covertly with one another for
increased influence within Afghanistan, all will benefit from a more
secure and stable country. President Ghani appreciates that Afghanistan
needs regional support in order to realize his vision of transforming
Afghanistan into a vital transportation and commercial hub in Central
Asia.
Stewardship of U.S. Resources
Stewardship of U.S. taxpayer dollars remains a top priority for
USFOR-A. It is our obligation to protect the trust and confidence of
the American people. Yet, war is an inherently inefficient and
challenging endeavor, and despite the dedicated efforts of many, cases
have unfortunately occurred over the years in which American resources
were not spent as efficiently as possible. We are working hard to
ensure both prudent spending and the identification of areas for cost
savings. USFOR-A has also welcomed and incorporated into our processes
the recommendations of independent agencies and various inspectors
general, which have proven most helpful when released in time to effect
change. USFOR-A will continue to scrutinize every dollar spent to
ensure it is necessary to mission success.
I would also like to commend to the committee the sterling work of
our Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A). This
subordinate command continues to implement a comprehensive financial
strategy to build Afghan fiscal discipline through budget compliance.
CSTC-A has, and continues to play, an outsized role in our campaign. In
spite of their small numbers, these highly talented individuals have
provided rigorous oversight of billions in expenditures. Their
enforcement of greater financial transparency continues to build
international donor confidence and encourage sustained foreign
investment in Afghanistan.
CSTC-A has also implemented several initiatives, many based on
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
recommendations, to establish greater accountability in ANSF and ASI
processes. CSTC-A has placed conditional controls on U.S. funding
provided to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. These
conditions are intended to ensure the proper implementation and
integration of financial accounting, payroll, human resources, and real
property systems; and provide mechanisms to prevent funds from being
misappropriated or otherwise misused. CSTC-A directly supports an
average of over 30 ongoing external and internal audits of the
coalition, ASI, and ANSF at any given time throughout the year, and has
already started to see positive results. It will continue working on
implementing systems and processes for effective ASI/ANSF internal
control programs that will not only identify corruption, but dissuade
it.
I would specifically like to thank members of this committee for
their support of the Vendor Vetting Task Force, also known as Task
Force 2010. This effort has proven to be very effective in preventing
U.S. money from going to insurgents. I am convinced that this task
force has saved American lives by identifying high risk vendors who
support the enemy.
I also appreciate the Senate's support for United States efforts to
improve the Afghan justice system. President Ghani and the Afghan
Government have recently made great strides in improving their
processes to detain, investigate, prosecute, and incarcerate insurgents
and extremists. The Afghans are also in the process of developing legal
statutes that will ensure thorough investigations and trials for
suspected terrorists, in order to uphold the rule of law and promote
greater legitimacy for the Afghan judicial branch. Through our
mentorship, the Afghans are now taking the initiative to centralize the
detention and incarceration of all national security threats at the
Parwan Detention Facility, which is now run entirely by the Afghans.
Our continued support for the Afghan justice system and responsible
application of Afghan laws will greatly enhance efforts to defeat the
insurgency and reinforce the legitimacy and credibility of the Afghan
Government.
v. desired conditions for the end of 2015
Considering the dynamism of the operational environment and the
players within it, we will not pursue, nor hope to achieve, a static
``endstate'' for 2015. Our campaign will evolve and adapt. What we will
pursue, however, is a general improvement in security conditions and
ANSF capabilities. In order for the insurgents to reconsider their
goals, the ANSF will need to demonstrate resilience and progress in
2015. If the ANSF are able to achieve this goal in their first year
with full security responsibilities and with decreasing U.S. and
coalition enabler support, then the momentum should be considerable
going into 2016 when the ANSF will be even more experienced and
capable.
The following conditions are desired at the end of 2015:
ASI/ANSF increasingly capable of protecting the
population and securing a legitimate Afghan Government with
limited U.S. and coalition support
ASI/ANSF confidence is increased
ASI/ANSF are increasingly sustainable excepting
aviation and the intelligence enterprise
ASI/ANSF increasingly capable of neutralizing
terrorist networks and denying terrorist safe havens with
limited U.S. and coalition support
ASI progress promotes continued U.S. and international
funding commitments
USFOR-A/RS forces retain sufficient regional access,
Freedom of Movement, and Freedom of Action ASI/PAKMIL
relationship is constructive
If these conditions are achieved, then we will consider our
campaign to be on track.
vi. metrics of progress
By almost all metrics, societal progress in Afghanistan has been
significant in the last 13+ years. United States and coalition forces,
along with an increasingly capable ANSF, have provided the necessary
security to enable these improvements. Much of this progress has been
paid with American blood and treasure. The following two charts
highlight the tremendous improvements made since the fall of the
Taliban regime in 2001:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
It is important to emphasize that these extraordinary advances in
Afghan society have stabilized the country, promoted popular support
for the central government, and inspired confidence in the future.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Dramatic, but fragile developmental advancements in Afghan society
have also directly contributed to an improved security environment. The
fragility of these gains reinforces the need for both our continued
security efforts and civilian assistance programs. While sustained
United States security and development assistance to Afghanistan is
intrinsically beneficial to the Afghans, it also contributes
substantively to United States national security by ensuring that
Afghanistan never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists.
vii. conclusion
The hard work and significant sacrifices of countless United States
and coalition military personnel and civilians over the last 13+ years
have created the conditions where Afghans can now take responsibility
for their own security and governance. The Ghani administration offers
us an extraordinary opportunity to develop a meaningful strategic
partnership that will stabilize Afghanistan, and in turn, offer greater
security for the U.S. Homeland. Political progress in Kabul
demonstrates the return on United States and international investments
in the future of Afghanistan and the Afghan people. President Ghani
recently remarked at the NATO Foreign Ministerial, ``Compelled by
tragedy and cemented by mutual sacrifice, the partnership between
Afghanistan, NATO, and the United States has entered a new phase.''
I firmly believe that our combined CT and TAA efforts in support of
the ANSF and ASIs will reinforce and deepen our strategic partnership
with the Afghan Government and shape conditions for a stable, secure,
and prosperous Afghanistan. We could offer no greater tribute to the
American people, our fallen, and their loved ones than by finishing
this mission well.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much, General.
In an address to the Nation on May 27, 2014, President
Obama said about Afghanistan, ``We will bring America's longest
war to a responsible end and then announce calendar dates for
our withdrawal. At the beginning of 2015, we'll have
approximately 9,800. By the end of 2015, we'll have reduced
that presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated
our troops in Kabul and on Bagram. We will have consolidated
our troops in Kabul and on Bagram. One year later, by the end
of 2016, our military will drawn down to a normal embassy
presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component''--and
I'm not making this part of his statement up--``just as we've
done in Iraq.''
General, we are worried about it being ``just as we've done
in Iraq.''
I guess the fundamental question I have for you, in light
of the fact that there is a 6-month transition of the
Government of Afghanistan, ISIS is now locating there, and
other things have happened since the President made this
statement. Do you believe that our troop presence schedule in
Afghanistan should be adjusted in light of ensuing events since
the President made his statement on May 27, 2014?
General Campbell. Sir, thank you for the question.
Sir, as I mentioned in the oral statement, I have provided
options to my chain of command to take a look at, as we do this
winter update, for additional options----
Chairman McCain. You've provided those options. Do you
favor those options?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely.
Chairman McCain. I thank you.
Are you worried about a lack of United States military
presence in Kandahar, the spiritual home of the Taliban,
including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),
air power capability, and advisors there?
General Campbell. Sir, currently, with the forces that we
have in Kandahar, I'm comfortable where we are through 2015.
They provide us the opportunity to continue to do our mission
of TAA down in Kandahar. That's with the 205th Corps, with the
police, with the special operating forces, and with the Air
Force. We have the requisite ISR to be able to continue that
mission through 2015.
Chairman McCain. Those options that you've provided to the
President, does that mean that the options that you support
would not draw down to a ``normal embassy presence in Kabul''?
General Campbell. Sir, the options I presented to my chain
of command were several options to make sure that we can
continue with our mission of TAA. I'm particularly concerned
about the summer of 2015. That will be the Afghans' very first
fighting season completely on their own. They've had the lead
for 2 years. They've done quite well. But, this is the first
one at the current force levels that we're at. As you mentioned
upfront, the current plan brings it down to Kabul-centric by
the end of 2015. President Ghani has asked for some
flexibility, and, in my options, I think I provide some options
both for President Ghani and for my senior leadership here to
take a look at, that would allow us the flexibility to continue
to get after the TAA mission and the CT mission.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
A group of us met with President Ghani over the weekend,
and he was very strong and adamant that this current plan will
put the Nation in danger. I hope that our leadership will pay
attention to him when he comes for a visit here, I believe in
March.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General.
You have two distinct missions. One is train, advise, and
assist Afghan National Security Forces. The other is the
counterterrorism mission, and those two missions require
different footprints, in terms of where you've located in the
country. Is that being considered by you in your
recommendations to President Obama? I mean, that sort of
dichotomy between the two missions? Does that shape your
recommendation, in terms of what sort of locations that you
must hold? Some you might hold simply for counterterrorism,
others you might be integral to training. Is that accurate?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. Both counterterrorism
and train/advise/assist are complementary missions. They
complement each other to lead toward force protection. So, I
have to take a holistic look at both those as we provide
options to the senior leadership.
Sir, I might add that we have been showing great
flexibility in the past. In the October timeframe, we came
forward for some flexibility on authorities, enablers, and
people, and the President granted some great flexibility that
enabled us to continue with the Resolute Support Mission after
January 1, 2015.
Senator Reed. There's another aspect of the
counterterrorism, which was alluded to by our panel yesterday.
That is, regional threats, not just solely located within
Afghanistan itself. Is that something you're considering, too,
in terms of recommendations to President Obama?
General Campbell. Sir, I would tell you that both United
States Forces-Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command, my higher
headquarters, President Ghani, as he's reached out to the
region, take a look at this regional approach all the time. As
I mentioned up front, what's different in the last 6 months is
the reachout that President Ghani's had, especially to
Pakistan, and the military-to-military, economic-to-economic,
people-to-people, intelligence-to-intelligence, those areas
that he continues to look at very hard. I've seen change in the
attitude. I've seen military-to-military talking together. This
hasn't happened since about 2011 to 2012, and that's quite
good. I think if they continue to work very hard and understand
they have a common enemy to face--they have to get rid of the
sanctuary on both sides--that that'll lead to a positive
outcome. We do look at a regional approach, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me go to an area that is sometimes not
highlighted. That's the Afghan National Police, because the
responsibility to train and also to create a justice system
overlaps not only with yourself but with many other U.S.
agencies and international partners. You've talked, I think, in
general terms about the status of the Afghan National Army, and
particularly their Special Operations Forces, but what about
the police? They're ultimately long gone, and it will be the
police and the villagers that will make sure the country is
stable.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. The police are about
157,000 strong, plus another 30,000 Afghan local police, which
receive a little bit different training than the army, a little
bit differently equipped. However, they continue to do some of
the same type of missions that the army has to go through. When
they work together, the army, the police, the Afghan Local
Police (ALP), they're quite good. This is what we call ``cross-
pillar coordination.'' I tell people, with the changes in
leadership, having confidence, holding people accountable,
working together, that the Taliban cannot defeat them. The
Taliban doesn't have the D-30 Howitzers, they don't have the
uparmored Humvees, they don't have the Mi-17s, they don't have
the intelligence fusion, none of that.
But, the police continue to work that very hard. They are
working through a holistic review on a force optimization piece
on the army and the police. President Ghani and the senior
leadership have looked at some changes to the police and how
they're organized and how they work more toward the community
policing piece of it. I know that's where they want to get to.
We do advise, at the ministerial level, the Ministry of
Interior (MOI), and then at the senior police level. Sir, we'll
continue to work that very hard.
Senator Reed. Finally, there are requirements that the
Government of Afghanistan has asked us to fulfill. Are there
any outstanding requests that we have to the Government of
Afghanistan that they must fulfill that will ensure our mission
is successful?
General Campbell. Sir, you're talking in terms of troops,
equipment, or----
Senator Reed. Troops, equipment, reform of their systems,
it is a partnership and we're focusing on what they are asking
of us. I know, under the previous presidency, there was a long
list of things we asked, and were not particularly successful
in getting. You seem to imply, I think quite accurately, that
with President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah, there is a new sense of
cooperation, et cetera. But, are there some significant issues
out there that they must deal with and we must be aware of?
General Campbell. Sir, I think both President Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah continue to work very hard, one with the National
Unity Government, they're working on the corruption piece.
We've asked them to look at that very hard. They continue to
work at that. They've embraced the international community.
Everywhere I go, every event I've seen both Dr. Abdullah and
President Ghani, first thing they do is thank the international
community, thank the American people for their sacrifices for
the last 13+ years. You didn't hear that before. President
Ghani is the Commander in Chief, and he's embraced the Afghan
Security Forces, both the army and the police. You haven't seen
that before. In fact, the Afghan Security Forces were probably
handcuffed the last 3 or 4 years on what they could and
couldn't do. We'd be in a different place if President Ghani
had been in position there the last couple of years. But, I
think, sir, everything that we talk about with MOI, Ministry of
Defense (MOD), and ask President Ghani to take a hard look at,
he absolutely gets on that.
Senator Reed. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, and thank you also for the time that
you spend with us personally on these issues.
Senator Reed brought up the police versus the army. Give us
a general idea of the size of each. I mean, the army is much
larger than the police. But, tell me, is it a 10-to-1, or what
is it? I should know, and I don't.
General Campbell. Sir, 352,000 is the Afghan Security
Forces; 195,000 for the Army, 157,000 for the Afghan Police,
and then there's an additional 30,000 that are the Afghan local
police.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, I understand that one. Thank you very
much.
I took a very personal interest as far back as 2003 in the
training of the Afghans. One reason is, the Oklahoma 45th
played a very significant role, not just in 2003, in the early
years, but also 2006 and 2007. I spent quite a bit of time over
there. I watched what they were doing. I was there when they
opened up the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). I even
commented that it reminded me, when I looked at it, of Fort
Sill. It's really state-of-the-art.
Now, you talked about Kabul. It's the fastest-growing city
and all that. Has the training center remained as effective as
it initially was, or is it growing? What's the capacity there?
General Campbell. Sir, the KMTC continues to be a bright
spot, a training place that absolutely embraces, the last
several years, what we've put into that. But, each of the corps
have their own regional training centers, as well. The Special
Operating Forces have the equivalent of a Center of Excellence,
like we have at Fort Bragg. It's very good. I was out west, in
Herat, about a week and a half ago, and told the corps
commander I wanted to go look at his training. This was
unannounced. He took me out there, walked through their medical
training, walked through their marksmanship training, walked
through how they cleared buildings, and all of those things
unannounced.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Campbell. All Afghan-led. It was pretty remarkable,
and I came away refreshed that all of that training that goes
on, for the most part, is Afghan-led--had been with our help
several years ago------
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
General Campbell.--but I feel very confident that they
continue to do that.
Senator Inhofe. I have to tell you, I was really impressed,
in those early years. I was there because we were participating
in that in a very personal way. Then, the expressions on the
faces of the Afghans, I thought they really wanted to train,
they were very proud of the accomplishments, particularly at
the Training Center. I never dreamed, at that time, we'd be
back here, 10-12 years later, talking about it.
This has been asked before, but for a different reason. Let
me just reflect back on what's happening right now. We had the
administration talking about 5,500 troops, then we had
President Ghani wanting us to reexamine that; and then, just
yesterday or the day before, we agreed, or the administration
talked about doing it. What concerns me is, if we're at 10,000
troops now--and we had General Mattis tell this committee, just
a short while ago, that we should be looking at approximately a
recommendation of 20,000 troops, and you're readjusting from
10,000 troops, is that implying that we're going make an
adjustment from the 5,500 troops, but it's not going to be up
anywhere close to what General Mattis said we needed?
General Campbell. Sir, none of the options recommend an
increase like that. Most of the options I'm discussing with my
senior leadership includes allowing more flexibility on glide
slope, allowing more flexibility on locations.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Does it bother you that we're talking
publicly about what we're going to be, when we're going to
withdraw, and when we're going to be downsizing and all of
that? Because, obviously they know everything we know. Does
that concern you?
General Campbell. Sir, I think General Dunford put it best
when he testified last July and he said he hoped that there
would be more ambiguity here. Sir, it's out in the open. We are
where we are. We'll continue to work that and mitigate----
Senator Inhofe. I know we are where we are, but do we have
to continue being ``are where we are''? I mean, when do we go
and start making our own plans, exclusively us, looking after
our own defense? Hopefully, that time will come. I won't ask
for an answer.
The last thing I'd mention, when you talk about having to
do something on the size of the force, right now we have
Afghanistan, we have Iraq, we have Syria, Africa, and we have
problems there, Jordan, of course, we talked about that last
week, and, just yesterday, introduced legislation to try to get
more of our help to our very great ally, President of Ukraine
Petro Poroshenko and those in Ukraine. Now, do you look at the
overall picture and talk to the rest of them as to what our
capacity is with all these things going on? Is that factored
into any recommendation you're going to have, in terms of
changing our structure in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, when I look at the options I present
to my senior leadership, I'm cognizant of what else is going on
in the world and the requirements that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have to
deal with. But, I particularly focus on Afghanistan, the impact
it has there. I'm not looking at what United States Africa
Command has, United States European Command----
Senator Inhofe. Sure. Appreciate it very much.
General Campbell. I provide those options, then the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, OSD, will work through that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. But, I know that in making
recommendations, in terms of overall force strength and all of
that, I'm sure that will factor into it.
Thank you very much.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, for hosting this hearing. I appreciate it very much.
General, what should the role of Afghanistan's neighbors,
particularly Pakistan, be in the reconciliation process? Do you
have concerns about the role that Afghanistan neighbors are
currently playing? What do you see our greatest challenges
being?
General Campbell. Thank you, Senator.
President Ghani said this several times, that he wants to
lead reconciliation. This is an Afghan process, an Afghan-led
process. He wants to take charge of this. This is very
important to him. He knows it's going to take some time. He's
also reached out to Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Raheel
Sharif and said, ``You know, I need some help, here. We have to
work this together.'' I think that dialogue continues between
them.
I was in Pakistan last week, and had these conversations
with General Raheel. I talked to both President Ghani and
General Raheel yesterday morning. They continue to dialogue.
Neither one of them wants to let the other one down. I think
Pakistan, for years and years, has been an issue. We've always
said, ``You can't talk about Afghanistan unless Pakistan is in
that equation.'' I think, with General Raheel, he's moving in a
different direction than we've seen in the past. Again, I've
been there four or five times in the several months I've been
on the ground there. I met with him. I met with him and the
President, together. I think that there's very good dialogue as
we move forward.
I think General Raheel understands that he has a big piece
to play in this, and his leadership will make a difference as
he works with some of the internal issues he has in Pakistan.
If you're in Afghanistan, you think everything bad comes out of
Pakistan. If you're in Pakistan, you think everything bad comes
out of Afghanistan. They have to work through that piece of it
together to fight this common enemy. I think, in the last 45 to
60 days, I've seen that more than I have ever seen before in
Afghanistan. We have an opportunity now, if we work very hard,
to make this reconciliation piece a potential reality, where it
hadn't been before.
Senator Gillibrand. Are there particular challenges with
regard to the border?
General Campbell. As far as cross-border? There always is,
ma'am. Up in the Hindu Kush, up in Paktia, along Kunar,
Nangahar, I mean, there's nothing that says, ``This is the
border.'' So, people have families that live on the Afghanistan
side, have families just right across the border, continues to
be that.
There is more cooperation now between the Afghan Border
Police and the Frontier Corps on the Pakistan side. Again,
about 2 weeks ago, the 201st Corps and the 203rd Corps met in
Jalalabad and met with the 11th Corps commander, who's in
Peshawar. They talked about borders. Last week, Lieutenant
General Fazli, who is the Afghan Border Police's senior border
policeman for Afghanistan, went to Pakistan for a week and
toured different spots on the Pakistan side. So, they continue
to talk.
We're building back the coordination center that we used to
have at Tourk. That should open up very soon. Used to have
United States, Afghan, and Pakistan, will now have Pakistan and
Afghan. I was up there probably 4 weeks ago with the Chief of
Staff of the Afghan National Army, General Sher Mohammad
Karimi. But, this will put Afghans and Pakistanis together in a
coordination center at a key point on the border. We'll put
another one down south, just south of Kandahar. We'll continue
to work that. I think they're working this very hard.
Senator Gillibrand. I'm very grateful for all the work
you've done to protect women's rights and to educate girls.
What are we doing now to ensure that progress on women's rights
will be protected as we transition into a more advisory
capacity? Is the Afghanistan Government capable of sustaining
the progress that you've made?
General Campbell. Ma'am, they work this very hard. Thank
you for the question. I have a gender advisor that works that
with the senior people in the Afghan Government. We continue to
see change in the number of women that join the police, that
join the army. They have some very tough goals to try to get to
over time, but they're working very hard toward that. I think
the police and MOI are doing a little bit better than the army,
but they understand how important it is.
President Ghani has made this one of his priorities. He
spoke about this to all the senior leadership in both the MOI
and the MOD, in meetings that I've been in. He's also trying to
incorporate more civilian and women into the ministries of both
MOI and MOD. Again, MOI is a little bit better than MOD. Their
goals that they have, of about 10 percent over the next several
years, is going to be very tough, just based on the culture.
But, I think all of them that I talk about really want to get
after this, and I do believe they're very genuine about this.
Senator Gillibrand. What's the status of terrorism attacks
specifically against schools with girls?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I don't have those statistics. I
can get those----
Senator Gillibrand. But, is it rising or falling, or is it
the same, I just don't have a sense of it today.
General Campbell. Ma'am, I can tell you it's probably about
the same. Again, I think wherever there are soft targets that
the Taliban and other insurgents can go after, they're going to
try to do that. If they go to a school, if they go inside of
Kabul, it gives them more of a strategic impact, because the
media will pick up on that, just like they did this tragic
incident in Peshawar on December 16, 2014. They hit a military-
type school and killed all those children. The Afghan people
understand that they want their kids to go to school, to
continue to have this education. But, I haven't seen a spike in
those numbers at all, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
General Campbell, thank you for your testimony and your
service.
Just on that question, to follow up, if the Taliban are
victorious, this would be devastating, would it not, for the
rights of women in Afghanistan? They've made a great deal of
progress in recent years.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely.
Senator Sessions. General Campbell, Ambassador Cunningham
told us yesterday, as did all the panelists, that the rate of
withdrawal is too high or too steep in Afghanistan. I tend to
agree with that. I think that's very difficult for anybody to
dispute, if you analyze it. I believe our Congress, in a
bipartisan way, is open to having a more robust assistance to
the Afghan forces. I feel it, in talking to my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle. I think the American people are
willing to stay the course and help in not an out-front way,
but in a supportive way, more than a lot of people think, if we
articulate that. I believe it's important for President Obama
to articulate that. He's the Commander in Chief, and I think
it's important for you to be clear to him, and the Defense
Department to be clear, to help alter the present course we are
on.
Second, I'm really pleased that you have gone even further
than our panelists yesterday in saying that this is not a
hopeless case. A lot of progress has been made. We just don't
want to let it slip away.
I do not see this, in any way, that we're starting a new
war. We have been partners with Afghanistan for 13+ years.
We've stood shoulder-to-shoulder with them. We've lost, as you
said, over 2,000 servicemembers, 20,000 wounded. It needs to
end successfully.
I just hope that somehow we don't make the mistake that
Senator McCain has so wisely warned us of, in Afghanistan, to
rush out when just a little more presence and a little more
support would be there. I encourage you to speak out on that. I
assume that your report, from what I hear you say, your advice,
calls for a stronger presence there.
I appreciate the optimism that you have. You've said
there's a new spirit there. It does appear that President Ghani
is much more attuned with the challenges than President Karzai
was, and that a lot of progress is being made. But, I have to
tell you, we've heard that before. We've been hearing this for
a long time, ``There's a new spirit there.'' I think there's
truth to it. But, isn't it true that, in a combat situation
involving, say, Iraqi or Afghani soldiers, that if just a few
United States forces, with communications ability, the ability
to call in air strikes, can embolden and encourage them to a
remarkable degree, and help them to be successful in a way
that, if they are out under attack and they don't have that
kind of support and confidence, they are not as effective
fighters? I've heard lower ranking and high ranking officers
say that's true.
General Campbell. Sir, our men and women of our Armed
Forces are incredibly gifted. They're bright. They're
intelligent. When other forces are around them, they learn
through osmosis. I mean, it's pretty incredible. Anytime we're
around Iraq or Afghan forces, in my experiences, they continue
to get better. I would not argue with that.
Senator Sessions. I was talking to an experienced officer
in Iraq last week. Been there a number of times. He said the
Iraqis will fight, and they fight so much better and so much
more confidently if just a few Americans are embedded with
them. It creates a confidence that goes way beyond the numbers.
Do you agree with that general philosophy?
General Campbell. Sir, I've spent about 19 months in Iraq.
I've spent three different tours in Afghanistan. I would tell
you that the Afghan fighters have been fighting for 35+ years.
There's no doubt, with the proper leadership, they will
continue to fight. The difference between Iraq and Afghanistan,
what I've seen now, is that the Afghans have a nationalist
pride about being, ``I'm for Afghanistan. I'm not Sunni, I'm
not Shi'a, I'm an Afghan. So, I'm not a Pashtun, I'm not a
Tajik, I'm an Afghan.'' They have this pride, and they're very
proud that they stood firm during the political instability.
They didn't break underneath ethnic lines. With the right
leadership, they can carry the day, here, sir.
Senator Sessions. We're moving to no troops outside of the
capital, it appears, to a ministerial force and advisory--a
normal State Department relationship with the Afghan
Government, soon. Less than 2 years. I just think that's taking
a risk, and I hope that you will make clear your view, from a
military point of view, I think the American people will
support it. I think President Obama will listen, and I think we
can have bipartisan support here for a more realistic approach
to the drawdown in Afghanistan.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you, General Campbell. I really appreciated the time
we spent together yesterday going over a challenging problem,
and that is how we do the requisite oversight of what we're
doing in Afghanistan, and how, at the same time, as we pull
into the back and allow the Afghan forces to take the lead, how
you protect data that could make them more vulnerable once they
are in the lead and once we are in a--just a supportive role. I
completely understand the tension there.
I just wanted to put on the record that I think you have
worked very hard to reverse some of the confusion that existed
around the special--Inspector General's report as to what
should and shouldn't be classified. I know you've taken steps
to declassify a wide swath of that information. I think the
commitment you made to me, that we'll continue to work on what
you feel strongly about, in terms of unit data and some of the
other data that could, in fact, put people at risk if it were
continued to be unclassified. I just want to thank you for your
attention to that. I think you understand that the oversight is
important. I think you also are very cognizant of the risks
associated with some of that data getting into the wrong hands.
So, I appreciate your help on that.
I want to express my sympathy for the deaths, not just of
Kayla Mueller, but of the other contractors, that have
occurred. This has been a theme of mine for years, and that is,
How do we manage the contracting force in theater? How do we
oversee the contracting force in theater? How do we protect the
contracting force in theater? I am worried about that.
We put into the--last year's National Defense
Authorization, a prohibition against funding any projects that
we can't inspect because of security reasons. I want to get
your take on where we are, in terms of protection of the
contracting force. I mean, we have contractors that are going
to have to maintain some of these systems, because Afghanistan
is not ready to--they don't have the technical capability of
maintaining some of what we have equipped them with.
Contractors are going to be a reality in that space for a long
time. I think we need to discuss that protection, not just
force protection, but, obviously, contractor protection.
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much for the
question.
Absolutely concur with you that force protection, both for
our service men and women and our contractors or other
civilians in Afghanistan, is utmost on my mind. We do
absolutely everything we can to make sure we give them the
right resources. We provide them what we call ``guardian
angels'' to provide that force protection support. Without
going into our tactics, techniques, and procedures of how we
would do that, that could potentially put them more at risk, I
would just tell you that this is utmost on my mind, of all the
men and women, of all the leadership. We'll continue to watch
that very closely.
I do agree that, as we downsize, we can't just say we're
taking the military out. We have to add another contractor in
there. We have to take a holistic look at what the requirement
actually is. There are some places where we'll say, we're not
going to put a military, we're not going to put a contractor
there, as well. We'll just have to mitigate that a different
way. So, we look at it very hard.
It was a very unfortunate incident, about 2 weeks ago, with
Kayla, where we did have three of our contractors killed by an
Afghan soldier. We've learned some lessons from that. The
Afghans continue to learn lessons from that, as well. Our
green-on-blue incidents have gone way, way down. We want to
continue to keep it that way. But, a lot of that is because of
the procedures we put in place, the procedures that the Afghans
have put in place, as well, to help vet their security forces.
But, ma'am, we'll continue to look at that very hard.
Senator McCaskill. If you could speak briefly to--President
Bush was the first one who spoke out about the propaganda tool
that Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) represented, the recruiting tool
that it represented. It continues to be, we're aware, a
recruiting tool. Could you speak to the issue of GTMO as it
relates to what is maybe the biggest threat we face, and that
is the recruitment worldwide of terrorists to join the fight,
particularly the fight that ISIS is conducting in a barbaric
fashion that has nothing to do with conventional warfare?
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
I think there's a lot of things out there that--a lot of
things out there that would incite people to attack Americans
already, that they're already preconceived to attack Americans.
I can't tell you how much GTMO does or doesn't do that, or
impact on their recruiting piece of it. But, my experience
tells me that there are people that want to do harm to people
both in Afghanistan and back here in the United States, and any
number of things can make them do that. But, many of them are
preconceived to do that. We can--what I have to do is continue
to work that hard on my force protection inside of Afghanistan,
and worry about that piece of it. I don't go out and look at
different pieces and how they recruit. I look more at the
force-protection piece inside of Afghanistan.
Senator McCaskill. That makes sense. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank you, General, for your
tremendous service to the country and for your family and for
all those that serve underneath you. I think we're very
fortunate to have your leadership.
I wanted to follow up to understand, just in terms of where
we are in the current plan, and in the consequences of it. Just
so we understand, if we keep the current timeline that was
proposed by the administration, and they don't adopt some of
the options that you've proposed to them, what does that mean,
in terms of when the withdrawal would have to start, in terms
of the fighting season? So, logistically, what would that mean
for you?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I--a military guy would never use
the term ``withdrawal.'' We're going to transition as we
continue to work that piece of it.
The current state of play is, we have 9,800 U.S. I have
about 12.9-, with the total NATO force. We're centered in Kabul
and Bagram. We have tactical advise-and-assist commands in
Mazar-e Sharif in the north and Herat in the west and Kandahar
in the south, Jalalabad and Gamberi in the east, and we have
several special operating camps at our--or Special Operating
Forces used inside of Kabul and other places in the country. To
be able to get down to the numbers that we're at, we'd have to
go to Kabul-centric by the end of the year. So, I would have to
work that glide slope.
Senator Ayotte. But, would that also require you to move
out of places during the fighting season?
General Campbell. Ma'am, part of that is physics----
Senator Ayotte. Right. Meaning logistically.
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. So, that would have to be done while you're
in the middle of the fighting season.
General Campbell. Ma'am, part of that, we would de-scope
and try to mitigate that as much as we could so that we didn't
impact on the fighting season. But, just based on physics,
you'd have to come out----
Senator Ayotte. Just based on physics. That's something
that we hope the President will take into consideration as he
looks at your options. Because it's an important matter of
physics to not----
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. I mean, we wouldn't normally pick to have
to do this in the middle of a fighting season. Is that true,
General?
General Campbell. Ma'am, we'd like to have every
opportunity to make sure we provide the right training,
advising, and assisting to the Afghans. It's very important, as
I said up front, for this fighting season 2015. We're doing
everything right now in the winter campaign to get them ready
to do that. Again, we're advising at the ministerial level, MOI
and MOD. We're advising at the corps. We're not on combat
operations every day with the brigades. We do advise--train,
advise, assist at the kandak level, or the battalion level,
tactical level with the Special Operating Forces. So, it would
have an impact, but we would continue to work through that.
Yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Appreciate it, General.
General, last march, you testified before the Readiness and
Management Support Subcommittee, and you had called the A-10 a
game changer. You had said, ``what I think the soldiers on the
ground, both the special operators and the conventional force,
would tell you, it's a game changer. It's ugly, it's loud. But,
when it comes in and you hear the `bvvrrr,' it just makes a
difference. So, it would be a game changer.'' Do you still
believe that? How has the A-10 performed during the conflict in
Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I currently do not have any A-10s
in Afghanistan. But, in my experience, the A-10 has been a
superb close-air-support platform. The comments I made back in
March, to include the sound effects, I would still stand by,
yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. Excellent.
So, you would agree, certainly with what General Odierno
has said, that the A-10 is our Nation's best close air support
platform.
General Campbell. Well, ma'am, I would tell you that the
Air Force does an incredible job of providing the close air
support that I have in Afghanistan today. They're not doing
that with A-10s today, and I--so, I would tell you they
continue to provide me the best I can have. I appreciate that,
and I ask, ``I need this,'' and the Air Force picks that
platform to do that.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
Let me ask you about ``no contracting with the enemy.''
That's something--legislation that Senator Brown and I--Scott
Brown, when he was here--we had pushed before the committee.
Then, now it's been expanded, the authorities, beyond
Department of Defense, but also to the United States Agency for
International Development, State Department. How has that
worked in Afghanistan? When we--I know that Senator McCaskill
had asked about the issue about contractors, and we had money
going to our enemies. We had money going to people who were
misusing our funds to work against our interests. So, how has
that and the task force to implement that been working in
Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Ma'am, in that lane, it's been an
absolute game changer, as well. So, probably about 780-plus
different contractors since 2010, we've taken a look at and
vetted those, and only probably 100-plus have been able to--
we've been able to contract through, based on some ties there.
It's denied insurgents probably $9.8 billion in money that we
haven't put toward those kind of contracts, where the enemy
would have access to that. So, that's been a game changer
there. We continue to work that. Most of that, for me, is what
we call ``over the horizon,'' so I don't have them on the
ground. But, we can work--reach back very quickly with that.
Then, based on that success, NATO has also adopted that
methodology to work the contracting piece.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for meeting with me yesterday. I
appreciated your time.
I agree that there is a need for more flexibility to do
what's needed, that we should look at the situation on the
ground and determine from that the decisions that we make. When
we do--you had mentioned before, Kabul-centric, that we might
at some point--if we found ourself in a Kabul-centric
situation. What would that do in areas like Helmand and
Nuristan, Nangahar, Kunar, if we wound up in that situation?
General Campbell. Sir, the plan is that, in the other--when
we go Kabul-centric, that we would have sufficiently worked the
corps through our TAA at the corps level, that they have the
capacity to be able to sustain the fight there, and then we
would continue the TAA inside of Kabul, at the ministry level.
Senator Donnelly. When you look at the numbers that we'll
need--and there's--obviously, there's no exact number that you
know. As you go, month-to-month, and take a look, you determine
what you need. What are your--best ballpark, if you were being
given flexibility, where we need to be, approximately, in 2015,
2016, 2017, U.S. forces?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I've provided those options
to my senior leadership. I'd rather discuss that in a
classified session, sir, if I could do that.
Senator Donnelly. That would be fine.
As you look at a Helmand, and you look at a Nuristan, what
is your definition of success in those areas, say, at the
beginning of 2017?
General Campbell. Sir, I think definition of success for
Helmand would be that the Afghan Security Forces have
sufficiently contained the insurgency, or that the governance
and the district governors, provincial governor, they're
providing the necessary governance to the people of that
particular province. Sir, without going into great detail, I
see great work happening in Helmand today. I was there
Thursday. Again, I can discuss more in a classified hearing
with you on what we intend to do with Helmand. But, I think
that the cooperation between the police and the army that I saw
Thursday when I was in Helmand is quite good and bodes well for
the future of Helmand.
Senator Donnelly. When you look at the Taliban and their
goals and their aims, what are the things that give them hope,
and how do we eliminate those things?
General Campbell. Sir, I think I would tell you that even
President Ghani has said probably 70 percent of the Taliban
want to come back in and get in the peace process. They're
tired of this fight. I've told you that a lot of their
leadership is disenfranchised, they're away in sanctuary,
they're not in Afghanistan. I think now, with a new National
Unity Government that almost 85 percent of the people want in
that country, there's no reason that the Taliban can't come to
the table and talk and be part of the political process.
President Ghani has reached out to them to be able to do that.
There's always going to be a small portion that will be
irreconcilable, that would not want to come back into a talk
like that. But, I think President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, continue
to work this very hard. They're engaging with many of the
tribal elders and elements, different parts of the country.
They're showing them that the government can provide to the
people. That's, I think, what the Taliban want, to have a
government that will provide what they want to have, whether
that's jobs, whether that's medical. I think President Ghani,
the National Unity Government, is on the way to doing that.
Senator Donnelly. Well, I want to thank you and your whole
team, because, when I was there last year, there was real
question as to--or I shouldn't--there was no question from the
military as to whether the Afghans were going to hold. But,
there was concern. From everything we've seen, the way it was
laid out, we've hit our metrics and more. Would you agree with
where we are in the metrics that we laid out?
General Campbell. Sir, I would. Not these metrics, but the
metrics we work with our Afghan partners and----
Senator Donnelly. Right.
General Campbell.--the police and the army, from the
numbers, from the level of training--they've taken over all the
training. Sir, I see that--again, I've been there three times,
and this time there's just a stark difference in the
motivation, in the leadership, them understanding that they
don't have as many of the U.S. and the coalition forces there,
they have to do this on, they want to take this on. So, I think
they continue to get better and better.
I've talked before about their special operating
capability. It's quite good. I've talked about four Mi-17
version 5s going from Kandahar to Helmand, 125 kilometers at
night, at 3 percent illumination, going onto a very small LZ,
guys getting out the back, they have a little iPad-type device,
they're talking to a PC-12, which is Afghan flown, that has
full motion video, and they tell them there's an insurgent, 200
meters, and they go. That's pretty remarkable capability that
they have. The rest of the--that the Taliban ought to know
about, because they don't stand a chance with that capability.
So, sir, they continue to get better.
Senator Donnelly. Thanks for your hard work on the Pakistan
piece. I think it's absolutely critical. I know how hard you're
working on it. As you continue to get that in a better and
better place, I think the whole area becomes a better and
better place.
General Campbell. Thank you.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, sir.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here. I appreciate your
service. I appreciate your frank conversation that you had with
me yesterday in my office.
To follow up on Senator Donnelly's comments on the Taliban,
do you think that they will make significant movements to
reassert control over certain territories? How important would
be our CT mission there to counter that?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think the--again, the Taliban
are a resilient force. They have the issue--they have issues,
but they continue to hang on in certain areas. They do--they
have changed their approach a little bit, as I talked about in
the opening statement, inside of Kabul, some of the remote
areas outside the cities, where it's very, very hard to have
the Afghan Security Forces. They go after soft targets, whether
it's the Afghan local police checkpoint with only two or three
people on it, away from the village, not properly equipped or
trained, don't have the right leadership. They see that, they
attack that. There's reports that they will take over a
district center.
When I was there before, they would take over a district
center, and the Afghan Security Forces would not be able to
take that back. Today, as I said up front, all the district
centers are owned by the Government of Afghanistan. If the
insurgents were able to attack a district center and take that
over, the difference today is that the police and the army
would get that back in 6 hours, 7 hours, as soon as they were
able to get the forces there. So, there's no doubt they
continue to work that very hard.
Our CT capability, without going into--in a classified
hearing--ma'am, is the best in the world. We continue to have
brave men and women that provide us a capability that's the
number one in the world, and we continue to have that as one of
our missions. I can give you more information, ma'am, if we go
into a classified piece, on that.
Senator Fischer. What does that mean for al-Qaeda (AQ)? Do
you believe that they will see increased pressure?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think that you have to continue
to keep the pressure on, on AQ. I think that, over the last
several years, in the last 4 or 5 months in particular, that
the pressure we've had on AQ has been quite good. Part of that
is based on what Pakistan has done on the big operation they've
had going on since June in North Waziristan. It has forced
people into Afghanistan. I think that, again, our CT capability
is quite good.
Senator Fischer. Yesterday, we spoke a little bit about the
capability gaps of the Afghan forces. Do you feel that that's
going to have an adverse operational impact on them?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think we're going to continue to
try to work that and close that gap. The places they have gaps
are hard for any army, so logistics is hard for the United
States Army, it's hard for the Afghan army. We've built in
programs over the last several years now, as we kind of step
back and take a look at it. In some places, quite frankly,
we've provided them too much stuff or we've provided them a
program that they're not going to get to. Now we're going to
come back a little bit and say, ``Okay, how can we adjust this,
how do we modify this, what will work best for Afghanistan?''
That's what I'm starting to see now, and a lot of that happens
in the logistics realm. Again, very hard for us to do that for
any army, for the Afghan army and the way they distribute
equipment, very, very tough. But, we're working that very hard.
They understand how important that is, so we'll continue to
work that.
Intelligence, I see them continue to work in the
intelligence realm very well. They're working more together.
They're in stovepipes--MOI, MOD, their National Directorate of
Security (NDS) or their intelligence agency. Today, they have
many fusion cells that bring them together, like we've done in
the past. So, I think that'll give them a greater capability as
they move forward.
Their close air support continues to grow. Their air force
continues to grow, and so the TAA mission, staying with them
here, we'll continue to build that capability. It will allow us
to be able to continue to transition out.
What President Ghani has told me, our most important legacy
will be the systems and processes that we provide to
Afghanistan. That's our legacy from the last 13+ years.
Senator Fischer. Are there some missions that they just
won't be able to do?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think there's--I think there are
some areas that we have to continue to work with the Afghans to
make sure they have the confidence. I have no doubt in my mind
they have the capability to do all the missions that are
required in Afghanistan. But, sometimes it's the leadership,
the confidence that leadership brings to be able to do that.
They've had many people that have been around for years and
years. President Ghani just retired 48 generals yesterday. What
it's doing--and they had--you haven't had retired of generals
in 4 or 5 years in Afghanistan. When he first took over, he
retired 15 generals. What that does is open it up for some of
these young, bright, energetic officers they have, the
noncommissioned officers they have in the Afghan army that have
been trained in the United States, in the United Kingdom, in
Germany, to assume leadership positions now. They've been
waiting for that, and I think President Ghani is enabling them
to be able to do that, and with this infusion of new
leadership, and then they hold them accountable, I mean, I
think leadership makes a difference, and that's going to be a
game changer, as well.
Senator Fischer. Am I correct in saying that it's an all-
volunteer army?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. That--and with the retirement of these
generals, that should encourage more enthusiasm within the
ranks, as well, wouldn't you say?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think they'll see that there is
hope to continue to move up. They've been stymied a little bit
the last several years. Now they see that there is room to
move. That'll continue to energize some of the young lieutenant
colonels and colonels. Again, it is a--a very good point--it is
an all-volunteer army, like our Army. As I said in the opening
statement, they do not have issues with recruiting. The issues
they have is--they've only been recruiting in the winter, as
opposed to 12 months in the year. That's what we're trying to
get them to do, is recruit on a sustainable basis, the entire
year, not just during the winter timeframe. They're working
through that now.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir, very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Campbell, both for your service and for
being here today.
I am struck by the tables that are provided in your
testimony about both the changes in Afghan society as a result
of the last 13 years and how Afghans feel about what's
happening in the country right now. I think most of us, as
politicians, would love to have some of these numbers: 77
percent of Afghans express confidence in their new government;
64 percent believe it's unlikely that the Taliban will return
to power; 55 percent believe their country is heading in the
right direction.
What--do you have a sense of what would happen to the way
Afghans feel about the progress in their country if the United
States withdrew all of our troops and support?
General Campbell. Ma'am, the Afghans that I talk to
continue to express their appreciation for the sacrifices of
our men and women, express their appreciation for what the
coalition, especially the United States, has provided to them
over the last 13+ years. Again, the difference between Iraq and
Afghanistan, here, is that Afghanistan people and the
government now do not want the coalition to leave. I think, to
the average Afghan, if they see us continue to go at that pace,
that it would lower the morale, it would give them a feeling
that they were being abandoned.
But, again, I think the Afghan senior leadership continues
to tell the Afghan people, ``There are ways to mitigate, we're
going to continue to get better, we appreciate the support.
But, this is going to be an Afghan fight. We have to take this
on.'' So, there's a balance there, I think. But, they
absolutely do understand the sacrifices we've provided, and
there's a difference, night and day, again, between this
leadership we have today in the senior leadership in
Afghanistan and where we were just a couple of months ago.
Senator Shaheen. You talked about the efforts of President
Ghani and CEO Abdullah to reach out to the Taliban and to try
and begin some sort of negotiations. Can you give us any
insights into how far along that is?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I'd rather discuss that in a
classified session, if I could.
Senator Shaheen. Okay.
To what extent are the Taliban--do we see signs that
they're being influenced by what's happening with ISIL in other
parts of the Middle East and the new reports that ISIL has
begun to infiltrate Taliban?
General Campbell. Well, ma'am, the Taliban and the ISIL are
like this. They have different ideologies. They want to fight
each other. So, you do have some Taliban that are--feel
disenfranchised from the Taliban, potentially because the
Supreme Commander of the Taliban Mullah Omar hasn't shown his
face for many, many years. So, they see this ISIS, or Daesh, as
another way to gain resources, as another way to gain media
attention. So, you do have some of the Taliban breaking off and
claiming allegiance toward ISIS. Part of that is happening in
different parts of Afghanistan. A lot of what we get is through
our Afghan partners, as they see that probably before we do. We
have seen some of the recruiting, we have seen some night
letters, we have seen some talk of it at some of the
universities. It is a concern to President Ghani, therefore a
concern to me. But, we continue to work that with our Afghan
partners to make sure that we understand where this is going
inside of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Senator Shaheen. Do we have any sense how the public in
Afghanistan and Pakistan views ISIL?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think it depends on where they
are and how much they read or hear about it. If you're inside
of Kabul, and you have access to the communications and
newspapers, radios, or TV, they're starting to get that media
blast of that in some of the outward parts of Afghanistan where
they may not have that communications, they may not even know
that that's going on. But, again, it has come up quite a bit,
here, in the last 45 to 60 days. President Ghani has talked to
the Afghan people about it, he's talked to the Afghan Security
Forces about it. I've made it a Party Information Requirement
for my forces. So, we'll continue to work hard with our Afghan
partners, here, to make sure we understand this network.
Senator Shaheen. A final question. You've--most of the
discussion has been about how the National Security Forces are
doing, but can you comment on what's happening with local
police efforts and to what extent they are professionalizing
their operations?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am, I can talk more about Kabul
and the police. There are about 14,000 police inside of Kabul.
Because I see them on a day-to-day basis. They continue to work
hard on the training, and they continue to work hard on trying
to do more community policing. These high-profile attacks
inside of Kabul. What you did hear about in late December
timeframe is an uptick. It is very, very tough to have--to stop
one or two people from taking a magnetic improvised explosive
device (IED) and sticking it on a bus, to take two or three
people and stop them from having a suicide vest and attacking a
nongovernmental organization. In a city of 3.5 million, again,
very, very tough.
But, what you don't hear about are all the number of
attacks, all the number of catches, all the number of people
that have been arrested by the Afghan police inside of Kabul
that didn't result in a high profile attack (HPA). What I would
tell you is, that number, compared to the number of HPAs, is
quite high. So I think one of the things that we can probably
work better with Afghanistan is to make sure they publicize
this, as well.
But, the police do quite well, because of their ability to
work with the Afghan people and their human intelligence
(HUMINT) networks to get after these threats. So, ma'am, I
think they continue to progress, not only the Afghan police
inside of the city, but some of the specialties in the
forensics. I've visited one of their labs in Herat, sort of
their crime scene investigation, where they do fingerprints,
where they do explosives, where they take a look at rifle
rounds that have gone off, to bring that together. They've
gotten quite good at their technology on the forensics, and
we'll continue to work that with them.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, thank you so much for joining us here
today. I know I don't need to say anything to boost your self-
esteem or your ego, but I do want you to know, sir, how widely
respected you are amongst the men and women that have served
under your leadership. We greatly appreciate that and thank you
very much for your service to our Nation. All of us here on the
panel appreciate you being here. You are in a very difficult
position at a very tentative time as we move forward in this
transition.
One thing that has been of great concern to me is ensuring
that, as our U.S. armed services are moving or transitioning--I
don't want to say ``withdrawing''--but, as they are
transitioning out of the more leadership-type positions, that
we do have the Afghan capability to back it up. Logistics is
always a great concern of mine. I did ask the panel yesterday
some thoughts on logistics, and a great comment that came from
Admiral Eric T. Olson, former Commander, United States Special
Operations Command, was that--as it applies to the Afghan
Security Forces, is that great shooters do not make a great
army. There is a total army that needs to be out there.
I would just like to know that we do have plans in place,
or that the Afghans are training to be logistical supporters,
as well, whether it's the medical community, transportation,
making sure that we have the maintainers for their equipment
and their weapons. Do they have those capabilities without that
United States support?
General Campbell. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your
service, as well.
We do, we continue to work the logistical piece. Again, we
identify this as a gap that we would continue to have to do TAA
on for a while. Maintenance in the U.S. Army, we continue to
have contractor logistics support in many places. A lot of that
in the aviation realm. So, we do have that in Afghanistan. We
continue to work very hard to build the mechanics, to build the
right level of personnel to take care of the Afghan equipment.
So, that is moving along, but that will continue to take time,
and we have to continue to do TAA to build that capacity for
the Afghans.
I think they'll continue to have a small portion that will
need contractors to work some of the very, very tough pieces of
equipment in the aviation realm. But, for the most part, I do
think they continue to grow that capacity.
Again, I said I went and saw some training in the
maintenance area and went into one of their maintenance bays.
They had--probably eight Humvees are up. They had several of
the mechanics working. These were all Afghan army men working
on these vehicles, and they were doing quite well. Their issue,
quite frankly, was parts, not getting the right parts. So, as
we did a deep dive on that one back to Kabul and looked at the
warehouses, the parts are there. So, their issue really is how
they distribute the parts from the warehouses, get them down to
the corps, get them down to the brigades and the kandaks. So,
we're working that very, very hard.
I went into eight warehouses inside Kabul. It was like a
Super Home Depot. They had all the things that they needed in
there, and it--so, I told President Ghani, ``We've got to get
the corps commanders in there to take a look at this.'' Once
they got them in there, they talked to the senior logisticians,
``You've got to move this stuff.'' Honestly, the culture inside
of Afghanistan is to hoard, and so they get this in there, they
hold on to it, they don't want to get that out. But, now
they've worked that very hard, and they understand the impact
it's going to have on the fight. I think the senior leadership
has moved that quite well, here, in the recent weeks, and
they're using the winter timeframe right now to make sure that
all classes of supply continue to move out to the--where the
units need it to build that readiness up for the fighting
season.
Senator Ernst. Thank you.
As Senator McCaskill had mentioned, that--just the
contracting piece, also, and any engagement. So, we see that
the Afghans are picking up more of the maintenance. I'm pleased
to hear that. I have been just very concerned about that
particular piece of it.
But, will we see a transition, then, away from American
contractors, more towards more national-type contractors within
that region? One thing that President Ghani had made clear in
his meeting with us this last weekend was that, if there were
not United States troops there, he would like to see more U.S.
contractors. Do you have a feel for if it would be our
contractors serving in nation, or would it be more of a local
force?
General Campbell. Ma'am, to give you rough figures, if we
have 30,000--probably 34,000 contractors; out of that, 24,000
are probably a combination of United States and third-country
nationals, and the other 10,000 are probably Afghan
contractors. We continue to work that number. That number will
go down quite significantly this year. We continue to try to
make sure that we have Afghans tied into all these so they
build that, not only for jobs in Afghanistan, but also to make
sure they can sustain that over time.
Senator Ernst. Great. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your great service.
Senator King and I enjoyed being with you in Afghanistan in
October, and learned a good deal. I'm incredibly heartened by
the progress. We just have to tell this story. This is
something that Americans should be proud of. We should thank
those who have served in Afghanistan over and over, because
this progress has been hard won, at a great cost.
But, just two items. The increase in life expectancy of 21
years over the course of the last 14 years is just virtually
unheard of. I mean, you could look across human history, nation
to nation, you will not see a life expectancy increase of that
kind in such a short period of time.
The second thing I'm interested in is women in the
parliament, from 0 to 28 percent in 14 years. Our first woman
came to Congress 99 years ago, Jeannette Rankin, 1917. We've
gone from 0 to 28 percent in 100--0 to 20 percent in 100 years.
They've gone from 0 to 28 percent in 15 years. That's pretty
impressive.
I agree with, I think, a bipartisan consensus on this
panel. We have to maintain this progress. Everything we do
should be conditions-based, not calendar-based. I think it's
okay to have a plan, but then you need to adjust it based on
the reality. I know you had--you encouraged the White House to
make some adjustments, in terms of the authorities granted to
U.S. troops during calendar year 2015. After consideration,
they did grant some changes in the authorities. That's good. We
have to have a conditions-based approach.
Personally, I think this is important for Afghanistan. It's
important because of the investment we've made. It's also
important because I think there is a powerful narrative about
the success in Afghanistan that we can apply around the globe.
I view it as sort of a contrasting narrative, Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Iraq didn't want us to stay. We're not occupiers, and so we
didn't stay. They then ran a government of national disunity,
where the Shi'as kicked around the Kurds and the Sunnis. The
situation in Iraq went to hell in a handbasket, and the United
States and others are playing a leadership role in now trying
to rescue it.
Afghans want us to stay. Seventy-seven percent of the
Afghan population, according to your statistics, think the
coalition staying and helping is a good thing. These are people
who chased the Soviet Union out of that country, battled them
to the death to chase them out. They want the United States to
stay. They want the coalition to stay.
Afghanistan's success creates a powerful argument that the
United States is the partner of choice in the world. We are the
partner of choice. We're actually seeing that in some
interesting places in the world today. India, which has had a
transition of non-alignment or even tilting toward Russia, now
does more military exercises with the United States than with
any other nation. They are seeing us, whether it's joint
exercises or training or purchase of military platforms, as a
partner of choice.
I was on the phone with the Commander, U.S. Northern
Command, Admiral William E. Gortney, yesterday. Mexico has had
a military tradition of leaning a little bit toward Russia.
But, they are now viewing the U.S. military as their partner of
choice.
I think success in Afghanistan--and I agree with the Chair
and all this committee--we have to make it conditions-based, we
have to stay and harvest the value of the success, because
every day we are showing that the United States is the partner
of choice.
Couple of concerns. I was first in Afghanistan in 2006 to
visit my Guard men and women who were there from Virginia, and
then-Ambassador Newman said, ``You've let Iraq take your eye
off the ball in Afghanistan. Iraq pulls our attention away.''
When we were in Afghanistan in 2001, by 2002 we were in Iraq,
too, and that pulled some attention away. At that point in
time, in 2006, he was worried about the same thing happening.
I have been calling on Congress since June. We need to be
in this battle against ISIL, and we need to be strong in it.
I'm going to support strong military action against ISIL. But,
I am nervous--and I think we do need to use history as our
guide and not let the battle against ISIL deflect any attention
away from the situation in Afghanistan and our continued need
to harvest and accelerate the gains that we've made there.
So, that's just an editorial comment. As we get into the
discussion about ISIL, I'm going to try to make sure that we're
not taking our eye off the ball in Afghanistan and the great
work you're doing.
You indicated--I thought it was interesting that you don't
think the Taliban is now an existential threat to the Nation.
We had testimony last year, I think from your predecessor, that
corruption could be an existential to the Nation, because it
weakens people's belief in the effectiveness of government, and
it also can exacerbate sectarian divisions if people think one
group of people is getting more than the other. Talk about the
efforts of the new administration to tackle corruption.
General Campbell. Sir, thank you for your question.
I do agree that corruption is--and President Ghani agrees,
too--that that could change the entire dynamic for him. So, he
ran, and Dr. Abdullah ran, on the idea that we would have to
get after corruption--they would have to get after corruption.
One of the first things he did was reopen the Kabul bank case
and really held people accountable there. He's taken a hard
look at how they assign senior leadership in all of the
ministries, and he's taken corruption into that. I think he and
Dr. Abdullah, in everything they do, that's foremost in their
mind as they select new leadership, as they engage with new
companies, on and on, they take in the corruption to understand
how that has--how bad that has been and how that impacts the
donor nations that they need so much for the next several years
as he continues to work on his economy. He's told me, in
private, that he's works--he works 20 percent security, 20
percent on the--I'm sorry--40 percent on security, 40 percent
on the economy. I know, as part of that, the corruption piece
comes on both sides. But, he worked very hard to make sure that
he picked ministers that were not corrupt, didn't have bad
influence. Dr. Abdullah did the same thing. I think they'll
continue to work that very hard.
It is of concern to all of the army and the police senior
leadership I talked to. They absolutely want to remain
apolitical, they absolutely want to make sure that they can get
anybody that is corrupt outside of their leadership. Even at
that level, they continue to express their concerns and then
work hard to make sure they can do everything they can to get
rid of corruption when they see it.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you so much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Cotton.
Senator Cotton. General Campbell, first, thank you for your
years of distinguished service and brave service to our
country. I and the people I represent are all very grateful for
all you have done.
You have a little over 10,000 troops left in Afghanistan
right now. Is that correct?
General Campbell. That is correct. The Statement of
Requirements for the NATO mission is about 12,900.
Senator Cotton. Most Americans who didn't serve in the
military, see it and experience it through movies, television,
so forth. If you look at the recent popular movie, ``American
Sniper,'' where the Chris Kyle character is giving overwatch to
marines going door to door in Anbar Province, kicking down
doors, that's probably what they have in mind when they think
about our operations, both in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you have
many, or any, infantrymen, dismounted tankers, or artillerymen
conducting those kind of operations in Afghanistan today?
General Campbell. I have men and women that continue to be
able to provide for their own force protection. We do not do--
we do not plan offensive combat operations at all. But, I have
to make sure that the men and women that are on the combat
outposts, the forward operating bases (FOBs), that they have
the ability to provide for their own force protection. We do
that mostly by, with, and through our Afghan partners, but they
do have to have the ability to continue to patrol in what we
call a Ground Defense Area (GDA) outside of those FOBs. But,
it's for force protection.
Senator Cotton. Is it fair to say that you have more troops
providing things like aerial support, intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance support, brigade, division, corps-
level planning support, things like that?
General Campbell. As opposed to----
Senator Cotton. As opposed to going out and conducting
dismounted or mounted combat patrols.
General Campbell. Yeah, Senator, I don't know the--
percentagewise, but I would tell you that I'm comfortable that
we have the ability to provide force protection on our combat
outposts and FOBs, and, at the same time, provide the requisite
expertise to do the ISR mission, that kind of thing. That ties
hand in hand with force protection. ISR is a great force-
protection enabler.
Senator Cotton. I raise the distinction between those kind
of front-line infantrymen who are doing the kind of missions
that you typically see in Hollywood movies, because I think
it's important for the American people to know, whether it's
from people like us here or from yourself, that a lot of the
missions that our troops are doing in Afghanistan right now
truly are supporting the Afghan Security Forces. That helps
build public support for our continued mission in Afghanistan,
that this is not the kind of war that we were fighting in
Afghanistan or Iraq, a decade ago. So, that's something of
which we should all be mindful as we're trying to marshal more
public support for this continued campaign.
Related point. If you could speak roughly, when would you
say the 2015 fighting season would end in Afghanistan? When do
the conditions in most of the country become too harsh for our
adversaries to keep fighting?
General Campbell. Well, again, I think, Senator, it depends
on the season. This past year, the winter season has been very
mild, so we haven't had a lot of snow, the passes haven't
closed down between Afghanistan and Pakistan. I think there's
many people that would say today, in fact, it's kind of a
continuous season, and we'd--we wouldn't look at it as fighting
season to fighting season. But, the Afghans continue to talk in
those kind of terms. Fighting season is really tied around the
weather. From about the April timeframe to the end of September
timeframe are the traditional months that I think we've seen
increase in enemy activity and operations.
Senator Cotton. How does that impact the timing of your
decision point for whether you would recommend that we keep the
current troop levels or we are able to reduce troop levels
further? Is there a point on the calendar at which you can no
longer wait to make a decision?
General Campbell. Senator, as I talked about earlier, there
is a point in physics when I have to start de-scoping and
retrograding equipment, downsizing facilities, to be able to
get to a number at a certain point in time. We would call those
``decision points.'' We have those laid out. I feel
comfortable, where we are right now, that I have flexibility in
that plan as we move forward on this winter review, but there
will come a point in time that I'll say, ``Hey, here's a
decision point. We've got to make a decision by X.''
Senator Cotton. Okay. Well, I would encourage you, as I
encouraged the Secretary of Defense nominee, to speak out,
using your best professional military judgment. I think you'll
find that there is a lot of members of this institution, the
Senate and the House of Representatives, who would support you
and support the decision of the President to keep at least
10,000 troops in Afghanistan until 2017 because it's in our
vital national security interests. I know you know the risks
that we face from leaving Afghanistan too early. This is not
your first rodeo there or anywhere else. I would say the risks
are embodied in those pictures that you have over there, of the
electricity in Kabul late at night. Those are great gains. We
should be proud of that. We should be proud of all the efforts
that our troops have put into it.
But, what I worry about is an American city that looks like
that going dark because of a terrorist attack that is once
again launched from Afghanistan, which is the land from which
al-Qaeda attacked us on September 11, and it is the singular
achievement in the war on terror, that we have expelled al-
Qaeda from that safe haven and they have not returned. It is
critical to make sure they don't.
I appreciate all of your efforts to make sure that doesn't
happen.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join my colleagues in thanking you, General
Campbell, for your extraordinary service to our Nation over
many years, and your dedicated and diligent work in Afghanistan
over a number of tours and following the very worthwhile work
done by your predecessors there.
I want to cover some of the points that you and I discussed
a little bit yesterday, when you were kind enough to visit my
office.
First of all, on the relationship with Afghanistan, they've
been a source of the IEDs, that so ravaged our troops in such
large numbers. Yesterday, in the hearing that we had with
Ambassador Cunningham and Ambassador--former Ambassador
Crocker, they indicated that--or, I should say, more precisely,
Ambassador Cunningham indicated that IEDs continue to be a
problem in Afghanistan. In your view, do you agree with his
assessment that they are a continuing military threat to the
Afghanistan forces, as well as our own?
General Campbell. Sir, thank you for the question.
I would tell you that I think IEDs have become the weapon
of choice, not only in Afghanistan, but throughout. Any
insurgency or terrorist attack will tie to some sort of IED.
So, that's something that started years ago, has been picked
up, continues to move, and it's not only in Afghanistan, but
will continue to be a threat to both the coalition forces and
the Afghan Security Forces. We do, however, continue to work
very hard at the counter-IED capability of our Afghan forces.
Again, I don't have the--I can get you the statistics, sir, but
the number of IEDs found, verse the number that went off on our
Afghan forces, continues to get better and better. Again, the
HUMINT and the Afghan that's been trained to be able to detect
those gets better and better. I think that's really noteworthy
as we've gone through the last couple of years, here.
Senator Blumenthal. Would you agree that the primary source
of those ingredients continues to be Pakistan, and that they
have done less than they could and should to stop the flow of
those bombmaking ingredients across the border?
General Campbell. Sir, I would tell you that there's ample
material inside of Afghanistan to build IEDs. There are reports
of portions of what it takes to make an IED that have come in
from Pakistan. I know that--I've talked to General Raheel about
that, as well. They continue to work that very hard. They have
also been impacted by this threat of IEDs on their own forces,
on their own civilians. They understand they have to go after
that, as well.
But, Afghanistan members, I think, would tell you that some
of the parts, some of the materials that come up, they would
believe that have come in from Pakistan, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. That perhaps is an area of focus where
the coalition forces can even impose greater cooperation with
Pakistan.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. I think one of the
things that Pakistan has done for our Afghan forces--I don't
think it's scheduled yet, but I know that General Raheel has
reached out to General Karimi, the Chief of the Army in
Afghanistan, and offered up counter-IED training inside of
Pakistan for the Afghan forces.
Senator Blumenthal. You and I spoke yesterday about the
possibility of purchasing helicopter parts and components for
the Mi-17s that Afghanistan now has, purchases from the
Russians that were financed with American taxpayer funds from
other sources, either in Europe or elsewhere in the world. Is
that an effort that you're going to pursue; in other words, to
stop any further purchases of, not only helicopters, but also
parts and components for those helicopters for the Afghanistan
forces?
General Campbell. Sir, as we talked about, the Mi-17 is a
critical component for the Afghan Security Forces, for their
air force, for their special mission wing. To be able to
continue to keep them flying, to keep them in the fight, it'll
be a continued piece on their maintenance and on their spare-
part piece. We're going to continue to work very hard, as we
talked about yesterday, to make sure that we do that within the
authorities that I have to make sure that we acquire those
parts in the right way, sir. So, absolutely.
Senator Blumenthal. ``In the right way'' means other than
Russoboronexport, the Russian export agency that has sold us so
many--not us, but the Afghans--so many helicopters with our
money.
General Campbell. Sir, what we're trying to work, really,
is to have the Afghans work through their process to make sure
they can get those parts to build a sustainable capability
within Afghanistan, so, once we are gone, they can do that
themselves. We have to start that now, yes, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. One last question before my time
expires. I know that you have focused on the healthcare needs,
particularly the mental healthcare needs, of the very brave and
dedicated men and women under your command. I want to thank you
for that effort, thank the U.S. Armed Forces for their
increased focus and attention to that issue.
Thank you, again, for your service.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service to our country. We
appreciate the comments that you've made so far today.
I have just a couple of questions, sir. First of all, last
year was the deadliest in the war, with more than 5,000 Afghan
soldiers and police being killed. You noted the ANSF were going
out on four times as many operations last year than previously,
so more casualties could be expected. How does the increase in
the operations tempo, up by four times, affect the complexity
involved to train the ANSF in the capabilities that still need
to be developed?
General Campbell. Thank you, sir. Are you referring to the
capabilities for the medical piece so that we can reduce the
number of casualties, or----
Senator Rounds. Basically, you're losing soldiers there
right now, and yet, at the same time, you're trying to train
them up. When you're losing them at this rate, how do you bring
them in and get them set up and continue the training regimen
that's necessary?
General Campbell. Yes, sir, thank you for the question.
Sir, as I said, probably a 5- to 7-percent increase, from
13 to 14, four-times higher operational tempo. Most of those,
and the higher percentage, was actually on the Afghan local
police that are outside, in the far places of Afghanistan, that
are designed to protect their individual villages. They're not
equipped with the same type of heavy weapons, with the same
type of training that the army and the regular police have.
But, the Taliban have recognized that they are a threat to them
because they're inside the villages and they're against the
Taliban, they could attack them inside, so they've gone after
those key targets, those soft targets.
As I said, sir, the ability to recruit and train the
Afghans has not been an issue. They continue to bring in the
numbers they need, both on the army side and on the police
side. The one issue, as we brought up earlier, that they need
to work on is the number of females that they continue to bring
in. But, I think, for the most part, they don't have issues
recruiting them.
What we are trying to do, though, sir, to continue to lower
the number of ``died of wounds,'' that kind of thing, is
increase their capability in the medical arena, on their
casualty evacuation on their medical evacuation. I've seen some
great achievements, here, in the last--different operations
that they've had, where they've been able to provide that
service to their men and women that are out there fighting. All
of them do some of the same things that we do. They carry
tourniquets, they have combat lifesavers. The medics wear
insignia that recognizes them as medics, they continue to put
as many folks in the medical training that they can. They
understand this is an issue for morale and also leads toward a
readiness issue. So, everybody's working this very hard, sir.
I've talked personally to the Afghan Army Surgeon General,
on a one-on-one session, to make sure that we can do everything
we can do to help them build that capability. I've talked to
the Chief of their Army, General Karimi. He's concerned about
it, and he's increased the number of people that he sends to
school and to make sure they continue to get all the medical
training they can.
Senator Rounds. Is the coordination also there between
Kabul and the local units of government, as well, with regard
to where the casualties are at? Is there a coordination between
the central government and those local units of government,
when it comes to this training?
General Campbell. Sir, I'd have to come back to you on
that, take that for the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Yes, the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) in
Kabul and the provincial governments/corps coordinate the treatment and
transportation of military and police casualties. The Afghan National
Army (ANA) has seven Regional Medical Hospitals (RMHs). To facilitate
medical evacuation and casualty evacuation movements, all RMHs have a
helicopter pad either on site or within 5 km. RMHs in Kabul, Herat
Mazar-Sharif, Shoraback, and Kandahar have airfields within 5 km that
can accommodate the C-208 and C-130 for fixed wing movement of
casualties. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has one hospital in Kabul.
A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ANA, ANP, and the National
Director of Security exists ensuring causalities are treated in each
other's facilities regardless of affiliate in the outlying provinces.
Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) also has access to
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) facilities. Coordination between
respective headquarters (HQs) in Kabul and the provinces/corps takes
place as needed when casualties require a higher level of care not
available in the province/corps. Capabilities in the capital often
exceed the care available outside Kabul. For civilian casualties, MoPH,
ANA, and ANP facilities will all provide care. If a higher level of
care is warranted, the civilian patient will be referred, but
transportation is not typically provided outside the province. Resolute
Support advisors are working with GIRoA to establish a National
Emergency Medical Response Center to better coordinate both military
and civilian casualties. In addition, advisors are steering GIRoA to
develop the Afghanistan Medical Council (AfMC) to assist in bridging
gaps. AfMC is an independent, statutory governing body to oversee and
regulate certification of medical professionals, medical practice,
medical and graduate medical education, and development of a National
Healthcare System to provide and standardize healthcare services
throughout Afghanistan.
General Campbell. I would tell you that there's--I can
talk, as far as the military side. I can't talk to you as far
as the civilian piece.
I have looked at Afghan hospitals inside of Kabul on the
civilian side to make sure they can take some of the military
casualties. The military have their own hospitals. We just
finished a brand-new one out in the 201st Corps, out in
Nangahar, that's actually quite good. So, I couldn't tell you
that kind of coordination between them work. I know there are
memorandums of understanding between the army, the police, the
NDS, and the intelligence arm to make sure they share those
facilities to bring the military folks in. They do bring in
civilian casualties to the military hospitals, as well, and
initially work them there.
So, if you're referring to that kind of coordination, yes,
sir, they do do that.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
I yield back my time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you, I'm so sorry I had other--I was in
other meetings, there. But, I appreciate you being here.
We hear an awful lot about what's going on, what caused--in
Iraq, we fell backwards. We lost Mosul, we lost a lot of our
equipment. You would think all the money that we invested in
training and equipping would have been put to better use than
what it was.
Now we have Afghanistan, and we hear we're back down--going
to be down, at the end of the year, to 5,500. Just really
briefly, what do you think it will take us to maintain a
presence so that we don't fall backwards in Afghanistan? What
do you think is going to maintain to get Iraq back to where it
can sustain itself?
General Campbell. Sir, I think the key there, really, for
Afghanistan, is to continue to build upon the capacity of the
Afghan forces so that they have the requisite skill sets to
make sure that they don't do what the Iraqi army did, and
that's fall apart. They have leadership, they have the right
equipment, they have the right training. I just don't see that
happening in Afghanistan.
Senator Manchin. But, General, it seemed like it takes our
presence for that to happen. When our presence was gone--we
should have seen Maliki falling apart and not having anything,
as far as a contingency plan, if you will. I'm just saying
that, back home in West Virginia, they want to know, ``do we
have to go back and re-buy it all over? Like we do in Iraq? Can
we prevent that in Afghanistan?''
General Campbell. Sir, again, I believe the Afghan Security
Forces are not going to let Afghanistan go in the way that Iraq
did.
Senator Manchin. I gotcha.
General Campbell. They've told me that. I've seen the
senior leadership in the army and the police tell me that. They
believe that, strongly. They have a government now that wants
to continue to work with the international forces, wants to
continue to provide requisite resources and authorities for
their leadership not to let them go down that route. As I told
you before, they went through the election last year, people
thought they would fracture among ethnic lines. They did not.
They're very proud of that.
I just don't see that happening, sir, with continued
training and they continue----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
General Campbell.--to build that up on the Afghan forces,
both the army and the police. I don't see that happening.
Senator Manchin. General, my other concern is the economy.
I've always believed--and I've been there a few times, myself,
talking to different people. Their economy in 2001, when all
this began, was about $4 billion. That was their economy, as
far as in Afghanistan. That went from $4 billion to $20
billion, based on American input of money and the war effort
that we put there. So, their economy was based or wrapped
around us. That--it had continued to grow, and it was spiking
up to 14.4-percent growth rate in 2012. Then it fell to 1.5-
percent growth rate, as we started retracting. Opium
cultivation was up by 7 percent, I think, last year. But--and
production increased by 17 percent. It's been reported that
opium traffic business makes up one-fifth of the size of the
Afghanistan legitimate gross domestic product.
How will the country ever be able to stand up on its own?
That's the only thing--when the drug trade is so profitable--
how can we divert them from the drug trade? If they don't have
the war effort and the amount of money we're pumping into it,
and we try to get them off the drug trade, where can they
stabilize that economy, sir?
General Campbell. Sir, leadership's going to make a
difference. I think, with President Ghani there, understanding
the issues he has with the narcotics and the drug smuggling,
going after that, provide the right leadership and the right
resources to go after that, will continue to help.
He is going after this entire piece on the economy. I said
earlier, he spends 40 percent of his time just on the economy,
from a regional perspective. He knows he can't do it just
within Afghanistan, although years and years down the road,
with the minerals they have, the mines they have, with the
agricultural base that they have, they're going to get much,
much better. But, he knows it's going to take years and years.
He's going to be dependent upon the donor nations for the next
several years. But, he's reached out to the entire region to
help him on the economic realm. When he first visited Pakistan,
he talked again about security, he talked about economics, he
talked about sharing of intelligence, he talked about people-
to-people. So, that is foremost on his mind.
Sir, he has a background from the World Bank. If there's
anybody that can turn Afghanistan around and their economy
around, it's going to be President Ghani. But, it's going to
take considerable time, sir.
Senator Manchin. My time's just about up. I just would say
that I'd like to talk to you more about that, as far as on the
precious metals--extraction of precious metals. Who--what part
of the world is getting those contracts? China has been a big
player in copper. I don't think we have a United States
corporation that basically has been a player over there, even
though we're giving them the support and protection in order to
harvest that. So, I--my time is up, sir, but I'd like to talk
to you in more----
General Campbell. Okay, sir.
Senator Manchin.--detail about that.
Thank you, General.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, thank you for your distinguished service.
I wanted to go back. To me, the humanitarian--positive
humanitarian impact that we've seen in Afghanistan since 2001,
I hope that the media and the American people understand the
miraculous turnaround of this country. Just to go back and to
note, the life expectancy you're talking about, from 43 years
old to 64 years old; schools where you had fewer than 900,000
students, virtually none of them women, now we have 8 million,
with 36 percent of them females. The numbers here are
startling.
To a certain extent, we all know that what, first and
foremost, have to do is implement a strategy in Afghanistan
that prevents terrorists from preparing themselves to launch
attacks like they did on September 11. That's very important.
It should be the first priority. But, I also think that those
who seem to want to have a precipitous withdrawal from
Afghanistan forget the tragic humanitarian crisis that would be
created if we did that. I hope that we start weaving into the
narrative, this is not only about our national security, but
this is about a city that went from a city of ruin to a city of
lights, fastest--fifth fastest growing city in the world.
There's a lot of hope there, and I think that the Afghani
people are looking to the United States to let them continue to
make the progress that we think they're in a position to make.
My question relates to a--Chairman McCain mentioned that
some of our members met with President Ghani, and he talked
about flexibility. You talked about some changes that you've
recommended to your leadership. Are the changes that you've
recommended substantially aligned with what President Ghani is
wanting, in terms of the current strategy for withdraw and
reduction--a reduction of troops?
General Campbell. Sir, I've not specifically talked to
President Ghani about the options, but I've been with him
several times a week. We've talked about what it would take to
continue to provide flexibility for me, as the ground
commander, so he knows where I stand on that. But, I think he
would support the options I've presented, yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. How do you feel about how those options
have been received by your leadership or the administration? In
other words, to what extent do you think that they'll be acted
on and then you'll be given the authority to act on the options
that you've recommended?
General Campbell. Sir, we're in discussions right now.
There is a process we go through, just like we did back in
October, November, December, when I worked the enablers and the
authorities and the bridging strategy that the President
allowed, the 1,000 bridging strategy that he gave me to
continue with the Resolute Support Mission. So, we're talking
those now, and I feel very good about where we're at, sir.
Senator Tillis. Would you characterize those changes or
those additional options as minor course corrections or some
fundamental shifts in certain areas, based on the current
strategy?
General Campbell. Sir, I'd characterize it as--as I said to
this committee 7 months ago, that, when I got on the ground, I
would make continual assessments. I've had 6 months on the
ground now to make those assessments of both where our forces
are, where the Afghan Security Forces are, where the threat is,
what has changed in Afghanistan, as I outlined in my oral
statement, and, based on that, provided this flexibility that I
think both President Ghani has asked for and that will stay
within where we need to be to reach our strategic objectives
inside of Afghanistan.
Senator Tillis. General, the trajectories that you would
create by looking at the Taliban in 2001 in Afghanistan, and
the current situation, do you believe, if we stay on the
current course, that we could expect these very positive trends
to continue at their same pace, or will their progress, going
forward, be impeded?
General Campbell. Sir, I think, in some areas, we'll
continue to have the same pace, or maybe increased pace, based
on the capability the Afghans have been built up over the last
13 years in some of those areas. In some areas, it may stay the
same. In some areas, it may go slower.
Senator Tillis. Any particular areas where you think are at
risk? Of those areas, are there any that you're in a position
to say are at clear risk, current strategy?
General Campbell. Sir, are you talking about the ones----
Senator Tillis. Yeah, I'm talking more on the humanitarian
side.
General Campbell. Sir, I think--really, I feel very
comfortable that the Afghans have worked with many of the
Nations, to include the United States Embassy there, on many of
those areas on the humanitarian side, to build their own
capability and capacity. I'd really leave that to Ambassador
McKinley and his folks to answer in great detail.
But, sir, I think they've built the capacity of many of
those areas, and I would feel very comfortable that, in most of
the sectors that we showed up here, would continue to at least
stay where they're at or continue to grow.
Senator Tillis. Well, thank you. I just want to thank you
and the men and women who have served over there. I hope that
they realize that's why those pictures are looking the way that
we're looking. We thank you and them for their service.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The charts that you provided are really, just, stunning
returns on investment. The question for Americans is, what does
it matter that young girls are going to school in Afghanistan?
It matters a lot, because you just can't kill all the
terrorists, but if you can allow young women and young people
to see a better future, they're going to be more resistant to
the Taliban. What does it matter that you have access to clean
water? It means that you have something to live for, not die
for. So, we're trying to build an Afghanistan where people will
reject the call to death, as the President said, and accept the
way forward.
Do you agree with me that most Afghans--90 percent,
probably--have no desire to go back to the Taliban days?
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely.
Senator Graham. The only way they would go back to the
Taliban days, if they lost the capacity to contain and defeat
the Taliban?
General Campbell. Sir, I think if they--if the Afghan
Security Forces were not able to do that, that that would be
the only way, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Do you support 352 Afghan Security Forces
for the foreseeable future?
General Campbell. Sir, I think the number 352,000, plus the
30,000 Afghan local police, for their army and the police,
continues to be the right number, the right distribution
throughout the country that we have, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. The cost to us would be what?
General Campbell. Sir, we're working very hard on the cost.
It's around $4.1 billion. This year came in a little bit less.
We continue to work very hard to save, where we can. I think
about $3.8 billion is what I came in with for 2016.
Senator Graham. So, you think it's in our national security
interest to spend $3.8 billion maintaining this force.
General Campbell. Sir, I think the small investment for the
Afghan Security Forces continues to provide them the ability to
protect their country, to provide for a more stable
Afghanistan. As I talked about in the oral statement, a safer
Afghanistan is a safer United States.
Senator Graham. Yeah, I don't know what $3.8 billion is of
the total Federal budget. It's probably not a whole lot. It's
still a lot of money to me. But, a return on investment for
that amount, I think, is enormous. It's just simple as this. We
can keep their army intact, they'll do the fighting, and we
won't have to. We'll do the supporting.
President Ghani, in Munich, suggested that, when he visited
the United States, he would like the opportunity to thank the
American people, and suggested whether or not a joint session
of Congress appearance would be possible. Do you think that
would help the overall relationship?
General Campbell. Sir, again, President Ghani thanks the
American people everywhere I've been with him. If he had the
opportunity to do that with a joint session of Congress, I
think that would be very good.
Senator Graham. A lot of us who were on the trip in Munich,
I think, will send a letter. I have enormous respect for the
Speaker. This would be one appearance I think we would all
support. I cannot tell you how hopeful I am, under President
Ghani's leadership. If we're just smart enough to see this
through, I think we'll get a good outcome, here. I will be
sending that letter, along with my colleagues.
If we go to--down to 5,500, as planned this year, without
some adjustment, are we out of Kandahar completely?
General Campbell. Sir, if we go to 5,500, as I said before,
we go to Kabul-centric. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Okay. So, I just want the committee to
understand that Kandahar is just not a spot on the map. That's
the spiritual home of the Taliban. Is that correct?
General Campbell. Sir, that's correct.
Senator Graham. If we hold Kandahar, there's no way they
come back. Does that make sense to you?
General Campbell. Sir, if the Afghan Security Forces hold
them----
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Campbell.--there, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. When I say ``we,'' I mean them, too.
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. So, if we begin to lose in the south, will
it have a splintering effect throughout the country?
General Campbell. Sir, it would provide the Taliban some
momentum. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. You believe, with a presence in Kandahar,
relatively small, we can secure the gains that we've had, we've
achieved, and it would be smart to probably keep that presence
at least for a while longer.
General Campbell. Sir, I think we need to continue to
provide the Afghan Security Forces some TAA, especially on
their air force and special operating----
Senator Graham. Yes.
General Campbell.--capability that they have in Kandahar.
Senator Graham. Now, about us. Do you agree with me that
this part of the world is a dangerous part of the world, and
the counterterrorism platform that we enjoy today in
Afghanistan is tremendously beneficial to protecting the
Homeland?
General Campbell. Sir, I concur with that.
Senator Graham. Okay. Do you agree with me that the Afghans
want us to stay?
General Campbell. Sir, I'd concur with that, as well.
Senator Graham. There's a debate about what happened in
Iraq. There is no debate about Afghanistan. The only question
is, Will we accept the invitation in the right format? So,
let's end this discussion with the idea that the Afghan people,
through their government, want us to stay.
General Campbell. Sir, the Afghan senior leadership on the
military side have told me repeatedly that they appreciate our
sacrifice and they would want us to stay. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. That's true of their political leadership,
also.
General Campbell. Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. It is in our national security interest to
stay, wisely.
General Campbell. Sir, as I talked about in the opening
statement, a safer, secure Afghanistan provides for safety for
our Homeland. We have not had another September 11 since we've
been forward-deployed. The pressure that the brave men and
women continue to apply to the terrorist networks inside of
Afghanistan have prevented them from being able to come to the
United States. I do believe that.
Chairman McCain. Senator Lee.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, General Campbell, for
being here. Thanks for all you do to protect our country and
keep us safe.
The mission in Afghanistan that we have, as stated in the
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force there, was, of
course, to use force against all nations, organizations, and
individuals deemed to have been involved in the planning,
authorization, and commission of the attacks of September 11th,
or to have perpetrated them, or to have harbored those who did.
So, our goal was basically to punish those who perpetrated the
attacks and to prevent future attacks against U.S. citizens.
Today, what can you tell us about what the capacity is of
terrorist groups that may be operating in Afghanistan and in
Pakistan to launch attacks against the United States? How have
the capabilities and the ambitions of those groups trended over
the last 5 years? How does it look today, as compared to 5
years ago?
General Campbell. Sir, I can give you a very general answer
on that, and then would prefer to go in a classified session if
you want to go into more detail on that. But, my read would be
that, based on, again, our presence inside of Afghanistan, with
a great counterterrorism capability, we've been able to
continue to keep pressure on insurgents that would want to do
harm to both Afghanistan and to other nations, to include
Europe and the United States. I think, over the last several
years, we've been able to keep that pressure down--or, keep
that pressure on them, and that has limited their ability to
plan attacks against our Homeland.
Senator Lee. You feel good about the improvement that's
been made over the last 5 years on that front.
General Campbell. Sir, I do.
Senator Lee. Where----
General Campbell. Sir, if I could rephrase----
Senator Lee. Yes. Yes, sure.
General Campbell.--that, I feel very good about the last 6
months, in what I've seen on the ground in Afghanistan on that.
Senator Lee. Okay. So, more--you've seen more progress in
the last 6 months than you perhaps saw----
General Campbell. Well, I've been over there the last 6
months----
Senator Lee. Right.
General Campbell.--so I can talk from a perspective of
seeing that, myself. I can't talk about before that.
Senator Lee. Understood. Understood. Thank you.
Where are the insurgent groups fighting against the Afghan
Government and coalition forces--where and how are they
generating their funding, their weapons, and their recruits?
What are we, as the United States--what are the U.S. Armed
Forces doing to disrupt those networks of funding and the
supply chains for their arms and so forth?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I'd rather give you a broad
general answer and discuss a little more in detail in a
classified hearing.
But, as we mentioned before, some of the funding comes from
the drug trade, some of the funding comes from minerals, some
of the funding is just from other Gulf nations, some of it is
from weapons smuggling. So, there's a long list of things that
provide insurgency funding with--inside of Afghanistan. I think
that both President Ghani understands that, Dr. Abdullah, the
Security Forces understand that, and they're continuing to work
very hard on attacking the sources of that funding to limit
what the insurgents can--could actually do.
Senator Lee. What's your assessment of the new Afghan
government's attempts to form an inclusive government and the
relationship between the civilian leadership in Kabul, on the
one hand, and the Afghan National Security Forces, on the other
hand?
General Campbell. Sir, I think both President Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah have worked very, very hard to maintain a National
Unity Government, to form this National Unity Government. I've
been with both of them several times. They both have given up a
little bit to move Afghanistan forward as they went through
this election. I think they complement each other.
I think President Ghani has taken on the role of Commander
in Chief. We haven't seen that before. He's told all of the
Afghan police and the army that their welfare is his welfare.
He's personally involved in every facet of their leadership, of
how they get resources. He continually goes out to different
sites to show the Afghan army and the police that he is their
Commander in Chief. So, sir, he is--he's gainfully employed to
show them that he cares for them, and everything about them,
which I had never seen before underneath President Karzai.
Senator Lee. Is the Afghan Government, in your opinion, on
track to increase their level of burden-sharing in supporting
the ANSF and becoming self-sustaining and self-governing?
General Campbell. Sir, they're working it this year. I
think they showed us that they could provide the requisite
amount that we asked them to do. But, it's going to take
continued time on their entire holistic economic approach.
Again, President Ghani knows he can't do that just by himself,
but he has to engage with the region to be able to do that.
He's very dependent upon, not only the United States, but the
other donor nations. But, he's taken a hard look at how he can
attack this problem by visiting, himself, several key leaders
in the region. He talks about different agreements that he's
making with other countries around to provide railroads,
provide ways to transport agriculture outside of Afghanistan,
to take a look at the mining industry, on and on. So, sir, he's
engaged in this every single day.
Senator Lee. Thank you very much, General.
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thanks again for your service, all your staff for
your service.
Your opening comments, I think your themes about service
and sacrifice and, importantly, success are very powerful, and
I think they're important for the American people to know. I
also appreciate your emphasis on military families and their
sacrifice. Many ways, the unsung heroes of the last several
years.
But, I think one of the general themes here that you're
seeing is that people are applauding the success. But, we had
General Mattis in here last week, talking about how it's clear
that the successes that we've seen in a whole host of areas
that you've listed could be reversed, that they're fragile in
many ways. The broader issue that I think most of us are
concerned about is a replay of what's happened--or what
happened in Iraq.
As a military leader--Senator Kaine spoke eloquently about
this a couple of minutes ago--do you think it's important to
have condition-based withdrawal dates or transition dates based
on success that you've been talking about, versus a calendar-
based withdrawal?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question.
I think it's important that the military commander on the
ground be able to provide his best military advice to his
senior leadership as he takes a look at a whole bunch of
different variables on the ground--the enemy, the situation of
the Afghan Security Forces, those type of things. I've
continued to do that for the last 6 months, and again, I've
provided options, in this winter review process, to my
leadership, that I believe allows us the flexibility to both
President Ghani, the Afghan people, that will continue to keep
us on a road to be successful like this.
Senator Sullivan. So, your approach is definitely
conditions-based versus a date on a calendar that says we're
leaving.
General Campbell. Sir, I think there's a lot of different
conditions that go into the recommendations that I provide.
Time is one of those. Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So, I think--the other thing that I think
is a big responsibility for all of us--for you, for us in the
Congress, for the executive branch--is, when we're looking at
our challenges--and there are many national security
challenges--that we level with the American people. They want
to know what those challenges are, they want to know we have a
strategy. I appreciate your candor today. I think you're
epitomizing that kind of straightforward leveling with the
people that I think is so important as we address these
challenges.
The President has already declared that the United States
combat mission in Afghanistan has ended. Yet, a lot of the
discussion today, we've been talking about a U.S.
counterterrorism mission. So, he says ``combat--the combat
mission is over,'' but we've been talking about a
counterterrorism mission. I think the counterterrorism mission
is very important for, obviously, its broader strategic
implications, in terms of protecting the Homeland, but isn't
a--isn't the U.S. combat--isn't the U.S. CT mission a combat
mission right now?
General Campbell. Sir, there's no doubt that I have, with
the United States Forces-Afghanistan and then with a NATO hat,
a couple of different missions. One is TAA, and one is the
counterterrorist mission. There's no issue about--from the
President on down--that we have that mission.
Senator Sullivan. Yes, it just seems to be a disconnect.
Again, I know this isn't where you're focused, but it does seem
to be a disconnect between what the President's telling the
American people, ``We're done with combat operations in
Afghanistan,'' and yet we have a robust, it sounds like--an
important CT mission that we're still undertaking. Again, I
think this goes to the leveling with the American people on
what we're actually doing.
Do you have--in terms of a robust CT mission, can that be
supported by the current troop levels contemplated by the
President?
General Campbell. Sir, I don't think I used the word
``robust,'' but I do have enough of the resources for the CT
mission that I currently have right now. We have downsized our
CT capability over the last several years. This, as we've
downsized the other forces out there. But, I do believe I have
the requisite resources to continue with the current CT mission
that I have.
Senator Sullivan. Would you, in 2016, if we are on this
trajectory that the President's talked about?
General Campbell. Sir, I would have to go make sure that I
had that flexibility within those numbers on the different
missions that I would have. I think right now--I'd have to go
back and make sure that was within those options that we
provided to the senior leadership.
Senator Sullivan. Okay, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. General, we thank you for being here. I
enjoyed our conversations and visit, Christmas-time, when I was
with you in Kabul.
Every witness before this committee, and every retired or
military man or woman, believes that we cannot have a calendar-
based withdrawal from Afghanistan. We certainly don't want to
see what the President described in 2014, ``a normal embassy
presence with a security assistance component, just as we've
done in Iraq.'' We don't want to do ``just as we we've done in
Iraq,'' obviously.
I'm keenly appreciative of your role in the decisionmaking
process as a uniformed military leader, but it's very clear
that, unless we change what is now the course we're on, then we
are going to have enormous difficulties in Afghanistan.
By the way, I appreciate those pictures. It's also a fact
that you can't go downtown Kabul, any American can't, without
armed escort. You can't drive around Kabul unless you're in an
armored vehicle. The Ring Road that we thought was going to
connect all of Afghanistan is not safe in many parts. The
Taliban control it. So, yes, there has been a lot of progress,
but there is a number of areas, including the fact that we
still haven't gotten a handle on this terrible thing, where
Afghans in uniform shoot American military members.
So, we have a long way to go, and you have to speak truth
to power, not just because of the fact that the situation on
the ground argues for conditions-based withdrawal, but I think
you owe it to the men and women who are still serving over
there. Because if you believe, from your assessment, that, if
we go to a Kabul-based situation by the end of 19---excuse me--
embassy-based situation by the end of 2016, a normal embassy
presence, then you have to speak up, because too many young
Americans have already lost their lives and their limbs in
Afghanistan. I and others have been there since the beginning,
and we can't allow their deaths to be in vain.
So, I strongly urge you, when you counsel the President, to
do the right thing. We all know what the right thing is.
I thank you for being here today.
Senator Reed, did you have anything?
Senator Reed. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. This hearing is adjourned. Thank you,
General.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
united states counterterrorism capacity and capabilities required in
afghanistan
1. Senator McCain. General Campbell, one of the two missions for
the United States military in Afghanistan is counterterrorism. Former
National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter said yesterday
``I absolutely agree that simply an embassy force in 2016 will not be
sufficient to provide intelligence, the direct action and the advise
and assist to the Afghan National Security Forces to make sure that we
are detecting and disrupting transnational plots in the region.'' How
many United States Special Operations Forces do we have in Afghanistan
now, and in your opinion, what capabilities and what number of troops
do we need to maintain in Afghanistan after 2016 to ensure terrorist
safe havens do not allow the growth of capability for terrorist
organizations to threaten the U.S. Homeland?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
2. Senator McCain. General Campbell, please describe the capacity
and capabilities to launch attacks against the United States by
terrorist groups that are operating in Afghanistan and in Pakistan and
describe how capabilities and the ambitions of those groups trended
over the last 5 years? In other words, how does it look today as
compared to 5 years ago?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
mission authorities
3. Senator McCain. General Campbell, please define which
authorities have changed in the transition of missions from
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Resolute Support
Mission and from Operation Enduring Freedom to Operation Freedom's
Sentinel, that is from 2014 to 2015, and explain how the new authority
impacts and limits your operations?
General Campbell. Under Operation Freedom Sentinel, we no longer
target belligerents solely because they are members of the Taliban.
However, to the extent that Taliban members or individuals of other
groups directly threaten the United States and coalition forces in
Afghanistan, United States forces are authorized to take action in
self-defense, in the defense of others (such as our North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) partners), and to protect the force. United
States forces also continue to target the remnants of al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, to prevent an al-Qaeda resurgence or external plotting
against United States targets or the Homeland. In order to protect and
safeguard the progress we have made in building a stronger, more
stable, and more resilient Afghanistan. United States forces, along
with our NATO allies, also continues to train, advise, and equip the
Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF), and as part of this
mission, may provide combat enabler support to the ANDSF in limited
circumstances to prevent detrimental strategic effects to these Afghan
security forces.
I am comfortable that we have sufficient operational authorities on
both the U.S. (Freedom Sentinal) and NATO (Resolute Support) sides to
perform my mission, which is primarily to conduct counterterrorism
operations against remnants of al-Qaeda, to train, advise, and assist
(TAA) Afghan forces, and to protect the force.
authority for close air support and medical evacuation
4. Senator McCain. General Campbell, the media reports that the
United States can provide close air support to Afghan forces in
extremis. When are you allowed to support Afghan operations?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
5. Senator McCain. General Campbell, what do you consider ``in
extremis,'' and can you give a few examples?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
6. Senator McCain. General Campbell, when are you able to provide
medical evacuation for Afghan forces?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
7. Senator McCain. General Campbell, CBS reports that ``If the
United States detects a group of Taliban or Haqqani fighters preparing
to attack American or coalition troops, the U.S. troops can go after
them. However, United States troops can't conduct offensive operations
on any Taliban forces they locate. Those forces have to be threatening
U.S. troops.'' Is this true, and what determines what the policy is on
what American airpower can be used against and what it can't be used
against?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
authority for counterterrorism operations
8. Senator McCain. General Campbell, how does an announcement that
we are only going after al-Qaeda affect the operational execution of
the counterterrorism mission?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
9. Senator McCain. General Campbell, do you have the leeway to go
after other terrorists not a part of al-Qaeda, and if so, using what
authority?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
10. Senator McCain. General Campbell, in your opinion, what should
be the defining characteristic of terrorist organizations in
Afghanistan that United States Forces should be allowed to target?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
11. Senator McCain. General Campbell, if the Islamic State of Syria
and Iraq or another organization with global ambition arises, should we
also target that organization?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
12. Senator McCain. General Campbell, the media reported a drone
strike in Afghanistan killed Abdul Rauf who was a militant commander
who recently swore allegiance to the Islamic State. What authority
allowed you to strike a target that was neither al-Qaeda nor Taliban?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
afghan special forces
13. Senator McCain. General Campbell, please describe the current
size of the Afghan Special Forces as well as how much capacity and what
key capabilities the Afghan Special Forces must develop to reach full
operational capability. Additionally, with the current plan to draw
down coalition troops, how long will it take for the Afghan Special
Forces to reach full operational capability?
General Campbell. The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) are
composed of over 17,000 highly trained operators divided across the
Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD), including the
Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC), the General
Command of Police Special Units, the MoD Ktah Khas, and the Special
Mission Wing (SMW). The ANASOC, the largest unit, is comprised of 10
special operations kandaks (battalions). The General Command Police
Special Units includes 3 MoI National Mission Units (NMUs) and 33
Provincial Special Units (PSUs). NMUs conduct a range of policing
functions from counter-terrorist operations to high-risk arrests and
hostage recovery. The PSU provides a relatively sophisticated quick-
reaction capability and special investigative element for the province.
The Ministry of Defense's Ktah Khas is a battalion of highly-trained
counterterrorism forces. The SMW is a special operations aviation unit
that supports both MoD and MoI ASSF units with night helicopter assault
capability and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
Current TAA priorities for developing the ASSF are focused on their
ability to conduct mission command and operational planning, fuse
intelligence with other Afghan security pillars, integrate with and
receive support from the Afghan National Army (ANA), maintain
sustainable logistics and budgeting, as well as manage human capital.
The SMW must continue to expand nation-wide operational reach and
improve their organic maintenance capacity.
Sustained effectiveness in these categories will likely require
several more years of focused TAA support. Many other factors weigh on
the ASSF progress rate including the overall economy and budgets for
Afghanistan's security institutions, as well as political support for
proper use of and leadership within the ASSF. Our estimates for future
partnering demands will remain conditions-based, and we will track the
performance of the ASSF closely in the coming fighting season.
afghan aviation
14. Senator McCain. General Campbell, the Afghan Air Force (AAF)
must be able to conduct air lift and air strike operations. Please
describe the current size and capability of the AAF, what full
operational capability means, and with the current plan to draw down
coalition troops, how long will it take for the AAF to reach full
operational capability?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
definition of success
15. Senator McCain. General Campbell, as you look at Helmand,
Kandahar, Nuristan, and Kunar, what is your definition of success in
those areas at the beginning of 2017?
General Campbell. These provinces are traditionally enduring
operational and support zones for insurgent elements. While each area
is characterized by unique threat dynamics and factors, the challenges
they present to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
(GIRoA), its authority and the integrity of Afghanistan, are broadly
the same. These areas are seams through which insurgent elements stage,
transit, and facilitate the personnel and material (i.e. weapons,
explosives, narcotics, etc.) to attack GIRoA and the ANDSF locally, as
well as to impact areas in and around Kabul.
NATO has ended its combat mission and the United States has
significantly reduced its military presence throughout Afghanistan. As
a result, success at the beginning of 2017 in these specific areas
rests with the efforts of GIRoA and ANDSF for the following: transition
to and maintain an offensive posture and mindset; place relentless
pressure on insurgent forces and their support zones (aka safe havens);
clear and hold many of these safe havens; capture and kill increasingly
significant numbers of insurgent leaders and fighters; and reduce
significantly civilian casualties which will demonstrate ANDSF's
ability to protect the populace.
The intended overall effect of these ANDSF offensive operations is
to force insurgents to expend increasing effort on self-defense and
survival. This reduces their ability to maintain the initiative, attack
outward and, critically, prevents them from achieving their strategic
objectives of overthrowing GIRoA and ruling Afghanistan. Strategic
communications will also be vital. If GIRoA demonstrates to key
audiences (Afghan population, Taliban, insurgency sponsors,
international community) that the insurgency cannot achieve its goals,
then confidence in the ANDSF and thus Afghan Security Institutions and
GIRoA will improve. This will set necessary conditions to achieve
President Ghani's reconciliation policy.
reconciliation
16. Senator McCain. General Campbell, you talked about the efforts
of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah
to reach out to the Taliban and to try and begin some sort of
negotiations. Please provide a description of how far along that is and
your assessment of key factors required for reconciliation and the
chances for success in the next 3 to 4 years.
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
taliban resources
17. Senator McCain. General Campbell, please describe the sources
and rough order of magnitude of amounts of funding for the Afghan
Taliban including your assessment of what percentage of their overall
funding each source provides.
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
afghan fighters in syria
18. Senator McCain. General Campbell, there are reports that Afghan
fighters, specifically Hazara, are supporting Hezbollah and Quds force
efforts in Syria. Are you aware of any Afghans being recruited or
trained to fight in Syria?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
combat
19. Senator McCain. General Campbell, although President Barrack
Obama has declared the end of the U.S. `combat mission,' it appears
that the United States will still be conducting `combat operations'
including counterterrorism operations. As a warfighter, do you see a
large distinction between combat `mission' and combat `operations'?
General Campbell. Although the formal combat mission has ended, we
are still operating in a combat environment. Whether conducting
counterterrorism missions against al-Qaeda or tactical TAA operations
with our Afghan partners, prudent military planning demands that we
always prepare for the worst case scenario.
Regarding how we approach the fight, the fundamental difference
between prior years and this current phase of the campaign is that the
Afghans are truly in the lead both in the overall combat mission and
other operations throughout Afghanistan. Limited U.S. and coalition
presence on TAA operations is intended to provide over-watch during
mission planning and execution.
20. Senator McCain. General Campbell, as a military commander, how
does that change your approach to the fight?
General Campbell. Although the formal combat mission has ended, we
are still operating in a combat environment. Whether conducting
counterterrorism missions against al-Qaeda or tactical TAA operations
with our Afghan partners, prudent military planning demands that we
always prepare for the worst case scenario. When a mission requires
putting our service men and women in harm's way, my duty as their
commander is to ensure they have the necessary resources required to
support our Afghan partners and to neutralize any force protection
threat they encounter during execution of their mission.
force protection
21. Senator McCain. General Campbell, you've said that the Afghans
provide an outer ring of force protection to United States and
coalition forces. Can you describe how important Afghan capabilities
are to the protection of U.S. Forces, and how many of your current
number of coalition troops are primarily devoted to your own force
protection?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger F. Wicker
insider threats and afghan human capital
22. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, on January 31, 2012, Lance
Corporal Eddie Dycus, a constituent of mine hailing from Greenville,
MS, was fatally shot in the head by an Afghan Army liaison officer
embedded with his unit in Helmand Province.
On August 5, 2014, a self-radicalized Afghan military policeman
fatally shot United States Army Major General Harold Greene and wounded
over a dozen NATO personnel at a training center in Kabul. General
Greene's death not only marks the highest-ranking casualty in the
Afghanistan conflict--it is also the first time an Army officer with a
major general rank or higher has been killed by enemy fire overseas
since Vietnam.
Building the capacity of the Afghan security forces is a key
element of our Afghanistan policy. I believe a successful Afghan
security infrastructure will rely in part on two critical pillars: (1)
the trustworthiness and loyalty of personnel; and (2) their capacity to
adequately execute their job functions.
If left unaddressed--I fear the intake of rogue and incompetent
personnel into the Afghan military and security services could have a
catastrophic impact on Afghanistan's viability as a secure and stable
state.
What is your current assessment of the ``insider threat'' facing
our troops from rogue elements and individuals within the Afghan
Security Forces?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
23. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, I believe we must do all we
can to avoid a garbage-in/garbage-out situation with regard to our
training programs in Afghanistan. How are we screening applicants for
our training programs?
General Campbell. In accordance with ISAF orders published in 2013
(which are still applicable) the eight-step vetting process which the
Afghan General Recruiting Command (GRC) uses includes the following
tools to ensure that Afghan National Police (ANP) recruits are screened
prior to entry to the force: identification check, two guarantors of
personal information verification (usually from tribal elders),
criminal check, verification stamp, drug screening, medical screening,
and personal data (biometric) screening.
In addition to this eight-step process, the Afghanistan National
Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) implemented a counterintelligence
vetting program for all new recruits (DOD 2013a, 24); and immediately
started revetting all personnel as they return from leave. Once
screened in accordance with the above process, ANP are allowed to
attend training.
Each Afghan student is screened multiple times from several sources
prior to travelling to the United States for training. The screening
includes internal screenings from the applicable Afghan Ministry, Leahy
Vetting for Human Rights Violations as well as the standard Non-
Immigrant Visa application screening by the State Department. All
candidates are also screened through the Biometrics Automated
ToolsetSystem.
24. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, what tools do you utilize to
ensure that prospective applicants are not members of the Taliban?
General Campbell. In accordance with ISAF orders published in 2013
(which are still applicable) the eight-step vetting process which the
Afghan GRC uses, includes the following tools to ensure that ANP
recruits are screened prior to entry to the force.
In addition to this eight-step process, the ANDSF implemented a
counterintelligence vetting program for all new recruits (DOD 2013a,
24); and immediately started re-vetting all personnel as they return
from leave. Once screened in accordance with the above process, ANP
recruits are allowed to attend training.
Each Afghan student is screened through their respective ministry,
the Department of State's Leahy Vetting system, Non-Immigrant Visa
Application screening, and through the Biometric Automated Toolset for
any items in their past that would preclude them from travelling to the
United States.
25. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, how capable are current
graduates of our training programs in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Afghan graduates of U.S.-based Professional
Military Education programs are able to perform the tasks for which
they were trained, including pilots being able to fly, maintainers able
to maintain aircraft, and Special Forces qualified individuals able to
perform special operations.
Within the last 3 years, all U.S.-led training programs
transitioned to the Afghans. They currently have control of the
execution all training programs with the exception of specialized
training programs which are not yet ready for transfer. Nevertheless,
the United States and coalition advisors, as well as contractors and
several International Community Law Enforcement Professional continue
to advise the Afghanistan National Police (ANP) in the development of
their courses, and continually conduct assessments of their training
programs. These advisors report the training programs are of excellent
quality, and graduates of these programs are capable of fulfilling
their duties. Advisors consider the Afghan police instructors extremely
capable and very experienced. An example of this is the firearms
training that Afghan police provide to new Afghan police. Firearms
instructors provide quality hands-on demonstrations and instruction,
including a combination of classroom and practical exercises for a
total of 40-60 hours. The instruction provided is on par with any U.S.
police basic academy training.
Graduates of flying training and aircraft maintenance courses have
proven capable but still require years of continued skills development
and experience to become fully capable of operating rotary wing and
fixed wing aircraft in combat operations. The average pilot requires
3\1/2\ years to become fully mission qualified in fixed wing or rotary
wing aircraft. The average aircraft maintenance specialist requires
approximately 7 years to become fully qualified as a maintenance
supervisor. Train, advise, and assist command-air continues to see
steady growth in aircrew advanced capabilities but Afghan aircrew and
aircraft maintainers are generally slower to learn than their western
counterparts and will take additional time to grow the confidence,
situational awareness, and experience required to reach their full
potential.
26. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, are applicants literate and
willing to learn?
General Campbell. All Afghan soldiers are required to be at a
minimum educated up to a third grade level as defined by the Ministry
of Education. If they are not already educated to that level or higher
when they are processed into the military, they are identified for the
Afghan Literacy program, which provides literacy training up to a 3rd
grade level in both Pashto and Dari, and takes place at all their
regional training centers, as well as at the Darulaman Literacy Center
in Kabul. Up to this point, over 300,000 Afghan soldiers over 6 years
have been trained through this program, and the classes that are
offered are always filled to capacity, oftentimes with requests for
additional classes.
All Afghans sent to the United States for training have at least a
base level knowledge of English and are further trained to higher
English level standards at the Defense Language Institute at Lackland
Air Force Base. During the past 3 years, over 89.8 percent of the
Afghans sent to training successfully completed their scheduled course
of instruction.
AAF candidates come from the same pool of human capital that
provides personnel to the ANA and other Afghan National Defense
Security Force elements. With Afghans in general having an
exceptionally low literacy rate, the AAF is challenged to find suitable
candidates to meet the technical requirements needed to succeed in the
aviation field. Additionally, English language requirements further
decrease eligible candidates and greatly increase in-country, pre-
training requirements (English) which directly increase timelines
associated with individuals becoming mission capable. To date, we've
seen that most applicants are very willing to learn and most are able
to successfully complete training requirements.
27. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, are graduates of our training
programs able to comprehend our military values which include respect
for civilian authority and the rule of law?
General Campbell. Each Afghan student graduating from Professional
Military Education training meets all requirements for graduation in
order to complete their course successfully. Most of these courses
contain instruction on military values, the respect for civilian
authority, and the rule of law.
For example, the Afghan 8-week Initial Police Course,
noncommissioned officer courses (Satanman), and Officer Basic/
Intermediate Command courses all have programs of instructions and
contains the modules which relate to military values and/or
paramilitary values as they apply to the police: Lawful use of Force (4
hours), Law and Ethics (11 hours), Human Rights and Gender Issues (18
hours), and Duty at the Police Station rule of law classes (8 hours).
The AAF legal department routinely provides airmen cadets with
basic instruction on rule of law concepts, including the overall aim
towards civilian governance even over acts of terrorism within the
GIRoA. Based on the recent observations of the TAA-Air's Legal Advisor,
the airmen cadets have displayed a level of understanding sufficient to
enable interactive discussions and intelligent questioning on the
topic. For example, during a February 2015 briefing on the topic,
airmen in a class of approximately 50 students debated the question of
why the AAF should detain and turn over to the civilian authorities a
captured insurgent, when killing him would provide a more efficient and
``just'' remedy to the overall fight against terrorism. The AAF Legal
Representative guided the debate towards a final conclusion that extra-
judicial killings were contrary to international norms and that the
AAF's and GIRoA's legitimacy and respect in the international community
hinged on its adherence to the rule of law.
28. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, are these graduates able to
effectively lead their own forces and pass on knowledge obtained from
American trainers?
General Campbell. Yes, Afghan graduates of Professional Military
Education programs are able to perform their duties and provide side-
by-side training to their fellow soldiers, thereby improving their
overall capabilities.
The U.S. and coalition forces have assisted the ANA and ANP to
develop their instructional programs. Graduates of our training
programs are able to apply the concepts learned in training to the
field. Examples include noncommissioned courses. Graduates from this
course have shown the ability to apply concepts learned in schools to a
field environment. They are capable of performing their duties upon
graduation with only local familiarization of their duty areas. Recent
incidents involving insurgent attacks in Kandahar and other provinces,
as well as prevention of attacks against Afghan National Defense
Security Force (ANDSF) in other places, show the effectiveness of this
training, as police have effectively repelled enemy advances.
The vast majority of AAF graduates are from basic pilot,
maintenance, and officer training. They are all serving in entry level
positions that do not require their leadership skills to be tested.
Based upon the responsibilities given and performance required they are
progressing as expected. A better determination on their leadership
capability can be assessed in the coming years, as they progress in
their weapon systems and assume more leadership responsibilities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard Blumenthal
women and security in afghanistan
29. Senator Blumenthal. General Campbell, Afghan women have made
tremendous gains following the collapse of the Taliban regime. I
understand that girls are now about 40 percent of elementary school
students, 25 percent of high school students, and 20 percent of college
students. Afghanistan once had one of the highest maternal mortality
rates in the world. Now, those rates have dropped dramatically from
1,600 to 460 deaths per 100,000 women. There is a network of women's
civil society groups throughout the country advocating for women's
rights and advancement in the economy and business. The Afghan Women's
Network has some 120 women's groups from all 34 Afghan provinces. Does
the current administration in Afghanistan have a plan to ensure Afghan
women's rights and security will be maintained, especially in urban
areas, and if so, what is your evaluation of such plan?
General Campbell. GIRoA has an entire ministry dedicated to this
topic, the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Oversight of human rights and
human rights training is also provided by the Ministry of Religious and
Cultural Affairs. Both security ministries have directorates dedicated
to Human Rights and Gender Integration. GIRoA has developed a series of
polices, plans, laws, and frameworks to ensure women's rights and
security. The ministries listed above are tasked to oversee the
implementation of those policies, plans, and legislation.
The National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan articulates
the actions that Afghanistan will take to implement United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1325, Women Peace and Security. It aligns
with other national plans yet may be ambitious for Afghanistan to
implement in totality. The empowerment of women within Afghanistan is
aligned to cultural expectations, norms, ethnicity, and religious
beliefs. It is most likely that major reform will be seen through
generational change. Solid progress has been made in the past 10 years
and will continue to be made if policies remain current and
perpetrators of violence are held accountable. This is partially due to
women being better educated and having an increased understanding of
their rights and how to report such incidents. The number of incidents
and gross violations of human rights reported will only reduce over
time as a result of the will of the GIRoA administration to act and
enforce the law. The Afghan Security Institutions must enforce the law
to better protect women within the Afghan society, including those
serving within the security sector. The money allocated to the
recruitment and retention of women in the security sector will aid in
this agenda. It is important that women are empowered to protect women.
30. Senator Blumenthal. General Campbell, what guarantee, if any,
has the current administration made to ensure that preserving the
rights of Afghan women will be a part of any attempted negotiations
with the Taliban?
General Campbell. President Ghani stated his commitment to
advancing women's rights in Afghanistan. He ran on these principals and
has governed so since becoming president. Although negotiations have
yet to begin, President Ghani's leadership not only makes
reconciliation possible but also the inclusion of women's rights more
favorable. I remain committed in supporting President Ghani for
reconciliation. This includes my support for preserving women's rights
in Afghanistan.
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 6, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:28 a.m. in Room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Tillis, Sullivan, Lee, Graham, Reed, Nelson, McCaskill,
Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, King, and Heinrich.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Good morning. As the committee convenes, I
want to make it clear that I will not tolerate a disruption of
the workings of this committee, and I will say that anyone who
does will be arrested, not ejected, but arrested. I want to
make that very clear. We will not tolerate disruption of the
workings of this committee. They are too important.
The Senate Armed Services Committee meets this morning to
receive testimony on the situation in Afghanistan. General
Campbell, we thank you for appearing before the committee
today, and we are grateful for your many years of distinguished
service and your leadership of the United States and coalition
forces in Afghanistan at this critical time. We ask that you
convey the gratitude and appreciation of this committee to all
of the brave men and women in uniform under your command.
Fourteen years ago, United States forces went to
Afghanistan because that was where, under the sanctuary under
the Taliban regime, al-Qaeda planned and conducted initial
training for the 9/11 attacks that killed 3,000 innocent
civilians on American soil. Our mission was to ensure that
Afghanistan would never again be a safe haven for al-Qaeda or
other radical Islamist terrorists to attack us again. As
General Petraeus told this committee recently, that mission has
been successful for 14 years.
American troops and civilians have made steady progress in
supporting our Afghan partners to secure their country and
dealt severe blows to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups that
want to attack the United States and our allies.
At the same time, we have seen a remarkable progress in
Afghan society: more schools and more teachers; greater
opportunities for women and girls in the classroom, in the
workforce, and in positions of leadership; higher literacy,
better roads and wider use of cell phones. Life expectancy in
Afghanistan has increased by 22 years in less than a
generation, a feat unparalleled in modern history.
It is precisely because we are fighting for progress and
fighting for our values that it has been so disturbing to read
reports alleging that some of our coalition partners may be
engaged in sexual abuse and other activities that contradict
our values. This committee treats such allegations with the
utmost seriousness, and we look forward to hearing from you,
General Campbell, as to what actions have been taken and what
processes put in place to address this situation.
Yes, we have made significant and steady progress in
Afghanistan. But as U.S. military officials and diplomats have
warned for years--I repeat, for years--these gains are still
reversible, and a robust and adaptive U.S. troop presence based
on conditions on the ground not on a calendar is essential to
ensuring that these gains endure. Failure to adopt such a
conditions-based plan, these experts have warned, would invite
the same tragedy that has unfolded in Iraq since 2011. If we
have learned anything from that nightmare, it is that wars do
not end just because politicians say so.
The evidence of that is already clear in Afghanistan. Since
President Obama hailed the end of combat operations in
Afghanistan last year, ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant] has arrived on the battlefield and the Taliban have
launched a major offensive to take territory across the
country, as we saw most recently in the key city of Kunduz.
Meanwhile, just like the Iraq Security Forces at the end of
2011, the Afghan National Security Forces are still developing
key capabilities. The shortfalls are hauntingly familiar:
intelligence, logistics, air lift, close air support, special
forces, and institutional development. Yet, the White House
remains committed to its politically driven withdrawal of
nearly all United States forces from Afghanistan.
It is not too late for President Obama to abandon this
dangerous course and adopt a plan for U.S. troop presence based
on conditions on the ground. But time is of the essence, and
continued delays by the White House are hurting our national
security interests and those of our partners in Afghanistan and
beyond.
America's friends and foes alike are waiting on President
Obama. The government and people of Afghanistan are waiting to
see what kind of support and commitment the United States will
make. Afghan Security Forces, whose morale has been tested by
heavy casualties against the Taliban, are waiting to find out
whether their American partners will remain at their side. Our
NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] partners are
waiting to determine their course in Afghanistan and need to
begin generating forces now for an extended commitment.
Pakistan is waiting for a United States decision while hedging
its bets with individuals and groups that are hostile to our
interests. The Taliban is waiting to see if it merely needs to
wait until the United States draws down to an ``embassy-centric
presence'' to have the battlefield largely to themselves.
Then there are the thousands upon thousands of American
troops and their families who have served and are serving in
Afghanistan who are waiting to see if their sacrifices will be
put at greater risk because we abandoned Afghanistan by blindly
following an inflexible timetable for withdrawal.
As the world waits, the consequences of the indecision and
the wrong decision are beginning to merge: growing instability,
terrorist safe havens, and an increase in direct threats to the
United States. We cannot turn back the clock on decisions made
four years ago in Iraq, but the decisions made now will
determine the nature and scope of the future challenges we face
in Afghanistan.
The world walked away from Afghanistan once before, and it
descended into chaos that contributed to the worst terrorist
attack ever against our homeland. We cannot afford to repeat
that mistake, because the threats we face are real and the
stakes are high for the lives of the Afghan people, especially
women and girls, for the stability of the region and for the
national security of the United States.
General Campbell, we thank you again for being with us this
morning. We look forward to your testimony.
Senator Reed?
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, welcome and thank you for your service.
Please also pass along our deep appreciation to the men and
women in uniform under your command in Afghanistan for their
service.
General, you have been in command for over a year of the
twin missions in Afghanistan: training and advising the Afghan
Security Forces and counterterrorism operations. Your purpose
and mission is to ensure that Afghanistan does not once again
become a safe haven for terrorists aiming to attack the United
States, its allies or their interests.
Your testimony this morning comes at a critical time. The
administration is in the process of considering operations for
the size and authorities for the United States military
presence in Afghanistan in 2016 and beyond. I strongly believe
that the United States force posture in Afghanistan going
forward should be shaped and resourced to enable you, General,
to achieve your missions' objectives based on conditions on the
ground. We should also take into account our regional
counterterrorism requirements, including against al-Qaeda and
an apparent growing presence of ISIL in determining the long-
term size and posture of the United States military presence in
Afghanistan.
The news reports regarding security conditions in
Afghanistan indicate a worsening situation over the past few
months. Taliban forces continue to be formidable, despite the
announcement of Mullah Omar's death. This year, casualties for
the Afghan Security Forces have reached their highest level
since the start of the conflict. The Taliban have expanded
their control over some rural areas, closing schools, reducing
the Afghan people's access to services, killing or intimidating
government officials, reimposing restrictions on Afghan women
and girls, and reversing the progress of the past decade in
these areas. Taliban attacks in southern and eastern
Afghanistan have increased, and most recently they conducted a
major operation to seize the provincial capital in Kunduz in
the north.
This situation raises significant concerns. Yet, in 2015,
Afghan Security Forces have repeatedly regrouped and retaken
territory from the Taliban. It is notable that, in the past few
days, Afghan forces, with enabling assistance from United
States and NATO and advisors and airstrikes, have retaken
central Kunduz from the Taliban. General Campbell, I hope you
will give us your assessment of whether the Afghan army and
police retain their will and capability to fight.
Security in Afghanistan depends not only on our training
and advising the Afghan Security Forces but also on whether
those forces believe there is an Afghan Government and
leadership that they are willing to support and defend. In
Iraq, we saw our training efforts catastrophically undermined
when Prime Minister Maliki gutted the army's leadership and
replaced competent leaders with his own crony loyalists,
resulting in an army that melted away when ISIL seized the City
of Mosul and suffered a number of other significant losses.
In Afghanistan, we have partners in President Ghani and CEO
Abdullah Abdullah. Yet, this unity government has struggled to
stand up its cabinet, and there are reports of serious
divisions at lower levels. General, we would be interested in
your views on President Ghani's commitment to ensuring that the
Afghan army and police have competent, non-corrupt leadership,
and any insights you may have on how to maintain and promote
the unity of the Afghan Government.
Our counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan have had a
number of significant successes this year. This is due in part
to an increased level of cooperation across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border and active military operations by the Pakistan
army that have driven al-Qaeda and other militants across into
Afghanistan creating opportunities for targeting these
extremists.
I am concerned, however, that our ability to execute
successfully these critical operations will be reduced as a
result of resources being redirected to support our campaign
against ISIL in Iraq and Syria or a possible reduction in our
counterterrorism footprint as part of the President's decision
on the future size of United States forces in Afghanistan.
I would also be interested in your thoughts on the
operational authorities you believe will be necessary going
forward to target terrorist groups that would hope to
capitalize on United States and international troop reductions
to once again use Afghanistan as a safe haven from which to
launch attacks.
Finally, our efforts to promote security in Afghanistan
will be severely damaged if we are not perceived as upholding
the highest standards for our forces and the Afghan forces that
we train. Recent news reports alleging a policy of
nonintervention when United States troops were aware of sexual
abuse by Afghan commanders receiving training are deeply
disturbing. General Campbell, I expect you to help this
committee get to the truth regarding these allegations and to
confirm for us that U.S. troops will not tolerate human rights
abuses by forces we are training or advising, including the
sexual abuse of any civilians.
Additionally, U.S. forces must uphold the highest standards
for the protection of civilians as they relate to collateral
damage caused by military operations. The United States must do
all it can to avoid incidents like the recent tragedy in Kunduz
where, according to news reports, United States airstrikes
damaged a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders killing more
than 20 patients and staff and wounding more than three dozen.
The Defense Department has announced that your headquarters
will be conducting an investigation of this incident and this
committee expects to be kept informed of the progress of that
investigation to the maximum extent appropriate as it goes
forward. General Campbell, I am interested in hearing from you
what additional steps are being taken to ensure that our rules
of engagement reinforce the importance of protecting civilians
from harm and preventing such tragic outcomes in the future.
Thank you again, sir, for your service, and we look forward
to your testimony.
Chairman McCain. Thank you very much.
General?
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN F. CAMPBELL, USA, COMMANDER, RESOLUTE
SUPPORT MISSION; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
General Campbell. Well, good morning, Chairman McCain,
Ranking Member Reed, and distinguished members of the
committee. I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
I have been honored to lead and represent the service men
and women of the United States Forces-Afghanistan for the last
14 months.
I would like to begin by thanking the committee for your
steadfast support of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines,
and our civilians. Due to your leadership and commitment, they
are the best trained and equipped force our Nation has ever
deployed. Their outstanding performance bears testimony to your
backing and the backing of the American people. So thank you
very much.
I would like to pay tribute to our military families. They
are the unsung heroes of the last 14 years of conflict. In many
ways, our frequent absences from home are harder on them than
they are on us. Without their love and support, we could not
succeed.
I would also like to acknowledge and honor the over 2,200
service men and women who have been killed in Afghanistan and
the over 20,000 who have been wounded. Tragically we lost 14
personnel, to include 6 airmen and 4 U.S. contractors, last
Friday in an aircraft mishap. We always remember the Afghan and
own fallen and the loved ones they left behind. Every day we
honor their memories by assisting the Afghans to build a stable
and secure country and by protecting our homeland.
Over 14 years have passed since the 9/11 attacks and we
have not forgotten why we first came to Afghanistan and why we
remain. Since 2001, exceptional efforts and courage of our
forces have ensured that another terrorist attack originating
from Afghanistan and directed against the United States
homeland has not occurred.
Eight months have passed since I last appeared before this
committee, and much has changed since then. Afghanistan, its
government and security forces, the enemy, and our own
coalition have undergone tremendous transitions. These changes
have ensured that this fighting season has been fundamentally
different. It cannot be compared to previous years. I would
like to emphasize how political, military, economic, and social
transitions are affecting the operational environment in order
to place our campaign in context. Afghanistan is at a critical
juncture and so is our campaign. But before I further explain
the formidable challenges and the opportunities before us, I
would like to address a few topics that have been in the
headlines here lately.
First, I would like to discuss the tragic loss of lives in
the strike on the hospital in Kunduz. By way of background,
United States Special Operations forces have been providing
training, advice, and assistance to Afghan National Defense
Forces who have been engaged in a tenacious fight with the
Taliban. On Saturday morning, our forces provided close air
support to Afghan forces at their request. To be clear, the
decision to provide aerial fire was a U.S. decision made within
the U.S. chain of command. The hospital was mistakenly struck.
We would never intentionally target a protected medical
facility.
I must allow the investigation to take its course, and
therefore, I am not at liberty to discuss further specifics at
this time. However, I assure you that the investigation will be
thorough, objective, and transparent.
I would also like to remind the committee and the American
people that we continue to make extraordinary efforts to
protect civilians. No military in history has done more to
avoid harming innocents. We have readily assumed greater risks
to our own forces in order to protect noncombatants. To prevent
any future incidents of this nature, I have directed the entire
force to undergo in-depth training in order to review all of
our operational authorities and rules of engagement.
Our record stands in stark contrast to the actions of the
Taliban. They have repeatedly violated the laws of war by
intentionally targeting civilians. The United Nations
attributes more than 70 percent of the noncombatants killed and
wounded in this war to the Taliban.
Second, I would like to discuss the sexual exploitation of
children by a few members of the Afghan Security Forces. All of
us consider this reprehensible. This criminal practice is
entirely unacceptable and unacceptable to the Afghans as well.
President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah have reiterated
their policies and laws to enforce this with their Afghan
Security Forces. We will do everything within our power to
defend and protect human rights. That is our moral obligation
to you, the American people, and ourselves. I have ordered 100
percent training of the force to ensure that they understand
our human rights policy, which has been in place since at least
2011. This policy requires that our personnel report any
suspected human rights violations committed by the Afghan
Security Forces, and this is to include any sexual abuse of
children. Whenever and wherever our personnel observe human
rights abuses, they will be conveyed through our chain of
command and in turn to the Afghan Government. Perpetrators must
be held accountable.
With still many weeks left in the traditional fighting
season, intense combat continues in many parts of the country.
The Afghan Security Forces have been severely tested this year,
but they continue to fight hard. In the wake of the coalition's
redeployment, the Afghan Security Forces and insurgents both
accepted that this fighting season would be decisive. There was
no winter lull, and since February the fighting has been nearly
continuous. Casualties on both sides have risen, and the
violence has moved beyond the traditional insurgent
strongholds.
Pakistan military operations this year have also displaced
foreign fighters into eastern and northern Afghanistan. The
emergence of Daesh, or the Islamic State in Khorasan Province,
IS-KP, has further complicated the theater landscape and
potentially expanded the conflict. Most recently, the Taliban
increased the tempo of their operations following the announced
death of their spiritual leader Mullah Omar.
We are also now seeing how our redeployment and transition
from combat operations to an advisory role have changed
battlefield dynamics. Only a few years ago, our coalition
numbered over 140,000 military personnel. Now our forces
comprise fewer than 14,000, of which approximately 10,000 are
U.S. service men and women. In years past, our aircraft
provided responsive and often decisive close air support to
coalition and Afghan troops in contact. This is no longer the
norm but the exception. Collectively, the Afghan Security
Forces are adapting to these changes and in some places they
are struggling.
Within this context, the fluidity of the current security
situation is not surprising. This fighting season started well
for the Afghan Security Forces as they executed successful
multi-corps, cross-pillar operations in Helmand, Zabul, and
Ghazni Provinces and in the southern approaches into Kabul. In
April, they fought back significant Taliban pressure in the
north, and in August and September, they reversed almost all of
the Taliban gains in the northern Helmand after considerable
effort.
Yet, there have been setbacks, and most recently, the
Taliban overran Kunduz, Kunduz City. Still, the Afghan Security
Forces rallied and they have regained control of most of the
city, just as they have successfully retaken other ground
temporarily lost throughout this fighting season.
The Afghan Security Forces' inconsistent performance in
Kunduz underscores several of their shortcomings. They must
improve their intelligence fusion, command and control,
utilization of their forces. They do not possess the necessary
combat power and numbers to protect every part of the country.
This makes it very difficult for the Afghan Security Forces to
counter the Taliban's ability to temporarily amass, seize an
objective, and then blend back into the population. Ultimately
the Afghan security leaders need to discern better when to
fight, when to hold, and where to assume risk.
Despite these shortcomings, however, the Afghan Security
Forces have displayed courage and resilience. They are still
holding. The Afghan Government retains control of Kabul,
Highway 1, its provincial capitals, and nearly all the district
centers. The Afghan Security Forces are effectively protecting
the principal population centers.
It is also apparent that our advisory support and financial
backing are strengthening the resolve and building their
systems and processes. The Afghan Security Forces have
repeatedly shown that without key enablers and competent
operational level commanders, they cannot handle the fight
alone in this stage of their development. Ultimately I am
convinced that the improved leadership and accountability will
address most of their deficiencies, but it will take time for
them to build their human capital.
The Afghan Security Forces' uneven performance in this
fighting season also underscores that their shortfalls will
persist well beyond this year. Capability gaps still exist in
the fixed and rotary wing aviation, combined arms,
intelligence, and maintenance. One of the greatest tactical
challenges for the Afghan Security Forces has been overcoming
the Afghan Air Force's still extremely limited organic close
air support capability.
Despite a myriad of challenges, the fundamental partnership
between the coalition and the Afghan Government remains
durable. The difference between the Ghani administration and
the previous administration is like night and day. At every
level, coalition and Afghan leaders continue to work together
in pursuit of shared objectives. The Afghan Government, civil
leaders, and military commanders demonstrate a growing
appreciation for the coalition's efforts.
President Ghani has asked NATO and the U.S. to provide some
flexibility in our planning to account for the fact that his
government remains in transition while the threats he is facing
are changing. He has asserted that a sustained coalition and
U.S. presence provides actual and psychological stability to
the country as the new government solidifies. He recognizes
that his new administration must invest considerable time and
effort to address the challenges of systemic corruption. He has
also acknowledged that while the Afghan Security Forces are
better equipped and trained than ever, much work remains to
build their systems and processes and improve their leader
development.
I have offered my chain of command several options for our
future laydown in 2016 and beyond. It was envisioned in mid-
2014 that we would transition to a normalized embassy presence
by January 2017. That remains our planning assumption. Since
that time, much has changed. We have seen the rise of Daesh [or
ISIL], an increased al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan due to
PAKMIL [Pakistani Military] operations, and now we have strong
partners in President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah. As a
result, I put forward recommendations to adjust to this new
environment while addressing our core missions, train, advise,
and assist the Afghan Security Forces and conduct
counterterrorism operations to protect the homeland.
As the upsurge in insurgent violence in the northern
Helmand and Kunduz shows, Afghanistan is again at a decisive
point. The President is well aware of the tenuous security
situation, and I also appreciate that he has many other global
issues to weigh as he considers my recommendations. My role is
to provide him my best military advice based upon my assessment
of the conditions on the ground weighed against the risks both
to the force and to the mission.
I am unable to discuss further details on the options I
provided to the President. In the past, when flexibility has
been requested of him, he took it under serious consideration
and made his decision. He provided flexibility this year. The
same decision process is being worked through now for 2016 and
beyond.
In closing, the challenges before us are still significant.
In an extremely tough fight, the Afghan Security Forces
continue to hold. They have remained resilient and they have
not fractured. Fully supported by an engaged commander-in-
chief, President Ghani, embraced by the Afghan people, and
backstopped by our military advisors, resources, and enablers,
the Afghan Security Forces' future and Afghanistan's prospects
for eventual peace still remain promising.
If we fail in this worthwhile mission, Afghanistan will
once again become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and other terrorists
bent on attacking our interests and citizens abroad and at
home. If a security vacuum arose, other extremist networks such
as Daesh would also rapidly expand and sow unrest through
Central and South Asia and potentially target our homeland.
The hard work and the sacrifices of countless coalition
military personnel and civilians over the last 14 years have
created the conditions in which the Afghans can and are now
taking responsibility for their own security and governance.
The Afghans welcome the opportunity to shape their destiny, but
they still desire, need, and deserve our assistance. Our
support cannot and should not be indefinite or unconditional.
The Afghans must continue to do their part. If they do, we
should continue to exercise strategic patience and sustain our
commitment to them.
Working together, we can be successful. A proactive,
cooperative Ghani administration and committed Afghan Security
Forces offer us a unique opportunity to further develop a
meaningful strategic relationship in a volatile but vital area
of the world. Our continued efforts to stabilize Afghanistan
will benefit the entire region and, in turn, offer greater
security for the United States homeland and Americans abroad
and at home.
Again, thank you for your steadfast support of our
campaign. I look forward to your questions. I also request the
committee to accept my written statement for the record. Thank
you very much, sir.
Chairman McCain. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of General Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement by General John F Campbell
i. introduction
Over 14 years have passed since we commenced military operations in
Afghanistan, and we have not forgotten the original motivations for our
mission, and why we remain. United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A)
remains focused on our most vital national security interest:
protecting the U.S. homeland. In this all-important endeavor, we
continue to be successful. Through our continued presence, active
support of the Afghan National Defense & Security Forces (ANDSF), and
Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations, we are preventing Afghanistan from
once again becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda, other international
extremist groups, and their hosts.
Since 2001, the extraordinary efforts of both our conventional and
special operations forces (SOF) have ensured that another terrorist
attack originating from Afghanistan and directed against the United
States homeland has not occurred. Today, U.S. SOF, alongside our Afghan
counterparts, continue to impose considerable pressure on what remains
of the terrorist networks that attacked us.
Simultaneously, United States advisors and their Coalition
counterparts continue to provide invaluable support and oversight of
the Afghan Security Institutions (ASI) at the ministerial-level, ANDSF
units at the corps-level, and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) at
the tactical-level. Working by, with, and through our Afghan partners,
our advisors serve as our primary means to improve the ANDSF's
capabilities and build their self-sustainability.
Yet in spite of our considerable progress, it is clear that our
campaign will remain a challenging one. The National Unity Government
(NUG) and the enemy are still locked in a fierce struggle. While I do
not consider the insurgency capable of overthrowing the NUG by force,
the enemy remains capable and lethal. The ANDSF, in turn, have thus far
proven unable to eradicate al-Qaeda entirely or compel the Taliban (TB)
to negotiate a political settlement. In an ongoing, unstable security
environment, other extremists groups are emerging to include Daesh, or
the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP). These nefarious
elements continue to sow fear among the Afghan population. The
insurgents also continue to inflict a serious, disruptive effect on the
NUG's ability to govern. The war continues to undermine public
confidence in the NUG and stymie economic progress, thereby prompting
the exodus of tens of thousands of Afghans.
The ANDSF have had to adapt during a year of significant
transition. There are still a few weeks left in the traditional
Fighting Season, and intense combat continues in several parts of the
country. Overall, the ANDSF have rendered a creditable overall
performance for a young force that has been severely tested, but has
remained resilient. In the wake of our drawdown since 2011 and drop in
enabler support, the ANDSF have taken ownership of the fight. They have
admittedly faltered at times; however, they continue to evolve,
improve, and fight hard in spite of increased casualties.
Significantly, they have demonstrated no signs of fracturing.
ii. results of this fighting season (fighting season) / state of the
andsf
Before further evaluating the results of this Fighting Season, it
is important to place this year in context. This year has been unique
for many reasons. In the wake of the Coalition's redeployment, the
ANDSF and insurgents both accepted that this fighting season could be
decisive. There was no winter lull, and since February, the fighting
has been nearly continuous. Casualties on both sides have risen, and
violence has moved beyond the traditional insurgent strongholds.
Other factors are also contributing to the uptick in casualties and
spread of violence. Pakistan Military (PAKMIL) operations have
displaced foreign fighters into eastern and northern Afghanistan. The
emergence of Daesh, or the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP), has
further complicated the theater landscape, and potentially, expanded
the conflict. Most recently, the Taliban have increased the tempo of
their operations in order to reassert their prominence within the
insurgent syndicate after the announced death of their spiritual
leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar (MMO).
We are also now seeing how our redeployment and transition from
combat operations to TAA have changed battlefield dynamics. Only a few
years ago, our Coalition numbered over 140,000 military personnel. Now
our force is comprised of fewer than 14,000 of which approximately
10,000 are U.S. servicemen and women. In years past, our aircraft
provided responsive and often decisive close air support (CAS) to
Coalition and Afghan troops in contact. This is no longer the norm--but
the exception. Our force reduction, drop in enablers, and resultant CAS
gap have created challenges for the ANDSF; they have understandably
struggled at times to adjust.
Within this context, the fluidity of the current security situation
is not surprising. This Fighting Season, the Taliban surged forces into
northern Helmand. Most recently, they overran Kunduz. Nevertheless, the
ANDSF rallied and regained control of most of the areas lost in
Helmand, just as they have successfully retaken other ground
temporarily lost throughout this Fighting Season. I am confident that
they will regain control of Kunduz as well. Still, the Taliban achieved
their aim in Kunduz.
The fighting in Kunduz underscores several shortcomings in the
ANDSF to include poor intelligence fusion, lack of cross-pillar
coordination, and sub-optimal utilization of their forces. They do not
possess the necessary combat power and numbers to protect every part of
the country. This makes it very difficult for the ANDSF to counter the
Taliban's ability to temporarily mass, seize an objective, and then
blend back into the population when confronted with an ANDSF
counterattack. Hence, a reprioritization of the ANDSF's security
efforts within the framework of their larger, multi-year campaign will
be required at the conclusion of this Fighting Season. They also need
to improve the responsiveness, flexibility, and preparedness of their
forces at the tactical and operational levels. Ultimately, ANDSF
leaders also need to discern better when to take the offensive, when to
defend, and where to assume risk.
Despite these shortcomings, however, the ANDSF have displayed
courage and resilience. They are still holding. GIRoA retains control
of Kabul, Highway 1, its provincial capitals (with the exception of
Kunduz for now), and nearly all district centers. The ANDSF are
effectively protecting the principal population centers. It is also
apparent that our advisory, resourcing, and contracting support and
financial backing are strengthening their resolve and building their
systems and processes.
In general, I would characterize the ANDSF's performance this
fighting season as uneven and inconsistent. They have learned some hard
lessons from their mistakes. On the positive side, when the ANDSF seize
the initiative, deliberately plan their operations, and coordinate
their actions across the security pillars, they achieve notable
results. When they execute deliberate, cross-pillar operations that are
thoroughly planned and resourced, they are highly successful. On the
negative side, when they act hastily and employ their forces in a
haphazard, uncoordinated manner such as in Helmand, they are far less
effective. They have also struggled to optimize their force laydown and
employment. They remain tethered to isolated checkpoints and static
defenses, which increases their vulnerability and reduces their ability
to maneuver effectively.
The ANDSF's mixed performance underlines both their weaknesses and
strengths. A closer examination of ANDSF actions and inactions in
Helmand in August and September underscores this point. Elements of the
215th Corps and local police units responded poorly to the initial
insurgent attacks on Now Zad and Musa Qala. To bolster the faltering
ANDSF, I directed the immediate employment of our Advise & Assist Cell-
Southwest (AAC-SW) and additional elements from NATO's Special
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A). We also provided
CAS for ANDSF units in-extremis. Fortunately, the Afghans recovered and
counter-attacked. While the tactical situation remains challenging in
Helmand, it is clear that the reinforced ANDSF have blunted the Taliban
offensive there.
The outcome in Helmand could have undoubtedly been much different.
President Ghani responded decisively to the crisis, and after a
frustrating start, senior ANDSF leaders took control of the situation.
Our advisors and enablers provided invaluable support, without which,
the ANDSF would most likely have suffered significantly more casualties
and a strategic setback. These events underscore that the ANDSF still
require broad support. They have repeatedly shown that without key
enablers and competent, operational-level leaders, they cannot handle
the fight alone in this stage of their development. Ultimately, I am
convinced that improved leadership and accountability will address most
of their deficiencies. ANDSF soldiers and police perform well when they
are well led and appropriately resourced. That is why our insistence on
sound leadership and strict accountability remains our top priority for
our TAA programs and activities. However, it will take time for the
Afghans to build their human capital.
The Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF), in particular, have
demonstrated improved proficiency in the last year. Many military
analysts consider them the best SOF in the entire region. Their
commando units are now conducting raids independently using their own
intelligence to drive their operations. The Special Mission Wing (SMW),
recently aligned under the Ministry of Defense (MoD), is also executing
long-range sorties in low illumination. Working together as envisioned,
the commando units and SMW are frequently carrying out unilateral
direct action missions against insurgent leaders and facilitators.
These are remarkable achievements, which reflect the maturation of
their formidable capabilities and the overall potential for the ANDSF
writ large.
While the conventional ANDSF still have capability gaps and
shortfalls, they do possess and are capable of leveraging significant
enabling assets to fight the insurgents (e.g., heavy mortars, D-30s
howitzers, armed Mi-17s, MD-530 attack helicopters, armored vehicles,
etc. and dedicated training for these platforms.) The insurgents have
none of these.
ANDSF Attrition
Of note, ANDSF operational tempo (OPTEMPO) has been twice as high
in the first nine months of 2015 than 2014. Not surprisingly, ANDSF
casualty rates have also increased this year. (The ANDSF have, however,
inflicted far greater casualties on the enemy.) The combination of an
increased OPTEMPO, assumption of greater security responsibilities,
rapid drawdown of Coalition forces and enabler support, and the
aggressive pursuit of the enemy all contributed to a marked increase in
ANDSF casualty rates. The ANP and Afghan Local Police (ALP) have borne
a disproportionate share of these losses. The ALP are not as well
equipped or trained as other ANDSF. They have often been misemployed as
regular ANP in distant checkpoints even though they should only operate
within their local villages.
A high ANDSF attrition rate, which accounts for casualties and all
other losses to the force, has impacted combat readiness.
Conspicuously, non-battle attrition, particularly unauthorized
absences, have induced approximately 70 percent of the ANDSF's
personnel losses. If present rates continue, attrition will pose
increasingly significant challenges to force generation, development,
and readiness over time. The main causes of ANDSF absenteeism are
assessed as poor leadership, high operational tempo, inadequate
soldier/police care, and poor force management. They have sometimes
failed to relieve forces committed in combat areas for sustained
periods. We continue to help the Afghans reduce combat casualties and
to address systemic causes of attrition in order to ensure the long-
term health and sustainability of their forces.
Persistent ANDSF Capability Gaps
The ANDSF's uneven performance this Fighting Season underscores
shortfalls that will persist well beyond this year. Capability gaps
still exist in fixed and rotary-wing aviation, combined arms,
intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and sustainment. Other needed
areas of improvement include resource management, cross-pillar
synchronization, and intelligence-based operations. One of the greatest
tactical challenges for the ANDSF this Fighting Season has been
overcoming the Afghan Air Force's (AAF) still extremely limited organic
CAS capability. These shortfalls can be rectified over time if the
appropriate time, money, and resources are allocated, and most
importantly, ANDSF leaders continue to mature and develop sufficiently
to implement these changes and needed reforms.
I remain concerned about the long-term viability of the ANDSF.
Succinctly, Afghanistan cannot afford its security forces--particularly
at their present size. Yet their current numbers are needed to contend
with the scale of the threat. If we sharply reduce their forces now, it
will have a detrimental effect. The international community currently
funds over 90 percent of the ANDSF's operating costs. The U.S. covers
the majority of this amount. We must assume that that the ANDSF will
not be self-sustainable for several years to come. At this stage,
without adequate international and U.S. funding support and an
appropriate Coalition troop presence to oversee the proper expenditure
of such funds, the ANDSF could potentially collapse.
Advisory Efforts
At the security ministries, our advisors continue to focus on
building ASI systems, processes, and national ANDSF sustainment
capabilities. They are also working to improve integration among the
different security pillars: military, police, and intelligence
services. At the corps-level, our advisors continue to concentrate on
developing the ANDSF planning capacity, command and control,
operational capabilities, unit logistics, and operational sustainment.
Our advisors at the ministries and our regional Train, Advise, &
Assist Commands (TAACs) continue to serve as important sensors and
touch points that allow us to verify and validate Afghan reporting
while reinforcing the use of organizational systems and processes. They
enable the Afghans to see themselves and to understand that they
possess adequate supplies and equipment. Our advisors routinely find
that reported shortages in operational units are most often the result
of failures in accounting and distribution rather than actual
deficiencies. We are assisting the Afghans to break the culture of
hoarding and eliminate false claims of shortages in order to garner
more resources and assistance. At all levels, our advisors also
continue to emphasize and enforce Afghan financial transparency and
accountability of donor resources.
iii. state of the threat
Throughout this Fighting Season, Al Qaeda, TB, Haqqani Network
(HQN), Daesh, and other extremist groups have challenged GIRoA (and at
times, each other) as they exerted their influence and vied for
prominence. Collectively, these enemies will present formidable
challenges to the Afghan government, ANDSF, USFOR-A, and the Coalition
for the remainder of 2015 and beyond.
In 2015, al-Qaeda has attempted to rebuild its support networks and
planning capabilities with the intention of reconstituting its strike
capabilities against the U.S. homeland and Western interests. Due to
our constant pressure, however, al-Qaeda activities are now more
focused on survival than on planning and facilitating future attacks.
It will be critical that, in coordination with our Afghan partners, our
comprehensive CT efforts continue to apply pressure against the al-
Qaeda network in order to prevent its regeneration, and the
corresponding threat it represents to our homeland.
The Taliban established ambitious goals for this Fighting Season in
hopes of capitalizing upon our transition from combat operations to
advising and exploiting ANDSF vulnerabilities in their first year
entirely in the lead. Their stated strategic objectives were to seize
at least one provincial capital and multiple district centers, and
control and hold more territory. The Taliban have attempted to gain
more control of the countryside in order to expand their freedom of
movement and action. They have been at least partially successful in
accomplishing these goals. In the absence of Coalition CAS, they have
also been more willing to mass their forces. Their main effort has
focused, as usual, on retaining and expanding their traditional
strongholds in Pashtun-dominated areas in the south. However, as
demonstrated by recent events in Kunduz, they have also extended their
influence in the north, which has further strained the ANDSF by
extending their lines of operation and ability to command and control
their forces over long distances. Overall, the Taliban remain a
resilient, adaptable, and capable foe in spite of markedly increased
casualties this year.
The death of Mullah Mohamed Omar (MMO) has generated a critical
juncture for the TB. It is still unclear whether his death will lead to
greater cohesion or splintering within the movement. Moreover, it is
uncertain whether current infighting among the Taliban will undermine
or aid reconciliation efforts. For now, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, the
self-proclaimed successor to MMO, continues to exert considerable
effort to legitimize his position and consolidate his power. The recent
Taliban success in Kunduz may bolster Mansour's authority and
potentially quell his rivals.
Al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, recently announced their
support of Mullah Mansour. He subsequently accepted their pledge of
loyalty. Of note, he also named Siraj Haqqani, a known ally of al-
Qaeda, as one of his deputy emirs. Whether the TB's renewed partnership
with al-Qaeda will shift the TB's targeting efforts beyond Afghanistan
has yet to be determined.
The Taliban maintain an adaptive propaganda apparatus, which they
will continue to leverage to influence the Afghan people, the
international community, and their supporters. Their adept use of
social media to advertise their operations in Kunduz serves as a clear
example of their capabilities. The Taliban will strive to shape
perceptions in the information space, despite their mixed military
performance, continued political failures, and moral hypocrisy.
Based in, and operating from Pakistan, HQN remains the most
virulent strain of the insurgency. It presents one of the greatest
risks to Coalition forces, and it continues to be an al-Qaeda
facilitator. HQN shares the Afghan Taliban goal of expelling Coalition
forces, overthrowing the Afghan government, and re-establishing an
extremist state. HQN fighters lead the insurgency in several eastern
Afghan provinces, and they have demonstrated the intent and capability
to launch and support high profile and complex attacks against the
Coalition. In response to several dangerous threat streams against
Coalition and Afghan personnel--particularly in Kabul--ANDSF and U.S.
SOF have stepped up security operations against HQN. These operations
have successfully disrupted several HQN attack plans that sought to
inflict significant casualties on the force. It will take a concerted
AF/PAK effort to reduce the effectiveness and capabilities of HQN.
The Emergence of the Islamic State in Afghanistan
Daesh remains one of my Priority Intelligence Requirements. In the
last year, we have observed the movement's increased recruiting efforts
and growing operational capacity. We now classify Daesh as
``operationally emergent.'' Many disaffected TB, including Tehrik-e-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members, have rebranded themselves as Daesh.
This rebranding is most likely an attempt to attract media attention,
solicit greater resources, and further increase recruitment. We have
not seen, however, a wholesale convergence of other insurgent groups
collaborating with Daesh. Nor have we detected a large influx of
foreign fighters joining the movement.
While they do yet possess the capacities or capabilities of the
Taliban, Daesh's emergence has nonetheless challenged the ANDSF,
National Directorate of Security (NDS), and GIRoA political leadership.
We have not seen any indication, however, that Daesh is capable of
waging a unified campaign to challenge GIRoA at this point. Notably,
the ANDSF recently initiated its first named operation against Daesh.
In the near term, we expect most Daesh operations to remain directed
against the TB, although attacks against nearby ANDSF or other soft
targets of opportunity are possible.
Of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, a recent UN report indicates
that Daesh has varying degrees of presence in all but nine. The
majority of its fighters are located in the east, specifically
Nangarhar Province. In the near term, we predict that they will
continue to recruit and grow their numbers, using higher pay and small-
scale, successful attacks as recruitment tools.
Perhaps the greatest threat that Daesh presents to the entire
region is not its emerging combat power, but its virulent, extremist
ideology. Daesh's success in the Middle East is beginning to attract
new adherents in Central and South Asia. While many jihadists still
view al-Qaeda as the moral foundation for global jihad, they view Daesh
as its decisive arm of action. Daesh's propaganda and recruiting
efforts, furthermore, already demonstrate remarkable sophistication.
President Ghani has remarked, ``If Al Qaeda is Windows 1.0, then Daesh
is Windows 7.0.''
President Ghani has been very circumspect about the Daesh threat.
While some have accused him of exploiting fears of Daesh for political
aims, I do not believe these criticisms are warranted. Daesh has grown
much faster than we anticipated, and its continued development in
Afghanistan presents a legitimate threat to the entire region. Its
adherents have already committed acts of brutality that have shocked
Afghan sensibilities. Moreover, Daesh senior leadership has publically
declared its goals of reclaiming Khorasan Province, which extends from
the Caucuses to Western India, as its spiritual home. For these
reasons, Ghani has sensibly used the evolution of Daesh as a pretext
for regional engagement on a host of security and economic issues.
iv. afghanistan/pakistan (af/pak) relations & potential reconciliation
with the taliban
The role of Pakistan remains integral to stability in Afghanistan.
Historical suspicions and competing interests have long characterized
Afghanistan/Pakistan (AF/PAK) relations. While difficulties are likely
to persist past 2016, there are indicators that relations between
Afghanistan and Pakistan could potentially thaw despite ongoing
terrorist attacks in both countries. Nonetheless, considerable
obstacles persist. It is clear, however, that for GIRoA to reconcile
with the Taliban, rapprochement with Pakistan will most likely have to
occur first.
To this end, there are ongoing efforts to strengthen ties between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Yet for every two steps forward in AF/PAK
relations, another is seemingly taken backwards. For example,
Pakistan's emergence as a broker and arbiter in formal talks between
the GIRoA and the Taliban in July brought all parties to the table.
However, subsequent terrorist attacks in Kabul in August, which
coincided with the emergence of new Taliban leadership, precipitated
widespread Afghan backlash and stalled further talks.
The common threat of violent extremism can still serve as a
catalyst to improve cooperation between the two countries. Pakistan,
like Afghanistan, has suffered greatly at the hands of terrorists and
violent extremists. The recent Pakistani Taliban (TTP) attack on a
Pakistan Air Force base serves as a case in point. Senior Pakistani
military officers have repeatedly declared that they can no longer
discriminate between ``good and bad'' terrorists. They appear to be
taking meaningful actions to back up their words. Aggressive PAKMIL
operations over the last year have applied considerable pressure on
extremists operating in the border region and Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), although additional pressure must still be applied
against HQN and the Taliban more broadly.
Resolute Support serves as a key facilitator and interlocutor for
Afghan and Pakistani military officials. We continue to actively
encourage and enable the Afghan and Pakistani officers to meet and
coordinate their security efforts through key leader engagements and
monthly, one-star meetings at the Resolute Support Tripartite Joint
Operations Center (RSTJOC). We assess that AF/PAK political and
military relations are likely to improve, albeit only incrementally and
on a transactional basis.
v. challenges and opportunities
All aspects of Afghan society remain in a state of flux as we
approach the end of 2015. Challenging political and security
transitions continue to occur simultaneously. The unstable security
environment and lack of investor confidence continue to foil economic
growth. The flight of foreign capital and sharp reduction in spending,
which had occurred at artificially high levels since 2001, has also
negatively impacted the Afghan economy. Significant social tensions
also persist (e.g., urban progressives versus rural conservatives;
former mujahedeen versus former communists; technocrats versus
warlords, etc.) Perceptions of declining security amidst extensive
political, economic, and social upheaval have induced tens of thousands
of Afghans to flee the country. The loss of talented human capital, or
``brain drain'', is particularly worrisome as gifted, educated
individuals are desperately needed to lead Afghanistan through this
time of transition.
Within the context of these multiple transitions and turmoil, the
NUG presents both significant promise and uncertainty. President Ghani
and CE Abdullah have proven to be amenable to working not only with one
another for the greater good of Afghanistan, but also with the
international community, NATO, and the United States Ghani and Abdullah
have both declared the United States to be Afghanistan's fundamental,
foundational partner and its most critical relationship. Both are also
committed to addressing the challenges of corruption and nepotism. Both
are likewise supportive of the rights of women and their empowerment in
Afghan society. Additionally, both are committed to achieving an
enduring peace in Afghanistan and the region.
We now have an opportunity with the NUG. However, Afghan leadership
vacancies, which persist at the local, provincial, and national levels,
continue to hinder the NUG's progress and the effectiveness of our
supporting efforts. Afghan parliamentarians, unfortunately, have often
vetoed qualified candidates for extraneous or simply political reasons.
An attorney general has yet to be appointed, and the Acting Minister of
Defense (MINDEF) continues to serve in spite of the Afghan Parliament's
rejection of his candidacy.
While Ghani and Abdullah have developed an effective, trusting, and
complementary relationship, their respective supporters often clash.
Both leaders must resolve how they will address and placate their
constituents while still promoting good governance and the fundamental
pillars of their recently published National Security Policy.
Fortunately, the very competitive political dynamics that often
threaten gridlock in the current Afghan government also promise that,
when policies are set, the vast majority of legitimate Afghan political
interests will be represented.
Despite myriad challenges, the fundamental partnership between the
Coalition and the Afghan Government, to include ASI and ANDSF, remains
durable. The difference between the Ghani administration and the
previous administration is like night and day. Throughout USFOR-A, we
have developed close professional relationships with nearly all senior
Afghan leaders, who have welcomed United States support and assistance.
At every level, Coalition and Afghan leaders continue to work together
in pursuit of shared strategic objectives. Moreover, the Afghan
government, civil leaders, and military commanders demonstrate a
growing appreciation for the Coalition's efforts. Afghan leaders are
genuine in their gratitude for our shared sacrifice and commitment to
their nation. I have also seen our Afghan partners develop a sense of
ownership and pride in their army and police force. Afghan citizens
realize and appreciate that they now have an increasingly credible,
professional security apparatus.
President Ghani has asked NATO and the U.S. to provide some
flexibility in our planning to account for the fact that his government
remains in transition while the threats it faces are diversifying. He
has asserted that a sustained Coalition and U.S. presence provides
actual and psychological stability to the country as the new government
solidifies. He recognizes, moreover, that his new administration will
require considerable time and effort to address the challenges of
systemic corruption. He has also acknowledged the while the ANDSF are
better equipped and trained than ever, much work remains to build their
bureaucratic processes and systems as well as improve their leader
development.
vi. conclusion
In closing, the challenges before us are still significant. In an
extremely tough fight, the ANDSF continue to hold. They have remained
resilient and have not fractured. When properly led, they are a
formidable force. Fully supported by a commander-in-chief who supports
his forces, embraced by the Afghan people, and backstopped by our
military advisors, resources, and enablers, the ANDSF and Afghanistan's
future and prospects for an eventual peace still remain promising.
If we were to fail in this worthwhile mission, Afghanistan would
once again become a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and other terrorists bent on
attacking our interests and citizens abroad and at home. Similarly, if
a security vacuum were to emerge, other extremist networks such as
Daesh would also rapidly expand and sow unrest throughout Central and
South Asia.
The hard work and sacrifices of countless Coalition military
personnel and civilians over the last 14 years have created the
conditions in which the Afghans can and are now taking responsibility
for their own security and governance. The Afghans welcome the
opportunity to shape their destiny, but they still desire, need, and
deserve our assistance. Our support, however, cannot and should not be
indefinite or unconditional. The Afghans must continue to do their
part; if they do, we should continue to exercise strategic patience and
sustain our commitment to them.
Working together, we can be successful. A proactive, cooperative
Ghani administration and committed ANDSF offer us a unique opportunity
to develop further a meaningful strategic relationship in a volatile,
but vital area of the world. Our continued efforts to stabilize
Afghanistan will benefit the entire region, and in turn, offer greater
security for the United States homeland and Americans at home and
abroad.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, General Campbell, and thank you
for your continued great leadership in a very difficult
situation. We are proud of your great leadership.
On the hospital issue, I know I speak for all members of
the committee that our sympathy for those who were killed and
injured in this tragedy is heartfelt and deep.
Is it true that the strike was requested by Afghan forces
on the ground that struck the hospital?
General Campbell. Sir, as I said yesterday in a press
statement, yes, sir. The Afghan forces on the ground requested
aerial support from our forces that were on the ground. But as
I said in my opening statement, even though the Afghans request
that support, it still has to go through a rigorous United
States procedure to enable fires to go on the ground.
Chairman McCain. But there was no American forward air
controllers on the ground.
General Campbell. Sir, we had a special operations unit
that was in close vicinity that was talking to the aircraft to
deliver those fires.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
General Campbell, the President on May 27, 2014 made a long
statement and said by the end of 2016, our military will draw
down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul with a security
assistance component. I am not making this up. He said, just as
we have done in Iraq.
General, in your opinion do the conditions on the ground
warrant a change to the current plan for the drawdown of United
States troops in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question.
Sir, as I mentioned in my opening statement, when that
decision was made in 2014, a lot has happened since then in
transition, the growth of Daesh, we did not have a national
unity government in 2014, the actions by Pakistan and the fight
they have had to push additional insurgents inside of
Afghanistan. Underneath that construct, it does not enable us
to provide a CT [counterterrorism] component. So as I have
talked about on the options, I provided several options to the
chain of command and will continue to work with my chain of
command and provide them my best military advice, the pros and
cons of each of those courses action as we move forward.
Chairman McCain. Well, could I respectfully ask again, do
the conditions on the ground warrant a change to the current
plan that calls for, by the end of 2016, we would be an
embassy-centric force?
General Campbell. Sir, again, based on conditions on the
ground, based on the transitions I have talked about, I do
believe that we have to provide our senior leadership options
different than the current plan that we are going with.
Absolutely.
The current plan, as envisioned right now, sir, as you
know, and as you talked about in your opening statement, is an
embassy-based presence. As I take a look at conditions on the
ground, as we have to continue to provide TAA [training,
advising, and assisting] to our Afghan partners, when the
President made that decision, it did not take into account the
change over the last two years. So the courses of action that I
have provided to my senior leadership provide options to adjust
that.
Chairman McCain. Did the attack on Kunduz surprise--maybe
the word is not ``surprise,'' but is it not an indication that
the Taliban have significant strength, including in an area in
the north where they generally speaking did not have very much
capability, thanks to the makeup there in northern Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, the Afghans, and quite frankly the
coalition, were surprised when the Taliban were able to take
over Kunduz City. A lot of reasons I think why. But the Afghans
are taking a hard look as well to make sure they understand and
do their own sort of after-action on this. Part of the reason,
they did not have many of the key leaders in place, the city,
for the most part, had police. The Afghan army was on the
outskirts. They did not reinforce. Bottom line, the Taliban
were able to come in, attack from within the city, and quite
frankly surprised the police forces that enabled the Taliban to
gain a great IO victory. I do not think the Taliban had intent
to stay in Kunduz for very long, and as soon as the Afghan
forces were able to bring additional forces in, logistically
resupply that, the Taliban, for the most part, melted away,
left the city. There are small isolated pockets that continue
to fight.
Chairman McCain. From a PR [public relations] standpoint,
though, it was a rather significant victory for the Taliban.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely, yes.
Chairman McCain. Finally, you said in your testimony we
will need to help the Afghans address capability gaps in
aviation, intelligence, and special operations. I would add
logistics to that list.
Should it not be that you should be recommending not
numbers of people to the White House but capabilities and then
fill in the numbers after that? Is that the process you are
using, or is it you are just giving them numbers?
General Campbell. Sir, I deal in capabilities, as you talk
about. So I look at the requirement and really the needs
assessment the Afghans would have and try to base the courses
of actions based on those requirements.
Chairman McCain. So their needs are aviation, intelligence,
and special operations according to your testimony.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. Sustainment, logistics.
The aviation piece we just, quite frankly, started late on
their air force, building their close air support capability.
Logistics and sustainment is hard for any army. For a United
States Army that has been around for 240 years, try to compare
that to an Afghan army that is nascent and maybe only 8 to 9
years old is quite tough.
Chairman McCain. Aviation is one of the areas of most
critical I would argue. I think they have two helicopters. Is
that right?
General Campbell. They have two functioning MI-35
helicopters. They have several MI-17's, and now they have the
MD-530, which we introduced here. But as far as close air
support helicopters, that is a key gap. As you know, sir, it
takes two or three years to grow a pilot, two or three years to
grow maintainers. We are doing that as fast as we can. They
started out the season with five MI-35's. Today they have two
just based on airframe flyability.
Chairman McCain. Well, I thank you. Again, General, I would
like to again express my appreciation for the outstanding job
you are doing under extremely difficult constraints. I thank
you, General.
Senator Reed?
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your testimony and for your
service.
So this has been a long struggle, and every community in
this country has seen the effects and just recently a brave,
young Rhode Islander, Sergeant First Class Andrew McKenna, was
killed in action in Kabul. So this is not just academic or
hypothetical. This is very real for our country and for the men
and women of this country and our armed services.
Let me ask you a question. You have two major missions,
train and equip, together with counterterrorism operations.
Just in the context of counterterrorism operations, do you need
a physical presence outside of Kabul to do that effectively?
General Campbell. Sir, to conduct counterterror operations
effectively, it would have to be outside of Kabul, yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So that would argue in terms of capabilities
for a presence that is beyond the simple environment of Kabul.
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. There is new leadership in the Taliban.
Mullah Mansour has taken control. His deputies include I think
one principal of the Haqqani Network, which is located on both
sides of the border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. All of this
raises the issue of the role of Pakistan, which is consistent
and a constant issue that comes up.
Just a few months ago, they were trying to broker peace
talks. Can you give us some insight into the current position
of the Pakistan Government with respect to what is going on in
your AOR [area of responsibility]?
General Campbell. Sir, again, as far as reconciliation and
Pakistan's role, Afghanistan has said many times that this has
to be Afghan-led on reconciliation. I think Pakistan
understands that. President Ghani and the leadership inside of
Pakistan have talked several times about reconciliation moving
forward. I think both President Ghani and Pakistan understand
that there has to be some sort of political resolution to this
fight, and so reconciliation is one of those ways.
Right now, with the Taliban being fractured, with Mansour
claiming that he is the head, other folks like Zakir, Manan,
Yaqoub, Dadullah, other senior Taliban members are actually
still trying to struggle to fight against that and do not
believe that Mansour should be the head. I think that will work
itself out, but I think there are opportunities for Afghanistan
to take advantage of that as they move forward.
There was, I think as has been mentioned here, one peace
talk. There was a second one that was on the table that was
moving forward in just a day or so before when the Mullah Omar
death was announced, and they kind of scrapped that.
I do believe--and I did have the opportunity to talk to
General Raheel Sharif, the Pakistan chief of the army. I talk
to him probably once a week. I try to get to Pakistan once a
month. I did talk to him last Monday, and he is dedicated to
try to move the peace process back. I know that he and
President Ghani will continue to try to work through that. But
again, sir, I think that is going to take time and a lot of
effort by a lot of people. I do not think that we should expect
that is going to happen here in the near future. But it will
take concerted effort by all.
Senator Reed. As you indicate in your testimony, both
President Ghani and CEO Abdullah seem to be committed to not
only a positive relationship with the United States but to
create a professional military force. Is that again your
consensus?
Also unlike, hopefully, Iraq, there does not appear to be
any major sectarian divisions material, developing within the
security force?
General Campbell. Sir, you are right. I do believe that the
Afghan Security Forces continue to be very resilient. President
Ghani has taken on the role as commander-in-chief. He takes
that very seriously. He visits training. He talks to his corps
commanders quite frequently in person, on video
teleconferences. So he takes on that role. I have seen the
Afghan Security Forces under very, very tough situations
continue to come together. I do not see--and I spent about 19
months in Iraq. I do not see the same decisive ethnic
infighting that I saw in Iraq.
They have had some setbacks. We knew this was going to be a
very tough season. Both the Afghan Security Forces and the
Taliban knew this would be a decisive fighting season. I think
over time, they continue to get better. So in northern Helmand
where they had some issues, Musa Qala was taken over. It took a
little bit of time, but the Afghan forces--although some of
those had retreated out, the majority got back together, had a
good plan, resupplied, and moved the right forces in to take
back over Musa Qala. They did the same thing in Kunduz. Again,
very hard to move that number of forces logistically, to plan
that very quickly. So if you try to compare Iraq and
Afghanistan, I see them as again night and day, two different
things. The Afghans are fighters and, sir, they are warriors.
Senator Reed. So both, from your perspective, operationally
and politically, the Afghans are making a commitment that
justifies continued support by the United States and NATO.
General Campbell. Sir, without a doubt. Absolutely, yes,
sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Could I mention the chart there, General?
The shaded areas are the areas of Taliban activity. Is that an
accurate chart in your view?
General Campbell. Sir, I got one right here.
Sir, if the red areas are active areas of Taliban, I think
for the most part that is on target.
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You have answered really most of my questions. Let me just
ask for clarification. When Ghani last January and then again
last week reemphasized that we may want to reexamine our
withdrawal plan, I think, as I understand it, you have a list
of options that you are prepared to give the administration to
look at. Is that what you are referring to?
General Campbell. Sir, President Ghani has asked on
different occasions to continue to have coalition forces. I
have already provided my recommendations for a force posture
post-2016. Yes, sir.
Senator Inhofe. You are not in a position to share any of
that.
General Campbell. Say it again, sir.
Senator Inhofe. You are not in a position to share any of
that with this committee at this time.
General Campbell. Sir, as I said in my opening statement, I
provided those to the leadership. I have to be able to give my
leadership the opportunity to make those decisions without----
Senator Inhofe. I understand.
In February when you were before this committee, you
outlined six criteria, six expectations. I would not expect you
to have those in front of you right now, but can you recall any
of those six that have not met your expectations? Then for the
record, outline each one of them and how they are coming on
that score sheet.
General Campbell. Sir, like you, sir, I do not remember
those six, but if I can take that for the record and reply back
to you.
Senator Inhofe. That would be fine.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) and Afghan
Security Institution (ASI) conditions that must be met include the
following:
Condition 1: Capable of protecting the population and securing a
legitimate Afghan Government with limited United States and Coalition
support. The ANDSF have made excellent progress protecting the
population and securing the government. This is the first year ANDSF is
in the lead without coalition forces in the field and with limited
Close Air Support. Although the ANDSF performance has been uneven at
times, I do not consider the insurgency capable of overthrowing the
National Unity Government (NUG) by force.
Condition 2: Maintain confident forces. I characterize the ANDSF's
performance as uneven and this has affected their confidence. When they
deliberately plan operations and have the right leadership they
succeed. When they act hastily or lack decisive leadership, they have
struggled to maintain the initiative.
Condition 3: Maintain sustainable forces. The ANDSF attrition rate
has impacted readiness and is a matter of concern. We have focused on
helping the Afghans address the systemic causes to attrition ensuring
their long term viability. Leadership is a primary reason for the poor
attrition rate.
(U) Condition 4: Capable of neutralizing terrorist networks and
denying terrorist safe havens with limited U.S. and Coalition support.
The Afghan Special Security Forces are capable of conducting raids
independently using their own intelligence and Special Mission Wing
(SMW) to execute long-range infiltrations in low illumination and
reflect the overall potential of the ANDSF. However, they are not ready
to stand alone to deny safe-havens to potential terrorist groups
without U.S. and coalition support.
Condition 5: Promote continued U.S. and international funding
commitments. President Ghani's signing of the Bilateral Security
Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement and public support for our
continued Coalition troop presence warrants international donor and
U.S. funding commitments. Without our presence, funding for the ANDSF
will likely evaporate.
Condition 6: Retain regional access, freedom of movement, and
action. Coalition Forces have maintained regional access, freedom of
movement, and action through a supportive government that wants our
support as a regional counterterrorism partner.
Senator Inhofe. At our last hearing, you stated the Afghan
army and national police have shown that they can win battles
on their own, overmatching insurgents whenever challenged. You
also estimated that it would be unlikely that the Taliban would
be able to overmatch them on the battlefield in 2015. How has
that estimate changed? Or has it?
General Campbell. Sir, I think again that this fighting
season we knew was going to be very, very tough. I still
believe that the Taliban cannot overtake the government. They
will not overthrow the Afghan Government. They will continue to
challenge the Afghan Security Forces. As the Afghan Security
Forces continue to grow, they have stretched the Afghan
Security Forces. As you look at the map Senator McCain referred
to, those areas up in the north or some areas up in Badakhsan
and in the far northeast, Farah, Kunduz, are areas in the past
that we had not seen as much insurgent activity. But, again,
all the enemy has to do is go in and cause terror, fear, and
then come back out, may not try to occupy or control, but they
are really trying to stretch I think the Afghan Security
Forces.
Their main goal continues, I believe, to be Helmand,
Kandahar, the heartland of the Taliban. So as they pull forces
from maybe the south or the east to the north, it could make
the Afghan Security Forces vulnerable. In the south, the Afghan
Security Forces understand this. They have a campaign plan for
this fighting season. They have a campaign plan of what they
want to do during the winter in preparation for the next
fighting season. So I think they understand this and continue
to work to try to improve.
Senator Inhofe. You know, I and probably every member of
this committee have been over there and have observed the
advancements that are made by the Afghans. I think they are
real. Senator Reed in his opening statement said something
about the will to fight. Has there been a deterioration in the
will to fight on their behalf?
General Campbell. Sir, we have seen on two occasions, sir,
in Kunduz with the police and probably northern Helmand with
the police that you had some members lose that will. They are
taking a hard look at why that happened, whether it was poor
leadership, which I believe was a big part of that, whether
they had just been in the fight too long and not been able to
rotate. Again, that is probably two battalions' worth out of
100-plus battalions. For the most part, I see the Afghans
continue to have the will to fight.
In the places that we have looked at that have come out, a
lot of those have been actually police that were untrained
police. They were hired, had not gone through the requisite
training, had been put out very hastily out on the checkpoints.
They may not have been supported by other forces. When they
took fire, they felt they may not have been supported and they
left. But, sir, that is not the majority. It is far from the
majority of the Afghan forces, and I think they continue to
learn from that and they have made adjustments.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Then lastly, you did already address the abusive behavior
or the accusations over there. But the press reports also--they
said, quote, they are happening also on our bases. You did not
say anything about our bases. Is there anything that you would
share with us as to whether or not--the accuracy of that
accusation?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I think the thing that
started this piece was a media article, and it was citing cases
from 2010, 2011, and 2012. I have reiterated my policy in
writing to all of my folks. I have not seen anything on our
bases, sir. Absolutely not.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you.
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
General.
I want to dig into a piece of your testimony just to make
sure we are all kind of on the page you are on. You talk about
we all knew this fighting season would be tough. Talk about why
this fighting season was particularly challenging.
General Campbell. Sir, we knew this was going to be tough,
again because this was really the first year that the Afghans
were going to be totally on their own.
Senator Kaine. So the Taliban would want to test that
early.
General Campbell. Sir, absolutely. The Taliban knew that as
well, and they also knew that if there was going to be some
sort of reconciliation in the end, they wanted to operate from
a position of strength. To get a position of strength, they got
to fight and they got to go out and cause disruption with the
Afghan Security Forces.
So I think everybody knew this was going to--the Afghans
certainly knew this was going to be very tough. They tried to
get out in front of this by conducting a multi-corps operation
early on in the February time frame. So they actually started
the fighting season--the Afghan Security Forces did--as opposed
to waiting till the Taliban brought it on. There is usually
about an April to October fighting season that people talk
about. This year, as I said, there really was not lull. There
was a continuous fight. The Afghans a lot of times take the
winter time frame to regroup to do additional training. They
did not have that opportunity.
Senator Kaine. They would love not only to be militarily
successful in this fighting season, but they would love to
destabilize the civilian government if they could if at all
possible.
General Campbell. The Taliban, yes, sir. Absolutely.
Senator Kaine. Talk a little bit about the Taliban post
Mullah Omar. We talked a bit about this in my office yesterday.
Sort of internal divisions and factions. We have also heard
claimed ISIL affiliations in Afghanistan, but a lot of the
reports have suggested that may be Talibanis who are not happy
with their leadership. So they are claiming an affiliation with
ISIL. Who is the Taliban today? Talk about that a bit.
General Campbell. Sir, thanks. Sir, again, the Taliban
under Mullah Omar had a spiritual leader. He had been there for
years and years. They did not see him for many years. In fact,
for the last two and a half years, there has been a big lie out
there that he had been passing on guidance, and many of the
Taliban I believe now feel that they trusted somebody that was
not there.
So they are disenfranchised. They want to do something
about it. So they are fighting back against Mansour because
they knew Mansour was the guy that had something to do with
this. So there are fractures within the Taliban. Mansour,
Yaquob, Manan, and many other ones, Dadullah. They are trying
to take control of a piece of it.
The Taliban are very decentralized, and so they do
operations that are very decentralized. But Mansour is trying
to get a coalescent group there. He has named, I think as
Senator McCain talked about early on and Senator Reed, but he
has named Siraj Haqqani as one of his deputes. Zawahiri from AQ
[al-Qaeda] has come out and said I pledge allegiance to the
Taliban as well. So there seems to be some steam over the Omar
piece to try to coalesce and get a group. But they have their
own issues with funding, with being able to work together,
leadership issues.
Up mostly in Nangarhar in the east, we have seen a rise of
Daesh or ISIL-KP [the Islamic State in Khorasan Province]. It
has been reported in a lot of different provinces, Sar-e Pol,
Helmand. But Nangarhar is where ISIS, or the Daesh, have
predominantly been, and that is where they want to set up and
use Jalalabad as their capital of Khorasan Province and they
want to try to recruit and they want to expand. This year,
right now the Taliban and Daesh continue to fight each other,
and so they are going at it inside of there.
A lot of the Daesh's we see continue to be disenfranchised
Taliban that maybe see Daesh as a way to gain more media, more
resources. So they kind of change T-shirts, raise a different
flag. We see a lot of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan] that are
Pakistani Taliban that have gone over to the Daesh as well.
So we continue to look at that. When I was here in
February, I think I called it nascent. The term I would use
today would be operationally emergent as they continue to try
to build upon their capacity. President Ghani looks at that. I
look at it every day as we move forward.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you about one more topic.
Prior to this assignment, you were Vice Chief of Staff of
the Army, and one of your responsibilities was readiness. We
are having an intense budgetary discussion here. How many of
our military strategies around the globe are limited because of
readiness deficits in the current budget environment?
General Campbell. Sir, all of the forces that I get in
Afghanistan have the requisite training and they have gone
through all of that. So I have not suffered that in
Afghanistan. I do know that with all the services, they
continue to have issues as we look toward the sequestration. I
think over time they have been able to balance that based on
priorities to provide Afghanistan the requisite forces with the
right training. But as the budget will continue to have issues,
hopefully that will not impact Afghanistan, but it certainly
could as we move forward, sir.
Senator Kaine. General, I appreciate your testimony. As
much as I agree with members of the committee that our strategy
in Afghanistan should be conditions-based not calendar-based, I
hope we will have a budget that is conditions-based, not
calendar-based to a decision that was made in August of 2011.
We should be making budgetary decisions based upon the needs of
today.
With that, Mr. Chair, thank you.
Chairman McCain. I agree.
Senator Cotton?
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
General Campbell, thank you very much for your service to
our country and thank you for the service you represent of the
many American men and women you have in theater with you.
I want to start with the Kunduz hospital bombing. So I
understand that an American aircraft and American ground troops
were involved in calling for fire that ultimately hit that
hospital?
General Campbell. Sir, we have U.S. special forces on the
ground. They are doing train, advise, and assist with our
Afghan partners. Our Afghan partners called for fire. The U.S.
aircraft delivered those munitions. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. There are three investigations underway?
General Campbell. Sir, I have a DOD [Department of Defense]
investigation. There is a NATO investigation, and the Afghans
are doing an investigation and will be open and transparent. I
have talked to investigating officers, Brigadier General Rich
Kim. He is up in Kunduz today. I talked to him this morning. He
is reaching out to all the folks that were involved there. He
is reaching out to Doctors Without Borders to make sure that we
have everything we can on this investigation as we move
forward.
Senator Cotton. You conduct investigations like this
anytime there is a similar incident?
General Campbell. Sir, we have to get to the facts. There
are a lot of questions out here. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. Do you think there is anyone here who
regrets this incident more than the pilots of that aircraft?
General Campbell. Sir, everybody wants to make sure that we
find out what happened. As you know, every soldier, sailor,
airmen, and marine, if they are involved in something like
this--that hurts.
Senator Cotton. Is there anyone that we are to blame for
this incident other than the Taliban for going into a civilian
area and fighting among civilian targets?
General Campbell. Sir, the investigation will tell me, as I
get the facts on that. But as you mentioned, the Taliban did go
into Kunduz. The Taliban did know that they were going to cause
a fight inside a built-up area. As I talked about, you know,
Taliban causes, based on the UN [United Nations], over 70
percent--I believe it is a little bit more--they target
civilians. There is a difference between target civilians and
what happened at the hospital.
Senator Cotton. The Taliban, like our enemies in Iraq, like
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, intentionally target
civilians and intentionally use civilians as shields. Is that
correct?
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Senator Cotton. I want to talk briefly about some of the
stories about abuse of children among certain Afghan leaders.
So you are a four-star general at the highest level of command
in Afghanistan. I served there six years ago as a captain.
There is a big gap between those two levels. Sometimes we see
things differently. I received training before I went, as did
my soldiers, and in Afghanistan I received training. I provided
training that said that such behavior was unacceptable. Nor did
I ever see such behavior. Is that still the case today,
training for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines
throughout the country?
General Campbell. Sir, that is correct. The Afghans have
also incorporated this into their training, human rights
training, under the basic training courses. In their officer
accession training, they have incorporated this. They have also
trained their JAG's [Judge Advocate Generals], or their
lawyers, to be able to perform what we call mobile training
teams to go out to the different corps to reemphasize the human
rights training throughout. President Ghani has stated
emphatically that he will prosecute anyone suspected of
committing sexual assault upon children.
So as I said in my opening statement, we have looked at
this very hard, and at least since 2011, I know that there has
always been a policy out there that says you will report
violation of human rights. I reiterated that in writing here
recently based on the media reports, and I have also required
that within 30 days all personnel in theater complete
additional training on human rights abuse reporting
requirements and that everybody new coming into theater
complete training upon their arrival into theater to make sure
that we get everybody there. The training very clearly
indicates that sexual abuse by Afghan Security Forces is a
human rights abuse issue.
Senator Cotton. Well, thank you.
You said that back to 2011. I can tell you that at least in
my neck of the woods in Afghanistan, it went back to at least
2008. I suspect it went back to 2001 as well.
I would like to turn to your testimony about the
differences in this fighting season from previous fighting
seasons. You cited the rise of the Islamic State, the national
unity government, Pakistan military operations in eastern and
northern Afghanistan. But there is also the difference of our
presence in the country. Your testimony on page three states,
``In years past, our aircraft provided responsive and often
decisive close air support to coalition and Afghan troops in
contact. This is no longer the norm but the exception. Our
force reduction, drop in enablers, and resultant close air
support gap have created challenges for the ANDSF [Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces]; they have understandably
struggled at times to adjust.''
It sounds to me like, General, that our unwise and
precipitous drawdown in Afghanistan over the last couple years
have contributed as much to the difficulty in the fighting
season this year as anything that we have seen from enemy
activity.
General Campbell. Sir, what I would say is that we knew
that we would have to continue to do train, advise, and assist
in many areas that we talked about, logistics, intelligence,
special operating forces. Close air support is the one that I
get asked about from the Afghans every single day. It is an
area that we started too late. We will continue to work that
very hard. We are surging on building their pilots, building
their maintainers. But as I put in my statement there, it has
been slow coming. So what we have really worked with the
Afghans is to enable them in every other way to try to work
through this with using their own QRF's [Quick Reaction
Forces], using every indirect fire means that they have. So it
is a balance and making sure that they can work through that.
Again, the Taliban do not have close support helicopters.
The Taliban do not have up-armored Humvees. The Taliban do not
have a lot of the sophisticated technical equipment that we
have provided to the Afghans over the years.
I go back to leadership and leadership makes a difference.
In areas that they have had problems, I think leadership has
been the key.
But we have to be able to provide the Afghans with this
ability to provide their own close air support, and that is
going to take several more years to get there. If they would
have had their own close air support at the levels that they
probably wanted, maybe something like Helmand may not have
happened. But as we go through and look at that--they are very
committed to working through this piece of it, and they have
made many adjustments as they go forward.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
You had said in response to Senator McCain that you deal in
capabilities not personnel numbers. I hope the President does
as well.
Chairman McCain. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Campbell, thank you for being here this morning and
for your service.
Thank you also for your forthrightness in talking about
what happened with the bombing of the hospital in Kunduz. I
know all of us looked at that horrific accident and want to
know how that could happen. I appreciate your talking about the
effort to investigate on our part what happened there.
But do you have any reason to object to having an
independent investigation done by the UN or another independent
body of what happened?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I have trust and confidence in the
folks that will do the investigation for NATO, the folks that
will do the investigation for DOD, and in the Afghan partners.
So all the very, very tough questions that we are all asking--
they will get after that. My investigating officer, again, is a
brigadier general, Rich Kim. I have all the trust and
confidence that he will get answers to all of those questions
and he will continue to work that very hard and will continue
to be transparent and provide all of that to this committee and
to the American people as we move forward.
Senator Shaheen. But as I understand your answer then, you
would not object to and would cooperate with an independent
body other than NATO or our Department of Defense in doing that
kind of an investigation?
General Campbell. I would let my higher headquarters or
senior personnel make that decision. We are reaching out,
again, to Doctors Without Borders and the personnel that were
on site and making sure that we get all sides of the story. I
did talk again to the investigating officer this morning. He
has done that. He has talked to a few. He is continuing to try
to get out to locations where he can talk to doctors, nurses,
survivors of that to make sure he gets all that story. We will
certainly share all of that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
There was a very interesting recent news article about the
role that Afghan-trained special forces units played in
regaining control of Kunduz and the role that female soldiers,
who were part of those units, played. I wonder if you could
share with us what you know about how those women who are
trained to serve in the Afghan army are faring and the role
that they are playing and the successes that they are seeing on
the ground.
General Campbell. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
I do believe that having the ability to have Afghan females
embedded in the special operating units provide them a unique
capability as they get on objectives to talk to females that
are on those objectives. They use this quite frequently. Female
Engagement Teams is what we used to call it. I think they call
it the same thing. So that has been quite helpful to their
national mission force, which is their equivalent of our
Rangers, at Qatayhas. They have some of these females also
inside of their commando unit. So this is quite good.
The MOI, the Ministry of Interior, with the police
continues to do better and better on recruiting females as
police, and the police can continue to come in and probably
operate in their own hometowns. It is a little bit more
difficult for the army to recruit females because most of them
would have to come in and then deploy someplace throughout the
country. So the MOD [Ministry of Defense] is a little bit
farther behind, but we continue to work it very hard.
This committee has earmarked money for us on gender
integration that we work toward recruiting methods. I have a
gender integration advisor that reports directly to me that
works with Ms. Ghani, that works with all the folks in
Afghanistan to continue to look at how we can do better
building this capacity. It has been slow. Culturally it is
hard, but I think both President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah really
want to get after this.
Senator Shaheen. Well, I know that most people on this
committee have talked about the importance of ensuring that
women continue to have a place in Afghan society that gives
them opportunities. So this is one of the ways in which we can
see women advance that I think will have a trickle- down effect
across other sectors. So I appreciate the efforts that you have
undertaken.
I also want to thank you for supporting the Special
Immigrant Visa Program [SIV] for those in Afghanistan who have
helped our troops. As you may be aware, the Defense
Authorization Act this year includes an additional 3,000 Afghan
SIV's, and maybe you could just speak briefly to how important
that is in terms of our dealings with Afghans and getting them
to help us.
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think as you know we have been
dependent on some great Afghans over the years to provide
interpreter/translation skill sets for us that we did not have.
They put their life on the line with tactical units. They have
done it for many, many years over and over. They put themselves
at risk and their families at risk. I think anything that we
can do to help mitigate the impact on them and the safety of
them and their families is greatly appreciated. I know that I
get asked all the time about that. They work that through our
embassy. Our embassy has a great program under Ambassador
McKinley to work through that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte?
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General Campbell, for your
service to the country and your leadership.
I wanted to ask you about--right now the administration's
stated policy in Afghanistan, as reiterated when President
Ghani visited our country in March, is that we will be drawing
down to a normal embassy presence in Kabul with security
assistance, just as we have done in Iraq and by the end of
2016. If that remains our policy, in light of the capability
gaps that you have identified in your testimony and have been
identified many times before this committee, what would be the
consequences of that in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Ma'am, if we go to a normal embassy
presence, as you stated there, we would have very limited
train, advise, and assist capability from Kabul.
Senator Ayotte. What do you think will happen to
Afghanistan if we do that?
General Campbell. Well, it will take much longer to
continue to train in some of those critical areas that we need
to train. So it would be very difficult, again, to do train,
advise, assist.
Senator Ayotte. So would we lose and would the Taliban gain
territory?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think that the Afghan Security
Forces, you know, where they are today, where they were two
years ago, where they will be in another year and a half--they
continue to improve. I do not believe that the Taliban can take
over the government. I do believe the Taliban understand that
they stress the Afghan Security Forces pulling out to the outer
pieces of Afghanistan, cause casualties on some of the road
checkpoints----
Senator Ayotte. General, I guess the question I want to
understand is without getting into numbers of troops or
anything like that, do you think, based on your military advice
being the Commander in Afghanistan, that we should revert to an
embassy presence alone by the end of 2016? Do you think that is
what we need to do to make sure that Afghanistan does not
become yet again a haven for al-Qaeda?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. I understand the question. I
have provided my chain of command options because I believe
there have been a lot of different transitions over the last
couple of years since that decision was made. If you go to just
embassy-only, again, our ability to do TAA [train, advise, and
assist] is very limited. Our ability to do CT is much more
limited.
Senator Ayotte. So your recommendations would be a presence
beyond the embassy, without getting into what they are.
General Campbell. The different options that we have laid
out through the chain of command provides our senior leadership
with options above and beyond a normal embassy presence based
on changes that have happened over the last two years and
changes on----
Senator Ayotte. So here is what I want to make sure the
American people understand. Why does this matter? Why does it
matter that we continue to work with the Afghan Security Forces
to ensure that Afghanistan does not go back to a place where it
becomes a haven for a group like al-Qaeda?
General Campbell. As I said in the opening statement,
ma'am, Afghanistan continues to be a dangerous area. That
region of the world, all of its neighbors do not play by rules.
Areas in Pakistan, areas in Afghanistan, if not continue to
have pressure on them----
Senator Ayotte. Does it matter to our security?
General Campbell. I think that as I said up front, we have
not had another 9/11 attack on our homeland because we have had
forces that have been forward deployed and have continued to
provide pressure and have continued to train our Afghan
partners so that they have this capability to take that on for
themselves. But that is going to take some time.
Senator Ayotte. I wanted to ask you about Iran's activities
in Afghanistan. Can you tell us what Iran, if anything, is
doing right now in Afghanistan in terms of supporting the
Taliban or other groups?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. At this level, I can tell you
that we have some reports that Iran has provided money, weapons
mostly in the west in the Harat area to the Taliban to fight
Daesh.
Senator Ayotte. They are supporting the Taliban right now--
Iran--with resources, money and weapons.
General Campbell. Again, we have reports that they have
provided money and weapons to the Taliban mostly in the west
around the Harat area. I do not have numbers of how much, how
much money, how extensive that is, but there have been reports,
yes, ma'am.
Senator Ayotte. How has cooperation been with Pakistan in
dealing with the Haqqani network and what more should we be
doing there?
General Campbell. Well, as you know, Haqqani continues to
be a big threat not only against the coalition but also the
Afghan people. Haqqani are the ones that were traditionally
responsible for the high-profile attacks, the VBIED's, vehicle-
borne IED's, the suicide vests. Haqqani are the ones that
attack innocent civilians.
So what I have stressed to Pakistan and I think at all
levels of our Government from DOD all the way to the White
House continue to express to Pakistan that they have to do more
to not provide sanctuary to Haqqani inside of Pakistan, so we
got to continue to keep the pressure on and make sure that
Pakistan understands that there is a common enemy here that
Afghanistan and Pakistan should work together. Terrorism knows
no boundaries. So they have to work it out together.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Has the Iranian assistance to the Taliban
increased or decreased or stayed the same recently?
General Campbell. Sir, I would have to come back to you on
the record. I would tell you that we saw it a few months as
there was increased fighting with Daesh and Taliban out in the
west, but I could not tell you if that was more or less than
from before.
[The information provided by General Campbell is classified.]
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly?
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your hard work in a very difficult
place.
One of the most expensive things has always been to have to
take the same ground twice. You know, we want to look at things
as they are and not as we hope. One of the main concerns I have
is that it makes it more difficult for the American and
coalition troops who are in Afghanistan and it makes it more
dangerous for them if we are not able to fulfill each of the
roles that the Afghan Government should in terms of security,
in terms of air, in terms of intelligence, in terms of the
logistics, that the weaker they are in those areas, it puts our
men and women in greater danger.
So it is a long way of asking you, are we really in a South
Korean type situation where we have to put significant numbers
in for a long term to help create the stability that needs to
be there? It seems from year to year to year we just kind of
bounce along or it gets a little bit worse. Is it not more
applicable to a South Korean type situation?
General Campbell. Sir, I would not compare it to South
Korea. What I would tell you is what we have been able to do
over the last 14 years is provide the Afghan Security Forces--
remember in 2001, they did not have an Afghan army. They did
not have an Afghan police. So they did not have an Afghan air
force. So the capabilities that they have today, because of the
great work by many men and women--and many of them have paid
the ultimate sacrifice. They are in a different place now. So
they have a capability, and they want to be a partner in the
region. They want to have their own CT capability to fight the
terrorism that is out there. Everybody is working very hard to
do that.
Force protection for the coalition, the U.S. forces, the
NATO forces--I have that. That is my number one priority, to
make sure that I do everything I can to mitigate where I would
have issues with that. Today with the resources I have and the
authorities that I have, I am comfortable where I am to be able
to provide the right force protection for those forces.
Senator Donnelly. We have come a tremendously long way, but
we want to make sure it does not slip back. The worry is that
if we just simply do numbers-based work, that it does not take
into consideration what is going on in the field.
So one of the proposals, I hope and assume, is that you
have given to the administration your best win scenario or the
best Afghan Government stabilization scenario, that you say,
look, here if I am not getting determinations on we want less
people or we want this or we want that, here is the best plan
for success. Is that going to be one of the things that is put
forward?
General Campbell. Sir, as we talked earlier, the courses of
action I provided to my senior leadership are based on
requirements, based on the capabilities that we talked about.
Of course, any military person on the ground wants to make sure
that that end state, that outcome, is success. We are not going
to put something forward that would not lead to that.
Senator Donnelly. When you look at where we are, in terms
of the village and tribal elders, what are the things we need
to do to give them long-term confidence that they should be
betting on our side as opposed to the Taliban? If you are in
some of those outlying areas and you see things happen like
what just happened in Kunduz--what are the kind of things they
are looking for that we need to be providing?
General Campbell. Sir, what they are looking for is for the
Afghan Government to provide them governance at the local and
at the district level. I think if you are a tribal elder, if
you are somebody on the outskirts, you are not thinking in
terms of what can the coalition provide. You are thinking in
terms of what can the Afghans provide, and so they look at the
Afghan forces and want to make sure that they have the ability
to have governance at that level.
President Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, the senior leadership in the
MOI, MOD continually try to engage with the senior elders. They
call them shuras, and so in Helmand, right after they had
issues in Musa Qala, the senior military got on the ground.
Major General Abdullah Khan brought in local elder leaders to
work through that piece. They also try to engage local elders
to build Afghan local police so that the villages can provide
their own security. They will do that in Kunduz as well as they
continue to move forward, and they will bring in the local
leadership to make sure they understand what the Security
Forces can provide and then what the Afghan Government can
provide.
Senator Donnelly. What was missed by the Afghans in Kunduz
in terms of the infiltration of the Taliban and then coming in?
What did we miss, or did we know and were not able to stop it?
What happened?
General Campbell. Sir, we are still looking at that, sir.
We have asked that question and the Afghans have asked that
question. President Ghani has established a commission, for
lack of a better term, to get up into Kunduz to give him a
readout on why this happened, who was responsible. So he has a
commission that is also doing that.
Senator Donnelly. The reason I ask--not to interrupt you,
General--is you wonder if there is another one brewing
somewhere else and are we picking up on the signals, or are the
Afghans picking up on the signals, and are we putting in place
a way to stop it from happening?
General Campbell. Sir, that is exactly the same question
that President Ghani asked at a meeting of the National
Security Council when he activated this commission. He said the
exact same thing. I want to make sure I understand what
happened, why it happened, and I want to make sure that it
cannot happen again. So we need to get the senior police and
army into Kunduz City to do that, and if you have people that
gave up and walked off the job, then they need to be
disciplined. If you have general officers that did not fight,
then they should not be in those positions. So he has asked all
those tough questions.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for your service.
In an address to the Nation on May 27, 2014, President
Obama said Afghanistan--and I quote--we will bring America's
longest war to a responsible end and then announced calendar
dates for the withdrawal. I will quote him again. At the
beginning of 2015, we will have approximately 9,800 U.S.
service members. By the end of 2015, we will have reduced that
presence by roughly half, and we will have consolidated our
troops in Kabul and Bagram Airfield. One year later by the end
of 2016, our military will draw down to a normal embassy
presence in Kabul with a security assistance component, just as
we have done in Iraq.
In looking at that, number one, from 9,800 down now--have
we drawn from 9,800 down in a manner consistent with following
that goal to its end as indicated on May 27?
General Campbell. No, sir, because what happened is back in
the February/March time frame, we asked for flexibility, and so
President Obama provided me flexibility on the timing and the
number. As you remember, 9,800 to provide train, advise, and
assist through this very first fighting season. If I had to get
down to the 5,500 number by the end of this year, I would have
had to start closing bases like Jalalabad, Kandahar, and even
Bagram. So I asked for, President Ghani asked for some
flexibility, and currently that 9,800 number I still have and
are not going to get down below that--required to get down
below that until probably May of 2016 time frame as we move
toward the current projection of this embassy-based.
But again, I have gone in with different courses of action
that outline pros and cons of different locations and different
force levels based on the capabilities that we need to continue
to provide to the Afghans.
Senator Rounds. Based upon that, it is fair to assume that
Bagram is not in the position of being closed down at this
time.
General Campbell. Sir, the current plan would have Bagram
closed by the end of 2016.
Senator Rounds. Have you made any movements toward that end
yet?
General Campbell. Sir, over the last couple of years, we
have had to close hundreds and hundreds of bases, so every day
we continually what we call ``descope'' and get rid of
buildings, get rid of equipment to send back to the United
States, turn over to the Afghans, other partners, and so every
day even in Kabul we are on that. We continue to descope. We do
that at Bagram. We do that at Jalalabad. We do that at
Kandahar. So I am doing that every day, but I have not reached
a point where if a decision is made to keep Bagram that is
irreversible.
Senator Rounds. Okay.
With regard to Taliban funding, if you could look at it
right now and determine where most of the funding is coming
from, could you list out where the funding for Taliban is
currently coming from in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Sir, a lot of the funding comes from
narcotics, from drug smuggling. It comes from kidnapping. It
comes from other countries that support the Taliban. So there
is a whole list.
Senator Rounds. Primarily local unit by local unit? I mean,
are they doing it on their own, separate, or is there a grand
plan in terms of all of them working together in a concerted
effort?
General Campbell. Sir, I think the Taliban is organized
where they have committees. They have a political committee.
They have an operations committee, that kind of thing. But they
are very independent--``decentralized'' I think is a better
word--as they conduct operations throughout Afghanistan.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
General Kim's report, the one which he would be working on
as we speak--is there a time frame for a release of that
report?
General Campbell. Sir, I have not determined that time
frame. I want to make sure that he has the time required to
talk to everybody that he needs to talk to. He has been up in
Kunduz for the last several days. I have had the ability to
talk to him each morning here. He is getting more and more
people to talk to, but as he talks to one person, that leads to
two more people to talk to. So I think this is going to take
some time.
As soon as I can get a preliminary assessment out of this,
I will go back to my senior leadership. Again, we want to make
sure that we can be transparent, open, very candid about what
happened here, learn from that, and make sure something like
this never ever happens again.
Senator Rounds. Reasonable to expect at least a preliminary
report within 30 days?
General Campbell. Sir, I think so, yes, sir.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator King?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to be very clear, General--and I think you have made
this clear, but in your professional military judgment,
conditions on the ground at the present time would require some
revision of the withdrawal plan to a Kabul-centric 1,000
personnel by the end of 2016. Is that correct?
General Campbell. I will stomp my foot. Yes, sir. The
options I provided provide pros and cons of different levels of
support above and beyond the 1,000, and I based that based on
my experience on the ground and the conditions that I have seen
as I have talked about Daesh, ISIL, what has happened in
Pakistan, the National Unity Government. So all of those are
factors and variables I considered as I worked on different
courses of action. Yes, sir.
Senator King. I am not asking you what you recommended. I
am asking you for your professional judgment as you are sitting
here today that there should revision to that plan.
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Senator King. Thank you.
General Campbell. Political questions. I am concerned about
the Ghani-Abdullah relationship. I understand there are still
some ministers not appointed. They are still in different
buildings. They do not seem to be communicating effectively.
This war is going to be impossible without some kind of unified
government in Kabul.
How are the politics of the National Unity Government
developing, and is there some role that we have to play to move
that along?
General Campbell. Sir, thanks for the question.
Again, sir, I think every single day both myself, my
partner, Ambassador McKinley--we work this and we understand
how important having a National Unity Government is. I think
the Afghans understand this as well. To think that there are
people that do not want the national unity government, that are
what I would call ``spoilers'' out there trying to disrupt
that, I think we would be foolish. Sir, there are. I think both
President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah understand this as well, and
they know that they have to do better to sync up where they are
going.
I think on major policy issues, both President Ghani and
Dr. Abdullah--there is no daylight between them. I think they
agree on those major policy issues on what is good for
Afghanistan and its future. I think where they have issues is
determining who is going to be this minister, who is going to
be the provincial police chief, those kind of things as they go
back and deal with their constituencies. But I think they
continue to understand they have to make those tough decisions.
On September 29th, they had a little over a year and they
understand now is the time to do that. I have seen, over the
last couple of weeks, an increased dialogue to make sure that
happens.
But that is a continual issue, and I think--you know,
again, the ambassador works that. I work that. All the other
international community ambassadors that are in Afghanistan
understand how important that is, and everybody consistently
works very hard to make sure that both President Ghani and Dr.
Abdullah understand that.
As far as the ministers, the only one that I know of not
appointed is the acting Minister of Defense, Stanekzai, who I
think is very, very capable and it would be a big mistake and a
tragedy if the parliament was to do something in Afghanistan to
make sure that he was not the minister. But he is absolutely
the real deal for Afghanistan as they move forward in the
ministry of defense.
Senator King. So finalizing that appointment would be a
step forward.
General Campbell. Sir, it would. Right now, President Ghani
has absolute trust and confidence in Mr. Stanekzai. He
continues to work as the acting minister, and I think he is
making decisions as the acting minister just as he would as a
minister.
Senator King. I hope you will maintain--I mean, we have a
substantial role there. We are very important to them, and I
hope we can use that influence to move this along.
I was disappointed, for example, when President Ghani spoke
to the Congress. Dr. Abdullah was sitting in the front row.
There was a great round of applause. That would have been a
wonderful moment for President Ghani to call Dr. Abdullah up
and receive the--it was a kind of symbolic gesture. It did not
happen. I hope you will continue to encourage President Ghani
to loosen up a little bit. He won. He could afford to be
magnanimous. That is free political advice to the president of
another country.
General Campbell. Sir, thank you. As you know, sir, Dr.
Abdullah represented Afghanistan at the UNGA [United Nation's
General Assembly] in New York City here last week and took that
on. I know that he and President Ghani continued to talk every
day as they went through that. So I think that is a step in the
right direction as well.
Senator King. Thank you.
Another political question. What is the feeling of the
population of Afghanistan about the Taliban? Is the Taliban
gaining adherence, losing adherence? Are they about the same?
If there were an honest poll taken, do you not approve of the
Taliban, what would the results be?
General Campbell. Sir, the people of Afghanistan understand
that the Taliban attacks civilians. The Taliban kill innocent
women and children. So the support that the Taliban have from
the average Afghan is not favorable. In fact, that percentage
over the years has continued to go down and down.
The Afghan people have great confidence, and the number one
institution in Afghanistan is their army. They have issues,
again, with the government. When they see terror, when they see
something happen that frightens them, they are going to blame
that on the government and on the Afghan Security Forces. But I
think if you put them side by side and said you can pick the
national unity government, you can pick the army, you can pick
the Taliban, they absolutely would not pick the Taliban. The
Taliban, again, go into many remote places. In some places,
they may provide some sort of Sharia law or governance. But I
think in the end, the people understand that the way of the
future for Afghanistan is with the national unity government,
having a very professionalized army and police, and so they do
not support the Taliban.
Senator King. Thank you. I am out of time.
Perhaps for the record, you could give us some of your
thoughts on whose side Pakistan is on in this struggle and what
role they are playing, just for the record. Thank you.
[The information provided by General Campbell is For Official Use
Only.]
General Campbell. Thank you, sir.
Senator King. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Graham?
Senator Graham. Thank you, General. Are you keeping Captain
McCarthy in check there?
General Campbell. Sir, I will take that for the record,
sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Graham. Okay.
Could you very briefly describe what winning would look
like in Afghanistan from an American point of view and what
losing would look like?
General Campbell. I think winning would have a stable
Afghanistan, a stable government, would have a professionalized
army and police that provided governance for the people of
Afghanistan, that people could go to school, people could work.
I think the opposite of that, an unstable Afghanistan would
provide opportunity for insurgents to use ungoverned spaces to
go after something like our homeland in the future.
Senator Graham. If we had the right configuration in
January 2017, what is the likelihood of winning over time?
General Campbell. Sir, I think we have a great opportunity
if we continue to support that Afghan Government and continue
to work with the Afghan Security Forces. This is our best
opportunity. We have not had a government like this that
reached out not only to the U.S. but to the international
community. We have not had a government that takes on its
responsibility to professionalize the army and the police like
we have. We have not had a government that understands what the
army and the police are going through. So this is our best
opportunity.
Senator Graham. Do the Afghan people want us to stay by and
large?
General Campbell. Sir, the Afghan people that I talk to
that I deal with--and I do bring in an advisory committee that
is made up of different facets of Afghan life to talk to about
every month. I do have a women's advisory committee that I
bring in to make sure we understand gender issues.
Overwhelmingly, the Afghans support the coalition and want to
continue to have that continued support.
Senator Graham. Do you agree with me if we go down to 1,000
forces, 1,000 people, Kabul-centric, embassy-centric, like 90
percent chance that the country falls apart?
General Campbell. Sir, I do not know if I would put a
percentage on it. Sir, what I would say is our ability to
provide train, advise, and assist and continue to grow the
Afghan forces would be very limited.
Senator Graham. What about the counterterrorism issue?
General Campbell. Sir, just from Kabul, I cannot do a
counterterrorism mission.
Senator Graham. Okay. Now, tell the American people why it
is in their interests for you to have a counterterrorism
footprint in Afghanistan.
General Campbell. Sir, I think two reasons. I think, first
off, we need to continue to build the Afghan capacity for their
CT element, and that takes our men and women to continue to
work with them as they do today. Their special operating
forces, their CTP's [counter terrorism police] are probably the
best in the region and continue to get better. But it is going
to take time to be able to raise that. So if we continue to
build their capacity, they want to be a regional partner. They
want to be able to handle those issues in that region. To have
a CT capability to keep pressure on some of the ungoverned
spaces--you know, we do have people that continue to want to do
bad things to the people----
Senator Graham. Let us dig into that a bit. A better
trained Afghan counterterrorism force is good for the stability
of Afghanistan. Do you agree?
General Campbell. I agree, sir.
Senator Graham. But there are no substitute for American
counterterrorism forces that would protect the homeland. Does
that make sense?
General Campbell. Sir, I believe that our counterterrorism
forces are the best in the world.
Senator Graham. But they would have a focus that the
Afghans would not have.
General Campbell. Again, we want to continue to build the
Afghan forces, yes, sir. But our forces provide our best----
Senator Graham. I am just trying to make the case, as well
as I know how, that we would be nuts to not have a
counterterrorism force inside of Afghanistan, United States
presence counterterrorism folks, making sure that we never get
attacked again like 9/11. Does that make sense to you?
General Campbell. Sir, I think General Dempsey has laid out
a regional CT piece to have regional CT throughout different
spots in the world to----
Senator Graham. But Afghanistan would be the centerpiece of
that.
General Campbell. Sir, I would concur with that, yes, sir.
Senator Graham. We are welcome there. They would welcome
this presence.
General Campbell. Absolutely.
Senator Graham. The only reason we would not have a
counterterrorism force in Afghanistan is because we decided not
to ourselves. The Afghans welcome that presence.
General Campbell. Sir, they welcome us there. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. Parwan Prison. Is that moving forward in an
acceptable way to use it as a national security detention
facility?
General Campbell. Sir, Parwan is the gold standard for
Afghanistan. Yes, sir.
Senator Graham. This new president is willing to use that
prison to take high-value targets, put them in jail so they
cannot bribe their way out. Is that correct?
General Campbell. Sir, he has moved high-value targets from
other provinces into Parwan because, again, it is the gold
standard. They have had some issues with some other prisons
here lately but not at Parwan.
Senator Graham. Just to end, one of my last questions. Do
you see a commitment by President Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah
to do things differently than Karzai that give you optimism in
terms of the future of Afghanistan if we continue to partner?
General Campbell. Sir, without a doubt.
Senator Graham. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Campbell. Thank you to all that serve
under you for really hard stuff that they are doing every day.
I will be looking forward to the investigation over the
tragedy of the Doctors Without Borders as it develops.
Corruption continues to be a major, major challenge in
Afghanistan. I know that Ghani made this a focus of his
campaign when he ran to lead the government in Afghanistan. But
I noticed the ``New York Times'' reporting last week that
corruption played a role in the Taliban's recent success in
Kunduz, saying that the local security forces were extorting
money from the locals, which raised sympathy for the Taliban.
They were being, in fact, hit up by the folks that we have been
spending hundreds of millions of dollars to train, and
obviously, that is unacceptable.
Could you talk about that, and what is your assessment of
the risk right now of corruption as it relates to the work we
are trying to do with the Afghan National Security Forces?
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
I think President Ghani has stated--many people say that
corruption is the number one issue as they look to the future.
President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah have really tried to get after
this from a couple different levels.
One is he knows that contracting has caused a lot of
corruption-type issues. So he has instituted a national
procurement directorate or agency that looks at every single
contract to make sure that those are valid, that he can get
this corruption out of the contractor piece.
The other area he has looked at very hard is on leadership
and trying to pick the right leaders based on their experience,
based on the right skill sets. So like something that you
referred to up in Kunduz where people are taking money,
extorting from the local folks up there, if he had the right
leadership in place, that would not happen.
So it is going to take time for him to get to all the right
levels to make sure he breeds this culture throughout the
Security Forces that corruption is not good and that if you are
corrupt, that you are going to be removed. You are going to be
held accountable. I have seen several instances over the last
several months where they have had different cases where both
in the MOI, the Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Defense,
where they have prosecuted folks that they found to be corrupt.
But it is going to take time, ma'am. I know they are both
committed to it. They both have worked very hard with their
inspector general counterparts in both the MOI and MOD to try
to help them get after the corruption. So I think they are both
committed.
Senator McCaskill. You are confident in their sincerity.
General Campbell. I am, yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. ISIL in Afghanistan. Obviously, this is
a problem that we are seeing the Taliban turning. I mean, all
the different factions in the Middle East are a challenge for
us, but in some ways they are also an advantage because there
is this fractionalization that keeps everyone from uniting in
terms of effective forces. I am worried about the conversion of
some of Taliban to an ISIS or ISIL loyalty situation and would
like your take on that.
I noticed in your previous testimony, you indicated that
you are seeing a switch of allegiance of the Taliban in
Pakistan to ISIL. If that is the case, I certainly would like
you to speak to that briefly because, obviously, Pakistan--that
is a whole other bag of worries in light of the fact that they
have nuclear capability.
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am. If I could hit the
Pakistan piece first because General Raheel Sharif and I have
talked about that as late as last week here. He has emphasized
that ISIL/Daesh has no place in Pakistan. So he absolutely
believes that that will be a threat as he moves forward. He
wants to make sure that that has no place. So I do not see
Pakistan aligning with ISIL if that is what you were saying.
Senator McCaskill. You see their government committed to
doing what is necessary without us having to prod, push, and
pay for that effort.
General Campbell. I have talked to General Raheel on that
several times, and I do believe that he is genuine and he is
pushing both his army and his intel services to fight Daesh.
Yes, ma'am.
On the other piece as far as ISIL and Daesh, we have seen,
as I said earlier, that--I would have called them nascent
several months ago. We put them in the category of
operationally emergent as they continue to recruit to gain a
base in predominantly Nangarhar in the eastern part of
Afghanistan. They are fighting other Taliban because their
philosophy there is a little bit different. We have not seen
them reach outside of Afghanistan, but I think that would be a
goal that they have if they have the ability to continue to
grow.
President Ghani has said that al-Qaeda was Windows 1.0 and
that Daesh is Windows 7.0 in their ability to use social media
to recruit. So he is concerned.
I made it early on a priority information requirement, a
PIR, for me, and I continue to look at that very hard. We have
talked to all the intelligence agencies inside of Afghanistan.
We are trying to partner Pakistan and Afghanistan up to look at
ISIL/Daesh as well to make sure that we all have a common
operating picture of what they are trying to do in the Khorasan
Province.
Senator McCaskill. Are they helping us with intelligence on
the ground, General, in terms of are they embedding effectively
in terms of human intelligence for us in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Are you talking about the Afghan forces,
ma'am?
Senator McCaskill. Yes.
General Campbell. I mean, Afghanistan probably--well, not
probably. Afghanistan has much better HUMINT [human
intelligence] than I have.
Senator McCaskill. Obviously.
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am.
Senator McCaskill. But are they effectively putting enough
resources behind that?
General Campbell. They have a very good NDS [National
Directorate of Security], which is their intel agency. They
work very well with the other pillars of police and the army. I
think what they have developed here in the last couple months,
what they call the Nazarot Center, is a national joint fusion
intelligence center where they try to take intelligence from
MOI, MOD, and the NDS to fuse national-level target sets. That
is something new and that is very good.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for being here today.
To look further into that flow of the foreign fighters that
are moving into Afghanistan, are we seeing more of a regional
draw with ISIL? In February, you mentioned that a few of the
Taliban seemed to be reflagging under the ISIS banner there.
Are we seeing that regional draw or are they drawing from
outside the region in north Africa, say? Then how does that
compare to the Taliban? Are we going to have local versus
foreign fighters? Is that going to continue to grow in
Afghanistan, and will it be similar to what we see with al
Nusra and ISIL that takes place in Syria?
General Campbell. Thank you, ma'am.
I think with ISIL, or Daesh, again particularly in the
Nangarhar area, we have seen mostly internal Taliban that want
to rebrand TTP, that want to rebrand. But there are reports of
people, foreign fighters, coming from outside of Afghanistan. I
could not give you a good percentage or numbers, but we have
seen increased reporting that there are some foreign fighters
that come in that want to try to establish again a base there
and try to bring in some sort of funding stream to build a base
in Nangarhar. But I think they are a ways from that. Again, the
Afghan forces, our forces continue to look at that.
I think the Taliban, if they have foreign fighter help,
whether that is Uzbek, Chechen. We have seen pieces and parts
of that up in the north. I think we have seen other reports
from the Afghans that they see a lot more of the foreign
fighters into the Badakhsan, into the Kunduz, into the Sar-e
Pol area. But as far as numbers or an increase in foreign
fighters, I do not think I could give that to you, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. What numbers are we looking at for ISIL
right now and also with the Taliban? What numbers are in
Afghanistan? Do you have any hard numbers on that? I know you
said it is difficult to determine the number of recruits, but
where are we?
General Campbell. Ma'am, the numbers I would give you would
be based on different reports I have seen. I could not give you
how accurate that would be, but I think in open press what I
have seen, anywhere between 1,000 and 3,000 on the Daesh. For
years and years, the numbers of Taliban inside of Afghanistan
has gone everywhere from 20,000 to 80,000. I think, hard to
distinguish in there which people just sympathize with the
Taliban and which ones are actually hard core Taliban, and the
intel community continues to look at that.
But what I would say is that the Afghan Security Forces
have really impacted the Taliban this year based on the number
of casualties that I believe they have caused the Taliban.
Senator Fischer. With the Afghan national police and also
with the local police forces--we visited about that a little
bit yesterday when you were in my office. What do you think are
their biggest challenges, the biggest weaknesses that they
have, and will they be able to become professional in moving
forward as we assess what our position is going to be in
Afghanistan?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think for the police, again, the
number one issue that I continue to stress with them is getting
the right leadership. The police have several thousand that are
untrained that provincial police chiefs have hired, and they
have not gone through the requisite training. They are doing
that to get them out on a checkpoint or get them into the fight
because they believe they have been stressed in different
areas. But they have got to get them into the right training to
make sure they have that.
I think with the Afghan local police, these are the ones
that have taken a lot of the casualties because they veered
outside of what they were designed to do and that was designed
to defend their local village. They were not designed to be 5
kilometers, 10 kilometers outside of that village to try to
take on a lot of Taliban. They were not equipped and were not
trained for that, but yet in some of the local areas, they have
misutilized them by putting them on those checkpoints.
Again, I believe that training is the key for the Afghan
police, but I think what we need to say here is that the police
in many cases are doing the same thing as the army. So in a
counterinsurgency fight, they are fighting very, very tough
like the army, and they are not manned and they are not
equipped like the army.
Senator Fischer. If the President would decide as one of
the options out there to keep our forces in Afghanistan longer,
what do you believe would be the reaction and the commitment of
our NATO partners? Would they support that decision? Would they
be able to maintain their contributions as well?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I think it would be country-
dependent. We have 41 countries that are tied into a residence
support right now. The ones that I have engaged with, for the
most part, are very supportive and want to continue to provide
assistance to Afghanistan either by contributing troops or
providing financial support. But I think again once the United
States makes the decision, we will see NATO come into that.
Senator Fischer. So you believe there would be support from
many NATO partners, also from the Afghan people if we would
choose to remain and continue a mission to stabilize the
country?
General Campbell. Absolutely, yes, ma'am.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to continue the line of questioning about the
incident we read about in the ``New York Times'' about young
boys being abused by Afghan commanders, as well as women and
girls. What is the military's policy when a service member
becomes aware of an instance of abuse? There has been some
discussion about what the policy actually is.
General Campbell. Yes, ma'am. What I said in a press
release a week or so ago was that there is no policy that says
disregard that. What our policy has said since 2011 is that you
have to report instances of sexual abuse by the Afghan Security
Forces up your chain command. So that is what I expect of all
of our men and women serving in Afghanistan to be able to do.
Senator Gillibrand. So the article talked about service
members who were disciplined who wanted to intervene or who
reported up their chain of command. Have you investigated those
instances?
General Campbell. Ma'am, as I said earlier, those from the
``New York Times'' article--these are cases from 2010, 2011,
and 2012 I believe. So, no, I did not have anything to do with
those cases.
Any reports that would come to me I would make sure that we
provided that to the Afghan Government as well. President Ghani
has made it very clear that he has a policy that he does not
tolerate that and he will prosecute that.
So the cases that you refer to are four or five, six years
ago. I cannot speak to those.
Senator Gillibrand. So have you followed up, though, to see
if those cases were handled properly?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I have not been involved in the
2010, 2011, or 2012 cases. No, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. So who should report to this committee
about an investigation of those specific cases? Because if the
policy changed in 2011, then arguably the cases from 2011 and
2012, if true, were handled incorrectly. Who is doing that
investigation?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I will have to take that for the
record. I do not know.
Senator Gillibrand. Okay. Please report to the committee
who is doing the investigation and when we will have the
results because if those individuals did report this and were
told to mind your own business, then obviously their commanders
were not following the policy in 2011 and 2012.
[The information follows:]
Any suspicion of human rights abuses, including suspected sexual
abuse of both adults and children must be immediately reported to the
chain of command, regardless of who the alleged perpetrators or victims
are.
The Department of Defense Inspector General may be best positioned
to conduct such an investigation.
Senator Gillibrand. What was the policy before 2011?
General Campbell. Ma'am, as I think Senator Cotton talked
about--and I was there in 2002, 2003, 2010 myself. This is my
third tour there. I have never seen a policy that did not
report it. I would tell you that there has always been a policy
that if you saw this, that you would report it. This is a
fundamental value of our military to treat people with dignity
and respect. So I cannot imagine somebody not doing that.
Senator Gillibrand. So why do you believe that the various
troops have reported this were told it is their culture? Why is
there an understanding by some troops that you do not intervene
when it is their culture? Are they poorly trained or just
unknowledgeable, or do you think commanders are getting it
wrong in the field?
General Campbell. Ma'am, I cannot speak again for those
individual cases, and I think those are disciplinary cases that
are either completed or ongoing. I would tell you that all the
forces I have been involved in absolutely understand what the
requirement is. Again, as I reiterated earlier, I have asked
all of our personnel currently in theater to go back and
receive this training again to make sure that we have 100
percent so that we did not miss anybody.
Senator Gillibrand. So what would we do today? If it was
reported that you hear screaming from Afghan military or Afghan
troops, from commanders, from children, what would our soldiers
do?
General Campbell. Our soldiers should report that up their
chain of command.
Senator Gillibrand. Then what does the chain of command do
with that information?
General Campbell. Ma'am, we would make sure that that
information got to the right authorities within the Afghan
Government, to the senior leadership in the Afghan----
Senator Gillibrand. So if the senior Afghan leadership
said, yes, we are not going to do anything about it because it
is our culture, what do we then do?
General Campbell. The Afghan leadership that I deal with I
do not think would say that. Again, I have talked to President
Ghani, Dr. Abdullah, the senior MOI, MOD, the senior army and
the police leaders. They absolutely understand this is not
conduct. This is criminal conduct and they understand that they
have to do something about it and they want to hold people
accountable. Are there going to be people that disregard that
in Afghanistan just like you would have maybe in any other
country, yes.
Senator Gillibrand. But you are saying then, though, that
our policy is still not to intervene. What our policy is based
on what you just said is we report it to the Afghanistan
authorities, and if they choose to do nothing, we do nothing.
General Campbell. No, I did not say that, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. So what do you do if they refuse to do
something?
General Campbell. Again, in the 14 months I have been
there, I have not had a case come to me that I had to go back
to the Afghan authorities and say you need to do something on
this. I think that is a result of the Afghans understanding
that they have to get after this. So I think they have improved
in that area. So I have not had to go back and do that. But if
something was brought through my chain of command to me that
there was abuse of children--this is criminal conduct--I would
make sure I went to the Afghans and said, you know, here is a
report. You need to go check out this report. I would expect
them to be able to do that. We work through our central
function three and the rule of law folks that I have that
continue to help provide train, advise, and assist in this area
with our senior Afghans, with their military lawyers as well.
So we would absolutely expect them to go do something. If they
did not do something and there was credible evidence that
something happened here, then I would raise that higher to the
president, and I would demand that something has to be done or
I will withhold this. There has to be conditions to this so
that they understand that. Blaming it on culture is not the way
that I think our forces have gone here.
Senator Gillibrand. So just to conclude, you are saying you
would raise it to President Obama and try to make him engage.
General Campbell. I would raise it to President Ghani.
Senator Gillibrand. President Ghani.
General Campbell. I would raise it first to the Minister of
Defense, Minister of Interior, the senior officials that I deal
with. Again, as soon as this news article came out, I called
President Ghani on this and said we got to make sure that--and
before I even finished the sentence, President Ghani said that
is absolutely criminal behavior. I will prosecute anyone that I
find that has done this.
The very next day, I went to a National Security Council
meeting. The president was there, Dr. Abdullah was there, the
MOD, MOI, all the senior cabinet members were there. Before he
started in his agenda of things that he had to get through, he
raised this issue and he made sure that every minister
understood that this behavior would not be tolerated. So I have
no doubt that Afghans get this, and I have no doubt that our
military personnel understand what is expected of them.
Chairman McCain. Senator Tillis?
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Campbell, welcome. The last time I saw you was in
Afghanistan, and before that, it was before this committee back
in February.
I do think that we have to go back and talk about a number
of the positive things that have occurred as a result of our
presence in Afghanistan. You did a great job of summarizing
that back in February, life expectancies, the number of
children in school, progress on protecting women and children.
It is a great story, and but for America's presence, I do not
think it would be a story that you would have been telling back
in February.
I want to go back to this drawdown and something that I
think you mentioned in February when we were talking with you
earlier this year. You just do not wake up Monday morning and
say I have got to bring down 1,000 troops and all the materials
that go with them by the end of the month. It takes a lot of
planning. I know that you have got a proposal to the President.
He has given you flexibility, which is what has allowed you to
keep the 9,800 there now. But at what point do you have to
start taking actions for the material drawdown to hit the 2016
end-of-year target? I mean, we have got to be weeks or months
away from you having to put a lot of those plans in place.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. It becomes a matter of physics.
Senator Tillis. How quickly do you have start--if the
President does not make any change in decision, when do we
start seeing material efforts to draw our troop forces down to
the embassy presence in Kabul?
General Campbell. Sir, as I said earlier, every single day
we continue to descope all of our bases out there. So we are
trying to get rid of unnecessary or stuff that was no longer
required in theater.
Senator Tillis. So you are effectively--I have got a couple
of questions, so I apologize for being short.
So you are effectively drawing down based on--I mean, you
are already taking the steps to draw down to something that we
know will be less than 9,800. We just do not know what the
number is.
General Campbell. Sir, I am. But I have also made sure that
based on the courses of action that I have recommended, if we
get a decision on that, it is not irreversible.
Senator Tillis. Well, I think the administration needs to
be crisp on this. I know you have provided it to your
leadership, but this is not something that should take long. I
think anybody who has followed the situation knows the
President is going down a perilous path if he goes far off of
what you already have in Afghanistan.
You mentioned something else, though, that I think is
important that I have not heard you talk about. That is in 2017
the other funding streams that are at risk that are also an
important part of the gains that we made and protecting those
gains I think with other partners. Can you tell me about any
progress or any concerns you have about that?
General Campbell. Sir, I think this is a very critical year
coming up for 2016. They will meet at the Warsaw Conference the
middle of next year, and that will determine all the donor
nations for how much they will donate for 2018, 2019, and 2020
for Afghanistan.
Senator Tillis. But that is critically--it is something
that is still an open switch and something that is critically
important if we are going to continue to build on our gains
there. Would you agree with that?
General Campbell. Sir, I do. I think again, having the
international community have confidence in Afghanistan is
important that we do not have donor fatigue there.
Senator Tillis. Thank you.
You know, something else that I just want to reinforce that
Senator Graham touched on--and he was trying to make the point
that there was counterterrorism resources to help us do our job
in the region. But what I think many of the American people do
not understand is the value of the CT efforts with respect to
threats in other areas of the region and potential threats to
the homeland. This was the birthplace of the 9/11 attacks.
There are bad people there who are trying to plot terrorist
actions against Americans, whether it could be American
installations abroad or right here in the homeland.
So getting down to an embassy presence only, we have heard
you say that we would lose all of our counterterrorism presence
in that region. Did I hear you correctly?
General Campbell. Sir, we would not have the ability to
conduct counterterrorism as I do today if we were just based in
Kabul.
Senator Tillis. So based on the current plan, a plan that
the administration is considering, we know it is going to be
diminished, but it could almost all go away by the end of next
year based on the current plans as you understand them today.
General Campbell. Sir, as I said up front, the planning
assumption in the current plan and glide slope that I am on is
to go to about 1,000 by the end of 2016. Yes, sir.
Senator Tillis. I think it is irresponsible and it is
dangerous.
I appreciate the work that you are doing because I know
that you probably have a different view. I respect the fact
that you are going through your chain of command, but this
President needs to understand he needs to be decisive and take
different action or he is putting American interests at risk.
Thank you all for your service.
Chairman McCain. Senator Manchin?
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General. I appreciate it.
I think what we are trying to get our hands around as far
as should we stay, if we do stay, how many will stay, and what
effect will that have. It goes back to the training and money
we have spent and the amount of effort and time we have spent
to train, how many people we have adequately to continue to
retrain, or will they ever be able to take the training over
themselves? Will ever trust them for that? How much money would
that cost? It just goes on and on and on, as you know.
The bottom line is, do you think that Afghanistan is more
stable and better prepared to take care of itself with our help
or without our help and how much of our help than Iraq was?
Because I think everyone is looking to the failed policies in
Iraq and saying, okay, why would you repeat that? I think it is
a different scenario as you said. The leadership in Afghanistan
has a much more different mindset and determined today than
Iraq was when we made our decision to leave.
So if you can just give me just a little--I just heard you
say about 1,000 is what you intend to recommend? Is that wrong?
General Campbell. No, sir. A thousand is the current
decision that we are on.
Senator Manchin. That is what we are on. We are on a glide
path to 1,000 right now by 2016.
General Campbell. Yes, sir, by the end of 2016. So that is
the current plan. That is to go to a normal embassy presence
that President Obama discussed back in 2014.
Senator Manchin. It would be hard to explain. Basically
that would be the same glide path we had if not maybe a little
difference than Iraq, and we saw the results of Iraq.
General Campbell. Sir, Afghanistan is not Iraq.
Senator Manchin. I got you.
General Campbell. You have a government that wants to have
you there. You have a government that wants to have a
counterterrorism capability. You have a fighting force that is
very resilient. So I think there are so many differences
between Iraq and Afghanistan.
Senator Manchin. Do you think that will change that
recommendation of 1,000, that will be upped?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I provided courses of action
and recommendations to my leadership that provides our
President, our national senior leadership with options based on
changes that have happened in the last two years.
Senator Manchin. The money we have spent right now--I mean,
it is an unbelievable amount of money for training the Afghans.
Do you expect that to continue, us pouring the money into there
for them to be able to train their people?
General Campbell. Sir, we are working very hard to make
sure we can continue to bring that money down.
Senator Manchin. Do they have any economy at all? Other
than the war effort, is their economy sucking off the U.S.
taxpayers? Do they have any ability to carry their own load
financially?
General Campbell. Sir, in the Chicago and the Tokyo
Commitments, they are required to provide about $500 million
toward their national security, and each year we try to up
that. Their economy is very, very tough, and President Ghani
based on his background--and the World Bank is working that
very hard. They had a very successful regional economic
conference here two or three weeks ago in Afghanistan. There
was just a Dubai conference where they had about 170- plus
investors come to take a look at it the different airfields
that we would leave. But it is going to take a long time to
build their economy. We built an army in a place they cannot
afford, sir. So they will be very dependent upon the
international community to continue to provide that money for
years to come.
Senator Manchin. General, finally, on the crash of the C-
130, we had six service members. One was from Marshall County,
West Virginia, Sergeant Ryan Hammond. I spoke to his parents
and his wife. I told them I would try to get all the
information I could of how this could have happened. We fly a
lot of C-130's in our Guard, as you know, and they are very
capable, able aircraft. Do you have any information that you
can share with me that I could share with the parents?
General Campbell. Sir, my thoughts and prayers are with all
the families. That very morning I went out to the crash site.
Right after that, I went to Bagram and talked to all of our C-
130 crews just to gather them in and talk to them. I did that.
Again, an investigation is ongoing.
Senator Manchin. Was it on takeoff is when--the accident
happened on takeoff.
General Campbell. Yes, sir. Sir, I can talk to you one-on-
one.
Senator Manchin. If you could, I would appreciate it, sir.
If I could just give his family some relief and some closure.
General Campbell. Okay, sir.
Senator Manchin. Thank you.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan?
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your testimony. It is very
enlightening and I know it is not easy to testify when you have
options on the way forward and you are not sure the commander-
in-chief agrees with you or not. So I think all of us
appreciate your testimony.
I am going to follow up on a number of the previous
questions you have been asked.
First, Senator Shaheen had asked about a UN investigation
possibly into the hospital accident. Does the UN usually
investigate major deliberate attacks on civilians in
Afghanistan when they are conducted by the Taliban?
General Campbell. Sir, I have not seen that in the past.
Senator Sullivan. I do not think they do typically.
So do you think it would seem fair or balanced if the UN
conducted an investigation, which was clearly on something that
was accidental--the hospital bombing--when they do not
investigate deliberate Taliban killing of civilians? Do you
think that would be viewed as fair, balanced, or something the
command needs or would welcome?
General Campbell. Sir, I cannot comment on how the UN would
do that. What I can comment on, as I said up front earlier, is
I have complete trust and confidence in the team that we have
to be thorough, transparent, and if there were mistakes made,
we will make sure that those come out. If there are people we
have to hold accountable, we will make sure we will do that. So
I have every trust and confidence in the U.S. and the NATO
investigation ongoing.
Senator Sullivan. I think most of us here do as well. I
certainly do not think an additional investigation by the UN
would be warranted or welcomed by this committee.
Let me ask the issue again--this is Senator Graham's and
Senator Tillis' questions. You are very focused on managing
risks. If we go forward with the current plan, does it increase
the risks that the Taliban could take over the government in
two or three or four years out?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I think we have another year
and a half to continue to grow the Afghan Security Forces. If
we went down to 1,000 around Kabul, we would not have the
ability to do train, advise, and assist----
Senator Sullivan. How about would it increase the risk that
the homeland would be attacked? You know, Senator Tillis had
some very good and direct questions that our CT capability
would essentially end. Would that increase the risk--I am just
talking incrementally increase the risk that the United States
of America would be attacked.
General Campbell. Sir, again, when the decision was made in
2014 by President Obama on the 1,000 going to a normalized
embassy, CT was not one of the variables tied into that
decision.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask just on the timelines. You
know, I was a lieutenant colonel in the Marines a couple years
ago. I was assigned to an OPT [Operational Planning Team] in
Afghanistan by General Dunford. When they were looking at the
force posture, our OPT was looking at the force posture that
would take us from the OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] mission
to the Resolute Support mission. It was a little frustrating to
be working on that because we had not gotten any guidance in
terms of numbers from the senior military or actually senior
civilian.
So you have said that you cannot talk about the options,
but have you actually been given a timeline by which the White
House is going to respond to your options and requests. As
Senator Tillis mentioned, the clock is ticking. Have you either
received information that you are going to be given guidance by
a certain date or have you requested a certain date by which to
be given guidance given that the clock is ticking on this very
important issue?
General Campbell. Sir, as you know, on a planning
perspective, as we lay out different courses of action, we have
what we call DP's, or decision points. So in all of our courses
of action, they would have a decision point of when that
decision would have to be made----
Senator Sullivan. Are we approaching one----
General Campbell.--so it would not be irreversible.
Senator Sullivan. Are we approaching one pretty soon?
General Campbell. Sir, I know that everybody in DOD,
everybody in NSC [National Security Council] is working very
hard to take a look at these different courses of action. As we
have talked about, the retrograde and the time that it takes
out, I think the senior leadership understands when those
decision points are and when they have to get those out.
Senator Sullivan. Let me ask a final question.
You know, having spent some time in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, I know you would probably agree with this. There is a
narrative in the region that in the 1980's we were very active
there because of the Soviet invasion, and we were very helpful
in terms of our assistance to people in those two different
countries. There is a sense that in the 1990's we, quote,
abandoned the region. I think that is a very powerful
narrative. I do not know if you have seen it there, but I
certainly have seen it there when I have been out in that part
of the world.
You mentioned--and I think it is really important testimony
today--that we are overwhelmingly welcome, as you mentioned, by
the civilian population, by the Afghan leadership. Do you think
if we draw down to just an embassy force, which is kind of what
we have in the rest of the world, that we would once again
resurrect this idea of abandoning the region, of abandoning the
people there, the governments there? If that were the case, how
do you think that would impact America's national security if
in the part of the world that is really the heart of the battle
against al-Qaeda and other places, the heart of the world that
brought us 9/11, that we were viewed once again as unreliable
and having abandoned the region, which is a narrative that is
very powerful still in that region? Do you think that narrative
would be resurrected, and how do you think that would impact
our national security?
General Campbell. Sir, I have been tied up with Afghanistan
for many years, and I think anybody in the military would tell
you presence equals influence. So the ability to continue to
provide train, advise, assist to our Afghan partners, to
continue to improve upon their capability is what any military
person would want to tell you. Again, I said that the Afghan
people continue to want to have a coalition presence. They
understand the impact that that has for them. So that is what
they want. They will continue to want that I believe unless we
do something that dissuades them from that.
But we have come a long way there, and a lot of this has to
do with this new national unity government. Remember, they
understand, different from where President Karzai was, that we
have provided a lot blood, sweat, and tears here, that many of
our men and women provided the ultimate sacrifice, we have
expended a lot of money, and they want to make sure that they
do not let us down here as well.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst?
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, General Campbell, for being here, and thank you
for your outstanding service and that of your men and women as
well. I do appreciate it very, very much, as do my
constituents.
I am going to go back to a couple points. They have been
talked about many, many times already this morning, General.
But going back to the sexual assault, the sexual abuses by
the Afghan National Security Forces against the Afghans,
particularly the young boys, it seems that many of the folks
that I have talked to that have served in that region, American
soldiers, it was common knowledge that this was happening. I do
not believe that there was a DOD policy that we turn a blind
eye. As a matter of fact, you have said since 2011 there has
been a policy in place, educational materials, classes, so
forth. But there may have been kind of an unofficial ``do
nothing'' policy. We are starting to see that corrected as it
comes to light. But it does affect the men and women that serve
with us in our forces and how they operate with the ANSF
[Afghan National Security Forces]. I mean, that is an issue, a
trust issue.
There was a 2011 report by Dr. Jeffrey Bordin. He was a Red
Team political and military behavioral scientist. He supported
half of the RC-East [Regional Command-East, Bagram]. He
commented--and I am quoting--several United States soldiers
reported that they had observed many cases of child abuse and
neglect that infuriated them and alienated them from the
civilian populace, and that there were numerous accounts of
Canadian troops in Kandahar complaining about the rampant
sexual abuse of children they have witnessed ANSF personnel
commit, including the cultural practice of bacha bazi, as well
as the raping and sodomizing of little boys. End quote.
Has any service member or civilian under your command now
or during your previous command of RC East reported up the
chain an allegation of an ANSF sexual assault against Afghan
children?
General Campbell. Ma'am, on this current tour, I have not
had any reports. I do not remember any specifically from 2010,
2011. I can go back and try to look at records for that.
Again, I cannot stress enough that this is about
discipline. This is about discipline of our men and women
understanding what right and wrong is, about treating people
with dignity and respect. As I said, even the Afghans,
President Ghani all the way down understand how important this
is, and they have reiterated to me that this is serious and
that if he knows of people that violate this, that conduct this
criminal activity, they will be prosecuted. We have reiterated
to our men and women again that if you see this, you have to
report this.
What you are referring to again is 2010, 2011, maybe 2012
reports. I think a lot has happened in that time frame. I
cannot comment on a particular company level or battalion level
unit that within that unit that the members of that unit felt
that it was okay to do some of that. Ma'am, I cannot comment on
that. I do not know that.
Senator Ernst. General, do you know of any instances where
an Afghan soldier was held accountable or an Afghan leader and
any disciplinary actions on their behalf?
General Campbell. I know that I have seen some disciplinary
actions over the last year in gross violation of human rights
when it has come to abusing of soldiers, abusing of other
members in the command. I have not seen it with the sexual
assault of children, though, in the last 14 months.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you. I think it is important
that we stress not only is it unacceptable amongst our own
ranks, but also those that we are serving with from that
region. So thank you for that.
Going back also to capabilities and conditions, I am glad
we look at that rather than the time frame. If we look at
keeping 10,000 troops on ground in Afghanistan, if there is a
decision point where we keep 5,000 troops on ground or zero
troops on ground, is there any way that you can just broadly
describe the conditions that must exist on the ground before we
get to those points? Do we leave it the same as we have now at
10,000? Or at what point could we get down to 5,000 and so
forth? Just very broadly. Thank you.
General Campbell. Again, ma'am, I think based on what has
happened since the President made his decision in 2014 to go
down to 1,000 around the embassy, we have taken a look at all
the conditions, and based on those, I have provided options to
take a look at the mission sets that we want to do in the
future. I believe we still have to do train, advise, and assist
at certain levels for aviation, for logistics, for
intelligence, for special operating forces. I believe that we
have to have a counterterrorism capability and you need a
certain amount of forces to be able to do that, so those are
based on what has happened in the last couple years and as we
look to the future, and so conditions on the ground have
changed since 2014.
I am appreciative that the senior leadership both at Joint
Staff OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and I believe
the White House are looking at these options, understanding
that conditions on the ground have changed and we have to look
at the pros and cons of this and move forward.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. My time has expired, but I do
want to thank you for your valuable, no BS assessment of what
is going on over there. We truly do need that. So thank you,
General. I appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Blumenthal?
Senator Blumenthal. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General, for your extraordinary service to our
Nation and particularly in your present role.
I have a question about Daesh, as I think you have referred
to it, interacting with the Taliban and with other factional
parts of our opponents there. How real a threat do you regard
Daesh as being compared to the Taliban, and could any sort of
negotiated solution involving the Taliban also involve those
other factions, including Daesh?
General Campbell. Sir, again, I think Daesh, ISIL, Khorasan
Province, ISIL KP, different names for--everybody is looking at
this to make sure that it cannot grow, it cannot build to a
level to do something like you have seen in Iraq and Syria.
Daesh and Taliban have different philosophies. They are
fighting each other. I do believe that within the ranks of the
Taliban, that there are reconcilables that understand that the
only way to end this is a political solution and they want to
be part of that inside of Afghanistan. Inside of the Taliban,
there will be a certain amount--I have upwards of 20 to 30
percent--that are irreconcilable, Haqqani probably being one. I
do not believe from what I know of Daesh that they are in the
reconcilable branch. They would be irreconcilable I would
believe at this point in time.
Senator Blumenthal. Are you satisfied with the efforts that
have been made toward reconciliation and negotiation so far?
General Campbell. Sir, I am not satisfied because we have
not got to it. So I mean, I think there is a lot more that can
be done by both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the Taliban, quite
frankly. So I am not satisfied. We got to continue to move
toward a peace process.
The first day that President Ghani took office in his
inauguration speech, he talked about bringing in the Taliban,
you know, that you have to be part of this peace process. You
cannot continue to kill fellow Afghans. You cannot continue to
kill fellow Muslims, and so be part of the peace process. I
think he genuinely wants that to happen and is doing everything
he can to try to push that, to include expending a lot of
political capital on Pakistan throughout the last several
months to drive them to help on reducing the violence inside of
Afghanistan to drive toward reconciliation.
Senator Blumenthal. Is that goal of reconciliation one of
the factors you consider in your recommendation as to what size
and scope the American presence there should be and over what
period of time? I think Senator Graham asked you what victory
would look like, what defeat would look like, but what your
answers suggest is that there is some different kind of picture
that it would look like.
General Campbell. Sir, I think there are a lot of different
audiences out there that understanding a continued presence by
the coalition would have an impact on. It would have an impact
on President Ghani. It would have an impact on the Afghan
Security Forces and their morale. It would have an impact on
the Afghan people. It would make a great impact on the Taliban.
It would make an impact on Pakistan and it would make an impact
on NATO. I think all of those audiences in differing levels
would--a decision to continue to have a larger number of
coalition forces, not only the U.S. but the coalition, would
have huge impact there.
Senator Blumenthal. You make reference in your testimony to
two other trends that I think are concerning, the brain drain
and the loss of economic resources, the drain on capital. Has
that increased in pace and seriousness?
General Campbell. Sir, there have been a lot of reports of
a lot of Afghans that are trying to leave the country. As a lot
of the countries in that area, the refugee issue is going into
Europe. A lot of those are Afghans who are trying to leave.
Both President Ghani and Dr. Abdullah have reached out to the
younger generation asking them to stay, to continue to work in
Afghanistan, so there has been, for lack of a better term, a
drain on the human capital piece here that I know they want to
keep.
The future of Afghanistan is two things I believe. It is
the Afghan Security Forces and then it is this younger
generation of Afghans that are tired of 35-40-plus years of
war.
Senator Blumenthal. One can hardly blame them given the
impact on their futures, economic and social and family. Longer
term, the success of Afghanistan as a country is really
dependent on the political factors and the social and economic
factors that are hopefully supported and promoted by the
American presence there as well.
Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Well, this is a very serious time for us. I would say to
Senator Blumenthal's good remarks--I would note that it is
also, in the situation we are in Afghanistan, a military
situation also that can impact the outcome. Without it, it will
impact the outcome. Is that correct, General?
General Campbell. Sir, you are talking about the Afghan
Security Forces?
Senator Sessions. Well, I am talking about our presence and
Afghan presence. There are some battles to be fought. Military
conflict is involved and is going to continue to be involved
for some time. Is it not?
General Campbell. Sir, Afghanistan will continue to be a
very dangerous place, and the Afghan Security Forces will
continue to be challenged in many areas. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. Well, the President has said he would
like to negotiate with the Taliban, and that has been attempted
for a number of years today. Is it harder or easier to
negotiate with the Taliban a reasonable solution and a peaceful
solution to Iraq if we made it absolutely clear we have an
irrevocable commitment to leave on a certain date?
General Campbell. Sir, the reconciliation piece again will
be Afghan-led by the Afghan Government. But you absolutely want
to operate from a position of strength as you do that. Yes,
sir.
Senator Sessions. I know it is a difficult question for
you, but I would just translate that to say you need to have a
military strength, and if it is not there, it gives confidence
to the Taliban to believe if they wait us out, then they can be
successful militarily. Even though the people of Afghanistan do
not prefer Taliban domination, we are setting this up, I am
afraid, to allow that to happen. It is a very dicey thing.
In terms of going to 1,000 troops, well, this is really not
a military presence. Is it? This is just simply an embassy
security force essentially.
General Campbell. Sir, the goal right now or the intent is
to have a security cooperation office. That would be a little
bit more than just embassy force protection. It would also have
the ability to provide oversight of foreign military sales,
oversight of the money that will have to continue to come into
Afghanistan as well.
Senator Sessions. It is essentially not a fighting force.
It signals that we are completely out of the fight militarily,
I would suggest. I think that is a dangerous signal to be
sending.
So you are talking about we need to train, assist, and
advise more. Is it your recommendation that that capability
extend beyond the end of 2016?
General Campbell. Sir, I have said that the Afghans will
continue to need support in many areas that we have identified,
that they will need continued help, aviation, logistics,
intelligence. So, yes, sir, train, advise, and assist in those
areas would require a little bit longer time.
Senator Sessions. To what extent do they have rotary
aircraft, helicopter, capability for evacuation of wounded or
resupplying remote forces or otherwise taking the battle to the
enemy? Does that remain a problem?
General Campbell. Sir, their close air support capability
is just starting to grow. They have relied on MI-35. They only
had five when we started the fighting season. They are down to
two. They do have MI-17's that provide them the ability to move
wounded, to provide resupplies. They have tried to put forward
firing machine guns, rocket pods on those to give them a little
bit better close air support capability. We have brought in an
MD-530, a little attack bird, that operates in different areas
of Afghanistan to give them a little bit better close air
support capability. They will have a fixed-wing capability
starting at the end of this year but into 2017, 2018 before it
is really online.
Senator Sessions. Well, I am worried about it. In your best
military judgment, what additional risk are we undertaking if
our goal is, as you said it is, to create a stable environment
in Iraq where people can go to school and have a chance for
prosperity? What risks are we incurring by setting a firm date
of ending by the end of 2016?
General Campbell. Sir, as I think it has been mentioned
many times before--maybe not in this hearing today, but that
whenever you put a time on something, that always gives
somebody the ability to manipulate that, whether that is the
enemy, whether that is the friendly forces. I think the options
that we have provided to the senior leadership is looking at
different outcomes that we want to have based on what has
changed over the last two years.
Senator Sessions. Well, the President of the United States
has made some very unwise decisions in this regard. He is
complicating the life of the people in Afghanistan and
certainly making your life a lot more difficult in my opinion.
I do not want to make a partisan argument here. I am not saying
that. We had a deep commitment to Afghanistan. We had an entire
international coalition on that part, bipartisan. This was the
good war. I think it is possible to achieve the goal you have
stated. Do you believe it is possible?
General Campbell. Sir, I would not be there if I did not
think it was possible.
Senator Sessions. I agree. I think to completely move out
and radically reduce our presence incredibly risk the gains our
men and women have fought so hard for, and allies around the
world have helped us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your leadership. I
think we would do well to listen to your advice. We should have
listened in Iraq, and we need to listen in Afghanistan.
Chairman McCain. I thank you, Senator.
General, as I understand it, the present plan is that there
would be increased reductions beginning in January. Is that
correct?
General Campbell. Sir, to get down to----
Chairman McCain. The embassy-centric----
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. You would begin those withdrawals in
January.
General Campbell. Sir, I would have to go back and look at
exact numbers.
Chairman McCain. Roughly.
General Campbell. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. So here we are in October, and the plan
now is to begin so that by 2017 we are down to a, quote,
embassy-centric force. That is the present plan. Right?
General Campbell. Sir, that is the present plan. Yes, sir.
Chairman McCain. So here we are sitting here in October and
you do not know whether to begin three months from now a rather
significant withdrawal of troops, which requires a lot of
planning, a lot of logistics, a lot of assets. Here we are
sitting here in October and you have been asked to provide the
White House with a, quote, series of options. Is that right?
General Campbell. Sir, I provided options, and in those
options, I have accounted for the glide slope that I have to
take to be able to get down to the required numbers there. Yes,
sir.
Chairman McCain. In addition, you have not been asked for
the best option, the one option, that would secure Iraq,
succeed in a mission in the most effective and efficient
fashion. Instead, you have been asked for, quote, options. Is
that right? Most of us were taught to believe there is only one
option for victory and success of a mission. But you have been
asked for options. Dare I ask how many?
General Campbell. Sir, I am not sure I have been asked for
options really. What I have done is taken a look since I have
been on the ground, the last 14 months, and seen where the
Afghans Security Forces are at in different metrics that we
take a look at in order to ensure that they have the right
capabilities----
Chairman McCain. But is there only one option to achieve
the most efficient, the most effective, least in danger of
further casualties? I do not understand this. I thought that
usually--my study of warfare is you develop a strategy and you
implement the strategy with a plan. You do not say, hey, we are
going to have five or six plans here, five or six options that
we are going to pursue. Most Commanders-in-Chief that I have
ever known of have called their military people together and
said give me the best strategy that we can employ and what is
necessary to achieve the goals of that strategy. Am I wrong
somewhere? Am I getting something wrong?
General Campbell. Sir, I could not comment if you are
getting something wrong. Sir, what I would say again is that I
have provided some options to take a look----
Chairman McCain. You have provided the options.
General Campbell.--train, advise, assist and a CT
capability in Afghanistan post 2016.
Chairman McCain. So you have given them, quote, options,
plural. Right? Not what most Commanders-in-Chief that I have
ever experienced. Give me the strategy, give me the plan, see
what it takes so that we can succeed in the best and most
efficient way to accomplish our goal. We all know what a goal
is. It is a free, stable, democratic Afghanistan.
Well, it is curious times. But, of course, those of us that
make any criticism apparently do not know a lot of the things
that the President of the United States knows.
So I thank you, General. You are doing as you were ordered,
and I have observed firsthand your leadership in Afghanistan on
several occasions, and I think it is outstanding. Obviously, I
am not complaining to you because you are playing the hand you
are dealt.
I just do not understand why this administration does not
understand that if we do what is presently planned to begin in
three months from now, that we will see the Iraq movie again.
There is no doubt in anybody's mind about that. Now we see a
burgeoning or embryonic ISIS. We see the Iranians providing
weapons and more for the Taliban. We just saw an attack on one
of the major cities in a part of Afghanistan that we up till
now had believed the most secure. It seems to me that would
lend some urgency to action which would reverse what is clearly
a deteriorating trend.
Finally, General, we look forward to the results of your
investigation of this terrible tragedy of the attack on the
hospital. I want to emphasize--I know speak for all of my
colleagues--that we deeply regret this tragedy. We do point out
from time to time about the fog of war.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roger Wicker
pakistan
General Campbell, I wanted to ask you some brief questions about
Pakistan--a partner in the region with whom we have a complex
relationship.
First, let me touch on the increasingly positive working
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan:
One such example is President Ghani Pakistan Prime Minister Sharif
to condemn the September 18 Taliban attack on Badaber Air Base in
Pakistan that killed 29. According to press reports, President Ghani
told Prime Minister Sharif that Afghanistan will ``never allow its land
to be used against Pakistan by anyone.''
1. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, what is your assessment of the
relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan now?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
2. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, is it fair to say that the
relationship has improved since President Karzai left office?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
Second, let me ask you about terrorist groups that operate in and
out of Pakistan:
The Haqqani network maintains a safe haven in North Waziristan,
Pakistan, across Afghanistan's southeastern border. The Institute for
the Study of War (Fred Kagan) refers to this Pakistani Taiban terrorist
group as one that ``has the backing of elements within the Pakistani
security establishment.''
3. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, how would you assess the
current state of the Haqqani network?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
4. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, are the Pakistanis doing
enough against the Haqqani Network in your opinion? What more should
they be doing?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
5. Senator Wicker. General Campbell, what is the level of
cooperation between you and your counterparts in the Pakistan security
apparatus?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kelly Ayotte
withdrawal/transition plan in afghanistan
6. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in your prepared statement for
today's hearing, you wrote that the Afghans ``still require broad
support'' and ``cannot handle the fight alone in this stage of their
development.'' Do you believe that this will change by the end of 2016?
General Campbell. By the end of 2016, the Afghan National Defense
Security Forces will be much farther along than they are today.
However, they will still require some level of support in developing
their systems and processes necessary to run a modern, professional
army and police force. The majority of that assistance will need to
address the long term capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, and
combined arms operations, and logistics, sustainment, and maintenance.
7. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, based on your multiple tours
in Afghanistan and your current position as commander there, do you
believe that the United States can protect its interests in Afghanistan
and the region if we drawdown to ``a normal embassy presence in Kabul''
by the end of 2016?
General Campbell. I presented several options to my chain of
command and the risks associated with each option. One of these options
presented to my chain of command was ``a normal embassy presence in
Kabul'' at the end of 2016. The normal embassy presence in Kabul option
presented significant risks in terms of United States interests and
Afghanistan's long term security viability.
capability gaps of afghan national defense and security forces
8. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in your prepared statement for
today's hearing, you identify critical gaps in the Afghan National
Defense and Security Forces. Are we making progress in rectifying those
shortcomings? What are the primary obstacles to closing those gaps more
quickly?
General Campbell. The critical capability gaps in the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are in the areas of
aviation, combined arms, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and
sustainment.
Yes, we continue to make progress in rectifying the critical
capability gaps. The primary obstacle to closing these gaps more
quickly is building the human capital required in the ANDSF. While
Resolute Support will pursue limited equipment solutions, particularly
in aviation; the primary tool for addressing these capability gaps is
in human capital development and requires sustained Security Force
Assistance.
Aviation. The primary obstacles to closing the aviation gap more
quickly are the acquisition of the necessary aircraft and the human
capital required to operate and sustain the aircraft. The train,
advise, and assist (TAA) mission is critical to maximize the employment
of limited assets and building human capital.
Combined Arms. Leadership is key to combined arms integration.
Continued TAA to build the human capital and train the leadership is
the most critical obstacle to improved combined arms operations and
will take time.
Intelligence. By the end of 2016, additional Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) collection equipment and systems
will be fielded to the ANDSF. Human capital remains the most critical
piece to successful implementation and synchronization of intelligence
networks and the primary obstacle to producing actionable intelligence
for the ANDSF.
Logistics, Sustainment, and Maintenance. Resolute Support is
improving logistics and sustainment management. Beginning in 2017, the
National Maintenance Strategy will provide an enduring, affordable
materiel readiness capability to build upon Afghan ownership of
sustainment. TAA during this period is critical to developing the human
capital necessary for managing these initiatives, augmented by
embedding highly educated Afghan civilians in key sustainment
organizations.
9. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, how much longer will the
Afghans require assistance in those gap areas? Will those gaps be
filled by the end of 2016?
General Campbell. The critical capability gaps in the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) are in the areas of
aviation, combined arms, intelligence, logistics, maintenance, and
sustainment. While we continue to make progress in rectifying the
critical capability gaps, the ANDSF are projected to require assistance
in some gap areas as far out as 2024. The primary obstacle to closing
these gaps more quickly is building the human capital required in the
ANDSF. Resolute Support will pursue limited equipment solutions,
particularly in aviation; however, the primary tool for addressing
these capability gaps is human capital development and requires
sustained Security Force Assistance.
10. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in light of the continuing
capability shortfalls, if the United States-led coalition withdraws or
goes to a normal embassy presence in Kabul before those capability gaps
are filled, what do you believe would be the consequence in
Afghanistan--not only for the Afghan Nation Security Forces and the
Afghan government, but for the United States interests there as well?
General Campbell. The Afghans would face significant challenges if
their key capability gaps in aviation, intelligence, combined arms
operations, and logistics, maintenance, and sustainment were not filled
before the United States reduced to an Embassy presence. Our objective
is to develop the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
into a capable and reliable counterterrorism (CT) partner through the
train, advise, and assist (TAA) mission. A critical part of that
mission is to fill the key capability gaps. Removing U.S. and Coalition
enablers without closing the ANDSF's key capabilities gaps would erode
the ANDSF's ability to fight the insurgency. This may jeopardize the
stability of the National Unity Government which would not be in the
interests of the United States and the Coalition.
al qaeda and the threat to the homeland
11. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in your prepared statement
you write that ``It will be critical that, in coordination with our
Afghan partners, our comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts continue
to apply pressure against the al-Qaeda network in order to prevent its
regeneration, and the corresponding threat it represents to our
homeland.'' Given this reality, how important is it that the United
States maintain a robust counter-terrorism capability in Afghanistan
beyond 2016?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
women's rights in afghanistan and women in the ansf
12. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in your prepared statement
you note that both President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah are
``supportive of the rights of women and their empowerment in Afghan
society.'' From your perspective, why is it valuable to have more
Afghan women serving not only as police, but also in the Afghan
National Army?
General Campbell. Having women serving in the Afghan National Army
(ANA) as well as the Afghan National Police (ANP), but so is valuable
to build professional forces by leveraging the entire population,
increasing the end strength of the ANDSF, and providing better
representation of the Afghan society as a whole. More women in the ANA
would serve to balance the force and increase the opportunities for
women in Afghanistan. Additionally, recruiting and training women in
operational support roles will provide continuity and institutional
knowledge in career areas such as finance, human resources,
communications, logistics, and administration.
13. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in Afghanistan, can women
play a unique and helpful role conducting searches and other activities
in the police and Army that typically men can't?
General Campbell. In Afghanistan, women make up approximately 50
percent of the population; therefore, women can play a play a unique
and helpful role in areas that men typically cannot. For example,
cultural barriers that exist between men and women, prevent men from
entering rooms of homes occupied by women and children. Women play
helpful roles in both cordoning off the women and children and
conducting searches. The ability of female Afghan National Defense
Security Forces to question both women and children on the activities
of male occupants at a residence often pays dividends that support the
mission.
taliban strikes
14. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, according to DoD's June
report to Congress, ``United States forces no longer target individuals
solely on the basis of their membership in the Taliban.'' Is that
statement correct?
General Campbell. Yes.
15. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, if we became aware of a
meeting of Taliban leaders tonight to plan attacks against Afghan
forces and the Afghan military was unable to respond in time to mount a
strike, is it United States policy in Afghanistan to not conduct a
strike against that meeting?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
taliban resilience
16. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, what is the primary reason
that the Taliban-led insurgency remains resilient?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
17. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, after so much time and the
investment of so much there, what does the resilience of the Taliban
insurgency tell us about the success of our strategy?
General Campbell. The U.S., as an external actor, cannot defeat the
insurgency on our own. Rather, we must enable and empower the
legitimate government of Afghanistan to fight on behalf of and with the
support of its own population. The National Unity Government (NUG) is
the willing partner we have lacked for so long. While the NUG and
Afghan Security Institutions must continue to develop and grow; great
strides have already been made.
This fighting season has been fundamentally different. A myriad of
factors to include the sharp drop in our Coalition numbers and enabler
support; the effects of Pakistan Military operations along the border;
and the emergence of the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) have
all played a role in making this year an exceptionally challenging one
for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Placed in
this context, their overall mixed performance is understandable.
Nonetheless, the ANDSF have still shown commendable resilience in the
face of these challenges and the resultant increased casualties. They
are still holding, and they have not fractured.
Despite the perceived resilience of the Taliban insurgency, the
Afghans have demonstrated a willingness and ability to take the lead.
Their security forces remain committed in the face of a determined
enemy and they have shown that they still merit our support. We must
demonstrate that the NUG has our full trust and backing. Maintaining
our presence ensures our influence across all instruments of power
(diplomatic, information, military, and economic).
``normal embassy presence'' and train, advise, and assist mission
18. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, how important have the Train,
Advise, and Assist commands (TAACs) been in carrying out the train
advise and assist mission in Afghanistan that is critical to building
independent Afghan military capabilities?
General Campbell. The TAACs are critical in carrying out the train,
advise, and assist (TAA) mission at the corps level by mentoring their
counterparts as the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF)
have taken the lead and assumed full responsibility for their security.
Their presence provides Resolute Support with necessary situational
awareness across Afghanistan. The TAACs provide a robust advising
capability to all of the required essential functions at the corps
level; feedback to the senior leaders in the ANDSF; and linkages to the
Afghan Security Institutions.
19. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, if the United States
transitions to a ``normal embassy presence in Kabul'' at the end of
2016, would this end or dramatically reduce the size and effectiveness
of the United States-led train, advise, and assist commands in
Jalalabad and Kandahar? Would Italy in the west and Germany in the
north likely follow our example and end their TAAC's?
General Campbell. A ``normal embassy presence in Kabul'' does not
support the personnel needed for any Train, Advise, Assist Command
(TAAC) including those stationed in Jalalabad and Kandahar. It is
likely, but not certain, that Italy and Germany would follow suit
without some of the support that the United States provides.
20. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, would a United States
transition to a ``normal embassy presence in Kabul'' hurt our ability
to build Afghan security force capabilities and assess and support the
relationship between the ministries and fielded forces?
General Campbell. A ``normal embassy presence in Kabul'' would
significantly hinder the ability of United States forces to help build
and assess the capability of Afghan security forces. There would be no
Coalition regional presence to continue training, advising and
assisting the Afghan fielded forces at the Afghan National Army corps
or provincial police headquarters level. We would greatly reduce our
situation awareness and limit the relationship building between the
ministries and those forces.
defense minister vacancy
21. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, in your prepared statement,
you note that the Acting Minister of Defense continues to serve in
spite of the Afghan Parliament's rejection of his candidacy. What has
been the impact of not having a formal Defense Minister in place?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
advanced precision kill weapon system performance
22. Senator Ayotte. General Campbell, I understand that Advanced
Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS) has performed well in Afghanistan
against a variety pf targets, both as a complement to and a substitute
for Hellfire. How would you rate APKWS' performance in theater?
General Campbell. A ``normal embassy presence in Kabul'' would
significantly hinder the ability of United States forces to help build
and assess the capability of Afghan security forces. There would be no
Coalition regional presence to continue training, advising and
assisting the Afghan fielded forces at the Afghan National Army corps
or provincial police headquarters level. We would greatly reduce our
situation awareness and limit the relationship building between the
ministries and those forces.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
united states counterterrorism reductions in afghanistan
23. Senator Sullivan. General Campbell, yes or no, will the lack of
a forward-deployed United States counterterrorism presence in
Afghanistan increase risk to the United States homeland over the next
2-3 years?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
24. Senator Sullivan. General Campbell, if yes, what specific ways
and to what extent would the lack of a forward-deployed U.S.
counterterrorism presence increase risk?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Lee
afghanistan threats
25. Senator Lee. General Campbell, over the last few weeks this
committee has held several hearings on the United States' strategy to
address various crises in the Middle East. These hearings have been
very informative, but I have become concerned that senior civilian and
military leaders are giving the impression that such strategies are
more successful than facts on the ground would suggest.
We know that since 2014 the Taliban have made gains in several
areas of southern and northern Afghanistan and has shown they have the
capability to conduct major operations against regional capitals. On
August 4 you stated at the Brookings Institution [QUOTE]:
``[The Taliban] are not taking territory or meeting any strategic
goals that they set out for themselves initially. They are going to
take a district and they are going to lose it. They are going to take
another district center and lost it too.''
This contradiction casts serious doubt over suggestions that our
efforts to stabilize Afghanistan have been successful, as we have seen
this borne out in places like Kunduz, where the Taliban captured the
city then retreated, then captured another area in the span of one
week.
Do you see an end to this trend, or is this a cycle that will
continue to play out for the foreseeable future?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
26. Senator Lee. General Campbell, even if the Afghan Government is
unable to completely secure the country from the Taliban as desired,
and provide the services that you described to Senator Graham as what
`winning' looks like, can you compare our ability at this point to our
ability in 2001 to detect and disrupt any terrorist organizations that
try to establish a base in Afghanistan and threaten the United States
homeland?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
27. Senator Lee. General Campbell, the original mission of
coalition forces in Afghanistan, which started nearly 15 years ago, was
to find and deny safe haven to those who planned and supported the
September 11th attacks.
What is the current state of the Al-Qaeda organization that planned
and carried out those attacks from their base in Afghanistan?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
28. Senator Lee. General Campbell, what is the ability of Al-Qaeda
and Al-Qaeda remnants to reconstitute themselves in Afghanistan if we
remain on the timetable that President Obama has laid out?
Specifically, do you think Al-Qaeda or any affiliated organization has
the capability to develop a base in Afghanistan again?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
29. Senator Lee. General Campbell, in your assessment of the ANSF's
capabilities and performance during the last fighting season, how do
you measure and judge what General Martin Dempsey has called ``the will
to fight'' in other foreign militaries that we have trained? More
broadly, how do you assess the willingness and commitment of the Afghan
people to support the current political structure and avoid regressing
into ethnic-based factions?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
30. Senator Lee. General Campbell, despite billions of dollars
spent on training, weapons, and the continued presence of air and
ground support for the ANSF, our Afghan partners cannot seem to contain
the Taliban, which has drastically less funding, no aerial
capabilities, and no international coalition providing assistance. I
understand what President Obama's ideal outcome is, but please give us
a realistic picture of how many more years and how much more funding
will be required from the United States military and American taxpayers
before the Afghan government becomes self-sustaining?
General Campbell. The Afghans will require United States funding
for years to come. Since FY 2012, the total annual cost of the Afghan
National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF), at a force level has
decreased from approximately $12.3 billion to roughly $5.0 billion for
FY 2016. The United States Government, the National Unity Government,
and international partners work closely together to reduce ANDSF costs
through funding conditionality, the divestiture of excess facilities,
and limited Afghan-led ``on-budget'' contracting where appropriate.
These efforts have reduced ANDSF costs without diminishing its capacity
to maintain its effectiveness.
The ultimate goal is a total ANDSF cost of $4.1 billion as agreed
upon at the 2012 Chicago Summit. Any move to reduce funding below $4.1
billion will require significant cuts to ANDSF force structure. Barring
a substantial improvement in the security situation, wargaming efforts
predict that drastic cuts will negatively impact ANDSF effectiveness
and increase risk to the enduring security and stability of
Afghanistan. Striking a delicate balance between ANDSF effectiveness
and ANDSF affordability will require close cooperation and
collaborative planning moving forward.
The Afghan government committed to providing $500 million in
support of the ANDSF starting in 2015; however the 2015 Afghan national
budget only allocates $419 million against this pledge. Although short
of its commitment, $419 million represents almost 19 percent of the
overall contribution to the Afghan budget--a large share compared to
the funding most countries typically provide for national security.
This is especially remarkable given that Afghanistan is currently in a
precarious fiscal position further strained by stagnating revenues thus
far this year. The country faces the dual challenge of restoring
confidence in its economic prospects and addressing formidable mid-term
development challenges. Ambitious economic reforms and implementation
of measures to mobilize revenue and strengthen the financial sector
will go a long way in bringing the country on a sustainable path for
development. If security conditions should deteriorate, however, due to
the government's inability to field the right force/force structure mix
to meet the current or future treat, this could slow private sector
investment, reduce the country's revenue base, and the subsequent gross
domestic product needed to adequately fund the ANDSF. This would extend
Afghanistan's reliance on international donor aid for an even longer
timeframe beyond what was envisioned at the Chicago Summit.
31. Senator Lee. General Campbell, can you describe for the
committee the strength, capability, and composition of the Taliban
forces? How are they replenishing their force structure, weapons and
equipment, and funding?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
32. Senator Lee. General Campbell, does the Taliban seek to divide
and control parts of Afghanistan, retake power over the entire country,
or come to some sort of reconciliation with the current government in
Kabul?
General Campbell. [For Official Use Only.]
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
hospital bombing in afghanistan
33. Senator Gillibrand. General Campbell, news reports suggest that
the bombing of the hospital on Saturday was requested by Afghan forces.
Do we verify requests for targeting by the Afghan forces to avoid
tragic accidents like the one this weekend? If so, how?
General Campbell. [Deleted.]
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