[Senate Hearing 114-]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-131]
SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTES
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
[Serial No. 114-242]
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 7, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
20-818 WASHINGTON : 2017
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
Chair HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri Georgia
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Dave Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Jodi Brignola, Clerk
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 2
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, Committee on
Armed Services................................................. 1
Salmon, Hon. Matt, a Representative from Arizona, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on Foreign
Affairs........................................................ 3
Sherman, Hon. Brad, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on
Foreign Affairs................................................ 5
WITNESSES
Denmark, Abraham M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
East Asia, U.S. Department of Defense.......................... 8
Willett, Colin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for
East Asia and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State........ 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 35
Denmark, Abraham M........................................... 44
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 33
Willett, Colin............................................... 37
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Sherman.................................................. 57
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 61
Mr. Larsen................................................... 62
Mr. Lowenthal................................................ 65
Mr. Salmon................................................... 63
SOUTH CHINA SEA MARITIME DISPUTES
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on
Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC, Thursday,
July 7, 2016.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome the members of the House
Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee and
the House Foreign Affairs Asia-Pacific Subcommittee to a
special joint hearing on the topic of maritime disputes in the
South China Sea.
I also want to extend a warm welcome to our two witnesses,
Ms. Colin Willett, Deputy Assistant Secretary [DAS] for
Strategy and Multilateral Affairs in the State Department's
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Abraham
Denmark, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia. I
thank you both for being here to testify at this special joint
hearing.
Our topic today is a timely and critically important one.
Early next week, the Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected
to rule on the legitimacy of China's expansive territorial
claims in the South China Sea.
In the aftermath of that ruling, the world will be watching
two things. First, to see whether China behaves like a
responsible stakeholder in the international system, and if
not, to see how America responds. For decades, the United
States has sought to facilitate China's integration into the
global economy and the rules-based international order that has
benefitted Asia so well. China's reaction to next week's ruling
will provide a clear indicator of how that is going and whether
Beijing's quest for regional dominance can be curbed by
international law and world opinion.
America's response will also send a powerful signal. While
the United States does not take sides in territorial disputes,
we can and should stand up for those parties that pursue their
peaceful resolution. The Philippines is one such party but not
the only one. And what we do or don't do to support our allies
in the rules-based international system in the weeks ahead will
have echoes across the region and in other corners of the
globe.
With so much at stake in the South China Sea, it is
critically important that the United States has a clear policy
toward the region and a strategy to sustain peace, prosperity,
and the rule of law in Asia. Diplomacy will play a crucial role
in avoiding and resolving conflict, and I am pleased to have
Ms. Willett and members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
[HFAC] with us here today to discuss that critical aspect of
any interagency approach to the region.
If China continues to flaunt international law and world
opinion, however, I firmly believe that the surest way of
averting another devastating conflict in the Asia-Pacific
region will be for the United States to remain present,
engaged, and capable of projecting decisive military power in
the region. Might does not make right, but it can be used to
deter threats to peace, prosperity, and the rule of law.
That is why I have been pleased to see an increase in U.S.
naval and military presence in the region and an increase in
the frequency of our freedom of navigation operations. I look
forward to hearing from Mr. Denmark about what the Department
of Defense is doing to deter Chinese aggression, reassure our
allies and partners, and maintain a favorable military balance
in the Asia-Pacific region going forward.
I now turn to my good friend and colleague, Mr. Courtney,
the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, for any comments that he may have.
Mr. Courtney.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
yourself and to Mr. Salmon for organizing today's hearing,
which again, as you stated, could not be more timely, given the
fact that a proceeding that the eyes of the world have been
watching for over a year or so is about to come to a climax
with the decision by the U.N. [United Nations] Hague Convention
in terms of resolving this question about maritime claims in
the South China Sea.
Again, the stakes are huge. Trillions of dollars of
commercial sea traffic and products pass through the South
China Sea every single year. There are numerous stakeholders in
terms of different nations, maritime nations that are adjacent
to it, and obviously, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. as a nation
has huge interests at stake in terms of making sure that
international norms are followed that have been followed for
the last 70 years in the wake of World War II and that
hopefully we are going to continue to see that rule of law
continue after The Hague's decision.
I think a nice--I have a written statement, which I am
going to ask to be submitted, and I am just going to briefly
end by saying that one way to sort of frame this question is
that in September of 2015, five Chinese naval ships entered
U.S. territorial waters off the coast of Alaska. In
acknowledging the transit of these vessels, the United States
made clear we viewed this action as well within the rights of
China and any other nation to conduct innocent passage through
legitimately established territorial seas and nonthreatening
military activities within exclusive economic zone of another
country.
The question is whether or not that same standard, which we
scrupulously followed, is going to be adhered to in the South
China Sea. And again, the Navy, as we have heard on the Armed
Services Committee, has been conducting these freedom of
navigation operations over the last 6 months, 12 months or so,
again, well within our rights under UNCLOS [United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea], and really, that is what I
think our policy should be, which is to just basically have a
single standard across the board, whether it is up in the
Alaskan waters or in the South China Sea.
And you know, obviously, you know, we have a huge amount at
stake, as I said earlier, but we are also, I think, the nation
that really a lot of our allies in the region are looking
towards in terms of leadership, and really, again, following
through on what I think is really the only path forward in
terms of assuring that international maritime activity is going
to continue peacefully and productively for all the
stakeholders that are affected.
So again, I have a written statement which I would ask to
be entered into the record, and with that, I would yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, all the written statements
will be entered as part of the record. And now it is my
privilege to recognize another good friend and colleague, the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Mr. Matt
Salmon of Arizona, for any remarks he may have.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MATT SALMON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ARIZONA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much, Chairman Forbes. I
appreciate you giving me the opportunity to join you in
convening this important and timely joint hearing.
The territorial disputes in the South China Sea may
represent the most significant long-term security challenge in
our shared jurisdiction. Our conversations about this topic are
often complicated by the minutia of territorial sea's baselines
and high tide elevations, but it is important for us to
remember today what the South China Sea dispute boils down to.
One nation turning away from the peaceful mechanisms of
international law and peaceful coexistence and instead
embracing belligerence.
Congress, the administration, and other counterparts across
the world, recognize the severity of the threat posed by
China's aggressive coercive actions in the South China Sea that
undermine international norms. Our Secretary of Defense and the
President himself regularly list the South China Sea among the
world's most concerning international friction points and raise
it at the highest levels with their Chinese interlocutors,
including Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Analysts around the world pour over the disputes, and the
United States has undertaken a series of highly publicized
freedom of navigation operations to contest China's outrageous
claims. Alarmingly, all of this attention seems to have had
little effect. Tensions in the sea continue to mount, and China
has established effective control of many areas by building
capable military facilities on top of disputed features.
In light of these trends, today's hearing could not come at
a better time. In the coming days, weeks, and months, the South
China Sea territorial disputes will present a series of
especially important challenges. Our response to these
challenges has the potential to reverse the trend of escalating
tensions or to cause further injury to the peaceful rules-based
international order. I would like to touch briefly on a few of
these challenges.
First, the arbitral tribunal deciding the Philippines'
legal case against China recently announced it will conclude
its decision on July 12. Although China is legally bound, and I
repeat, they are legally bound to its result, it has refused to
participate and has clearly said it will not comply. I am
concerned that many seem to have written off China's
noncompliance as a foregone conclusion.
You must remember that this case is the most significant
substantial approach to settling disputes in the South China
Sea through a peaceful, equitable process. China should be held
accountable to the tribunal's ruling. The Scarborough Shoal
represents another critical test. China and the Philippines
have come to the physical confrontation over this site before,
and recent rumors hint that China may soon extend its island
building campaign to the Shoal.
Despite how near Scarborough is to Philippine shores, its
disputed status makes it unclear whether it is covered by the
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty. This uncertainty means
that if aggression around Scarborough Shoal is not handled
properly, the very credibility of such treaties could be
damaged. These treaties are anchors of hub-and-spoke alliance
system in the Pacific and damage to them could have dire
consequences on American influence and security in the region.
Finally, I want to mention the continuing threat posed by
China's ability to declare an Air Defense Identification Zone
[ADIZ] over the South China Sea. I am concerned we have few
direct options to counter this type of escalation if China
chooses to pursue it. China's network of airstrips, radars,
missile batteries constructed across the South China Sea while
the rest of the world watched, may prove a capacity--excuse
me--may provide a capacity to enforce such an ADIZ.
While the United States military would never recognize such
a zone, commercial carriers will likely comply with China's
notification requirement as they have under China's ADIZ in the
East China Sea. China will once again unilaterally have changed
the status quo. These countless other challenges posed by the
South China Sea territorial disputes will continue to test the
United States and our allies.
Though the answers are sometimes not easy to find, I am
really glad we came together today to hold this joint hearing
and working towards solutions, and keeping the issue at the
forefront of foreign policy and national security agendas is
critical, and I appreciate the opportunity. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And with that, I would
like to yield to the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Asia
and the Pacific, Mr. Sherman, for any comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRAD SHERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I will be a little
bit of a contrarian, but if I just agreed with everybody who
had just spoken, it would be so boring.
It is my view that the power in making decisions in any
important area of our policy is often under the control of the
domestic organization that has power and cares about that
policy.
So when it comes to the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP],
Wall Street wants it, Wall Street will probably get it. When
you look at the Pentagon and its needs, we see that for 150
years every time our military forces have confronted a worthy
symmetrical uniformed adversary, it has ended with glory for
our Armed Forces, from the Spanish-American War through the
victory over the Soviet Union without a major conflagration.
And every time we have faced a non-uniformed asymmetrical
opponent, it has been a terrible experience for our military
from the Philippine insurrection right up until the operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, not that we are always unsuccessful,
but it has never been gloriously easy.
And so it is not surprising that the Pentagon is looking
for a worthy adversary, and there is only one available in the
world, and that is China. And so we are told that we should
spend hundreds of billions of dollars focused on developing new
technologies and procuring new weapons systems for the purpose
of confronting China in the South China and East China Sea.
Not only are we subject to this, but China is subject to it
as well. In China, there is one institution at the center of
making decisions, that is the Communist Party, and that
Communist Party suffers a great crisis of legitimacy. People
all over China are asking, ``Why are these guys running
things?'' Their old answer was they are running things because
they are the vanguard of the proletarian. Not so much. Then
they said: ``Shut up. We are giving you 10 percent economic
growth.'' I would be inclined to switch political parties if I
could achieve 10 percent annual economic growth, but the
Communist Party can no longer do that. So the Communist Party
of China is retreating into the last refuge of scoundrels and
illegitimate governments, and that is exaggerated nationalism,
and the best way for them to do that is to focus on these
islands.
The amount of cost that we are incurring as we build toward
this confrontation, again, is hundreds of billions of dollars.
We don't have a good cost accounting system for our military to
tell us what weapons systems relate to what international
threats and what foreign policy objectives, but every time I
talk to the Pentagon about research and procurement, they say:
``Sherman, we are not interested in doing research on anything
unless it shoots down Chinese planes over the South China
Sea.'' There are other things that we confront, particularly a
war on terrorism where research is called for.
Now, we are told that these islands are of such great
importance. They have remained uninhabited, even though they
are off the shore of the most teeming and populated continent,
they have been uninhabited for millennia. We are told that
trillions of dollars of trade goes through these islands. That
is all trade going in and out of Chinese ports, which means if
China were able to militarize these islands, they would be able
to blockade their own ports.
We are told that there is economic value in minerals, and
none of which have happened, but we are sure of one thing, and
that is, if there is any oil, it doesn't belong to us. It
belongs to Japan, the Philippines, China, whoever owns these
islands. And keep in mind, all of our allies want us to spend
hundreds of billions of dollars defending their islands which
may or may not have any economic value at all, but they are
never willing to spend more than 1, maybe 2 percent of their
GDP [gross domestic product] to defend their islands or their
countries.
So I am not saying we should surrender to China, but we
should not surrender to the urge to exaggerate. We should be
careful, and we should relax. I am not pro-China. I am pro-
Ambien, America's leading sleep product.
There are many situations in the world where countries make
outlandish claims that can be quietly resisted without turning
the Pentagon on its head, spending hundreds of billions of
dollars developing new lethal technologies and reorienting our
foreign policy and our military policy toward dealing with one
particular outlandish claim.
So we need to resist calmly China's claims in the South
China Sea. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Willett, we are glad to have you with us today, and Mr.
Denmark. And before I turn to your testimony, I want to make
one procedural motion.
I ask unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be
allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there an objection?
Hearing none, non-subcommittee members will be recognized
at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.
And with that, Ms. Willett, we want you to take all the
time you want as long as you can get it within that 5-minute
allotment that we have given there to give us your thoughts and
your comments, and again, your written testimony will be made
part of the record, so thank you for being with us, and we turn
the floor over to you.
STATEMENT OF COLIN WILLETT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU FOR EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Willett. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Forbes and
Chairman Salmon. It is a great opportunity to appear before
this----
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Willett, I am going ask you to do what they
asked me to do. Can you get a little closer to that mic.
Sometimes they just aren't very sensitive and don't pick up.
Thank you.
Ms. Willett. Sure. So thank you, Chairman Forbes and
Chairman Salmon for the opportunity to appear before this joint
subcommittee hearing today. It is a very timely issue. It is a
very important issue. The importance of the South China Sea to
global commerce and to regional stability, I think is well
known. Its economic and strategic significance means the United
States has a vested interest in ensuring that territorial and
maritime issues are managed peacefully.
Next week will present an important milestone in the South
China Sea dispute. On July 12, the arbitral tribunal convened
under the Law of the Sea Convention is set to issue a decision
on the Philippine submissions relating to the application of
the convention to the South China Sea.
The Philippines has asked the tribunal to rule on a number
of issues, particularly on the validity of China's nine-dash
line and on the maritime entitlements generated by various land
features in the South China Sea. Such a ruling has the
potential to narrow the areas which can legitimately be
considered subject to dispute based on maritime zones generated
from contested land features as well as the undisputed mainland
coast of Southeast Asian claimants.
While the tribunal will not address the underlying
sovereignty claims to land features, the decision does have the
potential to crack the door open to a new modus vivendi among
the parties that would help manage tensions in those disputed
spaces.
It is possible to envision a diplomatic process among the
claimants that would explore different ideas for managing
marine resources in areas that all relevant parties agree are
subject to competing claims.
Such a path towards cooperation is achievable if claimants
have the political will, flexibility, and creativity to find
reasonable and practical arrangements that could serve as
starting points for addressing these longstanding tensions.
Conversely, an adverse reaction to the tribunal ruling could
become a source of increased tension.
The Law of the Sea Convention makes clear that the absence
of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not
constitute a bar to the proceedings, and that a decision by the
tribunal shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute;
in this case, China and the Philippines.
The world will be watching to see whether China chooses a
path of diplomacy and cooperation or continues to walk along
one of confrontation with its neighbors. The U.S. approach to
the dispute aims to reduce the risk of conflict and preserve
space for diplomatic solutions, including by pressing all
claimants to exercise restraint, maintain open channels of
dialogue, lower their rhetoric, and behave responsibly in the
sea and in the air, and acknowledge that the same rules and
standards must apply to all.
The international community has an interest in maintaining
a peaceful and stable South China Sea and preserving a rules-
based regional system. As such, we will keep the South China
Sea and maritime cooperation at the top of the agenda in the
region's multilateral forum while also working bilaterally with
the relevant countries. We will continue to ensure that
problematic behavior is exposed and censured. We are engaging
closely with all of the claimants at all levels of government,
as President Obama did in his recent trip to Vietnam, and
Secretary Kerry did at the strategic and economic dialogue in
Beijing last month.
We are working with Southeast Asian coastal states to
improve their maritime domain awareness, maintain effective
presence in their claimed waters, and enable them to increase
communication and collaboration amongst themselves. A common
operating picture can help prevent unintended escalations and
improve levels of cooperation. For these countries, having a
steady and consistent presence is an important demonstration
that they have no intention of relinquishing their legitimate
maritime rights.
These diplomatic and capacity building efforts rest on top
of our robust and durable U.S. military presence in the region,
which my colleague will discuss in greater detail. But let me
underscore that the United States will not hesitate to defend
our national security interest and to honor our security
commitments to our allies and partners.
The United States has been an important partner in
protecting the security and stability of the Asia-Pacific
region for decades, and we will continue to protect our rights
and the rights of all nations to fly, sail, and operate
wherever international law allows.
I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today
and look forward to discussing.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Willett can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Willett, thank you.
Mr. Denmark, we look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF ABRAHAM M. DENMARK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EAST ASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Chairman Salmon,
ranking members, distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for----
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Denmark, could you do the same thing, could
you get a little closer?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you for inviting me and Deputy Assistant
Secretary Willett to testify before you today on this important
issue.
I would like to thank both of the committees for your
leadership in supporting our Nation's robust engagement across
the Asia-Pacific. South China Sea is an area of immense
economic and strategic importance. For decades, it has been a
critical operational area for our military and is central to
our strategy of strengthening a principled rules-based order
that enables regional stability and prosperity.
This afternoon I will describe a region at a crossroads
with the upcoming U.N. arbitral tribunal and what actions the
Department of Defense is taking to preserve regional stability
for decades to come.
At the center of the South China Sea disputes are a series
of competing claims among Brunei, China, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam. While the U.S. takes no
position on competing territorial sovereignty claims, we do
take a strong position on protecting and in upholding the
rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace
guaranteed to all, and we seek to uphold key principles at the
heart of a rules-based international order, including customary
international law, unimpeded lawful commerce, freedom of
navigation and overflight, and the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
We do have concerns about the actions by any claimant that
may have an effect of eroding these principles. China in
particular has undertaken a series of initiatives that set it
apart from other claimants, reclaiming 3,200 acres in the
Spratly Islands, building harbors, logistical facilities, and
military-grade airfields as it deploys military assets to these
features, and using low-intensity coercion to enhance its
presence and ability to control the South China Sea.
At the same time as China has been building outposts,
another process has also been playing out. In just 5 days, on
July 12, a United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration
tribunal will issue a ruling on these disputed features. The
ruling will mark an important crossroads for the region. It
will present an opportunity for those in the region to
determine whether the Asia-Pacific's future will be defined by
adherence to international laws and norms that have enabled it
to prosper, or whether the region's future will be determined
by raw calculations of power.
In light of this key inflection point, I would like to
briefly describe what we are doing in the region to preserve
regional stability. The United States has undertaken a whole-
of-government approach in the South China Sea with the
Department of Defense [DOD] working in lockstep with the State
Department and others to support our diplomacy with a robust
military capability.
I would like to outline the four broad DOD efforts that
have supported the broader USG [U.S. Government] strategy.
First, the Department of Defense has been providing a credible
capability in the South China Sea and the region to deter
conflict and to create space for our diplomatic efforts to
succeed. We have increased our military presence, and we are
ensuring our presence is geographically distributed,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.
Second, we have enhanced our tempo of military operations.
From exercises, to freedom of navigation operations and
presence operations, DOD continues to fly, sail, and operate
wherever international law allows so that others can do the
same.
Third, we are enhancing our regional security network
through building partner capacity, training, and exercises,
particularly through our engagement with ASEAN [Association of
Southeast Asian Nations].
And finally, we are engaging China directly to reduce risk.
We consistently encourage China to take actions that uphold the
shared principles that serve so many in the Asia-Pacific so
well. We seek to keep lines of communication with Beijing open
to improve our cooperation in areas of mutual interest and to
speak candidly and constructively, manage differences when we
disagree.
These efforts have set the stage for engagements following
the upcoming decision from the U.N. arbitral tribunal. DOD will
provide critical support to our diplomacy by providing a
credible deterrent against the use of force and in favor of the
peaceful resolution of these disputes. We will continue to
defend ourselves, our allies and partners, our interests, and
our principles.
Mr. Chairman, ranking members, distinguished members of the
committees, the upcoming U.N. arbitral tribunal ruling provides
an opportunity for the region to stand firm in our enduring
commitments to a principled order in the Asia-Pacific and the
rest of the world. And it is an opportunity for us to reconfirm
our commitment to work with the region to ensure a principled
future, one in which all people have the opportunity to live in
peace and prosperity.
I thank you very much, and I look forward to our questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Denmark can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Willett, Mr. Denmark, thank you both for
being here.
Let me ask you this, Mr. Denmark. Is there any military
significance to Scarborough Shoal to the United States?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The military value of
Scarborough is not intrinsic to the feature itself. It is
highly variable, dependent on if a country--if a claimant were
to place military capabilities on Scarborough, it will be
highly valuable, depending on the specific capabilities that
have been in place.
So to my mind, the value of Scarborough is one of strategic
importance in that it would increase a claimant's ability, de
facto ability to control the South China Sea and would, I
think, marginalize a principled international order in which
countries refrain from occupying, and constructing, and
deploying military assets to previously unoccupied features.
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Willett said that we will do everything
necessary to defend the national security interest of the
United States and allied defense rights. If you did have a
militarization of the Scarborough Shoal, would that have any
impact on our national interest or our allied defense rights?
Mr. Denmark. Well, Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult for
me to comment to any degree of specificity on potential future
hypotheticals.
Mr. Forbes. Well, we need to--don't we need to know? I
mean, don't we need a strategy to be able to answer those kinds
of questions, or--I mean, are we saying we don't have a
position based on the Department of Defense right now as to
whether or not there is any military significance there and if
it does have military significance as to whether or not it
would impact our national security interests?
Mr. Denmark. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I said, the military
significance of Scarborough is not intrinsic to the feature
itself but rather what would be in place upon it. So it is
difficult for me to react, to guess as how I would react
because there is such a wide degree of variability.
Mr. Forbes. Is there anything you could tell us as to what
would constitute the militarization of Scarborough Shoal?
Mr. Denmark. Militarization is not a term that we have
used. The term was introduced, as you know, sir, during
diplomatic exchanges with the Chinese. We look to resolve these
issues through diplomacy.
Mr. Forbes. I understand. We want everybody to take a
breath and be calm, but at some point in time, they don't
always do that. And so if we were to have a situation, they say
they are not going to militarize those islands. If they were to
militarize those islands, would that be contrary to the
national security interest of the United States?
Mr. Denmark. Again, sir, I think it is too--the variability
in what could be placed on various----
Mr. Forbes. So the Department of Defense or you can't give
us an opinion as to whether or not you think the militarization
of the Scarborough Shoal would be against the national security
interest of the United States?
Mr. Denmark. Well, in terms of--you asked me, sir, what I
can comment upon is the military implications of this.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Mr. Denmark. And in terms of military implications, as I
said, the variability, based on what could be in place on any
of these features, is extremely broad, and so therefore it is
difficult for me to hypothesize about how we may react or
respond to what may be put on any one of these features.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Let me ask you this then. The 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty finds the United States and the Philippines were
bound to respond to attacks on the armed forces, public
vessels, or aircraft of the other party as well as island
territories under its jurisdiction.
Has the United States or--either through the Department of
Defense or the State Department even made an analysis of
whether or not it thinks the Scarborough Shoal is an island
territory under the jurisdiction of the Philippines?
Mr. Denmark. Sir, treaties tend to be--the specific meaning
of treaties tend to be handled by the State Department, so let
me--before I turn things over----
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Mr. Denmark [continuing]. To my colleague, let me just say,
as I have said in my written testimony, as DAS Willett
mentioned in her statement, that we are--we retain an ironclad
commitment to the defense of our allies, and that is something
that we will not hesitate to follow through with.
Mr. Forbes. Ms. Willett.
Ms. Willett. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, the United States
does not take a position on disputes over land features, and
the Scarborough Shoal is disputed.
Mr. Forbes. How would you interpret your treaty
responsibilities if it says ``island territories under the
Philippine jurisdiction,'' how would you make the determination
as to whether that was or was not under the jurisdiction of the
Philippines?
Ms. Willett. Scarborough Reef is a disputed feature, and we
don't take a position on whose claim is more legitimate.
Mr. Forbes. So if there was a dispute with China over
whether or not one of their vessels belonged to them or to the
Philippines, the United States wouldn't make a decision over
that?
Ms. Willett. I think the language in the Mutual Defense
Treaty is clear in terms of its applicability to persons and
vessels from the----
Mr. Forbes. Is it not clear about island territories under
its jurisdiction?
Ms. Willett. Scarborough Reef is a disputed feature that we
don't recognize any country's sovereignty over. That said, our
treaty commitment to the Philippines is absolutely ironclad.
This is something that we would take very seriously, and any
move to occupy a currently unoccupied feature, or further
militarize a currently occupied feature, is very dangerous and
it is very destabilizing and I think something that would
concern not just us but the other countries in the region.
Mr. Forbes. And I am going to try one more bite at this,
and then I am going to give it to Mr. Courtney. I understand it
would be very destabilizing. Military actions always are. What
my concern is, we have a treaty, and at some point in time, we
have to make an analysis or determination what is in that
treaty and what is not in that treaty. We specifically state in
here armed forces, public vessels, aircraft, and we talk about
island territories under its jurisdiction.
At some point in time, the United States has to make its
own legal determination as to whether or not they think those
vessels belong to the Philippines or the aircraft belong to the
Philippines. Are you saying that anytime somebody just puts
that in dispute that the United States is going to step back
and not defend that?
Ms. Willett. No. I mean, I think the language in the treaty
is clear. In the specific case of Scarborough Reef, the land
feature itself is disputed.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Willett, I would just like to drill down with you a
little bit about UNCLOS and its history and just sort of the
structure of how that treaty operates.
Again, in terms of how past cases have played out, I think
your testimony mentioned India and Bangladesh had a dispute
which went through the arbitration process, and it ended up
with a peaceful resolution. Is that correct?
Ms. Willett. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Courtney. And it had been a longstanding claim over
many years that led up to that decision. But again, the sort of
moral and global force of the UNCLOS kind of prevailed at the
end of the day to have a positive outcome?
Ms. Willett. Yes. I think that is correct. I mean, I think
there are actually numerous examples within the region where
countries have effectively used legal dispute resolution
mechanisms to settle territorial, including maritime territory,
disputes amongst themselves. And so it can be a very effective
tool for upholding that rules-based system.
Mr. Courtney. But there is no sort of, you know, UNCLOS
SWAT [special weapons and tactics] team that is out there, so
that, again, in terms of enforcing a ruling. I mean, it is
really something that sort of uses, as I said, sort of the
international, you know, standing as a way of trying to get
people to work within the rule-based system that it created. Is
that correct?
Ms. Willett. Yes, it is. UNCLOS protects the rights of all
nations, whether they have maritime entitlements themselves or
not, to a specific standard for use of the seas. So it protects
globally everyone's right to legally use international waters
around the world. And so I think the pressure comes from an
understanding that we all benefit from having an international
system for regulating how seas can be used that benefits all of
us.
Mr. Courtney. All right. So over, you know, the last year
or so, though, I mean, it appears that China has been trying to
sort of step outside that structure and sort of negotiate sort
of on a bilateral basis with countries in the region there to
sort of, again, establish their own agreements regarding, you
know, the issues that are really under the jurisdiction of
UNCLOS.
Is that sort of the pattern that you have seen, the salami
slicing, as they call it?
Ms. Willett. Yes, Congressman. I think you hit on it
exactly that the fundamental issue at stake in the South China
Sea is it is not about the rocks. It is about the rules. Is
China, as it becomes a global sort of player and as its
interests expand, is it going to play by the same rules as the
rest of the globe does, whether that is in terms of the Law of
the Sea or trade law or what have you? The question that is
posed right now, is China going to play inside that rules-based
system that has benefitted all of us so much over the last 70
years?
Mr. Courtney. All right. So and during the course of this
proceeding--I mean, it is my understanding that the U.S.
actually tried to obtain observer status in the, you know, the
litigation that took place there, and we actually were denied
that opportunity because the U.S. Senate has never ratified
UNCLOS. Is that your understanding, or is that your testimony?
Ms. Willett. Yes. The Obama administration, like all
previous administrations, believes very firmly that our
interests would be served by ratifying the Convention on the
Law of the Sea. We did request observer status at the hearings
under--held by the arbitral tribunal, but because we are not a
party to the Convention, we are not able to participate, and it
does harm us that we have not yet ratified the Convention. It
is a common criticism when we speak out about the importance of
these rules when we, ourselves, have not----
Mr. Courtney. Right.
Ms. Willett [continuing]. Signed up.
Mr. Courtney. And that is, frankly, an observation that has
been made by our military leadership as well. I mean, Admiral
Richardson, you know, has testified to that effect. General
Dunford has testified to that effect, and Admiral Harris, who
is out there in the middle of all this with the 7th Fleet in
PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] has said that, really, it is time
for this country to move forward and ratify UNCLOS.
And again, as we get closer to the decision, frankly, I
think hopefully our friends in the upper chamber will
understand that, you know, this is not just some sort of parlor
game in Washington. I mean, it has real life effects in terms
of trying to, again, maintain, you know, what I think has been
a rules-based system of maritime law and that we benefit from
it in many respects even more so than other countries.
Mr. Connolly. Would my friend yield?
Mr. Courtney. Sure.
Mr. Connolly. My understanding is that by not being a
member, and the Chinese being a member, they actually can
influence all the committees and subcommittees and we can't.
And so in terms of doing the actual work of the law of the
seas, we are day to day at a disadvantage and they are day to
day at an advantage. I don't know if Ms. Willett wants to
confirm that, but I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. Courtney. Well, all I would just point out is there is
a House Resolution 631 urging the Senate to ratify, and
hopefully today some Members will take a look at that and maybe
have them sign onto it because, as I said, next week, the eyes
of the world are going to be on this treaty and its benefits.
And certainly, I mean, I think what we have heard without
specifics this morning or this afternoon is really that, you
know, we are going to be part of whatever that sort of
international, you know, force to make sure that the decision
is really adhered to. And again, we have that single standard
that really, I think, is so important and that UNCLOS, you
know, is really focused on creating. We all benefit from that.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Chairman Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
When I first started serving on the Foreign Affairs
Committee, it was 1995, Warren Christopher was the Secretary of
State, and I remember asking the question in a hearing like
this, what was our State Department policy toward China, and
the answer kind of astounded me, yet it has been a policy of
many administrations. He called it strategic ambiguity. I
thought that was the oddest policy I had ever heard.
And having been to China myself probably close to 50 times
and speaking the language, living in Taiwan for a couple of
years, being around them a lot of time, I think this is a
country we need to have some real strategic clarity with, and I
think one of reasons that things are getting so out of control
in the South China Sea is that everybody is kind of dancing
around, you know, the 800-pound gorilla in the room. China has
stated pretty openly that with this arbitral tribunal decision
that is expected in a couple of weeks that they don't intend to
adhere to it.
So then what? I guess that is my question. What are our
options then? A lot of our allies in the region are extremely
concerned about China's land grabbing. And as the chairman of
the HAS [House Armed Services] Committee said that, you know,
not only island grabbing but putting military installations on
those islands, and so virtually all of our allies in the region
have expressed grave concerns about what China is doing, and
they are waiting on us to do something.
What is that something? If they flout the decision by the
tribunal, what is our next move? Because I think all eyes are
going to be watching us, and though we don't specifically have
any land disputes ourselves but our allies do, the other
concern I have is that I think that the South China Sea is a
real tinderbox. Whenever President Obama or Secretary Kerry
talks about, or Ash Carter talks about the South China Sea, it
is always one of the top national security concerns that we
have. It is always delineated as such.
And so what I am wondering, you know, with a lot of the
close encounters with the ships and the planes, you know, just
one wrong move at any given time could escalate into a major
conflict, a major problem. What is our recourse if they just
flout that decision?
Ms. Willett. So to your point about China, Mr. Chairman, it
is a big and obviously very strategically important
relationship to the United States. It is one that has grown
dramatically over the last several years, but one that contains
disagreements but also contains a great deal of areas where we
have common interests and can cooperate fairly effectively.
And I would say that that dialogue, that cooperation has
grown quite a bit over the last several years. It is true that
we still have areas of disagreement, but part of that is our
continued dialogue and our continued cooperation has allowed us
to be able to deal with those areas pretty frankly.
Now, there are areas, and the South China Sea is a clear
example, where we continue to have a very significant
difference of opinion and a great deal of friction. Our
strategy overall, from day one, has been multifaceted. It
includes diplomatic, military, capacity building, and economic
tools aimed at shaping the strategic environment such that
flouting the rules-based order and not playing by the same
rules as others, the incentives aren't there, and ensuring that
the effects of coercion, or you know, lawbreaking aren't
positive.
The net effect of what we are seeing is a situation where,
you know, no claimant can expect to flout the law, flout the
ruling in a way that doesn't draw international approbation and
interest and a great deal of scrutiny, and in fact, has
resulted in a situation where we are seeing a much greater
demand for U.S. security presence, U.S. security cooperation,
U.S. engagement, and we have seen much greater interest in
economic diversification, including interest in TPP, expanded
security ties to other regional players such as India and
Japan, such that flouting international law, pushing back,
behaving in a way that is not consistent with the rules-based
order isn't paying the dividends that it might otherwise. And I
believe that our intensive diplomatic, economic, and military
engagement has played an important role in creating an
environment where the payoff just isn't worth it.
I think it is clear that Southeast Asian claimants continue
to stand up for their rights and push back against efforts to
coerce and bully them. We have seen a great deal of growth in
multilateral cooperation on these big strategic issues, and I
would expect that to continue.
Mr. Salmon. What can we do to encourage ASEAN to step up to
the plate in a bigger way, because heretofore--I know that most
of the ASEAN members, because I have met with them, they are
all very concerned about what is going on in the South China
Sea and Chinese belligerence, but ASEAN as a group has yet to
be incredibly effective as one strong voice to deal maybe some
reputational harm to China. What can we do to help maybe make
that stronger, that response from them?
Ms. Willett. Well, thank you. ASEAN has actually been a
consistent voice for international law and an international
rules-based system for the nearly 50 years that they have
existed. But you are correct, Mr. Chairman, that their
institution has some limitations. There have been some
instances and some limitations to their ability to speak out,
but on this issue, they have actually spoken out fairly clearly
fairly recently both in their joint statement with the
President at the Sunnylands Summit in February where they made
a clear statement in support of the Convention on the Law of
the Sea and the right of countries to pursue dispute resolution
through all peaceful processes, including legal and diplomatic
processes.
They have made their own standalone statements through
their foreign ministers at their foreign ministerial in April,
and we expect them to continue to take that principled line on
the importance of the rule of law and international conventions
such as the Law of the Sea.
Mr. Salmon. Finally, is imposing reputational harm the
absolute best that we can do? Other than upgrading the maritime
security capabilities of our partners in the region, do we have
any other tools for inducing behavioral change in the South
China Sea?
Ms. Willett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I said, our
strategy is multifaceted. It is diplomatic, it is military, it
is about capacity building with the other claimants, it is
about economic tools, but it is a cumulative long-term strategy
aimed at making clear that the strategic environment is such
that it is not in any claimant's or any nation's interest to
violate international law.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. There is only one significantly
inhabited island in dispute in the South and East China Sea
called Taiwan, a lot more people than all the--and one way to
defend Taiwan would be to spend a few hundred billion dollars
on more naval assets; but there is something else that would be
just as effective, probably more effective, and that is with a
clear law that would immediately eliminate China's ``most
favored nation'' [MFN] status if they blockade or invade
Taiwan.
Under those circumstances, the missiles that China could
use on any day to just threaten Taiwan and close its ports
would, I think, become inoperative. Ms. Willett, would you
oppose or would the State Department oppose an effort by
Congress to just say if you invade or blockade Taiwan, at that
moment you automatically lose MFN?
Ms. Willett. Thank you, Congressman. I am happy to take
your question and consult with my colleagues who cover Taiwan
policy and come back to you with an answer.
Mr. Sherman. Can I count on a clear unambiguous answer for
the record?
Ms. Willett. I have to take your question back to my
colleagues who cover Taiwan.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 57.]
Mr. Sherman. I think it was my--the chairman of our
subcommittee that talked about ambiguity. It might be good to
be ambiguous toward China but maybe not ambiguous toward
Congress on this issue. I hope to get a clear answer.
Mr. Denmark, there has been a massive increase in the
world's attention to disputes between Japan and China over
islands. Has Japan massively increased its defense budget over
the last 4 years? And don't they spend well less than a quarter
of what we spend as a percentage of GDP?
Mr. Denmark. Thank you, sir. I don't have the specific
numbers in front of me. I do believe it is a percentage of how
much----
Mr. Sherman. It is about 1 percent of their GDP.
Mr. Denmark. In terms----
Mr. Sherman. They keep claiming they are going to increase
it, they never actually increase it, and they want us to spend
hundreds of billions of dollars to develop and deploy naval
assets to defend islands that don't have any oil, but if they
do have oil, it is Japan oil or Chinese oil, it is not American
oil.
Mr. Denmark. To answer your question, sir, in terms of
absolute numbers, I do believe that Japan's defense budget has
increased in recent years, although not dramatically, as you
said, sir. But we have seen, I think, very important
developments in our alliance with Japan in the last few years
with our agreement on new defense guidelines, the passage of
new legislation that enables their----
Mr. Sherman. They are not willing to put their money where
they want us to put our money. They are not willing to put
their lives where they want us to put our lives, and it is nice
that they will issue joint communiques, but joint communiques
don't cost anything.
Ms. Willett, I want to return to the UNCLOS. I agree with
you. It is not about the rocks. It is about the rules. China
seems to have it the best of both worlds. They join UNCLOS,
serve on the subcommittees, as the gentleman from Virginia
pointed out, and yet they are not going to follow the outcome
of this arbitration provision. Should we join--I mean, there
are various arguments about us not joining UNCLOS, but it seems
like China has demonstrated that you can join, participate, and
if you disagree with anything they do, well, you just say they
don't have jurisdiction.
Is there any mineral rights or fishing rights or anything
of value that the United States claims that someone is
objecting to in a way that we could lose in UNCLOS, and if so,
would we have to recognize the binding power of its decision?
Ms. Willett. On the China question, Congressman, it is true
that China has indicated that it does not accept the
jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Mr. Sherman. You can be sure they will accept it if they
happen to win.
Ms. Willett. Our focus is on their behavior following the
tribunal decision. Actions matter in this case.
Mr. Sherman. This question more is about why shouldn't we
join UNCLOS? It seems China is demonstrating that you can
participate, you can influence, and you don't really have to
follow their rulings, so what is--can you think of any
disadvantage to joining UNCLOS? Is there anything we could
lose?
Ms. Willett. Disadvantage to joining UNCLOS?
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Ms. Willett. No. Our position is that it materially
benefits us to be a part of the Convention of the Law of the
Sea.
Mr. Sherman. So we get the benefits, you can't think of
anything we could lose, but even if we lost in an arbitration
on UNCLOS about some arctic resource, China is demonstrating
that you don't have to follow the ruling. It sounds like a
great organization to join.
Ms. Willett. China has not yet demonstrated that you don't
have to follow the ruling. There hasn't been a ruling.
Mr. Sherman. They have demonstrated that if the ruling goes
against them, they will not feel it binding on them.
Ms. Willett. I am concerned with their actions after we
have an actual decision from the tribunal.
Mr. Sherman. I mean, they may scale back what they do
voluntarily for a host of reasons, but it is clear that they
have laid the legal foundation to win if they win at UNCLOS and
not to feel bound by it if they lose.
Ms. Willett. They have presented an argument asserting that
they are not bound by the tribunal if--when it rules. That is
not----
Mr. Sherman. And it is an incredibly weak argument.
Ms. Willett. That is correct.
Mr. Sherman. If we ever needed to present an argument, we
could certainly present one that strong. Their argument is that
some other government that they don't recognize once drew a
line claiming something. That is like a Confederate general
claiming Cuba, and so we claim all of Cuba. It is--so again,
there are the advantages that the gentleman from Virginia
pointed out.
What could we possibly lose by joining UNCLOS? I don't know
if Mr. Denmark has a comment. I will see if you have a comment,
and then I believe my time has more than expired.
Ms. Willett. The Convention on the Law of the Sea protects
our maritime interests around the world. It is an important
legal framework that ensures all countries are able to make use
of the seas based on a rules-based system. We firmly believe
that it is in the United States' interests to ratify, and we
expect all parties to the Convention to fulfill their
obligations under it.
Mr. Sherman. I will just yield to the gentleman from
Connecticut to remind us of the H.R. resolution that allows us
to register our belief. That would be 631, and you are allowed
to cosponsor that, right? Good to find out. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back his time.
The distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Byrne, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you. Several of us on these two panels
were in China together a couple months ago, and we had the
opportunity to have a number of briefings and actually got to
hear the Chinese position. And the Chinese position is that we
are a weakening power in the Pacific. Now, I don't know that we
necessarily have to agree with their assessment, but I think it
is important we understand that is their assessment. They got
me to thinking about what Teddy Roosevelt always said, which
is, ``Walk softly but carry a big stick.'' A lot of what we
have heard today has been about using discretion and the use of
power, which is certainly appropriate in any environment,
particularly in a sensitive environment like the South China
Sea. But I guess the question I have is, do we have a big
enough stick over there? Do we have the right military assets
in place in the right place to do what we need to do to fulfill
the objectives of the United States, both militarily and
otherwise? We keep having these incidents. The Chinese are
clearly pushing very hard. You are from the Department of
Defense. Do you have the assets that you need to carry out your
mission?
Mr. Denmark. Yes, Congressman, I believe we do. It is
interesting, you mentioned, you referenced President Roosevelt
in that, several months ago, I had the opportunity to accompany
Secretary of Defense Carter to the USS Teddy Roosevelt
operating in the region, which the ship calls itself
``America's Big Stick,'' which I think is a nice example----
Mr. Byrne. I have also been on that vessel. It has a motto
stenciled all throughout it saying ``putting warheads on
foreheads.'' I love that. It is a good motto.
Mr. Denmark. As I mentioned in my testimony, Congressman,
we have increased our presence in the region over the last
several years, and this is responding to a fairly ubiquitous
and loud demand signal that we have been hearing from across
the region from our allies and our partners stating that they
are concerned about activities and actions happening in the
South China Sea and asking us to work with them. And we have
answered that call. We are working with them to enhance their
capabilities. We are conducting exercises. We are conducting
training. We are building our own capabilities in the region.
Our operations tempo has increased, and we see that all these
actions are providing for the common good. They are increasing
maritime domain awareness and maritime security in the region,
supporting our allies and our partners as well as our own
national interests. And all of our missions are done
meticulously to ensure that everything that we do is done in a
way that is compatible and supports international law and
maintains safety.
Mr. Byrne. Well, a number of us are going with Mr. Courtney
to the RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] exercise in a couple weeks.
I want to go back to that Chinese perception. If we believe
we have the appropriate number of assets, how do we cure that
problem? Because a misperception is as dangerous to us as
anything else. How do we cure that misperception with the
Chinese? Do exercises like RIMPAC help with that, or does there
need to be more direct communication between us and them? What
is the source of their misunderstanding, and what can we do
about it?
Mr. Denmark. Well, Congressman, I do think that RIMPAC is a
very good demonstration of American leadership and American
power in that no other country is able to bring together so
many countries to work together in pursuit of a common
objective. So I think RIMPAC is a terrific example of that. In
terms of our interactions with China, we have pursued for
several years very consistently a robust military-to-military
relationship with them, which includes military diplomacy in
which our senior leaders, their senior leaders from our two
militaries, interact with each other, both in person and over
communications. We visit each other's countries. We visit each
other's militaries. And from the U.S. perspective, we try to
enhance that sort of transparency as a way to ensure, to reduce
the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation.
We have also recently agreed to several confidence-building
measures on rules of behavior in airspace and on the high seas,
which we see as a very important aspect of our efforts to
reduce risk. As our militaries operate in closer proximity to
one another to a greater degree of regularity, we see that
efforts of risk reduction are very important.
In terms of managing Chinese perceptions, as somebody who
has studied China for a long time, I find that task to be very
complicated and very difficult. What we can be responsible for
is to make sure that we are doing the right things, to make
sure that we have the capabilities in the places that we need
to make sure that we are building the capabilities of our
allies and partners and make sure that we are able to defend
ourselves, defend our allies, and defend our interests. And I
believe we are.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Throughout the opening statements and certainly throughout
the witnesses' opening statements, there is a theme of the
importance of recognizing global rules and norms and
understanding the mechanisms by which to resolve disputes. So I
think many of us in Congress have been concerned when we look
at China's unilateral moves, whether in the East China Sea or
in the South China Sea, which really go against international
norms, unilateral moves, whether it is Scarborough Shoals, or,
you know, declaring an ADIZ over the East China Sea, which
really go outside the norms--so if we just think about the next
steps and what is in our toolbox as the United States to help
deescalate tensions, I think it is reasonable to go ahead and--
we should certainly--I do wish we were a part of UNCLOS. We are
not. But we are going through the process of recognizing
international norms and international mechanisms by which to
resolve disputes, so a ruling will come out shortly.
I think it behooves us to make sure, as an international
community, when we see that ruling, we do everything we can to
enforce that ruling. Now, what I would say is, you know, let's
say that ruling is not the one China is looking for, and they
choose to ignore that ruling. We look at, I think Ms. Willett,
you talked about the tools that we have. We are already engaged
diplomatically in the sense that we have gone to UNCLOS. I
would consider that a diplomatic tool by which to resolve this
dispute. We can continue to engage them diplomatically, but we
have already used that tool. None of us is interested in a
military or kinetic engagement. We certainly are posturing by
having some of our assets in the region. And the importance of
the South China Sea, the reason why these small reclaimed
islands are so important is that is one of the most important
trade routes in the world right now. It is of incredible
economic importance to not only the United States but to our
allies in the region. And the number of goods that move through
that region are very important, so they are very strategic.
We can try to use economic tools to get China back to the
table, but the worry here is, you know, China increasingly is
moving assets to that island, and the more assets they have,
the harder it will be to move them off of those islands. And it
is much easier for us to deal with this today than it will be a
decade from now.
So, Mr. Denmark, outside of that, what are our options?
Mr. Denmark. Well, thank you, Congressman.
I think you can understand why I would be reluctant to
discuss military options to any degree of specificity in an
open hearing. What I do feel comfortable saying in an open
setting is that we remain very committed to continue to defend
our allies, to defend critical principles that we see as
necessary to the continued peace and stability of the region,
and to continue to defend our national interests. In terms of
what happens after a decision, I would refer you to the
statement that I submitted in that we see the military role in
this as being essential to deter conflict and ensure that
diplomacy has space to succeed, and we are going to continue to
play that role.
Mr. Bera. And certainly there is no desire for a military
option here. I mean, we want diplomacy, and we certainly want
China to understand that it is in China's economic benefit to
have open seaways and the free movement of goods and services.
They obviously see that as well. So, from our perspective,
let's hope adhering to international norms and international
mechanisms by which to resolve dispute, that China will take
that mechanism as a member of UNCLOS and adhere to whatever
ruling we do see next week. Otherwise, I think we ought to come
back into a joint committee here and really, you know, send a
strong message that we have got to adhere to these
international norms.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Looking at the South China Sea, there appear to be a number
of nations that have significant economic and, perhaps,
security interests. How would you rank those in terms of
importance? Let's talk about it in terms of economics. Which
countries use the South China Sea the most perhaps for fishing,
food, commerce, oil, things of that nature?
Ms. Willett. Thank you, Congressman.
It is a big, complicated question. There are a number of
claimants. They all have different, or not all, but they have
varying claims. They have varying ways that they assess the
values of those claims. I think----
Mr. Brooks. I am not asking about claims. I am talking
about who uses them.
Ms. Willett. No, I understand. But the geographic scope of
individual claims impacts how they assess the value of the
resources and the importance of those spaces, which is all to
say it is a complicated answer.
Mr. Brooks. What is your judgment?
Ms. Willett. From a U.S. perspective, what is most
important and what is driving these disputes vary much from
country to country; from our perspective, what is most
important is whether or not they are going to pursue those
claims in a way----
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Denmark, I am not getting an answer.
Perhaps you can share with me your insight on which countries
have the greatest amount of economic interest in the South
China Sea. It might be oil being shipped through the South
China Sea that they are dependent on. It might be unfinished or
finished products. It might be food in the form of fishing. Do
you have a judgment as to which countries have the greatest
economic interest in the South China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. Well, Congressman, it is a very interesting
question. I don't believe I have seen an academic analysis that
tries to rank these. What I have seen, though, is that the
complexities of international trade in this region means that
it is not just the claimants that are affected, although
obviously they have a critical interest in it, but countries
outside of even the immediate area of the South China Sea, like
Japan, like South Korea, like the United States, also have a
critical interest----
Mr. Brooks. Let's talk about it for a moment. South Korea,
what is their interest in the South China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. Well, obviously, I can't speak for them.
Mr. Brooks. I understand you cannot speak for them. Do you
have no judgment?
Mr. Denmark. What I would say is my sense is that all
countries in the region--I wouldn't want to identify one
specifically. I would say all countries in the region----
Mr. Brooks. I thought this was an easy question. South
Korea, do they rely on their oil shipments from the Persian
Gulf and from other areas to go through the South China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. So what I was going to say is that South
Korea, Japan, most of the countries of the region rely
tremendously on international trade, much of which flows
through the South China Sea.
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Let's try to get to some specifics, and I
have already lost about 70 percent of my time. South Korea, oil
shipments through the South China Sea, do they have other
commerce that is shipped to or from South Korea through the
South China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. Congressman, I am not trying to not answer
your questions. As a representative of----
Mr. Brooks. The answer is yes or no or you don't know.
Mr. Denmark. What I will say, as a representative of the
Department of Defense, I don't have those figures with me here.
Mr. Brooks. Well, I am not asking for specific figures.
Ms. Willett, are you familiar with whether or not South
Korea ships or receives products through the South China Sea,
other than oil? We have already established oil.
Ms. Willett. All countries in East Asia receive and ship
goods and services--oil, liquid and natural gas--through the
South China Sea.
Mr. Brooks. Is it fair to say that South Korea has a
significant interest, then, in the South China Sea?
Ms. Willett. Yes. I believe about 30 percent of the liquid
natural gas that gets shipped to South Korea and Japan goes
through the South China Sea. About 25 percent of the world's
goods----
Mr. Brooks. And Japan also has a significant economic
interest?
Ms. Willett. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Brooks. And the Philippines has a significant economic
interest?
Ms. Willett. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. Vietnam has a significant economic interest?
Ms. Willett. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. Taiwan has a significant economic interest?
Ms. Willett. Yes, all countries in East Asia have a
significant economic interest.
Mr. Brooks. And would it be fair to say that their economic
interest on a percentage of GDP is greater than that of the
United States of America, economic interest?
Ms. Willett. I would have to go back and look at the
specifics because a great deal of this trade is also bound for
the United States.
Mr. Brooks. What can the United States of America do to
encourage these other countries that have a greater reliance on
shipping through the South China Sea to step up to the plate
and absorb more of the defense costs associated with those
shipping lanes?
Ms. Willett. We work very closely with all of these
countries on diplomatic, military, economic approaches to
ensuring that the rules are followed in the South China Sea.
Mr. Brooks. But they aren't stepping up to the plate like
the United States of America is. My question is, what can we
get them to do to step up to the plate to measures that are
commensurate with their economic interests?
Ms. Willett. We continue to engage with all of our partners
in the region to ensure that we are all playing a part in
ensuring that a rules-based order is protected in the South
China Sea.
Mr. Brooks. If the United States of America were to
withdraw its military assets in the South China Sea, would that
encourage these other countries to step up to the plate?
Ms. Willett. I think that is a question for those other
countries. I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time is expired.
The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Chairmen
Forbes and Salmon, for holding this important and timely
hearing.
Two weeks ago, I had the pleasure of meeting with the Prime
Minister of Timor-Leste to discuss a variety of bilateral
issues. In particular, Secretary Willett, I would like to
briefly note my concern regarding the outstanding maritime
dispute between Australia and Timor-Leste. I believe the United
States should use our diplomatic power and influence to bring
about a swift resolution to this matter, and the lack of an
agreement on this maritime dispute undermines our credibility
when discussing the issue of the China-South China Sea maritime
issues with the Chinese. I do know the Chinese raise this very
often, so I hope that we can use some of our influence to
encourage a swift resolution to the matter, and I think the
political will exists in the region if we just need--of if we
can just nudge this along. So I know Mr. Courtney has
introduced a resolution to this matter, and I will also add my
name to the chorus of people who believe the Senate should
ratify UNCLOS.
Now my first question is for, I guess, Secretary Denmark. I
believe that an asymmetric advantage we have in countering
Chinese influence in the South China Sea is the partnerships
that we have in the region, and we should continue to cultivate
them. Are programs such as the Maritime Security Initiative
[MSI] a helpful tool for building partner capacity, and what
areas can be improved? I am particularly concerned that we can
find over $3 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative
program, but we struggle to find $100 million for the Maritime
Security Initiative. Now, you briefly touched on MSI in your
testimony, Secretary Denmark, but I think this disparity sends
the wrong message about our rebalance strategy, especially
given your commentary on the need for building partner
capacity. Do you agree? If you could just give it a brief
answer. I have very little time.
Mr. Denmark. We believe that MSI is very important. It is
something that we have been working very actively to help train
and equip our allies and partners. I agree with you that our
allies and partners are a critical advantage to us in the
region. And we are just in the beginning of this effort, and we
are looking to continue to advance it.
Ms. Bordallo. So you do agree then. Secretary Denmark, my
final question is for you. On Guam, we are particularly
concerned with the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy's
increased presence in the South China Sea and the high number
of unsafe aerial and maritime intercepts they are conducting.
Could you elaborate on the steps that the Department is taking
to, one, A, reduce Chinese intercepts and, B, create a roadmap
for deescalating potential conflicts resulting from a botched
Chinese reaction?
Mr. Denmark. Sure. Yes, of course. As I have mentioned
before, we have recently concluded several confidence-building
measures with the Chinese, which are designed to reduce risk in
terms of setting rules of behavior for interactions between our
aircraft and our surface vessels based on existing
international laws and norms. And we have seen an increase in
the number of interactions between our forces in recent years,
primarily because both sides are more active in the region
militarily, but at the same time, we have seen a decrease in
unsafe intercepts between our two sides, which I think
demonstrates the effectiveness of these efforts.
So we are going to continue to work with China to continue
to advance these efforts to reduce risk, to enhance our ability
to communicate with one another.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
I was just wondering, has China adopted the U.N. Convention
on the Law of the Sea?
Ms. Willett. Yes, Congresswoman. They were integral in the
drafting of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and have
ratified it.
Mrs. Hartzler. Ratified it. Okay. So they should abide by
that, no question, obviously. Has the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea ever ruled for a shared claim between
countries? Could that be something potentially they would do
next week?
Ms. Willett. The tribunal in this instance won't rule on
the underlying question of sovereignty over the individual land
features. What it will do is potentially clarify what maritime
entitlement those features are entitled to, among other issues.
I would have to go back and look at the history of previous
tribunals and get back to you on your question. But at the
moment, the issue at question isn't who owns the land feature,
but what maritime space is generated from a land feature. Is it
a territorial sea or an exclusive economic zone?
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Very good. How avoidable have recent
near misses between U.S. and Chinese air- and seacraft been,
and do you believe these incidents indicate that we are likely
to see additional tense military encounters?
Mr. Denmark. Congresswoman, as I mentioned, we have
actually seen, the number of interactions between our aircraft
and vessels in international places have increased in recent
months and years. We have seen a decrease in the number of
unsafe interactions between our two sides, as a result, I
believe, of the risk reduction efforts that we have conducted.
But as our forces continue to operate in relatively close
proximity to one another, it is an issue that we are going to
continue to be focused on, and these efforts at risk reduction
are something that we are going to continue to pursue with the
PLA.
Mrs. Hartzler. So, back to the claim, a lot of my
colleagues have advocated that the Senate adopt UNCLOS, and how
would you respond to the concerns that I have heard that it
would jeopardize American sovereignty by subjugating some of
our rights to the U.N. and also perhaps jeopardize our fishing
industry and the ability to fish certain areas? How would you
respond to those concerns?
Ms. Willett. It is our view, the Obama administration and
the previous administrations, that the legal framework offered
by the Convention on the Law of the Sea protects U.S. maritime
interests and protects our rights around the world. On the
specifics of what our accession and a ratification of the
treaty might look like, I wouldn't want to speculate. That is
something, I think, that would be part of the Senate
deliberations.
Mrs. Hartzler. Would you like to add anything?
Mr. Denmark. If I could just add, from a DOD perspective,
our military forces, even though we have not ratified UNCLOS,
our military forces do operate in accordance with its
guidelines, and we are very meticulous to make sure that all of
our operations are conducted within the bounds of international
law.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is
recognized for a little less than 5 minutes.
Ms. Graham. I won't even take that long, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate it. Both of the chairmen, thank you for this
opportunity.
Ms. Willett, you mentioned that the United States will be
looking at China's actions following conclusion of arbitration.
Aside from the obvious--and I will say it has surprised me
somewhat this hearing--and I have been here from the
beginning--because it seems like the witnesses, that you all
are somewhat hesitant, and I am assuming because of the
sensitivity of the subject we are discussing, so I don't know
if this would be maybe better addressed in a classified, Mr.
Chairman. But aside from the obvious, what actions will you all
be looking at from China's perspective that would signal
noncompliance?
Ms. Willett. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I think the hesitance comes in part from the fact that it
is a complicated legal question that has been put before the
tribunal, and we do not have a ruling yet from the body that we
could evaluate or even assess, you know, what noncompliance
might look like. Thus far, our efforts have been focused on
engaging intensively with China, with the other claimants, with
the other parties in the region, to ensure that, following the
ruling, everyone behaves with restraint, everyone is looking
for ways to use the tribunal decision as a jumping-off point to
restart diplomatic discussions about a common way forward that
avoids conflict but looks for commonalities that can be built
on so that in these disputed spaces, we can reduce the risk of
misunderstanding and find a way for all of the parties involved
to benefit and to behave in a manner that is consistent with
international law and that isn't in violation of whatever the
ruling is. But until we see the ruling, it is difficult to
speculate on just what its implications are.
Ms. Graham. And I think that is a fair comment. However, I
will segue to something Mr. Denmark said. I certainly hope--and
I will end with this--that if, in fact, there is a failure to
live up to what our expectations are following the decision,
unknowing what the decision is at this point, but I think we
can all extrapolate out what would be a violation, that we do
have--and you said, Mr. Denmark, that we are making sure we
have the capabilities where we need them, and I wrote that
down, make sure we have the capabilities where we need them. I
think that is a key statement because, clearly, this is an area
in the world where there are a lot of potential international
implications if, in fact, they do not fulfill their
obligations, being China.
I will end with that. I don't really think there is a need
to have a follow-up response, and I appreciate you all being
here. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. We want to thank you both for being here. I
told you at the beginning that we would allow you time to have
any final comments. Unfortunately, these votes are called, so
what I am going to allow you to do if you would like is to
submit anything for the record to clarify any statement you
have made or to put anything else in there that you feel we
didn't cover that you thought was important. Is that okay with
both the ranking members and with the chairman?
With that, the other members have said that they do not
need to return to ask their questions, so we are going to let
you guys go. Thank you so much for being here.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 7, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 7, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
July 7, 2016
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHERMAN
Ms. Willett. We remain committed to preserving Taiwan's democracy
and ensuring the freedom of the people on Taiwan from coercion,
threats, and intimidation. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act,
the United States would consider any effort to determine the future of
Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts and
embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific
area and of grave concern to the United States. [See page 17.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 7, 2016
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. Under the terms of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Philippines, each party is bound to
respond to attacks on the ``armed forces, public vessels or aircraft''
of the other party, as well as ``island territories under its
jurisdiction.'' Do the terms of this alliance cover Philippine forces
in the disputed areas of the South China Sea? Do they cover the
Scarborough Shoal?
Ms. Willett. President Obama has been clear that we will stand by
our commitments to the Philippines, as we do any mutual defense treaty
ally. The long-standing, ironclad alliance between the Philippines and
the United States has contributed to peace, stability, and prosperity
in the Asia-Pacific region for more than 70 years. We do not comment on
specific hypotheticals. We believe the language in the Mutual Defense
Treaty is clear.
Mr. Forbes. China has claimed that the outposts it is constructing
in the Spratlys are for civilian purposes only, and that China will not
``militarize'' the islands. In the view of the United States
government, what would count as ``militarization?''
Ms. Willett. The United States opposes efforts by any claimant to
use force or threat of force to advance its territorial or maritime
claims. We have consistently voiced support for the peaceful resolution
of disputes in accordance with international norms. We consistently
call on claimants to cease further land reclamation, construction of
new facilities, and militarization of their outposts in the South China
Sea. We would consider the introduction and rotation of military
assets, including but not necessarily limited to offensive weapons
systems and combat aircraft, on occupied outposts as militarization.
Mr. Forbes. As to China's maritime claims in the South China Seas,
has the State Department or the Department of Defense performed an
analysis, either officially or unofficially, as to the validity of
China's territorial claims and reclamation activities? If so, can the
administration provide such analysis to our committees?
Ms. Willett. The Department conducted an analysis of China's
maritime claims in the South China Sea in volume no. 143 of its
longstanding publication Limits in the Seas, which was released
December 2014. It is currently available on the Department of State
website. The United States does not take a position on competing
sovereignty claims over land territory in the South China Sea.
Mr. Forbes. According to press reports, China has declared that it
will be holding a week of naval exercises on the eve of the court's
ruling, and has designated approximately 40,000 square miles of the
South China Sea--an area roughly the size of Kentucky--as a no-go zone
for foreign shipping. Are these reports accurate? How do you interpret
China's actions?
Mr. Denmark. The People's Liberation Army continues to conduct
routine military operations--including military exercises--in the South
China Sea. We were aware of China's naval exercise in the South China
Sea that occurred during the timeframe that the arbitral tribunal
announced its ruling. We recognize the right of any State to conduct
exercises in accordance with the established international laws and
norms. We understand this particular exercise was part of China's
annual naval training plan and would refer you to the Chinese
government for further information.
U.S. forces operate in the Asia-Pacific on a regular basis,
including in the South China Sea, and have done so for decades. All
operations are conducted in accordance with international law. The
establishment of a Warning Area in international waters for the conduct
of an exercise does not give any country the right to prohibit the
entry of ships or aircraft into that area. The United States and China
agreed to these international standards as part of the Confidence
Building Measures signed in 2014 and will discuss lessons learned from
this event during our relevant diplomatic dialogues.
Mr. Forbes. In 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification
Zone or ADIZ over the East China Sea. Some observers have suggested
that China may intend to declare a similar zone over the South China
Sea, and enforce it from its artificial island bases. How would the
United States respond to the declaration of such an ADIZ?
Mr. Denmark. When China announced its 2013 East China Sea (ECS) Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the United States made it clear
that a unilateral and uncoordinated ADIZ over politically sensitive
areas was provocative and raised tensions. This declaration has not
affected U.S. military operations in any way.
A Chinese declaration of an ADIZ over disputed territories and
water space in the SCS would not grant it any new authority or
strengthen its claims over the area. In fact, such a declaration would
only serve to increase tensions with China's neighbors. Just as in the
East China Sea, an ADIZ in the South China Sea would not change how the
United States conducts military operations in the region. The United
States will continue to fly, sail, and operate in accordance with
international law, as U.S. forces do all around the world. U.S. forces
will continue to be present and active in and around the SCS on a
regular basis.
Mr. Forbes. Some observers have suggested that rather than trying
to achieve legal jurisdiction over the South China Sea, Beijing may
simply strive for de facto control, and use its paramilitary forces,
fishing boats, and ``maritime militia'' to achieve dominance in the
region without crossing the threshold into outright conflict. How
should the United States respond to and counter that kind of ``gray
zone'' aggression against our partners? Do we have a strategy to do so,
or the forces, tactics, and capabilities required?
Mr. Denmark. To address security concerns in the region, including
those referred to as ``gray zone'' aggression, the Department of
Defense has executed a four-part strategy to achieve our broader
national objectives:
First, we have strengthened our own military capacity and
presence in the region through efforts such as the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines.
Second, we have enhanced the tempo of our military
operations in the region increasing our visible presence in the region.
U.S. military forces are present and active in and around the Western
Pacific on a daily basis. U.S. ships and aircraft operate routinely
throughout the Western Pacific--including the South China Sea, East
China Sea and Philippine Sea--and have for the last 70 years. In the
past year, U.S. aircraft carriers, Ronald Reagan and John C. Stennis
Strike groups, conducted routine operations in the international waters
of the South China Sea and the Philippine Sea. The Stennis operated in
the South China Sea for three months before joining the Reagan in the
Philippine Sea for combined training and exercises. These routine
operations were conducted in accordance with international law and
demonstrated continued U.S. freedom of navigation in international
waters in accordance with international norms, standards, rules and
laws.
Third, we continue to network our security relationships
by enhancing our engagements and cooperation with and among our allies
and partners, and thorough building partner capacity efforts such as
the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.
Finally, we have sought to leverage our military
diplomacy with partners, including China, to reduce the possibility of
misunderstanding and miscalculation between our forces.
These efforts, combined with the strategic investments we are
making at home, will ensure that we are ready to address all
contingencies in the region.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. China has stated that it neither accepts nor recognizes
the Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling against its claims in the
South China Sea. This has led to media speculation as to potential
Chinese provocations and U.S. military responses. However, given the
mutual goals of resource extraction and fishing among claimants to the
contested waters, resolving these conflicting claims is primarily a
diplomatic question. How can the State Department play a constructive
role in this process?
Ms. Willett. The Administration employs a comprehensive and
multifaceted approach to the South China Sea that includes intense
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, a consistent military presence
and operations, defense engagement and partner capacity building, and
sustained economic engagement. As a non-claimant, one of our primary
interests is in helping shape a rules-based strategic environment so
that disputes are settled peacefully and in accordance with
international law. Our consistent and steady presence in the South
China Sea plays an important role in deterring any claimant from
employing the use or threat of force to assert their claims, leaving
open the door for constructive diplomatic or other peaceful processes
among claimants. We are strengthening our defensive presence in the
South China Sea. As part of a long term strategy, we are moving 60
percent of our naval fleet to the Pacific and rotating more of our
forces through friendly countries in the region. We are also
strengthening maritime domain awareness and law enforcement
capabilities in the region. This includes new security cooperation
agreements with allies and partners in Southeast Asia and providing
equipment and training to help partners better patrol offshore and
ensure their ability to maintain an effective presence. On the
diplomatic front, we are advocating for peaceful dispute resolution and
compliance with international law. We continue to engage in intense,
high-level diplomacy with all claimants, including advocating for them
to take advantage of the July 12 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling to find a
workable modus-vivendi in areas subject to dispute. President Obama,
Secretary Kerry, and Secretary Carter continue to make our interests
and concerns clear to all claimants in an open and frank manner. In
addition, we have consistently called on all parties to negotiate a
Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, which would build on the
Declaration on the Conduct they negotiated in 2002.
Mr. Larsen. What is the U.S. military's assessment of China's long-
term goals as a naval power in Asia and beyond? Are there any ways a
more powerful Chinese navy is in the U.S. national interest?
Mr. Denmark. China's Navy is shifting its mission from ``near sea''
defense to ``far seas'' protection, which was espoused as the Navy's
objective in China's most recent Defense White Paper. China's maritime
emphasis and attention to missions guarding its overseas interests has
increasingly drawn the PLA beyond China's borders and its immediate
periphery. The PLAN is increasingly conducting operational tasks
outside the so-called ``first island chain'' with multi-mission, long-
range, sustainable naval platforms that have robust self-defense
capabilities. Over the past 15 years, China's ambitious naval
modernization program has produced a more technologically advanced and
flexible force. The PLAN now possesses more than 300 surface ships,
submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol craft. China is rapidly
retiring legacy combatants in favor of larger, multi-mission ships
equipped with advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons
and sensors.
As China's capabilities improve, we consistently encourage China to
be a constructive partner in the region and to contribute positively to
regional stability. China's contributions to global and regional public
goods--such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief--would be in
the interests of the entire Asia-Pacific, including the United States.
Mr. Larsen. Does the U.S. military believe that China's building up
of ``islands'' and installation of military facilities in the South
China Sea are the result of PLAN pressure and influence on China's
civilian leadership, or are these the result of a centrally-directed
strategy from China's top civilian leadership?
Mr. Denmark. I would refer you to Chinese authorities to address
questions about China's internal policy coordination process.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SALMON
Mr. Salmon. Since the hearing, the tribunal deciding the
Philippines v. China arbitration has issued its ruling, largely
invalidating China's claims in the South China Sea. China, predictably,
has made clear that it refuses to recognize or abide by this ruling. As
the tribunal lacks an enforcement mechanism, what will be the
ramifications of China's noncompliance? Does this noncompliance stand
to damage the credibility of international law? How can we hold them
accountable?
Mr. Denmark. As provided in the Law of the Sea Convention, the
Arbitral Tribunal's decision in this case is legally binding on both
the Philippines and China. China's stated non-compliance with the
ruling does not negate the legitimacy of the ruling.
Although the United Nations Permanent Court of Arbitration does not
have a mechanism to enforce the ruling, this is common to all
international maritime law. The expectation in this and other cases
relating to international maritime law is that both parties will comply
with their obligations and exercise restraint. We have encouraged China
and all claimants to clarify their claims in accordance with
international law as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention, and to
work together to creatively and peacefully manage and resolve their
differences. The United States will continue to provide a credible
presence in the region to create the diplomatic space for China and the
Philippines to resolve their differences. Our military operations,
though not intended to enforce the ruling, will continue to uphold
freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, as we do
around the world.
Mr. Salmon. Our strategy towards the South China Sea has been
limited to imposing reputational harm on China, rather than actually
attempting to elicit a change in its behavior. Our freedom of
navigation operations have shown that we will not recognize China's
excessive claims, and our statements in support of international law
show that China's noncompliance with the arbitral ruling is wrong; but
this strategy hasn't stopped Chinese militarization of the area. Is
imposing reputational harm really the best we can do? Other than
upgrading the maritime security capabilities of our partners in the
region, do we have any tools for inducing behavioral change in the
South China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. We are committed to defending our allies and
protecting the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and
airspace guaranteed to all countries. The United States will continue
to conduct routine and lawful operations in the South China Sea in
order to protect the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and
airspace guaranteed to all countries.
We have a multi-pronged strategy to defend and uphold these
interests and principles and set the stage for change. First, the
United States has strengthened our own military capacity and presence
in Southeast Asia though such efforts as rotationally basing ships,
aircraft and Marines in Singapore and the Philippines. Second we have
enhanced the tempo of our military operations in the region which
included a persistent and scalable Command and Control Detachment in
the Philippines, dual carrier operations in the Philippine Sea and a
deployed rotational air component to the Philippines. Third, we have
enhanced our regional security network by building partner capacity
through the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative, training
regional forces, and conducting multilateral exercises such as
BALIKATAN and RIMPAC. Finally we have leveraged military diplomacy to
reduce risk with China utilizing Confidence Building Measures, high
level dialogues, and existing structures such as Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS) and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus.
In combination with the broader United States Government diplomatic
engagement strategy these lines of effort have provided an increased
set of tools for creating more favorable conditions for claimants to
lower tensions and take steps to peacefully resolve disputes, including
through peaceful dispute mechanisms such as arbitration.
Mr. Salmon. ASEAN is the multilateral body most directly involved
in the South China Sea disputes, but has had trouble making forward
progress due to its consensus-based procedures. Some members of ASEAN
continue to ask for U.S. assistance to secure the region. The Maritime
Security Initiative was recently implemented to assist coastal states'
abilities to address challenges in the area, including China's
belligerence. What more can we do to work with our friends in ASEAN to
move toward a secure region? How can we facilitate progress within the
framework of ASEAN? Will the disputes cause fractures in the ASEAN
community and what can we do to prevent it?
Mr. Denmark. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is
critical to the regional security architecture. The United States
supports ASEAN centrality, and has focused on enhancing ASEAN through
engagement, building partner capacity, training and exercises. This is
why DOD has invested in ASEAN thorough multiple high-level dialogues
such as the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus
(ADMM-Plus). In addition to the dialogue, DOD has taken action to back
up the principles we espouse. We are deepening multilateral regional
security architecture through the ADMM-Plus and its Experts Working
Groups, through which we are pursuing practical defense cooperation,
initiatives, and exercises to address challenges that affect us all
more effectively.
Additionally, we have begun implementing the Southeast Asia
Maritime Security Initiative, which Congress authorized in Section 1263
of the FY16 NDAA. This is a comprehensive, multi-year effort that will
reinforce our partners' and allies' maritime security efforts and
address shared challenges. In the Initiative's first year, we're
helping the Philippines enhance its National Coast Watch Center and
outfitting a previously provided excess high endurance cutter with
reconnaissance and maritime sensors, advising Vietnam on maritime
patrol capabilities, providing Indonesia and Malaysia with
communications equipment and training, and advising Thailand on fusion
center operations.
In addition to building partner capacity, we also conduct several
bilateral and multilateral exercises. Examples include BALIKATAN with
the Philippines, and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise includes
27 nations focused on building maritime cooperation, security, and
disaster response capacity. Additionally, PACIFIC PATHWAYS builds
partner capability and interoperability with Thailand, South Korea, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
In recent years, we have also seen Asia-Pacific countries come
together to strengthen bilateral and trilateral ties. For example,
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia, members of ASEAN, are coming
together to counter maritime threats in coastal waters. And Indonesia
has proposed trilateral joint maritime patrols with Malaysia and the
Philippines, including counter-piracy patrols in the Sulu Sea. The
United States welcomes and encourages these burgeoning partnerships
among like-minded partners who share our vision of a principled
regional order. By networking security together, we believe we
strengthen the ability of ASEAN and all countries to enjoy stability
and prosperity in a dynamic region.
Mr. Salmon. Secretary Kerry recently warned that the United States
would treat a Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea as a ``provocative
and destabilizing act.'' Tensions were high when China declared an ADIZ
in the East China Sea in 2013, and much of that strain has shifted
south. Given China's militarization of the South China Sea, does China
now have the infrastructure in place to declare an ADIZ? Would the
United States and the international community comply with a Chinese
South China Sea ADIZ? How would it differ with the Chinese ADIZ in the
East China Sea?
Mr. Denmark. When China announced its 2013 ECS ADIZ, we made it
clear that declaring a unilateral and uncoordinated ADIZ in a
politically sensitive area was provocative and raised regional
tensions.
A unilateral and uncoordinated declaration of an ADIZ over disputed
territories and water space in the SCS would not grant China any new
authority over the region and only serves to increase tensions with
China's neighbors. Just as in the East China Sea, an SCS ADIZ would not
change how the United States conducts military operations in the
region. The United States will continue to fly, sail, and operate in
accordance with international law, as U.S. forces do all around the
world. U.S. forces will continue to be present and active in and around
the SCS on a regular basis.
Mr. Salmon. The Philippines v. China arbitral tribunal's award has
defined the Scarborough Shoal as a rock under the Law of the Sea
treaty. What implications does this definition have for the U.S.-
Philippines alliance? What does this settling of the Shoal's status
mean for the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty?
Mr. Denmark. As President Obama and Secretary Carter have stated,
our commitment to the Philippines is ironclad. This alliance has been
nurtured over decades; tested in crisis; and is built on shared
interest, values, and sacrifice. Our alliance relationships form the
bedrock of our role in the Asia-Pacific, and accordingly, the stability
and security that have helped so many in the Asia-Pacific to rise and
prosper.
The United States takes no position on competing sovereignty claims
to features in the South China Sea and encourages all parties to seek a
peaceful diplomatic resolution to their disputes.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOWENTHAL
Mr. Lowenthal. Ms. Willett, last month the Foreign Ministers of
ASEAN released a strong statement of concern on Chinese activities in
the South China Sea. In what I think is a pretty extraordinary move,
however, the ministers retracted the statement after coming under heavy
pressure from China.
What can the United States do to build greater consensus among the
nations of Southeast Asia? Will ASEAN ever be able to speak with one
voice on the Sea?
Ms. Willett. The United States values ASEAN's role at the center of
the region's multilateral security architecture, and believes that
ASEAN centrality plays an important role in maintaining regional
stability. We continue to invest in ASEAN institutions, including a
commitment toward helping ASEAN further implement its own goals to
become a more integrated and effective economic, political, and socio-
cultural community. We also continue to diplomatically engage all ten
members at all levels, using these opportunities to impress upon them
the importance of ASEAN speaking out in favor of international law,
rules, and standards.
Our relationships throughout Southeast Asia are strengthening,
support for a common vision of a rules-based regional order is
deepening, and demand for us to play a more active role in upholding
regional stability is increasing.
If thwarting ASEAN consensus to prevent a specific mention on the
July 12 Arbitral Tribunal ruling was meant as a means to draw attention
away from the decision and its legally binding effect on the
Philippines and China, those actions achieved the opposite result. In
fact, the region and international community are increasingly vocal
about calling for compliance with international law and against
activities that raise tensions and complicate the situation. Last
month, ASEAN foreign ministers jointly called for disputes to be
resolved peacefully, with full respect for diplomatic and legal
processes. The United States and ASEAN Member States also stressed the
importance of international law, including freedom of navigation and
overflight.
Mr. Lowenthal. In the case that the UNCLOS tribunal rules in favor
of the Philippines and China completely ignores the ruling, as signs
have indicated, what would this mean for China's general commitment to
international law?
Ms. Willett. The tribunal's ruling will be final and binding on
both China and the Philippines under the Law of the Sea Convention, an
international treaty that both countries helped negotiate and willingly
joined. China's public rejection of the tribunal's decision would
certainly raise questions about China's commitment to honoring its
international obligations and commitments. But we're especially
watching China's actions, and whether it acts in a manner consistent
with the arbitral decision or acts in violation of its treaty
obligations. Actions by China that violate the tribunal's decision or
otherwise escalate tensions would send a worrying signal to the
international community about China's attitude to international rules
and norms.
As a result, we are working, together with allies, to convince
China to act in accordance with international law--not just in the
South China Sea, but on other issues as well. To this end, we engage
directly with the Chinese government to underscore the importance of
respecting and upholding the rules-based international order and to
highlight the risks and costs of undermining it. We also engage with
other countries in the region, as well as the broader international
community, to build support for common principles and set shared
expectations for Beijing.
Mr. Lowenthal. Should we be worried about China's potential
rejection of an unfavorable tribunal ruling as setting a precedent to
ignore international legal commitments in the future?
Ms. Willett. The tribunal's ruling will be final and binding on
both China and the Philippines under the Law of the Sea Convention, an
international treaty that both countries helped negotiate and willingly
joined. China's public rejection of the tribunal's decision would
certainly raise questions about China's commitment to honoring its
international obligations and commitments. But we're especially
watching China's actions, and whether it acts in a manner consistent
with the arbitral decision or acts in violation of its treaty
obligations. Actions by China that violate the tribunal's decision or
otherwise escalate tensions would send a worrying signal to the
international community about China's attitude to international rules
and norms.
As a result, we are working, together with allies, to convince
China to act in accordance with international law--not just in the
South China Sea, but on other issues as well. To this end, we engage
directly with the Chinese government to underscore the importance of
respecting and upholding the rules-based international order and to
highlight the risks and costs of undermining it. We also engage with
other countries in the region, as well as the broader international
community, to build support for common principles and set shared
expectations for Beijing.
We have made real progress. We have demonstrably strengthened our
relationships throughout the Asia Pacific region, deepened regional
support for a common vision of a rules-based regional order, and seen
an increase in regional demand for us to play an active role in
upholding regional stability. The region and international community
are increasingly vocal against activities that raise tensions. Instead,
they are in favor of respect for international law and restraint among
all claimants, including China.
Mr. Lowenthal. What other avenues are available to the United
States or the international community to pressure China to respect the
tribunal's decision?
Ms. Willett. As a non-claimant, our vital interest lies in helping
shape a regional environment in which disputes can be settled
peacefully and in accordance with international law. To this end, the
Administration is pursuing a comprehensive and multifaceted approach to
the South China Sea.
Our consistent and steady presence in the South China Sea plays an
important role in deterring claimants from employing the use of force
to assert their claims, leaving open the door for constructive
diplomatic or other peaceful processes among claimants. We are
strengthening our security posture in the South China Sea. As part of a
long term strategy, we are moving 60 percent of our naval fleet to the
Pacific and rotating more of our forces through friendly countries in
the region.
We are also strengthening maritime domain awareness and law
enforcement capabilities in the region. This includes new security
cooperation arrangements with allies and partners in Southeast Asia and
providing equipment and training to help partners better patrol the
maritime domain and ensure their ability to maintain an effective
presence.
On the diplomatic front, we are advocating for peaceful dispute
resolution and compliance with international law. We are engaging in
intense, high-level diplomacy with all claimants, including advocating
for them to take advantage of the July 12 Arbitral Tribunal's ruling to
advance a modus vivendi in disputed areas. President Obama, Secretary
Kerry, and Secretary Carter make our interests and concerns clear to
all claimants in an open and frank manner.
Mr. Lowenthal. Mr. Denmark, the United States has conducted several
``freedom of navigation'' operations in the South China Sea to ensure
that these essential waterways continue to remain open for all.
Australia has also conducted freedom of navigation flights in the sea,
can we expect our other allies in the region, like the Philippines or
Singapore, to also contribute to these efforts?
Mr. Denmark. Our Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)
demonstrate the commitment of the United States to operate wherever
permitted under international law, and to uphold the rights, freedoms,
and lawful uses of the sea that are enjoyed by all nations in
accordance with international law. They are designed to support and
sustain the principled rules-based order in the Asia-Pacific. The
United States will continue to conduct FONOPs around the world,
including in the South China Sea.
Questions on the specific response by individual countries must be
answered by their respective governments.
Mr. Lowenthal. Should we be encouraging our allies to conduct these
exercises?
Mr. Denmark. The United States welcomes all states to exercise
their rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea and airspace.
Mr. Lowenthal. With so many different actors and militaries
operating in the region, how can we be sure that there are open lines
of communication and misunderstandings do not lead to violent
confrontations?
Mr. Denmark. We actively seek to reduce the risk of
miscommunication and miscalculation at sea through a variety of
mechanisms. These include our bilateral and multilateral defense
dialogues, such as ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus,
combined exercises such as Rim of the Pacific 2016, and participation
in multilateral organizations such as the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS).
In 2014, the member states of WPNS agreed to the Code of Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), which standardizes basic communications
between naval ships and aircraft in an effort to minimize the risk of
miscommunication and miscalculation. This, and other efforts such as
our bilateral Confidence Building Measures with China, provide the
practical mechanisms to mitigate risk of unintended incidents.
We also maintain a robust military-to-military relationship with
China that seeks to reduce risk and enhance mutual understanding. As
part of this effort, U.S. military leaders regularly engage their
Chinese counterparts and maintain regular channels of communications
with them through the use of the Defense Telephone Link.
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