[Senate Hearing 114-300]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 114-300
WORLDWIDE THREATS
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 26, 2015
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma JACK REED, Rhode Island
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BILL NELSON, Florida
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri
KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia
DEB FISCHER, Nebraska JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
TOM COTTON, Arkansas KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
JONI ERNST, Iowa JOE DONNELLY, Indiana
THOM TILLIS, North Carolina MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii
DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska TIM KAINE, Virginia
MIKE LEE, Utah ANGUS S. KING, JR., Maine
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
TED CRUZ, Texas
Christian D. Brose, Staff Director
Elizabeth L. King, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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february 26, 2015
Page
Worldwide Threats................................................ 1
Clapper, James R., Director of National Intelligence............. 4
Stewart, Lt. Gen. Vincent, Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 38
(iii)
WORLDWIDE THREATS
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THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2015
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD 09106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John McCain
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators McCain, Inhofe,
Sessions, Wicker, Ayotte, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst,
Sullivan, Reed, Manchin, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Donnelly, Hirono,
Kaine, and King.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman McCain. Well, good morning. Good morning,
everybody.
We have some nominations that, when we get sufficient
number of frightened members who couldn't brave the snow today
to come in--and we also have a--that----
Glad to see the Senator from Maine here, who is used to
this kind of weather year-round.
So, anyway, so we'll--if we get a quorum, we'll talk about
the nominations.
And also, I'd like to tell the members here that Senator
Reed and I have agreed on a letter to the Budget Committee
concerning our views as to what the Budget Committee should do
on Defense. And, hopefully, we'll circulate that letter and get
as many signatures as possible. Both Senator Reed and I have
reached agreement on that letter, and I'd like you to look at
it, and as many as possible can sign it.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
nature and scope of the global threats faced by the United
States and our allies.
I want to welcome James Clapper, Director of National
Intelligence, and General Vincent Stewart, the newly confirmed
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Thank you for
being with us today.
The committee recently conducted several hearings with some
of our most respected national security leaders to explore the
need for strategic thinking to address the threats we face. In
the course of those hearings, these military and foreign policy
leaders all agreed that the current international environment
is more complex and dangerous than at any time in recent
memory.
On the terrorism front, ISIL continues to dominate much of
Syria and Iraq while spreading its dark and vicious ideology in
its effort to become the dominant Islamic extremist group in
the world. At the same time, the risk of attacks by foreign
fighters returning from the battlefield, or lone-wolf threats
inspired by ISIL's successes, only increases the danger to the
West. And Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Africa, al Qaeda and
its affiliated groups continue to take advantage of ungoverned
spaces to plan attacks against the United States and Western
interests.
Simply put, we are engaged in a generational fight for
civilization against brutal enemies, and defeating these
enemies require significant intelligence resources and focus,
given the diffuse and constantly evolving nature of the threat.
But, as we continue the fight against Islamic extremists,
we must not lose sight of the other strategic threats we face.
As the world ponders how to respond to Russia's invasion and
dismemberment of Eastern Ukraine, Russia's provocations are
only more worrisome in light of Vladimir Putin's intense focus
on building up and modernizing Russia's military forces and
doctrine and the geopolitical ambitions that these new Russian
capabilities are designed to further.
In Asia, stability and security of a vital and economically
significant region is threatened by North Korea's continued
aggression, buildup of its nuclear arsenal, and development of
long-range ballistic missiles. The far greater challenge is
China's dramatic growth and modernization of its own military
capabilities, which appear designed to restrict the United
States military's ability to operate in the western Pacific.
That chart over there is very interesting, in that it shows
the expansion by China in areas of the South China Sea. And I
hope our witnesses might comment on the fact that, apparently,
they are filling in enough of that area to perhaps employ
weaponry such as anti-air and other capabilities.
Anyway, Iran continues to exert malign influence throughout
the Middle East and Africa, using proxies in Lebanon, Syria,
Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Gaza, and Bahrain, to undermine United
States strategic interests. In fact, the Iranian influence and
presence in Iraq have become one of the key factors and, it
seems, limitations in United States policy planning in Iraq and
Syria. We must also remain focused on the myriad potential
threats of the future and, thus, maintain technological
superiority against potential adversaries. Today this is of
most concern in the cyber and space domains, where we see
increasingly capable and aggressive activities by nation-state
adversaries in areas with few established norms.
I'd appreciate our witnesses' thoughts on each of these
major issues. As policymakers, we look to the intelligence
committee--community to provide timely and accurate information
about the nature of the threats we face, the intentions of our
adversaries, and the likely effect of certain actions we could
take. In an age of increasing threats and flat defense budgets,
the need for accurate intelligence about the plans and
intentions of global actors becomes even more paramount.
Again, I want to thank Director Clapper and General Stewart
for testifying today. I look forward to your assessments of the
nature and scope of the myriad threats we face, how the
intelligence community prioritizes and approaches these many
threats, and which of these many issues concern you the most.
Senator Reed.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Senator Reed. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses. As they know
very, very well, we currently face an alarming number of
complex and varied national security challenges from many
corners of the globe. And our witnesses' views on, and
assessments of, these challenges are critical to the work of
this committee.
Last week, I traveled to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq,
and had the opportunity to meet not only with the leaders in
those countries, but also with the United States civilians and
uniformed personnel who are so ably and courageously serving
the United States.
In Iraq, our military commanders stressed that, despite the
setbacks that extremist fighters have suffered, ISIS remains
capable militarily. It continues to consolidate its power in
the region, including through the coercion of local
populations. Coalition airstrikes have enabled local security
forces, including Kurdish peshmerga and the Iraqi government's
newly established militias, many of them Shi'a, to begin to
gain ground from ISIS. But, concerns remain about when Iraq
Security Forces will be ready to launch a counteroffensive to
take Mosul and about Iran's growing influence inside Iraq. I
look forward to hearing the witnesses' views on Iraq and the
capabilities of both the military and the new government.
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Taliban remains resilient,
despite coming under pressure on both sides of the border. The
challenge for United States forces in Afghanistan will be to
keep the counterterrorism pressure on the Taliban even as we
build the capacity of Afghan Special Operations Forces to
ensure that Afghanistan does not once again become a haven for
al-Qaeda and other terrorists. We would be interested in our
witnesses' views on the Taliban threat for the 2015 fighting
season, the possibility of Pakistan-supported reconciliation
talks with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan, and
the significance of reports of a growing ISIS presence in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
On Iran, the diplomatic effort to prevent Iran's
acquisition of nuclear weapons are ongoing, and the end of
March is the next point at which we will assess Iran's intent
with regard to its nuclear program. I hope the witnesses will
provide us with an update on the intelligence community's
thinking with regard to negotiations and our assessment of
Iran's activities in the region under the two possible
scenarios: deal or no deal.
In Syria, coalition airstrikes of the naval Kurdish
fighters to regain control of Khobani and expand outward, but
ISIS remains a formidable force. General Nagata will begin
training the moderate Syrian opposition in the coming months.
And, if successful, these forces could, over time, assist the
coalition to promote the conditions for a political settlement.
Just last week, at a Regional Chiefs of Defense Conference, the
United States and Turkey signed a key agreement to allow
training of these forces to begin in Turkey once recruits are
identified. I am interested in the witnesses' views on the
potential of this Syrian training initiative and the challenges
we'll face.
In Europe, the post-cold-war international order is under
threat from a Russia that seeks to intimidate the Ukraine and
other neighboring countries through the creation or
perpetuation of conflicts at increasingly aggressive military
activities. Your assessment of the size of Russia's military
buildup and President Putin's intentions could be of interest
to the committee.
We've faced a different, but no less complex, series of
challenge in the Asia-Pacific region. A recent cyber attack on
Sony by North Korea illustrates the unpredictable and coercive
nature of that regime and demonstrates that even a relatively
small and weak rogue nation taking advantage of our
unparalleled dependence on electronic networks can reach across
the ocean to cause extensive damage to a United States-based
economic target through cyberspace. Furthermore, while Chinese
cyber attacks are not as public, they are just as problematic
and continue to pose a security challenge to the United States.
We would be interested to know whether we can expect more
attacks of this nature and what we can do to make our systems
and our Nations more resilient in the future.
Finally, we have a threat close to home, and that is
sequestration. It is a threat that jeopardizes not only our
National security, but our public safety, health,
transportation, education, and environmental resources, as
well. As we receive testimony today on the current and future
threats to our National security, we here in Congress must be
mindful of the necessity to find a balanced and bipartisan
solution that includes a repeal of sequestration.
Thank you again for appearing today, and I look forward to
hearing your testimony.
Chairman McCain. Welcome the witnesses.
General Clapper.
STATEMENT OF JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Clapper. Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Reed, and
members of the committee, it's a great pleasure and honor for
me to be here with General Vince Stewart. And he and I are here
today to update you on some, but certainly not all, of the
pressing intelligence and national security issues facing our
Nation.
I need to note up front that there were some classified
issues we discussed in our closed hearing on Tuesday that we
won't be able to discuss as fulsomely in this open televised
hearing.
In the interest of time and to allow for questions, I will
only cover some of the wave tops on behalf of both of us. Two
overall comments at the outset:
One, unpredictable instability is the new normal. The year
2014 saw the highest rate of political instability since 1992,
the most deaths as a result of state-sponsored mass killings
since the early 1990s, and the highest number of refugees and
internally displaced persons, or IDPs, since World War II.
Roughly half of the world's currently stable countries are at
some risk of instability over the next 2 years.
The second overall comment is, this pervasive uncertainty
makes it all the harder to predict the future. 2014 and 2015
saw a number of events that illustrate this difficulty: the
North Korean attack on Sony, the most serious and costly
cyberattack against United States interests to date, the ebola
epidemic, and the small-scale but dramatic terrorist attacks in
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, and the United
States.
Again this year, I'll start with cyber threats. Attacks
against us are increasing in frequency, scale, sophistication,
and severity of impact. Although we must be prepared for a
catastrophic large-scale strike, a so-called ``cyber
Armageddon,'' the reality is that we've been living with a
constant and expanding barrage of cyberattacks for some time.
This insidious trend, I believe, will continue. Cyber poses a
very complex set of threats, because profit-motivated
criminals, ideologically motivated hackers, or extremists in
variously capable nation-states, like Russia, China, North
Korea, and Iran, are all potential adversaries, who, if they
choose, can do great harm. Additionally, the methods of attack,
the systems targeted, and the victims are also expanding in
diversity and intensity on a daily basis.
2014 saw, for the first time, destructive cyberattacks
carried out on United States soil by nation-state entities,
marked first by the Iranian attack against the Las Vegas Sands
Casino Corporation, a year ago this month, and the North Korean
attack against Sony in November. While the both of these
nations have lesser technical capabilities in comparison to
Russia and China, these destructive attacks demonstrate that
Iran and North Korea are motivated and unpredictable cyber
actors.
Russia and China continue to develop very sophisticated
cyber programs. While I can't go into detail here, the Russian
cyber threat is more severe than we had previously assessed.
And Chinese economic espionage against United States companies
remains a major threat, despite detailed private-sector
reports, scathing public indictments, and stern U.S. demarches.
With respect to non-nation-state entities, some
ideologically motivated cyber actors expressing support for
ISIL have demonstrated their capabilities by hacking several
social media accounts. The so-called ``Cyber Caliphate''
successfully hacked CENTCOM's Twitter account and YouTube page
in January, and, 2 weeks ago, hacked Newsweek magazine's
Twitter handle.
The most pervasive cyber threat to the U.S. financial
sector is from cyber criminals. Criminals were responsible for
cyber intrusions in 2014 into JPMorgan, Home Depot, Target,
Nieman Marcus, Anthem, and other United States companies. And,
in the future, we'll probably see cyber operations that change
or manipulate electronic information to compromise its
integrity instead of simply deleting or disrupting access to
it. In the end, the cyber threat cannot be completely
eliminated. Rather, we must be vigilant in our efforts to
detect, manage, and defend against it.
Moving on to terrorism. In 2013, just over 11,500 terrorist
attacks worldwide killed approximately 22,000 people.
Preliminary data for the first 9 months of 2014 reflects nearly
13,000 attacks, which killed 31,000 people. When the final
accounting is done, 2014 will have been the most lethal year
for global terrorism in the 45 years such data has been
compiled. About half of all attacks, as well as fatalities, in
2014 occurred in just three countries: Iraq, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan.
I'm drawing this data--the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL) conducted more attacks than any other terrorist
group in the first 9 months of 2014, and in--credit where
credit's due, I'm drawing this data from the National
Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, or START, at the University of Maryland.
The recent terrorist attacks in Europe emphasize the threat
posed by small numbers of extremists radicalized by the
conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The global media attention and
widespread support in extremist circles for these attacks
probably will inspire additional extremists to conduct similar
attacks.
And ISIL, al Qaeda, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
and, most recently, al-Shabaab, are calling on their supporters
to support lone-wolf attacks against the United States and
other Western countries. Of the 13 attacks in the west since
last May, 12 were conducted by individual extremists.
Since the conflict began, more than 20,000 Sunni foreign
fighters have traveled to Syria from more than 90 countries to
fight the Assad regime. Of that number, at least 13,600 have
extremist ties. More than 3400 Western fighters have gone to
Syria and Iraq. Hundreds have returned home to Europe. About
180 Americans or so have been involved in various stages of
travel to Syria. I should point out this is those who've
attempted to go, didn't get there, those who got there and were
killed, those who got there, fought, and went to another
country, and some number who have come back. A relatively small
number have returned, and we've not identified any of them
engaged in attack plotting. Nevertheless, the homegrown violent
extremists continue to pose the most likely threat to the
Homeland. Lone actors or insular groups who act autonomously
will likely gravitate to simpler plots that don't require
advanced skills, outside training, or communication with
others. A small, but persistent, number of Sunni terrorist
groups remain intent on striking the United States and the
west, some of whom still see commercial aviation as an
appealing target.
Moving to the Mideast, ISIL is increasing its influence
outside of Iraq and Syria, seeking to expand its self-declared
caliphate into the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, and South
Asia, and planning terrorist attacks against Western and Shi'a
interests. ISIL's rise represents the greatest shift in the
Sunni violent extremist landscape since al Qaeda affiliates
first began forming, and it is the first to assume at least
some characteristics of a nation-state.
Spillover from the Syrian conflict is raising the prospect
of instability in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. In Iraq,
sectarian conflict in mixed Shi'a/Sunni areas is growing, and,
if not blunted, will undermine progress against ISIL. While
Prime Minister Abadi has begun to alter the ethnosectarian tone
in Iraq, resistance from his Shi'a political allies and
persistent distrust among Iraqi leaders will limit progress
toward a stable, inclusive political environment.
ISIL's ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations
in Iraq has been degraded by coalition airstrikes, the
provision of weapons and munitions by the United States and
other allies, and stiffened defenses by the Iraqi Security
Forces, Kurdish peshmerga, Shi'a militants, and tribal allies,
not to mention the Iranians. However, ISIL remains, as we've
seen, a formidable and brutal threat.
Moving to Syria and parts of western Syria, the Syrian
regime made consistent gains in 2014, but it will require years
for it to reassert significant control of the country as a
whole. The regime has a clear advantage over the opposition,
which is plagued by disunity as well as firepower, manpower,
and logistical shortfalls. Right now, they're incapable of
militarily ousting Assad, and will probably remain so in 2015.
Assad is confident. He thinks the war is winnable. The
conflict, with over 202,000 people killed--estimated to have
been killed--will continue to threaten the stability of its
regional neighbors and foster the rise of regional sectarianism
and extremism. As well, it will strain the region's fragile
economic balance as millions of refugees continue to flee the
conflict. Over 52 percent of Syria's prewar population, or
about 11.4 million people, has been displaced.
Iran is exerting its influence in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
Tehran has provided robust military support to Damascus and
Baghdad in the form of arms, advisors, funding, intelligence
collection, electronic warfare, and cyber support, and combat
support. More broadly, Iran will face many of the same decision
points in 2015 as it did in 2014. Foremost is whether the
Supreme Leader will agree to a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions
relief, but, at the same time, to preserve his options on
nuclear capabilities.
In Libya, two rival governments emerged, so the country has
no clear legitimate political authority and is embroiled in a
civil war. External support to both sides by countries in the
region has further stoked the violence. Extremists and
terrorist groups affiliated with al Qaeda and ISIL are
exploiting Libya's permissive security environment. They're
using the country to train and to plot. ISIL's beheadings of
the Coptic Christians highlight the growing threat posed by
ISIL and affiliated groups in Libya.
Moving to Yemen, the evacuation of our Embassy in Sana'a
has, for now, reduced the effectiveness of our counterterrorism
efforts. After President Hadi's attempted resignation and the
Huthi's unilateral dissolution of the government, Yemen's
political future and stability are, at best, uncertain,
particularly with Hadi's apparent escape to Aden and perhaps
his reassertion of his presidential authorities. Iran has
provided support to the Huthis for years, and there ascendancy
is increasing Iran's influence.
Let me move briefly to Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is
entering its second year and is achieving--and achieving a
lasting solution that allows Kiev to pursue western integration
will be difficult, to say the least. Moscow sees itself in
direct confrontation with the west over Ukraine, and will be
very prone to overreact to United States actions. Putin's goals
are to keep Ukraine out of NATO and to ensure separatist
control and autonomous entity within Ukraine. He wants Moscow
to retain leverage over Kiev. And Crimea, in his view, is
simply not negotiable.
Russian dominance over the former Soviet space is Russia's
highest foreign policy goal. Falling oil prices, Ukraine-
related costs, and Western sanctions have spurred double-digit
inflation and have tipped Russia's economy towards recession.
Russia will continue to possess the largest, most capable
foreign nuclear ballistic missile force. Russia's weapons
modernization plans will focus on strategic warfare and ways to
mitigate what they think are our advantages, like prompt global
strike.
China. China's leaders are primarily concerned with
domestic issues: the Communist Party's hold on power, internal
stability, and economic growth. Although China is looking for
stable ties with the United States, it's more willing to accept
bilateral and regional tensions in pursuit of its interests,
especially on maritime sovereignty issues. And, as you noted,
Chairman McCain, China is expanding and accelerating the
buildup of outposts in the South China Sea, to include
stationing for their ships and potential airfields. More
broadly, they continue an aggressive military modernization
program directly aimed at what they consider to be our
strengths. Their military training program last year included
exercises unprecedented in scope, scale, and complexity to both
test modernization progress and to improve their theater
warfare capabilities. President Xi Jinping is pursuing an
ambitious reform agenda that risks both leadership tensions and
domestic unrest. The slowdown of the Chinese economy is
reinforcing the leader's neuralgia about internal stability and
reinforcing a harsh crackdown on internal dissent.
Needless to say, there are many more threats to United
States interests worldwide that we can address, many of which
are covered in detail in our statement for the record--notably,
the classified version--such as Afghanistan, North Korea, and
weapons of mass destruction.
But, I think, with that grim litany, will--I will stop and
will open to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Clapper follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VINCENT STEWART, DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of time, we
have the statement for the record and just one oral statement
from Director Clapper.
[The prepared statement of General Stewart follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman McCain. Thank you.
Director Clapper, on the issue of defensive weaponry to
Ukraine, do you believe that, if we give that assistance, that
it would escalate--provoke Putin to escalate his assistance to
the, quote, ``separatists'' and his aggression against Ukraine?
Mr. Clapper. Well, General Breedlove discussed this
recently, and he did make, I think, a very apt comment, and,
you know, predicting exactly what Putin will do or what his
behavior will be is something of an unknown. I think the
intelligence community view is that, if we were to provide
lethal assistance to Ukraine, that this would evoke a negative
reaction from Putin and the Russians. It could potentially
further remove the very thin figleaf of their position that
they're not--have not been involved in Ukraine, and could lead
to accelerating or promoting more weaponry and higher
sophistication into the separatist areas to support the
separatists. But, I hasten to add, this is an intelligence
community assessment, and this is not necessarily to suggest
opposition to provision of lethal aid.
Chairman McCain. Well, I'm glad you added that, because my
next question is, What more do you think that Putin would do--
could do? Go to Kiev?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, we don't----
Chairman McCain. They certainly--the weaponry he's using
now is his most sophisticated weaponry.
Mr. Clapper. We don't--well, he could bring in a lot more
if he wanted to, and----
Chairman McCain. He could bring in more----
Mr. Clapper.--certainly more volumes of it.
Chairman McCain. To do what?
Mr. Clapper. Well, for example, armed helicopters----
Chairman McCain. Yeah, to do--to achieve what goal?
Mr. Clapper. Well, it is not our assessment that he is bent
on capturing or conquering all of Ukraine. He certainly wants--
--
Chairman McCain. Absolutely.
Mr. Clapper.--I believe he wants a whole--from an
infrastructure standpoint--entity, I believe, composed of the
two oblasts in eastern Ukraine--
Chairman McCain. Which he's already----
Mr. Clapper.--to include, perhaps----
Chairman McCain:--achieving.
Mr. Clapper.--a land bridge to Crimea and perhaps a port--
specifically, Mariupol. We do not believe that an attack on
Mariupol is imminent. Think they're in the mode now of
reconstituting and regrouping after the major confrontation in
Debaltseve.
Chairman McCain. Well, I have to tell you that I disagree
with you. They're already increasing activities around
Mariupol, and I will predict to you now he will put additional
pressure on Mariupol, because he wants to establish the land
bridge there. Just as some of us predicted exactly what he's
doing now.
And to say that we're worried about provoking him, he's not
going to go to Kiev. He's going to establish the land bridge to
Crimea, and then he's going to figure out whether he should go
to Moldova, or not. He's already putting intense pressure on
the Baltics. We all know that. We don't have to have
intelligence reports to get that.
So, this idea that somehow we will provoke Vladimir Putin--
he's done everything he wanted to do, General. You tell me what
he didn't want to do that would have--that he would have done
if we had provided these people with the ability to defend
themselves rather than be slaughtered by the most modern
equipment that the Russians have.
Mr. Clapper. Well, I don't think he will view it happily if
we provide--if the United States provides lethal support.
That's----
Chairman McCain. Because more Russians might be killed who
are now in Crimea killing Ukrainians.
Mr. Clapper. That's right. And it will be harder for him to
hide that fact to the home audience.
Chairman McCain. What difference does it make whether he
hides it? There's no hiding what he's done. Everybody knows
what he's done.
Mr. Clapper. Well, everyone in Russia----
Chairman McCain. General Breedlove has made it--laid it out
very clearly.
Well, I'm not in an open dispute with you. I'd--we've got
to move on. But, it is just incredible to believe that he would
be, quote, ``provoked'' to further action, when he has achieved
every goal that he sought along the way. And we'll see who's
right about Mariupol, Director Clapper.
Mr. Clapper. Sir, I'm not arguing about Mariupol. The only
issue there is timing. I believe they will not--they'll wait--
--
Chairman McCain. He's got plenty of time.
Mr. Clapper.--they'll wait til the spring before they
attack. That's----
Chairman McCain. Sure.
Mr. Clapper. That will be a formal undertaking for the
Russians and the separatists.
Chairman McCain. I agree with you.
Mr. Clapper. It's much better defended.
Chairman McCain. I totally agree with you. Why not pull
back? He's not getting any increasing in sanctions, he's not
getting weapons--or the Ukrainians aren't receiving defensive
weapons from us. If I were him, I would do exactly that, too.
He's got plenty of time.
Yesterday, the Secretary of State said, ``Our citizens, our
world today, is actually--despite ISIL, despite the visible
killings that you see and how horrific they are, we're actually
living in a period of less daily threat to Americans and to
people in the world than normally. Less deaths, less violent
deaths today than through the last century.'' And yet, just
today, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and others have said that there are threats to 30
nations--excuse me--30 States in this Nation. What is your view
of the threat to the United States of America, Director
Clapper?
Mr. Clapper. Well, first, sir, I will say, as I've said
every year--this'll be the fifth year that--in my 50-plus years
in the intelligence business, I don't know of a time that has
been more beset by challenges and crises around the world. I
worry a lot about the safety and security of this country, for
a lot of reasons, not the least of which, which Senator Reed
alluded to, is the impacts that sequestration is having on the
intelligence community. We didn't get a pass. So, the same
rules that apply to, say, the Department of Defense apply to
us, as well. So, the combination of the challenges that we have
around the world and the declining resource base that we have
to monitor them is of concern to me.
Chairman McCain. So, could I just----
Mr. Clapper. Director Comey was referring to the fact that
he now has some form of investigation--and, of course, the FBI
has a tiered system for intensity of investigation--and they
now have some form of investigation on homegrown violent
extremists, not necessarily direct sympathizers or supporters
of ISIL, but in all 50 of our States.
Chairman McCain. Thank you, Director. And I could just ask,
again, because you made reference to it, if we don't--if we
stick to sequestration, as it is planned, it will impair our
ability for you to do your job and defend this Nation. Is that
a correct statement?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. And I've said that in the past. A
little harder for intelligence to make that case as concretely
as, say, the Navy and how many ships it builds, or the Air
Force and how many aircraft it's able to fly. In our case, the
impacts--I hate to use the word, but I will--are more
insidious, in that predicting when we have a lesser capability
will eventuate in a failure is hard to quantify. But, just
based on my best professional judgment from having served in
this business for a long time, I'm very concerned about it. And
if we revert to sequestration in 2016, the damage to the
intelligence community will be quite profound.
Chairman McCain. I thank you very much, Director.
Thank you, General.
Jack?
Senator Reed. General, thank you. And, both generals, thank
you.
The Chairman has covered very well some of the issues
arising out of the Russian activities in Ukraine and Crimea. Is
your assessment that Putin is carrying out a strategic plan, or
is some of this opportunistic? He's just seizing the moment? Or
it's a combination of both?
Mr. Clapper. I'm sorry, sir, I didn't----
Senator Reed. Or is it a combination of both.
Mr. Clapper. Both----
Senator Reed. He has a strategy----
Mr. Clapper.--a strategic plan and----
Senator Reed.--and opportunistic----
Mr. Clapper. Well, yes. I think it became a strategic plan
when Yanukovych upped and left very suddenly last--almost a
year ago, 22nd of February. And then I think he saw an
opportunity, particularly with the seizure of Crimea, which I
think has always been in his craw. And, given Putin's approach
and the way he looks at greater Russia and what a disaster the
breakup of the Soviet Union was, and his--as I said in my
statement, that his highest foreign policy objective is
controlling the former Soviet space. So, I think, on the heels
of the seizure of Crimea and the establishment of some sort of
an arrangement in eastern Ukraine, and what I believe will be
more of a softer approach, maybe not direct military action,
but, as the Chairman alluded to, Transnistria and Moldova, and
certainly there'll be pressure brought to bear in the Baltics,
particularly where there are high levels of Russian minorities.
A little different situation with the Baltics, since they are
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, which, of
course, Moldova, Ukraine, et cetera, are not.
Senator Reed. We have conducted recently some very small
military demonstrations in the Baltics. Company of the 173rd
Airborne went in. I think just a day or two ago there was a
parade of U.S. military vehicles. What's the reaction to the
Russians to those?
Mr. Clapper. Well, they, I think, watch that. I mean,
that's--it's an--it's symbolically important. There's a
messaging there. And I think it is--and they're sensitive to
that. They're mindful of the fact that the Baltic nations are
NATO members. And I do think they distinguish that.
Senator Reed. We have elaborate sanctions in place. You've
indicated in your comments that they have not had, in my
interpretation, an appreciable effect yet on his strategy. They
might be affecting the economy, but they haven't affected his
strategy.
Mr. Clapper. That's exactly right, Senator Reed. So far,
that has not changed his approach. And, of course, what's had
the greater impact, frankly, on the economy has been the----
Senator Reed. Oil.
Mr. Clapper.--precipitous drop in oil prices.
Senator Reed. Do you have any sort of indication that this
is--as this situation deteriorates further, there will be an
impact on his strategy?
Mr. Clapper. There could. And there--and, of course, what
we see is, they're very sensitive to opposition, you know,
demonstrations in the street. They're very, very sensitive
about a color revolution occurring in Russia, itself. And, of
course, that's another reason why Putin reacted to the
situation in Ukraine, because he believes we instigated that as
another color revolution in Ukraine right on his doorstep, and
that, in turn, posed a--in his mind, an existential threat to--
in Russia.
Senator Reed. Just changing gears, the Iranians have a
explicit presence in Iraq today, and we have forces there, too.
And in the next several days or weeks, there's two possible
triggering events. One would be much more aggressive action
against the Assad regime in Syria or the resolution of the
negotiations with the Iranians on their nuclear program. Do you
have any views with respect to what might happen to--within
Iraq with respect to their Iranian forces, which are now sort
of not cooperating with us, but----
Mr. Clapper. Is your question, sir, Is there a connection
between the nuclear negotiations and agreement----
Senator Reed. Will there be a reaction in Iraq to either
the activities that we undertake, or proceed to undertake, in
Syria or the conclusion of the negotiations?
Mr. Clapper. I really don't think that the negotiations,
one way or the other, will have much bearing on what they do in
Iraq or anyplace they are trying to exert their influence,
meaning Syria or now Yemen. As best we can tell, the Iranians
have kind of segmented the nuclear negotiations and potential
nuclear agreement from their regional aspirations.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have three questions--two short ones; the other one may
require going on the record.
Director Clapper, I know what your answer is, after hearing
your opening statement, but, when you said, ``Looking back over
my now more than half century of intelligence, I've not
experienced a time when we've been beset by more crisis and
threats around the globe.'' And you still stand by that. And--
correct?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir. And if I'm hear next year, I'll
probably say it again.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Well, I appreciate that. You've been
straightforward and honest about these things.
General Stewart, you stated, and this--that we face a more
diverse and complex problem than we have experienced in our
lifetimes. Still stand by that?
General Stewart. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Well, now, there's an assumption, when
we're out in the public, out talking to real people and away
from Washington, that we, who are on this committee, know a lot
of answers that we don't know. And one of them that should be a
very easy answer--and I want to get something from you guys
that I can stand on--when we talk about the power, in terms of
the strength and number of bodies in this--in ISIL or ISIS--in
September 2014, we talked about that it's been an additional
some--20,000 since this all started. I think we all agree on
that. But, they said it was somewhere between 20- and 31,5-
fighters that were in Iraq and Syria. Now we know, since that
time, it's gone beyond that. Then, in August, they talked about
from 80- to 100,000. Then, in November, one of the Kurdish
leaders stated that the--ISIL's military had increased to
200,000 fighters. Can you kind of give us an idea--and, number
one, why it's so difficult to do, and, number two, something
that we can use and quote you two as the sources?
Mr. Clapper. It's--from my vantage, it's unfortunate these
numbers get out. For one, we don't have what I would call
Census Bureau door-to-door survey accuracy or fidelity over
these numbers. They're very hard to come by. We have to derive
them inferentially from a number of different sources. Ergo,
even when we do come out with numbers, they're--you'll have a
wide range. So, the current estimate is--that we're standing
on, here, is somewhere in the range between 20- and 32,000
fighters. Now, the difficulty here is assessing who's a core
fighter who does this full-time, who may be a facilitator or
supporter and do it part time, and all that sort of thing.
I will say that the--this is one effect of the airstrikes,
has been substantial attrition. They lost at least 3,000
fighters in Khobani. For whatever reason, they wanted to do
that. And, as well, what that's driving them to--now we're
seeing evidence of conscription. So, the estimate that we're
going with----
Senator Inhofe. But, that's----
Mr. Clapper.--right now, but this is very dynamic, is 20-
to 32,000.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. We're--gosh, I--well, anyway.
It may take a while to get into this, but I am--I'm very
much--I was over in the Ukraine when they had their elections.
And that's when they had the elections, and it was Yatsenyuk as
much as Poroshenko. They were just elated. Both of them from
different political parties, but the political parties are very
pro-Western, and they were rejoicing in the fact that, for the
first time in 96 years, the Communists don't have one seat in
Parliament. To me, I thought, when that happened, there's not
going to be any problem with us going in with weapons. And
obviously, the Democrats and Republicans up here agreed with
that. We have language in our last defense authorization bill
that we had $75 million, where we were encouraging the
President to use, through the European Reassurance Initiative,
for weapons going in to be of assist to our best friend in that
area.
Now, I can't figure out why we don't do it. Let me just ask
the two of you. Would you recommend it?
Mr. Clapper. Sir, I think I have to answer two ways, here.
One, institutionally, this is a policy issue. And----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, now----
Mr. Clapper.--the Intelligence Community doesn't----
Senator Inhofe.--let me make sure. I'm not talking about
sending troops, I'm talking about sending lethal weapons.
Mr. Clapper. I understand. I understand----
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Clapper.--what you're asking, and that's what I'm
answering, I think. So, from an intelligence community
perspective, that is a policy issue. We're down in the engine
room, shoveling intelligence coal, and the people up on the
bridge, to use a Navy metaphor, drive the ship and rearrange
the deck chairs.
I have a personal view. And it is only that----
Senator Inhofe. All right.
Mr. Clapper.--that I would favor it. But, that's a personal
perspective, and----
Senator Inhofe. That's what----
Mr. Clapper.--it does not----
Senator Inhofe. And I appreciate your----
Mr. Clapper.--represent an official company policy of the
Intelligence Community.
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that very much.
And General Stewart?
General Stewart. Sir, I'm trying to stay out of the
personal----
Senator Inhofe. I know you're trying to stay out, but----
General Stewart. So----
Senator Inhofe.--it's time that we--we've got to get this
done.
General Stewart.--we stand by the assessment, that lethal
aid couldn't be delivered quickly enough or change the military
balance of power on the ground.
Senator Inhofe. So, you're for lethal, right?
General Stewart. It would not change the military balance
of power, and it couldn't get there quickly enough to make a
difference, and that Russia will up that----
Senator Inhofe. As a military guy, do you buy this argument
that we might be provoking negative reaction from Putin? You
know, I listen to--I see what our--what the President is doing
on--every once in a while. And they talk about, ``Well, we
don't want to make the terrorists mad at us, they might hurt
us.'' And, you know--so, what's your opinion about this
statement on provoking a negative reaction from Putin?
General Stewart. I think as important as Moscow placed on
Ukraine to keep it in their near abroad, to keep it out of the
EU, to keep it out of NATO, I think they will up the ante if we
do any lethal aid or take any actions to bolster the
Ukrainians. Whether that provokes the President or not, it's
hard for me to say. The realities are, they see this as central
to their foreign policy, they see it as critical that they keep
Ukraine out of NATO, to keep it out of the Western sphere of
influence----
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, and----
General Stewart.--and exert influence. And they'll react
accordingly, I suspect.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Chairman McCain. Well, I'm sure that Hitler felt the same
way, General Stewart, about the Sudetenland, about German-
speaking people. I'm sure he felt exactly the same way that
Vladimir Putin does. And, for you to say that we can't get
lethal weapons there quickly enough, that defies logic,
General. I know how we can transport weapons. We can put 'em on
aircraft and fly 'em over there.
General Stewart. But, you----
Chairman McCain. How do you justify a statement like that?
General Stewart. Senator, I believe the answer was, ``We
couldn't deliver lethal aid sufficiently--quickly enough to
change the military balance of power on the ground.'' And I
think I stand----
Chairman McCain. Quickly enough? What does that mean? I--
it's----
General Stewart. Russia and the separatists have
significant interior lines that they can resupply a lot faster
with a lot heavier weapons than we could deliver in--so, it
would be a race to see who could arm. And I think, with their
interior lines, they would have a significant advantage on the
ground.
Chairman McCain. I'm sure that the Russians had a
significant advantage when they invaded Afghanistan. I'm sure
that, throughout history, when we've helped people who have
been invaded and oppressed, and when we haven't, what is--the
consequences have been. Very disappointing, General.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony.
I want to go back to the Middle East and to what's
happening in Syria. To what extent is Assad's continued--I
don't want to say ``control over Syria,'' because I appreciate
that he doesn't have control over the entire country--but, to
what extent is his position there an obstacle to our fight
against ISIL? And is there--what's the thinking about how to
change that dynamic?
Mr. Clapper. Well, I--that--the last part of your question
is a tough one. I--he maintains the control because of his
control of the economic levers, to the extent that they have
them. His focus is on the--what I would call the ``Western
spine,'' say from Aleppo to Damascus. That's where most of the
population is, and the major commercial entities, to include
the ports. So, he has surrounded by people who are committed to
preserving that, because they benefit from it. They are the
minority. The Alawites are, you know, only 10 percent. So, for
them, this is an existential struggle. And, of course, the
irony is that we actually are in common in--both Assad and his
regime are opposed to and fighting ISIL, as we are. And so,
it's a very, you know, complex array of factors there.
Senator Shaheen. And to what extent have--has that affected
other Arab countries in the Middle East and their willingness
to engage with us?
Mr. Clapper. Well, there's been, you know, I think,
somewhat of a change. It's gradual. But, the fact that many of
these countries aren't participating in the coalition that
General John Allen has been organizing. I do think the brutal
savagery of the ISIL, and the beheadings and then the emulation
of the Jordanian pilot, have had a galvanizing effect on
opinion in the Mideast region. So, I think there is more of a
willingness to cooperate. There certainly is, from the
standpoint of intelligence sharing and our partnering with our
counterparts in that part of the world.
Senator Shaheen. And are you optimistic that Turkey will
become more engaged than they have been?
Mr. Clapper. No, I'm not. I think Turkey has other
priorities and other interests. They are more focused on what
they consider to be the threat: the KGK, the Kurdish
resistance, if you will, in Turkey. Public opinion polls show,
in Turkey, they don't see ISIL as a primary threat. They're
more focused internally on their economy and this sort of
thing. And, of course, the consequence of that is a permissive
environment, in terms of--because of their laws, and the
ability of people to travel through Turkey en route to Syria.
So, somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 percent of those
foreign fighters find their way to Syria through Turkey.
Senator Shaheen. And to move to Iraq, to what extent is
Iran's presence in Iraq an obstacle to Abadi's ability to make
the kinds of overtures and engage the Sunnis in the way that he
needs to in----
Mr. Clapper. Well, he--he's in a very----
Senator Shaheen.--order to keep the country unified?
Mr. Clapper.--very difficult position, having to balance
these competing constituencies. And clearly the Iranians have
influence. They're there. They're helping, as well, in the
fight against ISIL. He's got issues with his own Shi'a power
base, since they're competitors to him. There's still great
reluctance to fully include the Sunnis, which must happen.
There are two laws in their Council of Representatives that are
extremely important to Sunnis: de-Ba'athification and----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Clapper.--anti-terrorism laws. So, he's in a very, very
difficult position.
Senator Shaheen. What I'm trying to ask you to respond to,
and I haven't been as articulate as I should, I guess, is, To
what extent does--is Iran weighing their efforts to under--to
take on ISIL versus the Sunni's role in Iraq? I mean, are they
balancing that? Are they just----
Mr. Clapper. Well, the fundamental interest of the
Iranians, of course, is to preserve a Shi'a or Shi'a-friendly
government in Baghdad. So, that is kind of their underlying
policy objective. And, of course, ISIL poses a threat to the
Iranians, as well. And so, they have an interest there in
sustaining their aggressive combat, if you will, and assistance
in opposing ISIL.
Senator Shaheen. My time is up. Thank you both.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ernst.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us today. I do
appreciate your service.
I'd like to go into the discussion with Iran a little bit
more. Their Iranian military is arguably one of the most
deployed forces in the Middle East from--in probably more than
a generation. But, they have been into areas, such as Syria,
Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen. So, Iran is effectively
reinforcing and increasing its sphere of influence in the
region. And it is also defending its allies in ways which
afford Iran the ability to decisively engage its adversaries
and immediately alter any battlefield momentum. So, we have
seen a progression of expert witnesses in front of this very
panel, and many of my colleagues and these witnesses have
stated that they do believe the President is failing in this
area of setting a national strategy. And his failure to
construct a comprehensive strategy against Iran has led to
Iran's expanded influence in the Middle East.
So, I would like to hear your assessment, Director Clapper,
on, of course, the tools that Iran has in its pocket, and
whether we are effectively engaging Iran, what we need to do to
gain a national security strategy. I'd like to see all the
pieces put together, please.
Mr. Clapper. Well, I can--Senator, I can comment on the
intelligence aspects of this. national security strategy,
again, is not my compartment.
But, the way that Iran is exerting its influence, I think,
most prominently in the region is through the--their
organization called the Iranian Republican Guard Corps, Quds
Force, which is a combination of intelligence and special ops,
has extensive commercial enterprise businesses, and this sort
of thing. And so, they use that as their instrumentality, as
they are now in Iraq, for extending their influence, as one of
their proxies. And, of course, another one of their proxies is
the Hezbollah, which they have had a long client-subordinate
relationship with. And so, they use those as sort of the
physical manifestation of their spreading their influence in
the region. And, certainly from an intelligence perspective,
we--you know, we try hard to keep tabs on those entities as we
can from intelligence.
Senator Ernst. And is there a way, Director, that we can
more effectively engage our neighbors in the Middle East to
push back on Iran's influence?
Mr. Clapper. Well, we--from an intelligence perspective,
which is all I can speak to, we do engage with our intelligence
counterparts in all of these countries, those who are willing
to engage with us, particularly the Sunni countries, who also--
who do harbor great reservations about Iranians--Iranian
objectives.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much.
I'll yield back my time.
Chairman McCain. Senator Donnelly.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
In regards to Iraq, what do you think are the biggest
challenges that the Iraqi forces face right now in pushing ISIS
back from Mosul and Tikrit?
Mr. Clapper. Well, a first thing, I think--and General
Stewart can speak to this as well, since he's----
Senator Donnelly. Right.
Mr. Clapper.--served there--but, obviously, the Iraqi
Security Forces, particularly the army, need to reconstitute,
after the precipitate losses in northern Iraq last June, where
about four-and-a-half divisions or so of Iraqi forces just kind
of melted away. So, that is--first order of business, I think,
is to reconstitute them, which includes training and,
hopefully, instantiation of a will to fight. They have
challenges, clearly, with command and control, with leadership,
with logistics. So, they've got a whole range of issues there
that need to be attended to before they'd be in a position to,
certainly unilaterally, retake a--you know, a place like----
Senator Donnelly. General, how long do you think that'll
take, to try to get them back up to speed?
General Stewart. So, if I could put it in context, last
fall they had about 185,000 in the Iraqi Security Force, about
three divisions--the 6th, the 9th, and the 7th Division. All
three of those divisions are engaged today, so they're not
getting that continuous training. They're engaged in
operations. They're building three additional divisions. Those
three divisions, you're talking about building from the ground
up. So, to build from the ground up individual soldiers----
Senator Donnelly. When are they ready?
General Stewart. We're talking probably 6 to 9 months, at a
best estimate.
Senator Donnelly. Director Clapper, here at home, when I
look at what's going on with ISIS and see the threats that
occur here, and the threat levels that we had last year--if you
had to put it in perspective--this time last year, this time
now--and it's an inexact art, percentagewise--significantly
increased threats now than we were having last year at this
same time, about the same?
Mr. Clapper. It's probably about the same, sir.
Senator Donnelly. Okay. And in regards to ISIS--so, our
push is to get 'em out of Iraq, then to remove them from
Syria--when we get to that point where ISIS is gone, does that
threat level come down, here at home?
Mr. Clapper. It would--I--yeah, absolutely it would, I
think, but--at least that would reduce the threat some. But,
again, as--if the caliphate is extended to other locations,
which is what ISIL is trying to do--Libya, Egypt, et cetera--
then we'll have that to contend with. So, yes, there would be
some reduction of threat because--if ISIL were defeated in both
Iraq and Syria, at least you are--have done away with a
substantial safe haven, which would serve to reduce the threat
some.
Senator Donnelly. When you look over to Libya, is that the
next place, or one of the key places, they look now as,
``Here's open space that's failed. Here's a place where we can
try to grow''?
Mr. Clapper. It is probably the most troublesome, from that
standpoint, just because of the conditions in Libya--you know,
two competing governments fighting with each other. There are,
in addition to ISIL, probably six or eight other terrorist
groups that have gathered in Libya. So, it's a magnet because
of--essentially, it's ungoverned.
Senator Donnelly. And when you look at a place that's
ungoverned, you know, not too far from the Mediterranean, right
there, what do you see--like you said, you don't set all the
strategy; you review all the intelligence--but, what do you see
as the best steps we can take in that region right now--and,
General Stewart, you, too--in Libya, to try to change the
course of what's going on?
Mr. Clapper. Well, from an intelligence perspective we, I
think, clearly need to step up our game from an ISR
perspective, where we can operate. I think there's a lot of
merit to partnering with the French, who have sort of staked
out their claim in the Sahel region of North Africa. So, we
have worked with the French, particularly from an intelligence
perspective, to share with them. They have history and heritage
there, access, and have committed to deploying troops in that
area--boots on the ground, which we can supplement. So, those
are things, from an intelligence perspective, that we--so, as
we get a better handle on just what is going on in that part of
the world.
Senator Donnelly. And I see my time is up, but I just want
to ask one very quick question that you can just----
How are we doing on cooperation, interagency, here at home?
Better than ever before?
Mr. Clapper. Well, that's, frankly, the reason my job was
created, after September 11, is--promote integration here in
this country. I'd like to think it's better. I was around for a
long time before September 11, so I--it is better, but it's--
there was always improvement. We're not as mature in the--on
the domestic side, in coordinating with State, local, tribal,
et cetera, but I think we've made a lot of progress there, and
we'll continue. And it's something I push very hard.
Senator Donnelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Fischer.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, what do you assess is Assad's likely
response to the introduction of our United States-trained
Syrians to move in against ISIL in Syria? And do you assess
that Assad will attack them?
Mr. Clapper. Well, if the--as long as Assad is--believes
somehow that this--once it gets up sufficient center of mass,
you know, enough force--as long as he felt as though this were
something to be used only against ISIL, he'd probably be okay
with it. But, I think he'd have a hard time determining whether
it's a threat to ISIL or a threat to him. So, I could see a
circumstance where, depending on what information he's
getting--and we wonder about that sometimes--that he could
easily consider that force as a threat to him.
Senator Fischer. Do you believe that you're receiving good
intelligence from that--from Syria, from that area, in regards
to this?
Mr. Clapper. No, we have a lot of gaps for--intelligence
gaps in Syria, principally because we're not there. So, no, I'm
not satisfied with that. We're working at it, obviously, to
come up with more intelligence from Syria. But, that's a tough
problem for us.
Senator Fischer. Have you received any intelligence that
would, I guess, give you comfort, in that the moderates that
would be trained by us would, in fact, be fighting ISIL and not
Assad?
Mr. Clapper. I think a more fulsome response to that would
be best in a classified environment. But, I guess the short
answer would be yes.
Senator Fischer. Okay. And how do you--how would you assess
Russia and Iran will be looking at these trained forces?
Mr. Clapper. Well, probably wouldn't like it. I think, at
this point, you know, Russia looks at Syria as a client, as an
ally, someone that they provide support to. So, again, it would
be almost the same perception problem with the Russians as it
would be with Assad. If--they could probably rationalize, if
it's focused on ISIL, but if it be--it's perceived as a threat
to the regime, then I think that they would react negatively to
it.
Senator Fischer. And if they would perceive it as a threat,
what type of force would they employ, then? You said they'd
react negatively.
Mr. Clapper. The Russians?
Senator Fischer. Yes.
Mr. Clapper. I'd--well, I--this is really speculative,
hypothetical. I don't think they would necessarily deploy
combat forces to Syria. They would probably step up military
equipment support, which they've been doing, intelligence
support, if, in fact, they, too, perceive that what we were
doing was a direct threat to Assad.
Senator Fischer. Okay. And if I could shift gears, here,
I'd like to ask you something about cybersecurity. As you know,
the Senate is looking at a bill to authorize greater
information sharing. There are some concerns out there about
the entities that the--that we might be sharing that
information with. I'd like to ask you, How do we balance that?
How do we balance the risks between really valuable information
sharing and the need not to provide information either to
private individuals, hackers that are out there, or to a
foreign government that may be able to pick up information that
we give our colleagues, in trying to work with this, that they
could then, in turn, use against us?
Mr. Clapper. Well, that's exactly the issue. In fact,
that's a general dilemma that we have across the board, whether
it's cyber or any other dimension. You know, the--sharing
versus security. And that's the same issue here. There is no
silver-bullet answer here.
I do think there, though, needs to be some form of
legislation that would protect, from a liability standpoint,
commercial concerns so that they would more freely--they'd be
in a position to share with the government. This is not
something government can do all by itself. There has to be--
given the pervasiveness of cyber in our society, we must have
the partnering of the civilian sector, which means promoting
sharing, both ways.
But, you're right, there's always this concern, there's
always a tradeoff between security and sharing.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Chairman McCain. Senator King.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To follow up on that, I believe that it's critically
important that we move legislation that provides for that
sharing so that we have more vigorous defense. And, indeed, the
Intelligence Committee reported out a bill last summer. I
understand that that bill has been somewhat renegotiated,
reworked, and it will be moving forward reasonably soon. I hope
that that's one of the Congress's highest priorities. I don't
know how many warnings we have to have.
Turning to ISIS, what are the chances that it will wear out
its welcome within the areas where it is now trying to govern,
because of the weight of its brutal and harsh ideology? And I
guess the followup question is, Do we have any intelligence
about what's going on inside Mosul, inside Raqqa, in terms of
the citizens and how they feel about the--this new regime?
Mr. Clapper. Senator King, to answer the question, I think
that is a very important point, and we are seeing anecdotal
evidence of resentment, and even resistance, in those areas
that are controlled by ISIL, because of their brutal approach
to enforcing Sharia.
I think the challenge--and we're already seeing indications
of this--that ISIL has--as I mentioned in my oral statement,
assuming some of the accouterments are some of the
characteristics of a nation-state, and now they've having
challenges with governance--they do not have enough financial
wherewithal to provide the services--municipal services that
are required to run a city of a million people. So, we're----
Senator King. You mean they're running----
Mr. Clapper.--electricity----
Senator King. You mean they're running a deficit? Maybe we
could ship them the sequester in a sealed railroad car.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Clapper. That'd be good.
We're seeing signs of electrical--electricity outages,
shortages of food and commodities. The airstrikes against
their--the refining capability has forced them to go to a lot
of individual mom-and-pop refining stills. So, they're going to
have trouble generating the revenue that would be needed to
actually run the areas they have captured. And that--and we're
seeing anecdotal evidence of the strains and the stresses
that's putting particularly on the city of Mosul and its
citizens.
Senator King. Does that suggest that perhaps a containment
strategy instead of a reinvasion strategy--General Stewart,
you've testified recently about the proportion of troops it
takes to root somebody out of an urban setting. Could you
articulate that for us?
General Stewart. If I recall, we talked about the ratio of
offensive forces to----
Senator King. Correct.
General Stewart.--take a urban environment, something in an
order of 10 to 1, offense versus a defense. That requires a
very skilled, determined force to take that kind of action.
There is something to be said about ISIL wearing out its
welcome. It's precisely what turned al Qaeda in Iraq before--
the brutality, the inability to govern--that convinced the
tribes that there may be a better option.
Senator King. And ISIS is much more brutal than--and
difficult than al-Qaeda, as I understand.
General Stewart. The question is, Where is the tipping
point? And it's very hard to determine where that tipping point
where, where the Sunnis in Anbar will go, ``This is enough.
There's a different option, and we ought to counter ISIS.'' So,
I think there will be a tipping point at some point. We just
don't know where that will be.
Senator King. But, a--as you just testified, a 10-to-1
ratio of offense to defense going into a city like Mosul means
you're going to have a large, well-trained force. And it's just
a question of whether that's going to be necessary, rather than
let it fall of its own weight. And I guess that's a question of
timing.
General Stewart. It's a question of timing, yes, sir.
Senator King. Quick question on cyber. It concerns me that
all of our discussions about cyber are essentially defensive.
We're talking about legislation to share information, we're
talking about greater rebutting of these kinds of intrusions.
Should we think, Mr. Director, about developing an offensive
capability to provide a deterrent? It concerns me that now a--
particularly a state actor can act essentially without fear of
consequences. Whereas, the theory of deterrence in our nuclear
field stood the test of time for 75 years. Should we think
about a deterrent capacity so that people know that if they
attack us in any kind of critical way, they're going to suffer
in return?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, we--I agree with you, Senator King. We--
and we do--you know, we do have offensive capabilities that I
can't go into here. I think the issue, though, is, What is the
policy? What is it that would achieve cyber deterrence? And
that is an issue that, at the policy level, we're still,
frankly, wrestling with.
Senator King. But, it is one that--I'm delighted to hear
that it is being wrestled with, and I think I heard you say
that this is something that we need to consider. And, of
course, to go back to Dr. Strangelove, if you have a deterrent
and don't tell people about it, it's not a deterrent.
Mr. Clapper. Well, that's true.
Senator King. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Ayotte.
Senator Ayotte. I want to thank the Chairman, thank both of
you for what you do to protect the country.
And I wanted to ask about Iran. And I know that in, your
written testimony, you have said--and you previously testified,
Director Clapper, before this committee, that Iran was on
track, by this year, in terms of its ICBM program. So, since
the negotiations have been ongoing on the nuclear program, has
Iran continued to develop its ICBM program? And can you tell me
what the status and the goal of that program would be from
Iran?
Mr. Clapper. The Iranians have continued on their space
launch vehicle program, and recently put into orbit a
satellite. And obviously, that--any work they do on missile--
missiles could conceivably go towards work on an
intercontinental ballistic missile. And it's going to be hard
to determine whether a given missile is launched for the
purposes of a space launch vehicle, a satellite they want to
put into space. Because if they do that, they also acquire
proficiency, expertise, and experience in what could be a--an
ICBM. And so, it's a hard question to answer, because it has a
lot to do with intent. But, there's no question they have the
technical competence.
Senator Ayotte. Do you think they have good intent, in
terms of what they're doing with their missile program?
Mr. Clapper. Well, it's--no. I mean, I think the huge
medium-range ballistic missile force they have today that's
operational is--you know, I think poses a threat to the region
now. So----
Senator Ayotte. And if they----
Mr. Clapper.--no, it's not.
Senator Ayotte. And if they were to get ICBM capability,
that obviously poses a threat, in terms of our country, and the
East Coast in particular.
Mr. Clapper. Well, it could. I mean, it, again, depends on
what they actually do. If they actually are able to--you know,
it's theoretically possible they could attempt to launch one
this year. So, this is something we just have to watch. But,
again, the challenge for us is going to be, you know,
determining just what their intent is.
Senator Ayotte. Could you help me understand also, as we
think about Iran's activities, what types of other activities
they're engaging in to establish regional hegemony?
Mr. Clapper. Well, they are certainly trying to, where they
can, reach out diplomatically. The organization that we watch a
lot is the IRGC Quds Force that I mentioned previously, their
intelligence activities throughout the region. But, they will
look to establish their influence by whatever mechanism they
can.
Senator Ayotte. So, as I understand it, obviously they
continue to support Assad, they have continued to support
groups in the region, including Hezbollah. What other
activities--are they still--would you still characterize them
as one of the largest state sponsors of terrorism in the world?
Mr. Clapper. They are still classified that way, yes.
Senator Ayotte. Thank you.
I would like to follow up on an issue that is hitting us at
home, but I think has international implications, and that is
of the international drug trafficking that's occurring. And, in
particular, my home State of New Hampshire, we've had a
devastating number of people who are dying from heroin
overdoses. And so, I would certainly like to hear your opinion,
General Stewart, about what is happening, in terms of drug
trafficking--in particular, heroin--and how is--are the
networks that are being used for drug trafficking, are they
also being used to fuel terrorism?
So, General Stewart, if you could share that with me. And
I'd be curious, Does Southern Command and Northern Command--
what do they need, in terms of fighting heroin and also the
drug trafficking that can be used to fuel terrorism, as well?
General Stewart. I'll have to look at the numbers again,
but I don't think drug trafficking is on the increase from
our--through our southern borders. I think Pakistan and
Afghanistan heroin production continues about at the norm that
we've seen over the last several years. We've seen no
indications that the drug trafficking routes are being used for
terrorist activities or hostile actions. And I spoke recently
to the folks down in Southern Command, and I don't recall any
request for additional capability to help them with the problem
in the south.
Mr. Clapper. If I can add, Senator.
Senator Ayotte. Yes.
Mr. Clapper. I well recall, I think it was last year, when
General Kelly, Commander of SOUTHCOM, testified with then-
General Jacoby, who was the NORTHCOM Commander--they testified
together. And one of the challenges with drug trafficking is
not so much a lack of intelligence--we have a lot of
intelligence on it--is the lack of resource, particularly in
the case of the ability to interdict, by the Coast Guard and
others. And that, since General Kelly's testimony, has been--is
being addressed. I've spoken--discussed that with the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, and we are putting more of his
capability, deploying more ships and planes, in the southern
hemisphere.
But, I think I would take, you know, a little mild
disagreement, here, with Vince, that I think this is a--it is a
problem, the--throughout this region, not only across the
border, but through Puerto Rico is another vulnerability we
have. And so--and we have pretty good intelligence on this.
I think the challenge has been--and again, sequestration
has had impacts--is on the ability to react and interdict.
Senator Ayotte. I thank both of you. And I also noticed
that, in your testimony, Director Clapper, you noted the
incredible surge of heroin-related deaths since 2007. So, thank
you. It's a horrible problem.
Senator Reed [presiding]: Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your testimony, both earlier in the
week and today. Mindful that this is a--not a classified
hearing, a few questions.
My perception of the level of American and allied
intelligence about the extent of the Iranian nuclear program is
that, before November 2013 and the beginning of the Joint Plan
of Action (JPOA), the level of intelligence was good. Certainly
there were gaps and challenges, but at least, if I go by public
reports, the level of intelligence at--that all have, together,
enabled some actions that have slowed the Iranian program.
One of the reasons I supported the JPOA is my assumption
that our intel sources haven't gone away, but the inspections
that were allowed--required under the JPOA, together with
existing intel sources, would even give us a better level of
intel, which would (a) help us determine if we needed, God
forbid, to take military action to stop the program, and (b)
enable us to better target any military action if, God forbid,
we should need to take it. Am I looking at this the right way?
Mr. Clapper. Yes, sir, I think you are. I will tell you
that the, you know, huge--that the important aspect of any sort
of agreement we might reach with the Iranians would be a very
invasive and thorough surveillance and inspection capability on
the part of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I think
that would be requisite to any kind of an agreement.
I--you know, we have, I think, a reasonably capable
intelligence capability, but I wouldn't want to rely on it,
only, for verification that, in fact, the terms of the
agreement were being lived up to.
Senator Kaine. And, Director Clapper, I agree with the last
point you made, is--I would look at any final deal, if one is
reached, in analyzing its content and determining whether I
support it or not. The degree of inspections, to me, is the key
factor, because that, combined with existing intel, is our
guarantee of an ability to (a) know if there's going to be a
problem, and (b) take appropriate action--target an appropriate
action to eliminate the problem.
You indicated, Director Clapper, in earlier testimony, that
your intel suggests that Iran is looking at the nuclear
negotiation as sort of separate from this whole question of
Iranian bellicosity and adventurism in the region, that these
are sort of separate items. My sense is, there is at least one
connection between the two. And this also bears on my analysis
of any deal, if reached. And that is this. Any deal, if
reached, would involve sanctions relief--i.e., dollars to Iran.
And they use dollars to carry out adventurism. I think--you
know, just from what I've heard, some of the sanctions relief
already may have enabled them to invest more heavily in running
Syria as a puppet state or invest more heavily in the Quds
Force or other agents that are destabilizing governments
outside of their own borders. And so, to at least that extent,
as we look at any deal, if there is such a deal, there could be
a connection between a deal and Iranian bellicosity outside
their borders.
Mr. Clapper. Perhaps, sir. And, in a classified
environment, I can go into this a little bit more. But, the
sanctions have had impacts on--financial impacts on the
Iranians, and it--that, in turn, has impacted funding for the
military and for even the Quds Force. So, I----
Senator Kaine. Yeah.
Mr. Clapper.--perhaps best left to a classified environment
for----
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Mr. Clapper.--more details.
Senator Kaine. We have had two meetings of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, in the last 3 weeks, where we've
heard from leaders from the region who are engaged in the fight
against ISIL. King Abdullah was with us about 3 weeks ago, and
he told us, in a coffee at the Foreign Relations Committee,
that American ground troops as part of this battle of ISIL
would not be a good idea, in his view. Yesterday, we had a
coffee with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim, who also said
American ground troops is a bad idea because it would convert
the perception of the battle against ISIL to the United States
or west against ISIL rather than, ``We are engaging in a battle
to clean up our own regional extremists. And we want the--we
want America's help on that.'' But, they both offered us advice
that American ground troops would be problematic, because it
would enable, from a propaganda standpoint, this being
positioned as American or Western occupation, and that America
is the point of the sphere--the spear against that terrorist
threat. I'd just report that to you, and I would be curious to
either of your's--your reactions to those comments from trusted
allies.
Mr. Clapper. Well, the--I have had similar discussions with
the King, and he is a staunch proponent, an articulate one,
for, you know, ``the people in the region have to take this on
and have to lead,'' and that, you know, the United States--
anytime we show up someplace, then, you know, we're a--we're,
by definition, occupiers. He--you know, he recognizes, as do
many others, that, at some point, there will be a need for
boots on the ground, but hopefully others, not the United
States, because that engenders its own challenges and issues.
Senator Kaine. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Reed. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Reed.
And just to follow up on Senator Kaine's comment, I think
we need to reestablish where we are, or confirm where we are,
not--Director Clapper, is it still our policy that no options
are off the table and that Iran should not have a nuclear
weapon?
Mr. Clapper. That's my understanding, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. That's your understanding. Do you have
any doubt about it?
Mr. Clapper. I take what the administration said for its
word, that all options are not--no options are off the table.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think that's true. We had a very
important hearing yesterday on nuclear forces and strategic
forces. And one of the things I came away with was greater
concerns than I had before about the proliferation impacts, the
instability in the region that could occur from a nuclear-armed
Iran. And I just think that we've got to be careful about that.
And I do remember that the CIA reported, in, what, early 2000s,
that Iran wasn't intent on building a nuclear weapon. That was
wrong, was it not?
Mr. Clapper. Well, up until 2003, they were. Right now,
they--and, of course, the--we believe the Supreme Leader would
be the ultimate decisionmaker, here. And, as far as we know,
he's not made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon. I do think
that they certainly want to preserve options across the
capabilities it would take to field one, but right now they
don't have one, and have not made that decision.
Senator Sessions. Well, we've been----
Mr. Clapper. But, I agree with you, it would be very--it
would be very profound and very destabilizing if they were to
achieve a nuclear weapon.
Senator Sessions. Is--I mean, it really makes us face some
really tough choices. Our--I don't--but, I don't think there's
any doubt they were--they would never--they never relinquished
the intention to build a weapon. The CIA report was in error.
And they are closer today. And every month that goes by, it
seems they get closer.
General Stewart, I had the honor to be briefed by you in
2006 or 2007 in the al-Anbar region in Iraq. And you gave us a
remarkable briefing about how you had--the marines had worked
with the tribal leaders, and they began The Awakening that
allowed them to remove al-Qaeda from that region after great,
great commitment by the marines and other forces.
This is what I would like to see. I am not for any major,
massive American troop leadership in Iraq, but I do think--and
I want you to give us your best judgment--but isn't it true
that even a few embedded forces with the Iraqis with the
ability to communicate to aircraft and bringing in smart bombs
and to assist them, that that does encourage them, and that the
Iranian forces fight better under those circumstances than if
they don't have the confidence that a--even a small American
presence with them brings?
General Stewart. Senator, let me answer the question this
way. Senator Kaine raised a great point of what we've heard.
The best propaganda victory that we could give ISIL is to make
this a fight between the West and Islam--and ISIL. But, being
able to provide ISR, precision fires, some command and control
will certainly help those forces--Iraqi forces--to be much more
effective on the ground than left to their own devices.
Senator Sessions. And--all right, I agree with that. But,
I'm just asking you, from your experience with them, isn't it
true that there is more confidence, even if there are just one
or two Special Forces there with them--not out in the--leading
the fight--
General Stewart. Right.
Senator Sessions.--but with the forces that are advancing?
General Stewart. There is a great sense of comfort when
U.S. forces are with our partners to provide precision, to
provide command and control, to help bolster leadership. There
is some advantage, yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. With regard to the momentum that we have
there, aren't there--I mean, we have a large Iraqi army. And--
--
Is my time up? My time's up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Maybe
we'll----
Chairman McCain [presiding]. If you want to finish your
question----
Senator Sessions. How--are they--can't some of those
divisions, some of those units, be utilized now to blunt the
momentum that they have--that ISIS has achieved, and maybe take
the bloom off their rose and give some confidence again, in the
Iraqi forces, that they can retake the territory, and the
sooner is better than later?
General Stewart. Yes, Senator. In fact, they have blunted
the ISIL advance. And, best as we can guess, ISIL has lost
territory over the last couple of months. So, it's not just the
Iraqi Security Forces. You have the Kurdish forces that are
involved. And they are making a difference. I wouldn't
categorize the difference as significant, but they are, in
fact, causing ISIL to lose territory at this point.
Senator Sessions. We've been training them for a decade.
Not as if they need another--I don't know. I'm--a little odd
that we need another 6 to 9 months of training, when I thought
we were training the Iraqi armies for nearly a decade.
General Stewart. When we talk about the 6 to 9 months
additional training, it is to deal with an urban fight, which
is very, very different, very complex, requires a great deal of
skill, a great deal of precision to be successful.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, General, in your leadership
and your commitment to fight this----
Chairman McCain. Also has to do with the collapse of the
Iraqi army.
Senator Manchin.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, both of you, again for being here. And just a
couple of questions I have.
Following up on the Iran nuclear capabilities that they may
have, since we know that they haven't dismantled--they might
have downgraded some of their enriched uranium--are we just
prolonging the inevitable? I mean, they're going to be able to
get up to enrichment and to armament speed pretty quickly, if
they desired, unless there's an absolute dismantlement of
their----
Mr. Clapper. Well----
Senator Manchin.--capabilities. Director Clapper?
Mr. Clapper.--that's obviously the concern, and that's why
the importance of intrusive and comprehensive surveillance and
inspection is so critical, to make sure they don't,
particularly, enrich to highly enriched uranium.
Senator Manchin. But, we're not doing away with any of
their centrifuges. They're not downgrading some of the things
that they can, or taking away their capabilities. I don't think
our agreement's----
Mr. Clapper. Well, that's----
Senator Manchin.--going to achieve that.
Mr. Clapper.--that's to be determined. That's a--you know,
the--and I don't want to talk too much about this----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Clapper.--because of the delicate state of play with
the negotiations, themselves. But, that's all in play as part
of the negotiations.
Senator Manchin. Well, I have a concern.
If I could switch gears over to China and--basically, our
partners in Asia-Pacific area, especially Taiwan. They're
growing uneasy about China's access area denial strategy which
seeks to limit American power in that region. Can you please
update us on China's effort to deny American access to the
Asia-Pacific region, sir?
Mr. Clapper. Well, the Chinese--and I can't go into a great
deal of detail here, but the Chinese are embarked on extremely
impressive military modernization program across the board. And
their modernization program is deliberately designed to
counteract or thwart what they feel are our strengths; meaning
carrier aviation, our bases, C4ISR, and our abilities in space.
And they are doing specific things in each one of those realms
to deny us, first, potentially, surveillance, command and
control, as well as what they view is our primary weapons--our
primary strengths. I can certainly go into--in more detail if
you're--if you'd like, in a classified setting.
Senator Manchin. Okay. I'm just--I guess you're not able to
speak about their developing capabilities within the last 10
years or what they're accelerating. I'm understanding they're
accelerating very fastly. You said they're impressive.
Mr. Clapper. They are. And they also are getting more and
more into the realm of indigenously designing and producing
things, rather than relying on others, notably the Russians.
Senator Manchin. Okay. Let me see, I had one more here for
you.
We talked about, I think, in a closed setting--you might be
able to talk about it in generality here--as far as ISIS, their
ability, as far as financial ability, to attract the dollars
they do, be able to operate the way they can. And are we having
any success in shutting down that money flow?
Mr. Clapper. Well, they--again, I'll have to speak in
generalities, here--they acquired a lot of funding initially,
some of which was derived from overrunning Iraqi banks.
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Clapper. That's going to dry up. And, of course, the
airstrikes against the oil has made that--forced them to go to
sort of mom-and-pop stills. And, as a consequence of the
brutality, the donations that they've received are tapering
off. So, I think, again, this says something about an
attrition----
Senator Manchin. I----
Mr. Clapper.--approach which I think, over time--and the
other thing, of course, that's draining resources is the
demands that they have for governance, particularly in large--
--
Senator Manchin. Yeah.
Mr. Clapper.--cities like Mosul.
Senator Manchin. Just a--just very quickly. But, the rapid
rise, as far as in their--when we first heard about ISIS, it
was 3-, 5,000, then it just seemed to leapfrog to 10-, 15-, 20-
, and 30-. Were they paying their soldiers, or attracting
because of better pay than--
Mr. Clapper. The reason they----
Senator Manchin.--al Qaeda and Taliban?
Mr. Clapper. The reason they--there was sort of mushrooming
growth there, and the initial phases when they did their
attacks in northern Iraq----
Senator Manchin. Sure.
Mr. Clapper.--was because the--this is largely a Sunni
region. They were very receptive, frankly, to joining up with
ISIL, which I think many viewed as a better protector of
themselves and their communities and their families than were
the Iraqi Government. So, that's what occasioned the joining
up.
Senator Manchin. Do you have any----
Mr. Clapper. Now, we're--we're now seeing anecdotal
evidence of their having--and paid, you know, money----
Senator Manchin. Were they paying better than----
Mr. Clapper. They are----
Senator Manchin.--everybody else?
Mr. Clapper.--also having to reduce the amount of money
they're paying some of their fighters.
Senator Manchin. So, that should reduce--that could reduce
some of their strength, right? If they don't pay them as well
as somebody else?
Mr. Clapper. That and the--and what we're also seeing--
again, anecdotal evidence of--they've been driven to
conscription. In other worse, forcing people to join the ranks
to----
Senator Manchin. Gotcha.
Mr. Clapper.--sustain their fighter force, particularly as
they've taken some pretty heavy losses--notably, in Khobani.
Senator Manchin. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman McCain. Senator Sullivan.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, gentlemen, for your wonderful
service to our country.
General Stewart, you may have noticed the Chairman has a
particularly soft spot in his heart for marines. He's probably
treated you in that regard. So----
General Stewart. I'm pretty delighted about that, too,
Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah. Well, I'll make sure he keeps
treating you with kid gloves, I'm sure.
I want to thank you gentlemen for what you're doing,
because I think that your service, particularly providing real,
accurate threat assessments to not only the Congress, but to
the American people, the administration, is absolutely,
fundamentally critical if we're going to get a hold of these--
many of the challenges that we face right now as a country. And
you probably noticed that this committee has had several
hearings over the last several weeks about these assessments
with some luminaries, Democrat, Republican, former Secretaries
of State, former four-star generals, about what they see as
some of the challenges and strategies that we need. I think
there was consensus that we're living in a very challenging
environment. Henry Kissinger mentioned it was one of the most
challenging that he's ever seen in his career, which says a
lot.
What I want to touch on a little bit is what I see as a
rather disturbing disconnect between some of the testimony that
comes from gentlemen like yourself from this whole series of
hearings that we had and the disconnect between that and senior
administration officials. Let me give you a few examples.
The President, himself, in the State of the Union, talked
about the crisis of 9/11 and everything has passed. Went
through a whole list of things that made it sound like we're
living in a very benign world environment.
The Secretary of State yesterday talked about, ``actually
living in a period of less daily threats to American and people
in the world normally.'' That was his quote.
The recent National Security Strategy document from the
White House lists, I believe, climate change if--as one of the
top, if not the top, national security threat, relative to,
say, Iran gaining nuclear weapons, or ISIS.
Do you agree with these assessments from the senior
leadership of the administration, that we're living in a less
daily threatening--that Iran gaining nuclear weapons is less of
a threat than climate change? I really need--I think it's
critical that we level with the American people what exactly
are the threats that we face as a country right now. And I
don't think we're getting it from the administration.
Mr. Clapper. Well, I think our function, in the
intelligence community, is to portray, as accurately as we can,
what we see as the threats. We probably always occupy the half
of the glass that's empty, and policymakers, and oftentimes
military commanders, will occupy the half of the glass that's
full. Probably the real truth is at the water line.
I think our instinct, frankly, is to perhaps--I've been
criticized for this--worst-case the situation. Having been on
the receiving end of virtually every post-event critique
investigating intelligence failures since September 11, I think
we are much more conservative and much more cautious than
others might be about the nature of the world out there. But, I
think we have a certain institutional responsibility, which we
try to discharge. If others don't see it that way or others
don't agree, that's certainly their prerogative.
Senator Sullivan. So, do you agree with those assessments
that----
Mr. Clapper. I'm not in the mode of--we don't do policy,
and I'm not critiquing those who do make it.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. I don't think that's policy that
they've been putting out. I think it's--they're giving threat
assessments to the American people that are inaccurate. But,
let me----
Mr. Clapper. Well, climate change----
Senator Sullivan. I'll move on----
Mr. Clapper. I mean, climate change, for example, I think
will have--does have national security implications. It--if you
watch what's going on in the Arctic now, and the impacts on
climate change, in terms of water availability and this sort of
thing, does have national security implications. I probably
wouldn't rank it up there as problem or threat number one, but
it is a serious concern.
Senator Sullivan. Let me just ask General Stewart. The--you
know, the--Senator Manchin was talking about the increasing
recruitment of ISIL. What role do you see that they are
perceived as continuing to win, as continuing to be victorious,
as continuing to be kind of a team that's gaining ground, not
being defeated? I think--in your experience, I'm sure that if a
recruit thinks he's going to go join a team and get killed, he
probably is not going to be interested in joining that team,
but if they seem to be perceived as kind of gaining ground--
North Africa now, Syria, Iraq--do you think that that helps in
their recruitment efforts?
General Stewart. A very capable propaganda media operation
that emphasizes their success and their victories, however
small, and that is a basis for attracting those who would move
to that ideology. So, their success on the battlefield, or
perceived success, or the way they're presented, certainly
helps them in gaining recruits for the fight.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here today.
The execution of Coptic Christians in Libya by terrorists
affiliated with ISIL raises a question about ISIL's ability to
coordinate with other groups. What's your assessment of the
links between ISIL in Syria and Iraq and the groups that have
acted in its name outside of those two countries?
Mr. Clapper. If you're referring to ISIL's other chapters
or provinces, so-called, if that's what you--if that's what
you're referring to?
Senator Gillibrand. Yes.
Mr. Clapper. And what's the connection there?
Senator Gillibrand. So, what's your assessment of their
ability to coordinate, to communicate, to engage in terrorist
acts outside of Syria and Iraq?
Mr. Clapper. If you--do you mean the homeland or elsewhere
in the world?
Senator Gillibrand. Your choice, but both would be good.
Mr. Clapper. Well, I think what they've tried--they're
trying to do, of course, is to create the--both the substance
and, maybe more importantly, the image of this global-scale
caliphate by establishing chapters or franchises, if you will,
in places like Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and South Asia. The extent
to which, though, they--this is some monolithic organization,
where ISIL in al-Rikah or Abu Du'a or Baghdadi is calling the
shots in, say, Afghanistan/Pakistan, I don't see a lot of
evidence of this. I think this is more about pledging
allegiance to the brutality and the savagery of the--of ISIL.
But, the first and foremost issues for these local chapters is
local.
I think, aspirationally, there is a threat that ISIL poses,
potentially, to the homeland, and those they might harbor in
their area, particularly in Iraq and Syria, who would do us
harm.
Senator Gillibrand. I agree with that assessment. And we
just had a recent case out of Brooklyn, where we had threats
being made.
You mentioned Yemen. Could you just briefly----
Mr. Clapper. If I----
Senator Gillibrand. Go ahead.
Mr. Clapper. If I might comment on that, ma'am, this is
what I was referring to in my oral statement about--and this is
a real challenge for all of us in--whether homeland security or
intelligence--is the appeal, the rhetorical or spiritual appeal
that, because of the effective--very highly effective media
capabilities that ISIL has demonstrated, and how that--they are
able to appeal to people, who then can act on their own at a
time--in a time and place and circumstance of their choosing.
And that is a very worrisome challenge, particularly in this
country. So, not so much them commanding/controlling plots as
much as----
Senator Gillibrand. Inspiring----
Mr. Clapper.--inspiring them.
Senator Gillibrand.--plots, right.
So, do you have recommendations for us about ways to stem
that tide? Do you believe that our allies and other countries
are doing their fair share? Particularly, I am concerned about
the flow of foreign fighters, some of them from the United
States, from Europe into--in and out of Syria. For example,
what should Turkey be doing to help us more?
Mr. Clapper. Well, as we discussed before, Turkey has its
own focus, which doesn't necessarily comport with ours, in
terms of focusing on ISIL or al-Qaeda. They have very
permissive laws. It would be good if they could--if we could--
if they would change them to have more stringent controls over
who transits through their country.
I do--I would volunteer that I think, because of the
effectiveness of the media campaign or the propaganda campaign
that ISIL mounts, that we, the United States, and we, the West,
we who oppose ISIL need to be, I think, much more aggressive in
mounting the counternarrative.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. I want to thank the witnesses.
Just before we conclude, could I just, again, take a look
at that chart over there--General, I know you've seen it--as to
the expansion of the Chinese by filling in areas in the South
China Sea. That's a rather dramatic change, it seems to me. And
obviously, they'd be filling in--that in, in order to place
installations there. Is--could you talk a little bit about that
before we conclude?
Mr. Clapper. Well, the Chinese, of course, have had their
exorbitant claims, the so-called ``Nine-Dash line,'' throughout
the South China Sea, been very aggressive about pursuing that.
The--and, of course, this runs afoul of counterclaims that many
of the other countries also have in the same area. And they,
too, are very concerned about it. In fact, I think, in a sense,
that's--that may be a good thing, because, in the end, their
strength is going to be as--if an act--they can act
collectively.
So, what the Chinese are doing, here, of course--in one
case, you know, building airfield--an airdrome so that they can
launch aircraft in and out to do patrols and surveillance and
further exert what they consider is their sovereignty over the
South China Sea. And it has been impressive, in the last year,
year and a half since they've been doing this, as they pursued
drilling, which has caused conflict with the Vietnamese and
others. And so, this is a worrisome trend of the Chinese
because of the tensions it's going to create in the South China
Sea.
Chairman McCain. So, you've----
Mr. Clapper. But, they've been very aggressive about it.
Chairman McCain. So, you've got, not only the capability to
build an airfield, but, obviously, weapon systems. Could also
be--
Mr. Clapper. Well, they could, exactly.
Chairman McCain. Yeah.
Mr. Clapper. Of course, they're still in the construction
phase, so what they actually deploy to something like this, or
whether they permanently--they make it big enough so they could
permanently station forces, that'll be interesting to see what
they do.
Chairman McCain. Well, obviously our attention is on other
parts of the world, but this is really quite a major step on
their part. And I thank you for helping us out on that.
Jack, do you----
Senator Reed. I'd--if I may, with just one question, in
reaction to Senator Gillibrand's questioning.
We all understand, there's a huge, sort of, public campaign
that ISIL is undertaking to attract recruits, to dramatize what
they're doing. And you may not be able to comment in this
setting. But, are we taking steps to interdict that
communication so that they're not able to put things up and
attract recruits and communicate?
Mr. Clapper. Well, the problem there is, their ubiquitous
use of the media. And so, the challenge is, How do you take
down the Internet? Because that's more and more what they're
doing. In the day when al Qaeda or ISIL put these things out,
it was kind of channelized, and we kind of watched it, and
could do that. They've gotten wise to that, and now they make
it very difficult, because of the universal forums and the way
they get things out so ubiquitously. Very hard to control it.
Ergo, what we must do, I believe, is counter the messages.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCain. General, I know you've had a--are going to
have and are having a very busy couple of days, and I know you
understand that we have our responsibilities to try to inform
members in the Senate so that we can shape legislation to help
you do your job more effectively and efficiently.
And we thank both of you for being here.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
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