[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
114th Congress Printed for the use of the
2nd Session Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
___________________________________________________________________________
MOLDOVA AT A CROSSROADS
SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
Briefing of the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
___________________________________________________________________________
Washington: 2016
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
234 Ford House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
202-225-1901
[email protected]
http://www.csce.gov
@HelsinkiComm
Legislative Branch Commissioners
HOUSE SENATE
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ROGER WICKER, Mississippi,
Chairman Co-Chairman
ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida BENJAMIN L. CARDIN. Maryland
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire
ALAN GRAYSON, Florida TOM UDALL, New Mexico
RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
New York
Executive Branch Commissioners
Department of State
Department of Defense
Department of Commerce
(II)
ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Helsinki process, formally titled the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe, traces its origin to the signing of the
Helsinki Final Act in Finland on August 1, 1975, by the leaders of 33
European countries, the United States and Canada. As of January 1,
1995, the Helsinki process was renamed the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The membership of the OSCE has
expanded to 56 participating States, reflecting the breakup of the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.
The OSCE Secretariat is in Vienna, Austria, where weekly meetings
of the participating States' permanent representatives are held. In
addition, specialized seminars and meetings are convened in various
locations. Periodic consultations are held among Senior Officials,
Ministers and Heads of State or Government.
Although the OSCE continues to engage in standard setting in the
fields of military security, economic and environmental cooperation,
and human rights and humanitarian concerns, the Organization is
primarily focused on initiatives designed to prevent, manage and
resolve conflict within and among the participating States. The
Organization deploys numerous missions and field activities located in
Southeastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The
website of the OSCE is: .
ABOUT THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, also known as
the Helsinki Commission, is a U.S. Government agency created in 1976 to
monitor and encourage compliance by the participating States with their
OSCE commitments, with a particular emphasis on human rights.
The Commission consists of nine members from the United States
Senate, nine members from the House of Representatives, and one member
each from the Departments of State, Defense and Commerce. The positions
of Chair and Co-Chair rotate between the Senate and House every two
years, when a new Congress convenes. A professional staff assists the
Commissioners in their work.
In fulfilling its mandate, the Commission gathers and disseminates
relevant information to the U.S. Congress and the public by convening
hearings, issuing reports that reflect the views of Members of the
Commission and/or its staff, and providing details about the activities
of the Helsinki process and developments in OSCE participating States.
The Commission also contributes to the formulation and execution of
U.S. policy regarding the OSCE, including through Member and staff
participation on U.S. Delegations to OSCE meetings. Members of the
Commission have regular contact with parliamentarians, government
officials, representatives of non-governmental organizations, and
private individuals from participating States. The website of the
Commission is: .
(III)
MOLDOVA AT A CROSSROADS
___________
September 22, 2016
Page
COMMISSIONER
Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ................................................ 1
PARTICIPANTS
Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe................................................. 1
Ambassador William Hill, National War College, National Defense
University .......................................................... 4
Matthew Rojansky, Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center .. 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts ........................... 23
MOLDOVA AT A CROSSROADS
_____________
SEPTEMBER 22, 2016
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Washington, DC
The briefing was held at 4 p.m. in room 2456, Rayburn House Office
Building, Washington, DC, Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor for the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating.
Commissioner present: Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, Commissioner,
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Panelists present: Alex Tiersky, Policy Advisor, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe; Ambassador William Hill, National
War College, National Defense University; and Matthew Rojansky,
Director, Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson Center.
Mr. Tiersky. Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the briefing on
``Moldova at a Crossroads.'' If you're here for the meeting on ocean
acidification, that ended just a few minutes ago; you're in the wrong
place.
I want to say nothing other than to welcome Congressman Joe Pitts
to present his opening remarks. Mr. Pitts, please.
Mr. Pitts. Thank you. [Applause.] Thank you. [Applause.] Thank you.
It's a pleasure to be with you, and I'm sorry I'll have to leave when I
conclude, because we are voting, I think around 4:15--I'll find out.
But welcome to the Helsinki Commission's briefing on ``Moldova at a
Crossroads.''
This briefing marks the latest in a series of events held in recent
years by the Commission on challenges facing Moldova. The Commission
has worked hard to keep informed on developments there and drive U.S.
policy towards greater effectiveness.
In 2012, Congressman David Pryce and I established the Moldova
Caucus to act as yet another entity to augment our government's foreign
policy with respect to the Republic of Moldova. The Caucus helped to
accelerate collaboration between Moldova's Government and members of
Congress, and it did so at a critical juncture.
As Moldova prepares for the Presidential elections scheduled for
October 30th, the country is at another crossroads. And while it seeks
to overcome significant internal challenges, Moldova also remains
squarely in the crosshairs of Russian destabilization efforts intended
to maintain Moscow's influence, and prevent closer relations between
Moldova and the West.
This briefing is intended to explore several issues, including
Russia's efforts and continued threats to Moldovan territorial
integrity and sovereignty; Russian destabilizing actions, including
misinformation campaigns, an economic blockade, and threatening
rhetoric; and the roles of the Moldovan Government and external actors,
including the U.S., the EU and the OSCE in addressing Moldova's
vulnerabilities.
Let me emphasize that Moldova remains a key concern not only for
the Helsinki Commission, but also for Congress as a whole. I was proud
to sponsor a resolution on Moldova, House Resolution 562, which was
passed by the House in July of 2014. And among other things, the
resolution reaffirmed that it is U.S. policy to support the Republic of
Moldova's sovereignty, their independence, their territorial integrity.
It called upon the government of Russia to withdraw its military forces
from Moldova, refrain from economic threats, and cease supporting
separatist movements, and affirmed that lasting stability and security
in Europe is a key U.S. priority that can only be achieved if the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all European countries is
respected.
These principles--sovereignty, territorial integrity and the like--
are the cornerstone of the Helsinki Final Act, commitments monitored on
a continuing basis by the Helsinki Commission. I'm afraid that many of
the challenges that my resolution sought to address, challenges that we
have learned about through past Commission hearings and briefings on
Moldova, are unfortunately still with us today.
Before turning the briefing over to Alex Tiersky from the Helsinki
Commission to moderate the discussion, let me say a few words about the
Commission itself.
I was first appointed to serve as a member of the Helsinki
Commission in 1999. In that time, the Commission has given me an
opportunity to promote and defend core U.S. values and interests on
issues ranging from religious freedom in Russia to combating child
pornography and other things. As a Commissioner, I have traveled with
fellow members of the House and Senate abroad to meet with our
counterparts from more than 50 OSCE nations to ensure that each country
is pushed to fully uphold its commitments, including the defense of
fundamental human rights.
The Commission often draws attention to issues and countries that
are not always in the Washington, D.C. spotlight, but are nevertheless
of crucial importance to the United States. The subject of today's
hearing is a case in point. While Georgia and the Ukraine--two
countries in similar circumstances--rightly get a lot of attention in
Washington, the Commission will continue to make sure that Moldova's
challenges also get the attention they deserve.
I'd therefore like to thank Ambassador Hill and Mr. Rojansky for
once again offering their expertise to the Helsinki Commission. It is
only through the support of exceptional individuals like our speakers
today that the Commission can ensure that its work is well-informed,
that it is relevant, and that it is effective.
So thank you very much for your interest, for your being here. And
so now over to you, Alex. Have a good afternoon.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you very much, Mr. Pitts. [Applause.]
Mr. Pitts very modestly noted he's a very longtime Commissioner
with the Helsinki Commission. And an extraordinarily strong and
sustained leader, particularly on the question of Moldova, so we're
very grateful for him coming to kick off our briefing, which he
actually had asked us to organize in conjunction with our chairman,
Chris Smith. So I appreciate their asking me to organize this briefing.
I've been looking forward to learning more about these critical
questions from our experts today. The Helsinki Commission itself has
long demonstrated a sustained interest in developments in Moldova,
including holding several hearings and briefings, such as this one. Our
agenda has covered issues ranging from democracy, rule of law, human
rights, to today's main focus, security issues, including a protracted
conflict in Transnistria. Other types of engagement by the Commission
on Moldova included a visit to Moldova in 2014 with a congressional
delegation and participation by the Commission's staff members in the
context of OSCE Parliamentary Assembly election observation missions.
So let me just say, I think, a few words that will resonate with
pretty much everyone in this room. From a security perspective, Moldova
certainly faces a number of internal and external challenges which have
a potential to bleed out to the broader region. Corruption, organized
crime, trafficking in goods and people--in a country that borders NATO
and the EU, this is, of course, a concern to us.
And just to name one particularly concerning report that wrapped
all of these concerns together for me, was an October 2015 Associated
Press piece that described official suspicions that criminal
organizations, some with ties to the Russian KGB successor agency, are
driving a thriving black market in nuclear materials in Moldova. This
frightening report is only compounded by what appear to be Russian
efforts to keep Moldova destabilized and rife with lawlessness and
criminal activity, particularly by perpetuating the so-called
protracted conflict in Transnistria.
So we have before us today a great opportunity to better understand
the current security situation in Moldova, including the hows and whys
of Russian influence in Europe's poorest country, particularly as it
heads into an important election season. Guiding us on this tour will
be two world-class experts on Moldova and Russian policy, certainly no
strangers to the Helsinki Commission.
Let me first introduce Ambassador William Hill from the National
War College, a career Foreign Service officer who served two terms as
ambassador and head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, where he was
charged with negotiation of a political settlement of the Transnistrian
conflict and facilitation of the withdrawal of Russian forces, arms and
ammunition from Moldova. Ambassador Hill has a tremendously long list
of impressive academic and professional accomplishments on his official
biography that has been made available to you. I can't possibly
summarize it, other than to say he seems to have worked everywhere and
done everything at the most interesting possible times, to say nothing
of speaking six foreign languages. He has been an invaluable witness to
previous Helsinki Commission events, and we're grateful that he's
accepted our invitation to once again inform our work.
As I mentioned, this is also not the first Helsinki Commission
rodeo for Matthew Rojansky, who directs the Kennan Institute at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. We're thrilled to be
able to once again call on his expertise, which he has deployed not
only at the Kennan Institute but also as deputy director of the Russia
and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
where he founded Carnegie's Ukraine Program and led a multiyear project
to support U.S.-Russia health cooperation. Significantly for our
purposes here, he also created a track II task force to promote
resolution of the Transnistria conflict. But of course, most important
for me is that he's an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS, which
is my alma mater. His full biography is also available to you. Matthew,
thanks for agreeing to share your thoughts with us today.
I'll first turn to Ambassador Hill, who I've asked to provide some
perspective on current developments in Moldova, and then I'll turn to
Matthew Rojansky for some words. Gentlemen, feel free to use the
podium. And then I'll ask a couple of questions of our panelists myself
before turning it to the audience for a question-and-answer session.
So, please, Ambassador Hill, if you would.
Amb. Hill. OK, thanks. I think I'll stay here, and I think I can
make myself heard by everyone.
Thank you very, very much. I am always happy to come back and visit
and cooperate with the Helsinki Commission. It's now, I think, 31 years
since I first hosted a Helsinki Commission staff member in Belgrade,
what was then Yugoslavia, and started a string of meetings and other
joint efforts with this grand institution.
I need to say that I am here offering remarks in my personal
capacity. Anything I may say does not reflect the views or positions of
the National Defense University, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the
U.S. Government. So I, and only I, am to blame.
I'm also really happy, always, to talk about Moldova. I've
developed over a long period of time a very deep affection and concern
for the welfare of that country, and it's from this starting point that
I come to offer my comments today.
I'm going to talk a little bit about Moldova and Right Bank
politics; I'm going to talk about politics on the Left Bank, in
Transnistria; I'll say a little bit about the conflict--the negotiation
seeking a settlement of the Transnistrian conflict and the role of the
OSCE; and end up with a couple of observations on general security
issues in Moldova. And they'll be necessarily brief, but I can try to
go into more detail depending on what strikes you, or if you disagree,
or if you have further thoughts on any of these.
Now, I'd like to start off saying that, at this point in time, I
think that the political situation on the Right Bank in Moldova is the
greatest threat to Moldova's stability and security. I say that not to
minimize the current difficulties with the Russian Federation, the
continued problems with the Transnistrian conflict, with the failure to
obtain full withdrawal of Russian military forces and equipment from
the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova, or a number of
other things. But there are a number of factors that have come together
to make the political, financial and economic situation as it's
developed on the Right Bank a real danger to further progress in
Moldova.
With a little bit of background, the post-2009 pro-European
coalitions in Moldova unfortunately consistently disappointed both
those who supported them from outside of Moldova and those who voted
for them inside Moldova. The coalition basically ended up in a very
deep and bitter fight between the PLDM and the PDM and between their
effective leaders, Prime Minister Vlad Filat and the deputy head of the
PDM Vlad Plahotniuc. This feud came out in the open in the fight after
the Padurea Domneasca scandal, the Imperial or Lord's Forest scandal,
and it ended up with both men out of the formal offices that they held
and, eventually, after--in 2015, with former Prime Minister Filat
charged and in jail. This was due to the fact, largely, that the PDM
and Plahotniuc effectively, in the division of labors among the
coalition, controlled the courts and the domestic police organs, which
worked against the PLDM and the backers of Filat.
In general--I say this not to favor one party or another--all of
the parties in the coalition basically failed to address issues of rule
of law inside Moldova on the Right Bank. This was particularly crucial
as it affected Moldova's financial institutions and the investment
climate in Moldova. And what you got out of this was the so-called
theft of the century, where three banks right at the time of the
elections of the end of November of 2014 ended up losing--having
something like almost $1 billion disappear into thin air through non-
performing loans, false loans, other mechanisms. It's still being
investigated.
Now, hostile takeovers of the major banks in Moldova and
channeling/laundering of money through these banks had been apparent
through open sources, through the press, as early as 2012-2013, and it
clearly involved by inference and by direct assertion significant funds
coming out of various sources in Russia, as well as from other
countries in the region, and passing then through various channels to
offshore sites through Latvia, Cyprus, Channel Islands, and off to
destinations that investigators are still determining. In a very
controversial move that led to the fall of one government and
contributed to the fall of another one later, the Moldovan National
Bank ended up making up a large portion of these losses, so that the
currency simply wouldn't collapse and the Moldovan population at large
would not suffer even more from this.
The mechanics of the scheme and who exactly was involved continue
to be debated. There are charges and counter-charges going on right
now. One of the investigatory reports by Kroll, a Western corporation,
was leaked, and the number of stockholders in these dummy corporations
was really shocking. But the point is that the problem really hasn't
been fixed.
The banking system, the financial markets in Moldova, and the lack
of reliable court and police organs and functions is still evident
enough that Moldova still remains vulnerable. And there has been a
significant problem with money laundering, illicit funds, capital
flight out of the former Soviet Union, with Russia being one of the
largest sources and problems in this respect. And it's not accidental;
Moldova was an easy target for licit and illicit actors able to use the
institutions--to seize control of financial institutions and move
stuff.
A succession of governments have been unable to address corruption
issues, and the fall of these governments, their replacement, have led
to demonstrations, in particular the winter of 2015-2016, when pro-West
and pro-Moscow demonstrators joined hands to lead one government,
Filat's government, out, and to protest the installation of the current
Filip government.
Meanwhile, PDM--Mr. Plahotniuc first tried to get himself installed
as prime minister. President Timofti would not go along with this. He
has lately been courting Western opinion and using resources, including
his media empire within Moldova, to create a more favorable impression
for his party and himself prior to the presidential vote coming up at
the end of October.
The EU, the U.S. and other Western actors have taken a sterner line
with Moldovan authorities after 2015, and have been demanding more
transparency, better evidence of progress. But one wonders, is this
closing the barn door after the horse has left? Is it too late?
I hope not, but Moldova remains in a perilous state now, where
population of working age continue to leave Moldova to seek employment
outside the country because investors just don't want to put their
money in an atmosphere like this. The budget of the country remains
significantly dependent upon remittances, and if Moldovans stop sending
money home, the country's going to be in real trouble. And the
electorate remains badly split. European integration has been widely
discredited among significant parts of the population because of the
succession of governments, the so-called theft of the century, and the
general failure of the programs of pro-European integration and reform
to show better results.
One result you can see is those who advocate union with Romania,
who used to get significantly less than 10 percent of the vote when I
was there, now poll up towards 20 percent of the vote. And one of the
candidates for president, Mihai Ghimpu, has said flat out that he's
running for president simply to advertise union with Romania as the
only solution to Moldova's problems. The very statehood of the country
is at stake. And before you can integrate Transnistria into Moldova,
you've got to make sure that you have a strong Moldovan state. So it's
not that I minimize the other difficulties which still face Moldova,
but this is just a challenge that all Moldovans really face right now.
Now, the Left Bank, Transnistria, is maybe even worse off
economically. It's an economic disaster. Working-age population has
fled to Ukraine, to Russia, wherever they can get a job. They're
sending money back. The Left Bank is significantly depopulated. It has
large deficits, monetary--financial subsidies from Russia and a high
dependence--maybe a higher dependence than the Right Bank on
remittances.
The current leadership is increasingly authoritarian and arbitrary.
It is not so much the authoritarian character of his rule but the
really unpredictable and arbitrary character. He is opposed by Sheriff,
the large conglomerate from the Left Bank that controls much of the
retail trade, the media and the Moldovan entry in the Champions League
in European football--Sheriff Tiraspol.
The Russians seem to be banking--betting on Sheriff and Sheriff
champion Krasnosyelsky, former head of the MVD, the police in the Left
Bank, now the head of the Sheriff-backed party that runs the
legislature on the Left Bank, the Renewal Party, or Obnovleniye. It
seems Moscow is going to back him in the elections in December. One
wonders whether they will be more successful than when they backed yet
another candidate and lost to Shevchuk in 2011.
The upshot is there is little prospect for positive change on the
Left Bank, irrespective of the outcome of the elections, and therefore
little real prospect for rapid progress in the settlement negotiations
and reintegration of Transnistria in Moldova.
The German 2016 OSCE chairmanship had ambitious, although still
pragmatic, goals for their year in the chair, and it has had some
successes. They, I think most significantly, convinced the EU to extend
the unilateral trade preferences for Transnistria through this year,
despite the terms of the association agreement with Moldova, which
called for these to end at the end of 2015. So this has not been an
issue in the Transnistrian settlement talks and they have been able to
concentrate on other issues.
The 5+2 talks have met again this year and the Germans got both
sides off to a special session, informal session, in Bulgaria as has
been done in years past. They adopted a number of practical, very small
measures to restore confidence and to eliminate some minor
administrative irritants between the Left and Right Banks, such as
recognizing license plates and things like that. These small
concessions nonetheless provoked a storm of protest from a number of
leading figures in Moldova and Right Bank civil society that remain
adamant about any concessions to Left Bank authorities.
Meanwhile, the status of ethnic or national minorities within
Moldova in Gagauzia and Taraclia remains really unaddressed. Just today
I pulled off the Web a recent report just out from the Institute for
Public Policy, one of the leading NGOs in Chisinau now, which treats in
detail the situation in the south of Moldova with minorities--Gagauzia,
Taraclia--and comes to the conclusion that very little has been done
and it remains with the failure to integrate these regions more
successfully into Moldovan politics and economy. There is very little
incentive to Transnistrian elites and push for them to get back into
Moldova as a whole.
With the state of politics in Moldova on both banks, there is
little chance of further progress this year. And I think the best that
Germany is going to be able to do is to hand off the process intact and
ready to move for Austria in 2017 if there are opportunities after
elections have been held on the Left and Right Banks and new
authorities look at these issues.
On security, Moldova, happily, seems relatively unaffected by the
war in Eastern Ukraine. Odessa Oblast seems to have calmed down and
there doesn't seem to be as much danger as there was in early to mid-
2014, the Russian mischief-making in Odessa, that would call on forces
coming out of Transnistria and that might spill back over into Moldova.
Basically, neither Chisinau nor Tiraspol for a long time have had any
desire to fight each other or to warm up the conflict again. And
barring relatively small or isolated provocations, I expect the
military situation will remain calm.
The Russians, both the peacekeeping forces and the Operational
Group of Russian Forces, the OGRV in Russian, conducted exercises with
the Transnistrian forces this summer, which drew some criticism. And
it's really a mystery why the OGRF, the OGRV, was involved because they
never were during my time there. They've generally just been there to
guard the ammunition and not much else.
I'm not sure that it signifies any real plans on the part of the
Russians other than the fact that the OGRV has been idle for so long
that many of them have probably forgotten that they are soldiers. But
it remains a concern. There is relatively little danger from the
Russian forces. They are more of a political impediment than a real
security impediment. The significant forces on the Left Bank belong to
the Transnistrian authorities. They were Russian during Soviet times.
They moved over to the Transnistrian flag. And those are the ones you
need to worry about.
But the political significance of the stalled Russian withdrawal
and political impediment that it places in improving Moldovan and,
generally, European relations with Russia remains there. These remain
sore points, but the disastrous state of the economy on both banks and
the deep political divisions and widespread disillusionment on the
Right Bank, in my estimation are relatively newer and right now are the
most clear and present danger to Moldova.
With the Moldovan electorate remaining equally split between east
and west, you could well have a pro-Moscow candidate win in the
presidential elections. The polls that I saw in the IPP's Barometer of
Public Opinion show that the two pro-Russian parties--the Socialists of
Dodon and Usatii's Partidul Nostru--are polling by far--or, you know,
much, much higher than any of the other parties in Moldova.
What the country desperately needs is rule of law, a real progress
in rule of law which would lead to a more secure investment climate,
which in turn might lead to the return of some of Moldova's educated,
working-age elite--capable, young and middle-aged Moldovans who now
reside from Canada and the United States, through Germany, Britain and
elsewhere in the West, a workforce and intellectual capability that
Moldova desperately needs back home to improve its economy.
It's not clear, as I said, that any of the choices offered in the
upcoming elections can promise progress on these key issues. But while
dealing and looking at Russia and looking at other issues in the
region, I think both the U.S. and the EU need also to focus and keep
their eye on these issues lest, for looking at security issues stemming
or emanating from the north and the east, we lose the entity that we
are seeking to promote, protect and encourage.
Thank you.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you, Ambassador. [Applause.]
Why don't we go straight to Matt Rojansky, please?
Mr. Rojansky. Well, thank you, Alex, and to the Commission and Mr.
Pitts.
Most of all, I just want to associate myself with pretty much
everything that Bill has just said, which is not hard for me because I
always invite him to lecture to my SAIS class about Ukraine, Moldova
and Belarus--the only class of its kind in the D.C. area, I would note
for those of you who are still interested in graduate degrees.
But there is one area where I need to depart, and that is that Alex
has asked me to talk specifically about the Russian challenge--let's
call it that--although I fully embrace the notion that Moldova's first
and foremost challenge does come from its just absolutely tortured
domestic politics.
Let me start, despite Alex's very generous introduction, with a
note of humility about what those of us in the expert community--and by
the way, although I clearly am at a think tank so it should be obvious
I'm expressing my own opinion, I do technically work for the Federal
Government since the Wilson Center was congressionally chartered. And
so I also apply the disclaimer: Nothing I'm saying is the position of
the Wilson Center or anyone else except myself.
So what experts can't do: First of all, we can't read Putin's mind.
I'm not going to do that. We can't tell Russians what their interests
are, or Moldovans or anyone else, for that matter. And we can't predict
what the next crisis is going to be. We have a terrible record of that,
although it turns out not to be bad for anybody's career. That's been
scientifically proven. [Laughter.]
What can we do? What can we actually be useful at? We can pay
attention to how Russians--and others in the region, but in this case
Russians in particular--define their interests. What do they say that
they actually want and not ignore that?
Second, we can identify patterns, themes and trends in what they
actually do. And then, third, we can recall what has, in fact,
happened--past lessons, mistakes, insights. And in that, I would note
that with certain very notable exceptions, the U.S. Government tends to
have a very short memory, and it's important, I think, to be a
repository of that.
So, that said, let me give you a very quick framework--and I
introduce it even though it's very broad because I will make reference
to it--a framework for understanding how I assess the Kremlin's goals
in general, Mr. Putin's goals specifically.
The 2000s--if you look at the decade, roughly speaking, between the
time that Mr. Putin became President of Russia and kind of the end of
the last decade, I think the theme of what he did in that time, in
Russia and to some extent in the post-Soviet space, was rolling back
the 1990s, the idea that he was going to save the integrity of the
Russian Federation by winning the war in Chechnya, by stopping the
separatism of various Russian regions and governors and political
figures and so on. He was going to restore the primacy of the Russian
state.
That's what the Power Vertical was all about. He was going to
stabilize Russia economically versus the basket case that it was in the
1990s, thereby regaining some degree of respect in the world. And all
of this is enabled by a kind of social contract with Russians that
says, stay out of politics and you'll get rich. And it basically
worked.
So what then is this decade about? What is the theme of the 2010s
and Putin's sort of second and third, fourth tour as President,
whatever you want to call it? What has this been about?
I think this is about rolling back the 1980s. So rather than
Yeltsin's chaotic 1990s, this is about Gorbachev's reforms in the
1980s, and basically saying: These people betrayed the Soviet Union,
these people betrayed my country, and I am going to undo what they did.
Now, the analogy doesn't hold perfectly but I think it's a useful
tool. That's why I introduce it. If you think about it, Gorbachev gave
away not just the Soviet space, the former Soviet space, but the Warsaw
Pact. He gave away the influence. This isn't to say direct territorial
control. Moscow never really had that, even in the post-World War II
era, but it had levers. It had ways of ensuring that stuff he didn't
want to happen wouldn't happen. And I think Putin wants those back.
Russia was clearly--in the guise of the Soviet Union was a global
great power. And if you look at what Russia is doing in Syria, it's
very clearly aimed both at an outcome in Syria, but also it's sending a
message to the United States, to Germany, to China that Russia is a
global great power to be reckoned with.
And even the Russian economy--if you think about primarily what
Gorbachev did, privatization wasn't just about Yeltsin in the 1990s.
Privatization actually began under Gorbachev, the idea that there would
be private enterprise, that there would be boards controlling Russian
Soviet enterprises. In fact, what Mr. Putin has done systematically,
especially the last 5 to 10 years, is to restore either state or
nomenklatura--which is a Soviet term for sort of the elite around the
political power--control of the Russian economy. And if you do that,
statistically/numerically through the Russian economy you see that that
is basically true.
This has been enabled in turn by that same social contract that
worked during the last decade. It's attenuated, it's hurting as a
result of Russia's tough economic situation, but it's still basically
intact because, by and large, the salient period in most Russians'
memories is still the 1990s--and by any measure they're still doing
much better--but also by the ``brain drain'' and the departure of this
enormous--sort of what I call the political safety valve, the fact that
if you oppose this deal, if you oppose the Kremlin, you can always
leave Russia, and that wasn't always possible.
All right, so that's kind of a broad framework for thinking about
where Putin is headed. How do Russians specifically think about Europe,
the European project, and how Moldova's European aspirations fit into
that--so why Moldova even matters for Russians in this context.
So first of all, the European project, as such, conflicts with the
Russian world view in a very fundamental level. The European project is
fundamentally premised on prosperity, the welfare state as we
understand it in modern Europe, particularly Western Europe. And
ordinary Russians have never shared that and so they don't buy it.
They're not sharing in that prosperity. They don't enjoy an effective
welfare state.
If you think about some of the sentiments behind the Brexit vote,
they're actually held in common very much with Russians--and, by the
way, with a large number of Americans, which has some implications we
can talk about.
The European project is built on the notion that there are certain
rules. We call it a European Acquis; you can call it values, whatever
you want, but the idea that European countries that claim that status
have got to play by certain rules. Well, that doesn't work with crony
capitalism, and that's the system that Putin has built in Russia today
and so it's rejected by the Kremlin.
Europe most of all is driven by its really deep fear of what?
Nationalism and military conflict. These are the two things that have
brought Europe to chaos and ruin and that the European project is
intended to avoid. Well, what are the two biggest foreign policy tools
of Russia today? Nationalism and military conflict, right? And so
again, fundamental world view is in conflict.
And then of course this notion of whether European identity even
appeals to Russians anymore. You can't describe every Russian with a
broad brush but, broadly speaking, there is more appeal in Russia today
for the notion either that Russia is the true repository of European
values and Europe has abandoned them, or the idea that there's
something distinctly Russian--the old sort of Pan-Slavism, Eurasianism,
Russophile, Slavophilism, whatever it is.
How do they think about NATO? Basically as a veil for U.S.
meddling. So NATO, in and of itself, is not really a thing. What it is,
is it's a tool that the United States has created to put a certain
gloss on our interventions in Europe and in the area that Russians care
most about.
They ask, what's the difference between NATO's interventions in
Kosovo, in Libya, NATO training Ukrainian, or for that matter Moldovan,
troops versus NATO next going into Belarus, into Kazakhstan or into
Russia itself? So there's really a kind of, you know, reverse domino
theory if you think about America's Cold War ideology at work there.
And then there's a different area, which I admit is actually
contradictory but they co-exist--this is one of the fun things about
Russia's political discourse--that NATO is actually a naive tool and
that therefore the United States is a naive instrument of cynical neo-
fascists in Europe. So the Baltic States, Southeast European countries
like Romania.
This is where historical memory--and this memory is genuinely held
by Russians--this is where it matters a lot that, for example, if you
read the history of this region, in fact it was Romania that occupied a
big chunk of Ukraine, including Odessa and so on, and it was Romanian
forces responsible for the atrocities and so on.
So this does play into genuine, deeply held historical memory on
the part of Russians, Ukrainians, Moldovans themselves, but the
narrative is that the United States just doesn't get it. We don't know
that we're being manipulated. And when NATO shows up in the region,
we're there for someone else's purposes, nothing that would be good for
the American people.
So what are Russia's apparent goals, if they see the world this
way, if they see Europe this way, and how does Moldova fit in?
I think, first of all, it's obvious Russia would seek to damage,
discredit and minimize the European project. That wasn't always true,
but given the water under the bridge of the last 5 to 10 years, it is
very true today. That entails exacerbating fissures within European
countries--refugees, nationalism. We obviously heard the sort of
glorying, the kind of schadenfreude over Brexit in Moldova.
Bill has mentioned it--Gagauz, Transnistrian separatism, the use of
passports, the distribution of pension payments, and of course the
Russian language itself, right, which is, again, very genuinely
connected to the history of the region, the experience of individuals,
family identity, et cetera, and nonetheless is a very valuable tool for
dividing society.
Bill I think made the point very delicately, and it is true:
Support for Romanian unification is higher than it has been in recent
history in Moldova, but it's still relatively low. It's somewhere south
of 20 percent, safely. The numbers I saw were in June of 2016: 13
percent support, 67 percent oppose. And then you have the huge ``I
don't know'' or ``I won't answer'' number, as usual in post-Soviet
polling.
But nonetheless, Moscow's objective would be to magnify that number
as much as possible, not because they actually want Moldova to join
Romania, but because that's a very useful narrative, that this is
Romanian imperialism all over again, and by extension NATO, American,
et cetera, even the sort of fascist narrative, and puts enormous
pressure on this already severely weakened Moldovan sovereignty that
Bill talked about.
And then of course the promotion of Eurasian alternatives--
pressuring Moldova and other former Soviet republics to join. And the
success stories there for Moscow have been Armenia and Kyrgyzstan,
which have more or less acceded to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic
Union and now Eurasian political union.
In Moldova, the latest numbers I've seen--these actually go back to
late 2015--30 percent support the Russian Eurasian alternative; 54
percent support the European association. I would guess that those
numbers are probably a little bit closer now, as Bill suggested, but
this was the latest poll that I had.
And of course dividing the trans-Atlantic connection--dividing the
United States from Europe and then a divide on the issue of
transatlanticism within European states--so referring to European
states that will host American troops or NATO exercises as being
``occupied,'' literally using that term, again dredging up a lot of
historical memory there.
Moldovans, again according to the October 2015 IRI poll, 31 percent
support NATO; 38 percent oppose NATO. But geography is what matters
most there. I mean, if Ukraine is not going to be in NATO, the notion
that Moldova would be this sort of extra front line, it's kind of
difficult to fathom that that would be a worthwhile undertaking,
especially given the Transnistria problem.
The point about values, Russians make the argument that Moldova is
a conservative society. That's just simply a statement of fact. People
are not particularly receptive to kind of modern Western divisive
social issues--questions of gay marriage and so on.
And so Moscow makes the argument: We are the repository of
traditional Christian values--we, us in the East, not the West--and so
you should stay with us rather than going with decadent ``Gayropa.''
And of course Russian-backed media--RT, Sputnik, which we see in the
U.S.--and then other sorts of media projects in Central and Eastern
Europe will back that up.
Money going directly to pro-Moscow parties. It's hard to prove this
stuff. This is the kind of thing you read in kind of the Moldovan
yellow press or the Russian-speaking yellow press. But there have been
a number of theories as to why these parties are suddenly able to
purchase hundreds of billboards with slogans like ``Together with
Moscow.'' And, you know, voters have gotten a meeting with the Russian
leadership, and so on.
And of course new NATO activities in the region--and this is very
important--are a double-edged sword, because while it may reassure the
Baltic States, for example, to have this NATO presence regularly
rotating into the region, or while it may reassure Romanians and
Bulgarians--with my recent visit to Sofia--to ask for a NATO flotilla
to come to the Black Sea, you can imagine how this argument would be
made by the Russians. ``What is NATO doing there? We're not threatening
them. We haven't invaded them. NATO is clearly there to claim this
territory and to threaten us.'' So it really is a tricky double-edged
sword.
And if you look--I would argue again, judged by what Russians do,
if you look at where they have located the three new division
headquarters in Eastern Europe, they're all on the border with Ukraine.
They are all intended to surround eastern Ukraine so that if necessary
they could essentially collapse the pincers and kind of take over what
they consider to be Novorossiya in eastern and southern Ukraine. They
are really not primarily designed to threaten places like the Baltic
States or central Europe, or even, for that matter, Moldova. But
obviously Moldova could be easily swept up in a conflict.
And then lastly, of course, it's very much in the Russian interest,
again, with this logic being taken seriously, to raise the level of
risk. The more fear there is, the more uncertainty, the more saber
rattling, the more Russia has to be taken into account, the less Europe
can choose the option--and this goes as much for Moldova as any other
country--of sort of, we develop ourselves and our success story on our
side of the line. And we see that playing out right now in Ukraine,
where the more Russia can destabilize Ukraine's attempts at reform, the
more success Russia has in its objectives.
Why all this matters to Americans--just very, very briefly, I would
say this is an extension, broadly speaking, of why Europe matters to
us. You know, we've been pulled into world wars in Europe. Global order
tends to be determined, just as a factual statement, by whether there
is order among European states. If there is, there is more global order
and it looks a certain way; if there isn't, there isn't.
And of course, the European project has led to the longest period
of interstate peace in the modern era, but also prosperity. The
European project promotes free trade, lowering of trade barriers. The
U.S. economy versus 50 years ago is now three times more dependent on
trade than it was--28 percent versus 9 percent. Our bilateral trade in
goods with Europe is almost a trillion dollars, and that I would say
substantially understates actual trade with Europe because you have
finance, you have American companies headquartered in Europe that sell
exclusively in Europe but that the revenues come back to the United
States. So that's substantially greater than our trade even with
China--just as a reminder of why this matters.
All that said, not all interests are created equal. I guess I'm a
kind of realist in this way. Moldova is small, so the argument could be
made that one way or the other, right--win Moldova, lose Moldova, it
sort of doesn't matter, it's so small.
Here's the thing: It is symbolic. And tipping points tend to have a
kind of, you know, snowball effect, to mix my metaphors. The Russian
troops are already present in Moldova through the OGRF and the
peacekeepers in Transnistria. The United States does relatively minimal
trade with Moldova, although very significant assistance, I would say,
proportional to other countries and as a proportion of the economy.
So while losing--sort of as a narrative--that's not to say it's a
battle with a winner and a loser--but losing as a narrative would not
be catastrophic. That's true. On the other hand, it would clearly
indicate that we are on the wrong track. Clearly I'm not saying it
wouldn't be catastrophic for Moldova. It clearly would. But in the
grand narrative, it would indicate that we're on the wrong track.
So what should we do to help Moldova? And let me try and end on
this. You know, I really like the British World War II posters--keep
calm and carry on. But what does that mean in this context? I mean,
it's always good wisdom.
First of all, understand what's actually going on. This isn't World
War II all over again. There are not thousands of Russian tanks that
are sort of poised to roll over the borders. This isn't the Cold War
again. You know, don't obsess over Putin. Don't play Kremlinology
games, counting people's liver spots, who's up, who's down. Don't make
hybrid war into a magic wand, like the Russians can achieve anything
they want by waving this magical hybrid war wand. No. Hybrid war,
whatever it might be--and I have a piece out on the table Alex very
kindly printed out. Hybrid war is possible in environments that are
friendly to it, and Crimea was obviously such an environment. Donbass
was to an extent. Moldova might be. But it's not the same as either of
those, so we shouldn't presume that the same tactics are possible.
And then most of all, we've got to manage and minimize the risks of
accidental escalation. Remember--and here, you know, the obvious case
up in the Baltics is ships and airplanes getting near each other and
risking an accident. But remember what happened in Odessa where you had
the Trade Union building catch on fire and probably unintentionally
kill a bunch of people who were protesting against the Maidan movement.
If something like that were to happen in the context of a Moldovan
protest movement--and we've seen a heck of a lot of protests--it kind
of reminds me that the whole 2009 change happened because of one
relatively small casualty. So you put that together with the current
very explosive environment with the situation in Ukraine--that's the
type of accident we should be on the lookout for.
And then carry on--what does that mean? Well, it means focus on
what we are about. What is the European project? What is the Western
message? We need to do a self-audit. Where are we vulnerable? Moldovan
corruption--I don't even have to say anything else. That's all I have
to say. Bill described it adequately. But also migration, nationalism,
pluralism, identity, history issues--we're ignoring all of this stuff,
bottom line.
This, by the way, is the mission of the Helsinki Commission, is to
deal with these issues, the so-called human basket issues of the OSCE.
And I simply want to say it's the right vehicle--the Helsinki
Commission, the OSCE--but we're not applying the right resources. And
Germany would have been, could have been, I think, a much stronger
leader on this. Let's hope that Austria finds the resources to do so.
And then, of course, the economic factor. How are questions of jobs
and trade impacted by, for example, Western sanctions policy? It's not
negligible. There is definitely a negative impact for most of the
countries that border on Russia and that do a lot of trade with Russia,
of Western sanctions--which isn't to say it's a bad idea at the end of
the day. It simply means we have to be very cognizant of the effects of
that and make sure that much like this argument about we're losing the
thing that we're seeking to protect, make sure we don't lose the
population in the course of seeking to assert their interests and to
protect them.
We have to be clear about our values. Don't fight fire with fire.
One of the most frustrating things to me always is to go to this part
of the world and be told, ``Look at all the Russian propaganda. We need
our own propaganda. Will you pay for it?'' This is a huge mistake
because it runs counter to our values.
And then lastly I'll simply say, the lesson of George Kennan's
original vision that he laid out in the famous long telegram and the
Mr. X article--my institute bears his name--is that containment is not
about running around the world and everywhere the Russian threat comes
up, you whack it like Whack-a-Mole. That is a recipe for exhausting
yourself, and it probably also undermines who you are.
Containment is about getting problem-solving right in the areas
where you can. And to the extent that we're failing that now, and being
on Capitol Hill and this institution, I think there are more than
enough reminders around us--that is our biggest vulnerability. That is
where any strategy that seeks to counter whatever Russian threat and
whatever Russian influence there may be in Europe's more vulnerable
regions is going to fall down. It's not going to be because they have
magical powers that can overcome where we're strong.
If I can leave you with one message, it's this--and I'll ask a
question to end this since I know we're going to transition in a moment
to the question-and-answer session. I would ask what the lesson of 25
years of dealing with the Moldova-Transnistria conflict is for Ukraine
and Donbass today, because I think that is an operative question that
American policymakers, certainly I think the Helsinki Commission, is
thinking about.
Thank you, Alex.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you. Fantastic. [Applause.] Thanks.
I will certainly be the first to put on the t-shirt that says
``keep calm and embody our values.''
So ladies and gentlemen, I'd like you to get your interventions,
your questions ready from the audience, but I do want to first provoke
and push back a little bit on our speakers.
Ambassador Hill, very sobering presentation. Clearly you mentioned
a couple of times you didn't see a lot of prospect or positive movement
in a number of different areas. Your focus on the internal challenges
as the most urgent and potentially problematic is very clear and heard.
I'd like to push you to pivot a little bit to whether or not those
internal challenges actually invite external influence and potentially
allow for greater latitude for external actors to play on what is a
potentially pretty precarious situation.
I'd also like to ask you--and I think this fits with Matt's
presentation--should there be a sense of urgency in any particular
direction, contrary to this idea of keep calm and contain, broadly
speaking?
Matt, I'd like you to speak a little bit--and thank you for your
terrific overview of Russian interests, strategy and memory, frankly--
can you speak to whether Russia--and I promise not to ask you for a
prediction----
Mr. Rojansky. Right.
Mr. Tiersky. Is Russia content with current trends, the status quo?
What factors--both in Moldova, Transnistria, the other protracted
conflicts--what factors could change their calculation in this respect,
and what levers might they pull to accelerate their desired ends,
without asking you to actually be in their minds?
And then we will go to audience questions.
Please, gentlemen.
Amb. Hill. Well, thanks. No, I want to be clear that my remarks are
not a call to forget about Transnistrian settlement or other things
like that. But it's more to pay attention to the fact that for some
time the international community, specifically the U.S. and the EU,
have been doing one thing or a set of things dealing with the courts,
policing the rule of law in Moldova, and it's clearly not working. And
so there is, I believe, a need to do more and different things.
Certainly I think a more comprehensive and stricter variation of
conditionality, a more rigorous set of milestones, standards and
metrics, needs to be set.
You know, when I was head of mission in 2005, 2006, we were sending
people out to survey the behavior in the courts in Moldova. There are
very fine reports that are on the web now about the status of courts in
Moldova in the mid-2000s. And you know, this seems like it was a tree
that fell in the forest and no one did very much about it.
Certainly the theft of a billion dollars in a country with a GDP of
under $10 billion ought to be enough to get people to wake up and pay
attention. One just needs to pay attention to this. It doesn't mean
neglect the other stuff, but it should--if not a sense of urgency, at
least a sense of importance, that if this is not fixed, you are simply
going to repeat the history in different forms. You know, people will
find new and different ways to steal money and funds that are in the
country unless both the organs of law enforcement, setting economic and
enforcing economic standards, and bringing those to justice, are
reliably reformed.
And I see some hints of this in both what I see in U.S. Government
and EU discussions, but there needs to be more.
In terms of inviting perhaps people like Muscovites to fish in
troubled waters--they already are. They already were. I mean, look,
Usatii, he used to work for Russian railroads. We know where that all
comes from, and it's not a mystery.
But the point is that Moldova for years has had a Russian-speaking
population that has seen in the left-wing parties--the Communists, and
now it's transferred to the socialists, and Partidul Nostru or
[inaudible]--they see it as protection. There's 30 to 40 percent of
Moldovan population that probably speak Russian at home even though the
statistics for Ukrainian and Russian minorities are lower. You have
mixed families or just Moldovan families who learned--who spoke Russian
in Soviet times and they haven't yet changed. And you need to integrate
these people into society, and it calls for a more nuanced, more
sensitive and more balanced linguistic and nationality and minority
policies within Moldova.
The OSCE mission in Moldova has been doing yeoman work on this for
the last couple of years; others need to do more. It doesn't mean you
need to punish the Moldovans, but find a way to get authorities in the
Right Bank to see that this is the way out, this is the way to bring
the population so that simply the appeal of those who would point to
the east and say there's a better solution somewhere else will cease to
have a voting public. Right now they have a voting public which they
don't need to create. It's there, and all they need to do is point to
it. It's one of the reasons why the Communists consistently get a high
percentage--30, 40 percent or more. And these parties--they're seen by
these Moldovan minorities as a defense of their interests. And until
Moldovan society and politics changes to recognize that, it's not
always going to be easy for parties that get support from the east.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you.
Matt?
Mr. Rojansky. Yes, thanks, Alex.
So, is Russia content with the status quo, and what might change
that calculus?
I think Russia is--as a general rule, Russian political leaders of
today's type are more content with ambiguity and uncertainty and gray
than Western leaders are. So all things are relative in the world. They
thrive more in such an environment than Western leaders, who tend, in a
kind of classically, Greco-Roman, logical framework, to seek clarity.
You're sort of either in the European Acquis or you're not. You're
either in compliance with OSCE norms or you're not.
You know, I--with all deference and respect and appreciation for
what our ambassador at the OSCE has been doing since the Ukraine crisis
broke out, there's only a certain number of times I can hear Americans
repeat, like, ``Russia, you're in violation; Russia, you're in
violation.'' It's like, Yeah, right, it's a mess. You know, the whole
space is a mess, and that is an environment in which the Russians are
comfortable operating. They can get their interests done and advance in
that environment. We have much more trouble doing that. For us, that
is--it throws us way off.
That said, I think there are a few factors that might change and
sort of throw the Russians back on their heels and in that sense
provoke a Russian reaction. And I want to be very clear here: The
Russians are not always operating according to some ingenious KGB plan
that they've pulled off the shelf. They are improvising every bit as
much as we often feel like we are in this town, or Brussels is, or
Berlin.
So number one would be domestic politics. They don't necessarily
know when some issue in the domestic economy or some opposition-
produced video expose about, gee, I don't know, Medvedev's $20 billion
dacha in Ivanovo Oblast that just came out a week ago--you should watch
it; it's awesome--that that is just going to go viral and cause--you
know, they don't know this stuff.
And when that happens--when and if that happens, then there is
likely going to be some pressure to stir up something geopolitically.
It doesn't have to be in the former Soviet space, but that simply tends
to be the most convenient target. They have the most leverage. They
have the most assets. And so you could definitely see the desire for a
sort of rally-around-the-flag patriotic moment for domestic
consumption.
Two would be what happens on the ground. Local opposition actors,
accidents, unintended events like, as I said, the Odessa Trade Union
fire--but also think in terms of the folks who, during the unfolding,
the kind of slow train wreck of the Ukraine crisis--a lot of the
biggest beneficiaries were actually people that the Russians didn't
fully know existed, or at least not at high levels, sort of local thugs
in Donbass, in Kharkiv, in Odessa, whoever, who sort of saw an
opportunity. And if they make enough noise and they create enough of an
opportunity, of course Moscow's going to exploit that opportunity.
They're not stupid. We, by the way, would do the same thing if suddenly
we found someone who appeared to stand up for Western values and
promise truth, freedom, justice and the American way. Of course we'd
support that person. So I think they could be tempted in that sense to
move in that direction.
And, by the way, there's also a kind of soft linkage at work,
where, if things are going badly on other fronts, if Russia is being
pushed back in many other directions, everything is connected. And so
the notion that Russia would act out in another direction where it
feels like it has greater capabilities--as, for example, it did in
Syria, I think in direct response to being thrown back on its heels in
Ukraine.
And then, of course, there is the notion of a direct tit-for-tat
reaction something that is directly connected, even if it's asymmetric,
to something that the West does. So, for instance, we make an argument
about Russian democracy being not credible, that Russia is an
authoritarian country, et cetera. What do the Russians do? They wade
into our politics and they lay bare, for all the world to see, that our
political leaders aren't so squeaky clean either and that our system
has a lot of problems in it. This is the sort of asymmetric tit-for-
tatism. And you could definitely see that playing out.
In the post-Soviet space, and particularly in the context that Bill
described, you know, it's de rigueur. It happens every day. But you
could put more and less emphasis on it, depending on how important it
is to you.
Mr. Tiersky. Ladies and gentlemen, we're going to move into
audience questions and answers. I'll ask our panelists to try to be
brief. We are running out of time. But I'm honored to let the audience
know that we've got Mrs. Tatiana Solomon from the Embassy of Moldova
with us today. I'd like to give her an opportunity to provide any
comments she might like to make in response to the presentation that
she's heard so far. Thank you.
Mrs. Solomon. [Off mic.]
Mr. Tiersky. Sure. You're welcome.
Mrs. Solomon. This is my first time seeing--being honored to talk
in front of the great crowd of people on the Hill.
I'm really very happy to see a growing attention for my country on
Capitol Hill. And I am thankful--on behalf of the Government, I would
like to thank Ambassador Hill, Matt, and the Honorable Joe Pitts, who
left--he is the co-chair of Congressional Moldova Caucus on the House
side--and Alex for organizing this event.
This is a very timely briefing in the Helsinki Commission today.
And I don't want to miss mentioning Mark Milosch [inaudible, background
noise]--who tremendously contributed for this event to happen.
To the keynote speakers, I would like to address a special thanks
for the insightful presentation and continued interest towards the
Republic of Moldova. And we do appreciate and we will send back home
all their expectations and giving their perspectives on the crucial
topics related to the Republic of Moldova, including the struggles that
our country goes through.
Indeed, Moldova has had a troubled path since gaining its
independence in 1991. Down the road, our independence has been
questioned and challenged, and it is a good time to reflect on the
achievements and to assess our government's preferred goals for the
future of our country and the people of Moldova.
The year 2016 is a crucial year for our country. Our first
strategic priority is to anchor our country firmly in the West. To
reach that, we have embarked on an ambitious and thorough reporting
process. This is where the battle for hearts and minds is won. We want
to make sure our development model benefits all Moldovans.
It is true that the challenges for Moldova are large, and we're
facing an uphill battle. However, we want Moldova to become a
successful example of transformation, which, despite all odds, have
appeared gradually. We highly appreciate U.S. support for Moldova's
European and Western integration agenda. Implementation of the
association agreement remains a top priority for our government. And
the road map of priority reforms agreed between the EU and Moldova
serve as the main tool to mobilize efforts at national level for the
implementation of crucial reforms in key sectors.
We are determined to further implement all these remaining actions
in the road map of priority reforms until the end of this year. And on
behalf of the government, I avail myself of this opportunity to assure
the United States Congress that we have utmost interest to work well
together and work within the U.S.-Moldova Strategic Dialogue.
I certainly accept, and we do recognize that the reforms cannot be
made overnight. It takes a lot to do that, and especially due to the
country's struggles and challenges during this 25 years of
independence.
While Matt said that it might not be very huge loss to not have
Moldova stable and secure, I would like to say that a stable and
democratic Moldova, at peace with itself and its neighbors, will
contribute to regional security and global security. And reforms indeed
might be painful, but we harbor no doubt that this is the only way to
offer a better future to our country and the Moldovan people. And from
now on, Matt, I promise that we will try, while implementing the
reforms, to keep calm and carry on. [Laughter.]
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you very much. Thank you, Tatiana. [Applause.]
Ladies and gentlemen, who would like to ask a question? If you
could please identify yourselves first. I see a number of questions. So
why don't we take the two at the front first. Please, why don't we
start over here? There's no microphone; if you could just project,
please.
Questioner. My name is Benedikt Harzl. I'm the Austrian Marshall
Plan Foundation fellow at CTR SAIS. I would also like to join in
thanking the two speakers for really very thought-provoking and
interesting, wonderful keynotes.
I have two questions. As we have heard from Ambassador Hill,
Moldova today seems to be occupied with homegrown domestic economic
problems. But that makes it also possible, the way I see it, for
Transnistrian authorities on the one hand, and the Russian Federation
on the other hand, to avoid the proactive engagement in the 5+2
discussions, which is pointing to this argument.
But at the same time, it also raises the question to which extent
do Transnistrian issue and the terms of a possible power-sharing
agreement are issues to place on the agenda as a pressing issue of the
Moldovan Government. My question is, is there still a shared vision of
how such a power sharing in the future--not unitary, but unified, could
look like? That's my first question.
And the second one relates to conditionality, which also Ambassador
Hill has referred to. But one very important element that was
unfortunately not mentioned by you, but which has been so predominant,
is the association agreement. Moldova has concluded and ratified this
document, and has thereby signed up to sweeping reforms with all these
different issues--benchmarks, monitoring, conditionality. It has even
signed up to future--[inaudible]--without even being represented in the
EU institutions, which raises some issues from the point of view of
democracy. Now, my question is, would this association agreement
address your concerns in terms of meeting certain criteria and, of
course, in driving the country forward?
Thank you.
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you.
And one more here. Let's take these together.
Questioner. Hi. Thank you very much. Andrew Comstock, Georgetown
University.
I had a question for Mr. Rojansky. Specifically, I was hoping you
could clarify your position when you were speaking of these competing
narratives in Moldova, one of unification with Romania versus this
alternative to the east. And it seemed in your speech that at times you
sort of kind of flat-out said that both of these narratives were being
supported by the Russian Government or pro-Russian civil society. I was
wondering if you could clarify, because they seem to be competing
narratives--if you could clarify how that works. What is the mechanism
behind that?
Mr. Tiersky. I'd like to try to get in two more rounds of questions
in the next 10 minutes, if I could ask you to try to keep your
responses brief. Would anyone like to speak on the sweeping reforms of
the association agreement?
Amb. Hill. Well, yes. There are two things. First, the AA--it would
be wonderful if the Moldovans implemented the Acquis Communautaire. It
would have been nice if the Romanian and Bulgarian Governments would
have implemented the Acquis in 2005-2006, before they were let in,
rather than having to play catch-up afterwards.
It's understood, yes, this would help. I mean, the EU standards are
ideals that, if fully implemented, would fix many of the problems. The
problem is getting people and states to do it. And that's where one
really needs to be--you go to the website of the EU mission on Moldova
and you'll see they've taken a much sterner line more recently. Will
this help? I hope so. We have to see. It's something to look at.
And power sharing is--the question of status is still theoretically
on the table in the 5+2 talks. The problem is that neither the
Transnistrians nor the Russians pay much attention to it. They don't
need an excuse in order--let me tell you, I've dealt with this for
seven years, and they need no excuse to avoid engaging in serious
talks.
The problem for Chisinau in these circumstances, you know that the
Transnistrians would like to preserve the status quo if they can. You
know that the Russians will assist them and push them to do so. The
question is, what can you do to make yourself more attractive, more
trustworthy, more believable, so that you can break some of the
Transnistrian elites away from the Russians?
There are considerable incentives. Transnistria still does as much
trade with the EU as it does with the CIS. And if you make it
attractive for the Transnistrians to work in a Moldovan legal and
economic space, you have a real chance, because, unlike the Donbas,
Transnistria is a thousand kilometers away from Russia. But the
Moldovans need to do that. And this has been one of the consistent
failings that many Moldovan negotiators and governments have shared.
Mr. Rojansky. Benedikt, very quickly, does the association
agreement meet my concerns? No, not because it doesn't say what it
needs to say, but because, in actual fact, in proof of fact, it has not
delivered what it needs to deliver yet, which isn't to preclude that it
ever does.
The reason why, because we in the West don't understand how the
political relationships here actually work. It's all a negotiation. If
you can extract more now, and then also get more later by running a
high risk and by playing fast and loose with the deal, then that's what
you're going to do. And the problem is so far, by and large, with some
exceptions, Moldovan politicians have gotten away with that, in part
because we--that is, the West--don't have better options. I'm not
saying I know what those options are. That's the problem. I don't have
a solution for that problem.
Andrew, on narratives, it's very simple, because it's not a binary
choice. It's not greater Romania or return to the Soviet Union. There
are many very valid choices down the middle of that, including
successful reform, Moldova as a sovereign, relatively normal,
functional European country. That's just not a narrative that helps
Moscow very much. But Moscow can actually find a lot of advantages to a
narrative that says Moldova is basically selling itself out, is a neo-
fascist, Romanian, expansionist instrument or, of course, well, the
Moldovans love us because we're all, after all, at the end of the day,
the same people. Either one of those is fine, just not the stuff in the
middle.
Mr. Tiersky. All right. More questions, please? Let's take all
three at the same time, if I could. Why don't we start over here,
please?
Questioner. Hi, I'm Kathleen Weinberger from the Institute for the
Study of War.
And I was wondering if you could both give me an idea of how you
think Moldova [inaudible] NATO activity in Eastern Europe. On the one
hand we do have--[inaudible] coming up. And I do think Moldova has a
very strong inclination to, as you were talking about, pursue
[inaudible]. On the other hand, I can see how this would be construed
by [inaudible] and by different actors in Moldova. So I was wondering
if you could give me an idea of how you see this as helping or hurting
Moldovan security.
Questioner. My name's Franklin Holcomb from the Institute for the
Study of War.
I was curious if you could talk about Moldova's other significant
neighbor and the developing relationship they have with them. How has
the Moldova-Ukraine relationship changed over the past few years,
particularly in relationship to how their relationship with the United
States as well ? [inaudible]
Mr. Tiersky. Thank you. And one more.
Questioner. Isabel MacCay from American University and Senator
Sullivan's office.
My understanding, Moldova seems to have a strong reliance on Russia
and Ukraine for energy resources. And I'm curious, as far as their
economy is concerned, as Moldova's infrastructure is concerned, how
that [inaudible] and what their options are. Because, as stated
[inaudible] they want to think of themselves as a Western nation, how
that causes a conflict in their energy resources, and what options are
then out there.
Mr. Tiersky. Let me add to that already very rich slate,
Ambassador. I don't want to leave you off the hook that Matthew has put
you on, which is, what are the lessons of Moldova, Transnistria, if I'm
getting this right, for the Donbas in particular, 25 years. So if we
could fix all of this in the following six minutes. Over to you,
gentlemen.
Amb. Hill. All right. Well, let's see. Very quickly, NATO causes
big splits in Moldova. But what really causes the splits are pushing
membership. And it's simply unrealistic to push that. We've already
found that with the Bucharest summit. But what NATO likes is PFP.
I once listened to--someone spoke to then President Voronin 10
years ago about NATO expecting a diatribe from the Communists. And
Voronin started in, went on for 10 minutes about all the wonderful
things NATO was doing in his country. And these are basically PFP type,
you know, non-war fighting type, cooperative type activities. That's
the way to get NATO in there, is NATO does an awful lot with
demilitarization, with security, with disaster relief, with civil
protection, things like that. And Moldova's been an active PFP member,
and that is a way to get publicity with the population while avoiding
the really divisive issue, which is signing up for membership, which
simply isn't going to happen.
On the reliance for energy, Moldova historically has been fighting
battles with Russia because the primary source of energy has been
Russian natural gas, both directly and to run the big Moldavskaya GRES,
the electrical office located on the Ukrainian border in Transnistria.
Recently, pipelines have been finished to Romania, to bring gas in
through Ungheni, but somebody's got to find the gas for the Romanians
to buy that doesn't come from Russia in order to go in there. If
Congress clears LNG exports, it would not be proper for me to tell
Congress what to do, but, you know, things like this sit there.
There are increasingly pipelines available to get stuff in, if you
can find the sources, because the Ukrainians are no longer great fans
of Gazprom and the Russians and probably would be willing if you could
get gas from Azerbaijan, say, up to Odessa. Building pipelines would
probably be prohibitively expensive. There's one in there, but are
there other ways to do that?
On Moldova, Ukraine, the relationship has not improved as much as I
thought it would be. I mean, I'm very encouraged overall. When I read
Putin's March 18th, 2014 speech, I was really worried because I said
he's going into Ukraine and he's going after all of southern Ukraine.
And it turns out that from Odessa all the way up to Donetsk, the
Ukrainians, even if they speak Russian, seem to want to be part of
Ukraine rather than part of Russia. And that is very encouraging for
Moldova.
What I haven't seen is as much cooperation between Ukraine and
Moldova and 5+2 talks as I would have expected. And I think that's
something that both U.S. and EU political leaders might think about,
about talking both with guys in Kyiv as well as in Chisinau about why
this hasn't happened and why the change in attitude towards all of
this. It may be the Ukrainians are just afraid of having provocation,
having a problem on their southwest when they've got a real problem on
their southeast.
But when it comes to the lessons of Donbas, it was no accident that
The New York Times called me up in August of 2014 and asked me about
all of these guys that I had dealt with in the Transnistrian conflict
who now seemed to be in responsible positions in the LNR and DNR. The
playbook is well known and it's well known how it's run.
The problem is that barring a military solution there's nothing
quick you can do about this. But there is a political solution. You can
avoid letting it screw up the rest of your country. You know, Ukraine
controls, what's it, 90 percent of Ukrainian territory; Moldova
controls 90 percent of Moldovan territory. Run that territory well,
avoid falling victim to provocations as much as you can. Yes, I know,
the Russians will do all sorts of boycotts, all sorts of other things
to try to make trouble for you, but we have to look at the fact, the
positive side, the glass is more than half full, it's 90 percent full
of territory that's controlled by recognized, reliable authorities
that, if they pay attention to good governance, can create a society
that will be attractive to the folks in these separatist entities, and
the separatist enterprise will be increasingly less attractive.
I don't expect the Russians to lose gracefully on this. But if we
play our cards right, we hold the winning hand. I firmly believe that.
Mr. Rojansky. These were very good questions. I think Bill answered
the gas question.
On Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, I think I can't really speak to
relations with Romania. I can tell you that on Ukraine, what I see is
that rather than being more coordinated or just closer to each other,
Kyiv and Chisinau are just more like each other. And that's disturbing
because I actually think that the Ukrainian post-Maidan reform emphasis
is also going in the wrong direction right now. And that's not to buy
into a propaganda narrative, it's just I kind of know too much about
the guys who are running the show. And they remind me an awful lot of
the guys who have been running the show in Chisinau for the last
several years. And so that bothers me because it suggests that anything
that's possible in Ukraine is possible in Moldova as well, and vice-
versa, in a negative sense. Sorry to be a pessimist about that.
On NATO, what I find interesting about what Bill says, it's all
correct, everything Bill says is correct. The problem is the battle of
narratives. So when you say, you know, we can get NATO in there to do
all this good stuff, counterterrorism and counter-
trafficking and stability ops and human security, that's all true. The
problem is that's not at all the way Russians see it.
They would see getting NATO in there as simply the first step, as I
said, this veil for American imperialism, the idea of the next step is
we occupy the region. And the problem is not that that is actually
going to happen and they'll be proven right. The problem is that that
narrative then blocks everything else, that it is a useful enough tool
that everything else you're trying to do in the meantime, all the sort
of good, glass-half-full stuff about your sovereignty and taking
advantage of the fact that you actually do control 90 percent of your
country and so on, goes off the rails because of this narrative.
Let me answer my own question if I can, 30 seconds. After 25 years,
I see three lessons. Number one, there is not a military solution. OK?
You may want there to be one. I know that this august body has just
passed a bill that entails the possibility of lethal support for
Ukraine, and that may be a good idea, but it doesn't mean that a
military solution is there that wasn't there.
Second, that it may very well be preferable to take the path of
separate development, to sort of make the 90 percent successful and let
the 10 percent vote with its wallet or with its feet, rather than
compromising their sovereignty by doing a deal now when it's a bad
deal.
But then the third point is the problem, and that's where we get
hung up, is that your sovereignty might be compromised anyway and it
might be compromised by the continuation of the conflict in those
ambiguous conditions and by your own failure to do the things that you
would have to do, that are hard things on your own side of the line.
And if that's the lesson of 25 years of Moldova and Transnistria,
and I often get shot down when I say this to Ukrainians, then
unfortunately it doesn't lead me to be very hopeful about how we
resolve the Donbas conflict in the short term or the long term in
Ukraine.
Mr. Tiersky. No, let's stick with the winning hand that Ambassador
Hill had.
Mr. Rojansky. Yeah, yeah, I know. The diplomat, right? Half full.
Mr. Tiersky. Ladies and gentlemen, I can assure you, I can assure
the embassy that the Commission will continue to monitor developments
in and around Moldova, certainly with a view towards supporting its
sovereignty and its territorial integrity and the right of Moldova and
Moldovans to choose their own future and in support of the reforms
necessary to make that path a reality. I think as the Commission does
that, we are fortunate that these gentlemen know that we will call on
them again and frequently.
Will you please join me in thanking them for their expertise this
afternoon?
[Whereupon, at 5:34 p.m., the briefing ended.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Welcome to the Helsinki Commission's briefing on ``Moldova at the
Crossroads.''
This briefing marks the latest in a series of events held in recent
years by the Commission on challenges facing Moldova. The Commission
has worked hard to keep informed on developments there and drive U.S.
policy towards greater effectiveness.
In 2012, Congressman David Price and I established the Moldova
Caucus to act as yet another entity to augment our government's foreign
policy with respect to the Republic. This caucus helped accelerate
collaboration between Moldova's government and Members of Congress, and
it did so at a critical juncture.
As Moldova prepares for presidential elections scheduled for
October 30, the country is at a yet another crossroads. While it seeks
to overcome significant internal challenges, Moldova also remains
squarely in the crosshairs of Russian destabilization efforts intended
to maintain Moscow's influence and prevent closer relations between
Moldova and the West.
This briefing is intended to explore several issues, including:
Russia's efforts and continued threats to Moldovan
territorial integrity and sovereignty;
Russian destabilizing actions, including disinformation
campaigns, an economic blockade, and threatening rhetoric;
and the roles of the Moldovan government and external
actors, including the U.S., the EU, and the OSCE, in addressing
Moldovan vulnerabilities.
Let me emphasize that Moldova remains a key concern not only for
the Helsinki Commission but also for Congress as a whole. I was proud
to sponsor a Resolution on Moldova, House Resolution 562, passed by the
House in July of 2014. Among other things, the resolution:
Reaffirmed that it is U.S. policy to support the Republic
of Moldova's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity;
called upon the Government of Russia to withdraw its
military forces from Moldova, refrain from economic threats, and cease
supporting separatist movements;
and affirmed that lasting stability and security in
Europe is a key U.S. priority that can only be achieved if the
territorial integrity and sovereignty of all European countries is
respected.
These principles--sovereignty, territorial integrity and the like--
are the cornerstones of the Helsinki Final Act, commitments monitored
on a continuing basis by the Helsinki Commission.
Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm afraid that many of the challenges my
resolution sought to address, challenges that we have learned about
through past Commission hearings and briefings on Moldova, are
unfortunately still with us today.
Before turning the briefing over to Alex Tiersky from the Helsinki
Commission to moderate the discussion, let me close by saying a few
words about the Commission itself.
I was first appointed to serve as a member of the Helsinki
Commission in 1999. In that time, the Commission has given me a
platform to promote and defend core U.S. values and interests on issues
ranging from religious freedom in Russia to combatting child
pornography. As a Commissioner, I have traveled with fellow Members of
the House and Senate abroad to meet with our counterparts from the more
than 50 OSCE nations to ensure each country is pushed to fully uphold
its commitments, including the defense of fundamental human rights.
The Commission often draws attention to issues and countries that
are not always in the Washington, DC spotlight, but are nevertheless of
crucial importance to the United States. The subject of today's hearing
is a case in point. While Georgia and Ukraine--two countries in similar
circumstances--rightly get a lot of attention in Washington, the
Commission will continue to make sure that Moldova's challenges also
get the attention they deserve.
I'd therefore like to thank Ambassador Hill and Mr. Rojansky for
once again offering their expertise to the Helsinki Commission. It is
only through the support of exceptional individuals like our speakers
today that the Commission can ensure its work is well-informed,
relevant, and effective.
Thank you for being here.
Over to you, Alex.
[all]
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