[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING CRITICAL SECURITY MEASURES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESPONSE AT
OUR NATION'S AIRPORTS
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 26, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts................................ 5
Witnesses
Mr. Jeremy P. Martelle, President, New York Aviation Management
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Ms. Marisa Maola, Regional Director, Region One, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
For the Record
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Letter......................................................... 19
EXAMINING CRITICAL SECURITY MEASURES, COMMUNICATIONS, AND RESPONSE AT
OUR NATION'S AIRPORTS
----------
Monday, October 26, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Syracuse, NY.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:42 a.m., in
the Ceremonial Courtroom, James M. Hanley Federal Building, 100
S. Clinton Street, Syracuse, New York, Hon. John Katko
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Katko and Keating.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security, the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, will come to order.
Before I do my statement, I would like to note the fact
that I used to practice in this courtroom for about 16 years,
and it is really nice to be back here. It is important that we
are having this hearing here today. This is the closest I will
come to having a gavel in this building ever again, I think.
I do want to make a statement for the record, and I will
begin.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
security measures, communications, and response at our Nation's
airports, and I will now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
If security at our Nation's airports was flawless, there
would be no need for today's hearing. But the fact of the
matter is that our Nation's airports are far from flawless as
far as security goes.
The subcommittee is convening this field hearing today to
assess the state of security preparedness among our Nation's
airports. Today, we will hear the critically-important
perspective of the individuals who face security challenges on
the front line each and every day in New York State and
elsewhere throughout our country.
The American people expect the best from the entities
entrusted with their safety. It is this subcommittee's
intention to continue working tirelessly to ensure the security
of the traveling public. I am humbled and honored to have the
opportunity both to represent the people of central New York
and to chair this critically-important subcommittee.
In my 10 months in office, I have worked vigorously to
address known challenges that the Department of Homeland
Security faces. Since January, I have introduced 7 pieces of
legislation that address transportation and border security
issues, 2 of which are already public law.
As you can tell from this committee, security is not a
partisan issue, and I am proud of the work that I have done
with my Democratic colleagues to tackle this critically
important issue. However, my colleagues and I have a lot more
work to do, and I promise we will continue to provide diligent
oversight of homeland security. When we see a problem with this
agency, we work swiftly to address it.
Two years ago, there was a tragic shooting at Los Angeles
International Airport where Gerardo Hernandez, a Transportation
Security Officer, lost his life, and two other TSA employees
and one member of the traveling public were injured. This
shooting and other incidents force us to face the grim reality
that airports remain a target for terrorists and other violent
actors who seek to disrupt the safe travel of the American
public and challenge the security of our Nation's
transportation systems. This is of serious concern.
Last month, President Obama signed the Gerardo Hernandez
Airport Security Act of 2015 into law. I introduced this piece
of bipartisan legislation because it specifically addresses the
ways in which the airport community and the TSA prepare for,
respond to, and communicate during major security incidents,
such as active shooters.
I will note also that I had a wonderful conversation with
Gerardo Hernandez' widow after the fact, and she was very
excited that the bill was passed, and she was excited that it
honored her husband, but she was more excited to do something
about security at airports across this Nation. She is a good
woman.
From the LAX shooting to the machete attack earlier this
year on a TSA employee in New Orleans, we know that there is a
dire need for airports to effectively ready themselves for a
wide range of security scenarios.
In this regard, TSA must be proactive in proliferating best
practices for security across the airport community to ensure
the well-being of both the agency's own employees and the
traveling public.
While each airport is unique, it is imperative that airport
stakeholders, airlines, law enforcement, emergency first
responders, and TSA work together to exercise plans and improve
coordination among relevant entities.
So far, in the 114th Congress, our subcommittee has
conducted rigorous oversight of airport access controls at
airports across this country. This issue goes hand-in-hand with
the overall security of the airport environment as we work to
mitigate insider threats and close security loopholes.
Our witnesses today conduct and experience daily airport
operations and are best prepared to inform Congress as to how
they work to enhance security incident preparedness.
Long before the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Syracuse community was made all too aware of the critical need
for a secure transportation system. On December 21, 1988, a
bomb detonated aboard Pan Am Flight 103, traveling from London
to New York. Thirty-five of the bombing victims were Syracuse
University students who were traveling home for the holidays
after spending a semester studying abroad.
Another one of the individuals on board was a very good
friend of mine's sister, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of New York. His sister was a student at Oswego State
University, and she was also lost on that flight. So to say
that it has hit home is an understatement.
Since that tragic event, there has been a litany of attacks
and plots against both commercial aviation and airports. This
reality highlights the need for Congressional oversight for
each aspect of the transportation system, including the
physical security and preparedness of airports themselves.
There is an on-going discussion between the airport
community and TSA about the future of airport exit lane
staffing. As many airports begin to adopt technological
solutions, like Syracuse has, I am interested in a better
understanding of the effectiveness of such technologies and the
benefit they provide to both TSA and the airports.
I will note that Syracuse has an automated exit lane. That
means that there are no guards there, as mandated after 9/11,
because the exit lane is completely automated. We want to
examine the efficacy of trying to expand that Nation-wide,
whether that is better security than having three or four
individuals there. There is also a cost-saving measure involved
in this as well.
Additionally, airport perimeter security, which my
colleague is vitally interested in, and employee access
controls remain critical in ensuring that secure and sensitive
areas of airports are only accessed by vetted and authorized
individuals.
Today I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about
their perspectives on the security posture of our airports and
how they are working to stay ahead of a changing threat
landscape while coordinating across Federal, State, and local
jurisdictions to ensure safety of the traveling public.
Syracuse Airport is on the cutting edge of leveraging
technology to address security vulnerabilities. I look forward
to hearing how Syracuse Airport and other airports throughout
New York State are utilizing innovative tactics to enhance
security.
In closing, I urge both of our witnesses to let us know how
Congress can help you fulfill your critical missions, and I
would appreciate a very candid discussion. Don't be afraid. I
won't go into prosecutor mode, I promise, although it is
tempting in this courtroom.
I thank both of our witnesses for their time, and I
appreciate the opportunity we all have today to hear how best
practices can be shared and refined to ensure the security and
safety of our Nation's aviation system.
With that, I will now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for any statement that he may have.
I want to thank him for making the effort to come here before,
when I flew down to Washington to serve in Washington this
week.
So, Mr. Keating.
[The statement of Chairman Katko follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Katko
October 26, 2015
If security at our Nation's airports was flawless, there would be
no need for today's hearing. But the fact of the matter is that our
Nation's airport security is far from flawless.
The subcommittee is convening this field hearing today to assess
the state of security preparedness among our Nation's airports. Today,
we will hear the critically-important perspective of the individuals
who face security challenges each and every day in New York State.
The American people expect the best from the entities entrusted
with their safety. It is this subcommittee's intention to continue
working tirelessly to ensure the security of the traveling public. I am
humbled and honored to have the opportunity both to represent the
people of central New York and to chair this critically important
subcommittee.
In my 10 months in office, I have worked vigorously to address
known challenges that the Department of Homeland Security faces. Since
January, I have introduced 7 pieces of legislation that address
transportation and border security issues, 2 of which are already
public law.
Security is not a partisan issue, and I am proud of the work I have
done with my Democratic colleagues to tackle this critically-important
issue. However, my colleagues and I have a lot more work to do, and I
promise we will continue to provide diligent oversight of DHS. When I
see a problem at this agency, I work swiftly to address it.
Two years ago, there was a tragic shooting at Los Angeles
International Airport where Gerardo Hernandez, a Transportation
Security Officer, lost his life, and 2 other TSA employees and 1 member
of the traveling public were injured.
This shooting, and other incidents force us to face the grim
reality that airports remain a target for terrorists and other violent
actors who seek to disrupt the safe travel of the American public and
challenge the security of our Nation's transportation systems. This is
of serious concern.
Last month, President Obama signed the Gerardo Hernandez Airport
Security Act of 2015 into law. I introduced this critical piece of
bipartisan legislation because it specifically addresses the ways in
which the airport community and the Transportation Security
Administration prepare for, respond to, and communicate during major
security incidents, such as active shooters.
From the LAX shooting, to the machete attack earlier this year on a
TSA employee in New Orleans, we know that there is a dire need for
airports to effectively ready themselves for a wide range of security
scenarios.
In this regard, TSA must be proactive in proliferating best
practices for security across the airport community to ensure the well-
being of both the agency's own employees and the traveling public.
While each airport is unique, it is imperative that airport
stakeholders, airlines, law enforcement, emergency first responders,
and TSA work together to exercise plans and improve coordination among
relevant entities.
So far, in the 114th Congress, our subcommittee has conducted
rigorous oversight of airport access controls at airports across the
country.
This issue goes hand-in-hand with the overall security of the
airport environment, as we work to mitigate insider threats and close
security loopholes.
Our witnesses today conduct and experience daily airport operations
and are best prepared to inform Congress as to how they work to enhance
security incident preparedness.
Long before the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the Syracuse
community was made all too aware of the critical need for a secure
transportation system. On December 21, 1988, a bomb detonated aboard
Pan Am Flight 103, traveling from London to New York.
Thirty-five of the bombing's victims were Syracuse University
students, who were traveling home for the holidays after spending a
semester studying abroad.
Since that tragic event, there has been a litany of attacks and
plots against both commercial aviation and airports. This reality
highlights the need for Congressional oversight for each aspect of the
transportation system--including the physical security and preparedness
of airports themselves.
There is an on-going discussion between the airport community and
TSA about the future of airport exit lane staffing. As many airports
begin to adopt technological solutions--including Syracuse--I am
interested in a better understanding of the effectiveness of such
technologies and the benefit they provide to both TSA and airports.
Additionally, airport perimeter security and employee access
controls remain critical in ensuring that secure and sensitive areas of
airports are only accessed by vetted and authorized individuals.
Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about their
perspectives on the security posture of our airports and how they are
working to stay ahead of a changing threat landscape while coordinating
across Federal, State, and local jurisdictions to ensure safety of the
traveling public.
Syracuse Airport is on the cutting edge of leveraging technology to
address security vulnerabilities. I look forward to hearing how
Syracuse airport and other airports throughout New York State are
utilizing innovative tactics to enhance security.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
important hearing.
Thank you to our witnesses for joining us this morning.
Every week I fly between my home in Massachusetts and my
office in the District of Columbia, and I am well aware that
our airports face unique and challenging times. The personnel
do a fine job working trying to keep us safe. In fact, it
wasn't long ago that the Chairman of the full committee,
Chairman McCaul and I, did a field hearing at Logan
International Airport. That was in 2011 to discuss both
individual shared concerns expressed by airport operators,
employees and, of course, passengers. It is with this
perspective that I carefully observe the security and the
layouts of our airports as I visit them.
As I left Boston and arrived in Syracuse this morning, I
noted the differences between the two, from size to staffing.
This morning's hearing provides us with an opportunity to
continue the on-going discussion over critical security,
communications, and response at our airports outside the walls
of the committee hearing room.
Led by Chairman Katko and the subcommittee's Ranking
Member, Congressman Rice, our subcommittee has followed tragedy
and triumphs at airports from Atlanta to New York to Los
Angeles. Today we find ourselves in Syracuse, where we have an
opportunity to hear from two sides of the multi-faceted
aviation security equation.
Ms. Maola, the Regional Director of TSA Region One, and Mr.
Martelle, the president of the New York Aviation Management
Association, again, thank you for being here.
No conversation surrounding airport security can continue
without thorough discussion of the tragedy at Los Angeles
International Airport nearly 2 years ago. On November 1, 2013,
a gunman entered LAX with a semi-automatic rifle, ammunition,
and the specific intent to harm Transportation Safety Officers.
He opened fire on Transportation Security Officer Gerardo
Hernandez, who was in the action of diligently checking
passenger boarding passes and doing this important function. He
was killed in cold blood.
He then proceeded into the sterile area of the airport,
where he shot and injured 2 Transportation Security Officers,
James Speer and Tony Grigsby.
The Los Angeles Airport Police Department, along with
numerous emergency responders, acted quickly and bravely to
subdue the shooter, who injured at least 6 innocent bystanders.
If it were not for their valiant actions, further loss of life
may have been catastrophic.
If there was one silver lining in such an inexplicable
tragedy, it is the increased knowledge and understanding we
have of our threats, our vulnerabilities, as well as our
capacity to respond. In the aftermath of the LAX shooting, we
learned that there was much to be done in terms of preparedness
in response to active shooter and other emergency situations
that may arise at our Nation's airports.
Through reviews in the last Congress, for instance, we
learned that not all the panic buttons and red phones utilized
at checkpoints were functioning properly, and real challenges
existed relating to the interoperability of communications for
first responders. I cannot underscore the importance that law
enforcement agencies be able to communicate with each other,
emergency care providers, the airport, and TSA, in real time.
How else can they ensure their responses to emergency
situations are comprehensive, and how else will those entities
coordinate a response with one another?
Since the LAX shooting, we learned that other
vulnerabilities pervade aviation security efforts. Of
particular interest to me is the risk posed by the airport's
perimeter. This spring, the Associated Press revealed that
there had been at least 268 perimeter security breaches at 31
major U.S. airports, and TSA has calculated a total of over
1,300 perimeter security breaches at 450 domestic airports from
2001 to 2011. This figure includes an incident near and dear to
my heart, when Delvonte Tisdale, a teenager from North
Carolina, snuck onto the tarmac at Charlotte Douglas
International Airport and perished when an airplane on which he
was stowed away dropped its wheels for a landing. That figure
does not account for continued perimeter security breaches
since 2011, including stowaways, stowaways that trespassed
across tarmacs, scaled perimeter fences, and drove vehicles
through barriers across airport property.
As I have often said, we are lucky that these individuals
did not harbor nefarious intentions, but that doesn't mitigate
the risk posed by such behavior to airports, employees and, of
course, the passengers and travelers who rely on TSA officers
and airport operators for their security.
The LAX incident revealed yet another discrepancy in our
respect for this first line of defense. TSO Hernandez lost his
life doing his job protecting our Nation's aviation passengers.
However, as TSOs are not considered law enforcement officers
under Federal law, his family was not initially entitled to
death benefits. Through leadership on this subcommittee and our
full committee, we are able to extend those benefits to his
family through work with our appropriations in the last
Congress. But other TSOs still do not receive death benefits.
Congresswoman Brownley of California has introduced
legislation, the Honoring Our Fallen TSA Officers Act, to
rectify this discrepancy, and I hope that all will give the
measure serious consideration. I myself am proud to be a co-
sponsor of this legislation.
Further, the Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of
2015, as the Chairman mentioned, recently became public law.
Now TSA and DHS are directed to work with airports to develop
and verify individualized plans to respond to security
incidents, as well as share best practices--that is very
important--among airports.
Further, at a recent hearing with TSA Administrator
Neffenger, I confirmed that TSA is currently conducting a top-
to-bottom review of our Nation's airport security needs. I look
forward to hearing from Ms. Maola about how the Gerardo
Hernandez Airport Security Act and comprehensive internal
review will make airports more secure and better-prepared for
emergency situations in the future. I also look forward to the
testimony of Jeremy Martelle of the New York Aviation
Management Association regarding changes to security plans and
sharing of best practices amongst New York airports.
It is our shared responsibility to mitigate, if not
prevent, tragic shootings like at LAX, or perimeter breaches
like those in San Jose, San Francisco, and Charlotte from
occurring in the future. I want to reiterate the importance of
the work done by the Transportation Security Officers. They are
working on the front lines every day to keep us safe.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing,
and I look forward to a productive dialogue, and I yield back
the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I want to note that Mr. Keating has been at the forefront
of arguing about beefing up firmer security at airports Nation-
wide, and his work in that area is much appreciated. His work
on the committee with me and the other colleagues is much
appreciated as well.
We are pleased to have two distinguished witnesses before
us today to speak on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in
the record.
Our first witness is Mr. Jeremy Martelle, who serves as
president of New York State Aviation Management Association.
Mr. Martelle has over 24 years of aviation experience in both
civil and military aviation operations. Mr. Martelle served as
the Security and Operations Manager at Albany International
Airport and served in the New York International Guard as a
member of the 109th Airlift Wing.
We thank you for your military service, and I say that as a
father whose son is just embarking on the beginning of his
military service.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Martelle to testify. But
before I do, I want to note for the record that Mr. Martelle
was a last-minute substitution. We very much appreciate him
dropping everything to come here. He was not notified until
Thursday evening of the substitution.
The substitution came about due to the fact that we had
originally scheduled Christine Callahan from the Syracuse
Airport to testify to shed light on some of the good things
that are going on in Syracuse Airport and to learn from some of
those good things. We got word from the mayor's office that she
was not allowed to testify, apparently for some litigation
reasons, so we appreciate Mr. Martelle for stepping in when he
did.
So, thank you very much, Mr. Martelle. Your testimony,
please.
STATEMENT OF JEREMY P. MARTELLE, PRESIDENT, NEW YORK AVIATION
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Martelle. Thank you. Good morning, Ranking Member
Keating and Chairman Katko. On behalf of the New York State
public and private-use airports, I would like to thank you for
inviting me to participate in today's field hearing on
examining critical security measures, communications, and
responses at our Nation's airports.
The New York Aviation Management Association's--referred to
as NYAMA--mission is to promote the viability and business
interests of New York State's airports. NYAMA represents over
13,000 members and affiliate members, 120 commercial service
and general aviation airports, fixed-base operators,
consultants, engineers, and aviation professionals at the State
and regional levels.
Airports are economic engines fueling growth in the
communities they serve. According to a 2010 study by the New
York State Department of Transportation, the aviation industry
contributes over $50 billion in annual economic activity in New
York State, and almost 400,000 State residents work in aviation
or aviation-related industries.
The economic benefits of New York State airports are
impressive. As a whole, aviation generates $18 billion in
payroll and $4.5 billion in State and local tax revenue
annually. However, the efficacy of this powerful economic
engine and its benefits to New York's citizens is threatened by
a critical lack of funding for our airports and their security
programs.
Airport security is an essential function of how airports
operate. The TSA and airport staff process millions of
passengers, thousands of airport employees, and tons of air
cargo safely and efficiently all year round. This is done
primarily through the cooperation of private business such as
the airlines, vendors, concessions, air cargo operators, and
the other agencies such as the airport operators, TSA, and
local law enforcement. It is because of this cooperation that
our airports are some of the safest in the world.
The TSA serves a 2-part role in airport security. First,
they are responsible for the screening of passengers and their
belongings. Second, they are the regulatory authority over all
other airport security functions. The airport operator must
develop and maintain an Airport Security Program in accordance
with Code of Federal Regulations Part 1542. This program
describes the means in which airports will carry out security
functions such as employee credentialing, fingerprinting,
criminal history background checks, security training, fence
line perimeter security, airport terminal access control
systems, camera systems, and vehicle checkpoint inspections. In
addition, airports are required to provide law enforcement
services to support their ASP and the TSA passenger checkpoint.
All of these functions come at a high expense which the airport
must bear with little or no Federal funding.
Airports are considered high-value targets for those who
wish to do us harm. The latest challenge in the battle to
secure our Nation's airports is to identify and eliminate what
is referred to as the ``airport employee insider threat.'' One
way our airports are addressing this is through the TSA's
newly-created My Airport Initiative, which is an awareness
program designed to target airport employees and instruct them
on the appropriate actions to take if they observe any
employees acting in a suspicious manner. The program was
initially launched with a short 5-minute video clip explaining
the initiative, and the TSA is encouraging airports to promote
this new campaign directed at the insider threat.
One of NYAMA'S member airports decided to incorporate the
TSA's My Airport into its security training classes to teach
employees how to identify and report these insider threats.
This airport has also teamed with local law enforcement and has
created an informational poster that has been placed in the
work areas of airport employees. These posters encourage
employees to report any suspicious behavior anonymously to
airport security. This effort shows how airports, local law
enforcement, and the TSA can work together to increase
awareness concerning airport security threats and take steps to
mitigate these potential problems before they happen.
NYAMA strongly supports active-shooter planning and
training. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, one of
our members, operates six metropolitan New York airports. When
I inquired about their active-shooter program, they stated that
their airports' law enforcement officers have partnered with
TSA and other first responders to hold drills at each of their
airports. They also use TSA and Homeland Security videos to
train airport staff in recommended procedures for active-
shooter incidents--run, hide, fight, et cetera. The Port
Authority's Assistant Director of Aviation Security and
Technology indicated that the TSA's resources are very limited
for training and educational aids like posters or handouts on
active shooters. They have posters on their website that
airports can reproduce at their own expense, and the Port
Authority has, in fact, spent its own funds for this purpose.
In recent years the TSA has engaged airports, requiring
them to increase the airports' participation in security
screening airport employees and products entering the sterile
and secured areas of the airport. Currently, airports are
required to conduct random and cursory inspections on all
employees. The TSA has begun to ask if airports are willing to
do more, much more. This increase has overloaded airports,
which are generally funded through Federal and State grants.
Adding more duties is a difficult task to accomplish. There
could be a point in the future where the screening of all
employees and products entering all sterile and secured areas
of the airport will become a requirement. This will place a
demand on the staffing and facilities like no other. Before
such a mandate could be initiated, Federal funding assistance
would need to be available to reimburse airports for these
costs.
The funding of airport security improvements for equipment
and facilities has always been a challenge for airports.
Shortly after the end of World War II, the Federal Government
embarked on a grants-in-aid program to units of State and local
governments to promote the development of a system of airports
to meet the Nation's needs. This program, known as the Federal
Aid Airport Program, was authorized by the Federal Airport Act
of 1946 and received its funding from the general fund of the
U.S. Treasury. Since then, this program has been amended
several times, most recently with the passage of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Funds obligated for the
Airport Improvement Program are drawn upon from the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund, which is supported by user fees, fuel taxes,
and other similar revenue sources.
A lot of things have changed since 1946. The aging
infrastructure of today's airports have required the allocation
of a large majority of airport funding to go directly to
immediate safety needs such as those associated with runways,
taxiways, safety areas, and aircraft parking aprons. Airport
security, while just as important, in many cases takes second
place to these highly visible safety improvement projects. One
way to combat this would be to create a dedicated funding
stream, similar to the current FAA Airport Improvement Program,
in order to assist airports in funding security improvements or
TSA mandates. This could be accomplished through carving out
special funding sources through the passenger facility charge
program or the security fee charges through airline ticket
purchases.
To give some perspective on the significant costs
associated with airport security improvements, I would like to
provide the following local example. In May 2013, the Syracuse
Hancock International Airport completed construction on a
passenger terminal security and access improvements project.
This $60 million project, which is currently being paid for
through the collection of passenger facility charges, was
designed to bring both the physical screening of passengers and
baggage in alignment with current-day security requirements,
and it also allowed for the expansion and implementation of
future screening requirements. The new centralized security
checkpoint has improved passenger and baggage screening at
several levels: New security screening equipment, including
advanced baggage imaging technology; implementation of TSA
PreCheck; improved customer service by consolidating TSA
resources into one centralized location; and the ability to
implement new security requirements, such as the requirement to
screen all concession employees.
While programs like this are not typical, extensive
financial resources had to be obligated in order for this
project to occur, and most airports would see other critical
projects go unfunded as a result of such a reprioritization of
resources. In the mean time, for the next several years a
portion of the airport's PFC funds will have to go to paying
for this required project rather than addressing other needs.
Having a National program that could prioritize these needs,
similar to the AIP program, with oversight and ranking by
priority, might give airports more flexibility to focus on
operational needs.
Technology in airport security has its own set of
challenges. Just like your home computer and other personal
electronic equipment, airport security technology has a limited
life span. This technological obsolescence, where a product is
no longer technologically superior to another similar product,
requires airports to be constantly planning for the next major
upgrade or replacement of these very important systems.
For example, access control from the public areas to the
secure areas of most airports is strictly managed through the
use of a computer-controlled access system using a card reader
and personal identification number. These systems have the
capability to enable and disable their own security badges if
they are stolen or the employee leaves airport employment. All
access can be immediately revoked.
The second layer of this system is the closed-circuit
television system, which is an integral part of every airport's
security program. Both of these types of systems have improved
substantially over the course of the past decade.
Unfortunately, the costs associated with keeping the technology
on the cutting edge, and in some cases keeping them
functioning, takes significant operational and capital
investment.
Another technological advancement that Syracuse Airport is
using is referred to as the automated exit portals. Following
completion of the centralized security checkpoint, the airport
reconfigured the previous checkpoints at each concourse as the
exits for passengers leaving the secure area. The airport then
installed automated exit portals at these locations. The
automated exit portals allow passengers and employees to exit
the secure area safely, while at the same time preventing
people from accessing the secured area. The portals provide a
positive barrier to security breaches by preventing people and
things from entering or accessing the secure area from a non-
secure area.
In addition to the safety and security benefits of the exit
portals, the cost savings are such that the portals have paid
for themselves. Because the exit portals are automated, the
airport is no longer required to physically monitor the exit
lanes, thus eliminating the human error element. In addition to
Syracuse, the exit portals are also located at the airports in
Atlantic City, St. Petersburg/Clearwater, and installation is
scheduled to begin this November at JFK.
The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act. Individual
incidents and detection of new security threats at airports
will many times result in increased scrutiny of and mandates on
airports on the part of the TSA. Sometimes events lead to
Congressional actions. The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security
Act represents one such response by Congress that seeks to
improve security incident preparedness by directing TSA to
verify that airports across the United States have incorporated
procedures for responding to active shooters targeting security
checkpoints into their existing incident plans.
Additionally, the legislation directs the administrator of
TSA to report to the appropriate Congressional committees
findings regarding the levels of preparedness at airports. The
new Federal law also requires that the agency certify to the
appropriate Congressional committees that all screening
personnel have participated in training for active-shooter
scenarios. Another feature of the legislation requires TSA to
conduct a review of the interoperable communications
capabilities of law enforcement and TSA to conduct a review of
these communications.
These are all important tasks, and it is appropriate in
most cases that Congress exercise oversight over TSA and
airport security efforts. Compliance by both TSA and airports
with these mandates will necessitate cooperation and
coordination among all stakeholders and recognition that new
rules and requirements for new technologies will impose
additional costs on an already financially-burdened airport
system.
NYAMA is well-positioned to actively participate in this
process and represent New York's airports and related
industries in this effort to make the Nation's aviation
facilities the safest and most secure in the world against
hostile threats. We stand ready to assist you, the Congress,
and the TSA in this important endeavor as we go forward.
I am available to answer any questions you may have. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martelle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeremy P. Martelle
October 26, 2015
Good morning Ranking Member Keating and Chairman Katko. On behalf
of New York State's public and private-use airports, I would like to
thank you for inviting me to participate in today's field hearing on
Examining Critical Security Measures, Communications, and Responses at
Our Nation's Airports. NYAMA's mission is to promote the viability and
business interests of New York State's airports. NYAMA represents over
13,000 members and affiliate members, 120 commercial service and
general aviation airports, fixed-based operators, consultants,
engineers, and aviation professionals at the State and regional levels.
Airports are economic engines fueling growth in the communities
they serve. According to a 2010 study by the New York State Department
of Transportation, the aviation industry contributes over $50 billion
in annual economic activity in New York State and almost 400,000 State
residents work in aviation or aviation-related industries. The economic
benefits of New York State airports are impressive. As a whole,
aviation generates $18 billion in payroll and $4.5 billion in State and
local tax revenue annually. However, the efficacy of this powerful
economic engine and its benefits to New York's citizens is threatened
by a critical funding for our airports security programs.
Airport security is an essential function of the how airports
operate. The TSA and airport staff process millions of passengers,
thousands of airport employees, and tons of air cargo safely and
efficiently all year round. This is done primarily through the
cooperation of private business such as the airlines, vendors,
concessions, air cargo operators, and the other agencies such as the
airport operators, TSA, and local law enforcement. It is because of
this cooperation, that our airports are some of the safest in the
world.
airport security
The TSA serves a two-part role in airport security. First, they are
responsible for the screening operation of passengers and their
belongings. Second, they are the regulatory authority over all other
airport security functions. The airport operator must develop and
maintain and Airport Security Program (ASP) in accordance with CFR Part
1542. This program describes the means in which airports will carry out
security functions such as; employee credentialing, fingerprinting,
criminal history background checks, security training, fence line
perimeter security, airport terminal access control systems, camera
systems, vehicle checkpoint inspections. In addition, airports are
required to a provide law enforcement entity to support their ASP and
the TSA passenger checkpoint. All of these functions come at a high
expense which the airport must bear with little or no Federal funding.
Airports are considered ``high-value targets'' for those who wish
to do us harm. The latest challenge in the battle to secure our
Nation's airports is to identify and eliminate what is referred to as
the ``airport employee insider threat''. One way our airports is
addressing this is through the TSA's newly-created ``My Airport
Initiative'' which is an awareness program designed to target airport
employees and instruct them of the appropriate actions to take if they
observe any employees acting in a suspicious manner. The program was
initially launched with a short 5-minute video clip explaining the
initiative and the TSA is encouraging airports to promote this new
campaign directed at the insider threat.
One of NYAMA'S member airports decided to incorporate the TSA's
``My Airport'' into its security training classes to teach employees
how to identify and report these insider threats. This airport has also
teamed with local law enforcement which has created informational
posters that have been put up in the work areas of airport employees.
These posters encourage employees to report any suspicious behavior
anonymously to airport operations. This effort shows how airports,
local law enforcement, and the TSA can work together to increase
awareness about airport security threats and take steps to mitigate
these potential problems before they happen.
NYAMA strongly supports active-shooter planning and training. The
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, one of our members, operates
six metropolitan New York airports. When I inquired about their active-
shooter program, they stated that their airports' law enforcement
officers have partnered with TSA and other first responders to hold
drills at each of their airports. They also use TSA/Homeland Security
videos to train airport staff in recommended procedures for active-
shooter incidents--run, hide, fight, etc. The Port Authority's
Assistant Director of Aviation Security and Technology indicated that
the TSA's resources are very limited for training and educational aids
like posters or handouts on active shooter. They have posters on their
website that airports can reproduce at their own expense and the Port
Authority has in fact spent its own funds for this purpose.
In recent years the TSA has engaged airports requiring them to
increase the airport's participation in screening airport employees and
products entering the sterile and secured areas of the airport.
Currently, airports are required to conduct random and cursory
inspections on all employees. The TSA has begun to ask if airports are
willing to do more, much more. This increase has overloaded airports
which are generally funded through Federal and State grants. Adding
more duties is a difficult task to accomplish. There could be a point
in the future where the screening of all employees and products
entering all sterile and secured areas of the airport will become a
requirement. This will place a demand on the staffing and facilities
like no other. Before such a mandate could be initiated, Federal
funding assistance would need to be available to reimburse airports for
these costs.
airport security funding
The funding of airport security improvements for equipment and
facilities has always been a challenge for airports. Shortly after the
end of World War II, the Federal Government embarked on a grants-in-aid
program to units of State and local governments to promote the
development of a system of airports to meet the Nation's needs. This
program known as the Federal-Aid Airport Program (FAAP) was authorized
by the Federal Airport Act of 1946 and received its funding from the
general fund of the U.S. Treasury. Since then, this program has been
amended several times, most recently with the passage of the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Funds obligated for the AIP are
drawn from the Airport and Airway Trust fund, which is supported by
user fees, fuel taxes, and other similar revenue sources.
A lot of things have changed since 1946. The aging infrastructure
of today's airports have required the allocation of a large majority of
airport funding to go directly to immediate safety needs such as those
associated with runways, taxiways, safety areas, aircraft parking
areas, etc. Airport security, while just as important, in many cases
takes second place to these very visible safety improvement projects.
One way to combat this would be to create a dedicated funding stream,
similar to the current AIP in order to assist airports in funding
security improvements or TSA mandates. This could be accomplished
through carving out special funding sources through the passenger
facility charge program or the security fee charges through airline
ticket purchases.
To give some perspective on the significant costs associated with
security improvements, I would like to provide the following example.
In May of 2013, right here in the Syracuse Hancock International
Airport completed construction on a passenger terminal security and
access improvements project. This $60 million project, which is
currently being paid for through the collection of passenger facility
charges, was designed to bring both the physical screening of
passengers and baggage in alignment with current-day security
requirements, and it also allowed for expansion and implementation of
future screening requirements. The new centralized security checkpoint
has improved passenger and baggage screening at several levels; new
screening equipment including advanced imaging technology,
implementation of TSA Pre-Check; improved customer service by
consolidating TSA resources into one centralized location; and the
ability to implement new security requirements, such as the requirement
to screen all concession employees.
While programs like this are not typical, extensive financial
resources had to be obligated in order for this project to occur and
most airports would see other critical projects go unfunded as a result
of such a reprioritization of resources. In the mean time, for the next
several years a portion of the airport's PFC funds will have to go to
paying for this required project rather than addressing other needs.
Having a National program that could prioritize these needs similar to
the AIP program with oversight and ranking by priority might give
airports more flexibility to focus on operational needs.
airport security and technology
Technology in airport security has its own set of challenges. Just
like your home computer and other personal electronic equipment,
airport security technology has a limited life span. This technological
obsolescence where a product is no longer technically superior to
another similar product requires airports to be constantly planning for
the next major upgrade or replacement of these very important systems.
For example, access control from the public area to the secure
areas of most airports is strictly managed through the use of a
computer-controlled access system using a card reader and personal
identification number. These systems have the capability to enable and
disable all automated controlled access points on all card readers/
security badges. If an employee loses their security badge, it is
stolen, or the employee leaves airport employment, all access can be
immediately revoked. The second layer of this system is the closed-
circuit television system which is an integral part of every airports
security program. The airport, local law enforcement, and TSA, have the
ability to reduce the number of access control doors employees are
permitted to use which ensures greater control over who can access the
secure area and from which access point.
Both of these types of systems have improved substantially over the
course of the past decade. Unfortunately, the costs associated with
keeping the technology on the cutting edge, and in some cases, keeping
them functioning, takes significant operational and capital investment.
Another technological advancement that Syracuse Airport is using
are referred to as the automated exit portals. Following completion of
the centralized security checkpoint, the airport reconfigured the
previous checkpoints at each concourse as the exits for passengers
leaving the secure area. The airport then installed automated exit
portals at these locations. The automated exit portals allow passengers
and employees to exit the secure area safely, while at the same time
preventing people from accessing the secured area. The portals provide
a positive barrier to security breaches by preventing people and things
from entering or accessing the secure area from a non-secure area. In
addition to the safety and security benefits of the exit portals, the
cost savings are such that the portals have paid for themselves.
Because the exit portals are automated, the airport is no longer
required to physically monitor the exit lanes, thus eliminating the
human error element. In addition to Syracuse, the exit portals are also
located at the airports in Atlantic City, St. Petersburg/Clearwater,
and installation is scheduled to begin this November at JFK.
the ``gerardo hernandez airport security act''
Individual incidents and detection of new security threats at
airports will many times result in increased scrutiny of and mandates
on airports on the part of the TSA. Sometimes events lead to
Congressional actions. The Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act
represents one such response by Congress that seeks to improve security
incident preparedness by directing TSA to verify that airports across
the United States have incorporated procedures for responding to active
shooters targeting security checkpoints into their existing incident
plans.
Additionally, the legislation directs the administrator of TSA to
report to the appropriate Congressional committees findings regarding
the levels of preparedness at airports. The new Federal law also
requires that the agency certify to the appropriate Congressional
committees that all screening personnel have participated in training
for active-shooter scenarios. Another feature of the legislation
requires TSA to conduct a review of the interoperable communications
capabilities of the law enforcement, fire, and medical personnel
responsible for responding to a security incident at airports in the
United States.
These are all important tasks and it is appropriate in most cases
that Congress exercise oversight over TSA and airport security efforts.
Compliance by both TSA and airports with these mandates will
necessitate cooperation and coordination among all stakeholders and
recognition that new rules and requirements for new technologies will
impose additional costs on already financially-burdened airports.
NYAMA is well-positioned to actively participate in this process
and represent New York's airports and related industries in this effort
to make the Nation's aviation facilities the safest and most secure in
the world against hostile threats. We stand ready to assist you, the
Congress and the TSA in this important endeavor as we go forward.
I'm available to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much, Mr. Martelle. We appreciate
you being here today, and we appreciate your testimony.
The second witness is Ms. Marisa Maola.
Did I say that correctly?
Ms. Maola. Yes, sir.
Mr. Katko. Okay.
She currently serves as the regional director of Region One
at the Transportation Security Administration, including New
York, New Jersey, Delaware, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Maine. Ms. Maola has
served in this post since January 2012.
In addition, Ms. Maola currently serves as the Federal
Security Director at JFK International Airport. I am interested
in hearing about the exit lane issue there as well. Previously,
Ms. Maola served as a Federal Security Director at LaGuardia
International Airport.
I am going to recognize you to testify, and I want to ask
you, if you can, to try to keep it as close to 5 minutes as you
can and just summarize your testimony. We will have plenty of
time to get into the details as we go on. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MARISA MAOLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, REGION ONE,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Maola. Yes. Good morning, Chairman Katko and
Congressman Keating. I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss airport security operations.
Providing security for the traveling public and workplace
safety for the Transportation Security Administration workforce
are our highest priorities.
On November 1, 2013, Transportation Security Officer
Gerardo Hernandez was shot and killed at his post at Los
Angeles International Airport. Officer Hernandez had worked for
the TSA since 2010 and left behind a wife and 2 children.
Behavioral Detection Officer Tony Grigsby, Security Training
Instructor James Speer, and a passenger were also wounded in
the shooting.
On March 21, 2015, Supervisory TSO Carol Richel was
attacked by an assailant with a machete at the Louis Armstrong
New Orleans International Airport. Officer Richel was grazed by
a bullet as a Jefferson Parrish Sheriff's deputy fired shots
during the attack. The assailant also sprayed wasp repellent at
three other TSA officers.
While our officers showed bravery and commitment in the
face of great tragedy, these incidents demonstrate an alarming
trend of lone-wolf individuals bent on harming our Nation's
transportation system and our TSA workforce.
Following the events at LAX, then-Administrator John
Pistole convened a working group to address vulnerabilities
highlighted during the incident. The group included
representatives from law enforcement agencies and associations,
labor groups and industry associations, TSA employees, and
other Federal, State, and local agencies. Out of these
discussions, TSA conducted a National review focused on
training and communications, emergency response equipment and
technology, and law enforcement officer presence at checkpoints
and response to emergencies. I would like to address each of
these issues.
The Los Angeles and New Orleans incidents raised concerns
about the adequacy of training for TSA employees responding to
emergency scenarios such as an active shooter. Following the
review, TSA made active-shooter training mandatory for our
workforce on an annual basis and created our own training
videos specifically focused on the airport environment. We also
regularly conduct mandatory emergency response training, table-
top exercises, and evacuation drills for our TSA personnel at
airports, along with our airport law enforcement partners.
Through daily shift briefings and internal communications, we
have made officer safety a reoccurring theme of TSA's
communication to our front-line employees, engaging our
officers on the importance of remaining vigilant and alert,
reinforcing access control measures, and reporting suspicious
activity.
Regarding emergency response equipment and technology, our
review indicated that many airports needed improvements to
their alert notification systems, such as ensuring that duress
alarms are present at all screening locations. In response, TSA
procured 5,500 additional duress alarms. We also conducted a
survey and found that 98 percent of the existing alarms were
fully functional. We took corrective action to fix the
remaining alarms, and TSA employees are now required to conduct
weekly tests on the alert systems.
As part of our review, TSA also studied law enforcement
presence at airports. TSA requires all airports to either post
a law enforcement officer at the screening checkpoint or
incorporate maximum law enforcement response times in their
airport security plan or ASP. TSA conducted a thorough review
of all ASPs to ensure these requirements were appropriately
documented. These response times can vary by airport to ensure
they are both practical and appropriate, as we recognize the
importance of allowing discretion in these determinations.
However, ensuring that all airports adopt clearly-articulated
maximum response times in their ASP is critical.
TSA continues to monitor and enforce airport compliance
with the response times defined in their respective ASPs.
Additionally, TSA has issued recommended standards for
increased law enforcement presence during peak travel times at
checkpoints and high-traffic lobby areas such as ticket
counters to provide visible deterrence and faster response
times. We support this effort through a partial reimbursement
agreement program that assists airports toward payment of
dedicated law enforcement officers working in and around the
passenger screening checkpoints during operational hours. We
have strongly encouraged airports to adopt these measures.
The tragic shooting of Officer Hernandez and the attack on
Officer Richel were horrifying and heart-rending. TSA has taken
a series of positive steps to prevent such tragedies from
occurring again. I want to thank the subcommittee for your
support as we seek additional ways to improve officer safety
and security and airport security generally. TSA greatly
appreciates the support of Congress in these endeavors and we
value the committee's direction through the Gerardo Hernandez
Airport Security Act of 2015, which codifies many of the
lessons we learned in our after-action report following the LAX
shooting and enables us to continue that work.
TSA has been coordinating extensively with the aviation and
surface transportation stakeholders on active-shooter drills,
emergency response planning and training, and we look forward
to that continued effort.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Maola follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marisa Maola
October 26, 2016
Good morning Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, and other Members
of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today.
On November 1, 2013, Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Gerardo
Hernandez was shot and killed at his post at a Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) checkpoint. Officer Hernandez had worked for TSA since 2010 and
leaves behind a wife and two children. Behavior Detection Officer (BDO)
Tony Grigsby, Security Training Instructor (STI) James Speer, and a
passenger were also wounded in the shooting.
On March 21, 2015, Supervisory TSO Carol Richel was attacked by an
assailant with a machete at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans
International Airport (MSY). Officer Richel was grazed by a bullet as a
Jefferson Parrish Sheriff's deputy fired shots during the attack. The
assailant also sprayed wasp repellent at three other TSA officers.
While our officers showed bravery and commitment in the face of
great tragedy, these incidents demonstrate an alarming trend of
continued and persistent threat of ``lone wolf'' individuals bent on
harming our Nation's transportation systems and its workforce.
lessons learned and follow-up actions
Following the events at LAX, then-Administrator Pistole convened a
working group to address vulnerabilities highlighted during the
incident. The group included representatives from law enforcement
agencies and associations, labor groups and industry associations, TSA
employees, and other Federal, State, and local agencies. Out of these
discussions, TSA conducted a National review focusing on the following
areas: Training and communications; emergency response equipment and
technology; and law enforcement officer (LEO) presence at checkpoints
and response to emergencies.
Training and Communications
The Los Angeles and New Orleans incidents raised concerns about the
adequacy of training for TSA employees responding to emergency
scenarios such as an active shooter. Historically, active-shooter
training had not been a primary focus, but was available to employees
through two optional on-line courses. As of March 31, 2014, all TSA
employees have completed this training, which is now mandatory for our
workforce on an annual basis. At the time of the attack at LAX, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) had its own active-shooter
training video, which was shared immediately with TSA employees. TSA
then created its own training video, specifically focused on the
airport environment. This new airport-specific video is shared with all
TSA employees. We also regularly conduct mandatory emergency response
training and exercises for TSA personnel at airports, and with our
airport and law enforcement partners to ensure seamless coordination
and preparation in the event of an emergency situation.
TSA also requires all worksites to develop and implement active-
shooter tactical response plans to include the designation of
evacuation routes and establishment of rendezvous points. In March
2014, TSA issued an Operations Directive requiring that all TSA Federal
Security Directors (FSDs) at airports conduct mandatory evacuation
drills twice a year. In addition, TSA recommends that airport operators
conduct active-shooter training and exercises twice per year. In the
case of New Orleans, an active-shooter scenario drill was conducted not
long before the attack, and included multiple airport stakeholders such
as the St. Charles Parish Sheriff's Office, the airport Fire
Department, and airport management.
TSA participates in annual tabletop exercises/briefing for disaster
response every May. These exercises facilitate the coordination among
TSA, the airport, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and State
and local law enforcement first responders. Many airports are also
going above and beyond by conducting training and exercises dealing
with scenarios such as hostage situations and vehicle-borne improvised
explosive devices. TSA's tactical response plans detail actions
required by field personnel in response to natural or man-made threats.
In addition to the annual active-shooter requirement, local TSA
leadership coordinates tactical response exercises on such scenarios as
security checkpoint breach, air piracy, and natural disaster response.
Officer safety has been a recurring theme in TSA's communications
to front-line employees. Through daily shift briefings and internal
communications, we continue to engage our officers on the importance of
remaining vigilant and alert. Other actions taken include:
Requiring all TSA devices to be programmed with alternate
airport emergency phone numbers;
Encouraging field employees to program their personal phones
with airport emergency phone numbers; and
Highlighting the active-shooter threat with a focus on
reinforcing secure area access control measures, challenging
individuals without proper identification in secure areas,
maintaining good situational awareness, and reporting any
suspicious activity.
Emergency Response Equipment and Technology
The National review following the LAX shooting indicated that many
airports needed improvements to their alert notification systems, such
as ensuring that duress alarms are present at all screening locations,
including at terminal lobbies. TSA conducted a survey of screening and
other locations and found that several of these locations did not have
alert notification capability. In response, TSA procured 5,500
additional duress alarms for critical locations where our officers
perform security screening operations. We also conducted a survey of
all existing duress alarms to determine if they were fully functional.
Ninety-eight percent of the existing alarms were deemed fully
functional, and we took corrective action to fix the remaining alarms.
TSA employees are now required to conduct weekly tests with our airport
partners to test the alert notification systems.
Law Enforcement Officer Presence Response to Emergencies
In accordance with a pre-existing Security Directive, TSA requires
all airports to either post a law enforcement office (LEO) at the
screening checkpoint or incorporate maximum LEO response times in their
Airport Security Programs (ASPs). Following the LAX incident, TSA
conducted a thorough review of all ASPs to ensure that these
requirements were appropriately documented. These response times can
vary by airport to ensure they are both practical and appropriate, as
we recognize the importance of allowing discretion in these
determinations. However, ensuring that all airports adopt clearly-
articulated maximum response times in their ASP is critical. TSA
continues to monitor and enforce airports' compliance with the response
times defined in their respective ASPs, as well as additional
requirements to maintain sections in their ASPs for contingency
planning and incident management.
Additionally, TSA has issued recommended standards for increased
law enforcement presence during peak travel times at checkpoints and
high-traffic lobby areas such as ticket counters to provide visible
deterrence and faster response times, and supports this effort through
a partial reimbursement agreement program that assists airports with
payment towards dedicated law enforcement officers working in and
around the passenger screening checkpoints during operational hours. We
have strongly encouraged airports to adopt these measures. In the wake
of the LAX attacks, TSA increased the percentage of Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response (VIPR) deployments conducted in commercial
aviation locations--a measure that remains in place today. TSA's VIPR
teams include Federal Air Marshals (TSA's law enforcement element), and
VIPR operations are planned in cooperation with State, local, and/or
Federal law enforcement organizations and transportation stakeholders.
TSA maintains 101 Assistant Federal Security Directors for Law
Enforcement (AFSD-LE) at 275 airports across the Nation. The primary
duty of each AFSD-LE is to establish and maintain liaison relationships
with local, State, and Federal law enforcement authorities on behalf of
TSA. An organized and structured liaison program is a critical
component to the overall transportation security mission, including the
law enforcement response strategy for incidents. The liaison
relationships with local, State, and Federal law enforcement
organizations ensure that the AFSD-LE has constant contact with these
partners, enabling a coordinated response to incidents.
the gerardo hernandez airport security act of 2015 (pub. l. 114-50)
TSA greatly appreciates the support of Congress in these
endeavors--from the subcommittee's hearings on LAX lessons learned in
the last Congress, to visiting LAX and meeting with Officer Hernandez's
widow, your Members have been great partners in reducing the likelihood
that situations like the LAX shooting or New Orleans attack will be
repeated. TSA also values the committee's direction through the Gerardo
Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-50), which requires
us to conduct a series of reviews and outreach measures aimed at
improving security incident response, including outreach to airports
and high-risk surface transportation stakeholders to verify they have
plans in place to address security incidents. This law codifies many of
the lessons we learned in our after-action report following the LAX
shooting, and enables us to continue that work. TSA has been
coordinating extensively with aviation and surface stakeholders on
active-shooter drills, emergency response planning, and training, and
we look forward to continuing that effort.
conclusion
The tragic shooting of Officer Hernandez and attack of Officer
Carol Richel were horrifying and heart-rending. TSA has taken a series
of positive steps to prevent such tragedies from occurring again. I
want to thank the subcommittee for your support as we seek additional
ways to improve officer safety and security, and airport security
generally.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Maola.
I ask unanimous consent to insert a letter I have sent to
Administrator Neffenger for the Transportation Security
Administration into the record. The letter focuses on defensive
tactic training, and I just want to enter it into the record at
this time. In part, it is about defensive tactic training for
Transportation Security Officers at airports Nation-wide, and
without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Chairman Katko to Peter Neffenger
October 26, 2015.
The Honorable Peter Neffenger,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 601 12th Street, South Arlington,
Virginia 22202.
Dear Administrator Neffenger: I write to inquire about defensive
tactics training curricula employed by the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA). This November will mark the two-year anniversary
of the tragic acts of violence carried out against three TSA employees
and one member of the traveling public at the Los Angeles International
Airport, which resulted in the death of Transportation Security Officer
Gerardo Hernandez. This tragedy became the impetus for H.R. 720, the
Gerardo Hernandez Airport Security Act of 2015, which I introduced
earlier this year. This legislation, which was signed into law on
September 24, 2015, seeks to enhance the security of TSA personnel,
aviation workers, and members of the traveling public.
The strength of TSA is its personnel, and the agency has a duty to
empower them through education and training, with sound personal
tactics to accomplish their zero-fail mission of ensuring that threat
objects of all kinds are not smuggled into an airport and onto an
airplane. While it is important to train employees on the proper
operation of equipment used at checkpoints, it is just as critical to
properly train employees on how to handle combative individuals, who
may seek to commit violent acts against passengers or TSA personnel. I
am concerned that TSA is not adequately preparing employees to deal
with threatening individuals posing a risk to their safety and the
safety of the traveling public. In light of this, I request responses
to the following questions by November 6, 2015:
1. What specific officer safety issues has TSA identified at
airport security checkpoints?
2. What are the baseline defensive tactics training TSA employees
receive, should an individual pose a threat to their safety?
3. How many hours of defensive tactics training are required for
each employee, in order to graduate from the entry-level
training academy?
4. How many hours of defensive tactics training are required for
each employee on a recurring basis?
5. Does TSA communicate with local, State and Federal agencies to
discover new trends in defensive tactics?
6. Has TSA implemented any enhancements to the defensive tactics
training curriculum, based on tactics being utilized by
criminal/terrorist groups?
7. What are the protocols employed by checkpoints to ensure a
timely law enforcement response to threatening individuals,
should a threat to an officer and/or public safety exist?
8. To what extent does TSA collect and track data on instances of
violent confrontations that occur at security checkpoints?
I look forward to working with you to minimize this officer and
public safety issue. The TSA expects the very best from the men and
women on the front lines, and they should expect the same from their
leadership. I appreciate your timely attention to this matter, and
should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or
my Committee staff.
Sincerely,
John Katko,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security.
Mr. Katko. In consultation with the Minority, we have
decided to do a more loosely-defined hearing here today. We
sometimes have as many as 30 people at a hearing, and sometimes
as little as 2. Down in Washington it is more formal in how we
proceed, but here, since there is definitely only going to be 2
of us here today, we are going to relax the standards a bit. We
are going to do about 10 minutes of questioning by myself,
followed by 10 minutes of questioning by Mr. Keating, and we
will go back and forth until you either are sick of us or we
are sick of you. How does that sound? All right?
I now recognize myself for 10 minutes of questions.
Ms. Maola, I want to start with you because I appreciate
your testimony in summary form, but I want to kind of drill
down a little farther in the security preparedness of the
airports, and it has been an evolution, as I understand it.
The Gerardo Hernandez incident a couple of years ago
exposed a gaping problem with security preparedness, so I want
to know what has happened since then in summary form, and if
you can after that tell us what is on the horizon given the
fact that the Gerardo Hernandez bill is now law.
Ms. Maola. Yes. Thank you, Chairman Katko. Lots of lessons
learned following the LAX shooting; and, of course, the safety
of our officers and the traveling public is paramount.
After the LAX shootings, TSA convened a working group and
they examined the incident and identified areas that needed
improvement, and the areas that needed improvement were
training, emergency response equipment, as well as law
enforcement presence.
So the training that TSA has been involved in over the last
year, we have completed active-shooter training on well over
55,224 employees. It is a yearly training, a mandatory
training, and within that training TSA created a video with
run, hide, and fight, which are some of the tactics which we
train our officers to utilize during an active-shooter
scenario.
As far as the emergency response technology, we did
recognize that the most immediate and the quickest way for our
officers to get help, especially during an imminent threat, is
to have duress alarms. We have been installing duress alarms at
our airports, and it is a work in progress. We have completed
most airports. Presently, if we don't have any new technology
in place, each airport does have either a panic button or a
phone, a direct line to the Port Authority--I am sorry, I am
speaking directly for JFK--but directly to the airport
authority, and we do test our alert notification system weekly
to ensure that it is working.
Also, as far as law enforcement presence, we have required
that the airports put into their airport security program a
maximum response time. For the most part, that is normally 5
minutes or less.
So those are some of the things that we are doing since the
LAX shooting. Sir, on behalf of the TSA, we do want to thank
the subcommittee for passing the Gerardo Hernandez bill. We
have a working group that has convened that is looking at the
provisions of the law, and they will be helping us to identify
what needs to be carried out. In particular, the bill does talk
about or requires TSA to disseminate best practices to our
stakeholders, but it also requires for the airports and for TSA
to work with the airports to have individualized incident
response plans at their airports.
Mr. Katko. Thank you. I want to follow up on a few of those
things.
As far as the emergency response, you have responded with
respect to technology and duress alarms and stated that was a
work in progress. What do you mean by that was a work in
progress?
Ms. Maola. So specifically within my region, I am working
with the Port Authority for JFK, as well as Newark. So those
airports do have means in place. We are working with a
contractor and hope to have complete installation of the new
duress alarms by this November.
Mr. Katko. Now, regarding the active-shooter training
scenarios, you said that you touch about 55,000 workers, and
you do it by video training. What other types of training do
you do to assist with the active-shooter situation?
Ms. Maola. So, we work very closely with our law
enforcement partners. Specifically for our officers, we do have
a training video, but we also exercise it. We conduct exercises
at our checkpoints. I could speak specifically for JFK. Again,
working closely with the Port Authority, the Port Authority
built a state-of-the-art, if you will, checkpoint and mock
ticket counter in one of our buildings, Building 208, with the
Port Authority Police, along with Port Authority Office of
Emergency Management. Several times throughout the year we
invite our TSOs, as well as our Behavior Detection Officers,
along with the police and the law enforcement community, and we
conduct active-shooter drills at mock checkpoints similar to an
airport environment. So we do that first-hand.
Not all airports are doing that, but we do have a
requirement to have table-top drills and active-shooter drills,
as well as at our checkpoints we conduct quarterly breach
drills with our officers.
Mr. Katko. Now, the Port Authority, I would expect, is
always going to have their antenna up high with respect to
terrorist activities, because we all know New York City is a
high-priority target for international terrorists. But with the
phenomenon developing of these lone-wolf situations, whether
they are fueled on the internet by an ISIS type of group or
just some sort of hate group Nation-wide, a domestic terrorism
type, there is more of a possibility that airports outside of
New York City are going to be high-value targets.
Do you have any sense from what type of stuff they are
doing in those airports outside of the New York City area, and
do we need to do more at those airports to beef up the active-
shooter scenarios and training?
Ms. Maola. Yes. So, it is not just exclusive to New York.
All airports are required to conduct active-shooter training.
Mr. Katko. How often do they have to do it?
Ms. Maola. It is a yearly requirement for our officers, but
as far as the law enforcement community, they are continually
working together with TSA, as well as other law enforcement
agencies, to carry out some of the training that they may have
learned. But more importantly, TSA did distribute over 500
copies of threat mitigation active-shooter training to our
airport partners where the airport partners brief not only
their own employees but the entire airport community on active
shooter.
Mr. Katko. Now, Mr. Martelle, could you give us your
perspective? Obviously, you are at a different airport, and you
head the New York State Association. How do you see the active-
shooter and emergency response programs at the airports that
you oversee?
Mr. Martelle. Well, we have an annual conference where we
bring airports across the State together to talk about issues,
and typically what we will do is we will go to the host airport
and conduct an activity there geared to bringing directors and
airport managers in to talk about issues. We conducted last
year, September of 2014--Syracuse airport hosted the
conference, and the Syracuse staff conducted an active-shooter
training where they utilized the emergency operation center
that brought first responders, airport law enforcement, TSA,
all of the groups together and went through a scenario and
activated their emergency operations center.
So for us, it is more of an education and training and
supporting our member airports, and I think the airports are
really on the cutting edge when it comes to this type of
training and working with our partners with the TSA and local
law enforcement, because this is such a serious subject.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
What I want to ask both of you just briefly is, is there
more that you could be doing if you had the resources that
Congress could help you with as far as active-shooter emergency
response is concerned? You had better say yes, right?
Mr. Martelle. Absolutely. As most of my testimony was
regarding funding, funding is absolutely critical. Putting
those dollars where it will support the TSA and help their
mission and help airports back-fill some of the areas that they
see as being critical to these types of programs is critical.
So any funding that can be put towards preventing these types
of actions is definitely helpful.
Mr. Katko. Ms. Maola.
Ms. Maola. Yes, and thank you, sir. Congress has been
incredibly supportive, especially following the LAX and New
Orleans incidents.
Specifically, any policy presently does not require--TSA is
not looking for anything. But, of course, funding is always on
the table. We can always use more funding to help support some
of the resources that we have at our airports.
Mr. Katko. Okay. Switching gears a little bit, the training
you have is trying to detect and respond to an active-shooter
situation. But these incidents also point up a problem with
respect to TSA Officers at airports, at least. They are
unarmed, and they don't have the ability really to defend
themselves in the traditional way, through weaponry. So you
have to rely on other security support that is at the airports.
This letter that I sent Homeland Security today to
Neffenger that I referenced a few moments ago has to do with
defensive tactics. I am concerned that there doesn't seem to be
enough training going on, if any training at all, with respect
to how TSO Officers are to protect themselves and defend
themselves if they are engaged in an active-shooter situation
in an assault-type setting.
So, if you could, Ms. Maola, talk about that; and, Mr.
Martelle, if you can add anything, please do so.
Ms. Maola. I can't speak specifically on the defensive
tactics, but I can speak with regard to the active shooter.
So you may have heard, Chairman Katko, that just following
the New Orleans incident and what occurred there, Officer
Richel did say that some of the tactics they used to defend
themselves came directly from the training that they had
received with the run, hide, and fight, where they actually
used, say, a suitcase to push the passenger away.
So our goal is the safety of our officers. There are other
things that we have done with regard to the incident at LAX,
and one of those does have to do with police officer presence.
The law enforcement officers have been very supportive,
especially after LAX, where they do perform some patrols in and
around our checkpoints.
We also have our VIPR teams. Our air marshals have VIPR
teams at the airports where they also are patrolling our ticket
counters and checkpoint areas.
We also do receive additional support from other law
enforcement within the airport such as CPB and the National
Guard if they are posted at specific airports, where they also
provide visibility, especially during peak times.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Mr. Martelle.
Mr. Martelle. Dedicated law enforcement at security
checkpoints is something that not all airports are doing, but a
lot of airports have been voluntarily policing LEOs at security
checkpoints landside, which is where the passengers come up to
the checkpoints. Syracuse Airport I know for a fact is doing
that, and that program has been well received.
Once again, it is a funding issue. You are taking resources
from other locations, but the airport feels that it is
something that is important and is part of an overall larger
program. But arming the TSA security screeners or anything of
that nature I can't comment on because I don't have enough
information.
Mr. Katko. Thank you.
I could go on for a lot longer, but I am going to try to
stick to somewhat of a schedule here and yield my time for Mr.
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is a great opportunity for me to see here in New York
how things compare to what I am most familiar with in the
Boston region. But I did notice, coming through these automated
exit lanes, how new technology can be helpful.
Under the regulations, statutory and regulatory language
that currently exists, there is some ambiguity about who is
going to be in charge of the staffing, who is going to be
responsible for the costs, and this can be a great problem. For
instance, if this were going to be retrofitted in another
airport and they had to do configuration remodeling, changing
the terminal, some of the interpretation is that once you do
that, you are totally responsible, going along the lines, at
least temporarily is my understanding, of still funding the
cost of the exit lane personnel from TSA and not imposing that
on the airport, something our subcommittee has worked to try
and not make a result of these interpretations because all
these airports are different.
You have small airports, municipal airports, authorities--
it runs the whole gamut. Putting the cost and the
responsibility on these airports that aren't doing, frankly,
enough now is a problem.
So, first of all, Mr. Martelle, from your perspective, how
do you deal with these lack of interpretations, or what happens
if you are trying to ultimately go to this, but in doing so you
are triggering all kinds of costs to yourselves? To me--and I
have said this before at hearings with TSA's top officials and
Homeland officials--if this is going to be required and it is
that important, TSA should be responsible for it and not leave
it in the hands of the airport organization.
So if you could comment on that problem, have you seen that
ambiguity? Is it something that airports can absorb? What do
you see here?
Mr. Martelle. It is difficult for airports to absorb that
because it does require additional staff, and historically that
is not a function that the airport has undertaken. I can speak
to the exit portals at Syracuse Airport. There are numbers
associated with it. They have 8 portals total. With equipment
and vendor installations, it was about $623,000, and the cost
to put in the infrastructure to accommodate those was
approximately $180,000. So it was a significant investment up
front.
While the portals do take up significant resources from an
infrastructure standpoint, the cost to man them without the
portals is about $300,000 a year for an ASO and about $550,000
a year for an LEO. You can recoup those costs over a period of
time. Right now there is no paying for maintenance and the
operations.
Mr. Keating. So you are doing the airports and absorbing
this cost for these new----
Mr. Martelle. Yes. The Syracuse Airport is absorbing the
cost for the maintenance and operation of those.
Mr. Keating. Don't you think that would be a huge
deterrence to other airports going forward, the expense of
this?
Mr. Martelle. It could be. If there was a grant or
something available to the airports to do the initial
installation, that would be very helpful.
Mr. Keating. What about the remodeling that goes with it? I
mean, maybe this was easy to configure here, but it could be
significant because you have wide-open spaces that you would
have to reconfigure, build walls, and the expense could be
enormous. So if you are trying to move to this and they are
absorbing the cost, especially medium and smaller-size
airports, where are they going to get the funds for this?
Mr. Martelle. That is a point well taken. In my testimony I
did talk about a $60 million improvement that the Syracuse
airport underwent in recent times here. They were planning for
this. So if you have an airport that needs to be reconfigured,
it could be a significant cost. It could be millions of dollars
to reconfigure the terminal.
Mr. Keating. It won't happen, even if it might be helpful.
The other thing I want to mention, too, is you mentioned
cameras at airports, and you are looking to remodel that. I
assume you are absorbing some of that cost, too? Or is TSA?
Mr. Martelle. What I am familiar with, Federal funding is
generally used for a lot of the security----
Mr. Keating. Who oversees it to make sure the camera is in
the right place?
Mr. Martelle. Well, I would hope that airports would work
with our partners, with law enforcement and the TSA, but there
isn't a guarantee of that.
Mr. Keating. Because I want to tell you that I referenced
in my opening remarks a 16-year-old that secreted himself in
the air well of a commercial airliner, a major airliner that
was going from Charlotte-Douglas to Boston, and how he was only
discovered after the landing gear went down over the town of
Milton and his body was found, where he had frozen to death.
I was the D.A. at the time. We went back with our police to
investigate that, since it was a death, and we found out that
the cameras didn't even pick his coming up through the
perimeter, didn't pick up his even being near the airplane.
Nothing was detected with the existing cameras that were there,
which is even more amazing.
It is not that a 16-year-old boy did this and went in, but
also that after knowing he did it, nothing ever showed up that
he was ever there. To me, when you are talking about cameras,
that is not just within the terminal but should be outside
around the perimeter, certainly around the area where the
planes are, so that can be detected.
Is that being done here? Do you have outside cameras? Could
the same problem occur here?
Mr. Martelle. At Syracuse Airport, they do have external
cameras. The systems have become antiquated very quickly. I do
know that they are looking at trying to secure investment once
again from a State grant program to help support putting in
additional cameras, especially out on the aircraft parking
aprons, which would assist and help with detecting. But there
again, you have to have somebody on the other side of the
camera sitting in a room and making sure----
Mr. Keating. Well, overall, we use a process, the Joint
Vulnerability Assessment that is being done, looking at all the
issues, outside and inside of the airports. But I must tell
you, and just again for the record, that when that young man
died, they were showing vulnerability assessments of 17
percent, I believe, of all the airports, only 17 percent,
despite the numbers I said in my opening remarks, and now it is
down to 3 percent. So it is going the other way.
So if you are looking at improving security, don't you
think, Ms. Maola--what is your experience here? Are you, like,
the norm, 3 percent of all the airports in the region where you
are looking at it? I mean, how can we judge vulnerability on a
piecemeal basis, and how can we do it with a decrease in these
kinds of assessments?
Ms. Maola. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great
question.
So, my job as a Federal security director is to ensure that
no one gets onto the air operations area. It is not only my job
for the TSA but it is an airport community initiative where
everyone is involved in it.
So presently what we do at many airports, and this goes
across our Nation, but we have a very robust compliance team of
inspectors that are out there every day. I can speak first-hand
for JFK. I have well over 50 inspectors that are out there on a
daily basis looking at perimeter, looking at cargo, catering,
et cetera.
We also specifically at JFK have roving patrols where the
Port Authority did contract the company that works 24/7 just
looking at our perimeter. We have well over----
Mr. Keating. I must say that JFK is one of the best, most
secure airports. Yet a man a few years ago was jet skiing----
Ms. Maola. Yes, yes.
Mr. Keating. He got into an accident, and he just went
right up on the runway to the planes.
Ms. Maola. Yes.
Mr. Keating. It is a tough balance, too.
The other pressure we hear from airports is the speed of
getting through the airports, because you weigh the risk versus
what you have to do to expedite people. It is a tough equation.
But there has been a decrease in that expediting that is
occurring, for people to go through what amounts to the TSA-
preferred lanes. We are hearing from--at least I hear from
Logan Airport in Boston that that has been a problem.
So, No. 1, if you could just quickly address what, if
anything, is happening there.
No. 2, very specifically, I am curious here in your region
if you are having the same problems. I think you are getting
more resources, frankly, in this regard for international
flights. We are reporting an hour, hour-and-a-half delays in
screening on international flights in our area, and we are
trying to deal with this, the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
issues. Resources are tight, and they helped in our region with
kiosks, additional kiosks. We even have the airports saying
we'll pay for the overtime for Customs and Border people to try
to alleviate this, yet they are not allowed to do it.
Are there statutory or regulatory roadblocks to that? What
can we do when we have an airport that is willing to give more
of their own resources to move people along and help customers,
but they have a roadblock in doing it? Is there something we
can do?
Ms. Maola. So, Congressman, TSA has just spent the last 7
months looking at effectiveness, security effectiveness and
that balance with the efficiency and the wait times. We trained
all of our officers in mission-essential threat mitigation
training. It was either a 10- or an 8-hour block for each
officer, and what we are seeing at the checkpoint is an officer
that is more diligent and screening one passenger, one bag at a
time, identifying the threat. So we are seeing that.
What we are seeing, especially when we had a very busy peak
summer, we saw tremendous growth across our system, a 5 or 7
percent increase in growth. Of course, it was attributed to
additional wait times. But, as you may be aware, our
administrator made a policy decision to cease Managed Inclusion
2. So all airports have ceased the Managed Inclusion 2. We do
also rely heavily on our other lanes of security such as our
BDOs, our law enforcement partners that are out there that help
mitigate some of the potential vulnerabilities or threats prior
to the checkpoint.
Mr. Keating. But the real issue I had, too, the specific
one, drilling down, is even when you have airports willing to
take that cost and you have existing personnel, why are there
still roadblocks allowing more--especially on the international
flights, the Customs and Border Patrol people, to be there? Is
it regulatory, too? Or is it statutory? Do you know?
Ms. Maola. I think I would have to defer that to Customs,
because it could be statutory on their end. But from a TSA
perspective, we have nothing to do with the Customs side of
that, wait times.
Mr. Keating. The dogs are helping on the TSA side.
Ms. Maola. Absolutely.
Mr. Keating. Moving people through. But there still has
been a delay here, too, because you are doing away with some of
the other procedures. Is that correct?
Ms. Maola. Yes.
Mr. Keating. It is a very tough balance to get people
through and to keep us secure.
I want to thank you for taking the time to be here, and we
will continue in this committee to try to be helpful on both
fronts, to try and deal with expediting people in and out, but
also making people more secure.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Keating.
I want to follow up on some things he was asking with
respect to the exit lanes, some of the nuts and bolts of it,
because it is an issue that I am wrestling with, and I see how
it works here in Syracuse because we have automated exit lanes,
and it seems to be, at best, a very minor inconvenience or no
inconvenience at all. Some people complain that it takes
standing there for 3 seconds as opposed to 1, or something like
that. If that is the biggest inconvenience you have, that is
not so bad.
But first of all, I guess we will start with Mr. Martelle.
How many airports under your jurisdiction, the New York State
Association, have the automated exit lanes? Is Syracuse the
only one?
Mr. Martelle. Right now, Syracuse plus JFK would make 2,
that I am aware of.
Mr. Katko. Are there any other airports, in the upstate
region at least, Buffalo, Rochester, the major airports, that
are looking into the automated exit lanes?
Mr. Martelle. None that I am aware of at this point. I do
know that when Ms. Callahan has the opportunity to talk to
other airports, we do discuss that and the benefits of that
type of program. But right now I am not aware of any.
Mr. Katko. What are some of the benefits you talked about?
Mr. Martelle. Staffing certainly is a big one. That is one
of the key issues, certainly staffing, and the reliability of
the checkpoints or the exit portals themselves. They don't take
breaks. They are there 24/7, and the ability for implements or
anything to enter the sterile area from the non-secured areas
is minimized. So you take the human error, that human element
out of it, and helping people exit in an efficient manner is a
benefit to it.
Mr. Katko. I will ask you the same question in a moment.
But before I get to that, given the fact that there have been
studies done that anywhere from $85 to $90 million a year could
be saved in manpower expenses for just monitoring the exit
lane, and you are taking away the human error capability, based
on those facts, is there any discussion that people are trying
to go toward the automated exit lanes, or is there still a
question of whether you can afford the up-front cost to make it
work?
Mr. Martelle. I think everything is on the table at this
point. The technology is definitely something that our member
airports are interested in. They are interested in the up-front
cost as something that certainly could potentially put a
roadblock, so any funding that could be secured to help support
that would certainly be welcome. But this is something that I
do know that airports are very interested in.
Mr. Katko. Okay.
Ms. Maola.
Ms. Maola. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. TSA has looked
at technology, and we work with airports interested in
investing in the technology as an alternate to have our
employees staff these lanes.
So more specifically, we, TSA, we don't have that funding
mechanism in place to pay for this type of technology, so we do
rely on our airports, our partners to fund some of the enhanced
security projects that are out there. As far as the role, we
work together. I mean, everyone is part of the detect, deter,
prevent. But we do rely heavily on our airports to fund those
types of technologies.
Mr. Katko. So that is part of the problem.
Now, I will ask you, and then I am going to ask Mr.
Martelle the same question. If expenses or costs associated
with initially going with exit lanes, automated exit lanes,
weren't an issue, which would you prefer based on your
expertise? Would you think it is better to have the automated
exit lanes or just keep them the way they are now?
Ms. Maola. So, what works in one airport may not
necessarily work in another airport. There are differences.
Mr. Katko. You sound like a politician saying that.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Maola. Well, I actually was privy coming to Syracuse
last night, landing, and I went through the portal. It is
wonderful. I thought to myself, wow, JFK, some of the
proposals--nothing is definitive, but the plan would be
Terminal 4 at JFK, which is our biggest international terminal,
is looking at this portal. But I had said, what would that look
like at a JFK? The 3 seconds, 5 seconds that it takes for an
individual to get into these portals, that processing time
could be pretty detrimental at a larger airport because you
would literally have lines that could go back all the way to
the gate. So I was looking at that difference and the balance.
So if no cost was involved, if it eliminates the human
factor, knowing that you have a great piece of technology like
this, of course TSA would have to look at what works at each
airport, because not all the airports are the same, and we do
not want to impede on the operation either, or slow down the
process.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Martelle.
Mr. Martelle. Putting on my airport manager's hat, I would
say anytime that we can cut down staffing costs and add some
technology that would decrease errors and allow for more
efficient screening of people, I would say I would support
that. I think that as the technology gets better, certainly it
will become more accessible by airports. But there again, it is
a funding issue of infrastructure. Some airports aren't
designed in the same manner. If you have seen one airport, you
have seen one airport. So making sure that the infrastructure
is there and the ability for airports to actually work around
that infrastructure and install these would be critical. But I
would support something like that.
Mr. Katko. In my previous life as a Federal prosecutor, I
often had the opportunity to travel abroad and train
prosecutors all over the globe. I was always struck, especially
in the European countries, that their technology generally was
much better than ours as far as these types of things go.
Have you been to the airport in Munich, by any chance? It
is unbelievable. It is high-tech, and they have all automated
exit lanes, and they seem to work wonderfully.
It just seems to me that if you have a chance for a billion
dollars of savings, close to a billion dollars of savings over
a 10-year period if you automate exit lanes, it seems to me we
can find a way to help you finance that and that is the way to
go.
The problem is you have some of these old airports, like
National Airport and JFK and LaGuardia, they are kind-of like
old hospitals. There are corridors everywhere, there are rooms
everywhere. It is not necessarily the best laid-out place. It
just keeps being built as capacity dictates. But as a general
rule, it seems to me that if we can somehow find a way to pay
for this stuff, it might actually make sense in the long run,
and I don't think you have to cut jobs. You can simply move
people from one area to another as attrition happens and do it
that way. I am not talking about eliminating jobs. I am just
talking about better utilizing the workforce and planning going
forward. With the technology the way it is now, anything we can
do to stop these issues.
I will just note quickly, when I am leaving National
Airport, I get off the plane and come off their Terminal 35,
and it is like a zoo, and then I walk out and there are
anywhere from three to four law enforcement people sitting at
desks playing solitaire on their computer or whatever, just
kind of standing there and watching people walk by and leave.
It just to me seems incredibly wasteful.
As we progress with our goal to make airports as secure as
possible, we ought to keep that in mind.
With that, I will yield back to my colleague.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to go back on the Customs and Border Patrol
issue with Mr. Martelle. Maybe that might be a better venue for
the question.
Are you aware of any airports--I am just familiar with
Boston--willing to have the cost of the overtime funded by
themselves just to expedite that hour, hour-and-a-half wait
that exists? If you are not aware, would you think that would
be something you would see a utility of from the airport side
if that is a problem there?
Mr. Martelle. I am not aware of any situation where that
has come into play, but certainly if an airport has that
funding available and they are willing to do that, that might
be something that could be entertained. But I think as far as
the Customs and Border Patrol situation is concerned, I can't
speak to that specifically because I am not familiar with it.
Mr. Keating. Maybe in part because your area is getting
extra Customs and Border people funded. That is something that
if an airport wanted to go ahead--we will follow that up on
both fronts, not as much with TSA but with Customs and Border.
I want to see, in terms of best practices and some of the
things we mentioned, where do we stand right now with upgrades
in communications so that airport officials and TSA officials
and local law enforcement can all communicate with each other
in real time? Both of you, if you can answer.
Mr. Martelle. I think this is still a significant challenge
with the interoperability of equipment. The technology from my
previous life at Albany airport, we had various systems that
were patch-worked together. One had a digital system. Another
agency had a different kind of analog system. I think those
challenges still exist. Things are getting better between law
enforcement agencies as old equipment becomes obsolete. I
believe that all the partners in the security for an airport
are getting together and discussing how they can make their
systems interoperable and communication between local law
enforcement, the TSA, and the airport sponsor together. That is
always important, and I do know that that is something that
many airports are working on currently.
Mr. Keating. My recollection of the 9/11 Commission study
dealt with the World Trade Center bombings, the airplanes
crashing into the World Trade Center. If they had more viable
first responder coordination back and forth, there is not one
other factor that they could identify that would have saved
more lives in that process of reacting to that. So wouldn't you
think that that would be a priority, Ms. Maola, of all the
things that we are doing, making sure they can all communicate
in real time?
Ms. Maola. Absolutely, Congressman. That is one of the
reasons why we did aggressively install the duress alarms, to
ensure that that communication between a truly life-and-death
situation, where it is imminent and they reach out directly to
the law enforcement officers to respond, that that is one of
those things that I couldn't agree with you more, sir.
Mr. Keating. The radio communications necessary following
that up would be----
Ms. Maola. The interoperability of communications is always
certainly a Government-wide challenge. One of the things that
we did do in light of the LAX incident was any TSA employee
phone that is issued has been uploaded with airport contact
information where there is immediate contact information
uploaded into every device, as well as we can only encourage
employees with their personal phones to do the same. So we do
provide guidance out there to the workforce. We are constantly
communicating with them about their well-being, ``See
Something. Say Something'', vigilance, protecting yourself.
Mr. Keating. Is there still a need to upgrade that
coordination with first responders and airport and TSA
officials? Is there still a necessary upgrade of that that has
to occur, the real-time communication, other than the alarm
saying ``come here,'' basically?
Ms. Maola. There is always room for improvement, and that
is one of the things that we are looking forward to in the
Gerardo Hernandez Act. As I mentioned earlier with Congressman
Katko, we have a working group that is convening looking at the
law so we can carry out the provisions in the law. But part of
that does discuss the incident response where every airport
will have to individualize their plans to ensure that we have
communications which are going to be included within that
response plan.
Mr. Keating. One reason I ask here is because if there is
any place in the country where there is an ability to do that
given the resources and the training of the first responders in
the New York area, as well as in the airports, it is here. If
it is not up to speed here, my conclusion would be that it is
not up to speed anywhere the way that it should be. So I am
curious.
If you could contact the committee and tell us what
upgrades you are doing, how that first responder communication
is going. Not every airport is the same as the airports here,
yet if you can do it here, you can do it in the smaller and
medium airports as well. It is probably in many of the smaller
airports more necessary than anyplace else.
In terms of deterrent issues, the VIPR program--and you can
take a minute to probably explain it better than I can--the
budget for that has been decreased $23 million, and the budget
for 2016 another $3.1 million decrease is in place for
elimination of two VIPR teams. They are deployed not only in
aviation facilities but also surface sector areas where I think
in our country bus, trains, and other surface transportation,
we haven't had the threats actually occur the way they have in
Europe, for instance, but there is reason to believe they might
be forthcoming.
I mean, what is your reaction to the cuts in this area?
Should it be a concern? Should it be something we look at in
Congress to make sure we are funding?
Ms. Maola. From a TSA perspective, the President did sign
that law, so there were cuts and the funding was taken away.
The VIPR, which is the Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response, it is really----
Mr. Keating. Notice I had you say that.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Maola. I like saying VIPR. But we do have that in place
where, yes, the resources were cut, but we have limited
resources at our airports. But we do utilize, as I mentioned
earlier--whether it is our Federal Air Marshals, we bring in
law enforcement at those airports, officers, BDOs, to be on
this VIPR team.
So I understand the cuts; and, of course, if there was any
way to have more funding to increase some of the VIPR activity,
of course, in my own personal opinion, I would support it.
Mr. Keating. Mr. Martelle, are they valuable to the
airports? Have you found that?
Mr. Martelle. I am sorry, I am not familiar with the VIPR
teams, but we have rapid intervention teams that we use that
are only geared toward aviation. To cut that program, we found
them very useful and I wouldn't see a need to cut a program
unless it was found it wouldn't be useful in certain respects.
But I can't really comment on the VIPR teams.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, and I yield my time back. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Katko. The last thing I want to touch on before I wrap
up my portion of the testimony is on access controls. As you
know, I have introduced a bill that hopefully will be voted on
in November about access controls in airports. The bill that I
introduced was precipitated by a number of acts that occurred
over the last few years at airports Nation-wide, the most
poignant one of which was a gentleman that was caught coming
off the plane from Atlanta to LaGuardia with a backpack full of
guns. He had either 14 or 15 guns, maybe as many as 17, 9-
millimeter guns and two assault rifles, most of which were
loaded.
It turns out this gentleman had made about 10 trips with
similar amounts in the past, and he had an airport employee
from Delta Airlines in Atlanta who would simply walk the bag
through from the non-secure area of the airport into the secure
area of the airport using a SIDA badge, and just handed him the
bag. The guy got on a plane and went up to New York and sold
them. Of course, the possibilities for something to go wrong
are incalculable, and the tragedies that could have resulted
are amazing, but it really pointed up this lack of security at
airports.
Some of TSA's responses included the VIPR team. Then we
hear more incidents, like the drug trafficking ring that was
disrupted at LAX and Dallas-Ft. Worth where they were simply
talking to each other, the employees, about where the VIPR
teams were in the secure areas of the airport, and they were
just going through other doors that weren't secure and bringing
the drugs into the airports. You overlay that with the fact
that one of the individuals, it came up at his preliminary
hearing, was offering to bring anything through the employee
access doors, including bombs. That, to me, is frightening.
We have an obligation to try and beef up security. You look
at all that and you say, well, let's make them secure. Let's
let them go through just like travelers have to go through. The
way these airports have been designed--we talked about it
earlier, how they kind of have been expanded in sometimes a
hodge-podge manner to meet demand--there are a lot of access
points. Some airports have as many as a couple of hundred
access points. Some have a lot less. Atlanta is going from 64
access points, trying to get down to 4, and they are trying to
go to 100 percent screening. There are only a few airports in
the country that can do 100 percent screening.
We have developed testimony about that, but as long as you
are here I just wanted to get your take on it, each of you,
what your concerns are with respect to access controls. You
have a very good perspective also because you have small
airports that you oversee and have influence on, and then you
have the big mamas in New York City. You have LaGuardia and
Kennedy. So, you have everything.
I understand the practical problems with trying to secure
all the access points, but God forbid we don't do everything we
possibly can and something happens, because when you have close
to a million airport employees Nation-wide, you just need one
bad guy. If you think about what is going on now in the country
with respect to ISIS and how people are getting radicalized
over the internet from afar and someone is having a bad time in
their life, and then they get this thing where you can get
everybody back by blowing something up or putting a bomb on a
plane or whatever, it is really kind of scary. For people
offering to take bombs on planes, it is kind of scary stuff.
So with that heavy overlay, I would just like to get your
take on the access control or, more importantly, what we can do
to beef up the access controls and what is realistic. Anyone
can start because it is a real fun topic, I'm sure, for you
two.
Ms. Maola. So, Congressman, aside from the logistics and
the cost involved in conducting 100 percent employee screening,
the individuals that work at the airport are vetted and are a
trusted population. It sort of contradicts what you just
mentioned, some of the examples that you provided. But we do
have a system in place with access control, with identification
that, of course, we can close down access immediately,
especially if the I.D. badges are lost or stolen. But we also
have to have our workers trust their fellow workers.
Basically, with the individuals that they are working with
every day, they practice challenge procedures, ``See Something.
Say Something.'' We have increased some of our Playbook
activity at some of these access points. The airports in
Syracuse have done a great job as far as reducing access
points, whether it is a small airport, a large airport. We are
making every attempt and effort to mitigate as much as we can.
We are forcing individuals and employees to either utilize a
checkpoint or some sort of screening or going through limited
doors where we have visibility there, whether it is VIPR,
Playbook, law enforcement, where there is some sort of
additional screening done at those doors.
Mr. Martelle. Access control is definitely something that,
from a financial perspective and a facility perspective, is
very significant. The screening of all airport employees can
take--if you have an initial push in the early morning and you
are screening thousands of employees arriving at some airports
in the morning, the insider threat is a big thing. Teaching
people that if you see somebody coming in who is not scheduled
to work with a backpack full of whatever, say something about
it, tell somebody that something doesn't look right.
So we rely on the airport employees to do a lot of the
internal part of security, and the practicality of screening
everybody right now is that it really isn't practical, even
though that is not a good way to look at it, just because of
the sheer nature of the way things are laid out in an airport
environment. I think screening product is definitely something
that needs to occur. You can screen employees, but you are also
going to need to screen product. There is product that goes
into the sterile area of airports out in the secured area that
may not be screened, and it is just as easy for somebody to do
something wrong with that as well.
So it is a comprehensive plan of people, product, and then
airport employees being diligent and notifying people when they
see something that is not right.
Mr. Katko. Yes, and the bill that is being contemplated
virtually came out prescribing what should be done at all
access points, and we have heard enough of the articulation of
what you both talked about today to realize that we need to
look at it more. So we are asking them to do an analysis of the
cost and the types of things that make the most sense going
forward.
But my overall sense is that we need to do more and beef up
access controls more than what we have right now. We owe it to
the American public and we have to get a handle on it because
it is a vulnerability that I had no idea existed until I got
into this job. We sometimes tell people if you knew what we
know, sometimes you wouldn't even get on a plane.
But I understand the American public is best served as it
possibly can be with the people at the airports and the
security they are trying to do. But it is very, very difficult,
and as air traffic and air capacity increases, like it is
projected to over the next couple of decades, it is our duty to
make sure that we do everything we can to make sure we get in
place the proper security measures, both for employees and
people visiting the airports.
So, Mr. Keating, do you have any more questions?
Mr. Keating. No, I just apologize for the notes back and
forth. There is a little irony here with airport management,
but our flight was cancelled back to the District of Columbia,
so we are scrambling to try and see if we can get back.
Mr. Katko. That is payback for talking about access
controls, I think.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Katko. Well, we really appreciate both of you coming up
here today, and we appreciate your professionalism. We
appreciate your candidness. Just so you know, when you testify,
it doesn't go into a vacuum. We have a bunch of people here
listening, and the staffers are far smarter than we are, and
they are going to take this information, synthesize it, and use
it. So it is not just a question of putting on a show and
having to come here. We take your input, and we take it very
seriously, and we value it. So, we appreciate it.
On behalf of Mr. Keating and myself, I want to thank both
of you for being here. Your testimony was great. The Members of
the committee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses, and we ask you to respond to those questions in
writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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