[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
READY AND RESILIENT?: EXAMINING FEDERAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 22, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-38
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Mr. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Bryan Koon, Director, Florida Division of Emergency
Management, Testifying on Behalf of The National Emergency
Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Emergency Management, National
Preparedness and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Homeland
Security and Justice Team, U.S. Government Accountability
Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for W. Craig
Fugate......................................................... 49
Questions From Honorable James E. Clyburn for W. Craig Fugate.... 61
READY AND RESILIENT?: EXAMINING FEDERAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND
RESPONSE
----------
Thursday, October 22, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Martha McSally
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McSally, Walker, Donovan,
Thompson, and Watson Coleman.
Also present: Representative Clyburn.
Ms. McSally. The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications will come to order. Welcome to the
other hearing going on on Capitol Hill this morning. The
subcommittee is meeting today to examine Federal response
capabilities for major disasters. I will now recognize myself
for an opening statement.
August 29 marked the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina,
the response to which was a failure at all levels of
government. The storm took more than 1,800 lives, impacted
millions of Gulf Coast residents, and cost an estimated $108
billion--the most costly disaster in U.S. history.
Ten years later, the Gulf Coast still bears the scars of
this disaster. Since Katrina, much has changed in how we manage
and respond to disasters. There have been major legislative
reforms and improvements made to the emergency preparedness and
response enterprise.
The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, or
PKEMRA, gave FEMA more authority to lean forward and be more
proactive as threats emerged.
We have also seen an improvement in the way we collectively
look at preparedness, through the development of the National
Preparedness System and its associated National Preparedness
Goal and Planning Frameworks, including the National response
framework, assessment of core capabilities, and planning and
exercising to identify and address gaps.
Finally, the way information moves--especially through the
use of social media--has changed how we communicate and
interact with each other and how we get news and critical
information.
In emergencies, we use social media to relay information to
first responders, communicate with loved ones, and request
assistance. Response organizations, including FEMA and
emergency managers Mr. Koon represents, use social media to
quickly share public safety information and maintain direct
communication with disaster survivors during and after an
incident.
As a whole, these changes have resulted in more coordinated
and effective responses to more than 1,200 declared disasters
in the 10 years since Katrina. Three years ago next week,
Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the Eastern Seaboard,
including areas represented by several of my colleagues on this
subcommittee.
The response to Sandy is in contrast to the failures of
Hurricane Katrina. FEMA pre-deployed more than 900 personnel
and established incident support bases and Federal staging
areas to preposition commodities, generators and communications
vehicles. These actions contributed to a more effect response.
Despite these improvements, the response to Hurricane Sandy
wasn't without its challenges. For example, issues related to
fuel distribution and power restoration impacted responses and
recovery efforts.
At the request of this committee, the Government
Accountability Office has been evaluating FEMA's response
capabilities, particularly in light of authorities provided in
PKEMRA. Some of this work is ongoing, but the GAO has issued
reports on FEMA's workforce, potentially improper disaster
assistance, coordination of emergency support function
responsibilities of Federal agencies, and logistics to name a
few.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Currie about GAO's
reviews and his suggestions for ways to further improve our
Federal response posture.
This Nation faces innumerable threats, including natural
disasters, terrorist attacks, emerging infectious diseases, and
a porous border. These complex threats pose unique challenges.
Administrator Fugate, I look forward to hearing how you are
working to continue to improve FEMA so it is a nimble
organization, prepared to respond along with Federal, State,
local, private, and non-profit partners to the evolving
challenges we face.
I also want to commend you for FEMA's recent work
responding to the devastating floods in the Carolinas. Our
thoughts are with all those who have been impacted.
With that, I welcome our distinguished witnesses here
today. I look forward to your testimony, and our discussions on
ways we can work together to continue to improve our response
capabilities.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any opening statement he may have.
[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairman Martha McSally
October 22, 2015
August 29 marked the 10th anniversary of Hurricane Katrina, the
response to which was a failure at all levels of government. The storm
took more than 1,800 lives, impacted millions of Gulf Coast residents,
and cost an estimated $108 billion--the most costly disaster in U.S.
history. Ten years later, the Gulf Coast still bears the scars of this
disaster.
Since Katrina, much has changed in how we manage and respond to
disasters. There have been major legislative reforms and improvements
made to the emergency preparedness and response enterprise. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) gave FEMA more
authority to ``lean forward'' and be more pro-active as threats emerge.
We have also seen improvement in the way we collectively look at
preparedness through the development of the National Preparedness
System and its associated National Preparedness Goal and Planning
Frameworks, including the National Response Framework; assessment of
core capabilities; and planning and exercising to identify and address
gaps.
Finally, the way information moves, especially through use of
social media, has changed how we communicate and interact with each
other, and how we get news and critical information. In emergencies, we
use social media to relay information to first responders, communicate
with love ones, and request assistance. Response organizations,
including FEMA and the emergency managers Mr. Coons represents, use
social media to quickly share public safety information and maintain
direct communication with disaster survivors during and after an
incident.
As a whole, these changes have resulted in more coordinated and
effective responses to the more than 1,200 declared disasters in the 10
years since Katrina.
Three years ago next week, Hurricane Sandy made landfall on the
Eastern Seaboard, including areas represented by several of my
colleagues on this subcommittee. The response to Sandy is in contrast
to the failures of Hurricane Katrina. FEMA pre-deployed more than 900
personnel and established incident support bases and Federal staging
areas to pre-position commodities, generators, and communications
vehicles. These actions contributed to a more efficient response.
Despite these improvements, the response to Hurricane Sandy wasn't
without its challenges. For example, issues related to fuel
distribution and power restoration impacted response and recovery
efforts.
At the request of this committee, the Government Accountability
Office has been evaluating FEMA's response capabilities, particularly
in light of authorities provided in PKEMRA. Some of this work is on-
going, but GAO has issued reports on FEMA's workforce, potentially
improper disaster assistance, coordination of Emergency Support
Function responsibilities of Federal agencies, and logistics, to name a
few. I look forward to hearing from Mr. Currie about GAO's reviews and
his suggestions for ways to further improve our Federal response
posture.
This Nation faces innumerable threats including natural disasters,
terrorist attacks, emerging infectious diseases, and a porous border.
These complex threats pose unique challenges. Administrator Fugate, I
look forward to hearing how you are working to continue to improve FEMA
so it is a nimble organization prepared to respond, along with Federal,
State, local, private, and non-profit partners, to the evolving
challenges we face.
I also want to commend you for FEMA's recent work responding to the
devastating flooding in the Carolinas. Our thoughts are with all who
have been impacted.
With that, I welcome our distinguished witnesses here today. I look
forward to your testimony and our discussion of ways we can work
together to continue to improve response capabilities.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Good morning, Madam
Chairman. I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to
assess Federal preparedness, response, mitigation, and recovery
capabilities that have evolved since Hurricane Katrina.
I am pleased that all of the witnesses are able to join us
today, particularly Administrator Fugate. Good seeing you
again. Yesterday, Secretary Johnson, however, appeared before
the full committee for the first time this Congress, and today
marks Administrator Fugate's also first appearance.
Although I am troubled that the committee has not had the
opportunity to engage agency principles until almost halfway
through the Congress, I am pleased that we are beginning to do
so and look forward to additional hearings next year.
I would also like to welcome the assistant Democratic
leader, James Clyburn, from South Carolina, to the Committee on
Homeland Security and ask unanimous consent that he be
permitted to participate in today's hearing.
Ms. McSally. Without objection.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Ten years ago, Hurricane Katrina
destroyed communities along the Gulf Coast, including my home
State of Mississippi. Confusion regarding roles and
responsibilities at every level of government, gaps in
emergency communication technologies, and lack of effective
coordination between Federal and State responders undermined
immediate response efforts.
Large contractors from outside the Gulf Coast were brought
in to do the work that local businesses not only could do, but
needed to do themselves, to rebuild and restore local
economies. Recovery activities were slow and dragged out, and
too often diverse populations and small local businesses were
left out of programs to rebuild their own communities.
Almost immediately, a consensus emerged that the Federal
response was woefully inadequate. Congress responded by passing
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, which
restructured FEMA and our larger emergency response
infrastructure.
Three years ago, FEMA's efforts to right the wrongs of
Katrina were tested when Hurricane Sandy slammed into the East
Coast. The response reflected significant progress in the
Federal Government's ability to support State and local
disaster response activities and recovery efforts were
ultimately bolstered by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act,
which provided for expedited recovery opportunities.
Nevertheless, Federal response and recovery capabilities
continue to face serious challenges. For several years, I have
raised concern about FEMA's disaster workforce and whether or
not they are receiving adequate training.
I understand that FEMA has implemented policies to improve
its training and management of the reservist program, but many
people have left the reservist workforce in response.
Moreover, a recent GAO report revealed gaps in recruitment
of DHS surge force capability and challenges with attrition and
costs for FEMA CORE program. These workforce retention issues,
coupled with FEMA's morale challenges, will jeopardize FEMA's
future disaster response capabilities.
Additionally, I continue to have concerns about FEMA's
efforts to ensure that small locally-owned businesses in areas
affected by disaster have the opportunities to compete for
contracts to rebuild their communities.
According to the GAO, FEMA still cannot determine which
companies are indeed local to an area affected by disaster, and
pre-Katrina requirements that pre-disaster contracts be
positioned to local contracts is not consistently enforced.
FEMA has to work harder to ensure the local small
businesses are part of the recovery process, and do more to
enforce limitations on noncompetitive disaster contracts.
As I close, Madam Chair, let me say that Director Fugate's
tenure there has added stability to the agency. Not without
challenges, he is available. There are some differences. We
will talk about some of those differences today. But we have
needed, for a long time, a steady hand. He has provided that
part of it.
Some of the hiccups are kind of downstream, and we will
talk a little bit about those today. But nonetheless, we are a
better agency because of the Katrina and Sandy experience. Our
goal is to continue to be that agency that Americans can count
on in their time of need.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
October 22, 2015
Yesterday, Secretary Johnson appeared before the full committee for
the first time this Congress and today marks Administrator Fugate's
first appearance.
Although I am troubled that the committee has not had the
opportunity to engage agency principals until almost half-way through
the Congress, I am pleased that we are beginning to do so and look
forward to additional hearings next year.
Ten years ago, Hurricane Katrina destroyed communities along the
Gulf Coast, including in my home State of Mississippi.
Confusion regarding roles and responsibilities at every level of
government, gaps in emergency communications technologies, and lack of
effective coordination between Federal and State responders undermined
immediate response efforts.
Large contractors from outside the Gulf Coast were brought in to do
the work that local businesses not only could do, but needed to do
themselves to rebuild and restore local economies.
Recovery activities were slow and dragged out, and too often
diverse populations and small, local businesses were left out of
programs to rebuild their own communities.
Almost immediately, a consensus emerged that the Federal response
was woefully inadequate.
Congress responded by passing the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act, which restructured FEMA and our larger emergency response
infrastructure.
Three years ago, FEMA's efforts to right the wrongs of Katrina were
tested when Hurricane Sandy slammed into the East Coast.
The response reflected significant progress in the Federal
Government's ability to support State and local disaster response
activities, and recovery efforts were ultimately bolstered by the Sandy
Recovery Improvement Act, which provided for expedited recovery
opportunities.
Nevertheless, Federal response and recovery capabilities continue
to face serious challenges.
For several years, I have raised concerns about FEMA's disaster
workforce and whether or not they receive adequate training.
I understand that FEMA has implemented policies to improve its
training and management of the Reservist Program, but many people have
left the Reservist Workforce in response.
Moreover, a recent GAO report revealed gaps in recruitment for DHS
Surge Force Capacity and challenges with attrition and cost for the
FEMA Corps program.
These workforce retention issues, coupled with FEMA's morale
challenges, will jeopardize FEMA's future disaster response
capabilities.
Additionally, I continue to have concerns about FEMA's efforts to
ensure that small, locally-owned businesses in areas affected by
disaster have the opportunity to compete for contracts to rebuild their
communities.
According to the GAO, FEMA still cannot determine which companies
are indeed ``local'' to an area affected by disaster and PKEMRA's
requirements that pre-disaster contracts be transitioned to local
contracts is not consistently enforced.
FEMA has to work harder to ensure the local small businesses are
part of the recovery process and do more to enforce PKEMRA's
limitations on noncompetitive disaster contracting.
Disaster recovery will be more inclusive and cost-effective as a
result.
Finally, despite the on-going challenges the FEMA continues to
tackle, I would like to take this opportunity to thank Administrator
Fugate for his tenacious efforts to improve how FEMA carries out its
mission.
Following the failed Federal response to Hurricane Katrina 10 years
ago, much of the American public lost confidence in the ability of FEMA
and the Federal Government to render aid when it was needed most.
The FEMA-coordinated Federal response to Hurricane Sandy 7 years
later--though not perfect--restored much of the confidence lost after
Hurricane Katrina.
Administrator Fugate, you deserve much of the credit for that.
To that end, I will be interested in learning what efforts you are
undertaking now to ensure that FEMA continues down the right path
during the next administration.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. Other Members of the
subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a very
distinguished panel before us today on this important topic.
Administrator Craig Fugate was confirmed by the U.S. Senate
and began his service as administrator of FEMA in May 2009.
Prior to coming to FEMA, Administrater Fugate served as
director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management. Mr.
Fugate began his emergency management career as a volunteer
firefighter, paramedic, and a lieutenant with the Alachua--did
I say that right?--County fire rescue.
Mr. Bryan Koon has served as the director of the Florida
Division of Emergency Management since February 2011. Prior to
joining the division, he worked with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for
5 years as operations manager and director of emergency
management.
Mr. Koon worked at the White House Military Office for 7
years, where he was the watch officer in the President's
emergency operations center while on active duty with the U.S.
Navy. Go Air Force--no, all right, sorry. Put that in the
Congressional Record. He then spent 2 years as a training
officer for Presidential contingency programs, conducting
training and exercising for the White House Military Office,
United States Secret Service, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, and others.
Mr. Koon is currently serving as the president of the
National Emergency Management Association and is testifying in
that capacity today.
Mr. Christopher Currie is the director of the GAO's
Homeland Security and Justice team, where he leads the agency's
work on emergency management and National preparedness issues.
In this role, Chris and his team of GAO auditors evaluate
Federal efforts and programs to prevent, plan for, and respond
to natural and man-made disasters.
Prior to this, he was acting director in GAO's Defense
Capabilities and Management team, where he led reviews of DOD
programs.
The Chair now recognizes Administrator Fugate for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Fugate. Well, thank you, Chairman and Members.
Congressman Thompson, we go way back when I first started in
FEMA.
As we look back at Katrina, there are lot of questions:
Well, why did it go wrong, who was at fault? It is easy to
point to an individual or to a system and say this failed. I
think you have to get to why we failed. It is an inherent
danger we face in dealing with disaster preparedness.
I am seeing it play out even today. That is, we prepare for
what we are capable of, and we hope it is never any worse. It
is interesting that even after Sandy, where we were barely able
to mobilize the resources fast enough to get to the disaster,
we are continuing to look at how we reduce our footprint, how
do we reduce our overhead, how do we reduce our budget.
I caution people in going, look, this is not a retail
delivery system. Disasters don't occur with a schedule, where
they are planned or where you know they are going to happen.
There is a certain inherent risk to wanting precision at
the expense of being fast. Much of what you are going to find
where you find errors at FEMA is not because we are not trying
to be good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. It is that we
understand that speed is critical in stabilizing a disaster.
It will not be precise, it is rarely going to be cost-
effective as it would be on a day-to-day basis, and it is going
to have errors. Now, that is not an excuse, that is just a
reality. So we always balance with precision is great, but at
what expense to getting to the survivors.
We have driven down our error rate on individual assistance
tremendously, but it is still high for the program; more than
we want to accept.
But I also know that the more we get that lower, it will
mean--and we will see this in South Carolina, where people who
don't have a driver's license, who may not know where their
Social Security number is, and are applying for assistance and
are eligible for that assistance--the system is going to not be
able to be as responsive. We are going to have to basically
then run that in a less efficient manner to try to help those
people.
We run into issues where families don't have deeds because
their property got passed down in the family and nobody went to
the courthouse and then we can't prove ownership of the home.
We use those tools to avoid fraud but, at the same time, we
have to balance that against the world we are in. So our
challenge is, is when we build for disaster we have to build
for what can happen. If we make a decision we are going to
build for what we can afford, then the expectation that it
scales up doesn't work.
We know that our systems have to be robust on the large end
and they have to be built around the people we serve, and the
survivors. That environment has all kinds of inherent risk,
where you try to put the controls in. But I also caution, the
more accuracy, the more precision we try to get, the slower the
response will become and the more likely that eligible people
may not get the assistance they need in the time frames they
need.
The other part of this is that we have learned is, we have
to plan for the communities we live in, not what fits our plan.
One of the great tragedies we saw that occurred during Katrina
was, for many communities that were not basically well-
represented, disadvantaged--low-income areas that probably many
people didn't go to very often--weren't in the plan.
The reason was, we kept putting them in the annexes. We
would look at people with disabilities and go, ``Well, you are
hard to do so we are going to put an annex in our plan for
you.''
``You have pets. Well, that is going to be a problem at the
shelter, so we are going to write annex on pets.'' ``You got
frail elderly. Well, they are not easy to take care of so we
are going to write an annex for them.''
When I asked the question, when I got to FEMA--is, well,
why are putting all these hard-to-do in annexes? Why did we
write a plan for easy instead of the communities we live in?
The answer was, we had provided as guidance how to plan for,
essentially, middle-class people with insurance, with a high
school education or better, who were English-proficient, who
had a car and generally had resources to take care of
themselves.
We didn't address the most vulnerable part of our
community. So the other part of our work is to plan for what
can happen, not what we are capable of doing. But the other
piece of that is, you plan for the communities you live in, you
don't make the community fit your plan.
If you find yourself putting groups into an annex you
fundamentally didn't get the whole picture of what your job is
to do. That means you have to focus not on the easy-to-do, but
on what the community requires.
So with that, Madam Chair, I look forward to questions.
We are an imperfect organization dealing with the inherent
uncertainties of disaster response, but I can tell you on
behalf of the FEMA staff nobody in this organization is
shirking from their duties to do the best they can when the
bell rings and the country needs us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fugate follows:]
Prepared Statement of W. Craig Fugate
October 22, 2015
introduction
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of this
distinguished subcommittee, my name is Craig Fugate, and I am the
administrator of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss FEMA's preparedness and response
efforts post-Hurricane Katrina.
As you are aware, this year marked the tenth anniversary of
Hurricane Katrina. The wide-spread devastation of Katrina affected
millions of people along the central Gulf Coast of the United States,
and exposed the Nation's vulnerabilities in how we prepare for, protect
against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate disasters. However,
over the last decade, with the support of Congress and the additional
authorities provided, including the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) and the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of
2013 (SRIA), FEMA continues to significantly improve the way we respond
to disasters so that communities are able to recover as quickly as
possible and build back safer and more resilient in the long-term.
There is a shared recognition that FEMA cannot only plan for events
we are capable of responding to; rather, we must plan for catastrophic
events that will overwhelm capabilities at all levels of the government
and private sector and challenge even the most scalable structures and
systems. Further, we must constantly enhance preparedness, test
systems, and exercise capabilities so we can support the whole
community following a catastrophic event. Our systems and capabilities
must be designed so that we are able to execute the mission whenever
and wherever needed, including in austere conditions.
We continue to work collaboratively with our stakeholders, across
the whole community, to ensure our Nation is better prepared for
current and future risks. By helping to build the capacity and
capabilities of our State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners, we
are empowering communities and citizens across the Nation--which, I
believe, will have a far greater impact than the Federal Government
alone ever will.
In my testimony today, I hope to highlight some of the ways in
which our agency is transforming into a better-prepared, more survivor-
centric agency that is capable of effectively responding to
catastrophic disasters.
leaning forward
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA)
The importance of PKEMRA cannot be overstated, and we are grateful
to Congress for the additional authorities this legislation provided
FEMA to become an even more effective agency in carrying out its
mission. PKEMRA was enacted, at least in part, due to challenges
identified during FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina. As clearly
demonstrated before, during, and after Hurricane Katrina, FEMA needed
additional, more robust authorities to lean forward as a Federal
agency.
PKEMRA provided FEMA clearer guidance on its responsibilities and
priorities, and the authorities and tools we needed to become a better
partner to our State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments.
PKEMRA required several major changes and established FEMA's place
within DHS. First, PKEMRA consolidated many of the responsibilities of
DHS's Preparedness Directorate under FEMA, returning programs that had
been removed, as well as adding significant new authorities and new
training, exercise, and grant programs. This has enabled greater Unity
of Effort for National preparedness across the entire Department.
Additionally, existing activities were reorganized to form FEMA's
Response, Recovery, and Logistics Management Directorates to better
focus response and recovery efforts. PKEMRA also provided us the
authority to establish a Private Sector Office to better foster
cooperation with businesses and non-profit organizations. And notably,
PKEMRA allowed FEMA to add a disability coordinator position to expand
capacity to address the needs of individuals with access and functional
needs.
In addition, in 2008, FEMA led the development of the National
Response Framework (NRF), which replaced the National Response Plan of
2004 and the Federal Response Plan of 1992. And as this subcommittee is
aware, the NRF was revised in 2013, incorporating, among other things,
a focus on the whole community and core capabilities.
PKEMRA also called for the establishment of ``a Surge Capacity
Force for deployment of individuals to respond to natural disasters,
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, including catastrophic
incidents.'' The Surge Capacity Force (SCF) provides the ability to
rapidly expand and supplement FEMA's incident workforce with employees
from other Federal agencies in a catastrophic event.
The SCF activated for the first time in November 2012, deploying
1,210 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) personnel, including 78
FEMA support staff, to provide assistance to Hurricane Sandy survivors
in New York.
The most important measure of the success of the SCF during Sandy
response and recovery efforts is the quantity and quality of assistance
provided to survivors in the aftermath of Sandy. SCF volunteers were
crucial to the success of Federal response and recovery activities. At
the height of the deployment, SCF personnel accounted for approximately
35 percent of the community relations teams in New York. These SCF
volunteers were often the first source of help and information to reach
survivors.
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA)
In January 2013, Congress passed, and President Obama signed, the
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, or ``SRIA'', into law, authorizing
several significant changes to the way FEMA delivers disaster
assistance. SRIA is one of the most significant pieces of legislation
impacting disaster response and recovery since PKEMRA and builds upon
the Robert T. Stafford Emergency Relief and Disaster Assistance Act.
SRIA, and the additional authorities it provides, is aiding
recovery efforts associated with recent disasters such as Hurricane
Sandy and the floods that impacted the States of Colorado and South
Carolina. SRIA's various provisions are intended to improve the
efficacy and availability of FEMA disaster assistance, making the most
cost-effective use of taxpayer dollars. Most notably, SRIA directs FEMA
to provide more objective criteria for evaluating the need for
assistance to individuals, to clarify the threshold for eligibility,
and to speed a declaration of a major disaster or emergency under the
Stafford Act.
One clear example of SRIA's effective use of taxpayer dollars is
the Public Assistance Permanent Work Alternative Procedure provision
that provides substantially greater flexibility in use of Federal funds
for Public Assistance applicants and far less administrative burden and
costs for all parties--if applicants accept grants based on fixed,
capped estimates. To date, FEMA is funding billions in Public
Assistance Permanent Work Alternative Procedure projects in States such
as New York and Louisiana.
preparing our nation for future risks
The administration remains steadfastly committed to strengthening
the security and resilience of the United States by systematically
preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to
the security of our Nation. In the future, when we respond to events
like Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm Sandy, and the floods we've seen
this month in South Carolina, it will not just be FEMA on the ground
supporting survivors. Our partners from across Government, the private
sector and non-governmental organizations are right there with us;
every day citizens are right there with us helping their neighbors.
After the changes ushered in following PKEMRA, FEMA--in
coordination with its partners across the whole community--developed
the National Preparedness System. As we continue to develop and
strengthen the National Preparedness System, we recognize this
collective effort--that everyone from the individual to the first
responder to me--has a role to play in preparing the Nation. With so
many people involved and so much at stake, it is important to establish
a common goal.
This all-of-Nation approach to preparedness, ushered in by PKEMRA,
is re-enforced in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-8: National
Preparedness. In PPD-8, the President called for greater integration
and a shared understanding for addressing threats and hazards across
all mission areas--prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and
recovery--in order to make the most effective use of the Nation's
limited resources and to achieve Unity of Effort. PPD-8 has several
parts, some FEMA already completed with its partners and others which
are on-going. PPD-8 has five key parts: The National Preparedness Goal,
the National Preparedness System, the National Planning Frameworks and
Federal Interagency Operational Plans, the National Preparedness
Report, and a Campaign to Build and Sustain Preparedness. All five
parts are interrelated. The National Preparedness Goal defines the end
we wish to achieve in preparedness; the National Preparedness System
describes the tools and programs to achieve the Goal; the five National
Planning Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operational Plans describe
how we deliver and use the capabilities developed through the System;
the National Preparedness Report provides the annual progress of how we
are doing in achieving the Goal; and lastly the Campaign to Build and
Sustain Preparedness focuses on public outreach, community-based and
private-sector programs to enhance National resilience, as well as
organize National research and development efforts on preparedness.
National Preparedness Goal
The National Preparedness Goal (the Goal), is the cornerstone of
the National Preparedness System. FEMA released the first edition of
the Goal in October 2011; and, just this month, FEMA and its partners
released the second edition of the Goal. The Goal describes a vision
for preparedness Nation-wide and identifies the core capabilities
necessary to achieve that vision across the five mission areas.
Our goal itself is succinct and remains unchanged: ``A secure and
resilient nation with the capabilities required across the whole
community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and
recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk.''
The second edition of the Goal represents a refresh from the 2011
version and incorporates critical edits identified through real-world
events, lessons learned, and continuing implementation of the National
Preparedness System. Some noteworthy examples of these edits include
the expanded inclusion of cybersecurity considerations, the addition of
a new core capability for response (Fire Management and Suppression),
and the emphasis to include innovations from science and technology
advances. The updated Goal identifies 32 distinct activities, called
core capabilities, which are needed to address our greatest risks. The
core capabilities serve as preparedness tools and provide a common
language for preparedness activities. The National Preparedness Goal
defines where we want to be as a Nation. To achieve the goal of a
secure and resilient Nation, FEMA and its partners are building the
guidance, programs, processes, and systems that support each component
of the National Preparedness System.
The National Preparedness System begins with identifying and
assessing risk and estimating capability requirements. One of the key
programs developed under the System is the Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA). The THIRA process helps
communities identify threats and hazards and determine capability
targets and resource requirements necessary to address anticipated and
unanticipated risks. Our State partners then assess their currently
capability levels against their THIRA targets in the State Preparedness
Report (SPR). Once each jurisdiction has determined capability targets
through the THIRA process, the jurisdiction estimates its current
capability levels against those targets in its SPR. The SPR is an
annual self-assessment of State preparedness based on the targets set
in the THIRAs. PKEMRA requires an SPR from any State or territory
receiving Federal preparedness assistance administered by DHS.
Taken together, the THIRA and SPR support the National Preparedness
System by helping to identify State and territorial preparedness
capability levels and gaps. States, territories, and the Federal
Government use this information to help make programmatic decisions to
build and sustain capabilities, plan to deliver capabilities, and
validate capabilities. States and territories submit their THIRA and
SPR annually to FEMA. The summary results are published in the annual
National Preparedness Report. Additionally, FEMA shares THIRA and SPR
data across the Federal Government and uses the results to guide
strategic direction for programs that help States close preparedness
capability gaps.
The next component of the National Preparedness System is to build
and sustain critical capabilities at all levels. FEMA's preparedness
grant programs have contributed significantly to the overall security
and preparedness of the Nation. We are more secure and better prepared
to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the
full range of threats and hazards the Nation faces than we have been at
any time in our history. As a Nation, we plan better, organize better,
equip better, train better, and exercise better, resulting in improved
National preparedness and resilience.
Much of this progress has come from leadership at the State and
local levels, fueled by FEMA's grant programs. Over the past 12 years,
Congress, through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has
provided State, territorial, local, and Tribal governments with more
than $36 billion. We have enabled States and local communities to build
and enhance capabilities by acquiring needed equipment, funding,
training opportunities, developing preparedness and response plans,
exercising and building relationships across city, county, and State
lines.
Although Federal funds represent just a fraction of what has been
spent on homeland security across the Nation overall, these funds have
helped to shift towards a culture of preparedness in the United States.
Response and recovery efforts from Hurricane Sandy and countless other
recent events bear witness to the improved capabilities that
preparedness grants have supported.
Because grantees must link grant investments to capability gaps or
requirements they have identified for the core capabilities as part of
the THIRA and SPR, we can measure grantees' implementation of the
System and annual progress in meeting the goals they have established
for each of the core capabilities in the Goal.
To build leadership and capacity in States and communities, FEMA
has continued America's PrepareAthon!, the successful grassroots
campaign for action to increase community preparedness and resilience
with the second annual National day of action aligned with the
culmination of National Preparedness Month in September. Thanks to the
National Preparedness Month Congressional co-chairs, including Chairman
McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and other Members of this distinguished
subcommittee for the continued commitment and leadership of this
important educational campaign.
This year, more than 23 million participants throughout the United
States and Territories have been registered to take action to prepare
for disasters through America's PrepareAthon! and its partners. As part
of America's PrepareAthon!, States, Tribes, cities, and counties across
the country planned community-wide events bringing together schools,
the business community, city government, faith leaders, hospitals,
individuals and families, and others to participate in community-wide
preparedness drills and activities for hazards that are relevant to
their area. America's PrepareAthon! works to build a more resilient
Nation by increasing the number of individuals who understand which
disasters could happen in their community, know what to do to be safe
and mitigate damage, take action to increase their preparedness, and
participate in community resilience planning.
In addition, FEMA continues to improve adoption, performance, and
accessibility of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System
(IPAWS). IPAWS is a collection of standards and technologies for
emergency alert systems. In 2014, FEMA worked with Federal, State,
local, territorial, and Tribal alerting authorities to extend the
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System to 49 States, Puerto Rico,
and the District of Columbia. Over 400 distinct emergency response
entities have become alerting authorities. Since June 2012, the
National Weather Service has used the system to distribute more than
11,000 imminent weather threat warnings, notifying citizens of
tornados, flash floods, dust storms, and other extreme weather events.
In addition to building and sustaining capabilities, we are working
hard to plan for delivering capabilities. FEMA continues to coordinate
with partners across the Nation through a unified approach and common
terminology to plan for all-threats and hazards and across all mission
areas of Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery.
National Planning Frameworks
In 2013, FEMA published the National Planning Frameworks, setting
the strategy and doctrine for building, sustaining, and delivering the
core capabilities identified in the Goal. By describing the
coordinating structures and alignment of key roles and responsibilities
for the whole community across all mission areas, the Frameworks foster
a shared understanding of our roles and responsibilities from the fire
house to the White House. They help us understand how we, as a Nation,
coordinate, share information and work together--which ultimately
results in a more secure and resilient Nation.
Building on the National Planning Frameworks, FEMA coordinated with
its Department and Agency partners, the development of the Federal
Interagency Operational Plans (FIOPs) for Prevention, Mitigation,
Response, and Recovery mission areas. The FIOPs define how the Federal
Government delivers core capabilities for the each mission area.
Specifically, each FIOP describes the concept of operations for
integrating and synchronizing existing Federal capabilities to support
State, local, Tribal, territorial, insular area, and Federal plans, and
is supported by Federal Department-level operational plans, where
appropriate.
Currently, FEMA is coordinating efforts to refresh the National
Planning Frameworks and the FIOPs. The updates account for changes in
policy and legislation since they were last published, consistent
formatting across all mission areas, critical edits from real-world
events, and lessons learned. FEMA is also working with DHS's National
Protection and Programs Directorate to finalize the FIOP for the
Protection mission area.
National Preparedness Report (NPR)
The 2015 NPR is the fourth iteration of this annual report. This
year's report places particular emphasis on highlighting preparedness
progress in implementing the National Planning across the five mission
areas and 6 overarching findings focused on National-level trends.
The 2015 NPR found that the Nation continues to make progress
building preparedness in key core capabilities including: Environmental
Response/Health and Safety, Intelligence and Information Sharing, and
Operational Coordination. Along with the five core capabilities
identified from last year including Interdiction and Disruption, On-
scene Security and Protection, Operational Communications, Public and
Private Services and Resources, and Public Health and Medical Services,
these eight core capabilities represent areas in which the Nation has
developed acceptable levels of performance for critical tasks, but
which face potential performance declines if not maintained and updated
to address new challenges.
Yet challenges remain. The 2015 NPR also identified six core
capabilities as areas for improvement. Cybersecurity, Housing,
Infrastructure Systems, and Long-term Vulnerability Reduction have
remained National areas for improvement for 4 consecutive years, and
Economic Recovery reemerged as an area for improvement from the 2012
and 2013 National Preparedness Reports. Access Control and Identity
Verification is a newly-identified National area for improvement.
Additionally, the NPR confirmed that recent events, including the
epidemic of the Ebola virus, highlighted challenges that remain in
addressing non-Stafford Act events--despite the NRF always being in
effect. These complex events have taken place over extended periods of
time and often across large geographic areas, with uncertainty
surrounding the role of existing coordination structures and
authorities for multi-agency activity for non-Stafford Act events.
The strengths and areas for improvement in the NPR will be used to
inform planning efforts, focus priorities for Federal grants, and
enable informed collaboration among stakeholders working together to
improve the Nation's preparedness. Continually reviewing and updating
the implementation of the National Preparedness System ensures that we
continue to improve our capabilities and together become a more
resilient Nation.
transforming our response efforts post-katrina
Improvements Within FEMA's Incident Management Assistance Teams
After Hurricane Katrina, Congress required the establishment of
``Emergency Support and Response Teams'' that would address
deficiencies revealed by the Katrina response. In accordance with these
requirements and lessons learned from other major incidents, FEMA
formally established the Incident Management Assistance Team (IMAT)
program in 2009. By 2011, FEMA designated three National and 13
Regional IMATs. Following lessons learned from Hurricane Sandy, FEMA
undertook a pilot project to restructure the IMATs. Here, FEMA's
primary goal was to increase team capability by integrating more FEMA
programs and interagency partners, and establishing a robust training
and performance system. Today, FEMA's IMATs better reflect the core
capabilities required by the National Response and Recovery Frameworks,
and include personnel who are accountable for coordinating the Federal
response regardless of type of incident.
Developed Hurricane-Specific Plans in FEMA Regions IV and VI With Our
Partners
In 2014, in coordination with our regional stakeholders, FEMA
Region IV--Atlanta, Georgia--completed a hurricane annex to its all-
hazards base plan. This plan includes a number of best practices, such
as: The publication of a resource phasing plan; identification of
staging areas; an introduction of modeling for each State; and linkages
to preparedness activities like exercises. In 2013, FEMA Region VI--
Denton, Texas--published an all-hazards base plan that focused on a
hurricane scenario. Since then, the Region conducts an annual update
prior to hurricane season and then exercises the plan in a multi-State
tabletop exercise. Region VI also has a dedicated planner for each of
its hurricane-prone States to better respond to, and rapidly conduct,
crisis action planning for hurricanes or any other threats.
State, Local, Tribal, and Interagency Integration
Through the deliberate planning efforts described above, State,
local, and Tribal partners have been core team members responsible for
providing input and authorship of the catastrophic plans. This can be
seen in how each State has an annex in the Region IV and VII (Kansas
City, Missouri) plans. These State annexes are developed jointly
between FEMA and the State and establish joint priorities between the
State and Federal Government and identify all State and Federal assets
available to provide response core capabilities as well as many other
resources for local and other whole community partners.
At both the National and regional levels, FEMA is working with
Tribes to develop more robust plans and annexes that recognize the
Tribal role in the whole community continuum of response and recovery.
The annex will apply to all Federal departments and agencies working
under the NRF in response to incidents requiring Federal coordination,
including incidents involving Federally-recognized Tribes whether the
Tribe requested and received a Presidential declaration on its own, or
chose to be included under a State declaration.
There is now a greater level of understanding of local threat
characteristics and how the integrated emergency management response
would occur. With a common methodology, response plans identify courses
of action that drill down to the county/parish level.
Creation of FEMA Corps
Created in 2012, FEMA Corps is a partnership between The
Corporation for National and Community Service and FEMA that
establishes a new track of up to 1,600 Service Corps Members within
AmeriCorps National Civilian Community Corps (NCCC) dedicated to
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery. This partnership builds
on the historic collaboration between the two agencies and will enhance
the Federal Government's disaster capabilities, increase the
reliability and diversity of the disaster workforce, promote an ethic
of service, expand education and economic opportunity for young people,
and achieve significant cost savings for the American taxpayer. When
the program is at full operational capability, and in an average
disaster year, we expect to see a savings of approximately $60 million
in a year.
In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, FEMA Corps played an important role
in assisting the agency with Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs),
canvassing door-to-door, delivering supplies, and registering
individuals and businesses for Individual Assistance and Public
Assistance grants. Their involvement in response and recovery efforts
across the country serve not only as a National resource today, but
ensure that we are cultivating the next generation of emergency
managers capable of supporting our Nation in the future.
conclusion
The destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina reminds us all that we
cannot become complacent. In fact, we can't afford to as there are many
communities throughout the Gulf Coast States still recovering from the
impacts of Katrina.
There are many lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, and those
lessons continue to help reshape, reform, and restructure our agency.
With the support of Congress and our whole community partners, FEMA is
leaning forward both in policy and in practice.
I am proud of how our agency has evolved, but I also recognize that
we have much more work to do. Thank you again for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I am happy to answer any questions that the
subcommittee may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Administrator Fugate.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Koon for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRYAN KOON, DIRECTOR, FLORIDA DIVISION OF
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Koon. Thank you, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee for holding this
important hearing today. As director of the Florida Division of
Emergency Management and president of the National Emergency
Management Association I am pleased to be here to discuss
preparedness and response capabilities on a National level.
As you have heard Administrator Fugate say, emergency
management is a whole community endeavor involving all levels
of government, the private sector, voluntary organizations, and
individual citizens. While emergency preparedness and response
capabilities are critical on the Federal level, it is important
to emphasize that they are only part of the capabilities
Nation-wide.
Today, I will focus on leveraging the preparedness and
response capabilities that we have in our States and
localities, as well as addressing opportunities for continued
improvement.
One of the greatest tools this Nation has is the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact. Ratified by Congress in 1996,
EMAC allows States to share resources amongst themselves during
disasters. It has been an overwhelming success and its use
continues to grow.
Most recently, 8 States sent 849 personnel to South
Carolina to assist with their flood-fighting efforts. These
deployments reduce the need for Federal resources and also
benefits the home States.
To quote Billy Estep, the Nassau County Emergency Managing
Director who deployed to South Carolina as part of the
Northeast Florida Incident Management team, ``No matter how
hard we try or how sophisticated our process we cannot recreate
this type of learning in an exercise environment. I feel these
opportunities are vital to our preparedness efforts both
locally and state-wide.''
The capability that the States and locals build to respond
to disasters both at home and through EMAC is often funded by
the Emergency Management Performance Grant. EMPG is the only
source of Federal funding directed to State and local
governments for planning, training, exercises, and key
professional expertise for all-hazards emergency preparedness.
EMPG is also used for public awareness and outreach
campaigns. Each year, Emergency Management agencies conduct
thousands of these engagements, reaching over 135 million
residents last year alone. Recipients of this grant continue
demonstrating a strong commitment for every dollar of Federal
funds invested; at least that much is matched by the recipient.
In the absence of these funds, State and local governments
would struggle to maintain the personnel or capabilities
necessary to build and sustain an effective emergency
management system.
Opportunities for improvement continue to exist. One such
area is the National Flood Insurance program. Much attention
has been paid to the NFIP over the last several years, and
rightly so. Although reforms have been implemented, Americans
remain under-insured against the threat posed by flooding, our
most prevalent hazard, and the trend line for the number of
flood policies Nation-wide continues to decline.
Too often, we watch our communities flood, only to hear
from residents that they did not have the appropriate coverage.
In the absence of insurance, they are reliant upon charitable
organizations and Governmental aid that its not designed to
make them whole. This delays the recovery of the community and
threatens it very existence.
We must redouble our efforts to design a system that helps
people evaluate and plan for their individual risk, while
simultaneously reducing our collective risk.
Concurrent with improving our insurance coverage is the
need for improved mitigation. To truly ensure that we are
prepared, we must incentivize and facilitate more resilient
communities. This point was made in the GAO's recent report
that reviewed Federal efforts during Hurricane Sandy recovery.
State and local officials reported that they were able to
effectively leverage Federal programs to enhance disaster
resilience, but also experienced challenges that could result
in missed opportunities.
Challenges in linking recovery and mitigation projects,
navigating multiple funding streams, and differing regulations
among the programs impact the desire and ability of local
communities and homeowners to take advantage of the
opportunities afforded by these programs.
The report indicated that the current program works, but is
constrained by its structure and implementation. Just as FEMA
has designed its response program to be survivor-centric, it
should also work to develop mitigation programs that are
community-centric and administered in a way to make mitigation
a clear and viable solution for the future.
We have made tremendous strides in the Nation's ability to
deal with disasters, and are on track for continued
improvement.
By investing in and leveraging the capabilities that exist
with the individual at the State and local level, the private
sector, and through our partnerships with organizations like
the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army, we can most
effectively determine the gaps that remain and should be filled
by FEMA and its Federal partners.
We appreciate the continued support of this subcommittee to
the emergency management community, as we work together in
forming new policies and procedures aimed at making these
disasters less impactful on our communities and constituents.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
welcome any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bryan Koon
October 22, 2015
introduction
Thank you Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of
the subcommittee for holding this important hearing today. As director
of the Florida Division of Emergency Management and president of NEMA,
which represents the State emergency management directors of the 50
States, territories, and District of Columbia, I am pleased to be here
to discuss preparedness and response capabilities on a National level.
As we look back on the tenth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina and
anticipate the upcoming third anniversary of Hurricane Sandy, this
timely hearing gives us an opportunity to discuss the lessons we have
learned and the changes we are working toward for the future.
As you have heard Administrator Fugate say throughout his tenure,
emergency management is a ``whole community'' endeavor. It involves the
public sector, the private sector, voluntary organizations, and
individual citizens--all of whom are crucial to preparing for disasters
and responding to and recovering from them. While emergency
preparedness and response capabilities are critical on the Federal
level, it is important to emphasize that they are only a part of the
capabilities Nation-wide. In my testimony this morning, I will focus on
leveraging the preparedness and response capabilities that we have in
our States and localities. Specifically, I will discuss the importance
of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact and the value that the
Emergency Management Performance Grant plays in assisting the whole
community.
national emergency preparedness and response capabilities
As Hurricane Joaquin moved towards the East Coast, South Carolina
closely monitored the storm and its projected tracks. While the
Hurricane did not make landfall in South Carolina, moisture from it
did. The State received very heavy rainfall for several days. In fact,
the official State-wide 24-hour rainfall record was exceeded in several
locations. This storm led to historic flooding which caused the tragic
deaths of 19 people and State-wide property damage.
President Barack Obama signed a State-wide emergency declaration on
October 5, 2015, authorizing Federal aid in anticipation of more rain.
However, resources from other States were already at work utilizing the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC).
EMAC has played an important role in facilitating collaboration
among States and enabling them to share resources and capabilities.
When States and the U.S. territories joined together and Congress
ratified EMAC (Pub. L. 104-321) in 1996, it created a legal and
procedural mechanism whereby emergency response resources such as Urban
Search and Rescue Teams could quickly move throughout the country to
meet disaster needs. All 50 States, the District of Columbia, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Guam are members of EMAC and have
committed their emergency resources in helping one another during times
of disaster or emergency.
Since its ratification by Congress, EMAC has grown significantly in
size, volume, and the types of resources States are able to deploy. For
example, over 67,000 personnel from a variety of disciplines deployed
through EMAC to the Gulf Coast in response to Hurricanes Katrina and
Rita, and 12,279 personnel deployed to Texas and Louisiana during
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike. More recent uses of EMAC have included the
response for the manhunt in Pennsylvania, severe weather in
Mississippi, wildfires in Washington, tropical storms in Hawaii, and
the historic snowstorms in Massachusetts.
For the historic flooding in South Carolina, 849 people have been
deployed through EMAC to assist with response and recovery efforts.
Resources and personnel have been received from 8 States including
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
North Dakota, and Tennessee. In fact, additional States made offers of
assistance.
Through EMAC, capabilities and resources such as Incident
Management Teams, Damage Assessment Teams, a National Flood Insurance
Program Administrator, a Volunteer Agency Liaison, Hazard Mitigation
Officers, a Recovery Chief, Public Assistance Officers, and Individual
Assistance Officers were deployed to South Carolina. EMAC has made it
easier for States to assist each other effectively--with the added
benefit of lessening the need for Federal resources in the process.
Utilizing EMAC not only benefits the receiving State but also those
who are deployed. The County Emergency Management Director, Billy
Estep, from Nassau County, Florida said the following upon returning
from a mission in South Carolina, ``I want to stress the most important
lesson learned from this deployment: No matter how hard we try or how
sophisticated our process, we cannot recreate this type of learning in
an exercise environment. I implore Florida Division of Emergency
Management (FDEM) leadership to continue and expand their obvious
support for these opportunities, and keep utilization of these teams
acutely focused on the all-hazards concepts which made us nimble enough
to adapt to our wide-breadth of assigned missions. I feel these
opportunities are vital to our preparedness efforts both locally and
State-wide.''
Building Capacity with EMPG
In addition to leveraging EMAC for resources during disaster
response, States and locals also build capacity and enhance their
capability to respond to disasters when they utilized the Emergency
Management Performance Grants (EMPG). EMPG is the only source of
Federal funding directed to State and local governments for planning,
training, exercises, and key professional expertise for all-hazards
emergency preparedness. The money is often used to conduct risk and
hazard assessments and support emergency operations centers which are
the coordination hubs for all disaster response. The program also
provides public education and outreach, enhanced interoperable
communications capabilities, and the ability to manage State-wide
alerts and warnings.
For example, in fiscal year 2014, EMPG significantly contributed to
public awareness and outreach campaign efforts. Local, Tribal, and
State emergency management officials conducted 5,886 local and Tribal
and 1,295 State-wide citizen and community preparedness outreach
campaigns. According to State responses, these outreach programs
benefited 135,568,054 residents while locally-specific programs
impacted 24,608,092 citizens.
Recipients of this grant continue demonstrating a strong
commitment; for every dollar of Federal funds invested, at least that
much is matched by both grantees and sub-grantees. In the absence of
these funds, State and local governments would struggle to maintain the
personnel or capabilities necessary to build and sustain an effective
emergency management system. EMPG stands as the beacon of Congressional
commitment to ensuring communities and States are more ready to
prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from any number of emergencies
and disasters. EMPG does far more, however, than provide funds for
planning, training, exercises, and communications. EMPG must continue
to be strengthened and maintained through shared investments.
continuing to improve our policies and programs
After Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act of 2006. This legislation expanded the FEMA
mission, creating stronger regions and adding the responsibility of
homeland security preparedness.
After Hurricane Sandy, in response to the needs of the State and
local governments, Congress once again immediately took action to make
serious improvements to the Stafford Act through the Sandy Recovery
Improvement Act. This legislation not only helped facilitate a smooth
recovery in the Sandy-impacted area, but also forever changes FEMA
programs and policies. Some of the provisions of SRIA, such as the
debris removal pilot program, have been supported by NEMA for many
years.
Just as we reviewed policies and programs after Hurricanes Katrina
and Sandy we must continue to review the programs and policies that we
use today. The measure of success related to disaster response and
recovery lies in the overarching programs which help guide our
policies. In order to gauge our success we must continue to review and
reform programs such as the National Flood Insurance Program.
Much attention has been paid to the NFIP over the last several
years, and rightly so. Reforms have been implemented that are designed
to stabilize the program, but the desired outcome is still many years
away. In the mean time, however, we as a Nation are still grossly
underinsured against the threat posed by flooding, our most prevalent
hazard. Time after time we watch as our communities flood, only to hear
from residents that they did not have the appropriate coverage. In the
absence of insurance, they are reliant upon their on fiscal ability,
the generosity of the charitable organizations, and Federal and State
aid that is not designed to make them whole. Such situations delay the
recovery of a community and threaten its very existence. We as a Nation
must redouble our efforts to design a system that helps people evaluate
their individual risk and plan accordingly while simultaneously
reducing our collective risk.
The lack of appropriate coverage is not limited to flood; too few
Americans truly understand their vulnerability to earthquakes and
landslides. The Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) ``megathrust'' fault is
a long dipping fault that stretches from Northern Vancouver Island to
Cape Mendocino California. This area creates the largest earthquakes in
the world, and has produced magnitude 9.0 or greater earthquakes in the
past, and undoubtedly will in the future. New research using land
deposits found at the bottom of the ocean points to a 1 in 3 chance of
a major earthquake in the Pacific Northwest in the next 50 years.
Recovering from a large-scale earthquake in this area would be
complicated tremendously by the lack of appropriate insurance coverage,
and would result in tremendous costs to government at all levels.
disasters: growing in intensity
The historic flooding in South Carolina is just one example of the
growing intensity in disasters. The year 2015 has been among the most
devastating on record for wildfires in the United States, with more
than 9 million acres burned so far this year, according to the National
Interagency Fire Center. Over the course of the year, fires have
stretched across the western half of the country, and are currently
raging in California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Wyoming,
and Texas.
The number of acres destroyed by fires have been rising
significantly, which experts attribute to hotter, drier conditions that
make the blazes harder to contain. With such a high volume of fires,
floods, and other disasters the need for mitigation efforts is growing
increasingly more important. Mitigation activities can take many forms
and the use of mitigation programs often differ by region. What does
not differ, however, is the return on investment of these programs.
FEMA's mitigation programs have been effective in reducing the property
damage, personal and commercial hardship, as well as long-lasting
monetary burdens after a disaster.
Mitigation is the first and the last step in a jurisdiction's
overall readiness. And while many communities have the desire to harden
their infrastructure, they lack the resources and technical ability
necessary to do so. If we are to truly ensure that we are prepared as a
Nation, we must increase our efforts to prepare our built environment
for future disasters by incentivizing and facilitating mitigation. This
point was made in the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report, Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the Federal
Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters that
reviewed Federal efforts to strengthen disaster resilience during
Hurricane Sandy recovery. The report addressed how Federal recovery
funds were used to enhance resilience, the extent to which States and
localities were able to maximize Federal funding to enhance resilience;
and actions that could enhance resilience for future disasters.
State and local officials from the States affected by Hurricane
Sandy GAO contacted, reported that they were able to effectively
leverage Federal programs to enhance disaster resilience, but also
experienced challenges that could result in missed opportunities. The
challenges fell into three categories:
Implementation challenges with PA and HMGP--for example,
officials reported that FEMA officials did not always help them
pursue opportunities to incorporate mitigation into permanent
construction recovery projects;
Limitations on comprehensive risk reduction approaches in a
post-disaster environment--for example, officials reported
difficulties with navigating multiple funding streams and
various regulations of the different Federal programs funded
after Hurricane Sandy; and
Local ability and willingness to participate--for example,
officials reported that some home and business owners were
unwilling or unable to bear the required personal cost share
for a home-elevation or other mitigation project.
This report indicates that the current program works, but is
constrained by its structure and implementation. Just as FEMA has
designed its response program to be ``survivor-centric'', it should
also work to develop mitigation programs that are ``community-centric''
and administered in a way to make mitigation a clear and viable
solution for the future.
understanding what works
While we still have work to do in reviewing and implementing
policies and programs, FEMA has undertaken efforts to improve many
processes and programs. The agency has made many advances in refining
their back-office operations such as improving their hiring,
management, information technology, and procurement systems. FEMA has
also encouraged the use of current codes and standards in existence for
mitigation rather than using cost-benefit analysis formulas.
The Public Assistance Reengineering is an excellent example of FEMA
working to improve and maximize existing programs. While it is still
too early to determine the effectiveness of the change, we are pleased
with the effort and urge that similar reforms be considered by other
programs that impact our ability to mitigate, prepare, and recover.
Throughout their strategic plan, FEMA has made it a priority to
build capability for catastrophic disasters. They have moved the focus
away from being singularly on Stafford Act programs and instead looked
at the Nation's resources to recover. Preparing for catastrophic
disasters has led FEMA to ensure that all employees are now deployable
emergency managers. The agency has started to train each employee,
regardless of the department or position, so that they can be deployed
as needed.
FEMA has also made it a priority to become an expeditionary
organization. The agency has increased and improved engagement across
the preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation missions while
also working towards reducing disaster risk Nationally. The agency has
focused on providing mitigation programs with a focus on future
conditions and not historical averages. The agency has worked to ensure
that the whole community uses the best available data and analytic
tools to make better risk-informed decisions before, during, and after
disasters.
conclusion
If we hope to see effective preparedness and response to disasters,
we must utilize the capabilities that we have as a Nation and allocate
resources to most effectively meet the need. The ability to share
resources will only strengthen the Nation's capability as a whole. One
of the most valuable partnerships in the whole community is between
State emergency management agencies. It's important to acknowledge that
increasing the Nation's preparedness and response capabilities doesn't
mean increasing FEMA's capabilities. Through programs such as EMAC,
which has been invaluable in deploying assets throughout the country
and enabling States to support each other more effectively, we are able
to reduce the need for Federal resources. When States work with each
other and build on the capabilities in their own States it results in
strong charitable partners like the American Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, or any of the scores of other organizations that are there when
Americans need them.
Going forward, we must encourage greater investments as States work
with one another to reduce the need for Federal assistance, reduces
Federal administrative costs, reduces property damages, and most
importantly save lives. We should also continue to support FEMA's grant
programs, such as the Emergency Management Performance Grant, funded at
a mere $350 million to be allocated between all States, the District of
Columbia, U.S. territories and thousands of local jurisdictions,
facilitates strong State and local emergency management agencies that
respond to the vast majority of incidents every day in our country. We
appreciate the continued support of this subcommittee to the emergency
management community as we work together in forming new policies and
procedures aimed at making these disasters less impactful on our
communities and constituents.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and welcome any
questions you may have.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Koon.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Currie for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT,
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS AND CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Currie. Thank you, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Thompson, other Members of the committee. We really appreciate
the opportunity to be able to be here and testify.
Before I get into some of our specific work that we have
done at GAO in this area, I would like to make a couple broader
points.
FEMA is a much different organization than it was in 2005,
and has made a lot of progress. I think the proactive
preplanning and response to Sandy were evidence of that, and
that the Federal Government at large was much better prepared
for another catastrophic storm.
However, FEMA and other agencies operate in a different
disaster and fiscal environment today. Extreme weather events
are now the norm, and Federal disaster spending has exploded.
It is not just traditional disaster relief funds from FEMA.
Now, many other Federal agencies are contributing more to
disaster relief either directly or indirectly.
Over the last decade, we at GAO have reported on progress
and challenges, as you mentioned, in numerous areas, including
efforts to implement over 300 provisions in the Post-Katrina
Act.
Today, I would like to focus on some of our work in three
of those areas. The first is National preparedness, the second
is response and recovery, and the third is what I would
categorize as FEMA management issues.
So let me talk a little bit about preparedness or, just
more simply, how capable we are to respond to a disaster. Some
of the biggest changes to FEMA in the Post-Katrina Act were in
this area. For example, there has been much progress in
establishing the coordinating structures, or the emergency
support functions, across the Federal Government.
Also, FEMA and other agencies have conducted numerous
exercises to test their readiness and identify capability gaps.
Challenges still exist in this area, though. Specifically, FEMA
doesn't necessarily control other Federal departments'
preparedness efforts and resources.
For example, FEMA manages National-level exercises, but we
found that other agencies don't always report back on actions
they took to close the gaps that are identified during those
exercises. So this impacts FEMA's ability to assess overall
preparedness.
The second area I would like to talk about is response and
recovery. Again, there has been much progress since the
problems we remember after Katrina. But more work is still
needed.
For example, we have recently evaluated FEMA disaster
payments to individuals, which was discussed in the opening
statements, after Sandy and compared them to Katrina. Due to
better controls that FEMA implemented after Katrina, we found
about 2.7 percent of payments at risk of being improper or
potentially fraudulent--it doesn't mean that those were all
fraudulent--compared to upwards of 22 percent after Katrina.
So this is unbelievably great progress, given the challenge
that Mr. Fugate mentioned of getting money out quickly but
making sure it is to the right people.
However, there are still improvements and some challenges
that exist, such as ability to validate Social Security numbers
with the Social Security Administration, and we made some
recommendations to address these issues.
I would also like to emphasize our work on mitigation and
resilience-building during recoveries. Given the increase in
Federal costs and extreme weather, mitigation is one of the few
solutions to buy down risk and decrease future cost. Mr. Koon
talked about this in his opening. We have reported recently
that resilience-building efforts were a much higher priority in
Sandy recovery, and States were able to use a number of the
Federal programs to mitigate against future disasters. However,
more work is needed to break down the barriers that still exist
in mitigation.
For example, States and locals had difficulty navigating
multiple fragmented Federal programs, all with rules,
regulations, and time frames. These weren't all FEMA programs;
these are programs across the menu of Federal agencies.
We also found that the Nation lacks a comprehensive
strategic approach to prioritizing our investments in
resilience. We made recommendations to begin addressing these
issues, but determining how to better invest our resilience
dollars won't be easy.
The last area I wanted to discuss is FEMA management. For
example, FEMA has taken a number of steps to better manage and
control the rising administrative costs. Now, these are the
costs of actually providing and managing disaster assistance.
Specifically, in response to our recommendation they
developed specific goals, and a plan to better manage and try
to reduce these costs.
Also, over the last decade we and others have found
continued challenges in FEMA's ability to complete and
integrate important strategic workforce planning efforts. We
just reported, back in July, that the agency had not completed
its plan to identify workforce gaps and lacked data on the cost
and performance of certain workforce components. That has been
a pretty consistent message across some of our reports over the
last 5 to 7 years.
So this completes my prepared remarks. I look forward to
the discussion, and any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris P. Currie
October 22, 2015
emergency management.--fema has made progress since hurricanes katrina
and sandy, but challenges remain
gao-16-90t
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to testify today about
efforts by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to more efficiently lead
the Nation's efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from
disasters and manage aspects of its operations to support these
efforts. We have reported on a broad range of issues and currently have
on-going work for this committee related to FEMA's disaster programs
and operations. The anniversaries of Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy
provide a valuable opportunity to assess FEMA's progress and challenges
in National disaster preparedness and response and recovery efforts, as
well as its management.
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was the largest, most destructive natural
disaster in our Nation's history. FEMA estimated that Hurricane Katrina
caused an estimated $108 billion in damages. Following the Federal
response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Congress passed the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act).\1\ The act
enhanced FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS and
contained over 300 provisions that call for DHS or FEMA action to
implement requirements or exercise authorities--or to be prepared to do
so under the appropriate condition. After the Post-Katrina Act was
enacted, we conducted reviews and issued multiple reports that
discussed a wide variety of these emergency management issues
reflecting the Federal Government and FEMA's efforts to implement
provisions of the Post-Katrina and improve National disaster
preparedness, and response and recovery.\2\ A selection of our related
reports is attached to my statement. Hurricane Sandy struck the United
States in October 2012, causing an estimated $65 billion in damages,
once again testing FEMA and the Federal Government's ability to respond
to catastrophic disasters.
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\1\ 6 U.S.C. 721, 723; 42 U.S.C. 5144. The Post-Katrina Act
was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006).
\2\ Two reports focused explicitly on the Post-Katrina Act; see
GAO, Actions Taken to Implement the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Reform Act of 2006, GAO-09-59R, (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2008); and
GAO, National Preparedness: Actions Taken by FEMA to Implement Select
Provisions of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,
GAO-14-99R: (Washington, DC: Nov. 26, 2013).
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The initial response to a disaster is the job of local government's
emergency services with help from nearby municipalities, the State and
volunteer agencies. In a catastrophic disaster, if the Governor
requests, Federal resources can be mobilized through FEMA for search
and rescue, electrical power, food, water, shelter, and other basic
human needs. The long-term recovery phase of disaster places the most
severe financial strain on local or State government and damage to
public facilities and infrastructure, often not insured, can overwhelm
even a large city. We have recognized the rise in the number--and the
increase in severity--of disasters as a key source of Federal fiscal
exposure.\3\ Similarly, managing fiscal exposure due to climate change
has been on our high-risk list since 2013, in part, because of concerns
about the increasing costs of disaster response and recovery
efforts.\4\
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\3\ The term fiscal exposure refers to the responsibilities,
programs, and activities that may either legally commit the Federal
Government to future spending or create the expectation for future
spending. See GAO Fiscal Exposures: Improving Cost Recognition in the
Federal Budget, GAO-14-28 (Washington, DC: Oct. 29, 2013). Also, see
GAO's Federal Fiscal Outlook webpage: http://www.gao.gov/
fiscal_outlook/federal_fiscal_outlook/overview#t=3.
\4\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-15-290 (Washington, DC:
Feb. 11, 2015); also http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/
limiting_federal_government_fiscal_exposure/why_did- _study.
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My testimony today discusses progress FEMA has made and challenges
that FEMA faces in three areas: (1) National preparedness, (2) disaster
response and recovery, and (3) selected FEMA management areas.
This statement is based on our prior work and focuses on reports
issued from September 2012 through September 2015. To conduct our prior
work, we reviewed relevant Presidential directives, laws, regulations,
policies, and strategic plans; surveyed States; and interviewed
Federal, State, and industry officials, among others. More information
on our scope and methodology can be found in each of the reports cited
throughout this statement.
The work upon which this testimony is based was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
national preparedness
Interagency Emergency Support Capability Assessments
In December 2014, we reported on the progress the departments that
coordinate Federal emergency support functions (ESF)\5\ have made in
conducting a range of coordination, planning, and capability assessment
activities.\6\ For example, all 10 ESF coordinators identified at least
one nonemergency activity through which they coordinate with their
ESFs' primary and support agencies.\7\ Further, all 10 ESF coordinators
identified at least one planning document--in addition to the
information contained in the NRF's ESF annexes--that they had developed
for their ESFs to further define the roles, responsibilities, policies,
and procedures for their ESFs' coordination and execution.
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\5\ Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are Federal interagency
coordinating structures that group capabilities into functional areas
most frequently needed in a National response. The ESFs are described
in annexes to the National Response Framework (NRF), a guide to how the
Nation responds to disasters and emergencies of all types and describes
the principles, roles and responsibilities, and coordinating structures
for delivering the core capabilities required to save lives, protect
property and the environment, stabilize communities, and meet basic
human needs following an incident. The NRF includes various annexes,
including those on ESFs.
\6\ DHS issued the National Preparedness Goal in September 2011
which defines what it means to be prepared for all types of disasters
and emergencies. The goal envisions a secure and resilient Nation with
the capabilities required to prevent, protect against, mitigate,
respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the
greatest risk.
\7\ The following 10 ESFs included in our review: Public Works and
Engineering; Energy; Public Health and Medical Services;
Communications; Information and Planning; Mass Care, Emergency
Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services; Logistics; Search
and Rescue; External Affairs; and Public Safety and Security.
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We found, however, that the ESF Leadership Group and FEMA,\8\ as
the group's chair, had not worked with other Federal departments to
issue supplemental guidance detailing expectations for the minimum
standards for activities and product deliverables necessary to
demonstrate ESF preparedness.\9\ In the absence of such guidance, we
found that ESF coordinators are inconsistently carrying out their
emergency response preparedness activities. We also found that, while
Federal departments have identified emergency response capability gaps
through National-level exercises, real-world incidents, such as
Hurricane Sandy and other assessments, the status of Federal
interagency implementation of these actions is not comprehensively
collected by or reported to DHS or FEMA and, as a result, DHS's and
FEMA's ability to assess and report on the Nation's overall
preparedness is hampered. Further, we found that FEMA's plan to lead
interagency actions to identify and address capability gaps in the
Nation's preparedness to respond to improvised nuclear device (IND)
attacks did not contain detailed program management information--such
as specific time frames, milestones, and estimated resources required
to close any given capability gap--which is needed to better enable on-
going management oversight of gap closure efforts.
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\8\ FEMA chairs the ESF Leadership Group, which is composed of the
Federal departments and agencies that are designated as ESF
coordinators. The ESF Leadership Group exists to coordinate
responsibilities, resolve interagency operational and preparedness
issues, and provide planning guidance and oversight for developing
interagency response plans and activities.
\9\ GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen
Interagency Assessments and Accountability for Closing Capability Gaps,
GAO-15-20 (Washington, DC: Dec. 4, 2014).
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In our December 2014 report, we recommended that FEMA--in
collaboration with other Federal agencies--(1) issue supplemental
guidance to ESF coordinators detailing minimum standards for activities
and product deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness,
develop and (2) issue detailed program management information to better
enable management oversight of the DHS IND Strategy's recommended
actions, and (3) regularly report on the status of corrective actions
identified through prior National-level exercises and real-world
disasters. DHS concurred with our recommendations and FEMA has taken
actions in response. For example, in June 2015, FEMA issued guidance
for ESF coordinators that details minimum standards for activities and
product deliverables necessary to demonstrate ESF preparedness. The ESF
Leadership Group established a set of preparedness performance metrics
to guide ESF coordination, planning, and capabilities assessment
efforts. The ESF Leadership Group-generated metrics set standardized
performance targets and preparedness actions across the ESFs.
Collectively, the metrics and reporting of these metrics should provide
an opportunity to better measure preparedness efforts by assessing if
ESF coordination and planning is sufficient, and whether required ESF
capabilities are available for disaster response. In addition, FEMA
developed a detailed program plan to provide a quantitative analysis of
current work and addressing existing capability gaps linked to a
project management tracking system to identify specific dates for past,
present, and upcoming milestones for its IND Program. We believe that
FEMA's actions in these areas have fully met the intent of these two
recommendations. FEMA officials also collected information on the
status of National Level Exercise Corrective Actions from 2007-2014, an
important step to respond to our other recommendation and we are
continuing to monitor FEMA's efforts in this area, however it has not
provided a time frame for its completion.
Disaster Logistics
We recently reported in September 2015 on FEMA's progress in
working with its Federal partners to implement the National Response
Framework (NRF) Emergency Support Function No. 7 (ESF 7) Logistics
Annex.\10\ We found that FEMA's efforts reflect leading practices for
interagency collaboration and enhance ESF 7 preparedness. For example,
FEMA's Logistics Management Directorate (LMD) has facilitated meetings
and established interagency agreements with ESF 7 partners such as the
Department of Defense and the General Services Administration, and
identified needed quantities of disaster response commodities, such as
food, water, and blankets. Additionally, FEMA tracks the percentage of
disaster response commodities delivered by agreed-upon dates, and
available through FEMA and its ESF 7 partners. Regarding FEMA's support
of its State and local stakeholders, we found that FEMA could
strengthen the implementation of its Logistics Capability Assessment
Tool (LCAT). For example, FEMA--through LMD and its regional offices--
has made progress in offering training and exercises for State and
local stakeholders, developing the LCAT, and establishing an
implementation program to help State and local stakeholders use the
tool to determine their readiness to respond to, disasters. However, we
found that, while feedback from States that have used the LCAT has
generally been positive, implementation of the program by FEMA's
regional offices has been inconsistent; 3 of 10 regional offices no
longer promote or support LCAT assessments. Further, LMD did not
identify staff resources needed to implement the program, and did not
develop program goals, milestones, or measures to assess the
effectiveness of implementation efforts.
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\10\ GAO, Emergency Management: FEMA Collaborates Effectively with
Logistics Partners but Could Strengthen Implementation of Its
Capabilities Assessment Tool, GAO-15-781, (Washington, DC: Sep 10,
2015).
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In our September 2015 report, we recommended that FEMA identify the
LMD and regional resources needed to implement the LCAT, and establish
and use goals, milestones, and performance measures to report on the
LCAT program implementation. DHS concurred with the recommendations and
is taking actions to address them. For example, FEMA officials said
they intend to work closely with regional staff to identify resources
and develop a plan to monitor LCAT performance.
We also reported on the status of FEMA's development of the
Logistics Supply Chain Management System (LSCMS) as part of a broader
look at 22 acquisition programs at DHS, in April 2015.\11\ We reported
that, according to FEMA officials, LSCMS can identify when a shipment
leaves a warehouse and the location of a shipment after it reaches a
FEMA staging area near a disaster location. At the time of our review,
LSCMS could not track partner organizations' shipments en route to a
FEMA staging area, and lacked automated interfaces with its partners'
information systems. We also reported that DHS leadership had not yet
approved a baseline establishing the program's cost, schedule, and
performance parameters. According to FEMA officials, FEMA's partners
and vendors can now receive orders directly from LSCMS and manually
input their shipment data directly into a vendor portal, providing FEMA
with the ability to track orders and shipments from time and date of
shipment to the estimated time of arrival, but not the in-transit real-
time location of shipments. They also said that the program baseline
was still under consideration by DHS leadership at the time of our
review. In addition, DHS's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) issued
a report on LSCMS in September 2014.\12\ The DHS OIG made 11
recommendations designed to address operational deficiencies that FEMA
concurred with, such as identifying resources to ensure effective
program management and developing a training program for staff. As of
July 2015, FEMA officials report that 5 of the OIG's recommendations
have been implemented, and the agency is taking steps to address the
remaining 6 recommendations.\13\
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\11\ GAO, Homeland Security Acquisitions: Major Program Assessments
Reveal Actions Needed to Improve Accountability, GAO-15-171SP
(Washington, DC: Apr. 22, 2015). Since this report was focused
generally on DHS's major acquisition programs, we made no
recommendations specific to LSCMS.
\12\ DHS OIG, FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System May
Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster, OIG-14-151,
Washington, DC: Sept. 22, 2014).
\13\ GAO, Emergency Management: FEMA Collaborates Effectively with
Logistics Partners but Could Strengthen Implementation of Its
Capabilities Assessment Tool, GAO-15-781, (Washington, DC: Sept. 10,
2015).
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Because of our own update on the status of LSCMS development, as
well as DHS OIG's review of LSCMS, we did not include a review of LSCMS
operations in the scope of our logistics report.
In addition to these completed reviews of preparedness efforts, we
currently have work underway for this committee assessing how FEMA's
regional coordination efforts support National preparedness.
Specifically, we plan to assess and report on FEMA's management of
preparedness grants, implementation of the National Incident Management
System, and interactions with regional advisory councils later this
year.
disaster response and recovery
Disaster Declarations
In September 2012, we reported on FEMA's processes for determining
whether to recommend major disaster declarations.\14\ We found that
FEMA primarily relied on a single criterion, the per capita damage
indicator, to determine whether to recommend to the President that a
jurisdiction receive Public Assistance (PA) funding.\15\ However,
because FEMA's current per capita indicator at the time of our report,
set at $1 in 1986, did not reflect the rise in: (1) Per capita personal
income since it was created in 1986 or (2) inflation from 1986 to 1999,
the indicator was artificially low.\16\ Further, the per capita
indicator did not accurately reflect a jurisdiction's capability to
respond to or recover from a disaster without Federal assistance. We
identified other measures of fiscal capacity, such as total taxable
resources, that could be more useful in determining a jurisdiction's
ability to pay for damages to public structures. We also reported that
FEMA can recommend increasing the usual proportion (75 percent) of
costs the Federal Government pays (Federal share) for PA (to 90
percent) when costs get to a certain level. However, FEMA had no
specific criteria for assessing requests to raise the Federal share for
emergency work to 100 percent, but relied on its professional judgment.
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\14\ GAO, Federal Disaster Assistance: Improved Criteria Needed to
Assess a Jurisdiction's Capability to Respond and Recover on Its Own,
GAO-12-838, (Washington, DC: Sept. 12, 2012).
\15\ The Public Assistance program provides for debris removal;
emergency protective measures; and the repair, replacement, or
restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly-owned facilities and the
facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations that provide
services otherwise performed by a Government agency.
\16\ The indicator would have been $3.57 in 2011 had it been
adjusted for increases in per capita income and $2.07 in 2012 had it
been adjusted for inflation from 1986 to 1999, rather than $1.35.
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In our September 2012 report, we recommended, among other things,
that FEMA develop a methodology to more accurately assess a
jurisdiction's capability to respond to and recover from a disaster
without Federal assistance, develop criteria for 100 percent cost
adjustments, and implement goals for and monitor administrative costs.
FEMA concurred with the first two recommendations, but partially
concurred with the third, saying it would conduct a review before
taking additional action. Since that time, FEMA has submitted a report
to Congress outlining various options that the agency could take to
assess a jurisdiction's capability to respond to and recover from a
disaster. We met with FEMA in April 2015 to discuss its report to
Congress. FEMA officials told us that the agency would need to
undertake the rulemaking process to implement a new methodology that
provides a more comprehensive assessment of a jurisdiction's capability
to respond and recover from a disaster without Federal assistance. They
said that they identified three potential options, which taken
individually or in some combination would implement our recommendation
by: (1) Adjusting the PA per capita indicator to better reflect current
National and State-specific economic conditions; (2) developing an
improved methodology for considering factors in addition to the PA per
capita indicator; or (3) implementing a State-specific deductible for
States to qualify for PA.\17\ Although FEMA initially concurred with
our recommendation to develop criteria for 100 percent cost
adjustments, it has concluded that it will not establish specific
criteria or factors to use when evaluating requests for cost share
adjustments. FEMA conducted a historical review of the circumstances
that previously led to these cost share adjustments, and determined
that each circumstance was unique in nature and could not be used to
develop criteria or factors for future decision making. Based on FEMA's
review and its clarification of the intent to use cost share
adjustments during only rare catastrophic events, we agreed that their
decision could lead to better stewardship of Federal dollars.
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\17\ Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, FEMA's Response to GAO-12-838 Fiscal Year 2015 Report to GAO,
(Washington, DC: Mar. 31, 2015.)
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Disaster Assistance Payments To Individuals
In December 2014, we reported on FEMA's progress in improving its
ability to detect improper and potentially fraudulent payments.
Specifically, while safeguards were generally not effective after
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the controls FEMA implemented since then,
designed to improve its capacity to verify applicants' eligibility for
assistance, have improved the agency's ability to prevent improper or
potentially fraudulent Individuals and Households Program (IHP)
payments. We reported that as of August 2014, FEMA stated that it had
provided over $1.4 billion in Hurricane Sandy assistance through its
IHP--which provides financial awards for home repairs, rental
assistance, and other needs--to almost 183,000 survivors. We identified
$39 million or 2.7 percent of that total that was at risk of being
improper or fraudulent compared to 10 to 22 percent of similar
assistance provided for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
However in December 2014, we identified continued challenges in the
agency's response to Hurricane Sandy, including weaknesses in the
agency's validation of Social Security numbers, among other things.\18\
Although FEMA hired contractors to inspect damaged homes to verify the
identity and residency of applicants and that reported damage was a
result of Hurricane Sandy, we found 2,610 recipients with potentially
invalid identifying information who received $21 million of the $39
million we calculated as potentially improper or fraudulent. Our
analysis included data from the Social Security Administration (SSA)
that FEMA does not use, such as SSA's most-complete death records. We
also found that FEMA and State governments faced challenges in
obtaining the data necessary to help prevent duplicative payments from
overlapping sources. In addition, FEMA relied on self-reported data
from applicants regarding private home insurance--a factor the agency
uses in determining benefits, as Federal law prohibits FEMA from
providing assistance for damage covered by private insurance; however
that data can be unreliable.
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\18\ GAO, Hurricane Sandy: FEMA Has Improved Disaster Aid
Verification but Could Act to Further Limit Improper Assistance, GAO-
15-15, (Washington, DC: Dec. 12, 2014).
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In our December 2014 report, we recommended, among other things,
that FEMA collaborate with SSA to obtain additional data, collect data
to detect duplicative assistance, and implement an approach to verify
whether recipients have private insurance. FEMA concurred with the
report's five recommendations and has taken actions to address them.
For example, in response to our recommendations, FEMA started working
with SSA to determine the feasibility and cost effectiveness of
incorporating SSA's identify verification tools and full death file
data into its registration process, and expects to make its
determination by the end of 2015. FEMA indicated that, depending on the
determination, one option would be to enter into a Computer Matching
Agreement with SSA.
FEMA has also approved plans to improve the standardization,
quality, and accessibility of data across its own disaster assistance
programs, which includes efforts to enhance data sharing with State and
local partners, that should allow it to more readily identify
potentially duplicative assistance. Also, after reviewing various
options, FEMA has decided to add an additional question to its
application to help confirm self-reported information on whether
applicants have private insurance. We are reviewing these actions to
determine if they reflect sufficient steps to consider our
recommendations fully implemented.
Disaster Recovery and Resilience
In July 2015 we reported that during the Hurricane Sandy Recovery,
5 Federal programs--the FEMA's Public Assistance (PA) and Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP), the Federal Transit Administration's
Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development's Community Development Block Grant-
Disaster Recovery, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Hurricane
Sandy program--helped enhance disaster resilience--the ability to
prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt
to disasters.\19\ We found that these programs funded a number of
disaster-resilience measures, for example, acquiring and demolishing
at-risk properties, elevating flood-prone structures, and erecting
physical flood barriers. State and local officials from all 12 States,
the District of Columbia, and New York City in the Sandy affected-
region reported that they were able to effectively leverage Federal
programs to enhance disaster resilience, but also experienced
challenges. The challenges included implementation challenges within PA
and HMGP, limitations on comprehensive risk reduction approaches in a
post-disaster environment, and local ability and willingness to
participate in mitigation activities. We found there was no
comprehensive, strategic approach to identifying, prioritizing, and
implementing investments for disaster resilience, which increased the
risk that the Federal Government and non-Federal partners will
experience lower returns on investments or lost opportunities to
strengthen key critical infrastructure and lifelines. Most Federal
funding for hazard mitigation is available after a disaster and there
are benefits to investing in resilience post-disaster. Individuals and
communities affected by a disaster may be more likely to invest their
own resources while recovering. However, we concluded that the emphasis
on the post-disaster environment can create a reactionary and
fragmented approach where disasters determine when and for what purpose
the Federal Government invests in disaster resilience.
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\19\ GAO, Hurricane Sandy: An Investment Strategy Could Help the
Federal Government Enhance National Resilience for Future Disasters,
GAO-15-515, (Washington, DC: July 30, 2015).
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In our July 2015 report, we recommended that: (1) FEMA assess the
challenges State and local officials report and implement corrective
actions as needed and (2) the Mitigation Framework Leadership Group
(MitFLG) establish an investment strategy to identify, prioritize, and
implement Federal investments in disaster resilience.\20\ DHS agreed
with both recommendations. With respect to the challenges reported by
State and local officials, FEMA officials said it would seek input from
Federal, Tribal, State, and local stakeholders as part of its efforts
to reengineer the PA program, which it believes will address many of
the issues raised in the report. In addition, DHS said that FEMA,
though its leadership role in the MitFLG would take action to complete
an investment strategy by August 2017.
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\20\ The Mitigation Framework Leadership Group (MitFLG) is an
intergovernmental coordinating body that was created to integrate
Federal efforts and promote a National cultural shift that incorporates
risk management and hazard mitigation in all planning, decision making,
and development to the extent practicable. It was established to
coordinate mitigation efforts across the Federal Government and to
assess the effectiveness of mitigation capabilities as they are
developed and deployed across the Nation.
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We currently have work underway for this committee assessing
several of FEMA's disaster response and recovery programs. For example,
we are reviewing FEMA's urban search and rescue program, incident
management assistance teams, and evacuation planning, as well as
National disaster assistance programs for children and special needs
populations. In addition, we are reviewing DHS's National emergency
communications programs and efforts to implement the National Disaster
Recovery Framework.
fema's management efforts
Administrative Costs for Managing Disaster Assistance
In December 2014, we reported on FEMA's progress in taking steps to
reduce and better control administrative costs--the costs of providing
and managing disaster assistance.\21\ For example, FEMA issued
guidelines intended to better control its administrative costs in
November 2010.\22\ In addition, FEMA recognized that administrative
costs have increased and it has taken steps such as setting a goal in
its recent strategic plan to lower these costs, and creating
administrative cost targets. Specifically, FEMA established a goal in
its Strategic Plan for 2014-2018 to reduce its average annual
percentage of administrative costs, as compared with total program
costs, by 5 percentage points by the end of 2018. To achieve this goal,
FEMA officials developed administrative costs goals for small, medium,
and large disasters, and are monitoring performance against the goals.
However, FEMA does not require these targets be met, and we found that
had FEMA met its targets, administrative costs could have been reduced
by hundreds of millions of dollars. We found that FEMA continued to
face challenges in tracking and reducing these costs. FEMA's average
administrative cost percentages for major disasters during the 10
fiscal years 2004 to 2013 was double the average during the 10 fiscal
years 1989 to 1998.\23\ Further, we found that FEMA did not track
administrative costs by major disaster program, such as Individual or
Public Assistance, and had not assessed the costs versus the benefits
of tracking such information.
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\21\ GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Opportunities Exist
to Strengthen Oversight of Administrative Costs for Major Disasters,
GAO-15-65 (Washington, DC: Dec. 17, 2014).
\22\ FEMA, Achieving Efficient JFO Operations: A Guide for Managing
Staffing Levels and Administrative Costs (Washington, DC: November
2010).
\23\ FEMA obligated $12.7 billion from the Disaster Relief Fund
(DRF) for its administrative costs from fiscal years 2004 through 2013
that represents 13 percent of the $95.2 billion obligated from the DRF
for the 650 major disasters declared during this time frame.
In our December 2014 report, we recommended that FEMA: (1) Develop
an integrated plan to better control and reduce its administrative
costs for major disasters, (2) assess the costs versus the benefits of
tracking FEMA administrative costs by the Disaster Relief Fund program,
and (3) clarify the agency's guidance and minimum documentation
requirements for direct administrative costs. FEMA agreed with the
report and its recommendations. As of August 2015, FEMA told us it is
developing an integrated plan to control and reduce administrative
costs for major disaster declarations. According to FEMA officials,
their Disaster Administrative Cost Integrated Project Team has been
working over the past several months to analyze FEMA's historic
administrative costs, identify cost drivers, document and evaluate the
delivery of disaster assistance, and set an improved framework to
standardize the way FEMA does business.
FEMA officials previously told us that the plan will describe the
steps the agency plans take to reduce administrative costs, milestones
for accomplishing the reduction, and clear roles and responsibilities,
including the assignment of senior officials/offices responsible for
monitoring and measuring performance. FEMA also continues to assess the
costs versus the benefits of tracking administrative costs by program.
According to FEMA officials, this project requires connecting multiple
disparate data sources. FEMA has identified some, but not all of the
data which needs to be integrated in order to be able to track
administrative costs by program area. FEMA is also evaluating its
direct administrative costs pilot program, which applies a standard
fixed percentage towards administrative costs. According to FEMA, if
successful, results from this program could inform the development of
additional guidance or regulatory modification and similar approaches
could be applied in future disasters. For current and other past
disasters, FEMA told us it plans to provide clarifying guidance.
According to FEMA, this information will be incorporated into the
Public Assistance unified guidance document that is scheduled to be
issued in January 2016.
Workforce Management Efforts
In July 2015, we reported on FEMA's progress in taking steps to
address various long-standing workforce management challenges in
completing and integrating its strategic workforce planning efforts we
have identified since 2007.\24\ We found that FEMA had not yet resolved
these challenges and fully addressed our prior workforce-related
recommendations. However, according to agency officials, they plan to
do so through efforts to develop: (1) A new incident workforce planning
model--pending final approval--that will determine the optimal mix of
workforce components to include in FEMA's disaster workforce, (2) a new
Human Capital Strategic Plan that was to have been finalized in
September 2015--that will help ensure it has the optimal workforce to
carry out its mission, and (3) an executive-level steering committee to
help ensure that these workforce planning efforts are completed and
integrated. In addition, we discussed FEMA's continuing, long-standing
challenges in implementing an employee credentialing system and
addressing employee morale issues.
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\24\ GAO, Federal Emergency Management Agency: Additional Planning
and Data Collection Could Help Improve Workforce Management Efforts,
GAO-15-437 (Washington, DC: Jul 9, 2015).
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We also reported that FEMA faces challenges in implementing and
managing its two new workforce components, the Surge Capacity Force and
the FEMA Corps. (The Surge Capacity Force consists of employees of DHS
components who volunteer to deploy to provide support to FEMA in the
event of a disaster. The FEMA Corps are temporary National service
participants of the National Civilian Community Corps who complete FEMA
service projects to complement its disaster-related efforts.) For
example, as of January 2015, the Surge Capacity Force was at 26 percent
of its staffing target of 15,400 personnel, and FEMA did not have a
plan for how it will increase the number of volunteers to meet its
goals. We also found that FEMA did not collect full-cost information,
including the costs of FEMA Corps background investigations and the
costs of the salaries and benefits of Surge Capacity Force volunteers
who are paid by DHS components while they are deployed. Further, we
concluded that FEMA did not assess all aspects of program performance
because it does not have performance measures that correspond to all
program goals and that doing so would better enable FEMA to assess
whether it was meeting its program goals.
In our July 2015 report, we recommended, among other things, that
FEMA develop a plan to increase Surge Capacity Force volunteer
recruitment and collect additional cost and performance information for
its new workforce components. DHS concurred with the five
recommendations in the report and identified related actions the
Department is taking to address them, primarily focusing on FEMA's
plans to issue a new strategic workforce plan. However, FEMA has not
met its September milestone for issuing the plan, but told us it
expects to issue the plan on October 30, 2015.
Disaster Contracting Management
We reported in September 2015 on FEMA's progress in building and
managing its contracting workforce and structure to support disasters
since enactment of the Post-Katrina Act.\25\ We found that the size of
FEMA's contracting officer workforce at the end of fiscal year 2014 was
more than triple the size of its workforce at the time of Hurricane
Katrina, growing from a total of 45 contracting officers in 2005 to 163
contracting officers at the end of fiscal year 2014. FEMA's workforce
increases are due in part to the creation of a headquarters staff in
2010 charged with supporting disasters, known as the Disaster
Acquisition Response Team (DART). DART has gradually assumed
responsibility for administering the majority of FEMA's disaster
contract spending, but FEMA does not have a process for how the team
will prioritize its work when they are deployed during a busy disaster
period. During this period of growth in the size of its contracting
officer workforce, FEMA has struggled with attrition at times. We found
this turnover in FEMA's contracting officer workforce has had
particular impact on smaller regional offices which, with only one or
two contracting officers, face gaps in continuity. Further, we found
that FEMA's 2011 agreement that establishes headquarters and regional
responsibilities in overseeing regional contracting staff poses
challenges for FEMA to cohesively manage its contracting workforce. For
example, regional contracting officers have a dual reporting chain to
both regional supervisors and headquarters supervisors, which heightens
the potential for competing interests for the regional contracting
officers. Furthermore, FEMA has not updated the agreement to
incorporate lessons learned since creating DART, even though the
agreement states it will be revisited each year. We also found that
FEMA has not fully implemented the four Post-Katrina Act contracting
requirements we examined, due in part to incomplete guidance and that
inconsistent contract management practices during disaster
deployments--such as incomplete contract files and reviews--create
oversight challenges.
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\25\ GAO, Disaster Contracting: FEMA Needs to Cohesively Manage Its
Workforce and Fully Address Post-Katrina Reforms, GAO-15-783,
(Washington, DC: Sept. 29, 2015).
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In our September 2015 report, we made eight recommendations to the
FEMA administrator and one recommendation to DHS to help ensure FEMA is
prepared to manage the contract administration and oversight
requirements of several simultaneous large-scale disasters or a
catastrophic event, to improve coordination and communication between
headquarters and regional offices with respect to managing and
overseeing regional contracting officers, and to improve the
implementation of contracting provisions under the Post-Katrina Act.
DHS concurred with our recommendations and identified steps FEMA plans
to take to address them within the next year. Specifically, FEMA plans
to update relevant guidance and policies related to headquarters and
regional office roles and responsibilities for managing regional
contracting officers and disaster contracting requirements.
We currently have work underway for this committee assessing
additional FEMA management areas, including assessing FEMA's management
of information technology systems that support disaster response and
recovery programs. We plan to report on that work early next year.
Chairman McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Currie. I now recognize myself
for 5 minutes for questions.
So this is really for the whole panel at first. The Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act is now almost 10 years
old. We have talked about some of the things that we have seen
improved from that act, and so the question is are there any
additional legislative actions that are required based on what
we have learned from the other disasters in the last 10 years?
If so, what would those be?
Starting with Administrator Fugate.
Mr. Fugate. Well, I think it comes back to what I learned
when I came to Washington. There are two important things that
Congress provides, is authorization to do work and
appropriations to do that.
But my appropriations is tied more to the Stafford Act. The
Homeland Security Act is a much broader document. We have, if
you have read, been charged with supporting everything from
unaccompanied children, which was not a Stafford Act response,
to supporting the Centers for Disease Control with instant
management assistance teams; again not a Stafford Act response.
Supporting the Gulf Coast oil spill; again, not a Stafford Act
response.
The authority is actually in our Homeland Security Act as
amended. You gave us no limitations. You said we were all-
hazard, we were an agent of the Executive branch, we were the
principal emergency manager for advice.
But our funding streams, and our traditional disaster
dollars and much of that capability, is actually funded out of
the Stafford Act, which does not recognize all those.
So I think, again, through the appropriations language and
the authorization language, one of our challenges, I think--and
this is to the other Federal agencies--we would prefer not to
be the agency they wait until it is bad before they ask for
help. But because they often times have to do interagency
agreements, or transfer authority for us to do that work, it
might be helpful to look at our role as to crisis manager
across Federal Government. Are there tools that can lower the
bar for other agencies to access or utilize FEMA in that
support?
The authorization language you give us gives us that
ability. But the funding mechanisms, particularly the Stafford
Act, there are not clean linkages. It would be something to
consider in carrying out the authorized language what that
would look like.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Koon, any perspectives?
Mr. Koon. The language in PKEMRA and SRIA, I think, gives a
lot of what we need to make sure that we have the most
effective programs across the Nation. I think the complete
utilization and implementation of those programs, as well as
what Mr. Currie noted, improving the management and other
aspects of the organization to help us achieve those outcomes,
will probably be the most effective at this point.
So I don't know that, at this point, any additional
legislation is necessary. It is simply a matter of making the
most effective use of what is out there today.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Mr. Currie.
Mr. Currie. Yes, ma'am. We haven't been on record talking
about specific suggestions for legislation. But what I would
say is kind-of similar to what Mr. Fugate said. I think what we
have seen over the last 10 years in this explosion of disaster
spending is not just spending by FEMA. It is spending across
all departments.
The example I like to use is, the Forest Service now spends
almost half of its budget on wildfire suppression. It is way
different than it was 6 to 8 years ago. So there has been a
growth and an expansion of this.
So I think this is really a whole-of-Government response
and approach to preparing for disasters. Because every, almost
every, agency in the Government is getting involved in this.
So, you know, looking at it from that perspective may change
the way we think about our programs and how we need to prepare.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you. Next, I want to talk about
mitigation. Several of you talked about it in your opening
statement. This is of great importance to emergency managers in
my home State of Arizona. We reached out to them asking for
their perspectives and inputs on this hearing.
Most of the mitigation funding is provided through
Hazardous Mitigation Grant Program after a disaster declaration
than before. I mean, obviously mitigation, the whole point is
to address it pre-disaster. So how can we more proactively
address the mitigation? Some of you touched on it already, but
if there are any additional points on mitigation you want to
bring up.
Administrator Fugate.
Mr. Fugate. To be brief, one of our challenges when we do
mitigation, and General Accounting Office, and I am sure
Director Koon can attest to this, we have to look at cost-
benefit analysis and a lot of gyrations to make sure the
dollars we are investing give a sufficient return on that. I
would much rather use building codes and standards.
What we find in many cases, if we know what the engineering
standard is and we can point to a standard, it negates the need
to do a lot of other cost-benefit analysis because it is
already a code requirement we can build back to.
So where we can identify those codes and standards--even if
they are not adopted at the local level--it means, at least for
the Federal dollars, we are building back to the science versus
what may have been adopted locally. It lowers the bar and
workload at the local level to do the cost-benefit analysis to
justify it.
Ms. McSally. Great, thanks. Either of the other witnesses.
Mr. Koon. Madam Chairman, I think there are three potential
ways we could improve mitigation. One would be, as I mentioned
in my oral testimony, to streamline the program to make sure
that we can do it as effectively as possible after a disaster
using those funds that FEMA provides.
Second, I concur with Administrator Fugate. By using codes
and standards and other things, we can tie mitigation into all
the other funding streams that go into help the construction of
the built environment and community. So that way, we leverage
all of the other funds that those communities are using.
Third, I think by tying it into programs that help us
reduce insurance cost to future--would ensure that those get
consideration as we build our environment.
Ms. McSally. Great. I have another quick question. I know I
am a little over here. But in a study done by the Fritz
Institute--you mentioned this, Administrator Fugate--looking at
perceptions of people that were affected by Katrina, of the 42
percent affected who did not evacuate 44 percent said the
reported reason was because they didn't want to leave their
pets behind.
I will tell you, I am an animal lover myself and I
literally would not leave without my rescue Golden, Boomer,
with me. So I get this. I know we passed the Pets Act in 2006.
Can you talk about changes that have been made and whether this
is still an issue?
Mr. Fugate. It is still going to be an issue jurisdiction
by jurisdiction. Some States have done better than others, but
what we clarified was, in our planning and our funding, what
would be permitted, what we would reimburse for under
protective measures. We make it quite simple. When we tell
people to evacuate, we say take your pets with you.
Part of this is getting people to understand, it isn't
necessarily about the pets themselves; it is a people issue. If
people choose not to evacuate or go into harm's way, it adds to
the workload to the responders. Therefore, it is in the public
interest to address this. But you cannot bolt it on; it has got
to be built in. Because if people don't have anywhere to take
the pets they are not going to evacuate.
Ms. McSally. Exactly. Great. Thank you. I am over. I
appreciate it. We might have another round here, but I want to
give an opportunity for my colleagues here.
So the Chair now recognizes Mr. Thompson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Administrator Fugate, you raised a fundamental issue that
we have grappled with on this committee since its inception.
That is the split jurisdictions.
Stafford Act authority is over in Transportation
Infrastructure Committee and everything else is over here with
us. When an emergency occurs, it is the Stafford Act enactment
that kind-of pushed things out. But we get all the calls, you
know, the Chairperson and all that.
So--and I say that for the committee's edification--that we
really have to fix that and some other things. Because right
now, DHS testifies before over 100 committees and subcommittees
here in Congress, and that is just too broad a brush. In time
of an emergency you really need clear direction. In this
instance, that is a classic example.
Mr. Fugate, one of the challenges that I am hearing more
and more about is whether or not our reserve workforce and
other thing is as robust as we need it should a catastrophic
occurrence happen. Can you speak to that?
Mr. Fugate. Short answer is, you are right. We are not
there, for a variety of reasons. One is, is changing the
requirements of the program. Some people chose that that was
not something they were interested in. But another fundamental
issue is, these are people who look at this as employment
opportunities. When we have very inactive years, as we have had
for the last couple of years, they are not State-engaged.
So one of our challenges is--our funding mechanisms, you
know, the military reserve--you do 2 weeks every year, and
every weekend. For our Reservists, they may not get called up
or deployed for over a year if there are no disasters.
So one of our challenges is, how do you get trained people
ready to go at a moment's notice, but keep them engaged when
you are not dealing with disasters? That is something that has
eluded us both a funding issue, but also an engagement issue.
So we continue to work this. But you are absolutely right,
our numbers are down. We have changed the program; we are
trying to bring that program to a higher level. But without a
retention mechanism, it is always a challenge to train people,
keep them engaged, and then not deploy them because there is
lack of activity. Which is a good thing, but it also means it
is hard to keep an engaged workforce.
Mr. Thompson. Well--and I think that, Madam Chairperson, as
a military person--you know readiness is always on point. I
think at some point, Mr. Administrator, you might have to help
us make the case from a financial standpoint that we need to,
you know, better to be prepared for the emergency when it
happens than not prepared when it happens. Because all of us
get the blame in that respect.
So that is a major issue. Obviously, I saw it in Katrina
and a little bit in Sandy, but we really need to have the
ability to plus-up when something happens.
Mr. Koon, can you speak to the agreements that States have
with FEMA that get called upon, and how, whether or not you
have seen a difference between States? Is there a uniform
agreement, and is that uniform agreement applied all the way
down to the local level?
Or, you have good areas, bad areas? I think Congressman
Clyburn is going to talk a little bit about his experience, is,
when you have, like South Carolina, you have some counties that
handle it very well and some counties that don't. What kind of
challenge does that set for from an emergency management
perspective?
Mr. Koon. Yes, sir, thanks for the question. Any time you
have a standing agreement or a prepared agreement ahead of
time, whether it is between the State and FEMA, or State
contractors between the county and State, or between States
like you have with EMAC, it tremendously improves the response
and recovery capability of that jurisdiction. Because now you
have worked through all of those issues ahead of time and you
are ready to execute those at a moment's notice.
You know exactly what resources the other partner is in
that situation, you know how to call them into action. You also
have, as you noted in your opening statement, the ability to
vet those local organizations who are able to support it.
So you are able to do a much better job at preparing for
that local economic recovery by, again, considering ahead of
time what resources are available in that jurisdiction or in
that State that will help benefit the economic recovery.
It can be a challenge at the local level, particularly for
those more rural jurisdictions, those small emergency
management agencies, who don't have capability to put into
place, ahead of time, those kinds of agreements. In those
situations we encourage States to work with their locals to
develop some standardized template so that they can utilize
those.
Because, again, it really does benefit the community when
you can put those into place right away. It also helps ensure
that you are complying with all of the regulations associated
with the Federal dollars that come into place and so that you
don't risk audits later on that would deallocate those funds.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chair.
Ms. McSally. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Walker, from
North Carolina, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I do not have
specifically a question today, but I do have a comment that I
would like to submit in the record for Administrator Fugate. I
wanted to take a moment today and thank FEMA and the men and
women working to respond in our specific times of need in North
Carolina.
In fact, our Governor, Pat McCrory of North Carolina, has
only the best to say about the work FEMA has done in North
Carolina following Hurricane Joaquin, and we cannot thank you
all enough.
Last, I would like to finish today by recognizing Michael
Sprayberry on his appointment to the FEMA National Advisory
Council. Mr. Sprayberry is the emergency management director
for the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, and I feel
the council made an excellent decision to bring him on board.
Again, thank you, Administrator, for your work along with the
rest of the Members.
I yield back, thank you.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5
minutes, from New Jersey.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would
like very much to yield, at this moment, to Mr. Clyburn.
Ms. McSally. Mr. Clyburn.
Mr. Clyburn. Thank you very much. I thank the gentlelady
for yielding. Madam Chair, Ranking Member, I don't know if many
people realize this or not, but a little over 10 years ago,
when we experienced Katrina and Rita, I was designated by the
Speaker of the House to be the Congressional coordinator for
our response to Katrina and Rita.
So I spent a lot of time in Louisiana and Mississippi, and
I learned a lot, which was added to my own personal experiences
with Hugo 26 years ago.
Now, what I have found--in keeping with the question raised
by Ranking Member Thompson--is that there seems to be a natural
default to State planning. I want to tell you what drives my
thought on this.
When I accompanied Secretary Johnson down to South Carolina
to listen to the State plans, here is what stuck with me from
that hearing, this quote: ``We may run out of money before we
reach all of the hard-hit areas, but we know where they are.''
Now, that bothered me tremendously and I still wake up
every morning thinking about that statement. Because there is
no one-stop facility. I think, Mr. Fugate, you mentioned that
FEMA's limitations--you may not have mentioned this--if you get
turned down by FEMA, then you got to go to the SBA. Then you
got to get turned down by SBA for the loan in order to go back
to FEMA in order to get the assistance. Now, this is not a good
model for a lot of rural communities, a lot of people who are
hit the hardest. Especially when they don't have
transportation.
Then we set up these recovery centers, and they are not
one-stop recovery centers. I could see it. If you go to this
table to talk to FEMA, then walk across the gymnasium or
auditorium to another table to talk to SBA. In this modern day,
with all the computers and stuff we got, I don't see why this
cannot be done, it cannot be a one-stop place for these people,
because they give up on the process.
So I am asking, how are these agreements agreed upon; these
agreements that you seem to default to, these State agreements,
State-by-State agreements? Do we study them or do we evaluate
them, or do we just accept what they send to us and then
respond to it?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, we evaluate them and we actually
do threat hazard assessments and a lot of other tools. But when
you get to the individual assistance, I am not sure who said
they were going to run out of money. It is not FEMA. You fully
funded FEMA in the Disaster Relief Fund. There is not an issue
on FEMA dollars.
As it goes to the SBA, FEMA, that is actually how the
program was designed was it is means tested. If you had
insurance, your needs are met; there is no need for a grant. If
you can afford an SBA disaster loan, then that is the
preferable route. It is only if you don't qualify would you be
qualified for a FEMA grant.
Part of what we do in the Government Accountability Office
looks at this as there are certain things we know that if you
already are getting certain types of assistance you have
already met the means test for the grant so we don't have to
send you to SBA. But if you have an income and the ability to
repay, we have to get the determination from SBA first. It is
that information we try to do.
I agree. I mean, I try to get people to look at this,
building systems around the survivor. I am just fortunate, sir,
you found SBA in the same place we were. Previously, we were
often times set up in different locations. But it is----
Mr. Clyburn. Excuse me. That is not what I said. We didn't.
That is the question. The question is: Is it possible to set up
one-stop? I remember, when we responded to Katrina and Rita, we
brought planeloads of people from Louisiana to South Carolina.
When we received them in South Carolina, we put them up in a
one-stop facility. We had every agency in that one place on the
University of South Carolina's campus, and nobody had to go
across town. Everybody could go from desk to desk to desk.
But that is not what is going on in our response to these
floods in South Carolina. So my question was: Can you require
States, in setting up these plans, to make it convenient for
rural, low-income citizens and require that we have the
hardest-hit areas responded to in a fashion that is conducive
to their life's experiences rather than to focus on the
subdivisions?
Mr. Fugate. It is a tough one because we work through the
Governor and the Governor's team. But we have a lot of
influence. What you are telling me is causing me even more
concern about some of the other things I have heard. That will
be addressed, and I will work on that.
But I still find that, again, our systems are based upon
the Governor's request, working through the Governor. The
Governor has to certify cost-share. So I can't take and bypass
the Governor, but I can be a good partner and point out things
that we see that we could do better, and focus more on the most
vulnerable communities.
Mr. Clyburn. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. I
appreciate your indulgence, but I just want you to know it was
not FEMA that said we may run out of the money. It was not
FEMA.
Thank you.
Ms. McSally. It sounds like things we might need to follow
up on. I really appreciate it.
Mr. Clyburn. Absolutely. I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Those are Federal agencies so I think there
has got to be a way we can mandate that Federal agencies are at
least in one-stop as we work with the States. So thanks for
highlighting that.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donovan, from New York, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I would like to thank
my colleague from South Carolina. Because I was elected to
office 13 months after superstorm Sandy and I had to create a
one-stop shopping for the residents of Staten Island and South
Brooklyn that were affected by that storm. So I agree with you,
sir.
I was always a believer, gentlemen, that Government should
have less interference in people's lives. But we are to do
certain things. We are to pick up people's garbage, we are to
protect our communities with our police and our Nation with our
armed forces. We ought to come to our citizens' relief at the
time of a disaster.
Over the past weeks, my staff has been collecting stories
from constituents who were affected by superstorm Sandy. I
represent Staten Island and the southern portion of Brooklyn,
and these people are still struggling to recover from the
disaster, in part because of the difficulties they have
navigating through the complex recovery programs.
We will be sharing these stories with your office, and I
hope that together we can work to ensure that similar
situations do not occur if and when the next disaster we face
comes about.
I would like to tell you about a woman, Carolyn Lauer. She
is 72 years old, a constitute of mine, who, like so many
others, had invested her life savings in her home and had just
managed to pay off her mortgage months before superstorm Sandy
struck our community. As a result of Sandy, her home was
destroyed.
Following instructions from FEMA she, immediately after the
storm, took out an SBA for $126,000 to pay for the repairs of
her home. Now she was grateful for the loan, but shortly
afterwards, after she took out that new mortgage grants became
available in the type that would repair her home. The fact,
though, is she was ineligible because she took out the SBA
loan.
She is now 72 years old and burdened with a new mortgage,
but was never informed that by taking out the SBA loan she
would not be available for the future grants from the Federal
Government.
Administrator, I just don't know whose responsibility it
is, and I am not saying it was yours or your agency's. But
whose responsibility do you believe it should be to inform
people that if--as my colleague from South Carolina said--
people took out an SBA loan they then would be ineligible for
future grants? When their neighbors, who did not take out SBA
loans, were eligible for these grants?
Mr. Fugate. Well, I would have to look into the direct
case. It really depends upon on at the point they filed a--the
SBA was made available.
During the initial response there was no supplemental
funds, there was no additional funds for HUD. So at that point,
that probably was the best information we had. Later, when
Congress--several months later--passed the Sandy supplemental
you provided substantial funding to HUD. I am not sure if these
were the funds they are referring to, but HUD funds are----
Mr. Donovan. They are, sir.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. Available to the State. The States
then determined how to administer those funds. In many cases,
they looked at those funds to elevate or repair structures that
were uninsured.
But at that point, the time line was when the initial
application was made FEMA grants were limited to a very small
amount of money--about $33,000--and that is not going to make
repairs. The SBA was probably what was available.
Now, if we knew that the supplemental was going to come
through and that that would be the decision being made it would
have been easier to bring all that together. But I think
because of the time lapse, that was part of the challenge. That
many of these longer-term recovery funds came in after a lot of
the initial assistance was being made.
We roughly saw and distributed about a billion dollars in
immediate assistance, whether it was rental assistance or other
direct payments, in about the first 35 days. So a lot of things
were happening to help people that may have predetermined what
would be available as other programs came on later. I think
this goes back to your point, also being raised here. We tend
to approach disasters--because FEMA's programs don't make
people whole--that it is a given.
Mr. Donovan. That is correct.
Mr. Fugate. We are just basically the beginning of that.
Other Federal programs which historically have provided that
assistance--such as HUD, in rural areas the Farm Service
Agency, and others--have programs that States can use in
disasters although they are not specifically designed for that
on the front end. Then through the appropriation process we
usually give them more authority to do that.
But now you are coming in as agencies in pieces. So where
we have this on the front end we try to bring everybody
together and work with the State on the longer-term recovery of
bringing those programs together and looking at gaps. But it is
still a challenge.
As we saw with Sandy, because of the length of time from
the initial impact before some of these programs kicked in I
wouldn't be surprised. But I hope you have given my staff that.
We will look into this and see what did happen and what was the
cause of it.
Mr. Donovan. Yes. The majority of the stories that we have
collected have to do with the SBA loans. So we will share those
with your staff. I look forward to maybe a time--I know this is
a difficult time to speak one-on-one, but maybe at some point
in the future we could sit down and speak about that. My time
is up, Madam Chair.
I yield the rest of it, but hope that we do have a second
round of questions.
Ms. McSally. Yes, we will have a second round. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I would like to just expound a little on this. I am
wondering, if we are giving States, the authority--the
Governors--to spend this money, do we set any parameters on how
they should be using this money? Should we be thinking about a
model of how that money should be addressed when coming into
States during and after emergencies?
Mr. Fugate. I would have to defer to the other programs,
HUD and others. Because I know with the supplemental they put
in--and, at that time, it was Secretary Donovan--it was putting
in some program guidance. But it gives the Governors the
flexibility to look at, you know, in many cases doing
elevations or buy-outs of structures, or using this to address
the gap between uninsured losses and making homes repaired.
Generally, they are doing it under authority of their
affordable housing programs. So often times you take existing
structures and then you adapt it to the disaster. I think if
you are looking at that, it would be going back to, and perhaps
Government accountability offices. Because a lot of times these
monies are trying to come down through existing programs and
adapted for disaster, they often times bring those legacies
that don't always fit or communicate across the spectrum.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am concerned about the methodology
FEMA uses to modify flood insurance maps for my State, which is
New Jersey. It is also New York. I mean, it is probably other
States, too, in the country.
These maps are an important tool developed to quantify
flood risk all around the country, and they are used not only
to determine flood insurance premiums--which is an issue for
me--but also to guide building codes and mitigation activities.
Subsequently, the determinations have significant real-world
consequences for families and business owners.
To date, dozens of New Jersey municipalities have appealed
these preliminary firms as currently drafted. The fundamental
methodological errors including, but not limited to,
inadequacies in validation and deficient HUD effects have
resulted in erroneous estimates of the 1 percent flood risk
elevation by several feet.
So, Administrator, I would like to ask you, when reviewing
these appeals are you considering the impact that potentially
flawed methodology would have on the preliminary firms for the
communities of New Jersey and elsewhere? What are you, what is
FEMA, doing to address the issue?
Mr. Fugate. Well, as you point out these are what we call
the ``preliminary maps,'' and that is part of the process of
getting the community feedback on it and looking at additional
data.
But the challenge with flood insurance maps are, they are
determining an insurance risk and the level of accuracy is
corresponding to the level of data. The type of data that would
be required to actually individually pick out houses is mind-
boggling. So we tend to look at the area, not--and that is why
you are still required to get elevation certificates for each
structure.
But technology is changing so we are looking at how do we
move from the existing engineering studies that we use to
determine the flood and how do we get better data.
In fact, we are partnering, and are joining as part of a
new center in Alabama bringing together the National Weather
Service and NOAA, the Corps of Engineers, ourselves, and
looking at how do we take things like LIDAR and other tools to
not increase the cost of the mapmaking, but increase their
accuracy to reduce the errors.
But as we have found in many cases, as much as we challenge
and go over this we still see substantial flooding outside of
the special risk area. So they are not tools that say whether
areas will flood or not. They are tools to determine when they
would exceed a threshold for mandatory purchase and increased
risk for flood insurance.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So does FEMA offer technical
assistance and guidance and--okay, thank you. Another piece of
this, and this particularly affects Bound Brook in my district.
Bound Brook has been working on a $130 million flood control
project for a number of years. Through the Army Corps of
Engineers as well as FEMA and everybody else actively engaged,
I took a tour of this just before coming here, last week. They
are waiting. Even though they have met these conditions, they
are waiting for a certification that will affect their
insurance rates. They are being told that they won't get that
certification until well into 2016.
Is this an issue that you see in other communities, and is
there something that we can do when communities have engaged in
these long-term projects and do qualify for better rates in
their insurance? Because this is really affecting some of our
owners.
Mr. Fugate. I would have to have staff look into this. I
don't have the specifics of this. I know, in general, what we
have run into before is when we do get improved projects we
have to go back in and do the remapping. It is basically a
resource and time issue. So I don't know what the time frames
are or what is involved in that. I would have to go back to
staff.
But in general, when we do get these we do factor them into
the new maps. But if it is something where we have to put it
into it, we have to go back and run the models. It is a staff
and time issue.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. That is a really important issue
because I know FEMA is always busy with the here and now. But
this is the after-effect when people have made the decisions
and done the things that they have been asked to do. So we need
to apply the resources to those so that they are no longer
negatively impacted financially with their insurance rates. If
that is an issue with a lack of resources with FEMA we need to
address that.
Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Absolutely. We are going to do a second round
of questions so the Chair now recognizes myself for another 5
minutes for a round of questions.
One question I had, as you were talking about the readiness
of individuals not getting, you know, the experience that they
need, is my experience in working at Africa Command in the
military is with OFDA, USAID Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. You know, similar mission but overseas and the
support that we provide. But it is the same types of challenges
that they are dealing with. Do you have any--how do you
interact with OFDA, and is there a way to do some cross-
pollination between those that are, you know, available to be
workers for FEMA and getting experience if OFDA is deploying
overseas?
Mr. Fugate. Well, I actually got cross-pollinated early in
my term. I was detailed to OFDA and USAID in the Haiti
response.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Fugate. We sent significant response to Haiti. OFDA is
a much more tiny organization, but we do share back and forth.
We have communications but it is, again, we actually look
within the Department of Homeland Security as part of the surge
workforce and continue to work on how we can use DHS employees,
which we did in Sandy, to augment the response.
Ms. McSally. I am just thinking. If OFDA is responding to
an overseas disaster and they need support, and you have
personnel that need the experience, if somehow--I know there
are authorities issues because there are stovepipes in
agencies--if there was a way to utilize them to get experience.
But am I dreaming there?
Mr. Fugate. I would refer to OFDA. What I heard when I went
over it the last time was, they work in an entirely different
environment and in an entirely different set of circumstances,
and it is not an exact transfer although we do similar things.
It worked to the degree that it worked in Haiti, but----
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. It would be worthwhile pursuing if
USAID was interested. I would be interested in talking.
Ms. McSally. Okay.
Mr. Fugate. I will reach out and we will see what they
think.
Ms. McSally. Yes. I have still got some friends there so
maybe we can work out a meeting and see if there is an option.
Next question is related to social media. I mentioned in my
opening statement. I know, Mr. Fugate, you are an avid social
media--or your organization is--avid social media users. FEMA
does a pretty good job, I think, of regularly communicating
through various platforms related to what citizens and
responders can do before, during, and after emergencies.
We actually had a roundtable with industry representatives
from some of the social media companies, discuss new tools--
some that they are using, and some that they are trying to
develop--that can further enhance capabilities to be resilient
in a disaster.
So a question, really, for the whole panel, you know. How
has the increased use of social media impacted the way you do
business. You know, are we where we need to be, or are there
ways that we can use it more robustly?
Mr. Fugate. Well, I will start and try to be short. I think
the big difference is, is you make the mistake with social
media that it becomes another press release. You are going to
fail. It is actually a two-way conversation. So even in the
response going into South Carolina, part of what we do is we
listen and respond back to social media. People oftentimes will
highlight areas of concern or where they say, hey, you are not
there, or, we haven't seen you.
Ms. McSally. Yes.
Mr. Fugate. So it is that two-way conversation. But you
have to build that on the front end. You have to build your
brand so the public knows who you are, that you are trusted,
and either follow you or come to you during disasters.
But you also have to make the devices work the way they
work. You have to communicate with the tools they are using.
Since I have been in the business we have gone from Twitter to
half a dozen other things and to, recently, Periscope. So it is
always we seem to be following where people are using the
devices because our goal is to communicate with them at their
level with the information they need.
Ms. McSally. Right, great.
Mr. Koon.
Mr. Koon. I concur with Administrator Fugate. Social media
is good for outreach, but it is better as an intelligence-
gathering tool for emergency managers to better understand what
is happening on the ground. We can use it to head off rumor
control. We should not be leading the charge on which tools we
are using. We should be following the public and utilizing the
tools they are utilizing.
It is also a tremendous way that we can assist--States can
assist States, localities can assist localities. In the most
recent storm, as Joaquin was headed to the coast, we used our
virtual operations support team which is based out of Florida
State University. It is a group of students who get together
who monitor social media to help understand what is going on in
and also push out information to support North Carolina's
efforts with regards to that.
That is no cost, no transportation. So that is one way that
emergency managers can support emergency managers across the
country at little to no additional cost.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Mr. Currie, any input on----
Mr. Currie. No, ma'am. Unfortunately, at GAO we just
haven't really done any work on that. A very interesting issue,
though.
Ms. McSally. Great. Yes. So last point. You know, in the
military we often talk about lessons learned, but I always use
the word lessons ``identified'' because we often don't learn
them. They become identified, but then if they don't get
actually implemented then we see the same mistakes over and
over again.
Specifically related to this, we had a hearing in this
committee, subcommittee, about the defense support to civil
authorities; how the military can support a natural disaster. I
know I am really running out of my time here, but Administrator
Fugate, do you have any comments on how we saw that improvement
related to Sandy? Is there anything else we need to identify
and actually learn related to the military support?
Mr. Fugate. Well, again, I think we have got the right
tools in place. With the idea of dual-status commanders so that
we can fold Title 10 active-duty and reserves now into a
Governor's response without having to set up dueling commands
is a huge step forward.
But I will give you the most recent example in the floods
in the Carolinas. We recognized early on that this was going to
be a rainfall event that would produce significant risk of
flash flooding, which would then dictate that you are going to
need a lot of swift-water rescue and helicopters with hoist
capabilities. Even within the Guard, that is finite capability.
With the military jurisdictions throughout the area, it was
important that we work back through NORTHCOM in anticipating
these resources.
Admiral Gortney and his team were able to work back through
the DOD establishment and put quite a few resources at our
readiness. Basically, we had PJs and choppers ready to go with
2-hour recall. So that system has improved, it is robust. The
leadership of DOD--Admiral Gortney and NORTHCOM and FEMA--we
worked to shorten the time frames from the time a request may
be needed to we have resources to support the State. This isn't
about we are getting in front of the TAG. But we want to make
sure we have the resources in the pipeline so that the TAG
makes the determination they are going to need additional Title
10 or Reserve capabilities, we are not waiting for that, it is
ready to plug in.
Ms. McSally. Great.
Mr. Fugate. But it is much-improved, it is dynamic, it is
getting better each time. I think the goal being seamless
between the active duty and the Guard will always be, you know,
there. But it is getting much better than it has been.
Ms. McSally. Okay, great. My time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Thompson for 5
minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Some of us
are probably not as adept to social media as we ought to be.
What is Periscope?
Mr. Fugate. Oh, it is a----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. You didn't see that movie?
Mr. Fugate. It is a----
Mr. Thompson. No.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. It is an interesting tool that
allows you to shoot live video from your phone, while people
can send you comments on their Twitter feeds. So if you have a
Twitter account and you go to Periscope it is like a live
broadcast and they can actually----
Mr. Thompson. I understand.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. Ask you questions in the middle of
it.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Now you know it.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Now I know.
Mr. Fugate. I didn't know that 6 months ago, sir, so it
is----
Mr. Thompson. Okay. One of the things you talked about,
some of us represent significantly rural populations.
Basically, so much of that population, just like an inner-city
population, is at risk when a disaster occurs. To what extent
do you require States to address that in a plan?
For instance, I have two cities in my district with public
transportation. That is it. I have some counties with no form
of transportation. If we have a disaster, then, you know, if
you have a vehicle you are fine. But a majority of them do not.
So is there any oversight or anything that you require States
to put in a plan for those type populations?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir, and it is primarily with the
evacuation support and things like that. But I want to go back
to this idea that you are presenting, which if you remember we
used to do what we called ``community relations.'' We would go
in the neighborhoods, we would give them a phone number to
call, and that is all we did.
Mr. Thompson. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Fugate. We are not doing that that way anymore. We are
going in, and if you haven't registered we are going to
register you where we find you. This is, again, why I am very
interested in what is happening in South Carolina: Are we
missing communities? Because we were up front with the
Governor. We will go to where people are, they don't have to
come to us.
So what we have found, sir, is that if we are going to put
in the resources to put people on the ground to go door-to-door
and say here is how you register with FEMA, why don't we just
register you where we find you so that if you don't have
transportation you are not having to come find us?
We know that particularly in the rural areas, those
communities that aren't on everybody's radar every day are easy
to miss. So we also work with our GIS folks that when we go
into these areas--because we start looking at the maps and
going are there any houses in an area that nobody is talking
about. Can we get a team out there and just go door-to-door?
So that is what my expectations are. That we will go to
where the people are. If that is not happening I need to know
that to fix it. But we have gotten out of this making them find
us. I want to go to them and, as much as possible, that first
contact get them in the system. Then use these recovery centers
if we need follow-up. But I would much rather set it up where I
can get to where people are.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Currie, have you all looked at this?
Mr. Currie. Not this issue specifically. But one thing that
comes to mind is the threat and hazard reduction analysis that
each State has to do in order to get preparedness grant
funding. So I would expect that a State with large rural
populations would look at that as part of its preparedness in
that process and figure out that that is an area of risk. That
is something we are going to have to address in a large
disaster and something we need to prepare better for.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Koon.
Mr. Koon. Mr. Thompson, we have used this in Florida in our
disasters, and it has two-fold benefits. First of all, it is
more survivor-centric and meets the needs of those citizens
where they are. It also meets some of the issues that Mr.
Currie has addressed with regards to administrative costs. It
costs a tremendous amount of fixed dollars to run a disaster
recovery center. If it is in a rural area with limited traffic
you are wasting money.
So it is much better to go out there and talk to the folks
where they are. So I have seen it work very effectively in
previous disasters in Florida.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. McSally. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Donovan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Madam Chair. As a follow-up, I just
want to clarify something with the administrator. I know that
Congress took 3 months to pass the supplemental appropriation.
But the Federal rules from 2011 preclude SBA loan recipients
from receiving HUD-funded grants. What my constituents don't
understand is why they weren't given that information
originally and advised that if they applied for a loan they
would be precluded.
Had they known that applying for the loan may have
precluded them from those future grants, they may have made
different decisions. I have other questions I wanted to ask
you, but I just wanted to clarify that point. That that was the
majority of the constituent concerns that my office had
received.
Mr. Fugate. I understand. Again, since we didn't have the
HUD program, there wasn't anything that we knew was coming for
certainty. I actually have to work back through with SBA.
Because we would not inform them of that because they are
actually getting an SBA loan.
So I want to make sure that in our communications--because
when we refer people to SBA we are not now running the SBA
program. But I think that your point is, are we making sure
that as we tell people what programs are available what the
caveats are is also part of that process. So I will take that
back and look at how we make sure that as people are coming
into our program, and if they are being referred to SBA, that
we include that in that messaging.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you very much, sir. The Army Corps is in
the process right now of building a seawall on the eastern
portion of Staten Island. That mitigating factor, which will
help reduce the risk of floods, will help to lower people's
insurance premiums. But at what point, sir, do people actually
see the reduction?
I don't know how far into the construction of the seawall
will they be able to start seeing reductions in their premiums.
Mr. Fugate. The process would be, if we know this is being
built and the jurisdiction has asked for their revision of
their maps even though projects aren't completed, that we know
they are funded we can actually look at what you want to do
this as you go through your next insurance cycle--if you are
going to do any adjustments, is look at what those improvements
are, map that improvement, and then provide the guidance to the
write-your-owns as they come up on the next rate cycle.
But we have taken projects that had not been completed and
begun that process, knowing that within the window of time it
is going to be completed and we need to start the mapping.
Because we will already have what the engineering impacts of
that will be.
So, again, I will ask staff to see where we are at on that,
if we have had that request, and how much have we begun on
that. We will report back.
Mr. Donovan. Wonderful, thank you. Before my time runs out,
my final question really has to do with the folks--a lot of the
folks in our area live in attached homes, apartment buildings.
Sometimes they are attached on one side as a semi-attached,
sometimes they are in the row of townhouses that are attached
on all sides. They are unable to elevate their homes, as may be
required by the new restrictions after superstorm Sandy. They
need some mitigation relief from their premiums, as well.
I know recently a plan had come out--a document came out--
from FEMA describing what some of these things that these
families can do to mitigate, aside from elevating their homes.
But what wasn't attached to that was like the actuarial report
of saying that if you do these other things that we recommend
here are the reductions that you will receive. Is that
something that would come out subsequent to the report being
issued?
Mr. Fugate. I would have to ask staff. Again, I know that
what we have recommended is reducing their impacts. I don't
know if that would change their rate substantially. I wouldn't
want to commit, saying if you do this it equals X, because I
think that is something we have to go back and look at. How
much do we actually reduce the risk of payouts versus we may do
a better job of not flooding parts of the contents but we may
still have a claim to be filed? So I would have to ask staff to
look at that and see what that looks like.
Mr. Donovan. Wonderful. Maybe at some point, when we get to
do the face-to-face, you and I maybe we could go over some of
those things. I thank you very much, all of you gentlemen, for
coming today.
Ms. McSally. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Clyburn for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clyburn. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Madam Chair,
I subscribe to your theory that seems to be based upon one of
my favorite writers, George Santayana, who once wrote if we
fail to learn the lessons of our history we are bound to repeat
them. It seems as if we are repeating some of the should-have-
been-learned lessons from Katrina and Rita.
I always mention Rita because, really, Rita did most of the
damage over in Mississippi and we seem to forget that. I am
particularly interested in whether or not if--I will keep my
fingers crossed--I am successful in persuading enough Members
of the Congress to do an emergency supplemental for these 32
counties in my State. We only have 46; two-thirds of the State
was affected by the storm. We had 19 losses, 19 fatal loss of
life. We had over 60,000 homes destroyed.
Now, there is no way in the world these people are going to
be adequately addressed under current appropriations. We are
going to have to have some kind of a supplemental to get them
back on their feet.
Now, the question is if we are successful down the road, as
we were with Sandy, is there some way for Congress to deal with
this issue of the SBA loans? Whether or not these SBA loans--
those people who may have gotten them--under current law they
would not be eligible for supplemental participation in the
supplemental. Now, there is something fundamentally unfair
about that. It seems to be almost inhuman. Is it possible for
us to address that issue?
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, my recommendation would be to work
back with SBA and, potentially, the other agencies that would
require supplemental, such as--and I would imagine you are
talking about maybe HUD and Community Block--development grant
dollars, Federal aid, highway, Farm Service Agency, USDA
disaster loans, crop damages and stuff.
Mr. Clyburn. Absolutely.
Mr. Fugate. That you ask them what are the errors or the
issues about what you are permitted by law to do that is
counterintuitive in this case, and is there drafting language
that could clear the decks. Because if they have a requirement
that says they cannot--it is usually a duplication of Federal
benefits--is----
Mr. Clyburn. Right.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. The issue is, do they have
solutions that you could incorporate into a supplemental that
would address these things so that, in some cases, you want to
get SBA loans out there. Because this may take a while and they
could make repairs. But could they not then seek a
reimbursement when they get a qualifying grant and pay the loan
off?
But it is the fundamental issue of duplication of benefits,
and I think if you ask the agencies what they would need to
minimize that or perhaps help navigate those areas, that would
be the approach I would take.
Mr. Clyburn. Well, thank you very much for that. But I
think a lot of times, with us--this is my first elected office.
I have been here 23 years, but I ran a State agency for about
18 years, and a county agency for 4 years before that. So I
know a little something about making these administrative
decisions.
Sometimes, often times, we confuse the words ``duplicate''
and ``supplement.'' Now, when you are supplementing you aren't
duplicating. But for some strange reason, we always want to lay
that supplement on top of the previous to make it a duplication
rather than a supplemental.
So I think that these fine lines have got to be dealt with.
It is too easy to toss people aside by confusing those two. I
am like Mr. Donovan: One of my constituents had just rebuilt
after a fire completely destroyed the home.
They rebuilt from the fire, and within 30 days the whole
home was wiped out because of the loan. Now, when you rebuild
after a fire there are some loans or some mortgages being
assumed. So that family is now destroyed for all intents and
purposes, for life. They will never regain their footing.
The way we are looking at some of these rules and
regulations now, they are just out in the cold, they are not
going to be able to participate.
So I am very, very concerned about that, and I would hope
that as we go forward with this--because these lives that were
lost, these 19 lives, they were not resisting leaving. They
were swept away in fast-moving waters. Some of them swept out
of their automobiles. Just driving along and got swept out of
their automobiles, and they are found miles away from their
automobile.
So there are things here that I really believe we need to
pay some close attention to. Because in spite of how we may
argue this issue, I am a firm believer that we are going to
have more of these disasters going forward. When you are having
a 500-year event every 10 years, it says something that we need
to be concerned about.
Mr. Fugate. Congressman, I----
Mr. Clyburn. Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. I agree with the issue about
duplication of benefits. I ran into this myself where we had
provided individual assistance. But because of delays in
administering and getting policy paid out with the National
Flood Insurance program, they often times got loans from the
Community Block Development Grant dollars and then we were able
to get the other issues settled.
So we made a decision--I had this discretion--that we would
determine that because of the severity of impacts that
duplication of benefits was not necessarily going to apply if
you were getting individual assistance and flood insurance
because the losses were so great. We would do it case-by-case.
So perhaps that is also giving either the Secretary or the
administrator of those programs that judgment so they can do it
case-by-case.
Sometimes you do blanket, you get unintended consequences.
But there is always that hardship that if you give the
administrator that discretion or the Secretary that discretion
I think you get to some of those hardship cases that otherwise
we don't have a good response for.
Mr. Donovan. If the gentleman would yield just for 30
seconds, we had a case where the people wanted to pay back the
SBA loan so that they would benefit from the HUD grants and
they weren't permitted to pay back the loan that they received.
So you talk about an injustice, sir, you are absolutely right.
Thank you.
Ms. McSally. Well, I appreciate both my colleagues here
raising this issue, and I would like to further have us look
into whether this is an interpretation of law or whether we
need a clarification in the law, and then work with the
relevant other committees to see if we can address that. So
thanks for highlighting that important issue.
Mr. Clyburn. Thank you very much.
Ms. McSally. I want to thank the witnesses for your
valuable testimony today, and also the Members for their
thoughtful questions. The Members of the subcommittee may have
some additional questions for the witnesses. We will ask you
respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7(e),
the hearing records will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for W. Craig Fugate
Question 1a. As we witness the disaster unfolding in South
Carolina, we are reminded that many counties have not experienced a
major disaster in over 20 years.
What support do local governments and other grant recipients
receive to help them navigate the sometimes byzantine Federal programs,
requirements, and regulations?
Question 1b. What can potential recipients do to maximize their
ability to get a grant and use grant dollars effectively?
Answer. Interagency Disaster Recovery Coordination/NDRF.--Since
publication of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) in 2011,
Federal agency partners have made considerable progress in assisting
State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments to understand and
access the numerous Federal resources and programs that may be able to
support disaster recovery efforts. The role of the Federal Disaster
Recovery Coordinator (FDRC), the field leadership position instituted
by the NDRF, during disasters such as South Carolina is to support
State and local governments understand the various Federal assistance
that could be available, both within and outside of that which is
provided under the Stafford Act. For example, in South Carolina the
FDRC facilitated an advisory group to take a holistic look at what
Federal programs may be available to support the restoration of the
public and private dams that were impacted from the storms. This was
not a single program approach, such as using FEMA's Public Assistance
program, but rather required the whole Federal family to come together
with the State to identify where programs could work together to
maximize the recovery funding available.
In South Carolina, the FDRC is convening several Federal Recovery
Support Functions (RSF), including the Community Planning and Capacity
Building (CPCB) RSF. CPCB coordinates and facilitates among Federal and
non-Federal partners the planning, capacity, and resilience building
support needed by local or Tribal governments in large or unique
events. Coordination and partner support is tailored to the needs of
disaster-impacted States, territories, Tribes, and local governments
through an information sharing, assessment, and strategy coordination
process. Examples of coordinated support activities may include:
Education, Peer-to-Peer Forums, and Workshops give local
leaders and recovery planners an opportunity to ask questions
and benefit from the recovery planning lessons learned by
others.
Recovery Planning is often needed by communities to begin an
organized process; CPCB Federal partners, as well as
universities and NGOs, can pool resources to support
communities with planning technical assistance, staffing
resources, and funding.
Community Engagement after a disaster can be fraught with
challenges, including resident displacement; CPCB partners can
advise or support communities with reaching and involving all
stakeholders in recovery planning.
Tools, Guidance, Training and other just-in-time materials
are available through the Community Recovery Management Toolkit
(http://www.fema.gov/national-disaster-recovery-framework/
community-recovery-management-toolkit) and other partner
resources.
Disaster Assistance Reengineering Effort (DARE)/DisasterAssistance.gov
Looking to the future, FEMA is undertaking a multi-year initiative
to modernize the DisasterAssistance.gov portal through the Disaster
Assistance Reengineering Effort (DARE). This initiative will
significantly reduce annual operating costs, minimize impact of future
budget reductions and lower the cost of entry for incorporating new
audiences for the portal, such as community leaders and local or Tribal
officials.
The DisasterAssistance.gov portal provides disaster survivors with
information, support, services, and a means to access and apply for
disaster assistance through joint data-sharing efforts between Federal,
Tribal, State, local, and private-sector partners. On December 31,
2008, DAIP launched a website called DisasterAssistance.gov. The site
allows you to:
Find disaster assistance that meets your personal needs.
Learn about more than 70 forms of assistance from 17 Federal
agencies.
Apply for disaster assistance and reduce the number of forms
you have to fill out.
Check the status of your application.
Find a FEMA Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) near you.
Find a hotel or a new place to live.
Find programs to help with food and nutrition needs.
Change the address for your Social Security, VA, or other
Federal benefits.
Learn about Small Business Administration (SBA) loans for
homeowners, renters, and businesses.
PA
During the Public Assistance Program grant delivery process, FEMA
works in partnership with States and Tribes, as the official grant
recipients, to provide an applicant (i.e. community) with the resources
necessary to navigate the Federal grant process. Specifically in South
Carolina, in the beginning phases of the disaster recovery process, the
State acted as a liaison between FEMA and applicants and was
responsible for providing applicants with specific information on State
regulations, documentation, reporting requirements, and technical
assistance.
Generally, after the President approves an emergency or major
disaster declaration, the State will host a meeting with applicants to
present an overview of the Public Assistance Program, address
application procedures, administrative requirements and general program
eligibility criteria. After a community has applied and is determined
to be eligible for FEMA funding, FEMA will hold a Kickoff meeting,
which is attended by the State and the applicant. During the meeting,
FEMA offers technical expertise to help the applicant understand and
fulfill the Public Assistance Program requirements, the roles and
responsibilities of the stakeholders involved, and program delivery
time lines.
Each community that wishes to receive Public Assistance funding
must fill out a Request for Public Assistance. It is the applicant's
responsibility to submit the Request for Public Assistance, identify
damaged facilities, support all necessary documentation, assist FEMA
with the project formulation, and review all scopes of work to
determine accuracy. Applicants can maximize their ability to obtain and
effectively use grant dollars by supplying all required documentation
and ensuring they follow any set condition of the grant. FEMA works
with communities on every step of this process to make it clear that we
help them through this process.
IA
On an on-going basis, FEMA Regional staff partner with our State,
local, Tribal, territorial, and community stakeholders during steady-
state operations to help them understand our programs, requirements,
and regulations in advance of disasters.
Following a Presidentially-declared disaster, at the request of the
State, FEMA, along with our other whole-community partners, staff
Disaster Recovery Centers and Mobile Disaster Recovery Centers. These
Recovery Centers serve as a one-stop location where disaster survivors
can be walked through FEMA's programs and the process to apply for
disaster assistance. In addition, our Disaster Survivor Assistance
(DSA) teams provide in-person, tailored outreach in the field to
register survivors for disaster assistance, provide guidance on the
registration process, and provide an overview of the assistance
available through FEMA.
DSA teams also verify previously-submitted information; provide
basic information about the status of the application, information on
other assistance for which the survivor may be eligible, and next steps
for completing an unfinished application. The teams also do direct
outreach to State and local officials, as well as to faith-based
organizations and communities. This outreach allows DSA teams to
identify disproportionately-impacted communities, populations with
Limited English Proficiency requirements, low literacy, access and
functional needs, and work with our whole-community partners to address
immediate emergency needs, explain our programs, and answer specific
questions about FEMA disaster assistance.
Following the completion of their registration, each applicant is
mailed a copy of Help After a Disaster, which provides a program
overview, information about next steps in the application process,
information on documents applicants may need to provide, appeals
information, and the applicant registration number an applicant should
reference when contacting FEMA. The booklet also addresses Frequently
Asked Questions about Individuals and Households Programs about
assistance. Applicants may also contact the FEMA helpline to discuss
their specific case and ask questions about the eligible uses of
disaster assistance.
Question 2a. Administrator Fugate, GAO has questioned FEMA's
ability to effectively respond to a catastrophic disaster. In the past,
you talked about ``catastrophic events that will overwhelm capabilities
at all levels of the government . . . and challenge even the most
scalable structures and systems.''
Please expand on those challenges and how you believe the
Government can overcome those challenges.
Question 2b. While planning is important, the ability to execute
the plan is more important. Can FEMA execute?
Answer. FEMA and our partners have built robust processes and
systems to implement the concepts described in our plans. Our regional
all-hazards, scenario, and location-specific plans are routinely
executed in response to threats from potential incidents. For example,
FEMA executed the draft of the Nuclear and Radiological Incident Annex
to the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans
(FIOPs) during the Southern Exposure and Marble Challenge exercises in
2015. The draft was used as the basis for the U.S. Government's Crisis
Action Plan, drove resource allocation and priorities for the Federal
Government, and created Unity of Effort between the local, State,
Federal, and private-sector response and recovery entities. FEMA has
also executed the plan for a Nuclear Power Plant Accident with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy, Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Department of Defense alongside the State of
South Carolina during the Southern Exposure exercise.
In the past year, we have executed plans for both Guam and Hawaii
in response to tropical cyclones. These plans were developed and
executed in partnership not just with the Federal Interagency Working
Group, but with the impacted State and territory. As Hurricane Joaquin
moved up the East Coast this year, emergency managers across the
Atlantic seaboard adapted our Regional Hurricane Annexes and used
planning factors and decision support tools built around those plans to
forecast and deploy resources ahead of a storm that could have impacted
any State on the Atlantic Coast.
During major exercises, FEMA has executed plans for a Southern
California Earthquake in partnership with local governments and the
State of California. FEMA has also executed the plan for a Nuclear
Power Plant Accident with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department
of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Department of Defense
(DoD) alongside the State of South Carolina.
FEMA has built a robust process for the development of meaningful
and useful plans, by incorporating lessons learned from exercises and
real-world events into the development and update of our plans. We
continue to focus on the rapid and adaptable execution of these plans.
For example, we are currently building decision support models based on
common planning factors to drive rapid decision making and resource
deployment. The agency is partnering with DoD to capture data that is
required for movement coordination of known resources to facilitate
their multi-modal transport by any carrier and streamlining our process
for displaying and executing tasks during an incident.
Question 3. The Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
(PKEMRA) included provisions to ensure that small, local businesses are
included in the response and recovery processes. According to GAO,
FEMA's progress in implementing PKEMRA's mandates regarding
noncompetitive contracts and local business contracting is mixed. What
is FEMA doing to improve guidance for contract officers so that
PKEMRA's mandates can be better implemented?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) trains all
of its contracting officers through an annual Disaster Contracting
webinar, which covers the PKEMRA mandate of including local businesses
in the response and recovery processes. The webinar includes items such
as the requirement to use local vendors during disasters, the need to
document the use of a non-local vendor solution, and the process for
transitioning work from a non-local vendor to a local vendor or
documenting why the transition did not occur. Also, FEMA is in the
process of revising its Emergency and Contingency Contracting Desk
Guide to further address this requirement. These resources are made
available through the FEMA SharePoint Site. In addition, we recently
revised the Disaster Contracting course content to expand on this
requirement. This course is offered to all contracting officers, but is
mandatory for those having Incident Management (IM) titles. Finally, as
part of FEMA's Qualification System (FQS), FEMA has established a
specific IM title within its Acquisition Cadre, called Acquisition
Business Specialists. These trained individuals are responsible for
assisting contracting officers by conducting outreach to local vendors,
determining local vendor capabilities, educating vendors on
requirements and opportunities for doing business with FEMA and/or the
Federal Government. Having this critical function as part of the FQS IM
organizational structure improves the contracting officer's ability to
increase competition and acquire goods and services from local
businesses.
Question 4. Administrator Fugate, FEMA is a very different
organization than it was 8 years ago. How is FEMA preparing now to
ensure that the improvements you have initiated are continued after
your tenure?
Answer. The agency has matured over the past 8 years, fully
embracing our mission statement ``to support our citizens and first
responders to ensure that as a nation we work together to build,
sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against,
respond to, recover from and mitigate all hazards.''
The first Strategic Plan under my tenure moved the agency in a new
direction and promoted a whole-community inclusive approach to
emergency management, acknowledging the important roles played by a
wide range of community partners, and allowing for a more flexible and
agile FEMA. The 2014-2018 FEMA Strategic Plan builds on that progress,
and institutionalized the whole community in ways that will position
FEMA and its partners to improve outcomes for disaster survivors and
enhance the Nation's preparedness for and resilience to future
disasters.
The Strategic Plan highlights five priorities that help to ensure
the improvements initiated in my tenure continue throughout the agency.
These priorities include:
1. Be survivor-centric in mission and program delivery
2. Become an expeditionary organization
3. Posture and build capability for catastrophic disasters
4. Enable disaster risk reduction Nationally
5. Strengthen FEMA's organizational foundation.
Be survivor-centric in mission and program delivery: FEMA must
recognize and adapt to the needs of the people we serve. Hurricane
Sandy highlighted that a number of FEMA's programs and processes were
designed for ease of administration rather than making survivors'
experience as easy as possible. Individuals and communities face
overwhelming challenges in the aftermath of a disaster, and they should
not need an instruction manual to access and navigate FEMA programs.
Our culture is changing to improve the ways that we anticipate and
adapt to survivors' needs, maximizing the speed, efficiency, and ease
of use of our programs and services for individuals and communities.
Become an expeditionary organization: We have worked tirelessly to
transform the total FEMA workforce into a more professional and
deployable organization. Under the theme, ``every employee is an
emergency manager,'' FEMA is harnessing the dedication and expertise of
every employee. Through the development of the FEMA Qualification
System, FEMA gives employees the opportunity to demonstrate and
document their knowledge and skills in specific incident management
positions. The qualification system standardizes the qualifications for
positions across the agency so that an employee who is qualified to
perform in a given disaster position in one FEMA region will be
prepared to perform in the same position in another region. This
maturation of our workforce has transformed the agency to ensure that
all employees, from our full-time employees to Reservists, are trained
and qualified emergency managers, making us more expeditionary.
Posture and build capability for catastrophic disasters: The
greatest challenge in emergency management lies in preparing for a
catastrophic disaster during which the impacts are so severe that
existing plans, coordination structures, communications, and
capabilities are insufficient and depleted quickly. To be successful,
FEMA has a culture that works to unshackle ingenuity to devise novel
solutions. FEMA cannot plan only for events we are capable of
responding to; we must plan for catastrophic events that will overwhelm
capabilities at all levels and challenge even the most scalable
structures and systems. Although we have made progress in improving
upon our capabilities, we must constantly enhance preparedness, test
systems, and exercise capabilities so we can support the whole
community following a catastrophic event--and this must continue after
my tenure. Our systems and capabilities must be designed so that those
executing the mission can do so wherever needed, including in austere
conditions. The agency recognizes that any Government-centric response
to a catastrophic incident will fail, so we're continuing to work with
local, State, Tribal, and territorial leaders to engage the whole
community and to harness and enhance the capabilities of communities
and citizens.
Enable disaster risk reduction Nationally: FEMA has taken
significant steps to improve and increase disaster risk reduction
throughout the Nation. The FEMA-led interagency Mitigation Leadership
Group (MitFLG) developed a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard
(FFRMS) to ensure Federally-funded projects are built to account for
accurate flood risk. In addition, the agency promotes increased risk-
informed action at all levels of society. FEMA will continue working
with whole-community partners to identify and address gaps in risk
management understanding and actions across the Nation--targeting both
technical and non-technical audiences and meeting the diverse risk
information needs of the public and private sectors (e.g., homeowners,
engineers, developers, insurers, urban planners, and emergency
managers). The agency has pushed the Nation forward on disaster risk
reduction, but much work remains to ensure our Nation is truly
resilient.
Strengthen FEMA's organizational foundation: FEMA has advanced in
its governance processes to ensure that our organization supports
FEMA's mission. The agency established the Human Capital Governance
Board and renewed the Information Technology Governance Board to move
forward on these critical areas. FEMA has also invested in improving
its linkages among planning, programming, budgeting and execution to
ensure strategy-driven resource decisions are conducted across the
agency. Overall, this has improved our internal processes and will help
ensure that the improvements are institutionalized as we continue to
mature our organization.
The agency looks significantly different than 8 years ago, and the
transformation to be survivor-centric and expeditionary while focused
on preparing for catastrophic disasters and reducing disaster risk has
been institutionalized across the organization.
Question 5. The Individual and Households Programs has experienced
notable challenges with respect to improper payments, due at least in
part to workforce training deficiencies. How is FEMA training its new
CORPS members and other disaster workforce employees to reduce the risk
of improper disaster payments, and ultimately future recoupment
proceedings?
Answer. Robust and thorough training for new and existing staff
members is a priority for the Individual Assistance (IA) program and
Individuals and Households Program (IHP). To provide the technical and
professional training necessary for FEMA agents to administer the IHP,
the following programs are in place:
New Hire Training.--Each new agent receives 12+ weeks of
training in IHP, including aspects of the program such as
registration intake; helpline inquiry and assistance; and
manual processing procedures. At the end of the initial
training program, supervisors provide on-going coaching and
mentoring to agents as they interact with survivors and process
their cases.
Refresher Training.--Agents attend refresher classes to
review the highlights of their initial IHP training, as well as
to ensure that any updates in policy/processing guidance are
understood and being applied. In addition, briefings are held
throughout the year each time new policy/processing guidance or
disaster-specific guidance is implemented.
Quality Reviews.--In order to maintain accuracy of skills
and knowledge, the IHP Quality Control department regularly
reviews case files and highlights subject matter or processes
that are problematic for agents. Using these reviews, custom
refresher training and reviews are developed for agents in
order to emphasize key points and review essential processes.
Testing/Evaluation Process.--The Training Section has
implemented a pre- and post-test process for each IHP course,
in order to measure the understanding of the agents and
effectiveness of the training materials for the program.
Updates/improvements to training materials can immediately be
developed, should agent scores reflect a lack of understanding
in relation to any of the processing procedures.
Specialized Processing Unit.--In order to minimize the
opportunity for improper payments, IA and IHP recently
implemented a specialized processing unit that will isolate
agents processing those parts of the IHP that are most
technically challenging. This Specialized Processing Unit was
recently launched after completion of a dedicated 4-day
training program for agents that reviewed and tested
proficiency in the processing of Continuous Temporary Housing
Assistance (CTHA), an element of the program with a high degree
of processing complexity. Additional specialized training
programs will be developed based on on-going monitoring of
quality control reports and supervisor evaluations of agents.
In addition, since 2005, FEMA has added controls to the assistance
delivery system that safeguard against waste, fraud, and abuse and
significantly reduce the percentage of improper payments.
Question 6a. The results of the 2015 DHS Federal Employee Viewpoint
Survey once gain spotlight the issue of low morale at the Department.
Given the expense of hiring and training new employees--both full
time and the disaster workforce--and the loss of institutional
knowledge when you lose an existing employee, how is low morale
affecting FEMA's ability to retain employees across your entire
workforce?
Question 6b. How is FEMA addressing retention issues?
Answer. Improving employee engagement and retaining high-quality
employees is a priority for FEMA. Based on the Federal Employee
Viewpoint Survey you referenced, FEMA recently commenced a series of
studies and programs designed to identify and address the root causes
of employee concerns.
FEMA's historical trends in this survey identified potential areas
where FEMA could increase employee engagement and satisfaction. FEMA
leadership opted to focus on three critical areas for possible
improvement: Effective leadership, employee development, and
performance-based rewards and advancement.
FEMA organized a series of employee focus groups to identify the
root causes of negative employee perceptions. After analyzing the
identified root causes of the problem, FEMA launched a series of
initiatives to improve engagement and retention. FEMA began a new
workforce management initiative to improve the process for completing
personnel actions and increase communications between employees and
supervisors. Deputy Administrator Joseph Nimmich created the ``Ask
Us!'' program to provide a two-way communications tool between senior
leaders and employees. This Q&A session during SES meetings allows
employees of all levels to ask questions directly to leadership.
In addition to the formal performance management system, employees
are allowed to informally recognize contributions of their colleagues
through the ``You Rock!'' program. Additional focus and training will
be placed on the leadership and communication skills of first- and
second-level supervisors to better enable them to relay individual and
organizational performance goals and metrics.
Question 7a. FEMA has acknowledged certain challenges with respect
to staffing, particularly with respect to the disaster workforce.
Have disaster workforce shortages affected FEMA's ability to
respond to any recent disasters, such as the South Carolina floods?
Question 7b. In the event the staffing levels become an issue, what
plans does FEMA have in place to ensure that FEMA can meet its mission?
Answer. Current staffing shortfalls have not impacted FEMA's
ability to respond to any recent disasters. At present, over 2,500 FEMA
employees are supporting 22 active disasters, and the agency continues
to deploy its Reservist workforce, FEMA Corps members, and full-time
employees to meet the needs of communities in a timely and effective
manner.
Disaster workforce staffing in South Carolina did, however, reveal
improvements needed for select cadres in the recruitment and retention
of our intermittent Reservist workforce. FEMA is working to refine its
hiring and training plans for all cadres for the next fiscal year to
ensure it maintains a high level of readiness for a variety of events
and scenarios. Building and retaining a professional, trained, and
experienced surge workforce, is critical to the agency's ability to
conduct its response, recovery, and mitigation missions, and we must
strive to dedicate additional resources to this effort.
As articulated in FEMA Strategic Priority 2.2, FEMA continues to
improve its Reservist program and its ``Every Employee is an Emergency
Manager'' policy by maximizing the contributions of the agency's full-
time staff to disaster operations. In the last few weeks, the Office of
Response and Recovery assigned over 500 full-time employees from across
the agency's Incident Management titles within the Individual
Assistance and Disaster Survivor Assistance Cadres. These employees
augment the agency's current capability to provide critical support to
survivors directly impacted by disasters, ensuring they have access to
the full range of FEMA programs from their homes and communities. FEMA
is also working with DHS HQ to grow the size of its Surge Capacity
Force and develop a more flexible concept of operations for the
program. Finally, the agency continues to improve its planning efforts
for disasters by developing time-phased force packages to ensure the
right personnel arrive at the right time to meet the needs of
survivors.
Question 8a. In an effort to improve how FEMA responds to and
assists in disaster recovery, the agency is currently undergoing an IT
modernization process, including updating the procurement policies.
FEMA has completed a security and resiliency review in 2014, but it's
yet to be released.
What is the status on the security and resiliency review?
Answer. FEMA's 2014 IT Resiliency and Security Review was conducted
between January and September 2014 and covered all 10 Regions, all HQ
Programs, and offices. Should a detailed brief be required, FEMA can
host a SECRET Classified briefing regarding the resiliency outcomes.
Question 8b. How does the report's release impact the agency's
progress moving forward with IT modernization?
Answer. The IT Resiliency and Security Review set the baseline for
a stabilized state of IT mission support, and re-emphasized the need
for a more optimized state as defined in an ``actionable'' Target
Architecture. The inventory and sequencing of investments/initiatives
in the initial version of the FEMA IT Modernization Plan is based
partially on the collection and ``road-mapping'' of initiatives that
were identified from the Review. The aggregation and prioritization of
recommendations from the 2014 Resiliency Review resulted in the
initiatives that comprise the first year of FEMA's IT Modernization,
Fiscal Year 2016.
The Cyber Security and IT Resiliency Review Teams heard the same
issues from each Region and Program regarding needs for improvement.
Every in-briefing interview with the Regional Administrators and
Program Directors cited many of the same needs, requirements, and
recommendations. Final Cyber Security and IT Resiliency Reports were
provided at the conclusion at each visit and captured themes for each
Region and Program. The Regional and Program Office reviews yielded a
substantial number of recommendations for improving FEMA's use of IT
and enhancing cybersecurity. Making FEMA resilient and secure requires
both cybersecurity improvements and better use of IT across the
emergency management process. The team found many of the same issues
across the agency, which include (but are not limited to) immature
security planning, poor configuration management segregation of duties
issues, and access control. Over 1,000 review items were consolidated
into 7 imperatives to reform the current state of FEMA IT. Four of the
imperatives address improvements in cybersecurity and IT management
practices. Three imperatives highlight specific improvements in the
application of technology to FEMA needs related to grants and financial
systems, human resources management and collaboration. The 7 major
imperatives are:
1. Ensure a reliable & dependable FEMA in all events.--FEMA must
have a proactive IT Cyber Security posture that ensures that
FEMA is 100% operational during all phases of the National
preparedness cycle as well as the ``Last Agency Standing'' in a
disaster, no matter how large or broad the effects are of that
disaster.
2. Create an IT environment that addresses both region and
headquarters' needs.--FEMA IT transformation will only be
successful in reducing FEMA IT costs and risks if the remaining
or new systems both fulfill HQ needs and facilitate regional
operations and business processes without requiring
workarounds.
3. Rebuild IT for Continuity of Operations.--FEMA must rebuild,
validate, and exercise IT capabilities needed to support
devolution and continuity of operations plans.
4. Replace obsolete IT with cost-effective and trustworthy
solutions.--FEMA's dependency on obsolete systems and their
associated resource burden degrades its ability to execute its
mission and invest in modernization and performance
improvements.
5. Integrate grants and financial management.--FEMA grant and
financial systems are incapable of providing end-to-end
visibility and management capabilities required to minimize
potential and serial disaster loss.
6. Deploy a comprehensive Human Resource management information
system.--FEMA disaster management capabilities are negatively
affected by human resources information systems data and
transaction processing shortcomings.
7. Employ a modern collaboration environment for FEMA and its
partners.--Although Regions operate under a unique set of
environmental conditions, they all require modern approaches
for collaboration, data sharing, and engagement with State,
Tribal, territorial, and local partners.
The 2014 Cyber Security and IT Resiliency Review also stabilized
FEMA's IT portfolio through a structured process of assessing each
system's compliance with Security requirements, issuance of full or
conditional Authorizations to Operate (ATOs) and identification of Plan
of Actions and Milestones (POAMs) with supporting business cases to
address security shortcomings. Systems with significant weaknesses,
redundancies or obsolescence were shut down.
Question 9. With respect to FEMA's efforts to improve disaster aid
verification, the agency agreed with GAO's recommendation and developed
a Corrective Action Plan. Please provide any additional updates to
those recommendations, and whether or not FEMA envisions continuing to
adhere to the time line.
Answer. This response is in reference to the GAO-15-15 Internal
Controls in FEMA's Individuals and Households Program (IHP).
Recommendation 1: Collaborate with SSA to assess the cost and
feasibility of checking used SSNs that were ineligible or belonged to
likely deceased individuals, document the results of this assessment,
and if determined to be cost-beneficial take steps to implement a
partnership to use SSA data.
FEMA's Disaster Assistance Improvement Program (DAIP) has had
discussions with representatives from Social Security Administration
(SSA) regarding the possibility of conducting an assessment of recent
disaster survivor registrations that were filed with social security
numbers (SSNs) that were ineligible or belonged to likely deceased
individuals. DAIP engaged the SSA in May 2015, to begin planning the
assessment process for the purpose of determining whether integrating
SSA's Enumeration Verification System and death file data will provide
additional checks and balances against potential fraud by disaster
assistance applicants. One of the options to address the intent of this
recommendation, depending on the outcome of these discussions, may be
to enter into a Computer Matching Agreement (CMA) with the SSA.
If the assessment determines that use of the SSA data would improve
the FEMA data validation process to help reduce fraud, waste, and
abuse, the resulting proposed sharing relationship between FEMA and SSA
would fall under this requirement, and in this circumstance, would
require development of a CMA. DAIP continues to target December 31,
2015 for completion of this assessment and determination.
Recommendation 2: Assess the cost and feasibility of addressing
limitations in FEMA's control identifying duplicate information in
applications in high-risk data fields--such as SSN, bank-account
information, address, and phone number--that may currently allow
individuals or households to improperly receive multiple payments, and
if determined to be cost effective take steps to address the system
design limitation.
FEMA's DAIP is evaluating the cost and feasibility of incorporating
new controls in the registration intake process for identifying and
flagging duplicate information in high-risk data fields for the purpose
of reducing multiple payments to individuals or households. FEMA is on
target to complete this analysis by December 31, 2015.
Outside the requirements of this recommendation, DAIP has begun to
re-engineer the registration intake capability as part of its system
modernization plan. Any new controls identified from the above analysis
for the purpose of flagging potentially duplicate records to reduce
multiple payments will be incorporated into the re-engineering effort,
which will result in a new system to be deployed in calendar year 2017.
Recommendation 3: As part of updates to the legacy systems, redesign
the compliance flag in the IHP system to clearly identify and document
applicants' compliance with NFIP requirements at the time when
assistance for flood-related damage was provided through IHP.
FEMA has worked with the developers to ensure that as additional
checks are run during the life-cycle for a disaster survivor's
application processing, the system will record changes so they are
easily viewed and queried to show the appropriate status for each phase
of the assistance process. FEMA has finalized requirements and obtained
a cost estimate. A single Change Request (CR) was made to the National
Emergency Management Information System (NEMIS) Individual Assistance
database to add an audit table for the National Flood Insurance Reform
Act (NFIRA) and National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). This audit
table will allow those with access rights to NEMIS data, including the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), to obtain all NFIRA/NFIP
compliance for an applicant throughout the process, no matter how many
times the compliance flag changes. NEMIS will still display the current
compliance flag, but an audit table with compliance data will be
available to the GAO and individuals with access rights to NEMIS. This
CR was approved for the next NEMIS release, and FEMA provided its
requirements to the developers. FEMA is on target to complete these
changes to NEMIS by May 31, 2016. Interim milestones are included
below. Everything remains on target.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interim Milestones Estimated Completion Dates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Begin requirements gathering process...... Completed.
Baseline requirements & Obtain Cost Completed.
Estimate from development contractor.
Requirements definition with development Completed.
contractor.
Complete development & testing............ 12/31/2015.
Information Technology (IT) Independent 03/31/2016.
Verification & Validation Testing &
Deployment Approvals.
Production Deployment (this change would 05/31/2016.
coincide with our large NEMIS release,
scheduled between March and May each
year).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation 4: As part of its committee that is implementing
enhanced data-sharing between Public Assistance and Individual
Assistance programs, establish data-reporting requirements for States,
including specific fields needed and a standard process for comparing
information across programs, including IHP and STEP, to better position
FEMA to evaluate such pilot programs and to help prevent potential
duplicative payments.
On December 5, 2014, FEMA established an enterprise Data Governance
Board co-chaired by FEMA's Deputy Administrator and the Chief
Information Officer (CIO) to provide executive oversight of initiatives
to enhance data sharing, including between Public Assistance and
Individual Assistance. The Board is focused on developing current and
target data architectures, which will help to normalize data across
programs, and improve the quality and accessibility of enterprise data.
Data governance will allow for the comparison of information across
programs, including the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) and
Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power (STEP), to better position
FEMA to evaluate such pilot programs and to help prevent potential
duplicative payments.
As part of this effort, the Data Governance Board has set up a Data
Stewardship program that creates positions such as Data Stewards who
will be responsible for working with the program experts to standardize
and clarify data fields across the agency. For example, FEMA identified
that the term ``state'' could refer to a location, a program status, or
an event. Various types of data have been grouped into ``Data
Families'' to better organize the standardization process, such as
location, finance, programs, authorities, incidents. The first step
FEMA will take is to standardize the fields for location-based data.
Further, in accordance with the FEMA Strategic Plan, emphasizing
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance on requirements and
business case development, the Office of the Chief Information Officer
(OCIO) plans to implement a technical solution in partnership with
FEMA's Public Assistance program and the Recovery Analytics Division.
The technical solution is contained within the OCIO Enterprise
Architecture and was approved by the aforementioned Data Governance
Board as well as the Information Technology Governance Board (ITGB) in
September 2015. The ITGB is an executive body that oversees agency-wide
information technology investment and strategy and is also co-chaired
by FEMA's Deputy Administrator and the CIO. The OCIO Enterprise
Architecture will feature web services to provide data to FEMA's
partners including State, local, and Tribal governments.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interim Milestones Estimated Completion Dates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
IT Governance approval of target Completed.
infrastructure and data domain of the
FEMA enterprise architecture.
DHS policy and technical solution Completed.
resolution and approval for
implementation of target design.
Completion of logical design of 12/31/15.
infrastructure and data domains for
implementation and completion of proof of
concept test with external partner using
simulated data.
FEMA Cyber Security assessment and 02/29/2016.
approval of target infrastructure and
data domain design.
Completion of Data Center infrastructure 05/31/2016.
and data domain enhancements in
Development Environment.
Completion of all testing of Data Center 05/31/2016-09/30/2016.
infrastructure and data domain
enhancements in Test Environment.
Deployment of target data sharing 09/30/2016.
capability in Production Environment.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation 5: Evaluate options, including costs and feasibility, to
identify an approach for verifying the accuracy of self-reported
information FEMA receives on whether applicants have private homeowners
insurance. Such options could include posting additional questions to
applicants, sharing data with Federal agencies to identify Federally-
backed mortgages, or developing a data-sharing approach with private
insurance companies.
FEMA has evaluated options for posing additional questions to
applicants and sharing data with Federal agencies to identify
Federally-backed mortgages.
FEMA conducted an analysis that included re-evaluating
opportunities to collect clarifying information on self-reported
insurance at the time of registration. Auditors reviewed the 563 cases
identified by the GAO as having received FEMA assistance for damage to
a property that had a Federally-backed mortgage that required
homeowners insurance (HOI).
Based on the case review, FEMA determined that it is cost
beneficial to add a question at registration intake asking if a
homeowner applicant has a mortgage. FEMA determined that 424 of the 563
cases with Federally-backed mortgages received $794,122 in assistance
for home repairs or personal property losses typically covered by HOI.
Estimated costs for implementing a question at registration intake are
approximately $25,000. As the cost for adding a question is less than
the amount of Federal assistance provided without such a question, it
is cost-beneficial to add this question.
In addition, FEMA attempted to assess requirements for data sharing
with Federal mortgage agencies and discussed the approach with Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac representatives. Based on the analysis, these
entities maintain information regarding each mortgage's lender, but not
insurance provider, coverage, or status. Therefore, FEMA would still
need to request additional information from the applicant regarding
insurance policy coverage as the potential data-sharing arrangement
alone would not provide definitive information to avoid potential
duplication with insurance benefits.
During registration intake, FEMA currently asks homeowners if they
have insurance. FEMA plans to add a question during the next
registration intake re-engineering effort (scheduled for release in
calendar year 2017) that asks homeowners, ``Do you have a mortgage for
the damaged residence?'' If the applicant reports having a mortgage but
no insurance, FEMA will obtain additional information from the
applicant prior to providing forms of assistance typically covered by
insurance. Adding this new question will provide an additional control
that improves the methodology to confirm the existence or absence of
insurance. FEMA considers the risk of duplication of benefits
mitigated, and on August 27, 2015, FEMA requested that the GAO close
this recommendation.
Question 10. Challenges still remain with respect to certain core
capabilities in the National Preparedness Report. How does FEMA plan to
address the consistently lowest-ranked capabilities, particularly with
respect to recovery capabilities and disaster housing?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) believes
that States, territories, urban areas, and Tribes should determine
their priorities for closing their capability gaps through the
implementation of the National Preparedness System (NPS). The National
Preparedness Goal (the Goal) defines the core capabilities necessary to
prepare for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the
security of the Nation, and it includes concrete, measurable objectives
to manage that risk. The NPS is the instrument to build, sustain, and
deliver the core capabilities in order to achieve the Goal. States,
Tribes, territories, and urban areas should use the NPS to determine
priorities for closing their capability gaps.
FEMA requires grantees to implement the NPS and tracks their
progress in both fulfilling the components of the System and in closing
capability gaps. As part of this requirement, States, territories,
major urban areas, and Tribes receiving funds from the Homeland
Security Grant Program or Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program,
update Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRAs)
annually and submit them to FEMA. Once a jurisdiction has determined
their capability targets through the THIRA process, the jurisdiction
assesses its current capability levels against those targets. States
and territories submit these capability assessments annually through
the State Preparedness Report (SPR). Taken together, the THIRA and the
SPR identify capability needs and gaps. These products allow the Nation
to look holistically across all capabilities and whole-community
partners to gauge areas of strength and areas for improvement. FEMA
requires States to use a set of tools, including the THIRA, SPR, and
grant funding Investment Justifications that help States assess
improvements in first-responder capabilities and State-wide
preparedness. FEMA then uses the data from these assessments to drive
the strategic direction of its planning, training, exercise support,
and technical assistance programs to ensure they are helping
communities build and sustain their capabilities.
FEMA has several guidance products and training programs devoted to
increasing State, local, Tribal, and territorial understanding of
developing and applying recovery core capabilities in a coordinated
effort. The eight recovery core capabilities include planning; public
information and warning; operational coordination; economic recovery;
health and social services; housing; infrastructure systems; and
natural and cultural resources. Two examples include, The Effective
Coordination of Recovery Resources for State, Tribal, Territorial and
Local Incidents published in January 2015 (available on FEMA.gov at
https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/101940) and the E89
NDRF Regional Leadership Workshop are two examples.
The National Preparedness Report highlights that the area of
housing lacks sufficiently-trained Federal personnel to assist in
large-scale incidents. Furthermore, States and territories have
insufficient training options that address housing processes and
programs. Additional challenges continue to impede progress, including
coordination of transitions in authority from response to long-term
recovery; funding variability caused by supplemental disaster
appropriations; timing of available housing options; and limited State
resources to execute disaster-housing operations. The 2016 National
Preparedness Report will explore whole-community actions currently
underway to achieve progress in the core capabilities repeatedly
identified as National areas for improvement.
The Federal Recovery Support Functions (RSFs) improve Federal
planning and preparation in the 8 core capability functional areas. The
6 RSFs, including the Housing RSF led by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, have been planning, training, and exercising
together since 2011. The Recovery Support Function Leadership Group
(RSFLG) conducted its first core capability readiness assessment in
2015. This process provides an initial baseline on the full range of
capabilities Federal departments and agencies have to support the State
and local recovery efforts. Future development of Federal support
capabilities will be easier to plan and monitor against the 2015
findings.
FEMA has taken steps to improve coordination and ensure that
survivors affected by disasters return to safe, secure, and functional
housing options as soon as possible following a declared disaster. Our
efforts are focused on providing tools that support individual
recovery; improving the disaster registration process; collaborating
with our whole-community partners to ensure immediate mass care needs
are addressed; reducing improper payments; addressing the needs of
disproportionately-impacted communities; and better supporting State
and local officials to identify the housing options that best meet
needs, and streamlining disaster assistance delivery.
Question 11a. The data that State and local jurisdictions use to
identify capability gaps for the THIRA and State Preparedness Report is
also used to help close preparedness capability gaps.
Can FEMA use this data to determine whether grant investments
either mitigate threats improve National preparedness?
Question 11b. Since grant investments must be linked to capability
gaps or requirements, how does FEMA track how those gaps are being
closed with appropriate grant investments?
Answer. FEMA uses the data from the THIRA and SPR process to
determine whether proposed grant investments will build capabilities
needed to close identified capability gaps. States and territories
receiving HSGP grants are required to prioritize funding to address
these gaps. Grant applicants submit an Investment Justification (IJ)
that details the activities, in the form of projects, which the
applicants will conduct during the 3-year period of performance.
Applicants are required to align each project to one of the core
capabilities in the National Preparedness Goal and identify the
National Incident Management System typed-assets that support the
capability. Applicants also identify if the investment will be used to
sustain or build greater capacity within the capability.
To ensure that HSGP applicants are directing their investments to
the appropriate capabilities and associated Planning, Organization,
Equipment, Training, and Exercise resource elements, FEMA evaluates how
well their IJs align to their most recent SPR.
The 2015 IJ-SPR alignment review indicated that 97 percent of
applicant IJ projects were directed towards investments that increase
capability for high-priority core capabilities with low capability
levels.
The THIRA and SPR allow the Nation to look holistically across all
capabilities and align grant investments to mitigate threats and
improve National preparedness.
Question 12. FEMA stated in its most recent Strategic Goal that it
seeks to reduce administrative costs associated with disasters by 5% by
2018. However, there is no formal guidance or hardline requirements
detailing how this goal should be achieved. What progress has FEMA had
in developing a plan to track and monitor administrative costs
associated with disasters?
Answer. The plan is in the final stages of the agency's concurrence
process. The agency expects to send the plan to the GAO no later than
December 4.
Question 13a. Earlier this year, the National Advisory Council
recommended that you appoint a technical expert to advise on the unique
needs of children during a disaster. I understand FEMA concurred with
that recommendation.
Please describe the activities this technical expert undertakes to
help ensure the unique needs of children are incorporated in disaster
plans.
Question 13b. To what extent does the technical expert coordinate
activities with relevant interagency partners, such as the Department
of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services?
Answer. FEMA concurred with the National Advisory Council
recommendation. In July 2015, FEMA established the position of a
National Advisor on Children and Disasters within the Office of
External Affairs. This individual is responsible for leading the
agency's efforts to ensure that children's disaster-related needs
continue to be integrated and implemented into all disaster planning,
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts initiated at the Federal
level. In this role, the Children's Advisor works hand-in-hand with
subject-matter experts throughout FEMA, and collaborates closely with
Federal, State, local, Tribal, non-Governmental partners, and pediatric
experts across the Nation.
The National Advisor on Children and Disasters previously worked in
unison with the former National Commission on Children and Disasters
(Commission), Department of Education, Department of Health and Human
Services, Department of Justice, non-governmental organizations, and
many other external partners and pediatric stakeholders to establish
resources and tools within FEMA to address the Commission's
recommendations, while supporting all external efforts wherever
applicable.
One example depicting how the National Advisor ensures that
children's disaster-related needs are incorporated into disaster plans
would be the Post Disaster Reunification of Children: A Nation-wide
Approach, recently cited in Save the Children's 2015 Report Card. The
development of this guidance was led by FEMA's former Child Coordinator
(current National Advisor) and the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children, with participation from the Federal family; the
States of Arizona, Louisiana, Missouri, New York, and Nevada; the
American Red Cross, external stakeholders, and pediatric experts from
across the Nation. Each of these National partners continue to work
together in order to socialize elements of this document with their
respective stakeholders.
FEMA's efforts continue to evolve, and we recognize the importance
of implementing children's disaster-related needs into our program
delivery and training. The coordination with our Federal and external
partners and identification of cross-cutting programs to support
children in the affected communities and States throughout their short-
and long-term recovery is vital to FEMA's program delivery and the
disaster services provided for children. This has proven to be
incredibly evident, especially during disaster operations in Joplin,
Missouri; New Jersey; and Moore, Oklahoma. Therefore, FEMA is committed
to institutionalizing newly-established resources and tools throughout
agency, and to further integrate disaster services and resources to
meet the needs of children in disasters throughout the Nation.
Question 14. GAO has reported that FEMA employees do not always
highlight all of the grant options--like the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program--to potential grant recipients. What is FEMA doing to ensure
that potential recipients have all of the information they need about
grants they may be eligible for?
Answer. FEMA offers three Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA)
programs to support States, Tribal governments, and local communities
in implementing cost-effective, long-term hazard mitigation measures.
The HMA programs are the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, the Pre-
Disaster Mitigation program, and the Flood Mitigation Assistance
program.
FEMA continues to work with our State, territory, and Tribal
partners through training and workshops to ensure that all mitigation
grant programs and their corresponding policies, guidance, tools, and
job aids are understood and available to all interested parties. In
fiscal year 2015 FEMA provided:
47 training courses which consisted of over 680 Federal,
State, and local officials on HMA programs and HMA tools.
On-line HMA training for over 330 Federal, State, and local
officials.
Updated HMA Guidance with 23 associated job aids which
further streamlines the HMA programs. The job aids provide
detailed information on a number of program-related issues
including Tribes as HMGP applicants, procurement and the HMGP
declaration process. FEMA also issued several other job aids
prior to the end of the fiscal year for Climate Resilient
Mitigation Activities.
3 webinars regarding the updated HMA Guidance that includes
all of FEMA's mitigation grant programs allowing over 600
Federal, State, and local officials to learn the changes to
program guidance.
Numerous emails to the 46,000 mitigation www.govdelivery.com
subscribers concerning HMA grant program information including
mitigation best practices, mitigation success stories and
opportunities for grants.
Direct technical assistance to States, territories, and
Federally-recognized Tribes from FEMA Regional Office staff.
2 cost-estimating webinars which allowed 60 Federal and
State officials to learn more about cost estimating for HMA
grants.
An Updated HMA Program Digest which provides an easy to use
reference for common HMA program terms.
Detailed responses to questions for over 200 calls and 230
emails received on FEMA's benefit cost analysis helpline.
Responses to over 850 emails and calls to the HMA helpline
from State and local officials and private citizens requesting
information on HMA programs.
State Mitigation Program consultations (State mitigation
plans) with States began in fiscal year 2015 to foster better
coordination between State and FEMA staff concerning mitigation
grants and mitigation planning.
Questions From Honorable James E. Clyburn for W. Craig Fugate
Question 1. Mr. Fugate, in your testimony, you mentioned that in
the Individuals and Households Program, many individuals will only
qualify for a FEMA grant if they do not qualify for an SBA loan. For
those falling into that category, the process therefore requires three
successive applications before aid is granted. Is there a way that upon
individuals' first applications to FEMA, their ineligibility for a loan
could be determined, and the grant processed upon the initial
application?
As I mentioned, having to complete three different applications
before receiving aid is a cumbersome process that many of my
constituents are having trouble completing. Especially in rural areas,
where many residents are still grappling with how to rebuild after the
floods, this has been the greatest concern I have heard from my
constituents and is a real hindrance to South Carolina's recovery from
this disaster.
Answer. The Individuals and Households Program (IHP) consists of
two components, Housing Assistance and Other Needs Assistance (ONA).
Under IHP, an applicant does not have to first apply to SBA, before
being determined eligible for housing assistance, which includes Home
Repair, Rental Assistance and/or Temporary Lodging.
However, certain categories of ONA are what is known as ``SBA
dependent'' or ``non-SBA dependent.'' Under section 408 of the Stafford
Act, ONA includes medical, dental, funeral, childcare, personal
property, and transportation assistance, and assistance for other
expenses. Because applicants may be eligible to receive low-interest,
long-term loans from SBA to help with personal property,
transportation, and moving and storage assistance, these categories of
assistance are known as SBA dependent and under 44 C.F.R. 206.119,
unless FEMA determines at registration that the individual or household
will be unable to pass SBA's income test, the applicant must first
apply to SBA for a loan before requesting assistance from FEMA. If
approved, SBA loans eliminate the need for ONA grants and thus avoid
the issue of duplication of benefits to applicants. If FEMA is able to
determine at registration intake that an individual's income falls
below SBA's threshold, they are immediately considered for any SBA-
dependent ONA they've applied for. For the non-SBA dependent ONA
categories of medical, dental, funeral, and child care assistance, the
applicant is immediately processed for FEMA assistance.
Question 2a. Mr. Fugate, we have discussed my concerns with FEMA's
deference to State policy decisions. While appropriate in many cases, I
truly believe that by not doing independent analysis of significant
policy decisions, FEMA, in some instances, is not providing the best
results.
Under your authorizing statutes, does FEMA have the authority to
make independent decisions in implementing relief programs if you judge
it in the best interest of Federal policy? If so, have you ever used
such authority on a particular decision?
Question 2b. Finally, when funds are provided through supplemental
appropriations after the fact for disaster recovery, can FEMA and other
agencies administering them make decisions independent of Governors on
how relief programs are implemented and aid is distributed?
Answer. FEMA is not monolithic, but works in daily partnership with
its Federal, State, local, and Tribal stakeholders per the requirements
of the National Incident Management System and the National
Preparedness System.
Yes, FEMA is charged with implementing the Stafford Act disaster
relief programs authorized under a declaration, particularly the
Individual Assistance (IA) Program, see 44 C.F.R. 206.110(c): ``FEMA
shall determine the appropriate types of housing assistance to be
provided . . . '', and the Public Assistance (PA) Program, See 44
C.F.R. 206.226(e): `` . . . the Regional Administrator may require cost
effective hazard mitigation measures not required by applicable
standards.'' and (g): ``[t]he Regional Administrator may approve
funding for and require restoration of a destroyed facility at a new
location . . . ''. FEMA, through the Federal Coordinating Officer is
also responsible for coordinating relief including the activities of
State, Tribal, and local governments and it is responsible for
establishing the Joint Field Office although it will consult with the
State/Tribe regarding location as this affects the ability of the
State/Tribe to co-locate personnel with FEMA. FEMA works with the
State/Tribe and local governments regarding establishment of Disaster
Recovery Centers to ensure adequate coverage, although location and
duration is ultimately FEMA's decision to make.
As an example, FEMA routinely determines whether to implement a
direct housing program to provide temporary housing units under the IA
Individuals and Households Program (IHP). While input from the State/
Tribe is considered, the determination is solely FEMA's to make to
ensure that applicants' disaster-related temporary housing needs are
appropriately addressed.
Generally, how a disaster relief program is implemented and aid is
distributed is under the Federal Agency's purview. Depending on the
underlying authority, the Federal Agency may be able to promote or
limit assistance based on policy considerations although the State/
Tribe may have some say within limits depending on the particular
program. For example, under IHP Other Needs Assistance (ONA), which is
cost-shared and which may be administered by the State/Tribe, the
State/Tribe under its administrative plan can determine whether certain
types of personal property may be eligible (chain saw reimbursement for
example) or the amount of assistance for certain categories of eligible
expenses such as for funerals or vehicle replacement.
[all]