[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WORLDWIDE THREATS AND HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 21, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Honorable Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Director, The National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Mr. James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Article........................................................ 44
Story.......................................................... 45
Letter......................................................... 46
UNHCR Resettlement Handbook--Country Chapters, COUNTRY CHAPTER
USA: The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA............................ 50
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Honorable Jeh C. Johnson 77
Questions From Honorable Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter for Honorable
Jeh C. Johnson................................................. 80
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for Honorable Jeh C.
Johnson........................................................ 85
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for Honorable Jeh C.
Johnson........................................................ 85
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for Nicholas J.
Rasmussen...................................................... 88
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for Nicholas J.
Rasmussen...................................................... 88
Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for James B. Comey.......... 88
Questions From Honorable Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter for James B.
Comey.......................................................... 89
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for James B. Comey..... 89
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for James B. Comey...... 89
WORLDWIDE THREATS AND HOMELAND SECURITY CHALLENGES
----------
Wednesday, October 21, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
New York, NY.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Smith, King, Rogers,
Duncan, Barletta, Perry, Clawson, Katko, Hurd, Carter, Walker,
Loudermilk, McSally, Ratcliffe, Donovan, Thompson, Jackson Lee,
Langevin, Richmond, Keating, Vela, Watson Coleman, Rice, and
Torres.
Chairman McCaul. The Committee on Homeland Security will
come to order. The committee is meeting today to examine
current and evolving threats to the homeland. I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
First, I would like to thank our witnesses for joining us
here today and for offering their insights on the security
challenges that we face at home and abroad.
We will cover a lot of ground today from America's border
security to our cyber defenses, but I want to focus, in
particular, on the rising terror threat to the homeland.
Last month, this committee held the first-ever
Congressional hearing at the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York.
On hallowed ground, we were reminded of the solemn pledge our
country made in the aftermath to never let such a day happen
again.
That resolve became the rallying cry of this Nation as we
embarked on a generational war against Islamist terror.
Fourteen years later, we are still engaged in that struggle.
Today, I expect an unvarnished assessment from our witnesses
about where we stand in the fight.
We are at a turning point in the new age of terror. I
predict this year could exceed the last to become the most
violent year on record for global terrorism. Radical Islamists
are recruiting on-line across borders and at broadband speed,
and the impact is being felt world-wide. Here in the United
States, there have been more terrorist cases this year
involving home-grown Jihadists than any full year since 9/11.
ISIS alone has inspired, or directed, 17 terror plots in
America since early 2014, and overall, the group has been
linked to more than 60 plots against Western targets from
Canada to Australia. The pace of terror plotting is
unprecedented, unrivaled, even by al-Qaeda at its peak. Yet, we
are no closer to dismantling ISIS than we were a year ago.
Despite 14 months of air strikes, the group has largely
maintained its core safe haven while expanding its global
footprint. The ISIS reign of terror is fueled by its
recruitment of foreign fighters who hail from more than 100
countries, including our own.
This committee launched a bipartisan task force to examine
the foreign fighter threat, and last month, the group released
its final report with some very disturbing findings. Overall,
they found that we are losing the struggle to stop Americans
from traveling overseas to join jihadists. We have managed--
only managed to stop a small fraction of the hundreds of
Americans who have attempted to fight in Syria and Iraq, and
some have even managed to make it back into the United States
after enlisting with terrorist groups.
We are falling behind the threat for many reasons.
Vulnerable young people are being recruited at record speeds,
and terrorists are shifting their communications to Dark Space,
which has made it far more difficult to monitor and intercept
suspects. These secured communication tools are also being used
to plot attacks in our own country.
Moreover, gaping security weaknesses overseas, especially
in Europe, are making it easier for extremists to travel to and
from the conflict zone. But at the end of the day, we cannot
keep individuals from being lured to terrorist hotspots unless
we eliminate the problem at its source. Sadly, those prospects
have grown darker.
The President's failure to develop a coherent strategy in
Syria and Iraq has emboldened our adversaries to fill the
vacuum with disastrous consequences. Russia and Iran are now
propping up Assad, and there are reports that even Cuban
special forces have joined the fight. Those rogue regimes will
fan the flames of sectarianism and make it harder for us to
eliminate the terrorist sanctuary in the region. Their actions
will also intensify refugee flows, which have become a serious
security challenge in light of reports that terrorists are
exploiting the crisis to sneak operatives into the West.
Violent extremists are also expanding their foothold from
Libya to Afghanistan. Yet, I am alarmed that we lack a clear
vision for reversing their gains and winning the wider war
against Islamist terror. If we fail to defeat our enemies
overseas and combat them in their hateful ideology, we will be
forced to fight more of them here at home. We have learned this
the hard way. Today, I hope to hear from our witnesses about
these challenges and how their agencies are working to
strengthen our defenses on the home front.
Again, I want to express my gratitude to each of you for
your close and continued cooperation with this committee, your
dedication to our country, and your success this year in
disrupting so many terrorist plots.
Let me just close by saying that the FBI and Homeland
working together have arrested almost 70 ISIS-related
individuals in this country. I am amazed at what we have been
able to stop, and I just want to commend you for that.
With that, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
October 21, 2015
Good morning. I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us and
for offering their insights on the security challenges we face at home
and abroad. We will cover a lot of ground today--from America's border
security to our cyber defenses--but I want to focus in particular on
the rising terror threat to the homeland.
Last month, this committee held the first-ever Congressional
hearing at the 9/11 Memorial Museum in New York. And on hallowed
ground, we were reminded of the solemn pledge our country made in the
aftermath: To never let such a day happen again. That resolve became
the rallying cry of this Nation as we embarked on a generational war
against Islamist terror.
Fourteen years later, we are still engaged in that struggle, and
today I expect an unvarnished assessment from our witnesses about where
we stand in the fight.
We are at a turning point in a new age of terror. I predict this
year could exceed the last to become the most violent year on record
for global terrorism. Radical Islamists are recruiting on-line, across
borders, and at broadband speed--and the impact is being felt world-
wide. Here in the United States, there have been more terrorist cases
this year involving home-grown jihadists than any full year since
9/11.
ISIS alone has inspired or directed 17 terrorist plots in America
since early 2014, and overall the group has been linked to more than 60
plots against Western targets, from Canada to Australia. This pace of
terror plotting is unprecedented--unrivaled even by al-Qaeda at its
peak. Yet we are no closer to dismantling ISIS than we were a year ago.
Despite 14 months of airstrikes, the group has largely maintained
its core safe haven while expanding its global footprint. The ISIS
reign of terror is fueled by its recruitment of foreign fighters, who
hail from more than 100 countries, including our own.
This committee launched a bipartisan task force to examine the
foreign fighter threat, and last month the group released its final
report with some very disturbing findings. Overall, they found that we
are losing the struggle to stop Americans from traveling overseas to
join jihadists.
We have only managed to stop a small fraction of the hundreds of
Americans who have attempted to fight in Syria and Iraq, and some have
even managed to make it back into the United States after enlisting
with terrorist groups. We are falling behind the threat for many
reasons.
Vulnerable young people are being recruited at record speeds, and
terrorists are shifting their communications to ``dark space,'' which
has made it far more difficult to monitor and intercept suspects. These
secure communication tools are also being used to plot attacks in our
country.
Moreover, gaping security weaknesses overseas--especially in
Europe--are making it easier for extremists to travel to and from the
conflict zone. But at the end of the day, we cannot keep individuals
from being lured to terrorist hotspots unless we eliminate the problem
at the source.
Sadly, those prospects have grown darker. The President's failure
to develop a coherent strategy in Syria and Iraq has emboldened our
adversaries to fill the vacuum, with disastrous consequences.
Russia and Iran are now propping up Assad, and there are reports
that even Cuban special forces have joined the fight. These rogue
regimes will fan the flames of sectarianism and make it harder for us
to eliminate the terrorist sanctuary in the region. Their actions will
also intensify refugee flows, which have become a serious security
challenge in light of reports that terrorists are exploiting the crisis
to sneak operatives into the West.
Violent extremists are also expanding their foothold from Libya to
Afghanistan, yet I am alarmed that we lack a clear vision for reversing
their gains and winning the wider war against Islamist terror. If we
fail to defeat our enemies overseas and combat their hateful ideology,
we will be forced to fight more of them here at home. We have learned
this the hard way.
Today I hope to hear from our witnesses about these challenges and
how their agencies are working to strengthen our defenses on the home
front.
I want to express my gratitude to each of you for your close and
continuing cooperation with this committee, your dedication to country,
and your successes this year in disrupting terrorist threats against
the American people.
Mr. Thompson. I thank the Chairman for holding today's
hearing.
Mr. Secretary, welcome to what is your first appearance
before this committee, this Congress. I look forward to hearing
your informed perspective on today's topic.
I would also like to thank Director Rasmussen and Director
Comey for their testimonies.
Mr. Chairman, while I agree that the threats to this Nation
are concerning and worthy of examination, I also believe that
as the authorizing committee of the Department of Homeland
Security, it is our responsibility to hear from the Secretary
about the overall management of DHS.
This bipartisan committee, the Government Accountability
Office and the inspector general, have all identified
challenges within the Department. Additionally, there are
components within the Department that have proposed
restructuring. While the Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative
has made strides since the beginning of the Congress, but the
Federal employee viewpoint survey still indicates that DHS has
a long way to go in improving workforce morale, also to DHS
components with a zero-fail mission, the Transportation
Security Administration and the Secret Service are on-going
much-needed reform.
Furthermore, the Department's cyber mission is critical as
we look to prevent crippling attacks from cyber terrorists.
While we have heard from several DHS officials, this Congress,
we have yet to hear from the head of the agency on the record
about how he is fulfilling his vision for the Department and
what he needs from Congress.
Today's hearing and the topic and testimony does not
provide for a hearing from the Secretary on the topics I have
mentioned. Therefore, I am asking you, Mr. Chairman, for a
commitment at some point to hold a hearing on the oversight of
the Department of Homeland Security and invite Secretary
Johnson to testify before the end of the first session of
Congress. I know the success of the Department is a shared
concern. Each Member of this committee should have the
opportunity to question the Secretary in an open setting and to
continue to hold him accountable.
Today's hearing on the world-wide threats gives the
committee the opportunity to hear the perspective of top
Government officials on the wide-ranging threat of terrorism
from both international groups and domestic terrorists. Through
its oversight, this committee has given attention to the threat
from international terror organizations, including al-Qaeda and
the Arabian Peninsula and the threat from Islamic State of Iraq
and Levant.
The committee's bipartisan task force looked at the threat
from foreign fighters, and one of their glaring, yet
unsurprising findings, is that there are still intelligence and
information-sharing gaps that need to be addressed. These gaps
also enter the conversation as we continue our efforts to
address our humanitarian response to the refugee crisis in
Syria. I want to hear from each witness about their agency's
intelligence capability and how they are working together as we
prepare to assist in this humanitarian crisis.
As Members of Congress, we have the responsibility to
convey accurate information to our constituents and to the
media. As we rightfully continue to address the threats from
international terrorist organizations, I want to reemphasize
that we should not lose sight of the threats posed by
terrorists that are right here in America, as they are those
that have no plans on traveling overseas to receive training
from any international group. Through social media networks,
ISIL has encouraged lone offenders to perpetrate violence right
here on our soil. This approach is not novel. Right-winged
domestic terrorist groups also use social media to recruit and
communicate.
Again, Mr. Chairman, violent extremists view no single
ideology or recruitment tactic, even though some Federal
officials have been dismissive of domestic terrorism, and
others generate false intelligence to the contrary. The facts
are clear: Since September 11, more people in the United States
have died in attacks by domestic extremists than in attacks by
international terrorist groups.
Mr. Chairman, we often discuss what the 9/11 Commissioners
call a failure of imagination. As we use today to discuss the
threats to our country, let us not fail to imagine the
devastation that can be caused by the extremists, both abroad
and in our backyards. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my
time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
While I agree that the threats to this Nation are of concern and
should be examined, I also believe that as the authorizing Committee of
the Department of Homeland Security, it is our responsibility to hear
from the Secretary about the overall management of DHS. This committee,
through its bipartisan work, the Government Accountability Office, and
the Inspector General have all identified challenges within the
Department.
Additionally, there are components within the Department that have
proposed restructuring, the Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative has
made strides since the beginning of the Congress, and the Federal
Employee Viewpoint Survey still indicates that DHS has a long way to go
in improving the morale of its workforce.
Furthermore, two DHS components with a zero-fail mission--the
Transportation Security Administration and the Secret Service--are
undergoing much-needed reform, and the Department's cyber mission is
critical as we look to prevent crippling attacks from cyber terrorists
abroad. While we have heard from several DHS officials this Congress,
we have yet to hear from the head of the agency on the record about how
he is fulfilling his vision for the Department and what he needs from
Congress.
Today's hearing topic and testimony does not provide for hearing
from the Secretary on the topics I have mentioned. Therefore, I am
asking you for a commitment to hold a hearing on the oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security and invite Secretary Johnson to testify
before the end of the first session of this Congress. I know the
success of the Department of Homeland Security is a shared concern.
Each Member of this committee should have the opportunity to question
the Secretary in an open setting and to continue to hold him
accountable.
Today's hearing on world-wide threats gives the committee the
opportunity to hear the perspective of top Government officials on the
wide-ranging threat of terrorism from both international groups and
domestic terrorists. Through its oversight, this committee has given
much-needed attention to the threat international terror organizations
including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the threat from the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
The committee's bipartisan task force looked at the threat from
foreign fighters and one of their glaring, yet unsurprising findings is
that there are still intelligence and information-sharing gaps that
need to be addressed. Those gaps also enter the conversation as we
continue our efforts to address our humanitarian response to the
refugee crisis in Syria.
I want to hear from each of the witnesses more about their
agencies' intelligence capabilities and how the interagency is working
together as we prepare to assist in this humanitarian crisis. As
Members of Congress, we have a responsibility to have accurate
information before we begin to spread our own propaganda to our
constituents and to the media. As we rightfully continue to address the
threats from international terrorist organizations, I want to
reemphasize that we should not lose sight of the threats posed by
terrorists that are right here in America. There are those that have no
plans on traveling overseas to receive training from any international
group.
Through social media networks, ISIL has encouraged lone offenders
to perpetrate violence right here on our soil. This approach is not
novel. Not only does ISIL use social media to encourage lone offenders,
but right-wing domestic terror groups also use social media to recruit
and communicate. Once again illustrating that violent extremist views
know no single ideology and recruitment tactics can mirror.
Even though some Federal officials have been dismissive of domestic
terrorism and others generate false intelligence to the contrary, the
facts are clear--since September 11, more people in the United States
have died in attacks by domestic extremists than attacks associated
with international terrorist groups. According to a survey conducted by
the Police Executive Research Forum and the Triangle Center on
Terrorism and Homeland Security, law enforcement places threats from
right-wing terrorists as one of the top three terror threats in their
jurisdiction.
We often discuss what the 9/11 Commissioners called failure of
imagination. As we use today to discuss the threats to our country, let
us not fail to imagine the devastation that can be caused by extremists
both abroad and in our back yards.
Chairman McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member. I appreciate
your bipartisan cooperation on the task force report, which I
think was valuable, and hopefully to Federal law enforcement in
the intelligence community. I will honor your request to have
another hearing on the oversight issue as well.
We have a distinguished panel before us. First, the
Honorable Jeh Johnson, who has served as the fourth Secretary
of Homeland Security since his swearing in on December 23,
2013. Previously, he served as the general counsel for the
Department of Defense where he led over 10,000 civilian and
military lawyers across the Department and worked on the raid
operation on the compound in Abbottabad to take down Osama bin
Laden.
Next, the Honorable Nicholas Rasmussen has served as a
director for the National Counterterrorism Center since
December 2014, served as the deputy director, and is a member
of the National Security Council staff where he was special
assistant to the President, and senior director for
counterterrorism.
Finally, we have the Honorable James Comey, who has served
as the Federal Bureau of Investigation's director since
September 2013. Previously, he was general counsel for
Bridgewater Associates, and deputy attorney general at the
Department of Justice. He also worked on the Exile program,
which I remember meeting with you, sir, a long time ago when I
was deputy attorney general for the State of Texas trying to
implement the same program in the State of Texas, and we thank
you for being here as well.
Witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record. I will remind Members that additional statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
October 21, 2015
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson, thank you for this
opportunity to hear testimony on ``World-wide Threats and Homeland
Security Challenges.''
I join my colleagues on the committee in welcoming the Secretary of
Homeland Security Jeh Johnson, FBI director James Comey, and Nick
Rasmussen, director of the National Counterterrorism Center to today's
hearing.
As a senior member of the House Committee on Homeland Security and
Ranking Member of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security the topic of threats to homeland security is of has
significance in light of the events over the last 12 months.
My primary domestic security concerns are:
to preventing foreign fighters and foreign-trained fighters
from entering the United States undetected;
countering violent extremism in the United States that is
domestic and international in nature;
Protecting critical infrastructure from physical and cyber
attack; and
Strengthening the capacity of the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Justice to meet the challenges
posed by weapons of mass destruction.
Foreign Fighters and Foreign-Trained Fighters
It is estimated that 250 U.S. citizens are among the number of
foreign recruits who have traveled to Syria since the beginning of the
conflict.
In 2014 the total number of foreign fighters entering Syria was
estimated to be 14,000.
A September 26, 2015 article in the New York Times has the number
of foreign fighters as 30,000, which is doubled the number of foreign
recruits of a year ago.
It is estimated that since 2011 foreign fighters have come from
over 100 countries.
This disturbing news coupled with the massive migration of people
seeking to flee from war-torn Syria now entering Europe by the
thousands raises important concerns regarding security.
The Obama administration has announced that the United States would
take in 10,000 refugees by working the High Commissioner on Refugees in
a long and structured vetting process.
The larger issue is not the process managed by the State Department
and the Department of Health and Human Services that has long ago
proven itself effective in identifying refugees who will be welcomed
guests in the United States.
Every year, the United States provides resettlement opportunities
to thousands of the world's most vulnerable refugees, in a program
endorsed by the President (and every President since 1980) through an
annual determination.
The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which resettled over
58,000 refugees in the United States in 2012, reflects our own
tradition as a Nation of immigrants and refugees.
I have long advocated for the plight of women and children in the
Syrian war, who now make up a significant percentage of those escaping
into Europe.
To qualify for refugee resettlement to the United States, refugees
must:
1. Be among those refugees determined by the President to be of
special humanitarian concern to the United States;
2. Meet the definition of a refugee pursuant to Section 101(a)(42)
of the INA (see below);
3. Not be firmly resettled in any third country; and
4. Be otherwise admissible under U.S. law.
The application process for admittance into the United States as
refugees is not easy nor is it quick.
The unprecedented circumstances that Europe is facing does mean
that the United States must exercise diligence in every step of the
process that will be followed that will allow up to 10,000 refugees
from the Syrian war into the United States.
Countering Violent Extremism
One of the enduring challenges for Members of this committee is how
we guide the work of the Department of Homeland Security.
One challenge we have faced is finding definitions for terrorism
that will address the reality of the acts that are intended to
intimidate or terrorize the public.
Understanding what terrorism is begins in law with its definition.
Title 22 of the U.S. Code, Section 26S6f(d) defines terrorism as
``premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents,
usually intended to influence an audience.''
The FBI defines terrorism as ``the unlawful use of force or
violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives.''
Terrorism is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or of any state or other subdivision of the United States and appears
to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or to
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
or kidnapping.
A domestic terrorist differs from a home-grown violent extremist in
that the former is not inspired by, and does not take direction from, a
foreign terrorist group or other foreign power.
DHS defines Domestic Terrorism as: ``Any act of violence that is
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical
infrastructure or key resources committed by a group or individual
based and operating entirely within the United States or its
territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist
group.''
Groups and individuals inspired to commit terrorist acts are
motivated by a range of personal, religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs there is no magic formula.
Further, the complexity of adding social media as a new source of
recruitment for violent extremists is complicating the efforts of law
enforcement, domestic security, and National defense.
The line between lawfully protected speech and activity that may be
to some radical--should be clearly defined.
Taking care to protect--civil liberties and Constitutional rights
means that our system of laws must acknowledge that reading, writing,
or speaking one's views or beliefs event when they are unpopular is not
a crime.
Hate speech is not a crime--while an act of violence motivated by
hate is.
Violent Extremist threats within the United States can come from a
range of violent extremist groups and individuals, including Domestic
Terrorists and Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs).
In the wake of the killings at Mother Emanuel in Charlotte South
Carolina several African American Churches have fallen victim to fires.
Historically, African American churches are the center of
religious, social, cultural, and political life for the communities
they serve.
Because of their importance to the social movements of the 1960s in
less than one month in 1962, 5 Black churches were burned in the State
of Georgia.
Securing Critical Infrastructure
Last week Assistant Secretary Caitlin Durkovich informed a
gathering of energy firm executives at an energy conference that ISIS
has been attempting to hack American electrical power companies.
Critical infrastructure is dispersed throughout the United States
and if primarily under the control of private owners or non-Government
operators; and includes:
The Electronic Utility Grid;
Water Treatment facilities;
Ports, railways, and highways;
Telecommunication System;
Food production, processing, and distribution;
Health care delivery system; and
Financial System.
Critical infrastructure relies upon distributed computer networks
to support vital functions and delivery systems.
The security of computing networks rely upon strong encryption and
protocols to assure that the security of encryption passwords and
network access is maintained.
To support the work of the Department of Homeland Security in
providing cyber protection to critical infrastructure, I introduced
H.R. 85, the Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act.
The bill facilitates research and development activities to
strengthen the security and resilience of the Nation's critical
infrastructure against terrorist attacks and All Hazard events.
The bill establishes research initiatives that would provide the
Secretary of Homeland Security with a report on:
the degree that certain critical infrastructure is reliant
upon other types of critical infrastructure;
programs that would improve professional development for
security professionals;
assessment of vulnerabilities in software systems,
firewalls, applications, and methods of analyzing
cybersecurity; and
coordination of Federal agencies' response to cyber
terrorism incidents.
The bill would take an in-depth approach to securing critical
infrastructure.
For example, the bill lays the foundation for the development of
tools to create enhanced computer modeling capabilities to determine
potential impacts on critical infrastructure under various incident and
threat scenarios as well as the potential for cascading failures that
impact other critical infrastructure should certain critical
infrastructure(s) be impacted by a terrorists attack or an All Hazards
event.
H.R. 85 would provide oversight committees and Members of Congress
with a better understanding of the terrorism preparedness of critical
infrastructure owners and operators, contractors, or non-Government
agency entities that provide computer-related support or services to
critical infrastructure.
The arrival of the Internet of Things, which will introduce
ubiquitous wireless technology that will have significant implications
for existing computing networks and their security.
The cybersecurity challenges of tomorrow will look very different
from the cybersecurity challenges of today.
It is the work of the committee to ensure that the Department of
Homeland Security has what it needs to meet the cybersecurity
challenges that it faces.
Weapons of Mass Destruction
In the not-too-distant future, the harnessing of nuclear energy
will no longer be the privilege of only a few nations.
Today, nuclear energy is under serious consideration in more than
55 developed and developing countries and an additional 60 countries
are expressing interest in, considering, or actively planning for
nuclear power.
These efforts, if successful, would represent a quadrupling of
today's 30 nuclear-powered nations.
These ambitious nations face immense security challenges and for
these reasons the United States should be working to develop
relationships with nations who are willing to accept our assistance in
developing peaceful nuclear programs.
However, I believe that we should take this effort one step further
by developing the infrastructure to move excess nuclear material and
waste from these nations so that it may be safely disposed of without
concern that it could fall into unfriendly hands.
I will soon introduce legislation to establish much-needed
foresight in meeting the future challenges posed by the emergency of
nuclear power in developing nations.
In my statement I have outlined several areas of particular concern
regarding World-wide Threats and Homeland Security Challenges.
I thank today's witnesses for their testimony and look forward to
the opportunity to ask questions.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair now recognizes Secretary Johnson
for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JEH C. JOHNSON, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Johnson. Thank you, Chairman, Congressman
Thompson, Members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear
before you again. You have my prepared statement. I will not
read it in its entirety. Let me just give you a few thoughts.
Last month, I attended, on 9/11, the ceremony that occurred
in Shanksville, Pennsylvania. This was the 14th anniversary of
9/11. That ceremony, in particular, was a sobering reminder of
the acts of terrorism, but also the acts of heroism that day,
particularly on Flight 93, the 40 passengers and crew that day.
I met almost all of their families that day.
The events on 9/11 were the most prominent and devastating
example of terrorist attacks by those who are recruited,
trained, and directed overseas and exported to our homeland.
The 9/11 hijackers were acting on orders from al-Qaeda's
external operations chief, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was, in
turn, carrying out the direction of Osama bin Laden. Likewise,
the attempted Shoe Bomber in December 2001, the attempted
Underwear Bomber in December 2009, the attempted Times Square
car bombing in May 2010, and the attempted package bomb plot in
October 2010 were all efforts to export terrorism to the United
States, and they all appeared to have been directed by
terrorist organizations overseas.
The response to these types of attacks and attempted
attacks on our homeland was and is to take the fight directly
to the terrorist organizations at locations overseas. But
today, the global terrorist threat is more decentralized, more
complex, and, in many respects, harder to detect.
The new reality involves the potential for smaller-scale
attacks by those who are either home-grown or home-based, not
exported, and who are inspired by, but not necessarily directed
by, a terrorist organization.
Today, it is no longer necessary for terrorist
organizations to personally recruit, train, and direct
operatives overseas and in secret and export them to the United
States to commit a terrorist attack.
Today, with new and skilled use of the internet, terrorist
organizations may publicly recruit and inspire individuals to
conduct attacks within their own homelands.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula no longer hides the fact
that it builds bombs. It publicizes its instruction manual and
its magazine, and publicly urges people to use it.
Today, we are also concerned about foreign terrorist
fighters who are answering public calls to leave their home
countries in Europe and elsewhere to travel to Iraq and Syria,
and to take up the extremist fight there. Many of these
individuals will return to their home countries with an
extremist motive. In this regard, I compliment this committee
for the report it issued on September 29 concerning foreign
terrorist fighters. I have read it. I believe this committee's
work is spot on, in many respects, in your assessments of the
risk.
As noted in the report, my Department has undertaken much
of what is recommended. We have been, and are continuing to
institute measures to detect and prevent travel by foreign
terrorist fighters, along with the good work of the FBI.
The recent wave of attacks and attempted attacks here and
in Europe reflect the new reality of the global terrorist
threat: The Boston Marathon Bombing in April 2013; the attack
on the war memorial and the parliament building in Ottawa in
October 2014; the attack on the Charlie Hebdo Headquarters in
Paris, France in January 2015; the attempted attack in Garland
City, Texas in May 2015; and the attack that killed five U.S.
service members in Chattanooga, Tennessee, in July.
What do these wave of attacks, recent attacks, and
attempted attacks, all have in common? They were all conducted
by home-grown or home-based actors, and they all appear to have
been inspired but not directed by al-Qaeda or ISIL.
Finally, we are concerned about domestic terrorism in the
form of a lone wolf who can include various aspects--which can
include various aspects of domestic terrorism, such as right-
wing extremism. We need to devote substantial efforts to the
study and understanding of these threats and will continue to
further our understanding of the underpinning of terrorist
threats in all forms.
In terms of what we are doing about it, I look forward to
your questions.
The last two thoughts I have: Members of Congress ask me,
what can we do to help? How can we support the Department's
homeland security missions? There are two things I would like
to leave you with: First of all, through the work of this
committee and the House, the House passed H.R. 1731, which, in
my judgment, is a solid cybersecurity piece of legislation. I
hope it or something closely resembling it becomes law. I note
that the Senate, with some managers' amendments, offered on the
Senate floor the other day, S. 754, which is the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act. That bill, too, in its current form
is, in my judgment, a good piece of legislation. I hope the
Senate takes it up on the Senate floor, passes it, and it goes
to conference with the House's bill. I want to thank the
Members of this committee who were leaders in that effort. We
need cybersecurity legislation.
Last thing I will say, and this is probably the most
important thing I can say by way of legislation, I cannot
deliver for the American public the homeland security that the
Congress expects of me and my Department as long as I have to
live with the sequestered budget. Unless Congress repeals
sequestration, that will have very significant negative effects
to our ability to deliver cybersecurity, border security,
aviation security, maritime security, work with the FBI and
others on other counterterrorism efforts, provide protection
for our National leaders, and so forth.
So I urge Congress to repeal sequestration so that we can
do what we need to do for the American people. Homeland
security is the front line of National security. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeh C. Johnson
October 21, 2015
Chairman McCaul, Representative Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here. I welcome the
opportunity to appear before you with Directors Comey and Rasmussen to
discuss threats to the homeland and what we are doing to address them.
Though I am prepared to discuss the full scope of DHS missions, in
these prepared remarks I will focus on: (i) Counterterrorism, (ii)
aviation security, and (iii) cybsersecurity.
counterterrorism
Last month, I attended a sobering ceremony in Shanksville,
Pennsylvania for the 14th anniversary of 9/11. Today, 14 years after 9/
11, it is still a dangerous world.
The events on 9/11 were the most prominent and devastating example
of terrorist attacks by those who are recruited, trained and directed
overseas, and exported to our homeland. The 9/11 hijackers were acting
on orders from al-Qaeda's external operations chief, Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed, who was in turn carrying out the direction of Osama bin
Laden.
Likewise, the attempted ``Shoe Bomber'' in December 2001, the
attempted ``Underwear Bomber'' in December 2009, the attempted Times
Square car bombing in May 2010, and the attempted ``Package Bomb'' plot
in October 2010, were all efforts to export terrorism to the United
States, and they all appear to have been directed by a terrorist
organization overseas.
The response to these types of attacks and attempted attacks on our
homeland was and is to take the fight directly to the terrorist
organizations at locations overseas.
But, today the global terrorist threat is more decentralized, more
complex, and in many respects harder to detect. The new reality
involves the potential for smaller-scale attacks by those who are
either home-grown or home-based, not exported, and who are inspired by,
not necessarily directed by, a terrorist organization.
Today, it is no longer necessary for terrorist organizations to
personally recruit, train, and direct operatives overseas and in
secret, and export them to the United States to commit a terrorist
attack. Today, with new and skilled use of the internet, terrorist
organizations may publicly recruit and inspire individuals to conduct
attacks within their own homelands. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
no longer hides the fact that it builds bombs; it publicizes its
instruction manual in its magazine, and publicly urges people to use
it.
Today, we are also concerned about foreign terrorist fighters who
are answering public calls to leave their home countries in Europe and
elsewhere to travel to Iraq and Syria and take up the extremists' fight
there. Many of these individuals will seek to return to their home
countries with that same extremist motive.
On September 29, this committee's bipartisan task force published a
report on foreign terrorist fighters. I would like to thank the
committee, in particular Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson,
for your work on this important assessment of how we in the U.S.
Government can enhance our efforts to counter the threat of foreign
terrorist fighters. As noted in the report, the Department of Homeland
Security has undertaken much of what is recommended. We have been and
are continuing to institute measures to detect and prevent travel by
foreign terrorist fighters.
The recent wave of terrorist attacks and attempted attacks here and
in Europe reflect the new reality of the global terrorist threat. The
Boston Marathon bombing in April 2013, the attack on the war memorial
and the parliament building in Ottawa in October 2014, the attack on
the Charlie Hebdo headquarters in Paris in January 2015, the attempted
attack in Garland City, Texas in May 2015, and the attack that killed
five U.S. service members in Chattanooga, Tennessee in July: What does
this recent wave of attacks and attempted attacks have in common? They
were all conducted by homegrown or home-based actors, and they all
appear to have been inspired, but not directed by, al-Qaeda or ISIL.
Finally, we are concerned about domestic terrorism in the form of a
``lone wolf'' which can include various aspects of domestic terrorism
such as right-wing extremism. We devote substantial efforts to study
and understand these threats and will continue to further our
understanding of the underpinnings of terrorist threats of all forms.
So, what are we doing about it?
The Department of Homeland Security, following the attacks in
Ottawa, Canada last October, and in reaction to terrorist groups'
public calls for attacks on government installations in the West,
directed the Federal Protective Service to enhance its presence and
security at various United States Government buildings in Washington,
DC and other major cities and locations around the country. We continue
this enhanced presence today.
There are presently 38 countries from which we do not require a
visa to travel here. This ``Visa Waiver Program'' is a valuable program
to promote trade and travel with our most valued allies. Last November,
I directed that, for security reasons, we add fields to the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization, or ``ESTA'' system that travelers from
these countries are required to use.
In August 2015, we introduced further security enhancements to the
Visa Waiver Program. From now on, countries in the Program will be
required to, among other actions, implement arrangements to share
information about known and suspected terrorists and serious criminals;
collect and analyze travel data; and cooperate with INTERPOL--both for
using INTERPOL's Lost and Stolen Passport Database to screen travelers
crossing a VWP's country's borders, as well as reporting foreign
fighters to multilateral organizations such as INTERPOL or EUROPOL. We
also requested permission for the expanded use of U.S. Federal air
marshals on international flights from VWP countries to the United
States. These security enhancements will enable us to learn more about
travelers from visa waiver countries and to more accurately and
effectively identify those who pose a security risk before they board
planes bound for the United States. These enhancements have already
produced tangible security benefits.
Next, given the new reality of the global terrorist threat--which
involves the potential for small-scale home-grown attacks by those who
could strike with little or no notice--we are enhancing our
collaboration with State and local law enforcement. Almost every day,
DHS and the FBI share intelligence and pertinent terrorist threat
information with Joint Terrorism Task Forces, State fusion centers,
local police chiefs and sheriffs. We have also enhanced our information
sharing with businesses and critical infrastructure.
With regard to the current refugee crisis, the United States is
committed to providing refuge to some of the world's most vulnerable
people, while carefully screening refugees for security concerns before
admitting them to the United States. The reality is that, with
improvements to the process we have made over time, refugees are
subject to the highest level of security checks. DHS works in concert
with the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the National
Counterterrorism Center, and the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center for
the screening and vetting of refugees. The U.S. Government conducts
both biographic and biometric checks on refugee applications, including
security vetting that takes place at multiple junctures in the
application process, and even just before arrival to account for
changes in intelligence. All refugees admitted to the United States,
including those from Syria, will be subject to this stringent security
screening. Acting on my direction, USCIS has developed additional
protocols to aid in the identification of security concerns with regard
to the Syrian population, and the entire Department, along with the
interagency, is committed to continual improvement of overall security
vetting, as new techniques or sources of information are identified.
Next, given the nature of the evolving terrorist threat, countering
violent extremism in this country is as important as any of our other
key missions. Building trusted partnerships with diverse communities is
essential to successfully countering violent extremism and curbing
threats to the safety of our country. These communities must be
empowered to reach those individuals most susceptible to the slick
internet appeal of ISIL before they turn to violence. In the last
fiscal year, DHS held close to 200 meetings, roundtables, and other
events in 14 cities in which I participated. Since becoming Secretary,
I have personally met with community leaders in Chicago, Columbus,
Minneapolis, Los Angeles, Boston, New York City, Houston, suburban
Maryland, and northern Virginia.
We are now taking our CVE efforts to the next level. On September
28, I announced a new DHS Office for Community Partnerships which
builds upon the ongoing CVE work across the Department, consolidates
our efforts, and takes them to the next level. This office will be the
central hub for the Department's efforts to counter the evolving global
terrorist threat to our country. I named Mr. George Selim as the
director of this Office. George brings significant experience to his
new role, having served as the director for community partnerships for
the National Security Council since 2012 and previously worked at the
DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties.
My objectives for this Office are to build upon our partnerships
with State and local communities and governments, coordinate and
promote relationship-building efforts inside and outside of Government,
identify resources to support countering violent extremism through
Government-funded grants, public-private partnerships, technology, and
philanthropy. Meanwhile, the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties will partner with the Office of Community Partnerships and
lead, improve, and expand its important community engagement work,
including Community Engagement Roundtables, Town Hall Meetings, and
Youth Forums, in cities all across the country.
Finally, our homeland security efforts must also involve public
vigilance and action. At the Super Bowl earlier this year, I re-
launched the ``If You See Something, Say Something''TM
public awareness campaign with the National Football League to help
ensure the safety and security of employees, players, and fans during
Super Bowl XLIX. The newly revamped materials highlight the individual
role of everyday citizens to protect their neighbors and the
communities they call home by recognizing and reporting suspicious
activity. ``If You See Something, Say Something''TM is more
than a slogan. The public must play an important role in keeping our
neighborhoods and communities safe.
aviation security
Since last summer, I have required enhanced screening at select
overseas airports with direct flights to the United States. The United
Kingdom and other countries have followed suit with similar
enhancements, and the European Union passed legislation for both near-
and long-term enhancements to cabin baggage screening requirements.
Earlier this year in response to a December incident at the
Hartfield-Jackson-Atlanta airport, I asked the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) to review and make recommendations to address
concerns about whether aviation workers with airport identification
badges could bypass security and smuggle weapons or explosives into an
operations area or even onto an aircraft. In April, in response to the
ASAC's recommendations, I directed the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to take several immediate actions, including
``real-time recurrent'' criminal history background checks coordinated
with the FBI, reducing the number of access points to secured areas,
and encouraging airport workers to report suspicious activity.
I have also prioritized the expansion of preclearance operations at
foreign airports with flights to the United States. Preclearance allows
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers overseas to screen
passengers bound for the United States at the front end of the flight,
protecting the plane, its passengers, and our country, before they even
enter the United States. We now have 15 preclearance sites overseas, in
6 different countries, operated by more than 600 CBP Officers and
agriculture specialists. The most recent preclearance operation was set
up early last year in Abu Dhabi. Since that time, in Abu Dhabi alone,
we have already inspected more than 580,000 passengers and crew bound
for the United States, and have determined 1,002 individuals to be
inadmissible, including a number of them based on National security-
related grounds. We are in active negotiations with several countries
to expand preclearance operations to ten new foreign airports. I view
preclearance as an important piece of our aviation security and our
counterterrorism mission.
In May, the Classified, preliminary results of the DHS Inspector
General's tests of TSA's screening at airports were leaked to the
press. The OIG completed its Classified report last month, and has
provided it to the Department and to Congress. The final report
recommends corrective measures that TSA is already undertaking. In May
and June, I directed a series of actions constituting a 10-point plan
to address the concerns raised by the OIG's testing. This plan included
a number of immediate and longer-term measures. Under the new
leadership of Admiral Peter Neffenger, TSA has promptly begun
increasing manual screening and random explosive trace detectors, re-
testing and re-evaluating the type of screening equipment tested by the
OIG, revising standard operating procedures, and conducting ``back to
basics'' training for every TSA Officer in the country. Many of these
measures have either been completed, or soon will be.
cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is critical to homeland security. Cybersecurity is a
top priority for me, the President, and this administration.
To be frank, our Federal .gov cybersecurity, in particular, is not
where it needs to be. In the case of the breach of the Office of
Personnel Management, a large amount of highly personal and sensitive
information was taken by a very sophisticated actor. There is a great
deal that has been done and is being done now to secure our networks.
We do, in fact, block a large number of intrusions and exfiltrations,
including those by state actors. But much more must be done.
By law, each head of a Federal department or agency is primarily
responsible for his or her agency's own cybersecurity. DHS has overall
responsibility for protecting Federal civilian systems from cyber
threats, helping agencies better defend themselves, and providing
response teams to assist agencies during significant incidents. We have
also been able to use the unique authorities given to us by Congress to
engage with the critical infrastructure community to reduce the risk
that our essential services and functions could be disrupted by a cyber
attack.
DHS's National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,
or ``NCCIC,'' is the U.S. Government's 24/7 hub for cybersecurity
information sharing, incident response, and coordination. Thirteen
Federal departments and agencies and 16 private-sector entities have
regular, dedicated liaisons at the NCCIC, while over 100 private-sector
entities collaborate and share information with the NCCIC on a routine
basis.
The NCCIC shares information on cyber threats and incidents, and
provides on-site assistance to victims of cyber attacks. In this fiscal
year alone, the NCCIC has shared over 15,000 bulletins, alerts, and
warnings, responded on-site to 21 incidents and conducted nearly 130
technical security assessments.
It is my personal mission to significantly enhance the Department's
role in the cybersecurity of our Government and the Nation. To achieve
this, I have directed the accelerated and aggressive deployment of
important technologies, guidance, and partnerships that my Department
is uniquely situated to provide.
First, we have prioritized full deployment of our EINSTEIN system:
An intrusion detection and prevention system that uses Classified
information to protect Unclassified networks. I have directed the
National Protection and Programs Directorate to make at least some
EINSTEIN 3A countermeasures available to all Federal civilian
departments and agencies no later than December 31, 2015. We are
currently on schedule to achieve this goal. We have also successfully
expanded our private-sector version of this program--Enhanced
Cybersecurity Services--to all critical infrastructure sectors.
EINSTEIN has demonstrated its value. Since its introduction, E3A
has blocked over 650,000 requests to access potentially malicious
websites. These attempts are often associated with adversaries who are
already on Federal networks attempting to communicate with their ``home
base'' and steal data from agency networks. Importantly, EINSTEIN 3A is
also a platform for future technologies and capabilities to do more.
This includes technology that will automatically identify suspicious
internet traffic for further inspection, even if we did not already
know about the particular cybersecurity threat.
Second, DHS helps Federal agencies identify and fix problems in
near-real-time using Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation programs--or
``CDM.'' Once fully deployed, CDM will monitor agency networks
internally for vulnerabilities that could be exploited by bad actors
that have breached the perimeter. CDM will allow agencies to identify,
prioritize, and fix the most significant problems first. It will also
provide DHS with situational awareness about Government-wide risk for
the broader cybersecurity mission.
Earlier this year, I directed that NPPD make the first phase of CDM
available to 97% of Federal civilian departments and agencies by
September 30, 2015. We achieved this goal ahead of schedule and are on
track to make the second phase available by the end of fiscal year
2016.
Third, information sharing is fundamental to achieving our mission.
We must be able to share information in as close to real time as
possible while ensuring appropriate privacy protections. We have made
excellent progress by leading the development of a system that makes
automated information sharing possible. By November, we will have the
capability to automate the distribution and receipt of cyber threat
indicators. Our partners in the intelligence community and law
enforcement have participated in the development of this capability and
support the policies that we have put in place to ensure that we have
both appropriate privacy protections and the quick dissemination of
relevant information to other agencies.
We are working closely with other agencies of our Government to
support the stand-up of the ODNI-led Cyber Threat Intelligence
Integration Center, or ``CTIIC.'' This is vital because the foreign
cyber threats we face as a Nation are too many, too sophisticated, and
increasingly too severe to wait any longer to ensure we integrate the
intelligence about cyber threats to better inform our defenses and our
actions--just as we do with regard to terrorist threats. DHS looks
forward to full implementation of this intelligence community
initiative, which will help all of the operational cyber centers better
understand various strategic cyber threats and provide improved
intelligence community support to the NCCIC, which will, in turn,
enable us to share more information with our private-sector partners.
Last month, we participated in frank discussions with officials of
the People's Republic of China on cyber issues of concern to both our
nations. This culminated in our President's announcing several key
cybersecurity commitments. As part of these commitments, we agreed to
investigate cyber crimes, collect electronic evidence, and mitigate
malicious cyber activity emanating from its territory, and to provide
timely responses to requests for information and assistance concerning
those activities. Both sides also agreed to provide updates on the
status and results of those investigations and to take appropriate
action. As part of this commitment, we agreed to establish a high-level
joint dialogue mechanism on fighting cyber crime and related issues.
Perhaps most importantly, the United States and China committed that
neither country's government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-
enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or
other confidential business information, with the intent of providing
competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors. The United
States and China also committed to create a senior experts group on
international security issues in cyber space.
Time will tell whether the Chinese will live up to these
commitments. I intend to remain personally engaged on these issues, to
ensure that China takes concrete steps to advance progress made thus
far. To be sure, these commitments do not resolve all our challenges
with China on cyber issues. But, they do represent a step forward in
our efforts to address one of the sharpest areas of disagreement in the
U.S.-China bilateral relationship. On the U.S. side, we are prepared to
fulfill our commitments. Words must be matched by actions.
We cannot detect and stop every cyber single intrusion. So often,
the most sophisticated actors penetrate the gate through a simple act
of spearphishing, because they know they can count on a single user
letting his guard down. But, we have made considerable progress and
continue to take aggressive action.
I urge Congress to act by passing cyber legislation. I applaud the
bipartisan work that has been done so far in this Congress. We need
legislation to accomplish at least two things:
First, we need explicit Congressional authorization of the EINSTEIN
program. This would eliminate any remaining legal obstacles to its
deployment across the Federal Government. The House has passed H.R.
1731, which accomplishes this and ensures agencies understand they are
legally permitted to disclose network traffic to DHS for narrowly-
tailored purposes.
Second, we need the Senate to finish its work on the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act as soon as possible. This committee's
engagement with the bill's sponsors has strengthened the legislation
and incorporated important modifications to better protect privacy. I
understand that work continues to make necessary changes, and we
greatly appreciate those efforts. But cyber criminals are not waiting
to steal intellectual property or financial data, so neither can
Congress wait to pass information-sharing legislation. I urge you to
call upon Senate leadership to bring this bill up as soon as possible
so that the Senate can finish its work and pass it.
conclusion
I am pleased to provide the committee with this overview of the
progress we are making at DHS on countering threats. You have my
commitment to work with each Member of this committee to build on our
efforts to protect the American people.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Secretary. I certainly agree,
and we need to reprioritize our budget towards National
security and National defense. On the cybersecurity bill, I am
glad we are able to enhance, I think, the Senate version more
towards the House effort, and I think we will have a successful
conference committee. That is why I have great hope and deliver
for you, so you can do a better job at that important effort.
Finally, thank you for your recognition of the report itself in
the task force.
With that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Rasmussen.
STATEMENT OF HON. NICHOLAS J. RASMUSSEN, DIRECTOR, THE NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Rasmussen. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Thompson, and the committee Members. Like Secretary
Johnson and Director Comey, I welcome today's opportunity to
discuss a range of threats to the homeland that concerns us the
most. But before getting into that threat picture in some
detail, I want to stress that we at NCTC are very closely
aligned with DHS, with FBI, and our other counterterrorism
community and intelligence community partners in terms of how
we view that threat environment.
From an analytic perspective, I would start by saying, that
the chances of a spectacular, large-scale attack in the
homeland by an overseas terrorist group have been substantially
reduced over the last several years. We have collectively
achieved that outcome through aggressive CT action against al-
Qaeda overseas and through the robust homeland security
infrastructure that we have developed as a country in the last
14 years.
But while we can look with some degree of satisfaction that
the work done to reduce that threat of a large-scale mass
casualty attack, there is still quite a bit to be concerned
about on the current terrorism landscape. That landscape, as
you yourself said, Mr. Chairman, is, in some ways, more
challenging than ever. It is also clear that the terrorist-
operating paradigm has shifted, and it has shifted in ways that
are proving particularly challenging as we try to identify and
disrupt potential threats to the homeland.
Today, there are more threats originating in more places
and involving a more diffuse and disparate set of individuals
than at any time previously.
Now, first, as you would expect, we are intensively focused
on the threat of ISIL, which you highlighted in your opening
statement, Mr. Chairman. In our judgment, ISIL has overtaken
al-Qaeda as the leader of the global violent extremist
movement, and the group views itself as being in direct
conflict with the West. That conflict is increasingly being
played out not just in Iraq and Syria, but also in other places
around the world where ISIL has declared itself to have a
province. These places include Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Yemen,
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Nigeria, the Caucasus
region, potentially in Southeast Asia as well. ISIL's
aggressive growth and expansionist agenda has implications for
us here at home, in our homeland threat picture, and there are
three especially concerning features of ISIL as a terrorist
group, in my judgment. The first is their access to resources,
extensive resources, in terms of manpower, military materiel,
and funds.
The second concerning feature of ISIL is the territorial
control the group exercises in Iraq and Syria as well as in
some of the provinces I mentioned a minute ago. The third,
again, is something that you highlighted in your remarks, Mr.
Chairman, their access to a large pool of individuals from
Western countries, both those who have traveled to Iraq and
Syria, and those who have remained in their home countries.
When we look for indicators of potential external
operations capability that could threaten the homeland from
ISIL, these are the key features we generally expect to see,
and they are present with ISIL. Secretary Johnson also alluded
to how we are coming to view the threat from ISIL, especially
the homeland piece of that threat. We started to view ISIL's
involvement in homeland attack activity as falling along a
spectrum. At one end of that spectrum, we see isolated
individuals who draw inspiration from ISIL's highly
sophisticated media content, even if ISIL leadership is not
directly guiding their actions.
At the other end of the spectrum, something more
traditional, we assess that there are individuals who may, in
fact, receive direct guidance and specific direction from ISIL
members. More often than not, individuals we see here in the
homeland tend to operate somewhere between those two ends of
the spectrum, creating a fluid picture that is difficult to
assess.
Second, if you look beyond our intensive focus on ISIL and
the threat it poses to the homeland, we continue to devote
substantial attention to al-Qaeda and its affiliates and nodes
around the world. Despite the unrelenting media attention
focused in ISIL, in no respect would I or our intelligence
community downgrade our intention on al-Qaeda-related threat
activity in favor of greater focus on ISIL. In fact, when I am
often asked in public settings to identify what my No. 1
terrorism concern is, I decline to answer, because I would not
want our focus on one terrorist threat to suggest that we are
not focused on other significant threats that we are
confronting.
Specifically, right now we are closely watching for signs
that core al-Qaeda's attack capability is potentially being
restored ahead of the U.S. military's drawdown in Afghanistan.
While the ability of al-Qaeda to train, recruit, and deploy
operatives from their safe haven in South Asia has been
degraded, we continue to watch for and track indications that
core al-Qaeda is, in fact, engaged in plotting activity aimed
at the homeland.
In the statements for the record, both Director Comey and
Secretary Johnson singled out al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
for particular attention, and that is for good reason. The
threat from AQAP remains at the top of our list of analytic
priorities, given the group's unrelenting focus on targeting
U.S. interests, including potentially the aviation sector.
Beyond Yemen, we have also been watching al-Qaeda's
affiliated networks of individuals in Syria who may be looking
to carry out external operations against the West, or
potentially the homeland. While we have had some very public
successes in terms of disrupting some of the individuals
involved in that plotting from Syria, there is clearly more to
be done in this regard, and the work continues.
Our third area of priority, my last area that I will
mention in my remarks, is the growing use of simple
opportunity-driven attacks by home-grown violent extremists,
what we call HVEs. That style of attack has clearly
proliferated within the last several years. When you look back
to 2009, we were seeing, on average, less than 2 or 3 of those
incidents per year. By last year, 2014, that number was a
dozen, and to date, this year, that number of incidents, or
disruptive plots, have already doubled for this year,
suggesting that there are, in fact, a greater number of HVEs
inside the United States pursuing potential attack plans.
While it is very difficult to put precise numbers on that
population of home-grown violent extremists here in the United
States, there is no question in my mind and in the mind of our
analysts that this population has increased in size over the
last 18 months.
In my judgment, ISIL has injected new energy and life into
that population of home-grown violent extremists. ISIL, for its
part, knows that it can have a real impact by motivating
individuals to act in their own locations by carrying out
individual attacks, even on a relatively modest scale. That is
particularly true of several such attacks when strung together
in a compressed time frame. That is a significant innovation in
the terrorist playbook, something that al-Qaeda never quite
managed to deploy against us, and it requires that we in the
counterterrorism community innovate and adapt as well.
To conclude, Chairman and Congressman Thompson, I want to
assure you and the rest of the committee that we continue to
work every day to detect, defeat, and disrupt all manner of
threats from across this full spectrum of terrorist concerns
that we have. I look forward to discussing these issues with
you and the committee in greater depth.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rasmussen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nicholas J. Rasmussen
October 21, 2015
Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of
the committee. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the threats
that concern us most. I'm pleased to join my colleagues and close
partners from the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
threat overview
With the fourteenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks several weeks
behind us, it's clear that we've had great success at substantially
reducing the chances of that kind of attack recurring. We've done that
not only with aggressive CT action against core al-Qaeda in South Asia
and around the world but also through the array of defenses we've
erected as a country. The counterterrorism and homeland security
infrastructure that exists gives us much greater defense, disruption,
and mitigation capabilities that we did not have at the time of those
attacks.
That said, the array of extremist terrorist actors around the globe
is broader, wider, and deeper than it has been at any time since 9/11,
and the threat landscape is less predictable. While the scale of the
capabilities of these violent extremist actors does not rise to the
level that core al-Qaeda had at its disposal at the time of 9/11 it is
fair to say that we face more threats originating in more places and
involving more individuals than we have at any time in the last 14
years.
We remain intensely focused on the threat from ISIL. There is no
doubt that the group views itself as being in direct connect with the
West. ISIL's access to resources--in terms of both manpower and funds--
and territorial control in areas of Syria and Iraq are the ingredients
that we traditionally look at as being critical to the development of
an external operations capability. We are very concerned and focused on
ISIL's trajectory in this regard. ISIL must also win the war on the
ground in Syria and Iraq, which remains, we believe, a top priority for
the group's leadership. This is in addition to advancing their effort
to establish and administer branches in areas further afield, branches
that are demonstrating increased operational capabilities in their
respective regions.
We are coming to view the threat from ISIL as a spectrum, where on
one end, individuals draw inspiration from ISIL's media content and
perceive successes. At the other end, individuals may receive direct
guidance from ISIL members. These ends of the spectrum are not polar
opposites, however. Rather, they are the clearest illustrations of what
is more often than not a very fluid picture where individuals operate
between the two extremes.
The tremendous efforts being made to counter the ISIL threat are
absolutely warranted, but I want to stress that we still view al-Qaeda
and the various al-Qaeda affiliates and nodes as being a principal
counterterrorism priority. We would not tier our priorities in such a
way that downgrades al-Qaeda in favor of greater focus on ISIL. When we
are looking at the set of threats that we face as a Nation, al-Qaeda
threats still figure prominently in that analysis.
The steady attrition of al-Qaeda senior leaders has put more and
more pressure on the few that remain. We believe we have constrained
both their effectiveness and their ability to recruit, train, and
deploy operatives from their safe haven in South Asia; however, this
does not mean that the threat from core al-Qaeda resident in the tribal
areas of Pakistan or in eastern Afghanistan has been eliminated
entirely.
Ahead of the U.S. military's draw-down in Afghanistan, we in the
intelligence realm are trying to understand the level of risk the
United States may face over time if al-Qaeda regenerates, finds renewed
safe haven, or restores lost capability. I am confident that we will
retain sufficient capability to continue to put pressure on that core
al-Qaeda network so that that situation will not arise.
We as an intelligence community will be very much on alert for
signs that that capability is being restored, and we would warn
immediately should we find ourselves trending in that direction. All
that said, I'm still not ready to declare core al-Qaeda as having been
defeated in the classical sense of the word where the capability has
been removed. So long as the group can regenerate capability, al-Qaeda
will remain a threat.
We also see increasing competition between extremist actors within
South Asia itself, between and among the Taliban, ISIL's branch in
South Asia, and al-Qaeda. This is an additional dynamic that we are
working to understand. While conflict among terrorist groups may well
distract them from their core mission of plotting attacks against
Western targets, conflict also serves to introduce a degree of
uncertainty into the terrorism landscape that raises questions that I
don't think we have answers to yet. This is something that we will
watch very closely.
Stepping back, there are two trends in the contemporary threat
environment that concern us most. First is the increasing ability of
terrorist actors to communicate with each other outside our reach. The
difficulty in collecting precise intelligence on terrorist intentions
and the status of particular terrorist plots is increasing over time.
There are several reasons for this: Exposure of intelligence
collection techniques; disclosures of Classified information that have
given terrorist groups a better understanding of how we collect
intelligence; and terrorist group's innovative and agile use of new
means of communicating, including ways in which they understand are
beyond our ability to collect. I know that FBI Director Carney has
spoken about these challenges on a number of occasions.
Second, while we've seen a decrease in the frequency of large-
scale, complex plotting efforts that sometimes span several years,
we've seen a proliferation of more rapidly-evolving threat or plot
vectors that emerge simply by an individual encouraged to take action,
then quickly gathering the few resources needed and moving into an
operational phase. This is something I would tie very much to the modus
operandi of ISIL-inspired terrorists. The so-called ``flash-to-bang''
ratio in plotting of this sort is extremely compressed, and allows
little time for traditional law enforcement and intelligence tools to
disrupt or mitigate potential plots.
ISIL is aware of this, and those connected to the group have
understood that by motivating actors in their own locations to take
action against Western countries and targets, they can be effective. In
terms of propaganda and recruitment, they can generate further support
for their movement, without carrying out catastrophic, mass-casualty
attacks. And that's an innovation in the terrorist playbook that poses
a great challenge.
countering violent extremism (cve)
The growing number of individuals going abroad as foreign terrorist
fighters to Iraq and Syria only emphasizes the importance of
prevention. Any hope of enduring security against terrorism or
defeating organizations like ISIL rests in our ability to diminish the
appeal of terrorism and dissuade individuals from joining them in the
first place.
To this end, we continue to refine and expand the preventive side
of counterterrorism. We have seen a steady proliferation of more
proactive and engaged community awareness efforts across the United
States, with the goal of giving communities the information and the
tools they need to see extremism in their midst and do something about
it before it manifests itself in violence. NCTC, in direct
collaboration with DHS, has led the creation of CVE tools to build
community resilience across the country.
Working and closely coordinating with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), NCTC is engaged in this work all across
the country.
We, in concert with DOJ, DHS, and FBI, sent our officers on
multiple occasions to meet with the communities in places such as
Denver, Sacramento, Buffalo, and Minneapolis to raise awareness among
community and law enforcement audiences about the terrorist recruitment
threat. Our briefing, developed in partnership with DHS, is now
tailored to address the specific issue of foreign fighter recruitment
in Syria and Iraq; and we have received a strong demand signal for more
such outreach.
This is not a law enforcement-oriented effort designed to collect
information. Rather, it is an effort to share information about how
members of our communities are being targeted and recruited to join
terrorists overseas. Seen in that light, we have had a remarkably
positive reaction from the communities with whom we have engaged.
We continue to expand our CVE tools. With our DHS colleagues, we
have created and regularly deliver the Community Resilience Exercise, a
table-top exercise that brings together local law enforcement with
community leadership to run through a hypothetical case study-based
scenario featuring a possible violent extremist or foreign fighter.
We also aim to encourage the creation of intervention models at the
local level. In the same way that local partners, including law
enforcement, schools, social service providers, and communities, have
come together to provide alternative pathways and off-ramps for people
who might be vulnerable to joining a gang, we are encouraging our local
partners to implement similar models for violent extremism. The more
resilient the community, the less likely its members are to join a
violent extremist group.
conclusion
In summary, confronting these threats and working with resolve to
prevent another terrorist attack remains the counterterrorism
community's overriding mission. I can assure you that we at NCTC are
focused on positioning ourselves to be better prepared to address the
terrorist threat in the coming years. We expect this threat will
increasingly involve terrorists' use of the on-line platforms that I
mentioned earlier in my remarks.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning. I want to assure you that our attention is concentrated on the
security crises in Iraq and Syria--and rightly so--but we continue to
detect, disrupt, and defeat threats from across the threat spectrum in
concert with our partners.
Thank you all very much, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir. We appreciate the work
that you do.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Comey.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. COMEY, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Thompson, Members
of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today. My
colleagues have made clear in their opening statements
something that I won't repeat, that ISIL has broken the model.
I want to explain why that change in model leads us to talk
so much about the challenges we face with encryption very
briefly. Social media has transformed human experience in
wonderful ways. I have no idea where anybody from my fifth
grade class at P.S. 16 in Yonkers, New York is today. My kids
will know everything about everybody from their fifth grade
class for the rest of their life. There is good and bad to
that. I think, on balance, it is wonderful. But ISIL has used
that ubiquitous social media to break the model and push into
the United States, into the pocket, onto the mobile devices of
troubled souls throughout our country in all 50 States a twin
message, come or kill, come or kill. Come to the so-called
caliphate, live a life of glory, participate in the final
battle between good and evil on God's side. Come to the
caliphate, and if you can't come, kill where you are.
Social media works to connect us. It works as a way to sell
cars or shoes or a movie. It works to crowdsource terrorism. So
starting in the summer of 2014, they really invested in this,
and it works. It led to troubled souls convincing themselves
that there was meaning for them in Syria and Iraq, or that they
should engage in acts of violence in the United States, and
that investment started to pay dividends, and taxed all of our
resources in the spring of this year, when suddenly we had
dozens and dozens of cases in the United States of people who
were progressing along the spectrum from consuming to acting to
killing where they are. Thank goodness, thanks to tremendous
work by the men and women who work for us, that was disrupted.
We arrested dozens of people during this year to disrupt those
plots.
The challenge we face is enormous, because this broken
model, this crowdsourcing of terrorism means there are hundreds
of people across our great country who are troubled, who are
consuming this poison. We have investigations in all 50 States
trying to understand. So where are they from consuming to
acting? Very hard to find them and to evaluate them. It gets
harder still. It is not just a Nation-wide haystack where we
are looking for needles, ISIL makes those needles disappear on
us. Because if they find a live one through Twitter, they will
move them through all these investigations to an end-to-end
mobile messaging app that is encrypted, and then the needle
disappears. So we know if somebody is really dangerous to us,
the needle goes invisible to us. That is very, very concerning.
The reason we are talking so much about encryption is we
see in ISIL, and more broadly, a conflict between two values
everybody in America cares about. We all care about safety and
security on the internet. I and Nick and Jeh are huge fans of
encryption, right? We want our key data encrypted. It helps the
FBI fight cyber intrusions. That value, safety and security, is
colliding with public safety, which we all care deeply about.
We don't have an easy answer, but a great democracy should see
when its values are in collision and talk about how we might
resolve those two things.
There is no easy answer. The good news is we are having
productive conversations with local law enforcement, which
cares deeply about this, with our allies, and with the
companies who make these devices and offer these services,
because they are good folks who care about both values. This is
a really hard problem for our country. We are not here to tell
what the answer is. We are here just to tell folks. The example
I use is, the FBI is not an alien force imposed on America from
Mars, right? We belong to the American people. We have the
tools the American people gave us through you; and our job,
when one of those tools isn't working so much anymore, is to
tell the American people. That is why we are talking so much
about encryption. You see it in the ISIL cases, you see it in
kidnapping cases, drug cases, child abuse cases. There is a
conflict in our values that we simply must figure out how to
resolve. It is obvious in the case of ISIL. We will continue
doing the work.
I am very grateful, as my colleagues are, for the high-
quality product that this committee did on travelers, those
responding to the first part of that siren song, that ``come.''
There is something interesting happening that I want to tell
the committee about. Just in the last few months, we are seeing
fewer people attempt to travel to join ISIL in Syria. We have
seen 6 in the last 3\1/2\ months. We were seeing 9 a month in
all the months before that.
I don't know what to make of that. One possibility is we
are not seeing it the way we were before; they are still going.
Another possibility is all of our efforts to lock people up and
punish them for going is making a difference, another
difference is help from our colleagues around the world,
especially the Turks, or something else. But we are starting to
notice that curve, which was going up like a hockey stick,
flatten a little bit. We will keep you posted on whether that
continues, but this committee has done such great work on that
topic, I wanted you to know that fact. We are very grateful for
the opportunity for this conversation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Comey follows:]
Prepared Statement of James B. Comey
October 21, 2015
Good afternoon Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and
Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the current threats to the homeland and our
efforts to address new challenges including terrorists' use of
technology to communicate--both to inspire and recruit. The wide-spread
use of technology propagates the persistent terrorist message to attack
U.S. interests whether in the homeland or abroad. As the threat to harm
Western interests evolves, we must adapt and confront the challenges,
relying heavily on the strength of our Federal, State, local, and
international partnerships. Our successes depend on interagency
cooperation. We work closely with our partners within the Department of
Homeland Security and the National Counterterrorism Center to address
current and emerging threats.
counterterrorism
Counterterrorism remains the FBI's top priority, however, the
threat has changed in two significant ways. First, the core al-Qaeda
tumor has been reduced, but the cancer has metastasized. The progeny of
al-Qaeda--including AQAP, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have become our focus.
Secondly, we are confronting the explosion of terrorist propaganda
and training on the internet. It is no longer necessary to get a
terrorist operative into the United States to recruit. Terrorists, in
ungoverned spaces, disseminate poisonous propaganda and training
materials to attract troubled souls around the world to their cause.
They encourage these individuals to travel, but if they can't travel,
they motivate them to act at home. This is a significant change from a
decade ago.
We continue to identify individuals who seek to join the ranks of
foreign fighters traveling in support of ISIL, and also home-grown
violent extremists who may aspire to attack the United States from
within. These threats remain among the highest priorities for the FBI
and the intelligence community as a whole.
Conflicts in Syria and Iraq continue to serve as the most
attractive overseas theaters for Western-based extremists who want to
engage in violence. We estimate approximately 250 Americans have
traveled or attempted to travel to Syria to participate in the
conflict. While this number is lower in comparison to many of our
international partners, we closely analyze and assess the influence
groups like ISIL have on individuals located in the United States who
are inspired to commit acts of violence. Whether or not the individuals
are affiliated with a foreign terrorist organization and are willing to
travel abroad to fight or are inspired by the call to arms to act in
their communities, they potentially pose a significant threat to the
safety of the United States and U.S. persons.
ISIL has proven relentless in its violent campaign to rule and has
aggressively promoted its hateful message, attracting like-minded
extremists to include Westerners. To an even greater degree than al-
Qaeda or other foreign terrorist organizations, ISIL has persistently
used the internet to communicate. From a homeland perspective, it is
ISIL's wide-spread reach through the internet and social media which is
most concerning as ISIL has aggressively employed this technology for
its nefarious strategy. ISIL blends traditional media platforms, glossy
photos, in-depth articles, and social media campaigns that can go viral
in a matter of seconds. No matter the format, the message of
radicalization spreads faster than we imagined just a few years ago.
Unlike other groups, ISIL has constructed a narrative that touches
on all facets of life--from career opportunities to family life to a
sense of community. The message isn't tailored solely to those who are
overtly expressing symptoms of radicalization. It is seen by many who
click through the internet every day, receive social media push
notifications, and participate in social networks. Ultimately, many of
these individuals are seeking a sense of belonging.
As a communication medium, social media is a critical tool for
terror groups to exploit. One recent example occurred when an
individual was arrested for providing material support to ISIL by
facilitating an associate's travel to Syria to join ISIL. The arrested
individual had multiple connections, via a social media networking
site, with other like-minded individuals.
There is no set profile for the susceptible consumer of this
propaganda. However, one trend continues to rise--the inspired youth.
We've seen certain children and young adults drawing deeper into the
ISIL narrative. These individuals are often comfortable with virtual
communication platforms, specifically social media networks.
ISIL continues to disseminate their terrorist message to all social
media users--regardless of age. Following other groups, ISIL has
advocated for lone-offender attacks. In recent months ISIL released a
video, via social media, reiterating the group's encouragement of lone-
offender attacks in Western countries, specifically advocating for
attacks against soldiers and law enforcement, intelligence community
members, and Government personnel. Several incidents have occurred in
the United States and Europe over the last few months that indicate
this ``call to arms'' has resonated among ISIL supporters and
sympathizers.
In one case, a New York-based male was arrested in September after
he systematically attempted to travel to the Middle East to join ISIL.
The individual, who was inspired by ISIL propaganda, expressed his
support for ISIL on-line and took steps to carry out acts encouraged in
the ISIL call to arms.
The targeting of U.S. military personnel is also evident with the
release of names of individuals serving in the U.S. military by ISIL
supporters. The names continue to be posted to the internet and quickly
spread through social media, depicting ISIL's capability to produce
viral messaging. Threats to U.S. military and coalition forces continue
today.
Social media has allowed groups, such as ISIL, to use the internet
to spot and assess potential recruits. With the wide-spread horizontal
distribution of social media, terrorists can identify vulnerable
individuals of all ages in the United States--spot, assess, recruit,
and radicalize--either to travel or to conduct a homeland attack. The
foreign terrorist now has direct access into the United States like
never before.
In other examples of arrests, a group of individuals was contacted
by a known ISIL supporter who had already successfully traveled to
Syria and encouraged them to do the same. Some of these conversations
occur in publicly-accessed social networking sites, but others take
place via private messaging platforms. As a result, it is imperative
the FBI and all law enforcement organizations understand the latest
communication tools and are positioned to identify and prevent terror
attacks in the homeland.
We live in a technologically-driven society and just as private
industry has adapted to modern forms of communication so too have
terrorists. Unfortunately, changing forms of internet communication and
the use of encryption are posing real challenges to the FBI's ability
to fulfill its public safety and National security missions. This real
and growing gap, to which the FBI refers as ``Going Dark,'' is an area
of continuing focus for the FBI; we believe it must be addressed given
the resulting risks are grave in both traditional criminal matters as
well as in National security matters. The United States Government is
actively engaged with private companies to ensure they understand the
public safety and National security risks that result from malicious
actors' use of their encrypted products and services. However, the
administration is not seeking legislation at this time.
The FBI is utilizing all lawful investigative techniques and
methods to combat the threat these individuals may pose to the United
States. In conjunction with our domestic and foreign partners, we are
rigorously collecting and analyzing intelligence information as it
pertains to the on-going threat posed by foreign terrorist
organizations and home-grown violent extremists. We continue to
encourage robust information sharing; in partnership with our many
Federal, State, and local agencies assigned to Joint Terrorism Task
Forces around the country, we remain vigilant to ensure the safety of
the American public. Be assured, the FBI continues to pursue increased
efficiencies and information-sharing processes as well as pursue
technological and other methods to help stay ahead of threats to the
homeland.
intelligence
Integrating intelligence and operations is part of the broader
intelligence transformation the FBI has undertaken in the last decade.
We are making progress, but have more work to do. We have taken two
steps to improve this integration. First, we have established an
intelligence branch within the FBI headed by an Executive Assistant
Director (``EAD''). The EAD looks across the entire enterprise and
drives integration. Second, we now have Special Agents and new
Intelligence Analysts at the FBI Academy engaged in practical training
exercises and taking core courses together. As a result, they are
better-prepared to work well together in the field. Our goal every day
is to get better at using, collecting, and sharing intelligence to
better understand and defeat our adversaries.
The FBI cannot be content to just work what is directly in front of
us. We must also be able to understand the threats we face at home and
abroad and how those threats may be connected. Towards that end,
intelligence is gathered, consistent with our authorities, to help us
understand and prioritize identified threats and to determine where
there are gaps in what we know about these threats. We then seek to
fill those gaps and learn as much as we can about the threats we are
addressing and others on the threat landscape. We do this for National
security and criminal threats, on both a National and local field
office level. We then compare the National and local perspectives to
organize threats into priority for each of the FBI's 56 field offices.
By categorizing threats in this way, we strive to place the greatest
focus on the gravest threats we face. This gives us a better assessment
of what the dangers are, what's being done about them, and where we
should prioritize our resources.
cyber
An element of virtually every National security threat and crime
problem the FBI faces is cyber-based or facilitated. We face
sophisticated cyber threats from state-sponsored hackers, hackers for
hire, organized cyber syndicates, and terrorists. On a daily basis,
cyber-based actors seek our state secrets, our trade secrets, our
technology, and our ideas--things of incredible value to all of us and
of great importance to the conduct of our Government business and our
National security. They seek to strike our critical infrastructure and
to harm our economy.
We continue to see an increase in the scale and scope of reporting
on malicious cyber activity that can be measured by the amount of
corporate data stolen or deleted, personally identifiable information
compromised, or remediation costs incurred by U.S. victims. For
example, as the committee is aware, the Office of Personnel Management
(``OPM'') discovered earlier this year that a number of its systems
were compromised. These systems included those that contain information
related to the background investigations of current, former, and
prospective Federal Government employees, as well as other individuals
for whom a Federal background investigation was conducted. The FBI is
working with our interagency partners to investigate this matter.
FBI agents, analysts, and computer scientists are using technical
capabilities and traditional investigative techniques--such as sources,
court-authorized electronic surveillance, physical surveillance, and
forensics--to fight cyber threats. We are working side-by-side with our
Federal, State, and local partners on Cyber Task Forces in each of our
56 field offices and through the National Cyber Investigative Joint
Task Force (NCIJTF), which serves as a coordination, integration, and
information-sharing center for 19 U.S. agencies and several key
international allies for cyber threat investigations. Through CyWatch,
our 24-hour cyber command center, we combine the resources of the FBI
and NCIJTF, allowing us to provide connectivity to Federal cyber
centers, Government agencies, FBI field offices and legal attaches, and
the private sector in the event of a cyber intrusion.
We take all potential threats to public and private-sector systems
seriously and will continue to investigate and hold accountable those
who pose a threat in cyber space.
Finally, the strength of any organization is its people. The
threats we face as a Nation have never been greater or more diverse and
the expectations placed on the Bureau have never been higher. Our
fellow citizens look to us to protect the United States from all of
those threats and the men and women of the Bureau continue to meet--and
exceed--those expectations, every day. I want to thank them for their
dedication and their service.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and committee Members, I
thank you for the opportunity to testify concerning the threats to the
homeland and terrorists' use of the internet and social media as a
platform for spreading ISIL propaganda and inspiring individuals to
target the homeland, and the impact of the Going Dark problem on
mitigating their efforts. I am happy to answer any questions you might
have.
Chairman McCaul. I thank you, Director.
The Chair now recognizes himself for questioning.
Let me say, on the encryption issue, Dark Space platform,
this committee is--we are meeting with technology companies
trying to find a solution to that. You have the foreign fighter
threat, but the threat over the internet is real; it has gone
viral. I think the good news is Junaid Hussain was taken out by
an air strike. That is publicly reported, and had some impact,
I think, but it is going to continue until we find a solution,
a technology solution.
I also want to commend you for the success both you and the
Secretary have had in stopping so many plots. We put out a
monthly terrorist snapshot, and the fact is, every month these
numbers go up in terms of terror plots. We had 17 terror plots
here in the United States, ISIS-directed or inspired, and
overall, almost 70 ISIS-related individuals arrested. You don't
know what you don't know. The Chattanooga case is a good
example. You can't stop all this. The chatter is so high, it is
hard to stop all of it.
My first question, just very simply, is--and I will direct
it to the Secretary--is: Do you consider the threat environment
to the homeland to be one of the greatest since 9/11?
Secretary Johnson. Chairman, like Nick, I tend not to rank
threats or rank periods----
Chairman McCaul. Use your mike.
Secretary Johnson. I tend not to rank threats or try to
make an assessment that a current period is more or less
dangerous than before, because we have to focus on a number of
things. The point that I want to stress is that it is
different. It is different than what it was in the 9/11 period
in that it is more decentralized and more diffused; it is more
complicated because of the going--Going Dark phenomenon because
of the very effective use of social media, and because of the
potential for the lone actor, who isn't necessarily exported
from overseas, but who could strike here at any moment, which
requires a more complex response, a more whole-of-Government
response.
We are very concerned. I am encouraged by the numbers Jim
cited of those we know about who have attempted to leave, but
we also know that ISIL is still out there every day making an
appeal. So we have got to stay busy.
Chairman McCaul. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. I think about it the way Jeh does. In some ways,
we are demonstrably safer, thanks to the work of this committee
and the whole of Government. This--our country is better
organized, better deployed, smarter, tougher than we were
before 9/11. So as Director Rasmussen said, I agree that the
threat of the big thing is not gone, but it is diminished
significantly. At the same time, there has been a metastasis of
the threat in all of the likely governed or ungoverned spaces
throughout the world.
We are obviously all looking at Libya closely now, and the
Sinai, and lots of other parts of the world. So it has been
more diffuse. It moves at us faster through social media, and
there is a whole lot more people in the United States--
energized, troubled souls--than there were by core al-Qaeda at
or after 9/11. So it is just very different today.
Chairman McCaul. Mr. Rasmussen.
Mr. Rasmussen. The only thing I would add to that is that
the diffusion and the dispersal of the threat that all three of
us have talked about creates a particular problem in that it
stretches our resources that much more widely. The blanket has
to cover more of the bed. When you look around the world, all
of the locations, all of the safe haven locations, all of the
regions of instability around the world where a potential
terrorist threat might emanate from are areas where we have to
look to enhance our collection of intelligence, enhance our
ability to partner with governments in those regions, and that
is just a resource challenge.
If you think about the period dealing with core al-Qaeda,
we were focused pretty extensively on Pakistan and Afghanistan,
now you could rattle off 12 or 15 countries where we are very,
very active.
Chairman McCaul. That is more of a global limit.
Let me move quickly to the latest edition of Dabiq, which
is ISIS's basically Inspire magazine. They discuss the idea of
moving a weapon of mass destruction through transnational
criminal organizations into the Western Hemisphere and across
the Southwest Border from Mexico into the United States. Being
from Texas, this certainly concerns me, and, of course, not
getting into specifics, but a plot was disrupted out of
Moldova, trying to smuggle to Islamist terror organizations,
nuclear materials that could have reached our shores. Director
Comey, how serious do you take this threat?
Mr. Comey. Deadly seriously. This is something that we have
worried about for a long time. We have a division of the FBI,
the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate, where people wake
up every single day worrying about this. It is one of the
reasons that we have tried to build such good relationships
with our law enforcement colleagues in so many of the places
where there might be materials available, including the former
Soviet States. So it is the classic, extremely low-probability,
extraordinarily high-impact event, so it has our constant
focus.
Chairman McCaul. My final question is on the Syrian
refugees. We have had testimony before this committee that we
don't have intelligence on the ground in Syria. We can't
properly vet these individuals through databases. We don't know
who they are. I visited a camp in Jordan with some Members on
the committee, and we were told the same thing. I know the
administration is planning on moving as high as 10,000 refugees
into the country. Just very quickly, as my time is running out,
how concerned are you from a security perspective on this? Do
you think this will increase your counterterrorism caseload if
we bring in 10,000 Syrians into the United States? Secretary
Johnson.
Secretary Johnson. Chairman, we--I am concerned that we do
the proper security vetting for refugees we bring into this
country. We committed to 10,000, and I have committed that each
one will receive a careful security vetting. It is true that we
are not going to know a whole lot about a lot of the Syrians
that come forth in this process, just given the nature of the
situation. So we are doing better at checking all the right
databases and the law enforcement and intelligence communities
than we used to, and so it is a good process, and it is a
thorough process, but that definitely is a challenge.
Chairman McCaul. Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. I don't think I have anything to add to Jeh. I
think he describes it well. We see a risk there. We work hard
to mitigate it. Our challenge will be, as good as we have
gotten ourselves at querying our holdings to understand
somebody, if the person has never crossed our radar screen,
there won't be anything to query against, and so we do see a
risk there.
Chairman McCaul. Well, for the record, we are a
humanitarian Nation. It is a humanitarian crisis, but we also
have a responsibility to protect the American people, and to
me, that is paramount as well.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Taking off from your
question relative to the Syrian refugees, can each of you
explain your agency's position on the vetting process for these
refugees? A lot of us are concerned about whether or not you
have enough information available to you to do an accurate
vetting. So, Mr. Rasmussen, can you----
Mr. Rasmussen. Sure. I am happy to start.
As Director Comey suggested, we have a lot of lessons
learned in this area from when we went through similar
processes over the last several years dealing with other large
refugee populations. So, I think we have now worked
successfully to make sure that every bit of available
intelligence information that the United States Government
holds will be looked at with respect to a potential nexus to
someone being screened as a potential refugee.
I certainly feel good about that process and the degree to
which we have tightened that up over time. You can't account
for what you don't know, and that goes to the intelligence
deficit that I think is embedded in your question. What we can
do, though, is understand where the potential vulnerabilities
are so that we are asking in the screening and vetting process
the right kinds of questions to give our screeners and vetters
the best possible opportunity to make an informed judgment. It
is not a perfect process; there is a degree of risk attached to
any screening and vetting process. We look to manage that risk
as best we can.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Johnson. Each of us at the table here is acutely
aware that in our world, one failure is the equivalent of
10,000 successes. There are, in fact, lessons we learned from
the vetting process with regard to the Iraqi refugees that we
took in. The process has improved. We are better at connecting
dots, checking the databases with information we have.
My people in USCIS, to do this, will be on the ground in
places to vet refugees along with the State Department, but
they will do so in consultation with our law enforcement and
our intelligence agency partners. We will do it carefully. We
have made this commitment, but we will commit the resources to
do it, and we will do it carefully.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Director.
Mr. Comey. I don't think I have anything useful to add. I
think my view was captured by what both the Secretary and the
Director said.
Mr. Thompson. So I--capsuling what has been said, it is
your feeling that our existing systems are robust enough to
assure this committee that, to the extent practical, no
terrorist can get through that process?
Secretary Johnson. Well, the issue we face, obviously, is
what Jim mentioned. We may have somebody who comes to us and is
simply not on our radar for any discernable reason. It may also
be the possibility that somebody decides to do something bad
after they have been admitted through the process. But we do
have a good system in place for the undertaking that we have
made.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Director, before this committee,
Assistant Director Steinbach said that the concerns in Syria is
that we don't have the systems in place on the ground to
collect the information to vet. That would be the concern:
Databases don't hold the information on these individuals. Is
that still the position of the Department?
Mr. Comey. Yes. I think that is the challenge we are all
talking about, is that we can only query against that which we
have collected. So, if someone has never made a ripple in the
pond in Syria in a way that would get their identity or their
interests reflected in our database, we can query our database
until the cows come home, but we are not going to--there will
be nothing to show up, because we have no record on that
person.
That is what Assistant Director Steinbach was talking
about. You can only query what you have collected. With respect
to Iraqi refugees, we had far more on our databases because of
our country's work there for a decade. This is a different
situation.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Smith from Texas.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to get some
figures on the table. I understand the administration wants to
admit about 15,000 Syrian refugees this year and as many as 25-
to 30,000 next year. Is that generally correct?
Secretary Johnson. The number this year is 10,000.
Mr. Smith. Ten thousand. Then next year would be how many?
Secretary Johnson. I don't believe that a firm decision has
been made with respect to fiscal year 2017, but this year, we
said we want to take in 10,000.
Mr. Smith. It has been reported that there would be 2 to 3
times that many next year, much more of a significant increase.
You have all used the word ``risk'' to describe admitting
these refugees, and I assume that what we have heard and read
is accurate, and that is that terrorist organizations are going
to be tempted to try to infiltrate these refugees and try to
sneak individuals into this country who might commit terrorist
acts. I guess the question I have for you is, how likely is it
that terrorist organizations are going to try to take advantage
of the admission of these refugees to get people in this
country who might commit terrorist acts? Is it likely? Not
likely?
Secretary Johnson. That is an intelligence question.
Mr. Rasmussen. We have certainly seen terrorist groups talk
about, think about exactly what you are describing, Mr. Smith,
trying to use available programs to get people not only in the
United States, but into Western European countries as well. So
we know that they aspire to do that. I don't know that I would
go so far as to say they are likely to succeed, because, again,
we----
Mr. Smith. Is it possible to conduct background checks on
these individuals, or is it only if they are already in the
database that they would be flagged? In other words, the
terrorist organization isn't going to try to get someone in as
a refugee if they already have a public background that you
would be able to uncover. They are going to get people into the
country who have not yet committed a terrorist act. Don't you
think it is likely that they are going to try to do that?
Secretary Johnson. There is a pretty thorough vetting
process of each individual, which encompasses a personal
assessment of each individual, which includes an interview. It
is not just simply what is in a public record, does the person
have a rap sheet of any kind. So there is that personal
assessment.
Mr. Smith. That is a little bit of my concern. You are
relying upon them and what they say or what they write out in
an application, and you can't go beyond that. So you are sort
of having to take their word for it.
Another red flag to me is that I--in past years,
historically, traditionally, refugees have been members of
families, and yet, the typical profile of a Syrian refugee, I
am told, is that most are young, single males as opposed to
family members. So to me, that would raise a red flag as well.
Do you have any information, any comments, about that?
Secretary Johnson. Coming from me, sir, the one observation
I have of resettled Syrian refugees in this country so far is
that they tend to settle into communities that are very--that
embrace them, that are very supportive in Syrian American
communities around the country. I have seen that personally
myself. It tends to be a pretty tight-knit and supportive
community.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Well, as I say, both the profile and the
motives of terrorist organizations and your admission that
there is some risk involved, to me, would persuade the
administration to go slow rather than fast when it comes to
admitting individuals who might not--who might do us harm.
Secretary Johnson, let me move to another subject. The
administration--this is more of a domestic concern. The
administration has announced that next month, it is going to
release a number of thousands of individuals from Federal
prison. How many individuals is the projection that will be
released next month? These are criminal aliens.
Secretary Johnson. Well, the total number that the
Department of Justice plans to release pursuant to their
guidelines adjustment next month, I am told, is about 2,000.
Mr. Smith. Two thousand.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Then how many of those individuals will be put
into the process to be removed?
Secretary Johnson. A fair number. This is something--let
me--let me stress, this is something that we have been working
on now for about a year, and the thing that I am focused on,
that I have been focused on, those who are released who are
undocumented, that they come directly into our custody, that
they are not released into the streets.
Mr. Smith. Good. Good.
Secretary Johnson. So I believe that process, because I
have checked numerous times, is in place, and that is exactly
what is going to occur.
Mr. Smith. Good. Last time you appeared before this
committee, I brought up the figure that the administration is
releasing close to 30,000 people every year who have been in
prison, been arrested, mostly convicted, and released them back
out into our communities and neighborhoods. You said that
figure was going to go down dramatically; it needed to stop. I
have heard that for a couple of years now. Is the
administration still releasing individuals back into our
communities who are in the country illegally, who have been
convicted of crimes, or are those individuals being put into
removal procedures now?
Secretary Johnson. Well, Mr. Smith, as I am sure you are
aware, if someone is in immigration detention with a final
order of removal, the law says that we have to do a 6-month
assessment.
Mr. Smith. Right.
Secretary Johnson. If repatriation is not imminent, there
are only limited circumstances under which we can hold them. I
have changed the process for deciding the circumstances under
which that happens. We don't have the final numbers yet for
fiscal year 2015, but I believe that the number of those who
have been released who have been convicted of crimes has gone
down from 30,000.
Mr. Smith. To what number?
Secretary Johnson. I don't have the number yet. But I am
told it has gone down from 30,000. Fiscal year 2013 was about
34, as I am sure you will recall; 2014 was about 30; and I
believe the number is south of 30 for fiscal year 2015.
Mr. Smith. I hope it is very far south of 30 for the sake
of innocent American citizens. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
I just want to state for the record that ISIS has been on
record through a smuggler stating that they want to exploit the
refugee process to infiltrate the West. I take them at their
word. So I would caution the administration to proceed very
carefully in this program.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you,
and I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and
your testimony.
I am going to turn to another trifecta, and that is going
back to the issue of cybersecurity, which we have referenced a
couple of times here today. I thank the Chairman for his
leadership on this issue and the Ranking Member.
Mr. Secretary, you reference, and you have spoken about
this before, the recent breach of OPM's networks and the role
DHS has in protecting agency networks, and I understand that
the leadership at OPM at the time was asleep at the switch and
that they certainly ignored warnings from their own inspector
general. I know that DHS to provide tools, EINSTEIN CDM, to
assist agencies. So I have to ask you at this point for an
update. You know, I--can you tell me with confidence that other
agencies under your care will not suffer breaches like OPM's?
Secretary Johnson. I can tell you that we are making rapid
and significant progress to ensure that does not happen. The
EINSTEIN 3A system right now, which has the ability to block
intrusions, is available and deployed to about half the Federal
civilian government.
I have directed my folks at DHS to make it available to 100
percent by the end of this year, and I believe we are on track
to do that.
We have gotten agency heads who, by law, are responsible
for their own cybersecurity to focus on this issue. I issued a
binding operational directive in May pursuant to authority
given to me by the Congress to do that, which is, in effect, a
scorecard to get agency heads to focus on this issue, and we
have a very aggressive plan for enhancing our diagnostics
ability.
So I believe that awareness in these agencies has been
enhanced significantly, including because of the OPM breach,
and that we are on an aggressive time table to cross the
Federal Government to ensure that this kind of thing can't
happen, or that the risk of it happening is significantly
reduced.
Mr. Langevin. So on the issue of binding operational
directives, I want to know, and this is basically authority
pursuant to what Congress says, has authorized, but how does it
work and what are the consequences if a binding operational
directive is ignored by the agency?
Secretary Johnson. Well, basically, the way the authority
works that Congress has given me, I have the ability to go to
each agency and say, here is--here are your vulnerabilities;
you need to clean them up by a certain date. If you don't, they
will be highlighted, and we will have to follow up with you on
this.
Mr. Langevin. They will be highlighted, but what does that
mean? What is the consequence if they ignore your binding
operation----
Secretary Johnson. My recollection--my recollection--now I
am working on recollection--is that it means a report to
Congress and a report to OMB. But I don't have the authority to
simply do that job for an agency head myself, or in any way
fine them or sanction them.
Mr. Langevin. That is a frustration which, you know, I have
been talking about for a long time. I think you or somebody
needs that authority.
Mr. Secretary, before my time runs out, do you still
believe that agencies should have primary responsibility for
their network defense?
Secretary Johnson. I believe that agency directors,
administrators themselves should be principally responsible for
their own networks. I also believe that DHS should have the
overall responsibility for the security of the Federal
Civilian.Gov system, but it should be on each agency head to
take responsibility for his or her own networks.
Mr. Langevin. Right. I would tend to agree with you that
you should have more responsibility than that in authority.
Mr. Secretary, as you know, one of my chief concerns is
protection of critical infrastructure from cyber attack. I
think all of us on this committee are aware of the threat that
we face them in cyber space, and I am curious about your take
on the response of critical infrastructure owners and
operators. In my experience, there has been a tendency to meet
the minimum requirements put on them, but to ask the Government
to incentivize any measure taken beyond that. Do you believe
owners and operators are innovating in their defensive efforts,
or are they generally just getting by?
Secretary Johnson. I think it depends on the size of the
business and the segment they are in, but I believe that owners
and operators of critical infrastructure are taking the threat
more and more significantly because of the information we are
sharing with them about what we are seeing, about some of the
threats that have been directed to them. So I believe there is
an increasing awareness out there, and it is not just a
minimalist approach.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Director Comey, in your testimony, you referenced the steps
the FBI has taken to continue to gather intelligence to stop
terrorism despite the challenge of Going Dark. I share your
concern. Can you expand on this beyond working with tech
companies to address the problem directly and acknowledging
that you are not asking for a legislative solution. What are
the other methods the FBI does employ?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Congressman.
We--when we face a needle that has gone invisible on us, we
have to lean more heavily on traditionally law enforcement
techniques, see if we can get a source close to the person, see
if we can get an undercover close to the person, see if
physical surveillance tells us something about the person, and
those obviously--there is obvious shortcomings in those
techniques, but we are not going to stop trying to get the job
done. So we will just lean on other things we have done for
years. It will be inadequate, frankly, but we will keep working
at it.
Mr. Langevin. I thank the Chair. This is an issue that I
have increasing concern about, this going dark, and our intel
and law enforcement's ability to really adequately see into the
threats that are facing us. It is a challenge that we are going
to have to continue to confront.
Chairman McCaul. Yeah. I share that concern, as well.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I share the concerns outlined by Mr. Smith
about ISIL using the Syrian refugees that the President has
decided to allowed into this country as a vehicle to sneak bad
actors in.
You described a, ``pretty thorough vetting process'' as a
part of your response to his answer. Can you tell me more about
that process?
Secretary Johnson. Well, first of all, we are happy to
brief you on the more sensitive aspects of it in a nonpublic
setting. But it involves consulting a number of different
agencies, law enforcement and intelligence, and the information
that they have regarding each individual applicant.
It is a more robust process than it used to be. To some, it
is time-consuming, but it is something that I think we need to
do. It involves any information you may have. It may take some
time to resolve any uncertainties about the information.
Sometimes there may be a variance in a name or a date of birth
or something of that nature. But it involves consulting a
number of different agencies as well as a personal interview
and gathering simply as much information as we possibly have
about the person.
Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate it if you would have your
appropriate staff member schedule that brief for me in a SCIF
and any other Members of the committee that would like to
participate.
Director Comey, from personal experience, I have seen your
agency do some phenomenal things with virtually no evidence,
other than a bad act, to locate bad people.
Having said that, I am curious to know, is there any other
tool that we can provide you, that the Congress could provide
you, that would help you locate these individuals that you all
referred to on social media that are recruiting and organizing
in this country that you don't have at present?
Mr. Comey. I don't think so, Congressman. To me, this
conversation about going dark is not about new authorities for
the FBI. You have given us the authority to go to Federal
judges and make a showing of probable cause and get a search
warrant or get an order to intercept communications. We think
that is appropriate. We are big fans of the rule of law and the
Bill of Rights, and so I think that is a good set of
authorities.
The challenge we face is solving the problems where those
tools under the Fourth Amendment are no longer as effective as
they were before. That is this huge, knotty problem I am
talking about.
So I don't see it as more authorities for the FBI. I see it
as all of us together trying to figure out how the authorities
we already have, the American people have given us, can be used
to good effect.
Mr. Rogers. You also made reference earlier, you and
Secretary Johnson, about the surge of activity that you are
having to manage now. Do you have the adequate resources to
deal with that surge? I know Secretary Johnson has talked about
sequestration and its burdens on his agency. What do you think
about that? Do you have what you need?
Mr. Comey. The honest answer is I don't know. For this
reason, I say that: If what we experienced in May, June, and
into the early part of July were to become the new normal, it
would really stretch the FBI. Because, to meet that surge, we
had to move a lot of folks from criminal work, because
surveillance is only easy on TV. Following somebody 24/7
without them knowing you are there is really hard. So we had to
surge hundreds of people from criminal cases, which are
important, move them over to the National security side.
That bump in cases has dropped off a little bit, and so we
are watching it very closely. We have moved people back to be
able to do the criminal work. But if that surge becomes our new
normal, then I will have a different view of it. I will
obviously make sure Congress knows the minute I have reached
that conclusion.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I hope you will. We want to be helpful.
We want to give you the tools that you need. But, frankly, we
have to hear from you what you need. We can't help you unless
you tell us what you need.
Mr. Comey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In light of the challenges that you described in terms of
encryption and expanding social networking, I think one
strategy is to maximize our other abilities to try and thwart
terrorist acts. Along those lines, it has been a priority of
mine, a priority of the committee's to look at enhancing
information sharing among Federal agencies and local law
enforcement, as well, particularly in the wake of the Boston
Marathon bombing.
I know that the FBI has moved forward in this, and I know
that DHS has offered recommendations in this regard that we are
reviewing here.
If I could, you know, Director Comey, if you could just
give us an update on what you have done already in the wake of
the Boston Marathon bombing--use that as a time frame--and what
you see going forward and any time lines in pursuing that.
Mr. Comey. Yeah. Thank you, Congressman Keating.
I think we learned some good things for us to get better,
coming out of the Boston Marathon bombing. I appreciate your
focus on it and the committee's. I believe we are in a much
better place today. We can always be better, but here is how I
think about our improvement.
We now make sure that everybody on the Joint Terrorism Task
Force knows that our default is sharing information. In
particular, we want the leaders of the agencies represented in
our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to understand that and actually
participate in it.
So we do an inventory review in each single JTTF on a
regular basis. Sometimes it is once a week; sometimes it is
once a month. We want everybody to come in and sit down and
say, ``This is the stuff we opened in the last month, this is
the stuff we closed; questions, concerns, anybody want to
follow up on it?'' so they are engaged at the JTTF, but also,
if there is something else they want to do in response to the
inventory, they are able to do that.
So I think we have pushed that both in letter, which is
important, but in spirit, which, frankly, is more important, to
understand, everybody, we are in this together. Especially this
threat that is so spread out, we need State and local partners
to spot this and stop it.
So I think we are in a much better place than we were 2\1/
2\ years ago. As I said, I don't want to be overconfident,
though. There are always ways to find ways to improve, but that
is my sense of where we are.
Mr. Keating. I think all of your agencies have done an
extraordinary job in thwarting so many potential terrorist
threats. You have done a great job, if you use the analogy, of
swatting mosquitoes, but the other thing we have to do,
particularly in light of some of our challenges, is to dry up
the swamp as much as we can.
Along those lines, I think it is very important work that
DHS has done, the Office of Community Partnerships, and making
that the hub, the central point of trying to thwart some of
these attacks.
I would like to ask the Secretary--Secretary Johnson, what
is your progress in that? How do you value that? How is your
funding for that? Because I am concerned about some of that. If
you could, I think it is promising that peer-to-peer--if you
could explain to the committee your progress with the peer-to-
peer program, how that might be working, because it is
important.
We are a great country. No one, I don't think, has the
resources to out-message us. But what we are not doing is we
are not maximizing on that, and that is important.
So if you could comment on that, sir.
Secretary Johnson. Thank you for that question.
I have taken a great personal interest in countering
violent extremism. I believe it is fundamental and
indispensable to our overall efforts. So I have done a number
of community engagements myself.
The reason I created the Office for Community Partnerships
is because I think we need to take our efforts to the next
level. So what this office does is consolidate in one place all
the people across my Department that are devoted to our CVE
efforts. I want to build on that so that we have a field
capability. I want an office that will, in addition to engaging
the community, also engage the tech sector, engage
philanthropies, develop our own grant-making capabilities here.
In terms of adequate funding, the single biggest thing that
I am going to keep coming back to in terms of adequacy of
funding is: Please repeal sequestration. If I have to deal with
sequestration, then I come up short on CVE and a lot of other
things.
Mr. Keating. How about peer-to-peer, the peer-to-peer
program? Are we engaging young people in terms of this
messaging process? Could you comment on that briefly?
Secretary Johnson. I think that among bright, college-age
people in particular lie the best ideas on CVE for the way
forward. So I have engaged several college organizations on
helping us in our efforts. That is a work in progress.
In my experience, young people, college-age people tend to
approach CVE a little differently than older, more experienced
people of their parents' age, which I can talk with you at
greater detail off-line about.
Mr. Keating. Yeah.
Lastly, just a comment that the perimeters that your
agencies have are important. That is why you are here. But if
we are going to be successful, we are going to have to expand
out beyond that, in the non-profit side, the public side, the
private side, and obtain more engagement. So I think that we
shouldn't shortchange resources that all your agencies have to
try and do that, as well, because I think it is an important
aspect, and it is one that we still haven't maximized.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
I want to commend the Secretary for adopting a lot of the
provisions in the combating violent extremism bill we marked up
out of committee. We appreciate that.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Johnson, the term ``OTM,'' ``Other than
Mexicans,'' is a DHS term, correct?
Secretary Johnson. It is certainly a term we use around
DHS.
Mr. Duncan. Used by your field officers of people
apprehended crossing the Southern Border that are not of
Mexican descent.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
I am going to take all Latinos out--Guatemalans, Hondurans,
El Salvadorans, all those out. There are other people that
cross the border that are of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern
descent. Am I not correct?
Secretary Johnson. You are correct.
Mr. Duncan. That are apprehended crossing the Southern
Border.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson. You are absolutely correct.
Mr. Duncan. Well, our Southern Border is not secure. We
have no idea who is coming into this country. I could go on to
Iran and Hezbollah and the tri-border region and the ties
between Lebanon and Paraguay, the tri-border region there that
the Chairman and I investigated a number of years ago. But let
me shift.
We have no idea who is in this country. We have no idea who
can come into this country through our Southern Border, because
it is not secure.
Are you familiar with the Jewish museum that was shot up in
Brussels in, I think, May or June 2014?
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. That is for Director Comey, too.
Several people died. The perpetrator was a foreign fighter
who had been trained in Libya or Syria or Iraq; we are not
sure. But he made his way back into Europe. And because of
Schengen and open borders, he made his way to Brussels and
killed several people and then fled. Made it all the way to
Marseilles, France; was just about to jump out of Europe into
Africa before he was apprehended.
These are the facts. Foreign-fighter flow is something we
have to be very, very serious about, especially because of open
borders, especially because of the millions of middle-age and
young Middle Eastern men that have migrated to Europe who could
possibly have the ability to enter in this country because of
open borders, visa waiver programs. It may not be this year, it
may be 5 years after they get citizenship, whatever it takes.
I will say this. I think the Chairman misspoke a while ago
when he used the number of 10,000 immigrants coming into this
country, refugees in the resettlement program. I have heard the
number is 100,000 next year. Regardless, it is too many if we
do not have the ability to properly vet those individuals.
Some of those will come to South Carolina. I will tell you
that the folks in South Carolina are very, very concerned about
our inability to vet properly the refugees that are coming.
I have been to the refugee camp in Jordan. I understand the
immense challenge that we face from a humanitarian standpoint.
I understand the need or desire for folks to leave the Middle
East and travel to Europe or try to come to this country to try
to create a better life for their family. I think the Chairman
spoke appropriately when he said we are a very humanitarian
Nation. History proves that.
But we have a different situation on our hands. We have a
group known as ISIS--and al-Qaeda is still relevant in this
world as a threat to the United States--who want to come to
this country, who have said they will exploit this refugee
program to come to this country. If they are able to make it to
Europe and they are able to jump to Africa and make it to South
America or Latin America, because of our open borders issues,
they could come across our border the way the OTMs are coming
today.
So, Mr. Comey, what can I tell folks in South Carolina
about our vetting of these refugees that will put their minds
to rest that we are properly vetting everyone that may come
into my State that may wish to harm the United States? What can
I tell them? Please share with me some bit of good news about
this Refugee Resettlement Program, because I am not hearing it.
Mr. Comey. The good news is we are much better at doing it
than we were 8 years ago. The bad news is there is no risk-free
process.
Mr. Duncan. So I hear interviews in the camps, in the
refugee camps, but I also hear that the records aren't there.
So I just want to encourage you all, the three of you that are
charged with the National security of this country, to rethink
the resettlement of refugees in this country, especially in the
numbers that I am hearing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. And----
Secretary Johnson. Mr. Chairman, can I----
Chairman McCaul. Yeah, a point of clarification. I think it
is important, and I think that is where you are going, because
the public have thrown out the 100,000 number as Syrian
refugees. My understanding is that there are 100,000 refugees
total world-wide and 10,000 potentially from Syria, and maybe
you want to clarify that.
Secretary Johnson. What we have said is that, for fiscal
year 2016, we will commit to resettling 10,000 Syrian refugees
and a total world-wide of 85,000.
Chairman McCaul. Okay. I just wanted to get that on the
record while we----
Mr. Duncan. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may, where do we
anticipate those 85,000 coming from? Syria? Iraq? Afghanistan?
Libya? Do we have any idea? Can we identify the countries that
are being targeted for refugee resettlement?
Secretary Johnson. Well, it is done by regions of the
world, sir. That is a publicly-available fact, which we can get
you. But refugees tend to come from every part of the world,
obviously, some more troubled places than others.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Mrs. Watson Coleman.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for holding this hearing.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I tell you, it is actually comforting to hear you refer to
each other by first name. It means you are collaborating and
cooperating. It is good that there is a relationship there. It
makes me feel a little bit better, although this is a very
scary time.
I have a few questions. I want to start with a question
with you, Mr. Johnson. The United States Secret Service is
leading an investigation of an on-line hacker that recently
told The Washington Post he gained access to not only the CIA
director's personal email account but also to your own email
account.
Would you please describe what current plan is in place for
the Secret Service to prevent this intrusion, given the
external infiltrations the Department has experienced recently,
including the OPM data breach?
Secretary Johnson. Ma'am, I don't think that I can comment
about an on-going investigation. The one thing I will say is
don't believe everything you read in the newspaper because a
lot of it is inaccurate. But there is a pending investigation
by the FBI and the Secret Service, and so I don't think I can
comment right now.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay. Thank you.
I am very interested in how we are approaching and looking
at the security and safety threats to us, obviously, by those
who are influenced or directed by foreign countries and
jihadists but also those who are our own home-grown, right-wing
extremists who wreak dangerous conditions upon unsuspecting,
innocent people.
So I would like to know from the three of you whether or
not there is an assessment of a greater risk or equal risk or
lower risk from one type of violent experience as opposed to
the other and what kind of resource application we have across
the various entities that deal with both types, both the, sort-
of, right-wing extremists----
Mr. Comey. All right.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Comey.
Mr. Comey. There are two parts to the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division: International terrorism, domestic
terrorism.
We have hundreds and hundreds of people wake up every day
worrying about domestic extremists. By that, I mean people who
are not inspired or motivated by international terrorism
organizations but are people who see themselves as part of some
political resistance movement or some racially motivated
movement in the United States. So we do a lot of work on that
front.
Our assessment of the threat is it is about the same as it
was over the last couple of years, hasn't dropped. It is about
the same.
The international terrorism threat, with respect to both
that coming from the outside in and those motivated internally,
as we have discussed here today, has changed and gone up,
especially with those who are responding to ISIL's twin-pronged
message.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. So, for clarification purposes,
though, is there any sort of ranking between the two types of
violence?
Mr. Comey. There is not.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is there a greater threat from the
domestic right-wing extremist who is racist and anti-Semitic
and all those things as opposed to the jihadist-inspired or -
directed?
Mr. Comey. We do not compare them in that way. That is sort
of like, which do you dislike more, heart attacks or cancer?
They are both----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Do you have to consider----
Mr. Comey [continuing]. Very dangerous things----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. But do you----
Mr. Comey [continuing]. We focus----
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am sorry.
Mr. Comey. Sorry.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. I am just trying to get at, is there a
difference in the application of resources for one type versus
the other? Are there different offices in charge of one type or
the other, or is there sort of a cross-pollination?
Mr. Comey. Well, there are, as I said, two divisions in the
FBI's Counterterrorism Division. One focuses on the domestic
terrorist threat, and the other focuses on the international,
including its manifestations inside the country.
Then they talk to each other a lot. I have gotten briefings
from them jointly, because they worry about whether there is
any kind of crossover.
But we think about them using the same kind of intelligence
resources. We apply the same tools to understand presence on
social media. So we are addressing both as the serious threats
that they are.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Are we collecting information on the
type of violence that occurs, like that occurred at Mother
Bethel Church and around the country? Are we collecting that
data and putting that into a database and sharing that so we
have an understanding of those types of violent extremists?
Mr. Comey. Yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rasmussen, do you care to comment on
that at all?
Secretary Johnson. I don't think there is anything I can
add to what Jim said.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay.
Mr. Rasmussen. I agree. Actually, my mission area actually
leaves me outside of the domestic terrorism, except for
analytical purpose.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Uh-huh.
My last question is a really, really quick one. I wasn't
here--and I don't think you either were here--but do we have
knowledge on whether or not we have had the same kind of angst
and anxiety when there was resettlement from the Iraqi
refugees? Do we find that that angst has been addressed? Have
we found learned lessons and done things differently? Thank
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Secretary Johnson. The short answer is, yes, we have. There
have been lessons learned from the Iraqi refugee experience
which I believe have, and I think with the FBI, improved the
process.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Clawson.
Mr. Clawson. Thank you, Chairman, for your leadership here
today, as always.
Appreciate all three of you all coming today and what you
do for our country and the sacrifice you make, because it is
not small. So I appreciate that.
On a personal level, I get tired of the bad trade deals
that our country makes. I get tired of our trading partners
taking us to the cleaners. I get tired of good-paying American
manufacturing jobs going overseas. Like this morning, if I am
the UAW, I am not happy with the Chinese currency and their
export subsidies. If I am Harley-Davidson, I am probably not
happy with where the yen is today, as we see our American
manufacturing infrastructure get decimated. Pretty soon, we are
just not going to make anything anymore. What is wrong--why not
protect the American worker a little bit?
On top of that, the Chinese hack us. Wait a minute.
Billions of dollars every month go to the Chinese in a trade
deficit. They hack our companies, and they hack our Government.
We just keep on trading.
Now, as I understand it, Secretary Johnson, you said time
will tell whether what we have done will keep them from hacking
in the future. I say, why don't we protect the American worker,
the American company, American unions, the UAW, and our
infrastructure at the same time? Because if we put our markets
on the table and said, ``Any more hacking, you lose access to
our retail markets,'' that would go away immediately, because
they depend on us to live.
So, while I watch our manufacturing sector get decimated
and these folks hacking us, you are there with the
administration. I just wonder why we don't use the obvious
leverage that we have. It is obvious. It makes me upset because
I see so many of my friends and people I grew up with lose
good-paying American jobs.
You say only time will tell whether the Chinese are going
to obey us or not or cooperate or not, while we open up our
markets. Am I missing something on my analysis of this
situation, Secretary?
Secretary Johnson. In response to the cyber attacks on our
Government and on the private sector, there are a number of
things, seen and unseen, that we have done and that we are
considering.
What I was referring to--what I am referring to when I said
time will tell, when the president of China was here and in the
run-up to his visit, the Chinese Government agreed that
economic espionage and theft of commercial information for
commercial purposes was wrong and was a crime. They agreed to
that in writing. Time will tell whether they will live up to
that agreement. But it was significant, in the sense that they
publicly, out of the mouth of their President, committed to
that. But time will tell whether----
Mr. Clawson. Have we ever talked, has the leadership of our
country, of using the obvious market leverage that we have--as
almost a third of the global GDP and the source of economic
growth for the whole world, do we ever talk about using that
leverage to get not only fair trade deals but keep them from
robbing our IP and keep them from hacking?
I mean, we could stop it next month. Just shut down the
retail markets to cheaters, and let the American worker catch a
break for once, all at the same time.
Secretary Johnson. I would have to refer you to other
agencies of our Government about that.
Mr. Clawson. But, look, you are part of the leadership
structure. Excuse me, but you are on the board of directors,
you are in the staff meetings, you know, and part of this
touches you. I think if you were back in the private sector at
a board of directors meeting, that answer might not be
acceptable.
I am asking, does the senior leadership of our country, as
we get taken to the cleaners on trade and on hacking and on IP,
has anybody thought about using our markets as leverage? Do you
all talk about that?
Secretary Johnson. I suspect the answer is yes----
Mr. Clawson. Well, then I would like to see a little bit.
Secretary Johnson [continuing]. But I, again, refer you to
other agencies of our Government----
Mr. Clawson. Come on now.
Secretary Johnson [continuing]. That can give you an answer
to that question.
Mr. Clawson. You know, the American worker doesn't want
referring to other agencies. Our folks that get their
technology stolen don't want to get referred to other agencies.
They want leadership. We are getting taken to the cleaners on
four different fronts, and we don't want to get referred to an
outside study. We want leadership for American jobs and
American technology. I don't think that is too much to ask.
You are part of the team. Help our companies and help our
unions and our workers get a fair shake.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning. I thank the Chairman very
much and the Ranking Member for these important hearings on
protecting the American people.
I want to pursue a line of questioning that sort-of follows
the opening statements that you gentlemen have made.
I take from the director of the National Counterterrorism
Center his sentence that said, ``The array of extremist
terrorist actors around the globe is broader, wider, and deeper
than it has been at any time since 9/11, and the threat
landscape is less predictable.'' I think that is an important
sentence that has been really crafted and reinforced by the
testimony and the leadership of all three of you. I appreciate
your service very much.
I have introduced the No Fly for Foreign Terrorists. I
would like to pursue, and starting with Director Comey, to
reinforce the seriousness with which we should take, even
though there is a lot of work, of individuals leaving the
United States and potentially coming back to the United States,
having gone to be part of the caliphate or ISIL, and to come
back to the United States.
Can you frame again how extensive that threat is?
Mr. Comey. Well, the returning terrorist fighter threat is
what I understand you to be asking about--is one that we are
watching very closely today. We see the logic of it telling us
that is going to be a problem for the next 5-years-plus.
Because not every terrorist is going to get killed on the
battlefield in Syria or Iraq, so, inevitably, there will be a
terrorist diaspora out of the so-called caliphate to Western
Europe or to the United States.
So it is a threat that all three of us and the people we
represent think about every day and also think about how it is
going to manifest down the road.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you maintain a statement that you made
a couple of weeks ago, that there is a terrorist cell in
almost--I think you said almost 50 or all 50 States that the
FBI is aware of?
Mr. Comey. In all 50 States, we have open terrorism
investigations related to a number of dimensions of the threat.
But in all 50 States, we have ISIL radicalization cases under
investigation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understood you also to be a supporter of
the concept of collecting data. I serve on another committee
dealing with crime and terrorism and investigations. My
understanding is that you believe that we should be in the
business of ensuring the data is collected sufficient for
information on how to act on some of these issues of terrorism
in particular.
Mr. Comey. I do. I am a big supporter of the rule of law
and using it to collect the information that will help us keep
people safe.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am very glad that you said that. I would
like to add into the--when I say that, the rule of law. Thank
you. Because I think that is an important point that people are
concerned about.
But I would like to put into the record the No Fly for
Foreign Fighters. I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files. H.R. 48,
114th Congress, the ``No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act'' is available at
http://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-Congress/house-bill/48.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
To the Secretary, let me first of all indicate that we are
certainly concerned about the hacking incident. I realize that
it is under investigation. I would ask this committee that we
would have an opportunity for a Classified briefing. I,
frankly, apologize for you, a public servant, to have had that
issue occur.
But let me move forward to this issue of the power grid and
cybersecurity, which I believe you have indicated that we need
more legislation. You also indicated that we should get rid of
sequester. Let me say that I support you, and many of us do. It
is very hard to function.
But I also would like to hear your comment about the power
grid of the United States and the work that the Homeland
Security Department is doing, the framework it is doing. I
would like to commend you to some legislation that I am going
to offer into the record regarding focusing specifically on the
power grids of the United States.
Would you just respond to that?
I would also like the director of counterterrorism to, as
well, answer that and follow up by answering a question
regarding the handle that we have on Syrian refugees that may
be coming into the United States.
I want to thank the Secretary for coming to my district and
having a very productive meeting with Syrian Americans, Syrians
in Houston who are open and welcoming those who may have to
come out of persecution.
Secretary.
Secretary Johnson. With regard to cybersecurity, the two
most significant things that we are hoping and need from
Congress are provisions in law to encourage the private sector
to share information with my department, cyber threat indicator
information with my department. Sharing information is vital to
our homeland security efforts for the private sector and for
the Government sector.
The other thing that is in pending legislation in now the
House and Senate is something that explicitly authorizes the
system we have for detecting, monitoring, and blocking unwanted
intrusions, what is currently our EINSTEIN system.
So those are two things in pending legislation that I think
would be extremely helpful to our overall cybersecurity
efforts.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you believe that--first of all, the
idea of the cybersecurity issue is that a lot of the
infrastructure is in the private sector. Is there enough
collaboration with the private sector? When we think of power,
we also think of water and other elements that serve the
public. Is there enough of an element of collaboration to be
able to put up that firewall protecting a potential cyber
threat or cyberterrorism?
Secretary Johnson. There is not enough, and so we need to
encourage more.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rasmussen, would you answer the question?
Mr. Rasmussen. To your question, ma'am, on the degree to
which terrorist organizations are interested in developing a
cyber capability, they absolutely are. It is clearly a growth
industry as far as terrorist organizations are concerned, and
particularly ISIL.
Thus far, the capability seems to be more evident at, I
would say, the low end of the spectrum. I don't mean ``low'' in
terms of minimizing, but, thus far, the kind of capability we
have seen largely shows up in terms of pushing out people's
personal information in a public way, which is potentially very
destructive.
Their interest in attacking in a cyber way our electrical
power grid or other forms of critical infrastructure we have,
thus far we see that as more aspirational, not something where
we see capability actually existing. But believe me, it is
something we are very, very carefully watching, because it is a
way for a terrorist group to try to achieve wide-spread impact.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, as I ask the Chairman if I could put
these items into the record, let me just say that we know that
a number of terrorist incidents were aspirational 1, 2 years
ago. I can't emphasize enough my concern on the cyber attack of
the Nation's power grid. I don't think we are putting any extra
information out. I hope that all of you will focus very
pointedly on that as a major concern.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to--and thank you very much for
your testimony--yield back, but I would like to ask the
Chairman to allow me to put into the record an article from The
Hill regarding ``Pushing to Boost Power Grid Defenses Against
ISIS'' and also a CNN statement regarding ``ISIL Is Beginning
To Perpetrate Cyber Attacks.'' I ask unanimous consent for the
record.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted For the Record by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
October 19, 2015, The Hill
jackson lee pushes to boost power-grid defenses against isis
By Katie Bo Williams--10/19/15 09:38 AM EDT
Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-Texas) on Friday called for action on a
bill bolstering power-grid cybersecurity after a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) official said the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
is trying to hack American electrical power companies.
``No solace should be taken in the fact that ISIS has been
unsuccessful,'' Jackson Lee said. ``ISIS need only be successful once
to have catastrophic impact on regional electricity supply.''
Caitlin Durkovich, assistant secretary for infrastructure
protection at DHS, told energy firm executives at an industry
conference in Philadelphia last week that ISIS ``is beginning to
perpetrate cyberattacks.''
Law enforcement officials speaking at the same event indicated that
the group's efforts have so far been unsuccessful, thanks in part to a
Balkanized power grid and an unsophisticated approach.
``Strong intent. Thankfully, low capability,'' said John Riggi, a
section chief at the FBI's cyber division. ``But the concern is that
they'll buy that capability.''
Jackson Lee, a senior member of the House Homeland Security
Committee and ranking member on the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, in January
introduced the Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act.
The bill directs DHS to work with critical infrastructure companies
to boost their cyber defenses against terrorist attacks, part of a
swath of legislation that has attempted to codify the agency's
responsibilities in that area.
Late last year, the Senate passed its version of the House-passed
National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act.
The bill officially authorized an already-existing cybersecurity
information-sharing hub at DHS.
Although a deadly attack on power plants or the electric grid--a
``cyber Pearl Harbor''--is still only a hypothetical, experts warn
critical infrastructure sites are increasingly at risk, as electric
grids get smarter.
National Security Agency Director Michael Rogers told lawmakers
last fall that China and ``one or two'' other countries would be able
to shut down portions of critical U.S. infrastructure with a cyber
attack. Researchers suspect Iran to be on that list.
In August, DHS announced the creation of a new subcommittee
dedicated to preventing attacks on the power grid.
The new panel is tasked with identifying how well the department's
lifeline sectors are prepared to meet threats and recover from a
significant cyber event.
The committee will also provide recommendations for a more unified
approach to state and local cybersecurity.
``There is a great deal that has been done and is being done now to
secure our networks,'' Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson told the
House Judiciary Committee in July. ``There is more to do.''
______
Story Submitted For the Record by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
CNN: ISIS is attacking the U.S. energy grid
October 15, 2015
The Islamic State is trying to hack American electrical power
companies--but they are terrible at it.
U.S. law enforcement officials revealed the hack attempts on
Wednesday at a conference of American energy firms who were meeting
about national security concerns.
``ISIL is beginning to perpetrate cyber attacks,'' Caitlin
Durkovich, assistant secretary for infrastructure protection at the
Department of Homeland Security, told company executives.
Investigators would not reveal any details to CNNMoney--or cite
evidence of specific incidents.
But they did say the attacks by the Islamic State have been
unsuccessful. Terrorists are not currently using the most sophisticated
hacking tools to break into computer systems and turn off or blow up
machines.
``Strong intent. Thankfully, low capability,'' said John Riggi, a
section chief at the FBI's cyber division. ``But the concern is that
they'll buy that capability.''
Indeed, hacking software is up for sale in black markets on-line.
That's often how mafias acquire the cyber weapons they use to break
into companies and steal giant databases of information they later sell
to fraudsters.
The FBI now worries that the Islamic State or its supporters will
buy malicious software that can sneak into computers and destroy
electronics. An attack on power companies could disrupt the flow of
energy to U.S. homes and businesses.
And it's not just Islamic extremists. There's an equal threat from
domestic terrorists and hate groups, according to Mark Lemery. He's the
``critical infrastructure protection coordinator'' who helps coordinate
defenses against attacks in Utah. But again, the worries are tempered.
``They'd love to do damage, but they just don't have the
capability,'' Lemery said. ``Terrorists have not gotten to the point
where they're causing physical damage.''
Officials made clear that the greater concern is attacks from other
countries. Riggi said malware found last year on industrial control
systems at energy companies--including pumps and engines--were traced
to the Russian government.
Besides, the likelihood of a hack taking out the entire U.S. energy
grid--or even a section of it--is extremely low. The grid isn't as
uniform and connected as people might believe. Currently, it's a
chaotic patchwork of ``grids,'' each with different types of machines
and software that don't smoothly coordinate or communicate.
That jumble actually works to the nation's advantage, energy
company executives said. It would take a large, expensive team of
highly technical spies to understand the layout of computers and
machines at an energy company. Then it takes stellar hackers to sneak
in. And even if they do manage to flip a switch--which companies
maintain has never happened here in the United States--the attack might
only take out electricity fed to a tiny portion of land, maybe a
section of a city. An entirely different type of attack would be needed
to carry that over to the next power plant.
Experts attending GridSecCon, held by the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation, seemed cautious but hopeful.
When energy industry representatives asked Riggi how the FBI knows
who's hacking--whether it's a government or independent hacking group--
he said American spies that are monitoring computer networks are quick
to share information with law enforcement.
``We've had pretty good success actually,'' Riggi said. ``Since the
FBI is an intelligence agency, we rely on the help of CIA and NSA. We
compare information with the NSA.''
Ms. Jackson Lee. And to put into the record H.R. 85, I ask
unanimous consent.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection.**
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
** The information has been retained in committee files. H.R. 85,
114th Congress, the ``Terrorism Prevention and Critical Infrastructure
Protection Act of 2015'' is available at http://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-Congress/house-bill/85.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Jackson Lee. And ask to put into the record a letter to
the President on encryption signed by over 100 individuals who
are very concerned about any proposals that we don't oversee--
even though I want to give tools appropriately--oversee in the
right way to protect both the American people and follow the
rule of law. I ask unanimous consent.
Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted For the Record by Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
May 19, 2015.
President Barack Obama,
The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20500.
Dear President Obama: We the undersigned represent a wide variety
of civil society organizations dedicated to protecting civil liberties,
human rights, and innovation on-line, as well as technology companies,
trade associations, and security and policy experts. We are writing
today to respond to recent statements by some Administration officials
regarding the deployment of strong encryption technology in the devices
and services offered by the U.S. technology industry. Those officials
have suggested that American companies should refrain from providing
any products that are secured by encryption, unless those companies
also weaken their security in order to maintain the capability to
decrypt their customers' data at the government's request. Some
officials have gone so far as to suggest that Congress should act to
ban such products or mandate such capabilities.
We urge you to reject any proposal that U.S. companies deliberately
weaken the security of their products. We request that the White House
instead focus on developing policies that will promote rather than
undermine the wide adoption of strong encryption technology. Such
policies will in turn help to promote and protect cybersecurity,
economic growth, and human rights, both here and abroad.
Strong encryption is the cornerstone of the modern information
economy's security. Encryption protects billions of people every day
against countless threats--be they street criminals trying to steal our
phones and laptops, computer criminals trying to defraud us, corporate
spies trying to obtain our companies' most valuable trade secrets,
repressive governments trying to stifle dissent, or foreign
intelligence agencies trying to compromise our and our allies' most
sensitive national security secrets.
Encryption thereby protects us from innumerable criminal and
national security threats. This protection would be undermined by the
mandatory insertion of any new vulnerabilities into encrypted devices
and services. Whether you call them ``front doors'' or ``back doors'',
introducing intentional vulnerabilities into secure products for the
government's use will make those products less secure against other
attackers. Every computer security expert that has spoken publicly on
this issue agrees on this point, including the government's own
experts.
In addition to undermining cybersecurity, any kind of vulnerability
mandate would also seriously undermine our economic security. U.S.
companies are already struggling to maintain international trust in the
wake of revelations about the National Security Agency's surveillance
programs. Introducing mandatory vulnerabilities into American products
would further push many customers--be they domestic or international,
individual or institutional--to turn away from those compromised
products and services. Instead, they--and many of the bad actors whose
behavior the government is hoping to impact--will simply rely on
encrypted offerings from foreign providers, or avail themselves of the
wide range of free and open source encryption products that are easily
available on-line.
More than undermining every American's cybersecurity and the
nation's economic security, introducing new vulnerabilities to weaken
encrypted products in the U.S. would also undermine human rights and
information security around the globe. If American companies maintain
the ability to unlock their customers' data and devices on request,
governments other than the United States will demand the same access,
and will also be emboldened to demand the same capability from their
native companies. The U.S. government, having made the same demands,
will have little room to object. The result will be an information
environment riddled with vulnerabilities that could be exploited by
even the most repressive or dangerous regimes. That's not a future that
the American people or the people of the world deserve.
The Administration faces a critical choice: will it adopt policies
that foster a global digital ecosystem that is more secure, or less?
That choice may well define the future of the Internet in the 21st
century. When faced with a similar choice at the end of the last
century, during the so-called ``Crypto Wars'', U.S. policymakers
weighed many of the same concerns and arguments that have been raised
in the current debate, and correctly concluded that the serious costs
of undermining encryption technology outweighed the purported benefits.
So too did the President's Review Group on Intelligence and
Communications Technologies, who unanimously recommended in their
December 2013 report that the U.S. Government should ``(1) fully
support and not undermine efforts to create encryption standards; (2)
not in any way subvert, undermine, weaken, or make vulnerable generally
available commercial software; and (3) increase the use of encryption
and urge U.S. companies to do so, in order to better protect data in
transit, at rest, in the cloud, and in other storage.''
We urge the Administration to follow the Review Group's
recommendation and adopt policies that promote rather than undermine
the widespread adoption of strong encryption technologies, and by doing
so help lead the way to a more secure, prosperous, and rights-
respecting future for America and for the world.
Thank you,
Civil Society Organizations
Access
Advocacy for Principled Action in Government
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC)
American Civil Liberties Union
American Library Association
Benetech
Bill of Rights Defense Committee
Center for Democracy & Technology Committee to Protect Journalists
The Constitution Project
Constitutional Alliance
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Demand Progress
Defending Dissent Foundation
DownsizeDC.org, Inc.
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Engine
Fight for the Future
Free Press
Free Software Foundation
Freedom of the Press Foundation
GNOME Foundation
Human Rights Watch
The Media Consortium
New America's Open Technology Institute
Niskanen Center
Open Source Initiative
PEN American Center
Project Censored/Media Freedom Foundation
R Street
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
TechFreedom
The Tor Project
U.S. Public Policy Council of Association for Computing Machinery
World Privacy Forum
X-Lab
Companies & Trade Associations
ACT/The App Association
Adobe
Apple Inc.
The Application Developers Alliance
Automattic
Blockstream
Cisco Systems
Coinbase
Cloud Linux Inc.
CloudFlare
Computer & Communications Industry Association
Consumer Electronics Association (CEA)
Context Relevant
The Copia Institute
CREDO Mobile
Data Foundry
Dropbox
Evernote
Facebook
Gandi.net
Golden Frog
Google
HackerOne
Hackers/Founders
Hewlett-Packard Company
Internet Archive
The Internet Association
Internet Infrastructure Coalition (i2Coalition)
Level 3 Communications
LinkedIn
Microsoft
Misk.com
Mozilla
Open Spectrum Inc.
Rackspace
Rapid7
Reform Government Surveillance
Sonic
ServInt
Silent Circle
Slack Technologies, Inc.
Symantec
Tech Assets Inc.
TechNet
Tumblr
Twitter
Wikimedia Foundation
Yahoo
Security and Policy Experts*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Affiliations provided only for identification purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hal Abelson, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ben Adida, VP Engineering, Clever Inc.
Jacob Appelbaum, The Tor Project
Adam Back, PhD, Inventor, HashCash, Co-Founder & President, Blockstream
Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Director, Center on Privacy & Technology at
Georgetown Law
Brian Behlendorf, Open Source software pioneer
Steven M. Bellovin, Percy K. and Vida L.W. Hudson Professor of Computer
Science, Columbia University
Matt Bishop, Professor of Computer Science, University of California at
Davis
Matthew Blaze, Director, Distributed Systems Laboratory, University of
Pennsylvania
Dan Boneh, Professor of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering at
Stanford University
Eric Burger, Research Professor of Computer Science and Director,
Security and Software Engineering Research Center (Georgetown),
Georgetown University
Jon Callas, CTO, Silent Circle
L. Jean Camp, Professor of Informatics, Indiana University
Richard A. Clarke, Chairman, Good Harbor Security Risk Management
Gabriella Coleman, Wolfe Chair in Scientific and Technological
Literacy, McGill University
Whitfield Diffie, Dr. Sc. Techn., Center for International Security and
Cooperation, Stanford University
David Evans, Professor of Computer Science, University of Virginia
David J. Farber, Alfred Filter Moore Professor Emeritus of
Telecommunications, University of Pennsylvania
Dan Farmer, Security Consultant and Researcher, Vicious Fishes
Consulting
Rik Farrow, Internet Security
Joan Feigenbaum, Department Chair and Grace Murray Hopper Professor of
Computer Science Yale University
Richard Forno, Jr. Affiliate Scholar, Stanford Law School Center for
Internet and Society
Alex Fowler, Co-Founder & SVP, Blockstream
Jim Fruchterman, Founder and CEO, Benetech
Daniel Kahn Gillmor, ACLU Staff Technologist
Robert Graham, creator of BlackICE, sidejacking, and masscan
Jennifer Stisa Granick, Director of Civil Liberties, Stanford Center
for Internet and Society
Matthew D. Green, Assistant Research Professor, Johns Hopkins
University Information Security Institute
Robert Hansen, Vice President of Labs at WhiteHat Security
Lance Hoffman, Director, George Washington University, Cyber Security
Policy and Research Institute
Marcia Hofmann, Law Office of Marcia Hofmann
Nadim Kobeissi, PhD Researcher, INRIA
Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Chief Technologist, Center for Democracy &
Technology
Nadia Heninger, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer and
Information Science, University of Pennsylvania
David S. Isenberg, Producer, Freedom 2 Connect
Douglas W. Jones, Department of Computer Science, University of Iowa
Susan Landau, Worcester Polytechnic Institute
Gordon Fyodor Lyon, Founder, Nmap Security Scanner Project
Aaron Massey, Postdoctoral Fellow, School of Interactive Computing,
Georgia Institute of Technology
Jonathan Mayer, Graduate Fellow, Stanford University
Jeff Moss, Founder, DEF CON and Black Hat security conferences
Peter G. Neumann, Senior Principal Scientist, SRI International
Computer Science Lab, Moderator of the ACM Risks Forum
Ken Pfeil, former CISO at Pioneer Investments
Ronald L. Rivest, Vannevar Bush Professor, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
Paul Rosenzweig, Professorial Lecturer in Law, George Washington
University School of Law
Jeffrey I. Schiller, Area Director for Security, Internet Engineering
Task Force (1994-2003), Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Bruce Schneier, Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and Society,
Harvard Law School
Micah Sherr, Assistant Professor of Computer Science, Georgetown
University
Adam Shostack, author, ``Threat Modeling: Designing for Security''
Eugene H. Spafford, CERIAS Executive Director, Purdue University
Alex Stamos, CISO, Yahoo
Geoffrey R. Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished Service Professor of
Law, The University of Chicago
Peter Swire, Huang Professor of Law and Ethics, Scheller College of
Business, Georgia Institute of Technology
C. Thomas (Space Rogue), Security Strategist, Tenable Network Security
Dan S. Wallach, Professor, Department of Computer Science and Rice
Scholar, Baker Institute of Public Policy
Nicholas Weaver, Researcher, International Computer Science Institute
Chris Wysopal, Co-Founder and CTO, Veracode, Inc.
Philip Zimmermann, Chief Scientist and Co-Founder, Silent Circle
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have two----
Chairman McCaul. How many more do you have?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just two more.
Chairman McCaul. Okay.
Ms. Jackson Lee. A United States of America report on
refugee resettlement and also ``Analysis by Top Computer
Experts on Encryption.''*** I ask unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** The information has been retained in committee files, entitled
``Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory Technical
Report'', and is available at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/97690.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman McCaul. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Submitted For the Record by Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
UNHCR Resettlement Handbook--Country Chapters
COUNTRY CHAPTER USA: THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
By The Government of the United States of America, July 2011, revised
October 2014
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED STATES OVERVIEW
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resettlement programme since: Selection Missions: Dossier
1975. Yes. Submissions: No
Resettlement Admission 2013-2014.......... 2014-2015
Targets: 1 Oct 2013-30 Sept 1 Oct 2014-30 Sept
2014. 2015
Admission targets for UNHCR 52,300............. 56,000
submissions:
Target for non-UNHCR 17,700............. 14,000
submissions:
-----------------------------------------
Total Resettlement 70,000............. 70,000
Admission Target:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS (1 OCTOBER-30 SEPTEMBER)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2013-2014 2014-2015
Region -------------------------------------------
UNHCR Non-UNHCR UNHCR Non-UNHCR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Africa...................... 15,000 0 16,500 500
East Asia................... 14,000 0 12,800 200
Europe/Central Asia......... 0 1,000 0 1,000
Americas.................... 300 4,700 700 3,300
Near East/South Asia........ 21,000 12,000 24,000 9,000
Allocated from Reserve...... 2,000 0 2,000 0
-------------------------------------------
Total................. 52,300 17,700 56,000 14,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUB-QUOTA FEATURES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Description, Additional
Designated Sub-Quota/Acceptance For Comments
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Emergency resettlement procedures...... No specific quota. Very limited
capacity to process applicants
from referral to arrival in
approx. 16 weeks.
Medical cases.......................... No limits on submissions.
Women-at-risk cases.................... No specific quota.
Unaccompanied children................. Accepted with Best Interests
Determination.
Family Reunion (within programme)...... P-3 family reunification
program re-launched Oct 2012,
DNA evidence of parent-child
relationships required, costs
reimbursed if relationship
proven. Following to join
(visa 93) beneficiaries are
also counted against the
refugee ceilings.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. resettlement policy
The United States has a long tradition of granting refuge to those
fleeing persecution. Since the Second World War, more refugees have
found permanent homes in the United States than in any other country.
Admissions of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United
States, as well as admission of those for the purpose of family
reunification are important tenets of the U.S. refugee resettlement
programme.
At the Federal level, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM) of the Department of State administers the U.S. Refugee
Admissions Programme in conjunction with U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) of the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS). Non-governmental organizations play a major
role in domestic resettlement activities and, along with the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), in overseas processing.
2. criteria for recognition of refugee status eligibility and asylum
A person must meet the U.S. definition of a refugee found in
Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which
closely follows the definition in the 1951 UN Convention. The INA also
defines as refugees, under certain circumstances specified by the
President, certain persons who are within their country of nationality,
or if they do not have a nationality, the country in which they are
habitually residing (See Annex B).
3. criteria for resettlement
To qualify for refugee resettlement to the United States, refugees
must:
(1) Be among those refugees determined by the President to be of
special humanitarian concern to the United States;
(2) Meet the definition of a refugee pursuant to Section 101(a)(42)
of the INA (see below);
(3) Not be firmly resettled in any third country; and
(4) Be otherwise admissible under U.S. law.
Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
The term ``refugee'' means:
(A) Any person who is outside any country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion, or
(B) in such circumstances as the President after appropriate
consultation (as defined in Section 207(e) of this Act) may
specify, any person who is within the country of such person's
nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality,
within the country in which such person is habitually residing,
and who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
The term ``refugee'' does not include any person who ordered,
incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any
person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.
For purposes of determinations under this Act, a person who has
been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary
sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or refusal to
undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive
population control programme, shall be deemed to have been persecuted
on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well-founded
fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or
subject to persecution for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall
be deemed to have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
political opinion.
4. resettlement allocations/processing priorities
The administration annually consults with the Congress on the U.S.
refugee admissions programme. These consultations provide an
opportunity for Congress and Administration representatives: the
Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Health and Human Services; to discuss the international
and domestic implications of U.S. refugee policy. These consultations
are the culmination of a many-faceted, consultative process that
includes discussions with Congressional staff, representatives of State
and local governments, public interest groups, international and non-
governmental organizations such as the Refugee Council USA (RCUSA) and
others concerned with refugees. During the Congressional consultations,
the President's proposed refugee admissions programme for the coming
fiscal year is presented. This proposal includes information on refugee
admissions levels, groups of refugees of special humanitarian interest
to the United States, and processing priorities.
The processing priorities serve as guidelines to determine
eligibility for access to the U.S. Government (USG) resettlement
programme and as a tool to manage the refugee admissions process within
the established annual regional ceiling.
The following priorities are in effect for Fiscal Year 2015 (1
October 2014-30 September 2015):
Priority One
UNHCR, U.S. Embassy, or specially-trained non-governmental
organization identified cases: persons facing compelling security
concerns in countries of first asylum; persons in need of legal
protection because of the danger of refoulement; those in danger due to
threats of armed attack in an area where they are located; or persons
who have experienced recent persecution because of their political,
religious, or human rights activities (prisoners of conscience); women-
at-risk; victims of torture or violence, physically or mentally
disabled persons; persons in urgent need of medical treatment not
available in the first asylum country; and persons for whom other
durable solutions are not feasible and whose status in the place of
asylum does not present a satisfactory long-term solution. As with all
other priorities, Priority One referrals must still establish past
persecution or a credible fear of future persecution from the country
from which they fled. All nationalities are eligible for processing
under Priority One.
Priority Two (P-2)
Specific groups of special concern (within certain nationalities)
as identified by the Department of State in consultation with NGOs,
UNHCR, DHS, and other area experts as well as some in-country programs.
Only those members of the specifically identified groups are eligible
for Priority Two processing. Each group will be selected based on its
individual circumstances.
In-country Priority Two programs include:
Former Soviet Union
This Priority Two designation applies to Jews, Evangelical
Christians, and Ukrainian Catholic and Orthodox religious
activists identified in the Lautenberg Amendment, Public Law
No. 101-167, 599D, 103 Stat. 1261 (1989), as amended
(``Lautenberg Amendment''), with close family in the United
States.
Cuba
Included in this Priority 2 program are human rights activists,
members of persecuted religious minorities, former political
prisoners, forced-labor conscripts (1965-68), persons deprived
of their professional credentials or subjected to other
disproportionately harsh or discriminatory treatment resulting
from their perceived or actual political or religious beliefs
or activities, and persons who have experienced or fear harm
because of their relationship--family or social--to someone who
falls under one of the preceding categories.
Iraqis Associated With the United States
Under various Priority 2 designations, including those set forth in
the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, employees of the U.S.
Government, a U.S. Government-funded contractor or grantee, and
U.S. media and NGOs working in Iraq, and certain family members
of such employees, as well as beneficiaries of approved I-130
(immigrant visa) petitions, are eligible for refugee processing
in Iraq.
Minors in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala
Under this new P-2 program, certain lawfully present qualifying
relatives in the United States can request access to a refugee
interview for an unmarried child under 21 in his/her country of
origin.
Priority Two groups outside the country of origin include:
Ethnic Minorities and Others From Burma in Camps in
Thailand
Individuals who have fled Burma and who are registered in nine
refugee camps along the Thai/Burma border and who are
identified by UNHCR as in need of resettlement are eligible for
processing.
Ethnic Minorities From Burma in Malaysia
Ethnic minorities from Burma who are recognized by UNHCR as
refugees in Malaysia and identified as being in need of
resettlement are eligible for processing.
Bhutanese in Nepal
Bhutanese refugees registered by UNHCR in camps in Nepal and
identified as in need of resettlement are eligible for
processing.
Iranian Religious Minorities
Iranian members of certain religious minorities are eligible for
processing and benefit from a reduced evidentiary standard for
establishing a well-founded fear of persecution, pursuant to
the 2004 enactment of Pub. L. 108-199.
Iraqis Associated with the United States
Under various Priority 2 designations, including those set forth in
the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, employees of the U.S.
Government, a U.S. Government-funded contractor or grantee, and
U.S. media and NGOs working in Iraq, and certain family members
of such employees, as well as beneficiaries of approved I-130
(immigrant visa) petitions, are eligible for refugee
processing.
Congolese in Rwanda
Certain Congolese who verifiably resided in Mudende Camp, Rwanda
during one or both of the massacres that took place in August
and December of 1997 are eligible for processing.
Priority Three
Nationals of the following countries who are spouses, unmarried
sons and daughters under 21 years of age, and parents of persons
admitted to the United States as refugees or granted asylum, or persons
who are lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens and were initially
admitted to the United States as refugees or granted asylum:
Afghanistan
Bhutan
Burma
Burundi
Central African Republic
Chad
Colombia
Cuba
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
El Salvador
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Iran
Iraq
Mali
Somalia
South Sudan
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Syria
Uzbekistan
Admissibility for Resettlement
Section 212(a) of the INA lists grounds under which aliens may be
excluded from the United States.
Refugees may be excluded for the following reasons:
(1) Health-related.--Some communicable diseases, physical or mental
disorders, and current drug abuse or addiction (Health-related
denials may be overcome when the problem has been successfully
treated, or upon waiver at the discretion of the Secretary of
Homeland Security).
(2) Criminal activity.--Individuals, who have committed crimes of
moral turpitude, drug trafficking, multiple criminal
convictions, prostitution, aggravated felonies or acts
involving persecution or torture.
(3) Security grounds.--Espionage, terrorist activity, membership in
Communist or other totalitarian parties, Nazi persecution or
genocide, or individuals who would present a serious security
threat. Refugee applicants must clear a series of biographic
and biometric checks prior to final approval.
Waivers of certain grounds of inadmissibility may be available in
some cases for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when
it is otherwise in the public interest. Requests for waivers for
refugees (Form I-602) should be sent to the Field Office Director of
the overseas DHS Office with jurisdiction over the case. DHS has sole
authority to determine whether or not to waive these ineligibilities
for refugees.
5. submission and processing via dossier selection
The U.S. refugee resettlement programme does not admit refugees by
dossier selection. All refugee applicants must be interviewed by a DHS
officer.
6. submissions and processing via in-country selection
With respect to a person applying in a third country for admission
to the United States as a refugee, an initial review is undertaken to
evaluate cases based on the applicants' situation in temporary asylum,
the conditions from which they have fled, U.S. National interest, and
other humanitarian considerations. Applicants who claim persecution or
a well-founded fear of persecution and who fall within the priorities
established for the relevant nationality or region are presented to DHS
for determination of eligibility for admission as a refugee under
Section 101(a)(42) of the INA.
6.1 Case Documentation
Applicants may submit a variety of documentation to corroborate
their claims, such as country conditions reports; death certificates;
baptismal certificates; prison records; arrest warrants; affidavits of
or letters from government officials, friends or family members, and
union, political party, or organization membership cards. Refugees are
often unable to provide documentary evidence, however, due to the
circumstances that give rise to flight. In such cases, testimony, if
credible, may be enough to establish eligibility for refugee status
without corroborating evidence. If documents are presented, they are
reviewed by the interviewing officer for content and authenticity.
6.2 Routing of Submissions
All refugee applicants must ultimately be interviewed by a DHS
Officer. USG-funded Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs), previously
known as Overseas Processing Entities (OPEs), usually managed by
resettlement agencies or IOM, prepare cases and schedule interviews
within their regions.
Some processing locations have DHS officers permanently assigned
who may adjudicate refugee applications (e.g. Rome, Nairobi, Accra,
Vienna, Moscow, Athens, Bangkok, New Delhi, Havana, and Mexico City,
among other locations).
In locations that do not have a regular DHS presence, the USG and
the RSC work together to schedule visits from DHS officers on a circuit
ride basis. The vast majority of refugee adjudications are conducted by
DHS officers on circuit ride, and the U.S. refugee admissions programme
is committed to frequent circuit rides to posts where there are
sufficient numbers of UNHCR- and Embassy-referred cases or others who
are eligible.
For those cases approved by DHS, the RSCs make preparation for
onward movement to the United States by arranging medical examinations
and a resettlement agency sponsor. IOM makes travel arrangements once
the final clearances have been obtained.
6.3 Decision-Making Process
Section 207 of the INA grants the Secretary of Homeland Security
the authority to admit, at his/her discretion, any refugee who is not
firmly resettled in a third country, who is determined to be of special
humanitarian concern, and who is admissible to the United States.
The authority to determine eligibility for refugee status has been
delegated to DHS/USCIS. USCIS officers conduct non-adversarial, face-
to-face interviews of each applicant to elicit information about the
applicant's claim for refugee status and any grounds of ineligibility.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screens arriving refugees for
admission at the port of entry.
6.4 Recourse Processing
There is no formal procedure for appealing the denial of refugee
status, although an applicant may file a Request for Review (RFR) of
his case to DHS on the basis of additional evidence or information not
available at the time of the interview.
6.5 Processing Times
The time required to process a refugee claim varies considerably
based on such factors as the availability of a DHS officer to
adjudicate the claim, RSC processing capabilities, type of security
checks required, and whether an applicant is admissible to the United
States. A very rough estimate of the time it takes from DHS approval of
the refugee application until departure is generally 6 to 12 months.
Emergency cases may be expedited and have occasionally been processed
in a very short time, depending on the circumstances
7. emergency cases/urgent cases
U.S. capacity to resettle emergency cases is limited by stringent
security clearance procedures, the regulatory requirement for a face-
to-face interview with all applicants, and enhanced protocols for
detecting and treating tuberculosis overseas. The U.S. does not have a
quota for emergency or urgent cases, and does not have a specific
processing time frame for such cases, but under limited circumstances
can process urgent cases in approximately 16 weeks.
In most cases, the U.S. will encourage UNHCR to transport a case to
an Emergency Transit Facility (ETF) for U.S. processing if protection-
related concerns require the individual to depart the country of asylum
in less than 16 weeks.
8. special categories/special needs
The U.S. does not have sub-quotas dedicated to specific needs
cases, and accepts UNHCR referrals of all types of special needs cases
without imposing a numerical cap.
9. medical requirements
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides the
Department of State with medical screening guidelines for all examining
physicians, which outline in detail the scope of the medical
examination for U.S.-bound refugees. The purpose of the medical
examination is to identify applicants with health-related conditions
that render them inadmissible to the United States.
Medical screening is mandatory for all refugees. Medical exams are
performed by U.S. Embassy-contracted panel physicians or by IOM. The
costs for medical exams are borne by the USG. Costs for medical
treatment necessary to make an already approved refugee ready for
travel are usually paid by the USG. Medical exams are valid for 3
months, 6 months or 1 year, depending on the location and the TB
classification, and must be valid at the time of departure for the
United States. Screening is generally coordinated by the RSC.
A refugee who is determined (in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services) to have a
communicable disease of public health significance; a physical or
mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may
pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the
alien or others; or is determined to be a drug abuser or addict, is
excludable. As of January 4, 2010, HIV infection is no longer an
excludable condition. A waiver for the above excludabilities is
available and must be approved by USCIS.
The U.S. provides pre-departure presumptive treatments in certain
locations. In FY 2014, this includes presumptive treatment for malaria
and parasites in some locations. Although refugees are not required to
receive vaccinations prior to departure, the U.S. administers vaccines
in locations where an outbreak of disease, such as measles, occurs in a
refugee camp or other location where U.S. refugee processing is taking
place. In 2013, the U.S. began routinely administering pre-departure
vaccinations in certain locations. As of June 1, this included Thailand
and Nepal. The U.S. expanded pre-departure vaccinations to Malaysia,
Kenya, and Ethiopia, and Uganda by the end of FY 2014.
10. orientation (pre-departure)
The Department of State strives to ensure that refugees who are
accepted for admission to the United States are prepared for the
significant life changes they will experience by providing cultural
orientation programs prior to departure for the United States. It is
critical that refugees arrive with a realistic view of what their new
lives will be like, what services are available to them, and what their
responsibilities will be.
Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) conduct one-to-five-day pre-
departure cultural orientation classes for eligible refugees at sites
throughout the world. In an effort to further bridge the information
gap, for certain groups, brief video presentations featuring the
experience of recently resettled refugees of the same ethnic group are
made available to refugee applicants overseas.
Prior to arrival in the United States, every refugee family
receives Welcome to the United States, a resettlement guidebook
developed with contributions from refugee resettlement workers,
resettled refugees, and state government officials. Welcome to the
United States is printed in 17 languages: Albanian, Amharic, Arabic,
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, English, Farsi, French, Karen, Karenni,
Kirundi, Kiswahili, Nepali, Russian, Somali, Spanish, Tigrinya, and
Vietnamese. The guidebook gives refugees accurate information about the
initial resettlement process. The Welcome to the United States refugee
orientation video is available in 17 languages: Af-Maay, Arabic,
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, English, Farsi, French, Hmong, Karen,
Karenni, Kirundi, Kiswahili, Nepali, Russian, Somali, Spanish,
Tigrinya, and Vietnamese. The Welcome to the United States guidebook
was revised in 2013. The new version is more comprehensive and
interactive, with student exercises included throughout the workbook.
11. travel
Refugees approved by DHS generally enter the United States within
six to twelve months of approval. Travel is coordinated by IOM, which
generally provides interest-free loans for the cost of their
transportation to the United States. (A refugee is expected to begin
incremental repayment of this loan six months after arrival in the
United States, and the total amount is generally expected to be repaid
within 3\1/2\ years.) Refugees generally travel coach class and must
pay for excess luggage. Refugees carry travel papers prepared by the
RSC which they must present to DHS officials at the port of entry to
the United States.
12. status on arrival and the path to citizenship
At the U.S. port of entry, refugees are admitted to the United
States by DHS officials and authorized employment. After one year, a
refugee must file for adjustment of status to lawful permanent
resident. Five years after admission, a refugee is eligible to apply
for U.S. citizenship. Refugees who wish to travel abroad before
adjusting to Lawful Permanent Resident Status must first obtain advance
permission to re-enter the United States from DHS in the form of a
Refugee Travel Document. Voluntary return to the country of persecution
or availing oneself of services of that country's Government (e.g.
passports) may affect the individual's refugee status. The USG does not
impede voluntary repatriation, but USG funding is not generally
available for refugees wanting to repatriate. Private organizations and
UNHCR may be able to assist refugees who choose to repatriate.
13. domestic settlement and community services
13.1 Overview of Services (providers and length of eligibility)
The U.S. resettlement program recognizes the desirability for
public and private non-profit organizations to provide sponsorship,
reception, and placement services appropriate to refugees' personal
circumstances, and to assist refugees to achieve economic
selfsufficiency as quickly as possible. Sponsoring agencies are
required to ensure that refugees' basic needs are met: initial housing,
essential furnishings and supplies, food or a food allowance, and
necessary clothing for a minimum of 30 days after arrival in the United
States. Further, sponsoring agencies also provide assistance to access
benefits and services, assistance with enrollment in English language
training, transportation to job interviews and job training, and
orientation about services available in the community and life in the
U.S. (employment opportunities, vocational training, education,
language classes, personal budgeting, safety, legal requirements, and
health care) for a period of no less than 30 days that may be extended
up to 90 days after arrival.
Initial reception and placement of refugees is carried out by
sponsoring agencies through cooperative agreements with the Department
of State. Longer term resettlement resources are provided primarily
through assistance programs funded by the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR) in the Administration of Children and Families,
Department of Health and Human Services. ORR supports domestic
resettlement through funds to states, voluntary agencies and community-
based organizations to provide for cash and medical assistance,
employment and social services. The primary ORR grantees may sub-grant
local non-profit organizations, county, and local governments. Private
organizations and individuals, such as relatives or friends of the
refugee or concerned citizens, may also assist with the refugee's
resettlement.
13.2 Reception
An IOM representative meets the refugee at his/her port of entry
and when necessary, ensures he/she makes his/her onward travel
connections. Sponsoring agencies meet the refugees at their final U.S.
destination and transport them to their initial housing, which includes
furnishings and supplies, food, clothing. The sponsoring agencies
provide basic services for a period of no less than 30 days that may be
extended up to 90 days.
13.3 Orientation
The U.S. resettlement program strives to ensure that refugees who
are admitted to the United States are prepared for the significant
changes they will experience during resettlement. Pre-departure
cultural orientation programs are available for refugees at many sites
around the world.
After arrival in the United States, the sponsoring agency provides
refugees with community orientation, which includes information about
the role of the sponsoring agency and those assisting the refugee,
public services and facilities, personal and public safety, public
transportation, standards of personal hygiene, the importance of
learning English, other services available, personal finance, and
information about legal status, citizenship, travel loan repayment,
selective service, and family reunification procedures.
Refugees may also receive materials in their native language which
provide information about life in the United States to ease the
transition to a new society and culture. ORR provides technical
assistance in domestic cultural orientation to promote and enhance
community orientation and supports English language training by funding
ESL programs and/or referral activities.
13.4 Housing
Under the guidelines established for reception and placement
services by the Department of State, the resettlement agencies ensure
that decent, safe and sanitary accommodation, according to U.S. Federal
housing quality standards, is made available to the refugee upon
arrival.
Refugees reuniting with family may spend some time at their
relative's accommodation. ORR provides cash assistance to eligible
refugees to cover basic needs such as food, clothing, and housing up to
eight months. Within the current code of Federal Regulations, ORR
extends social services funding to cover housing expenses.
13.5 Health
Resettlement agencies refer refugees to local health services for a
comprehensive health assessment upon arrival in order to identify and
treat health problems which might impede employment and effective
resettlement. This assessment is provided free of charge. Refugees are
eligible to apply for Medicaid or Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA)
provided by ORR to cover basic health care costs. ORR ensures medical
screening for all refugees through RRMA or Medicaid. ORR covers health
and mental health needs of eligible refugees up to eight months through
the RMA program. RMA provides medical services to those refugees
ineligible for Medicaid.
13.6 Language Training
English language ability is critical to a refugee's successful
transition in American society. English as a Second Language (ESL)
training programs vary among communities. The local resettlement agency
is the best source of information about the availability of such
programs. ORR funds a technical assistance provider to promote and
support English language training.
13.7 Education
Public schools in the United States are operated by local
governments so curriculum and facilities vary. Public school education
is free for grades Kindergarten to 12 (approximately ages 5 to 18) and
is mandatory for children ages 6 to 16. The resettlement agency will be
able to provide more information about school registration and other
educational resources in the community. ORR supports the integration of
refugee children into the American school system through a refugee
school impact grant to refugee-impacted areas.
13.8 Vocational Training
Refugees should be aware that job mobility in the United States is
great and that refugees frequently change jobs as technical skills and
English ability improve. Refugees should also be aware that foreign job
certification is often not valid in the United States and that further
training, testing, and/or certification may be necessary for some jobs.
Vocational and technical schools train people for special skilled
occupations, such as auto mechanics, computer programming, and medical
and dental assistants. These programs require varying levels of English
language ability and often require payment. The local resettlement
agency will be able to provide more information about the availability
and cost of such programs.
13.9 Employment-related Training
ORR employability training services are designed to enable refugees
to achieve economic self-sufficiency as soon as possible. Employment-
related training can include: the development of a self-sufficiency
plan, job orientation, job development, job referral, placement,
follow-up, English language training, and employability assessment
services to include aptitude and skills testing. In addition, services
can include career laddering and recertification activities for refugee
professionals seeking to fulfill their full career potential.
13.10 Employment
Achieving economic self-sufficiency is the cornerstone of the U.S.
resettlement program and getting a job is the first step toward that
goal. Many jobs available to newly-arrived refugees are entry-level and
refugees are encouraged to improve their language and job skills in
order to move up the economic ladder. Refugees receive assistance from
the resettlement agency or other employment service program in their
community in finding a job, though it may not be in the same field in
which the refugee was previously employed. Refugees must have
documentation authorizing employment, such as the I-94 form, which they
receive from DHS upon arrival, or an Employment Authorization Document
(EAD), which they receive from DHS 30 days or more after arrival. The
Matching Grant program funded by ORR is particularly focused on
intensive case management employability services in support of early
self-sufficiency. ORR also provides technical assistance to expand and
promote employment opportunities.
13.11 Financial Assistance
The U.S. resettlement program is a public-private partnership. The
Department of State provides the sponsorship agency $1,925 per refugee
to provide for their basic needs and core services. Of the $1,925 per
capita funding, $1,125 must be spent directly on refugees. While
affiliates must spend at least $925 on each refugee, they may choose to
allocate up to $200 of the $1,125 on other more vulnerable refugees.
Federal funding is only intended to provide a portion of the resources
needed to serve the refugee. Each sponsoring agency and its affiliates
raise private resources, both cash and in-kind, to further address the
individual needs of each refugee.
The Department of Health and Human Services is the primary funding
source in providing financial assistance to States, counties, and local
non-profits to assist refugees become economically self-sufficient as
quickly as possible. States, counties, non-profits, and communities
provide additional resources to support such programs. Refugees are
eligible to apply for public benefits, cash or food assistance, to
cover a portion of their expenses. The level of benefits varies State
by State.
13.12 Supplemental Support for Refugee with Special Needs
The Department of State refugee per capita funding provides $200
that a local sponsoring agency can utilize for individual refugees with
special needs. Additionally, each community in which refugees are
resettled is unique, with different strengths and weaknesses.
Recognizing this, each sponsoring agency and its affiliates work to
determine the most appropriate placement for each refugee, so that that
location best matches the individualized needs of that refugee. Once a
placement is determined the local affiliate works with other community
partners to prepare for the special needs of the refugee. The
Department of Health and Human Services programs and discretionary
funding allow for the creation of programs to address the diverse needs
of refugees and the communities.
13.13 Mechanism for sharing information with service providers;
including details on expected populations, specific cases, and
integration issues
The Department of State shares information about expected
populations for resettlement with other Federal partners, the
sponsoring agencies, and States on an annual and quarterly basis. They
in turn provide this information to other service providers. Background
information and cultural information is published on certain refugee
populations planned for resettlement, which include integration issues.
Specific case information is provided to service providers through the
Department of State comprehensive database. This gives individual
biographic data on each refugee to the sponsoring agency that will
resettle the refugee and may be shared with other service providers who
will serve that specific case. Pipeline information is available to
sponsoring agencies, States, and Federal partners. Individual medical
data is provided to the Department of Health and Human Services upon
arrival of each refugee to ensure appropriate follow-up. Sponsoring
agencies, through this database, then provide a status report on each
individual refugee at the end of their reception and placement period.
14. family reunification of refugees
Family unity is an important element of the U.S. refugee admissions
programme. This is reflected in the processing priorities discussed in
Section 4, as well as in other refugee and immigrant admissions
programmes detailed below.
14.1 National Definition of Family
For U.S. immigration purposes, the validity of a marriage is
generally determined by the law in the place of celebration.
There are certain exceptions to that rule. For example, refugees
may be prevented from complying with formal marriage registration
requirements based on circumstances resulting from their flight from
persecution. If a marriage is invalid based on a failure to comply with
formal registration requirements, a marriage may still be valid for
U.S. immigration purposes if the parties were prevented from formal
perfection of the marriage due to circumstances relating to their
flight from persecution. Examples of circumstances beyond a couple's
control and relating to the flight from persecution would include
inability to access host country institutions due to refugee camp
policies or conditions, discriminatory government policies or
practices, and other consequences of the flight from persecution. A
couple who has been prevented from formal perfection of the marriage
must also show other indicia of a valid marriage. The relevant
considerations may include: holding themselves out to be spouses,
cohabitation over a period of time, children born to the union, and the
performance of a marriage ceremony.
Common law marriages may be accepted for U.S. immigration purposes
if the law of the place of celebration allows a couple to marry by
agreement, without formal ceremony, licensing, or registration
requirements, and recognizes the relationship as a legally valid
marriage. However, common law marriages that are not legal in the place
of celebration and are simply de facto cohabitation would not be
considered a marriage for immigration purposes under U.S. law.
In July 2013, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) issued a
precedent decision in Matter of Zeleniak, 26 I&N Dec. 158 (BIA 2013),
recognizing lawful same-sex marriages and spouses if the marriage is
valid under the laws of the State where it was celebrated. A same-sex
spouse may now be included on refugee application if the applicant and
spouse are legally married.
USCIS generally looks to the law of the place where the marriage
took place when determining whether it is valid for immigration law
purposes. USCIS does not recognize a marriage legally transacted in a
foreign jurisdiction if the marriage is contrary to Federal public
policy. This includes polygamous marriages and some minor marriages.
According to the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) Section
101(a)(35): The term [terms] ``spouse,'' ``wife,'' or ``husband'' do
not include a spouse, wife or husband by reason of any marriage
ceremony where the contracting parties thereto are not physically
present in the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have
been consummated.
According to INA Section 101(b)(1)(A)-(E): (1) The term ``child''
means an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age who is:
(A) a child born in wedlock;
(B) a stepchild, whether or not born out of wedlock, provided the
child had not reached the age of eighteen years at the time the
marriage creating the status of stepchild occurred;
(C) a child legitimated under the law of the child's residence or
domicile, or under the law of the father's residence or
domicile, whether in or outside the United States, if such
legitimation takes place before the child reaches the age of
eighteen years and the child is in the legal custody of the
legitimating parent or parents at the time of such
legitimation;
(D) a child born out of wedlock, by, through whom, or on whose
behalf a status, privilege, or benefit is sought by virtue of
the relationship of the child to its natural mother or to its
natural father if the father has or had a bona fide parent-
child relationship with the person;
(E)(i) a child adopted while under the age of sixteen years if the
child has been in the legal custody of, and has resided with,
the adopting parent or parents for at least two years or if the
child has been battered or subject to extreme cruelty by the
adopting parent or by a family member of the adopting parent
residing in the same household: Provided, that no natural
parent of any such adopted child shall thereafter, by virtue of
such parentage, be accorded any right, privilege, or status
under this Act; or
(ii) subject to the same proviso as in clause (i), a child who:
(I) is a natural sibling of a child described in clause (i) or
subparagraph (F)(i);
(II) was adopted by the adoptive parent or parents of the
sibling described in such clause or subparagraph; and
(III) is otherwise described in clause (i), except that the
child was adopted while under the age of 18 years;
Certain family members may join relatives in the United States by
one of the following means:
A UNHCR referral for the purpose of family reunification
(Such referrals follow the procedures outlined in Section 6).
An Affidavit of Relationship (AOR).--An AOR is a form filed
with a resettlement agency by refugees, permanent residents, or
American citizens to establish a relationship in order to
qualify for consideration under the priority three, family
reunification category.
Visa 93.--A resettlement authorization for the spouse and
unmarried children under 21 of a refugee already resident in
the United States.
Visa 92.--A resettlement authorization for the spouse and
unmarried children under 21 of an asylee already resident in
the United States.
Regular immigration.--Refugees may also qualify for
admission under regular immigration categories if they have the
requisite relatives in the United States.
14.2 Family Reunification Eligibility
Use of an AOR requires that the relative applying for U.S.
resettlement establish refugee status in his own right and be otherwise
admissible for entry into the United States, as determined by DHS. An
acceptable AOR permits an applicant to be considered under Priority 3.
A Visa 93 or Visa 92 petitioner must establish proof of relationship
(spouse or unmarried child under 21). While immediate family members do
not need to qualify as refugees in their own right in order to be
eligible for Visas 92 or 93 and may still be situated in their
countries of origin, they must demonstrate that they meet the required
standards regarding admissibility to the U.S.
14.3 Allocations for Family Reunification
All family reunification cases, whether direct applicants, UNHCR
referrals or Visas 93 beneficiaries, count against the annual regional
refugee admissions ceiling. Visas 92 beneficiaries do not count against
the annual admissions ceiling.
14.4 Routing of Applications
UNHCR referrals for the purpose of family reunification follow the
procedures outlined in Section 6.
AOR.--A relative in the United States files an AOR with a
local branch of one of eleven resettlement agencies with a
cooperative agreement with the Department of State. If
determined to be eligible, routing then follows the procedures
outlined in Section 6.
Visa 93.--A refugee in the United States must file Form I-
730 (Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition) with DHS on behalf of
his/her spouse and minor, unmarried children, along with
supporting documentation to verify the relationship. The I-730
must be filed within two years of the refugee's arrival in the
U.S.
Visa 92.--An asylee in the United States must also file Form
I-730 (Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition) with DHS on behalf of
his/her spouse and minor, unmarried children, along with
supporting documentation to verify the relationship.
14.5 Case Documentation
When the refugee applicant seeks resettlement in the United States
through UNHCR based on family ties, such ties may be supported by a
marriage and/or birth certificates, certificates of adoption or
approved Form I-130s (Petition for Alien Relative). If these documents
are unavailable, a church record, school record or census record
showing date and place of birth may be acceptable. If the above
documentation is unavailable, the applicant may present a notarized
voluntary agency Affidavit of Relationship (AOR), sworn statements of
persons who are not related to the principal applicant attesting to the
relationship claimed, or, if necessary, such affidavits from persons
related to the principal applicant. UNHCR need not request that an AOR
be filled out when referring a case under Priority One.
14.6 Processing Times
The processing timeline for family reunification cases is longer
than that for UNHCR-referred cases, as the AOR must be vetted by USCIS
prior to commencing RSC prescreening, and DNA evidence of certain
parent-child relationships, at the applicant's expense, is required.
Following a four-year suspension due to relationship/identity fraud,
the U.S. re-started the P-3 program on October 15, 2012.
15. references/resources
The following materials are available from any U.S. Embassy that
processes refugees or from the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration at the U.S. Department of State:
Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL), Welcome to the United States:
A Guidebook for Refugees. 2012. http://
www.culturalorientation.net
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives.
Immigration and Nationality Act, May 1995. http://www.uscis.gov
U.S. Department of State, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Health and Human Services. Report to the
Congress: Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2015,
September 2014. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
232029.pdf
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Katko.
Mr. Katko. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any reports to put
into the record, but I do have a report I want to talk about
for a moment.
Chairman McCaul. You may.
Mr. Katko. That is the--I was chair of the joint terrorism
task force--the report, Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter
Travel. I appreciate your comments. I am proud of the work that
our task force did. Many of my colleagues sitting here today
were part of that task force. It was done in a bipartisan
manner.
When we did this over a 6-month period of time, we spent an
extensive amount of time with folks from Homeland Security, as
well as FBI, and spent a lot of time with the National
Counterterrorism Center, as well, and we learned an awful lot.
I could be here all day asking you specifics about the
report, but I just--a couple things I do want to touch on.
In the wake of 9/11 and the 9/11 Commission, there was
legislation passed in 2006 to develop a National strategy to
combat foreign fighter travel. The landscape has changed
tremendously since then, as we all know, especially with
respect to ISIS.
One of the report's recommendations is to basically have an
updated report of that, and I wanted to hear what your thoughts
are on that, all of you.
Secretary Johnson. Congressman, in general, I do believe
that we need a comprehensive strategy to foreign terrorist
fighter travel.
I also agree that since 2006 the threat has evolved
enormously, particularly from European countries. We are
concerned about those who have been to Syria and who come to
this country from a country for which we do not require a visa,
which is why, as you know, I announced a number of security
enhancements with respect to travel from European countries to
deal with this exact threat.
But it is a significant problem, and I agree that we should
have--we do have this in very large measure, but we should have
a comprehensive overall strategy for dealing with it. We are
doing a lot on my end. The FBI is doing a lot on their end to
interdict those who are leaving this country who are going to
Syria. But this something that is going to be with us for a
while. It also involves working with our friends and allies
internationally, working with the Government of Turkey, for
example, which is something I am personally focused on at the
moment.
The last thing I will say, I read most of your report. I
didn't get through all of it. I thought it was an excellent
report. I complimented one of your staff on the elevator ride
up here. I said, ``You wrote a great report''----
Mr. Katko. That made his day, by the way, just so you know.
That made his day, that complimenting the staffer. He
appreciates that, so thank you.
Secretary Johnson. Well, he pointed out to me, ``It wasn't
me. It was the Members of Congress.''
Mr. Katko. I appreciate that.
Secretary Johnson. I thought you would.
Mr. Rasmussen. Can I just add on to that, sir?
The one thing we can be sure of is that today's conflict
zone is obviously Iraq and Syria, where we are so heavily
focused on foreign terrorist fighters, but we can be certain
that there is likely around the corner in future years another
conflict zone where foreign terrorist fighters will be a
problem that we will confront as a matter of National security.
So I think some of the very things your report
highlighted--the structures and procedures and capabilities we
are putting in place to deal with this problem--don't
necessarily give us immediate relief. They don't help us next
month tell you that the flow of foreign fighters has been
squashed or shut down, but I would argue, importantly, that we
are building some capability that will bear out over time.
Similarly, like Secretary Johnson said, so much of the work
on this problem is international work right now. I would say
that there is a good-news story embedded in this problem in
that our foreign partners are far more willing to share
information on this problem than would have been the case in
2006 or 2007, when we were dealing with the foreign terrorist
fighter problem at that time.
So, again, the size of the problem, undoubtedly larger and
more complex, but the array of resources we are able to call on
around the globe, countries with whom you would never think we
would be working, we are exchanging successfully information on
foreign terrorist fighters.
Mr. Katko. Right. It seems like the phenomenon with respect
to ISIS, at least, and the radicalization of home-grown
terrorists here and getting them to go overseas to fight for
them is an added twist. So I think that is something that
probably warrants an update in the whole terror travel
analysis.
Mr. Comey, I know you didn't have a chance to answer, but I
do have a question for you that is different in nature, given
the short period of time I have. I am concerned about the Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, JTTFs, and the stresses that are being
put on them.
You traditionally have investigated international and
domestic terrorism as part of the JTTF. So, to address a
question that was brought earlier, the JTTF doesn't
discriminate under which cases they look at. Whatever comes
across their radar, whether it is a domestic case or an
international case, gets a high priority. Is that correct?
Mr. Comey. That is correct.
Mr. Katko. My concern is, grafted on top of that now is
this whole new phenomenon about ISIS and the stress that that
is putting on, both from foreign fighters coming back, having
to expend all the capital and resources to track them, which is
very difficult, as well as trying to find a needle in the
haystack for those who are getting radicalized over the
internet.
So I know you talked about it, but I want to make sure we
get a good understanding. Are the JTTFs being stressed beyond
the breaking point? Or are they okay? Or do they need more
help?
Mr. Comey. They are being stressed tremendously. As I said
earlier, they were very, very stressed in May and June and
early July, in particular. But, given your career experience,
you know the kind of folks they are. They will just get the
work done.
What I want to make sure I do is, if we have a new normal,
that we get them the plus-up and resources they may need. I am
not in a position yet where I am going to come back and ask for
that, but it is something we watch very carefully.
Mr. Katko. Okay. I understand that working together with
the State and local authorities is helping you to leverage
that. I encourage what we can to keep that going, because that
is a really important aspect of the puzzle. So thank you very
much.
I yield back my time.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mrs. Torres.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To FBI Director Comey, I want to thank you personally for
the outreach that your L.A. office has done in my district. It
was really important for me to ensure that we have a face
behind that, you know, phone number that we are supposed to be
reporting issues of concern to. They have offered to do a
follow-up in a more, you know, law-enforcement-to-law-
enforcement, because we did have members of the community at
that hearing. So thank you for that work.
In your testimony, we were talking about terrorist
propaganda and the outreach that these terrorist groups are
doing through social media. I am very concerned about their
infiltration with our local gangs. We have placed a lot of
attention and I congratulate all of you on the work that you
are doing internationally.
My concern is the Mexican Mafia. My concern is the white
supremacist groups that have targeted African-American
communities. I want to ensure and be on record that we are
doing everything that we can to also follow up on those issues.
Mr. Comey. Yes, Congresswoman. Thank you for that. Those
are an important part of the FBI's work with our local partners
all day, every day, the gangs you mentioned, extremists that
you mentioned. The Bureau was given the resources after
September 11 to make sure we could be great at both our
international terrorism responsibilities and these criminal
responsibilities.
Mrs. Torres. Earlier in your testimony, you said that due
to sequestration you have had to move people out of criminal
investigations to do surveillance work for these potential
terrorist folks that go dark. That is why I bring that out to
you.
Mr. Comey. I echo what my colleague Secretary Johnson said
about sequestration. One of the reasons we have had to move
those resources is we are trying to hire out of the hole that
was left for us 2 years ago. So we hired 2,000 people this last
year; we are going to hire close to 3,000 this year. So we are
trying to dig out of that hole and get us the people who can
fill those slots. If we get hit again, I don't know what we
will do.
Mrs. Torres. When we first met last year, I had asked you
specifically about ensuring that you hire people, you know,
that look like America and that we are targeting areas where we
need certain languages and certain ethnic backgrounds to be
represented at the FBI table.
How has your progress been on that?
Mr. Comey. It is probably too early to tell, but we are
devoting a tremendous amount of effort to that, to trying to
encourage people from all different backgrounds and walks of
life to try and get into the FBI. It is not about lowering the
standards. We don't need to lower the standards. We just need
people to give us a chance.
The obstacle we face, one of my daughters said to me,
``Dad, the problem is you are the man.'' I said, ``Thank you.''
She said, ``I don't mean that as a good thing, Dad. You are
`the man.' Nobody wants to work for `the man.' '' You have to
change the way they think about it. So we are working very hard
about that, for folks to understand that the Bureau----
Mrs. Torres. Right.
Mr. Comey [continuing]. Is great place for people, whether
Latino, African-American, Asian, men, or women, to work. It is
a work in progress. But I have 8 years left, and so I will----
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
Mr. Rasmussen, you talked about a creation of community
engagement groups. How do you intend to do that? Who are the
community partners that you will be inviting to participate?
Mr. Rasmussen. In my written remarks, I highlighted the
work we are doing at NCTC alongside Secretary Johnson's team
and Director Comey's team. I will tell you, though, in this
effort to deal with countering violent extremism here inside
the United States, it ends up being a separate and distinct
conversation in almost every community. Because in each
community in which we are working together, all of us, the
community leadership looks different, the problem looks
different, the set of actors who may have influence looks
different. That is what makes it hard.
I think we are doing very good work in this area, but it
has been hard to scale up because there is no National-level
solution, no single answer, where you say, if you just touch
this in Los Angeles, it works in Dallas or it works in Miami or
it works----
Mrs. Torres. That is why it is so important to engage local
law enforcement and to ensure that diversity is at the top of
our priority.
Mr. Rasmussen. I agree completely.
Again, I wouldn't even suggest that we are bringing a
solution to those local communities. In many cases, we are
bringing information, which will hopefully empower those
communities to actually make the choices and the changes and
take the steps necessary to deal with extremism in their midst.
That is not a Federal solution.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hurd.
Mr. Hurd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to our distinguished panel for being here today.
Also, please tell the men and women that work for you all thank
you on behalf of us, as well.
I spent 9 years as an undercover officer in the CIA. I was
in the CIA when 9/11 happened. To think that, if you would have
asked me then that there wouldn't be a major attack on our
homeland for over 14 years, I would have said you all were
crazy. But we haven't had one, because the men and women in you
all's organizations are all working as if it is September 12
every single day. The operational discipline and tenacity that
takes, I recognize that and understand that, and my hats go off
to them. It is great representing the 23rd Congressional
District of Texas, but it is also great representing those men
and women that are doing that.
I represent over 820 miles of the border, so, Secretary
Johnson, I am here to report to you that you have some
hardworking men and women in Border Patrol and Customs along
that border. I had the awesome opportunity to award three of
them with the Congressional Medal of Valor. They went above and
beyond during a flood. It read like straight out of a movie. So
I see what these men and women are doing every day.
One issue that they do have is--and don't need to address
it here, but I would like to work with your staffs, and it
probably impacts the FBI, as well, Director Comey, and this is
the right-sizing of the Federal fleet. I think GSA's
requirements don't take into account the unique challenges that
law enforcement has to deal with, nor folks on the border. So I
look forward to working with whoever in you all's offices on
maybe this issue and looking at solving that problem with the
GSA.
Secretary Johnson, I am also interested in learning from
your staff on how you all calculate got-aways and that process.
That is something I would welcome an analysis of that from the
correct folks on your team, if that is okay.
My first question to you, Secretary Johnson, is: The cyber
deal with China that was recently announced, have we seen any
impact that is having on attacks on our critical infrastructure
from the Chinese?
Secretary Johnson. I would say it is, at this point, too
early to make an informed assessment.
One thing that I will be looking to see is whether in our
follow-up engagement, which I hope to have in December, we will
see real progress, building on what we have agreed to on paper.
So that, to me, will be a first indicator of whether or not the
Chinese are taking seriously what they agreed to do when they
were here in September.
Mr. Hurd. Excellent.
Like you in your opening remarks, I hope the Senate sends
us a bill so that we can, you know, reconcile those differences
and get something to the President to sign, because
cybersecurity is important.
Director Comey, I appreciate your opening remarks and your
stressing that the Bureau is not seeking any legislative issues
regarding the going-dark phenomenon or encryption. Because
there is still a perception out there amongst the private
sector and privacy groups that the FBI is still looking for a
back door or a front door to encryption. We all know that that
is technically not able to do that. If you allow the good guys
to have access to the back door, then you are allowing the bad
guys to have access to the back door.
My question, though, is: When you have groups like ISIS
using social media tools to increase their effort, doesn't that
also give us an opportunity to increase our targeting of these
groups?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Congressman.
First, with respect to your predicate, I honestly don't
agree with your framing of it, in terms of the encryption
issue. I don't think there is a single ``it.'' It is a very
complicated technical landscape. I resist the term ``back
door.'' I know it dominates the conversation today, but I don't
know what the answer is. I see lots of companies who are able
to provide secure services to their customers and they still
comply with court orders.
So people tell me it is impossible. I am a little
skeptical.
Mr. Hurd. So here is my question, though. A lot of folks--I
have sat down and talked with these people and talked with
people in your organization about, give me the use cases in
which the case actually went cold. Because even if you have
people using a device, you may not get the plain text
information, but you do have the device. You do know that
someone is using that. You do know the location of that device.
So saying that you still can't target terrorists that way
and throwing certain companies under the bus by saying they are
not cooperating, I don't think that is an accurate portrayal of
what is really going on.
Mr. Comey. Yeah, and I hope you didn't hear me to throw
anybody under the bus. We are collecting and we will get you
hundreds and hundreds of cases. But, to me, that actually
doesn't--I think everybody agrees the logic of encryption means
that all of our work will be severely affected by it, but I
don't think that is the end of the conversation.
The question is: How much do we care about that, and what
can we do about it? We will demonstrate the cases where it
affects criminal work and intelligence work and National
security work, but I don't think that ends the conversation.
Mr. Hurd. I 100 percent agree.
I disagree a little bit with some of your opening remarks
that there is a conflict in our values. I don't think there is
a conflict of our values. Our civil liberties are the things
that make our country great. We can protect our civil liberties
and our digital infrastructure and give our men and women that
are working hard to keep us safe every single day the tools
they need in order to continue to protect us in an increasing
environment.
I am over my time. I look forward to working with you on
this issue and the private sector, because this is something
that we can solve.
I yield back, Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes our first female
combat pilot, Ms. Martha McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and the hard work
of you and all the men and women that are in your
organizations.
I was on the task force. I was proud to be on the task
force. Certainly very eye-opening and troubling, but very
important work for us to identify some of the challenges and
loopholes we have, which have been, you know, further discussed
in your testimony today. Look forward to working with you all
to see how we can, you know, obviously, close those loopholes
and increase our security.
I want to specifically talk about the recruitment of women
and girls. We have talked about, you know, we think there are
over 250, maybe, Americans have been recruited, over 2,500
Westerners. A lot of the men are being recruited to go over and
join the caliphate to fight, but women and girls are been
recruited to go over and basically be subjected to sexual
slavery--a very different dynamic. We have heard reports that
the women and the girls, quite frankly, can't leave in the same
freedom as some of the men do.
So do any of you have comments about the different dynamic
there and then different efforts we would have in order to
counter the violent extremism and the recruitment of women and
girls?
Mr. Rasmussen. It is a very good question. What we do know
is that ISIL does prioritize trying to recruit and bring young
women to the caliphate. They target some of their messaging
directly to that community, and they adopt themes that they
think will resonate with young women in Western Europe and even
here in the United States.
You will probably remember, not too long ago, The New York
Times ran a very disturbing series on the front page that
described in some very vivid detail some of the horrific
experiences young women have been put through by moving to the
caliphate.
I was heartened to see that that kind of information was
becoming public, because it can only help to have that
information exposed. But is The New York Times going to be the
vehicle that reaches young women and explains to them how at
risk they are if they respond to this call or, in the way that
Director Comey described in his opening remarks, the way they
gravitate, the way they might choose to gravitate towards the
positive ends of this message? I don't think The New York Times
is going to be the vehicle that helps us explain that and
create that sense of awareness that it is not the environment
they are signing up for.
Ms. McSally. Right.
Secretary Johnson. Congresswoman, I think a fundamental
part of our CVE efforts here in this country is a message that
has to be addressed to young women about the type of
exploitation they could be subjected to----
Ms. McSally. Right.
Secretary Johnson [continuing]. If they go to these places.
But I also believe it includes a message to their parents, as
well----
Ms. McSally. I agree. Thank you.
Secretary Johnson [continuing]. Their family units.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
Moving on to a different topic, we have had a lot of
discussion today about vetting the refugees. We identified in
the task force some challenges with the Visa Waiver program
and, you know, just making sure, again, that we are keeping the
country safe.
One of the elements--we had a demonstration out of the
university in my district, University of Arizona, related to
deception-detection technology. What we have learned in some of
the briefings I have gotten is, even with a face-to-face
interview, you often could be wrong if someone is trying to
deceive. There has been decades of work done in identifying
through, you know, neurological means and other things whether
somebody is deceiving, whether that is filling out on-line
forms or in person.
We did give a demo to some individuals in your
organization, but I would really like to follow up with that,
because I think these are some cheap technologies that we could
deploy that helps us in the vetting fight for a variety of
different dynamics here. I know some of your members were
there, but it is sometimes difficult, you know,
bureaucratically, to move technology quickly.
So I would really like to follow up with all of you related
to this deception-detection technology, because I think it
really would be helpful, if you are open to it.
Secretary Johnson. Yes.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thank you.
Then the last thing is, you know, I ran the
counterterrorism operations at AFRICOM in my last military
assignment. We talk about foreign fighters and foreign fighter
training. Working with your organizations, you know, we were
watching thousands and thousands of terrorists being trained in
al-Shabaab training camps, and we had the authority, but we
didn't really have the will to do anything about it.
You know, we are all talking about ISIS right now, but we
do have AQIM, AQAP, al-Shabaab, certainly with the challenges
with pulling out some forces in Yemen, limiting our
intelligence. Just wanted some discussion on that so that we
are not all focused on ISIL and not, you know--I know your
organizations are not, but I just want to hear your assessments
of addressing the AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab threats.
Are there any similar issues that we don't have the will to
be addressing those? Or what other challenges are you having
with those threats?
Mr. Rasmussen. Thank you for raising that issue, because,
as you saw in my remarks, I resist a little bit the kind of
gravitational pull that says that ISIL is the sole focus of our
counterterrorism effort right now. It is certainly--as I said
in my testimony, the group has surpassed al-Qaeda in terms of
its prominence in leading a global jihadist movement, but, in
terms of the threat we face, each of the groups you rattled
off, Congresswoman, very, very dangerous, lethal, and deserving
of all of the resources and analysis we can bring to bear on it
as a counterterrorism community.
Simply as a matter of workforce management, I have had to
resist the pull also to, again, surge analysts in the direction
of only working on ISIL-related threats because of the array of
other places around the world where al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda
affiliate groups, and other extremist groups are potentially
threatening us. So thank you for raising that.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
My time has expired, but I look forward to following up
with your organizations on those threats, as well.
Thank you.
Chairman McCaul. The Chair recognizes Mr. Ratcliffe.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of the witnesses for all that you do to keep
America safe.
I would like to go back to the issue in Syria that has
displaced millions of folks seeking refugee status around the
world. Obviously, it is a humanitarian concern for all of us. I
am certainly sympathetic to the atrocities there. Like many of
the Members have mentioned, I appreciate our country's profound
and long-time commitment to providing a place of security to
those fleeing disastrous conflicts.
That being said, I did want to drill down a little bit on
the President's announcement a month ago of a 600-percent
expansion in the number of Syrian refugees allowed into this
country, going from about 1,600 a year to a figure of at least
10,000, as the President mentioned. I think, Secretary, you
clarified that number today.
So, while humanitarian concerns are certainly warranted--we
know that--I know that you would all agree with me that the
President's actions certainly raise some real security risks
here at home.
Director Comey, you have recently testified before the
Senate that, while we do have a robust screening process here,
I think you did acknowledge that at the same time there are
some information gaps in our databases that we use to screen
these individuals. Is that correct?
Mr. Comey. That is correct.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay.
But, again, I know you all agree that it is also vitally
important that we understand who is coming into this country to
the best of our ability, especially when we also know that ISIS
has expressed an interest and an intent in using the refugee
process to get in the United States.
That is also a fact, isn't it, Director?
Mr. Comey. Yes. I think Director Rasmussen testified to
that just a few minutes ago.
Mr. Ratcliffe. All right. So with that in mind, I think we
are all agree that it is imperative these decisions be made on
an humanitarian basis, but also with respect to National
security in mind, and each of you and your respective teams are
full of extremely talented, capable, dedicated folks that can
inform these decisions, and so I want to find out the extent to
which they were utilized.
Was the figure announced by the President of 10,000, was
that the product of a thorough analysis by your respective
agencies? I will start with you, Secretary.
Secretary Johnson. The announcement of 10,000 was the
product of considerable interagency discussion. My Department
and USCIS was certainly consulted in arriving at that number.
It is, as I think you noted very definitely, striking a balance
between what we know we can accomplish with the resources we
have, and not shutting our eyes and our doors to what is really
a horrible world situation and doing our part to try to
alleviate it. But yes, we were consulted, sir.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Great. Thank you.
Director Comey.
Mr. Comey. That is my understanding as well. There was an
interagency process run through the National Security Council,
and the FBI was a participant in those conversations.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Director Rasmussen.
Mr. Rasmussen. The same as well.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Thank you.
Director Rasmussen, I want to talk to you a little bit.
Back in June, we held a hearing at this committee called
``Terrorism Gone Viral,'' and it really examined the terrorist
attack in Garland, Texas, which is just outside of my district,
and related to ISIS's use of the social media, which is
something that we have all talked about a lot today.
In our June hearing, I really tried to get answers on the
issue of why ISIS has been so skillful in this area relative to
other foreign terrorist organizations. I asked about whether or
not it was due to better funding, or whether it was certain
individuals within the group. The responses I got were largely,
well, the internet hadn't really developed when al-Qaeda was
going; social media wasn't as pervasive until recently. But I
think those responses ignored the fact that, you know, at
present, other terrorist organizations certainly exist, but it
appears that ISIS still remains uniquely skilled in this area.
So you gave some testimony recently in an exchange with
Senator Johnson at the Homeland Security Committee in the
Senate, and I wanted to ask you a little bit about that. Maybe
it relates to--I know there were reports in September that
ISIS's social media activities seem to ramp down following the
death of Junaid Hussain, but I guess I want to know your
opinion. Is ISIS unique in recruiting foreign fighters and
inspiring lone-wolf attackers? Is that a product of some unique
capability that they have? If not, are there other factors, or
what are the other factors that make ISIS so skillful in this
area?
Mr. Rasmussen. I hesitate to use the word ``unique,''
because, you know, the capabilities that they are using to
mobilize potential fighters or terrorists, those aren't
necessarily things that can't be transferred or adopted by
other groups going forward. I think the innovation that ISIL,
as an organization, undertook that differentiated it from al-
Qaeda in a significant way was that ISIL truly did aspire to be
a mass movement.
In creating the caliphate, the idea was to populate the
caliphate with individuals all around the world. Al-Qaeda
traditionally and typically operated as a clandestine terrorist
movement, where vetting processes and letting individuals into
the group was a very serious business. So you did not see al-
Qaeda--I would argue they probably didn't have the tools to do
this, but they were not seeking to create a mass organization
capable of controlling territory the way Iraq--in Iraq and
Syria the way ISIL has.
So I would hate to rule out, though--or I would hesitate to
rule out that other terrorist organizations could not adopt the
same kinds of skillful techniques that ISIL has.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. I was just informed that--for the Members,
that Director Comey has a hard stop at 12:30. So just take that
into consideration.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Donovan.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, my colleagues have articulated the incredible
responsibility you all have protecting our country from
domestic homegrown radicalized individuals to people who are
overseas who want to attack our country to fighting mass--
possible mass destruction in our country to lone wolves
shooting up people who are worshipping in a church in the
South. Tremendous. I want to just touch on something that no
one has touched on yet, and that is the possibility of nuclear
devices.
Director Comey, your agents have done a remarkable job in
thwarting smugglers from trying to equip ISIS with nuclear
materials. Recently, one was reported, and I think there were 4
others, or 5 others, during the last few years.
Are we getting some assistance from some of the former
Soviet countries? Russia also would be threatened by this. What
other materials possibly should we be looking towards other
than just nuclear devices? Certainly, I know there are other
materials that have been harmful to our country, but what other
materials that people like these--ISIS or al-Qaeda other groups
are looking to use against our country?
Mr. Comey. Thank you, Congressman. The answer is we get
cooperation across the board on this, because whatever people's
political difference is, everybody understands the threat posed
by radiological nuclear chemical biothreats. So we have
invested as a country, and the FBI in particular, in building
relationships with our counterparts, you know, a whole host of
Eastern European countries, the former Soviet States there, so
that is a good news story.
The challenge we all face is, ISIL's mission is simply to
kill a lot of people. So they are not in love with any
particular tool, as long as it will kill people. So we focus
on, obviously, devices themselves, but also radiological
materials, that might--a cesium that might be used to terrify
people or to injure people, a long-term radiological illness.
So there is a broad spectrum there.
As I said earlier, we have folks in the FBI, and I know my
partners here do, that wake up every day focused just on this,
because we see the threat as low probability, huge impact.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, my fellow New Yorker. My other
fellow New Yorker, Secretary Johnson. Yesterday Congress passed
a bill of mine to authorize Securing the Cities, a pilot
program that your agency started back in 2006, very successful
in New York, New Jersey region, expanded to Houston, Los
Angeles, Long Beach area, District of Columbia. The efforts
that you are making there, because we are expanding, do you
have the resources to continue the success of that program in
the future, because it has been remarkably successfully in our
area, where you and Director Comey and I come from, and the
successes that we have heard from my colleagues are just
remarkable.
Secretary Johnson. My assessment of the Securing the Cities
program is that it has been very successful, and it is very
important and very valuable. So thank you for your support for
it. As you noted, we have moved to other cities, and I think we
need more of that. We try to do three or more cities at a time,
but--it is a valuable program, and I know that there are more
cities out there that can definitely benefit from this.
Mr. Donovan. I am sorry, Mr. Rasmussen. If you are not from
New York, I am not going to ask you a question.
My time is up. Thank you.
I yield the rest of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. I thank you for that. The Chair recognizes
Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. First of all, let me thank the Chairman and
the Ranking Member and thank the witnesses who do a very
difficult job and very difficult circumstances with ever-
changing technology.
I would hate to be in your job. But let me just ask, and I
know there is a lot of talk about a number of issues, but I am
going to get a little local in my area, because we do have the
largest petrochemical footprint in the United States in my
district, and we also have millions and millions of visitors
that come, and then we also have the largest port complex in
the United States in my district.
So as you all share intelligence, and as you all go about
protecting the homeland, how worried are you all about our port
security, our chemical facility security, our refinery
security, and our ability to protect them?
Secretary Johnson. Well, let me begin with that. New
Orleans is a confluence of things that we in Homeland Security
are concerned about, as you have laid out in your question,
Congressman. Given the--and so it is rightly on our radar.
Given the nature of the threat we face, it is difficult to
rank with any real degree of certainty where we should focus on
and what we should not focus on. For example, I think all of us
would agree that prior to this summer, we didn't have any
particular reason to put Chattanooga, Tennessee high on
anybody's list. So given the--given the range of threats we
face, we have to be vigilant in a bunch of different places,
but certainly port security, maritime security, and the other
things that converge in New Orleans are areas where I know many
aspects of our Department are focused in.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Comey.
Mr. Comey. Congressman, I don't think I have anything to
add to what Jeh said. Except, you know, because we have a lot
of folks working in your district, it is a big focus of our
work. We do face a large array of threats, but we try to focus
resources on the big attractants for terrorist activity to try
and make it harder for them, and a big piece of that is
focusing on ports, on tourist locations, and on travel
locations.
Mr. Richmond. Let's spend just a quick second talking about
the encryption and the back door. I guess my question, and I
guess it is a technical question, that if our tech companies
create the back door, aren't there apps or over-the-counter
things that would also allow people to encrypt it, or are you
all pretty confident that you can access data through any over-
the-counter encryption?
Mr. Comey. Thank you for that question. As I said to
Congressman Hurd earlier, I resist the term ``back door,''
because mostly I don't understand what it means. What we are
looking for is a world in which, ideally, when judges issue
court orders to search a device or to intercept communications,
companies are able to comply with that. Today, lots of the most
sophisticated internet service providers are able to comply.
Their systems, no one is telling me, are fatally insecure. Like
some of the biggest email providers in the world, based in the
United States, comply with our court orders. So I actually
don't think the problem is one of technology, I think it is one
of business model. There are lots of companies who have said:
We will never do this for the Government. So that is a problem
we have to figure out how to solve.
But here is the bad news: Commercially-available
encryption, strong encryption, we cannot break it. So we find
ourselves getting court orders from judges. We make a showing
of probable cause, judge gives us permission for a limited
period of time to intercept, we can't unencrypt that data, so
we are out of luck. So we have to figure out other ways to try
and make that gang case, that kidnapping case, or that
terrorism case.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you. I see my time has expired. I yield
back.
Chairman McCaul. Mr. Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This morning, The Daily Caller reported that the U.S.
attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia has indicted two
senior NASA managers, NASA managers, at the Langley Research
Center for willfully violating National security regulations
while allowing a visiting Chinese foreign national to gain
complete and unrestricted access to the Center.
If this wasn't troubling enough, the article reports that
in the wake of this case involving alleged espionage by a
Chinese national, and now foreigners have more, not less,
access to NASA operations at present.
Before the Bo Jiang case, all foreign nationals, including
green card holders, could be monitored and restricted. But now
green card holders are treated like U.S. citizens with
unrestricted access to all parts of the space research
facility. It quotes a senior NASA official as saying, ``If you
have a green card, your allegiance may still be to China, but
the green card gets you legal authority to work in the United
States; therefore, we don't track them. They don't have any
restrictions to transfer technology-controlled plans. They are
given access to the same exact way as a U.S. citizen, because
they have a green card.''
First, I would like to commend Director Comey and the FBI
for their role in pursuing this case over the last several
years. But, second, I would like to ask the panel whether this
is common practice that non-U.S. citizens holding green cards,
but with sworn allegiance to other countries, have the same
access and privileges as a U.S. citizen at NASA centers and
other facilities that may be of interest to foreign intelligent
services? If so, why?
Secretary Johnson. I am sure that Nick and Jim have their
own answers to this. I will just say--I haven't read the
particular article, Congressman, that you are referring to. I
have been in countless places in Government buildings,
sensitive areas, where the sign says, U.S. citizens only, who
obviously have their requisite security clearances. I can't
tell you the number of places where I see that. It is fairly
common. I don't know about the particular circumstance that you
are referring to there, but I will be happy to refer to my
friends here.
Mr. Comey. Congressman, obviously, because the case is
pending, I am not going to comment on the case. I thank you for
the kind words about our folks who worked hard on it. I think
the issue that you are talking about with NASA is about access
by foreigners to Unclassified information. As Secretary Johnson
said, there is a whole regime that is very tight around what
access foreigners might get to Classified information. I think
the issue there is when green card holders wander around a
space that is not Classified, what of America's information can
they see there. Honestly, I am not smart enough on the issue
right now to talk to you about in this forum, but it is
something we have to get smarter about.
Mr. Barletta. Sure.
Mr. Rasmussen. With respect to my organization, we operate
in a highly Classified environment, and any foreign national or
nonsecurity clearance holding individual would be required to
be strictly escorted around our facility, again, as in any
place in the intelligence community.
Mr. Barletta. Do you think this committee should look at
changing security laws and access by green card holders to
bolster defense at these Federal facilities, or are you
satisfied with what we have in place?
Mr. Comey. I will answer with another that I don't know.
Again, with respect to access to Unclassified information, I
don't know enough about the issue sitting here to offer you a
view on it.
Secretary Johnson. I would have to give the same answer,
sir.
Mr. Rasmussen. Again, because I operate only in the
Classified space, so it is difficult to answer in the
Unclassified.
Mr. Barletta. I would like to thank you all of you for your
testimony today. It was very helpful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Loudermilk.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess I am bringing up the rear here. First of all, thank
you all for what you are doing to protect America. Very
difficult time we live in. It seems like every committee--and I
apologize I wasn't here for all the questioning. I listened to
your statements, but another committee hearing dealing with
vulnerabilities of our power grid. So it seems like most of the
committees I am on is something dealing with security.
Question, I want to go back to the refugee situation. I
apologize if I am redundant on some of the questions. I don't
think they have been asked. But the concern I have, yes, we are
a very humanitarian Nation, I think we do have some
responsibility there. But our priority is securing this Nation
and the people of this Nation. I have read reports that of the
Syrian refugees, 72 percent of them are young males while 28
percent are women and children under the age of 11. The
question I have for whoever has the information is, to your
knowledge, is that true, and if it is not, what is the
breakdown? If it is, why is there such a disparity?
Secretary Johnson. Congressman, I don't recall what the
percentage breakdown is. I have heard a number, but I don't
recall what it is. I don't know the accuracy of that 72, 28
percent number, but we can certainly get you what we know to be
the case.
Mr. Loudermilk. Mr. Rasmussen.
Mr. Rasmussen. I am in the same position.
Mr. Comey. The same.
Mr. Loudermilk. It is very concerning to me with that
response that we are considering bringing in refugees, and we
don't know that--what the breakdown of the percentage of
these----
Secretary Johnson. Well, sitting here, I don't know. It is
a piece of data that we have. I just don't know sitting here.
Mr. Loudermilk. All right. I appreciate the candor there.
How are we going to monitor these folks? I mean, I have
also read reports that al-Qaeda, ISIS, have also said that
their intention is to exploit the refugee crisis and to use
that to infiltrate operatives into various countries. I mean,
how are we going to monitor these folks? Do we have plans going
forward?
Secretary Johnson. Congressman, as we discussed previously,
there is that concern. We know that organizations such as ISIL
might like to try to exploit this program, and it is for that
reason that while we are going to do what we have committed to
do for humanitarian reasons, you know, this is a world-wide
crisis, we are talking about 10,000 people, I am committed that
we do it carefully, and we vet these people as carefully as we
can.
We live in a world where one failure is the equivalent of
10,000 successes. So, I think we are all committed, with the
improved process we have, to do the best we can deliberately as
we can with regard to each individual applicant for refugee
status here.
Mr. Loudermilk. Do we have the resources to do this? Are we
already stretched thin, and we are just going to be adding so
much more to our vulnerabilities by going through this process?
Secretary Johnson. We are very busy. Our overall commitment
in fiscal year 2015 was 75,000 world-wide. Next year--this
year, we have committed to taking in a little more, 85, 10,000
of which will be Syrians. The director of USCIS has developed a
plan along with the State Department to make sure we have
adequate resources to vet these people.
Mr. Loudermilk. Of the--last question, and I yield back. I
know we all have other things we need to be doing, but this is
very critical.
Are we--do we have a system of prioritization? Like, we
know that certain religious groups, Christians, for example,
are the most at risk in some of these areas. Are we going to
prioritize those that are greatest at risk to allow them in?
I have read reports that some of the Christian Syrian
refugees are having a difficult time coming to the United
States and some other countries. Is that true?
Secretary Johnson. I would have to get back to you and take
that one for the record, sir.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. Well, I appreciate that.
Again, thank you for what you are doing. I am greatly
concerned over where we are going with the refugee crisis.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman McCaul. If I could just add to that. It is
unfortunate the Gulf states have not agreed to take one Syrian
refugee. They are seeing the Arabs, and those are Sunni Arab
populations. They certainly have the wherewithal.
But in closing, let me just say thank you to all three of
you, and to the men and women in your organizations who every
day wake up to protect Americans from the threats that we face.
I think you have done an extraordinary job stopping so many of
these threats, many that we know about, and many that the
American people don't know about.
The challenges are enormous, and the threats are grave, but
on behalf of the Congress, let me just say thank you, again,
for what you do day in and day out.
With that, this committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Question 1a. Last week, during a commencement speech at Stanford
University, U.S. National security advisor Susan Rice, stated that
``climate change is a direct threat to the prosperity and safety of the
American people.'' In a hearing my subcommittee held earlier this year,
it was noted that while the Department has released 13 strategic
documents related to climate change--Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, Climate Change Adaptation Report, Climate Change Adaptation
Roadmap, DHS Climate Action Plan, to name a few, only two--possibly a
third-- strategic documents related to countering violent extremism
exist. In addition, while the Department requested $16 million on
climate change activities for fiscal year 2016, there was no request to
fund activities related to countering violent extremism. Does the
Department consider violent extremism less of a direct threat to the
prosperity and safety of the American people than climate change?
More specifically, how has the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) reacted or adjusted their focus, if at all?
Answer. DHS prepares for a multitude of threats and hazards (man-
made and natural) that include the impacts of climate change and the
threat of violent extremism. Violent extremism is neither limited by
international borders nor to any single ideology. Groups and
individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other
ideological beliefs have promoted and used violence in the United
States or against U.S. interests to try to force political, economic,
or social change.
Our approach to countering violent extremism emphasizes the
strength of local communities. Well-informed and well-equipped
families, communities, and local institutions represent the best
defense against violent extremists. While our primary purpose is to
prevent a terrorist or violent extremist attack by an individual or
group recruited by a violent extremist organization--or inspired by a
violent extremist ideology--we also support stronger and safer
communities as important ends themselves. This is a critical priority
for all of DHS.
DHS has recently undertaken a number of actions to improve and
prioritize CVE efforts further. In September 2015 we established the
Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) OCP's mission is to ``develop
and implement a full-range of partnerships to support and enhance
efforts by key stakeholders to prevent radicalization and recruitment
to violence by terrorist organizations. The Office will leverage the
resources and relationships of the Department of Homeland Security and
apply the personal leadership of the Secretary to empower leaders in
both the public and private sectors to spur societal change to counter
violent extremism.'' OCP's major objectives are:
Philanthropic engagement.--OCP will engage the philanthropic
community to facilitate long-term partnerships with
communities;
Tech sector engagement.--OCP will engage the tech sector to
empower credible voices in vulnerable communities against
violent extremism;
Community engagement.--OCP will conduct a community
engagement roadshow that engages DHS Senior Leadership with
vulnerable communities;
Field support expansion and training.--OCP will strengthen
and expand DHS field staff with training and connecting them to
support local communities and front line law enforcement
engaged in CVE efforts;
Grant support.--OCP will work with FEMA to increase access
to grants that support CVE initiatives.
Key stakeholders and partners working with OCP range from local law
enforcement, to the private sector, to civil society. OCP works with
local, State, Tribal, territorial, and Federal law enforcement by
providing training, exercises, and technical assistance. Influential
community leaders such as religious leaders, city councils, and local
NGOs work directly with OCP field staff in identifying issues specific
to that community, conducting CVE community exercises, and voicing
concerns at community roundtables. Congress is supporting this effort,
and in this year's spending deal, approved a $50 million grant program
to be administered by DHS to address violent extremism, which includes
up to $10 million allocated towards prevention efforts. The Office for
Community Partnerships will use this $10 million to help non-Government
efforts to counter violent extremism.
Further, the administration recently announced the creation of the
Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, which is an interagency effort
tasked with organizing Federal CVE efforts. The CVE Task Force will be
hosted and led by DHS for the first 2 years; afterwards, the Department
of Justice will assume leadership for 2 years, after which it is
expected that leadership will rotate. It will consist of staffing from
agencies and departments such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the National Counterterrorism Center. The main objectives of the
interagency task force are:
Research and Analysis.--The task force will coordinate
Federal support for on-going and future CVE research and
establish feedback mechanisms for CVE findings, thus
cultivating CVE programming that incorporates sound results.
Engagements and Technical Assistance.--The task force will
synchronize Federal Government outreach to and engagement with
CVE stakeholders and will coordinate technical assistance to
CVE practitioners.
Communications.--The task force will manage CVE
communications, including media inquiries, and leverage digital
technologies to engage, empower, and connect CVE stakeholders.
Interventions.--The task force will work with CVE
stakeholders to develop multidisciplinary intervention
programs.
DNDO remains singularly focused on the threat of radiological and
nuclear terrorism, regardless of the cause. Our current analytical
methodologies account for adversaries by their level of capability,
which includes a span of possibilities from state-sponsored groups to
lone actors. DNDO remains committed to understanding how the threat of
radiological and nuclear terrorism will evolve in the future and
ensuring our defensive investments are targeted appropriately. DNDO
also remains committed to ensuring that the Nation maintains
operationally-ready technical nuclear forensics capabilities so that
the United States can hold fully accountable any State, terrorist
group, or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist
efforts to obtain or use radiological or nuclear weapons or materials
out of regulatory control.
Question 1b. Has DNDO highlighted any gaps in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA) that could account for these recently-
documented smuggling attempts?
Answer. DNDO views the recently documented disruptions of smuggling
attempts to be positive examples of success for the layered defense
upon which the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) is based.
In particular, these examples highlight the international cooperation
that DNDO and its interagency partners pursue on a daily basis. While
gaps exist in the individual layers of the GNDA, DNDO works
collectively to make the illicit acquisition, fabrication, and
transport of a nuclear or radiological device or material an
increasingly difficult endeavor for terrorists. In conjunction with our
interagency colleagues, we continue to work with our international
partners to bolster their defensive capabilities and improve the
overall effectiveness of the GNDA.
Question 2a. Given the requirement for expediting Syrian refugee
resettlements, are DHS assets adequate to conduct thorough security
screening of refugee applicants?
Question 2b. Has USCIS engaged in additional cross-training
opportunities with the IC?
Answer. The security vetting for refugees is the most robust
screening process for any category of individuals seeking admission
into the United States. The process is multi-layered and intensive,
involving multiple law enforcement, National security, and intelligence
agencies across the Federal Government. Additional enhancements have
been added with regard to Syrian refugees. DHS and the Department of
State continually evaluate whether more enhancements are necessary and
coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
All refugee applicants, including Syrians, may only be admitted to
the United States after all security checks are completed. With every
refugee application, the burden of proof is on the applicant to show
that he or she qualifies for refugee status. The law requires refugee
applicants to provide information that establishes their identity and
allows U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to assess
whether they present a security risk to the country. If USCIS does not
have enough information to reach a sound decision, or if fact patterns
evident in the case raise questions that are not satisfactorily
addressed by the refugee applicant, the refugee case is placed on hold
until those issues can be resolved, or it is denied. Below is a
detailed account of the vetting steps conducted for refugee applicants,
including security checks, and multiple interviews.
For every refugee applicant, the Department of State conducts
biographic checks of the refugee's primary name and any aliases against
its Consular Lookout and Support System database (CLASS). CLASS
includes watch list information from the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB), the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center, and Interpol,
including criminal history, immigration history, and records of any
prior visa applications submitted by the applicants. Significantly, for
individuals meeting certain criteria, the Department of State also
requests a Security Advisory Opinion name check against law enforcement
and intelligence databases. In addition, the Department of State
initiates an interagency check against intelligence community holdings,
including the National Counterterrorism Center. These latter two
enhanced biographic checks are conducted for all refugee applicants
within a designated age range, regardless of nationality. These
biographic checks do not occur only once, but are repeated throughout
the vetting process to ensure that adjudicators consider the most up-
to-date information available to the U.S. Government.
USCIS also collects biometric information, consisting of
photographs and fingerprints, for refugee applicants of certain ages.
USCIS coordinates the screening of refugee applicant fingerprints
against the vast biometric holdings of the FBI's Next Generation
Identification system, and DHS's Automated Biometric Identification
System (IDENT). Through IDENT, applicant fingerprints are screened not
only against watch list information, but also for previous immigration
encounters in the United States and overseas--including, for example,
cases in which the applicant previously applied for a visa at a U.S.
embassy. Working with DHS, the Department of Defense (DOD) augments
biometric screening on refugee applicants of all nationalities who fall
within the prescribed age ranges by checking the fingerprints of
refugee applicants against their own database.
In addition to biographic and biometric system checks, refugee
applicants undergo a series of interviews including an interview with
Department of State contractors who interview the applicant to confirm
information about the case, collect identification documents, and
obtain biographic data.
After this prescreening occurs, the case is referred to a highly-
trained USCIS officer responsible for conducting refugee status
interviews overseas and making the eligibility determination. In
addition to the basic training received by all USCIS officers, refugee
officers undergo 5 weeks of specialized and extensive training that
includes comprehensive instruction on all aspects of the job, including
refugee law, grounds of inadmissibility, fraud detection and
prevention, security protocols, interviewing techniques, credibility
analysis, and country conditions research. USCIS officers conduct
extensive interviews with each refugee applicant to develop all
relevant issues related to eligibility for refugee resettlement and
admissibility to the United States. These interviews provide the U.S.
Government a very useful tool for gathering information about a refugee
applicant that may not already exist in a database. Officers receive
additional training on country conditions and issues specific to the
populations they will be interviewing. Before they may interview
refugee applicants from the Middle East, USCIS has instituted Middle
East-specific training for officers adjudicating cases with Iraqi and
Syrian applicants. This training includes additional information on
country conditions, armed groups operating in Iraq and Syria and a
Classified briefing.
Additionally, USCIS Headquarters staff provides an additional level
of scrutiny by reviewing all Syrian refugee applicant cases prior to
the USCIS officer interview to identify potential National security
concerns. For cases with potential National security concerns, USCIS
Headquarters staff conducts both open-source and Classified research on
the facts presented and synthesizes an evaluation for use by the
interviewing officer. This information provides case-specific context
relating to country conditions and regional activity and is used by the
interviewing officer to develop lines of inquiry related to the
applicant's eligibility and credibility.
Before an approved refugee arrives in the United States, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at DHS receives a manifest of all
refugees who have prior approval to travel to the United States. As
part of CBP's Pre-Departure targeting operations, CBP gathers
information and assesses risk and conducts pre-departure screening for
all international flights arriving to the United States by commercial
air. CBP receives this manifest in advance of a refugee's scheduled
travel. The agency performs initial vetting before arrival at a Port of
Entry and then conducts additional background checks of these subjects
upon arrival. CBP Officers inspect and interview all refugees applying
for admission to verify identity and admissibility as refugees.
A refugee applicant cannot be approved for travel and admission to
the United States until all required security checks have been
completed and cleared. Bottom line--under the current system, if there
is doubt about whether an applicant poses a security risk, that
individual will not be admitted to the United States as a refugee.
Question 3. USCIS adjudicators should be trained in interview
techniques, common tactics used by fraudulent/deceitful actors,
information gathering/verification methods, regional/cultural
knowledge, and local linguistic trends (names/aliases) for translators.
Answer. Recognizing that a well-trained cadre of officers is
critical to protecting the integrity of the refugee process, we have
focused our efforts on providing the highest-quality training to our
adjudicating officers. In addition to the basic training required of
all USCIS officers, refugee officers receive 5 weeks of specialized
training that includes comprehensive instruction on all aspects of the
job, including refugee law, grounds of inadmissibility, fraud detection
and prevention, security protocols, interviewing techniques,
credibility analysis, and country conditions research. Before deploying
overseas, officers also receive pre-departure training which focuses on
the specific population that they will be interviewing. This includes
information on the types of refugee claims that they are likely to
encounter, detailed country of origin information, and updates on any
fraud trends or security issues that have been identified. With the
advent of large-scale processing of Iraqi applicants in 2007, USCIS
officers who adjudicate Iraqi refugee applications began receiving
additional 2-day training on country-specific issues, including
briefings from outside experts from the intelligence, policy, and
academic communities. This training has since expanded to a 1-week
training in order to include Syria-specific topics as well.
In order to fully explore refugee claims and to identify any
possible grounds of ineligibility, specially-trained USCIS officers
conduct an in-person, in-depth interview of every principal refugee
applicant. The officer assesses the credibility of the applicant and
evaluates whether the applicant's testimony is consistent with known
country conditions. These adjudicators also interview each accompanying
family member age 14 and older to determine their admissibility to the
United States. In addition, refugee applicants are subject to robust
security screening protocols to identify potential fraud, criminal, or
National security issues. All refugee status determinations made by
interviewing officers undergo supervisory review before a final
decision is made. Refugee Affairs Division policy requires officers to
submit certain categories of sensitive cases--including certain
National security-related cases--to Refugee Affairs Division
Headquarters to obtain concurrence prior to the issuance of a decision.
This allows for Headquarters staff to conduct additional research,
liaise with law enforcement or intelligence agencies, or consult with
an outside expert before finalizing the decision.
Questions From Honorable Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter for Honorable Jeh C.
Johnson
Question 1. To what extent is the DHS working to address the
National shortage of trained and educated cybersecurity professionals
who are needed not only by Government, but by industry?
Answer. The Department leads the National cybersecurity public
awareness, education, training, and workforce development efforts to
create a more resilient and capable Nation, which includes not only the
Government, but the private and non-profit sectors as well. Through
this work, the Department continues to support building resilient,
cyber capable communities, to ensure current and future cyber
operational requirements will be met through a skilled cybersecurity
workforce.
The process of developing a strong, resilient cybersecurity
workforce must begin before college.
As such, the Department issued the competitive Cybersecurity
Education and Training Assistance Program (CETAP) grant to provide
cyber education for middle school and high school teachers and
students.
The CETAP grant supports development of cybersecurity-integrated
middle school and high school curricula, which high schools across the
country can adopt and offer to numerous students each year. The
Department plans to leverage this curriculum and provide free, on-
demand training to public school teachers Nation-wide through the
Federal Virtual Training Environment (FedVTE). Using a virtual
capability to reach teachers in any location, at any time, will provide
for a tremendous flexibility to reach a broad audience. The curricula
developed through CETAP are already free and available for download to
all U.S. teachers.
The CETAP grant also provides cyber education summer camps, with
the primary goal of educating high school teachers who return to their
schools prepared to educate students on cyber-related content across
multiple academic disciplines. Cyber education camps will be held in
three communities in the summer of 2016, with more than 30 high schools
participating. Upon completion of summer camp, the Department estimates
each teacher will educate approximately 120 students over the course of
an academic year.
DHS/NPPD also supports cyber competitions for middle school and
high school students through its sponsorship of the annual Air Force
Association CyberPatriot competition, steering participating students
toward cybersecurity careers and studies. Since 2009, the program has
experienced per annum growth of more than 20 percent.
At the college level, DHS partners with the National Security
Agency (NSA) to co-lead the National Centers of Academic Excellence
(CAE) program. The CAE program promotes higher education and research
in Information Assurance and Cyber Defense, producing a growing
pipeline of professionals with cybersecurity expertise in various
disciplines. There are now over 191 academic institutions with CAE
designation in 46 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.
CAE graduates fill cybersecurity roles across the country, including in
the private sector.
DHS also partners with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
the Office of Personnel Management to co-sponsor the CyberCorps:
Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. The SFS program provides
competitive awards to multiple colleges and universities with existing
strong academic programs in cybersecurity to fund cybersecurity
scholarships. Students receive SFS scholarships for up to 3 years to
study cybersecurity, after which they must work for a Federal, State,
local, or Tribal government organization in a position related to
cybersecurity for a period of service equivalent to the length of their
scholarship.
To train State and local law enforcement professionals, the Secret
Service operates the National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI). The
National Computer Forensics Institute (NCFI), located in Hoover, AL, is
a Federally-funded training center dedicated to instructing State and
local law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges in digital/
cyber crime investigations. The NCFI was opened in 2008 through
collaboration between the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the State of Alabama, with a
mandate to provide State and local law enforcement, legal, and judicial
professionals a free, comprehensive education on current cyber crime
trends, investigative methods, and prosecutorial challenges. Its more
than 4,000 students have included personnel from all 50 States, three
U.S. territories, and over 1,500 agencies Nation-wide. The Secret
Service plans to hold over 46 classes and train an estimated 1,200
personnel.
DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) also supports cyber
competitions for all ages through the U.S. Cyber Challenge, which
presents on-line challenges focused on fundamental cybersecurity skills
where the top scorers are invited to go to cybersecurity camps to
participate in classroom learning. In addition, DHS S&T supported the
development of the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition, where
teams of college students are charged with maintaining and defending a
business interest from concentrated, orchestrated attacks from a red
team. DHS S&T is also engaged in building a community of cybersecurity
professionals, private and public sector, to maintain and enhance their
skills through competitions through the http://cybercompex.org portal,
an on-line community focused on cybersecurity and cybersecurity
competitions.
S&T is also supporting the development of a curriculum development
tool for educators to create cybersecurity learning objectives in fun,
easy-to-learn branching story-telling and knowledge checks.
In addition to supporting formal education initiatives, the
Department also provides free on-line cybersecurity training through
FedVTE. An on-line training platform, FedVTE provides Government
cybersecurity and IT professionals with hands-on labs and training
courses. Annually, FedVTE aids in addressing training gaps for more
than approximately 60,000 cybersecurity professionals across the
Government. The environment is accessible from any internet-enabled
computer and is free to users and their organizations. This program
saves the Federal Government approximately $72 million in training
costs annually. Although originally intended for a Federal Government
audience, DHS has recently granted access to State, local, Tribal, and
territorial Government employees and to U.S. veterans.
Finally, the DHS National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and
Studies (NICCS) portal represents a key component that promotes the
National Cybersecurity Workforce Framework, which includes tools and
resources for organizations focused on cybersecurity workforce and
information for individuals about cybersecurity careers. The NICCS
portal makes resources available to the American public, including the
private sector, assisting users of all ages in locating cybersecurity
learning opportunities and careers. The NICCS portal also hosts the
National Cybersecurity Training Catalog--a clearing house of
cybersecurity or cybersecurity-related education and training courses
offered across the United States; the Cybersecurity Workforce
Development Toolkit--a guide to building an organization's
cybersecurity workforce and provides easy access to the FedVTE training
portal.
Question 2. Has DHS looked at partnering with academia like
Armstrong State University in Savannah, Georgia to further assist in
seeding growth to meet future needs of the Nation?
Answer. DHS partners with NSA to co-lead the CAE program, which
enables collaboration with the nearly 200 colleges and universities
with CAE designation. DHS/NPPD has directly partnered with CAEs in the
past to further the cause of meeting the future needs of the Nation in
cybersecurity. For example, in fiscal year 2012, DHS/NPPD funded
projects at the University of Washington, Dakota State University, the
University of Texas at San Antonio, and Mississippi State University to
demonstrate the importance of cybersecurity in critical infrastructure
protection.
Each academic institution with one or more CAE designations
contributes significantly to the growth of a strong and dependable
pipeline of cybersecurity employees, by providing interns and graduates
who will enter the workforce armed with the most current and in-demand
cybersecurity knowledge that employers seek. Further, to receive
designation, each CAE must demonstrate that their cybersecurity
curriculum maps to core and optional knowledge units, thus
demonstrating that their curriculum meets the Nation's cybersecurity
needs.
Although Armstrong State University is not currently a designated
CAE, if Armstrong State University wishes to apply for CAE designation,
its representatives should visit https://www.iad.gov/NIETP/
CAERequirements.cfm to learn more about the program requirements.
Question 3. How does DHS engage with academic institutions, such as
Armstrong State University, to encourage the adoption of best practices
and find common solutions to our most pressing cybersecurity concerns?
Answer. DHS engages with academic institutions across the country,
including in multiple States, the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, primarily through its co-leadership of the
CAE program. Through the CAE program, DHS interacts with nearly 200
community colleges and universities throughout the year at various
events, such as cybersecurity education conferences, and at individual
meetings with these schools. In addition, DHS contributes to the
development and enhancement of core and optional knowledge units, which
collectively standardize the curricula offered at these schools, thus
ensuring that America's students receive the most rigorous and current
cybersecurity educations possible. Further, DHS serves as a strategic
advisor to the CAE program, including providing advice on the program's
communication plans and growth strategy.
While an academic institution, such as Armstrong State University,
need not have CAE designation for DHS to engage with it, by receiving
CAE designation, Armstrong State would demonstrate that its
cybersecurity curriculum meets the Government's needs in cybersecurity
education and is among the top schools in the Nation in terms of its
cybersecurity course offerings. If Armstrong State University wishes to
apply for CAE designation, its representatives can visit https://
www.iad.gov/NIETP/CAERequirements.cfm to learn more about the program
requirements, and DHS personnel are available to speak to the
University's representatives.
Another way that DHS engages with the academic community to
encourage adoption of best practices and educate students about ways to
be safe on-line is through the National Cybersecurity Awareness
Campaign, Stop.Think.Connect. Academic Alliance. The
Stop.Think.Connect. Campaign is a National public awareness campaign
aimed at increasing the understanding of cyber threats and empowering
the American public to be safer and more secure on-line.
Through the Academic Alliance, DHS and the Campaign share vital
resources and information to partners, stakeholders, students, and
community members across the country at a variety of academic
institutions.
Currently, there are over 50 Academic Alliance partners that have
joined the Campaign partnership through DHS to date. These universities
and colleges join 150 additional partners from non-profit organizations
and Government agencies/departments committed to increasing on-line
safety. This collaboration allows all partners to obtain cybersecurity
tips, messaging, articles, and presentations, gain access to DHS
Campaign materials, tools, and subject-matter experts, and join monthly
partner discussions highlighting current cyber issues and trends.
The Stop.Think.Connect. Campaign provides the Academic Alliance
partners with beneficial insight into cyber threats that fellow
academic institutions face as well. They also join monthly partner
calls that highlight resources and information from non-profit partners
and partners from Federal/local government agencies and departments. In
addition, these partners plan outreach activities throughout the year
across the country, including focused cybersecurity awareness
activities during National Cyber Security Awareness Month, which takes
place each October.
In August 2000, the Secret Service and CERT, part of the Software
Engineering Institute (SEI), a Federally-funded research and
development center (FFRDC) located at Carnegie Mellon University,
established the Secret Service CERT Liaison Program. The purpose of the
liaison program is to provide technical support, training,
opportunities for research and development. Through this partnership
with CERT, the Secret Service extends its investigative capabilities
through the efforts of more than 150 scientists and researchers in the
fields of computer and network security, malware analysis, forensic
development, training, and education.
The Secret Service leverages CERT's innovative technology and
expert staff to meet emerging investigative and protective challenges.
To meet emerging challenges to investigative operations, the Secret
Service sponsors the development of forensic tools available for use by
law enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies. CERT provides
support to complex electronic crime investigations in the areas of
forensic analysis, network traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, malicious
code analysis forensic tool development and training development.
DHS also partners with the National Science Foundation (NSF) and
the Office of Personnel Management to co-sponsor the CyberCorps:
Scholarship for Service (SFS) program. The SFS program provides
competitive awards to multiple colleges and universities with existing
strong academic programs in cybersecurity to fund cybersecurity
scholarships. Students receive SFS scholarships for up to 3 years to
study cybersecurity, after which they must work for a Federal, State,
local, or Tribal government organization in a position related to
cybersecurity for a period of service equivalent to the length of their
scholarship. This program is specifically called out and funding is
required by the Department in appropriations language.
Additionally, the U.S. Secret Service operates a cyber facility
housed on the University of Tulsa, a CyberCorps SFS program school,
wherein SFS students work with Special Agents of the Secret Service
toward a three-pronged mission: (i) Training Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agents in mobile device forensics; (ii) developing
novel hardware and software solutions for extracting and analyzing
digital evidence from mobile devices; and (iii) applying the hardware
and software solutions to support criminal investigations conducted by
the Secret Service and its partner agencies.
Question 4. Does the agency have any plans to increase cooperation
with the academic community moving forward?
Answer. DHS is actively engaged with the academic community in
terms of information sharing and collaboration on projects that support
the DHS mission. For example, the DHS Office of Academic Engagement
formed the Homeland Security Academic Advisory Committee (HSAAC), which
advises DHS on matters related to the five DHS mission areas from an
academic perspective. HSAAC includes a cybersecurity subcommittee.
Although cooperation between DHS and the academic community is
strong, DHS is always seeking opportunities to expand and enhance this
cooperation. For example, DHS is very interested in expanding the
number of CAE-designated institutions to include at least one
designated CAE in all 50 States. Further, DHS is looking to expand the
number of CAE focus areas, ensuring that more CAEs are able to become
certified in cybersecurity areas that support DHS's mission critical
needs. DHS is actively seeking the support and interest of academic
institutions to reach to local high schools and middle schools to
encourage adoption of cyber-integrated curricula. Finally, DHS will
continue to build its awareness and general cyber outreach efforts with
academia.
Question 5. What is DHS doing to synchronize these efforts and
adopt a combined approach to address an evolving cyber threat
landscape?
Answer. Cybersecurity is a shared mission and requires coordinated
efforts among Government, the private sector, and academia to
effectively manage both current and emerging risks. DHS executes
coordination with academia through three principal mechanisms. First,
DHS, within its National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD),
maintains a Cybersecurity Education and Awareness program office that
is responsible for synchronizing education and workforce development
across the cybersecurity community. By centralizing education and
workforce activities within a single program office, NPPD promotes
broad and systemic adoption of common standards and curricula. The
Centers for Academic Excellence (CAE) program exemplifies this
approach, as NPPD is able to synchronize cybersecurity programs across
over 200 higher education institutions through guidance, accreditation,
and workforce opportunities for eligible students.
Second, NPPD's National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center (NCCIC) serves as the U.S. Government's 24/7 hub for
cybersecurity information sharing, incident response, and coordination.
Thirteen Federal departments and agencies and 16 private-sector
entities have regular, dedicated liaisons at the NCCIC, while over 100
private-sector entities collaborate and share information with the
NCCIC on a routine basis. The NCCIC shares information on cyber threats
and incidents, and provides on-site assistance to victims of cyber
attacks. In this year alone, the NCCIC has shared over 15,000
bulletins, alerts, and warnings, responded on-site to 21 incidents and
conducted nearly 130 technical security assessments. The NCCIC allows
DHS to adopt a combined approach in bringing together government, the
private sector, and international allies in addressing a shared cyber
threat.
Third, NPPD leverages the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) to work with critical infrastructure partners across the
country. Recognizing that critical infrastructure is increasingly
dependent on cyber space for the provision of key services and
functions, NPPD works to align physical and cybersecurity services to
work with the private sector in developing and promulgating sector- and
organization-specific guidance, in turn promoting the adoption of
common best practices that are sufficiently flexible to address the
unique business and risk environments of individual organizations.
Question 6. How hard would it be to tie in cyber activities at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, GA with the
capabilities pioneered by universities like Armstrong State in the
cyber forensics realm?
Answer. To ensure its training continues to meet the needs of
today's law enforcement officers and agents, the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) must incorporate expertise and
technological advances born from academia, industry, military, and law
enforcement in its cyber training programs. As innovation is not
exclusive to one specific individual or entity, FLETC partners with a
diverse cross-section of experts to ensure it maintains current
knowledge and expertise in the critical area of cyber forensics.
FLETC participates in discussions with a variety of Government and
non-Government committees and groups that share thoughts and ideas
related to cyber crime. Through these organizations, FLETC has
opportunities to discuss tools, techniques, and training standards with
other cyber experts, which often leads to FLETC incorporating new
material into its cyber-related training. The following are
professional organizations FLETC presently partners with in sharing and
developing cyber training, which also partner with academia:
Computer Crime and Digital Evidence Committee for the
International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Center
for Forensics Science at the University of Central Florida
Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate, Cyber Forensics Working Group, Centers of
Excellence with multiple universities including the University
of South Carolina, the University of Minnesota, and the
University of Illinois
Federal Bureau of Investigation Cyber Shield Alliance and
Cyber Investigator Certification Program, Software Engineering
Institute of the Carnegie Mellon University
INTERPOL Global Cybercrime Expert Group.
FLETC also partners with the following organizations, primarily
consisting of law enforcement, which routinely share ideas with
academia about cyber tools and techniques:
National Technical Investigators Association
Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy
High Technology Crime Investigations Association
International Association of Computer Investigative
Specialists
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section of the
United States Department of Justice.
Periodically, FLETC meets with academic institutions to discuss
cyber curriculum and to share information. FLETC has conducted cyber
training for law enforcement at the campuses of Armstrong Atlantic
State University and the University of Central Florida. A faculty
member from each university participated in the session on his or her
respective campus. Additionally, FLETC is currently partnering with the
College of Coastal Georgia (CCGA) by sharing curriculum development
expertise as CCGA pursues designation as a Center of Academic
Excellence in Information Assurance/Cyber Defense. This partnership
allows both organizations to share best practices, exposes FLETC staff
to related university-level processes, and facilitates increased access
by CCGA to associated FLETC subject-matter experts. Since 2007 FLETC
has hosted 7 college interns in its Cyber Division. These students
conducted research projects and attended training in a variety of law
enforcement topics. FLETC would welcome the opportunity to expand its
collaboration with academia on cyber training in the interest of
ensuring its training curriculum is up-to-date and meets the needs of
today's law enforcement officers and agents.
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Question 1a. There have been varying data reports on the ratio of
men to women and children coming into our borders. Most of the
statistics I have come across indicate that the majority of Syrian
refugees are predominately males while a small percentage remains women
and children. Is this true?
Question 1b. If so, what is the correct ratio of Syrian refugee men
to women and children?
Answer. The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees we have
accepted and will accept are families, children, and other especially
vulnerable refugees, such as victims of torture and those with medical
needs or disabilities. We have prioritized the most vulnerable of
Syrian refugees for resettlement--which include those who are victims
of the violence perpetrated by both the Assad regime and ISIL in Syria.
Of the overall caseload of Syrian refugees referred to the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), that caseload is evenly split
between male and female applicants (53 percent male and 47 percent
female). Over 50 percent of applicants are 18 years of age or younger;
approximately 2.5 percent of the applicants are over the age of 60; and
fewer than 2 percent of the applicants are unattached single males with
no cross-referenced cases and no relatives or friends in the United
States. For information regarding refugees resettled in the United
States, we would refer you to the Department of State.
Question 2. As we welcome an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees in
fiscal year 2016 alone, how are you and your partner agencies planning
to monitor admitted refugees to ensure violent extremists have not
infiltrated their ranks?
Answer. Refugees undergo a rigorous screening process prior to
their admission into the United States. The process is the most robust
for any category of individuals seeking admission into the United
States, and is multi-layered and intensive. It involves multiple law
enforcement, National security, and intelligence agencies across the
Federal Government. Only those satisfying these rigorous requirements
are admitted into the United States as refugees.
Refugee status is a permanent immigration status and a person
admitted as a refugee is authorized to remain in the United States
indefinitely barring any negative information such as criminal history
or loss of immigration status. A person admitted as a refugee is
required to apply for adjustment of status to lawful permanent
residency 1 year after being admitted to the United States. Five years
after arrival a refugee can apply for naturalization, provided they
have adjusted status to permanent resident during this time,
continuously resided in the U.S. for 5 years prior to applying for
naturalization, submit to security checks, and meet the other
eligibility requirements for naturalization.
Like other residents of the United States, refugees enjoy freedom
of movement within the country. Refugees, like other non-citizens, are
required to report any change-of-address to USCIS within 10 days of
moving within the United States or its territories. As noted, a refugee
is also required to apply for adjustment of status to permanent
residence status 1 year after admission as a refugee. At this point,
security checks are re-run and the applicant is questioned again about
potential grounds of inadmissibility, such as criminal activity or
terrorism-related inadmissibility grounds. Finally, any refugee who
comes to the attention of law enforcement or National security agencies
may be subject to criminal charges or civil immigration proceedings,
possibly leading to removal from the country.
Question 3. Is the United States prioritizing Christian refugees,
who are focal persecution targets in Syria?
Answer. When referring cases to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program, the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and Department of State
emphasize the most vulnerable Syrians, including female-headed
households, children, survivors of torture, and individuals with severe
medical conditions. Members of religious minorities, including
Christians, may be among those referred as vulnerable refugees.
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Question 1. What specific steps have the Department of Homeland
Security, FBI, and NCTC taken to ensure its respective workforces
reflect the diversity of the communities they protect?
Answer. DHS issued a Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan in
fiscal year 2012 that specifically provides the framework for
recruiting a diverse workforce, creating an inclusive workplace, and
ensuring management accountability. The Office of the Chief Human
Capital Officer coordinates Departmental efforts to recruit from a
diverse, broad spectrum of potential applicants, including a variety of
geographic regions, academic sources, and professional disciplines.
Each DHS operational component completes an annual Component Recruiting
and Outreach Plan that identifies short and long-term workforce needs,
including workforce diversity. To the extent practical, we coordinate
specific recruiting efforts collaboratively. We also maintain a
consolidated recruitment presence on our website.
Question 2. What are your respective diversity goals and what is
the time frame for achieving those goals?
Answer. DHS (and other Federal agencies) are not permitted to have
diversity goals in terms of hiring, except with hiring veterans and
individuals with disabilities. For all other groups, DHS analyzes the
workforce diversity of each component and works on recruiting and
outreach strategies for groups with low participation rates.
Question 3. Have DHS, FBI, and NCTC engaged in outreach efforts to
high school and post-secondary schools to inform students about careers
in homeland security and intelligence?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) maintains several
dedicated outreach initiatives and partnerships with academic
institutions to promote the Department's mission to various academic
communities. Two DHS Headquarters programs focus on engagement with the
academic community:
In 2011, DHS established the Office of Academic Engagement
(OAE) to build and strengthen the Department's relationship
with the academic community. Among its responsibilities, OAE
manages the Homeland Security Academic Advisory Council, a
Federal advisory committee of college and university
presidents, academic leaders, and interagency partners that
provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary on topics
related to homeland security and the academic community,
including cybersecurity and student and recent graduate
recruitment.
In 2013, the Department established the CyberSkills
Management Support Initiative (CMSI), addressing
recommendations from the Homeland Security Advisory Council's
Task Force on CyberSkills. CMSI's main purpose is to develop
and execute Department-wide human capital strategies, policies,
and programs that will create, enhance, and support a top-notch
DHS cyber workforce. CMSI works directly with secondary and
post-secondary institutions to provide students with
information regarding DHS's cybersecurity mission and workforce
opportunities.
In 2014, DHS OCHCO executed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU)
with five higher education associations representing more than
1,500 colleges and universities, including community colleges
and minority-serving institutions. Through the MOUs, DHS
engages the associations to provide information on employment
and internship opportunities for students and recent graduates.
DHS meets with the associations semiannually and provides
quarterly reports to the associations on employment and grant
opportunities. Also as a result of the MOUs, in 2015, DHS
representatives participated in National conferences of the
Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities and the Asian
American and Pacific Islander Association of Colleges and
Universities to share information on employment opportunities
at DHS.
As the number of students studying technical and cyber-related
majors has increased, the Department recognizes that academic
institutions and student groups provide access to a large talent pool
for cybersecurity positions. These outreach events build partnerships
with 2-year and 4-year academic institutions, as well as K-12 schools
to connect classroom coursework to real-world cybersecurity careers.
The Department uses several approaches to connect with academic
institutions and students, including:
Launching the Secretary's Honors Program Cyber Student
Volunteer Initiative (CSVI) in 2013. CSVI allows students
pursuing cybersecurity-related degrees at 2- and 4-year
colleges and universities the opportunity to gain hands-on
experience at DHS through temporary volunteer opportunities.
CSVI initially started as a pilot program with 21 participants,
who worked with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in 18
cities Nation-wide. The 2014 CSVI cohort expanded to 7
participating Components with 70 student volunteers placed in
40 DHS office locations. In 2015 the cohort included 8
participating components that placed 51 volunteers in 31 DHS
offices in 20 States.
Conducting cybersecurity-focused panel discussions and tours
with academic institutions at various DHS component locations
attended by DHS executive leadership.
Hosting webinars with colleges and universities informing
students of DHS career opportunities and the Department's
commitment to engaging cyber talent to build a cybersecurity
workforce.
Developing the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers
and Studies (NICCS) portal, an on-line resource for Government,
industry, academia, and the general public to learn about
cybersecurity awareness, education, careers, and workforce
development opportunities.
Sponsoring the CyberCorps: Scholarship for Service (SFS)
program through the National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD). SFS provides scholarships through the
National Science Foundation to 56 universities across the
country. Selected students receive SFS scholarships for up to 3
years to study cybersecurity, after which they owe the
Government a period of service equivalent to the length of
their scholarship.
Sponsoring the CyberPatriot competition, which impacts
numerous middle and high school students each year and steers
them toward cybersecurity careers and studies. Since 2009, this
NPPD program has experienced per annum growth of more than 20
percent. Teams from all 50 States and the District of Columbia
participate in CyberPatriot.
Sponsoring the National Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition
where more than 2,000 students representing over 180 colleges
and universities competed in a scenario-based defense
competition.
Supporting the U.S. Cyber Challenge, where approximately
2,000 students compete on-line for a scholarship and a chance
to attend 1 of 4 week-long cybersecurity training camps
throughout the Nation.
Regularly conducting outreach to schools to inform students
about careers in homeland security intelligence through the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A). In fiscal year 2015,
I&A participated in 13 outreach events at universities and
colleges Nation-wide. Two of these events were in concert with
intelligence community partners, including the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and National Counterterrorism Center. In
September 2015, I&A also supported a Congressional Black Caucus
event designed to increase diversity in Government that
included high school and post-secondary students.
Question 4. What obstacles stand in the way of your respective
agencies hiring a workforce that represents the diversity of the United
States?
Answer. The DHS civilian workforce is very diverse. In fiscal year
2015, 43 percent of the workforce self-identified as other than white
(non-Hispanic) compared to 35 percent for the Federal Government
overall. Hispanics comprise nearly 21 percent of the DHS civilian
workforce, compared to the 8 percent for the Federal workforce overall.
DHS is committed to a diverse and inclusive workforce, and efforts to
create a diverse workforce remain a special focus for the Department's
recruitment efforts.
DHS is the Nation's largest law enforcement agency; almost 40
percent of positions across DHS are law enforcement-related. DHS is
committed to greater outreach to women regarding career opportunities
in law enforcement. This commitment is demonstrated by strong
partnerships with professional organizations for women law enforcement,
ensuring broad DHS engagement in high-profile recruiting events
focusing on women and women in law enforcement in particular, and
various component-lead best practices including targeted marketing
campaigns. Specific examples include:
strong coordination with Women in Federal Law Enforcement
(WIFLE) organization and at WIFLE annual training conferences
attendance at Women's Leadership Symposium and Women
Veterans Employer Symposium
OCHCO partnering with CBP regarding Border Patrol Agent and
CBP Officer recruitment and hiring, with a focus on
transitioning service members, veterans, and women and
marketing in Professional Woman's Magazine Spring 2015 Issue
and WomenforHire.com.
In addition, in fiscal year 2015, the President's Council on
Veterans Employment (Council) asked the DHS CHCO to lead an interagency
workgroup on Women Veterans. The workgroup's final report and
recommendations were adopted by the Council and now apply to all 24
agencies under the Executive Order. The White House reviewed the report
and issued a blog on the Joining Forces website and requested OPM to
publish the report on the ``Feds Hire Vets'' website. In fiscal year
2016, OCHCO will assemble a DHS-wide workgroup to develop a broader
strategy on recruitment of women for law enforcement, which will also
include a specific focus on women veterans.
Competition with other Federal agencies and the private sector for
the same talent is the primary obstacle in creating and sustaining a
workforce that fully reflects the diversity of the United States. For
some high-demand positions such as cybersecurity and science,
technology, engineering, and math (STEM), DHS competes for top talent
with not only other Federal agencies, but the private sector as well.
DHS is working to enhance the pool of available diverse talent in these
types of fields through its utilization of the Pathways Programs; the
Secretary's Honors Program; Cyber Student Volunteer Initiative; and
MOUs with Higher Education Associations. DHS shares information about
employment opportunities with Higher Education Associations such as
Hispanic Association of Colleges and Universities (HACU); National
Association for Equal Opportunity in Higher Education (NAFEO); American
Indian Higher Education Consortium (AIHEC); Asian Pacific Islander
American Association of Colleges and Universities (APIACU); and the
American Association of Community Colleges (AACC). DHS is also
partnering with the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy, OPM, and 13 other Federal agencies to increase diversity in
STEM across the Federal Government. DHS also utilizes mechanisms such
as direct hire authority for cybersecurity positions, an authority
which OPM recently extended at the Department's request. DHS is
actively working on the long-term implementation of cybersecurity-
specific hiring and pay flexibilities which Congress granted to the
Secretary in the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act.
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for Nicholas J. Rasmussen
Question 1a. There have been varying data reports on the ratio of
men to women and children coming into our borders. Most of the
statistics I have come across indicate that the majority of Syrian
refugees are predominately males while a small percentage remains women
and children. Is this true?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. If so, what is the correct ratio of Syrian refugee men
to women and children?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As we welcome an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees in
fiscal year 2016 alone, how are you and your partner agencies planning
to monitor admitted refugees to ensure violent extremists have not
infiltrated their ranks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Is the United States prioritizing Christian refugees,
who are focal persecution targets in Syria?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for Nicholas J. Rasmussen
Question 1. What specific steps have the Department of Homeland
Security, FBI, and NCTC taken to ensure its respective workforces
reflect the diversity of the communities they protect?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are your respective diversity goals and what is
the time frame for achieving those goals?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Have DHS, FBI, and NCTC engaged in outreach efforts to
high school and post-secondary schools to inform students about careers
in homeland security and intelligence?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What obstacles stand in the way of your respective
agencies hiring a workforce that represents the diversity of the United
States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Scott Perry for James B. Comey
Question 1. Earlier this month, the Associated Press reported that
in the past 5 years, the FBI has thwarted four smuggling attempts of
nuclear and radioactive material in Eastern Europe--with the latest
occurrence in February of this year. With the knowledge of this
thriving ``nuclear black market,'' what is the administration's plan to
counter this threat?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are the FBI's plans for the influx of expected
Syrian refugees?
Does the FBI anticipate that the influx of Syrian refugees will
present a burden on existing manpower and resources?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter for James B. Comey
Question 1. What is the FBI doing to target terrorist groups that
use the internet to prey on young Americans?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Are we using social media to engage communities to
recognize when a young individual might be a target to a terrorist
group?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. What is being done specifically to work on the
community level to address the issue of targeting young adults?
Are we talking with clergy?
Are we doing town hall meetings?
Is law enforcement making themselves available on a daily basis?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Barry Loudermilk for James B. Comey
Question 1a. There have been varying data reports on the ratio of
men to women and children coming into our borders. Most of the
statistics I have come across indicate that the majority of Syrian
refugees are predominately males while a small percentage remains women
and children. Is this true?
Question 1b. If so, what is the correct ratio of Syrian refugee men
to women and children?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As we welcome an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees in
fiscal year 2016 alone, how are you and your partner agencies planning
to monitor admitted refugees to ensure violent extremists have not
infiltrated their ranks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Is the United States prioritizing Christian refugees,
who are focal persecution targets in Syria?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Norma J. Torres for James B. Comey
Question 1. What specific steps have the Department of Homeland
Security, FBI, and NCTC taken to ensure its respective workforces
reflect the diversity of the communities they protect?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. What are your respective diversity goals and what is
the time frame for achieving those goals?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Have DHS, FBI, and NCTC engaged in outreach efforts to
high school and post-secondary schools to inform students about careers
in homeland security and intelligence?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What obstacles stand in the way of your respective
agencies hiring a workforce that represents the diversity of the United
States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.