    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-108]

                                    HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING

                                       ON

                        THE MARINE CORPS 2017 OPERATIONS

                         AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET REQUEST

                             AND READINESS POSTURE

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                                 MARCH 3, 2016

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                                    ___________

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                     ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman

    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
        Chair                            TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
                    Andrew Warren, Professional Staff Member
                   Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
                            Katherine Rember, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Paxton, Gen John M., Jr., USMC, Assistant Commandant of the
      Marine Corps; LtGen Glenn M. Walters, USMC, Deputy Commandant
      for Programs and Resources, U.S. Marine Corps; and MajGen
      Vincent A. Coglianese, USMC, Assistant Deputy Commandant for
      Installations and Logistics (Plans), U.S. Marine Corps.........     1

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
          Member, Subcommittee on Readiness..........................    22
        Paxton, Gen John M., Jr......................................    23
        Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
          Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness........................    21

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]

      THE MARINE CORPS 2017 OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE BUDGET REQUEST AND
                               READINESS POSTURE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                                     Subcommittee on Readiness,
                               Washington, DC, Thursday, March 3, 2016.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:50 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
    Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Wittman. I call to order the House Committee on Armed
    Services Subcommittee on Readiness.
        In the interest of time we will dispense with our opening
    statements, and General Paxton, we will go directly to you. I
    understand that you will give the opening statements for the
    panel and then we will proceed into questions unless there is
    anything additional that you might have.
        [The prepared statements of Mr. Wittman and Ms. Bordallo
    can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 21.]

         STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN M. PAXTON, JR., USMC, ASSISTANT
     COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS; LTGEN GLENN M. WALTERS, USMC,
       DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR PROGRAMS AND RESOURCES, U.S. MARINE
    CORPS; AND MAJGEN VINCENT A. COGLIANESE, USMC, ASSISTANT DEPUTY
    COMMANDANT FOR INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS (PLANS), U.S. MARINE
                                 CORPS

        General Paxton. No. Thank you, Chairman. I appreciate the
    opportunity to appear before the subcommittee again, and
    General Walters, from our Deputy Commandant for Program and
    Resources and Major General Coglianese from our Assistant
    Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics.
        So it is great to be with the committee again, sir. Thank
    you.
        Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and
    distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank you
    for the opportunity to appear today and to report on the
    readiness of your United States Marine Corps.
        The Marine Corps is committed to remaining our Nation's
    ready force, a force that is truly capable of responding to a
    crisis anywhere around the globe and at a moment's notice. It
    has been so for the last 240 years since Captain Samuel
    Nicholas led his Marines ashore in Nassau on this very day in
    1776.
        Last year the Congress was kind enough to reiterate the
    expectations of the 82nd Congress that the Marine Corps
    continue to serve as our Nation's expeditionary force in
    readiness, and to be most ready when the Nation is least ready.
    I thank you for that reaffirmation and assure you that your
    Marine Corps is meeting today and will continue to meet
    tomorrow your rightly high expectations.
        Marines continue to be in demand from all our combatant
    commanders around the world. They are forward deployed, engaged
    on land and sea, and ready for crisis response in Africa,
    Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific.
        Last year Marines conducted air strikes in Iraq, in Syria.
    They enabled Georgian forces who were operating in Afghanistan,
    and they conducted lifesaving disaster response operations in
    Nepal, among many other missions, all while remaining poised to
    respond at a moment's notice.
        Maintaining that ``fight tonight'' warfighting relevance
    across our five pillars of readiness, and I believe you all
    have the handout there that we will refer to during the course
    of the testimony on the five pillars of readiness. That is what
    requires a careful balancing, rather.
        We must constantly balance between our operational
    readiness and our institutional readiness, between capability
    and capacity, between current operations and future operations,
    between steady state and between surge readiness, as well as
    between low-end and high-end operations and training.
        All of this as we face increasing and varied demands from
    the COCOMs [combatant commands]. In our challenging fiscal
    environment, we are struggling to maintain all of those
    balances.
        As the Commandant said in his posture statement earlier
    this week, the Marine Corps is no longer in a healthy position
    to generate current readiness and reset all of our equipment
    while simultaneously sustaining our facilities and modernizing
    to ensure our future readiness.
        We have continued to provide the COCOMs with operationally
    ready forces, prepared to execute all assigned missions. In
    some cases these units are only fully trained to just those
    assigned missions and not to the full spectrum of possible
    operations.
        In addition, this operational readiness is generated at the
    cost of our wider institutional readiness. This year I must
    again report that approximately half of our non-deployed units
    are suffering from some degree of personnel, equipment, or
    training shortfalls.
        We continue to prioritize modernization for our most urgent
    areas, primarily the replacement of aging aircraft and aging
    amphibious assault vehicles and we defer other needs.
        Our installations continue to be built by areas for today's
    readiness, putting the hard-earned gains from the past decade
    and indeed much that the committee and the Congress has helped
    us with at risk. While our deployed forces continue to provide
    the capabilities demanded by the COCOMs, our capacity to do so
    over time and in multiple locations remains strained.
        Our deployment-to-dwell time ratio continues to exceed the
    rate that we consider sustainable in the long term. The strains
    on our personnel and our equipment are showing in many areas,
    particularly in aviation, in communications, and in
    intelligence.
        We have already been forced to reduce the capacity
    available to the COCOMs by reducing the number of aircraft
    assigned to several of our aviation squadrons, and we expect to
    continue those reductions throughout 2017.
        While we are able to maintain steady-state operations
    today, to include the ever-expanding Phase Zero operations as
    we shape theaters and work on theater security cooperation and
    building partnership capacity, our ability to surge for the
    crisis of the war fight becomes increasingly challenged.
        Though your Marine Corps remains able to meet all the
    requirements of the defense strategy to conduct high-end
    operations in a major contingency response, we may not be able
    to do so with a level of training for all our units or along
    the timelines that would minimize our costs in damaged
    equipment and in casualties.
        These challenges in providing and balancing provide the
    context for my message today. Your Marine Corps remains ready
    to answer the Nation's call, but with no margin for error on
    multiple missions, in which failure is not an option. To win in
    today's world, we have to move quickly, we have to move
    decisively, and we have to move with overwhelming force.
        So Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity for all of us
    to appear before the committee. I ask that you accept the
    written statement for the record, and prepared to answer your
    questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of General Paxton can be found in
    the Appendix on page 23.]
        Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Paxton, thank you so much.
    Lieutenant General Walters, Major General Coglianese, thank you
    so much for joining us today, and thanks so much for your
    leadership. We understand it is a challenging time with all the
    threats we see around the world and they change and morph each
    and every day. And we want to make sure that we are here
    listening intently to what the Marine Corps' needs are to
    regenerate and maintain that readiness.
        As you spoke of, the readiness recovery effort is based on
    projecting the timeframes from a foundation of being able to
    reestablish that readiness. Within that framework, give us your
    projections about when the Marine Corps will attain on that
    path, setting the conditions for readiness and then moving from
    there, when it will attain full-spectrum readiness? And on what
    percentage do you think on that path you will meet as you get,
    hopefully, to that full-spectrum readiness?
        And then let us know, too, on the way obviously there will
    be some risk that you will assume, and you spoke about that
    risk. What core functions will you assume that risk in? Because
    what we want to make sure is that, you know, we are
    understanding where that risk might rest and help where we can
    as we put together this year's NDAA [National Defense
    Authorization Act].
        So if you will do that, and of course you could put that in
    the context of the fiscal year 2017 Navy budget and what it
    provides for you as you are setting those conditions for
    readiness recovery.
        General Paxton. Thank you, Chairman. I understand, and I
    will also try and defer to my colleagues so you get a little
    different sense in terms of how the budget was indeed balanced
    and work with the Department of the Navy and then also where
    some of the exemplars are for particular sets of equipment,
    sir.
        So if I may, sir, if I understood then there were two
    questions. The first part of your question was ``when.''
        Mr. Wittman. When.
        General Paxton. So we will continue as we have in years
    past to make sure that the forces that are deployed today are
    100 percent trained, 100 percent ready. Within the time we are
    allotted we can also guarantee that the next-to-deploy forces
    will be 100 percent trained, 100 percent certified, 100 percent
    ready.
        The issue is for the ones beyond there. And in addition, as
    you heard me say in the oral statement, sir, that we have
    several example communities where we have had to go back and in
    order to reset equipment and generate future readiness, we have
    had to reduce the density of units that are all deployed.
        Perhaps the most stressed community and the examples that I
    would submit to the subcommittee are aviation. We have several
    type model series where the aircraft is aging. We continue to
    fly them a lot, particularly our F-18s and AV-8s on the fixed-
    wing side. We have gotten rid of the CH-46 community, sir.
        But as we brought on the V-22 community we brought them on
    early. They are two to three times the speed, two to three
    times the range, two to three times the lift. They have proven
    themselves in Iraq and Afghanistan, but they are in high demand
    by the COCOMs.
        So we look to train new pilots in the V-22, and we need to
    bring new aircraft onboard. In addition, we need to bring on
    the sustainment capability for them.
        So right now we only have 14 of our 18 projected V-22
    squadrons. We struggle sometimes to get all the parts out there
    and then to keep the pilots trained.
        So the answer to your first question, sir, in terms of
    when, we do not believe that we are going to have full-spectrum
    aviation readiness until at least 2020. And that is presuming
    that the budget continues as it is and that we can align
    dollars to maintain hours to fly pilots and then the actual
    people in the pipeline, sir. So that is the answer to your
    first question, sir.
        The second question on pacing items and examples of things
    where we take risk, several years ago if I was over to testify
    I would have said that our combat engineers, our EOD [explosive
    ordnance disposal] capability, some of our unmanned systems
    were the pacing items for us.
        Right now we find that some of the pacing items are
    actually our intelligence battalions, our radio signals
    battalions, our intelligence battalions, because those units
    are now not only forward deployed with our Marine Expeditionary
    Units [MEUs], but we have generated two Special Purpose Marine
    Air-Ground Task Forces [MAGTFs], one that supports AFRICOM
    [U.S. Africa Command] and one that supports CENTCOM [U.S.
    Central Command].
        Each of those is about 2,200 Marines. In the case of the
    CENTCOM one, they are operating over about 1,200 to 1,800 miles
    in six different countries. And they are very busy. Well, in
    order to make those units work they need a command element that
    can integrate and plan and deliver air-ground logistics. So it
    is the intelligence and the communications that go there.
        That comes at the expense of the units in the States that
    provide the people and provide the equipment. So those units
    are all under a 1:2 dep-to-dwell [deployment to dwell] now, and
    we watch the tempo. And then when they come back, Chairman,
    they are also reach-back capabilities. So units forward may be
    coming back to them for target analysis, for planning and
    things like that.
        So in terms of the first one, sir, if you don't mind, I
    would defer to General Walters----
        Mr. Wittman. Sure.
        General Paxton [continuing]. To see if he has anything else
    for us.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes. Yes.
        General Walters. Sir, you asked what do we take risk in?
        Mr. Wittman. General Walters, if I can, if I can get you to
    put your microphone on that would be great. Thanks.
        General Walters. Sorry, sir. I went silent and I didn't
    press the button.
        Mr. Wittman. No problem.
        [Laughter.]
        General Walters. You asked about where we took risk in the
    2017 budget. I have some examples for you, basically in three
    areas. Number one, we couldn't take any risk in end strength.
    We can't do that, and in fact, we can make an argument that
    dep-to-dwell is directly related to our end strength and why
    that might not be sufficient to do what we need to do and meet
    the timelines that the Assistant Commandant laid out.
        We took half of our JLTV [Joint Light Tactical Vehicle]
    production to balance the 2017 column. We are only at 74
    percent in FSRM [Facilities, Sustainment, Restoration, and
    Modernization], and we lost 44 percent of our MILCON [Military
    Construction]. Our O&M [Operations and Modernization] funds in
    2017 are by my estimation somewhere about $450 million to $460
    million less than what we would call our minimum base to do
    what we need to do for in 2017. Hopefully that gives you some
    context of what we are talking about. And a lot of these are
    reflected in our unfunded priority list that we sent over.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes. That sounds a lot like to me the term we
    hear of tiered readiness, which----
        General Walters. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman [continuing]. Yes.
        General Walters. We don't do tiered readiness.
        Mr. Wittman. I know. I know.
        General Walters. But we have readiness issues----
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        General Walters [continuing]. As we face fiscal challenges.
        Mr. Wittman. That is right. Well, and when you have to
    manage risk you almost end up by default tiering the readiness
    capability----
        General Walters. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Wittman [continuing]. Across the concentric----
        General Walters. Yes, sir. And you park risk on places that
    make you suck your teeth when you put the budget together.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes. Thank you, gentlemen.
        I will go down to Ms. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
    morning Generals.
        General Paxton, my question is for you. You mentioned that
    the Marine Corps has struggled to maintain the balance between
    current and future readiness often being required to defer the
    latter and favor the former. So what steps can Congress take to
    allow you to budget adequately to meet your readiness
    requirements?
        General Paxton. Thank you, Ranking Member Bordallo. The
    Congress has been very generous in terms of working with us to
    answer specific needs. Given the overall reduction in the total
    obligational authority, since PB [President's budget] 2012,
    which is the baseline that we use to measure, the issue for us
    becomes the challenge of, within the Department of Defense
    [DOD], future readiness versus current readiness.
        So we fully understand and support both the President and
    the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] and their move for the Third
    Offset Strategy. And we know that there are things we must do
    in terms of nuclear capability, cyber capability, space
    capability, whether it is buying new or replacing old. But
    those elements are increasingly costly as the threat of
    adversaries around the world makes great inroads on us.
        So invariably, Congresswoman, we think that the future
    expenses there are often taken at the result of end strength
    and current capability. So we struggle within that balance to
    support what we know needs to be done nationally for the
    defense strategy, but to maintain current bench readiness. So
    we watch our end strength very carefully, and we also watch our
    ability to get beyond just today's fight, ma'am.
        So the money is there. Other things that pressurize us
    within the Department of Navy [DON], our shipmates and
    colleagues in the Navy have been very good. We work with them
    on aviation capability and on amphibious shipping capability.
    But the DON budget is pressurized by the Ohio replacement
    program. So there are some big bills and some must-pay bills
    nationally that continue to pressurize the day-to-day ops
    [operations] today, ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. So I guess what you are saying, General, then
    is that we have to continue to be innovative, right, and work
    with what we have?
        General Paxton. Well, ma'am, we certainly understand that,
    but again, within the budget constraints that we know we have
    to operate under, at some point we believe that capacity has
    and depth on the bench has a capability all its own.
        Ms. Bordallo. Good. This is either for you or General
    Walters. What are the impacts for Marines and their families as
    well as operational readiness of asking Marines to average
    closer to a 1:2 deployments rather than your target of 1:3?
    Whichever one.
        General Paxton. Yes, ma'am, I will start but then I will
    defer to both my colleagues because General Walters was a
    commanding general of the 2nd Marine Aviation Wing and they
    were over in Afghanistan 3 years ago, so he can tell you about
    that. And General Coglianese was the commanding general of the
    1st Marine Logistics Group out on the West Coast.
        So the challenge for us obviously is Marines join to fight.
    Marines join to travel around the world. So we don't have a
    problem with first-term Marines. Officer or enlisted, regular,
    I mean, Active Duty or Reserve Component. They come in to do
    what Marines do, which is go around the world and fight.
        But as we continue the deployment schedule, it sometimes
    does become onerous. There are education requirements you have
    for the individual Marine. There is schooling, not only a
    professional military education within their occupational
    specialties, but just tactical and technical training as well,
    and we need to get them out to independent duty. We always need
    recruiters and drill instructors. So how we manage the career
    expectations that the institution needs and that the individual
    expects with a 1:2 dep-to-dwell becomes a challenge.
        And then as the force ages, right now the average Marine is
    just a little over 25 years old, most of the force is on their
    first term, and 75 percent of the force is forward deployed. So
    we are very--all the services are busy, but against even that
    metric we are the youngest and the most forward deployed. So as
    the force ages it becomes harder.
        General.
        Ms. Bordallo. General Walters.
        General Walters. Yes, thank you, ma'am. The other aspect I
    would add to the Assistant Commandant's statement, is 1:2, 1:3,
    what does it really mean? 1:3 gives you time and the time to
    train. And when you get back from a deployment if you are gone
    for 6 months and you are going to be back for a year, the first
    month is basically leave and resetting your equipment. The last
    6 months is training if you do it right. And you have got to
    train for the next deployment.
        That doesn't leave you a whole lot of time to reset the
    force both in equipment and personnel. So if you want to
    achieve readiness you have to provide time for these Marines to
    come back, reset themselves and then train themselves back up
    and be a whole unit. And it is really the people and the
    equipment together and the training opportunity and time for
    them to get ready for their next deployment.
        Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
        General Walters. That is where we see stress. If you
    provided more time, then they would ready for the full range of
    military operations one and two. One of the only ways to do
    that is quit deploying them as much as they are now or having a
    bigger force. Those are the two levers you can pull to get to a
    1:3, which is the optimum. Thank you, ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. And did you want to hear from----
        General Coglianese [continuing]. Covered, m'aam.
        Ms. Bordallo. He said it all. All right. General Walters,
    the Marine Corps is an important element of the U.S. Asia-
    Pacific rebalance. And we will be conducting a RIMPAC [Rim of
    the Pacific] exercise this summer. Now, how do you anticipate
    that these deployments will build readiness and contribute to
    regional security policy in the Pacific? General.
        General Walters. Yes, ma'am. The RIMPAC operation I think
    we are also using as a vehicle to test out an alternative, as
    you say, to become more innovative with our organizations. The
    RIMPAC operation is going to have that component in there. Our
    posture in the Pacific, as you are well aware, that we are
    committed to 22,500 Marines west of the dateline. We have a
    plan for that.
        And I think as we proceed down there the fiscal pressures
    on exercises such as RIMPAC are going to be more and more
    telling even this year at our current funding level in this
    fiscal year.
        And we are already getting inputs of reducing the scope and
    scale of a lot of our exercises. RIMPAC is one of those ones
    that we will try and preserve at its full capability and
    capacity, ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. I have another question here for
    General Coglianese. We have heard that the construction
    schedule for the FRF [Futenma Replacement Facility] has been
    delayed by 2 years, and Congressman, the Chairman, Mr. Wittman
    and I were just in Okinawa. We heard about this. And it is my
    hope that the Government of Japan can quickly resolve the
    remaining issues so that we can get the construction of the FRF
    and the Okinawa consolidated plan back on schedule.
        It is important that we continue to sustain our
    infrastructure and operational capabilities at Futenma. So to
    that end, can you please describe some of the key
    infrastructure investments you intend to make in fiscal year
    2017 to ensure Futenma continues to meet the operational
    requirements of the Marine Corps?
        General Coglianese. Yes, ma'am, thank you. Thank you for
    that question. The whole rebalancing has many pieces to it, and
    as far as Okinawa, as you know, there are political
    ramifications, legal suits from the local Okinawans, with Japan
    itself, and the project has been delayed.
        But we are, I think, on course still with our DPRI [Defense
    Policy Review Initiative] plan of moving forces around from
    Okinawa to Guam. We see it as a delay but not stopping anything
    we are doing.
        Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
        General Coglianese. As far as reinvesting in Futenma, we
    are not planning on doing any major reinvesting in Futenma that
    I know of because of the alternate site that we are going to.
        Ms. Bordallo. I think what I want to hear is that this will
    not affect the move to Guam. Our construction and so forth is
    ongoing, and I think this is what concerns my constituents back
    home, that there is another delay in this move. So would you
    say then that is--General Paxton.
        General Paxton. I was going to say, Ranking Member, that we
    are still on track. I don't think it is delaying. As you know,
    the three MILCON projects that we had were slid 1 year. We do
    have a power plant being built, and also the Japanese
    Government----
        Ms. Bordallo. Is this money from----
        General Paxton [continuing]. Is also doing, as you know,
    MILCON projects on Guam as we speak. So although it is tied
    together, we see the plan still as on track for Guam. Just
    delayed on the MILCON, but, you know, we still think we are
    going to be IOC [initial operating capacity] and as we
    predicted.
        Ms. Bordallo. Well, you know, just a few years ago we found
    out that ultimately Guam was delinked from this Futenma
    situation, so----
        General Paxton. So, ma'am, Ranking Member, it is a
    distributed laydown. So when we look at the pieces we realize
    there are some connections between what happens on Okinawa with
    the FRF and up at Henoko area, what happens in Iwakuni, what
    happens in Guam, what happens in Darwin, and what happens in
    Hawaii.
        So we try to keep all those pieces linked and they have to
    stay linked in terms of the environmental study, the monies
    available for MILCON, the ability to train people. The risk
    that we have is we never want to have a Marine stationed
    somewhere where he or she is not able to train or not
    deployable.
        But the master plan in terms of movement to Guam and have
    some of the III MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] and 3rd MARDIV
    [Marine Division] units actually relocate from Okinawa to Guam
    is still an integral piece of the distributed laydown in the
    Pacific, ma'am.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you, General.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
        We will now go to Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
    thank you for being here. And I know the last couple of years
    you have had to manage through the sequester shutdowns,
    continuing resolutions [CRs]. If you get an appropriation
    measure, it is at the last minute. And you have got a big job
    to do, and the fact of the matter is you don't know what your
    budget is going to be or your appropriation is going to be for
    next year.
        And I appreciate your courtesy, General Paxton, but ``thank
    you'' might should be replaced with ``thank you, sir, may I
    have another?'' I think you have been treated very unfairly by
    us in the last several years, especially with all of the things
    that we expect you to do.
        As you know, the Marines you have got distributed ground
    forces, maintain forward presence in a lot of areas. You are
    responsible for establishing local relationships and responding
    rapidly to a tremendous number of things that can happen
    anywhere in the world.
        You are not investing in the unmanned aerial systems, the
    Group 5s, the MQ-9s that have the extended loiter time. And I
    just wonder when we talk about the close air support mission,
    how much additional risk is being taken by not investing in
    more MQ-9s? And is that an area where we need to do something
    then to get more of those for you, or additional close air
    support weapons?
        General Paxton. Thank you, Congressman. I will start and
    then defer again to General Walters as the wing commander and
    as the program. But the short answer to your question is
    absolutely we are taking risk in unmanned aerial systems,
    regardless of whether it is Group 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. We would
    like to have more. That is cutting-edge technology. There is
    much to do in terms of innovation to see how we can integrate
    an unmanned system with a manned system.
        The Commandant was just out on the West Coast last week to
    take a look at future options for that integration. The
    challenge for us continues to be the pacing item of our manned
    systems that we are absolutely essential to moving Marines
    around the battlefield, to delivering ordnance on targets, and
    to sustaining the fight. So once again it is that delicate
    tradeoff between the current fight and the future fight.
        We are committed to unmanned systems. We have at least two
    that are programs of record here that we are working with the
    Department of the Navy to continue to procure. And we know that
    is an area that we would have to get, as the Commandant said,
    smarter, better, faster, cheaper in.
        General Walters. Thank you, Representative Scott. To
    emphasize a couple of things the ACMC [Assistant Commandant of
    the Marine Corps] has said, we have Class 1, 2 and 3 and we
    have a Class 3 program in the RQ-21. The Commandant has tasked
    us to go back and look at a capabilities analysis of that. And
    what do we want? Or what do we need?
        The trick is always when you talk Class 4 and Class 5 is
    Class 4 is something we could probably afford if we take some
    risks elsewhere and we will get some benefit from that. Class 5
    is kind of a UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] that is do you need
    it in the Marine Corps or do you need access to it in joint? We
    fully support--I mean, when in Afghanistan we used MQ-9s, we
    used the Predators, the Reapers, everything was over my AO
    [area of operations].
        Obviously if we are in a joint force then we need to have
    the joint capability available to us, but we are taking a very
    serious look at it and seeing what we can afford. I think the
    Commandant would want to propose buying as much as we could to
    put in the MAGTF because we are sometimes by ourselves in
    different places in the world. But this is I guess I could say
    it is a real big debate point right now, what can we afford and
    how quick can we get it?
        Mr. Scott. But as long as you have it in the joint force
    you feel like you are----
        General Walters. Well, that is an option, but there are
    scenarios where if the joint force is not available then we
    have to look very seriously at what capability we bring in the
    Marine Corps, and we need to pursue that.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you for your service.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
        We will now go to Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is good to see
    you all here. We have been very, very fortunate, Mr. Chairman,
    that we had great leadership at Camp Pendleton in San Diego,
    and I was delighted to have an opportunity to work particularly
    with General Paxton and General Coglianese. So thank you again
    for being here and for your dedication to our country.
        One of the discussions that we have had over the last few
    weeks particularly is the Russian aggression in the Baltics.
    And I wondered if you could respond to the European Reassurance
    Initiative [ERI] and how that might be impacted by the
    situation of prepositioning our stocks in Norway.
        How are we doing with the progress of that in shifting the
    focus from transportation to heavier equipment in the area?
    Where do you think that is and what do you need?
        I guess I would also say, because I think we hear from our
    constituents all the time, and we know the military will do
    anything that we ask of them, particularly the Marines. I think
    a lot of people are often thinking of the Marines when they
    think about that and they want us to keep them safe here at
    home.
        Often you hear some criticism, if you will, that we have
    too many troops in the European theater. So could you put this
    together so people understand how important it is?
        General Paxton. Thank you, Congresswoman Davis. I will
    start and then defer to General Coglianese, who can talk a
    little bit actually about the prepositioning. We are keenly
    aware of the emergence of another potential ``fight tonight''
    area in terms of Russian aggression through Europe. As you and
    the members of the committee well remember, in days of old the
    Marines had a mission on the northern and southern flank of the
    European AOR [area of responsibility].
        With our Special Purpose MAGTF that works for the Africa
    commander, the previous AFRICOM and EUCOM [U.S. European
    Command] commanders were able to broker a unit and force-
    sharing agreement so that forces could shop relatively quickly
    and seamlessly back and forth between the two of them. So we
    have a large component of that Special Purpose MAGTF and they
    are titled the Black Sea Rotation Force.
        So for several years now they have been doing bilateral and
    multilateral engagements and exercises, primarily on the
    southern flank and working out of two particular countries
    there where we have some basing and station arrangements.
        That Special Purpose MAGTF still is dependent on mobility
    to get to where they need to go, so they need V-22s and KC-130s
    and things that are already in short supply for everyone else.
        So we do have forces over there. We do depend on the ERI to
    help them out. We don't have enough density there, and we don't
    have enough mobility there.
        As we speak here today, we are recovering Marines from
    exercise Cold Response in Norway where we work with Norwegian
    and United Kingdom allies to train up there. And this is really
    the first time since pre-9/11 that we have had a large
    footprint north of the Arctic Circle doing cold weather
    operations.
        So we are slowly reestablishing environmental capability
    and fighting capability in those two areas.
        The issue for us remains getting in, the power projection
    piece, and then sustaining. So we are back to the discussion we
    have about the adequacy and the availability of our amphibious
    fleet to get us to those two theaters because they are remote
    and you have great sea lines of communication to get there. And
    then we are dependent on maritime prepositioning or cave
    prepositioning for supplies.
        As you know, Congresswoman, we got rid of one of the
    MPSRONs [maritime prepositioning ship squadrons]. It was
    largely a fiscally driven decision several years ago. But we
    only have two maritime prepositioning squadrons now, both in
    the Pacific AOR. We would like to have that one back in Europe.
    That would be a big boon. In the absence of that we continue to
    use the caves in Norway. And I will let General Coglianese talk
    about what those caves mean to us and what is and is not there,
    ma'am.
        General Coglianese. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
    As you know, that MPSRON squadron was in the Mediterranean,
    too, so it was located in the European area. There is a lot of
    emphasis on the caves right now, our prepositioning. We have
    recently put more things in it, surrounded it. It is basically
    a battalion landing team mechanized with a command element,
    assets and some logistics assets and some aviation assets or
    for ground aviation logistics.
        There are tanks, AAVs [Amphibious Assault Vehicles], and,
    you know, the Norwegians are very good partners and it has been
    a great relationship since 1986 when we started the program.
    But it is the emphasis on that program, I think, has been
    spotlighted and it has increased in recent times with the
    tension in Europe.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
        General Coglianese. I can go on to tell you more about what
    is in there, but like you say, right now the exercise that is
    going right now has been very successful in drawing that
    equipment out. And once again we will reconstitute it, put it
    back in with our partners in Norwegian and use it for future
    exercises.
        Mrs. Davis. Okay. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Davis. Appreciate it.
        Mr. Nugent.
        Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
    the generals for being here today. Really do appreciate
    everything that you do.
        You know, I am concerned when you start hearing about the
    dwell time. You know, the Marine Corps really had their act
    together, I think, in regards to dwell time versus, you know, I
    have got three sons in the Army, you know, 15 months in
    Afghanistan isn't exactly the best outcome.
        And so I start to worry when you hear dwell times slipping,
    particularly when the Marine Corps, I believe, did a great job.
    And, you know, it really does help, you know, that your troops
    but also their families that are, you know, left behind to have
    to make it.
        At what point, you know, we cut the Marine Corps end
    strength, at what point do we get to where we--I know we will
    fight if we have to, but at some point in time I think we have
    to start making decisions about where we fight because what we
    don't want to do is break the Marine Corps or the Army for that
    matter.
        So is there a breaking point that we, hopefully, have not
    come close to? But is there such a thing as a breaking point?
        General Paxton. So thank you, Congressman Nugent. I am sure
    there is a breaking point. We don't always know where it is. We
    try to predict it. We try to predict the breaking point by
    readiness or by risk or by fiscal or by people. What we always
    are mindful of is we don't want to find that breaking point in
    the rearview mirror and realize that we actually culminated
    some time ago and we can't do what we do.
        To your question, sir, as I said in my opening statement,
    we are going to be ready with every unit tonight. And we are
    going to be ready with the next one that comes. So when the
    military plans, I believe, sir, that they plan against the most
    dangerous enemy course of action as opposed to the most likely
    enemy course of action.
        So when the geographic combatant commanders come before the
    committee and they say here is what could happen in my AOR,
    those risks that any of those six geographic combatant
    commanders pose then become risks that are transferred
    institutionally to the four services. And then we worry about
    not that we can fight, but can we do a two at one? Can we do a
    delay and a deny? Can we do a win and a deny?
        And more importantly in today's world where adversaries
    have increasing capability and more command and control and
    they are developing better generation aircraft and a deeper
    bench for shipping, the issue is can they project their power
    and will faster than we can respond?
        So our concern is not the quality of the soldier, sailor,
    airman, Marine and what we are going to do. It is can we get
    enough of them to the point where we are at risk----
        Mr. Nugent. Do you have capacity?
        General Paxton. So that is exactly it, sir.
        Mr. Nugent. It's the same issue. It is about capacity. You
    know, the will and readiness, you know, the will to fight I
    don't question any Marine's will to fight or any soldier's will
    to fight.
        But, you know, in the Army at one point in time, you know,
    I think they were staffed up to 110 percent so if they fielded
    they would be with, you know, 100 percent personnel ready to
    go.
        And they are struggling right now between, you know, folks
    that for whatever reason, you know, medical, which is a big
    one. How is the Marine Corps doing in regards to, you know,
    your strength of your units? I am not talking about the ones
    deployed necessarily, but, you know, the ones in reserve?
        General Paxton. So our manpower situation, sir, is good
    right now. Our recruiting is good. Our retention is good. Our
    schooling is good and the availability of the individual Marine
    and consequently the availability of the unit is good overall.
        The issue, as General Walters alluded to earlier, is the
    timing about getting the right number of the right grade, the
    right MOS [military occupational specialty], the right skill
    set to the right unit in time that they can do training to work
    up. And this is what happens when we go from a 1:3 to a 1:2.
        So when you make that big jump what you sacrifice is that
    you are going to be ready just in time and you are going to be
    ready just for the assigned mission.
        You don't have the latitude or the luxury to plan for other
    missions that could pop up and you don't have the latitude to
    take a little bit longer and delay your deployment. So
    everything is a little bit of self-induced crisis.
        General Walters. No, sir. It is the dep-to-dwell and the
    end strength and how much you use it. On a daily basis we use
    up our readiness. The only real lever we can provide is time to
    train. All the metrics we see on the quality of our people, the
    money we put into those programs seems to be working.
        It is what does the country want us to do? If the country
    wants us to do more than we are doing now, then we could report
    to you that we might be closer to that breaking point.
        I think our dep-to-dwell now is about at as high an
    operational tempo as we can stand. We have seen this in the
    past in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. We saw the crisis in
    certain MOSs. And when we built the force back up we targeted
    certain battalions, Cobra squadrons, 53 squadrons, and we
    targeted those just because that is what we could build, not
    because that was the only demand signal. But that is what we
    could accomplish.
        Mr. Nugent. Thank you.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Nugent. Appreciate that.
        Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Bells are ringing--
    --
        Mr. Wittman. Yes.
        Mr. Courtney [continuing]. So I will be real quick and
    thank you for your testimony. I think it is important to not
    let go unnoticed this morning on page 13 of your testimony, the
    Marines, again, are the first service to hit initial operating
    capability for the F-35, which is really I think a new sort of
    milestone in, you know, in aviation history, not just for this
    country but for the world. So again, congratulations to your
    team for doing that.
        Can you talk a little bit about, you know, the plan which
    is to actually, you know, send a squadron out to Japan in 2017?
    And what does that mean, I mean, in terms of, you know, what
    are they going to do and what is it replacing? And because
    obviously I think this is quite significant, and again, you
    deserve a lot of credit.
        General Paxton. Thank you, Congressman Courtney, and again,
    mindful of the time here so we will go quick. The F-35 did meet
    IOC last summer. We have a squadron that is full up in Yuma
    right now and we are still on timeline to move that squadron to
    Iwakuni. The F-35 represents to us not only the V/STOL
    [vertical/short take-off and landing] capability that we need
    to project power, assure from ship-to-shore in an expeditionary
    operation, but it is also a fifth generation aircraft which
    means it has enhanced navigation, communications, and
    particularly EW [electronic warfare] and cyber capability.
        So the intent on moving it to Iwakuni, where we are
    grateful for the support for the facilities out there, is that
    we can actually move from IOC to FOC [full operational
    capability] and test it in an operational environment,
    sometimes working with other dissimilar aircraft whether it is
    U.S. or allies and actually see how good and how well we have
    designed and prepared the aircraft.
        As is always the case, if you put aircraft in the hands of
    soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines they will help you
    figure out whether you did the designing and the production
    right or whether it has capabilities you didn't anticipate you
    could do.
        And General Walters.
        General Walters. No, sir, and it is going to the Pacific,
    and if you look at what the Navy is doing with their carrier
    laydown, the fifth generation carrier, first fifth generation
    carrier for the Navy, is going to be on the West Coast. That
    has caused us to change our plans and follow the carrier out to
    the West Coast. So we are going to have to find some money to
    put the capability out there in Miramar.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney, and we appreciate
    that. We have votes, about 6 minutes left in the votes, so it
    won't allow us to be able to get there and get back in time.
    Mr. Gallego didn't have a chance to have his question asked,
    but I will make sure we take his questions, get them entered
    for the record.
        And gentlemen, thank you so much. Thanks for the great job
    that you do on behalf of our Nation and thanks for the great
    job your Marines do for our Nation. We deeply appreciate all of
    your valuable information you provided for us today to make
    sure we give the proper direction in this year's NDAA to
    provide for the resources for the Marine Corps to continue on
    the path to restore readiness.
        So folks, thanks again, and we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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