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## WORLD WIDE THREATS

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

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## WORLD WIDE THREATS

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2016.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. “MAC” THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order.

This year, as we did last year, the committee meets today to get an assessment of the threat environment in which our military personnel are asked to operate. I think it is important that we understand not only the threats that are out there today, but the general direction of trends as we make decisions about this year’s Defense Authorization Act.

If we just think about some of the things that have changed since we had this hearing last year, we can remember the enormous amount of time and effort spent about Russia’s activities in Ukraine. Of course, those gains have been consolidated, and now there is the most significant military presence in the Middle East that they have had since the 1970s.

Meanwhile, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has launched attacks, both in Europe and the United States, and it has spread to more countries including, notably, Libya and Afghanistan, as well as others. There have been reports which have been confirmed in other congressional hearings about ISIS use of chemical weapons on the battlefield.

Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to be provocative to the point of even detaining U.S. sailors recently. North Korea launches missile tests and nuclear tests and sticks its finger in the eye of the world. And meanwhile, China is continuing to develop its islands out of the Pacific Ocean and has begun to install, according to reports, military aircraft and surface-to-air missiles on those islands. So needless to say, the world is not getting any simpler, and the world is not getting any less dangerous.

I really appreciate our witnesses being here today to help explore these issues. I would remind members that this obviously is an open, unclassified session. Immediately upon its conclusion we will go into a classified session with the same witnesses, so if you have questions that required a classified answer, obviously withhold and we will do that in the classified session.

Before turning to our witnesses, I would be pleased to yield to the distinguished gentlelady from California for any comments she would like to make.

**STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE  
FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement be entered into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Mrs. DAVIS. We look forward to Ranking Member Smith returning, hopefully within a few weeks, absolutely. And it has been an honor to try and help out in this role.

As we know, and, Generals, you are here to discuss again how complex and a dangerous place the world is today, unpredictable. And we know that there are at least five key national security challenges that are driving defense planning and budgeting. All of them key, all of them critical, and we look forward to your comments today.

It is so important for us to receive clear objective and comprehensive assessments from the defense intelligence community. A deep and clear understanding of these threats, and the trends and developments that drive them, is fundamental to the committee's work in shaping the defense budget, and in helping the Department of Defense and the rest of the national security establishment perform their duties effectively.

So we look forward to your comments. I know I would like to discuss our priorities, and how perhaps those are changing. We certainly acknowledge your difficult and challenging work. And thank you again for being here today.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

We are pleased to welcome back before the committee, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, and welcome, I believe for the first time, at least in this capacity, the Director of Intelligence for the Joint Staff, Major General James Marrs, our witnesses today. Thank you both for being here.

Without objection, your complete written statements will be made part of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any oral comments you would like to make at this time. General Stewart.

**STATEMENT OF LTGEN VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC,  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

General STEWART. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to provide Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the global security environment and the threats facing the Nation.

Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range of multifaceted challenges, adversaries' threats, foreign military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks. Taken together, these

issues reflect the diversity, scope, and complexity of today's challenges to our national security.

In my opening remarks, I would like to highlight just a few of these threats, which represents our five focus areas in all war-fighting domains: space, cyberspace, air, surface, and subsurface.

Turning first to the current threat from ISIL. With the coalition engaged against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] is helping the warfighter and our policy-makers better understand both the ideology and the capabilities of ISIL. ISIL, as well as like-minded extremists, are born out of the same extreme and violent Sunni Salafi ideology. These Salafi jihadis are determined to restore the caliphate, and as they have shown, are willing to justify extreme violence in their efforts to impose their social order on others.

As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has become the most significant terrorist threat to the United States and our allies. In 2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria and expanded globally. Spectacular external attacks demonstrate ISIL's relevance and reach and are a key part of their narrative.

ISIL will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the United States homeland, in 2016. ISIL's foreign fighter cadre is core to its external attack capability, and a large number of Western jihadists in Iraq and Syria will pose a challenge for Western security services.

On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control large swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition strikes impeded ISIL's ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, curtailed its use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to lower its profile. In 2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL forces, and emerging resource shortfalls, will probably challenge ISIL's ability to govern in Iraq and Syria. However, the group probably will retain Sunni Arab urban centers.

Turning to Afghanistan: In their first full year in the lead, Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent operations; however, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack of coalition enablers and at high operational tempo, which led to uneven execution of operations. As a result, insurgents expanded their influence in rural areas, limiting the extension of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized units and their enablers will be necessary to continue securing key population centers in Afghanistan.

Russia: Russian military activities continue at historically high levels. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive foreign and defense policy, including conducting operations in Syria, sustaining involvement in Ukraine, and expanding military capabilities in the Arctic. Last year, the Russian military continued its robust exercise schedule and aggressively, and occasionally, provocative out-of-area deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military activities in 2016.

Turning to China: China is pursuing a long-term comprehensive military modernization program to advance its core interests, which include maintaining its sovereignty, protecting its territorial integrity, and projecting its regional influence, particularly in the South China Sea. In addition to modernizing equipment and oper-

ations, the People's Liberation Army has undergone massive structural reforms, including increasing the number of navy, air force, and rocket force personnel, establishing a theater joint command system, and reducing their current seven military regions down to five joint theaters of operations.

China has the world's largest, and most comprehensive, missile force and has prioritized the development and deployment of 125 regional ballistic missiles and cruise missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities against the United States forces in the region. And they field an antiship ballistic missile, which provides the capability to attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of striking Guam during its September 2015 military parade in Beijing.

In North Korea: North Korea's nuclear weapons program is evolving, and evolving ballistic missile programs are a continuing threat. In January, North Korea issued a statement claiming that it had successfully carried out a nuclear test, and last month, North Korea conducted another space launch.

The Democratic Republic of Korea displays of a new modified road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, during their recent parade, and its 2015 test of a new submarine launch ballistic missile capability, further highlights Pyongyang's commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear delivery options. North Korea also continues efforts to expand its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material.

In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the strategic value of space and are focusing on diminishing our advantage with the intent of denying the U.S. use of space in the event of conflict. Both countries are conducting antisatellite research and developing antisatellite weapons, making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested, and congested.

In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing capabilities of advanced state actors such as Russia and China. They target DOD personnel, networks, supply chain, research and development, and critical infrastructure information in the cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant threat to conduct destructive cyberattacks. Non-state actors' use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open-source research remains a significant challenge.

Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing unique defense intelligence around the world and around the clock, to the warfighters, the defense planners, the defense acquisition community, and policymakers to provide warning and defeat these and other threats.

I look forward to the committee's questions.

[The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.  
General Marrs.



**STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR  
FOR INTELLIGENCE, J-2, JOINT STAFF**

General MARRS. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Mrs. Davis, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to represent the intelligent equities of the Joint Staff and combatant commands at this hearing.

As the primary military intelligence adviser to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am responsible for providing daily intelligence information to the Chairman, his staff, and many senior defense and national decision makers. Additionally, as the J-2, I also conduct intelligence operations, plans, and policy assessments, and make recommendations to the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and combatant commands.

I share Lieutenant General Stewart's concerns regarding the global threats we face and look forward to taking your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Let me just ask each of you a relatively simple question. Our core responsibilities under the Constitution are to provide and support, build, and maintain the military forces that are necessary for the defense of the country. And a lot of the decisions we make affect not just the military today but the military tomorrow, 3, 5 years out. So the trends, the way things are moving are important for us to try to keep in mind. Nobody can predict the future, but the general direction of things.

So my question to you is, what is or are the primary trends that you see in the threat environment that we should take into account in making decisions about military personnel and pay and benefits and weapons and equipment and so forth? What are those trends that you think are so significant that we have got to keep those in mind as we make the program-by-program decisions that it is our responsibility to make? General Stewart.

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I will start, and General Marrs will correct me when I am done.

We talk about the complexity in the world today, but we are looking at breakdown of nation-states as we knew them in the past. We are talking about regions where nation-states are fracturing, and we are uncertain how those nation-states will act after conflict is done. We are seeing resurgence of Russian activity, as I mentioned earlier, where Russia intends to exert its influence on the global stage and will challenge our interests wherever those interests are globally.

China, again, continues to push the envelope in reclaiming territory, disputed territory in the South China Sea that will complicate our ability to maneuver and conduct operations in the Pacific. These terrorist organizations, whether it is Al Qaeda or it is ISIL, continue to push the idea that they will replace the international order as we know it with an extreme ideology.

So whether it is resurgent Russia in Europe, whether it is a rising Iran in the Middle East and the conflict between Iran and the Saudis in the Middle East or it is a competition with China in the Pacific, there are just a range of global actions that we simply are—we have not seen the likes of which, in certainly my time as I have served.

So the world is far more complicated, it is far more destabilized, it is far more complex than at any time that I have seen it, and the outcomes in the next several years will be decisive for our Nation.

And, Jim, I don't know if you have got—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General Marrs, before you respond, what I heard then was the breakdown of the liberal order and the nation-states system is one of the dominant trends that has a number of repercussions that we have to keep in mind as we think about military capability. Now, I may have heard it—but that is what my ears heard.

General STEWART. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. All right. General Marrs.

General MARRS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

I think I would underscore two things that General Stewart mentioned: First, on the non-state side of the house, I think the continued challenge of ungoverned or weakly governed areas is something that absolutely is facilitating the growth of these violent extremist organizations. That combined with the relative ease of access of technology, and specifically cyber technology, that allows these organizations to rather quickly develop linkages.

What I would say on the state side of this is that the real challenge, I think, is the volume of capabilities we are seeing being developed that really threaten our competitive advantage. And principally, what we are seeing in Russia and China is just a breadth of capabilities from strategic systems to anti-access/area denial to even, I would say, a growing adeptness at operating sort of just short of traditional military conflict that is posing a significant challenge in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I am repeating this back to you just to make sure I understand. So among the things I think you said are erosion of our technological superiority, and that is us, especially versus Russia and China; and then these new forms of warfare conflict are another part of that, at least on the state side, but actually ISIS employs them as well through their social media and other aspects. Is that the gist of it?

General MARRS. That is accurate, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General STEWART. If I could. Look at it in three terms: Our resurgence of competitive nation-states that compete against our interests; breakdown of traditional nation-states, generates ungoverned space, generates conflict that we are not quite sure how that will play out; and then the ability for emerging states or even non-state actors to have access to disruptive technology that is readily available across a wide range of networks.

So those three things combined leads to a trend that has manifested itself as a very, very unstable condition in our world today.

The CHAIRMAN. Which makes our job complex, because we have got to prepare for everything from nuclear war down to hybrid and the kind of little green men sort of situations where you don't really know what is happening. And that is the challenge that you all face as well.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, again, for being here.

Given what you have just stated, could you share with us how we then reorder, if at all, our intelligence priorities framework? What are we doing differently? Clearly during the Cold War intelligence collection was important. That obviously has been shifted in many ways to counterterrorism for a number of years. So what is changing, if at all? Why? And what should we be doing about it in terms of resources?

General STEWART. So none of us in the Intelligence Community like to set priorities because we will invariably get it wrong. The area that we think is stable will turn out to be unstable. But I will tell you what I have done. We have got five priorities that I consider no-fail mission for the defense intelligence enterprise.

How do we win the current fight, primarily focused against those transregional terrorist threats, whether they be in Iraq, Syria, or in Afghanistan. That is priority number one.

The next set of priorities are focused on these nation-states who will compete with us on the globe. Russia, as a dominant nuclear-armed challenge to our interest around the globe. Iran, how will Iran behave as it comes out of a sanction regime, has increased revenues, continues to develop missile capability, competes with its neighbors in the region. North Korea, we have seen the level of activity in North Korea, whether it is nuclear missile technology, intercontinental or medium-range ballistic capability, a regime that can best be described as unstable, certainly uncertain what its intentions are.

And longer term, what will China and China's role be on the international order. China presents itself as a peaceful rise to regain its status on the international stage. We are not so certain that that rise will be peaceful because of some of the things that it is doing in the Pacific and globally.

So those are our five top priorities. There are a whole series of contingencies that we are still thinking about, but if you ask me today where I was putting my resources, those were the top five. And hopefully, General Marrs and the J-2 and the rest of the folks are thinking about some of the lesser priorities so that we are not surprised by something that happens on the stage.

Mrs. DAVIS. General Marrs, do you want to comment?

General MARRS. And I think the one thing I would add is more from a process perspective, so the focus is absolutely where General Stewart said it is. What we are working, along with DIA and USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence], is on what is called an integrated defense intelligence priorities framework. And that is a project that has been underway over the last year, and it is basically to set in place a formalized mechanism where we, as a Department, can better articulate what the defense intel priorities are and make sure that those are clearly linked to the national level framework.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And does that allow for some reordering within that? I guess it is the out-of-the-box thinking. And as an example, where would you see that where you actually had shifted in seeking something that you hadn't expected within that framework?

General MARRS. So it is probably premature to say that about this process that is just evolving right now. So literally, we are working with USDI on a version 1.0 of this capability that will see or be unveiled later this spring.

But I will say that, absolutely, a big part of what we have to do is, while we are mindful of these larger strategic challenges out there, that we still have a team that has to play position around the world and be thinking about the things that aren't in the paper right now.

And I am confident that the team has a good approach for that, both in terms of how we as defense or intel professionals think about warning, and really that is our part of the trade craft that helps to avoid surprise. And also at the national defense or at the ODNI [Office of the Director of National Intelligence] level, thinking about tradecraft in the sense of what has been called in the 2014 national intelligence strategy "anticipatory intelligence." So it is even at that level trying to figure out how we better make room for that in our daily activities.

General STEWART. If I could add though, given the five priorities, the five focus areas I talked about, we have done a series of seminars to look at those key areas, and think our way through, not only from the country specific but the regions, what we know today, and really start thinking about what are some of the black swan events that we are not all thinking about, the nonlinear events that could unfold.

And so we are putting in place a process where we think about alternative analysis, black swan events, awfully hard to call. It is interesting to note that one of the events that we looked at in the Middle East was what would happen if the Mosul Dam collapsed.

And we are hearing increasingly now this discussion about the viability of the Mosul Dam and what that would mean. That is something that is nontraditional intel kind of thinking, but it would have significant implications if that event occurred.

So we have got some processes in place where we are thinking about alternative analysis and red teaming so that we are not caught blind looking at Russia, and Iran, and North Korea, and miss some event.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES [presiding]. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.

The Chair now recognizes himself for a series of questions.

General Stewart, General Marrs, first of all, thank you both for being here.

General Stewart, I would never instruct a general what to do but I am going to request, especially with those three stars, that you pull that mike just a little closer to you so that we can hear you even better. We are proud of your service. And I was looking at your résumé. I wished I had time to read it all in the record, but through all of those over 35 years, I guess now—how many years total do you have?

General STEWART. I think I am starting my 35th year.

Mr. FORBES. We just are so proud of what you have done.

As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, one of the things that we are doing now to everyone that appears before this

committee based on some information we got at our retreat for the committee a week or so ago is, did you have to submit your statement for the record to any individual or entity prior to submitting it to us today?

General STEWART. Not for review. We certainly submit that, so that my bosses are aware of what I submitted. But not for review, not for modification, not for changes.

Mr. FORBES. Okay. So who do you submit it to?

General STEWART. Both the DNI [Director of National Intelligence] and USDI.

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Now, the other question I would ask is, we looked at this—in your best personal, professional military judgment as well as the written statement that is here, as I understand from your written statement, you are to give us an assessment of the global security environment and to address the threats facing the Nation.

As Chairman Thornberry mentioned, sometimes we are looking directionally because it is hard for us just to take a snapshot of today. But if we were going back to, let's say, the beginning of this decade—we could pick any other time that you think would be preferable, but let's begin in 2010—if I were to ask you, would that assessment and security environment and threats facing the Nation, is it better today or worse today than it was in 2010?

General STEWART. I would assess it is far more complex today than it was in 2010. The things I have outlined, breakdown of nation-states, conflict in region, reemergence of competitive peers, far more complex, and I would submit more dangerous than it was in 2010.

Mr. FORBES. And to help us with our colleagues when we are trying to get dollars for defense, if we were to ask you to give me a percentile figure from 1 to 10, 1 being no change, 10, let's say, being an alarming change, where would you peg it along that continuum between 1 to 10, between let's say 2010 and today?

General STEWART. Now, that is not real good math here, but I would probably put it in the five or six range.

Mr. FORBES. Five or six range.

General STEWART. Yes, sir.

Mr. FORBES. Now, the other thing we are always looking at too is our ability to forecast what we think these things are going to get worse or better. So let's go back to 2010 because we started making a lot of cuts to national defense back around 2010, 2011, 2012. Was this threat assessment that has changed, as you indicated to a five or six, along that continuum, were they predicted at that particular point in time, or were these surprises to us?

General STEWART. There were certainly lots of indications of Russian military modernization. There is certainly lots of indication of China military modernization, the reclamation effort. ISIL was not a dominant theme, but Al Qaeda was certainly still a threat. So I don't know that any of these are large surprises. The morphing of Al Qaeda into ISIL probably took some elements by surprise, but all of the pieces were there.

So much of the things that we are seeing today, we saw the precursors of those things in 2009, 2010, 2011, and have now just manifested themselves on the international stage. So it is hard for

me to call them surprises when there are lots of indicators there in the past.

Mr. FORBES. So then just to sum up, basically the assessment of the global security environment on the threats facing our Nation today have gotten about a 6 on a 1-to-10 scale in terms of difference between no change and alarming change. And according to your best assessment, most of those were predictable probably at the beginning of the decade as we went into this?

General STEWART. I think there are great philosophers somewhere out there that said prediction is particularly difficult especially when it is about the future. So I think there are certainly some trends there that would indicate that we would be headed for troubling times if we did not reverse or counter.

A growing Russian military modernization, a more assertive and aggressive China in the Pacific, the breakdown of some of these states in the Middle East, the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the possibility that ISIL would establish or attempt to establish the caliphate; all of those precursors were there. They have just now gone full blown in the last 3 to 5 years.

Mr. FORBES. And I would concur with your assessment, and I think our big concern is that, that is why many of us were so puzzled that we began cutting national defense so much over this decade when we could have predicted pretty much this kind of alarming war we are now facing.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stewart and General Marrs, welcome. Thank you for your testimony before this committee today as we help to shed light on some of the most dangerous threats that are facing the Nation around the world today.

General Stewart, I will start with you. I thought that was a very insightful analysis in terms of the challenges we face, in terms of resurgence of nation-states, breakdown of some traditional states, and the rise of destructive technologies.

Can you give the committee a sense of how you are properly organizing and resourcing the Defense Intelligence Agency to both better understand these threats and understand where they are going in the future?

Maybe some specific examples, so that we understand what the outcomes of these trends are going to be, how they will challenge the United States going forward, and how we are prepared to counter those threats?

General STEWART. Following the lead of my predecessor, you know, we have organized, reorganized the Defense Intelligence Agency along integrated intelligence center lines. That allows us to focus on regional challenges and give a center director all of the authority to work with the combatant commands to understand the many challenges in that region. That is a key foundational portion of what we have done to get a better sense of the challenges that we face.

We have laid on top of that an architecture, at least we are building an architecture. We probably refer to it as ICITE [intel community information technology environment], that will allow us

to use a cloud-based architecture to move content, make content available to the analysts wherever they are in the enterprise.

That, I think, will be very significant in making information available and then using some big data analytic tools to help us to see these trends and represent those trends in a more timely manner. That is a very important next step.

And then leveraging or working closely with our partners, our international partners, so that when we understand we have shortfalls or risk, we can use our partners to cover, to mitigate some of those risks or shortfalls. I do not have enough capacity to cover the globe. I will not be able to cover every contingency and every crisis given the structure that we have today, which is why we focus primarily on those five areas that I have talked about.

But we are doing all the things process-wise, organizational-wise, architectural-wise, command and control-wise, to make sure we have the best information ready to deliver to our policymakers. And anything this committee can do to help increase our capacity would be greatly welcomed.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, General.

So among the things that you touched on and one of the things that concerns me the most, of course, is the rise of destructive technologies. And clearly, none can be greater than the cyber threats that we face. And how do you feel we are positioned in terms of our ability to understand our adversaries' cyber capabilities, and do you feel that we are properly resourced to defend against those threats?

General STEWART. We are actively building back the analytic capability to understand adversaries' cyber capabilities. So we are building that back. We have made some investments to get some analysis in that space.

Thinking about the cyberspace, that domain, the ability to counter activities in that space from kinetic actions, which requires a level of analysis that just find the nodes that we could defeat kinetically, all the way through the more discrete cyber, understanding key nodes, key networks, key routers, key switches. That requires an exquisite level of intelligence that we have not invested in over the last several years.

So we are starting to build those pieces back now. That will take us a little bit of time. The fact that we are focused on those key threats, key actors, Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, will help us, but it won't position us to deal with the non-state or the emergent actor in that space.

Mr. LANGEVIN. And General, do you believe that CYBERCOM [Cyber Command] should be its own independent COCOM [combatant command], and how might this benefit our cyber operations worldwide?

General STEWART. I haven't really thought about that question, to be honest. And I am hesitant to go there, because I know that Admiral Rogers, the commander at U.S. Cyber Command, has an opinion on that.

Mr. LANGEVIN. We just want your opinion.

General STEWART. So I will just say at this point, CYBERCOM needs the relationship that it has with NSA [National Security Agency] far more than NSA needs CYBERCOM. I don't know that

CYBERCOM could be effective and carry out its mission without that very close relationship, integral, integrated relationship that it currently has with NSA. It would have to build significant capacity to understand the threats and counter those threats, and I think that would be very costly in the near term.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you both.

Chairman, I will yield back.

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman yields back.

Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Chairman Forbes.

And thank you General Stewart, General Marrs, for being here today.

And General Stewart, I appreciate you citing concerns about maintaining our technological edge and evolution of unconventional warfare. This is a focus of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee. I have the privilege of working with Congressman Langevin on these issues, and we look forward to working with you in the future to address that.

And also, General, Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently discussed potential threats being posed by advancements in biotechnology, including an ability to edit human genes, so-called gene editing. I am concerned about the types of technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone actors.

Can you describe for the committee the national security threats being posed by these and similar biotechnologies.

General STEWART. I am always hesitant to talk about sequencing a genome. Could we take this to the closed hearing, if that is okay?

Mr. WILSON. Be happy to.

General STEWART. Because I don't want in this setting to talk about either our capabilities or an adversary's effort in this space.

Mr. WILSON. I'd be happy to.

And again, thank you for your extraordinary service. I did represent Parris Island, so I have a deep affection. My late father-in-law was one of you, a marine.

And General Marrs, with your recent experience as U.S. Cyber Command director of intelligence prior to your post as Joint Staff, could you please explain what deliverables can be expected from the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental project.

And Secretary Carter has established a program between the military's innovators, cyber warfare operators, and private sector innovators, such as Silicon Valley. What technologies or tactics should be developed to keep intel-driven operations in the lead against any enemy with regard to cyber warfare?

General MARRS. So, sir, I think the specific focus of that program is still evolving, but it really, for me, comes down to how do we better harvest the volume of information that exists out there, and figure out innovative ways to basically make sense of that cloud and apply it to keeping our networks safe.

Mr. WILSON. Well, we really appreciate your leadership.

And also, General Marrs, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has reported that roughly 30 percent of the former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected and reengaging



in terrorism killing American families. What trends has the DIA observed in detainee recidivism and the capacity and willingness in past practices of foreign countries receiving detainees to take appropriate steps to mitigate the risks that they would reengage in terrorism to threaten and kill American families?

General STEWART. If I could jump on that one, please. The recidivism rate remains about 17 percent confirmed recidivism. Most of the nation-states where we transferred detainees have done a really credible job in either controlling, monitoring, or keeping them from getting back into terrorist activities. We have not seen an upward trend in recidivism. Like I said last year when I briefed this committee, we were somewhere in the 18, 19 percent range, and we remain about that same rate today.

Mr. WILSON. And something that concerned me, a number of the detainees were sent to Yemen, but it has disintegrated. What has happened to the detainees in that country?

General STEWART. If I could take that one for the record, please. I don't have specifics on Yemeni detainees, but if I could take that one for the record, I will get back to you.

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, what is the assessment of the relationship between Russia and Cuba?

General STEWART. Russia continues to have a strong partnership with the Cubans. They continue to do out-of-area exercises with Cuba. The relationship is not as close as it was during the height of the Cold War. I think that is basic calculus of what is important, but I think they do well together.

Mr. WILSON. Would that include port and landing rights within that country?

General STEWART. Yes, Congressman.

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much. And appreciate both of you.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the patience in letting me get back to my chair. Wasn't too obvious.

General, can you talk a little bit more about China—and I apologize I wasn't here, but I was here for your opening statement—in discussing the three categories of territorial integrity. There was the first one, but then you talked about its projection into the South China Sea.

Do you do strategic or operational assessments or tactical assessments about the intent beyond South China Sea and how China might be using its investment in surface and other modernization for projection beyond the South China Sea?

General STEWART. So we have seen not only reclaiming some 3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea, we also see increasing naval activity in the East China Sea, disputed territory with Japan. Building commercial capability on these outlying regions will ultimately mean that China will want to defend their economic interests.

So we are starting to see surface-to-air missiles being placed in the region. We are starting to see, as I have indicated, increased

missile technology that can counter our naval forces. We are seeing outposts being built.

Mr. LARSEN. Specific to investment with surface combatants though, do you see this as a test zone for operations beyond the first and second island chains?

General STEWART. At this point, the evidence seems to indicate defending the Nine-Dash Line and the territorial disputed areas. The aircraft carriers that they are building, the one that they built and the second one, I believe, they just commissioned, will not have the same blue open ocean capability that our aircraft carriers have, nor will it be able to execute air operations the way that we use our carriers.

So at least initially, it looks like it is localized. But some of the excursions now with port facilities in Africa and their submarine technologies suggest a much broader global capability in the offing. And I can talk more specifically about the surface capability in closed hearing.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah, I would prefer that. I will just follow up and I will yield back.

It is not just you, others out of the Pentagon and maybe the State Department have used the term they are reclaiming land. And let's be clear, they are not reclaiming anything; they are creating land. They are not reclaiming land that exists; they are creating land in violation of international law and we need to be clear about that.

If we say they are reclaiming land that doesn't exist by creating it, it sort of gives us some justification that it was theirs to claim in the first place. And I think we need to really push back hard on this because they are creating that which does not exist and that which is not recognized by international law.

General STEWART. I think that is a fair assessment that the territory does not exist. They are building territory. In the reclamation language, it suggests that they are falling back on their ancestral claim that this territory existed. It is part of their land domain, and so it is really just building that back in.

So technically, you are absolutely right; there is no territory there. They are building territory. And so the language is not as precise as we probably should have it.

Mr. LARSEN. Yeah. All right. Thanks a lot.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Stewart, there has been much discussion about Russia and the Open Skies Treaty. And so I want to ask you a question about the Open Skies Treaty. Can you please provide the committee with details on the counterintelligence risks to the United States and our allies of a digital electro-optical, EO sensor and an infrared sensor, IR sensor. We are aware these planes fly over not only the United States but also our allies in Europe. And can you provide the committee with any reports or assessments DIA has prepared on these questions?

Now, we have heard, of course, responses that we can just cover things, that we can mitigate this. But if we can, also the Russians

can. But the concern I guess we have is what are we actually getting from this treaty, because Russia does get more because of our space assets, the clarity which we have versus the clarity that is offered from their access from Open Skies. And can't this information be used such as simple task such as targeting and threatening the United States?

This is obviously something that has been a significant amount of discussion. I would like to know what the DIA has reviewed, what assessments you have done, and what the DIA has prepared.

General STEWART. I have got to keep this really simple for me. This Open Skies discussion is, think Polaroids in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, versus 1080 high-definition capability as we go to a digital environment. The things that you can see, the amount of data that you can collect, the things that you can do with post-processing using digital techniques allows Russia, in my opinion, to get incredible foundational intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of our facilities.

So from my perspective, it gives them a significant advantage and, yes, we both can use the same techniques. But I have a great concern about the quality of imagery, the quantity of the imagery, the ability to do post-processing of digital imagery, and what that allows them to see as foundational intelligence that I would love to have personally, and I would love to deny the Russians having that capability.

Mr. TURNER. Excellent. Thank you. I note many people have been very concerned because of then, as you just described that fidelity of information, how it is translated into actual risks to the United States.

Now, as we were coming out, I would like to ask both of you, we were in the anteroom here, we were having a discussion about the number of exercises that Russia is having. General Breedlove has testified before us and has foreshadowed to our committee his concern of the snap exercises that Russia is using that have translated into actual military action and the inability to discern when an exercise is going on or when an actual military action is going to be pursued.

As you look at this, my concern has been—I think a lot of people who are looking at it are very concerned that these exercises are not training but they are actually practicing. I would love to hear from both of you your thoughts on the Russian posture and the exercises that they are undertaking.

General STEWART. The recent snap exercises have been realistic. They have been threatening. They show a level of sophistication that I have not seen in the 20 or so years that I have been watching Russian/Soviet activity. It certainly looks as realistic training as anything I have seen the Russians do.

Now, whether that is training because of the improved military, improved technology, lessons learned from what they have seen us do, or genuinely practicing for out-of-area or defense of Russian sovereignty, quote "sovereignty," they are as realistic as anything that I have seen the Russians do over the last 20 years.

There is some evidence that previous snap exercises were great rehearsal exercises for their deployment into Syria. So if you take that as a model, then you can extrapolate that these practice, very

deliberate, very thoughtful, high-intensity rehearsals could be rehearsals for some other either localized or out-of-area operations.

General MARRS. Sir, I think I would echo General Stewart's comments and just underscore that our impression has absolutely been that Russia has been evolving the art of using these exercises to create ambiguity and within that ambiguity make our task of warning against potential action more difficult.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Lieutenant General Stewart, so what I am hearing here, Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, are the four national threats. We all agree on that. And global jihad is our growing transnational threat. And part of what makes answering these difficult is that they all require very different approaches to deal with them.

So terrorism requires more special forces; China, you know, requires us to have a strong maritime and naval capability; the Russians require the ground forces; and Iran and Korea will continue to use asymmetrical tools to basically mess with us.

From your perspective, is the U.S. meeting these threats with the right balance of resources at this point or into the future? And does refocus towards Asia or the proposed rotational brigade that we are having going through Eastern Europe, for example, allocate our resources smartly enough, or is this an area where we are probably missing the mark, now and maybe looking 5 years forward?

General STEWART. So I am always hesitant to talk about the right force construct, because that really is an intelligence question, and I would defer to the service chief and the chairman to talk about the right force construct. Certainly in my conversations and in the things that we have reported, we have explained the totality of the threat, the challenges that we face. And I think, I would like to defer to the services and the chairman to talk about what is the right construct military forces.

Mr. GALLEGO. I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't know if you can do it in this setting or not, but one of the things that concerns me is the link between Russia and Iran, the new amount of money that Iran now has, obviously, to purchase weapons, most of which would likely come from Russia, and the impact that that may have on the strategy in Syria.

General STEWART. One of the things that we assess, in addition to Russia moving into Syria to prop up the Assad regime, is Russia's ability to demonstrate their advanced weapons capabilities, to buyers in the Middle East and across the globe. So we certainly expect that this show of capability as Iran gets additional resources as they come out of the sanction regime could lead to Iran purchasing advanced weapon systems from the Russians.

We have already seen them go through with the deal of the S-300. There is discussion about some of their aircraft that the Russians are using in the region. So I fully expect that Iran will use

some of their resources to continue to modernize their military forces and that their supplier of choice will likely be the Russians.

Mr. SCOTT. General, they already have the ability in Iran to hit a multitude of countries in the region, dozens of countries in the regions. The thing that they did not have was a quality targeting system and then questions about the actual capacity of the warhead, if you will, on the missile. Do you believe that our sanctions will hold in keeping them from getting better targeting and stronger warheads?

General STEWART. Our sanctions in the past have not kept the Iranians from developing the most sophisticated ballistic missile capability in the region, capable of reaching all of their potential adversaries, capable of reaching into Europe. They have not only built a very robust missile technology; they have improved their accuracy; they have improved their mobility. I don't see them changing that trajectory because their missile capability is a way to confuse, confound our actions, and it is a guarantee for the regime.

So I don't see sanctions changing that trajectory at all. I think as we lift sanctions, in fact, there is increase in likelihood that they will find ways to improve lethality, mobility, range of all of their missile systems.

Mr. SCOTT. Gentleman, thank you for your service. I will save the remainder of my questions for the next hearing.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman yields back.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, again, thank you for your service.

Russia has become to many a more serious threat over the course of the last 5 years, particularly with Putin. When we are making projections through intelligence, what is the likelihood of that leadership remaining past the end of the year? What does your intelligence tell you?

General STEWART. The likelihood that Putin will remain—

Mr. NORCROSS. Putin remains past the end of the year, because there are a number of folks who have come out publicly suggesting that the economy is strangling him and he is hanging on by a shoestring.

General STEWART. He has a weak economy. He has demographic issues within the country. I see no indications that Putin will not survive the near term, near term being the next year or so. Their out-of-area operations and the casualties and the economy could cause some internal unrest, but when you look at his—in spite of the economy, you look at his popularity ratings, all of us should be as popular as he is viewed in Russia.

The Russian people have a tendency to endure more suffering and pain than most of us are willing to accept. So I see no trend at this point that indicates that he will not be here through 2016 and beyond.

Mr. NORCROSS. So when we take a look back at what caused the downfall of the old Soviet Union, primarily, along with many other issues, it had to do with the economy that drove that nation into the ground.

With Iran now entering the oil market and along with the U.S. and international, that is a serious glut, where we are not hearing from any of the economic forecasters that that is going to rebound. That is their single driver for their economy. Do you see that trend continuing?

General STEWART. That trend will continue. It will challenge a number of domestic issues. It will cause them to reprioritize some of their military spending, so they will spend at a lower rate. It will challenge whether or not they can sustain large scale out-of-area operations, but I don't see it in the near term as a challenge to Putin and the regime.

Mr. NORCROSS. And just to follow up on one issue. You talk about his popularity ratings. Of course, anything that comes out of Russia you take with a grain of salt, has very little to do with the truth.

What independent assessment do you have that his popularity actually does remain strong with the general public?

General STEWART. I don't have any independent. I know what the Russians publish and I know that Russia also controls the narrative far better than we do in this country, in any Western country. So he is controlling the narrative, he controls to a great extent what the Russian people see and the conclusions that they draw from that, but there isn't anything that I have seen that genuinely refutes the belief that he is a strong leader. He is making Russia stand up to the West, he is demonstrating historical Russian desire to be a dominant world player.

I don't see anything outside of the Russian narrative that refutes that which they are feeding the Russian people. So in the absence of something definitive, the Russian people believe he is standing up to the West, they believe he is a strong and forceful leader, they believe he has put Russia in the rightful place where they should stand on the international stage, and the economy is painful, but it is worth enduring, because we are now a dominant power.

Mr. NORCROSS. The economy is also driving China in a direction that they are not comfortable with. In fact, we just read they laid off 1.2 million workers, which, given the size of the country, doesn't seem significant, but it is.

Do you see the economy driving their military program at a slower pace than it has been?

General STEWART. I have not seen a slower pace, though I suspect that if the economy continues the way it is, that they will have to again make some prioritization, they will reduce their activity, but I don't think they are walking away from this military modernization. It may slow, but they are not walking away from this military modernization. That is core to China's future.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. And I yield back.

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, General Stewart and General Marrs, for your service and for being here today to testify.

Like many of my colleagues, I want to focus my question on the implications of a resurgent Russia to the Intelligence Community. In addition to your testimony today, we have heard from senior

leaders in DOD, as well as leaders in academia, of Russia's resurgence and military modernization in terms of their ability to apply this hybrid threat model in Eastern Europe.

What is your assessment of how well our Intelligence Community is equipped to counter this hybrid threat, what changes have we made, and what changes do we still need to make in order to maintain pace with the very complex 21st century threats we are facing today?

General STEWART. I am not sure that I am at all comfortable with the hybrid threat description. I think most nation-states would be really insane to take us on in a conventional approach, because of our superiority in our conventional weapons systems.

So they are going to take us on in the information space and try to control and dominate the narrative, they are going to try to come after us in asymmetric large or small formations that will confuse our targeting effort. That only makes sense to counter the way we are structured and the way that we generally fight and have fought, for the last 15 or 20 years.

So I am sometimes anxious when I hear Russia ascribed to creating this hybrid threat warfare, because I think it just makes sense to counter our superior conventional capabilities.

Now, having said that, how do you defeat that? How do you get after that from an intelligence standpoint? That requires a significant more investment in understanding the open source environment, so that you can understand these little green men as they show up, because they are going to do some things in the open source that you ought to be able to exploit. You are going to require much more robust HUMINT [human intelligence] capability, and those HUMINT capabilities must be targeted against specific threats and specific regions. And then you have got to have a way to deal with the idea that an adversary will want to deny, degrade, deceive, destroy your information environment, and your information messaging.

So if you can think your way through those, at least those three layers, you have got a chance to defeat the, quote, little green men, and then be able to apply conventional military capabilities against an advance.

Ms. STEFANIK. Do you feel that the Intelligence Community is adequately equipped to address those threats that you just outlined and the changing nature related to the open source environment, the increase in HUMINT capabilities that we need? What changes do we need to make going forward?

General STEWART. So, yes, we are starting now to reenergize how we use open source as foundation to what we do in the Intelligence Community. I think for far too long we have invested in the high-end, high-technology collection where, in many cases, there is a great deal of information that we could use, foundational type of intelligence that is available open source, publicly available with limited or no expectation of privacy.

So we are starting to put the model together where we can leverage the open source environment. We are not there yet. We need a good governance model, we need a model that talks about ethical behavior in the open source environment, what are the right trade-crafts to use in the open source environment, how do you protect

private citizens', American citizens', information in that environment. So we are stepping our way through that now.

In terms of the HUMINT aspect, there is still more that we need to do in refining precisely where those hard targets are and investing that human capability against those hard targets. I think we are making progress, but we are not quite where we need to be at this point.

Ms. STEFANIK. General Marrs, do you have anything to add?

General MARRS. I think at this point I would just say that, and really it has been emphasized well by General Breedlove in his recent testimony, that there has been a concerted effort at the senior levels of the Department, not just in DOD with General Breedlove, the Secretary, and the chairman, but also working with Director Clapper on how to make these changes quickly. And I would be happy to talk in more detail in closed session on that.

Ms. STEFANIK. Great. Thank you for your testimony.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Ms. Gabbard.

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to run through a few questions in different parts of the world, the first starting with Iran. I know that our intelligence in the past has been relatively limited or poor, and I am wondering now in the post-Iran deal world that we are living in how your intelligence picture has changed or improved, or what you are looking at in helping us both as we are looking at the implementation of the deal, but also what is happening in Iran overall.

General STEWART. I hate to do this, I really do, but I would like to take this to a closed session.

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. I thought you would say that.

General STEWART. Because I think talking about where our footprint and where our opportunities might be would—

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. Moving over to Eastern Europe, what would you say Russia's priorities are, given their actions and activities in Syria as well as Ukraine? And then also on the Ukraine side, how much and how effectively have you seen the Ukrainian military using their new special forces and unconventional tactics against the so-called Russian separatists there along the border?

General STEWART. I am going to take the first question, and then maybe General Marrs will take the Ukrainian question.

Russia has not lost sight of Ukraine as an important, maybe even vital, interest to be included as part of the Russian Federation. So I view their activity in Syria as multidimensional, one of which is, how do we take the international community's focus off of Ukraine while we keep it in this state of isolated conflict and maybe cause the Ukrainian regime to do something that falls outside of the Minsk agreement and, therefore, allows Russia to continue its activity. So I think part of—one of the things that I believe Russia has done in Syria is taken our attention off of the Ukraine. And I suspect that at some point they will come back to Ukraine either under the guise that, we have solved the problem for you in the West by our actions in Syria, therefore, you ought to lift your concerns, your restrictions, and your sanctions against our activities in Ukraine, and you ought to give us some dividend,



and that dividend might be defined as, your hands off of Ukraine, because it is part of our sphere of influence.

So I think this is a very—and maybe I am ascribing too much to the Russian thinking, but I think this is part of the grand plan that Ukraine remains in a state of conflict, but never lose sight of the fact that Ukraine must be part of the Russian sphere of influence and outside of the West's.

General MARRS. And I think my answer to your second question regarding the effectiveness of the Ukrainian special forces has been improved and, I think, led to an increased stability—or increased agility on the part of Ukraine to respond to separatists' actions.

Ms. GABBARD. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Generals, for being here today.

I have two areas of concern: one is obviously the foreign fighters as they flow back and forth from Syria and Iraq. General Breedlove was quoted, I think just recently in regards to his testimony, you know, the fact that, you know, the daily flow into Europe, you know, they are using that disguise of refugees coming in, and they are really taking advantage of that in Europe, but also possibly here in the United States.

Can you comment in regards, do we have a good handle on that or not?

General STEWART. In Europe, I am not sure that there is a great handle on how you sift through potential foreign fighters, jihadists that are coming in through this mass migration. So that is an issue, I think, there.

I am not concerned about the U.S., because of the capabilities that we have within our homeland defense. The things that we can do with the biometrics and the screening process makes it far less likely for them to just come across the border hidden within a mass wave of migrants.

So I think it is less of a challenge here. It is not a completely diminished challenge, but I think it is far less here than it is in Europe.

Mr. NUGENT. But wouldn't that be the case—I mean, obviously that is true if they are coming through a point of entry in the United States—

General STEWART. Right.

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. But if they are coming across an open border area, obviously we don't have the ability to do that kind of screening, correct?

General STEWART. Correct. Open borders, if they don't come through, I don't—I don't put that at the high end of my threat concern.

Mr. NUGENT. Okay.

General STEWART. And let me tell you where I put my threat concern at with migrants. My threat concern with migrants are the migrants who are legitimately moving to get out of a crisis environment. They get to a nation-state, whether it is here or in Europe.

They get marginalized, they get isolated, they get dissatisfied, they feel disenfranchised, they don't have opportunity, and they be-

come a source to be recruited and radicalized, because now they view their situation as worse now than it was in the past.

Mr. NUGENT. You are seeing that, you know, in Germany and others where they are actually going and getting a one-way visa back to the country they came from, whether it is Afghanistan or Iraq or Syria, because they feel marginalized within the country they have gone to, and I get that. I mean, we see that across the board where people can be self-radicalized for whatever reason they may harbor within their hearts, but I worry about those that have the military experience, and I am sure you do too, of having served in combat.

It is a big difference between reading about it and actually doing it. So I am concerned that—it seems like that is an issue that obviously needs more discussion.

But getting to Russia in particular, I would just tell you that, you know, from the—you know, the approach that we have taken, and one of the generals that sat here and testified in front of us said, you know, we are hugging the bear. We thought that we could embrace Russia and live with them in a way that we are going to have mutual agreement. And obviously in their reaction and what they are doing in the Baltic States, what they have done in Crimea shows that that was a miscalculation.

Now, I don't know if it was a miscalculation because of our intelligence ability to let our executive branch know, or if we told them and they just didn't act. Can you give me some—as we relate to the State Department back and forth?

General STEWART. I think maybe some of this is a little bit of revisionist history—

Mr. NUGENT. Okay.

General STEWART [continuing]. To be quite honest. Russia—Russia is carrying out and acting today in the same way that a nation-state—

Mr. NUGENT. Well, I agree, but did we not try to take a different approach with Russia? As one of the generals that sat here and spoke about it, we were trying to hug the bear.

General STEWART. Absolutely.

Mr. NUGENT. We were trying to get them to—we thought we—

General STEWART. And wouldn't that have been a—

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. Had a different reset.

General STEWART. Wouldn't that have been a positive thing to do—

Mr. NUGENT. Oh, absolutely, but—

General STEWART [continuing]. If we could have gotten the Russians to—

Mr. NUGENT [continuing]. But did we honestly—did they have the intel to give them the proper perspective to know that, hey, listen, that may or may not happen? That is all I am asking.

General STEWART. I think we had a pretty good sense that Russia would act in its interests, that Russia would be concerned about being encircled and isolated by Western forces, that Russia would revert back to thinking—going back to czarist time about their role in the European continent. So all of that was available for folks to look at.

The approach that we took, whether it is to try to get Russia to act in a more responsible way within the international community, I don't know that any of us could have predicted that Vladimir Putin would come to power and would change that trajectory that was set by those leaders who preceded him. So it always looks better in retrospect—

Mr. NUGENT. Always.

General STEWART [continuing]. But I certainly think the policy of trying to get Russia to act in a different way than it had, in the competitive way that it had acted over the last previous 50 years, was probably a positive thing.

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I yield back. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford.

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you. Thank you, General, General.

I have two different questions on two different subjects. And I just go back to your comments about ISIS and the answer you just gave. I just need to fully understand this.

ISIL will probably conduct additional attacks, attacks in Europe and attempt to direct attacks in the United States homeland in 2016. I think that is, at least my constituents, what their fear is, that it won't—the lone attacker will probably give way to directed attacks. How do we—I am sure you have answered this already, but could you do it again? How do we address that? We know it is coming. We think it is coming, anyway. We strategize around it. What is our strategy? What do I tell my constituents about how we are going to direct—

General STEWART. I can tell you what the Intelligence Community will try to do: get as clean an understanding of the foreign fighters who have gone into Iraq and Syria to support ISIL; try to get the best appreciation for those who are flown back, and we have some techniques that has been very helpful; and most importantly, to make sure as a community, we share, not just across the defense intelligence community, but our law enforcement communities and all those who will see activities. That really is the key. If we can share this information that each of us have in our different silos, and I think that has gotten a lot better over the last several years, we have a great opportunity to counter some of these threats and challenges coming from overseas. So—

Mr. ASHFORD. So it is train—sorry.

General STEWART. I am sorry?

Mr. ASHFORD. No. I am sorry. Go ahead.

General STEWART. We will not stop the lone wolf attackers. That someone is going to get radicalized and someday pick up a weapon and go after Americans, that is almost impossible to stop, but we can certainly get a good sense of those who are acting overseas, those who have got military training, and those who we are seeing indications that they are either coming back or trying to influence individuals in this country.

Mr. ASHFORD. And I know Congress in various ways has attempted to address the refugee issue, the visa issue. Aren't those legitimate concerns? I mean, to me I, as a Member who cosponsored a bill on refugees, it wasn't that we didn't want refugees to come here, isn't it reasonable that the flow of ISIL-related individ-

uals back into Europe or into the United States through an existing program that is legitimate, I mean, you know, refugee program or visa program, isn't that a valid concern that we must have?

General STEWART. Absolutely legitimate, absolutely valid concern. Where it rises to the level of most dangerous threats for me, we have mechanisms in place, we have procedures in place that mitigates many of those concerns. So those that are coming through established borders, ports of entries and the like, not as great a concern. Could some come through borders where we don't have control? Absolutely. How high would I put that on the list of threats? Something to monitor, but not terribly high on my list.

Mr. ASHFORD. All right. And that is—for example, we don't stop a refugee program or we don't stop a visa program, but we think about it as something that could be an avenue of flow of—where there could be a flow of individuals that could, in fact, lead an attack.

I mean, my concern in listening to this for all year, year and a half now almost, is this sense that they are training people in Syria, they have sophisticated abilities, they haven't used their cyber ability apparently yet, but, like, they might or could in the future, but that when you train somebody and they are radicalized ab initio, they are radicalized there; it is not radicalizing a lone wolf in Nebraska, it is—and that person could come back into Europe or the United States or anywhere else, and they are doing it already in other parts, obviously, Libya and other parts of the world, and they could put together a force of like-minded people and, you know, attack us. That is not an—that is a concern, isn't it? Obviously, you have said it is, but—

General STEWART. That is a concern and that is a plausible scenario.

Mr. ASHFORD. And then my next question, thank you, is related to intelligence gathering and cyber and all these very high-tech fields that you have done a great job, I think, in elevating, and it is—but how do we in a general sense, how do we recruit our young people to do that work? How do we get them interested in not being in the private sector right away making, you know, bundles of money, and going into work for you? How do we do that, in your view? What are the recruitment tools?

General STEWART. Yeah. I am going to start a little bit, and then maybe General Marrs will pick this up.

I have found no problems with the marines, who are genuine patriots, who had great technical skills, who are willing to do this business in cyberspace when I was associated with U.S. Army Command. None of them were leaving because they could get paid more by any of the industry giants. They did this business because they were true patriots who wanted to serve their country.

Where I found folks who left, was because we didn't have any well-designed construct to retain them and allow them to continue to do this highly skilled work that they wanted to do. In spite of bonuses, we tended to move them off to do what they viewed as nontrivial missions. And so they weren't leaving for money; they were leaving because they couldn't get to do the things they wanted to do.

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, General. I am way over time, so—

The CHAIRMAN. General Marrs, is there anything you wanted to add on that question right quick?

General MARRS. Sir, I guess I would just say, having had some opportunities to be a consumer of cyber skills along the way, that absolutely the more we can get out early on and, I guess, expose our young folks to what is possible within this community, once they see that and the mission that is involved, it is pretty easy at that point to bring them on.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. The only thing I would add, General, is to the extent we can help in these career tracks, we want to be helpful. A lot of it is not within—or traditionally within the thing that we decide, but there are some aspects of this, and we want to be helpful in just what you said.

Ms. McSally.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and your service.

General Stewart, you mentioned, you know, the transnational threats, the ISIS threat, you know, certainly didn't have happen overnight. I talk about it as a generational threat. I don't think it is going to be defeated overnight.

In your best military judgment, you know, how long do you think we are going to be dealing with this type of threat? Again, it is right now ISIS, but it comes in many jihadist forms and affiliates in these ungoverned spaces. How long do you think we will be dealing with this as a major threat, requiring military capabilities, you know, to address the threat?

General STEWART. Yeah. That is a terrific question. We have spent a little bit of time recently looking at this particular threat, the ISIL, the center of gravity, what are their critical vulnerabilities, so that we could take this particular threat down. But the reality is that it is based on a very extreme Salafist ideology, and unless there is a narrative that counters that ideology, it will re-emerge someplace else in some other form.

That is probably not an ideology that we in the West can counter. We need our partners in the region who believe in the broadest sense of Islam and what it brings to the table to have this dialogue, this conversation about how do we—this very marginalized group.

When you take apart the 1.6 million Muslims and you whittle it down to this, Salafist jihadist, movement, you are probably talking less than a couple hundred thousand folks, who are as great a threat to Islamic regimes.

In fact, in many cases a greater threat to Islamic regimes than they are to the West. So we need them to counter that ideology and offer an alternative view of Islam that allows people to feel like they are part of a society that is looking to take care of their citizens, to enhance their opportunities, and, oh, by the way, practice their religion as they see fit.

Ms. MCSALLY. But is it safe to say that is a whole-of-society approach, whole-of-government, that there still might be a military, you know, potential that we need to be prepared for, given this threat? It is not going to go away in the next year or two, I guess, is what I am trying to say.

General STEWART. It is a long-term challenge that we always have to maintain that military capability to take out their command and control, take out their leadership, take out their networks that finance——

Ms. MCSALLY. Wherever they are.

General STEWART. Wherever they are.

Ms. MCSALLY. Whether that is Libya, Iraq, Syria.

General STEWART. Absolutely.

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Moving on again, my time in the military, you know, one of the biggest things we were concerned about was terrorists and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] coming together. And, you know, we have seen the desire, threat equals, you know, capability plus intent, of ISIS to acquire biological or chemical weapons or to recruit individuals who have those capabilities to create them.

Can you comment on any concerns you have about the nexus of ISIL and WMD?

General STEWART. Neither ISIS nor Al Qaeda has walked away from their desire to develop chemical, biological capability that they can use against the West.

Ms. MCSALLY. Got it.

General STEWART. They have retained that intent.

Ms. MCSALLY. And as far as the capability, can you comment on that, or should we wait until the classified?

General STEWART. I think we could talk about it more fully in the classified setting, but they will recruit expertise who can bring a range of capabilities to ISIL, whether that is financiers——

Ms. MCSALLY. Right.

General STEWART [continuing]. Media consultants, or chemical experts.

Ms. MCSALLY. Is it fair to say the difference between Al Qaeda, where they were trying to maybe acquire it where it existed, whereas ISIS is trying to recruit individuals with the expertise to potentially home-grow it?

General STEWART. There is some indication that ISIL is working very hard to develop their own capability.

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you.

Total different topic. Vice Admiral Branch, the chief of Naval Intelligence, and since November of 2013, he hasn't had a security clearance due to an ongoing investigation. A number of our colleagues wrote a letter to Secretary Mabus about this last week.

I can't picture—again, we are not going to weigh in on the investigation or anything like that, but being in a position where you have oversight of Navy intelligence, but you have no security clearance for over 2 years, I can't picture him not being able to be in meetings or provide oversight.

Can you share, General Marrs, how that impacts your day-in-and-day-out interaction with the naval intelligence operation?

General MARRS. I think day in and day out, our partnership is very, very strong at the senior leadership level, but——

Ms. MCSALLY. But he can't be in the room.

General MARRS. And I will say for the individuals who represent him, but I will absolutely agree that it is not an optimal situation for the Navy.

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. Thank you.

General Stewart, do you have anything to add? Okay. Thanks.

And one last topic on the reports coming out of CENTCOM [Central Command] where about 40 percent of analysts are saying that they feel that the integrity of the analysis is potentially not pure. I don't know how better to say that. General Stewart, do you have any—

General STEWART. I am so glad you asked that question, because my staff has been trying to keep me from not commenting on this, and I desperately want to comment on it, because I think the assertion that somehow 40 percent of that workforce either represents the totality of our analytic enterprise or truly represents that their judgments are not being accounted for disturbs me more than I can state.

We have a very robust process of thinking through the analytic effort, citing your sources, validating and vetting your sources. Opinions count slightly, only because you are a three-star, your opinions count. Analysts must apply the analytic rigor that is necessary to deliver that content in a compelling way to their commander.

The 40 percent, and I saw this number distorted to 400, is absolutely gross distortion of the challenges that they face down at CENTCOM. It undermines the great workforce that we have down there at CENTCOM, who every single day are giving their best judgment to that commander about how activities and actions are going on the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility].

Ms. MCSALLY. But there is an investigation ongoing.

General STEWART. There is an ongoing—

Ms. MCSALLY. So clearly there is some—

General STEWART [continuing]. Investigation.

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah. Okay.

General STEWART. We neither control the scope nor the pace of that investigation. And it is remarkable that folks have named names in an investigation prior to that investigation being completed. And if these individuals are exonerated, no one will retract the really distorted reporting that they have had in this situation.

Ms. MCSALLY. I am way over my time. So thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General STEWART. I thank you for giving me an opportunity—

Ms. MCSALLY. Absolutely.

General STEWART [continuing]. To vent on that one.

Ms. MCSALLY. Tell me how you really feel.

The CHAIRMAN. General, it is true, however, and I have read that report myself cover to cover, that they are reflecting in the survey data that there is more question at CENTCOM than the other combatant commands about whether the analysts believe that the work they do is altered in some way. And I understand your point about the 40 percent. I have, again, looked through all those charts, and I don't want to get into too much specifics here, but there is a reason to have an investigation.

And as I have said, we are working with the Intelligence Committee as well as Defense Appropriation Committee, being respectful of the IG [Inspector General] investigation, but it is a matter of interest for this committee if, in fact, intelligence is being shaped

in some way to please superiors, whether they be military or political superiors. So we are also trying to be really careful and not interfere with the IG investigation, but to say there—you did not say this, and I am not trying to put words in your mouth either. To say there is not an issue at CENTCOM, I think, would be also a misrepresentation of what this survey showed.

I am happy for any further comments you would like to make.

General STEWART. Mr. Chairman, there is an issue there. And the only thing that I have asked folks to do is let the investigation play out. Let's do a thorough investigation, let's understand what the real issues are down at Central Command, and not impugn the entire analytic effort of the defense intelligence enterprise—

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General STEWART [continuing]. Which is what some people have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah.

General STEWART. And that is disturbing when you are trying to lead a workforce that have the challenges that we talked about here, and yet they are questioned and challenged and judged poorly in the media and by a number of other individuals. It just is unfair to that workforce, it is unfair to the leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I think that is right. And you are perfectly right to defend the workforce that is doing incredibly difficult work every single day. And I think you are also exactly right that this investigation, both the IG investigation and what we are doing among the committees, ought to proceed, but as is appropriate for intelligence, it ought to proceed not in the public eye. And I think that, in my opinion, those are perfectly valid points to make. At the same time I would say, but they have got to proceed, because there is an issue there that needs to be pursued.

Mr. Walz, thank you for letting me take a little of your time—delay your time a little bit. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. WALZ. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you both for being here.

Again, I will try and get up to that line where I understand some of this may have to go into the classified, but after the 2009 Georgian incursion by the Russians, it became apparent to them, it looks like, that their armor wasn't where it needed to be, and there has been talk of how much they put into that and how much they have done.

I am curious about what you are able to gather from this, because we can gather that they have new main battle tanks and things like that, but putting an armored vehicle into the field is one thing, keeping it there is quite another.

I am more interested in what do we know about their maintenance or logistics, how do they do that, and are they doing it to a level that should be of concern?

General STEWART. Yeah. I think we probably should talk about this in a closed hearing, because they have systematically modernized, not just the weapons system, how they deploy and employ those forces and sustain those forces.

Mr. WALZ. Very good. No. I appreciate that.

The only other thing I would say as we are talking worldwide threats and those things, General Stewart, and I was out to visit



you, and several of us, where you made a statement that was pretty profound and stuck with me.

Some of our challenges worldwide and security challenges do start here at home, whether it is budgetary or, as the chairman has made a calling of, and I totally agree with him, on acquisition reform. And I think it is always important whenever we are discussing these capabilities what you need, we do have a lot of influence in that.

And your statement candidness on acquisition reform is something I repeat often and the chairman has pushed it. And I know this is a very hard lift, but I just wanted to reassure you, it is sinking, and it is obvious from the leadership and the chairman and many on this committee. So I thank you for that and do understand that as you have to think about all the things that are being asked about here, it does come back home to budgetary, it does come back home to acquisition, how fast you can field things you need to field. So I appreciate that help.

I yield back, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being here. I always appreciate those who give their lives to the cause of protecting their fellow human beings.

General Stewart, you know, there are obviously a lot of us that are concerned that we seem not to be having the kind of at least observable progress on ISIS, at least in the timeframe we would like to see it. I know everybody feels the same way. But in light of that, what do you consider to be the Islamic State's center of gravity? What are we doing to attack that center of gravity? What is the strongest thing that we can do against their weakest and most vulnerable and most critical—

General STEWART. So we define the center of gravity, the source of their power as either the virtual or the physical caliphate. So the existence of a caliphate, the narrative that the caliphate exists is a draw to forces.

Mr. FRANKS. Yep.

General STEWART. It is a draw to that ideology that, we are going to be part of this final caliphate and this final battle. So the caliphate must be destroyed. The notion, the narrative of the caliphate must be destroyed. We can go after that in a number of ways. You have got to go after the leadership. We can't take pressure off the leadership and we can't take pressure off of the middle management, the bureaucrats who run this proto-state we call ISIL and its caliphate. You have got to go after the narrative, as we talked about earlier. You have got to go after its financial networks. These are all critical vulnerabilities.

And you are seeing some increased activity against those financial nodes and networks, how they generate cash, because if they are going to act like a proto-state, they are going to have to generate cash, they are going to have to pay employees, they are going to have to run the machinery, they are going to govern like a state, and so you can start going after those things that will allow them to act as a proto-state, act as a caliphate. Leadership, command and control, financial networks, infrastructure, logistics nodes, and all those things are legitimate targets, and we are seeing quite a

significant increase from Central Command and others in going after those very specific nodes.

So the caliphate is under attack. How that will play out over the next 12 to 18 months will be where we will focus our effort to understand the impact that we are having going after those center of gravity and defeating the idea of a caliphate, both in the physical and virtual space.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I was glad to hear you mention going after the narrative. That is more of a strategic approach, in my judgment, because, you know, tactically we usually prevail, but oftentimes in the effort to try to prevent this motivation that the discussion the caliphate prevents, sometimes we don't address this on a strategic level. So I am glad to see. I know it is difficult for a military force to have a psychological approach, but it nevertheless is pretty important when a group feels that they are somehow transcendently justified in doing what they are doing. It is important to attack that, and I appreciate you saying that.

Let me shift gears, if I could, and probably, given the time I have, need to address this to both of you. What do you consider the importance of Iran's ballistic missile program to its military strategy in the wake of the Iran deal, or the JCPoA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]? And in your assessment, how likely is it that Iran will continue to move forward with the development and testing of these systems despite threats of new sanctions?

General STEWART. Iran's missile program is one of the centerpieces of defense of their regime. They have built a very robust missile capability in the face of 30-plus years of sanctions. There is no indication that they are going to walk away from their ballistic missile technology and capability. They will continue to improve their ranges, they will continue to improve lethality, they will continue to improve maneuverability, and I don't see that changing any time under any sanctions regime.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, it is not exactly encouraging, but I think you are absolutely right.

General, did you have any—

General MARRS. Sir, I would just add that absolutely Iran sees its ballistic missile capability as key to its power projection. And I guess of additional concern is what they have stated publicly is their intent to conduct another space launch potentially as early as this year, and that could unveil a capability that may have intercontinental range.

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I will try quickly here. Do you believe that Russia is attempting to supplant American leadership in the Middle East with a hegemony led by kind of a Moscow-Tehran combination?

General STEWART. In a word, yes.

Mr. FRANKS. All right. That is a fast answer.

Thank you very much, both of you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Having served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps, the only thing—you know, I walked away opposed to the stability operations, or what we used to call nation building, but now I have con-

cluded that the only thing worse than that is doing regime change without a follow-on stability operation or nation building, and that is what we have today in Libya. And I am just very concerned that the vacuum that has been created through regime change has given a real anchor for ISIS or for these extremist groups to operate out of.

To what extent do you see them moving out of Raqqa in Syria and over to Libya?

General STEWART. The specifics of any forces, ISIL forces, moving to Libya, I think we should talk about in a closed hearing.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay.

General STEWART. However, the Libyan branch of ISIL is the most capable and the next most dangerous branch of the ISIL enterprise.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. What I saw when I was in Iraq in 2005–2006 was that the Sunni Arabs felt pushed out of the Baghdad government, the Shia-dominated Baghdad government. And I think it is hard for us to understand, but they have such a vertically integrated form of government, that all the decisions really come out of Baghdad. I mean, there is no revenue at the local or the provincial level, and so when you use the term “pushed out of the government,” it is far more significant than anything that we can comprehend here. And that the Kurds had insisted on a provision in their constitution whereby they could form the semiautonomous regions. And when we look at where ISIS was able to come into Iraq and easily take over areas, they were all the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq. And I would hope that we could push our government to try and influence the Baghdad government to allow this formation of a semiautonomous region in a post-ISIS Iraq, but going to where we are right now, it would seem that we are making gains in pushing back the ISIS in Iraq. We have certainly just taken Ramadi, albeit probably destroyed it, take it.

Where do you see—what is the prognosis for Mosul right now?

General STEWART. I think every effort is being made to get after Mosul this year. As you know, urban operations is complex, it is fought in multiple dimensions. So isolating Mosul is the first step, whether or not the Iraqi Security Forces are ready to go in and systematically clear an urban environment, a large urban environment. I don’t believe that they have the capability. They will need a significant amount of help from coalition partners. I don’t know that they will ask for that help. So I am not as optimistic about seizing and clearing Mosul in this year, as I have read recently. We can begin the operations, we can begin to isolate, we can do some of the preparatory work, but securing, taking, and securing Mosul in the next 8 to 10 months is not something I am seeing in my crystal ball.

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Lastly, and this is to both of you, and that is, when I look at ISIS, they have maybe three streams of revenue coming in: one is through contributions from radical Islamists throughout the Islamic world; the second one is industries that they have taken over, whether petroleum or cement; and then the third is their ability to tax economic activity in the areas that they govern. To what extent have we compromised those three sources of revenue?

General STEWART. I think we have made a pretty significant dent in their oil revenues by targeting some of the transport. I think we have done significant dent in their cash reserves by striking some of those targets. The taxing of locals, I am not sure how successful we have been.

And your third area was?

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, I think contributions coming—

General STEWART. Contributions.

Mr. COFFMAN. Yeah. I think as long as they are seen as ascendant, that money is going to flow. And I think the fact that we have reversed some of that perception, I think, has been helpful.

General STEWART. Reversing the ascendancy will reduce the amount of support, external support, that they get.

Mr. COFFMAN. General.

General MARRS. The only thing I would add is that success, I think, against both the oil infrastructure and the banking facilities is a result of just some excellent Intel Community collaboration.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just touch on a couple things right quick. Afghanistan, we haven't talked about. To what extent do you believe that a significant terrorist threat to the United States would re-form in Afghanistan without constant pressure being applied against it, whether that be Al Qaeda or ISIS?

General STEWART. There is no doubt in my mind that if there is not constant pressure on either ISIL in the Uruzgan Province or remnants of Al Qaeda, that they will continue to pursue targeting U.S. and Western interests from safe havens in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General Marrs, do you have a different view?

General MARRS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Press reports indicate that an ISIS operative was captured, and hopefully, of course, he will be interrogated. My question is have interrogations been a significant source of intelligence that have helped prevent terrorist attacks in the past, and has that source of intelligence diminished in recent years?

General STEWART. Interrogation, as I understand it from the Army Field Manual, which is about establishing a rapport with the detainee so that you can get truly valuable intelligence, has worked. I don't know if I can quantify how much it has prevented terrorist activity, but that type of technique works, it gets good insights that lead to other operatives, it gives us insights into how the network operates. So there is value there, and ultimately that could prevent terrorist activity.

The, quote, enhanced interrogation techniques are a guarantee of having a detainee tell you what they want—what you want to hear in order to stop the pain.

The CHAIRMAN. Really what I was getting at is we hadn't been doing much questioning, because we hadn't had many captures in recent years. Isn't that right?

General STEWART. So you may have noticed an uptick in special operations intended to capture, interrogate, and gather materials that will give us greater insights into the network, and I think that will pay dividends in the long term.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah. I think a significant source of our information, we have not had in recent years, we ought to—hopefully will have it, that is part of the reason—this is not you all's issue, but we asked the administration to provide a plan on how they intend to deal with detainees that they capture in the future. It was one of the omissions in the report that we received last week.

That is all I have. Susan, do you have anything else? Okay.

Thank you both for being here. And this will conclude the open session of our hearing, and we will see you all momentarily upstairs. The hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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# **A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 2, 2016

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 2, 2016

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**Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith**

**HEARING ON**

**World Wide Threats**

**March 2, 2016**

The world is a complex and dangerous place, as Secretary Carter acknowledged when he recently highlighted five key national security challenges that are driving defense planning and budgeting.

The first challenge focuses on deterring Russian aggression. Russian nationalism has recently fueled a significant military build-up, a revanchist foreign policy, and expeditionary military activities. The Russian military is currently bolstering the Assad regime in Syria with the aim of asserting strategic influence in the region. In 2014, Russia illegally occupied Crimea and fomented the continuing separatist struggle in eastern Ukraine. Russia also sponsored separatist movements in Moldova and Georgia. Russian military forces, demonstrating enhanced capabilities and hybrid warfare techniques, have been instrumental in these endeavors. These concerning developments are further compounded by Russia's noncompliance with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and its policy of discrediting the United States, NATO, and the European Union.

The second challenge focuses on maintaining stability in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which includes an emergent China. Although we should not assume an adversarial relationship with China, its extensive military modernization efforts and its actions in the region certainly bear watching. It would be helpful if the Chinese would refrain from pressing territorial claims in a militaristic fashion and abide by internationally accepted norms. China's recent actions have demonstrated, however, that China is intent upon developing an arsenal of sophisticated weaponry and that it may be resorting to the use of gray zone tactics, short of open conflict, to achieve its foreign policy. We must be prepared to address these and other regional threats to stability now and in the future.

Continued North Korean belligerence comprises the third challenge. In recent months, North Korea's efforts to test nuclear and missile capabilities have flagrantly defied the international call for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula. The North Korean threat also incorporates the prospect of asymmetric or hybrid warfare methods. We must coordinate closely with our regional allies to adapt, as necessary, to deter, contain and marginalize the threat posed by the dangerous, and often unpredictable, North Korean regime.

Iran and the overall problem of terrorism represent the remaining two challenges. While we have secured an agreement with Iran regarding its nuclear

program, Iran continues to pose other challenges, including its backing of the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen. At the same time, the United States and Iran are assisting the Iraqi government in its struggle with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The ISIL threat continues to metastasize in numerous ways, from its recruitment of disaffected individuals through its use of social media, to its spread of violence as the means for extremism, to the kindling of a broader Sunni-Shi'a conflict.

For these reasons ISIL demands a lot of our attention, but we cannot disregard the broader terror threat picture. Core Al Qaeda has not been entirely eliminated, and some Al Qaeda affiliates continue to pose threats to the United States. We also need to stay mindful of the fragile security situation in Afghanistan, despite that country's notable progress. Similarly, Pakistan, a nuclear-armed state, is conducting operations against its internal extremist threats. Long-term Pakistani stability remains an open question. Other threats also abound. Threats emanating from, and within, the African and South American continents, cyber-threats, and the threats of arms proliferation and other forms of illicit trafficking are just a few examples taken from a broad spectrum.

It is, therefore, very important for us to receive clear, objective, and comprehensive assessments from the defense intelligence community, and that we provide the resources necessary for it to regularly and accurately produce those assessments. The threats we face today are very real and very complex. A deep and clear-eyed understanding of these threats and the trends and developments that drive them is fundamental to this committee's work in shaping the defense budget and in helping the Department of Defense and the rest of the national security establishment to perform their duties effectively. I thank our witnesses for appearing today.

Statement for the Record

Worldwide Threat Assessment

Armed Services Committee  
United States House of Representatives



Vincent R. Stewart, Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

March 2, 2016

*Information available as of February 29, 2016 was used in the preparation of this assessment*

**INTRODUCTION**

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and Members of the Committee, thank you for the invitation to provide the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) assessment of the global security environment and to address the threats facing the nation. They include a list of multifaceted challenges, adversaries, asymmetric threats, the emergence of foreign militaries with near peer capabilities, and highly adaptive transnational terrorist networks. This Statement for the Record has organized these threats regionally, followed by global issues such as Cyber, International Terrorism, and Foreign Intelligence capabilities, to include insider threats. These issues taken together reflect the diversity, scope and complexity of today's challenges to our national security.

The men and women of your DIA are stationed around the globe, leading the intelligence community in providing unique defense intelligence from the strategic to the operational to the tactical. They deliver decision advantage to warfighters, defense planners, the defense acquisition community and policymakers. DIA men and women — uniformed and civilian — know they have a unique responsibility to the American people and take great pride in their work. I am privileged to serve with them and present their analysis to you. My hope in this hearing is to help the nation — through the important oversight role of Congress — to better understand the global challenges it faces and to support this committee in developing possible responses to these threats. On behalf of the entire Defense Intelligence Enterprise, thank you for your continued confidence. Your support is vital to us.

**REGIONAL THREATS****MIDDLE EAST**

I will begin today with Middle East security challenges, where the region, in my opinion, is now facing one of the most dangerous and unpredictable periods in its modern history. The security challenges have rapidly multiplied since 2011, as nations are confronted with simultaneous internal and external threats including terrorism, subnational armed groups, and conventional military threats. The region's threat environment has become more dangerous and unpredictable with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's (ISIL) emergence, and many nations are using the rubric of combatting terrorists to eliminate their political or sectarian adversaries. Drivers of unrest — aging authoritarian leaders, lack of political transparency, corruption, insufficient economic opportunity, and sparse social mobility — will also remain, compounded by the consequences of the Arab Awakening: civil conflict, ungoverned spaces, social cleavages, instability spillover, and growing Iranian involvement. My comments on this volatile and important region will focus on Syria, Iraq and Iran.

**SYRIA:** The civil war in Syria is a manifestation of the region's precarious transition since 2011. As the two sides pursue political dialogue, the regime is unlikely to be militarily defeated or collapse in the near-term and is poised to enter 2016 in a stronger military position against the opposition in light of increased support from its key allies: Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, and Russia. Increased Russian involvement probably will also help the regime regain key terrain in high priority areas, such as Aleppo and Idlib.

Despite regime advantages, territory is likely to be contested in 2016. We anticipate the regime's strategy will be to bolster defenses along Syria's western spine — from northern Dara to northeastern Latakia — and to conduct operations to impede key opposition supply lines. We also expect the regime to press ISIL and secure areas around the Ash Shaer gas fields, degrading the group's presence around key energy infrastructure sites.

A divided Syrian opposition is likely to suffer from inconsistent command and control and access to resources. Anti-regime forces continue to fight each other and the regime, with al-Qa'ida's Syria-based affiliate Al-Nusrah Front and ISIL making gains at the expense of more moderate anti-regime forces. Increased Russian involvement is likely to harden the opposition's stance towards the regime and may undermine moderate forces cohesion, increasing the chance for radicalization among moderate opposition members. This could result in opposition groups cooperating or merging with terrorist groups to survive regime offensives. The Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Force likely will seek to cut lines of control to ISIL's de facto capital of Raqqa, but will probably be incapable of capturing it.

ISIL controls large swaths of Syria and Iraq, to include strongholds of Raqqa, Mosul, and Fallujah. In 2015, coalition airstrikes impeded ISIL's ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, caused it to curtail use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to lower its profile. In 2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL forces and emerging resource issues will probably challenge ISIL's ability to govern in Iraq and Syria. However, the group probably will retain large Sunni Arab urban centers, enabled by strong military capabilities, leadership, and command and control.



**IRAQ:** Systemic institutional deficiencies hinder the progress of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Shia and Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in achieving key military objectives against ISIL. The ISF lacks sufficient logistics and military preparedness, exacerbating poor morale. Force generation is complicated by a lack of experienced and qualified soldiers, while funding and materiel shortfalls hamper the Sunni mobilization program.

The ISF cannot defend against foreign threats or sustain conventional military operations against domestic challenges without continued foreign assistance. The recapture of Sinjar in November and the Ramadi government center in December depended on extensive coalition airstrikes and other support. Through 2016, the ISF writ large is likely to continue to need coalition support to combat ISIL on multiple fronts. Iraq is diversifying defense acquisitions through foreign suppliers such as Russia, Iran, and other non-U.S. suppliers to overcome equipment shortfalls and capability gaps. However, the ISF lacks a coherent procurement strategy, adversely impacting the interoperability of current and future military equipment.

In 2016, we expect the Government of Iraq to rely heavily on support from the primarily Shia Popular Mobilization Committee (PMC) forces. PMC forces, with ISF support, made gains last year against ISIL in the strategically important city of Baiji. They are now poised to attack ISIL in Baiji's surrounding areas. Kurdish forces have also re-taken territory from ISIL in Northern Iraq, and we expect continued Kurdish counter-ISIL operations in 2016. The Kurds likely will maintain, and possibly expand, their buffer zone with ISIL, which could include moving further into ethnically-mixed areas in northern Iraq. Such moves serve to amplify existing tensions

between the Peshmerga and Baghdad's forces in these areas, and threaten to intensify sectarian tensions between Arabs and Kurds in northern Iraq. While there have been no attacks against U.S. or coalition forces by Iran, Lebanese Hizballah, or their proxies, the potential threat will almost certainly persist through 2016.

**IRAN:** Iran remains a threat to regional stability as its national interests often diverge from our own and those of our regional allies. Iran's national security priorities are ensuring regime survival, expanding regional influence, and enhancing Tehran's military capabilities and deterrence posture.

Iran's security strategy is based on deterrence, withstanding an initial strike should deterrence fail, and retaliating to force a diplomatic resolution. Iran uses underground facilities and denial and deception extensively to conceal and protect its strategic assets. We do not anticipate changes to this security posture in 2016. Iran will focus on defending allies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, with its actions intended to increase regional influence at Western expense.

In January, Iran fulfilled key commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This extended the timeline for Iran to gather enough fissile material to build a weapon to about a year. In exchange, Iran received sanctions relief under the agreement, but such economic relief is unlikely to have an immediate impact on Iran's military capabilities. Over the long term, however, economic growth could support its conventional military priorities such as ballistic and cruise missiles, naval systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and air and air defense systems.

Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of striking targets throughout the region, ranging as far as southeastern Europe. Iran is likely to continue developing more sophisticated missiles, with improved accuracy, range, and lethality, irrespective of JCPOA implementation. Iran stated publicly it intends to launch the Simorgh Space-Launch Vehicle (SLV), which would be capable of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) ranges if configured as such. This test launch could occur in 2016.

Iran continues to develop additional anti-access/area denial capabilities. The Navy is fielding increasingly lethal weapons, to include more advanced mines, small submarines, armed UAVs, attack craft, and ship and shore based anti-ship capable cruise missiles. Tehran is also prioritizing the improvement of its air and air defense forces. For example, last year Iran signed a contract with Russia to purchase the advanced and highly capable S-300 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system, putting it one step closer to modernizing its antiquated air defense system.

The survival and stability of its key Iraqi and Syrian allies is an Iranian priority. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and Lebanese Hizballah are important foreign policy instruments, and provide Tehran the ability to project power in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and beyond. In 2016, we expect Iran and Hizballah to increase the provision of training, materiel, and funding to forces defending the Syrian Regime.

In Iraq, Iran and Hizballah train and advise Iraqi Shia militant groups, and provide training and equipment to Government of Iraq forces. Iranian advisers have planned and led operations against ISIL. Iranian-supported Iraqi Shia groups also warn of their willingness and preparedness to fight U.S. forces in Iraq. Although almost certainly not at the direction of Iran

or group leadership, low-level Shia group members may have conducted attacks against coalition aircraft and personnel.

In late 2015, Iran deployed over 1,000 ground troops to engage in combat operations in Syria. The arrival of Iranian ground forces coincided with the start of Russian airstrikes and increased Russian support to pro-regime operations. Tehran and Moscow have deepened their cooperation and are coordinating operations in Syria to preserve their Syrian ally, while also participating in diplomatic talks aimed at ending the conflict.

## **RUSSIA**

Moscow continues to devote major resources to modernizing its military forces, viewing military power as critical to achieving key strategic objectives: acknowledged great power status, dominating smaller regional states and deterring NATO from military action in Eurasia. Russian leadership considers a capable and survivable nuclear force as the foundation of its strategic deterrent capability, and modernized, agile general purpose forces as vital for Eurasian and limited out-of-area power projection.

Moscow's assertive pursuit of foreign policy and security objectives includes military involvement in Ukraine, operations in Syria and expansion of its military capabilities in the Arctic. Last year, the Russian military continued its robust exercise schedule and its aggressive, and sometimes provocative, out-of-area deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military activity in 2016, although Moscow's military modernization efforts will be complicated by economic and demographic challenges.

**Operations in Syria:** Moscow, a long-time ally of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, has supplied the Syrian regime with weapons, supplies, and intelligence throughout the Syrian civil war. Moscow began to deploy military forces to Syria in late August 2015, likely both to shore up the regime and assert Russia's status as a military player and powerbroker in the Middle East. The majority of Russian air strikes, artillery and rocket fires initially supported regime ground offensives and focused on opposition targets. An increasing number of strikes have since targeted Islamic State forces and facilities while sustaining operations against the opposition. Tensions between Russia and Turkey following the November 24, 2015 downing of a Su-24 bomber have not impacted the pace of Russian air operations.

Russia has sought to use the Syrian intervention as a showcase for its military modernization program and advanced conventional weapons systems. Moscow has launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) from Caspian Sea naval units and a Kilo-class submarine in the Mediterranean Sea. They have also demonstrated new capabilities with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) from its Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear H heavy bombers. These operations are meant to demonstrate strategic capabilities and message the West about the manner in which the Russian military could operate in a major conventional conflict.

Russia will almost certainly be able to logistically support its current level of operations in Syria via a mix of air, naval, and commercial maritime means for the foreseeable future. Moscow may opt to increase its forces in Syria if unable to make progress on securing increased acceptance and support for the Assad Regime, or if support to regime ground offensives are

unsuccessful. The most likely additions would be additional air and artillery assets, and potentially include Russian-led and -enabled proxy forces.

**Ukraine Crisis:** In September 2015, Moscow began placing more emphasis on diplomacy after a year of often intense fighting along the line of contact. While maintaining the strong separatist military force it trained, equipped, and furnished with leadership, the Kremlin focused on implementing the Minsk II agreement to institutionalize influence with Ukraine without risking more sanctions. Despite deemphasizing a military approach to Ukraine, Moscow retains the ability to rapidly redeploy troops to the border, including prepositioning logistics stockpiles.

**Military Doctrine and Strategy:** Russia's military doctrine reflects its perception of a heightened threat environment and sense of urgency about its preparedness to address those perceived threats. Moscow has moved to further improve its capabilities to meet what it sees as Western challenges to its internal stability, dominance of neighboring states and status as a great power abroad. In 2016, Russia will attempt to optimize its strategic forces, develop precision strike weapons, create efficiencies in defense industry, and improve professional military training and education. Russia will also seek to prepare its economy and state and local governments to transition from peace to war-time.

The Arctic — and associated international disputes — is a major emphasis for Russian security policy. Moscow has increased the readiness of its Northern Fleet through increased exercise activities and refurbishing airbases and has added air-defense and coastal-defense cruise missiles and ground force assets to the region. The Joint Strategic Command (OSK) "North," established in late 2014 on the basis of the Northern Fleet, will be reinforced by an air force and

air defense (PVO) army. Despite this increased military focus on the Arctic, we believe Russia will likely prefer to use existing multilateral and bilateral mechanisms to address competing claims and other security issues in the region.

**Force Modernization:** Russia's future force will be smaller, but more capable of handling a range of contingencies on Russia's periphery and expeditionary operations. We expect continued effort to improve joint operations capabilities and rearmament. Russia's ambitious rearmament program will be challenged by corruption and industrial inefficiency, Western sanctions, and the poor state of its economy. Moscow will continue its military modernization efforts despite these difficulties, but many major programs will likely face delays or cuts.

Russia places the highest priority on the maintenance of its robust arsenal of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Moscow is making large investments in its nuclear weapon programs. Strategic nuclear forces priorities include force modernization and command and control facilities upgrades. Russia will field more road-mobile SS-27 Mod-2 ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, deploy more Dolgorukiy class ballistic missile submarines with SS-N-32 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and will continue the development of the RS-26 ICBM and next-generation cruise missiles.

**Space and Counterspace:** Russia is advancing its space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability and has nearly doubled the number of satellites in its ISR constellation since 2014. Moscow views U.S. dependence on space systems as key enablers for military operations as a vulnerability. Russian military doctrine highlights counterspace capability as a force multiplier. Russia has a highly advanced space surveillance network, a

prerequisite for counterspace operations, and is modernizing and expanding these systems.

Russia's counterspace capabilities include satellite warning-enabled denial and deception and jamming systems targeting satellite communications. Russian leaders assert that their armed forces have antisatellite weapons and conduct antisatellite research.

### CHINA AND NORTH KOREA

**Chinese Force Modernization:** China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve its capability to fight short-duration, high-intensity regional conflicts. While preparing for a Taiwan contingency remains the primary driver of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization, the Chinese military has increased its preparations for other contingencies, including conflicts in the East or South China Seas.

In addition to modernizing equipment and operations, the PLA is undergoing massive structural reform. Changes being implemented include increasing the number of Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force personnel at the expense of ground forces, establishing a theater joint command system and reducing their current seven military regions down to five joint theaters of operation. The emphasis on joint commands reflects China's intention to emulate the style of joint operations pioneered by the U.S.

A key component of PLA strategy in a regional contingency is planning for potential U.S. intervention. China has the world's largest and most comprehensive missile force, and has prioritized the development and deployment of regional ballistic and cruise missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities against U.S. forces and bases throughout the region. They continue to field an anti-ship ballistic missile, which provides the capability to attack U.S.



aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean. China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, capable of striking Guam, during its September 2015 military parade in Beijing.

The PLA is modernizing its nuclear forces by enhancing silo and underground facility-based ICBMs and adding more road-mobile systems. In addition, the PLA Navy deployed the JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in 2015, which, when armed with the JL-2 SLBM, provides Beijing its first sea-based nuclear deterrent.

**South China Sea (SCS):** China has long identified the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity as a “core interest” and has embarked on a multi-year, whole of government approach to securing Chinese sovereignty over the area within the “nine-dash line” as Chinese territory. In 2015, China shifted from enlarging and building its outposts in the SCS to developing them for civilian — and eventually military — occupation and use. In 2016, China likely will continue to add dual-use capabilities to these man-made features, including harbors, communications and surveillance systems, logistics support facilities, and airfields. China’s military capabilities in the SCS have been enhanced with the recent deployment of long-range surface-to-air missiles to the Paracel Islands. The PLA’s response to recent U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations, as well as an Australian ISR flight in December, demonstrate that Beijing recognizes the need to defend these outposts and is prepared to respond to any military operations near them.

**Defense Spending:** China has the fiscal strength and political will to support robust defense spending growth for the foreseeable future. In 2015, China announced a 9.2 percent inflation-adjusted increase in its annual military budget, to \$144 billion, continuing more than two decades of annual defense spending increases. Data analysis since 2006 indicates China’s

officially-disclosed military budget grew at an inflation-adjusted average of 9.8 percent per year.

**Space and Counterspace:** China possesses the world’s most rapidly-maturing space program, using on-orbit and ground-based assets to support civil, economic, political, and military objectives. In parallel, China continues to develop counterspace capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries in a crisis or conflict.

**DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (DPRK):** North Korea remains a critical security challenge for the U.S. Despite significant resource shortfalls and aging hardware, the DPRK maintains a large, conventional, forward-deployed military and continues to improve its ability to launch rapid, small-scale attacks against South Korea. North Korea’s continuing efforts to construct and use underground facilities to protect and strengthen the defense of key elements of its leadership and military. DPRK leadership’s willingness to ignore the plight of their people yet undertake provocative actions against Seoul — demonstrated during its August 2015 ambush of South Korean soldiers — poses a serious threat to the U.S. and its regional allies. We also remain concerned about North Korea’s proliferation activities in contravention of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program and evolving ballistic missile programs underscore the growing threat. The DPRK’s display of a new or modified road mobile ICBM during a recent parade and its 2015 test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile capability highlight its commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear delivery options, while strengthening missile force survivability. North Korea also continues efforts to expand its stockpile of

weapons grade fissile material. In early January, North Korea issued a statement claiming it had successfully carried out a nuclear test, and on 7 February, Pyongyang launched a SLV from a west coast testing facility. The technology involved in a satellite launch would be applicable to North Korea's other long-range missile programs.

## **SOUTH ASIA**

**AFGHANISTAN:** In 2015, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) took primary responsibility for security in Afghanistan for the first full year. The Afghan National Army conducted several independent multi-corps operations against the insurgency in diverse regions of the country. Security forces also successfully secured almost all provincial capitals and national lines of communication, to include major highways. A positive development in the evolution of the ANDSF is the use of special operations forces to effectively respond to terrorist threats and to deny safe haven to networks across the country, albeit with coalition support.

Despite these increased capabilities, the ANDSF is still facing significant challenges in leadership, combat enablers, logistics and sustainment, and ministerial capacity. The ANDSF cannot manage the insurgency and ensure security across Afghanistan without further improvement in these key areas and the development of human capital. The 2015 fighting season highlighted these shortfalls and a security posture which is overstretched and ineffectively utilized. The temporary fall of Kunduz City in September 2015, the result of Taliban efforts to expand operations in northern Afghanistan and exploit ANDSF capability gaps, illustrated these deficiencies. Despite the Afghan Army's ability to mount effective

counterattacks to regain lost terrain — as in Kunduz —the force is challenged to effectively employ organic aerial and ground fire enablers in support of reactive operations.

The late July announcement of former leader Mullah Omar's death, and the contentious accession of new leader Mullah Mansour, led to the emergence of a Taliban opposition faction in late 2015. Infighting between Mansour's supporters and the opposition has occurred, and the Taliban have faced competition from the ISIL's emergent regional affiliate. The Taliban and the ISIL are focused on countering the international presence and expanding territorial footholds in Afghanistan. In the 2016 fighting season, we expect the Taliban-led insurgency will try to build on its temporary victory in Kunduz by attempting to surround and pressure population centers. They will also seek to make incremental gains in rural areas and conduct high-profile attacks against government and civilian targets in key cities, particularly Kabul.

**PAKISTAN:** In 2016, Islamabad will face internal security threats from militant, sectarian, and separatist groups. ISIL in Khorasan and al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent also will remain significant security concerns for Islamabad. Counterinsurgency operations along Pakistan's Western border and paramilitary operations in Karachi have had some success in reducing violence and are likely to continue.

Pakistan's nuclear stockpile continues to grow. We are concerned that this growth, as well as the evolving doctrine associated with tactical nuclear weapons, increases the risk of an incident or accident. Islamabad continues to take steps to improve its nuclear security, and is aware of the threat presented by extremists to its program.

**INDIA and PAKISTAN:** Tensions between India and Pakistan subsided in late 2015 following high-level diplomatic engagement and an agreement to continue talks next year. However, there remains a significant risk that tensions could once again escalate with little warning, particularly if there is a large-scale terrorist attack in India.

## **AFRICA**

Africa's security environment is volatile due to dysfunctional political systems, conflict, and permissive environments for transnational terrorist and criminal groups. The region remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks, civil conflict, outbreaks of mass violence, trafficking networks, and humanitarian emergencies. Additionally, depressed global commodity prices and internal economic mismanagement and corruption are negatively impacting Africa's economic growth prospects and limiting government resources, weakening state capacity to respond to security threats. African and UN forces are responding to most security challenges, but most of the region's militaries continue to require sustained international assistance to address the continent's security environment.

In North Africa, years of civil conflict over political control of Libya and an expanding extremist presence in the country are the most pressing security concerns. UN sponsored negotiations to end the political impasse in Libya are slowly progressing, though obstacles to establishing a unified and functioning government will persist. ISIL has taken advantage of this permissive environment to establish a stronghold in the coastal Libyan city of Surt. Libya's instability has enabled the flow of illicit activity across the country's porous borders and increased concerns over a heightened terrorist threat across North Africa and the Sahel region. The Libyan conflict

and terrorist safe haven will persist until an inclusive unity government is established and secured by a loyal and capable military, which is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

West Africa's Sahel and Lake Chad regions are also contending with a number of violent extremist groups. The military forces within this region are stretched to defend against entrenched extremist groups or to confront cross-border extremist attacks. Given the enduring presence of terror groups in northern Mali, partner nations are working with Bamako to help reform and improve its military, and UN forces are securing major towns in the country's northern region. However, much work remains to be done to contain extremist threats in Mali and across the Sahel region. In northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad region, terror attacks by the Islamic State (IS)-West Africa, also known as Boko Haram, persist and are likely to continue despite the combined military efforts of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. The four states are working to operationalize the Multi National Joint Task Force to better combat IS-West Africa, but the results have been limited and efforts to address the socio-political drivers of IS-West Africa's success have lagged.

Parts of central and eastern Africa are at risk of instability over the next year, necessitating the continuing presence of peacekeepers. In Somalia, al-Shabaab attacks and control of some rural areas will persist as African Union troops, supported by the nascent Somali National Army, attempt to sustain control of southern region population centers. The January 15 al-Shabaab attack on a Kenyan military camp in southern Somalia highlighted the fragility of the country's security environment.

The risk of episodic violence in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan will also continue despite peace and stability efforts. In Burundi, opposition to President Nkurunziza's third term has increased the risk of ethnic violence with potentially destabilizing regional implications. Ongoing efforts to extend presidential terms in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Republic of Congo could spark new episodes of unrest. Additionally, the potential death or incapacitation of several heads of state throughout the region, especially in Zimbabwe, would contribute to a heightened risk of regional instability.

### **LATIN AMERICA**

Latin American nations continue to confront transnational threats challenging regional stability and prosperity, and the region remains vulnerable to transit by bad actors. At the same time, nations outside the hemisphere are seeking greater regional influence.

Mexico remains the primary transit country for U.S.-bound cocaine, and a major supplier of methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras face some of the highest levels of violence in the world, exacerbated by drug trafficking and gang activities. Colombian cocaine production significantly increased in 2014, the majority of which is destined for the U.S. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgent group is in peace talks with the government and has 5,000-7,000 members capable of surging short-duration offensives against government outposts and critical infrastructure. The FARC, the National Liberation Army, and criminal bands continue to profit from the drug trade.

Russia continues to engage with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela and probably wants access for Russian military forces to ports and airfields in those countries.

## **GLOBAL THREATS**

### **CYBER**

DIA remains concerned about the growing capabilities of advanced state actors – such as Russia and China – as they seek to gain advantage through knowledge and understanding of Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, systems, and networks. Advanced state actor aggregation of bulk data obtained from compromises could be used to conduct pattern analysis possibly exposing sensitive operations or relationships and their demonstrated access to networks could threaten data integrity within Defense databases. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant threat to conduct disruptive cyber-attacks as an asymmetric response, raising the possibility of unintended escalatory consequences. Each of these state actors continue to employ a combination of government personnel, contractors, and loosely affiliated or ideologically aligned hackers, augmenting their capabilities and challenging our ability to attribute malicious cyber activity.

International progress toward agreement on accepted and enforceable norms of behavior in cyberspace may provide an opportunity to limit the scope and scale of nation-state cyber activities and establish parameters for deterrence of malicious cyber operations. However, non-state actors' use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open source research will endure as an enabler to their global decentralized operations, and the potential exists for a "lone wolf" cyber-attack.



**TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM**

As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has now become the most significant terrorist threat to the U.S. and our allies. In 2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and Syria and expanded globally, establishing official branches in Libya, Sinai, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Caucasus. Branches in Libya and Sinai posed the greatest threat in 2015, but we assess that other branches will likely grow increasingly dangerous as we move into 2016. Emerging branches include those in Mali, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Tunisia, Somalia, and possibly other countries. Spectacular external attacks demonstrate ISIL's relevance and reach and is a key part of their narrative.

ISIL will likely increase the pace and lethality of its transnational attacks as infrastructure and capabilities mature. It will purposefully attempt to stoke sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni, and between the West and Islam, to create the chaotic environment in which it thrives. ISIL will probably conduct additional attacks in Europe and attempt to direct attacks on the U.S. Homeland in 2016. We expect that ISIL leaders in Syria will be increasingly involved in directing attacks rather than just encouraging lone attackers. ISIL's foreign fighter cadre is core to its external attack capability, and the large number of western jihadists in Iraq and Syria will pose a challenge for western security services.

We also assess that Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE) will continue to pose a threat to DoD interests. Although HVEs are likely less able to conduct complex or spectacular attacks, difficulty in detecting preoperational planning makes them more likely to succeed. Lone actors

continue to find inspiration from ISIL propaganda. Since 2004, more than half of HVE plots in the U.S. either targeted or considered targeting DoD facilities or personnel.

Al-Qa'ida also remains a serious threat to U.S. interests worldwide. It retains affiliates in Yemen, Somalia, North Africa, Syria, and South Asia. International focus on ISIL may allow al-Qa'ida to recover from its degraded state. We are concerned al-Qa'ida could reestablish a significant presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, if regional counterterrorism pressure decreases.

### **FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE THREAT**

Foreign intelligence threats continue to expand and pose grave persistent threats to the DoD, its personnel, and capabilities. Our adversaries collect intelligence to enable their planning and operations and to counter our strategic and operational activities. Their collection against the Defense Industrial Base erodes U.S. military and technological advantages. Insiders also continue to constitute a major threat. Insiders who disclose sensitive U.S. government information without authorization will remain a significant threat in 2016. The sophistication and availability of information technology that can be used for nefarious purposes exacerbate this threat both in terms of speed and scope of impact.

Russia, China, and Iran are the most persistent and enduring foreign intelligence challenges for DoD. Cuba also remains a critical counterintelligence threat. Russia has the most sophisticated intelligence services; China's are the most prolific, using a variety of techniques and resources to collect vast amounts of valuable sensitive and classified DoD information; and Iran's services

remain an aggressive foreign intelligence challenge. In addition, a number of other foreign intelligence entities, including non-state groups, also continue to develop their capabilities.

These hostile foreign intelligence entities focus not only on targeting our armed forces and warfighting capabilities, but also increasingly pose threats to our supply chain, technologies, research and development, defense intelligence capabilities, and critical infrastructure.

Acquisition of commercially available technology makes it easier for less sophisticated foreign intelligence entities to acquire technical equipment and use it to target the U.S. Some of these foreign intelligence entities also seek to influence our national policy and decision-making processes.

**Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, USMC**  
**Director, Defense Intelligence Agency**

Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart became the 20th Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance on 23 January 2015. He formerly served as the Commander, Marine Forces Cyber.

Lieutenant General Stewart received his baccalaureate degree from Western Illinois University, Macomb, IL, where he majored in History (1981). He also earned master's degrees in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport, RI (1995) and in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, Washington, DC (2002).

His military education includes: The Basic School, Quantico, VA, (1981-82); The Armor Officer Basic Course, Fort Knox, KY, (1982); The Basic Communications Officer Course, Quantico, VA, (1985); The Cryptologic Division Officer's Course, Washington, DC, (1986); The Amphibious Warfare School, Quantico, VA, (1988-1989); The Naval Command and Staff, Naval War College, Newport, RI, (1994-1995); The School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, VA, (1995-1996); and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Ft. McNair Washington, DC, (2001-2002).

Lieutenant General Stewart's principal command tours include: Tank Platoon Leader with Company A, 1st Tank (1982-1983) and Executive Officer, Headquarters and Service Company, 1st Tank Battalion (1984-1985) Camp Pendleton, CA; Company Commander with Company I, Marine Support Battalion, Adak, Alaska, (1986-1988); Company Commander with Headquarters and Service Company, 2d Radio Battalion (1989-1990); Company Commander with Company E, Marine Support Battalion, Misawa Japan (1992- 1994); Commanding Officer, 1st Intelligence Battalion, Camp Pendleton, CA, (1999-2001); and Commanding Officer, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, NC, (2006-2008).

His principal staff assignments include: Project Officer, Light Armored Vehicle, Anti- Tank, Twenty-Nine Palms, CA, (1983-1984); Assistant Signals Intelligence Officer, 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, (1990-1991); Assistant Operations Officer, 2d Radio Battalion, Camp Lejeune, NC, (1991-1992); Chief, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, Experimental, Quantico, VA, (1996-1999); Deputy Director, Intelligence Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, C3I (2001-2002); Deputy G-2, Marine Forces Central Command (2002); Senior Intelligence Planner, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (2002-2005); Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Marine Corps Forces Command, Norfolk, VA, (2005-2006); Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, NC, (2008-2009); and Director of Intelligence, HQMC, Washington, DC, (2009-2013).

Lieutenant General Stewart's military decorations include: the Defense Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit with one gold star; the Bronze Star; the Meritorious Service Medal with one gold star; the Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal, with two gold stars; the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal; the Combat Action Ribbon; the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal; and various unit awards.

**Maj. Gen. James Marrs**  
**Director for Intelligence, J-2**

Major General James R. Marrs is the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. He serves as the principal intelligence adviser to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is responsible for all aspects of the management and execution of the Joint Staff's intelligence support to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. He leads a team of professionals providing current and crisis intelligence, warning, and intelligence insights and advice to operations, policy and plans, and acquisition.

Major General Marrs was commissioned in 1987 as a distinguished honors graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. His career includes a variety of duties spanning operations, strategy, policy, and plans. His deployments include participation in operations Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Southern Watch, and Enduring Freedom, and he has commanded at the squadron, group, center, and wing levels.

Major General Marrs is a graduate of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. He also served as a special adviser to the Vice President of the United States, where he provided advice and expertise on a range of national security issues. Prior to his current assignment, General Marrs served as the Director for Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland.

**EDUCATION**

1987 Bachelor of Science, International Affairs, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.  
 1989 Master of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 1993 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.  
 1998 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 1999 Master of Airpower Art and Science, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.  
 2003 Senior Service School, National Defense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va.  
 2006 National Security Management Course, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y.  
 2007 Executive Leadership Seminar, Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill  
 2009 Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.  
 2010 Senior Executive Fellows Program, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.  
 2014 Senior Joint Information Operations Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

**ASSIGNMENTS**

1. June 1987 – July 1989, Student, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2. July 1989 – January 1990, Student, Intelligence Officer Technical Training, Goodfellow AFB, Tex.
3. January 1990 – November 1992, Intelligence Requirements Officer, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
4. November 1992 – May 1993, Chief, Center C4I Systems, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
5. May 1993 – August 1993, Chief, Command and Control Warfare Tactical Analysis Branch, Air Force Electronic Warfare Center, Kelly AFB, Tex.
6. August 1993 – March 1994, Command Staff Analyst, Commander's Action Group, Headquarters Air Intelligence Agency, Kelly AFB, Tex.
7. March 1994 – August 1997, Operations Officer, 18 Intelligence Squadron, Schriever AFB, Colo.
8. August 1997 – July 1998, Student, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
9. July 1998 – June 1999, Student, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

10. June 1999 – August 2000, Chief, Air and Space Strategy Branch, Directorate of Strategic Planning, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
11. August 2000 – February 2001, Chief, Information Operations, and Speechwriter for the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Operations Group, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
12. February 2001 – June 2001, Director of Operations, 70 Intelligence Wing, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
13. June 2001 – August 2002, Commander, 91st Intelligence Squadron, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
14. August 2002 – April 2003, National Defense Fellow, Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Va.
15. April 2003 – June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, D.C.
16. July 2005 – June 2007, Commander, National Security Agency/Central Security Service Texas, and 543rd Intelligence Group, Lackland AFB, Tex.
17. June 2007 – April 2009, Commander, 480th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Wing, Langley AFB, Va.
18. April 2009 – June 2009, Student, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
19. June 2009 – July 2010, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
20. July 2010 – July 2011, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C.
21. August 2011 – July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director of Intelligence, United States Forces-Afghanistan
22. July 2012 – February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2 and Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
23. March 2014 – June 2015, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, Md.
24. June 2015 – present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

#### **SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS**

1. April 2003 – June 2005, Special Adviser to the Vice President, National Security Affairs, the White House, Washington, D.C., as a Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel
2. June 2009 – July 2010, Senior Air Force Planner and Chief, Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Security Council Matters Division, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel
3. July 2010 – July 2011, Senior Military Assistant, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C., as a Colonel and Brigadier General
4. August 2011 – July 2012, Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan and Deputy Director for Intelligence, United States Forces-Afghanistan, as a Brigadier General
5. July 2012 – February 2014, Vice Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2 and Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Task Force (APTF), the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., as a Brigadier General
6. March 2014 – June 2015, Director of Intelligence, U.S. Cyber Command, Fort George G. Meade, Md., as a Brigadier General and Major General
7. June 2015 – present, Director for Intelligence, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

#### **MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS**

Defense Superior Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters Legion of Merit  
 Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters  
 Air Force Commendation Medal  
 Air Force Achievement Medal

**EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION**

Second Lieutenant – May 27, 1987

First Lieutenant – May 27, 1989

Captain – May 27, 1991

Major – Sept. 1, 1997

Lieutenant Colonel – May 1, 2000

Colonel – Aug. 1, 2004

Brigadier General – Apr. 1, 2011

Major General – Aug. 2, 2014





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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MARCH 2, 2016

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON**

Mr. WILSON. Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, recently discussed potential threats being posed by advancements in bio-technology, including an ability to edit human-genes, so called “gene-editing.” I am concerned about these types of technologies falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone actors. Can you describe for the committee the national security threats being posed by these and similar bio-technologies?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. WILSON. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this committee that that Afghan leaders are “skeptical we will continue to be there” beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said President Obama’s plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016 from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the United States with “a very limited ability” to conduct its counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers on force levels and drawdown timelines?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. WILSON. In his January 2016 report, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed that, “the Taliban now controls more territory than at any time since 2001.” What is DIA’s estimate of the extent of Taliban control in Afghanistan?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. WILSON. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this committee that that Afghan leaders are “skeptical we will continue to be there” beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said President Obama’s plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016 from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the United States with “a very limited ability” to conduct its counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers on force levels and drawdown timelines?

General MARRS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

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#### **QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI**

Mr. GARAMENDI. To what extent does the Open Skies Treaty’s provision that all information collected on Open Skies flights be shared with all parties to the treaty mitigate the counterintelligence threat posed by potential Russian flights with a new, electro-optical sensor?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

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#### **QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN**

Mr. COFFMAN. How well are defense intelligence missile warning capabilities postured to address the nation-state threats highlighted during the hearing (Russia, China, Iran and North Korea)?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON**

Mr. MOULTON. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats, including enhanced Russian naval activities?

General STEWART. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MOULTON. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats, including enhanced Russian naval activities?

General MARRS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.]

