[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-105]
WORLD WIDE THREATS
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 2, 2016
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
on Armed Services.............................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Marrs, Maj Gen James, USAF, Director for Intelligence, J-2, Joint
Staff.......................................................... 5
Stewart, LtGen Vincent R., USMC, Director, Defense Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 39
Stewart, LtGen Vincent R..................................... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[Response provided was classified and retained in committee
files.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 71
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 71
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 72
Mr. Wilson................................................... 71
WORLD WIDE THREATS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2016.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
This year, as we did last year, the committee meets today
to get an assessment of the threat environment in which our
military personnel are asked to operate. I think it is
important that we understand not only the threats that are out
there today, but the general direction of trends as we make
decisions about this year's Defense Authorization Act.
If we just think about some of the things that have changed
since we had this hearing last year, we can remember the
enormous amount of time and effort spent about Russia's
activities in Ukraine. Of course, those gains have been
consolidated, and now there is the most significant military
presence in the Middle East that they have had since the 1970s.
Meanwhile, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has
launched attacks, both in Europe and the United States, and it
has spread to more countries including, notably, Libya and
Afghanistan, as well as others. There have been reports which
have been confirmed in other congressional hearings about ISIS
use of chemical weapons on the battlefield.
Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to be provocative to the
point of even detaining U.S. sailors recently. North Korea
launches missile tests and nuclear tests and sticks its finger
in the eye of the world. And meanwhile, China is continuing to
develop its islands out of the Pacific Ocean and has begun to
install, according to reports, military aircraft and surface-
to-air missiles on those islands. So needless to say, the world
is not getting any simpler, and the world is not getting any
less dangerous.
I really appreciate our witnesses being here today to help
explore these issues. I would remind members that this
obviously is an open, unclassified session. Immediately upon
its conclusion we will go into a classified session with the
same witnesses, so if you have questions that required a
classified answer, obviously withhold and we will do that in
the classified session.
Before turning to our witnesses, I would be pleased to
yield to the distinguished gentlelady from California for any
comments she would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement
be entered into the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mrs. Davis. We look forward to Ranking Member Smith
returning, hopefully within a few weeks, absolutely. And it has
been an honor to try and help out in this role.
As we know, and, Generals, you are here to discuss again
how complex and a dangerous place the world is today,
unpredictable. And we know that there are at least five key
national security challenges that are driving defense planning
and budgeting. All of them key, all of them critical, and we
look forward to your comments today.
It is so important for us to receive clear objective and
comprehensive assessments from the defense intelligence
community. A deep and clear understanding of these threats, and
the trends and developments that drive them, is fundamental to
the committee's work in shaping the defense budget, and in
helping the Department of Defense and the rest of the national
security establishment perform their duties effectively.
So we look forward to your comments. I know I would like to
discuss our priorities, and how perhaps those are changing. We
certainly acknowledge your difficult and challenging work. And
thank you again for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
We are pleased to welcome back before the committee,
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General
Vincent Stewart, and welcome, I believe for the first time, at
least in this capacity, the Director of Intelligence for the
Joint Staff, Major General James Marrs, our witnesses today.
Thank you both for being here.
Without objection, your complete written statements will be
made part of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any
oral comments you would like to make at this time. General
Stewart.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
General Stewart. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
provide Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the global
security environment and the threats facing the Nation.
Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range
of multifaceted challenges, adversaries' threats, foreign
military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks.
Taken together, these issues reflect the diversity, scope, and
complexity of today's challenges to our national security.
In my opening remarks, I would like to highlight just a few
of these threats, which represents our five focus areas in all
warfighting domains: space, cyberspace, air, surface, and
subsurface.
Turning first to the current threat from ISIL. With the
coalition engaged against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] is helping the
warfighter and our policymakers better understand both the
ideology and the capabilities of ISIL. ISIL, as well as like-
minded extremists, are born out of the same extreme and violent
Sunni Salafi ideology. These Salafi jihadis are determined to
restore the caliphate, and as they have shown, are willing to
justify extreme violence in their efforts to impose their
social order on others.
As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has become the most
significant terrorist threat to the United States and our
allies. In 2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and
Syria and expanded globally. Spectacular external attacks
demonstrate ISIL's relevance and reach and are a key part of
their narrative.
ISIL will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in
Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the United States
homeland, in 2016. ISIL's foreign fighter cadre is core to its
external attack capability, and a large number of Western
jihadists in Iraq and Syria will pose a challenge for Western
security services.
On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control
large swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition strikes impeded
ISIL's ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, curtailed
its use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to
lower its profile. In 2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL
forces, and emerging resource shortfalls, will probably
challenge ISIL's ability to govern in Iraq and Syria. However,
the group probably will retain Sunni Arab urban centers.
Turning to Afghanistan: In their first full year in the
lead, Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent
operations; however, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack
of coalition enablers and at high operational tempo, which led
to uneven execution of operations. As a result, insurgents
expanded their influence in rural areas, limiting the extension
of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized
units and their enablers will be necessary to continue securing
key population centers in Afghanistan.
Russia: Russian military activities continue at
historically high levels. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive
foreign and defense policy, including conducting operations in
Syria, sustaining involvement in Ukraine, and expanding
military capabilities in the Arctic. Last year, the Russian
military continued its robust exercise schedule and
aggressively, and occasionally, provocative out-of-area
deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military
activities in 2016.
Turning to China: China is pursuing a long-term
comprehensive military modernization program to advance its
core interests, which include maintaining its sovereignty,
protecting its territorial integrity, and projecting its
regional influence, particularly in the South China Sea. In
addition to modernizing equipment and operations, the People's
Liberation Army has undergone massive structural reforms,
including increasing the number of navy, air force, and rocket
force personnel, establishing a theater joint command system,
and reducing their current seven military regions down to five
joint theaters of operations.
China has the world's largest, and most comprehensive,
missile force and has prioritized the development and
deployment of 125 regional ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities against
the United States forces in the region. And they field an
antiship ballistic missile, which provides the capability to
attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.
China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile
capable of striking Guam during its September 2015 military
parade in Beijing.
In North Korea: North Korea's nuclear weapons program is
evolving, and evolving ballistic missile programs are a
continuing threat. In January, North Korea issued a statement
claiming that it had successfully carried out a nuclear test,
and last month, North Korea conducted another space launch.
The Democratic Republic of Korea displays of a new modified
road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, during their
recent parade, and its 2015 test of a new submarine launch
ballistic missile capability, further highlights Pyongyang's
commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear
delivery options. North Korea also continues efforts to expand
its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material.
In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the
strategic value of space and are focusing on diminishing our
advantage with the intent of denying the U.S. use of space in
the event of conflict. Both countries are conducting
antisatellite research and developing antisatellite weapons,
making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested,
and congested.
In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing
capabilities of advanced state actors such as Russia and China.
They target DOD personnel, networks, supply chain, research and
development, and critical infrastructure information in the
cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant
threat to conduct destructive cyberattacks. Non-state actors'
use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open-
source research remains a significant challenge.
Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing
unique defense intelligence around the world and around the
clock, to the warfighters, the defense planners, the defense
acquisition community, and policymakers to provide warning and
defeat these and other threats.
I look forward to the committee's questions.
[The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
General Marrs.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
INTELLIGENCE, J-2, JOINT STAFF
General Marrs. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Mrs.
Davis, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to represent the intelligent equities of
the Joint Staff and combatant commands at this hearing.
As the primary military intelligence adviser to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am responsible for
providing daily intelligence information to the Chairman, his
staff, and many senior defense and national decision makers.
Additionally, as the J-2, I also conduct intelligence
operations, plans, and policy assessments, and make
recommendations to the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and combatant
commands.
I share Lieutenant General Stewart's concerns regarding the
global threats we face and look forward to taking your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Let me just ask each of you a relatively simple question.
Our core responsibilities under the Constitution are to provide
and support, build, and maintain the military forces that are
necessary for the defense of the country. And a lot of the
decisions we make affect not just the military today but the
military tomorrow, 3, 5 years out. So the trends, the way
things are moving are important for us to try to keep in mind.
Nobody can predict the future, but the general direction of
things.
So my question to you is, what is or are the primary trends
that you see in the threat environment that we should take into
account in making decisions about military personnel and pay
and benefits and weapons and equipment and so forth? What are
those trends that you think are so significant that we have got
to keep those in mind as we make the program-by-program
decisions that it is our responsibility to make? General
Stewart.
General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, I will start, and General
Marrs will correct me when I am done.
We talk about the complexity in the world today, but we are
looking at breakdown of nation-states as we knew them in the
past. We are talking about regions where nation-states are
fracturing, and we are uncertain how those nation-states will
act after conflict is done. We are seeing resurgence of Russian
activity, as I mentioned earlier, where Russia intends to exert
its influence on the global stage and will challenge our
interests wherever those interests are globally.
China, again, continues to push the envelope in reclaiming
territory, disputed territory in the South China Sea that will
complicate our ability to maneuver and conduct operations in
the Pacific. These terrorist organizations, whether it is Al
Qaeda or it is ISIL, continue to push the idea that they will
replace the international order as we know it with an extreme
ideology.
So whether it is resurgent Russia in Europe, whether it is
a rising Iran in the Middle East and the conflict between Iran
and the Saudis in the Middle East or it is a competition with
China in the Pacific, there are just a range of global actions
that we simply are--we have not seen the likes of which, in
certainly my time as I have served.
So the world is far more complicated, it is far more
destabilized, it is far more complex than at any time that I
have seen it, and the outcomes in the next several years will
be decisive for our Nation.
And, Jim, I don't know if you have got----
The Chairman. Well, General Marrs, before you respond, what
I heard then was the breakdown of the liberal order and the
nation-states system is one of the dominant trends that has a
number of repercussions that we have to keep in mind as we
think about military capability. Now, I may have heard it--but
that is what my ears heard.
General Stewart. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Okay. All right. General Marrs.
General Marrs. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I think I would underscore two things that General Stewart
mentioned: First, on the non-state side of the house, I think
the continued challenge of ungoverned or weakly governed areas
is something that absolutely is facilitating the growth of
these violent extremist organizations. That combined with the
relative ease of access of technology, and specifically cyber
technology, that allows these organizations to rather quickly
develop linkages.
What I would say on the state side of this is that the real
challenge, I think, is the volume of capabilities we are seeing
being developed that really threaten our competitive advantage.
And principally, what we are seeing in Russia and China is just
a breadth of capabilities from strategic systems to anti-
access/area denial to even, I would say, a growing adeptness at
operating sort of just short of traditional military conflict
that is posing a significant challenge in the future.
The Chairman. Okay. I am repeating this back to you just to
make sure I understand. So among the things I think you said
are erosion of our technological superiority, and that is us,
especially versus Russia and China; and then these new forms of
warfare conflict are another part of that, at least on the
state side, but actually ISIS employs them as well through
their social media and other aspects. Is that the gist of it?
General Marrs. That is accurate, sir.
The Chairman. Okay.
General Stewart. If I could. Look at it in three terms: Our
resurgence of competitive nation-states that compete against
our interests; breakdown of traditional nation-states,
generates ungoverned space, generates conflict that we are not
quite sure how that will play out; and then the ability for
emerging states or even non-state actors to have access to
disruptive technology that is readily available across a wide
range of networks.
So those three things combined leads to a trend that has
manifested itself as a very, very unstable condition in our
world today.
The Chairman. Which makes our job complex, because we have
got to prepare for everything from nuclear war down to hybrid
and the kind of little green men sort of situations where you
don't really know what is happening. And that is the challenge
that you all face as well.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, again, for being here.
Given what you have just stated, could you share with us
how we then reorder, if at all, our intelligence priorities
framework? What are we doing differently? Clearly during the
Cold War intelligence collection was important. That obviously
has been shifted in many ways to counterterrorism for a number
of years. So what is changing, if at all? Why? And what should
we be doing about it in terms of resources?
General Stewart. So none of us in the Intelligence
Community like to set priorities because we will invariably get
it wrong. The area that we think is stable will turn out to be
unstable. But I will tell you what I have done. We have got
five priorities that I consider no-fail mission for the defense
intelligence enterprise.
How do we win the current fight, primarily focused against
those transregional terrorist threats, whether they be in Iraq,
Syria, or in Afghanistan. That is priority number one.
The next set of priorities are focused on these nation-
states who will compete with us on the globe. Russia, as a
dominant nuclear-armed challenge to our interest around the
globe. Iran, how will Iran behave as it comes out of a sanction
regime, has increased revenues, continues to develop missile
capability, competes with its neighbors in the region. North
Korea, we have seen the level of activity in North Korea,
whether it is nuclear missile technology, intercontinental or
medium-range ballistic capability, a regime that can best be
described as unstable, certainly uncertain what its intentions
are.
And longer term, what will China and China's role be on the
international order. China presents itself as a peaceful rise
to regain its status on the international stage. We are not so
certain that that rise will be peaceful because of some of the
things that it is doing in the Pacific and globally.
So those are our five top priorities. There are a whole
series of contingencies that we are still thinking about, but
if you ask me today where I was putting my resources, those
were the top five. And hopefully, General Marrs and the J-2 and
the rest of the folks are thinking about some of the lesser
priorities so that we are not surprised by something that
happens on the stage.
Mrs. Davis. General Marrs, do you want to comment?
General Marrs. And I think the one thing I would add is
more from a process perspective, so the focus is absolutely
where General Stewart said it is. What we are working, along
with DIA and USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence], is on what is called an integrated defense
intelligence priorities framework. And that is a project that
has been underway over the last year, and it is basically to
set in place a formalized mechanism where we, as a Department,
can better articulate what the defense intel priorities are and
make sure that those are clearly linked to the national level
framework.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And does that allow for some
reordering within that? I guess it is the out-of-the-box
thinking. And as an example, where would you see that where you
actually had shifted in seeking something that you hadn't
expected within that framework?
General Marrs. So it is probably premature to say that
about this process that is just evolving right now. So
literally, we are working with USDI on a version 1.0 of this
capability that will see or be unveiled later this spring.
But I will say that, absolutely, a big part of what we have
to do is, while we are mindful of these larger strategic
challenges out there, that we still have a team that has to
play position around the world and be thinking about the things
that aren't in the paper right now.
And I am confident that the team has a good approach for
that, both in terms of how we as defense or intel professionals
think about warning, and really that is our part of the trade
craft that helps to avoid surprise. And also at the national
defense or at the ODNI [Office of the Director of National
Intelligence] level, thinking about tradecraft in the sense of
what has been called in the 2014 national intelligence strategy
``anticipatory intelligence.'' So it is even at that level
trying to figure out how we better make room for that in our
daily activities.
General Stewart. If I could add though, given the five
priorities, the five focus areas I talked about, we have done a
series of seminars to look at those key areas, and think our
way through, not only from the country specific but the
regions, what we know today, and really start thinking about
what are some of the black swan events that we are not all
thinking about, the nonlinear events that could unfold.
And so we are putting in place a process where we think
about alternative analysis, black swan events, awfully hard to
call. It is interesting to note that one of the events that we
looked at in the Middle East was what would happen if the Mosul
Dam collapsed.
And we are hearing increasingly now this discussion about
the viability of the Mosul Dam and what that would mean. That
is something that is nontraditional intel kind of thinking, but
it would have significant implications if that event occurred.
So we have got some processes in place where we are
thinking about alternative analysis and red teaming so that we
are not caught blind looking at Russia, and Iran, and North
Korea, and miss some event.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes [presiding]. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.
The Chair now recognizes himself for a series of questions.
General Stewart, General Marrs, first of all, thank you
both for being here.
General Stewart, I would never instruct a general what to
do but I am going to request, especially with those three
stars, that you pull that mike just a little closer to you so
that we can hear you even better. We are proud of your service.
And I was looking at your resume. I wished I had time to read
it all in the record, but through all of those over 35 years, I
guess now--how many years total do you have?
General Stewart. I think I am starting my 35th year.
Mr. Forbes. We just are so proud of what you have done.
As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, one of
the things that we are doing now to everyone that appears
before this committee based on some information we got at our
retreat for the committee a week or so ago is, did you have to
submit your statement for the record to any individual or
entity prior to submitting it to us today?
General Stewart. Not for review. We certainly submit that,
so that my bosses are aware of what I submitted. But not for
review, not for modification, not for changes.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. So who do you submit it to?
General Stewart. Both the DNI [Director of National
Intelligence] and USDI.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Now, the other question I would ask is,
we looked at this--in your best personal, professional military
judgment as well as the written statement that is here, as I
understand from your written statement, you are to give us an
assessment of the global security environment and to address
the threats facing the Nation.
As Chairman Thornberry mentioned, sometimes we are looking
directionally because it is hard for us just to take a snapshot
of today. But if we were going back to, let's say, the
beginning of this decade--we could pick any other time that you
think would be preferable, but let's begin in 2010--if I were
to ask you, would that assessment and security environment and
threats facing the Nation, is it better today or worse today
than it was in 2010?
General Stewart. I would assess it is far more complex
today than it was in 2010. The things I have outlined,
breakdown of nation-states, conflict in region, reemergence of
competitive peers, far more complex, and I would submit more
dangerous than it was in 2010.
Mr. Forbes. And to help us with our colleagues when we are
trying to get dollars for defense, if we were to ask you to
give me a percentile figure from 1 to 10, 1 being no change,
10, let's say, being an alarming change, where would you peg it
along that continuum between 1 to 10, between let's say 2010
and today?
General Stewart. Now, that is not real good math here, but
I would probably put it in the five or six range.
Mr. Forbes. Five or six range.
General Stewart. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Now, the other thing we are always looking at
too is our ability to forecast what we think these things are
going to get worse or better. So let's go back to 2010 because
we started making a lot of cuts to national defense back around
2010, 2011, 2012. Was this threat assessment that has changed,
as you indicated to a five or six, along that continuum, were
they predicted at that particular point in time, or were these
surprises to us?
General Stewart. There were certainly lots of indications
of Russian military modernization. There is certainly lots of
indication of China military modernization, the reclamation
effort. ISIL was not a dominant theme, but Al Qaeda was
certainly still a threat. So I don't know that any of these are
large surprises. The morphing of Al Qaeda into ISIL probably
took some elements by surprise, but all of the pieces were
there.
So much of the things that we are seeing today, we saw the
precursors of those things in 2009, 2010, 2011, and have now
just manifested themselves on the international stage. So it is
hard for me to call them surprises when there are lots of
indicators there in the past.
Mr. Forbes. So then just to sum up, basically the
assessment of the global security environment on the threats
facing our Nation today have gotten about a 6 on a 1-to-10
scale in terms of difference between no change and alarming
change. And according to your best assessment, most of those
were predictable probably at the beginning of the decade as we
went into this?
General Stewart. I think there are great philosophers
somewhere out there that said prediction is particularly
difficult especially when it is about the future. So I think
there are certainly some trends there that would indicate that
we would be headed for troubling times if we did not reverse or
counter.
A growing Russian military modernization, a more assertive
and aggressive China in the Pacific, the breakdown of some of
these states in the Middle East, the competition between Iran
and Saudi Arabia, the possibility that ISIL would establish or
attempt to establish the caliphate; all of those precursors
were there. They have just now gone full blown in the last 3 to
5 years.
Mr. Forbes. And I would concur with your assessment, and I
think our big concern is that, that is why many of us were so
puzzled that we began cutting national defense so much over
this decade when we could have predicted pretty much this kind
of alarming war we are now facing.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stewart and General Marrs, welcome. Thank you for
your testimony before this committee today as we help to shed
light on some of the most dangerous threats that are facing the
Nation around the world today.
General Stewart, I will start with you. I thought that was
a very insightful analysis in terms of the challenges we face,
in terms of resurgence of nation-states, breakdown of some
traditional states, and the rise of destructive technologies.
Can you give the committee a sense of how you are properly
organizing and resourcing the Defense Intelligence Agency to
both better understand these threats and understand where they
are going in the future?
Maybe some specific examples, so that we understand what
the outcomes of these trends are going to be, how they will
challenge the United States going forward, and how we are
prepared to counter those threats?
General Stewart. Following the lead of my predecessor, you
know, we have organized, reorganized the Defense Intelligence
Agency along integrated intelligence center lines. That allows
us to focus on regional challenges and give a center director
all of the authority to work with the combatant commands to
understand the many challenges in that region. That is a key
foundational portion of what we have done to get a better sense
of the challenges that we face.
We have laid on top of that an architecture, at least we
are building an architecture. We probably refer to it as ICITE
[intel community information technology environment], that will
allow us to use a cloud-based architecture to move content,
make content available to the analysts wherever they are in the
enterprise.
That, I think, will be very significant in making
information available and then using some big data analytic
tools to help us to see these trends and represent those trends
in a more timely manner. That is a very important next step.
And then leveraging or working closely with our partners,
our international partners, so that when we understand we have
shortfalls or risk, we can use our partners to cover, to
mitigate some of those risks or shortfalls. I do not have
enough capacity to cover the globe. I will not be able to cover
every contingency and every crisis given the structure that we
have today, which is why we focus primarily on those five areas
that I have talked about.
But we are doing all the things process-wise,
organizational-wise, architectural-wise, command and control-
wise, to make sure we have the best information ready to
deliver to our policymakers. And anything this committee can do
to help increase our capacity would be greatly welcomed.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
So among the things that you touched on and one of the
things that concerns me the most, of course, is the rise of
destructive technologies. And clearly, none can be greater than
the cyber threats that we face. And how do you feel we are
positioned in terms of our ability to understand our
adversaries' cyber capabilities, and do you feel that we are
properly resourced to defend against those threats?
General Stewart. We are actively building back the analytic
capability to understand adversaries' cyber capabilities. So we
are building that back. We have made some investments to get
some analysis in that space.
Thinking about the cyberspace, that domain, the ability to
counter activities in that space from kinetic actions, which
requires a level of analysis that just find the nodes that we
could defeat kinetically, all the way through the more discrete
cyber, understanding key nodes, key networks, key routers, key
switches. That requires an exquisite level of intelligence that
we have not invested in over the last several years.
So we are starting to build those pieces back now. That
will take us a little bit of time. The fact that we are focused
on those key threats, key actors, Russia, China, North Korea,
Iran, will help us, but it won't position us to deal with the
non-state or the emergent actor in that space.
Mr. Langevin. And General, do you believe that CYBERCOM
[Cyber Command] should be its own independent COCOM [combatant
command], and how might this benefit our cyber operations
worldwide?
General Stewart. I haven't really thought about that
question, to be honest. And I am hesitant to go there, because
I know that Admiral Rogers, the commander at U.S. Cyber
Command, has an opinion on that.
Mr. Langevin. We just want your opinion.
General Stewart. So I will just say at this point, CYBERCOM
needs the relationship that it has with NSA [National Security
Agency] far more than NSA needs CYBERCOM. I don't know that
CYBERCOM could be effective and carry out its mission without
that very close relationship, integral, integrated relationship
that it currently has with NSA. It would have to build
significant capacity to understand the threats and counter
those threats, and I think that would be very costly in the
near term.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you both.
Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Forbes.
And thank you General Stewart, General Marrs, for being
here today.
And General Stewart, I appreciate you citing concerns about
maintaining our technological edge and evolution of
unconventional warfare. This is a focus of the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee. I have the privilege of working
with Congressman Langevin on these issues, and we look forward
to working with you in the future to address that.
And also, General, Jim Clapper, the Director of National
Intelligence, recently discussed potential threats being posed
by advancements in biotechnology, including an ability to edit
human genes, so-called gene editing. I am concerned about the
types of technologies falling into the hands of terrorist
groups or even lone actors.
Can you describe for the committee the national security
threats being posed by these and similar biotechnologies.
General Stewart. I am always hesitant to talk about
sequencing a genome. Could we take this to the closed hearing,
if that is okay?
Mr. Wilson. Be happy to.
General Stewart. Because I don't want in this setting to
talk about either our capabilities or an adversary's effort in
this space.
Mr. Wilson. I'd be happy to.
And again, thank you for your extraordinary service. I did
represent Parris Island, so I have a deep affection. My late
father-in-law was one of you, a marine.
And General Marrs, with your recent experience as U.S.
Cyber Command director of intelligence prior to your post as
Joint Staff, could you please explain what deliverables can be
expected from the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental project.
And Secretary Carter has established a program between the
military's innovators, cyber warfare operators, and private
sector innovators, such as Silicon Valley. What technologies or
tactics should be developed to keep intel-driven operations in
the lead against any enemy with regard to cyber warfare?
General Marrs. So, sir, I think the specific focus of that
program is still evolving, but it really, for me, comes down to
how do we better harvest the volume of information that exists
out there, and figure out innovative ways to basically make
sense of that cloud and apply it to keeping our networks safe.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we really appreciate your leadership.
And also, General Marrs, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence has reported that roughly 30 percent of
the former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected and
reengaging in terrorism killing American families. What trends
has the DIA observed in detainee recidivism and the capacity
and willingness in past practices of foreign countries
receiving detainees to take appropriate steps to mitigate the
risks that they would reengage in terrorism to threaten and
kill American families?
General Stewart. If I could jump on that one, please. The
recidivism rate remains about 17 percent confirmed recidivism.
Most of the nation-states where we transferred detainees have
done a really credible job in either controlling, monitoring,
or keeping them from getting back into terrorist activities. We
have not seen an upward trend in recidivism. Like I said last
year when I briefed this committee, we were somewhere in the
18, 19 percent range, and we remain about that same rate today.
Mr. Wilson. And something that concerned me, a number of
the detainees were sent to Yemen, but it has disintegrated.
What has happened to the detainees in that country?
General Stewart. If I could take that one for the record,
please. I don't have specifics on Yemeni detainees, but if I
could take that one for the record, I will get back to you.
[The information referred to is classified and retained in
the committee files.]
Mr. Wilson. And additionally, what is the assessment of the
relationship between Russia and Cuba?
General Stewart. Russia continues to have a strong
partnership with the Cubans. They continue to do out-of-area
exercises with Cuba. The relationship is not as close as it was
during the height of the Cold War. I think that is basic
calculus of what is important, but I think they do well
together.
Mr. Wilson. Would that include port and landing rights
within that country?
General Stewart. Yes, Congressman.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much. And appreciate both of
you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
patience in letting me get back to my chair. Wasn't too
obvious.
General, can you talk a little bit more about China--and I
apologize I wasn't here, but I was here for your opening
statement--in discussing the three categories of territorial
integrity. There was the first one, but then you talked about
its projection into the South China Sea.
Do you do strategic or operational assessments or tactical
assessments about the intent beyond South China Sea and how
China might be using its investment in surface and other
modernization for projection beyond the South China Sea?
General Stewart. So we have seen not only reclaiming some
3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea, we also see
increasing naval activity in the East China Sea, disputed
territory with Japan. Building commercial capability on these
outlying regions will ultimately mean that China will want to
defend their economic interests.
So we are starting to see surface-to-air missiles being
placed in the region. We are starting to see, as I have
indicated, increased missile technology that can counter our
naval forces. We are seeing outposts being built.
Mr. Larsen. Specific to investment with surface combatants
though, do you see this as a test zone for operations beyond
the first and second island chains?
General Stewart. At this point, the evidence seems to
indicate defending the Nine-Dash Line and the territorial
disputed areas. The aircraft carriers that they are building,
the one that they built and the second one, I believe, they
just commissioned, will not have the same blue open ocean
capability that our aircraft carriers have, nor will it be able
to execute air operations the way that we use our carriers.
So at least initially, it looks like it is localized. But
some of the excursions now with port facilities in Africa and
their submarine technologies suggest a much broader global
capability in the offing. And I can talk more specifically
about the surface capability in closed hearing.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah, I would prefer that. I will just follow
up and I will yield back.
It is not just you, others out of the Pentagon and maybe
the State Department have used the term they are reclaiming
land. And let's be clear, they are not reclaiming anything;
they are creating land. They are not reclaiming land that
exists; they are creating land in violation of international
law and we need to be clear about that.
If we say they are reclaiming land that doesn't exist by
creating it, it sort of gives us some justification that it was
theirs to claim in the first place. And I think we need to
really push back hard on this because they are creating that
which does not exist and that which is not recognized by
international law.
General Stewart. I think that is a fair assessment that the
territory does not exist. They are building territory. In the
reclamation language, it suggests that they are falling back on
their ancestral claim that this territory existed. It is part
of their land domain, and so it is really just building that
back in.
So technically, you are absolutely right; there is no
territory there. They are building territory. And so the
language is not as precise as we probably should have it.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. All right. Thanks a lot.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stewart, there has been much discussion about
Russia and the Open Skies Treaty. And so I want to ask you a
question about the Open Skies Treaty. Can you please provide
the committee with details on the counterintelligence risks to
the United States and our allies of a digital electro-optical,
EO sensor and an infrared sensor, IR sensor. We are aware these
planes fly over not only the United States but also our allies
in Europe. And can you provide the committee with any reports
or assessments DIA has prepared on these questions?
Now, we have heard, of course, responses that we can just
cover things, that we can mitigate this. But if we can, also
the Russians can. But the concern I guess we have is what are
we actually getting from this treaty, because Russia does get
more because of our space assets, the clarity which we have
versus the clarity that is offered from their access from Open
Skies. And can't this information be used such as simple task
such as targeting and threatening the United States?
This is obviously something that has been a significant
amount of discussion. I would like to know what the DIA has
reviewed, what assessments you have done, and what the DIA has
prepared.
General Stewart. I have got to keep this really simple for
me. This Open Skies discussion is, think Polaroids in the
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, versus 1080 high-definition capability
as we go to a digital environment. The things that you can see,
the amount of data that you can collect, the things that you
can do with post-processing using digital techniques allows
Russia, in my opinion, to get incredible foundational
intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of
our facilities.
So from my perspective, it gives them a significant
advantage and, yes, we both can use the same techniques. But I
have a great concern about the quality of imagery, the quantity
of the imagery, the ability to do post-processing of digital
imagery, and what that allows them to see as foundational
intelligence that I would love to have personally, and I would
love to deny the Russians having that capability.
Mr. Turner. Excellent. Thank you. I note many people have
been very concerned because of then, as you just described that
fidelity of information, how it is translated into actual risks
to the United States.
Now, as we were coming out, I would like to ask both of
you, we were in the anteroom here, we were having a discussion
about the number of exercises that Russia is having. General
Breedlove has testified before us and has foreshadowed to our
committee his concern of the snap exercises that Russia is
using that have translated into actual military action and the
inability to discern when an exercise is going on or when an
actual military action is going to be pursued.
As you look at this, my concern has been--I think a lot of
people who are looking at it are very concerned that these
exercises are not training but they are actually practicing. I
would love to hear from both of you your thoughts on the
Russian posture and the exercises that they are undertaking.
General Stewart. The recent snap exercises have been
realistic. They have been threatening. They show a level of
sophistication that I have not seen in the 20 or so years that
I have been watching Russian/Soviet activity. It certainly
looks as realistic training as anything I have seen the
Russians do.
Now, whether that is training because of the improved
military, improved technology, lessons learned from what they
have seen us do, or genuinely practicing for out-of-area or
defense of Russian sovereignty, quote ``sovereignty,'' they are
as realistic as anything that I have seen the Russians do over
the last 20 years.
There is some evidence that previous snap exercises were
great rehearsal exercises for their deployment into Syria. So
if you take that as a model, then you can extrapolate that
these practice, very deliberate, very thoughtful, high-
intensity rehearsals could be rehearsals for some other either
localized or out-of-area operations.
General Marrs. Sir, I think I would echo General Stewart's
comments and just underscore that our impression has absolutely
been that Russia has been evolving the art of using these
exercises to create ambiguity and within that ambiguity make
our task of warning against potential action more difficult.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Lieutenant General Stewart, so what I am hearing here,
Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, are the four national
threats. We all agree on that. And global jihad is our growing
transnational threat. And part of what makes answering these
difficult is that they all require very different approaches to
deal with them.
So terrorism requires more special forces; China, you know,
requires us to have a strong maritime and naval capability; the
Russians require the ground forces; and Iran and Korea will
continue to use asymmetrical tools to basically mess with us.
From your perspective, is the U.S. meeting these threats
with the right balance of resources at this point or into the
future? And does refocus towards Asia or the proposed
rotational brigade that we are having going through Eastern
Europe, for example, allocate our resources smartly enough, or
is this an area where we are probably missing the mark, now and
maybe looking 5 years forward?
General Stewart. So I am always hesitant to talk about the
right force construct, because that really is an intelligence
question, and I would defer to the service chief and the
chairman to talk about the right force construct. Certainly in
my conversations and in the things that we have reported, we
have explained the totality of the threat, the challenges that
we face. And I think, I would like to defer to the services and
the chairman to talk about what is the right construct military
forces.
Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't know if you can do it in this setting or not, but
one of the things that concerns me is the link between Russia
and Iran, the new amount of money that Iran now has, obviously,
to purchase weapons, most of which would likely come from
Russia, and the impact that that may have on the strategy in
Syria.
General Stewart. One of the things that we assess, in
addition to Russia moving into Syria to prop up the Assad
regime, is Russia's ability to demonstrate their advanced
weapons capabilities, to buyers in the Middle East and across
the globe. So we certainly expect that this show of capability
as Iran gets additional resources as they come out of the
sanction regime could lead to Iran purchasing advanced weapon
systems from the Russians.
We have already seen them go through with the deal of the
S-300. There is discussion about some of their aircraft that
the Russians are using in the region. So I fully expect that
Iran will use some of their resources to continue to modernize
their military forces and that their supplier of choice will
likely be the Russians.
Mr. Scott. General, they already have the ability in Iran
to hit a multitude of countries in the region, dozens of
countries in the regions. The thing that they did not have was
a quality targeting system and then questions about the actual
capacity of the warhead, if you will, on the missile. Do you
believe that our sanctions will hold in keeping them from
getting better targeting and stronger warheads?
General Stewart. Our sanctions in the past have not kept
the Iranians from developing the most sophisticated ballistic
missile capability in the region, capable of reaching all of
their potential adversaries, capable of reaching into Europe.
They have not only built a very robust missile technology; they
have improved their accuracy; they have improved their
mobility. I don't see them changing that trajectory because
their missile capability is a way to confuse, confound our
actions, and it is a guarantee for the regime.
So I don't see sanctions changing that trajectory at all. I
think as we lift sanctions, in fact, there is increase in
likelihood that they will find ways to improve lethality,
mobility, range of all of their missile systems.
Mr. Scott. Gentleman, thank you for your service. I will
save the remainder of my questions for the next hearing.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my
time.
Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, again, thank you for your service.
Russia has become to many a more serious threat over the
course of the last 5 years, particularly with Putin. When we
are making projections through intelligence, what is the
likelihood of that leadership remaining past the end of the
year? What does your intelligence tell you?
General Stewart. The likelihood that Putin will remain----
Mr. Norcross. Putin remains past the end of the year,
because there are a number of folks who have come out publicly
suggesting that the economy is strangling him and he is hanging
on by a shoestring.
General Stewart. He has a weak economy. He has demographic
issues within the country. I see no indications that Putin will
not survive the near term, near term being the next year or so.
Their out-of-area operations and the casualties and the economy
could cause some internal unrest, but when you look at his--in
spite of the economy, you look at his popularity ratings, all
of us should be as popular as he is viewed in Russia.
The Russian people have a tendency to endure more suffering
and pain than most of us are willing to accept. So I see no
trend at this point that indicates that he will not be here
through 2016 and beyond.
Mr. Norcross. So when we take a look back at what caused
the downfall of the old Soviet Union, primarily, along with
many other issues, it had to do with the economy that drove
that nation into the ground.
With Iran now entering the oil market and along with the
U.S. and international, that is a serious glut, where we are
not hearing from any of the economic forecasters that that is
going to rebound. That is their single driver for their
economy. Do you see that trend continuing?
General Stewart. That trend will continue. It will
challenge a number of domestic issues. It will cause them to
reprioritize some of their military spending, so they will
spend at a lower rate. It will challenge whether or not they
can sustain large scale out-of-area operations, but I don't see
it in the near term as a challenge to Putin and the regime.
Mr. Norcross. And just to follow up on one issue. You talk
about his popularity ratings. Of course, anything that comes
out of Russia you take with a grain of salt, has very little to
do with the truth.
What independent assessment do you have that his popularity
actually does remain strong with the general public?
General Stewart. I don't have any independent. I know what
the Russians publish and I know that Russia also controls the
narrative far better than we do in this country, in any Western
country. So he is controlling the narrative, he controls to a
great extent what the Russian people see and the conclusions
that they draw from that, but there isn't anything that I have
seen that genuinely refutes the belief that he is a strong
leader. He is making Russia stand up to the West, he is
demonstrating historical Russian desire to be a dominant world
player.
I don't see anything outside of the Russian narrative that
refutes that which they are feeding the Russian people. So in
the absence of something definitive, the Russian people believe
he is standing up to the West, they believe he is a strong and
forceful leader, they believe he has put Russia in the rightful
place where they should stand on the international stage, and
the economy is painful, but it is worth enduring, because we
are now a dominant power.
Mr. Norcross. The economy is also driving China in a
direction that they are not comfortable with. In fact, we just
read they laid off 1.2 million workers, which, given the size
of the country, doesn't seem significant, but it is.
Do you see the economy driving their military program at a
slower pace than it has been?
General Stewart. I have not seen a slower pace, though I
suspect that if the economy continues the way it is, that they
will have to again make some prioritization, they will reduce
their activity, but I don't think they are walking away from
this military modernization. It may slow, but they are not
walking away from this military modernization. That is core to
China's future.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
General Stewart and General Marrs, for your service and for
being here today to testify.
Like many of my colleagues, I want to focus my question on
the implications of a resurgent Russia to the Intelligence
Community. In addition to your testimony today, we have heard
from senior leaders in DOD, as well as leaders in academia, of
Russia's resurgence and military modernization in terms of
their ability to apply this hybrid threat model in Eastern
Europe.
What is your assessment of how well our Intelligence
Community is equipped to counter this hybrid threat, what
changes have we made, and what changes do we still need to make
in order to maintain pace with the very complex 21st century
threats we are facing today?
General Stewart. I am not sure that I am at all comfortable
with the hybrid threat description. I think most nation-states
would be really insane to take us on in a conventional
approach, because of our superiority in our conventional
weapons systems.
So they are going to take us on in the information space
and try to control and dominate the narrative, they are going
to try to come after us in asymmetric large or small formations
that will confuse our targeting effort. That only makes sense
to counter the way we are structured and the way that we
generally fight and have fought, for the last 15 or 20 years.
So I am sometimes anxious when I hear Russia ascribed to
creating this hybrid threat warfare, because I think it just
makes sense to counter our superior conventional capabilities.
Now, having said that, how do you defeat that? How do you
get after that from an intelligence standpoint? That requires a
significant more investment in understanding the open source
environment, so that you can understand these little green men
as they show up, because they are going to do some things in
the open source that you ought to be able to exploit. You are
going to require much more robust HUMINT [human intelligence]
capability, and those HUMINT capabilities must be targeted
against specific threats and specific regions. And then you
have got to have a way to deal with the idea that an adversary
will want to deny, degrade, deceive, destroy your information
environment, and your information messaging.
So if you can think your way through those, at least those
three layers, you have got a chance to defeat the, quote,
little green men, and then be able to apply conventional
military capabilities against an advance.
Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that the Intelligence Community
is adequately equipped to address those threats that you just
outlined and the changing nature related to the open source
environment, the increase in HUMINT capabilities that we need?
What changes do we need to make going forward?
General Stewart. So, yes, we are starting now to reenergize
how we use open source as foundation to what we do in the
Intelligence Community. I think for far too long we have
invested in the high-end, high-technology collection where, in
many cases, there is a great deal of information that we could
use, foundational type of intelligence that is available open
source, publicly available with limited or no expectation of
privacy.
So we are starting to put the model together where we can
leverage the open source environment. We are not there yet. We
need a good governance model, we need a model that talks about
ethical behavior in the open source environment, what are the
right tradecrafts to use in the open source environment, how do
you protect private citizens', American citizens', information
in that environment. So we are stepping our way through that
now.
In terms of the HUMINT aspect, there is still more that we
need to do in refining precisely where those hard targets are
and investing that human capability against those hard targets.
I think we are making progress, but we are not quite where we
need to be at this point.
Ms. Stefanik. General Marrs, do you have anything to add?
General Marrs. I think at this point I would just say that,
and really it has been emphasized well by General Breedlove in
his recent testimony, that there has been a concerted effort at
the senior levels of the Department, not just in DOD with
General Breedlove, the Secretary, and the chairman, but also
working with Director Clapper on how to make these changes
quickly. And I would be happy to talk in more detail in closed
session on that.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you for your testimony.
I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to run
through a few questions in different parts of the world, the
first starting with Iran. I know that our intelligence in the
past has been relatively limited or poor, and I am wondering
now in the post-Iran deal world that we are living in how your
intelligence picture has changed or improved, or what you are
looking at in helping us both as we are looking at the
implementation of the deal, but also what is happening in Iran
overall.
General Stewart. I hate to do this, I really do, but I
would like to take this to a closed session.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay. I thought you would say that.
General Stewart. Because I think talking about where our
footprint and where our opportunities might be would----
Ms. Gabbard. Sure. Moving over to Eastern Europe, what
would you say Russia's priorities are, given their actions and
activities in Syria as well as Ukraine? And then also on the
Ukraine side, how much and how effectively have you seen the
Ukrainian military using their new special forces and
unconventional tactics against the so-called Russian
separatists there along the border?
General Stewart. I am going to take the first question, and
then maybe General Marrs will take the Ukrainian question.
Russia has not lost sight of Ukraine as an important, maybe
even vital, interest to be included as part of the Russian
Federation. So I view their activity in Syria as
multidimensional, one of which is, how do we take the
international community's focus off of Ukraine while we keep it
in this state of isolated conflict and maybe cause the
Ukrainian regime to do something that falls outside of the
Minsk agreement and, therefore, allows Russia to continue its
activity. So I think part of--one of the things that I believe
Russia has done in Syria is taken our attention off of the
Ukraine. And I suspect that at some point they will come back
to Ukraine either under the guise that, we have solved the
problem for you in the West by our actions in Syria, therefore,
you ought to lift your concerns, your restrictions, and your
sanctions against our activities in Ukraine, and you ought to
give us some dividend, and that dividend might be defined as,
your hands off of Ukraine, because it is part of our sphere of
influence.
So I think this is a very--and maybe I am ascribing too
much to the Russian thinking, but I think this is part of the
grand plan that Ukraine remains in a state of conflict, but
never lose sight of the fact that Ukraine must be part of the
Russian sphere of influence and outside of the West's.
General Marrs. And I think my answer to your second
question regarding the effectiveness of the Ukrainian special
forces has been improved and, I think, led to an increased
stability--or increased agility on the part of Ukraine to
respond to separatists' actions.
Ms. Gabbard. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Generals, for being here today.
I have two areas of concern: one is obviously the foreign
fighters as they flow back and forth from Syria and Iraq.
General Breedlove was quoted, I think just recently in regards
to his testimony, you know, the fact that, you know, the daily
flow into Europe, you know, they are using that disguise of
refugees coming in, and they are really taking advantage of
that in Europe, but also possibly here in the United States.
Can you comment in regards, do we have a good handle on
that or not?
General Stewart. In Europe, I am not sure that there is a
great handle on how you sift through potential foreign
fighters, jihadists that are coming in through this mass
migration. So that is an issue, I think, there.
I am not concerned about the U.S., because of the
capabilities that we have within our homeland defense. The
things that we can do with the biometrics and the screening
process makes it far less likely for them to just come across
the border hidden within a mass wave of migrants.
So I think it is less of a challenge here. It is not a
completely diminished challenge, but I think it is far less
here than it is in Europe.
Mr. Nugent. But wouldn't that be the case--I mean,
obviously that is true if they are coming through a point of
entry in the United States----
General Stewart. Right.
Mr. Nugent [continuing]. But if they are coming across an
open border area, obviously we don't have the ability to do
that kind of screening, correct?
General Stewart. Correct. Open borders, if they don't come
through, I don't--I don't put that at the high end of my threat
concern.
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
General Stewart. And let me tell you where I put my threat
concern at with migrants. My threat concern with migrants are
the migrants who are legitimately moving to get out of a crisis
environment. They get to a nation-state, whether it is here or
in Europe.
They get marginalized, they get isolated, they get
dissatisfied, they feel disenfranchised, they don't have
opportunity, and they become a source to be recruited and
radicalized, because now they view their situation as worse now
than it was in the past.
Mr. Nugent. You are seeing that, you know, in Germany and
others where they are actually going and getting a one-way visa
back to the country they came from, whether it is Afghanistan
or Iraq or Syria, because they feel marginalized within the
country they have gone to, and I get that. I mean, we see that
across the board where people can be self-radicalized for
whatever reason they may harbor within their hearts, but I
worry about those that have the military experience, and I am
sure you do too, of having served in combat.
It is a big difference between reading about it and
actually doing it. So I am concerned that--it seems like that
is an issue that obviously needs more discussion.
But getting to Russia in particular, I would just tell you
that, you know, from the--you know, the approach that we have
taken, and one of the generals that sat here and testified in
front of us said, you know, we are hugging the bear. We thought
that we could embrace Russia and live with them in a way that
we are going to have mutual agreement. And obviously in their
reaction and what they are doing in the Baltic States, what
they have done in Crimea shows that that was a miscalculation.
Now, I don't know if it was a miscalculation because of our
intelligence ability to let our executive branch know, or if we
told them and they just didn't act. Can you give me some--as we
relate to the State Department back and forth?
General Stewart. I think maybe some of this is a little bit
of revisionist history----
Mr. Nugent. Okay.
General Stewart [continuing]. To be quite honest. Russia--
Russia is carrying out and acting today in the same way that a
nation-state----
Mr. Nugent. Well, I agree, but did we not try to take a
different approach with Russia? As one of the generals that sat
here and spoke about it, we were trying to hug the bear.
General Stewart. Absolutely.
Mr. Nugent. We were trying to get them to--we thought we--
--
General Stewart. And wouldn't that have been a----
Mr. Nugent [continuing]. Had a different reset.
General Stewart. Wouldn't that have been a positive thing
to do----
Mr. Nugent. Oh, absolutely, but----
General Stewart [continuing]. If we could have gotten the
Russians to----
Mr. Nugent [continuing]. But did we honestly--did they have
the intel to give them the proper perspective to know that,
hey, listen, that may or may not happen? That is all I am
asking.
General Stewart. I think we had a pretty good sense that
Russia would act in its interests, that Russia would be
concerned about being encircled and isolated by Western forces,
that Russia would revert back to thinking--going back to
czarist time about their role in the European continent. So all
of that was available for folks to look at.
The approach that we took, whether it is to try to get
Russia to act in a more responsible way within the
international community, I don't know that any of us could have
predicted that Vladimir Putin would come to power and would
change that trajectory that was set by those leaders who
preceded him. So it always looks better in retrospect----
Mr. Nugent. Always.
General Stewart [continuing]. But I certainly think the
policy of trying to get Russia to act in a different way than
it had, in the competitive way that it had acted over the last
previous 50 years, was probably a positive thing.
Mr. Nugent. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I yield back.
Thank you, General.
The Chairman. Mr. Ashford.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you. Thank you, General, General.
I have two different questions on two different subjects.
And I just go back to your comments about ISIS and the answer
you just gave. I just need to fully understand this.
ISIL will probably conduct additional attacks, attacks in
Europe and attempt to direct attacks in the United States
homeland in 2016. I think that is, at least my constituents,
what their fear is, that it won't--the lone attacker will
probably give way to directed attacks. How do we--I am sure you
have answered this already, but could you do it again? How do
we address that? We know it is coming. We think it is coming,
anyway. We strategize around it. What is our strategy? What do
I tell my constituents about how we are going to direct----
General Stewart. I can tell you what the Intelligence
Community will try to do: get as clean an understanding of the
foreign fighters who have gone into Iraq and Syria to support
ISIL; try to get the best appreciation for those who are flown
back, and we have some techniques that has been very helpful;
and most importantly, to make sure as a community, we share,
not just across the defense intelligence community, but our law
enforcement communities and all those who will see activities.
That really is the key. If we can share this information that
each of us have in our different silos, and I think that has
gotten a lot better over the last several years, we have a
great opportunity to counter some of these threats and
challenges coming from overseas. So----
Mr. Ashford. So it is train--sorry.
General Stewart. I am sorry?
Mr. Ashford. No. I am sorry. Go ahead.
General Stewart. We will not stop the lone wolf attackers.
That someone is going to get radicalized and someday pick up a
weapon and go after Americans, that is almost impossible to
stop, but we can certainly get a good sense of those who are
acting overseas, those who have got military training, and
those who we are seeing indications that they are either coming
back or trying to influence individuals in this country.
Mr. Ashford. And I know Congress in various ways has
attempted to address the refugee issue, the visa issue. Aren't
those legitimate concerns? I mean, to me I, as a Member who
cosponsored a bill on refugees, it wasn't that we didn't want
refugees to come here, isn't it reasonable that the flow of
ISIL-related individuals back into Europe or into the United
States through an existing program that is legitimate, I mean,
you know, refugee program or visa program, isn't that a valid
concern that we must have?
General Stewart. Absolutely legitimate, absolutely valid
concern. Where it rises to the level of most dangerous threats
for me, we have mechanisms in place, we have procedures in
place that mitigates many of those concerns. So those that are
coming through established borders, ports of entries and the
like, not as great a concern. Could some come through borders
where we don't have control? Absolutely. How high would I put
that on the list of threats? Something to monitor, but not
terribly high on my list.
Mr. Ashford. All right. And that is--for example, we don't
stop a refugee program or we don't stop a visa program, but we
think about it as something that could be an avenue of flow
of--where there could be a flow of individuals that could, in
fact, lead an attack.
I mean, my concern in listening to this for all year, year
and a half now almost, is this sense that they are training
people in Syria, they have sophisticated abilities, they
haven't used their cyber ability apparently yet, but, like,
they might or could in the future, but that when you train
somebody and they are radicalized ab initio, they are
radicalized there; it is not radicalizing a lone wolf in
Nebraska, it is--and that person could come back into Europe or
the United States or anywhere else, and they are doing it
already in other parts, obviously, Libya and other parts of the
world, and they could put together a force of like-minded
people and, you know, attack us. That is not an--that is a
concern, isn't it? Obviously, you have said it is, but----
General Stewart. That is a concern and that is a plausible
scenario.
Mr. Ashford. And then my next question, thank you, is
related to intelligence gathering and cyber and all these very
high-tech fields that you have done a great job, I think, in
elevating, and it is--but how do we in a general sense, how do
we recruit our young people to do that work? How do we get them
interested in not being in the private sector right away
making, you know, bundles of money, and going into work for
you? How do we do that, in your view? What are the recruitment
tools?
General Stewart. Yeah. I am going to start a little bit,
and then maybe General Marrs will pick this up.
I have found no problems with the marines, who are genuine
patriots, who had great technical skills, who are willing to do
this business in cyberspace when I was associated with U.S.
Army Command. None of them were leaving because they could get
paid more by any of the industry giants. They did this business
because they were true patriots who wanted to serve their
country.
Where I found folks who left, was because we didn't have
any well-designed construct to retain them and allow them to
continue to do this highly skilled work that they wanted to do.
In spite of bonuses, we tended to move them off to do what they
viewed as nontrivial missions. And so they weren't leaving for
money; they were leaving because they couldn't get to do the
things they wanted to do.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, General. I am way over time, so----
The Chairman. General Marrs, is there anything you wanted
to add on that question right quick?
General Marrs. Sir, I guess I would just say, having had
some opportunities to be a consumer of cyber skills along the
way, that absolutely the more we can get out early on and, I
guess, expose our young folks to what is possible within this
community, once they see that and the mission that is involved,
it is pretty easy at that point to bring them on.
The Chairman. Okay. The only thing I would add, General, is
to the extent we can help in these career tracks, we want to be
helpful. A lot of it is not within--or traditionally within the
thing that we decide, but there are some aspects of this, and
we want to be helpful in just what you said.
Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony and your service.
General Stewart, you mentioned, you know, the transnational
threats, the ISIS threat, you know, certainly didn't have
happen overnight. I talk about it as a generational threat. I
don't think it is going to be defeated overnight.
In your best military judgment, you know, how long do you
think we are going to be dealing with this type of threat?
Again, it is right now ISIS, but it comes in many jihadist
forms and affiliates in these ungoverned spaces. How long do
you think we will be dealing with this as a major threat,
requiring military capabilities, you know, to address the
threat?
General Stewart. Yeah. That is a terrific question. We have
spent a little bit of time recently looking at this particular
threat, the ISIL, the center of gravity, what are their
critical vulnerabilities, so that we could take this particular
threat down. But the reality is that it is based on a very
extreme Salafist ideology, and unless there is a narrative that
counters that ideology, it will reemerge someplace else in some
other form.
That is probably not an ideology that we in the West can
counter. We need our partners in the region who believe in the
broadest sense of Islam and what it brings to the table to have
this dialogue, this conversation about how do we--this very
marginalized group.
When you take apart the 1.6 million Muslims and you whittle
it down to this, Salafist jihadist, movement, you are probably
talking less than a couple hundred thousand folks, who are as
great a threat to Islamic regimes.
In fact, in many cases a greater threat to Islamic regimes
than they are to the West. So we need them to counter that
ideology and offer an alternative view of Islam that allows
people to feel like they are part of a society that is looking
to take care of their citizens, to enhance their opportunities,
and, oh, by the way, practice their religion as they see fit.
Ms. McSally. But is it safe to say that is a whole-of-
society approach, whole-of-government, that there still might
be a military, you know, potential that we need to be prepared
for, given this threat? It is not going to go away in the next
year or two, I guess, is what I am trying to say.
General Stewart. It is a long-term challenge that we always
have to maintain that military capability to take out their
command and control, take out their leadership, take out their
networks that finance----
Ms. McSally. Wherever they are.
General Stewart. Wherever they are.
Ms. McSally. Whether that is Libya, Iraq, Syria.
General Stewart. Absolutely.
Ms. McSally. Right. Moving on again, my time in the
military, you know, one of the biggest things we were concerned
about was terrorists and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
coming together. And, you know, we have seen the desire, threat
equals, you know, capability plus intent, of ISIS to acquire
biological or chemical weapons or to recruit individuals who
have those capabilities to create them.
Can you comment on any concerns you have about the nexus of
ISIL and WMD?
General Stewart. Neither ISIS nor Al Qaeda has walked away
from their desire to develop chemical, biological capability
that they can use against the West.
Ms. McSally. Got it.
General Stewart. They have retained that intent.
Ms. McSally. And as far as the capability, can you comment
on that, or should we wait until the classified?
General Stewart. I think we could talk about it more fully
in the classified setting, but they will recruit expertise who
can bring a range of capabilities to ISIL, whether that is
financers----
Ms. McSally. Right.
General Stewart [continuing]. Media consultants, or
chemical experts.
Ms. McSally. Is it fair to say the difference between Al
Qaeda, where they were trying to maybe acquire it where it
existed, whereas ISIS is trying to recruit individuals with the
expertise to potentially home-grow it?
General Stewart. There is some indication that ISIL is
working very hard to develop their own capability.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Total different topic. Vice Admiral Branch, the chief of
Naval Intelligence, and since November of 2013, he hasn't had a
security clearance due to an ongoing investigation. A number of
our colleagues wrote a letter to Secretary Mabus about this
last week.
I can't picture--again, we are not going to weigh in on the
investigation or anything like that, but being in a position
where you have oversight of Navy intelligence, but you have no
security clearance for over 2 years, I can't picture him not
being able to be in meetings or provide oversight.
Can you share, General Marrs, how that impacts your day-in-
and-day-out interaction with the naval intelligence operation?
General Marrs. I think day in and day out, our partnership
is very, very strong at the senior leadership level, but----
Ms. McSally. But he can't be in the room.
General Marrs. And I will say for the individuals who
represent him, but I will absolutely agree that it is not an
optimal situation for the Navy.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Thank you.
General Stewart, do you have anything to add? Okay. Thanks.
And one last topic on the reports coming out of CENTCOM
[Central Command] where about 40 percent of analysts are saying
that they feel that the integrity of the analysis is
potentially not pure. I don't know how better to say that.
General Stewart, do you have any----
General Stewart. I am so glad you asked that question,
because my staff has been trying to keep me from not commenting
on this, and I desperately want to comment on it, because I
think the assertion that somehow 40 percent of that workforce
either represents the totality of our analytic enterprise or
truly represents that their judgments are not being accounted
for disturbs me more than I can state.
We have a very robust process of thinking through the
analytic effort, citing your sources, validating and vetting
your sources. Opinions count slightly, only because you are a
three-star, your opinions count. Analysts must apply the
analytic rigor that is necessary to deliver that content in a
compelling way to their commander.
The 40 percent, and I saw this number distorted to 400, is
absolutely gross distortment of the challenges that they face
down at CENTCOM. It undermines the great workforce that we have
down there at CENTCOM, who every single day are giving their
best judgment to that commander about how activities and
actions are going on the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility].
Ms. McSally. But there is an investigation ongoing.
General Stewart. There is an ongoing----
Ms. McSally. So clearly there is some----
General Stewart [continuing]. Investigation.
Ms. McSally. Yeah. Okay.
General Stewart. We neither control the scope nor the pace
of that investigation. And it is remarkable that folks have
named names in an investigation prior to that investigation
being completed. And if these individuals are exonerated, no
one will retract the really distorted reporting that they have
had in this situation.
Ms. McSally. I am way over my time. So thank you. And thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
General Stewart. I thank you for giving me an opportunity--
--
Ms. McSally. Absolutely.
General Stewart [continuing]. To vent on that one.
Ms. McSally. Tell me how you really feel.
The Chairman. General, it is true, however, and I have read
that report myself cover to cover, that they are reflecting in
the survey data that there is more question at CENTCOM than the
other combatant commands about whether the analysts believe
that the work they do is altered in some way. And I understand
your point about the 40 percent. I have, again, looked through
all those charts, and I don't want to get into too much
specifics here, but there is a reason to have an investigation.
And as I have said, we are working with the Intelligence
Committee as well as Defense Appropriation Committee, being
respectful of the IG [Inspector General] investigation, but it
is a matter of interest for this committee if, in fact,
intelligence is being shaped in some way to please superiors,
whether they be military or political superiors. So we are also
trying to be really careful and not interfere with the IG
investigation, but to say there--you did not say this, and I am
not trying to put words in your mouth either. To say there is
not an issue at CENTCOM, I think, would be also a
misrepresentation of what this survey showed.
I am happy for any further comments you would like to make.
General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, there is an issue there. And
the only thing that I have asked folks to do is let the
investigation play out. Let's do a thorough investigation,
let's understand what the real issues are down at Central
Command, and not impugn the entire analytic effort of the
defense intelligence enterprise----
The Chairman. No.
General Stewart [continuing]. Which is what some people
have done.
The Chairman. Yeah.
General Stewart. And that is disturbing when you are trying
to lead a workforce that have the challenges that we talked
about here, and yet they are questioned and challenged and
judged poorly in the media and by a number of other
individuals. It just is unfair to that workforce, it is unfair
to the leadership.
The Chairman. No. I think that is right. And you are
perfectly right to defend the workforce that is doing
incredibly difficult work every single day. And I think you are
also exactly right that this investigation, both the IG
investigation and what we are doing among the committees, ought
to proceed, but as is appropriate for intelligence, it ought to
proceed not in the public eye. And I think that, in my opinion,
those are perfectly valid points to make. At the same time I
would say, but they have got to proceed, because there is an
issue there that needs to be pursued.
Mr. Walz, thank you for letting me take a little of your
time--delay your time a little bit. The gentleman is
recognized.
Mr. Walz. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you both for being
here.
Again, I will try and get up to that line where I
understand some of this may have to go into the classified, but
after the 2009 Georgian incursion by the Russians, it became
apparent to them, it looks like, that their armor wasn't where
it needed to be, and there has been talk of how much they put
into that and how much they have done.
I am curious about what you are able to gather from this,
because we can gather that they have new main battle tanks and
things like that, but putting an armored vehicle into the field
is one thing, keeping it there is quite another.
I am more interested in what do we know about their
maintenance or logistics, how do they do that, and are they
doing it to a level that should be of concern?
General Stewart. Yeah. I think we probably should talk
about this in a closed hearing, because they have
systematically modernized, not just the weapons system, how
they deploy and employ those forces and sustain those forces.
Mr. Walz. Very good. No. I appreciate that.
The only other thing I would say as we are talking
worldwide threats and those things, General Stewart, and I was
out to visit you, and several of us, where you made a statement
that was pretty profound and stuck with me.
Some of our challenges worldwide and security challenges do
start here at home, whether it is budgetary or, as the chairman
has made a calling of, and I totally agree with him, on
acquisition reform. And I think it is always important whenever
we are discussing these capabilities what you need, we do have
a lot of influence in that.
And your statement candidness on acquisition reform is
something I repeat often and the chairman has pushed it. And I
know this is a very hard lift, but I just wanted to reassure
you, it is sinking, and it is obvious from the leadership and
the chairman and many on this committee. So I thank you for
that and do understand that as you have to think about all the
things that are being asked about here, it does come back home
to budgetary, it does come back home to acquisition, how fast
you can field things you need to field. So I appreciate that
help.
I yield back, Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
being here. I always appreciate those who give their lives to
the cause of protecting their fellow human beings.
General Stewart, you know, there are obviously a lot of us
that are concerned that we seem not to be having the kind of at
least observable progress on ISIS, at least in the timeframe we
would like to see it. I know everybody feels the same way. But
in light of that, what do you consider to be the Islamic
State's center of gravity? What are we doing to attack that
center of gravity? What is the strongest thing that we can do
against their weakest and most vulnerable and most critical----
General Stewart. So we define the center of gravity, the
source of their power as either the virtual or the physical
caliphate. So the existence of a caliphate, the narrative that
the caliphate exists is a draw to forces.
Mr. Franks. Yep.
General Stewart. It is a draw to that ideology that, we are
going to be part of this final caliphate and this final battle.
So the caliphate must be destroyed. The notion, the narrative
of the caliphate must be destroyed. We can go after that in a
number of ways. You have got to go after the leadership. We
can't take pressure off the leadership and we can't take
pressure off of the middle management, the bureaucrats who run
this proto-state we call ISIL and its caliphate. You have got
to go after the narrative, as we talked about earlier. You have
got to go after its financial networks. These are all critical
vulnerabilities.
And you are seeing some increased activity against those
financial nodes and networks, how they generate cash, because
if they are going to act like a proto-state, they are going to
have to generate cash, they are going to have to pay employees,
they are going to have to run the machinery, they are going to
govern like a state, and so you can start going after those
things that will allow them to act as a proto-state, act as a
caliphate. Leadership, command and control, financial networks,
infrastructure, logistics nodes, and all those things are
legitimate targets, and we are seeing quite a significant
increase from Central Command and others in going after those
very specific nodes.
So the caliphate is under attack. How that will play out
over the next 12 to 18 months will be where we will focus our
effort to understand the impact that we are having going after
those center of gravity and defeating the idea of a caliphate,
both in the physical and virtual space.
Mr. Franks. Well, I was glad to hear you mention going
after the narrative. That is more of a strategic approach, in
my judgment, because, you know, tactically we usually prevail,
but oftentimes in the effort to try to prevent this motivation
that the discussion the caliphate prevents, sometimes we don't
address this on a strategic level. So I am glad to see. I know
it is difficult for a military force to have a psychological
approach, but it nevertheless is pretty important when a group
feels that they are somehow transcendentally justified in doing
what they are doing. It is important to attack that, and I
appreciate you saying that.
Let me shift gears, if I could, and probably, given the
time I have, need to address this to both of you. What do you
consider the importance of Iran's ballistic missile program to
its military strategy in the wake of the Iran deal, or the
JCPoA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]? And in your
assessment, how likely is it that Iran will continue to move
forward with the development and testing of these systems
despite threats of new sanctions?
General Stewart. Iran's missile program is one of the
centerpieces of defense of their regime. They have built a very
robust missile capability in the face of 30-plus years of
sanctions. There is no indication that they are going to walk
away from their ballistic missile technology and capability.
They will continue to improve their ranges, they will continue
to improve lethality, they will continue to improve
maneuverability, and I don't see that changing any time under
any sanctions regime.
Mr. Franks. Well, it is not exactly encouraging, but I
think you are absolutely right.
General, did you have any----
General Marrs. Sir, I would just add that absolutely Iran
sees its ballistic missile capability as key to its power
projection. And I guess of additional concern is what they have
stated publicly is their intent to conduct another space launch
potentially as early as this year, and that could unveil a
capability that may have intercontinental range.
Mr. Franks. Well, I will try quickly here. Do you believe
that Russia is attempting to supplant American leadership in
the Middle East with a hegemony led by kind of a Moscow-Tehran
combination?
General Stewart. In a word, yes.
Mr. Franks. All right. That is a fast answer.
Thank you very much, both of you. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Having served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps,
the only thing--you know, I walked away opposed to the
stability operations, or what we used to call nation building,
but now I have concluded that the only thing worse than that is
doing regime change without a follow-on stability operation or
nation building, and that is what we have today in Libya. And I
am just very concerned that the vacuum that has been created
through regime change has given a real anchor for ISIS or for
these extremist groups to operate out of.
To what extent do you see them moving out of Raqqa in Syria
and over to Libya?
General Stewart. The specifics of any forces, ISIL forces,
moving to Libya, I think we should talk about in a closed
hearing.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
General Stewart. However, the Libyan branch of ISIL is the
most capable and the next most dangerous branch of the ISIL
enterprise.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. What I saw when I was in Iraq in 2005-
2006 was that the Sunni Arabs felt pushed out of the Baghdad
government, the Shia-dominated Baghdad government. And I think
it is hard for us to understand, but they have such a
vertically integrated form of government, that all the
decisions really come out of Baghdad. I mean, there is no
revenue at the local or the provincial level, and so when you
use the term ``pushed out of the government,'' it is far more
significant than anything that we can comprehend here. And that
the Kurds had insisted on a provision in their constitution
whereby they could form the semiautonomous regions. And when we
look at where ISIS was able to come into Iraq and easily take
over areas, they were all the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq.
And I would hope that we could push our government to try and
influence the Baghdad government to allow this formation of a
semiautonomous region in a post-ISIS Iraq, but going to where
we are right now, it would seem that we are making gains in
pushing back the ISIS in Iraq. We have certainly just taken
Ramadi, albeit probably destroyed it, take it.
Where do you see--what is the prognosis for Mosul right
now?
General Stewart. I think every effort is being made to get
after Mosul this year. As you know, urban operations is
complex, it is fought in multiple dimensions. So isolating
Mosul is the first step, whether or not the Iraqi Security
Forces are ready to go in and systematically clear an urban
environment, a large urban environment. I don't believe that
they have the capability. They will need a significant amount
of help from coalition partners. I don't know that they will
ask for that help. So I am not as optimistic about seizing and
clearing Mosul in this year, as I have read recently. We can
begin the operations, we can begin to isolate, we can do some
of the preparatory work, but securing, taking, and securing
Mosul in the next 8 to 10 months is not something I am seeing
in my crystal ball.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Lastly, and this is to both of you, and
that is, when I look at ISIS, they have maybe three streams of
revenue coming in: one is through contributions from radical
Islamists throughout the Islamic world; the second one is
industries that they have taken over, whether petroleum or
cement; and then the third is their ability to tax economic
activity in the areas that they govern. To what extent have we
compromised those three sources of revenue?
General Stewart. I think we have made a pretty significant
dent in their oil revenues by targeting some of the transport.
I think we have done significant dent in their cash reserves by
striking some of those targets. The taxing of locals, I am not
sure how successful we have been.
And your third area was?
Mr. Coffman. Well, I think contributions coming----
General Stewart. Contributions.
Mr. Coffman. Yeah. I think as long as they are seen as
ascendant, that money is going to flow. And I think the fact
that we have reversed some of that perception, I think, has
been helpful.
General Stewart. Reversing the ascendency will reduce the
amount of support, external support, that they get.
Mr. Coffman. General.
General Marrs. The only thing I would add is that success,
I think, against both the oil infrastructure and the banking
facilities is a result of just some excellent Intel Community
collaboration.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. Let me just touch on a couple things right
quick. Afghanistan, we haven't talked about. To what extent do
you believe that a significant terrorist threat to the United
States would re-form in Afghanistan without constant pressure
being applied against it, whether that be Al Qaeda or ISIS?
General Stewart. There is no doubt in my mind that if there
is not constant pressure on either ISIL in the Uruzgan Province
or remnants of Al Qaeda, that they will continue to pursue
targeting U.S. and Western interests from safe havens in
Afghanistan.
The Chairman. Okay. General Marrs, do you have a different
view?
General Marrs. No, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Press reports indicate that an ISIS
operative was captured, and hopefully, of course, he will be
interrogated. My question is have interrogations been a
significant source of intelligence that have helped prevent
terrorist attacks in the past, and has that source of
intelligence diminished in recent years?
General Stewart. Interrogation, as I understand it from the
Army Field Manual, which is about establishing a rapport with
the detainee so that you can get truly valuable intelligence,
has worked. I don't know if I can quantify how much it has
prevented terrorist activity, but that type of technique works,
it gets good insights that lead to other operatives, it gives
us insights into how the network operates. So there is value
there, and ultimately that could prevent terrorist activity.
The, quote, enhanced interrogation techniques are a
guarantee of having a detainee tell you what they want--what
you want to hear in order to stop the pain.
The Chairman. Really what I was getting at is we hadn't
been doing much questioning, because we hadn't had many
captures in recent years. Isn't that right?
General Stewart. So you may have noticed an uptick in
special operations intended to capture, interrogate, and gather
materials that will give us greater insights into the network,
and I think that will pay dividends in the long term.
The Chairman. Yeah. I think a significant source of our
information, we have not had in recent years, we ought to--
hopefully will have it, that is part of the reason--this is not
you all's issue, but we asked the administration to provide a
plan on how they intend to deal with detainees that they
capture in the future. It was one of the omissions in the
report that we received last week.
That is all I have. Susan, do you have anything else? Okay.
Thank you both for being here. And this will conclude the
open session of our hearing, and we will see you all
momentarily upstairs. The hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 2, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 2, 2016
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 2, 2016
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence,
recently discussed potential threats being posed by advancements in
bio-technology, including an ability to edit human-genes, so called
``gene-editing.'' I am concerned about these types of technologies
falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone actors. Can you
describe for the committee the national security threats being posed by
these and similar bio-technologies?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Wilson. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this
committee that that Afghan leaders are ``skeptical we will continue to
be there'' beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said
President Obama's plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016
from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the
United States with ``a very limited ability'' to conduct its
counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist
Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please
describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown
of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators
will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers
on force levels and drawdown timelines?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Wilson. In his January 2016 report, the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed that, ``the Taliban now
controls more territory than at any time since 2001.'' What is DIA's
estimate of the extent of Taliban control in Afghanistan?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Wilson. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this
committee that that Afghan leaders are ``skeptical we will continue to
be there'' beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said
President Obama's plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016
from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the
United States with ``a very limited ability'' to conduct its
counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist
Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please
describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown
of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators
will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers
on force levels and drawdown timelines?
General Marrs. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. To what extent does the Open Skies Treaty's
provision that all information collected on Open Skies flights be
shared with all parties to the treaty mitigate the counterintelligence
threat posed by potential Russian flights with a new, electro-optical
sensor?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. How well are defense intelligence missile warning
capabilities postured to address the nation-state threats highlighted
during the hearing (Russia, China, Iran and North Korea)?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
Mr. Moulton. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S.
and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar
figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats,
including enhanced Russian naval activities?
General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Moulton. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S.
and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar
figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats,
including enhanced Russian naval activities?
General Marrs. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
[all]