    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-105]

                               WORLD WIDE THREATS

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                 MARCH 2, 2016

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ____________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    99-649                       WASHINGTON : 2017

    ________________________________________________________________________________________
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
    E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

                         COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        One Hundred Fourteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado                   Georgia
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana              TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    PAUL COOK, California                MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               PETE AGUILAR, California
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
    THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                     Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
                          William S. Johnson, Counsel
                             Britton Burkett, Clerk

                               C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
      on Armed Services..............................................     2
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Marrs, Maj Gen James, USAF, Director for Intelligence, J-2, Joint
      Staff..........................................................     5
    Stewart, LtGen Vincent R., USMC, Director, Defense Intelligence
      Agency.........................................................     2

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
          Member, Committee on Armed Services........................    39
        Stewart, LtGen Vincent R.....................................    41

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [Response provided was classified and retained in committee
          files.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Coffman..................................................    71
        Mr. Garamendi................................................    71
        Mr. Moulton..................................................    72
        Mr. Wilson...................................................    71

                              WORLD WIDE THREATS

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                              Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2016.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
        This year, as we did last year, the committee meets today
    to get an assessment of the threat environment in which our
    military personnel are asked to operate. I think it is
    important that we understand not only the threats that are out
    there today, but the general direction of trends as we make
    decisions about this year's Defense Authorization Act.
        If we just think about some of the things that have changed
    since we had this hearing last year, we can remember the
    enormous amount of time and effort spent about Russia's
    activities in Ukraine. Of course, those gains have been
    consolidated, and now there is the most significant military
    presence in the Middle East that they have had since the 1970s.
        Meanwhile, ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] has
    launched attacks, both in Europe and the United States, and it
    has spread to more countries including, notably, Libya and
    Afghanistan, as well as others. There have been reports which
    have been confirmed in other congressional hearings about ISIS
    use of chemical weapons on the battlefield.
        Meanwhile, the Iranians continue to be provocative to the
    point of even detaining U.S. sailors recently. North Korea
    launches missile tests and nuclear tests and sticks its finger
    in the eye of the world. And meanwhile, China is continuing to
    develop its islands out of the Pacific Ocean and has begun to
    install, according to reports, military aircraft and surface-
    to-air missiles on those islands. So needless to say, the world
    is not getting any simpler, and the world is not getting any
    less dangerous.
        I really appreciate our witnesses being here today to help
    explore these issues. I would remind members that this
    obviously is an open, unclassified session. Immediately upon
    its conclusion we will go into a classified session with the
    same witnesses, so if you have questions that required a
    classified answer, obviously withhold and we will do that in
    the classified session.
        Before turning to our witnesses, I would be pleased to
    yield to the distinguished gentlelady from California for any
    comments she would like to make.

        STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement
    be entered into the record.
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 39.]
        Mrs. Davis. We look forward to Ranking Member Smith
    returning, hopefully within a few weeks, absolutely. And it has
    been an honor to try and help out in this role.
        As we know, and, Generals, you are here to discuss again
    how complex and a dangerous place the world is today,
    unpredictable. And we know that there are at least five key
    national security challenges that are driving defense planning
    and budgeting. All of them key, all of them critical, and we
    look forward to your comments today.
        It is so important for us to receive clear objective and
    comprehensive assessments from the defense intelligence
    community. A deep and clear understanding of these threats, and
    the trends and developments that drive them, is fundamental to
    the committee's work in shaping the defense budget, and in
    helping the Department of Defense and the rest of the national
    security establishment perform their duties effectively.
        So we look forward to your comments. I know I would like to
    discuss our priorities, and how perhaps those are changing. We
    certainly acknowledge your difficult and challenging work. And
    thank you again for being here today.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
        We are pleased to welcome back before the committee,
    Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General
    Vincent Stewart, and welcome, I believe for the first time, at
    least in this capacity, the Director of Intelligence for the
    Joint Staff, Major General James Marrs, our witnesses today.
    Thank you both for being here.
        Without objection, your complete written statements will be
    made part of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any
    oral comments you would like to make at this time. General
    Stewart.

    STATEMENT OF LTGEN VINCENT R. STEWART, USMC, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
                          INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

        General Stewart. Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Davis,
    members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
    provide Defense Intelligence Agency's assessment of the global
    security environment and the threats facing the Nation.
        Mr. Chairman, my statement for the record details a range
    of multifaceted challenges, adversaries' threats, foreign
    military capabilities, and transnational terrorist networks.
    Taken together, these issues reflect the diversity, scope, and
    complexity of today's challenges to our national security.
        In my opening remarks, I would like to highlight just a few
    of these threats, which represents our five focus areas in all
    warfighting domains: space, cyberspace, air, surface, and
    subsurface.
        Turning first to the current threat from ISIL. With the
    coalition engaged against the Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant, DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] is helping the
    warfighter and our policymakers better understand both the
    ideology and the capabilities of ISIL. ISIL, as well as like-
    minded extremists, are born out of the same extreme and violent
    Sunni Salafi ideology. These Salafi jihadis are determined to
    restore the caliphate, and as they have shown, are willing to
    justify extreme violence in their efforts to impose their
    social order on others.
        As the Paris attacks demonstrated, ISIL has become the most
    significant terrorist threat to the United States and our
    allies. In 2015, the group remained entrenched in Iraq and
    Syria and expanded globally. Spectacular external attacks
    demonstrate ISIL's relevance and reach and are a key part of
    their narrative.
        ISIL will probably attempt to conduct additional attacks in
    Europe, and attempt to direct attacks on the United States
    homeland, in 2016. ISIL's foreign fighter cadre is core to its
    external attack capability, and a large number of Western
    jihadists in Iraq and Syria will pose a challenge for Western
    security services.
        On the ground in Syria and Iraq, ISIL continues to control
    large swaths of territory. In 2015, coalition strikes impeded
    ISIL's ability to operate openly in Iraq and Syria, curtailed
    its use of conventional military equipment, and forced it to
    lower its profile. In 2016, the growing number of anti-ISIL
    forces, and emerging resource shortfalls, will probably
    challenge ISIL's ability to govern in Iraq and Syria. However,
    the group probably will retain Sunni Arab urban centers.
        Turning to Afghanistan: In their first full year in the
    lead, Afghan Security Forces increasingly conducted independent
    operations; however, these forces struggled to adapt to a lack
    of coalition enablers and at high operational tempo, which led
    to uneven execution of operations. As a result, insurgents
    expanded their influence in rural areas, limiting the extension
    of government control. The deployment of Afghan specialized
    units and their enablers will be necessary to continue securing
    key population centers in Afghanistan.
        Russia: Russian military activities continue at
    historically high levels. Moscow continues to pursue aggressive
    foreign and defense policy, including conducting operations in
    Syria, sustaining involvement in Ukraine, and expanding
    military capabilities in the Arctic. Last year, the Russian
    military continued its robust exercise schedule and
    aggressively, and occasionally, provocative out-of-area
    deployments. We anticipate similar high levels of military
    activities in 2016.
        Turning to China: China is pursuing a long-term
    comprehensive military modernization program to advance its
    core interests, which include maintaining its sovereignty,
    protecting its territorial integrity, and projecting its
    regional influence, particularly in the South China Sea. In
    addition to modernizing equipment and operations, the People's
    Liberation Army has undergone massive structural reforms,
    including increasing the number of navy, air force, and rocket
    force personnel, establishing a theater joint command system,
    and reducing their current seven military regions down to five
    joint theaters of operations.
        China has the world's largest, and most comprehensive,
    missile force and has prioritized the development and
    deployment of 125 regional ballistic missiles and cruise
    missiles to expand its conventional strike capabilities against
    the United States forces in the region. And they field an
    antiship ballistic missile, which provides the capability to
    attack U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific Ocean.
    China also displayed a new intermediate-range ballistic missile
    capable of striking Guam during its September 2015 military
    parade in Beijing.
        In North Korea: North Korea's nuclear weapons program is
    evolving, and evolving ballistic missile programs are a
    continuing threat. In January, North Korea issued a statement
    claiming that it had successfully carried out a nuclear test,
    and last month, North Korea conducted another space launch.
        The Democratic Republic of Korea displays of a new modified
    road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile, during their
    recent parade, and its 2015 test of a new submarine launch
    ballistic missile capability, further highlights Pyongyang's
    commitment to diversifying its missile forces and nuclear
    delivery options. North Korea also continues efforts to expand
    its stockpile of weapons-grade fissile material.
        In space, China and Russia increasingly recognize the
    strategic value of space and are focusing on diminishing our
    advantage with the intent of denying the U.S. use of space in
    the event of conflict. Both countries are conducting
    antisatellite research and developing antisatellite weapons,
    making the space domain increasingly competitive, contested,
    and congested.
        In cyberspace, DIA remains concerned about the growing
    capabilities of advanced state actors such as Russia and China.
    They target DOD personnel, networks, supply chain, research and
    development, and critical infrastructure information in the
    cyber domain. Iran and North Korea also remain a significant
    threat to conduct destructive cyberattacks. Non-state actors'
    use of cyberspace to recruit, propagandize, and conduct open-
    source research remains a significant challenge.
        Mr. Chairman, the men and women of your DIA are providing
    unique defense intelligence around the world and around the
    clock, to the warfighters, the defense planners, the defense
    acquisition community, and policymakers to provide warning and
    defeat these and other threats.
        I look forward to the committee's questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Stewart can be found in
    the Appendix on page 41.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        General Marrs.

         STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN JAMES MARRS, USAF, DIRECTOR FOR
                     INTELLIGENCE, J-2, JOINT STAFF

        General Marrs. Good morning, Chairman Thornberry, Mrs.
    Davis, and distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to represent the intelligent equities of
    the Joint Staff and combatant commands at this hearing.
        As the primary military intelligence adviser to the
    Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I am responsible for
    providing daily intelligence information to the Chairman, his
    staff, and many senior defense and national decision makers.
    Additionally, as the J-2, I also conduct intelligence
    operations, plans, and policy assessments, and make
    recommendations to the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and combatant
    commands.
        I share Lieutenant General Stewart's concerns regarding the
    global threats we face and look forward to taking your
    questions.
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        Let me just ask each of you a relatively simple question.
    Our core responsibilities under the Constitution are to provide
    and support, build, and maintain the military forces that are
    necessary for the defense of the country. And a lot of the
    decisions we make affect not just the military today but the
    military tomorrow, 3, 5 years out. So the trends, the way
    things are moving are important for us to try to keep in mind.
    Nobody can predict the future, but the general direction of
    things.
        So my question to you is, what is or are the primary trends
    that you see in the threat environment that we should take into
    account in making decisions about military personnel and pay
    and benefits and weapons and equipment and so forth? What are
    those trends that you think are so significant that we have got
    to keep those in mind as we make the program-by-program
    decisions that it is our responsibility to make? General
    Stewart.
        General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, I will start, and General
    Marrs will correct me when I am done.
        We talk about the complexity in the world today, but we are
    looking at breakdown of nation-states as we knew them in the
    past. We are talking about regions where nation-states are
    fracturing, and we are uncertain how those nation-states will
    act after conflict is done. We are seeing resurgence of Russian
    activity, as I mentioned earlier, where Russia intends to exert
    its influence on the global stage and will challenge our
    interests wherever those interests are globally.
        China, again, continues to push the envelope in reclaiming
    territory, disputed territory in the South China Sea that will
    complicate our ability to maneuver and conduct operations in
    the Pacific. These terrorist organizations, whether it is Al
    Qaeda or it is ISIL, continue to push the idea that they will
    replace the international order as we know it with an extreme
    ideology.
        So whether it is resurgent Russia in Europe, whether it is
    a rising Iran in the Middle East and the conflict between Iran
    and the Saudis in the Middle East or it is a competition with
    China in the Pacific, there are just a range of global actions
    that we simply are--we have not seen the likes of which, in
    certainly my time as I have served.
        So the world is far more complicated, it is far more
    destabilized, it is far more complex than at any time that I
    have seen it, and the outcomes in the next several years will
    be decisive for our Nation.
        And, Jim, I don't know if you have got----
        The Chairman. Well, General Marrs, before you respond, what
    I heard then was the breakdown of the liberal order and the
    nation-states system is one of the dominant trends that has a
    number of repercussions that we have to keep in mind as we
    think about military capability. Now, I may have heard it--but
    that is what my ears heard.
        General Stewart. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Okay. All right. General Marrs.
        General Marrs. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
        I think I would underscore two things that General Stewart
    mentioned: First, on the non-state side of the house, I think
    the continued challenge of ungoverned or weakly governed areas
    is something that absolutely is facilitating the growth of
    these violent extremist organizations. That combined with the
    relative ease of access of technology, and specifically cyber
    technology, that allows these organizations to rather quickly
    develop linkages.
        What I would say on the state side of this is that the real
    challenge, I think, is the volume of capabilities we are seeing
    being developed that really threaten our competitive advantage.
    And principally, what we are seeing in Russia and China is just
    a breadth of capabilities from strategic systems to anti-
    access/area denial to even, I would say, a growing adeptness at
    operating sort of just short of traditional military conflict
    that is posing a significant challenge in the future.
        The Chairman. Okay. I am repeating this back to you just to
    make sure I understand. So among the things I think you said
    are erosion of our technological superiority, and that is us,
    especially versus Russia and China; and then these new forms of
    warfare conflict are another part of that, at least on the
    state side, but actually ISIS employs them as well through
    their social media and other aspects. Is that the gist of it?
        General Marrs. That is accurate, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay.
        General Stewart. If I could. Look at it in three terms: Our
    resurgence of competitive nation-states that compete against
    our interests; breakdown of traditional nation-states,
    generates ungoverned space, generates conflict that we are not
    quite sure how that will play out; and then the ability for
    emerging states or even non-state actors to have access to
    disruptive technology that is readily available across a wide
    range of networks.
        So those three things combined leads to a trend that has
    manifested itself as a very, very unstable condition in our
    world today.
        The Chairman. Which makes our job complex, because we have
    got to prepare for everything from nuclear war down to hybrid
    and the kind of little green men sort of situations where you
    don't really know what is happening. And that is the challenge
    that you all face as well.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, again, for being here.
        Given what you have just stated, could you share with us
    how we then reorder, if at all, our intelligence priorities
    framework? What are we doing differently? Clearly during the
    Cold War intelligence collection was important. That obviously
    has been shifted in many ways to counterterrorism for a number
    of years. So what is changing, if at all? Why? And what should
    we be doing about it in terms of resources?
        General Stewart. So none of us in the Intelligence
    Community like to set priorities because we will invariably get
    it wrong. The area that we think is stable will turn out to be
    unstable. But I will tell you what I have done. We have got
    five priorities that I consider no-fail mission for the defense
    intelligence enterprise.
        How do we win the current fight, primarily focused against
    those transregional terrorist threats, whether they be in Iraq,
    Syria, or in Afghanistan. That is priority number one.
        The next set of priorities are focused on these nation-
    states who will compete with us on the globe. Russia, as a
    dominant nuclear-armed challenge to our interest around the
    globe. Iran, how will Iran behave as it comes out of a sanction
    regime, has increased revenues, continues to develop missile
    capability, competes with its neighbors in the region. North
    Korea, we have seen the level of activity in North Korea,
    whether it is nuclear missile technology, intercontinental or
    medium-range ballistic capability, a regime that can best be
    described as unstable, certainly uncertain what its intentions
    are.
        And longer term, what will China and China's role be on the
    international order. China presents itself as a peaceful rise
    to regain its status on the international stage. We are not so
    certain that that rise will be peaceful because of some of the
    things that it is doing in the Pacific and globally.
        So those are our five top priorities. There are a whole
    series of contingencies that we are still thinking about, but
    if you ask me today where I was putting my resources, those
    were the top five. And hopefully, General Marrs and the J-2 and
    the rest of the folks are thinking about some of the lesser
    priorities so that we are not surprised by something that
    happens on the stage.
        Mrs. Davis. General Marrs, do you want to comment?
        General Marrs. And I think the one thing I would add is
    more from a process perspective, so the focus is absolutely
    where General Stewart said it is. What we are working, along
    with DIA and USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for
    Intelligence], is on what is called an integrated defense
    intelligence priorities framework. And that is a project that
    has been underway over the last year, and it is basically to
    set in place a formalized mechanism where we, as a Department,
    can better articulate what the defense intel priorities are and
    make sure that those are clearly linked to the national level
    framework.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. And does that allow for some
    reordering within that? I guess it is the out-of-the-box
    thinking. And as an example, where would you see that where you
    actually had shifted in seeking something that you hadn't
    expected within that framework?
        General Marrs. So it is probably premature to say that
    about this process that is just evolving right now. So
    literally, we are working with USDI on a version 1.0 of this
    capability that will see or be unveiled later this spring.
        But I will say that, absolutely, a big part of what we have
    to do is, while we are mindful of these larger strategic
    challenges out there, that we still have a team that has to
    play position around the world and be thinking about the things
    that aren't in the paper right now.
        And I am confident that the team has a good approach for
    that, both in terms of how we as defense or intel professionals
    think about warning, and really that is our part of the trade
    craft that helps to avoid surprise. And also at the national
    defense or at the ODNI [Office of the Director of National
    Intelligence] level, thinking about tradecraft in the sense of
    what has been called in the 2014 national intelligence strategy
    ``anticipatory intelligence.'' So it is even at that level
    trying to figure out how we better make room for that in our
    daily activities.
        General Stewart. If I could add though, given the five
    priorities, the five focus areas I talked about, we have done a
    series of seminars to look at those key areas, and think our
    way through, not only from the country specific but the
    regions, what we know today, and really start thinking about
    what are some of the black swan events that we are not all
    thinking about, the nonlinear events that could unfold.
        And so we are putting in place a process where we think
    about alternative analysis, black swan events, awfully hard to
    call. It is interesting to note that one of the events that we
    looked at in the Middle East was what would happen if the Mosul
    Dam collapsed.
        And we are hearing increasingly now this discussion about
    the viability of the Mosul Dam and what that would mean. That
    is something that is nontraditional intel kind of thinking, but
    it would have significant implications if that event occurred.
        So we have got some processes in place where we are
    thinking about alternative analysis and red teaming so that we
    are not caught blind looking at Russia, and Iran, and North
    Korea, and miss some event.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes [presiding]. Thank you, Mrs. Davis.
        The Chair now recognizes himself for a series of questions.
        General Stewart, General Marrs, first of all, thank you
    both for being here.
        General Stewart, I would never instruct a general what to
    do but I am going to request, especially with those three
    stars, that you pull that mike just a little closer to you so
    that we can hear you even better. We are proud of your service.
    And I was looking at your resume. I wished I had time to read
    it all in the record, but through all of those over 35 years, I
    guess now--how many years total do you have?
        General Stewart. I think I am starting my 35th year.
        Mr. Forbes. We just are so proud of what you have done.
        As the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, one of
    the things that we are doing now to everyone that appears
    before this committee based on some information we got at our
    retreat for the committee a week or so ago is, did you have to
    submit your statement for the record to any individual or
    entity prior to submitting it to us today?
        General Stewart. Not for review. We certainly submit that,
    so that my bosses are aware of what I submitted. But not for
    review, not for modification, not for changes.
        Mr. Forbes. Okay. So who do you submit it to?
        General Stewart. Both the DNI [Director of National
    Intelligence] and USDI.
        Mr. Forbes. Okay. Now, the other question I would ask is,
    we looked at this--in your best personal, professional military
    judgment as well as the written statement that is here, as I
    understand from your written statement, you are to give us an
    assessment of the global security environment and to address
    the threats facing the Nation.
        As Chairman Thornberry mentioned, sometimes we are looking
    directionally because it is hard for us just to take a snapshot
    of today. But if we were going back to, let's say, the
    beginning of this decade--we could pick any other time that you
    think would be preferable, but let's begin in 2010--if I were
    to ask you, would that assessment and security environment and
    threats facing the Nation, is it better today or worse today
    than it was in 2010?
        General Stewart. I would assess it is far more complex
    today than it was in 2010. The things I have outlined,
    breakdown of nation-states, conflict in region, reemergence of
    competitive peers, far more complex, and I would submit more
    dangerous than it was in 2010.
        Mr. Forbes. And to help us with our colleagues when we are
    trying to get dollars for defense, if we were to ask you to
    give me a percentile figure from 1 to 10, 1 being no change,
    10, let's say, being an alarming change, where would you peg it
    along that continuum between 1 to 10, between let's say 2010
    and today?
        General Stewart. Now, that is not real good math here, but
    I would probably put it in the five or six range.
        Mr. Forbes. Five or six range.
        General Stewart. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Forbes. Now, the other thing we are always looking at
    too is our ability to forecast what we think these things are
    going to get worse or better. So let's go back to 2010 because
    we started making a lot of cuts to national defense back around
    2010, 2011, 2012. Was this threat assessment that has changed,
    as you indicated to a five or six, along that continuum, were
    they predicted at that particular point in time, or were these
    surprises to us?
        General Stewart. There were certainly lots of indications
    of Russian military modernization. There is certainly lots of
    indication of China military modernization, the reclamation
    effort. ISIL was not a dominant theme, but Al Qaeda was
    certainly still a threat. So I don't know that any of these are
    large surprises. The morphing of Al Qaeda into ISIL probably
    took some elements by surprise, but all of the pieces were
    there.
        So much of the things that we are seeing today, we saw the
    precursors of those things in 2009, 2010, 2011, and have now
    just manifested themselves on the international stage. So it is
    hard for me to call them surprises when there are lots of
    indicators there in the past.
        Mr. Forbes. So then just to sum up, basically the
    assessment of the global security environment on the threats
    facing our Nation today have gotten about a 6 on a 1-to-10
    scale in terms of difference between no change and alarming
    change. And according to your best assessment, most of those
    were predictable probably at the beginning of the decade as we
    went into this?
        General Stewart. I think there are great philosophers
    somewhere out there that said prediction is particularly
    difficult especially when it is about the future. So I think
    there are certainly some trends there that would indicate that
    we would be headed for troubling times if we did not reverse or
    counter.
        A growing Russian military modernization, a more assertive
    and aggressive China in the Pacific, the breakdown of some of
    these states in the Middle East, the competition between Iran
    and Saudi Arabia, the possibility that ISIL would establish or
    attempt to establish the caliphate; all of those precursors
    were there. They have just now gone full blown in the last 3 to
    5 years.
        Mr. Forbes. And I would concur with your assessment, and I
    think our big concern is that, that is why many of us were so
    puzzled that we began cutting national defense so much over
    this decade when we could have predicted pretty much this kind
    of alarming war we are now facing.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Stewart and General Marrs, welcome. Thank you for
    your testimony before this committee today as we help to shed
    light on some of the most dangerous threats that are facing the
    Nation around the world today.
        General Stewart, I will start with you. I thought that was
    a very insightful analysis in terms of the challenges we face,
    in terms of resurgence of nation-states, breakdown of some
    traditional states, and the rise of destructive technologies.
        Can you give the committee a sense of how you are properly
    organizing and resourcing the Defense Intelligence Agency to
    both better understand these threats and understand where they
    are going in the future?
        Maybe some specific examples, so that we understand what
    the outcomes of these trends are going to be, how they will
    challenge the United States going forward, and how we are
    prepared to counter those threats?
        General Stewart. Following the lead of my predecessor, you
    know, we have organized, reorganized the Defense Intelligence
    Agency along integrated intelligence center lines. That allows
    us to focus on regional challenges and give a center director
    all of the authority to work with the combatant commands to
    understand the many challenges in that region. That is a key
    foundational portion of what we have done to get a better sense
    of the challenges that we face.
        We have laid on top of that an architecture, at least we
    are building an architecture. We probably refer to it as ICITE
    [intel community information technology environment], that will
    allow us to use a cloud-based architecture to move content,
    make content available to the analysts wherever they are in the
    enterprise.
        That, I think, will be very significant in making
    information available and then using some big data analytic
    tools to help us to see these trends and represent those trends
    in a more timely manner. That is a very important next step.
        And then leveraging or working closely with our partners,
    our international partners, so that when we understand we have
    shortfalls or risk, we can use our partners to cover, to
    mitigate some of those risks or shortfalls. I do not have
    enough capacity to cover the globe. I will not be able to cover
    every contingency and every crisis given the structure that we
    have today, which is why we focus primarily on those five areas
    that I have talked about.
        But we are doing all the things process-wise,
    organizational-wise, architectural-wise, command and control-
    wise, to make sure we have the best information ready to
    deliver to our policymakers. And anything this committee can do
    to help increase our capacity would be greatly welcomed.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
        So among the things that you touched on and one of the
    things that concerns me the most, of course, is the rise of
    destructive technologies. And clearly, none can be greater than
    the cyber threats that we face. And how do you feel we are
    positioned in terms of our ability to understand our
    adversaries' cyber capabilities, and do you feel that we are
    properly resourced to defend against those threats?
        General Stewart. We are actively building back the analytic
    capability to understand adversaries' cyber capabilities. So we
    are building that back. We have made some investments to get
    some analysis in that space.
        Thinking about the cyberspace, that domain, the ability to
    counter activities in that space from kinetic actions, which
    requires a level of analysis that just find the nodes that we
    could defeat kinetically, all the way through the more discrete
    cyber, understanding key nodes, key networks, key routers, key
    switches. That requires an exquisite level of intelligence that
    we have not invested in over the last several years.
        So we are starting to build those pieces back now. That
    will take us a little bit of time. The fact that we are focused
    on those key threats, key actors, Russia, China, North Korea,
    Iran, will help us, but it won't position us to deal with the
    non-state or the emergent actor in that space.
        Mr. Langevin. And General, do you believe that CYBERCOM
    [Cyber Command] should be its own independent COCOM [combatant
    command], and how might this benefit our cyber operations
    worldwide?
        General Stewart. I haven't really thought about that
    question, to be honest. And I am hesitant to go there, because
    I know that Admiral Rogers, the commander at U.S. Cyber
    Command, has an opinion on that.
        Mr. Langevin. We just want your opinion.
        General Stewart. So I will just say at this point, CYBERCOM
    needs the relationship that it has with NSA [National Security
    Agency] far more than NSA needs CYBERCOM. I don't know that
    CYBERCOM could be effective and carry out its mission without
    that very close relationship, integral, integrated relationship
    that it currently has with NSA. It would have to build
    significant capacity to understand the threats and counter
    those threats, and I think that would be very costly in the
    near term.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you both.
        Chairman, I will yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
        Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Forbes.
        And thank you General Stewart, General Marrs, for being
    here today.
        And General Stewart, I appreciate you citing concerns about
    maintaining our technological edge and evolution of
    unconventional warfare. This is a focus of the Emerging Threats
    and Capabilities Subcommittee. I have the privilege of working
    with Congressman Langevin on these issues, and we look forward
    to working with you in the future to address that.
        And also, General, Jim Clapper, the Director of National
    Intelligence, recently discussed potential threats being posed
    by advancements in biotechnology, including an ability to edit
    human genes, so-called gene editing. I am concerned about the
    types of technologies falling into the hands of terrorist
    groups or even lone actors.
        Can you describe for the committee the national security
    threats being posed by these and similar biotechnologies.
        General Stewart. I am always hesitant to talk about
    sequencing a genome. Could we take this to the closed hearing,
    if that is okay?
        Mr. Wilson. Be happy to.
        General Stewart. Because I don't want in this setting to
    talk about either our capabilities or an adversary's effort in
    this space.
        Mr. Wilson. I'd be happy to.
        And again, thank you for your extraordinary service. I did
    represent Parris Island, so I have a deep affection. My late
    father-in-law was one of you, a marine.
        And General Marrs, with your recent experience as U.S.
    Cyber Command director of intelligence prior to your post as
    Joint Staff, could you please explain what deliverables can be
    expected from the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental project.
        And Secretary Carter has established a program between the
    military's innovators, cyber warfare operators, and private
    sector innovators, such as Silicon Valley. What technologies or
    tactics should be developed to keep intel-driven operations in
    the lead against any enemy with regard to cyber warfare?
        General Marrs. So, sir, I think the specific focus of that
    program is still evolving, but it really, for me, comes down to
    how do we better harvest the volume of information that exists
    out there, and figure out innovative ways to basically make
    sense of that cloud and apply it to keeping our networks safe.
        Mr. Wilson. Well, we really appreciate your leadership.
        And also, General Marrs, the Office of the Director of
    National Intelligence has reported that roughly 30 percent of
    the former Guantanamo detainees are confirmed or suspected and
    reengaging in terrorism killing American families. What trends
    has the DIA observed in detainee recidivism and the capacity
    and willingness in past practices of foreign countries
    receiving detainees to take appropriate steps to mitigate the
    risks that they would reengage in terrorism to threaten and
    kill American families?
        General Stewart. If I could jump on that one, please. The
    recidivism rate remains about 17 percent confirmed recidivism.
    Most of the nation-states where we transferred detainees have
    done a really credible job in either controlling, monitoring,
    or keeping them from getting back into terrorist activities. We
    have not seen an upward trend in recidivism. Like I said last
    year when I briefed this committee, we were somewhere in the
    18, 19 percent range, and we remain about that same rate today.
        Mr. Wilson. And something that concerned me, a number of
    the detainees were sent to Yemen, but it has disintegrated.
    What has happened to the detainees in that country?
        General Stewart. If I could take that one for the record,
    please. I don't have specifics on Yemeni detainees, but if I
    could take that one for the record, I will get back to you.
        [The information referred to is classified and retained in
    the committee files.]
        Mr. Wilson. And additionally, what is the assessment of the
    relationship between Russia and Cuba?
        General Stewart. Russia continues to have a strong
    partnership with the Cubans. They continue to do out-of-area
    exercises with Cuba. The relationship is not as close as it was
    during the height of the Cold War. I think that is basic
    calculus of what is important, but I think they do well
    together.
        Mr. Wilson. Would that include port and landing rights
    within that country?
        General Stewart. Yes, Congressman.
        Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much. And appreciate both of
    you.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Washington, Mr. Larsen, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
    patience in letting me get back to my chair. Wasn't too
    obvious.
        General, can you talk a little bit more about China--and I
    apologize I wasn't here, but I was here for your opening
    statement--in discussing the three categories of territorial
    integrity. There was the first one, but then you talked about
    its projection into the South China Sea.
        Do you do strategic or operational assessments or tactical
    assessments about the intent beyond South China Sea and how
    China might be using its investment in surface and other
    modernization for projection beyond the South China Sea?
        General Stewart. So we have seen not only reclaiming some
    3,000 acres of land in the South China Sea, we also see
    increasing naval activity in the East China Sea, disputed
    territory with Japan. Building commercial capability on these
    outlying regions will ultimately mean that China will want to
    defend their economic interests.
        So we are starting to see surface-to-air missiles being
    placed in the region. We are starting to see, as I have
    indicated, increased missile technology that can counter our
    naval forces. We are seeing outposts being built.
        Mr. Larsen. Specific to investment with surface combatants
    though, do you see this as a test zone for operations beyond
    the first and second island chains?
        General Stewart. At this point, the evidence seems to
    indicate defending the Nine-Dash Line and the territorial
    disputed areas. The aircraft carriers that they are building,
    the one that they built and the second one, I believe, they
    just commissioned, will not have the same blue open ocean
    capability that our aircraft carriers have, nor will it be able
    to execute air operations the way that we use our carriers.
        So at least initially, it looks like it is localized. But
    some of the excursions now with port facilities in Africa and
    their submarine technologies suggest a much broader global
    capability in the offing. And I can talk more specifically
    about the surface capability in closed hearing.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah, I would prefer that. I will just follow
    up and I will yield back.
        It is not just you, others out of the Pentagon and maybe
    the State Department have used the term they are reclaiming
    land. And let's be clear, they are not reclaiming anything;
    they are creating land. They are not reclaiming land that
    exists; they are creating land in violation of international
    law and we need to be clear about that.
        If we say they are reclaiming land that doesn't exist by
    creating it, it sort of gives us some justification that it was
    theirs to claim in the first place. And I think we need to
    really push back hard on this because they are creating that
    which does not exist and that which is not recognized by
    international law.
        General Stewart. I think that is a fair assessment that the
    territory does not exist. They are building territory. In the
    reclamation language, it suggests that they are falling back on
    their ancestral claim that this territory existed. It is part
    of their land domain, and so it is really just building that
    back in.
        So technically, you are absolutely right; there is no
    territory there. They are building territory. And so the
    language is not as precise as we probably should have it.
        Mr. Larsen. Yeah. All right. Thanks a lot.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Stewart, there has been much discussion about
    Russia and the Open Skies Treaty. And so I want to ask you a
    question about the Open Skies Treaty. Can you please provide
    the committee with details on the counterintelligence risks to
    the United States and our allies of a digital electro-optical,
    EO sensor and an infrared sensor, IR sensor. We are aware these
    planes fly over not only the United States but also our allies
    in Europe. And can you provide the committee with any reports
    or assessments DIA has prepared on these questions?
        Now, we have heard, of course, responses that we can just
    cover things, that we can mitigate this. But if we can, also
    the Russians can. But the concern I guess we have is what are
    we actually getting from this treaty, because Russia does get
    more because of our space assets, the clarity which we have
    versus the clarity that is offered from their access from Open
    Skies. And can't this information be used such as simple task
    such as targeting and threatening the United States?
        This is obviously something that has been a significant
    amount of discussion. I would like to know what the DIA has
    reviewed, what assessments you have done, and what the DIA has
    prepared.
        General Stewart. I have got to keep this really simple for
    me. This Open Skies discussion is, think Polaroids in the
    1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, versus 1080 high-definition capability
    as we go to a digital environment. The things that you can see,
    the amount of data that you can collect, the things that you
    can do with post-processing using digital techniques allows
    Russia, in my opinion, to get incredible foundational
    intelligence on critical infrastructure, bases, ports, all of
    our facilities.
        So from my perspective, it gives them a significant
    advantage and, yes, we both can use the same techniques. But I
    have a great concern about the quality of imagery, the quantity
    of the imagery, the ability to do post-processing of digital
    imagery, and what that allows them to see as foundational
    intelligence that I would love to have personally, and I would
    love to deny the Russians having that capability.
        Mr. Turner. Excellent. Thank you. I note many people have
    been very concerned because of then, as you just described that
    fidelity of information, how it is translated into actual risks
    to the United States.
        Now, as we were coming out, I would like to ask both of
    you, we were in the anteroom here, we were having a discussion
    about the number of exercises that Russia is having. General
    Breedlove has testified before us and has foreshadowed to our
    committee his concern of the snap exercises that Russia is
    using that have translated into actual military action and the
    inability to discern when an exercise is going on or when an
    actual military action is going to be pursued.
        As you look at this, my concern has been--I think a lot of
    people who are looking at it are very concerned that these
    exercises are not training but they are actually practicing. I
    would love to hear from both of you your thoughts on the
    Russian posture and the exercises that they are undertaking.
        General Stewart. The recent snap exercises have been
    realistic. They have been threatening. They show a level of
    sophistication that I have not seen in the 20 or so years that
    I have been watching Russian/Soviet activity. It certainly
    looks as realistic training as anything I have seen the
    Russians do.
        Now, whether that is training because of the improved
    military, improved technology, lessons learned from what they
    have seen us do, or genuinely practicing for out-of-area or
    defense of Russian sovereignty, quote ``sovereignty,'' they are
    as realistic as anything that I have seen the Russians do over
    the last 20 years.
        There is some evidence that previous snap exercises were
    great rehearsal exercises for their deployment into Syria. So
    if you take that as a model, then you can extrapolate that
    these practice, very deliberate, very thoughtful, high-
    intensity rehearsals could be rehearsals for some other either
    localized or out-of-area operations.
        General Marrs. Sir, I think I would echo General Stewart's
    comments and just underscore that our impression has absolutely
    been that Russia has been evolving the art of using these
    exercises to create ambiguity and within that ambiguity make
    our task of warning against potential action more difficult.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Lieutenant General Stewart, so what I am hearing here,
    Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, are the four national
    threats. We all agree on that. And global jihad is our growing
    transnational threat. And part of what makes answering these
    difficult is that they all require very different approaches to
    deal with them.
        So terrorism requires more special forces; China, you know,
    requires us to have a strong maritime and naval capability; the
    Russians require the ground forces; and Iran and Korea will
    continue to use asymmetrical tools to basically mess with us.
        From your perspective, is the U.S. meeting these threats
    with the right balance of resources at this point or into the
    future? And does refocus towards Asia or the proposed
    rotational brigade that we are having going through Eastern
    Europe, for example, allocate our resources smartly enough, or
    is this an area where we are probably missing the mark, now and
    maybe looking 5 years forward?
        General Stewart. So I am always hesitant to talk about the
    right force construct, because that really is an intelligence
    question, and I would defer to the service chief and the
    chairman to talk about the right force construct. Certainly in
    my conversations and in the things that we have reported, we
    have explained the totality of the threat, the challenges that
    we face. And I think, I would like to defer to the services and
    the chairman to talk about what is the right construct military
    forces.
        Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I don't know if you can do it in this setting or not, but
    one of the things that concerns me is the link between Russia
    and Iran, the new amount of money that Iran now has, obviously,
    to purchase weapons, most of which would likely come from
    Russia, and the impact that that may have on the strategy in
    Syria.
        General Stewart. One of the things that we assess, in
    addition to Russia moving into Syria to prop up the Assad
    regime, is Russia's ability to demonstrate their advanced
    weapons capabilities, to buyers in the Middle East and across
    the globe. So we certainly expect that this show of capability
    as Iran gets additional resources as they come out of the
    sanction regime could lead to Iran purchasing advanced weapon
    systems from the Russians.
        We have already seen them go through with the deal of the
    S-300. There is discussion about some of their aircraft that
    the Russians are using in the region. So I fully expect that
    Iran will use some of their resources to continue to modernize
    their military forces and that their supplier of choice will
    likely be the Russians.
        Mr. Scott. General, they already have the ability in Iran
    to hit a multitude of countries in the region, dozens of
    countries in the regions. The thing that they did not have was
    a quality targeting system and then questions about the actual
    capacity of the warhead, if you will, on the missile. Do you
    believe that our sanctions will hold in keeping them from
    getting better targeting and stronger warheads?
        General Stewart. Our sanctions in the past have not kept
    the Iranians from developing the most sophisticated ballistic
    missile capability in the region, capable of reaching all of
    their potential adversaries, capable of reaching into Europe.
    They have not only built a very robust missile technology; they
    have improved their accuracy; they have improved their
    mobility. I don't see them changing that trajectory because
    their missile capability is a way to confuse, confound our
    actions, and it is a guarantee for the regime.
        So I don't see sanctions changing that trajectory at all. I
    think as we lift sanctions, in fact, there is increase in
    likelihood that they will find ways to improve lethality,
    mobility, range of all of their missile systems.
        Mr. Scott. Gentleman, thank you for your service. I will
    save the remainder of my questions for the next hearing.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield the remainder of my
    time.
        Mr. Forbes. Gentleman yields back.
        The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, is recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, again, thank you for your service.
        Russia has become to many a more serious threat over the
    course of the last 5 years, particularly with Putin. When we
    are making projections through intelligence, what is the
    likelihood of that leadership remaining past the end of the
    year? What does your intelligence tell you?
        General Stewart. The likelihood that Putin will remain----
        Mr. Norcross. Putin remains past the end of the year,
    because there are a number of folks who have come out publicly
    suggesting that the economy is strangling him and he is hanging
    on by a shoestring.
        General Stewart. He has a weak economy. He has demographic
    issues within the country. I see no indications that Putin will
    not survive the near term, near term being the next year or so.
    Their out-of-area operations and the casualties and the economy
    could cause some internal unrest, but when you look at his--in
    spite of the economy, you look at his popularity ratings, all
    of us should be as popular as he is viewed in Russia.
        The Russian people have a tendency to endure more suffering
    and pain than most of us are willing to accept. So I see no
    trend at this point that indicates that he will not be here
    through 2016 and beyond.
        Mr. Norcross. So when we take a look back at what caused
    the downfall of the old Soviet Union, primarily, along with
    many other issues, it had to do with the economy that drove
    that nation into the ground.
        With Iran now entering the oil market and along with the
    U.S. and international, that is a serious glut, where we are
    not hearing from any of the economic forecasters that that is
    going to rebound. That is their single driver for their
    economy. Do you see that trend continuing?
        General Stewart. That trend will continue. It will
    challenge a number of domestic issues. It will cause them to
    reprioritize some of their military spending, so they will
    spend at a lower rate. It will challenge whether or not they
    can sustain large scale out-of-area operations, but I don't see
    it in the near term as a challenge to Putin and the regime.
        Mr. Norcross. And just to follow up on one issue. You talk
    about his popularity ratings. Of course, anything that comes
    out of Russia you take with a grain of salt, has very little to
    do with the truth.
        What independent assessment do you have that his popularity
    actually does remain strong with the general public?
        General Stewart. I don't have any independent. I know what
    the Russians publish and I know that Russia also controls the
    narrative far better than we do in this country, in any Western
    country. So he is controlling the narrative, he controls to a
    great extent what the Russian people see and the conclusions
    that they draw from that, but there isn't anything that I have
    seen that genuinely refutes the belief that he is a strong
    leader. He is making Russia stand up to the West, he is
    demonstrating historical Russian desire to be a dominant world
    player.
        I don't see anything outside of the Russian narrative that
    refutes that which they are feeding the Russian people. So in
    the absence of something definitive, the Russian people believe
    he is standing up to the West, they believe he is a strong and
    forceful leader, they believe he has put Russia in the rightful
    place where they should stand on the international stage, and
    the economy is painful, but it is worth enduring, because we
    are now a dominant power.
        Mr. Norcross. The economy is also driving China in a
    direction that they are not comfortable with. In fact, we just
    read they laid off 1.2 million workers, which, given the size
    of the country, doesn't seem significant, but it is.
        Do you see the economy driving their military program at a
    slower pace than it has been?
        General Stewart. I have not seen a slower pace, though I
    suspect that if the economy continues the way it is, that they
    will have to again make some prioritization, they will reduce
    their activity, but I don't think they are walking away from
    this military modernization. It may slow, but they are not
    walking away from this military modernization. That is core to
    China's future.
        Mr. Norcross. Thank you. And I yield back.
        Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Stefanik, is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    General Stewart and General Marrs, for your service and for
    being here today to testify.
        Like many of my colleagues, I want to focus my question on
    the implications of a resurgent Russia to the Intelligence
    Community. In addition to your testimony today, we have heard
    from senior leaders in DOD, as well as leaders in academia, of
    Russia's resurgence and military modernization in terms of
    their ability to apply this hybrid threat model in Eastern
    Europe.
        What is your assessment of how well our Intelligence
    Community is equipped to counter this hybrid threat, what
    changes have we made, and what changes do we still need to make
    in order to maintain pace with the very complex 21st century
    threats we are facing today?
        General Stewart. I am not sure that I am at all comfortable
    with the hybrid threat description. I think most nation-states
    would be really insane to take us on in a conventional
    approach, because of our superiority in our conventional
    weapons systems.
        So they are going to take us on in the information space
    and try to control and dominate the narrative, they are going
    to try to come after us in asymmetric large or small formations
    that will confuse our targeting effort. That only makes sense
    to counter the way we are structured and the way that we
    generally fight and have fought, for the last 15 or 20 years.
        So I am sometimes anxious when I hear Russia ascribed to
    creating this hybrid threat warfare, because I think it just
    makes sense to counter our superior conventional capabilities.
        Now, having said that, how do you defeat that? How do you
    get after that from an intelligence standpoint? That requires a
    significant more investment in understanding the open source
    environment, so that you can understand these little green men
    as they show up, because they are going to do some things in
    the open source that you ought to be able to exploit. You are
    going to require much more robust HUMINT [human intelligence]
    capability, and those HUMINT capabilities must be targeted
    against specific threats and specific regions. And then you
    have got to have a way to deal with the idea that an adversary
    will want to deny, degrade, deceive, destroy your information
    environment, and your information messaging.
        So if you can think your way through those, at least those
    three layers, you have got a chance to defeat the, quote,
    little green men, and then be able to apply conventional
    military capabilities against an advance.
        Ms. Stefanik. Do you feel that the Intelligence Community
    is adequately equipped to address those threats that you just
    outlined and the changing nature related to the open source
    environment, the increase in HUMINT capabilities that we need?
    What changes do we need to make going forward?
        General Stewart. So, yes, we are starting now to reenergize
    how we use open source as foundation to what we do in the
    Intelligence Community. I think for far too long we have
    invested in the high-end, high-technology collection where, in
    many cases, there is a great deal of information that we could
    use, foundational type of intelligence that is available open
    source, publicly available with limited or no expectation of
    privacy.
        So we are starting to put the model together where we can
    leverage the open source environment. We are not there yet. We
    need a good governance model, we need a model that talks about
    ethical behavior in the open source environment, what are the
    right tradecrafts to use in the open source environment, how do
    you protect private citizens', American citizens', information
    in that environment. So we are stepping our way through that
    now.
        In terms of the HUMINT aspect, there is still more that we
    need to do in refining precisely where those hard targets are
    and investing that human capability against those hard targets.
    I think we are making progress, but we are not quite where we
    need to be at this point.
        Ms. Stefanik. General Marrs, do you have anything to add?
        General Marrs. I think at this point I would just say that,
    and really it has been emphasized well by General Breedlove in
    his recent testimony, that there has been a concerted effort at
    the senior levels of the Department, not just in DOD with
    General Breedlove, the Secretary, and the chairman, but also
    working with Director Clapper on how to make these changes
    quickly. And I would be happy to talk in more detail in closed
    session on that.
        Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you for your testimony.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman [presiding]. Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, gentlemen. I am going to run
    through a few questions in different parts of the world, the
    first starting with Iran. I know that our intelligence in the
    past has been relatively limited or poor, and I am wondering
    now in the post-Iran deal world that we are living in how your
    intelligence picture has changed or improved, or what you are
    looking at in helping us both as we are looking at the
    implementation of the deal, but also what is happening in Iran
    overall.
        General Stewart. I hate to do this, I really do, but I
    would like to take this to a closed session.
        Ms. Gabbard. Okay. I thought you would say that.
        General Stewart. Because I think talking about where our
    footprint and where our opportunities might be would----
        Ms. Gabbard. Sure. Moving over to Eastern Europe, what
    would you say Russia's priorities are, given their actions and
    activities in Syria as well as Ukraine? And then also on the
    Ukraine side, how much and how effectively have you seen the
    Ukrainian military using their new special forces and
    unconventional tactics against the so-called Russian
    separatists there along the border?
        General Stewart. I am going to take the first question, and
    then maybe General Marrs will take the Ukrainian question.
        Russia has not lost sight of Ukraine as an important, maybe
    even vital, interest to be included as part of the Russian
    Federation. So I view their activity in Syria as
    multidimensional, one of which is, how do we take the
    international community's focus off of Ukraine while we keep it
    in this state of isolated conflict and maybe cause the
    Ukrainian regime to do something that falls outside of the
    Minsk agreement and, therefore, allows Russia to continue its
    activity. So I think part of--one of the things that I believe
    Russia has done in Syria is taken our attention off of the
    Ukraine. And I suspect that at some point they will come back
    to Ukraine either under the guise that, we have solved the
    problem for you in the West by our actions in Syria, therefore,
    you ought to lift your concerns, your restrictions, and your
    sanctions against our activities in Ukraine, and you ought to
    give us some dividend, and that dividend might be defined as,
    your hands off of Ukraine, because it is part of our sphere of
    influence.
        So I think this is a very--and maybe I am ascribing too
    much to the Russian thinking, but I think this is part of the
    grand plan that Ukraine remains in a state of conflict, but
    never lose sight of the fact that Ukraine must be part of the
    Russian sphere of influence and outside of the West's.
        General Marrs. And I think my answer to your second
    question regarding the effectiveness of the Ukrainian special
    forces has been improved and, I think, led to an increased
    stability--or increased agility on the part of Ukraine to
    respond to separatists' actions.
        Ms. Gabbard. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Nugent.
        Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    Generals, for being here today.
        I have two areas of concern: one is obviously the foreign
    fighters as they flow back and forth from Syria and Iraq.
    General Breedlove was quoted, I think just recently in regards
    to his testimony, you know, the fact that, you know, the daily
    flow into Europe, you know, they are using that disguise of
    refugees coming in, and they are really taking advantage of
    that in Europe, but also possibly here in the United States.
        Can you comment in regards, do we have a good handle on
    that or not?
        General Stewart. In Europe, I am not sure that there is a
    great handle on how you sift through potential foreign
    fighters, jihadists that are coming in through this mass
    migration. So that is an issue, I think, there.
        I am not concerned about the U.S., because of the
    capabilities that we have within our homeland defense. The
    things that we can do with the biometrics and the screening
    process makes it far less likely for them to just come across
    the border hidden within a mass wave of migrants.
        So I think it is less of a challenge here. It is not a
    completely diminished challenge, but I think it is far less
    here than it is in Europe.
        Mr. Nugent. But wouldn't that be the case--I mean,
    obviously that is true if they are coming through a point of
    entry in the United States----
        General Stewart. Right.
        Mr. Nugent [continuing]. But if they are coming across an
    open border area, obviously we don't have the ability to do
    that kind of screening, correct?
        General Stewart. Correct. Open borders, if they don't come
    through, I don't--I don't put that at the high end of my threat
    concern.
        Mr. Nugent. Okay.
        General Stewart. And let me tell you where I put my threat
    concern at with migrants. My threat concern with migrants are
    the migrants who are legitimately moving to get out of a crisis
    environment. They get to a nation-state, whether it is here or
    in Europe.
        They get marginalized, they get isolated, they get
    dissatisfied, they feel disenfranchised, they don't have
    opportunity, and they become a source to be recruited and
    radicalized, because now they view their situation as worse now
    than it was in the past.
        Mr. Nugent. You are seeing that, you know, in Germany and
    others where they are actually going and getting a one-way visa
    back to the country they came from, whether it is Afghanistan
    or Iraq or Syria, because they feel marginalized within the
    country they have gone to, and I get that. I mean, we see that
    across the board where people can be self-radicalized for
    whatever reason they may harbor within their hearts, but I
    worry about those that have the military experience, and I am
    sure you do too, of having served in combat.
        It is a big difference between reading about it and
    actually doing it. So I am concerned that--it seems like that
    is an issue that obviously needs more discussion.
        But getting to Russia in particular, I would just tell you
    that, you know, from the--you know, the approach that we have
    taken, and one of the generals that sat here and testified in
    front of us said, you know, we are hugging the bear. We thought
    that we could embrace Russia and live with them in a way that
    we are going to have mutual agreement. And obviously in their
    reaction and what they are doing in the Baltic States, what
    they have done in Crimea shows that that was a miscalculation.
        Now, I don't know if it was a miscalculation because of our
    intelligence ability to let our executive branch know, or if we
    told them and they just didn't act. Can you give me some--as we
    relate to the State Department back and forth?
        General Stewart. I think maybe some of this is a little bit
    of revisionist history----
        Mr. Nugent. Okay.
        General Stewart [continuing]. To be quite honest. Russia--
    Russia is carrying out and acting today in the same way that a
    nation-state----
        Mr. Nugent. Well, I agree, but did we not try to take a
    different approach with Russia? As one of the generals that sat
    here and spoke about it, we were trying to hug the bear.
        General Stewart. Absolutely.
        Mr. Nugent. We were trying to get them to--we thought we--
    --
        General Stewart. And wouldn't that have been a----
        Mr. Nugent [continuing]. Had a different reset.
        General Stewart. Wouldn't that have been a positive thing
    to do----
        Mr. Nugent. Oh, absolutely, but----
        General Stewart [continuing]. If we could have gotten the
    Russians to----
        Mr. Nugent [continuing]. But did we honestly--did they have
    the intel to give them the proper perspective to know that,
    hey, listen, that may or may not happen? That is all I am
    asking.
        General Stewart. I think we had a pretty good sense that
    Russia would act in its interests, that Russia would be
    concerned about being encircled and isolated by Western forces,
    that Russia would revert back to thinking--going back to
    czarist time about their role in the European continent. So all
    of that was available for folks to look at.
        The approach that we took, whether it is to try to get
    Russia to act in a more responsible way within the
    international community, I don't know that any of us could have
    predicted that Vladimir Putin would come to power and would
    change that trajectory that was set by those leaders who
    preceded him. So it always looks better in retrospect----
        Mr. Nugent. Always.
        General Stewart [continuing]. But I certainly think the
    policy of trying to get Russia to act in a different way than
    it had, in the competitive way that it had acted over the last
    previous 50 years, was probably a positive thing.
        Mr. Nugent. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and I yield back.
    Thank you, General.
        The Chairman. Mr. Ashford.
        Mr. Ashford. Thank you. Thank you, General, General.
        I have two different questions on two different subjects.
    And I just go back to your comments about ISIS and the answer
    you just gave. I just need to fully understand this.
        ISIL will probably conduct additional attacks, attacks in
    Europe and attempt to direct attacks in the United States
    homeland in 2016. I think that is, at least my constituents,
    what their fear is, that it won't--the lone attacker will
    probably give way to directed attacks. How do we--I am sure you
    have answered this already, but could you do it again? How do
    we address that? We know it is coming. We think it is coming,
    anyway. We strategize around it. What is our strategy? What do
    I tell my constituents about how we are going to direct----
        General Stewart. I can tell you what the Intelligence
    Community will try to do: get as clean an understanding of the
    foreign fighters who have gone into Iraq and Syria to support
    ISIL; try to get the best appreciation for those who are flown
    back, and we have some techniques that has been very helpful;
    and most importantly, to make sure as a community, we share,
    not just across the defense intelligence community, but our law
    enforcement communities and all those who will see activities.
    That really is the key. If we can share this information that
    each of us have in our different silos, and I think that has
    gotten a lot better over the last several years, we have a
    great opportunity to counter some of these threats and
    challenges coming from overseas. So----
        Mr. Ashford. So it is train--sorry.
        General Stewart. I am sorry?
        Mr. Ashford. No. I am sorry. Go ahead.
        General Stewart. We will not stop the lone wolf attackers.
    That someone is going to get radicalized and someday pick up a
    weapon and go after Americans, that is almost impossible to
    stop, but we can certainly get a good sense of those who are
    acting overseas, those who have got military training, and
    those who we are seeing indications that they are either coming
    back or trying to influence individuals in this country.
        Mr. Ashford. And I know Congress in various ways has
    attempted to address the refugee issue, the visa issue. Aren't
    those legitimate concerns? I mean, to me I, as a Member who
    cosponsored a bill on refugees, it wasn't that we didn't want
    refugees to come here, isn't it reasonable that the flow of
    ISIL-related individuals back into Europe or into the United
    States through an existing program that is legitimate, I mean,
    you know, refugee program or visa program, isn't that a valid
    concern that we must have?
        General Stewart. Absolutely legitimate, absolutely valid
    concern. Where it rises to the level of most dangerous threats
    for me, we have mechanisms in place, we have procedures in
    place that mitigates many of those concerns. So those that are
    coming through established borders, ports of entries and the
    like, not as great a concern. Could some come through borders
    where we don't have control? Absolutely. How high would I put
    that on the list of threats? Something to monitor, but not
    terribly high on my list.
        Mr. Ashford. All right. And that is--for example, we don't
    stop a refugee program or we don't stop a visa program, but we
    think about it as something that could be an avenue of flow
    of--where there could be a flow of individuals that could, in
    fact, lead an attack.
        I mean, my concern in listening to this for all year, year
    and a half now almost, is this sense that they are training
    people in Syria, they have sophisticated abilities, they
    haven't used their cyber ability apparently yet, but, like,
    they might or could in the future, but that when you train
    somebody and they are radicalized ab initio, they are
    radicalized there; it is not radicalizing a lone wolf in
    Nebraska, it is--and that person could come back into Europe or
    the United States or anywhere else, and they are doing it
    already in other parts, obviously, Libya and other parts of the
    world, and they could put together a force of like-minded
    people and, you know, attack us. That is not an--that is a
    concern, isn't it? Obviously, you have said it is, but----
        General Stewart. That is a concern and that is a plausible
    scenario.
        Mr. Ashford. And then my next question, thank you, is
    related to intelligence gathering and cyber and all these very
    high-tech fields that you have done a great job, I think, in
    elevating, and it is--but how do we in a general sense, how do
    we recruit our young people to do that work? How do we get them
    interested in not being in the private sector right away
    making, you know, bundles of money, and going into work for
    you? How do we do that, in your view? What are the recruitment
    tools?
        General Stewart. Yeah. I am going to start a little bit,
    and then maybe General Marrs will pick this up.
        I have found no problems with the marines, who are genuine
    patriots, who had great technical skills, who are willing to do
    this business in cyberspace when I was associated with U.S.
    Army Command. None of them were leaving because they could get
    paid more by any of the industry giants. They did this business
    because they were true patriots who wanted to serve their
    country.
        Where I found folks who left, was because we didn't have
    any well-designed construct to retain them and allow them to
    continue to do this highly skilled work that they wanted to do.
    In spite of bonuses, we tended to move them off to do what they
    viewed as nontrivial missions. And so they weren't leaving for
    money; they were leaving because they couldn't get to do the
    things they wanted to do.
        Mr. Ashford. Thank you, General. I am way over time, so----
        The Chairman. General Marrs, is there anything you wanted
    to add on that question right quick?
        General Marrs. Sir, I guess I would just say, having had
    some opportunities to be a consumer of cyber skills along the
    way, that absolutely the more we can get out early on and, I
    guess, expose our young folks to what is possible within this
    community, once they see that and the mission that is involved,
    it is pretty easy at that point to bring them on.
        The Chairman. Okay. The only thing I would add, General, is
    to the extent we can help in these career tracks, we want to be
    helpful. A lot of it is not within--or traditionally within the
    thing that we decide, but there are some aspects of this, and
    we want to be helpful in just what you said.
        Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
    gentlemen, for your testimony and your service.
        General Stewart, you mentioned, you know, the transnational
    threats, the ISIS threat, you know, certainly didn't have
    happen overnight. I talk about it as a generational threat. I
    don't think it is going to be defeated overnight.
        In your best military judgment, you know, how long do you
    think we are going to be dealing with this type of threat?
    Again, it is right now ISIS, but it comes in many jihadist
    forms and affiliates in these ungoverned spaces. How long do
    you think we will be dealing with this as a major threat,
    requiring military capabilities, you know, to address the
    threat?
        General Stewart. Yeah. That is a terrific question. We have
    spent a little bit of time recently looking at this particular
    threat, the ISIL, the center of gravity, what are their
    critical vulnerabilities, so that we could take this particular
    threat down. But the reality is that it is based on a very
    extreme Salafist ideology, and unless there is a narrative that
    counters that ideology, it will reemerge someplace else in some
    other form.
        That is probably not an ideology that we in the West can
    counter. We need our partners in the region who believe in the
    broadest sense of Islam and what it brings to the table to have
    this dialogue, this conversation about how do we--this very
    marginalized group.
        When you take apart the 1.6 million Muslims and you whittle
    it down to this, Salafist jihadist, movement, you are probably
    talking less than a couple hundred thousand folks, who are as
    great a threat to Islamic regimes.
        In fact, in many cases a greater threat to Islamic regimes
    than they are to the West. So we need them to counter that
    ideology and offer an alternative view of Islam that allows
    people to feel like they are part of a society that is looking
    to take care of their citizens, to enhance their opportunities,
    and, oh, by the way, practice their religion as they see fit.
        Ms. McSally. But is it safe to say that is a whole-of-
    society approach, whole-of-government, that there still might
    be a military, you know, potential that we need to be prepared
    for, given this threat? It is not going to go away in the next
    year or two, I guess, is what I am trying to say.
        General Stewart. It is a long-term challenge that we always
    have to maintain that military capability to take out their
    command and control, take out their leadership, take out their
    networks that finance----
        Ms. McSally. Wherever they are.
        General Stewart. Wherever they are.
        Ms. McSally. Whether that is Libya, Iraq, Syria.
        General Stewart. Absolutely.
        Ms. McSally. Right. Moving on again, my time in the
    military, you know, one of the biggest things we were concerned
    about was terrorists and WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
    coming together. And, you know, we have seen the desire, threat
    equals, you know, capability plus intent, of ISIS to acquire
    biological or chemical weapons or to recruit individuals who
    have those capabilities to create them.
        Can you comment on any concerns you have about the nexus of
    ISIL and WMD?
        General Stewart. Neither ISIS nor Al Qaeda has walked away
    from their desire to develop chemical, biological capability
    that they can use against the West.
        Ms. McSally. Got it.
        General Stewart. They have retained that intent.
        Ms. McSally. And as far as the capability, can you comment
    on that, or should we wait until the classified?
        General Stewart. I think we could talk about it more fully
    in the classified setting, but they will recruit expertise who
    can bring a range of capabilities to ISIL, whether that is
    financers----
        Ms. McSally. Right.
        General Stewart [continuing]. Media consultants, or
    chemical experts.
        Ms. McSally. Is it fair to say the difference between Al
    Qaeda, where they were trying to maybe acquire it where it
    existed, whereas ISIS is trying to recruit individuals with the
    expertise to potentially home-grow it?
        General Stewart. There is some indication that ISIL is
    working very hard to develop their own capability.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you.
        Total different topic. Vice Admiral Branch, the chief of
    Naval Intelligence, and since November of 2013, he hasn't had a
    security clearance due to an ongoing investigation. A number of
    our colleagues wrote a letter to Secretary Mabus about this
    last week.
        I can't picture--again, we are not going to weigh in on the
    investigation or anything like that, but being in a position
    where you have oversight of Navy intelligence, but you have no
    security clearance for over 2 years, I can't picture him not
    being able to be in meetings or provide oversight.
        Can you share, General Marrs, how that impacts your day-in-
    and-day-out interaction with the naval intelligence operation?
        General Marrs. I think day in and day out, our partnership
    is very, very strong at the senior leadership level, but----
        Ms. McSally. But he can't be in the room.
        General Marrs. And I will say for the individuals who
    represent him, but I will absolutely agree that it is not an
    optimal situation for the Navy.
        Ms. McSally. Okay. Thank you.
        General Stewart, do you have anything to add? Okay. Thanks.
        And one last topic on the reports coming out of CENTCOM
    [Central Command] where about 40 percent of analysts are saying
    that they feel that the integrity of the analysis is
    potentially not pure. I don't know how better to say that.
    General Stewart, do you have any----
        General Stewart. I am so glad you asked that question,
    because my staff has been trying to keep me from not commenting
    on this, and I desperately want to comment on it, because I
    think the assertion that somehow 40 percent of that workforce
    either represents the totality of our analytic enterprise or
    truly represents that their judgments are not being accounted
    for disturbs me more than I can state.
        We have a very robust process of thinking through the
    analytic effort, citing your sources, validating and vetting
    your sources. Opinions count slightly, only because you are a
    three-star, your opinions count. Analysts must apply the
    analytic rigor that is necessary to deliver that content in a
    compelling way to their commander.
        The 40 percent, and I saw this number distorted to 400, is
    absolutely gross distortment of the challenges that they face
    down at CENTCOM. It undermines the great workforce that we have
    down there at CENTCOM, who every single day are giving their
    best judgment to that commander about how activities and
    actions are going on the CENTCOM AOR [area of responsibility].
        Ms. McSally. But there is an investigation ongoing.
        General Stewart. There is an ongoing----
        Ms. McSally. So clearly there is some----
        General Stewart [continuing]. Investigation.
        Ms. McSally. Yeah. Okay.
        General Stewart. We neither control the scope nor the pace
    of that investigation. And it is remarkable that folks have
    named names in an investigation prior to that investigation
    being completed. And if these individuals are exonerated, no
    one will retract the really distorted reporting that they have
    had in this situation.
        Ms. McSally. I am way over my time. So thank you. And thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        General Stewart. I thank you for giving me an opportunity--
    --
        Ms. McSally. Absolutely.
        General Stewart [continuing]. To vent on that one.
        Ms. McSally. Tell me how you really feel.
        The Chairman. General, it is true, however, and I have read
    that report myself cover to cover, that they are reflecting in
    the survey data that there is more question at CENTCOM than the
    other combatant commands about whether the analysts believe
    that the work they do is altered in some way. And I understand
    your point about the 40 percent. I have, again, looked through
    all those charts, and I don't want to get into too much
    specifics here, but there is a reason to have an investigation.
        And as I have said, we are working with the Intelligence
    Committee as well as Defense Appropriation Committee, being
    respectful of the IG [Inspector General] investigation, but it
    is a matter of interest for this committee if, in fact,
    intelligence is being shaped in some way to please superiors,
    whether they be military or political superiors. So we are also
    trying to be really careful and not interfere with the IG
    investigation, but to say there--you did not say this, and I am
    not trying to put words in your mouth either. To say there is
    not an issue at CENTCOM, I think, would be also a
    misrepresentation of what this survey showed.
        I am happy for any further comments you would like to make.
        General Stewart. Mr. Chairman, there is an issue there. And
    the only thing that I have asked folks to do is let the
    investigation play out. Let's do a thorough investigation,
    let's understand what the real issues are down at Central
    Command, and not impugn the entire analytic effort of the
    defense intelligence enterprise----
        The Chairman. No.
        General Stewart [continuing]. Which is what some people
    have done.
        The Chairman. Yeah.
        General Stewart. And that is disturbing when you are trying
    to lead a workforce that have the challenges that we talked
    about here, and yet they are questioned and challenged and
    judged poorly in the media and by a number of other
    individuals. It just is unfair to that workforce, it is unfair
    to the leadership.
        The Chairman. No. I think that is right. And you are
    perfectly right to defend the workforce that is doing
    incredibly difficult work every single day. And I think you are
    also exactly right that this investigation, both the IG
    investigation and what we are doing among the committees, ought
    to proceed, but as is appropriate for intelligence, it ought to
    proceed not in the public eye. And I think that, in my opinion,
    those are perfectly valid points to make. At the same time I
    would say, but they have got to proceed, because there is an
    issue there that needs to be pursued.
        Mr. Walz, thank you for letting me take a little of your
    time--delay your time a little bit. The gentleman is
    recognized.
        Mr. Walz. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you both for being
    here.
        Again, I will try and get up to that line where I
    understand some of this may have to go into the classified, but
    after the 2009 Georgian incursion by the Russians, it became
    apparent to them, it looks like, that their armor wasn't where
    it needed to be, and there has been talk of how much they put
    into that and how much they have done.
        I am curious about what you are able to gather from this,
    because we can gather that they have new main battle tanks and
    things like that, but putting an armored vehicle into the field
    is one thing, keeping it there is quite another.
        I am more interested in what do we know about their
    maintenance or logistics, how do they do that, and are they
    doing it to a level that should be of concern?
        General Stewart. Yeah. I think we probably should talk
    about this in a closed hearing, because they have
    systematically modernized, not just the weapons system, how
    they deploy and employ those forces and sustain those forces.
        Mr. Walz. Very good. No. I appreciate that.
        The only other thing I would say as we are talking
    worldwide threats and those things, General Stewart, and I was
    out to visit you, and several of us, where you made a statement
    that was pretty profound and stuck with me.
        Some of our challenges worldwide and security challenges do
    start here at home, whether it is budgetary or, as the chairman
    has made a calling of, and I totally agree with him, on
    acquisition reform. And I think it is always important whenever
    we are discussing these capabilities what you need, we do have
    a lot of influence in that.
        And your statement candidness on acquisition reform is
    something I repeat often and the chairman has pushed it. And I
    know this is a very hard lift, but I just wanted to reassure
    you, it is sinking, and it is obvious from the leadership and
    the chairman and many on this committee. So I thank you for
    that and do understand that as you have to think about all the
    things that are being asked about here, it does come back home
    to budgetary, it does come back home to acquisition, how fast
    you can field things you need to field. So I appreciate that
    help.
        I yield back, Chairman.
        The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
    being here. I always appreciate those who give their lives to
    the cause of protecting their fellow human beings.
        General Stewart, you know, there are obviously a lot of us
    that are concerned that we seem not to be having the kind of at
    least observable progress on ISIS, at least in the timeframe we
    would like to see it. I know everybody feels the same way. But
    in light of that, what do you consider to be the Islamic
    State's center of gravity? What are we doing to attack that
    center of gravity? What is the strongest thing that we can do
    against their weakest and most vulnerable and most critical----
        General Stewart. So we define the center of gravity, the
    source of their power as either the virtual or the physical
    caliphate. So the existence of a caliphate, the narrative that
    the caliphate exists is a draw to forces.
        Mr. Franks. Yep.
        General Stewart. It is a draw to that ideology that, we are
    going to be part of this final caliphate and this final battle.
    So the caliphate must be destroyed. The notion, the narrative
    of the caliphate must be destroyed. We can go after that in a
    number of ways. You have got to go after the leadership. We
    can't take pressure off the leadership and we can't take
    pressure off of the middle management, the bureaucrats who run
    this proto-state we call ISIL and its caliphate. You have got
    to go after the narrative, as we talked about earlier. You have
    got to go after its financial networks. These are all critical
    vulnerabilities.
        And you are seeing some increased activity against those
    financial nodes and networks, how they generate cash, because
    if they are going to act like a proto-state, they are going to
    have to generate cash, they are going to have to pay employees,
    they are going to have to run the machinery, they are going to
    govern like a state, and so you can start going after those
    things that will allow them to act as a proto-state, act as a
    caliphate. Leadership, command and control, financial networks,
    infrastructure, logistics nodes, and all those things are
    legitimate targets, and we are seeing quite a significant
    increase from Central Command and others in going after those
    very specific nodes.
        So the caliphate is under attack. How that will play out
    over the next 12 to 18 months will be where we will focus our
    effort to understand the impact that we are having going after
    those center of gravity and defeating the idea of a caliphate,
    both in the physical and virtual space.
        Mr. Franks. Well, I was glad to hear you mention going
    after the narrative. That is more of a strategic approach, in
    my judgment, because, you know, tactically we usually prevail,
    but oftentimes in the effort to try to prevent this motivation
    that the discussion the caliphate prevents, sometimes we don't
    address this on a strategic level. So I am glad to see. I know
    it is difficult for a military force to have a psychological
    approach, but it nevertheless is pretty important when a group
    feels that they are somehow transcendentally justified in doing
    what they are doing. It is important to attack that, and I
    appreciate you saying that.
        Let me shift gears, if I could, and probably, given the
    time I have, need to address this to both of you. What do you
    consider the importance of Iran's ballistic missile program to
    its military strategy in the wake of the Iran deal, or the
    JCPoA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]? And in your
    assessment, how likely is it that Iran will continue to move
    forward with the development and testing of these systems
    despite threats of new sanctions?
        General Stewart. Iran's missile program is one of the
    centerpieces of defense of their regime. They have built a very
    robust missile capability in the face of 30-plus years of
    sanctions. There is no indication that they are going to walk
    away from their ballistic missile technology and capability.
    They will continue to improve their ranges, they will continue
    to improve lethality, they will continue to improve
    maneuverability, and I don't see that changing any time under
    any sanctions regime.
        Mr. Franks. Well, it is not exactly encouraging, but I
    think you are absolutely right.
        General, did you have any----
        General Marrs. Sir, I would just add that absolutely Iran
    sees its ballistic missile capability as key to its power
    projection. And I guess of additional concern is what they have
    stated publicly is their intent to conduct another space launch
    potentially as early as this year, and that could unveil a
    capability that may have intercontinental range.
        Mr. Franks. Well, I will try quickly here. Do you believe
    that Russia is attempting to supplant American leadership in
    the Middle East with a hegemony led by kind of a Moscow-Tehran
    combination?
        General Stewart. In a word, yes.
        Mr. Franks. All right. That is a fast answer.
        Thank you very much, both of you. And thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Mr. Coffman.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Having served in Iraq with the United States Marine Corps,
    the only thing--you know, I walked away opposed to the
    stability operations, or what we used to call nation building,
    but now I have concluded that the only thing worse than that is
    doing regime change without a follow-on stability operation or
    nation building, and that is what we have today in Libya. And I
    am just very concerned that the vacuum that has been created
    through regime change has given a real anchor for ISIS or for
    these extremist groups to operate out of.
        To what extent do you see them moving out of Raqqa in Syria
    and over to Libya?
        General Stewart. The specifics of any forces, ISIL forces,
    moving to Libya, I think we should talk about in a closed
    hearing.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay.
        General Stewart. However, the Libyan branch of ISIL is the
    most capable and the next most dangerous branch of the ISIL
    enterprise.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. What I saw when I was in Iraq in 2005-
    2006 was that the Sunni Arabs felt pushed out of the Baghdad
    government, the Shia-dominated Baghdad government. And I think
    it is hard for us to understand, but they have such a
    vertically integrated form of government, that all the
    decisions really come out of Baghdad. I mean, there is no
    revenue at the local or the provincial level, and so when you
    use the term ``pushed out of the government,'' it is far more
    significant than anything that we can comprehend here. And that
    the Kurds had insisted on a provision in their constitution
    whereby they could form the semiautonomous regions. And when we
    look at where ISIS was able to come into Iraq and easily take
    over areas, they were all the Sunni-dominated areas of Iraq.
    And I would hope that we could push our government to try and
    influence the Baghdad government to allow this formation of a
    semiautonomous region in a post-ISIS Iraq, but going to where
    we are right now, it would seem that we are making gains in
    pushing back the ISIS in Iraq. We have certainly just taken
    Ramadi, albeit probably destroyed it, take it.
        Where do you see--what is the prognosis for Mosul right
    now?
        General Stewart. I think every effort is being made to get
    after Mosul this year. As you know, urban operations is
    complex, it is fought in multiple dimensions. So isolating
    Mosul is the first step, whether or not the Iraqi Security
    Forces are ready to go in and systematically clear an urban
    environment, a large urban environment. I don't believe that
    they have the capability. They will need a significant amount
    of help from coalition partners. I don't know that they will
    ask for that help. So I am not as optimistic about seizing and
    clearing Mosul in this year, as I have read recently. We can
    begin the operations, we can begin to isolate, we can do some
    of the preparatory work, but securing, taking, and securing
    Mosul in the next 8 to 10 months is not something I am seeing
    in my crystal ball.
        Mr. Coffman. Okay. Lastly, and this is to both of you, and
    that is, when I look at ISIS, they have maybe three streams of
    revenue coming in: one is through contributions from radical
    Islamists throughout the Islamic world; the second one is
    industries that they have taken over, whether petroleum or
    cement; and then the third is their ability to tax economic
    activity in the areas that they govern. To what extent have we
    compromised those three sources of revenue?
        General Stewart. I think we have made a pretty significant
    dent in their oil revenues by targeting some of the transport.
    I think we have done significant dent in their cash reserves by
    striking some of those targets. The taxing of locals, I am not
    sure how successful we have been.
        And your third area was?
        Mr. Coffman. Well, I think contributions coming----
        General Stewart. Contributions.
        Mr. Coffman. Yeah. I think as long as they are seen as
    ascendant, that money is going to flow. And I think the fact
    that we have reversed some of that perception, I think, has
    been helpful.
        General Stewart. Reversing the ascendency will reduce the
    amount of support, external support, that they get.
        Mr. Coffman. General.
        General Marrs. The only thing I would add is that success,
    I think, against both the oil infrastructure and the banking
    facilities is a result of just some excellent Intel Community
    collaboration.
        Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        The Chairman. Let me just touch on a couple things right
    quick. Afghanistan, we haven't talked about. To what extent do
    you believe that a significant terrorist threat to the United
    States would re-form in Afghanistan without constant pressure
    being applied against it, whether that be Al Qaeda or ISIS?
        General Stewart. There is no doubt in my mind that if there
    is not constant pressure on either ISIL in the Uruzgan Province
    or remnants of Al Qaeda, that they will continue to pursue
    targeting U.S. and Western interests from safe havens in
    Afghanistan.
        The Chairman. Okay. General Marrs, do you have a different
    view?
        General Marrs. No, sir.
        The Chairman. Okay. Press reports indicate that an ISIS
    operative was captured, and hopefully, of course, he will be
    interrogated. My question is have interrogations been a
    significant source of intelligence that have helped prevent
    terrorist attacks in the past, and has that source of
    intelligence diminished in recent years?
        General Stewart. Interrogation, as I understand it from the
    Army Field Manual, which is about establishing a rapport with
    the detainee so that you can get truly valuable intelligence,
    has worked. I don't know if I can quantify how much it has
    prevented terrorist activity, but that type of technique works,
    it gets good insights that lead to other operatives, it gives
    us insights into how the network operates. So there is value
    there, and ultimately that could prevent terrorist activity.
        The, quote, enhanced interrogation techniques are a
    guarantee of having a detainee tell you what they want--what
    you want to hear in order to stop the pain.
        The Chairman. Really what I was getting at is we hadn't
    been doing much questioning, because we hadn't had many
    captures in recent years. Isn't that right?
        General Stewart. So you may have noticed an uptick in
    special operations intended to capture, interrogate, and gather
    materials that will give us greater insights into the network,
    and I think that will pay dividends in the long term.
        The Chairman. Yeah. I think a significant source of our
    information, we have not had in recent years, we ought to--
    hopefully will have it, that is part of the reason--this is not
    you all's issue, but we asked the administration to provide a
    plan on how they intend to deal with detainees that they
    capture in the future. It was one of the omissions in the
    report that we received last week.
        That is all I have. Susan, do you have anything else? Okay.
        Thank you both for being here. And this will conclude the
    open session of our hearing, and we will see you all
    momentarily upstairs. The hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                                A P P E N D I X

                                 March 2, 2016

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                 March 2, 2016

    =======================================================================

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                 March 2, 2016

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON

        Mr. Wilson. Jim Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence,
    recently discussed potential threats being posed by advancements in
    bio-technology, including an ability to edit human-genes, so called
    ``gene-editing.'' I am concerned about these types of technologies
    falling into the hands of terrorist groups or even lone actors. Can you
    describe for the committee the national security threats being posed by
    these and similar bio-technologies?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Wilson. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this
    committee that that Afghan leaders are ``skeptical we will continue to
    be there'' beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said
    President Obama's plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016
    from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the
    United States with ``a very limited ability'' to conduct its
    counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist
    Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please
    describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown
    of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators
    will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers
    on force levels and drawdown timelines?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Wilson. In his January 2016 report, the Special Inspector
    General for Afghanistan Reconstruction observed that, ``the Taliban now
    controls more territory than at any time since 2001.'' What is DIA's
    estimate of the extent of Taliban control in Afghanistan?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Wilson. A few weeks ago General Campbell testified before this
    committee that that Afghan leaders are ``skeptical we will continue to
    be there'' beyond the end of 2016. Additionally, Campbell said
    President Obama's plan to draw down to 5,500 troops by the end of 2016
    from the 9,800 service members in Afghanistan now, would leave the
    United States with ``a very limited ability'' to conduct its
    counterterrorism operations and its mission to train, advise and assist
    Afghan security forces. From both of your perspectives could you please
    describe what are the security risks associated with a further drawdown
    of U.S. forces to 5,500 by the end of 2016, and what key indicators
    will you look for over the next several months to inform policymakers
    on force levels and drawdown timelines?
        General Marrs. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                      QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. To what extent does the Open Skies Treaty's
    provision that all information collected on Open Skies flights be
    shared with all parties to the treaty mitigate the counterintelligence
    threat posed by potential Russian flights with a new, electro-optical
    sensor?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
        Mr. Coffman. How well are defense intelligence missile warning
    capabilities postured to address the nation-state threats highlighted
    during the hearing (Russia, China, Iran and North Korea)?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
        Mr. Moulton. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S.
    and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar
    figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats,
    including enhanced Russian naval activities?
        General Stewart. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
        Mr. Moulton. Given close, longstanding cooperation between the U.S.
    and U.K. and challenges in the Straits of Gibraltar, how does Gibraltar
    figure into Department of Defense plans to counter maritime threats,
    including enhanced Russian naval activities?
        General Marrs. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]

                                      [all]