[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-98]
FULL SPECTRUM SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 25, 2016
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
on Armed Services.............................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Breedlove, Gen Philip M., USAF, Commander, United States European
Command........................................................ 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Breedlove, Gen Philip M...................................... 37
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Castro................................................... 65
Mr. Conaway.................................................. 65
Mr. Gibson................................................... 66
Mr. Hunter................................................... 65
Mr. Scott.................................................... 66
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 65
Mr. Takai.................................................... 66
FULL SPECTRUM SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 25, 2016.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order. Seventy years
ago next week, Winston Churchill gave his famous Iron Curtain
speech in Fulton, Missouri. Among his insights was this, quote:
``I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they
desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of
their power and doctrines.''
He went on, ``From what I have seen of our Russian friends
and allies during the war I am convinced there is nothing they
admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they
have less respect than weakness, especially military
weakness,'' end quote.
I think what was true then is true now and we are seeing it
play out before our eyes. The famous reset by the Obama
administration with regard to Russia has not gone so well. Just
over the past year or so Russia has consolidated its gains in
Ukraine, has intervened in Syria, establishing a stronghold in
the Middle East for the first time since the 1970s, and has
continued to take unprecedented, provocative actions against
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ships and planes.
Russia presents a full spectrum of threats, from a modern
nuclear arsenal which Putin has threatened to use against
conventional forces, to hybrid tactics based on deception and
confusion and little green men. So far, NATO and the U.S. have
grappled to find effective countermeasures.
The President's budget proposal significantly--proposes to
significantly increase our exercises in Eastern Europe as part
of the European Reassurance Initiative. But rather than ask for
more money to pay for it, his budget proposal would take it out
of readiness, modernization--both of which have been under
siege for years. That can hardly leave the Russians quaking in
their boots.
Of course, Russia is not the only issue on the plate of our
distinguished witness today. The growing threat of terrorist
attack from ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] coming both
from Syria, Iraq, and from Libya, as well as the migration of
refugees more generally, are a significant issue for this
theater.
In addition, whether a cyberattack would invoke Article 5
obligations under the NATO treaty, as we talked about in our
hearing a couple weeks ago, is one of the many questions facing
us all.
Finally, the security of Israel, which is also within this
geographic command, is always a matter of keen interest and
concern before this committee.
We are privileged to have before us a witness to help
clarify all of these issues. Before introducing him I will turn
to the gentlelady from California for any comments she would
like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement be
entered into the record.
General----
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mrs. Davis. General Breedlove, thank you very much for
being here today with us, and as you conclude your time in
command and you look to your retirement as well--and we hope
that will be a good and smooth transition--I want to thank you
for your work to enhance cooperation with our European partners
and for moving us forward to address the challenges to Europe's
security.
The chairman has made some excellent points, of course,
about the complex and ever-changing situation that we face
every day. I am very interested in your thoughts on Russian
motivations and how U.S. and our allies can most effectively
respond without pushing Russia--the Russian government to be
even more adversarial.
Russia's destabilizing efforts continue, and it seems clear
that Russian aggression and malign influence in Europe are
likely the issues that the United States and our partners in
Europe will have to grapple with for years to come. We must
continue to lead in deterring Russian aggression and, if
necessary, in concert with our partners--but our first priority
has to be to prevent conflict.
I look forward to your testimony today and again thank you
very much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Our witness today is General Philip
Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander of our NATO forces and
commander of the United States European Command.
General Breedlove, my understanding is that our current
schedule is for you to rotate out of your current position and
move on to other challenges after just about 40 years in the
United States military. And so as we begin I want to thank you
very much for your service in this position.
And throughout your career your interaction with this
committee has been extremely valuable. You have been in a key
position at a very critical time when literally the world has
changed. And I know I speak on behalf of all our colleagues in
thanking you for the way you have done this job especially, but
also your entire military career.
Without objection, your entire witness statement will be
made part of the record and we will turn the floor over to you.
STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Breedlove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Congresswoman Davis, distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I have had no greater honor in my 39-plus-year career than
to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guard,
and civilians of the U.S. European Command [EUCOM]. These
remarkable men and women serve not only in the EUCOM theater,
but also in harm's way across the globe.
I thank this committee for your continued support to them
and to their families.
I am also honored to serve alongside the men and women in
uniform of the nations of Europe. They are willing and capable.
They play an essential role in helping protect our own vital
interests.
The last time I addressed this committee the security
situation in Europe was complex. Since then, the situation has
only grown more serious and more complicated.
Today Europe faces security challenges from two directions.
First, to the east Europe faces a resurgent, aggressive Russia.
Russia has chosen to be an adversary and poses a long-term
existential threat to the United States and to our European
allies and partners.
Russia is eager to exert unquestioned influence over its
neighboring states to create a buffer zone, and Russia is
extending its course of influence yet further afield to try to
reestablish a leading role on the world stage.
Russia does not want to challenge the agreed rules of the
international order; it wants to rewrite them. Russia sees the
United States and NATO as threats to its objectives and as
constraints on its aspirations. So Russia seeks to fracture our
unity and challenge our resolve.
Russia, Mr. Chairman, as you said, recognizes strength and
sees weakness as opportunity. To that end, Russia applies all
instruments of national power, including its military, to
coerce, corrupt, and undermine targeted European countries.
Some call this unconventional warfare; some call it hybrid;
I like to talk about it as sending in little gray men who use
their diplomatic, economic, and informational tools, in
addition to military pressure, to shape and influence nations
without triggering a NATO Article 5 military response.
To the south, from the Levant through North Africa, Europe
faces a complicated mix of mass migration spurred by state
instability and state collapse, and masking the movement of
criminals, terrorists, and foreign fighters.
Within this mix ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant], or Daesh, as I call them, is spreading like a cancer,
taking advantage of paths of least resistance, threatening
European nations and our own with terrorist attacks. Its
brutality is driving millions to flee from Syria and Iraq,
creating an almost unprecedented humanitarian challenge.
Russia's entry into the fight in Syria has wildly
exacerbated the problem, changing the dynamic in the air and on
the ground. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary,
Russia has done little to counter Daesh but a great deal to
bolster the Assad regime and its allies. And together, Russia
and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration
from Syria in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and
break European resolve.
All genuinely constructive efforts to end the war are
welcome, but that is not yet what we are seeing.
EUCOM is standing firm to meet this array of challenges. To
counter Russia, EUCOM, working with allies and partners, is
deterring Russia now and preparing to fight and win if
necessary.
That demonstrated preparedness to defeat is an essential
part of our deterrent message. To counter Daesh, EUCOM is
actively facilitating intelligence-sharing and encouraging
strong civil-military relationships across ministries and
across borders.
And to meet all real and potential challenges, EUCOM is a
central part of U.S. leadership in the NATO alliance as the
alliance continues its adaptation through the Warsaw Summit,
including the readiness and responsiveness of the entire NATO
force structure.
This year's budget request reflects our solemn commitment
to the security of our allies and partners and to protecting
our homeland forward. EUCOM does not yet have the personnel,
equipment, and resources necessary to carry out this growing
mission.
But the continuation of the European Reassurance
Initiative, or ERI, would strongly support EUCOM's efforts to
counter Russian aggression and other threats by closing gaps in
our posture and resourcing. EUCOM has carefully planned and
executed the ERI funds you have authorized over the past 2
years, even as our headquarters has shrunk to become one of the
smallest.
This year's budget request would significantly increase ERI
funding to $3.4 billion. That would let us deepen our
investment in Europe along five key lines of effort: providing
more rotational forces, increasing training with our allies and
partners, increasing prepositioned warfighting equipment in
theater, increasing the capacities of our allies and partners,
and improving the requisite supporting infrastructure.
Together, the tools ERI would provide would send a clear
and visible message to all audiences of our strong will and
resolve. Our further efforts to assure, deter, and defend,
supported by ERI, would complement those of the entire whole-
of-government team.
EUCOM remains committed to a shared vision of Europe whole,
free, at peace, and prosperous.
Mr. Chairman, as my military career draws to an end I want
to thank you again for your unwavering support of the men and
women of our Armed Forces. And at this time I want to thank you
for the personal opportunity to command them. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found
in the Appendix on page 37.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
We had a hearing a couple weeks ago talking about Russia.
Among the witnesses, for example, was your predecessor. And the
question was raised, is ERI to really deter Russia or is it to
make our allies feel better? And maybe it will do one but not
the--the latter but not the former.
What is your view of that?
General Breedlove. So, sir, I would agree with parts of
that but I would like to elaborate on some others. I would
agree that ERI does both assure our allies and I believe ERI
begins the movement or the changes we need to make to fully
deter Russia. But it is a step along that path.
For the past two decades, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we
have been in the position where we have been trying to make a
partner out of Russia in Europe. And we have downsized our
forces, downsized our headquarters, capabilities, et cetera, to
become a community that was focused on engaging Russia as a
partner and building partnership capacity in Europe.
And what we now have is clearly not a partner in Russia.
And so we have to begin reshaping the European Command and the
NATO force structure to be able now to confront someone that
does not wish to share our norms and values in Europe.
And those 20 years of change will not be overcome in one or
two steps. ERI is one of the steps along the way to reposition
us, I think, in forces, in headquarters capability, in the way
we deal with our allies, to get to where we need to be to
deter.
The Chairman. Well, let me follow up with one other
question for you, and it really goes to the heart of
deterrence, what deters. There was an article that just came
out in the Foreign Affairs magazine that raises a point that I
have thought about, and let me just read you a couple of
sentences and then get your reaction.
This is an article entitled ``Eurasia's Coming Anarchy,''
by Robert Kaplan. He says, ``In China and Russia it is domestic
insecurity that is breeding belligerence. Whereas aggression
driven by domestic strength often follows a methodical, well-
developed strategy, one that can be interpreted by other states
which can then react appropriately, that fueled by domestic
crisis results in daring, reactive, impulsive behavior which is
much harder to forecast or counter.''
And then he goes on to say, ``Part of what Putin is doing
is for the more chaos he can generate abroad, the more valuable
the autocratic stability he provides at home will appear.''
So I guess my interpretation of that is part of what is
going on, especially in Russia and maybe China, is for domestic
political concerns they gotta have outward aggression, and the
last point was the more chaos out there the more valuable he
tries--he believes it makes him for his internal purposes to
stay in power.
But that makes it harder to deter, because if it is all
about what is happening inside Russia then maybe this
deterrence and ERI and other things isn't really going to get
much done. I would appreciate your reaction to the thought and
anything you can shed on that.
General Breedlove. Thank you, Chairman. And I, again, would
like to agree with some of the terms but elaborate on others.
You have heard me say before that deterrence is in the mind
of the deterred. And so we are after the mind and the decision-
making process of Mr. Putin.
And I did see some of the discussion you had with Jim
Stavridis, and I would like to use a similar formulation in
that what I believe Mr. Putin sees and will deter him is using
all of the instruments of a nation's power--diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic. But they are all
required.
As you said in your opening statement and I did in mine,
Mr. Putin understands strength and recognizes weakness. If we
only use the diplomatic, the informational, and the economic to
address Mr. Putin, he will see that the military is absent or,
as I think Admiral Stavridis talked to you about, a lack of
will to use the military may be absent.
And so I think that to deter Mr. Putin we have to have an
all-of-government response which shows resistance
diplomatically, informationally, militarily, and economically.
And then, important to the military piece is not only having
the capability and the capacity, but showing the will to use it
if and when required.
Could I then address the other two pieces of your question?
First, exterior chaos: I believe exterior chaos is a tool
that Mr. Putin likes to use to give him a platform to show that
the great power of Russia needs to intervene in a West that
cannot bring order to the world, and it gives him that platform
to try to talk about the game that great Russia, as an equal
player on the stage, bringing order.
The second piece that you talked about, sir, is domestic
crisis inside the nation. I believe Mr. Putin is using a crisis
inside his nation. I do believe that his people are feeling the
drop in the oil prices, the sanctions, and the other things
affecting his government.
But he uses that to focus them on an external enemy to
bring their focus to what he wants to do with his nation and
his power. And he is now focusing his people completely on the
United States first and foremost, and secondarily NATO as an
external enemy that they need to be ready to rise up to meet.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, General, for being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We have an opportunity to work with our allies, our
partners, and I think the discussion that you just had with the
chairman is very helpful. Is that something that you feel is
understood throughout the--our allied community?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, I do. But understood is not
attached always to the kind of action that maybe we would seek
or hope for. But I will tell you that I am an optimist here. I
am more of a glass full--half-full in the way our allies are
now approaching the security environment in Europe.
In Wales we saw the leading edge of the problems in Ukraine
and we made the biggest changes to NATO ever, and some things
are going extremely well--most things are going extremely well
in that change. The military things we have done to change at a
very high level this joint task force, the way we have
organized our headquarters, the overall changes in the
readiness and responsiveness of NATO forces, most specifically
the ERF [European Rotational Force]--all these things are
completely moving apace to be completed before Warsaw, and we
have deployed and demonstrated them.
And as I mentioned to you in not the too-distant past, we
see the nations now turning around budgets. The numbers may be
wrong; it changes from day to day. But 16 to 17 of our nations
have stopped declines in their budgets; 5 were over 2 percent;
6 or 7 now have a credible plan to get to 2 percent spending in
a reasonable amount of time.
So I have seen change which is good.
Mrs. Davis. And the European Reassurance Initiative--how do
you see that as a tool then for us to support, I think, those
efforts specifically? And I just want to get a sense of--you
mentioned that this is not going to be a 1-year budget. As I
understand it, this is part of our Overseas Contingency
Operation funds, and yet it is something that is going to have
to continue.
What would that look like to you? We are sorry that you are
going to be leaving the command, but we know that you want to
leave something in place. What should that look like as we move
forward?
General Breedlove. So, ma'am, as I explained before, and I
won't go too far back but we have got about 20 years of a
different paradigm to correct. We are on our third--we will
have had 2 years of ERI and we are now asking for this third
year of ERI.
We have kept, as you heard me mention in my opening
remarks, a focus on basically five areas.
Infrastructure--and that is not building buildings, that is
fixing ports, fixing rail yards, changing exercise and training
areas, changing storage areas in order to make it easier for us
to rapidly reinforce Europe.
Preposition of equipment we talked about, and that is that
we are in this ERI looking to bring across our second heavy
force to put into preposition status. And this one will be used
not for practicing but for warfighting.
We are using the ERI to rotationally increase our forward
force structure. I have been very straightforward: There is no
real substitute for permanently forward-stationed forces. But a
second best, which is acceptable and which is where we are
heading, is to have a heel-to-toe rotational forces fully
funded to increase our presence in Europe, and that is a part
of the ERI.
Building the partnership capacity, bringing other nations
in the NATO alliance up alongside of us in the skill sets and
capabilities we need.
And then the last piece: training and exercise with our
partners.
So I don't mean to build a watch, but those five elements
are going to be needed to be sustained for some number of years
to get us to that position where we believe we are now in the
position where we can deter--as well as ensure, but deter. And
we are working now on what that future position we think should
be.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, sir. And I think as people are
refining that further that will be helpful for us to know and
to work with our budget folks, as well.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join with you in thanking General Breedlove for
your service. It has been an incredibly important time for you
to be in Europe because you have both been incredibly
articulate of the rising threat of Russia but not alarmist. You
have balanced in telling us policymakers and decision makers as
to what we need to do to give you the tools to change the
dynamics.
You and I have discussed the very public RAND study that
most recently has tried to give a picture of that
vulnerability, looking at the Baltics perhaps being available
within 60 hours to Russia's new aggression, their
modernization, and their forces.
I appreciate your use of the word ``deter'' because it is
incredibly important that we deter aggression, not just meet
aggression. Preventing it from happening in the first place is
going to require a military force for which there would be risk
to the other side.
You have indicated prepositioning as an important aspect. I
would like to talk to you about two aspects of our change in
posture that we need. And General Ben Hodges, who is the
commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, has stated that, quote:
``There used to be 300,000 soldiers in Europe during the height
of the Cold War. Today we have 30,000 with the same mission: to
assure allies and to deter Russia.'' There is a big difference
between 300,000 and 30,000.
So there are two vulnerabilities that we have, in listening
to your comments; and I would like to know how to address them.
One: We don't know what we used to know about what Russia
is doing. We used to have all eyes on them and when they would
do buildups and preparations for what you described as snap
exercises we knew where they were going, what they were doing,
and how they were going to do it.
And two: With the concept of prepositioning, you know, we
just don't have what we need there and we might not be able to
get there. In the RAND study they point out the vulnerability
of playing an away game while the adversary is playing a home
game.
Could you please describe what we need to be doing in both
the aspects of greater understanding, greater visibility into
Russia's actions and what they are doing, and secondly, then,
emphasize again your statements of our need to have forces
there?
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you very much for the
question, and I will try not to go long because it is quite a--
to walk this from left to right will take a moment. First and
foremost, a lot of smart people in RAND. I really love their
work and I have known most of these people most of my military
career.
But what you find from a study is tied a lot to how you
have been given the problem. And what is the status of the
forces at the beginning of a problem I think is at the heart of
the matter of the question you are asking me.
We used to have a very persistent and capable look at
Russia at the strategic level, the operational level, and the
tactical level so that we could understand what they were doing
with their forces. And we built a robust system of indications
and warnings, INW, that was based on that robust intel.
For the past 20 years we have been refocusing--for all the
right reasons, I think you would agree--some of our
intelligence on Al Qaeda, Daesh, Taliban, other elements around
the world. And so for the past 20 years, as we have been trying
to make Russia a partner we have reapportioned a large portion
of our ability to see away from Russia and towards these other
threats.
So the bottom line is we do not have that insight into
their operational- and tactical-level work. We retained a view
of that strategic force which makes them an existential threat,
but we lost contact with the operational and the tactical.
And in order to determine that we need to move forces into
position that might change the outcome of the studies that you
are referring to we need to have that capability and capacity
of intelligence to reestablish indications and warnings so that
we can deploy quickly the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task
Force, or deploy quickly the U.S. IRF [Immediate Response
Force] to have them in position before or possibly to deter a
conflict, and that might change some of the outcomes of what
you are talking about.
So it is incredibly important for the first part of your
question that we reestablish our ability to see and interpret
so that we can deploy early to hope to avoid conflict or to
change the outcome of the conflict.
Secondarily, as I said before, I believe that we will never
go back to where Europe was when Captain Breedlove went there
in 1983. Two corps, seven divisions, multiple brigades, 10
fighter wings--it was a force to be reckoned with. We will
never go back there. This is not the Cold War.
But I do believe we are not where we need to be now in the
mixture of permanently forward-stationed forces, prepositioned
stock so that we can rapidly fall in on it. And then as you
mentioned at the last part of your question, we are not where
we might need to be to be able to penetrate with A2AD--anti-
access and area denial environment that would allow us to do
the third part, which is rapidly reinforce.
So just 20-second wrap up: I believe that we need to move
forward in what our forward forces are, forward in how much
prepositioned stock we have so that we don't have to have as
many forward forces, and we need to make sure that we have the
capacity to do anti-access/area denial to break it so that we
can continue to rapidly reinforce.
I hope I answered your question, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
And thank you. General, for your leadership and your
thoughtful testimony here today.
On page 4 of your written testimony you advocate that the
U.S. should join the United Nations Convention on Law of the
Sea treaty, UNCLOS. I find that kind of striking because
yesterday your colleague, Admiral Harris, who is dealing with a
totally different part of the globe and totally different set
of issues in terms of maritime contest, made precisely the same
recommendation. And I was wondering if you could sort of
describe what you think the benefits would be if we took your
advice and ratified UNCLOS and what are the hindrances that you
are dealing with today by not being part of the convention.
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the question. I think
our uniformed military has been pretty consistent over time in
the support of the UNCLOS.
If I could just do a vignette for you of the Arctic. We are
facing a very challenging situation in the Arctic. The Arctic,
I think, should be an opportunity. As the ice flow pattern
changes, the maritime trade route in the Arctic shortens by
over 30 days, I am told, transit to the Far East. That should
be an opportunity.
Many of our NATO allies, Canada, and the U.S. are concerned
about what we see as the militarization of the Arctic now by
Russia. What we would see in the Crimea situation and the Duma
situation, currently in Syria, is that Russia has a pattern of
putting military force in the field to set the conditions to
negotiate from a position of power.
And so what we see now in the Arctic is Russia establishing
a military capability and capacity to influence that new
passage in the north. And being part of the UNCLOS would allow
us to be at the table in the diplomatic, informational, and
economic arenas to address that.
Last week I think, sir, you saw that Russia changed its
claim in the North Pole area. It didn't affect U.S. claims, but
it affected three of our other allies' and partners' claims.
And these are the kind of things that will be severed in the
framework of the UNCLOS.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Again, I think we learned again the harm recently when the
Hague Convention denied the U.S. request to intervene on the
Philippine claims in the South China Sea--again, a trend that I
think really mirrors what you are talking about, militarizing a
part of the Pacific. And our inability to even be at the table
when these issues are being resolved that will have a direct
impact in terms of military strategy and resources in the
future, you know, is the ultimate unforced error. So thank you
for your input this morning on that issue.
Admiral Stavridis, when he was here a couple weeks ago,
talked about the fact that the undersea realm is getting much
busier, said, you know, highest level of activity since the
Cold War. Do we have enough assets in terms of naval
resources--submarines, anti-submarine, surface ships in terms
of the European Command to address that issue?
General Breedlove. So, sir, I am glad you asked that in the
context of the European Command. I wouldn't want to try to
advise you on the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations] business on
numbers.
But these undersea assets are a very highly sought-after
asset. I will just factually say I did not get what I have
asked for, and what that means is that in the North Sea in the
vicinity what we call the GIUK gap--Greenland, Iceland, U.K.
gap area--where all of the sophisticated submarines and surface
combatants that Russia has comes out of the bastion area where
they are built, tested, and fielded, and then employs in the
Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and some of transits to the
Pacific.
But the bottom line is in that very contested, very highly
sophisticated part of the world we play zone defense. We can't
play man-on-man. And so I hate to simplify this, but it is just
a very simple way of understanding.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Again, our fleet today of attack subs is about 52 and, as I
think you know, it is going to dip just because of the legacy
fleet going offline. And, I mean, I guess we would probably
agree that that is just going to make that stress even worse
for your successors, in terms of trying to get those--the
assets you need to play zone defense, let alone man-to-man.
General Breedlove. And, sir, I would just--and not to
change the question or to divert, but this is similar to other
stories in what we call low-density, high-demand requirements:
high-end ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance],
high-end aircraft, certainly submarines, et cetera, et cetera.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, it is good to have you back in front of us. Thank
you for your service, and I don't think the administration has
announced who is going to follow you but you are going to be
tough to follow and I appreciate all you have done for our
country.
General, do you have an opinion as to whether you believe
Russia has any intention of returning into compliance with the
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty?
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the question and I am
going to answer it in the way I answer a lot of things. I am
unable to ascertain and I don't think I am qualified to really
determine what Mr. Putin and his folks intend, but what I would
say is that what I have done--and I have said this to you
before--I look at what our opponent does as far as building
capabilities and capacities, and then I infer from that how he
would use them or what he might do with them.
And I think you have heard me testify before, as have many
others, that we firmly believe that Russia is in violation of
the INF Treaty, and that not only are they in violation of the
INF Treaty but the type of weapons system that they have tested
and fielded in that category is very easily hidden or masked in
its conventional forces. And so it is worrisome to me that they
have created a capability that will be very problematic for us
to keep track of.
Mr. Rogers. How do you think we should raise the cost to
Russia for its violations?
General Breedlove. Sir, the Secretary of Defense has laid
out his approach to that and it is an escalating approach
starting with diplomacy and then moving to more what I would
call kinetic means. And I believe that we are in the phase
where we are--we and our allies are trying to reach a
diplomatic solution to that. But I support the Secretary of
Defense framework for addressing the breach in the INF.
Mr. Rogers. What do you think Russia is trying to hide from
us in Kaliningrad by illegally denying our flights over this
heavily militarized piece of Russian territory?
General Breedlove. So Kaliningrad, sir, as you know, is a
very militarized piece of property. And as we talked about just
a little bit before, in this discussion of anti-access/area
denial, A2AD, as we shorten it, Kaliningrad is a fortress of
A2AD. It projects land attack cruise missile capability; it
projects coastal defense cruise missile capability; and it
projects air defense capability; so a complete bubble to defend
against land approach routes or land targets, air targets, and
seaborne targets.
And as I mentioned before, some of the land attack cruise
missile systems or land attack missile systems in Kaliningrad
are those that can be dual-use, meaning they can be nuclear.
And I would not guess what they are trying to hide, but there
are a lot of things in there that support these capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. Lastly, you made reference in your opening
statement to Russia weaponizing the migration from Syria. Can
you speak more specifically to that?
General Breedlove. Sir, I cannot--again, I look at what I
see in capabilities and capacities and I determine intent. So
what I am seeing in Syria in places like Aleppo and others are
what I would call absolutely indiscriminate, unprecise bombing,
rubblizing major portions of a city that do not appear to be--
to me to be against any specific military target because the
weapons they are using have no capability of hitting specific
targets. They are unguided, dumb weapons.
And what I have seen in the Assad regime from the beginning
when they started using barrel bombs, which have absolutely no
military utility, they are unguided and crude, and what are
they designed to do is terrorize the public and get them on the
road; later, Assad using chlorine gas and other chemical-type
approaches to these same barrel bombs. Again, almost zero
military utility, designed to get people on the road and make
them someone else's problem--get them on the road; make them a
problem for Europe to bend Europe to the will of where they
want them to be.
And so I see a continuing pattern in Aleppo and other
places of this indiscriminate use of military capability that
all I can determine from it is the goal is to get more people
on the road and make them a problem for someone else to bend
the will of those being affected.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Very disturbing.
Mr. Ashford.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you very much. We had the opportunity a few
weeks ago to--in conjunction with the trip to the Gulf States,
to stop at NATO headquarters and be briefed, and much of what
was said there is what you have suggested today. And I want to
thank you for the efforts to get the other NATO partners to
contribute the 2 percent. I think you had a great deal to do
with that and it is such a big deal.
And also the shift in the last 2 years in how we approach
Russia, the threat of Russia, is much to do with your efforts,
so I really--you know that, but I want to thank you again for
that.
One of the discussion points at NATO headquarters really
was the discussion about the treaty itself, about Article 5,
about--is--in your view, does the language of that agreement,
which was--or that treaty, which is relatively older now--a
little younger than me, but older--is the language sufficient
as we look at the types of threats that you have described,
whether it is cyber or whether it is little gray men or it is a
different kind of situation?
How close to Estonia do the Russians have to be or if there
is some sort of cyber activity or other kinds of activity like
that? At what point does it trigger? And that is my question.
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for that. And if I could
just wind the clock back a little bit to the other articles of
the treaty. We often talk about Article 5; as important to me
is Article 3 and Article 4.
Article 3 can be summarized very succinctly in defense
begins at home, and we have been using that with our allies and
partners to talk to them about just what you said: increasing
and thickening their own defense, investment in their own
country. And that investment is not only 2 percent in total,
but what is also important is that 20 percent of that needs to
be recapitalization of investment in kit. It is not helpful if
the entire portfolio is in personnel costs. And so Article 3--
important.
Defense begins at home, and we have been working with
allies and partners to build capabilities that fit nicely into
the alliance. Everybody doesn't need to be flying F-16s. Some
people need to be creating tactical air control parties,
rotary-wing lift, et cetera, et cetera. So molding the alliance
via Article 3.
Article 4, of course, is that point at where the nation
feels threatened and begins a conversation with the other
nations about, ``We are facing a threat and how are we going to
respond?'' And this is the point when the nations are starting
to look at and say, ``This is a legitimate breach of what NATO
was built to do--collective defense.''
And then Article 5, of course, is the most highly
recognized one.
To your point, the language is not precise when it comes to
what we now call sort of the gray areas: the cyber, the
hybrids. And Mr. Putin is trying to live below that Article 5
level. He is taking action in nations now all around his
periphery, trying to remain below that level at which the
alliance would respond.
That is tough. It is tougher in the states between Russia
and NATO, but I think he is already taking these actions in
some NATO nations.
I would encourage maybe your staff to look at Mr.
Gerasimov's model, his strategy of indirect action and
deterrence. It is completely unclassified and out there on the
Net, and if you look at his stage one, two, and three and what
the actions he prescribes in that model of war, he is already
taking those actions in many of our nations.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thank you for coming before this committee again.
I understand this might be your last time before this
committee, so if you will forgive me I would like to just take
a moment and express my personal gratitude to you for being the
noble and benevolent leader you have been on behalf of human
freedom in this country, and I know my 7-year-old children have
a better chance to walk in the light of freedom because of
people like you.
And I truly believe that on just the basis of this
committee's perspective that you have been a strategic asset in
the arsenal of freedom, and I can't express to you just the
personal goodwill I have for you and your family.
With that, in your opening statement--or your written
statement--you talk a lot about the assurance and deterrence
missions you accomplished under the umbrella of Atlantic
Resolve. And it is my understanding that Atlantic Resolve is
really not a named operation. What additional authorities and
resources could you tap into if Operation Atlantic Resolve were
a named operation?
General Breedlove. So, sir, thank you. And thank you for
your support of--Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, which is dear
to my heart, but also to our military forces.
So the difference between the operation itself--and a named
operation is subtle but important. Named operations have
funding streams, they have dedicated rules of engagement, they
garner certain priorities and allocations of forces, et cetera,
et cetera. And so a named operation would bring more stability
and long-term focus to Atlantic Resolve.
We are thankful to this committee and others for 3 years--
or 2 years and possibly a third year--of ERI, which is very
important to Atlantic Resolve because it pays for those
rotational forces and things that explain we are a part of the
way forward. I think a named operation would give a sustained
funding stream to things like that.
Mr. Franks. You also mentioned that EUCOM does not yet have
the personal--personnel, equipment, and resources necessary to
carry out its growing mission. And to me that implies that
although there is a plan for the future, that if a military
crisis were to break out in there tomorrow, that you would not
be equipped to deal with it as you would see fit.
So what specific resources do you need to fulfill your
missions which are not included in the current budget? And
secondarily, is your headquarters adequately sized and staffed
at the levels required for you to execute your mission?
General Breedlove. So, sir, if I could step back just to
piggyback on a thought that I put out before, for 20 years we
have been trying to make a partner out of Russia and we have
changed our force structure and our headquarters and other
capabilities in Europe to reflect a mission that was about
engagement and building partnership capacity.
Now we have determined that we--people categorize it
differently, but we definitely do not have a partner in Russia.
And our resolve now is to be able to meet the challenge of a
resurgent, revanchist, however you want to label it, Russia.
We have to be able now to be a warfighting headquarters and
a warfighting force, as opposed to an engagement and
partnership-building capacity force. We will still do those
functions, but we have to rethink, do we have the capability
and capacity to be a warfighting force? And we do not.
And I think that we have got to look at our forward force
structure; we have got to look at our prepositioned capability;
and we have got to make sure we have the access to Europe in
the face of A2AD. That will take capacity and it will take some
new capabilities.
And as to the headquarters, our Secretary--Assistant Deputy
Secretary of Defense has recognized that our headquarters is
not sized right. We are still downsizing the headquarters from
the BCA [Budget Control Act], first $478 billion cuts. We had 5
years' worth of cuts to the headquarters laid in. We are still
getting smaller. But this year the Deputy Secretary has
increased our headquarters size to stop--to arrest that, and
hopefully we will continue to do that across the next years.
But it will take some time to reconstitute a warfighting
headquarters from where we have been for the last 20 years.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this
committee and this country have the opportunity to access the
wisdom and acumen of this gentleman in the future.
The Chairman. Appreciate it.
Mr. Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
And, General, thank you very much for your service.
Are we meeting Russia's threat in the Arctic, from your
perspective in Europe? Are we adequately meeting the
militarization of the Arctic today?
General Breedlove. I am going to try to answer this
question along the following lines: I do not believe that our
nation, nor most of the other nations of the Arctic Council,
wants to militarize the Arctic.
Mr. Moulton. Well, I agree with that.
General Breedlove. But what we see is that our opponent has
decided to militarize the Arctic. And so I think this is again
a discussion of do we have the appropriate capabilities of all
manner--aircraft, icebreakers, other things--and do we have the
capacities? And that is work that is being looked at now. I
think----
Mr. Moulton. From your assessment today, do you believe
that we have those capabilities and capacities to meet and
deter Russia's activity in the Arctic?
General Breedlove. In the Arctic? We do have some extremely
capable Arctic capabilities, as do some of our allies.
In fact, just before arriving here for this series of
engagements with Congress I was in Alaska and we were talking
about this with the leadership in Alaska and the forces of the
ALCOM [Alaskan Command] there, and they do specialize in these
capabilities. The real question is we have to determine what
the capacities that are required are.
Mr. Moulton. General, moving on to a different topic and
back to Representative Ashford's question, some experts have
said that now we have to afford additional policy authority to
DOD [Department of Defense] to allow for training of National
Guard, other forces, to counter the little green men and little
gray men in Eastern Europe. How can this be best accomplished
and what changes to statute or what policy provisions would
better enable that kind of cooperation?
General Breedlove. Sir, I am going to be very honest. I
don't think I can answer it the context of how you asked it,
but I do believe I can address this issue.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Okay.
General Breedlove. So the capacity to address hybrid
warfare in its many forms--and it is bigger than little green;
as you have heard, we also talk about little gray men, meaning
that hybrid warfare goes across all four elements of national
power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. And
so leaving the nations where they are and helping them to
determine what they need to do is important, and I will get to
the part that is important to you.
For instance, if you look at the three Baltic nations from
north to south, they do things very differently. This hybrid
approach in one nation is almost completely a military problem
and very slightly a ministry of interior problem. In another of
the nations it is about 50/50, ministry of defense, ministry of
interior. And then the other one is exactly opposite; it is
almost entirely ministry of interior and partly ministry of
defense.
So I think where your question is heading is, as you know,
we have unique title 10 limitations of what we can do with
other nations, so it is an all-of-government engagement. The
National Guard brings some interesting capabilities, when you
have guardsmen who have experiences in other fields--for
instance judiciary, legal----
Mr. Moulton. Sure.
General Breedlove. And so I think that is where this may
have headed.
Mr. Moulton. So, General, do you think that we need to
revise the current policy to be able to do that kind of
training, to better meet this hybrid warfare or whatever you
want to call it threat from Russia?
General Breedlove. Sir, I don't think I know--or I am not
familiar with the limitations enough to pass judgment. But let
me tell you, as a commander I need the ability to engage a
government across all the elements of government power to train
them to address the hybrid war.
Mr. Moulton. That is very helpful, General. I think my
concern is that, as you said, we are never going to get to the
seven divisions that we had in the Cold War, and we can expend
all our resources trying to incrementally move in that
direction, which may be headed in the right direction, but if
[we] expend all our resources doing that and don't get to a
point where it adequately does deter Putin at the expense of
all these other aspects of this warfare we are going to really
miss the boat.
General Breedlove. I completely agree that we have to have
capacities in all of those elements of national power to deter,
as we have talked about with Congresswoman Davis.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. General, I want to thank you for testifying
before us today and, once again, thank you for your sage
counsel and advice and all your years of experience and what
you have brought to the table. You will be sorely missed.
Everything you said I think is spot-on to where we need to be
in terms of deterrence and dealing with an emerging Russia.
I do have some questions. I told you earlier with respect
to B-52s, Barksdale Air Force Base is in my district, home of
Global Strike Command and General Rand, and so I want to know
from you, what is the deterrence effect of the B-52 bomber?
What do you see as the future for that bomber in terms of what
it can bring to the battlefield both in kinetic action but also
in deterrence?
General Breedlove. Sir, I will not dodge your question, but
I would say this is much more appropriately addressed by
General Welsh and others as to that specific platform. But let
me tell you what the bomber--and the B-52 being a mainstay of
that fleet--the bomber brings to deterrence.
And that is as you know the B-52, the B-1, and to a certain
degree the B-2 have become much more flexible across their
lives. And the B-52 as a platform for employing all manner of
weapons like the other bombers, but certainly the B-52 is a
great deterrent effect because it can be a part of a purely
conventional response to try to de-escalate the situation,
which is what we really want.
We don't want to fight. We want the capacity and capability
to defeat, but we don't want to go there. And so the ability of
that particular platform to be able to do all missions and
bring capacity to both a conventional and a non-conventional
war is important.
The other piece is it has proved, as you know, to be an
incredibly long-living airframe with capability still into the
future. I am not sure if it is still true, but when I was the
vice chief of staff at the Air Force now 5 years ago we used to
say that the mother of the son or daughter that will be the
last pilot of the B-52 has not been born yet.
Dr. Fleming. Right.
General Breedlove. And it will be well over 100 years old
before we are done with it.
Dr. Fleming. Yes. Amazing.
Well, and since you brought that up, we are looking at the
development of the Long Range Strike Bomber [LRS-B], so my
question is what will be that effect and what are the current
timelines for both the upgrade to B-52 and replacement of long-
term strike bombers?
General Breedlove. So, sir, as you remember, we were
talking earlier about A2AD--anti-access/area denial. One of the
biggest keys to being able to break anti-access/area denial is
the ability to penetrate the air defenses so that we can get
close enough to not only destroy the air defenses but to
destroy the coastal defense cruise missiles and the land attack
missiles, which are the three elements of an A2AD environment.
One of the primary and very important tools to busting that
A2AD environment is a fifth-generation ability to penetrate. In
the LRS-B you will have a platform and weapons that can
penetrate, key to the future in the--of the older generation
bombers and platforms are developing, and we are and have those
weapons that can penetrate. And so those upgrades are all
important to me as a user so that I can call on the service to
bring forward the capabilities and capacities to address A2AD.
Dr. Fleming. Right. Great. Thanks.
And in the remaining time I have, could you comment on the
current state of research by the Navy and Air Force into
deterrence assurance? By this I mean the gaming scenarios in
planning to address the aggressive behavior and Russia's
apparent shift in nuclear doctrine.
General Breedlove. So I can't speak specifically to just
the services. You may be familiar with what we call the RSI,
the Russian Strategic Initiative. It is modeled after the CSI,
the Chinese Strategic Initiative, which is nearly 7 years old.
As we in the past couple of years have seen Russia as no longer
a partner we have developed the Russia Strategic Initiative to
do just this kind of work, to look at the things we need to
change in weaponry, but more importantly, to do things like war
gaming to understand how they would react to our war plans, et
cetera, et cetera.
So what I am aware is as the leader of the Russia Strategic
Initiative for the Department of Defense, we are getting some
very exquisite help in understanding this business.
Dr. Fleming. Great. Well, thank you, General, and so much
for the Russian reset.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I want to thank you for your testimony today and
for your service to our nation. Your service has been
absolutely invaluable to our country and we will miss you in
your retirement. But I certainly want to be among the many to
wish you well in this next chapter of your life.
Officials within the Department have stated that they are
very worried that our military's ability to counter and wage
electronic warfare has atrophied pretty significantly while
other partners around the world--or I should say adversaries
around the world--have invested heavily in this area, and that
we may be lagging behind countries such as Russia. Would you
agree with this assessment, and how do you believe EUCOM is
currently positioned to address this challenge across the AOR
[area of responsibility]?
My other question that I have I hope we can get to is--and
I spend a lot of time obviously on cybersecurity, and you
mentioned that the challenges that we face in that space with
respect to what Russia is doing. And my question is, how do you
believe that we are doing at countering cyber threats with our
allies against what Russia is doing and what their capabilities
are? And do our NATO allies see eye to eye on this threat, and
are our partners' capabilities mature enough to manage the
dangers that--and challenges that we are seeing across
cyberspace?
General Breedlove. Thank you, sir.
On the electronic warfare the same sort of situation
applies. For 20 years we have been making a partner out of
Russia so our focus has not been on the capabilities that they
have been developing. And secondarily, again, for all the right
reasons for the last 13 or so years our nation's military has
been focused on counterinsurgency operations, COIN, in
Afghanistan and fighting Al Qaeda in some of the spaces around
the world.
And so we have been focused very deeply on addressing a
threat that does not have electronic warfare capability. So
while we have retained capability, we have not really practiced
to it to the veracity that we used to, nor have we retained the
capacity that might be required to bust these growing A2AD
problems we see around the world.
So to really shorten the answer up, we have electronic
warfare capability; we probably do not have the capacity we
need now to address it. Our suppression of enemy air defense
capabilities, SEAD, to take down air defense nets and things
are very good but they are not dense. We don't have a lot of
them.
Russia knows how we roll and they have invested a lot in
electronic warfare because they know that we are a connected
and precise force and they need to disconnect us to make us
imprecise.
When it comes to cyber, this is, sir, I think a glass well
over half-full. When I arrived to my station about 3 years ago
I think that many of the nations of the alliance and in Europe
were very insularly focused. They were acknowledging the cyber
threat but they were worried primarily about their own cyber
problem.
What we discovered, though, is with 28 nations in alignment
in an alliance you may have an absolute iron curtain wall
around two or three of them, but there are 25 other doors into
the enterprise. And so what we had to do is come to a larger,
more corporate approach to cyber.
And, sir, I see that happening. I am encouraged by what I
see happening.
I would recommend that someday in your travels you stop
into Estonia and go to the NATO cyber center in Tallinn. It is
absolutely superior and they are adding value to our alliance
every day.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
Next question: Is there a role for the U.S. and for EUCOM
to play in assisting our European allies to mitigate the
potential national security threats when it comes to the
ongoing refugee crisis? What does that role look like and what
resources are needed?
General Breedlove. Sir, there is a role and we are
executing that role now. The refugee crisis and the part that
we are addressing the most is that embedded in this refugee
flow is criminality, terrorism, and foreign fighters. We have
adopted and built a very good network of sharing information,
sharing intelligence, and trying to target and understand these
flows of criminals, terrorists, and foreign fighters as they
move back and forth, and so we are a part of that now.
As you are aware, the NATO alliance began an operation in
the Aegean Sea essentially just about a week ago where we are
beginning to try to help our Greek and Turk allies to address
the dense flow of refugees across that water space by being a
part of managing that water space in terms of surveillance and
reconnaissance and handing off data to the coast guards of
Turkey and Greece. It is a little more complicated than that,
but we have--the NATO alliance has begun to enter into that
portion of the mission as well.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General, and thank you again for
your service. We wish you well.
General Breedlove. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I definitely want to thank General Breedlove and his
staff for your honest answers in the prior meeting that we had.
It is very sobering to hear where we are and without illusion.
I worry as we move forward. You know, we have done this now
pivot to Asia, rebalance in the Pacific, all those types of
things, and I think we are trying to do, unfortunately, way too
much in regards to the stresses that we are putting on the
military.
You know, there was a point in time where our policy was to
be able to fight, you know, two major conflicts while, you
know--but what we found is that we had a hard time doing one
when you look back at Afghanistan and we had to have, you know,
forces there for 15 months on a single rotation.
And so I think that we are fooling sometimes the American
public to think we have the--I know we have the desire and I
know that we have the best trained, best equipped force on the
face of the Earth. But I don't know that we have enough, and I
think we hit that on capacity, that we have enough to do the
things that we told the American people that we can do and
should do.
I think we have been really I guess hiding the ball in
regards to hoping that our adversaries don't see that, and I
truly have a lot of--I believe that Mr. Putin is very
calculating and is not stupid by any stretch of the
imagination.
But I guess the question is, you know, back when I first
ran 6 years ago it was a big deal about, ``Hey, listen we need
to get out of Europe; we need to let the Europeans deal with
their issues.'' And I think while that sounded good at the
time, obviously now we are paying a dear price for that.
So why is it so important? And we need to stress this to
the American public because everyone is footing the bill. Why
is it so important that we have permanently stationed--forward-
stationed troops and equipment in Europe? Why is it that
important that we should invest that?
General Breedlove. So, sir, thank you for the question. And
just a 30-second recap: I believe that permanently forward-
stationed troops are a part of that mixture.
Mr. Nugent. Correct.
General Breedlove. We have to have the appropriate amount
of permanent-stationed, the appropriate amount of prepositioned
so that we can rapidly reinforce, and then we need to have the
capability and capacities to be able to rapidly reinforce to
include busting this A2AD problem. So the permanently forward-
stationed forces are an important part.
And here are some things that are not often heard.
Permanently forward-stationed forces buy you a lot of things.
One of them is relationships, and relationships equal access.
The flexibility that our--many of our nations, but let me
just mention a few--that Spain, Italy, Greece, and even
Turkey--the flexibility that they give us to move around and
employ forces to address problems across all of North Africa,
the Levant, and even to support CENTCOM [Central Command] into
Syria and Iraq, this is all built on relationships and trust
that are established over time by permanently stationed forward
forces. I cannot overstate the importance of having these--this
access.
A couple of sort of quippy remarks that I will give to you.
One is that you cannot surge trust. You cannot surge
relationships. If we are not in a nation, establishing trust
and relationship, and then when we desperately need to be able
to do execute force from or within that nation you don't--you
can't surge the trust or the relationship.
Mr. Nugent. And doesn't having permanently stationed forces
buy us time to do just what you are talking about? When you
have prepositioned equipment it buys us time to actually get to
that equipment?
General Breedlove. It does. It does, and that is why it is
a mix. The permanently forward-stationed forces are there,
ready, and can execute. They are ready to fight forward if they
have to, and that allows--enables the prepositioning and
enables the capability to respond.
Mr. Nugent. So do we have enough prepositioned--or not
prepositioned, but do we have enough permanently stationed
troops in Europe?
General Breedlove. Sir, I am on record multiple times as
saying no. We are looking at that now, but if we choose not to
increase permanently stationed forces forward then we can
adjust and pick up the requirement in the rotational force.
Mr. Nugent. But hasn't it been a problem in regards to--and
I know we--and I'm getting gaveled out on this one--but in
regards to when you have different commands flushing through
that you don't have a continuity?
General Breedlove. Right. This is a problem that could
manifest itself. Our U.S. Army and Navy and Air Force, by the
way, in their rotation patterns are dedicating units. It will
not always be perfect, but we have units assigned with a
primarily European mission that are a part of that rotational
force. We are trying to address just your concern.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate it.
And I appreciate the Chair. Thank you for very much.
The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I am actually going to continue
the gentleman's line of questioning because we were thinking
along much of the same ways.
General, thank you again so much for being here. I want to
pick up on this line of questioning.
You know, the fiscal year 2017 budget request quadruples
the amount of the fiscal year 2016 request for the European
Reassurance Initiative, but a lot of that is for prepositioning
of equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, and for heel-to-toe
rotational deployments. I was reading the National Commission
on the Future of the Army's report that has two significant
recommendations. One is to forward station an ABCT [armored
brigade combat team] in Europe itself, whereas the other has to
do with the aviation, the CAB [combat aviation brigade].
And I want to sort of peel back the layers of the effect of
the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative and what it has
done to our aviation capability in Europe. Specifically, you
know, we go back to this idea of building trust and long-term
relationships. One, let me start off by saying--am I right in
saying that you would prefer to have permanently placed ABCT
and additional equipment in Europe? Would that be a true
statement?
General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. So on the aviation side, the report
actually suggests that the rotational model will work except
that we need more of a warfighter-aligned headquarters. What is
there now is really more of an administrative aviation
headquarters as opposed to a CAB-type of headquarters there
that would actually be much more aligned to that rotational
mission, they can come in, they can pick up. Would you agree
with that?
General Breedlove. So, ma'am, the report I think correctly
identifies the absolute value of having a dedicated command and
controlled force. And frankly, it just emphasizes the value in
general of Army aviation as one element of air power in Europe.
And they are all absolutely critical.
Ms. Duckworth. They are. Thank you. I am not promising
anything, but I would hope that with such an increase in the
ERI funding that we might be able to address some of the
aviation shortfall.
Can you talk a little bit more about the rotational model
on your aviation needs in Europe? And where have you assumed
specifically the most risk and what capability gaps needs the
most attention when it comes to Army aviation?
General Breedlove. So, ma'am, what I need to do is give
some thanks and respect to what the Army did as they took the
last tranche of aviation out of Europe. If you look at it in a
net way, we really didn't lose any presence because the
aviation that we had in Europe at the time was continually
being tasked into theater. So while it was assigned in Europe
it was gone a fair amount.
A larger piece left Europe, but the rotational piece that
we got to replace it is dedicated to Europe and does not rotate
into theater. So it netted out almost exactly the same in the
amount of time that we had aviation on the ground. So I need
to--we need to properly acknowledge the Army's efforts to make
this right for Europe.
But the larger picture is that faced with the revanchist,
resurgent Russia, we do not have the aviation requirement that
we need in Europe, and that will be the focus of my command
into the future.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. And so you are actually saying--are
you saying then that you would like to have a full--a CAB
permanently stationed in Europe?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, the planning is ongoing. It may
be more than a CAB. I would not want to put a number on it now
and have it exactly wrong when the planning is finished.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. I only have a minute left. Can you
comment a little bit on the State Partnership Program? Having
been in the--spent my 23 years in the Illinois National Guard--
--
General Breedlove. Cannot say enough about it.
Ms. Duckworth. Since Poland is our country and they are
staring down the barrel of Russian aggression there in Poland--
--
General Breedlove. The State Partnership Program, 21
States, 22 nations, is one of my premiere tools. I hate to use
a word like that, but literally they represent 23, 24 percent
of the engagement that I have in Europe.
I have told this committee a couple of times that I much
prefer permanently stationed forces, rotational forces being an
acceptable but second option.
I would recategorize a little bit the State Partnership
Program. They are a rotational force. They are a bit episodic.
But the difference is that they maintain long-term
relationships in leadership, in command, in training.
Forces are going left to America, right to Europe, and
the--most of these programs are wildly successful. Some of them
are just successful. But the point being that this is a very
valuable tool in our quiver to be able to develop capacity in
our allies, especially the smaller, former Soviet allies, et
cetera, et cetera.
Ms. Duckworth. And I thank you for service to this country,
General.
General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am.
The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And, General, thank you. As everyone else has, you are a
great military leader and we appreciate it more than we could
ever tell you.
Yesterday on the floor of the House, Mr. Brooks, who just
left a few hours ago, gave a very disturbing speech on the fact
that America is headed toward Greece financially. I later came
along to give another 5-minute speech about the waste of money
in Afghanistan, talked about the fact that John Sopko said
that, to the Senate, that our country, Department of Defense
spent $6 million to buy nine goats from Italy to send to
western Afghanistan.
I wonder, when I listen to you, and--because I have such
great respect for your evaluation of Russia and the threat that
they could bring to more of Europe than it does today. Then I
think about the comment by Admiral Mullen when he was Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs when he said, ``The biggest threat to our
military is the growing debt of our nation.''
I listen to you and your recommendations and the things
that you feel like we need to do not only in Europe but for our
military, but specifically Europe today that we need to do to
be a stronger deterrent in Europe. My concern is that I have
read recently that a couple of the civilian leaders in a couple
of the countries have debated reducing the amount of money
going into the defense budget of some of those countries.
You, having relationships that you have had both with
military leaders and civilian leaders, do you feel--talking
about the civilian leaders now, not the military leaders--that
they fully understand that they have got to make a financial
investment as much as America has to make to keep Europe safe
from being taken over by Russia?
General Breedlove. Sir, thank you much. And if I could just
comment that I have deep respect for Admiral Mullen. I have
worked for him a couple of times directly in my life and he is
a man of, I think, incredible character, and he really has it
upstairs.
The answer to the last part, which is the focus of your
question, is we need to have a sober reply. But I have said
that I am a glass half-full----
Mr. Jones. Right.
General Breedlove [continuing]. Here.
In Wales we made a commitment--we being the nations of the
alliance--made a commitment to get towards the 2 percent. They
gave themselves a broad time period, which, you know, was a
little bit worrisome--10 years. But they made a commitment to
get to 2 percent. What I have seen is because of the continued
aggressive behavior of Russia the nations have become much more
focused on this.
And I have used these three numbers a couple of times. They
are exactly wrong. They change, but they are pretty close to
right: 16 of NATO's nations have stopped the decline in their
budget; 5 of NATO's nations are already at 2 percent--we need
to qualify at least one of those and I will mention that in a
second; and then I believe--this is Phil Breedlove's opinion,
not others--that there are about 7 nations that have I think a
legitimate plan to get to the right spending in a reasonable
amount of time, not 10 years but 4, 5, 6 years.
And so I think I would use those numbers to point out to
you sir, that I do believe the leadership of the nations are
beginning to make decisions with their budgets. I do not want
to overstate because there is a lot here to do. And as I
mentioned earlier, one of the important things in the 2 percent
is that it is important and the other goal is that 20 percent
of that 2 percent is on recapitalization investment so that
they can bring capability to the table.
If the entire budget is a personnel budget it is not going
to be helpful over time as a force. And so we also need to
bring focus among our allies and partners that they not only
get the investment up, or certainly arrest the decrease, but
they also need to look at the investment accounts to make sure
that they are bringing capabilities to the fore.
But I just want to close with it is not perfect. A lot of
work to do, but I am over half-full here because of what I see
in these trend lines.
Mr. Jones. General, thank you so much.
I yield back.
The Chairman. I was just looking; we are at 26 percent,
according to the last chart we have up here, on the
monetization part. So we got a little work to--have a little
work to do.
Ms. Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Breedlove, for being here to testify
and for your service and leadership to our nation.
I am interested to hear your thoughts on the increased
online presence of ISIL in Europe and our capacity to truly
counter these threats at the combatant command level. How is
EUCOM leveraging technology and new ideas to counter online
propaganda and equipment as it relates not only to the hybrid
threat posed by Russia but also this increased online
recruitment and digital propaganda that we are seeing by ISIL
in Europe?
General Breedlove. So I would categorize this in two ways.
We are not where we need to be yet. We have a lot to do. We
have started and are headed in the right direction.
I am sure you will have Admiral Rogers here from NSA
[National Security Agency]/Cyber Command to talk to you. He has
been a magnificent partner in that he has taken the approach of
pushing capacity and capability to the combatant commanders so
that the combatant commanders can individually focus and target
that capability and capacity.
In this open forum I will have to stop there on what that
looks like, but let me assure you that the admiral has a
wonderful focus on how he is going to do this for us, but it
is--we have a lot farther to go.
Inside of EUCOM itself, again, in an open forum I will tell
that we have several venues where we are using exquisite tools
to get after this problem set. And I will just stop there.
Again, not enough yet, but we have started this process.
Ms. Stefanik. So as much as you can say in an open forum,
what tools do you need? How will increased ERI funding assist
in the area? Broadly, can you give us guidance?
General Breedlove. So, ma'am, ERI is more focused on our
allies and how we fight there, and so I will have to have my
staff get back to your staff. I don't want to misstate.
I am not sure that there is this specific capability. There
are capabilities in cyber, but what you are talking about I
cannot definitively speak to that. I will have my staff contact
your staff on that----
Ms. Stefanik. Great.
General Breedlove [continuing]. Rather than misstate.
[EUCOM has contacted Rep. Stefanik's staff and will provide
a briefing in response to her questions.]
Ms. Stefanik. Let me shift to another area. A mission as
complex as EUCOM requires a great deal of international
partnership and interagency communication. How well, in your
assessment, is EUCOM integrated with the various agencies
throughout Europe to counter the increased threats, and would
you say there is a solid unity of effort between partners and
agencies to counter the challenges posed by a resurgent Russia
and the various unconventional threats that face Europe today?
General Breedlove. Ma'am, this is a place I am very proud
of our command. We are well integrated. And partially that is
because this committee made decision years ago to develop a
distinct branch of our command called J9 where we pull in all
of the other agencies. It is a little mini agency. And we pay
for their presence in order to ensure that we have connections
to law enforcement, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and
a lot of other agencies which we will not mention here.
But we know that in Europe when we try to combat things
like foreign fighter flows and terrorism--in Europe this is not
about kinetic strikes like it is in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
and portions of North Africa. In Europe this is about
integrating with the highly capable legal, judicial, and police
systems of Europe. And so we have invested distinctly in this
capability to have connective tissue to the other nations of
Europe.
And so this is a place where EUCOM before my time--I do not
take the credit except for that we have expanded it and
continued to fund it before me--but leaders before me have seen
the wisdom and the value of this interagency approach in
Europe.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, General Breedlove, for your service and
commitment to our troops and to our security. You have talked
many times about the force structure and our downsizing in
Europe. I think back at one point we had I think six A-10
squadrons in the U.K. back in the day, then we went to one at
Spain, and less than 3 years ago that one closed down.
We are now deploying A-10 units of the nine remaining
operational across the active Guard and Reserve for part of the
ERI in order to help with training and deterrence. So that is
just one example, but that was just a couple years ago.
Can you give some insight into the logic? That is an entire
capability, because now there is none there, that we have lost.
And I am still waiting to hear about from the Air Force as
the cost comparison of stations that are full-time versus
rotating over. But can you give some insight as to that logic,
and do you think looking in hindsight that was not a good
decision?
General Breedlove. So I will allow the Air Force to talk to
you about cost-benefit ratio.
Ms. McSally. Right----
General Breedlove. As a user I am just looking for the
capability.
And I think, you know, I--the round number that my staff
gave me is that we are--we have about two A-10 exercises and
about 200 flying hours a month on average now in EUCOM. So we
are asking for that capability.
I try to refrain from asking specifically for airframes; I
try to ask for capabilities. And certainly we have airplanes
that can deliver what the A-10 delivers, but the A-10 is
extremely good at delivering----
Ms. McSally. I mean, just based on your overall testimony,
though----
General Breedlove. Right.
Ms. McSally [continuing]. Would it be better to have a
capability like that stationed in Europe versus rotating over,
just in line with everything that you said?
General Breedlove. So what we have seen is that that
capability serves a very important niche of our requirements.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
You may not be able to answer the next question but a
recent RAND study, looking at defense of the Balkans, talked
about, among other things, a, you know, lack of air superiority
because of just the swift nature of that potential scenario.
You said you were looking into force structure options, but if
you were not resource-constrained and you had everything you
wanted, could you give a sense or can you get back to me with a
sense of what would the fighter force structure look like in
order to make sure we have air superiority.
It has been now 60 years since the last time we did not
have air superiority in any military operation so----
General Breedlove. April 1953----
Ms. McSally. Exactly.
General Breedlove. So yes, ma'am. We do not at present have
sitting on the ground in Europe sufficient capacity----
Ms. McSally. Right----
General Breedlove [continuing]. To ensure air superiority
over the battlefield. We would have to start off any conflict
working towards localized air superiority to employ troops and
then reinforce from the rear.
If I could, I would actually attack this question a little
differently. The premiere aircraft in air superiority these
days are not only air superiority platforms but they are
explicit, stealth, precision, attack platforms.
And these kinds of capabilities are incredibly important to
busting that A2AD problem that we have talked about several
times today, not only to provide air superiority for the troops
but that stealthy ability to deliver precise weapons to take
down A2AD is incredibly important. And it will take a
significant amount more of that capability to establish what
you and I have known to be air superiority over the
battlefield.
Ms. McSally. Yes. Could we maybe get back in a classified
setting about what that--like how many--what would that look
like? What would the force structure look like? What----
General Breedlove. So, as you know, we are working our war
plan through the business now, and that will allow us to
definitize that. It is not ready for primetime yet.
Ms. McSally. I have just got about a minute left. Obviously
we have talked about the challenge of our partners not reaching
2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product] and their
spending. It seems like the awareness level is going up and
some turning around, but it is still not enough.
If we compare the--with the PACOM [Pacific Command]
theater, you know, our allies see the value of us being there
for their own defense and they often support in other ways,
even if it is not just with the military. They are paying the
bills; they are providing that monetary support.
Are there other initiatives we could push a little harder
on right now, now that we have got the Russian threat, we have
got the ISIS threat, to say, ``All right, fine. If you are not
ramping up your military capability, you are going to start
paying some of the bills for us to be here so that we can free
up resources for other things'' just to be a little more
creative and have them step up their contribution.
General Breedlove. As you know, in limited ways that has
already happened in a couple of places. And as I mentioned
before, it is not perfect. We need more. But what we really
see, especially in the Mediterranean nations, is the
flexibility that they allow us to move forces around,
especially to meet the threat in North Africa, is quite
demonstrative.
I asked someone once, ``Would you--what would happen if
another nation asked to come into your state and on a routine
basis move around large groups of foreign military and foreign
aircraft, and sometimes do that on less than 48 hours'
notice?'' And so I think we have to acknowledge that there are
some sacrifices these nations are making.
Ms. McSally. They get value out of it too.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. General, do you know off the top of your head
how many permanent U.S. military installations we still have in
Europe?
General Breedlove. I do not. The number of new major
installations is less than two dozen, but there are a lot of
small ones.
The Chairman. Yes. Okay. Thank you.
One other question I want to ask you with your NATO hat on
that has not been raised today is Turkey. You know, we read
every day about the tensions related to this Syria situation
especially, and so from a NATO perspective what is that
relationship like with Turkey today as it integrates into the
alliance?
General Breedlove. So, Mr. Chairman, let me say
unequivocally in a mil-to-mil environment, which is where I am
most qualified, it is a strong and remaining strong
relationship. Of course, the position of the military inside
Turkey has changed over time, but our mil-to-mil relationship
is strong.
We don't always see perfectly eye to eye, but we have
incredible cooperation and personal relationships. The chief of
defense there, General Hulusi Akar, is not American-trained but
he is Western-trained and he really understands the way we do
business, and he has--he is a very much a cooperative partner.
Turkey, as you know, Mr. Chairman, lives in a really tough
neighborhood: to their south a civil war that is really going
quite badly; to the north the Black Sea, which has become a
bastion of Russian power--again, one of the three major A2AD
nodes that we have talked about. And so Turkey is in a tough
place and facing what they see are some tough problems around
them.
But let me assure you, I feel only qualified to speak to
the mil-to-mil piece. We have a strong and continued
relationship mil-to-mil with our ally Turkey.
The Chairman. Well, we have seen in other cases where that
continuation of a strong military relationship is really the
bedrock as governments come and go that our relationships can
often depend on, so I think that is a very important thing for
us to keep in mind.
General Breedlove. Nineteen major installations, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir, I appreciate that. I often
get asked at home why don't we close some bases in Europe, and
so that is--helps arm me with the facts.
General, I have got to warn you that you have received lots
of accolades today and people saying they are going to miss
you. The problem is even this week we have had interactions
with two former combatant commanders and picking their brain,
so we don't usually let people get off too lightly or
completely away from us. And we may see you again before the
change of command, but thank you very much for being here today
and for your insights.
And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 25, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 25, 2016
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 25, 2016
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. Do you believe we have enough Patriot battalions to
support the continued mission of deterrence against Russia?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. Conaway. Russia has greatly expanded its distribution of
natural gas throughout Europe. This pattern appears to be part of a
larger geo-political agenda in countries such as Syria and Ukraine, as
witnessed by incursions into Crimea and elsewhere. Natural gas
exportation significantly enhances Russia's ability to operate abroad,
playing a significant component in an otherwise weakening economy. In
view of increased use of Russian natural gas at regional energy
facilities that supply heating to numerous U.S. military installations
throughout Western Europe, is the expansion of Russian energy not a
considerable risk factor?
General Breedlove. Using natural gas from countries who rely on
Russian supplies does pose a risk. While not ideal, the United States
government is working with our European Allies and partners to
determine ways to diversify their energy sources.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTRO
Mr. Castro. Has NATO discussed changes to Article 6 to include non-
conventional attacks such as a cyber attack?
General Breedlove. Article 6 of the Washington Treaty relates
generally to the location of an armed attack on a NATO member that
could trigger the collective defense provisions of Article 5. While
there have been many discussions relating to cyber attacks and Article
5, we are unaware of any specific discussions on Article 6 changes.
It is NATO's articulated policy, expressed in paragraph 72 of the
Wales Action Plan (Sep. 5, 2014), that ``cyber defense is part of
NATO's core task of collective defense.'' In general, NATO assets exist
to protect NATO networks, and allies must protect their own national
assets. As set forth in the ``Active Engagement, Modern Defence''
statement at NATO's Lisbon Summit in November 2010, cyber attacks ``can
reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity,
security and stability.'' As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said in
October 2010, there is a ``constructive ambiguity'' with regard to the
use of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including in the case of
cyber attacks. Such a decision would be taken by the North Atlantic
Council on a case-by-case basis.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. Russia has greatly expanded its distribution of natural
gas throughout Europe. This pattern appears to be part of a larger geo-
political agenda in countries such as Syria and Ukraine, as witnessed
by incursions into Crimea and elsewhere. Natural gas exportation
significantly enhances Russia's ability to operate abroad, playing a
significant component in an otherwise weakening economy. In view of
increased use of Russian natural gas at regional energy facilities that
supply heating to numerous U.S. military installations throughout
Western Europe, is the expansion of Russian energy not a considerable
risk factor? The Army is about to construct a major new medical center
at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks Installation in Germany, a facility to
replace Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This facility provides
medical care for service personnel and their families in the European
Theater from each branch of the military. There remains a possibility
that Russian natural gas will be the exclusive energy source for heat
at the facility. Would such an acquisition policy be counter-productive
to NATO's efforts to address Russia's recent posturing?
General Breedlove. No, we do not believe this acquisition policy is
currently counter-productive to NATO's efforts. We recognize that in
the long term overreliance on Russian natural gas could prove
problematic. The United States government is working with our NATO
Allies and partners on energy diversification efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON
Mr. Gibson. What is your assessment of the criticality of the
Global Response Force? Also, what is your assessment of the level of
risk of continuing the Army drawdown, and what it would mean in terms
of buying down risk to station an Armored Brigade Combat Team and a
Combat Aviation Brigade in Europe?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. Can you describe the infrastructure and capabilities
European Command (EUCOM) needs now in order achieve information and
cyber dominance in a hybrid conflict?
General Breedlove. A future conflict will be characterized by a
combination of regular, irregular, and cyberspace-based warfare
typically supported by an aggressive propaganda campaign. In order to
achieve information dominance in such a conflict in its area of
operations, EUCOM would need to be able to inform, persuade and
influence both foreign decision makers and population groups.
Specifically, it would require both the capacity and capabilities to
conduct sustained ``influence operations.'' While EUCOM has some
capacity and capability to conduct these kinds of ``influence
operations,'' shortfalls exist that create risk to U.S. objectives in a
hybrid conflict. Capacity could be achieved through an increase in the
numbers of qualified analysts available to the command, both in reach
back and at the headquarters, sub-unified command level (Special
Operations Command Europe), and the component level (Army, Air Force,
Navy, Marines). It is key to have qualified persons who can conduct the
activities that lead to dominance, including Military Information
Support Operations. We require new influence operations capabilities
emphasizing research, analysis, and assessment, as well as the
employment of social media. The capacity and capabilities we need are
very difficult, if not impossible, to ``surge.'' Russia, as we know, is
employing many resources in its influence operations in Eastern Europe.
Accordingly, EUCOM believes that funding for influence operations
should be increased and included in the Department's base budget.
Mr. Scott. What are the current gaps in your intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with regard to your
combatant command? How does the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
Radar System platform integrate into your current ISR network?
General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI
Mr. Takai. You focused the majority of your testimony on explaining
how Russia is our greatest threat. Though most focused on Europe and
the Middle East, Russia is also engaged politically and militarily in
the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Ships and submarines of the Russian Pacific
Fleet and long range aircraft routinely demonstrate Russia's message
that it is a Pacific power. America's future demands greater attention
to the Asia-Pacific region. Russian ballistic missile and attack
submarines remain especially active in the Asia-Pacific. The arrival in
late 2015 of Russia's newest class of nuclear ballistic missile
submarine (DOLGORUKIY SSBN) in the Far East is part of a modernization
program for the Russian Pacific Fleet and signals the seriousness with
which Moscow views this region. Your testimony highlighted the
importance of maintaining relationships. I quote, ``You can't surge
trust.'' The same could be said for relationships with our allies in
the Asia-Pacific; the risks associated with major combat operations in
the Asia-Pacific theater place a premium on preexisting command
relationships.
Don't you think the European Reassurance Initiative could do with
less so that resources could be adequately distributed to the growing
threat of Russia, and China, and North Korea, in the Asia-Pacific
region?
General Breedlove. The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is
necessary to address the Russian threat to NATO Allies and other
partners within the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). With the FY17
ERI budget request, we are consciously beginning to address the
requirement to take prudent actions now (e.g., store prepositioned Army
equipment, provide full-time Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
presence, enhance exercises with Allies, etc.) that will aid in
deterring future Russian aggression in Europe. I believe the scope of
FY17 ERI is appropriate and necessary to meet the threat in Eruope, and
it does not address the challenges in other theaters. However, I am
also sensitive to the needs to address emerging requirements in other
Combatant Command AORs as well given overall budget constraints.
[all]