    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-98]

                       FULL SPECTRUM SECURITY CHALLENGES

                         IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON

                             DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

                                   __________

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                               FEBRUARY 25, 2016

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                       One Hundred Fourteenth Congress

                 WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman

    WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      ADAM SMITH, Washington
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado                   Georgia
    ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          JACKIE SPEIER, California
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana              TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    PAUL COOK, California                MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio               BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana             SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
    BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama               PETE AGUILAR, California
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
    MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
    STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
    THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma

                      Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                    Katie Sendak, Professional Staff Member
                          William S. Johnson, Counsel
                             Britton Burkett, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
      on Armed Services..............................................     2
    Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
      Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..........................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Breedlove, Gen Philip M., USAF, Commander, United States European
      Command........................................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Breedlove, Gen Philip M......................................    37
        Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
          Member, Committee on Armed Services........................    35

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Castro...................................................    65
        Mr. Conaway..................................................    65
        Mr. Gibson...................................................    66
        Mr. Hunter...................................................    65
        Mr. Scott....................................................    66
        Mr. Shuster..................................................    65
        Mr. Takai....................................................    66

       FULL SPECTRUM SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON
                             DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

                                  ----------

                              House of Representatives,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, February 25, 2016.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
    2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
    Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
        REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
                                SERVICES

        The Chairman. Committee will come to order. Seventy years
    ago next week, Winston Churchill gave his famous Iron Curtain
    speech in Fulton, Missouri. Among his insights was this, quote:
    ``I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they
    desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of
    their power and doctrines.''
        He went on, ``From what I have seen of our Russian friends
    and allies during the war I am convinced there is nothing they
    admire so much as strength and there is nothing for which they
    have less respect than weakness, especially military
    weakness,'' end quote.
        I think what was true then is true now and we are seeing it
    play out before our eyes. The famous reset by the Obama
    administration with regard to Russia has not gone so well. Just
    over the past year or so Russia has consolidated its gains in
    Ukraine, has intervened in Syria, establishing a stronghold in
    the Middle East for the first time since the 1970s, and has
    continued to take unprecedented, provocative actions against
    NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ships and planes.
        Russia presents a full spectrum of threats, from a modern
    nuclear arsenal which Putin has threatened to use against
    conventional forces, to hybrid tactics based on deception and
    confusion and little green men. So far, NATO and the U.S. have
    grappled to find effective countermeasures.
        The President's budget proposal significantly--proposes to
    significantly increase our exercises in Eastern Europe as part
    of the European Reassurance Initiative. But rather than ask for
    more money to pay for it, his budget proposal would take it out
    of readiness, modernization--both of which have been under
    siege for years. That can hardly leave the Russians quaking in
    their boots.
        Of course, Russia is not the only issue on the plate of our
    distinguished witness today. The growing threat of terrorist
    attack from ISIS [Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] coming both
    from Syria, Iraq, and from Libya, as well as the migration of
    refugees more generally, are a significant issue for this
    theater.
        In addition, whether a cyberattack would invoke Article 5
    obligations under the NATO treaty, as we talked about in our
    hearing a couple weeks ago, is one of the many questions facing
    us all.
        Finally, the security of Israel, which is also within this
    geographic command, is always a matter of keen interest and
    concern before this committee.
        We are privileged to have before us a witness to help
    clarify all of these issues. Before introducing him I will turn
    to the gentlelady from California for any comments she would
    like to make.

        STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
                CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly
    ask unanimous consent that the ranking member's statement be
    entered into the record.
        General----
        The Chairman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]
        Mrs. Davis. General Breedlove, thank you very much for
    being here today with us, and as you conclude your time in
    command and you look to your retirement as well--and we hope
    that will be a good and smooth transition--I want to thank you
    for your work to enhance cooperation with our European partners
    and for moving us forward to address the challenges to Europe's
    security.
        The chairman has made some excellent points, of course,
    about the complex and ever-changing situation that we face
    every day. I am very interested in your thoughts on Russian
    motivations and how U.S. and our allies can most effectively
    respond without pushing Russia--the Russian government to be
    even more adversarial.
        Russia's destabilizing efforts continue, and it seems clear
    that Russian aggression and malign influence in Europe are
    likely the issues that the United States and our partners in
    Europe will have to grapple with for years to come. We must
    continue to lead in deterring Russian aggression and, if
    necessary, in concert with our partners--but our first priority
    has to be to prevent conflict.
        I look forward to your testimony today and again thank you
    very much.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Our witness today is General Philip
    Breedlove, Supreme Allied Commander of our NATO forces and
    commander of the United States European Command.
        General Breedlove, my understanding is that our current
    schedule is for you to rotate out of your current position and
    move on to other challenges after just about 40 years in the
    United States military. And so as we begin I want to thank you
    very much for your service in this position.
        And throughout your career your interaction with this
    committee has been extremely valuable. You have been in a key
    position at a very critical time when literally the world has
    changed. And I know I speak on behalf of all our colleagues in
    thanking you for the way you have done this job especially, but
    also your entire military career.
        Without objection, your entire witness statement will be
    made part of the record and we will turn the floor over to you.

     STATEMENT OF GEN PHILIP M. BREEDLOVE, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
                        STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

        General Breedlove. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
    Congresswoman Davis, distinguished members of the committee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
        I have had no greater honor in my 39-plus-year career than
    to lead the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guard,
    and civilians of the U.S. European Command [EUCOM]. These
    remarkable men and women serve not only in the EUCOM theater,
    but also in harm's way across the globe.
        I thank this committee for your continued support to them
    and to their families.
        I am also honored to serve alongside the men and women in
    uniform of the nations of Europe. They are willing and capable.
    They play an essential role in helping protect our own vital
    interests.
        The last time I addressed this committee the security
    situation in Europe was complex. Since then, the situation has
    only grown more serious and more complicated.
        Today Europe faces security challenges from two directions.
    First, to the east Europe faces a resurgent, aggressive Russia.
    Russia has chosen to be an adversary and poses a long-term
    existential threat to the United States and to our European
    allies and partners.
        Russia is eager to exert unquestioned influence over its
    neighboring states to create a buffer zone, and Russia is
    extending its course of influence yet further afield to try to
    reestablish a leading role on the world stage.
        Russia does not want to challenge the agreed rules of the
    international order; it wants to rewrite them. Russia sees the
    United States and NATO as threats to its objectives and as
    constraints on its aspirations. So Russia seeks to fracture our
    unity and challenge our resolve.
        Russia, Mr. Chairman, as you said, recognizes strength and
    sees weakness as opportunity. To that end, Russia applies all
    instruments of national power, including its military, to
    coerce, corrupt, and undermine targeted European countries.
        Some call this unconventional warfare; some call it hybrid;
    I like to talk about it as sending in little gray men who use
    their diplomatic, economic, and informational tools, in
    addition to military pressure, to shape and influence nations
    without triggering a NATO Article 5 military response.
        To the south, from the Levant through North Africa, Europe
    faces a complicated mix of mass migration spurred by state
    instability and state collapse, and masking the movement of
    criminals, terrorists, and foreign fighters.
        Within this mix ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant], or Daesh, as I call them, is spreading like a cancer,
    taking advantage of paths of least resistance, threatening
    European nations and our own with terrorist attacks. Its
    brutality is driving millions to flee from Syria and Iraq,
    creating an almost unprecedented humanitarian challenge.
        Russia's entry into the fight in Syria has wildly
    exacerbated the problem, changing the dynamic in the air and on
    the ground. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary,
    Russia has done little to counter Daesh but a great deal to
    bolster the Assad regime and its allies. And together, Russia
    and the Assad regime are deliberately weaponizing migration
    from Syria in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and
    break European resolve.
        All genuinely constructive efforts to end the war are
    welcome, but that is not yet what we are seeing.
        EUCOM is standing firm to meet this array of challenges. To
    counter Russia, EUCOM, working with allies and partners, is
    deterring Russia now and preparing to fight and win if
    necessary.
        That demonstrated preparedness to defeat is an essential
    part of our deterrent message. To counter Daesh, EUCOM is
    actively facilitating intelligence-sharing and encouraging
    strong civil-military relationships across ministries and
    across borders.
        And to meet all real and potential challenges, EUCOM is a
    central part of U.S. leadership in the NATO alliance as the
    alliance continues its adaptation through the Warsaw Summit,
    including the readiness and responsiveness of the entire NATO
    force structure.
        This year's budget request reflects our solemn commitment
    to the security of our allies and partners and to protecting
    our homeland forward. EUCOM does not yet have the personnel,
    equipment, and resources necessary to carry out this growing
    mission.
        But the continuation of the European Reassurance
    Initiative, or ERI, would strongly support EUCOM's efforts to
    counter Russian aggression and other threats by closing gaps in
    our posture and resourcing. EUCOM has carefully planned and
    executed the ERI funds you have authorized over the past 2
    years, even as our headquarters has shrunk to become one of the
    smallest.
        This year's budget request would significantly increase ERI
    funding to $3.4 billion. That would let us deepen our
    investment in Europe along five key lines of effort: providing
    more rotational forces, increasing training with our allies and
    partners, increasing prepositioned warfighting equipment in
    theater, increasing the capacities of our allies and partners,
    and improving the requisite supporting infrastructure.
        Together, the tools ERI would provide would send a clear
    and visible message to all audiences of our strong will and
    resolve. Our further efforts to assure, deter, and defend,
    supported by ERI, would complement those of the entire whole-
    of-government team.
        EUCOM remains committed to a shared vision of Europe whole,
    free, at peace, and prosperous.
        Mr. Chairman, as my military career draws to an end I want
    to thank you again for your unwavering support of the men and
    women of our Armed Forces. And at this time I want to thank you
    for the personal opportunity to command them. I look forward to
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Breedlove can be found
    in the Appendix on page 37.]
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
        We had a hearing a couple weeks ago talking about Russia.
    Among the witnesses, for example, was your predecessor. And the
    question was raised, is ERI to really deter Russia or is it to
    make our allies feel better? And maybe it will do one but not
    the--the latter but not the former.
        What is your view of that?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, I would agree with parts of
    that but I would like to elaborate on some others. I would
    agree that ERI does both assure our allies and I believe ERI
    begins the movement or the changes we need to make to fully
    deter Russia. But it is a step along that path.
        For the past two decades, as you know, Mr. Chairman, we
    have been in the position where we have been trying to make a
    partner out of Russia in Europe. And we have downsized our
    forces, downsized our headquarters, capabilities, et cetera, to
    become a community that was focused on engaging Russia as a
    partner and building partnership capacity in Europe.
        And what we now have is clearly not a partner in Russia.
    And so we have to begin reshaping the European Command and the
    NATO force structure to be able now to confront someone that
    does not wish to share our norms and values in Europe.
        And those 20 years of change will not be overcome in one or
    two steps. ERI is one of the steps along the way to reposition
    us, I think, in forces, in headquarters capability, in the way
    we deal with our allies, to get to where we need to be to
    deter.
        The Chairman. Well, let me follow up with one other
    question for you, and it really goes to the heart of
    deterrence, what deters. There was an article that just came
    out in the Foreign Affairs magazine that raises a point that I
    have thought about, and let me just read you a couple of
    sentences and then get your reaction.
        This is an article entitled ``Eurasia's Coming Anarchy,''
    by Robert Kaplan. He says, ``In China and Russia it is domestic
    insecurity that is breeding belligerence. Whereas aggression
    driven by domestic strength often follows a methodical, well-
    developed strategy, one that can be interpreted by other states
    which can then react appropriately, that fueled by domestic
    crisis results in daring, reactive, impulsive behavior which is
    much harder to forecast or counter.''
        And then he goes on to say, ``Part of what Putin is doing
    is for the more chaos he can generate abroad, the more valuable
    the autocratic stability he provides at home will appear.''
        So I guess my interpretation of that is part of what is
    going on, especially in Russia and maybe China, is for domestic
    political concerns they gotta have outward aggression, and the
    last point was the more chaos out there the more valuable he
    tries--he believes it makes him for his internal purposes to
    stay in power.
        But that makes it harder to deter, because if it is all
    about what is happening inside Russia then maybe this
    deterrence and ERI and other things isn't really going to get
    much done. I would appreciate your reaction to the thought and
    anything you can shed on that.
        General Breedlove. Thank you, Chairman. And I, again, would
    like to agree with some of the terms but elaborate on others.
        You have heard me say before that deterrence is in the mind
    of the deterred. And so we are after the mind and the decision-
    making process of Mr. Putin.
        And I did see some of the discussion you had with Jim
    Stavridis, and I would like to use a similar formulation in
    that what I believe Mr. Putin sees and will deter him is using
    all of the instruments of a nation's power--diplomatic,
    informational, military, and economic. But they are all
    required.
        As you said in your opening statement and I did in mine,
    Mr. Putin understands strength and recognizes weakness. If we
    only use the diplomatic, the informational, and the economic to
    address Mr. Putin, he will see that the military is absent or,
    as I think Admiral Stavridis talked to you about, a lack of
    will to use the military may be absent.
        And so I think that to deter Mr. Putin we have to have an
    all-of-government response which shows resistance
    diplomatically, informationally, militarily, and economically.
    And then, important to the military piece is not only having
    the capability and the capacity, but showing the will to use it
    if and when required.
        Could I then address the other two pieces of your question?
        First, exterior chaos: I believe exterior chaos is a tool
    that Mr. Putin likes to use to give him a platform to show that
    the great power of Russia needs to intervene in a West that
    cannot bring order to the world, and it gives him that platform
    to try to talk about the game that great Russia, as an equal
    player on the stage, bringing order.
        The second piece that you talked about, sir, is domestic
    crisis inside the nation. I believe Mr. Putin is using a crisis
    inside his nation. I do believe that his people are feeling the
    drop in the oil prices, the sanctions, and the other things
    affecting his government.
        But he uses that to focus them on an external enemy to
    bring their focus to what he wants to do with his nation and
    his power. And he is now focusing his people completely on the
    United States first and foremost, and secondarily NATO as an
    external enemy that they need to be ready to rise up to meet.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mrs. Davis.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, General, for being here.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        We have an opportunity to work with our allies, our
    partners, and I think the discussion that you just had with the
    chairman is very helpful. Is that something that you feel is
    understood throughout the--our allied community?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, I do. But understood is not
    attached always to the kind of action that maybe we would seek
    or hope for. But I will tell you that I am an optimist here. I
    am more of a glass full--half-full in the way our allies are
    now approaching the security environment in Europe.
        In Wales we saw the leading edge of the problems in Ukraine
    and we made the biggest changes to NATO ever, and some things
    are going extremely well--most things are going extremely well
    in that change. The military things we have done to change at a
    very high level this joint task force, the way we have
    organized our headquarters, the overall changes in the
    readiness and responsiveness of NATO forces, most specifically
    the ERF [European Rotational Force]--all these things are
    completely moving apace to be completed before Warsaw, and we
    have deployed and demonstrated them.
        And as I mentioned to you in not the too-distant past, we
    see the nations now turning around budgets. The numbers may be
    wrong; it changes from day to day. But 16 to 17 of our nations
    have stopped declines in their budgets; 5 were over 2 percent;
    6 or 7 now have a credible plan to get to 2 percent spending in
    a reasonable amount of time.
        So I have seen change which is good.
        Mrs. Davis. And the European Reassurance Initiative--how do
    you see that as a tool then for us to support, I think, those
    efforts specifically? And I just want to get a sense of--you
    mentioned that this is not going to be a 1-year budget. As I
    understand it, this is part of our Overseas Contingency
    Operation funds, and yet it is something that is going to have
    to continue.
        What would that look like to you? We are sorry that you are
    going to be leaving the command, but we know that you want to
    leave something in place. What should that look like as we move
    forward?
        General Breedlove. So, ma'am, as I explained before, and I
    won't go too far back but we have got about 20 years of a
    different paradigm to correct. We are on our third--we will
    have had 2 years of ERI and we are now asking for this third
    year of ERI.
        We have kept, as you heard me mention in my opening
    remarks, a focus on basically five areas.
        Infrastructure--and that is not building buildings, that is
    fixing ports, fixing rail yards, changing exercise and training
    areas, changing storage areas in order to make it easier for us
    to rapidly reinforce Europe.
        Preposition of equipment we talked about, and that is that
    we are in this ERI looking to bring across our second heavy
    force to put into preposition status. And this one will be used
    not for practicing but for warfighting.
        We are using the ERI to rotationally increase our forward
    force structure. I have been very straightforward: There is no
    real substitute for permanently forward-stationed forces. But a
    second best, which is acceptable and which is where we are
    heading, is to have a heel-to-toe rotational forces fully
    funded to increase our presence in Europe, and that is a part
    of the ERI.
        Building the partnership capacity, bringing other nations
    in the NATO alliance up alongside of us in the skill sets and
    capabilities we need.
        And then the last piece: training and exercise with our
    partners.
        So I don't mean to build a watch, but those five elements
    are going to be needed to be sustained for some number of years
    to get us to that position where we believe we are now in the
    position where we can deter--as well as ensure, but deter. And
    we are working now on what that future position we think should
    be.
        Mrs. Davis. Thank you, sir. And I think as people are
    refining that further that will be helpful for us to know and
    to work with our budget folks, as well.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Mr. Turner.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to join with you in thanking General Breedlove for
    your service. It has been an incredibly important time for you
    to be in Europe because you have both been incredibly
    articulate of the rising threat of Russia but not alarmist. You
    have balanced in telling us policymakers and decision makers as
    to what we need to do to give you the tools to change the
    dynamics.
        You and I have discussed the very public RAND study that
    most recently has tried to give a picture of that
    vulnerability, looking at the Baltics perhaps being available
    within 60 hours to Russia's new aggression, their
    modernization, and their forces.
        I appreciate your use of the word ``deter'' because it is
    incredibly important that we deter aggression, not just meet
    aggression. Preventing it from happening in the first place is
    going to require a military force for which there would be risk
    to the other side.
        You have indicated prepositioning as an important aspect. I
    would like to talk to you about two aspects of our change in
    posture that we need. And General Ben Hodges, who is the
    commanding general of U.S. Army Europe, has stated that, quote:
    ``There used to be 300,000 soldiers in Europe during the height
    of the Cold War. Today we have 30,000 with the same mission: to
    assure allies and to deter Russia.'' There is a big difference
    between 300,000 and 30,000.
        So there are two vulnerabilities that we have, in listening
    to your comments; and I would like to know how to address them.
        One: We don't know what we used to know about what Russia
    is doing. We used to have all eyes on them and when they would
    do buildups and preparations for what you described as snap
    exercises we knew where they were going, what they were doing,
    and how they were going to do it.
        And two: With the concept of prepositioning, you know, we
    just don't have what we need there and we might not be able to
    get there. In the RAND study they point out the vulnerability
    of playing an away game while the adversary is playing a home
    game.
        Could you please describe what we need to be doing in both
    the aspects of greater understanding, greater visibility into
    Russia's actions and what they are doing, and secondly, then,
    emphasize again your statements of our need to have forces
    there?
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you very much for the
    question, and I will try not to go long because it is quite a--
    to walk this from left to right will take a moment. First and
    foremost, a lot of smart people in RAND. I really love their
    work and I have known most of these people most of my military
    career.
        But what you find from a study is tied a lot to how you
    have been given the problem. And what is the status of the
    forces at the beginning of a problem I think is at the heart of
    the matter of the question you are asking me.
        We used to have a very persistent and capable look at
    Russia at the strategic level, the operational level, and the
    tactical level so that we could understand what they were doing
    with their forces. And we built a robust system of indications
    and warnings, INW, that was based on that robust intel.
        For the past 20 years we have been refocusing--for all the
    right reasons, I think you would agree--some of our
    intelligence on Al Qaeda, Daesh, Taliban, other elements around
    the world. And so for the past 20 years, as we have been trying
    to make Russia a partner we have reapportioned a large portion
    of our ability to see away from Russia and towards these other
    threats.
        So the bottom line is we do not have that insight into
    their operational- and tactical-level work. We retained a view
    of that strategic force which makes them an existential threat,
    but we lost contact with the operational and the tactical.
        And in order to determine that we need to move forces into
    position that might change the outcome of the studies that you
    are referring to we need to have that capability and capacity
    of intelligence to reestablish indications and warnings so that
    we can deploy quickly the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task
    Force, or deploy quickly the U.S. IRF [Immediate Response
    Force] to have them in position before or possibly to deter a
    conflict, and that might change some of the outcomes of what
    you are talking about.
        So it is incredibly important for the first part of your
    question that we reestablish our ability to see and interpret
    so that we can deploy early to hope to avoid conflict or to
    change the outcome of the conflict.
        Secondarily, as I said before, I believe that we will never
    go back to where Europe was when Captain Breedlove went there
    in 1983. Two corps, seven divisions, multiple brigades, 10
    fighter wings--it was a force to be reckoned with. We will
    never go back there. This is not the Cold War.
        But I do believe we are not where we need to be now in the
    mixture of permanently forward-stationed forces, prepositioned
    stock so that we can rapidly fall in on it. And then as you
    mentioned at the last part of your question, we are not where
    we might need to be to be able to penetrate with A2AD--anti-
    access and area denial environment that would allow us to do
    the third part, which is rapidly reinforce.
        So just 20-second wrap up: I believe that we need to move
    forward in what our forward forces are, forward in how much
    prepositioned stock we have so that we don't have to have as
    many forward forces, and we need to make sure that we have the
    capacity to do anti-access/area denial to break it so that we
    can continue to rapidly reinforce.
        I hope I answered your question, sir.
        The Chairman. Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you. General, for your leadership and your
    thoughtful testimony here today.
        On page 4 of your written testimony you advocate that the
    U.S. should join the United Nations Convention on Law of the
    Sea treaty, UNCLOS. I find that kind of striking because
    yesterday your colleague, Admiral Harris, who is dealing with a
    totally different part of the globe and totally different set
    of issues in terms of maritime contest, made precisely the same
    recommendation. And I was wondering if you could sort of
    describe what you think the benefits would be if we took your
    advice and ratified UNCLOS and what are the hindrances that you
    are dealing with today by not being part of the convention.
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the question. I think
    our uniformed military has been pretty consistent over time in
    the support of the UNCLOS.
        If I could just do a vignette for you of the Arctic. We are
    facing a very challenging situation in the Arctic. The Arctic,
    I think, should be an opportunity. As the ice flow pattern
    changes, the maritime trade route in the Arctic shortens by
    over 30 days, I am told, transit to the Far East. That should
    be an opportunity.
        Many of our NATO allies, Canada, and the U.S. are concerned
    about what we see as the militarization of the Arctic now by
    Russia. What we would see in the Crimea situation and the Duma
    situation, currently in Syria, is that Russia has a pattern of
    putting military force in the field to set the conditions to
    negotiate from a position of power.
        And so what we see now in the Arctic is Russia establishing
    a military capability and capacity to influence that new
    passage in the north. And being part of the UNCLOS would allow
    us to be at the table in the diplomatic, informational, and
    economic arenas to address that.
        Last week I think, sir, you saw that Russia changed its
    claim in the North Pole area. It didn't affect U.S. claims, but
    it affected three of our other allies' and partners' claims.
    And these are the kind of things that will be severed in the
    framework of the UNCLOS.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        Again, I think we learned again the harm recently when the
    Hague Convention denied the U.S. request to intervene on the
    Philippine claims in the South China Sea--again, a trend that I
    think really mirrors what you are talking about, militarizing a
    part of the Pacific. And our inability to even be at the table
    when these issues are being resolved that will have a direct
    impact in terms of military strategy and resources in the
    future, you know, is the ultimate unforced error. So thank you
    for your input this morning on that issue.
        Admiral Stavridis, when he was here a couple weeks ago,
    talked about the fact that the undersea realm is getting much
    busier, said, you know, highest level of activity since the
    Cold War. Do we have enough assets in terms of naval
    resources--submarines, anti-submarine, surface ships in terms
    of the European Command to address that issue?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, I am glad you asked that in the
    context of the European Command. I wouldn't want to try to
    advise you on the CNO's [Chief of Naval Operations] business on
    numbers.
        But these undersea assets are a very highly sought-after
    asset. I will just factually say I did not get what I have
    asked for, and what that means is that in the North Sea in the
    vicinity what we call the GIUK gap--Greenland, Iceland, U.K.
    gap area--where all of the sophisticated submarines and surface
    combatants that Russia has comes out of the bastion area where
    they are built, tested, and fielded, and then employs in the
    Atlantic, in the Mediterranean, and some of transits to the
    Pacific.
        But the bottom line is in that very contested, very highly
    sophisticated part of the world we play zone defense. We can't
    play man-on-man. And so I hate to simplify this, but it is just
    a very simple way of understanding.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
        Again, our fleet today of attack subs is about 52 and, as I
    think you know, it is going to dip just because of the legacy
    fleet going offline. And, I mean, I guess we would probably
    agree that that is just going to make that stress even worse
    for your successors, in terms of trying to get those--the
    assets you need to play zone defense, let alone man-to-man.
        General Breedlove. And, sir, I would just--and not to
    change the question or to divert, but this is similar to other
    stories in what we call low-density, high-demand requirements:
    high-end ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance],
    high-end aircraft, certainly submarines, et cetera, et cetera.
        The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, it is good to have you back in front of us. Thank
    you for your service, and I don't think the administration has
    announced who is going to follow you but you are going to be
    tough to follow and I appreciate all you have done for our
    country.
        General, do you have an opinion as to whether you believe
    Russia has any intention of returning into compliance with the
    INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty?
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for the question and I am
    going to answer it in the way I answer a lot of things. I am
    unable to ascertain and I don't think I am qualified to really
    determine what Mr. Putin and his folks intend, but what I would
    say is that what I have done--and I have said this to you
    before--I look at what our opponent does as far as building
    capabilities and capacities, and then I infer from that how he
    would use them or what he might do with them.
        And I think you have heard me testify before, as have many
    others, that we firmly believe that Russia is in violation of
    the INF Treaty, and that not only are they in violation of the
    INF Treaty but the type of weapons system that they have tested
    and fielded in that category is very easily hidden or masked in
    its conventional forces. And so it is worrisome to me that they
    have created a capability that will be very problematic for us
    to keep track of.
        Mr. Rogers. How do you think we should raise the cost to
    Russia for its violations?
        General Breedlove. Sir, the Secretary of Defense has laid
    out his approach to that and it is an escalating approach
    starting with diplomacy and then moving to more what I would
    call kinetic means. And I believe that we are in the phase
    where we are--we and our allies are trying to reach a
    diplomatic solution to that. But I support the Secretary of
    Defense framework for addressing the breach in the INF.
        Mr. Rogers. What do you think Russia is trying to hide from
    us in Kaliningrad by illegally denying our flights over this
    heavily militarized piece of Russian territory?
        General Breedlove. So Kaliningrad, sir, as you know, is a
    very militarized piece of property. And as we talked about just
    a little bit before, in this discussion of anti-access/area
    denial, A2AD, as we shorten it, Kaliningrad is a fortress of
    A2AD. It projects land attack cruise missile capability; it
    projects coastal defense cruise missile capability; and it
    projects air defense capability; so a complete bubble to defend
    against land approach routes or land targets, air targets, and
    seaborne targets.
        And as I mentioned before, some of the land attack cruise
    missile systems or land attack missile systems in Kaliningrad
    are those that can be dual-use, meaning they can be nuclear.
    And I would not guess what they are trying to hide, but there
    are a lot of things in there that support these capabilities.
        Mr. Rogers. Lastly, you made reference in your opening
    statement to Russia weaponizing the migration from Syria. Can
    you speak more specifically to that?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I cannot--again, I look at what I
    see in capabilities and capacities and I determine intent. So
    what I am seeing in Syria in places like Aleppo and others are
    what I would call absolutely indiscriminate, unprecise bombing,
    rubblizing major portions of a city that do not appear to be--
    to me to be against any specific military target because the
    weapons they are using have no capability of hitting specific
    targets. They are unguided, dumb weapons.
        And what I have seen in the Assad regime from the beginning
    when they started using barrel bombs, which have absolutely no
    military utility, they are unguided and crude, and what are
    they designed to do is terrorize the public and get them on the
    road; later, Assad using chlorine gas and other chemical-type
    approaches to these same barrel bombs. Again, almost zero
    military utility, designed to get people on the road and make
    them someone else's problem--get them on the road; make them a
    problem for Europe to bend Europe to the will of where they
    want them to be.
        And so I see a continuing pattern in Aleppo and other
    places of this indiscriminate use of military capability that
    all I can determine from it is the goal is to get more people
    on the road and make them a problem for someone else to bend
    the will of those being affected.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, General.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. Very disturbing.
        Mr. Ashford.
        Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you very much. We had the opportunity a few
    weeks ago to--in conjunction with the trip to the Gulf States,
    to stop at NATO headquarters and be briefed, and much of what
    was said there is what you have suggested today. And I want to
    thank you for the efforts to get the other NATO partners to
    contribute the 2 percent. I think you had a great deal to do
    with that and it is such a big deal.
        And also the shift in the last 2 years in how we approach
    Russia, the threat of Russia, is much to do with your efforts,
    so I really--you know that, but I want to thank you again for
    that.
        One of the discussion points at NATO headquarters really
    was the discussion about the treaty itself, about Article 5,
    about--is--in your view, does the language of that agreement,
    which was--or that treaty, which is relatively older now--a
    little younger than me, but older--is the language sufficient
    as we look at the types of threats that you have described,
    whether it is cyber or whether it is little gray men or it is a
    different kind of situation?
        How close to Estonia do the Russians have to be or if there
    is some sort of cyber activity or other kinds of activity like
    that? At what point does it trigger? And that is my question.
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you for that. And if I could
    just wind the clock back a little bit to the other articles of
    the treaty. We often talk about Article 5; as important to me
    is Article 3 and Article 4.
        Article 3 can be summarized very succinctly in defense
    begins at home, and we have been using that with our allies and
    partners to talk to them about just what you said: increasing
    and thickening their own defense, investment in their own
    country. And that investment is not only 2 percent in total,
    but what is also important is that 20 percent of that needs to
    be recapitalization of investment in kit. It is not helpful if
    the entire portfolio is in personnel costs. And so Article 3--
    important.
        Defense begins at home, and we have been working with
    allies and partners to build capabilities that fit nicely into
    the alliance. Everybody doesn't need to be flying F-16s. Some
    people need to be creating tactical air control parties,
    rotary-wing lift, et cetera, et cetera. So molding the alliance
    via Article 3.
        Article 4, of course, is that point at where the nation
    feels threatened and begins a conversation with the other
    nations about, ``We are facing a threat and how are we going to
    respond?'' And this is the point when the nations are starting
    to look at and say, ``This is a legitimate breach of what NATO
    was built to do--collective defense.''
        And then Article 5, of course, is the most highly
    recognized one.
        To your point, the language is not precise when it comes to
    what we now call sort of the gray areas: the cyber, the
    hybrids. And Mr. Putin is trying to live below that Article 5
    level. He is taking action in nations now all around his
    periphery, trying to remain below that level at which the
    alliance would respond.
        That is tough. It is tougher in the states between Russia
    and NATO, but I think he is already taking these actions in
    some NATO nations.
        I would encourage maybe your staff to look at Mr.
    Gerasimov's model, his strategy of indirect action and
    deterrence. It is completely unclassified and out there on the
    Net, and if you look at his stage one, two, and three and what
    the actions he prescribes in that model of war, he is already
    taking those actions in many of our nations.
        Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Mr. Franks.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, thank you for coming before this committee again.
    I understand this might be your last time before this
    committee, so if you will forgive me I would like to just take
    a moment and express my personal gratitude to you for being the
    noble and benevolent leader you have been on behalf of human
    freedom in this country, and I know my 7-year-old children have
    a better chance to walk in the light of freedom because of
    people like you.
        And I truly believe that on just the basis of this
    committee's perspective that you have been a strategic asset in
    the arsenal of freedom, and I can't express to you just the
    personal goodwill I have for you and your family.
        With that, in your opening statement--or your written
    statement--you talk a lot about the assurance and deterrence
    missions you accomplished under the umbrella of Atlantic
    Resolve. And it is my understanding that Atlantic Resolve is
    really not a named operation. What additional authorities and
    resources could you tap into if Operation Atlantic Resolve were
    a named operation?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, thank you. And thank you for
    your support of--Luke Air Force Base in Arizona, which is dear
    to my heart, but also to our military forces.
        So the difference between the operation itself--and a named
    operation is subtle but important. Named operations have
    funding streams, they have dedicated rules of engagement, they
    garner certain priorities and allocations of forces, et cetera,
    et cetera. And so a named operation would bring more stability
    and long-term focus to Atlantic Resolve.
        We are thankful to this committee and others for 3 years--
    or 2 years and possibly a third year--of ERI, which is very
    important to Atlantic Resolve because it pays for those
    rotational forces and things that explain we are a part of the
    way forward. I think a named operation would give a sustained
    funding stream to things like that.
        Mr. Franks. You also mentioned that EUCOM does not yet have
    the personal--personnel, equipment, and resources necessary to
    carry out its growing mission. And to me that implies that
    although there is a plan for the future, that if a military
    crisis were to break out in there tomorrow, that you would not
    be equipped to deal with it as you would see fit.
        So what specific resources do you need to fulfill your
    missions which are not included in the current budget? And
    secondarily, is your headquarters adequately sized and staffed
    at the levels required for you to execute your mission?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, if I could step back just to
    piggyback on a thought that I put out before, for 20 years we
    have been trying to make a partner out of Russia and we have
    changed our force structure and our headquarters and other
    capabilities in Europe to reflect a mission that was about
    engagement and building partnership capacity.
        Now we have determined that we--people categorize it
    differently, but we definitely do not have a partner in Russia.
    And our resolve now is to be able to meet the challenge of a
    resurgent, revanchist, however you want to label it, Russia.
        We have to be able now to be a warfighting headquarters and
    a warfighting force, as opposed to an engagement and
    partnership-building capacity force. We will still do those
    functions, but we have to rethink, do we have the capability
    and capacity to be a warfighting force? And we do not.
        And I think that we have got to look at our forward force
    structure; we have got to look at our prepositioned capability;
    and we have got to make sure we have the access to Europe in
    the face of A2AD. That will take capacity and it will take some
    new capabilities.
        And as to the headquarters, our Secretary--Assistant Deputy
    Secretary of Defense has recognized that our headquarters is
    not sized right. We are still downsizing the headquarters from
    the BCA [Budget Control Act], first $478 billion cuts. We had 5
    years' worth of cuts to the headquarters laid in. We are still
    getting smaller. But this year the Deputy Secretary has
    increased our headquarters size to stop--to arrest that, and
    hopefully we will continue to do that across the next years.
        But it will take some time to reconstitute a warfighting
    headquarters from where we have been for the last 20 years.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I hope that this
    committee and this country have the opportunity to access the
    wisdom and acumen of this gentleman in the future.
        The Chairman. Appreciate it.
        Mr. Moulton.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        And, General, thank you very much for your service.
        Are we meeting Russia's threat in the Arctic, from your
    perspective in Europe? Are we adequately meeting the
    militarization of the Arctic today?
        General Breedlove. I am going to try to answer this
    question along the following lines: I do not believe that our
    nation, nor most of the other nations of the Arctic Council,
    wants to militarize the Arctic.
        Mr. Moulton. Well, I agree with that.
        General Breedlove. But what we see is that our opponent has
    decided to militarize the Arctic. And so I think this is again
    a discussion of do we have the appropriate capabilities of all
    manner--aircraft, icebreakers, other things--and do we have the
    capacities? And that is work that is being looked at now. I
    think----
        Mr. Moulton. From your assessment today, do you believe
    that we have those capabilities and capacities to meet and
    deter Russia's activity in the Arctic?
        General Breedlove. In the Arctic? We do have some extremely
    capable Arctic capabilities, as do some of our allies.
        In fact, just before arriving here for this series of
    engagements with Congress I was in Alaska and we were talking
    about this with the leadership in Alaska and the forces of the
    ALCOM [Alaskan Command] there, and they do specialize in these
    capabilities. The real question is we have to determine what
    the capacities that are required are.
        Mr. Moulton. General, moving on to a different topic and
    back to Representative Ashford's question, some experts have
    said that now we have to afford additional policy authority to
    DOD [Department of Defense] to allow for training of National
    Guard, other forces, to counter the little green men and little
    gray men in Eastern Europe. How can this be best accomplished
    and what changes to statute or what policy provisions would
    better enable that kind of cooperation?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I am going to be very honest. I
    don't think I can answer it the context of how you asked it,
    but I do believe I can address this issue.
        Mr. Moulton. Okay. Okay.
        General Breedlove. So the capacity to address hybrid
    warfare in its many forms--and it is bigger than little green;
    as you have heard, we also talk about little gray men, meaning
    that hybrid warfare goes across all four elements of national
    power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. And
    so leaving the nations where they are and helping them to
    determine what they need to do is important, and I will get to
    the part that is important to you.
        For instance, if you look at the three Baltic nations from
    north to south, they do things very differently. This hybrid
    approach in one nation is almost completely a military problem
    and very slightly a ministry of interior problem. In another of
    the nations it is about 50/50, ministry of defense, ministry of
    interior. And then the other one is exactly opposite; it is
    almost entirely ministry of interior and partly ministry of
    defense.
        So I think where your question is heading is, as you know,
    we have unique title 10 limitations of what we can do with
    other nations, so it is an all-of-government engagement. The
    National Guard brings some interesting capabilities, when you
    have guardsmen who have experiences in other fields--for
    instance judiciary, legal----
        Mr. Moulton. Sure.
        General Breedlove. And so I think that is where this may
    have headed.
        Mr. Moulton. So, General, do you think that we need to
    revise the current policy to be able to do that kind of
    training, to better meet this hybrid warfare or whatever you
    want to call it threat from Russia?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I don't think I know--or I am not
    familiar with the limitations enough to pass judgment. But let
    me tell you, as a commander I need the ability to engage a
    government across all the elements of government power to train
    them to address the hybrid war.
        Mr. Moulton. That is very helpful, General. I think my
    concern is that, as you said, we are never going to get to the
    seven divisions that we had in the Cold War, and we can expend
    all our resources trying to incrementally move in that
    direction, which may be headed in the right direction, but if
    [we] expend all our resources doing that and don't get to a
    point where it adequately does deter Putin at the expense of
    all these other aspects of this warfare we are going to really
    miss the boat.
        General Breedlove. I completely agree that we have to have
    capacities in all of those elements of national power to deter,
    as we have talked about with Congresswoman Davis.
        Mr. Moulton. Thank you, General.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Dr. Fleming.
        Dr. Fleming. General, I want to thank you for testifying
    before us today and, once again, thank you for your sage
    counsel and advice and all your years of experience and what
    you have brought to the table. You will be sorely missed.
    Everything you said I think is spot-on to where we need to be
    in terms of deterrence and dealing with an emerging Russia.
        I do have some questions. I told you earlier with respect
    to B-52s, Barksdale Air Force Base is in my district, home of
    Global Strike Command and General Rand, and so I want to know
    from you, what is the deterrence effect of the B-52 bomber?
    What do you see as the future for that bomber in terms of what
    it can bring to the battlefield both in kinetic action but also
    in deterrence?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I will not dodge your question, but
    I would say this is much more appropriately addressed by
    General Welsh and others as to that specific platform. But let
    me tell you what the bomber--and the B-52 being a mainstay of
    that fleet--the bomber brings to deterrence.
        And that is as you know the B-52, the B-1, and to a certain
    degree the B-2 have become much more flexible across their
    lives. And the B-52 as a platform for employing all manner of
    weapons like the other bombers, but certainly the B-52 is a
    great deterrent effect because it can be a part of a purely
    conventional response to try to de-escalate the situation,
    which is what we really want.
        We don't want to fight. We want the capacity and capability
    to defeat, but we don't want to go there. And so the ability of
    that particular platform to be able to do all missions and
    bring capacity to both a conventional and a non-conventional
    war is important.
        The other piece is it has proved, as you know, to be an
    incredibly long-living airframe with capability still into the
    future. I am not sure if it is still true, but when I was the
    vice chief of staff at the Air Force now 5 years ago we used to
    say that the mother of the son or daughter that will be the
    last pilot of the B-52 has not been born yet.
        Dr. Fleming. Right.
        General Breedlove. And it will be well over 100 years old
    before we are done with it.
        Dr. Fleming. Yes. Amazing.
        Well, and since you brought that up, we are looking at the
    development of the Long Range Strike Bomber [LRS-B], so my
    question is what will be that effect and what are the current
    timelines for both the upgrade to B-52 and replacement of long-
    term strike bombers?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, as you remember, we were
    talking earlier about A2AD--anti-access/area denial. One of the
    biggest keys to being able to break anti-access/area denial is
    the ability to penetrate the air defenses so that we can get
    close enough to not only destroy the air defenses but to
    destroy the coastal defense cruise missiles and the land attack
    missiles, which are the three elements of an A2AD environment.
        One of the primary and very important tools to busting that
    A2AD environment is a fifth-generation ability to penetrate. In
    the LRS-B you will have a platform and weapons that can
    penetrate, key to the future in the--of the older generation
    bombers and platforms are developing, and we are and have those
    weapons that can penetrate. And so those upgrades are all
    important to me as a user so that I can call on the service to
    bring forward the capabilities and capacities to address A2AD.
        Dr. Fleming. Right. Great. Thanks.
        And in the remaining time I have, could you comment on the
    current state of research by the Navy and Air Force into
    deterrence assurance? By this I mean the gaming scenarios in
    planning to address the aggressive behavior and Russia's
    apparent shift in nuclear doctrine.
        General Breedlove. So I can't speak specifically to just
    the services. You may be familiar with what we call the RSI,
    the Russian Strategic Initiative. It is modeled after the CSI,
    the Chinese Strategic Initiative, which is nearly 7 years old.
    As we in the past couple of years have seen Russia as no longer
    a partner we have developed the Russia Strategic Initiative to
    do just this kind of work, to look at the things we need to
    change in weaponry, but more importantly, to do things like war
    gaming to understand how they would react to our war plans, et
    cetera, et cetera.
        So what I am aware is as the leader of the Russia Strategic
    Initiative for the Department of Defense, we are getting some
    very exquisite help in understanding this business.
        Dr. Fleming. Great. Well, thank you, General, and so much
    for the Russian reset.
        And I yield back.
        The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        General, I want to thank you for your testimony today and
    for your service to our nation. Your service has been
    absolutely invaluable to our country and we will miss you in
    your retirement. But I certainly want to be among the many to
    wish you well in this next chapter of your life.
        Officials within the Department have stated that they are
    very worried that our military's ability to counter and wage
    electronic warfare has atrophied pretty significantly while
    other partners around the world--or I should say adversaries
    around the world--have invested heavily in this area, and that
    we may be lagging behind countries such as Russia. Would you
    agree with this assessment, and how do you believe EUCOM is
    currently positioned to address this challenge across the AOR
    [area of responsibility]?
        My other question that I have I hope we can get to is--and
    I spend a lot of time obviously on cybersecurity, and you
    mentioned that the challenges that we face in that space with
    respect to what Russia is doing. And my question is, how do you
    believe that we are doing at countering cyber threats with our
    allies against what Russia is doing and what their capabilities
    are? And do our NATO allies see eye to eye on this threat, and
    are our partners' capabilities mature enough to manage the
    dangers that--and challenges that we are seeing across
    cyberspace?
        General Breedlove. Thank you, sir.
        On the electronic warfare the same sort of situation
    applies. For 20 years we have been making a partner out of
    Russia so our focus has not been on the capabilities that they
    have been developing. And secondarily, again, for all the right
    reasons for the last 13 or so years our nation's military has
    been focused on counterinsurgency operations, COIN, in
    Afghanistan and fighting Al Qaeda in some of the spaces around
    the world.
        And so we have been focused very deeply on addressing a
    threat that does not have electronic warfare capability. So
    while we have retained capability, we have not really practiced
    to it to the veracity that we used to, nor have we retained the
    capacity that might be required to bust these growing A2AD
    problems we see around the world.
        So to really shorten the answer up, we have electronic
    warfare capability; we probably do not have the capacity we
    need now to address it. Our suppression of enemy air defense
    capabilities, SEAD, to take down air defense nets and things
    are very good but they are not dense. We don't have a lot of
    them.
        Russia knows how we roll and they have invested a lot in
    electronic warfare because they know that we are a connected
    and precise force and they need to disconnect us to make us
    imprecise.
        When it comes to cyber, this is, sir, I think a glass well
    over half-full. When I arrived to my station about 3 years ago
    I think that many of the nations of the alliance and in Europe
    were very insularly focused. They were acknowledging the cyber
    threat but they were worried primarily about their own cyber
    problem.
        What we discovered, though, is with 28 nations in alignment
    in an alliance you may have an absolute iron curtain wall
    around two or three of them, but there are 25 other doors into
    the enterprise. And so what we had to do is come to a larger,
    more corporate approach to cyber.
        And, sir, I see that happening. I am encouraged by what I
    see happening.
        I would recommend that someday in your travels you stop
    into Estonia and go to the NATO cyber center in Tallinn. It is
    absolutely superior and they are adding value to our alliance
    every day.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
        Next question: Is there a role for the U.S. and for EUCOM
    to play in assisting our European allies to mitigate the
    potential national security threats when it comes to the
    ongoing refugee crisis? What does that role look like and what
    resources are needed?
        General Breedlove. Sir, there is a role and we are
    executing that role now. The refugee crisis and the part that
    we are addressing the most is that embedded in this refugee
    flow is criminality, terrorism, and foreign fighters. We have
    adopted and built a very good network of sharing information,
    sharing intelligence, and trying to target and understand these
    flows of criminals, terrorists, and foreign fighters as they
    move back and forth, and so we are a part of that now.
        As you are aware, the NATO alliance began an operation in
    the Aegean Sea essentially just about a week ago where we are
    beginning to try to help our Greek and Turk allies to address
    the dense flow of refugees across that water space by being a
    part of managing that water space in terms of surveillance and
    reconnaissance and handing off data to the coast guards of
    Turkey and Greece. It is a little more complicated than that,
    but we have--the NATO alliance has begun to enter into that
    portion of the mission as well.
        Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General, and thank you again for
    your service. We wish you well.
        General Breedlove. Thank you, sir.
        The Chairman. Mr. Nugent.
        Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I definitely want to thank General Breedlove and his
    staff for your honest answers in the prior meeting that we had.
    It is very sobering to hear where we are and without illusion.
        I worry as we move forward. You know, we have done this now
    pivot to Asia, rebalance in the Pacific, all those types of
    things, and I think we are trying to do, unfortunately, way too
    much in regards to the stresses that we are putting on the
    military.
        You know, there was a point in time where our policy was to
    be able to fight, you know, two major conflicts while, you
    know--but what we found is that we had a hard time doing one
    when you look back at Afghanistan and we had to have, you know,
    forces there for 15 months on a single rotation.
        And so I think that we are fooling sometimes the American
    public to think we have the--I know we have the desire and I
    know that we have the best trained, best equipped force on the
    face of the Earth. But I don't know that we have enough, and I
    think we hit that on capacity, that we have enough to do the
    things that we told the American people that we can do and
    should do.
        I think we have been really I guess hiding the ball in
    regards to hoping that our adversaries don't see that, and I
    truly have a lot of--I believe that Mr. Putin is very
    calculating and is not stupid by any stretch of the
    imagination.
        But I guess the question is, you know, back when I first
    ran 6 years ago it was a big deal about, ``Hey, listen we need
    to get out of Europe; we need to let the Europeans deal with
    their issues.'' And I think while that sounded good at the
    time, obviously now we are paying a dear price for that.
        So why is it so important? And we need to stress this to
    the American public because everyone is footing the bill. Why
    is it so important that we have permanently stationed--forward-
    stationed troops and equipment in Europe? Why is it that
    important that we should invest that?
        General Breedlove. So, sir, thank you for the question. And
    just a 30-second recap: I believe that permanently forward-
    stationed troops are a part of that mixture.
        Mr. Nugent. Correct.
        General Breedlove. We have to have the appropriate amount
    of permanent-stationed, the appropriate amount of prepositioned
    so that we can rapidly reinforce, and then we need to have the
    capability and capacities to be able to rapidly reinforce to
    include busting this A2AD problem. So the permanently forward-
    stationed forces are an important part.
        And here are some things that are not often heard.
    Permanently forward-stationed forces buy you a lot of things.
    One of them is relationships, and relationships equal access.
        The flexibility that our--many of our nations, but let me
    just mention a few--that Spain, Italy, Greece, and even
    Turkey--the flexibility that they give us to move around and
    employ forces to address problems across all of North Africa,
    the Levant, and even to support CENTCOM [Central Command] into
    Syria and Iraq, this is all built on relationships and trust
    that are established over time by permanently stationed forward
    forces. I cannot overstate the importance of having these--this
    access.
        A couple of sort of quippy remarks that I will give to you.
    One is that you cannot surge trust. You cannot surge
    relationships. If we are not in a nation, establishing trust
    and relationship, and then when we desperately need to be able
    to do execute force from or within that nation you don't--you
    can't surge the trust or the relationship.
        Mr. Nugent. And doesn't having permanently stationed forces
    buy us time to do just what you are talking about? When you
    have prepositioned equipment it buys us time to actually get to
    that equipment?
        General Breedlove. It does. It does, and that is why it is
    a mix. The permanently forward-stationed forces are there,
    ready, and can execute. They are ready to fight forward if they
    have to, and that allows--enables the prepositioning and
    enables the capability to respond.
        Mr. Nugent. So do we have enough prepositioned--or not
    prepositioned, but do we have enough permanently stationed
    troops in Europe?
        General Breedlove. Sir, I am on record multiple times as
    saying no. We are looking at that now, but if we choose not to
    increase permanently stationed forces forward then we can
    adjust and pick up the requirement in the rotational force.
        Mr. Nugent. But hasn't it been a problem in regards to--and
    I know we--and I'm getting gaveled out on this one--but in
    regards to when you have different commands flushing through
    that you don't have a continuity?
        General Breedlove. Right. This is a problem that could
    manifest itself. Our U.S. Army and Navy and Air Force, by the
    way, in their rotation patterns are dedicating units. It will
    not always be perfect, but we have units assigned with a
    primarily European mission that are a part of that rotational
    force. We are trying to address just your concern.
        Mr. Nugent. I appreciate it.
        And I appreciate the Chair. Thank you for very much.
        The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
        Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I am actually going to continue
    the gentleman's line of questioning because we were thinking
    along much of the same ways.
        General, thank you again so much for being here. I want to
    pick up on this line of questioning.
        You know, the fiscal year 2017 budget request quadruples
    the amount of the fiscal year 2016 request for the European
    Reassurance Initiative, but a lot of that is for prepositioning
    of equipment in Central and Eastern Europe, and for heel-to-toe
    rotational deployments. I was reading the National Commission
    on the Future of the Army's report that has two significant
    recommendations. One is to forward station an ABCT [armored
    brigade combat team] in Europe itself, whereas the other has to
    do with the aviation, the CAB [combat aviation brigade].
        And I want to sort of peel back the layers of the effect of
    the Army's Aviation Restructuring Initiative and what it has
    done to our aviation capability in Europe. Specifically, you
    know, we go back to this idea of building trust and long-term
    relationships. One, let me start off by saying--am I right in
    saying that you would prefer to have permanently placed ABCT
    and additional equipment in Europe? Would that be a true
    statement?
        General Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Duckworth. Okay. So on the aviation side, the report
    actually suggests that the rotational model will work except
    that we need more of a warfighter-aligned headquarters. What is
    there now is really more of an administrative aviation
    headquarters as opposed to a CAB-type of headquarters there
    that would actually be much more aligned to that rotational
    mission, they can come in, they can pick up. Would you agree
    with that?
        General Breedlove. So, ma'am, the report I think correctly
    identifies the absolute value of having a dedicated command and
    controlled force. And frankly, it just emphasizes the value in
    general of Army aviation as one element of air power in Europe.
    And they are all absolutely critical.
        Ms. Duckworth. They are. Thank you. I am not promising
    anything, but I would hope that with such an increase in the
    ERI funding that we might be able to address some of the
    aviation shortfall.
        Can you talk a little bit more about the rotational model
    on your aviation needs in Europe? And where have you assumed
    specifically the most risk and what capability gaps needs the
    most attention when it comes to Army aviation?
        General Breedlove. So, ma'am, what I need to do is give
    some thanks and respect to what the Army did as they took the
    last tranche of aviation out of Europe. If you look at it in a
    net way, we really didn't lose any presence because the
    aviation that we had in Europe at the time was continually
    being tasked into theater. So while it was assigned in Europe
    it was gone a fair amount.
        A larger piece left Europe, but the rotational piece that
    we got to replace it is dedicated to Europe and does not rotate
    into theater. So it netted out almost exactly the same in the
    amount of time that we had aviation on the ground. So I need
    to--we need to properly acknowledge the Army's efforts to make
    this right for Europe.
        But the larger picture is that faced with the revanchist,
    resurgent Russia, we do not have the aviation requirement that
    we need in Europe, and that will be the focus of my command
    into the future.
        Ms. Duckworth. Okay. And so you are actually saying--are
    you saying then that you would like to have a full--a CAB
    permanently stationed in Europe?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, the planning is ongoing. It may
    be more than a CAB. I would not want to put a number on it now
    and have it exactly wrong when the planning is finished.
        Ms. Duckworth. Okay. I only have a minute left. Can you
    comment a little bit on the State Partnership Program? Having
    been in the--spent my 23 years in the Illinois National Guard--
    --
        General Breedlove. Cannot say enough about it.
        Ms. Duckworth. Since Poland is our country and they are
    staring down the barrel of Russian aggression there in Poland--
    --
        General Breedlove. The State Partnership Program, 21
    States, 22 nations, is one of my premiere tools. I hate to use
    a word like that, but literally they represent 23, 24 percent
    of the engagement that I have in Europe.
        I have told this committee a couple of times that I much
    prefer permanently stationed forces, rotational forces being an
    acceptable but second option.
        I would recategorize a little bit the State Partnership
    Program. They are a rotational force. They are a bit episodic.
    But the difference is that they maintain long-term
    relationships in leadership, in command, in training.
        Forces are going left to America, right to Europe, and
    the--most of these programs are wildly successful. Some of them
    are just successful. But the point being that this is a very
    valuable tool in our quiver to be able to develop capacity in
    our allies, especially the smaller, former Soviet allies, et
    cetera, et cetera.
        Ms. Duckworth. And I thank you for service to this country,
    General.
        General Breedlove. Thank you, ma'am.
        The Chairman. Mr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        And, General, thank you. As everyone else has, you are a
    great military leader and we appreciate it more than we could
    ever tell you.
        Yesterday on the floor of the House, Mr. Brooks, who just
    left a few hours ago, gave a very disturbing speech on the fact
    that America is headed toward Greece financially. I later came
    along to give another 5-minute speech about the waste of money
    in Afghanistan, talked about the fact that John Sopko said
    that, to the Senate, that our country, Department of Defense
    spent $6 million to buy nine goats from Italy to send to
    western Afghanistan.
        I wonder, when I listen to you, and--because I have such
    great respect for your evaluation of Russia and the threat that
    they could bring to more of Europe than it does today. Then I
    think about the comment by Admiral Mullen when he was Chairman
    of the Joint Chiefs when he said, ``The biggest threat to our
    military is the growing debt of our nation.''
        I listen to you and your recommendations and the things
    that you feel like we need to do not only in Europe but for our
    military, but specifically Europe today that we need to do to
    be a stronger deterrent in Europe. My concern is that I have
    read recently that a couple of the civilian leaders in a couple
    of the countries have debated reducing the amount of money
    going into the defense budget of some of those countries.
        You, having relationships that you have had both with
    military leaders and civilian leaders, do you feel--talking
    about the civilian leaders now, not the military leaders--that
    they fully understand that they have got to make a financial
    investment as much as America has to make to keep Europe safe
    from being taken over by Russia?
        General Breedlove. Sir, thank you much. And if I could just
    comment that I have deep respect for Admiral Mullen. I have
    worked for him a couple of times directly in my life and he is
    a man of, I think, incredible character, and he really has it
    upstairs.
        The answer to the last part, which is the focus of your
    question, is we need to have a sober reply. But I have said
    that I am a glass half-full----
        Mr. Jones. Right.
        General Breedlove [continuing]. Here.
        In Wales we made a commitment--we being the nations of the
    alliance--made a commitment to get towards the 2 percent. They
    gave themselves a broad time period, which, you know, was a
    little bit worrisome--10 years. But they made a commitment to
    get to 2 percent. What I have seen is because of the continued
    aggressive behavior of Russia the nations have become much more
    focused on this.
        And I have used these three numbers a couple of times. They
    are exactly wrong. They change, but they are pretty close to
    right: 16 of NATO's nations have stopped the decline in their
    budget; 5 of NATO's nations are already at 2 percent--we need
    to qualify at least one of those and I will mention that in a
    second; and then I believe--this is Phil Breedlove's opinion,
    not others--that there are about 7 nations that have I think a
    legitimate plan to get to the right spending in a reasonable
    amount of time, not 10 years but 4, 5, 6 years.
        And so I think I would use those numbers to point out to
    you sir, that I do believe the leadership of the nations are
    beginning to make decisions with their budgets. I do not want
    to overstate because there is a lot here to do. And as I
    mentioned earlier, one of the important things in the 2 percent
    is that it is important and the other goal is that 20 percent
    of that 2 percent is on recapitalization investment so that
    they can bring capability to the table.
        If the entire budget is a personnel budget it is not going
    to be helpful over time as a force. And so we also need to
    bring focus among our allies and partners that they not only
    get the investment up, or certainly arrest the decrease, but
    they also need to look at the investment accounts to make sure
    that they are bringing capabilities to the fore.
        But I just want to close with it is not perfect. A lot of
    work to do, but I am over half-full here because of what I see
    in these trend lines.
        Mr. Jones. General, thank you so much.
        I yield back.
        The Chairman. I was just looking; we are at 26 percent,
    according to the last chart we have up here, on the
    monetization part. So we got a little work to--have a little
    work to do.
        Ms. Stefanik.
        Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, General Breedlove, for being here to testify
    and for your service and leadership to our nation.
        I am interested to hear your thoughts on the increased
    online presence of ISIL in Europe and our capacity to truly
    counter these threats at the combatant command level. How is
    EUCOM leveraging technology and new ideas to counter online
    propaganda and equipment as it relates not only to the hybrid
    threat posed by Russia but also this increased online
    recruitment and digital propaganda that we are seeing by ISIL
    in Europe?
        General Breedlove. So I would categorize this in two ways.
    We are not where we need to be yet. We have a lot to do. We
    have started and are headed in the right direction.
        I am sure you will have Admiral Rogers here from NSA
    [National Security Agency]/Cyber Command to talk to you. He has
    been a magnificent partner in that he has taken the approach of
    pushing capacity and capability to the combatant commanders so
    that the combatant commanders can individually focus and target
    that capability and capacity.
        In this open forum I will have to stop there on what that
    looks like, but let me assure you that the admiral has a
    wonderful focus on how he is going to do this for us, but it
    is--we have a lot farther to go.
        Inside of EUCOM itself, again, in an open forum I will tell
    that we have several venues where we are using exquisite tools
    to get after this problem set. And I will just stop there.
    Again, not enough yet, but we have started this process.
        Ms. Stefanik. So as much as you can say in an open forum,
    what tools do you need? How will increased ERI funding assist
    in the area? Broadly, can you give us guidance?
        General Breedlove. So, ma'am, ERI is more focused on our
    allies and how we fight there, and so I will have to have my
    staff get back to your staff. I don't want to misstate.
        I am not sure that there is this specific capability. There
    are capabilities in cyber, but what you are talking about I
    cannot definitively speak to that. I will have my staff contact
    your staff on that----
        Ms. Stefanik. Great.
        General Breedlove [continuing]. Rather than misstate.
        [EUCOM has contacted Rep. Stefanik's staff and will provide
    a briefing in response to her questions.]
        Ms. Stefanik. Let me shift to another area. A mission as
    complex as EUCOM requires a great deal of international
    partnership and interagency communication. How well, in your
    assessment, is EUCOM integrated with the various agencies
    throughout Europe to counter the increased threats, and would
    you say there is a solid unity of effort between partners and
    agencies to counter the challenges posed by a resurgent Russia
    and the various unconventional threats that face Europe today?
        General Breedlove. Ma'am, this is a place I am very proud
    of our command. We are well integrated. And partially that is
    because this committee made decision years ago to develop a
    distinct branch of our command called J9 where we pull in all
    of the other agencies. It is a little mini agency. And we pay
    for their presence in order to ensure that we have connections
    to law enforcement, FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and
    a lot of other agencies which we will not mention here.
        But we know that in Europe when we try to combat things
    like foreign fighter flows and terrorism--in Europe this is not
    about kinetic strikes like it is in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
    and portions of North Africa. In Europe this is about
    integrating with the highly capable legal, judicial, and police
    systems of Europe. And so we have invested distinctly in this
    capability to have connective tissue to the other nations of
    Europe.
        And so this is a place where EUCOM before my time--I do not
    take the credit except for that we have expanded it and
    continued to fund it before me--but leaders before me have seen
    the wisdom and the value of this interagency approach in
    Europe.
        Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you very much.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you.
        Ms. McSally.
        Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, General Breedlove, for your service and
    commitment to our troops and to our security. You have talked
    many times about the force structure and our downsizing in
    Europe. I think back at one point we had I think six A-10
    squadrons in the U.K. back in the day, then we went to one at
    Spain, and less than 3 years ago that one closed down.
        We are now deploying A-10 units of the nine remaining
    operational across the active Guard and Reserve for part of the
    ERI in order to help with training and deterrence. So that is
    just one example, but that was just a couple years ago.
        Can you give some insight into the logic? That is an entire
    capability, because now there is none there, that we have lost.
        And I am still waiting to hear about from the Air Force as
    the cost comparison of stations that are full-time versus
    rotating over. But can you give some insight as to that logic,
    and do you think looking in hindsight that was not a good
    decision?
        General Breedlove. So I will allow the Air Force to talk to
    you about cost-benefit ratio.
        Ms. McSally. Right----
        General Breedlove. As a user I am just looking for the
    capability.
        And I think, you know, I--the round number that my staff
    gave me is that we are--we have about two A-10 exercises and
    about 200 flying hours a month on average now in EUCOM. So we
    are asking for that capability.
        I try to refrain from asking specifically for airframes; I
    try to ask for capabilities. And certainly we have airplanes
    that can deliver what the A-10 delivers, but the A-10 is
    extremely good at delivering----
        Ms. McSally. I mean, just based on your overall testimony,
    though----
        General Breedlove. Right.
        Ms. McSally [continuing]. Would it be better to have a
    capability like that stationed in Europe versus rotating over,
    just in line with everything that you said?
        General Breedlove. So what we have seen is that that
    capability serves a very important niche of our requirements.
        Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
        You may not be able to answer the next question but a
    recent RAND study, looking at defense of the Balkans, talked
    about, among other things, a, you know, lack of air superiority
    because of just the swift nature of that potential scenario.
    You said you were looking into force structure options, but if
    you were not resource-constrained and you had everything you
    wanted, could you give a sense or can you get back to me with a
    sense of what would the fighter force structure look like in
    order to make sure we have air superiority.
        It has been now 60 years since the last time we did not
    have air superiority in any military operation so----
        General Breedlove. April 1953----
        Ms. McSally. Exactly.
        General Breedlove. So yes, ma'am. We do not at present have
    sitting on the ground in Europe sufficient capacity----
        Ms. McSally. Right----
        General Breedlove [continuing]. To ensure air superiority
    over the battlefield. We would have to start off any conflict
    working towards localized air superiority to employ troops and
    then reinforce from the rear.
        If I could, I would actually attack this question a little
    differently. The premiere aircraft in air superiority these
    days are not only air superiority platforms but they are
    explicit, stealth, precision, attack platforms.
        And these kinds of capabilities are incredibly important to
    busting that A2AD problem that we have talked about several
    times today, not only to provide air superiority for the troops
    but that stealthy ability to deliver precise weapons to take
    down A2AD is incredibly important. And it will take a
    significant amount more of that capability to establish what
    you and I have known to be air superiority over the
    battlefield.
        Ms. McSally. Yes. Could we maybe get back in a classified
    setting about what that--like how many--what would that look
    like? What would the force structure look like? What----
        General Breedlove. So, as you know, we are working our war
    plan through the business now, and that will allow us to
    definitize that. It is not ready for primetime yet.
        Ms. McSally. I have just got about a minute left. Obviously
    we have talked about the challenge of our partners not reaching
    2 percent of their GDP [gross domestic product] and their
    spending. It seems like the awareness level is going up and
    some turning around, but it is still not enough.
        If we compare the--with the PACOM [Pacific Command]
    theater, you know, our allies see the value of us being there
    for their own defense and they often support in other ways,
    even if it is not just with the military. They are paying the
    bills; they are providing that monetary support.
        Are there other initiatives we could push a little harder
    on right now, now that we have got the Russian threat, we have
    got the ISIS threat, to say, ``All right, fine. If you are not
    ramping up your military capability, you are going to start
    paying some of the bills for us to be here so that we can free
    up resources for other things'' just to be a little more
    creative and have them step up their contribution.
        General Breedlove. As you know, in limited ways that has
    already happened in a couple of places. And as I mentioned
    before, it is not perfect. We need more. But what we really
    see, especially in the Mediterranean nations, is the
    flexibility that they allow us to move forces around,
    especially to meet the threat in North Africa, is quite
    demonstrative.
        I asked someone once, ``Would you--what would happen if
    another nation asked to come into your state and on a routine
    basis move around large groups of foreign military and foreign
    aircraft, and sometimes do that on less than 48 hours'
    notice?'' And so I think we have to acknowledge that there are
    some sacrifices these nations are making.
        Ms. McSally. They get value out of it too.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman. General, do you know off the top of your head
    how many permanent U.S. military installations we still have in
    Europe?
        General Breedlove. I do not. The number of new major
    installations is less than two dozen, but there are a lot of
    small ones.
        The Chairman. Yes. Okay. Thank you.
        One other question I want to ask you with your NATO hat on
    that has not been raised today is Turkey. You know, we read
    every day about the tensions related to this Syria situation
    especially, and so from a NATO perspective what is that
    relationship like with Turkey today as it integrates into the
    alliance?
        General Breedlove. So, Mr. Chairman, let me say
    unequivocally in a mil-to-mil environment, which is where I am
    most qualified, it is a strong and remaining strong
    relationship. Of course, the position of the military inside
    Turkey has changed over time, but our mil-to-mil relationship
    is strong.
        We don't always see perfectly eye to eye, but we have
    incredible cooperation and personal relationships. The chief of
    defense there, General Hulusi Akar, is not American-trained but
    he is Western-trained and he really understands the way we do
    business, and he has--he is a very much a cooperative partner.
        Turkey, as you know, Mr. Chairman, lives in a really tough
    neighborhood: to their south a civil war that is really going
    quite badly; to the north the Black Sea, which has become a
    bastion of Russian power--again, one of the three major A2AD
    nodes that we have talked about. And so Turkey is in a tough
    place and facing what they see are some tough problems around
    them.
        But let me assure you, I feel only qualified to speak to
    the mil-to-mil piece. We have a strong and continued
    relationship mil-to-mil with our ally Turkey.
        The Chairman. Well, we have seen in other cases where that
    continuation of a strong military relationship is really the
    bedrock as governments come and go that our relationships can
    often depend on, so I think that is a very important thing for
    us to keep in mind.
        General Breedlove. Nineteen major installations, Mr.
    Chairman.
        The Chairman. Thank you, sir, I appreciate that. I often
    get asked at home why don't we close some bases in Europe, and
    so that is--helps arm me with the facts.
        General, I have got to warn you that you have received lots
    of accolades today and people saying they are going to miss
    you. The problem is even this week we have had interactions
    with two former combatant commanders and picking their brain,
    so we don't usually let people get off too lightly or
    completely away from us. And we may see you again before the
    change of command, but thank you very much for being here today
    and for your insights.
        And with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                               February 25, 2016

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                    PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               February 25, 2016

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               February 25, 2016

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                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

        Mr. Shuster. Do you believe we have enough Patriot battalions to
    support the continued mission of deterrence against Russia?
        General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
        Mr. Conaway. Russia has greatly expanded its distribution of
    natural gas throughout Europe. This pattern appears to be part of a
    larger geo-political agenda in countries such as Syria and Ukraine, as
    witnessed by incursions into Crimea and elsewhere. Natural gas
    exportation significantly enhances Russia's ability to operate abroad,
    playing a significant component in an otherwise weakening economy. In
    view of increased use of Russian natural gas at regional energy
    facilities that supply heating to numerous U.S. military installations
    throughout Western Europe, is the expansion of Russian energy not a
    considerable risk factor?
        General Breedlove. Using natural gas from countries who rely on
    Russian supplies does pose a risk. While not ideal, the United States
    government is working with our European Allies and partners to
    determine ways to diversify their energy sources.
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTRO
        Mr. Castro. Has NATO discussed changes to Article 6 to include non-
    conventional attacks such as a cyber attack?
        General Breedlove. Article 6 of the Washington Treaty relates
    generally to the location of an armed attack on a NATO member that
    could trigger the collective defense provisions of Article 5. While
    there have been many discussions relating to cyber attacks and Article
    5, we are unaware of any specific discussions on Article 6 changes.
        It is NATO's articulated policy, expressed in paragraph 72 of the
    Wales Action Plan (Sep. 5, 2014), that ``cyber defense is part of
    NATO's core task of collective defense.'' In general, NATO assets exist
    to protect NATO networks, and allies must protect their own national
    assets. As set forth in the ``Active Engagement, Modern Defence''
    statement at NATO's Lisbon Summit in November 2010, cyber attacks ``can
    reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity,
    security and stability.'' As NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said in
    October 2010, there is a ``constructive ambiguity'' with regard to the
    use of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, including in the case of
    cyber attacks. Such a decision would be taken by the North Atlantic
    Council on a case-by-case basis.
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
        Mr. Hunter. Russia has greatly expanded its distribution of natural
    gas throughout Europe. This pattern appears to be part of a larger geo-
    political agenda in countries such as Syria and Ukraine, as witnessed
    by incursions into Crimea and elsewhere. Natural gas exportation
    significantly enhances Russia's ability to operate abroad, playing a
    significant component in an otherwise weakening economy. In view of
    increased use of Russian natural gas at regional energy facilities that
    supply heating to numerous U.S. military installations throughout
    Western Europe, is the expansion of Russian energy not a considerable
    risk factor? The Army is about to construct a major new medical center
    at the Rhine Ordnance Barracks Installation in Germany, a facility to
    replace Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. This facility provides
    medical care for service personnel and their families in the European
    Theater from each branch of the military. There remains a possibility
    that Russian natural gas will be the exclusive energy source for heat
    at the facility. Would such an acquisition policy be counter-productive
    to NATO's efforts to address Russia's recent posturing?
        General Breedlove. No, we do not believe this acquisition policy is
    currently counter-productive to NATO's efforts. We recognize that in
    the long term overreliance on Russian natural gas could prove
    problematic. The United States government is working with our NATO
    Allies and partners on energy diversification efforts.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON
        Mr. Gibson. What is your assessment of the criticality of the
    Global Response Force? Also, what is your assessment of the level of
    risk of continuing the Army drawdown, and what it would mean in terms
    of buying down risk to station an Armored Brigade Combat Team and a
    Combat Aviation Brigade in Europe?
        General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                        QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
        Mr. Scott. Can you describe the infrastructure and capabilities
    European Command (EUCOM) needs now in order achieve information and
    cyber dominance in a hybrid conflict?
        General Breedlove. A future conflict will be characterized by a
    combination of regular, irregular, and cyberspace-based warfare
    typically supported by an aggressive propaganda campaign. In order to
    achieve information dominance in such a conflict in its area of
    operations, EUCOM would need to be able to inform, persuade and
    influence both foreign decision makers and population groups.
    Specifically, it would require both the capacity and capabilities to
    conduct sustained ``influence operations.'' While EUCOM has some
    capacity and capability to conduct these kinds of ``influence
    operations,'' shortfalls exist that create risk to U.S. objectives in a
    hybrid conflict. Capacity could be achieved through an increase in the
    numbers of qualified analysts available to the command, both in reach
    back and at the headquarters, sub-unified command level (Special
    Operations Command Europe), and the component level (Army, Air Force,
    Navy, Marines). It is key to have qualified persons who can conduct the
    activities that lead to dominance, including Military Information
    Support Operations. We require new influence operations capabilities
    emphasizing research, analysis, and assessment, as well as the
    employment of social media. The capacity and capabilities we need are
    very difficult, if not impossible, to ``surge.'' Russia, as we know, is
    employing many resources in its influence operations in Eastern Europe.
    Accordingly, EUCOM believes that funding for influence operations
    should be increased and included in the Department's base budget.
        Mr. Scott. What are the current gaps in your intelligence,
    surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with regard to your
    combatant command? How does the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack
    Radar System platform integrate into your current ISR network?
        General Breedlove. [The information referred to is classified and
    retained in the committee files.]
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI
        Mr. Takai. You focused the majority of your testimony on explaining
    how Russia is our greatest threat. Though most focused on Europe and
    the Middle East, Russia is also engaged politically and militarily in
    the Indo-Asia-Pacific. Ships and submarines of the Russian Pacific
    Fleet and long range aircraft routinely demonstrate Russia's message
    that it is a Pacific power. America's future demands greater attention
    to the Asia-Pacific region. Russian ballistic missile and attack
    submarines remain especially active in the Asia-Pacific. The arrival in
    late 2015 of Russia's newest class of nuclear ballistic missile
    submarine (DOLGORUKIY SSBN) in the Far East is part of a modernization
    program for the Russian Pacific Fleet and signals the seriousness with
    which Moscow views this region. Your testimony highlighted the
    importance of maintaining relationships. I quote, ``You can't surge
    trust.'' The same could be said for relationships with our allies in
    the Asia-Pacific; the risks associated with major combat operations in
    the Asia-Pacific theater place a premium on preexisting command
    relationships.
        Don't you think the European Reassurance Initiative could do with
    less so that resources could be adequately distributed to the growing
    threat of Russia, and China, and North Korea, in the Asia-Pacific
    region?
        General Breedlove. The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is
    necessary to address the Russian threat to NATO Allies and other
    partners within the USEUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). With the FY17
    ERI budget request, we are consciously beginning to address the
    requirement to take prudent actions now (e.g., store prepositioned Army
    equipment, provide full-time Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT)
    presence, enhance exercises with Allies, etc.) that will aid in
    deterring future Russian aggression in Europe. I believe the scope of
    FY17 ERI is appropriate and necessary to meet the threat in Eruope, and
    it does not address the challenges in other theaters. However, I am
    also sensitive to the needs to address emerging requirements in other
    Combatant Command AORs as well given overall budget constraints.

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