[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-94]
THE CHALLENGE OF CONVENTIONAL AND
HYBRID WARFARE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION: THE CHANGING NATURE OF
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND
ITS EFFECT ON MILITARY PLANNING
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 24, 2016
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Fourteenth Congress
WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JOHN GARAMENDI, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado Georgia
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
MO BROOKS, Alabama DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
PAUL COOK, California MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
THOMAS MacARTHUR, New Jersey
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
William S. Johnson, Counsel
Britton Burkett, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Committee
on Armed Services.............................................. 2
Thornberry, Hon. William M. ``Mac,'' a Representative from Texas,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.......................... 1
WITNESSES
Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.. 3
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M., USA, Commander, United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, and U.S. Forces-Korea........ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Harris, ADM Harry B., Jr..................................... 43
Scaparrotti, GEN Curtis M.................................... 67
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services........................ 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Castro................................................... 85
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 86
Mr. Nugent................................................... 88
Mr. Scott.................................................... 86
Mr. Shuster.................................................. 85
Mr. Takai.................................................... 87
Mr. Wilson................................................... 85
.
THE CHALLENGE OF CONVENTIONAL AND HYBRID WARFARE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
REGION: THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND ITS EFFECT
ON MILITARY PLANNING
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 24, 2016.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ``Mac''
Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ``MAC'' THORNBERRY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Events of recent days remind us that American national
security cannot focus just on the Middle East or Africa or
Europe; there are real and growing threats facing us in Asia as
well. The erratic North Korean regime persistently marches
toward more sophisticated nuclear weapons and longer range
missiles, despite past agreements it has signed and despite
pressure from China and others. Meanwhile, China is also
marching steadily toward making the South China Sea a private
lake, fully under Chinese control. Again, regardless of the
promises made or the pressure applied, it moves ahead with its
own agenda.
While we in the country are understandably alarmed at these
developments, we have got to go beyond concern and decide how
we will respond as we carry out our constitutional duties to
raise and support, provide and maintain the military forces of
the United States. The threats facing us in Asia cover a wide
spectrum of military capability: from new, modern nuclear
warheads that are steadily being produced by the Chinese and
determined efforts by North Korea to upgrade its nuclear
arsenal to missiles of increasing range and lethality to hybrid
war-like tactics, which we have seen in other theaters as well.
To me, this means we must have a credible nuclear
deterrent. We must have missile defense. We must have
sufficient naval presence in order to deter some of what we are
seeing in Asia. We also must work with key allies in the
regions, strong allies, such as Japan, the Republic of Korea,
Taiwan, Australia, among others. Only together can we ensure
that this vital region of the world continues to be an economic
engine and continue--and will have peace and stability in the
future.
We are very grateful to have our witnesses today to help
talk about the key role the United States military plays in
achieving those goals. Before I turn to them, I will yield to
the distinguished acting ranking member, Mrs. Davis from
California.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And if I may, I want to ask unanimous consent to submit our
Ranking Member Smith's statement for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mrs. Davis. And I also wanted to welcome Admiral Harris and
General Scaparrotti and to thank you for appearing before our
committee today.
The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is critical to our national
interests. And despite your best efforts in promoting growth
and prosperity through our committed presence and engagement,
the challenges that we face, as you well know, are no small
task. The North Korean regime resorts to brinkmanship and open
provocation to further its objectives. North Korea's nuclear
tests have openly defied the international call for a nuclear-
free Korean Peninsula, and the regime uses hybrid and
asymmetric warfare to reinforce its survivability and to exert
undue influence.
As the chairman noted, we must work with our allies in the
region to contain the North Korean regime and deter further
aggression and, of course, be prepared to act if necessary.
Reinforcing our missile defense posture on the peninsula in
coordination with South Korea is one step in the right
direction.
China continues to press its claims in the South China Sea,
and their actions have shown that it too will resort to gray
zone tactics short of open conflict to achieve foreign policy
goals. Instead of further provocation, China should abide by
internationally accepted norms and contribute to a peaceful and
equitable resolution to the disputed claims.
These developments, as we all acknowledge, emphasize the
need for a persistent U.S. presence. We should continue to
bolster collective security, help to peacefully address
concerns, facilitate productive multilateral exchanges,
encourage democratization efforts, and reinforce ties with our
many allies and partners.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our presenters today.
Thank you again very much for being here and for your great
service to our country. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentlelady.
Just to remind members, immediately upon the conclusion of
this open hearing, we will go to a closed classified session
with our witnesses today, so if you have questions that touch
on classified material, it would be best to do that later.
I am very pleased to welcome our witnesses today: Admiral
Harry B. Harris, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; and General
Curtis Scaparrotti, Commander, United Nations Command, Combined
Forces Command, and U.S. Forces in Korea.
Without objection, both of your written statements will be
made part of the record, and feel free to summarize them or
make such other comments as you would like.
Admiral Harris, thanks for being here.
STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN, COMMANDER, U.S.
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry and
Representative Davis and distinguished members. It is an honor
for me to appear before this committee. I am pleased to be here
with General Scaparrotti to discuss how U.S. Pacific Command
[PACOM] is protecting America's interests across the vast Indo-
Asia-Pacific.
Since taking command of PACOM last May, I have had the
extraordinary privilege of leading the 400,000 soldiers,
sailors, airmen, marines, Coast Guardsmen, and civilians
serving our Nation. These dedicated men and women and their
families are doing an amazing job, and I am proud to serve
alongside them.
To provide you some issues of concern, I would like to
briefly highlight a few regional issues. As China continues its
pattern of destabilizing militarization of the South China Sea,
we have resumed our freedom of navigation operations there, a
waterway vital to America's prosperity, where $5.3 trillion in
trade traverses each year.
General Scaparrotti and I remain aligned in dealing with
North Korea's recent underground nuclear test, followed by its
ballistic missile launch.
A revanchist Russia is revitalizing its ability to execute
long-range strategic patrols in the Pacific to include the
basing of its newest strategic ballistic missile submarine and
last month's bomber flights around Japan.
Recent terrorist attacks in Bangladesh and Indonesia
underscore the fact that violent Islamic extremism is a global
concern that must be crushed.
We have continued to strengthen our alliances and
partnerships. Japan's peace and security legislation
authorizing limited collective self-defense will take effect
this year. This legislation and the revised guidelines for
U.S.-Japan defense cooperation will significantly increase
Japan's ability to work with us.
Thanks to the great leadership of General Scaparrotti here,
South Korea and the United States have taken a strong and
unified stance to maintain peace and stability on the Korean
Peninsula. In the face of recent North Korean aggression, PACOM
hosted a tri-CHOD [Chief of Defense] meeting between U.S.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dunford; Japan Chairman,
Admiral Kawano; and South Korea Chairman, General Lee.
Trilateral cooperation between Japan, South Korea, and the
United States is a priority, and I am doing everything I can to
enhance it.
Our alliance with the Philippines took an important step
forward when the Philippine Supreme Court recently upheld the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which will
provide significant partnership and access benefits.
I am also excited about our growing relationship with
India, where I will visit next week. As the world's two largest
democracies, we are uniquely poised to help bring greater
security and prosperity to the entire region.
Two visionary policies are now coinciding as the United
States rebalances west to the Indo-Asia-Pacific and India
implements its ``Act East'' policy. Last month's Malabar
exercise between India, Japan, and the United States shows the
security interconnectedness of the Indian Ocean, Asia, and the
Pacific Ocean.
I rely heavily on Australia, not only for its advanced
military capabilities across all domains but, importantly, for
Australia's warfighting experience and leadership in operations
around the world.
These examples clearly demonstrate to me that the United
States is a security partner of choice in the Indo-Asia-
Pacific. It is also why I believe that our strategic rebalance
has taken hold. Given that four of the five strategic problem
sets identified by Secretary Carter--China, North Korea,
Russia, and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]--are in
our region, I would say that we can't rebalance fast enough.
But there is more work to do, and we must not lose the
momentum.
So I ask this committee to support continued investment in
future capabilities. I need weapons systems of increased
lethality that go faster, go further, and are more survivable.
If funding uncertainties continue, the U.S. will experience
reduced warfighting capabilities, so I urge the Congress to
repeal sequestration.
Finally, I would like to thank this committee and the whole
Congress for your enduring support to PACOM and to the men and
women in uniform, our civilian teammates, and our families.
Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in
the Appendix on page 43.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN CURTIS M. SCAPARROTTI, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES-KOREA
General Scaparrotti. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Davis, and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored
to testify today as the Commander of the United Nations
Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States Forces-
Korea [USFK]. On behalf of the American soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines, and our civilians serving in the Republic
of Korea, thank you for your support.
Admiral Harris, thank you for your vision and the
professional support of the entire PACOM team for USFK.
I have prepared brief opening remarks, and I appreciate
that my written posture statement is being entered into the
record.
Since my last testimony, our U.S.-ROK [Republic of Korea]
alliance has continued to focus on advancing our combined
capabilities. Some of these advanced capabilities include the
establishment of the first U.S.-ROK combined division,
additional rotations of U.S. forces to the peninsula, the
execution of our annual combined training exercises, and steady
progress on our $10.7 billion plan to relocate U.S. forces in
Korea. Furthermore, the Republic of Korea has improved its
capabilities with the recent establishment of the Korean Air
and Missile Defense System and Center and the Allied Korea
Joint Command and Control System.
The Republic of Korea has also invested in modern
equipment, with the purchase of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter,
Global Hawk, the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile
upgrades, and also AH-64 Apache helicopters. These alliance
advances help counter the real and the proximate North Korean
threat.
North Korea continues to conduct provocations and to
resource its large conventional force. And, of greater
significance, North Korea continues to aggressively develop
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in direct violation of
the U.N. Security Council resolutions, as demonstrated with its
fourth nuclear test and its fifth TD-2 launch in January and
February.
In regards to this threat, my top concern remains the
potential for a North Korean provocation to start a cycle of
action and counteraction which could quickly escalate, similar
to what we experienced this past August. While I am proud to
report that our alliance stood shoulder to shoulder and
deescalated the situation, it could have spiraled out of
control and demonstrates why we must remain ready to ``fight
tonight.''
To maintain this level of readiness, we will continue to
focus on sustaining, strengthening, and transforming the
alliance, with an emphasis on our combined readiness in four
critical areas. First, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] remains my top readiness challenge. CFC
[Combined Forces Command] USFK requires additional persistent
all-weather ISR capabilities, as well as dependable moving
target indicator support to maintain situational awareness and
provide adequate decision space.
Second, it is critical for the alliance to establish a
layered and interoperable ballistic missile defense. To advance
this goal in the near future, we will begin bilateral
consultations regarding the feasibility of deploying the THAAD
[Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] system to the Republic of
Korea, which would complement the Patriot system's
capabilities.
Third, we must maintain an adequate quantity of critical
munitions to ensure alliance supremacy in the early days of
conflict on the peninsula. This requirement is further
amplified by the approaching loss of cluster munitions due to
shelf-life expiration and the impending ban.
And, fourth, we must focus on command, control,
communications, computers, and intelligence, or C4I. Both the
United States and the Republic of Korea are investing in new
tactical equipment that will comprise a reliable C4I
architecture, but more is required.
In closing, I would like to express how proud I am of our
service members, our civilians, and their families serving in
the Republic of Korea, who never lose sight of the fact that
they are serving on freedom's frontier.
I would also like to recognize Ambassador Mark Lippert,
Admiral Harry Harris, and the U.S. and ROK senior leaders for
their enduring commitment to our mission.
I thank you and this committee for your support, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Scaparrotti can be found
in the Appendix on page 67.]
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Let me ask you each to address really a very basic
question, and that is, do you have the military forces required
to fulfill the missions you have been assigned?
And, Admiral Harris, you mentioned the freedom of
navigation operations, which have been underway. From what one
reads, they are pretty few and far between and don't seem to be
making much of a difference, because we also read that the
Chinese have put surface-to-air missiles on these new islands
they are constructing. So if you could address, broadly, in
your theater, do you have the military forces to carry out the
missions you are assigned, and then, more specifically, the
Chinese South China Sea issues that have arisen.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Happy to do that.
With regard to the first issue of do I have the forces
necessary to conduct our missions, today, I feel I do. I think
we are set up well in NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
2016. Thanks to the Congress for that. And in the budget
submission for fiscal year 2017, it meets the concerns that I
had in the past, the fiscal year 2017 budget addresses those
concerns. So I am comfortable with where we are today, but
today we are not at war, and I think that is an important
point.
There are concerns that I have, clearly. As General
Scaparrotti mentioned, there are concerns about munitions. My
submarine numbers--and I mentioned this yesterday during my
testimony--I don't have the submarines that I feel I need, but
that is a function of the total number of submarines that the
United States Navy has and the global demand for that platform.
More persistent intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance aircraft and systems, ISR, is a requirement, I
think, as well as cyber and getting after cyber.
I have testified in the past and have spoken in the past
about the need for a long-range anti-surface missile, a missile
that can out-stick, if you will, Chinese missile systems in the
Pacific and so on. And I am pleased that in the fiscal year
2017 budget, you know, there are funds put against development
of LRASM, the long-range anti-surface missile. Secretary Work
recently spoke about the work that has been done to improve the
SM-6 missile and give it an anti-surface and anti-ship
capability, which I think is dramatic, and that is exactly what
I need in the Pacific.
With regard to your question about China's actions, in my
opinion, China's intent to militarize the South China Sea is as
certain as a traffic jam in DC. It is no doubt in my mind what
their intent is. Their SSMs, their surface--their SAMs
[surface-to-air missiles], rather, their missiles on Woody
Island, their 10,000-foot runways that they are building in
Subi Reef and Fiery Cross Reef and elsewhere, their advanced
radars that we saw pictures of the last couple days at
Cuarteron Reef, these are all indications of militarization.
And, in my mind, they are changing the operational landscape of
the South China Sea.
The Chairman. And if you could address, sir, the freedom of
navigation operations. Do you have enough ships, and what kind
of ships would you say are most effective for those sorts of
operations?
Admiral Harris. Sure. So, on the freedom of navigation
operations, clearly, have enough ships to do that. The 7th
Fleet out there, homeported principally in Japan, has the
ships, the requisite ships to do freedom of navigation
operations.
The best kind of ship, in my opinion, to do that is the
DDG-51-class, Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, highly capable,
the right kind of weapons and the right kind of systems to
ensure that freedom of navigation operations are conducted well
and the ship is well able to defend itself should those
operations go awry.
Regarding the frequency of freedom of navigation operations
and their effect on China's militarization in the South China
Sea, freedom of navigation operations, the military part of
that, the freedom of navigation operation itself is only a part
of the broader policy approach to what China's doing. So I
think my part of that, the execution of the operation itself,
is one piece of it, and I think we are doing that, as I said,
and we will be doing more of it, as I have spoken before in
other venues. We will be doing them more, and we will be doing
them with greater complexity in the future. And as the
Secretary said, we will fly, sail, and operate wherever
international law allows. And then there is a policy piece to
it and a diplomatic piece and a political piece to it, and that
is for the whole-of-government effort on moving China and their
position in the South China Sea.
The Chairman. General, do you have the forces you need to
carry out the mission to which you have been assigned?
General Scaparrotti. Chairman, thank you for the question.
I would say that, first of all, for the forces on the
peninsula, I enjoy being financed or budgeted at the very top
of the priority list, so the forces are getting the funding to
do the exercises, the training, and assets that they need on
the peninsula to be ready to fight tonight, and I appreciate
the support of this committee in ensuring that we do have that
resourcing.
As I noted in my opening comments, there are areas of
concern. First is ISR. On the Korean Peninsula, we are facing a
foe that is a million strong, and it is literally 35 miles from
the capital and the--you know, half of their population, the
Korean population, 35 miles away with an adversary that uses a
cycle of provocation. So, typically, I think I have about 12
hours or less warning, and persistent ISRs allows me to have
that indication and warning and to set my posture to first
defend South Korea and the large American citizen population
that we have there as well. So ISR is something that is at the
top of my list.
I mentioned ballistic missile defense. You are well aware
of the large arsenal that North Korea has in ballistic missiles
that are--that is growing in strength but also in accuracy. I
think that the discussions we are having right now to add THAAD
to Korea are very important. We need THAAD there to have a
layered defense. I need more munitions so that I have the first
30 days of munitions for the fight in terms of interceptors,
and I rely on the quick deployment of at least two more
battalions of Patriot as well if we go to crisis. So, you know,
the assets of BMD [ballistic missile defense] there, the more
that I have there, the better protected we are.
And I think those are the primary of those four that I
would mention shortly here, and I can go into more detail
later.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I appreciate you both being here.
I wonder if you could expand a little bit more on the South
China Sea issues, obviously the militarization there, China's
consolidation of its claims and rejection of internationally
accepted methods of dispute. So how might we best mitigate the
risk of miscalculation leading to increased tensions or even
conflict in the area?
Admiral Harris. Well, I think, ma'am, that, short of
military confrontation, which we all want to avoid, I think the
way forward, the best way to go forward is to present and
maintain our credible military power and to maintain our
network of like-minded allies, partners, and friends in the
region and encourage them to operate in the South China Sea.
And we must continue to operate in the South China Sea to
demonstrate that that water space--and the air above it--is
international and not the territory of any nation.
I think the diplomacy, obviously, is probably the most
important thing. We need to encourage China to act as a
responsible actor on the international space when it comes to
things like the South China Sea. Secretary Kerry recently said
at Sunnylands that we have only one policy with regard to the
South China Sea, and that is a negotiated settlement, that is
to negotiate and work with China, and that is kind of where I
am on that.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Admiral.
And, perhaps, General Scaparrotti, with your hat as well,
how do we better complement, then, our efforts? Certainly you
are speaking to the defense lane very appropriately here today,
but I am wondering about other Federal agencies and working
with them in diplomatic, economic, and certainly assistance
efforts in that kind of holistic way. What are we doing? Which
could we be doing more? Where are the gaps?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think, you know, we know from
experience that a holistic approach is always the most
effective, and so I think, including Treasury, many of the
other agencies here, including them in all that we do, we on--
in USFK as a subcomponent command, we also have close
connection to all those agencies that work with PACOM, and they
are regularly a part of our planning, our exercises, in fact,
the one we will do this next month. And I think that type of
close collaboration with all the agencies in our government,
bringing them into the planning, the exercises that we do,
gives them good awareness. And then, you know, as things happen
in the theater, we have a relationship, we have an
understanding, and we can work and collaborate much more
quickly.
Mrs. Davis. And do you see a greater role for Congress in
this as well, since we tend to stay in our lane also?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I do. And I appreciate the fact
that many Members of Congress come out to see us. Particularly,
I know it is a long trip to Korea, but I think Korea is a place
that is complex, and until you have stood on the DMZ
[Demilitarized Zone], then just that picture alone is quite
informative, and I appreciate the fact that so many make the
trip and have the conversation and discussion with us.
Mrs. Davis. Yeah. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Admiral, General, thank you so much for your service.
I want to thank you, the service members, military families.
What a commitment of protecting American families, also
protecting our great allies.
And, Admiral Harris, I am particularly grateful that I have
had the opportunity to visit with you in the past. And, to me,
you are a living example of America's alliance with Japan. It
is just, to me, so historic and inspiring to know that we have
a Japanese-American as the U.S. Pacific commander at Pearl
Harbor. How far we have come. And just being in your presence
has just been so positive and has to be reassuring to the
people all over Asia.
Also, I am very grateful that my family has had an
association with Asia. My dad served in the Flying Tigers
during World War II, and I grew up hearing from him a great
affection for the people of China and the people of India. And
so I am hopeful that indeed positive can continue to advance,
but with that in mind, Admiral, I appreciate your interest in
maintaining our technological superiority, and later today,
there will be a subcommittee hearing of the Emerging Threats
and Capabilities Subcommittee on the Department of Defense
science and technology programs. These issues continue to be of
crucial importance to this committee, particularly the
chairman, and this is key to our warfighters' future success.
Could you please describe what do you see as the right
balance between investing in future capabilities, like the
third offset strategy, and getting the commander what he needs
now? How has the fiscal year 2017 budget request prioritized
the modernization affecting your command?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, sir, for those questions. I will
just start by talking about General Stilwell for just a second.
There is an article in today's clips about how the Chinese are
honoring General Stilwell in Chongqing in China at a museum
that is run by the government there, and the relationship that
he formed and his feelings for the Chinese. So I think that is
an appropriate way to start this off. Thank you for that.
Mr. Wilson. Absolutely.
Admiral Harris. With regard to the fiscal year 2017
request, it has, I think, a good mix in it of funding for what
we need today and funding for technological innovations, such
as the third offset. Recently, Secretary Work talked about the
SCO office, the Special Capabilities Office, and the work that
they are doing. And this is important stuff as we seek to not
only modernize our force but also to maintain the force we
have.
And so, you know, as a combatant commander, I don't have
the luxury of waiting 5 years for the next great thing that is
going to come down the pike, because I have to be ready to
fight tonight, and that is the stance that we take in the
Pacific most--epitomized by General Scaparrotti and the
challenge he has on the peninsula. So, you know, I can't say to
you all: Hey, just give me a 5-year break here while we wait
for the next technology thing to come down the road. So I need
to have a modernized, capable military today, but I recognize
as a uniformed officer that we have to modernize, and so that
is the challenge, I think, for the service chiefs.
You know, I talked yesterday about how much easier it is to
be an insatiable combatant commander than it is to be a service
chief in 2016, but as a nation, we have an insatiable need for
security, and rightfully so. And so, you know, it comes to the
point, I guess, in the forward forces.
So I am pleased with how my input to the Secretary was
upheld in the fiscal year 2017 budget, and I am pleased that
that budget not only ensures that I have a modern, capable
force to fight today but that the needs that I have identified,
the shortfalls that we talked about in the last question, are
being addressed.
Mr. Wilson. And we look forward to your input.
And, General Scaparrotti, China and North Korea's increased
utilization of hybrid warfare, are we prepared for cyber
warfare potential on the Korean Peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. Sir, it is one of my concerns, given
that North Korea has made a deliberate effort to improve their
capabilities as much as they can. Kim Jong-un has stated that.
And, as you know, he has demonstrated their capability with
Sony and the attack on South Korea's media and banking
industries in 2013. So I am very concerned about it.
I would answer your question and say, yes, I believe we are
prepared today on our--you know, defense of our military
systems and within the cyber domain, but it is a rapidly
developing domain and area that we have to stay on it every
day. We specifically have been working on our joint cyber
center. I recently have been added a cyber mission team
specifically for Korea, and that is building now. That is a
great addition to our capability.
I would mention to you that I also have another concern,
and that is that I am within an alliance, the ROK's capability
and ours, so we are collaborating with their joint cyber center
as well to make sure that we don't have a vulnerability because
of our combined systems, et cetera, and that is work that we
need to continue to do.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks, gentlemen, for making it out.
You know, on the West Coast, it is not that far to go to
Korea, so maybe, from here, it is, but it is not that far from
home.
So we get a lot of questions about when North Korea does
things and when China does things. First, for Admiral Harris, a
couple reports have come out recently, one looking at the
rebalance strategy and what can be done to improve that and
enhance that. One suggestion--this is out of CSIS [Center for
Strategic and International Studies]--one suggestion was a
western Pacific joint task force, and I was wondering what your
opinions about that are. And in the answer, if you could relate
that to building partnership capabilities and whether or not,
much like we do with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization],
there is a NATO commitment of a 2 percent of GDP [gross
domestic product], but we can do that in a formal structure, if
there is a value of informal commitments from our friends and
allies in the region to invest in their capabilities to support
regional objectives.
And then I have got a question for the general after that.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. Good to see you.
Mr. Larsen. Good to see you.
Admiral Harris. On the CSIS study, I have read it, they had
a number of interesting recommendations in there. I had a
meeting with the CSIS leadership and spoke to them in my last
trip to Washington.
On the idea of a maritime task force for the western
Pacific, we have one, and it is called PACOM. And if there is
some smaller entity of that, we have that also, and it is
called the 7th Fleet. So I am very comfortable with the command
and control structure and the forces as they are arrayed under
PACOM. So there is a commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, which
is a JTF [Joint Task Force]-certified, large combatant level
staff headed up by a four-star that can carry out any operation
that I need; the same with U.S. Army Pacific, General Brooks,
four-star Army general, huge land forces under his command that
can do that, if necessary. And then, in the far Pacific, in the
Far East, you know, there is the U.S. 7th Fleet and all of its
capability, there is the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and all
of its capability. So I think that we have in existence today
the thing that CSIS recommended by another name. So I am
comfortable with that, but I appreciate the insights that I got
from their study.
Regarding partner capabilities, we could not do what we
need to do alone, and we have great allies and partners in the
region. I will start with Japan and its capability: a very
powerful military, a tremendous maritime self-defense force, a
great submarine force, a very capable land force, and a very
strong air force in Japan. And on the other end of the globe
down there is Australia, a partner and ally who has been with
the United States, fought with us in virtually every conflict
in the 20th century, and certainly into the 21st century. They
are--they have a highly specialized, highly trained, very
capable military that are completely aligned in terms of
equipment and training and that with the United States. So, as
I mentioned in my opening statement, I rely heavily on
Australia, not only for their operational capability but for
their warfighting experience and advice.
I think we will not see anything resembling NATO----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. In the Pacific. It is--each
country there is so different--and they face different levels
of threat; they have different levels of relationships with
other countries--that I don't think we will get this large,
broad multilateral alliance like NATO. But the good news is we
have strong alliances with five nations in the Pacific. We have
strong partnerships with a whole lot more. And we are working
hard, working strongly on improving trilateral cooperation
between the U.S., Japan, and Korea; between the U.S., Japan,
and Australia; and the U.S., Japan, and India.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Yeah. I just have very few seconds left
for--thank you.
General, just quickly, would the ROKs be prepared today for
THAAD if there was an agreement today to deploy THAAD to the
Republic of Korea, and if not, what does that timeline look
like?
General Scaparrotti. Representative, we will have a--we are
forming a joint working group that I think will have its first
meeting probably within a week. I think we will have that
settled. THAAD is a complex system. It is going to take some
time for us to find the right location, because where you
locate it makes a difference of how effective it is. So we have
got to find the right location and do that work, which we will
do in accordance with our SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement]. I
am confident that that process will go well, but at this point,
it is hard--it is difficult for me to tell you what the
timeline looks like, but I should be able to do that, you know,
and relatively soon.
The Chairman. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Scaparrotti, I wanted to follow up on that area.
Given Kim Jong-un's erratic behavior and recent nuclear tests
and ballistic missile tests, what capabilities do you need to
make sure you can maintain the security of your forces as well
as the ROK?
General Scaparrotti. As I said, the most important to me is
ISR, because it allows me to be in the proper posture to be
able to get ahead of whatever it is he intends to do. And on
the Korean Peninsula, I have got a very large conventional
force in very close proximity to Seoul. That is one problem
set. And then I have their asymmetric problem set, which is
primarily their nuclear; their missile; their SOF [special
operations] forces, the largest SOF forces in the world, 60,000
strong; long-range artillery capability; and their cyber. Many
of those are deeper into the country, so it is a very difficult
ISR challenge, probably one of the toughest in the world, given
the terrain, mountainous.
Mr. Rogers. Are your current ISR capabilities adequate?
General Scaparrotti. I need more persistence, sir. That
would be very, very helpful. So that is the one I come up. And
then the other four in particular that I mentioned earlier are
the ones that I most need.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
Admiral Harris, can you please explain the advantages of
ensuring that U.S. Patriot battalions have modular capability?
Admiral Harris. Sure. Clearly, Congressman, because of the
mobility associated with that and the fact that I can move the
Patriots around with some degree of flexibility. So in the
Pacific, Patriot is a key part of our ballistic missile
defense, as is THAAD. So we have a THAAD battery in Guam that
is there on a temporary basis now, expected to go to a
permanent status, PCS [permanent change of station] status, if
you will, later this year, and then, as General Scaparrotti
mentioned, as we work with the Koreans to consult on putting
THAAD in Korea as well. Then the other part of that, of course,
is Aegis, so----
Mr. Rogers. Speaking about Aegis, my understanding is the
discussion was to take the Aegis Ashore site there in Hawaii
and activate it instead of just being a training facility. Now
I hear there is discussion of closing it down. What is going on
with----
Admiral Harris. Well, that--so I talked about my desire to
keep it as a permanent facility, because it has demonstrated a
great capability. Now, it was built as a training facility and
testing facility for the Aegis Ashore sites in Europe, but I
think we should study it. I think we should take a hard look at
it and whether we want to make it a permanent facility or not,
but there is a lot between now and then.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Admiral Harris. This is just an idea now, but the Aegis
Ashore in Hawaii, for example, has no interceptors, right. I
mean, it--so----
Mr. Rogers. Right. We would have to put them in. I agree.
Admiral Harris. So there is a lot there, but I think it is
worthy of study, and that is kind of where we are now. So we
are a long way from making a decision either way right now.
Mr. Rogers. Great. As I read the President's budget, there
are four Baseline 9 destroyers that we are losing. Were any of
those going to PACOM, and if so, what is the effect of losing
those destroyers?
Admiral Harris. I will be honest with you, I am not
familiar with that number, but we are getting new Baseline 9
destroyers in Japan now; we are setting out there in part of
the overseas homeporting program. So, in the Pacific, I am
comfortable with where we are with regard to that capability,
and that is a tremendous capability. I mean, that ties
together----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. The E-2D and the Aegis system
for this thing we call cooperative engagement.
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Admiral Harris. So I am pleased with that.
Mr. Rogers. What is the benefit of having an Aegis Ashore
site in Japan for the U.S. and for Japan?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I don't know that there is a benefit
to it. You know, we have--Japan has Patriot batteries, and that
is--they are very capable. We have the TPY-2 radar systems at
Shariki and Kasumigaseki, and those are helpful. I think there
is a study in place to look at whether an Aegis Ashore site has
utility in Japan, but it is premature for me to make that
statement now.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah. My understanding was it would free up our
Aegis ships in the Asian Pacific. Is that not----
Admiral Harris. That could be, I mean, certainly.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to remind my colleagues that my home is next
door to North Korea, when we talk about distances.
So, Admiral and General, thank you for your testimony and
for your service and leadership.
Mr. Wittman and I were just out in your region a day ago,
and I appreciated the opportunity to get updates on the
progress we are making in realigning forces and trying to
posture our force to respond to the environment in the region.
One of the things that people become aware of when traveling in
the region is the tyranny of distance. This is never more
evident than when it comes to making sure we maintain a forward
and deployed fleet.
And, Admiral, you noted the need for more submarines as a
top priority yesterday. To support this, I believe it is
critical that we maintain robust ship repair and dry-dock
capabilities, including at a nuclear capable level, in the
western Pacific.
Now, you wrote a letter to the Guam Economic Authority
stating, and I quote: ``The Navy has consistently stated a
robust ship repair capability in Guam as a matter of strategic
importance and remains an operational priority for the Pacific
Fleet.''
Do you continue to share this view, Admiral?
Admiral Harris. I do, Congresswoman.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral, in your testimony before the SASC
[Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, the Japan press
picked up on a 2-year delay in IOC [initial operational
capability] for the Futenma Replacement Facility, and I believe
this delay is due to legal challenges after the election of
Governor Onaga. I just want the people of Guam to be clear
about whether this delay in Okinawa would impact Guam. And, as
you know, the 2012 2+2 statement delays progress on Futenma
from progress on Guam. Moreover, Chairman Wittman noted in his
recent visit to Guam that we were light years ahead of where
progress stood several years ago. So I would note that we have
made great progress. So can you comment on this progress on
Guam in the coming years and the importance of the investments
in military construction for Guam in this year's budget? And
how does that help you as PACOM commander address the changing
nature of threats in the Asia-Pacific region?
Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am. I believe that Guam is a
strategic bastion for the United States. The capabilities that
are there and its location demand that we consider it a
strategic bastion, and so, you know, we have put our fourth SSN
there, nuclear submarine there, and we have brought in our
second submarine tender there. So that is very exciting and I
think the right level of emphasis on our submarine force in the
western Pacific.
With regard to Futenma, I will defer to the Marine Corps on
where they stand on the linkages between the Futenma
Replacement Facility and the exodus of that group of marines
from Okinawa to both Guam and Hawaii, but clearly the plan as
conceived was, you know, we would move marines from Futenma to
Camp Schwab-Henoko and then subsequently move a group of
marines, 8,000 or so, from Okinawa to Hawaii and Guam, Guam and
Hawaii in that order, but whether we are going to link that now
or not, given that there is a delay in the movement of forces
from Futenma to Schwab, I will have to defer to the Marine
Corps on that.
Ms. Bordallo. I just want to be clear as to whether Guam
would be affected in----
Admiral Harris. It would only be affected perhaps in terms
of timing, but the intent to move marines to Guam remains as
strong as ever. That intent is there, and the resources we are
putting into Guam and in the Commonwealth of Northern Marianas,
that is proceeding apace.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for your service and thank you
for the great job that you are doing in the Asia-Pacific. As
Ms. Bordallo said, we had a great trip there.
Admiral Harris, I want to ask your perspective. As we got
the laydown on the situation there in the Asia-Pacific, one of
the things that was really compelling to me was the effort by
the Chinese in the South China Sea. As you pointed out, their
efforts there on Woody Island and the Paracels is something
that is done. There is nothing that we can do to necessarily
reverse that. The place, though, where I do believe we can have
an impact is in the Spratly Islands. As you know, over 3,000
acres of reclamation there, those places are set up
specifically, I believe, for them to militarize those areas.
As you spoke in your opening testimony, you talked about
submarines as one of the elements that you have as a critical
part of force structure. There is also a suggestion of a second
aircraft carrier. In looking at what we can do to deter or
prevent further militarization of the South China Sea, give me
your perspective on the priority that you would need as far as
naval assets, and I am asking you submarines versus the second
aircraft carrier. Give me what your priorities would be in that
situation.
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Congressman.
My priority, given the way you framed the question, is
clearly submarines. Submarines are the original stealth
platform. They clearly give us an asymmetric advantage. Our
asymmetry in terms of warfare, because of submarines, is
significant. And, you know, in the modernizing sense, we need
to maintain that asymmetric advantage.
The second aircraft carrier, you know, I am a combatant
commander, and I want more, and I want it now, right? The more
I can get it, the faster I can get it, the happier I am.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
Admiral Harris. But I think there are fiscal, diplomatic,
and political hurdles--significant ones--to overcome before we
would put a second carrier strike group in the western Pacific,
you know, when you talk about an air wing, where would you put
it, where would you train them, the 10,000 sailors, their
families, the housing, the schools, the hospitals, the whole
thing. But there are other things that we could do, in my
opinion, that would improve our capability in the western
Pacific and have an effect. We could consider putting another
SSN [attack] submarine out there. We could put additional
destroyers forward. We could put maybe the new destroyer, the
DDG-1000s, move them forward. So there are a lot of things we
could do short of putting a full carrier strike group in the
western Pacific.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. And you believe that is the most
effective way that we could deter further militarization there
in the Spratlys?
Admiral Harris. I think that is a big part of it----
Mr. Wittman. Good.
Admiral Harris [continuing]. Yes.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, Admiral Harris.
General Scaparrotti, I appreciate your time when we were
there visiting at U.S. Forces-Korea and the great job you are
doing there.
One of the questions I wanted to ask is, as you look at
your needs--and, as you have pointed out, the threat, ISR, a
critical portion of that to make sure you can look at what
potentially is happening to the north. Another element, though,
that is important is, if you do need to act, is to make sure
that you have not only the information and people, the manning,
but also the hardware.
Give me your perspective on where you are right now as far
as munitions stores and whether they are adequate for what you
look at as the potential scenarios there with North Korea.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you, sir, for the question. As
you know--I will first describe the conflict on the Korean
Peninsula, because while we have seen provocation, if we went
to conflict in the Korean Peninsula, given the size of the
forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to
the Korean War and World War II: very complex, probably high
casualty. And because of that, first of all, it is just going
to be a situation where I want to be ahead of that and be able
to deter the aggressor. So my need is particularly to have the
forces, the ballistic missile defense forces, et cetera, so
that when I pick up the indication and warning, I can establish
my defense, protect South Korea, our forces, and our population
there immediately.
I think I have a good force for doing that today in the
peninsula, but I also rely on PACOM for immediate forces to
respond: for example, the air forces stationed in Japan and
throughout the PACOM theater; ISR to be responsive; the Marine
force and MEF [Marine Expeditionary Force] to be responsive.
And we keep a package--``we'' being PACOM commander, his force,
his subordinate commands, and myself--that we know the
readiness of those forces on any given day and any given hour
that I need immediately, and we track those, and that is very
important to my ability to respond and defend Korea.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
General, I have had a request from the recording people, if
you would make sure the microphone is right in front of your
face, then it seems to work better. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to both witnesses for your leadership and
your testimony this morning.
Admiral, on page 5 of your testimony, you pretty much laid
out what is sort of the guideposts for the sovereignty claims
issues, which we have discussed this morning with the island
building, and basically, it says, we encourage all countries to
uphold international laws reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention. Should the United States ratify UNCLOS [United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea], the Law of the Sea
treaty?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, sir, for the question. Before I
answer, I want to just say that I have spent a lot of time
talking to proponents and opponents of UNCLOS in the last 3 or
4 months, and I appreciate the time I have spent with those
experts, and I understand their arguments. And I understand
those arguments for those folks who are opposed to UNCLOS, but
I am a proponent of it. And I think, in the 21st century, our
moral standing is affected by the fact that we are not a
signatory to UNCLOS. I think there are some economic
disadvantages as well. We could get into a discussion about the
Russian stuff in the Arctic and how they are using UNCLOS to
their advantage, and we are unable to because we are not a
signatory to it.
So, you know, I will tell the members of this committee and
anyone else that for me, personally, my opinion is the United
States should accede to UNCLOS.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And, again, when we discussed this
at PACOM earlier, or last fall, that was before the Hague
Convention ruled against the United States request to be part
of the--just as an observer on the Philippines claim on the
Spratly Islands, which Mr. Wittman referred to earlier. I mean,
it is kind of unbelievable we are allowing sort of litigation
to proceed that the consequences in terms of military strategy
and resources of this country in the Asia-Pacific could hinge
on the outcome of that claim, and we are completely shut out
because of an unforced error. I mean, we have done this to
ourselves. And so, you know, thank you for your frankness this
morning. Myself and Congressman Don Young are going to
introduce a bipartisan resolution in the House, again, citing
events in the South China Sea as why we really need to take a
fresh look at the Law of the Sea treaty. And, as a nation, we
need to move forward and get in the game in terms of, you know,
these critical issues, because it is going to determine the
course of maritime policy and military policy and budgets for
decades to come. So thank you, again, for that input.
Earlier you mentioned the fact that we have a shortage of
submarines in the Asia-Pacific. Again, today, we are operating
with an attack sub fleet of about 52. Even with the two-a-year
build rate that we started in 2011, that is going to continue
to drop to, at this point, based on the shipbuilding plan that
was submitted last week, to 41. Can you talk about what that
will do to future commands in terms of the challenges that you
are already facing with a larger fleet size?
Admiral Harris. Sure. So PACOM suffers a shortage of
submarines today. My requirements are not being met, as are not
the requirements of other COCOMs [combatant commands] as well.
So we have a submarine force of about 52 attack submarines, and
all the COCOMs need them for all their reasons. And when you
add up all their requirements, it exceeds the ability of the
Navy to provide submarines forward, when you consider a lot of
those are in maintenance and a lot of other things.
I worry that we are going to go down to 41, because as we
go down to the low 40s, China is going to increase their
submarine force, even as they are today. And then Russia, which
has the most capable submarine force in the world next to ours,
they are moving their latest generation SSBNs, the ballistic
missile submarines, to the Pacific. So the Dolgorukiy-class
SSBNs got there at the end of last year, and that is just the
beginning. And then China, meanwhile, has their Jin, J-I-N,
Jin-class SSBNs that they are bringing online, and we are
seeing them now.
I feel that I must be able to keep those submarines at
risk, and I am able to do so today, but as we go down in
numbers, then that becomes a concern to me.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Thank you. And we have actually an
opportunity on Seapower [Subcommittee] to look at the next
block contract, because, frankly, there is a dip in that, and
we should do everything we can to avoid that, because that will
at least bring the number up somewhat and mitigate, you know,
what you just described.
As long as I have 10 seconds left and people are boasting
about proximity to Asia-Pacific, if an attack submarine leaves
Groton, Connecticut, and goes under the ice, it can actually
get there ahead of the folks from Washington State.
And, with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Larsen. Thank God for Connecticut.
The Chairman. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, General Scaparrotti and Admiral Harris, for
being here--all your entourage--for your commitment to
protecting us all. We appreciate it. Sometimes you don't get
told that enough.
Admiral Harris, I guess I will start out with a really easy
question: Are you aware of any collusion between Iran and North
Korea with regards to North Korea's intermittent but ongoing
nuclear and missile tests?
Admiral Harris. Sir, I am not aware of collusion directly.
But we know that there is a relationship between North Korea
and Iran, but I am not privy to the details of the nuclear
collusion, if you will.
Mr. Franks. General Scaparrotti, that is your perspective
as well?
General Scaparrotti. That is mine as well, yes, sir.
Mr. Franks. Admiral, your colleague here, General
Scaparrotti, called BMD one of USKF's four critical needs and
is certainly--that is--but given the unpredictable and
belligerent nature of the North Korean regime combined with
their steadily increasing ballistic missile technology, how
important do you believe this layered missile defense system
that we have is in deterring North Korea?
And in light of some of the recent events that I think are
pretty serious, can you describe if you think that there are
currently enough defense assets in your command to deter or
defeat a North Korean ballistic missile attack?
Admiral Harris. Well, first, I will talk about the
criticality of a layered defense. It is absolutely critical.
You know, we have 28,000 American troops on the Korean
Peninsula. We have their families. We have several hundred
thousand Americans who live and work in South Korea, and the
North Korean capability is growing. And they threaten not only
our fellow citizens and our allies in Korea; they threaten
Japan, they threaten Hawaii, the West Coast in the mainland of
the United States, and then potentially the East Coast.
They are on a quest to miniaturize their nuclear weapons
and the means to deliver them intercontinentally, and they pose
a very real threat to the United States. So I think the layered
defense is the only answer to go after the missiles once
launched. That means THAAD--and I am glad we are engaged in
consultations with Korea on putting a THAAD battery there--
Patriot, Aegis, the whole thing.
Mr. Franks. Well, how has the fiscal year 2017 budget
request, prioritization of modernization, affected your
commands? I mean, do you currently have the assets you need to
fight tonight while currently modernizing?
Admiral Harris. I am pleased with the fiscal year 2017
budget. I was asked to make comments about it up my chain, and
my concerns were addressed, and principally those concerns were
in anti-surface weapons and anti-surface ship missiles and in
advanced fighter aircraft for the PACOM theater.
Mr. Franks. All right. I guess, let me put it this way, and
I will address the question to both of you: If there is
anything that you feel like that if you had the option that you
could increase in terms of your capability, meaning particular
area, what would that be?
Admiral Harris. In my case, sir, I would ask for more Joint
Strike Fighters, more fifth-generation aircraft to go after the
A2/AD [anti-access/area denial] threat that we face in the
Pacific.
Mr. Franks. General Scaparrotti.
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would say, one, high-altitude
multi-INT [intelligence] intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets; and I would go back to the ballistic
missile defense assets: for instance, Patriot. It would be
ideal to have more Patriot than I have now as opposed to
relying on the additional Patriot at crisis. But the fact of
the matter is, is that our missile defense forces are
stretched. There is great demand around the globe of that for
similar kinds of threats; THAAD, for instance, same.
So, you know, if I were to tell you what more could I use
and we had the budget to do it, I think those would be my top
two right there.
Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am going to do something
crazy; I am going to yield back my last 18 seconds.
And thank you, all, very much.
The Chairman. Chair appreciates that.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to our witnesses for being here.
I too just returned from Japan. I was part of a
congressional delegation that spent 3 days in Tokyo and 2 days
in Okinawa. And I had spent years there--many years ago, I was
a high school student there.
And as I hadn't been back in the interim, I really was
struck by the tremendous changes in that country but also in
the relationship we have developed with Japan. Because at the
time I lived there, it was really not too long after World War
II, and there was certainly an effort to constrain Japan
militarily and, yet, to reassure it about its being protected.
So, as we have moved forward, we are in a very different
environment. And I appreciate the rationale for it, as things
have really changed in that part of the--in the Asia-Pacific
area.
And, Admiral, you referenced the peace and security
legislation that Japan just passed that really authorizes it to
engage in a more expansive way in regional security efforts.
And one of the questions I had there and posed there was, is
money following that? As Japan is sort of--as the ties are
being loosened on what it can do and cannot do militarily, is
funding following that effort so that they absorb a little more
of the financial responsibility for protecting that part of the
world?
Admiral Harris. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I believe it is, but I don't know that for a fact. I know
that the government and the Prime Minister have said that
funding will follow, that they are going to fund their
aspirations to improve their military and their capability. But
I will also add that the primary costs of our U.S. forces in
Japan are paid for by Japan.
Ms. Tsongas. Yes. And what is that amount? I know we were
given a figure over there. Do you know off the top of your
head?
Admiral Harris. No, ma'am, but I will find out before the
closed hearing.
Ms. Tsongas. I would welcome that.
Admiral Harris. It is in the hundreds of billions of
dollars, but I will find that out and get back to you on that.
[The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you for that.
And the other issue that came up too was sort of
encouraging jointness between Japan's security forces and our
forces as we are seeking ways to work together. And I am
wondering how you are thinking that through and encouraging
that.
Admiral Harris. And encouraging----
Ms. Tsongas. Jointness, more joint operations between our
forces and theirs.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. So everything we are doing is joint
these days in the U.S. side. And I think the other countries
are observing that and learning from that.
So, last fall, we had an SLS, a senior leader seminar, with
the Japan Joint Staff, which is their joint headquarters in
Tokyo. And we went through some of our war planning and some of
our efforts in that arena. So I think Japan recognizes that
they need to be more joint within their military than they are,
and they are working with us closely to improve their
jointness.
So I was honored last week to travel to Japan, and I spoke
at the 10th anniversary of the Japan Joint Staff. And I have
been associated with Japan, their military, for most of my
career, and they are far and away further along in jointness
today than they have been. That is not to say that they don't
have a ways to go.
And I think that the jointness between their air force and
their navy, for example, should be improved, and I think they
recognize that. They are moving toward a greater amphibious
capability, and that forces a level of cooperation between
their ground self-defense force and their maritime self-defense
force.
So I am very optimistic about where Japan is going in terms
of jointness and their ability to work with us in a joint
manner across our services.
Ms. Tsongas. And that is what I was getting at, was they
are working us with as much as they are within the different
branches of their services.
Admiral Harris. That is right.
Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.
I too will yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. We are on a roll here.
Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here. It is an honor to have
you before our committee. Certainly, I have spent plenty of
time in the Pacific as a Navy pilot myself, now serving in the
Oklahoma Air National Guard.
General Scaparrotti, I wanted to ask you or actually share
with you one of my big concerns I have heard from one of my
constituents. I want to make you aware of a recent Army
regulation change regarding dining facility use for
rotationally deployed forces under your command. Effective
February 15, 2016, the Army declared essential unit messing for
rotationally deployed soldiers serving in the Pacific. In other
words, all soldiers deployed temporary duty to Korea must use
the dining facility, the DFAC.
This policy will literally take money out of soldiers'
pockets, hundreds of dollars per month, in two ways: First, the
Army will charge for meals at the DFAC through automatic
payroll deductions. That is automatic payroll deductions. These
deductions will occur whether or not a soldier actually uses
the DFAC. And, as you are aware, when you do missions in these
areas, those missions happen during breakfast, happen during
lunch, and you are not able to use the DFAC. So soldiers will
have money deducted, even though they are not using the DFAC.
Second, the Army is also taking away their daily food
allowance, known as the government meal rate. I have a
constituent in the 10th Combat Aviation Brigade currently at
Camp Humphreys. The Army's bureaucratic jiggery-pokery will
reduce his paycheck over $700 per month through the automatic
DFAC deduction and stopping meal allowances. I want to repeat
that: $700 per month. These soldiers are not going to Korea for
a week or even a month; they are going for 9 months. And so
when you lose $700 a month, that ends up being a good chunk of
money.
In contrast, a soldier at Camp Humphreys, under the
permanent change of station orders, is apparently exempt from
the automatic meal deduction. Aviation units, such as the 10th
CAB [Combat Aviation Brigade], don't plan training or missions
around the whims of the DFAC, as I have already talked about.
That is why the food allowance exists in the first place. That
is why it was there.
And I would like to show you some pictures here of what is
going on at the DFAC in Korea. There are a couple of pictures.
Can we just slide through a few more?
[The slides referred to were not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bridenstine. So these soldiers, they are having their
money automatically withheld, and then they are being forced to
wait in an hour line in order to go through the DFAC. Some of
them can't go through the DFAC at all because of missions. When
they do go, they are waiting an hour, and that is three times a
day. That is 3 hours a day where they are being delayed. Again,
this happens three times a day.
I just want to get a commitment from you, General, that you
will do something for our soldiers, who are flying, in many
cases, high-risk--and these are steady-state missions. This
isn't like a surprise. This isn't something that just came up.
These are steady-state missions at the DMZ. And, number one, I
want to make sure they get their meals. I want to make sure
that they are not waiting in line for 3 hours three times a
day. And I want to make sure that they are not having their
money taken away. Can you commit to me that you will look into
this?
General Scaparrotti. Absolutely. And I will come back to
you personally on it. We have got not only the CAB that you
mentioned, but, you know, we have other rotational units,
obviously, as a part of our readiness that rotate regularly on
9-month rotations. They are probably affected as well.
[The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
And, Mr. Chairman, before I yield back, I just want to note
that I want to introduce legislation to make sure that this is
taken care of. Thank you.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Takai.
Mr. Takai. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Admiral Harris, General Scaparrotti, for
being here.
Admiral Harris, again, regarding the Aegis Ashore
facility--or the hope for a facility--North Korea's nuclear
test in January underscores the concern that we have, that
North Korea may develop the ability to place a bomb on a long-
range ballistic missile that could reach the U.S. West Coast. I
referred to public comments you made that converting the Aegis
missile defense test site in Hawaii into a combat-ready
facility is a good idea to help protect the U.S. mainland.
Since we have assets on Kauai, why not use them? How would
this permanent land version add to U.S. defense needs? And what
would it take to integrate the site into a larger U.S.
ballistic missile defense system?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, Congressman. Good to see you again.
I believe that we need to do everything we can to defend
our Nation, and that is my job in the Pacific. I think the
Aegis Ashore facility in Kauai is a national treasure, and we
should use it to the best of our ability. And I think one of
the ways that we could improve our national ballistic missile
defense capability is by converting that to a permanent
facility with interceptors. It seems reasonable to me, but it
demands further study. It demands a lot of study.
I think, at the end of the day, we will learn that what it
will do, it would be able to defend Hawaii, and other systems
we have would defend the continental United States. But that is
good. I am good with that. And that is what I have recommended,
that we begin the study to see if it is feasible and what it
would take to do it.
There is not only the technical aspects of the
architecture, the ballistic missile defense architecture; there
is a political dynamic, as you well know, and the whole piece
would increase in footprint in Hawaii and all that. So it is a
whole effort that needs to be looked at. But I am advocating it
because I think we need to do it.
I noted that after I made that statement, that China
objected, just as they have objected to the consultations we
have with Korea to put THAAD in Korea. And I find it
preposterous that China would insert itself in negotiations
between us and our Korean ally on how best to defend our Korean
ally and our Americans there, and they would interject
themselves in our internal discussions of whether we should
improve our ability to defend our own homeland.
Mr. Takai. Thank you.
Actually, just a few days ago, China's Foreign Ministry
spokeswoman compared the United States military infrastructure
in Hawaii to China's land reclamation and strategic placement
of missiles on disputed territory in the South China Seas. Can
you just tell us your perspective on whether Hawaii should be
and could be compared to the disputed territory in the South
China Seas?
Admiral Harris. Yeah. That statement that the Chinese
spokesman made almost doesn't merit comment. I mean, it is
ridiculous, and to me, it is indicative of the spokesperson's
tone deafness.
Mr. Takai. I agree.
In regards to the status of the rebalance, if U.S. defense
spending remains limited to the cap set forth in the Budget
Control Act of 2011, as amended, the so-called sequester
levels, how might this impact the plans for bolstering U.S.
force posture and presence in the Asia-Pacific region? And what
might be the implications of maintaining deterrence and for
operational risk in a potential combat situation?
Admiral Harris. As I have testified before, certainly at my
confirmation hearing, that I think that if we return to
sequester levels for the duration of the law, out to the early
2020s, it will harm our ability dramatically, our ability to
defend our Nation. I think all that would be affected. And we
are going through that now as we look at downsizing the Army,
and should we do that? Where should those forces come from that
would be part of the downsizing and everything?
So I have testified before that I think a continued
sequester would hurt us significantly in our military
readiness, and I stand by that.
Mr. Takai. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Byrne.
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today.
Admiral Harris, let me ask you some questions about the
littoral combat ship [LCS] program. You have stated that the
littoral combat ship was a vital capability for you to engage
through the PACOM area of operation. You note the LCS was
needed to do missions not suited for DDGs, destroyers. How
beneficial is having such a capability in your AOR [area of
responsibility] to patrol waters not easily navigated by larger
platforms?
Admiral Harris. Well, thanks for the question, sir. Just by
definition, I mean, the littoral combat ship is designed to
operate in shallower waters than our destroyers and cruisers. I
think in where we are now in phase zero, the LCS is a terrific
platform to work with our allies and partners in the region.
I think that there is work, though, that could be done to
the LCS to make the ``C'' more ``C,'' the combat part of
littoral combat ship. And I am pleased, through the Senate and
the House and the Congress writ large, that we are looking at
doing that. So we are going to, quote-unquote, ``up-gun'' the
LCS. And I think that is terrific.
I want our adversaries in the Pacific to think about the
LCS the way I thought about the Nanuchkas, Osa's, and Tarantuls
of the Soviet Navy back in those days, back during the Cold
War. We used to track and be concerned about those little, tiny
patrol boats that the Soviets had because they were missile-
armed corvettes. And I want the Chinese and the Russians and
other adversaries we might have to think about the LCS in that
way. And I think we can think of it in that way if we put the
right kind of missile on it and up-gun it.
Mr. Byrne. Of course, that is the plan. As you know, the
last, I think, 20 ships in the 52-ship buy would be frigates
that would have the up-gun and the more heavier platform. But I
guess what I hear you saying is, is that because you have so
many of them--and it is a cost-effective way to have so many of
them--that it is another way for us to project our strength in
a maritime environment, in a shallow-draft environment we find
in many of those islands.
Admiral Harris. That is correct. I stated when I was the
Pacific Fleet commander that I value the LCS. I believe there
is a place for LCS in the joint force now that I am the PACOM
commander, and I look forward to working with them as they come
online.
Mr. Byrne. You also mentioned how we are able to work with
other nations and their navies with littoral combat ship. Could
you expand on that some, please?
Admiral Harris. Sure. A lot of our friends and partners in
the region have small navies. And they want to learn from us or
they want to learn from somebody, and I would rather they learn
from us than other potential partners. And their navies are
small. And when a cruiser comes in there or even a DDG for that
matter, it can overwhelm them. And so an LCS is the right
platform to do that.
It is also the right platform to train in areas of
shallower depths, just by definitions, as I talked about, and
the cruisers are smaller so that footprint is smaller. And, for
that reason, I think in a partnership environment way, the LCS
is, again, an ideal platform.
Mr. Byrne. Let me ask you about another vessel. It is
called the joint high-speed vessel [JHSV]. They just renamed it
the EPF [expeditionary fast transport]. And I understand that
those vessels are getting some pretty good use in PACOM. This
is a well-built ship with ability to add a lot of additional
capabilities. What do you see as the future of the joint high-
speed vessel, the EPF, in your AOR?
Admiral Harris. I think it has great potential for some of
the mission sets that I have to be concerned about, more so the
Pacific Fleet commander would worry about it. But the joint
high-speed vessel has a great ability to move a lot of things
quickly. And by ``a lot of things,'' I mean, troops and their
equipment. And the Army is using a version of that now in the
western Pacific.
So I am looking forward to the JHSV EPF coming online in
greater numbers. I think that you could put an expedition or a
field hospital, for example, on a JHSV and turn it into a
hospital ship. We explored that in the last few months in my
time as Pacific Fleet commander during Pacific Partnership.
That is an exciting new capability that I think we should take
a hard look at.
Mr. Byrne. Well, thank you for your service, gentlemen,
both of you.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for your service.
The U.S. PAC [Pacific] Command has given authorization in
the fiscal year 2016 NDAA's South China Sea initiative to build
our maritime security in the region and improve the domain
awareness of our partners in the region. In your opinion, does
this authority need to be expanded, and if so, what changes
would you like to see made?
Admiral Harris. Sir, that is the maritime security
initiative. I am pleased with where we are with it now. I think
we will get about $50 million this year for that. My team is
working with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] on that
to figure out the best ways to improve the maritime domain
awareness of some of the countries in the region, and I am
satisfied with where we are with that this year.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
General. Anything you would add, General?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
Admiral, you mentioned in your testimony PAC Command's need
for enduring cyber capability in the theater. Cyber warfare is
undoubtedly a growing aspect of modern warfare and something we
must strive to be ahead of as much as possible. Would making
USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] a combatant command like
CENTCOM [Central Command] help funnel focus and funding to a
vitally important aspect of this new theater of warfare?
Admiral Harris. In my opinion, sir, CYBERCOM should be an
independent combatant command.
Mr. Johnson. Would you pull that mike closer.
Admiral Harris. Yeah. In my opinion, sir, CYBERCOM should
be an independent combatant command on the level of PACOM or
CENTCOM, as you say. Currently, it is a sub-unified command
under USSTRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command].
Mr. Johnson. Do you have any thoughts on how Congress can
be effective in helping bring that about?
Admiral Harris. No, sir. I think it is being addressed
adequately within DOD [Department of Defense], and ultimately,
the Chairman will make his best military advice known to both
the President and the Secretary and a decision will be
rendered. And I think that is appropriate in this case at this
time.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
General, anything to add?
General Scaparrotti. No, sir. I agree with Admiral Harris.
I know it is under discussion now. And I think the DOD, as he
said, is considering that, and it will be handled in a normal
process.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Admiral, considering Vietnam's claims in the Spratly and
Paracel Islands and rising patriotism in Vietnam, and animosity
towards China resulting from the 2014 oil rig standoff, and
Hanoi becoming the eighth largest arms importer from 2011 to
2015, a maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South
China Sea has perhaps the greatest possibility for becoming a
flash point in the region.
However, in recent public discussions on the issue of the
South China Sea, it has been surprising to understand the
dearth of information on our engagement with Vietnam. Most of
the focus has been instead on our defense treaty with the
Philippines and their arbitration case. Moving forward, do you
see a place for increased bilateral dialogue between the U.S.
and Vietnam, and if so, what developments would you like to
see?
Admiral Harris. So I have made Vietnam and India focuses--
foci--focuses, I guess, of effort for PACOM. I think there are
great opportunities in both countries for us to move forward in
our relationship and partnerships in the region. So I am
excited by our opportunities in Vietnam just for the reasons
you mentioned. You know, they are a growing nation. They have a
like view with us of China and our concerns in the South China
Sea. And they are becoming a player on the world stage, and
they are certainly a player in ASEAN [Association of Southeast
Asian Nations].
So I look forward to continuing our relationship with
Vietnam. I appreciate the fact we are able to increase our
trade with Vietnam, including in the defense arena. I went to
Vietnam when I was a Pacific Fleet commander, and I look
forward to having the opportunity to go there as a Pacific
Command commander.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you.
Anything to add, General?
General Scaparrotti. No, thank you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. McSally.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
General Scaparrotti, you said earlier that should we have
to be involved--God forbid--in military conflict on the
peninsula, it would be more akin to Korea or World War II:
complex, high casualty. Are you concerned at all--we have
heard, you know, the service chiefs come before us in the last
year, sequestration, the impact, and us being in 15 years of a
counterinsurgency mindset has had a real impact on the
readiness of units. The squadron I commanded was ready to head
over there on 24 hours' notice, but a lot of the readiness has
really been degraded across the joint force that are on a TPFDD
[time-phased force and deployment data] ready to go for
supporting that kind of contingency. Are you concerned at all
about the real readiness levels of being able to respond
quickly?
General Scaparrotti. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Yes, I am. As
you know, all of our services are really coming out of a
bathtub in readiness, and it has been improving because of the
increased funding. And we appreciate that support, but it is
going to be some time before our forces are at a point where
all of the units have now been through training that prepares
them really for a complex environment, high-intensity conflict.
I can speak specifically of the Army. It takes time for us
to get units through those complex rotations at our national
training centers. We have got younger generations who haven't
combined fires, for instance, et cetera, fire and maneuver in
large formations. Those are things that an individual, small
unit, and larger unit training that is complex.
So I am concerned about it. I know that all the services
are focused on this, and we, on the peninsula, are as well. So,
when we do our exercises and we bring units in, that is the
kind of training at each level that we are focused on.
Ms. McSally. Great. I am interested in following up a
little bit more in the classified session as well as far as the
risks we are at right now.
General Scaparrotti. Thank you.
Ms. McSally. I think I also heard you say in the shortage
of munitions that you mentioned that the potential cluster
munition ban and the impact that that would have on your
ability to do your job. I just want to make sure I understood
that.
Neither the U.S. nor South Korea are signatories to the
cluster munition ban, so can you just clarify what you meant?
And if we were to become a signatory and those would be banned,
what impact would that have on munition?
General Scaparrotti. That is correct, neither signatories.
However, the U.S. has a policy that in 2019, in January of
2019, we would essentially comply with the Oslo treaty through
policy.
Ms. McSally. So what impact would that have?
General Scaparrotti. The impact for me would be significant
because the majority of my munitions are cluster munitions that
are affected by that policy. And, of course, then what I am
concerned about and the reason I am bringing it up now is we
need to begin to replace those munitions so that I have the
proper stockage for the first 30 days on site.
Cluster munitions in and of themselves provide an effect
that in this fight is very important, is very difficult to
replicate with unitary rounds. So we need to get to a cluster
munition. We need to keep this cluster munition until such time
that we are able to produce a replacement that meets the less
than 1 percent dud rate and we can produce it in numbers to
meet my need.
Ms. McSally. But just to clarify, it would be best for the
military mission that you have for that ban to not go into
effect?
General Scaparrotti. That is correct. That is what I mean
by we need to keep what we have and be able to use it until we
can replace it properly.
Ms. McSally. Thank you.
Admiral Harris, I want to talk a little bit about the ISIS
[Islamic State in Iraq and Syria] threat and how you are seeing
that in the whole theater. I am on Homeland Security as well.
You know, looking at the foreign fighter flow, we know there is
at least a couple thousand coming from your theater--China,
Indonesia, some from Australia--that we are aware of; also,
about a half a dozen affiliates that have allegiance to ISIS;
and obviously, the Jakarta bombing that ISIS claimed in
January.
Can you just talk about the trends you are seeing? And is
there any concern with us or our allies in the direction this
is going?
Admiral Harris. Yes, ma'am. It is a significant concern of
mine, the numbers of fighters that are leaving PACOM countries
and going to the fight. Of greater concern are those, however,
that are returning because not only are they even more
radicalized; now they are militarized, weaponized, and so that
is a concern.
I am concerned by some of the trends I am seeing in the
region. In one of the countries, recently, there was a Pew
survey where over 50 percent of the respondents said it was
okay to execute a Muslim who converted to some other religion;
30 percent of the respondents in that country said it was okay
to use violence in the name of Islam. That sounds like
something coming right out of the pages of the ISIS handbook.
So I worry about that quite a bit.
I made the comment in the past that there are more Muslims
in the PACOM region than in Central Command.
Ms. McSally. Exactly.
Admiral Harris. And so Islamic extremism is an area of
concern, as I mentioned in my opening statement, and we look at
that very closely. And fortunately, Special Operations Command
Pacific, SOCPAC, is there, and Admiral Kilrain is charged with
monitoring that and having an effect on that.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. My time is expired. Thanks.
The Chairman. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris and General Scaparrotti, thank you very much
for your testimony today and your service to our Nation.
For years now, we have underinvested in our EW [electronic
warfare] capabilities, where our adversaries have actually
invested heavily in those areas. Now, some of this you may not
be able to go into an open session, but to the degree that you
can, where are we held risk because of that underinvestment as
we are shifting to the Asia-Pacific region? And how overmatched
are we? And what areas do we further need to invest? And where
are our adversaries' capabilities strongest? What keeps you
awake at night should conflict ever break out and we need to
confront this?
Admiral Harris. Thanks, sir.
In trying to dance on the unclassified side of this
question, I will say that I am concerned about principally in
the EW environment with Russia and China. They are our peer
competitors in this. I think we are investing now more than we
have been in electronic warfare, and our new concept electronic
warfare maneuver, I think, is gaining a foothold in the Navy
and in the joint force.
So I am pleased with where we are moving along, though I
think that we need to invest more in it, not only in terms of
fiscal resources but also in terms of tactical development.
Mr. Langevin. General, do you want to add anything?
General Scaparrotti. Yeah, I would agree. I think that our
investment in that has been periodic, and as a result, we have
seen the need, started to respond to it, and then probably
dropped off over time, I think, specifically over the last 10
years. And we are now beginning to invest in that in terms of
our people, our skills, and our assets, and I think we need to
continue that.
Mr. Langevin. Admiral Harris, in your testimony, you
highlighted that the world's 300 foreign submarines, 200 are
located in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and 150 of those
belong to China, North Korea, and Russia. How is the United
States keeping pace with this growing force in the region, and
what investments need to be made to enhance our undersea and
antisubmarine warfare capabilities as well as to our anti-
access and area denial strategies?
Admiral Harris. So one of the biggest asymmetric advantages
that the United States enjoys over any peer competitor or other
competitor in the world is our undersea warfare capability. The
submarine gives us an advantage over any other adversary we
might face. Unfortunately, those adversaries recognize that,
and they are improving and increasing their own antisubmarine
warfare and undersea warfare capabilities.
Clearly, while our submarines are far and away better, in
my opinion, today, quantity has a quality all its own, and the
numbers of Russian and Chinese submarines, particularly Chinese
submarines, are a matter of concern. I think the Russian
submarine force never took a hiatus at the end of the Cold War,
and we are seeing some very impressive platforms come out of
Russia, including the Dolgorukiy, as I mentioned earlier, the
SSBN.
So I think that we must continue to invest in our undersea
warfare capabilities, not only in terms of numbers of
submarines but in improving the submarines that we have. I
think the Virginia Payload Module, for example, is fantastic.
We can't get enough of them and the capabilities that it brings
to the fight.
Mr. Langevin. Good. Thank you.
I would like to shift, if I could, to cyber. And I have a
pretty good understanding of our cyber capabilities. But,
again, as we are shifting to the Asia-Pacific and we are going
to be partnering more closely with our allies in the region,
where is your level of confidence in their cyber capabilities
should we need to partner with them and should conflict break
out?
I know the challenges that we face in securing our own
systems, but to the degree that we are going to be dependent on
our allies in the region and their cyber capabilities, which
may be not as robust as what ours are.
Admiral Harris. Thank you, sir. I will defer to General
Scaparrotti for the specifics of your question with regard to
Korea. He has some ideas on that.
But, in general, I am concerned about it. As we work on
this with our allies, friends, and partners, we are as strong
as only the weakest link in the chain, and cyber could be that
weak link. And so their vulnerability to intrusion and
exploitation is a matter of concern to me.
General Scaparrotti. Sir, I would echo Admiral Harris'
point with respect to Korea as well. We have a good working
relationship in terms of our two joint cyber centers and our
cyber domain work overall, but it is initial. It is new, and it
is developing, and it needs to develop rapidly, because we have
a threat. North Korea is active every day. And so my concern is
that we act with enough focus and we act fast enough and with
enough assets.
The second thing I would say, when you are into that
domain, each country has their own concerns about protection of
information and capabilities, and so it is an area that is very
difficult to work in a collaborative way that you need to at
times as well. And that is something that we have got and other
nations have to work their way through in order to really close
the gaps that we have got to close in our systems.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, welcome. Aloha. I am not going to harp on this,
but I will mention it quickly. I know it has been talked
earlier about the Aegis Ashore on Kauai and just the paramount
importance of protecting Hawaii and the United States from
North Korea's threat.
But, Admiral Harris, I would like to talk to you a little
bit about India. I know you have a trip very soon to go and
visit India. Two things: there is a potential sale of eight F-
16s to Pakistan that I and other Members of Congress have
expressed very serious concerns about, given the fact that
Pakistan has long harbored and given safe haven to various
terrorist groups that continue to launch destabilizing attacks
within India as well as Afghanistan; the recent release of
Hafiz Saeed, one of the masterminds of the 2008 Mumbai
terrorist attack, where six U.S. citizens were killed, even at
the protests of the United States.
There are a number of other concerns that we have. But, in
particular, I am wondering if you can talk about how, as you
and others have spoken of the importance of this opportunity to
strengthen our relationship with India as we head into a strong
partnership into the future and the benefits that that brings
us, what impact could this sale of F-16s have on our
relationship with India and the work that you and others are
doing to strengthen that?
Admiral Harris. That is a great question and timely too,
ma'am, because I go to India on Monday to keynote the Raisina
Dialogue event in New Delhi.
I view India as our great strategic opportunity in PACOM,
and we need to do as much as we can with India in a mil-to-mil
sense and in every other sense. We have a terrific ambassador
there in Richard Verma, who is looking aggressively at ways to
improve our relationships with India across the board. And I am
excited by that.
With regard to the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, while I don't
have a professional opinion on that sale itself, certainly it
will affect some aspect of our relationship with India. I know
that I will be asked about it when I go to India, and I hope to
be able to tell them that that sale is just one aspect of many
military sales we make across the world, and that we view our
relationship with India very importantly. And I hope that we
can work through this sale and their perception of it to
continue to improve our relationship with India.
Ms. Gabbard. Yeah, thank you. I think this is something
that they will definitely be bringing up with you at that
dialogue, in particular because of the recent attack at their
air force base and the terrorist organization behind that being
from Pakistan.
What do you see here really as the next critical step
towards strengthening that U.S.-India partnership?
Admiral Harris. So we are moving out aggressively in the
technical field with the DTTI [Defense Technology and Trade
Initiative] initiative that Under Secretary Kendall is pushing.
And I think that is excellent. There are some what we call
foundational agreements that have to be executed with partner
nations in order to move, quote-unquote, to the next level. And
we are working with India on the signing of those foundational
agreements.
One of those is the LSA, Logistics Support Agreement, which
allows us to do acquisition cross-servicing, for example.
Another one is called the CISMOA [Communications and
Information Security Memorandum of Agreement], and it involves
communications security so that we can be assured that India
will protect our communications as we would protect theirs. And
so these are foundation agreements that we enact with every
country we work with.
We have not gotten to the point of signing them with India,
but I think we are close. We are closer now than we ever have
been. And I am encouraged by what I am hearing from my
colleagues in India, and I look forward to having that
discussion with them when I go there next week.
Ms. Gabbard. Great.
Thank you, Admiral Harris. I appreciate the leadership that
you have taken, in particular on strengthening this
relationship and recognizing the importance of it in our
overall strategy within the Asia-Pacific. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I would like to ask you to discuss and provide
some guidance for me and others on how to approach the issue of
cost sharing for our obligations and the benefits that we
provide in the Pacific.
The easy way for me to look at it when it comes to Europe
is through the 27 other NATO members who have a target of
spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense, even though only
4 of them today are doing that. But it is something that I can
ask of our allies who enjoy the benefit of the U.S.
disproportionate presence there and defense capacity.
How should I look at that when it comes to Asia and the
Pacific?
Admiral Harris. A great question, sir. And I think that the
NATO model, as I mentioned before, doesn't work for the
Pacific. So you have to look at each of our treaty allies
individually and look at those--that subset of treaty allies
where we have major concentrations of U.S. forces. And who is
the greater beneficiary of that, or who are the beneficiaries
of that?
Certainly, part of the beneficiary of us having a large
carrier strike group bring expeditionary force presence in
Japan is us. We are there for us and the values that we hold
dear and what is important to the United States. Certainly, it
is a benefit to Japan. And so our obligation to Japan under our
treaty is to defend them and their obligation to us under that
same treaty is to provide us a place from which we can defend
them. So that is simplistic, but that sort of gets at that
issue.
So they provide us an enormous host nation funding level--
which I promised I would get to you in the closed session--to
foot the bill, if you will, for U.S. forces that are based in
Japan. And that model extends to Australia, for example. We are
undergoing host nation funding discussions with Australia now
as we move a sizable Marine and Air Force presence to Darwin
and Tindal. And the level of that funding and how much it
should be is a subject of negotiation. We certainly get a
benefit from operating out of Australia, as do the Australians.
Singapore is another case, a very important case. Singapore
is not a treaty ally, but it is certainly an important
strategic partner to us. And they allow us to put our littoral
combat ships, to rotationally deploy them out of their nation,
and they have agreed to allow us to operate rotationally P-3s
and P-8 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft. And we get
that benefit from operating out of Singapore because of our
interests in the South China Sea, Strait of Malacca, and the
eastern Indian Ocean.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yeah. All of that makes sense, and I think
that same logic could extend to our presence in Europe, and yet
there we have a very defined commitment from our allies there.
As you outline some of the challenges that we face, a rising
China, a resurgent Russia, just to name two, and some of the
investments that you are going to ask or the Department of
Defense and the administration will ask the taxpayer to make,
all of which I think are sound, I think it is also an
appropriate time to think about what our allies and other
beneficiaries in the Asia-Pacific region should expect to
contribute. And we, the taxpayer, the Representatives should
have a clear understanding of that.
And I don't know if, General Scaparrotti, if you want to
talk about Korea as an example with the THAAD batteries and
Patriot missile battery deployments there, use that as an
example. What part of that cost is shared by--understand the
benefit to us of having our service members and those defenses
there. What does Korea share in that in terms of cost?
General Scaparrotti. I would just say that this is a unique
alliance with the U.S.-ROK Alliance, and it has started and has
grown since the Korean War. And in this case, we have got a
treaty partner and a partner that spends 2.5 percent pretty
routinely each year in their defense. And they spend portions
of their defense money to meet commitments that we have agreed
upon mutually that they need to develop in order to strengthen
the alliance. And in the closed session, we can talk
specifically about that.
Secondly, through negotiations, they also--called a special
measures agreement--they annually pay a certain percentage of
the cost of U.S. forces to be stationed in Korea and assist in
their defense. So I think it is a good construct. They are
great partners in this respect. And they have been true to
the--they have the same funding challenges that we have, but
they have been true to meeting their commitments in that
respect.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Harris, it is good to see you here again.
My question is actually for General Scaparrotti. It has to
do with the Army's ARI [Aviation Restructure Initiative] and
how that is going to affect the combat aviation brigades in
Korea. In Korea, the Army will be relying on rotational forces
if this ARI is complete, as opposed to a CAB that is stationed
there.
The National Commission on the Future of the Army
recommended keeping a CAB permanently assigned to the
peninsula, because short-term rotations--and I am quoting--
``short-term rotations will not permit aviation units the time
needed to properly mitigate risks posed by the threat situation
in Korea, and, specifically, rotating units will not have time
to master the geographic and environmental conditions well
enough to operate effectively and safely in the region.''
Obviously, Korea is a country with numerous terrain and
extreme weather conditions. Our aviation crews will have to be
able to operate in all sorts of environments, and they are, but
a permanently assigned unit there will be better able to handle
and maintain proficiency.
Permanently stationing a CAB in Korea would come with a
significant upfront price tag as well as enduring costs. So,
despite the operational concerns, the fiscal reality is that it
just might not be realistic. Your written testimony lays out an
array of complex threats that we face on the peninsula. So I
think that, despite the cost, it is worth discussing.
As a commander, which force structure--a rotational force
or a permanently stationed combat aviation brigade--do you feel
best enables you to meet the threats and operational needs in
the peninsula?
General Scaparrotti. Thank you for the question.
We have a permanently stationed combat aviation brigade
there now, and there is discussion about perhaps going to a
rotational one. I completely agree with the commission in terms
of this is an environment that is difficult to fly in,
mountainous, weather. It is an environment that they also have
to fly in close proximity to an adversary that will shoot at
them.
Ms. Duckworth. Right.
General Scaparrotti. And, third, we have mission sets there
that are joint in nature. We do a lot of work with our air and
our naval forces off the coast. And as a result of that, it is
very difficult to get pilots to that level of proficiency, come
into the peninsula, and, in a 9-month rotation, be able to
sustain that, because some of that simply has to be done on the
peninsula after they arrive.
And because of that, I have said that I do not agree with a
rotational force in Korea. I think it will produce a less-ready
force, and also, it will be more dangerous for our crews.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you.
Do you think politically--well, for our allied militaries,
do you think a rotational force will signal to the ROK a
decrease in U.S. commitment to the region's defenses? Is there
a perception on their side that switching to rotational force
would give them?
General Scaparrotti. Well, I think the key to this is what
force you do rotate and their readiness when they arrive. For
instance, I agree with the forces that we rotate today. We are
now rotating an armored brigade, for instance, and the ROKs are
fully in support of this. But our commitment is that we deliver
one that is combat-ready, fully manned, and also has been
trained culturally for that environment. That is something that
we have to do.
And I think as long as--I know for the Republic of Korea--
as long as we meet that commitment, they will be supportive of
using a rotational force. Now, I think there is a certain base
that we have there that is permanent, and we have got to
maintain that. You couldn't go to a larger percentage of that
rotational force. I personally wouldn't be in support of that.
But for the specific needs that we have today that we have
asked for a rotational force, it has been productive.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Great. Thank you.
I want to transfer onto whether or not the Korean wartime
operational control transfer is ever going to really happen.
You know, we have pushed this off. Do you think they will ever
be ready? Are there conditions that need to be in place,
metrics that we are looking for?
General Scaparrotti. First, yes, they will be ready. They
are a modern force, and they are working hard to, one, improve
their capabilities but also build the capabilities they need.
In the OPCON [operational control] transition plan that was--
again, another step was taken that in October between the two
Secretaries, we have laid out in detail the capabilities that
they have to meet, and we are now working on the next layer of
that that provides the timelines on each of those capabilities.
Generally, we have agreed on those in the past. We are
confirming those this year, and they are already working on
most of those as well. So, yes, I think there will be an OPCON
transition. I, too, believe that it should be conditional, not
time based. And in the closed session, I can talk in a little
more detail on the commitments that we have mutually made to
ensure that we can bring that about.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you. I look forward to that classified
briefing.
The Chairman. Admiral, Mr. O'Rourke made a passing
reference to Russia. We see increasing Russia in Europe, in the
Middle East. Are you seeing that in the behavior of their ships
and planes and so forth?
Admiral Harris. I am, Mr. Chairman. We are seeing in the
Pacific, as I mentioned before, their new Dolgorukiy-class
SSBN. I remind folks that there are 3,000 miles of Russian
coastline that is in my area of responsibility, including six
major strategic bases from which they deploy their submarines,
their ships, and their long-range bomber aircraft.
We are seeing long-range bomber aircraft patrols increasing
in East Asia. They circumvented Japan just recently. And their
ship task forces are operating in the region as well.
The Chairman. We often don't think of Russia in your
theater, but as you just described it, they have a big presence
there.
Admiral Harris. Yes, sir. I think of them often.
The Chairman. I appreciate the fact that you do.
I recently had someone say that they were meeting with a
Chinese official who said explicitly: You are the past; we are
the future.
I think many of us had not expected the degree of
aggression, provocation just within the past few years that we
see from China. Do you believe that that is their attitude, and
do you have a reason why we are seeing it seemingly sped up,
certainly in their activities in the South China Sea?
Admiral Harris. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that that is
their attitude. As I testified yesterday, I think they are on--
they have a goal of certainly regional hegemony, and they would
like to see the United States out of what they consider their
affairs.
But I think that their provocations are causing the other
countries in the region to look hard at their relationships
with China, and they are turning to the United States as their
security partner of choice. And you have to ask yourself why
these countries, who were formally leaders in the Non-Aligned
Movement, for example, are turning away from China and turning
toward the United States, not only giving us access to their
bases for our ability to operate but increasingly in terms of
trade and military interoperability.
So I think that the statement from China that, quote, ``We
are the future, and you are the past,'' unquote, I think that
is another indication of the tone deafness of the spokesman who
made that comment.
The Chairman. Fair point. The key for us then is to be a
reliable, credible partner for these nations who are turning to
us, and that gets back to the responsibilities of this
committee, in part.
Thank you both for being here and testifying. I think, if
it is okay with you all's schedule, what I would like to do is
just within about 5 minutes or so reconvene upstairs in our
SCIF, 2337, and continue on a classified or have a classified
discussion.
But, for now, this hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee proceeded to
classified session.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 24, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 24, 2016
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 24, 2016
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. North Korea is seen as a technologically backward
nation, and yet there is a growing presence of computers and other
digital media devices that serve as a widow to the outside world. Do
you see a way this be used to increase their awareness about the
outside world, and help to break the information blockade their
government tries to impose on them?
General Scaparrotti. As a result of increased electronic media in
North Korea--including cell phones that number in the millions--outside
information is indeed much more prevalent than in the past. Strong
ideological campaigns backed by Kim Jong Un's documented and aggressive
use of corporal and capital punishment, however, have limited the
impacts of this outside information on North Korean society and
leadership. Computers, in particular, are overwhelmingly tied to a
nation-wide ``intra-net'' and cannot access the world wide web--only a
few computers in select organizations have internet access. We do
believe the North's leadership is concerned and sensitive to the type
of information its citizens are receiving. It is indeed a regime
vulnerability, albeit one Pyongyang has successfully controlled to
date. Increased efforts targeting this vulnerability would add
additional stress to the regime.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. Shuster. You stated in the hearing that you would rely on two
more battalions of Patriot if we ``go to crisis'' on the Korean
peninsula. Do you believe the overall inventories of Patriot missiles
and total number of Patriot battalions are sufficient to be able to
deliver this capability?
General Scaparrotti. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CASTRO
Mr. Castro. You mentioned in your written testimony that the U.S.
relationship with Japan is a cornerstone of regional stability. Can you
speak to how we can further leverage our relationship with Japan to
maintain peace and security in the region?
Admiral Harris. We further leverage our relationship with Japan to
maintain peace and security through continued cooperation and support
as they implement their national security strategy and legislative
changes in the newly passed Peace and Security Legislation.
Japan's 2013 National Security strategy, their first-ever published
strategy, emphasizes the need to make ``proactive contributions to
peace.''
We welcome this approach by the Japanese and are cooperating with
them to help them identify their priorities and coordinate with USPACOM
and other partners (e.g. Australia) to complement our Theater Campaign
Strategy.
For example, Japan is embarking on a program to ``build partner
capacity,'' especially maritime domain awareness capability and
capacity for partners such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, and
Malaysia. Those efforts by Japan are complementary to our own efforts
to help our partners manage their own security environment, and we are
using venues such as security assistance synchronization/coordination
fora to work together to maximize the benefits to countries like the
Philippines.
Japan is very early in its process of executing its new strategy
and building partner capacities. Our coordination and synchronization
with them on this new strategy are also in the early stages, but Japan
is making progress and we are learning how to work together to maintain
peace and security in the region.
USPACOM will continue to encourage and support Japan in the conduct
of presence operations throughout the region and, hopefully, we will
see Japanese freedom of navigation operations in the future. As Japan
looks to become more active in the theater, the regular presence of
Japanese ships, aircraft and personnel operating in accordance with
international law supports and reinforces our own messages about
adherence to international norms, law and standards of behavior.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Please describe the importance of space capabilities,
such as communications, missile warning, and reconnaissance is to your
mission. Related, to what extent are you concerned with our posture to
adequately respond to the growing Chinese counterspace threats?
Admiral Harris. USPACOM relies heavily on space-based capabilities
to conduct joint functions necessary in the execution of our OPLANs.
Commanders at all levels rely on satellite communications (SATCOM) to
command and control their forces and conduct Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) across the range of military
operations. The USPACOM area of responsibility spans over half the
globe and available SATCOM is a high-demand, low-density resource.
Space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities provide crucial intelligence data support to provide
warning and enable targeting, force deployment and defense. Space-based
positioning, navigation and timing (PNT), primarily from global
positioning system (GPS), is fundamental to the maneuvering of forces
and is a critical enabler for search and rescue efforts during
peacetime and conflict. Finally, timely missile warning is essential to
support active and passive defense of U.S., allied and civilian
infrastructure and personnel.
As the shared domain of space continues to grow increasingly
congested and contested, adversaries continue to develop means to
curtail our access to space-enabled capabilities. I have significant
concerns regarding China's continuing development and fielding of
lethal and non-lethal counter-space systems, as these systems can
threaten my ability to achieve OPLAN objectives. USPACOM requires
resilient space capabilities to support operations. Resilience is
achieved through careful consideration of the existing and required
space, ground, and terminal segments of space systems to maximize
flexibility and minimize vulnerability. As these threats continue to
mature, the U.S., in coordination with our allies and partners, must
develop and implement both material and non-material solutions to
mitigate these threats.
Mr. Coffman. According to public reports, at a recent parade in
North Korea, four missiles on KN-08 launchers were noticeably different
than earlier missiles shown. Why? Are these the same missiles as
previously seen or did we see in a new variant of these missiles in
October?
Admiral Harris. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What additional resources do you need to dominate the
cyber-battlefield? And, how would the creation of a Cyber Command
enhance your ability to oppose technologically advanced adversaries?
Admiral Harris. To dominate the cyber-battlefield, USPACOM requires
growth in the areas of cyber personnel, training, and tools. USPACOM
requires additional personnel capable of conducting cyberspace
operations planning and to effectively command and control the cyber
mission forces operating in the Pacific theater. These personnel and
the collective DOD cyberspace professionals require additional training
in cyber intelligence, operations, and planning to better react to
rapidly evolving cyberspace threats. Lastly, USPACOM requires
additional tools such as a common operational picture capable of
providing situational awareness for all three cyberspace lines of
operation: DOD Information Network Operations, Defensive Cyberspace
Operations, and Offensive Cyberspace Operations within the USPACOM area
of responsibility. These tools would enhance my ability to create
effects within cyberspace to counter the constant advancement of our
adversaries' cyberspace capabilities.
I support the establishment of US Cyber Command as an independent
combatant command. I believe this will enhance unity of effort within
the department and accelerate the coordination and execution of global
cyberspace operations.
Mr. Scott. In the wake of the nuclear test, what was the change in
military relations between the United States and our South Korean
partners?
General Scaparrotti. In short, the adversities we have faced since
last August, to include the nuclear test, have revealed the strength of
our U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Alliance and made the Alliance
stronger. Our military relations with the Republic of Korea (ROK)
remain robust and agile as we coordinate in assessing the situation,
consider Alliance options, close divergences through candid discussion,
and as nations, support each other's national interests. Through these
efforts, we have toughened our resolve to deter North Korea and improve
our interoperable capabilities through combined actions that illustrate
our Alliance strength. Extending beyond these actions, we continue to
hold regular bilateral consultations at multiple levels, to include
participation from other U.S. and ROK agencies, which further displays
our combined dedication to deterring the threat and defending the
Korean Peninsula.
Mr. Scott. What are the current gaps in your in-theatre
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities with
regard to North Korea? How does the Joint Surveillance and Target
Attack Radar System (JSTARS) platform integrate into the current ISR
network?
General Scaparrotti. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAKAI
Mr. Takai. Building Partner Capacity: What is the United States
doing to build up the naval power and MLE capabilities of Southeast
Asian countries? Please provide specific examples.
Admiral Harris. Using Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense
Authorization Act, Section 1263, ``South China Sea Initiative''
authority, the United States Department of Defense is planning to spend
approximately $50 million this year to develop the naval and maritime
law enforcement capabilities of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei by investing in systems and
training for those nations' navies and certain maritime law enforcement
agencies. Congressional notification of specific capabilities is
planned for March 2016 in accordance with U.S. law.
USPACOM has also made a number of investments in maritime security
and maritime law enforcement in the Southeast Asia region using the DOD
Counternarcotics Program. Specifically, there are three countries where
USPACOM has ongoing efforts. First, in the Philippines, USPACOM has a
long-running program in the Sulu Sea area to enhance the capability of
the Philippine National Police Maritime Group. USPACOM provided
extensive training and infrastructure development to expand the
effectiveness of this element in policing the Sulu Sea area. In
Cambodia, we have a multi-year effort underway with their National
Committee for Maritime Security based in Sihanoukville, to expand their
operational capability. Lastly, in Vietnam, USPACOM is in the beginning
stages of program development with the Vietnam Border Guards to enhance
their capabilities to combat illegal entry, transnational crime,
smuggling and trade fraud.
Mr. Takai. Please describe the strategic and military/operational
implications of China's deployment of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) on
Woody Island, in the disputed Paracel Island group. Do you expect
similar deployments of SAMs, anti-ship cruise missiles, or other
similar equipment to disputed islands in the Spratlys? What would be
the strategic and military/operational implications of such deployments
for the United States? What is your assessment of the potential
military and law-enforcement utility of these newly expanded sites,
both for China's asserting and defending its territorial claims in the
South China Sea, and in potential conflict scenarios against U.S.
forces?
Admiral Harris. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Takai. What is your assessment of China's ability to use hybrid
warfare tactics to gain control of small islands that are administered
by another country? How might a hybrid warfare approach by China in the
East China Sea and South China Sea create problems for the United
States and its allies? What should the United States and its allies do
to deter a hybrid warfare approach by China and to improve the options
for responding in a contingency?
Admiral Harris. China has been using a hybrid warfare approach
(blending conventional and irregular forces to create ambiguity, seize
the initiative, and paralyze the adversary which may include the use of
both traditional military and asymmetric systems) for years to
incrementally increase its control over its South China Sea claims and
to put greater pressure on other South China Sea claimants. It has been
using a similar approach to challenge Japan's exclusive administration
of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. This is a whole-of-
government Chinese approach that incorporates military and civil
maritime forces, diplomacy, economic carrots and sticks, and legal
warfare. If unchecked, this approach, I believe, will allow China
eventually to be in a position through coercion or force to wrest
control of the islands and features it claims in both the East and
South China Seas.
This approach is a challenge to the U.S. and its allies because it
demands a unified, whole-of-government effort to counter it. Military
action alone will not be sufficient to counter a Chinese approach that
is designed to achieve its goals while remaining below the threshold of
military conflict. That is why coordination among the interagency and
the strengthening of our alliances and partnerships in the region are
so important.
Mr. Takai. Building Partner Capacity: What is the United States
doing to build up the naval power and MLE capabilities of Southeast
Asian countries? Please provide specific examples.
General Scaparrotti. I believe this question would best be answered
by the Commander of Pacific Command and would respectfully defer to
Admiral Harris's views on this matter.
Mr. Takai. What is your assessment of China's ability to use hybrid
warfare tactics to gain control of small islands that are administered
by another country? How might a hybrid warfare approach by China in the
East China Sea and South China Sea create problems for the United
States and its allies? What should the United States and its allies do
to deter a hybrid warfare approach by China and to improve the options
for responding in a contingency?
General Scaparrotti. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT
Mr. Nugent. We know the Asia-Pacific is a key region for illicit
trafficking of everything from counterfeit goods to narcotics to
humans. How do you see illicit trafficking networks affecting U.S.
policy interests in the Asia-Pacific region and what assets and
capabilities do we have to tackle these threats? Additionally, are we
seeing any indications that any of these illicit funds are being used
by foreign terrorist organizations, or local insurgencies in places
like Thailand or Burma, to support their operations?
Admiral Harris. Illicit trafficking exists to generate revenue for
the traffickers. This distinction is primarily what separates
transnational criminal organizations from ideologically driven
terrorist or insurgent organizations.
I believe that how this revenue is ultimately used underlies a much
larger national security issue. It isn't really about crime as much as
it's about the ultimate stability of current global systems. These
criminal organizations have amassed unprecedented wealth from illicit
trade and they pose a significant threat. Drugs are still the foremost
money-maker for criminal enterprises, but counterfeit goods of all
types, endangered wildlife, and even human organs contribute to a
massive, globalized black market enabled by technology, whose value
even by conservative estimates would rank amongst the top twenty
nations in the world by gross domestic product.
No longer do we simply have a counter-drug problem, we face an
expanding, globalized, transnational crime problem.
Developing and transitional states offer the most fertile ground
for growth of transnational crime and the nearly inevitable result is
an intermingling of criminal and political power that sanctions
corruption and undermines governmental institutions.
I see this corruption and associated instability as one of the
biggest impacts on U.S. interests in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.
Instability is particularly visible in countries like Burma and
Thailand, but exists elsewhere in the region as well. Countries
positioned astride major drug trafficking corridors, especially those
that also have disputed areas within their borders, are especially
vulnerable to instability due in large part to the violence required to
maintain these criminally lucrative areas. The illicit criminal
networks formed by these elements are far reaching, transnational by
definition, and between terrorism and crime is born more out of
logistical convenience than any ideological convergence, and actually
has its strongest overlap at the lower organizational levels. Various
aspects of the criminal networks including travel facilitation,
document fraud, and weapons procurement, help to meet the basic
logistical requirements of terrorist, insurgent and criminal
organizations across the region.
From a Defense Department perspective, the challenge is that we are
tasked to fight and win the nation's wars--our authorities, our
systems, our processes and our people were all built around traditional
nation-state threats. Four of the five priority challenges listed in
the Fiscal Year 2018 to 2022 Defense Planning Guidance are traditional
state actors. The increasingly asymmetric threats from non-state
actors, from terrorists to high-end criminals, continue to present new
and unique issues for us. We must continue to creatively examine our
approaches to defending the homeland using DOD assets and authorities
such as the Department's counter-narcotics program.
My command remains actively engaged with partner nation law
enforcement and military elements to counter these illicit activities
and strongly advocates and supports regionally focused cooperation.
My approach to dealing with these issues really comes down to
partnerships and international norms. I am focused on modernizing and
strengthening our alliances and our partnerships, and we are working to
advance international rules and norms in everything we do. All of our
bilateral engagements and capacity building efforts are underpinned by
these guiding principles. Whether we are working on information sharing
with French Polynesia to enable successful interdictions of drug
smugglers transiting Oceania, or building capacity with Philippine
National Police to improve maritime security in in the Sulu Sea--we are
committed to building a cooperative network of partners to help defeat
these threats.
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