[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SAFEGUARDING OUR NATION'S SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AGAINST
EVOLVING TERRORIST THREATS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 17, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-32
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
John Katko, New York, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Mark Walker, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
John Ratcliffe, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Krista P. Harvey, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
John Katko, New York Filemon Vela, Texas
Will Hurd, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Mandy Bowers, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 5
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Eddie Mayenschein, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Security Policy and Industry Engagement, Transportation
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Ms. Jennifer Grover, Director, Transportation Security and Coast
Guard Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, U.S.
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Raymond Diaz, Director of Security, Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (New York):
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Ms. Polly Hanson, Chief of Police, National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak):
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
For the Record
The Honorable John Katko, a Representative in Congress From the
State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Letter......................................................... 2
SAFEGUARDING OUR NATION'S SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS AGAINST
EVOLVING TERRORIST THREATS
----------
Thursday, September 17, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
joint with the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Katko
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security]
presiding.
Present from the Subcommittee on Transportation Security:
Representatives Katko, Rogers, Carter, Walker, Ratcliffe, Rice,
Keating, and Payne.
Present from the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence: King, Hurd, Higgins, and Vega.
Also present: Representative Langevin.
Mr. Katko. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittees on Transportation Security and Counterterrorism
and Intelligence, will come to order.
The subcommittees are meeting today to hear testimony on
our ability to safeguard our Nation's surface transportation
systems against evolving terrorist threats. I now recognize
myself for an opening statement.
I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing. I am
pleased to be joined by fellow New York delegation Members
Chairman Peter King, Ranking Member Kathleen Rice, and Ranking
Member Brian Higgins to talk about a topic that is so vital to
the State of New York.
Protecting our Nation's surface transportation systems
requires full cooperation and participation at the Federal,
State, local, and individual levels. An attack on any of our
surface transportation systems not only disrupts the local
economy and infrastructure, but would have a ripple effect to
cities across our Nation. For example, in my own district in
Syracuse, New York, we have a freight line that runs through
our downtown area and provides critical economic benefit to the
region.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess our ability and
readiness to detect and disrupt threats to our Nation's
critical surface transportation systems.
Before we begin, I would like to express my pride and
admiration for the four Americans that, through unrivaled acts
of courage and bravery, were able to thwart a terrorist attack
aboard a Paris-bound train on August 21, 2015. The heroic
actions of these four men--Mark Moogalian, a teacher originally
from Midlothian, Virginia; Anthony Sadler, a senior at
Sacramento State University; Air Force Airman First Class
Spencer Stone; and Oregon Army National Guard Specialist Alek
Skarlatos--saved countless lives. They really represent the
best of what America has to offer.
However, it is our responsibility to the American people to
do all that we can to defend them against such heinous acts,
and the American people should not be put in a position
requiring them to defend their lives while riding a train,
subway, or bus to vacation, commute to work, or simply to run
an errand.
Since September 11, 2001, many people have come to think of
a terrorist attack against the United States as one which is an
elaborate scheme against a hardened target. Increasingly,
however, the terrorists and their sympathizers are choosing
soft targets. The Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris, the military
recruiting centers attack in Chattanooga, and now the train
attack in Paris are just a few of such examples.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on their
perspectives on the state of rail and mass transit security, to
identify progress made since the terrorist attacks on September
11, and assess any remaining shortfalls and how to address
them.
I ask unanimous consent to insert into the record a letter
I sent to Administrator Neffenger from the Transportation
Security Administration expressing my concern over the
vulnerable state of security of our Nation's surface
transportation systems. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The information follows:]
September 17, 2015.
The Honorable Peter Neffenger,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, 601 12th Street South, Arlington,
Virginia 22202.
Dear Administrator Neffenger: I write regarding the efforts and
capabilities employed by the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to secure the surface transportation sector in the United States.
As the country faces growing and proliferating threats from lone-wolf
terrorist actors, it is imperative that TSA responds to the threat
landscape in an adaptive and proactive manner. Indicated by the
recently-foiled terror attack on a Paris-bound passenger train in
France, which was mitigated by brave U.S. service members, surface
transportation security presents an entirely unique challenge in
efforts to secure transportation.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security, I am
concerned that surface transportation is an increasingly attractive
target for terrorists seeking to inflict damage on the American public
and the U.S. economy, which depends heavily on the free movement of
people and goods via transportation systems. It is in light of this,
that I am convening a joint Subcommittee hearing on the security of our
surface transportation sector. At the hearing, the Subcommittee will
hear from a number of federal and local stakeholders on how security
can be improved in the surface environment. As a supplement to the
testimony we will receive from TSA's witness at the hearing, I request
answers to the following questions:
1. What are the primary threats facing surface transportation
security?
2. What proactive actions has the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and TSA taken to respond to the unique vulnerability of
surface transportation?
3. How are information-sharing enterprises, such as the state and
local fusion centers and FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces
utilized to protect surface transportation and what is TSA's
role in this effort?
4. How has TSA worked to improve coordination between federal,
state, and local entities and what is the primary mechanism by
which TSA communicates threat information to its transit agency
stakeholders?
5. Does TSA conduct regular risk assessments on the nation's
surface transportation sector, as a whole, as well as on
specific transit agencies? If so, how often, and are the
results of such assessments shared with stakeholders?
6. What is the current deployment focus of TSA-led Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams? Are they
focused more heavily on surface or aviation systems?
7. How does TSA measure the security contribution of its surface
inspectors program? What sort of surface-specific training do
these inspectors receive to qualify them to assess the unique
security challenges of the surface transportation environment?
8. What technological advancements is DHS/TSA investing in to
enhance the screening, vetting, and security of surface
transportation travelers and workers?
I look forward to working with you to close vulnerabilities in the
surface transportation sector and ensure that TSA is doing everything
possible to keep the traveling public safe in every mode of
transportation. I appreciate your attention to this matter, and should
you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my
Committee staff[.]
Sincerely,
John Katko,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security.
Mr. Katko. I now recognize a Member of the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, the gentlewoman from New York, Miss
Rice, for an opening statement.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening
this hearing. I also want to thank the witnesses for joining us
here today to discuss the evolving threats to our Nation's
surface transportation system.
Since the beginning of the 114th Congress, this
subcommittee has mainly focused its attention on aviation
security. But with all modes of surface transportation carrying
well over 10 billion passengers each year and more than 2.5
million miles of pipeline carrying hazardous liquids and
natural gases, I am confident we can all agree that surface
transportation security is equally as important. So I am
pleased to have the opportunity today to address the security
challenges facing the surface transportation sector as we
assess the evolving threats of terrorism.
Last month, four individuals, including three brave
Americans, thwarted a potential mass shooting when a man
carrying a machine gun and a knife boarded a high-speed train
traveling from Amsterdam to Paris. That should serve as a vivid
reminder to us all that the threat of terrorism is just as real
on our trains as it is on our planes, and we must be prepared
to confront and neutralize that threat wherever we may find it.
We must work together to rigorously assess our surface
transportation systems and ensure that we have adequate
procedures in place to respond to a terrorist attack on an
American pipeline or mass transit system. We must have
reliable, comprehensive security plans in place for a wide
range of scenarios. We must have seamless communication between
Government entities and transit agencies. We must continue to
encourage the public to be vigilant at all times, because, as
we saw last month in France, that can be the difference between
life and death.
I am very eager to hear what both the TSA and the private
sector are doing to guarantee the safety of our citizens, not
only those who travel on our mass transit systems, but also
those who live near pipelines and freight railroads, as well as
those who travel every day on our highways.
I am also eager to hear what front-line security training
has currently provided to our transit system workers, given
that TSA has not yet fulfilled the statutory mandate that they
develop and implement security training requirements for public
transportation rail and bus workers.
In July, Ranking Member Thompson and I asked GAO to review
TSA's surface inspection program. Specifically, we asked about
the roles and responsibilities of those inspecting surface
transportation, how the structure of the inspection program
aligns with TSA's mission, and what steps are being taken to
measure its effectiveness. I look forward to seeing the results
of that review upon its completion, and I would welcome any
additional information about those questions that our witnesses
could provide today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing. I
look forward to a productive dialogue today. I yield back the
balance of my time.
[The statement of Miss Rice follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Kathleen Rice
September 17, 2015
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for convening this hearing.
I also want to thank the witnesses for joining us today to discuss
the evolving threats to our Nation's surface transportation systems.
Since the beginning of the 114th Congress, this subcommittee has
mainly focused its attention on aviation security.
But with all modes of surface transportation carrying well over 10
billion passengers each year, and more than 2.5 million miles of
pipeline carrying hazardous liquids and natural gases, I'm confident we
can all agree that surface transportation security is equally as
important.
So I'm pleased to have the opportunity today to address the
security challenges facing the surface transportation sector as we
assess the evolving threats of terrorism.
Last month, four individuals, including three brave Americans,
thwarted a potential mass shooting when a man carrying a machine gun
and a knife boarded a high-speed train traveling from Amsterdam to
Paris.
That should serve as a vivid reminder to us all that the threat of
terrorism is just as real on our trains as it is on our planes--and we
must be prepared to confront and neutralize that threat wherever we may
find it.
We must work together to rigorously assess our surface
transportation systems and ensure that we have adequate procedures in
place to respond to a terrorist attack on an American pipeline or mass
transit system.
We must have reliable, comprehensive security plans in place for a
wide range of scenarios. We must have seamless communication between
Government entities and transit agencies. We must continue to encourage
the public to be vigilant at all times--because as we saw last month in
France, that can be the difference between life and death.
I am very eager to hear what both the Transportation Security
Administration and the private sector are doing to guarantee the safety
of our citizens--not only those who travel on our mass transit systems,
but also those who live near pipelines and freight railroads, as well
as those who travel every day on our highways.
I'm also eager to hear what front-line security training is
currently provided to our transit system workers, given that TSA has
not yet fulfilled the statutory mandate that they develop and implement
security training requirements for public transportation, rail, and bus
workers.
In July, Ranking Member Thompson and I asked the Government
Accountability Office to review TSA's surface inspection program.
Specifically, we asked about the roles and responsibilities of
those inspecting surface transportation, how the structure of the
inspection program aligns with TSA's mission, and what steps are being
taken to measure its effectiveness.
I look forward to seeing the results of that review upon its
completion, and I would welcome any additional information about those
questions that our witnesses could provide today.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for convening this hearing.
I look forward to productive dialogue today, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Miss Rice.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Mr. King, for any
statement he may have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for
holding this joint hearing with the Counterterrorism and
Intelligence Subcommittee today on terror threats to surface
transportation.
If I may be allowed, I would like to acknowledge the fact
that yesterday the House passed H.R. 720, which you sponsored,
to require all airports and other surface transportation hubs
to establish procedures responding to security threats such as
active shooters. This was in response to the tragic murder of
TSA screener Gerardo Hernandez, who was shot and killed back in
November 2013 at LAX. It will now be sent to the President for
signature. I want to take this opportunity to congratulate you
on this passage of your first public law. It took me a lot
longer to get there than it did you. So congratulations.
Mr. Katko. Thank you very much.
Mr. King. By the way, as part of that, I think the fact
that you are holding this hearing today, this joint hearing, is
emblematic of the dedication you have on this, as does Miss
Rice and Ranking Member Higgins.
With the recent attempt by a terrorist on a high-speed rail
in Europe to take multiple lives, we are more cognizant than
ever of the vulnerability of our public transportation
infrastructure. That day, as Chairman Katko mentioned,
passengers were fortunate to have among them four brave
Americans, including two members of America's Armed Forces, who
reacted swiftly and bravely to take down the Islamist extremist
who attempted to take as many lives as possible that day. But
the odds are that when the next would-be terrorist attacks
passengers on a train or a subway, the public may not be so
fortunate to have such capable people on board who are ready to
react.
The easy access to rail transportation is one of the
features that makes it so popular. Compared with air travel,
most of us individually appreciate the relative ease of using
subways, like the Metro here in the District of Columbia or MTA
in New York or commuter rail, such as Long Island Railroad or
Metro-North. Everyone values and enjoys simple and easy access.
However we have seen the vulnerability inherent in easy access
in most transit services, including we have seen that in
London, Mumbai, Madrid, Tokyo, and now in Paris. I think as a
New Yorker, where we have in New York City alone literally
thousands of train station entrances and exits, combine that
with Grand Central Station, Penn Station, you realize just how
challenging this is.
With ISIS urging supporters to carry out attacks in the
United States, we have to continue to evaluate the threat,
vulnerability, and related security measures within our
security transportation infrastructure. I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses about efforts to deter and prevent
attacks, as well as how we are balancing the efficiency of
public transit with security.
A key issue is how the Federal Government is assisting
State, local, and regional partners to better protect the
traveling public against the threat of terrorism on America's
public transportation and commuter rail systems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony. I
yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. King.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Mr. Higgins,
for any statement he may have.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing to examine options for enhancing the safety and
security across our surface transportation sectors.
The attacks of 9/11 focused and exploited the weaknesses
inherent in our aviation security to perpetuate one of the
worst attacks on United States soil. However, we must remember
other modes of transportation have been and remain a top
priority for terrorist groups world-wide and their affiliates.
There have been devastating terrorist attacks against all modes
of surface transportation across the globe, including train
bombings in Belarus, India, Russia, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, and most recently a shooting on a train traveling from
Amsterdam to Paris.
While there was not been a successful transportation-
related attack by al-Qaeda in the United States since 9/11,
there have been a number of thwarted plots. My concern with
this issue led me to introduce legislation in July entitled the
Known Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threats
to Transportation Act.
The Department of Energy plans to begin transporting highly
enriched uranium liquid from Canada to South Carolina next
year. The Department of Energy proposes to transport this
waste, which is far more radioactive than spent nuclear fuel,
across the Northern Border at the Peace Bridge, crossing
through several States and municipalities before reaching South
Carolina. An attack on one of these trucks crossing the Peace
Bridge could contaminate the Great Lakes--which contains 84
percent of North America's surface fresh water--with highly
radioactive material.
Moreover, an attack on a truck moving through heavily
populated areas throughout the United States would have obvious
and devastating consequences.
Despite these risks, the Department of Energy is about to
begin importing highly radioactive material, which has never
before been shipped in this manner, using outdated, pre-9/11
information that does not reflect the threats we face today.
My bill, which was advanced through my Counterterrorism and
Intelligence Subcommittee today unanimously, would direct the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and
Analysis to conduct an assessment of the risks associated with
the transportation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological materials. The bill also mandates that the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis consult and share information with
the heads of other Federal agencies, including the
Transportation Security Administration, so that the assessment
is informed by the most current information about homeland
security threats.
As my bill continues to move through the House and the
Senate, I hope to raise awareness of the security risks and
protections needed within the surface transportation sector of
our country.
Again, I thank Chairman King, Chairman Katko, and my fellow
Ranking Member Rice for their leadership in focusing our
oversight on this hearing. With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Mr. Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
September 17, 2015
Chairmen, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to
examine options for enhancing the safety and security across our
surface transportation sectors.
The attacks of 9/11 focused and exploited the weaknesses inherent
in aviation security to perpetrate one of the worst attacks on U.S.
soil. However, we must remember other modes of transportation have been
and remain a top priority for transnational terrorist groups world-wide
and their affiliates.
There have been devastating terrorist attacks against all modes of
surface transportation across the globe including train bombings in
Belarus, India, Russia, Spain and the United Kingdom, and most
recently, a shooting on a train traveling from Amsterdam to Paris.
While there has not been a successful transportation-related attack by
al-Qaeda in the United States since 9/11, there have been a number of
thwarted plots.
My concern with this issue led me to introduce legislation in July
titled the ``Known CBRN Threats to Transportation Act.'' The Department
of Energy plans to begin transporting highly enriched uranium liquid
from Canada to South Carolina next year. The Department of Energy
proposes to transport this waste, which is far more radioactive than
spent nuclear fuel, across the Northern Border at the Peace Bridge,
crossing through several States and municipalities before reaching
South Carolina.
An attack on one of these trucks crossing the Peace Bridge could
contaminate the Great Lakes, which contain 84% of North America's
surface fresh water, with highly radioactive material. Moreover, an
attack on a truck moving through heavily-populated areas throughout the
United States would have obvious and devastating consequences.
Despite these risks, the Department of Energy is about to begin
importing highly radioactive material, which has never before been
shipped in this manner, using outdated, pre-9/11 information that does
not reflect the threats we face today.
My bill, which was advanced through my Counterterrorism and
Intelligence Subcommittee today unanimously, would direct the
Department of Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
to conduct an assessment of the risks associated with the
transportation of chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological
materials.
The bill also mandates that the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
consult and share information with the heads of other Federal agencies,
including the Transportation Security Administration so that the
assessment is informed by the most current information about homeland
security threats.
As my bill continues to move through The House and Senate, I hope
to raise awareness of the security risks and protections needed within
surface transportation sector of our country.
Again, I thank Chairman King, Chairman Katko, and my fellow Ranking
Member Rice for their leadership and focusing our oversight on this
hearing.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely and important
hearing.
The Transportation Security Administration was established shortly
after the terrorist attacks of 2001.
While the name of the agency implies that its mission is to help
secure all modes of transportation, in practice, most of TSA's
attention and resources are dedicated to aviation security.
TSA has an important statutory role to play in securing freight
rail, highway and motor carriers, pipelines, and mass transit and
passenger rail systems.
Last month's attempted terrorist attack on a passenger train in
Europe should remind us all of the need to focus on and allocate
resources to securing all modes of transportation.
On August 21, 2015, a terrorist opened fire on a train full of
passengers en route from Amsterdam to Paris.
Thanks, in large part, to the selfless efforts of four individuals,
including three Americans, the attacker was subdued and the attack--
which could have been much worse--was ended.
With this event fresh in our minds, it is necessary for us to
discuss what TSA can be doing to bolster the Nation's non-aviation
transportation systems.
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, which I authored, directed TSA to take specific actions to
address various issues and vulnerabilities within the surface
transportation sector.
In addition to requiring security assessments for public
transportation systems, it directed TSA to issue regulations for a
public transportation security training program.
This plan would provide public transportation employees, including
front-line employees, with the training necessary to properly respond
in the event of a security threat.
The law gave TSA interim authority to issue final regulations and
required TSA to have a detailed program in place by August 1, 2008.
Needless to say, to this date--nearly 8 years later--the front-line
training requirement still has not been implemented by TSA.
It is necessary that the men and women who work to ensure that
these transportation systems are trained to react to and mitigate the
effects of a terrorist attack or security incident; they are a vital
layer of security.
TSA cannot implement security initiatives within the surface
transportation sector alone.
In fact, it takes a comprehensive public-private partnership to
effectively address vulnerabilities.
Given today's panel, we will gain a good understanding of the way
that TSA communicates and works with private-sector entities to prepare
for security events and implement security measures.
I expect that Chief Hanson of Amtrak and Mr. Diaz of the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority in New York will give valuable
insight and perspective regarding the procedures in place to keep
travelers safe, as they protect and transport millions of passengers
every day, and I thank them for being here.
I also look forward to hearing from Ms. Grover about TSA's progress
in addressing issues involving rail security incident reporting
requirements, as well as the system TSA utilizes to integrate
stakeholder feedback into their surface operations.
Lastly, I look forward to hearing about TSA initiatives in place to
address all vulnerabilities and issues associated with surface modes of
transportation from Mr. Mayenschein.
I thank all witnesses for being here today, and look forward to the
dialogue.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Katko. We are pleased to have with us today a group of
distinguished witnesses to speak on this very important topic.
Let me remind the witnesses that their entire written
statements will appear in the record. I simply want to caution
you that we are going to be interrupted at some point for votes
today. So the more brief the opening statements, it would be
probably most productive for us. So I would appreciate you
accommodating us on that.
Our first witness today is Mr. Eddie Mayenschein, who
serves as assistant administrator in the Office of Security
Policy and Industry Engagement at the Transportation Security
Administration. Previously, Mr. Mayenschein served as an
executive at United Airlines and was vice president of flight
operations for Ameriflight, the world's largest Part 135
airline.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mayenschein to testify.
STATEMENT OF EDDIE MAYENSCHEIN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mayenschein. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko, Ranking
Member Rice, Chairman King, and Ranking Member Higgins,
distinguished Members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's role in surface
transportation security.
The surface transportation enterprise is massive. It is a
huge challenge to secure surface transportation systems in a
society where the free movement of people and commerce is not
only expected, it is a valued way of life. Unlike the aviation
realm where TSA conducts security operations, TSA's role in
surface is focused primarily on oversight, cooperation, and
regulation.
Since its inception, TSA has worked collaboratively with
surface transportation operators, security partners, and the
Federal interagency to ensure appropriate security posture. Our
emphasis has been four-fold: Intelligence and information,
sharing transportation security grants, training and exercises,
and operational augmentation.
Since 2002, TSA has valued collaborative information
sharing among interagency and industry partners. Intelligence
and information-sharing efforts are conducted through entities
such as the Transit Policing and Security Peer Advisory Group,
or the PAG, consisting of chiefs of police and security
directors from 27 entities, including the largest U.S. public
transportation systems, also Canada and the United Kingdom. We
also host forums such as the Annual Mass Transit and Passenger
Rail Security Roundtable and monthly industry operator
conference calls in all modes.
TSA advises FEMA for DHS surface transportation grants and
develops risk-based funding priorities on security initiatives
in surface transportation. Since 2006, $2.3 billion has been
made available via the various security grant programs.
Through close work with our partners, we provide resources
for security exercises and training. With Congress' help, TSA
created the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program,
or I-STEP, to assist surface entities testing and evaluating
their security plans and their ability to respond to incidents.
Most recently, an I-STEP exercise was conducted in Philadelphia
to prepare for the papal visit.
As was the practice first initiated by DOT's Federal
Transit Administration, TSA also works very closely with our
stakeholders to update and disseminate recommended security
guidelines, such as security action items for mass transit,
highway and freight rail, motor coach security best practices,
and pipeline security smart practice observations.
Lastly, each of the surface modes has developed or is
developing handbooks, guides, and/or security DVDs, Web-based
training addressing such subjects as sabotage, IED detection
and response, and highlights the DHS-sponsored Run, Hide, Fight
active-shooter training.
The TSA First Observer program trains highway professionals
to observe, assess, and report potential security and terrorism
incidents. Beginning in 2004, and also with Congressional
support and authorization, TSA expanded the National Explosive
Detection
K-9 Program to include mass transit, passenger rail systems,
and ferries. Currently, 139 transit maritime K-9 teams are
deployed to high-risk systems.
In the aftermath of the terrorism incidents in London's
transit system in 2005, TSA created the Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response, the VIPR team concept, to augment law
enforcement and security personnel to enhance security in the
Nation's transportation system. Currently, 31 VIPR teams are
based in 20 high-risk locations throughout the Nation.
TSA appreciates the collaborative working relationship we
have with our industry partners, including those from Amtrak
and New York MTA, who are testifying on this panel today.
The recent incident in France is a reminder that we
collectively must remain attentive to world-wide threats and
incidents. Following that incident, transit and law enforcement
agencies across the Nation participated in an Amtrak-sponsored
operation known as RAILSAFE, which is conducted several times
each year to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable
security activities.
I thank the committee Members for their interest, and most
importantly, their demonstrated support of these issues, and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mayenschein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eddie Mayenschein
September 17, 2015
Good afternoon Chairman Katko, Ranking Member Rice, Chairman King,
Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of the committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) role in surface
transportation security.
TSA is a high-performing counterterrorism agency, applying a
layered, intelligence-driven and risk-based approach to protect the
Nation's transportation systems, including aviation, mass transit and
passenger rail, freight rail, highway and motor carrier, and pipeline.
Additionally, TSA leverages its core competencies in credentialing,
explosives detection, and intermodal security to support the U.S. Coast
Guard as lead agency for maritime security. With its surface
transportation programs, TSA strengthens and enhances the security of a
complex transportation network through cooperative and collaborative
efforts with significant sector operators to develop best practices and
share information.
surface transportation background
TSA could not accomplish this essential mission without
intelligence analysis and information sharing, explosives detection
canine teams, Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams,
and our industry partners voluntarily adopting security improvements
and sharing best practices with each other and with TSA. This
collaborative ``whole community'' approach helps to ensure that both
TSA and industry resources are applied efficiently and have the highest
efficacy in reducing risk to the Nation's transportation systems.
Protecting the Nation's transportation systems to ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce is crucial to every American's daily
life. There are over 12,000 individual companies or agencies that
operate within the five modes of the surface transportation landscape.
More than 500 individual freight railroads operate on nearly 140,000
miles of track carrying essential goods. Eight million large capacity
commercial trucks, and almost 4,000 commercial bus companies travel on
the 4 million miles of roadway in the United States and more than
600,000 highway bridges and through 350 tunnels greater than 100 meters
in length. In the mass transit and passenger rail mode there are
approximately 7,300 organizations representing a wide range of systems
from very small bus-only systems in rural areas to very large multi-
modal systems in urban areas. Surface transportation operators carry
approximately 750 million intercity bus passengers and 10 billion
passenger trips on mass transit each year. The pipeline industry
consists of more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines, owned and
operated by approximately 3,000 private companies, which transport
natural gas, refined petroleum products and other commercial products
throughout the United States.
TSA oversees the development and implementation of risk-based
security initiatives for these different modes of surface
transportation in coordination with our security partners. As part of
its security and counterterrorism mission, TSA works with private and
municipal operator stakeholders to formulate policies and practices
that improve security operations in their day-to-day environment. The
Surface Division conducts analysis of transportation security and
threat issues from both a long-term strategic perspective and near
real-time analysis through data collected from TSA inspections and
assessments. These analyses facilitate the assessment of risk in each
surface mode and guide the development of risk reduction plans and
initiatives. For instance, in 2007 our review of the industry scores in
the training category of the BASE assessments indicated a potential
vulnerability. TSA addressed this vulnerability by modifying the
Transit Security Grants Program to prioritize front-line employee
training.
These activities, such as Security Awareness Messages (SAMs),
provide our security partners with a menu of risk mitigation options
they can implement based on the threat and their specific capabilities.
Additionally, we develop, evaluate, approve, and implement surface
transportation security initiatives to ensure that security guidance,
policies, and regulations issued by TSA are risk-based, outcome-
oriented, and effective in reducing risk.
collaboration with federal, state, local, tribal, and private entities
TSA maintains strong working relationships with modal
administrations of the Department of Transportation (DOT). The
Department of Transportation is the co-Sector Specific Agency with TSA
for the transportation sector and routinely communicates, coordinates,
and collaborates on the harmonization of safety and security
priorities. This coordination includes working directly with the
Federal Railroad Administration, the Federal Transit Administration,
the Federal Highway Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration. As part of the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure
Partnership Advisory Council framework, DOT and TSA co-chair Government
Coordinating Councils for surface transportation modes, including
freight rail, mass transit and passenger rail, highway and motor
carrier, and pipelines. Coordinated activities include collaboration on
new and existing regulations, conducting security assessments and
analysis of data, developing and conducting training and exercises to
address counterterrorism and all-hazards, and sharing Unclassified and
Classified information as appropriate.
TSA engages with State, local, Tribal, and private-sector partners
to identify ways to reduce vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve
security through collaborative and voluntary efforts while maintaining
the flow of people and commerce. Planning initiatives and policies in
coordination with our stakeholders is of utmost importance. TSA works
with industry operators to ensure efforts and resources are
appropriately directed towards reducing risk to the surface
transportation network and infrastructure. Collaboration with those
stakeholders is particularly important, and achieved in part through
formal structures like the DHS-led Critical Infrastructure Partnership
Advisory Council framework, Sector Coordinating Councils, and other
industry-centric organizations such as the Mass Transit Policing and
Security Peer Advisory Group.
Through these established networks and other informal channels, TSA
collaborates with security and corporate leadership of the industry and
municipal operator stakeholders in the pursuit of policy that reduces
risk, including implementation of exercises, physical and cyber
hardening measures, and operational deterrence activities. We also work
very closely with our stakeholders in the development and dissemination
of recommended practices, such as Security Action Items (SAIs) for mass
transit, highway, and freight rail; motor-coach security best
practices, and the Pipeline Security Smart Practice Observations.
Through these networks, we have also established robust information
sharing procedures and capabilities, such as the distribution of SAMs,
the establishment of monthly stakeholder conference calls, and the
dissemination of intelligence and threat information through modal
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).
On the passenger rail side, TSA and Amtrak partner on programs such
as Regional Alliance Including Local, State, and Federal Efforts
(RAILSAFE) to deter terrorist activity through unpredictable security
activities. This program also incorporates other rail, transit, and
local law enforcement agencies and involves counterterrorism activities
such as increased station and right-of-way patrols, greater security
presence on trains and at stations, explosive detection sweeps using
canine teams, and random passenger bag inspections. Participating
entities conduct these activities at local and regional high-risk
transit locations to disrupt potential terrorist activities and
reconnaissance as part of the layered approach to security. On average,
more than 40 States and over 200 agencies, including TSA's VIPR teams,
participate RAILSAFE activities.
Through highway and motor carrier security programs, TSA has
provided multiple voluntary initiatives to industry through forums and
other communications, including security action items and training,
which focus on over-the-road buses that service high-threat urban
areas, trucks carrying hazardous materials, and student transportation.
Additionally, TSA coordinates and collaborates with the Department of
Transportation to develop and implement a National Strategy for Bridge
and Tunnel Security based on the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
(USACE) vulnerability assessments. As a result, and working with USACE,
TSA has assessed 100 percent of all high-risk bridges and tunnels, and
has provided 81 percent of the remediation recommendations to asset
owners. The final 19 percent of reports are in the process of being
completed and will be shared within the next 12 months.
For the transport of hazardous cargo on the Nation's roadways, TSA
conducts security threat assessments on professional drivers with
Commercial Drivers Licenses who seek endorsement to haul hazardous
materials. Only those applicants who have been successfully vetted and
have received a TSA-approved Security Threat Assessment (STA) are
allowed to transport such hazardous materials.
We work very closely with the pipeline industry on identifying and
improving cybersecurity vulnerabilities, including coordinating a
number of Classified briefings to increase awareness of the threat.
TSA's involvement in the Pipeline Corporate Security Review (CSR) and
Critical Facility Security Review (CFSR) program continues to help our
pipeline stakeholders improve their organization-wide and critical
infrastructure-specific security postures.
As an example of our close working relationships with the industry,
TSA recently successfully launched the Loaned Executive Program aimed
at providing senior-level transportation security officials with first-
hand experience of the Transportation Security Administration's various
counter-terrorism and risk reduction roles in enhancing industry
security is providing real-world experience and detailed industry
exposure to TSA's surface security programs and policies. The program,
which began as a pilot last September, has seen executives from Amtrak,
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, and Bay Area Rapid
Transit Authority participate in the program so far.
TSA provides the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) with
subject-matter expertise to assist in the development of transportation
security Notice of Funding Opportunities (grants) for surface
transportation owners and operators. These FEMA grants support
transportation risk mitigation by applying Federal funding to critical
security projects with the greatest security effects. Between fiscal
years 2006 and 2014, over $2.2 billion in transportation security grant
funding was awarded to freight railroad carriers and operators, over-
the-road bus operators, the trucking community, and public mass transit
owners and operators, including Amtrak, and their dedicated law
enforcement providers. TSA continuously reviews the grant program
framework and makes recommendations to FEMA, ensuring funding
priorities are based on identified or potential threat and
vulnerabilities identified through TSA assessment programs such as the
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) program, together
with consideration of potential consequences. As a result, DHS is able
to direct grant funds to activities that have the highest efficacy in
reducing the greatest risk, such as critical infrastructure
vulnerability remediation, equipment purchases, anti-terrorism teams,
mobile screening teams, explosives detection canine teams, training,
drills/exercises, and public awareness campaigns.
training and exercises
TSA works closely with our transportation stakeholders to provide
resources for security training and exercises. Through a National
review of assessments, TSA identified areas where we could assist
transportation entities in providing better security training to their
front-line employees. As such, TSA prioritized the development and
distribution of security training resources for surface transportation
front-line employees through channels such as TSA-produced training
modules and making recommendations to adjust grant program priorities.
TSA's First ObserverTM program trains highway professionals
and other security entities, such as those responsible for providing
parking and facility security at major sporting arenas and venues, to
observe, assess, and report potential security and terrorism incidents.
Since fiscal year 2006, over $141 million in grant funding has been
awarded to mass transit, freight rail, and over-the-road bus operators
for security training, including over $129 million through the Transit
Security Grant Program for mass transit agencies and Amtrak; over $6.9
million through the Freight Rail Security Grant Program for freight
rail carriers; and $5.4 million through the Intercity Bus Security
Grant Program for over-the-road bus operators. Additionally, we have
developed and distributed an array of mode-specific training products
for front-line employees. With this targeted effort on security
training, TSA has seen assessment results related to security training
improve across all modes of surface transportation. As an example,
since 2007, the percentage of grant-eligible mass transit agencies that
have a sound security training program based on their BASE scores has
increased from 19% to 66%. Also, as a sub-set, the percentage of
agencies in the higher-risk regions with sound security training
programs has increased from 27% to 78%.
With regard to exercises, TSA collaborates with industry through
our Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) across
all modes of surface transportation. TSA facilitates I-STEP exercises
to help surface transportation entities test and evaluate their
security plans, including prevention and preparedness capabilities, and
their ability to respond to threats and cooperate with first responders
from other entities. Entities that receive an I-STEP exercise are
selected through an extensive review process based on risk, which looks
at elements such as assessment results, emerging threats as identified
through intelligence resources. As new threats emerge, I-STEP scenarios
are updated to ensure our industry partners are prepared to exercise
the most appropriate countermeasures.
assessments and inspections
TSA also plays a role in surface transportation security through
voluntary assessments and regulatory compliance inspections. The
Surface Division works closely with TSA's Office of Security Operations
(OSO), which conducts both voluntary assessments and required
regulatory compliance inspections.
TSA conducts approximately 10,000 regulatory inspections of freight
railroads each year to ensure compliance with regulations requiring the
secure exchange of custody of rail cars carrying Rail Security
Sensitive Materials, as well as reporting significant security concerns
and providing location and shipping information of certain rail
shipments to TSA.
OSO's Surface Transportation Security Inspectors conduct a thorough
security program assessment of mass transit agencies to include Amtrak,
and over-the-road bus operators through the BASE program. BASE
assessments are conducted with emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit
and passenger railroad systems measured by passenger volume, which
account for over 95 percent of all users of public transportation.
Results of these assessments feed into resource allocation decisions,
including I-STEP exercises and grant funding, to ensure that the
higher-risk entities with the greatest need receive priority
consideration for available resources. For instance, in 2007 our review
of the industry scores in the training category of the BASE assessments
indicated a potential vulnerability. TSA addressed this vulnerability
by modifying the Transit Security Grants Program to prioritize front-
line employee training.
Assessments and inspections in surface transportation are not
limited to rail and highway operations. In pipeline mode, for example,
the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(Pub. L. No. 110-53) required TSA to develop and implement a plan for
inspecting the critical facilities of the top 100 pipeline systems in
the Nation. These required inspections were conducted between 2008 and
2011 through the Critical Facility Inspection program, with regular
recurring reviews now being conducted through TSA's Critical Facility
Security Review program.
conclusion
TSA works collaboratively with surface transportation industry
partners to develop and implement programs while enhancing security and
mitigating the risk to our Nation's surface transportation systems
while promoting commerce. I want to thank the committee for its
continued assistance to TSA and for the opportunity to discuss our work
in partnering with the surface transportation industry to provide
better security to the American people. Thank you, and I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Mayenschein, for your testimony.
We appreciate you being here today.
Our second witness is well-known to us, Ms. Jennifer
Grover, who currently serves as the director for transportation
security and Coast Guard issues on U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice Team.
Ms. Grover, I just want to note that you have provided
great information for us in both a secure and a nonsecure
setting in the past, and I look forward to hearing from it
again today. I encourage you, as always, to be as frank and
forthright as possible with issues so that we can best address
them moving forward.
So what that, I recognize you to testify.
STATEMENT OF JENNIFER GROVER, DIRECTOR, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
AND COAST GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Grover. Thank you. Good afternoon. I am pleased to be
here today to discuss TSA's efforts to secure the U.S. surface
transportation system.
As many of you have already noted, rail and transit
systems, pipelines, and the Nation's highway transportation
system are inherently vulnerable to attack and difficult to
secure because they are open systems with multiple access
points, where people and vehicles can generally move about
freely. In this situation, good intelligence and robust
communication about possible threats becomes critically
important.
Compared to aviation, where TSA has a direct role in
providing security, TSA's role in surface transportation
security is indirect. For example, TSA contributes to surface
transportation security by providing industry with recommended
security standards and conducting voluntary security
assessments.
TSA is also responsible for gathering information and
sharing intelligence about potential threats. Specifically, TSA
requires U.S. rail agencies to report all rail security
incidents, with the intent of allowing TSA to analyze the data,
identify new threats, and alert the rail industry and law
enforcement.
For this to work, though, TSA has to receive consistent and
accurate information on these rail incidents. They have to have
a data management system in place to capture the information,
to conduct appropriate analysis, and have effective data-
sharing mechanisms. TSA has recently taken steps to improve in
all of these areas.
In 2012, GAO found that TSA headquarters had not provided
guidance to local TSA officials, called surface inspectors,
about the types of rail security incidents that rail systems
had to report, which led to inconsistent reporting. As a
result, the number of incidents per million riders reported by
7 passenger rail systems ranged from less than 1 to 23 during
2011.
Now, some variation is always to be expected. But in this
case passenger rail officials told us that they had received
inconsistent feedback from TSA surface inspectors about what
should be reported, particularly for incidents involving
weapons. We also found that TSA's enforcement of the reporting
requirement varied, with some rail systems not inspected at all
over an 18-month period and TSA inspectors taking action
against some rail systems but not others when both rail systems
failed to report the same type of incident.
In addition, the quality of TSA's data was poor, as its
data management system didn't capture all incidents and was
prone to data entry errors. Due to other technical limitations,
TSA couldn't provide basic information, such as the number of
incidents by type or rail system. Without this type of analytic
ability, TSA faced challenges in identifying patterns or trends
in the data as the system was intended to do.
Finally, in June 2014, GAO also found that surface
transportation stakeholders varied in their level of
satisfaction with TSA's security-related information sharing,
but TSA did not have a systematic process for collecting and
addressing stakeholder feedback to ensure that the information
they were providing was of value.
In response to our recommendations on these issues, TSA
provided guidance to surface inspectors and rail systems to
clarify reporting requirements and took steps to enhance the
consistency of its inspection process. TSA has also made
improvements to capture data on previously-unreported security
incidents and changed the data system to improve its analytic
capabilities. In addition, TSA has developed a new process to
document and respond to stakeholder feedback on its efforts.
Collectively, these changes addressed the intent of our
recommendations. If TSA implements them effectively going
forward, they will help to ensure that the rail security
incident reporting process is consistently implemented and that
TSA has the tools and information necessary to develop a
useful, comprehensive, and accurate picture of security
incidents, as well as developing trends or patterns.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Grover follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Grover
September 17, 2015
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-15-205T, a testimony before the Subcommittees on
Transportation Security and Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The U.S. surface transportation system's size and importance to the
country's safety, security, and economic well-being make it an
attractive target for terrorists. Within the Federal Government, TSA--a
component of the Department of Homeland Security--is the primary
Federal agency responsible for overseeing and enhancing the security of
the surface transportation system. A key component of this
responsibility is ensuring that security-related information is
collected, analyzed, and shared effectively across all modes, including
rail. In 2008, TSA issued a regulation requiring U.S. passenger rail
agencies to report all potential threats and significant security
concerns to TSA, among other things.
This testimony addresses the extent to which TSA has: (1) Developed
systematic processes for integrating stakeholder feedback about
security-related information it provides and analyzing trends in
reported rail security incidents, and (2) ensured consistent
implementation of rail security incident reporting requirements. This
statement is based on related GAO reports issued in June 2014 and
December 2012, including selected updates on TSA's efforts to implement
GAO's prior recommendations related to rail security and information
sharing. For the selected updates, GAO reviewed related documentation,
including tools TSA developed to provide oversight. GAO also
interviewed TSA officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is making no new recommendations in this statement.
surface transportation security.--tsa has taken steps designed to
develop processes for sharing and analyzing information and to improve
rail security incident reporting
What GAO Found
In June 2014, GAO found that the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) did not have a systematic process for
incorporating stakeholder feedback to improve security-related
information sharing and recommended that TSA systematically document
and incorporate stakeholder feedback. TSA concurred with this
recommendation and, in April 2015, TSA developed a standard operating
procedure to help ensure proper evaluation and consideration of all
feedback TSA receives. In December 2012, GAO found TSA had made limited
use of the rail security incident information it had collected from
rail agencies, in part because it did not have a systematic process for
conducting trend analysis. TSA's purpose for collecting this
information was to allow TSA to ``connect the dots'' through trend
analysis. However, the incident information provided to rail agencies
by TSA was generally limited to descriptions of specific incidents. As
a result, officials from passenger rail agencies GAO spoke with
reported that they generally found little value in TSA's incident
reporting requirement. On the basis of these findings, GAO recommended
that TSA establish a systematic process for regularly conducting trend
analysis of the rail security incident data. Although GAO has not
assessed the effectiveness of TSA's efforts, by August 2013, TSA had
developed a new analysis capability that, among other things, produces
Trend Analysis Reports from the incident data.
In December 2012, GAO found that TSA had not provided consistent
oversight of its rail security reporting requirement, which led to
variation in the types and number of passenger rail security incidents
reported. Specifically, GAO found that TSA headquarters had not
provided guidance to local TSA inspection officials, the primary TSA
points of contact for rail agencies, about the types of rail security
incidents that must be reported, which contributed to inconsistent
interpretation of the regulation. The variation in reporting was
compounded by inconsistencies in compliance inspections and enforcement
actions, in part because of limited utilization of oversight mechanisms
at the headquarters level. GAO also found that TSA's incident
management data system, WebEOC, had incomplete information, was prone
to data entry errors, and had other limitations that inhibited TSA's
ability to search and extract basic information. On the basis of these
findings, GAO recommended that TSA: (1) Develop and disseminate written
guidance on the types of incidents that should be reported, (2) enhance
existing oversight mechanisms for compliance inspections and
enforcement actions, (3) establish a process for updating WebEOC with
previously-unreported incidents, and (4) develop guidance to reduce
data entry errors. TSA concurred with these recommendations and has
taken actions to implement them. Specifically, in September 2013, TSA
disseminated written guidance to local TSA inspection officials and
passenger and freight rail agencies that provides clarification about
the rail security incident reporting requirement. In August 2013, TSA
enhanced existing oversight mechanisms by creating an inspection review
mechanism, among other things. TSA also established a process for
updating WebEOC in March 2013, and in October 2014, officials reported
that they have updated the guidance used by officials responsible for
entering incident data to reduce data entry errors associated with
incident types. Although GAO has not assessed the effectiveness of
these efforts, they address the intent of the recommendations.
Chairmen Katko and King, Ranking Members Rice and Higgins, and
Members of the subcommittees: I appreciate the opportunity to
participate in today's hearing to discuss our work related to the
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to secure the
U.S. surface transportation system, particularly those associated with
passenger and freight rail.\1\ The transportation system's size and
importance to the country's safety, security, and economic well-being
make it an attractive target for terrorists. As shown by the active-
shooter incident that occurred on a train traveling from Amsterdam to
Paris on August 21, 2015, rail systems are inherently vulnerable to
attack in part because they rely on an open architecture that is
difficult to monitor and secure because of its multiple access points;
hubs serving multiple carriers; and, in some cases, lack of barriers to
access. One of the critical challenges facing rail system operators--
and the Federal agencies that regulate and oversee them--is finding
ways to protect rail systems from potential terrorist attacks without
compromising the accessibility and efficiency of rail travel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The surface transportation modes include passenger rail (such
as subway-type mass transit systems and intercity rail such as Amtrak),
freight rail, highway and commercial vehicle, and pipeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the Federal Government, TSA--a component of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the primary Federal agency responsible
for security in all modes of transportation, including aviation,
passenger and freight rail, highway and motor carrier, maritime, and
pipeline.\2\ A key component of this responsibility is ensuring that
information related to transportation security and potential threats
across all modes is collected, analyzed, and shared effectively.
Disrupted terrorist attacks in recent years, such as the April 2013
disruption of a planned attack on a passenger train operating between
Toronto and New York City, highlight the importance of reporting and
sharing security-related information. TSA's other responsibilities,
however, vary by transportation mode. Specifically, TSA has a direct
role in ensuring the security of the aviation mode through its
management of a passenger and baggage screener workforce that inspects
individuals and their property to deter and prevent an act of violence
or air piracy. In contrast, TSA's responsibilities for securing surface
transportation systems such as passenger and freight rail systems have
primarily included developing National strategies, establishing
security standards, and conducting assessments and inspections of
surface transportation modes, while public and private-sector
transportation operators are responsible for implementing security
measures for their systems. TSA's annual budget further highlights the
difference between TSA's roles in securing the aviation and surface
transportation modes. For example, the DHS Appropriations Act, 2015,
enacted March 4, 2015, appropriated $123,749,000 for surface
transportation security compared with $5,639,095,000 for aviation
security.\3\
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\2\ Pub. L. No. 107-71, 101(a), 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. 114(d)).
\3\ Pub. L. No. 114-4, 129 Stat. 39, 44-46 (2015). The
approximately $124 million and $5.6 billion appropriated to TSA's
Surface Transportation Security and Aviation Security accounts,
respectively, do not reflect amounts appropriated to TSA's Intelligence
and Vetting and Transportation Security Support accounts, which also
support TSA's surface and aviation security missions, as well as the
$250 million in fee collections available to TSA through the Aviation
Security Capital Fund to support security-related airport improvement
projects and the procurement and installation of explosives detection
systems for use at airports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement today addresses the extent to which TSA has: (1)
Developed systematic processes for integrating stakeholder feedback
about security-related information provided by the agency and analyzing
trends in reported rail security incidents, and (2) ensured consistent
implementation of rail security incident reporting requirements. This
statement is based on related GAO reports issued in December 2012 and
June 2014, including selected updates on TSA's efforts to implement our
prior recommendations related to information sharing and rail
security.\4\ To conduct our earlier work, among other things, we
conducted a survey of 481 transportation stakeholders, including
freight and passenger rail stakeholders, from November 2013 through
January 2014, regarding their satisfaction with TSA's sharing of
security-related information. We received responses from 337
stakeholders (a 70 percent response rate). We also reviewed TSA policy
documents and guidance on rail security reporting requirements, and
passenger rail security incident data from January 2011 through June
2012. The reports cited in this statement provide detailed information
about our scope and methodology. For the selected updates, we reviewed
related documentation and interviewed TSA officials on TSA's progress
in addressing our recommendations. This documentation includes tools
TSA developed to provide oversight of the rail security incident
reporting process, guidance for TSA inspectors and rail agencies, and
updates to TSA's data management system, among other things. The work
upon which this statement is based was conducted in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives.
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\4\ GAO, Transportation Security Information Sharing: Stakeholder
Satisfaction Varies; TSA Could Take Additional Actions to Strengthen
Efforts. GAO-14-506 (Washington, DC: June 24, 2014), and Passenger Rail
Security: Consistent Incident Reporting and Analysis Needed to Achieve
Program Objectives. GAO-13-20 (Washington, DC: Dec. 19, 2012).
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background
The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
(9/11 Commission Act) directed DHS to create a plan for sharing
transportation security-related information among public and private
entities that have a stake in protecting the Nation's transportation
system, including passenger and freight rail. This plan--first issued
in July 2008--is now called the Transportation Security Information
Sharing Environment (TSISE).\5\ The TSISE describes, among other
things, the information-sharing process. TSA disseminates security
information through several information products, including reports,
assessments, and briefings, among others. These products are
distributed through mechanisms including the Homeland Security
Information Network and mechanisms sponsored by industry, such as the
Association of American Railroads' Railway Alert Network, among others.
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\5\ Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1203(a), 121 Stat. 266, 383-85 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 114(u)). The TSISE was formerly called the
Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan (TSISP). In fiscal
year 2013, TSA renamed the plan the TSISE to reflect that the TSISE is
not a part of a plan, but rather a series of processes.
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TSA is also specifically responsible for receiving, assessing, and
distributing intelligence information related to potential threats and
significant security concerns (rail security incidents) related to the
Nation's rail system. Specifically, in 2008, TSA issued a regulation
requiring U.S. rail systems to report all rail security incidents to
TSA's Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC), among other
things.\6\ The TSOC is an operations center open 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, that serves as TSA's main point of contact for monitoring
security-related incidents or crises in all modes of transportation.
The regulation also authorizes TSA officials to view, inspect, and copy
rail agencies' records as necessary to enforce the rail security
incident reporting requirements.\7\ This regulation is supported by TSA
policies and guidance, including the Transportation Security Inspector
Inspections Handbook, the National Investigations and Enforcement
Manual, and the Compliance Work Plan for Transportation Security
Inspectors. TSA's regulation is intended to provide the agency with
essential information on rail security incidents so that TSA can
conduct comprehensive intelligence analysis, threat assessment, and
allocation of security resources, among other things.\8\ According to
the regulation, potential threats and significant security concerns
that must be reported to the TSOC include bomb threats, suspicious
items, or indications of tampering with rail cars, among others.\9\
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\6\ 49 C.F.R. 1580.105, .203. These requirements generally apply
to passenger and freight rail carriers, as well as rail hazardous
materials shippers and rail hazardous materials receivers located
within high-threat urban areas. The regulation also requires rail
agencies to designate rail security coordinators, and codifies TSA's
authority to conduct security inspections of rail agency property. 49
C.F.R. 1580.101, .201.5 This is the only rule that TSA has issued to
date regarding passenger rail security. Additional rules have been
issued regarding freight rail security, specifically requirements
related to rail shipments of specified hazardous materials. The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 also
mandates TSA to develop and issue regulations for a public
transportation security training program, among other things. Pub. L.
No. 110-53, 1408, 121 Stat. 266, 409-11 (codified at 49 U.S.C.
1137). As of September 2015, a draft regulation had not been submitted
for public comment. According to TSA, the training rule is among the
agency's highest priorities, but officials did not provide a target
date for when the revised regulation will be provided for public
comment.
\7\ 49 C.F.R. 1580.5.
\8\ 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852, 76,876 (Dec. 21, 2006).
\9\ 49 C.F.R. 1580.105(c), .203(c).
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Within TSA, different offices are responsible for sharing
transportation security-related information and for implementing and
enforcing the rail security incident reporting requirement. For
instance, TSA's Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement
(OSPIE) is the primary point of contact for sharing information with
private-sector stakeholders, and is responsible for using incident
reports and analyses, among other things, to develop strategies,
policies, and programs for rail security, including operational
security activities, training exercises, public awareness, and
technology. TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) receives
intelligence information regarding threats to transportation and
designs intelligence products intended for officials in TSA, other
parts of the Federal Government, State and local officials, and
industry officials, including rail agency security coordinators and law
enforcement officials.
The TSOC, managed by TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air
Marshal Service, is the TSA entity primarily responsible for collecting
and disseminating information about rail security incidents. Once
notified of a rail security incident, TSOC officials are responsible
for inputting the incident information into their incident management
database known as WebEOC, and for disseminating incident reports that
they deem high priority or significant to selected TSA officials; other
Federal, State, and local government officials; and selected rail
agencies' law enforcement officials. Figure 1 shows the intended steps
and responsibilities of TSA components involved in the rail security
incident reporting process.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
TSA's Office of Security Operations (OSO) is responsible for
overseeing and enforcing the incident reporting requirement.
Responsible for managing TSA's inspection program for the aviation and
surface modes of transportation, the Office of Security Operations'
Surface Compliance Branch deploys approximately 270 transportation
security inspectors--surface (TSI-S) Nation-wide.\10\ The TSI-Ss are
responsible for, among other things, providing clarification to rail
agencies regarding the incident reporting process and for overseeing
rail agencies' compliance with the reporting requirement by conducting
inspections to ensure that incidents were properly reported to the
TSOC. Six regional security inspectors--surface (RSI-S) within the
Compliance Programs Division are responsible for providing National
oversight of local surface inspection, assessment, and operational
activities.
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\10\ There are currently 49 TSA field offices under the Surface
Compliance Branch. TSI-Ss report to assistant Federal security
directors--inspection (AFSD-I), who are responsible for all inspection,
compliance, and enforcement activity in their areas of responsibility.
Each office is led by a Federal security director charged with the
implementation of all field operational activities across all modes of
transportation. For other transportation modes, as of September 2015,
TSA has deployed 496 air cargo inspectors and 672 aviation regulation
inspectors.
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tsa has developed processes designed to integrate stakeholder feedback
and address gaps in trend analysis
TSA Has Developed a Process Designed to Incorporate Feedback on
Security-Related Information
In June 2014, we found that TSA had some mechanisms in place to
collect stakeholder feedback on the products it disseminates containing
security-related information and had initiated efforts to improve how
it obtains customer feedback, but had not developed a systematic
process for collecting and integrating such feedback.\11\ Specifically,
in February 2014, TSA reconvened its Information Sharing Integrated
Project Team (IPT), whose charter included, among other things,
milestones and time frames for developing a centralized management
framework to capture stakeholder satisfaction survey data on all of
TSA's security-related products and the systems used to distribute
these products.\12\ However, at the time of our June 2014 report, the
IPT Charter did not specify how TSA planned to systematically collect,
document, and incorporate informal feedback--a key mechanism used by
the majority of the stakeholders we surveyed, and a mechanism TSA
officials told us they utilize to improve information sharing. For
instance, the rail industry provided TSA with a list of areas for
emphasis in intelligence analysis in December 2012, and TSA
subsequently initiated a product line focusing on indications and
warnings associated with disrupted or successful terrorist attacks. TSA
officials stated that they further refined one of the products as a
result of a stakeholder requesting information on tactics used in
foreign rail attacks. In 2013, one TSA component built a system to
track informal information sharing with stakeholders at meetings and
conferences, and through e-mail, but TSA officials stated that the data
were not used for operational purposes, and TSA had no plans to
incorporate this system into its centralized management framework
because the IPT had decided to focus its initial efforts on developing
a survey mechanism.
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\11\ GAO-14-506. Mechanisms include surveys attached to security-
related information products and informal feedback collected at
meetings with stakeholders.
\12\ According to TSA officials, TSA formed the IPT in 2009 but
planning stopped because of multiple TSA organization realignments. IPT
members include OIA, OSPIE, and other TSA components, as well as
external entities, such as the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis,
stakeholders, and trade associations. One of the primary missions of
the IPT is to evaluate TSA's information-sharing services across all
modes of transportation.
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According to our June 2014 survey results, surface transportation
stakeholders were generally satisfied with TSA's security-related
products and the mechanisms used to disseminate them.\13\ In
particular, 63 percent of rail stakeholders (70 of 111) reported that
they were satisfied with the products they received in 2013, and 54
percent (59 of 110) reported that they were satisfied with security-
related information-sharing mechanisms.\14\ However, because TSA lacked
specific plans and documentation related to improving its efforts to
incorporate all of its stakeholder feedback, it was unclear how, or if,
TSA planned to use stakeholder feedback to improve information sharing.
As a result of these findings, we recommended that TSA include in its
planned customer feedback framework a systematic process to document
informal feedback, and how it incorporates all of the feedback TSA
receives, both formal and informal. TSA concurred, and in response, by
April 2015, had taken actions to develop these processes. Specifically,
TSA developed a standard operating procedure to organize how its
offices solicit, receive, respond to, and document both formal and
informal customer feedback on its information-sharing efforts, which
delineates a systematic process for doing so. TSA also developed a TSA-
wide standard survey for its offices to use to obtain formal and
informal feedback on specific products, and created an information-
sharing e-mail inbox to which all survey responses will be sent,
evaluated, and distributed to the appropriate office for action. We
have not evaluated these actions, but if implemented effectively, we
believe that TSA will now be better-positioned to meet stakeholder
needs for security-related information.
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\13\ Sixty-seven percent of surface transportation stakeholders
(125 of 186) reported that they were satisfied with the security-
related products they received from TSA in 2013, and 58 percent of
surface transportation stakeholders (106 of 183) reported that they
were satisfied with the mechanisms used to disseminate this
information. Respondents who were not satisfied with TSA's security-
related products or information-sharing mechanisms cited concerns that
the information provided was often dated, among other issues. Survey
respondents were asked to rate their organization's satisfaction using
the following terms: ``Very satisfied,'' ``somewhat satisfied,''
``neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,'' ``somewhat dissatisfied,''
``very dissatisfied,'' and ``don't know.'' We use the term
``satisfied'' to describe organizations that indicated they were either
``very satisfied'' or ``somewhat satisfied.'' Similarly, we use the
term ``dissatisfied'' to describe organizations that indicated they
were either ``very dissatisfied'' or ``somewhat dissatisfied'' with the
information they received. Because satisfaction and dissatisfaction
were not the only possible responses, when we report that 59 percent of
respondents reported being satisfied, for example, that does not
necessarily mean that 41 percent were dissatisfied.
\14\ These results for rail stakeholders differ from those reported
in GAO-14-506 because they represent the survey responses we received
from all passenger and freight rail agencies. The ``public transit''
category in GAO-14-506 included 13 agencies in modes other than rail.
To arrive at the numbers in this statement, we combined the responses
of the 23 rail agencies in the public transit category with the
responses received from 88 and 87 rail agencies in response to our
questions on satisfaction with TSA products and mechanisms,
respectively.
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TSA Efforts Should Help Address Gaps in Conducting Trend Analysis of
Rail Security Incident Information
In December 2012, we found TSA had made limited use of the rail
security incident information it had collected from rail agencies, in
part because it did not have a systematic process for conducting trend
analysis.\15\ TSA's stated purpose for collecting rail security
incident information was to allow TSA to ``connect the dots'' by
conducting trend analysis that could help TSA and rail agencies develop
targeted security measures. However, the incident information provided
to rail agencies by TSA was generally limited to descriptions of
specific incidents with minimal accompanying analysis. As a result,
officials from passenger rail agencies we spoke with generally found
little value in TSA's incident reporting process, because it was
unclear to them how, if at all, the information was being used by TSA
to identify trends or threats that could help TSA and rail agencies
develop appropriate security measures. However, as we reported in
December 2012, opportunities for more sophisticated trend analysis
existed. For example, the freight industry, through the Railway Alert
Network--which is managed by the Association of American Railroads, a
rail industry group--identified a trend where individuals were
reportedly impersonating Federal officials. In coordination with TSA,
the Railway Alert Network subsequently issued guidance to its member
organizations designed to increase awareness of this trend among
freight rail employees and provide descriptive information on steps to
take in response. The Railway Alert Network identified this trend
through analysis of incident reporting from multiple freight railroads.
In each case, the incident had been reported by a railroad employee and
was contained in TSA's incident management system, WebEOC.
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\15\ GAO-13-20.
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On the basis of these findings, in December 2012, we recommended
that TSA establish a systematic process for regularly conducting trend
analysis of the rail security incident data, in an effort to identify
potential security trends that could help the agency anticipate or
prevent an attack against passenger rail and develop recommended
security measures. TSA concurred with this recommendation and by August
2013 had developed a new capability for identifying trends in the rail
security incident data, known as the Surface Compliance Trend Analysis
Network (SCAN). SCAN is designed to identify linkages between incidents
captured in various sources of data, assemble detailed information
about these incidents, and accurately analyze the data to enhance the
agency's ability to detect impending threats. According to TSA
officials, SCAN consists of three elements: Two OSO surface detailees
located at TSOC, enhanced IT capabilities, and a new rail security
incident analysis product for stakeholders. According to TSA, one of
the key functions of the surface detailees is to continuously look for
trends and patterns in the rail security incident data that are
reported to TSOC, and to coordinate with OSPIE and OIA to conduct
further investigations into potential trends. As I will discuss later
in this statement, TSA has also made improvements to WebEOC, including
steps to improve the completeness and accuracy of the data and the
ability to produce basic summary reports, which we believe should
facilitate this type of continuous trend analysis.
TSA generates a Trend Analysis Report for any potential security
trends the surface detailees identify from the rail security incident
data. The Trend Analysis Report integrates incident information from
WebEOC with information from multiple other sources, including TSA's
compliance database and media reports, and provides rail agencies and
other stakeholders with analysis of possible security issues that could
affect operations as a result of these trends. According to TSA
officials, since SCAN was established, approximately 13 Trend Analysis
Reports have been produced and disseminated to local TSA inspection
officials and rail agencies. Although we have not assessed the
effectiveness of these efforts to better utilize rail security
information, we believe these actions address the intent of our
recommendation. Further, if implemented effectively, they should better
position TSA to provide valuable analysis on rail security incidents
and to develop recommended security measures for rail agencies, as
appropriate.
tsa has taken steps to improve consistent implementation of the rail
security incident reporting process
TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Consistency of the Rail Security
Incident Reporting Process
In December 2012, we found that TSA had not provided consistent
oversight of the implementation of the rail security reporting
requirement, which led to considerable variation in the types and
number of passenger rail security incidents reported.\16\ Specifically,
we found that TSA headquarters had not provided guidance to local TSA
inspection officials, the primary TSA points of contact for rail
agencies, about the types of rail security incidents that must be
reported, a fact that contributed to inconsistent interpretation of the
regulation by local TSA inspection officials.\17\ While some variation
was expected in the number of rail security incidents that rail
agencies reported because of differences in agency size, geographic
location, and ridership, passenger rail agencies we spoke with at the
time reported receiving inconsistent feedback from their local TSA
officials regarding certain types of incidents, such as those involving
weapons. As a result, we found that, for 7 of the 19 passenger rail
agencies included in our review, the number of incidents reported per
million riders ranged from 0.25 to 23.15.\18\
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\16\ GAO-13-20.
\17\ For example, officials from one rail agency we spoke with had
been told by their local TSA inspection officials that they were
required to report all instances in which a person was hit by a train,
because an individual cannot be struck by a train in the right of way
without trespassing or breaching security. In contrast, officials from
another rail agency told us that their agency does not report all of
these incidents because they are most often intentional suicides that
are unrelated to terrorism. ``Local TSA inspection officials'' refers
to TSI-Ss and AFSD-Is.
\18\ This includes incidents reported to the TSOC from January 1,
2011, through December 31, 2011, and recorded in WebEOC. However, there
are limitations and errors associated with these data, which are
discussed in greater detail later in this statement. Because of
limitations associated with identifying the total number of incidents
by agency, we limited this analysis to 7 of the 19 passenger rail
agencies that we included in our review. Ridership data for 2011 were
provided by the American Public Transportation Association.
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This variation we identified was compounded by inconsistencies in
compliance inspections and enforcement actions, in part because of
limited utilization of oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level.
For example, in December 2012, we found that TSA established the RSI-S
position as a primary oversight mechanism at the headquarters level for
monitoring rail security compliance inspections and enforcement actions
to help ensure consistency across field offices. However, at the time
of our report, the RSI-S was not part of the formal inspection process
and had no authority to ensure that inspections were conducted
consistently. We also found that the RSI-S had limited visibility over
when and where inspections were completed or enforcement actions were
taken because TSA lacked a process to systematically provide the RSI-S
with this information during the course of normal operations. As a
result, our analysis of inspection data from January 1, 2011, through
June 30, 2012, showed that average monthly inspections for the 19 rail
agencies in our review ranged from about eight inspections to no
inspections, and there was variation in the regularity with which
inspections occurred.\19\ We also found that TSA inconsistently applied
enforcement actions against passenger rail agencies for not complying
with the reporting requirement. For example, TSA took enforcement
action against an agency for not reporting an incident involving a
knife, but did not take action against another agency for not reporting
similar incidents, despite having been inspected.
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\19\ We reviewed inspection data for 19 passenger rail agencies.
Three passenger rail agencies had not been inspected, including a major
metropolitan rail agency. Local officials we interviewed said it was
unlikely that no incidents had occurred at that agency.
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On the basis of these findings, in December 2012, we recommended
that TSA: (1) Develop and disseminate written guidance for local TSA
inspection officials and rail agencies that clarifies the types of
incidents that should be reported to the TSOC, and (2) enhance and
utilize existing oversight mechanisms at the headquarters level, as
intended, to provide management oversight of local compliance
inspections and enforcement actions. TSA concurred with both of these
recommendations and has taken actions to implement them. Specifically,
in September 2013, TSA disseminated written guidance to local TSA
inspection officials and passenger and freight rail agencies that
provides clarification about the requirements of the rail security
incident reporting process. This guidance includes examples and
descriptions of the types of incidents that should be reported under
the regulatory criteria, as well as details about the type of
information that should be included in the incident report provided to
the TSOC. Further, as of August 2013, TSA had established an RSI-
dashboard report that provides weekly, monthly, and quarterly
information about the number of inspection reports that have been
reviewed, accepted, and rejected. According to TSA officials, this
helps ensure that rail agencies are inspected regularly, by providing
the RSI-Ss with greater insight into inspection activities. TSA has
also enhanced the utilization of the RSI-Ss by providing them with the
ability to review both passenger and freight rail inspections before
the inspection reports are finalized and enforcement action is taken.
According to TSA officials, this allows the RSI-Ss to ensure that
enforcement actions are applied consistently by local TSA inspection
officials. TSA also developed a mechanism for tracking the
recommendations RSI-Ss make to local TSA inspection officials regarding
changes to local compliance inspections, as well as any actions that
are taken in response. Collectively, we believe that these changes
should allow the RSI-Ss to provide better management oversight of
passenger and freight rail regulatory inspections and enforcement
actions, though we have not assessed whether they have done so. We also
believe these actions, if implemented effectively, will help ensure
that the rail security incident reporting process is consistently
implemented and enforced, and will address the intent of our
recommendations.
TSA Has Taken Steps to Improve the Accuracy and Completeness of
Incident Data
In December 2012, we also found that TSA's incident management data
system, known as WebEOC, had incomplete information, was prone to data
entry errors, and had other limitations that inhibited TSA's ability to
search and extract basic information.\20\ These weaknesses in WebEOC
hindered TSA's ability to use rail security incident data to identify
security trends or potential threats. Specifically, at the time of our
2012 report, TSA did not have an established process for ensuring that
WebEOC was updated to include information about rail security incidents
that had not been properly reported to the TSOC.\21\ As a result, of
the 18 findings of noncompliance we reviewed that were a result of
failure to report an incident, 13 were never entered into WebEOC, and
consequently could not be used by TSA to identify potential security
trends. In addition, in December 2012, we found that TSA's guidance for
officials responsible for entering incident data was insufficient, a
fact that may have contributed to data entry errors in key fields,
including the incident type and the mode of transportation (such as
mass transit or freight rail). At the time of our report, because of
data errors and technical limitations in WebEOC, TSA also could not
provide us with basic summary information about the rail security
incident data contained in WebEOC, such as the number of incidents
reported by incident type (e.g., suspicious item or bomb threat), by a
particular rail agency, or the total number of rail security incidents
that have been reported to the TSOC.\22\ Without the ability to
identify this information on the number of incidents by type or the
total number of incidents, we concluded that TSA faced challenges
determining if patterns or trends exist in the data, as the reporting
system was intended to do.
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\20\ GAO-13-20.
\21\ TSA could become aware of such an incident through a
compliance inspection, media reports, or other Governmental incident
management systems.
\22\ To conduct our analysis, we asked TSA to provide all passenger
rail incidents reported to the TSOC from January 1, 2011, through June
30, 2012, as well as the total number of incidents reported by selected
rail agencies. In response to this request for data, TSA provided us
with several inconsistent datasets from WebEOC, which officials
attributed to differences in the way the data were searched and
compiled from WebEOC.
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On the basis of these findings, in December 2012 we recommended
that TSA: (1) Establish a process for updating WebEOC when incidents
that had not previously been reported are discovered through compliance
activities, and (2) develop guidance for TSOC officials that includes
definitions of data entry options to reduce errors resulting from data-
entry problems. TSA concurred with both of these recommendations and
has taken actions to implement them. Specifically, in March 2013, TSA
established a process for the surface detailee position, discussed
earlier in this statement, to update WebEOC when previously unreported
incidents are discovered through compliance activities. Additionally,
in October 2014, TSA officials reported they have updated the guidance
used by TSOC officials responsible for entering incident data into
WebEOC to include definitions of incident types. TSA has also made
changes to WebEOC that will allow for officials to search for basic
information, such as the total number of certain types of incidents,
required to facilitate analysis. We have not reevaluated the data
contained in WebEOC, but we believe that the changes TSA has made
should allow the agency to conduct continuous analysis of the rail
security incident data to identify potential trends. We believe these
actions address the intent of our recommendations and, if implemented
effectively, should improve the accuracy and completeness of the
incident data in WebEOC. This should provide TSA with a more
comprehensive picture of security incidents as well as allow it to
better identify any trends or patterns.
Chairmen Katko and King, Ranking Members Rice and Higgins, and
Members of the subcommittees this concludes my prepared statement. I
would be happy to respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Grover, for your testimony. We
appreciate you taking the time to be here today as well.
Our third witness is Mr. Raymond Diaz, who is currently
serving as the director of security at the Metropolitan
Transportation Authority. Previously, Mr. Diaz served as chief
of the Transit Bureau with the New York City Police Department.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Diaz to testify.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND DIAZ, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, METROPOLITAN
TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY (NEW YORK)
Mr. Diaz. Good afternoon, Chairman Katko, Chairman King,
and other Members of the subcommittees. Thank you for holding
this hearing and for inviting me to discuss security at New
York's Metropolitan Transportation Authority. Joining me today
is Michael Coan, the chief of the department for the MTA
Police.
Before joining the MTA in January 2014 as director of
security, I served as chief of the New York City Police
Department's Transit Bureau, responsible for the safety and
security of the MTA, New York's TRANSIT SYSTEM. During my 41-
year career with the NYPD, I also served as commanding officer
of Patrol Borough North and Patrol Borough South and the School
Safety Division. Before joining the NYPD, I served in Vietnam
with the United States Marine Corps.
In my present position, I am responsible for the security
of the MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with the
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the National Guard,
the NYPD, and the New York and Connecticut State Police. I
oversee the MTA Police Department, which has jurisdiction in 14
counties in New York and Connecticut and patrols a 5,000-
square-mile rail network. I am responsible for the
implementation and execution of the security strategy that
offers maximum protection to the public, the MTA employees, and
MTA property.
Before I discuss security in more depth, I would like to
set the stage with some basic facts about the MTA. Every day we
move more than 8.7 million people on our subways, buses, and
commuter rail lines. We are one of the few transit systems in
the world that operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days
a year. Our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry nearly 300 million
vehicles a year. Our network of trains, buses, bridges, and
tunnels is a trillion-dollar asset, meaning this: If we were to
build our network today, including about 9,000 rail cars, 5,000
buses, and millions of other assets, it would cost nearly $1
trillion.
Protecting millions of people a day in a trillion-dollar
asset is an enormous task. I can tell you that the MTA's
priority is clear: Ensuring the safety and security of our
customers and our employees.
To protect our customers and our assets, the MTA employs
multi-layered security strategies. Some strategies, like
policing, are highly visible. Others are less visible, like
structural hardening, advances in technology, and improved
communications.
The hallmark of policing our 5,000-square-mile territory is
collaboration. Let me explain. In response to the growing
threat of active-shooter attacks, over 95 percent of our PD
officers have received transit security grant-funded active-
shooter training. In addition, over 60 officers have received
heavy weapons training. We have a robust See Something, Say
Something campaign coupled with security awareness training for
our front-line employees. The two serve to encourage vigilance,
as well as educate individuals as to what appropriate actions
should be taken when suspicious activity is observed. To date,
the MTA has trained in excess of 35,000 front-line employees.
The recent incident of a potential active shooter in France
thwarted by vigilant rail passengers clearly illustrates the
importance of such awareness initiatives and training. Transit
Security Grant Program grant awards have also supported our See
Something, Say Something campaign and our civilian employee
training.
Behind the scenes, one critical layer to us surely is the
structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure.
Since 9/11, the MTA has invested close to $1.4 billion of local
funds towards an aggressive campaign to harden our subway and
our commuter rail systems, as well as our bridges, tunnels, and
other infrastructure. Critical stations and vulnerable areas
have been secured with electronic security systems, consisting
of CCTV, intrusion detection, and access control devices. We
have also deployed chemical, biological, radiological detection
technology at such locations.
We have benefited from over $400 million in support for our
security program from DHS since 2003. TSA and FEMA have helped
us immeasurably with grant allocations and reallocations.
Unfortunately, the trend of a shrinking National program
has limited our ability to move forward with our capital
security mitigations. For example, in fiscal year 2009, the MTA
received $92 million of a $349 million National program. Six
years later, the National appropriation has dropped by 75
percent, leaving only $87 million for transit agencies across
the country.
We are grateful for the support and are pleased that the
initial period of performance for transit security grants has
been extended to 36 months, which affords us time needed to
complete capital security projects funded through the TSGP.
Another layer of MTA's security strategy is communication
and intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have
excellent working relationships with our DHS partners
represented by FEMA and TSA. We attend regular meetings,
conference calls, and continually exchange information. When
potential threats are identified, they are communicated
immediately. We share intelligence with many law enforcement
agencies on a daily basis through our Inter-Agency
Counterterrorism Task Force.
Additionally, we conduct joint patrol initiatives with
other regional transportation agencies, including Amtrak, the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit,
the New York and Connecticut State Police, the New York State
National Guard, and the NYPD. MTA PD detectives represent the
MTA on the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, the FBI's Cyber
Crimes Unit, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area, and the
NYPD Counterterrorism and Intelligence Units.
I am proud to oversee this system and its proactive and
accomplished security personnel and look forward to continuing
to work with my colleagues in law enforcement and you in the
House to keep our customers safe and our systems secure. Once
again, thank you for inviting me to testify today, and I will
be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Diaz follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond Diaz
September 17, 2015
Good afternoon Chairmen Katko and King, and other Members of the
subcommittees. Thank you for holding this hearing and for inviting me
to discuss security at New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. Joining me today are Michael Coan, chief of department of
the MTA Police.
Before joining the MTA in January 2014 as director of security, I
served as chief of the New York City Police Department's Transit
Bureau, responsible for the safety and security of the MTA New York
City Transit system. During my 41-year career with the NYPD, I also
served as commanding officer of Patrol Boroughs Manhattan North and
South, and the School Safety Division. Before joining the NYPD, I
served in Vietnam with the U.S. Marine Corps.
In my present position, I'm responsible for the security of the
MTA, including coordinating MTA efforts with the Department of Homeland
Security, the FBI, the National Guard, the NYPD, and the New York and
Connecticut State Police. I oversee the MTA Police Department, which
has jurisdiction in 14 counties in New York and Connecticut and patrols
a 5,000-square-mile rail network. I'm responsible for the
implementation and execution of a security strategy that offers maximum
protection to the public, MTA employees, and MTA property.
Before I discuss security in more depth, I'd like to set the stage
with some basic facts about the MTA. Every day, we move more than 8.7
million people on our subways, buses, and commuter rail lines. We're
one of the few transit systems in the world that operates 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year. Our 7 bridges and 2 tunnels carry
nearly 300 million vehicles a year. Our network of trains, buses,
bridges, and tunnels is a $1 trillion asset, meaning this: If we were
to build our network today--including about 9,000 railcars, 5,000
buses, and millions of other assets--it would cost nearly $1 trillion.
Protecting millions of people a day and a trillion-dollar asset is
an enormous task. I can tell you that the MTA's top priority is clear:
Ensuring the safety and security of our customers and employees. To
protect our customers and our assets, the MTA employs a multi-layered
security strategy. Some strategies, like policing, are highly visible;
others are less visible, like structural hardening, advances in
technology, and improved communications.
The hallmark of policing our 5,000-square-mile territory is
collaboration. Let me explain. The NYPD is responsible for patrolling
the most heavily-used portion of our network, New York City subways and
buses. We work closely with the NYPD to ensure that capital investments
are consistent with the latest security and policing strategies.
The MTA PD polices our commuter rail system. Metro-North Railroad
and Long Island Rail Road are the two busiest commuter rail agencies in
the country. Since 9/11, we've concentrated on counter-terrorism
strategies. The department has grown from 494 uniformed officers to 722
today. Fifty K-9 teams are now deployed throughout the system, and
we've significantly increased our presence on trains and at stations.
In addition to the MTA PD, 721 Bridge and Tunnel officers patrol our 7
bridges and 2 tunnels.
In response to the growing threat of active-shooter attacks, over
95% of our MTA PD officers have received TSGP-funded Active-Shooter
Training. In addition, over 60 officers have received heavy weapons
training.
We have a robust ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign, coupled
with security awareness training for civilian front-line employees. The
two serve to encourage vigilance as well as educate individuals as to
what appropriate action should be taken when suspicious activity is
observed. To date, the MTA has trained in excess of 35,000 front-line
employees.
The recent incident of a potential active shooter in France
thwarted by vigilant rail passengers clearly illustrates the importance
of such awareness initiatives and training. TSGP grant awards have also
supported our ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign and civilian
employee training.
Behind the scenes, one critical layer to our security is the
structural and technological hardening of our infrastructure. Since 9/
11, the MTA has invested close to $1.4 billion of local funds toward an
aggressive campaign to harden our subway and commuter rail systems, as
well as bridges, tunnels, and other infrastructure. Critical stations
and vulnerable areas have been secured with electronic security systems
consisting of CCTV, intrusion detection, and access control devices.
We've also deployed chemical, biological, and radiological detection
technology at such locations.
We've benefitted from over $400 million in support of our security
program from DHS since 2003. TSA and FEMA have helped us immeasurably
with grant allocations and reallocations. Unfortunately the trend of a
shrinking National program has limited our ability to move forward with
our capital security mitigations. For example, in fiscal year 2009 the
MTA received $92 million of a $349 million National program. Six years
later, the National appropriation has dropped by 75%, leaving only $87
million for transit agencies across the country.
We're grateful for this support, and are pleased that the initial
``period of performance'' for transit security grants has been extended
to 36 months, which affords us the time needed to complete capital
security projects funded through the TSGP.
Another layer of the MTA's security strategy is communication and
intelligence sharing. At the Federal level, we have an excellent
working relationship with our DHS partners, represented by FEMA and
TSA. We attend regular meetings and conference calls, and continually
exchange information. When potential threats are identified, they are
communicated immediately.
We share intelligence with many law enforcement agencies, on a
daily basis, through our Inter-Agency Counterterrorism Task Force
(ICTF). Additionally, we conduct joint patrol initiatives with other
regional transportation agencies including: Amtrak, the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey, New Jersey Transit, the New York and
Connecticut State Police, the New York State National Guard, and the
NYPD.
MTA PD detectives represent the MTA on the FBI's Joint Terrorism
Task Force, the FBI Cyber Crimes Unit, the High-Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program, and the NYPD Counter Terrorism and
Intelligence units.
I'm proud to oversee this system and its proactive and accomplished
security personnel, and look forward to continuing to work with my
colleagues in law enforcement and you in the House to keep our
customers safe and our system secure. Once again, thank you for
inviting me to testify today. I'm happy to answer any questions you
might have.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Diaz, for your testimony and for
being here today.
Our fourth witness is Chief Polly Hanson, who serves as
Amtrak chief of police, overseeing more than 500 law
enforcement officers and civilians across the Nation.
Previously, Chief Hanson served for 27 years at the Metro
Transit Police, rising to the position of chief of police and
director of Office of Law Enforcement and Security at the U.S.
Department of Interior.
Ms. Hanson, I will note, and for the rest of the panel,
that our votes have been called. So after your testimony, we
will take a break to go do the votes and then reconvene.
STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF OF POLICE, NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORPORATION (AMTRAK)
Chief Hanson. Yes, sir. Good afternoon.
The Amtrak Police Department was created to protect
Amtrak's employees, passengers, rolling stock, and other
critical infrastructure. We do that by working closely with our
colleagues in the law enforcement and counterterrorism
communities to collect intelligence, pilot new technology, and
surge our resources.
The Amtrak Police Department consists of more than 500
members based in 30 locations. Our patrol officers are the most
visible part of our department. They patrol stations, ride
trains, perform education and enforcement on railroad safety,
and are the first response to Amtrak incidents. Our Special
Operations Unit consists of officers with tactical skills who
perform station surges, conduct random passenger bag screening,
perform countersurveillance, and dignitary protection. Our K-9
Program, which consists of both conventional and vapor wake
detection dogs, average 1,000 train rides a month.
Terrorist tactics continue to evolve and we must keep pace.
U.S.-based extremists will continue to pose the most frequent
threat to the U.S. homeland. As tragic attacks in Boston and
New York have shown, the new terrorist threat is already here.
From lone-wolf attackers to ISIL radicals, we see a greater
likelihood of attack now than we have in years.
The internet and cyber space have become the new recruiting
ground and the new battle space. Aided by the internet and
social media, ISIL has featured plans to kill U.S. soldiers and
law enforcement, and the recent attack in France demonstrates
the threat is evolving and increasing.
Across the country, we coordinate with numerous other
local, State, and Federal agencies. We have officers assigned
to the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force, as well as
joint terrorist task forces in Baltimore, Chicago, New York,
Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, DC.
One of our most visible efforts builds on a partnership
with TSA that led to the creation of something called RAILSAFE.
Amtrak Police, NYPD, and TSA started RAILSAFE in 2010, and
there have been 50 RAILSAFEs in 42 States, the District of
Columbia, and Vancouver, British Columbia, involving over 265
agencies and over 1,600 law enforcement members since 2010.
Amtrak has used DHS funding to provide our RAILSAFE partners
and other first responders with training on the sharing of
intelligence and the unified response to Amtrak incidents.
Internationally, Amtrak Police partner with foreign law
enforcement agencies in Europe with RAILPOL, where we share
information on policing, intelligence, and Amtrak has a working
relationship with Interpol. The Amtrak Intelligence Unit
coordinates with the United States Department of
Transportation. We have members aligned with regional fusion
centers. We do welcome the VIPR teams who deploy at many of our
stations on an unpredictable and random basis.
Amtrak is a DHS test bed for piloting of new technology,
and we have taken advantage of the TSA Baseline for Security
Enhancement, which highlights Amtrak's security posture and
adherence to accepted security practices.
To extend our reach, we have developed programs that enable
our employees, as well as our passengers, to report things that
strike them as suspicious. We have trained our employees in
techniques to spot suspicious behaviors, and by using phones or
texting, have added tens of thousands of eyes to our efforts to
watch over our passengers, trains, and facilities. It is a part
of our larger strategy of working collaboratively with partner
organizations and passengers so that we can add their unique
strength to our own to ensure the safety of our systems and the
communities we serve.
Amtrak has taken advantage of DHS campaigns like If You See
Something, Say Something, and passengers and employees can text
us at APD11.
Since the creation of TSA, there have been many security
measures implemented. But we need to continue our partnerships,
encourage our employees, passengers, and patrons to be
observant and report suspicious activity. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Amtrak Police role in rail passenger
protection, and I look forward to answering any questions you
may have when you return.
[The prepared statement of Chief Hanson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Polly Hanson
September 17, 2015
Chairmen Katko and King, Ranking Members Rice and Higgins, and
Members of the subcommittee, good afternoon, and thank you very much
for the invitation to testify today. Amtrak takes its responsibility to
protect its riders very seriously, and on behalf of Mr. Boardman, our
president and CEO, and the men and women of the Amtrak Police
Department (APD) I welcome the opportunity to testify before you today.
Amtrak is America's Railroad. Our passengers travel between more
than 500 communities in 46 States and our trains operate on over 21,000
miles of track. Amtrak operates more than 300 daily trains delivering
over 30 million travelers a year safely to their destinations. The
Amtrak Police Department was created to protect Amtrak's employees,
passengers, patrons, stations, stops, rolling stock, and other critical
infrastructure. We do that by working closely with our colleagues in
the law enforcement and counter-terrorism communities to collect
intelligence, pilot new technology, and surge our resources on Amtrak
trains, along our right-of-ways, and in our stations and engage our
passengers and patrons in being our partners in safety.
The Amtrak Police Department consists of more than 500 members
based in 30 locations. While the department was created in the 1970's,
it really wasn't until after September 11 that counter-terrorism became
a large focus of our security plans. Uniform Patrol Division officers
are the most visible part of our department. They patrol stations, ride
trains, perform education and enforcement on railroad safety, and are
the first response to Amtrak incidents. Our Special Operations Unit
consists of officers with tactical skills who perform station surges,
conduct random passenger bag screening, and perform counter
surveillance, right-of-way patrols, and dignitary protection. Our K-9
program which consists of both conventional and vapor wake detection
dogs average 1,000 train rides a month. The Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) supports Amtrak's robust K-9 program.
Terrorist tactics continue to evolve, and we must keep pace. U.S.-
based extremists will continue to pose the most frequent threat to the
U.S. homeland. As the tragic attacks in Boston, Texas, and New York
have shown over the last several years, the new terrorist threats are
already here. Either alone or in small groups, with the ability to mask
the extent of their radicalization, these individuals represent the
most lethal of threats. From ``lone-wolf'' attackers to ISIL radicals,
we see a greater likelihood of attack than we have in years. The
internet and cyber space has become the new recruiting ground and the
new battlespace. Aided by the internet and social media, ISIS has
featured plans to kill U.S. soldiers or law enforcement and the recent
attacks in France and against tourists in Tunisia demonstrate the
threat is increasing.
Across the country, we coordinate with numerous other local, State,
and Federal agencies, including the TSA, DHS, NCTC, CBP, DEA, FBI, U.S.
MARSHALLS and the U.S. Capitol Police. Amtrak officers are assigned to
the FBI National Joint Terrorism Task Force at the National Counter-
Terrorism Center, as well as Joint Terrorism Task forces in Baltimore,
Chicago, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington, DC.
One of our most visible efforts builds on a partnership with the
TSA that led to the creation of the Regional Alliance Including Local,
State, and Federal Efforts (RAILSAFE) Network. More than 200 agencies
in over 40 States usually participate in Operation RAILSAFE which
increases visibility at stations and stops and along the right-of-way
and by water and in the air. Amtrak Police, NYPD, and TSA started
RAILSAFE in 2010 and there have been 50 RAILSAFEs in 42 States, the
District of Columbia, and Vancouver, Canada involving over 265 agencies
and over 1,600 law enforcement members since then.
Amtrak has used DHS funding to provide our RAILSAFE partners and
other first responders with training on railroad safety, the sharing of
intelligence, and the united response to Amtrak incidents. This
training has been provided to almost 300 participants since 2014 in 11
States.
Internationally, Amtrak Police has partnered with foreign rail law
enforcement agencies throughout Europe with the RAILPOL organization.
Rail policing issues, intelligence, and information sharing are
discussed and solid relationships have been established by our
participation. Additionally, Amtrak Police has a working relationship
with Interpol.
Building on the extensive intelligence, military, and law
enforcement backgrounds of its members, the Amtrak Intelligence Unit
coordinates with the United States Department of Transportation Office
of Intelligence, Security, and Emergency Response and has members
aligned with the Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center and the
Maryland State Fusion Center. Amtrak Police also welcome the Visible
Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) Teams who deploy at many of
our station facilities on an unpredictable and random basis. On a daily
basis, TSA supports Amtrak's random passenger bag inspection program.
Amtrak is a DHS test bed for the piloting of new technology and we
have taken advantage of the TSA Surface Transportation Security
Inspection Program Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement, which
highlights Amtrak's security posture and adherence to accepted security
practices.
To extend our reach, we have developed programs that enable other
Amtrak employees as well as our passengers to report on things that
strike them as unusual or suspicious. We have trained Amtrak's
employees in techniques to spot suspicious behaviors. Using phones or
texting, these tools have added tens of thousands of eyes to our
efforts to watch over our passengers, trains, and facilities. The
ability to leverage our skilled workforce, with its knowledge of the
operating environment, is an important strength that contributes to the
security and safety of our system. It is part of our larger strategy of
working collaboratively with partner organizations and passengers so
that we can add their unique strengths to our own to ensure the safety
of our system and the communities it serves.
Amtrak has taken advantage of DHS public awareness campaigns like
``If You See Something, Say Something'' and texting a tip to APD11
which was another initiative supported by DHS funding. I want to
emphasize that since the creation of TSA there have been many security
measures implemented but we need to continue our partnerships,
encourage our employees, passengers, and patrons to be observant and
report suspicious activity or behavior.
Thank you again, for this opportunity to discuss the Amtrak Police
role in rail passenger and infrastructure protection. I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Ms. Hanson.
There is a series of three votes. We anticipate it being--
the first vote is just about ready to be expired. So we have
got to roll. We have two 5-minute votes after that. As soon as
the last vote is done, we will start here again in 10 minutes.
So without objection, the committee and subcommittee is in
recess subject to the call of the chair.
[Recess.]
Mr. Katko. The Subcommittees on Transportation Security and
Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order. I now
recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions.
I want to make kind-of an overarching observation first
before I get into some questions, and that is I am very mindful
of the surface transportation attacks that have occurred
overseas in Europe, the tragedy of them from years ago until
more recently and the attempts more recently. It does make me
conclude that we are vulnerable to that in this country as
well.
It was compounded when I went to Penn Station recently and
took a tour there, and just the sheer mass of people there on a
regular basis, and the different entry points and the different
trains that are there, the different agencies that are there,
Amtrak and Metro-North, and the subways and everything else. It
just really does, I shudder to think what a tragedy that could
happen there, just like you think about in airports.
The difference between the rails and airports are that
airports have a tremendous amount of scrutiny to them right now
and a tremendous amount of security. I am concerned that the
surface transportation system is lacking in the amount of
security that it needs. But I am interested to hear from the
viewpoints of all of you that are on the front lines every day,
particularly Mr. Diaz and Ms. Hanson and Mr. Mayenschein. Also
your observations, Ms. Grover, throughout your testimony with
others today, as to what you think can be done better.
So I guess to start out with Mr. Diaz and Ms. Hanson, since
you have been on the front lines for most of your careers, if
not all of them, that you kind-of give me your observation of
what you think the overall state of security is and what you
think needs to be done moving forward. We can start with Ms.
Hanson, if you would please.
Chief Hanson. I think there are a couple really wonderful
things working. You mentioned New York. I can speak to there,
but other places as well. In my testimony and others, you did
hear people talk about collaboration and partnership.
So New York has a very strong partnership with all the
entities and more that you described that do provide service in
and out of Penn Station. They, law enforcement executives,
security people, freight members, and others have quarterly
meetings and just have had several to coordinate and
communicate about the Pope's visit.
So I think you have a very strong presence there that is
integrated, a tremendous amount of professionalism. That said,
you also have layered security in the way that there is
technology. Certainly using things like text-a-tip, which we
use and other transportation entities use, because you do have
to rely on the 700,000 people that are in Penn Station a day
and the thousands of employees that we all have there.
In my 27 years at Metro, I always thought one of the most
important employees was the custodian, because that is somebody
who is very familiar with the station and knows when something
is suspicious.
So we do have layered protection with biological detection.
Some places use chemical detection. Long guns are deployed. You
have countersurveillance, and by that I mean members that are
not in uniform that have been trained to look for suspicious
activity. Then I think the strong intelligence sharing that we
have that may involve Federal partners and may not. The group
that is in partnership in New York have each other on speed
dial and text. The chief texted me when we had the derailment
in Philadelphia to see if I needed any resources or support. Of
course, in an event like the one we had in Philadelphia, the
first inquiry is always, is there an act of terrorism?
I can speak to what happened Friday at Union Station, which
was not an active-shooter situation but did involve a shooting.
We had done quite a bit of training with our employees, our
business owners, our property manager, and our passengers.
People did what we had taught them to do. Our businesses locked
the doors, turned off the lights, and hid. Our employees
hunkered down, in some cases in the back in the track area
where they took passengers. We had an Acela that was loading.
Our crews got on there, locked everybody down on that train.
We had a response from the region because we were surging
that day, but we had a coordinated response, and within 14
minutes, we had train service back up because of the way that
event was mitigated, the way things were communicated, and the
strong partnerships that we have.
I think you alluded to the fact that something did happen
in 1993 on the Long Island Railroad, 6 people were killed and
almost 20 people were injured by somebody, in that case, was
mentally ill but still came on the train with a gun. An off-
duty Long Island Railroad police officer was the one that made
the lock up. But in that case, much like France, the passengers
on that train jumped on that guy and subdued him.
So I think it is a combination of factors with law
enforcement, our partnerships, the training we provide our
employees, and the intelligence that we share as a community.
Did I answer your question, sir?
Mr. Katko. Yes. We could be here all day really discussing
it. It is unfair to ask you to summarize it so quickly, but
that is the time we have.
Just in my time left, Mr. Diaz, if you could briefly
respond to my question?
Mr. Diaz. Chairman, I think as of September 2014, at the
Governor's direction, if you look at Penn Station and some of
our major terminals, like Grand Central, we substantially
increased, by probably about 40 percent on the MTA PD side,
increased our police presence there, our uniformed presence. In
addition to that, the National Guard, New York National Guard
was substantially increased in our terminals. The New York
State Police now also are present in both of our terminals,
Penn Station and Grand Central Station, in addition to riding
our trains.
So I feel very comfortable with the level of uniformed
presence we have in those terminals. However, there is a
concern because we were able to support that through transit
security grant funding and a large part of that funding expired
August 31. We have sort-of, like, we are running out of money.
We thought we would probably have to cut back a little bit,
but the direction from our Governor's office was that he did
not want to see an increase. So we have been spending a lot of
money to put those extra resources there. That is a concern of
mine, at some point, that we are not going to have the funds to
continue the level of presence we have had in those terminals.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Diaz.
Of course, I have a thousand more questions I could ask,
but I am going to respect the clock here as best I can. The
Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the
subcommittee, the gentlelady from New York, Miss Rice, for any
questions she may have.
Miss Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz, I just want to start with you, Mr. Diaz. The New
York subway system, I would say, arguably, right, is considered
larger than most of those, any other passenger rail systems in
terms of passengers per day. How many people, what is the
number, 8 million?
Mr. Diaz. It is about 6 million passengers a day. We run
over about 7,800 trains on a week day.
Miss Rice. So how do you run such a vast operation and do
it as successfully as you have? Now, taking into consideration
the fact that, obviously, money is a big priority, and we hear
you loud and clear about funds drying up making it more
challenging for you to do your job. But you do it pretty well.
I mean, I ride the subway, and I am pretty amazed that is done.
I mean, you have issues. But how do you get it right? The
report that Ms. Grover did: What, if any, improvements would
you make if you could?
Mr. Diaz. Well, what I would like to say, the New York City
Police Department actually patrols our transit system. They
have about 2,600 officers and they do a fantastic job. I mean,
crime is like a minimum number of crime. We average about, I
think, six crimes a day for that entire transportation system.
They do a fantastic job of patrolling it. We have surge
operations. We have bag inspections. Robust K-9 units that
patrol those areas. We have a pretty elaborate CCTV and
electronic security systems. Intrusion detection. Our tunnels
are hardened to make it difficult for anybody to get into our
tunnels and do anything to our trains and to our
infrastructure.
We have a lot of infrastructure protection in addition to
the railroads. We have, it was mentioned earlier, Penn Station,
if you look at Penn Station, it has bollards that circle almost
the entire station. So if someone with a large bomb in a large
vehicle, they are not going to get into that station. So we
feel very comfortable with that.
But those are the types of things that we like to do to
protect our system. Again, it takes money to do that.
Miss Rice. So you describe a very good relationship,
obviously, with the NYPD. My question would be to Ms. Hanson,
to you, again, Mr. Diaz, and Mr. Mayenschein, the Chairman said
in his opening statement that up to this point a lot of the
focus, at least before the incident that happened in Paris or
outside of Paris, a lot of the focus in terms of security and
transportation security has been on the aviation industry.
So what I would like you to talk about, the three of you,
is what level of cooperation and coordination do you have with
people who are focused on that area, aviation security, and
land and surface security? Because there is a lot of overlap
there. So however you want to take the answer.
Mr. Diaz. I can just say, on the intelligence side and
information sharing, like recently there were some threats to
aviation, we get immediate notifications for our partners at
TSA. We have excellent communication when it comes to
intelligence, I think. I am very impressed.
I mean, every day I get intelligence information from all
of our law enforcement partners, our Governmental partners. I
have an interagency counterterrorism task force that every day
gets briefings from all of those other areas and puts together
a nice briefing package. We get that before 7 o'clock every
morning. We distribute that to other law enforcement agencies.
The information sharing, I think, is really outstanding. We
have officers embedded into JTTF, New York City Intel-
CounterTerrorism. The information sharing, I think, is
outstanding. I don't think there is any problem with that.
TSOC, I know, was mentioned. About an hour ago, I just saw
a TSOC notification from our New York City Transit to TSOC
regarding a fare evader that didn't pay a fare and had a
firearm on him illegally.
So I think we have come a long way.
Miss Rice. Mr. Mayenschein--because I have one question I
want to ask all of you--would you agree, and Ms. Hanson, would
you agree with Mr. Diaz's assessment?
Mr. Mayenschein. Absolutely. I think what has happened with
the surface transportation system is almost magical. It is a
perfect match of Government and the private sector coordinating
instantaneously and sharing information back and forth.
This is all pretty much in absence of regulations.
Aviation, maritime is heavily regulated. Not so, so much in
surface. This has all been done because of the need to do it.
This constant sharing back and forth is really quite
tremendous. We make each other better. They improve what we do.
We improve what they do. We share the best practices across the
networks. When we get information from GAO about improvements
that need to be made, we welcome those and make those
improvements. We just continually get better. It is pretty
amazing to me.
Miss Rice. Ms. Hanson, would you add anything to that?
Chief Hanson. Yes, two things. The Federal security
directors out at the airports, we do have a close relationship
with them at Amtrak because we do get resources from them. So
there is regular dialogue.
The other thing that I would say, which was a point that
you have made, so aviation, and this isn't just recently, since
September 11, the focus has really been on aviation. Of course,
aviation moves millions of people a year, and mass transit
moves billions, but the funding has been the reverse. So the
money is focused on aviation versus transportation.
I would ditto my colleague here where, because of the
appropriations, the 2015 money has been delayed. We do rely on
that money for additional resources for events that we will
have, such as the Pope, in our case, the Super Bowls, and
events like that where we have an increased threat because of
the increased ridership.
So the funding that we have gotten from the intercity
passenger grant and that they have gotten from the transit
security grant is something we have really come to rely on and
is what has allowed MTA to do the infrastructure that they have
done and the campaigns and some of the intelligence sharing. So
that would be dramatic for us to have a reduction in funding.
Miss Rice. Message received. Well done.
One last question. In 5 words or the less, what is the
biggest threat to our surface transportation system?
Mr. Mayenschein. Certainly the unknown, the home-grown,
unknown, violent extremist. They are like an unguided missile,
like a scud missile. We just don't know that they are there. I
think that is the biggest threat.
Ms. Grover. The fact that the systems are just wide open.
Chief Hanson. It has been explosives. It will be
explosives. Then the lone wolf is a serious consideration,
because somebody with a weapon, we see what they can do, and
somebody with a knife, we see what they can do. But it is the
combination of lone wolf and explosives.
Mr. Diaz. I concur.
Miss Rice. Great. Thank you all.
Mr. Chairman, I just ask unanimous consent that Mr.
Langevin be allowed to sit and question the witnesses during
this hearing.
Mr. Katko. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, the esteemed gentleman
from New York, Mr. King, for any questions he may have. He told
me to say ``esteemed'' by the way.
Mr. King. It was supposed to be ``very esteemed.'' In any
event, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset let me just say that, as Miss Rice said, the
message is received. I really have to make sure that we deliver
that to people in my party who play games with the spending and
don't realize there is consequences. Any talk of Government
shutdown, of money not coming, even if it comes months from
now, the damage can be done. So your message is well received
certainly by me.
I have two questions, and it will be to Mr. Diaz and to
Chief Hanson. First of all, thank you both for your testimony,
and all of you for your testimony, and to you two in law
enforcement, for the work you have done over the years.
Two questions. Taking Penn Station and Grand Central, where
everything comes together, you have the New York City subway
system, you have Metro-North, you have Amtrak, how well-
constituted are you as far as incident command? Who is in
charge when something occurs? Is that delineated as to who is
responsible when an incident occurs? Also, does the FDNY get
involved in that? Because here you have, let's see, at least
three, four police departments, you have the National Guard.
Again, I am just wondering, is that all coordinated as to who
is in charge and who is not?
Second on that, going back to years ago with the Transit
Police, there was the problem with communications. How are the
communications, the radio communications between the various
police departments at Penn Station and Grand Central? That is
probably the one area where all of you come together. Either
one. Mr. Diaz, you can go first.
Mr. Diaz. Yes, Chairman. Incident command, again, Grand
Central is a Metro-North property. We do have also New York
City Transit presence in Grand Central. We have great a
relationship with them, a great working relationship. There is
a fire brigade assigned to Grand Central that works for Metro-
North, and they have a great relationship with the fire
department, all the fire department chiefs.
I think as far as interoperability, I think we get along
very good. As far as radio communication, that might be a
little more difficult, but I think more important than radio
communication, I think, is interagency cooperation and
interagency interaction with each other. I think that we get
the job done.
Chief Hanson. I would say at Penn Station, very similar. We
have a very strong emergency manager there. People know where
to come. There are regular exercises----
Mr. King. Emergency manager, is he with Amtrak?
Chief Hanson. He is, yes, sir. Retired NYPD and has a very
close relationship with the fire department. Everyone knows
where to come. They regularly exercise. Unfortunately, there
are enough events, smoke in a tunnel, that people do have an
opportunity to exercise those capabilities.
I think interoperability will always be an issue. Even with
our potential access to 800 megahertz, it is not so much just
being on the frequency, it is the other back end, cabling in a
tunnel and some of the infrastructure that is so old.
But I think we have very strong relationships, very strong
incident and unified command.
I would want to go back to one of your points about
funding, and I am not belaboring it----
Mr. King. Go ahead.
Chief Hanson [continuing]. But sequestration did impact us
very negatively. In our case, it diminished our grants by half
a million dollars and it set us back over a year for our K-9
Program with TSA. So we have one person in TSA K-9 training
now, and if the Government shuts down, I would imagine that
they have to come back home. We have two more dog handlers
going to Lackland Air Force Base in October, and I would
imagine if there is a shutdown, they have to come down.
So it has taken us a year to catch up because of
sequestration. Now, when we are trying to build our K-9 program
back up, we will be limited by what happens here.
Mr. King. One final question. Is everyone allowed to
partake in table-top exercises as far as the police
departments?
Mr. Diaz. [Inaudible.]
Chief Hanson. I think what you heard earlier in the
testimony from TSA was, at Amtrak's request, TSA sponsored an
I-STEP tabletop in Philadelphia. It was for all first
responders and Federal, local, State entities, and it was the
first table-top, and it was very effective, very well received.
Mr. King. Thank you all for your testimony and your
service.
I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. King.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, just let me thank you, because a lot of what you do
is about what didn't happen. You rarely get credit for what
didn't happen. So thanks for all you have done to keep things
from happening.
Lawrence Wright wrote a book called ``The Looming Tower,''
which is a Pulitzer Prize-winning book about 9/11, and in it,
he recounts the experience of an FBI agent working in his
office in New York City. When the second plane hit the South
Tower, he physically got sick because he knew that between the
FBI, the CIA, and other law enforcement agencies, that they had
the intelligence to perhaps thwart that attack on New York City
and the Nation.
So the sharing of information was very, very important,
from which the PATRIOT Act came. A lot of things were added on
to it that were objectionable to people, but the bottom line,
the original thrust was to remove the barriers that existed
between various law enforcement agencies so that they could
pool their resources, they could share information, toward the
goal of more effectively stopping terrorist activity.
Mr. Diaz, New York City is probably, you know, all of its
law enforcement agencies, all of the affiliates, is probably
the greatest counterterrorism organization in the world--not
out of choice, but out of necessity. You touched on it a little
bit, but you had also mentioned that there are 6 million people
that travel on those trains every day in 78 different trains.
Can you talk a little bit more about how that information is
shared? Is that a result of policy or the result of just the
intuitive relationship that exists between law enforcement
agencies towards the same goal, and that is protecting your
common constituency?
Mr. Diaz. Yes, sir. I think we all have the same goal.
Again, like I said earlier, we have detectives that are
assigned to JTTF, that are assigned to HITDA, that are assigned
to NYPD Counterterrorism, and NYPD Intelligence. There is great
information sharing. I mean, we talk together all of the time.
Every day I receive briefings and alerts.
I can say that, and it is funny, because it is not just at
working hours. We have such a great relationship. We have
fraternal organizations and we see each other at evening, at
dinners, and other places. So we are constantly talking to each
other. I think we have come a long, long ways from 9/11, and I
don't think those issues that existed then exist anymore today.
Mr. Higgins. So I presume that that is driven in large part
by just an inherent sense that New York City is always going to
be a major target, it is a high-impact target, and, thus, the
role of law enforcement agencies working together is probably,
while it is important generally, it seems to be particularly
important in a city like New York.
Chief Hanson. Well, I would say a couple of things to that.
Amtrak has assigned somebody to the National Terrorism Task
Force, so that we have the overarching, because we are in 46
States.
One of the things that I would highlight, though, is after
September 11, then-Amtrak Police Chief Sonja Proctor
established a group called the Northeast Corridor Coalition. So
that group starts in the District of Columbia and goes to New
York City. Regularly there is an intelligence component to that
and then there is the higher-level executives, to include
myself, Chief Bratton, and the chiefs in every town, State,
from the District of Colubia to New York. Tremendous amount of
exposure, for some people, who the first time we road the train
didn't even know Amtrak went through their city.
So that has allowed a growth of information sharing,
relationships, a real sensitivity that people don't always have
towards transportation policing. Transportation policing is
very different and defined and specific. That is why that
community of folks that are very similarly situated with those
responsibilities is so important for those groups to share
information.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you very much. I have no further
questions. I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Ratcliffe.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Chairman Katko and Chairman King
both, for holding this hearing.
The terrorist attacks of September 11 certainly showed the
entire Nation that terrorists are willing to go to virtually
any length and any means to inflict harm on the American
people. In the years after September 11, the Federal Government
has certainly taken a number of necessary steps to secure our
airports and our airplanes from future attacks.
But, as we all know, terrorists don't operate under
conventional rules. I know this well as a former terrorism
prosecutor. Terrorists adapt and they find new methods to
exploit security and vulnerabilities to achieve their goal of
mass casualties. So we have seen that in, frankly, places
around the world.
The district that I represent, the Fourth Congressional
District of Texas, is full of small towns, like many of those
that span this entire country. Almost all those communities
have a bus stop and a train stop, whereas, they may not have an
airport. So I would like to start with you, Ms. Hanson. Do you
happen to know how many commercially-operated passenger air
traffic hubs there are in the United States?
Chief Hanson. I flunk.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I understand it might be a better question
for Mr. Mayenschein. I think it is around 200. The reason I ask
is, by comparison, how many Amtrak stations are there around
the country?
Chief Hanson. Well, we go to 500 destinations. What I would
like to tell you is that in small towns that you talked about,
we took DHS money to train our partners in those small towns
who we are very reliant on. We have regional detectives. But
some of the response time, depending on where they are in
relation to the train, could be an hour, 2 hours.
So we have had those detectives cultivate close
relationships with local law enforcement. The RAILSAFE Program
that we described is an output of that. So we call on those
folks during particular times to work with us and other
partners to increase visibility.
What I did was take DHS money to create a day-and-a-half
course that, first of all, identifies what the threat is in the
transportation environment. It explains how Amtrak collects
intelligence and shares it. Then we run through a table-top
exercise, one for a suspicious package and one for an active
shooter. We have done that starting in 2015 and trained
hundreds of law enforcement folks in 11 States.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. But in terms of response time and some
of what you related, that is important, but before we get
there, I guess, my concern is what we have seen in Europe, and
I have intimated before that we have seen a number of surface
transportation terrorist attacks. Last week I was at Union
Station, took an Amtrak train, and I didn't go through security
at all when I got on that train like I do at an airport. So
other than the things that you just related----
Chief Hanson. You may not have thought you went through
security. We have a very robust vapor wake detection program.
So those dogs that you see walking around there that look so
nice with the floppy ears and they are very animated and
excited were possibly smelling your wake to see if you had
explosives.
We also, as I mentioned earlier, have tactical units that
are doing countersurveillance. So they are observing people's
behavior. We also have people on trains and other capabilities.
So you may not have seen the security. It doesn't mean that it
is not there.
Unfortunately, last year we had an attack on a train in
Niles, Michigan. There we do not have the resources. They
attacked our conductor, hurt him very bad. It was an
emotionally disturbed man. We had to rely on the Niles Police
Department who came and mitigated that situation. So it was a
coordination of our efforts with our local law enforcement
colleagues to respond.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Well, and as I related, I didn't go
through a formal security checkpoint or clearance like you see
at the airport. One of the other things was that neither did my
luggage that was with me and I didn't see that. On trains you
see different sizes, everything from large suitcases to
backpacks.
Other than dogs and walking patrols, are there any
mechanisms in place for the inspection of luggage?
Chief Hanson. Amtrak is going to start a program starting
October 1 where there is going to be restrictions imposed on
the size and number of luggage. As a result of that, there may
be more observation about luggage. But no, we are not screening
your luggage like an airline does.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Well, I see my 5 minutes went very quickly,
so I yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Ratcliffe.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey Mr.
Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to our Ranking
Member.
According to the rail industry officials, the transport of
crude oil on trains through dense urban areas has increased 40-
fold since 2008. In addition to that, over the past decade or
so railroads have begun shipping large quantities of flammable
liquids, such as ethanol and crude oil, creating an entirely
new response challenge.
Every day, dangerous rail freight carrying security-
sensitive cargo travels throughout my district, weaving through
residential areas and passing by schools and homes and
businesses. In fact, Bakken crude, the more flammable oil,
which makes it probably the most dangerous to transport,
travels along New Jersey's rail line at a volume of 15 to 30
million gallons per day.
I have said it before in the whole committee and in my
subcommittees and I will say it again, my district has the two
most dangerous miles in America for terrorist targets, and that
is in the area around Newark, New Jersey, and Elizabeth, where
the rail, the interstate, the airport, the port, and chemical
installations are within a 2-mile radius.
With that said, Mr. Mayenschein--did I get it right?
Mr. Mayenschein. Yes.
Mr. Payne [continuing]. What role does TSA playing ensuring
that dangerous rail freight in the communities that they must
travel through are secure as can be? I have put forth
legislation in order to strengthen the rail cars that carry
this dangerous oil. So to my question?
Mr. Mayenschein. So there are a couple levels here. First
of all, this Rail Sensitive Security Material, the RSSM, is
something that we do pay attention to, that is regulated. It is
inspected. There are regulations that require inspections for
certain things. So that is your toxic inhalation hazards, your
liquefied chlorine, all the methylethanol bad stuff that is on
trains. But that is not Bakken crude. That is a hazardous
material, a different classification. There are regulations
requiring hazardous material.
So with the rate of inspections that go with this RSSM
material, when it is transferred from shippers there are
required inspections, when it transfers from one company's rail
car to another company's rail car, there are required
inspections, a surveillance of paperwork, and that sort-of
thing.
Mr. Payne. As we have seen over the past several years, the
major explosion in Canada, we had an incident in Lynchburg,
Virginia, and also a situation where a train derailed and fell
into the James River in Virginia. I am very concerned about
those issues.
So how does TSA track the trains carrying the hazardous
material in real time? Are there any steps taken en route from
trains in high-threat urban areas? Mind you, my other issue is
when these cars are sitting railside, the security of that is
in place, it seems very lacking when it is just sitting in the
yard to move to its next destination.
Mr. Mayenschein. So if there is RSSM, there is toxic stuff,
the car needs to be attended. I mean, that is part of the
requirement, it needs to be attended.
Mr. Payne. We are finding that that is not the case,
though, to the degree that we feel that it is necessary in
order to secure that.
Mr. Mayenschein. Okay, I will take that back and take a
look at that for you and get back to you specifically and get
you very specific data, particularly for the Newark area.
To the other part of your question, the TSA doesn't
currently track hazardous materials in real time. So we don't
presently do that. The TSA does have regulation and procedures
in place to locate shipments of rail security and sensitive
materials in the event of an elevated threat condition. So if
there is an elevated threat condition, we will immediately
reach out to the partners, the railroads, and they have 30
minutes to respond back to us to identify where those toxic
inhalation hazards, those RSSM materials are located.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr.
Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses here today.
If I could, I would like to change tack a bit and ask about
another threat that is facing our surface transportation
system, and that is relating to cyber attack. So, Mr.
Mayenschein, can you just give us a brief overview of TSA's
actions in this domain?
Mr. Mayenschein. Well, we are just now develop--we have
always had an eye on cybersecurity, but in the last year this
has become something that we are paying great attention to.
Particularly we have seen a denial-of-service attacks at
airlines, possibly other attacks.
So we are connected through the interagency. We are talking
to our partners out in the private sector about cybersecurity.
We address it. Just recently we had a newsletter that went out
to our surface partners and right on the front page was
cybersecurity.
So we are on top of it. We are learning, like everyone else
is. This is another new threat against our homeland.
Mr. Langevin. I think it is important, especially when you
look at things like skid attacks. The same type of system that
governs pumps and balances is the same thing that governs the
switches and such to keep trains on track or to change track
and such and could obviously be potentially penetrated.
Can you also describe TSA's role in developing guidance for
the transportation sector as it relates to the NIST Cyber
Framework?
Mr. Mayenschein. Well, again, we are connected through all
the agencies. In my shop at the TSA, I am the NIST builder for
the TSA. So I am the direct connection there. It is a vibrant,
on-going process. You know, I would be welcome to come and talk
to you about how we do that very specifically. It is very
convoluted, complex, but there is some great work that is done
there.
Mr. Langevin. Sure. I would like to do some follow-up on
that then.
Mr. Mayenschein. That is great.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Diaz, Ms. Hanson, can you describe how
you view the cybersecurity risk to your respective
organizations? How do you go about making risk-management
decisions? Do you feel that you have adequate in-house
resources of information security? Whom do you partner with to
help protect your assets?
Mr. Diaz. On the MTA PD side, we have a lieutenant and two
investigators that are assigned to the FBI Cyber Task Force. I
think we have gotten a little ahead of the curve on that
because we haven't had any real issues.
But our IT department is ahead of the curve on that. They
have a number of things in place. I am not really a computer
expert, but I know that we get probes every single day,
numerous probes into our system, and they have all been
defeated. But it is a concern, and we do have our personnel
assigned with the FBI so when that event comes we have things
in place that are ready to address it.
Mr. Langevin. Ms. Hanson.
Chief Hanson. Amtrak used DHS funding to have a
vulnerability risk assessment done. Our IT section, which is
not in the police department, has increased their personnel and
staffing. We closely align and have a very close relationship
with the FBI.
The FBI did recently put out some areas that they thought
needed attention because of some of the threats from ISIL for
September 11, and because of that they have got outsourced
young hackers who work with our IT team, security team, to make
sure that we are aware of who is trying to probe our system.
We obviously have other concerns as a result of some of the
new train sets we are building to make sure that we have and
continue to work with the FBI about concerns there that could
be in place to gather information that would be inadvertent and
unintentional, but have a bad consequence.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Mayenschein, going back to you again, how does TSA
handle reports of cybersecurity intrusions and events? Do they
count as security incidents? Are they reported to the TSOC and
entered into the WebEOC system? Does TSA have any additional
steps it takes for cyber incidents as compared to more
traditional security events?
Mr. Mayenschein. Well, again, we are just now building
through a couple different departments at the TSA a coalition
inside the TSA to start paying attention to these, not that we
haven't been paying attention to them.
I don't know specifically if this is a reported event. I
will get back to you specifically if cyber events or cyber
attacks are reportable to the TSOC.
Certainly they should be and I will require that. That is
something that I can do. If they are not, the------
Mr. Langevin. I would also like to know what happens once
the cyber incident is reported, what is the follow-up? How do
you ensure that the vulnerability is closed?
Mr. Mayenschein. Well, again, if it is internal to the TSA,
and I don't know of any of those events, but if it is something
to one of our security partners that happened in the private
sector, there is again this great dialogue and communication to
kind-of close those things. But in additional steps, we will
make sure that everybody within our stakeholders would know,
this sharing of information, that there was an attack, cyber
attack, and how it was done, and we would share that
immediately.
Mr. Langevin. Ms. Grover, do you have anything to add?
Ms. Grover. Well, just that 1 of the 10 categories of
incidents that is required to be reported to the TSOC is the
general category of threats. So it would depend on the specific
guidance that TSA had developed about how to define threats
about whether or not those are reported.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Katko. Thank you, Mr. Langevin.
Before we conclude, there are a couple of overarching
observations that I want to make. No. 1 is that, when I was at
the 9/11 museum last Monday, September 8, for our field
hearing, there was much discussion about the fact that people
forget about 9/11 outside of New York City because they think
that the terrorist threat is just focused on New York City. I
know much of our testimony today was about New York City.
But it is pretty clear to me and it is pretty clear to the
committee that a terrorist threat is Nation-wide, and we can't
stress enough the importance of having a discussion about
Nation-wide threats. We have had a lot of discussion about New
York and a little bit about Washington, but it is a Nation-wide
threat, and I know you are all aware of that. But I just want
the public to understand that it is not limited to New York
City by any stretch of the imagination. The recent lone-wolf
attacks we have seen in Chattanooga and elsewhere bear that
out.
So it is a concern going forward that the diligence and the
competence and the professionalism that is displayed in the
major urban areas needs to be branched out to the other areas.
It is a discussion we need to continue to have. I know with the
resources the way they are, that is a major concern. So I am
sure we will have more discussions about that going forward.
The other thing is, Ms. Grover, you didn't have a lot of
opportunity to speak today, and some people are relieved with
that and some people are not when you are a witness. But I will
tell you that your reports are always extremely well done and
we do read them and we do digest them and we do learn from
them. So please keep up the good work that you are doing.
Appreciate it.
Ms. Grover. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Katko. All right.
Now, I thank the witnesses, all of you, for your testimony,
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses,
and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to
Committee Rule 7(e), the hearing record will be held open for
10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittees stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]