[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEZBOLLAH'S GROWING THREAT AGAINST
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-163
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina GRACE MENG, New York
TED S. YOHO, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director and Fromer-Wexler fellow, Stein
Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy................................. 6
Mr. Tony Badran, research fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 23
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D., professor, Security Studies Program,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
University..................................................... 39
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 9
Mr. Tony Badran: Prepared statement.............................. 25
Daniel L. Byman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 41
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 58
Hearing minutes.................................................. 59
HEZBOLLAH'S GROWING THREAT AGAINST
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
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TUESDAY, MARCH 22, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute.
We will then hear from our witnesses and without objection,
witnesses, your prepared statements will be made a part of the
record and members may have 5 days in which to insert
statements and questions for the record subject to the length
limitations in the rules.
Before we begin today, I would just like to say, and I'm
sure that I'm speaking on behalf of all of the members, that we
condemn in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in
Brussels today and our condolences are with those impacted by
this evil and with all of the people of Brussels.
We stand ready, willing and able to assist our European
allies with whatever they need to root out these terrorists and
hold those responsible accountable.
I think today's attacks and the subject matter of today's
hearing only serve to further underscore the need for all of
us--the U.S., our allies, all--to do more to combat and destroy
ISIS and other terrorist groups like Hezbollah and it has to
start with finding a comprehensive plan for Syria that includes
defeating all the terror groups and seeing Assad removed from
power.
We certainly have trying times ahead but I'm confident that
these terrorists will not change our way of life and that
freedom and democracy will ultimately triumph over this radical
extremism and hatred.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Iran,
Syria, Lebanon, Israel--the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and
the Arab states and Iran--these are all some of the top
priorities for U.S. national security interests in the Middle
East.
And one of the common denominators here, one thing at the
center of all of this, is the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization--FTO--Hezbollah.
This Shi'ite Islamist group is an Iran proxy group that is
known to be one of the world's most dangerous and capable
terror organizations trained and equipped and funded by Iran's
Quds Force.
Hezbollah has been responsible for some of the world's most
infamous terror attacks including the 1983 U.S. Marine barracks
bombing in Beirut, the 1994 AMIA Jewish community center in
Buenos Aires and the bombing of a bus in Bulgaria which
targeted Israeli citizens.
But this is just a small fraction of the terror activities
as Hezbollah is present around the world including an alarming
presence right here in our own hemisphere where it is involved
in drug trafficking, smuggling networks and terror operations.
This U.S.-designated FTO has been responsible for provoking
war with Israel most recently in the 34-day conflict in 2006
which saw the militant group launch over 4,000 rockets
indiscriminately into northern Israel.
Hezbollah is responsible for destabilizing Lebanon's
political scene and is growing its influence and presence
there, much to the detriment of Lebanon and her people.
Hezbollah was found to be responsible for the assassination
of the former prime minister in 2005 and, of course, Hezbollah
has been used by the Iranian regime as ground forces to protect
the regime's interest in Syria.
With all of this it is clear that Hezbollah represents a
growing threat to our national security interests, especially
in the wake of the sanctions relief that the Iranian Government
has received as part of this weak and dangerous nuclear
agreement.
Hezbollah receives financial and materiel support from Iran
and now with the regime receiving this financial windfall of
over $100 billion, it is not only reasonable to expect that
Iran will increase its support for its proxy, it is as near of
a guarantee as one can have.
With the terror group being such a vital arm of Iran's
foreign policy agenda we would be silly and ignorant to expect
that it wouldn't use this as an opportunity to strengthen this
vital extension of its damaging apparatus.
This is likely one of the major driving forces behind the
Gulf countries and the Arab League making the decision to
designate Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
This designation, regardless of the motivations, was a step
in the right direction and we'd like to see more of that from
our GCC partners in fighting terror groups like Hezbollah and
that includes doing more to combat terror financing in those
countries.
But it is encouraging and we should seek to work with them
in an effort to cut off Hezbollah's support from Iran and
eliminate the threat that it poses.
Saudi Arabia has cut its military assistance to Lebanon in
part because of Hezbollah's undue influence in Beirut and the
Lebanese Government. That undue influence led the Lebanese
justice minister to resign.
This should be sounding alarm bells for the administration.
Not only is it allowing Iran and Hezbollah to push us around in
Syria but it is allowing Iran to grow its influence in Lebanon
and extend its grasp in the region.
Now we have Hezbollah on the border with Israel in Lebanon
and we have Hezbollah in the Golan Heights, and just because it
is preoccupied with the fight in Syria doesn't mean it has
turned a blind eye on Israel.
Make no mistake about it. The cease fire between Israel and
Hezbollah has nothing to do with Hezbollah not wanting to fight
Israel. It has everything to do with the terror group
restocking and building up its missile and rocket stockpile so
that it can once again launch an all-out attack against the
Jewish state.
In fact, with all the chaos going on in Syria right now, it
has helped Iran and the Assad regime in their efforts to
smuggle more weapons and more ammunition and more sophisticated
weapons systems to the terror group and that includes some
advanced Russian-made weapons systems, which could seriously
jeopardize Israel's security.
Anytime we have Russia, Iran and Hezbollah operating in the
same theater with the same objectives, it cannot be good for
the security and the stability of the region.
It is an imminent threat to our friend and ally, the
democratic Jewish state of Israel, and it is a great threat to
our national security interests in the region as the proxy war
between Iran and some of our GCC allies threatens to escalate.
The Obama administration needs to do more to counter
Hezbollah and Iran in Syria, which means delivering a
comprehensive strategy to defeat ISIS and the Assad-Hezbollah-
Iran nexus.
It needs to do more to take action to combat the weapons
transfers from Russia to Iran and to Hezbollah in Syria. The
President needs to use the tools at his disposal to sanction
Hezbollah and cut off its network, and the President needs to
realize that foregoing old alliances in the region to
legitimize relations with and legitimize itself, the Iranian
regime, is a strategic calamity that will have terrible
consequences for the region and for our national security
interests for years to come.
With that, I'm pleased to recognize the ranking member, my
friend, Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman.
I'd also like to just take a moment to say that we stand
with the people of Brussels, the people of Belgium and all
those who are resolute in battling ISIS and the terrorist
groups that cowardly launch attacks on innocent civilians.
It will not win, not in Belgium, not in Turkey, not in Cote
d'Ivoire, not in Israel, nowhere, and our thoughts and prayers
go out to the victims--today's victims and to their families.
Thank you to our witnesses. It's a pleasure to welcome you
all back to our subcommittee and I thank the chairman for
convening today's hearing to examining the terrorist
organization Hezbollah whose dangerous behavior poses a threat
in nearly every corner of the globe.
Hezbollah was founded as a resistance group against Israel,
a group dedicated to the destruction of the state of Israel.
Today, its activities are broad and they are wide.
Hezbollah has become Iran's proxy terrorist using Iranian
dollars to launch attacks around the world just as they use
Iranian weapons to kill Syrians.
Hezbollah is responsible for the 1992 Israeli Embassy
bombing in Argentina which killed 29 people, the 1994 bombing
of the AMIA Jewish center that killed 85 people. It attacked a
bus of tourists in Bulgaria in 2012.
Since 2008, attacks plotted by Hezbollah have been foiled
in Cyprus, in Azerbaijan, in Georgia and in Turkey. And in 2012
a Hezbollah plot to assassinate the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia
right here in Washington was uncovered.
This attack, had it gone forward, would have resulted in
the deaths of innocent civilians here in our nation's capital.
And while Hezbollah has been a designated U.S. Foreign
Terrorist Organization since 1997, it still operates freely
around the world as a so-called political group--a political
group.
The distinction between Hezbollah's political and military
wings allows the group to fundraise throughout Europe and Latin
America.
The Hezbollah International Financing Prevention Act, which
I was proud to introduce with Chairman Royce, Ranking Member
Engel and my friend, Mr. Meadows, has been signed into law and
would help crack down on Hezbollah's use of the banking system
as well as its other funding sources from narco-trafficking to
money laundering.
Now, today's hearing comes on the heels of two surprising
announcements--the designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist
organization by the Gulf Cooperation Council followed by the
same designation by the Arab League.
These actions are a clear indication of just how dangerous
Hezbollah has become as it does Iran's dirty work throughout
the Middle East.
Iran has a long history of meddling in neighboring
countries with hopes of destabilizing governments and inciting
unrest among Shi'ite populations.
After the conclusion of the nuclear agreement, there is
increasing concern about the kind of damage an Iran with access
to billions of dollars in sanctions relief could do.
But Hezbollah is not just a threat to Israel and to Arab
states. This murderous group has a history of attacking
American citizens and American interests.
Since its inception in 1982, Hezbollah has attacked
American citizens in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut
in 1983, killing 63 including 17 Americans, the U.S. Marine
barracks bombing in October 1983 which killed 241 American and
58 French servicemen, the bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in
Beirut in 1984 which killed 24, the hijacking of TWA 847 in
1985 in which a Navy diver was shot in the head and his body
dumped on the Tarmac, and the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi
Arabia in 1996 that killed 19 U.S. airmen.
Desperate to hang on to its best friend, Bashar al-Assad,
Iran dispatched Hezbollah mercenaries to Syria nearly 5 years
ago. Hezbollah has sustained the regime's grip on power and
aided in the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of innocent
Syrians by providing Assad with somewhere between 6,000 and
8,000 fighters.
Just this week, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah vowed
that his fighters would press on in Syria even as Assad loses
his support from the Russian air force.
The conflict in Syria has delivered an influx of new
weapons into the region, increasing the chances that dangerous
chemical or advanced precision weapons had fallen into
Hezbollah's hands.
Already Hezbollah is reportedly in possession of Russian-
designed surface-to-air shoulder-mounted missile systems and
with an arsenal of well over 100,000 missiles, which are,
according to Nasrallah, capable of reaching every corner of
Israel, it is troubling to imagine these rockets with precision
capabilities or Hezbollah with a stockpile of chemical weapons
that could one day be used against Israel.
The U.S. must lead the efforts to interdict Iranian weapons
as they make their way to Hezbollah for use in Syria and
against Israel. We have tremendous cooperation with Israel in
these efforts but the international community under the mandate
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the
de-arming of Hezbollah, must step up these efforts.
The Security Council must do more to ensure that Security
Council resolutions are implemented. The U.N. peacekeeping
mission in Lebanon does not have the ability to de-arm
Hezbollah. There is no enforcement mechanism.
Hezbollah has a stranglehold on Lebanon, the country is
paralyzed because Hezbollah essentially functions as a state
within a state. The political stalemate has persisted for
nearly 2 years with the government unable to select a
President.
Moreover, the Lebanese Armed Forces must be the sole
security apparatus in the country. I was pleased to see the
Security Council reaffirm this last week reiterating their
strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and
political independence of Lebanon and underscoring the crucial
role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in
extending and sustaining the authority of the state in
supporting the country's stability.
As long as Hezbollah remains in Syria, a threat to Lebanon
remains. Retaliatory bombings have struck Beirut, the country
is buckling under the weight of over 1 million refugees and
Hezbollah is desperate to see its lifeline to Iran preserved.
This makes a political solution that removes Bashar al-
Assad from power all the more important for regional
international security. Without Assad, the Hezbollah-Iran nexus
is inherently weakened.
Madam Chairman, it is time for the world to call Hezbollah
what it is--a terrorist organization that murders innocent
civilians at the behest of Iran.
I hope today will give us new insight into how we can beat
Iranian support for Hezbollah and curb the menacing group's
activities in the Middle East and around the world, and I yield
back.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And seeing no member request for time, we are so pleased to
get to our witnesses and I thank the witnesses and the audience
for their patience, as we had a series of votes.
We are pleased to welcome back Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director
of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence for
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Previously, Dr. Levitt has served as the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Intelligence and Analysis at the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, a branch chief under the Director of National
Intelligence and a Counterterrorism Advisor to the State
Department's Special Envoy to the Middle East. Welcome, Dr.
Levitt.
We would also like to welcome back Dr. Tony Badran, a
research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Dr. Badran focuses on Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah.
As an expert on U.S. foreign policy toward Syria and
nonstate actors and terrorist groups, Dr. Badran has--well, I
made you a doctor, that's not bad--has written extensively--my
arm hurts, maybe you could take a look at it--extensively in
Hezbollah.
And lastly but not least, we would like to welcome back Dr.
Daniel Byman, who is a professor in the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and
the research director for the Saban Center for the Middle East
Policy at the Brookings Institution.
Dr. Byman previously served as a professional staff member
for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United
States and the joint 9/11 inquiry staff of the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees.
Thank you, gentlemen. Your prepared remarks will be made a
part of the record and please feel free to summarize. Dr.
Levitt, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR AND FROMER-WEXLER
FELLOW, STEIN PROGRAM ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE,
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and
Ranking Member Deutch, members of the committee.
It's a pleasure to be here. I, too, would like to just make
a comment about Brussels. I was in Brussels last week meeting
with counterterrorism officials including with officials as
they were planning the first raid last Tuesday.
But I also had the opportunity while there to talk to them
about Hezbollah and there is some silver lining here, because
due to Hezbollah's tremendous investment in international
organized crime, going up to the highest levels of Hezbollah,
we now have an opportunity to work with Europeans, even within
the context of a European Union designation of Hezbollah that
is partial, just the military and terrorist wings, as if such a
distinction exists.
Hezbollah will be the first to tell you it does not, and so
maybe this is something we should push on again.
But even where things are, we are seeing tremendous
cooperation with them on these cases. The fact is that
Hezbollah has branched out and experienced a regional
transformation.
We see the designation by the GCC and Arab League and it's
because of an increased amount of Hezbollah activity in the
region, not just the long history of Hezbollah in the Gulf, and
to be clear, for example, just 2 months after the finalization
day of JCPOA we had the arrest of Mughassil who was one of the
masterminds of the Khobar Towers bombing that you both
mentioned.
Hezbollah's transformation has, clearly, taken it to Syria.
It has taken it to Iraq in small numbers. But, for example, the
Treasury Department designated al-Inmaa Group, a Beirut-based
engineering company which has been opening up basically fronts
to finance and support Hezbollah activities, a small footprint
in Yemen, which is most noticeable for the very high ranking
Hezbollah operatives that they have sent there.
When Hezbollah sends a special operations commander like
Abu Ali Tabatabai to Yemen, that means that Yemen means
something to them, even if they're not sending large numbers of
people.
Hezbollah's global criminal networks are on the increase
and it's important to note that they rely sometimes on what we
call these criminal super facilitators who can move and launder
tremendous amounts of money in and out of Europe, in and out of
the United States.
It's important to note that the Department of Justice, the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, has been targeting a
whole host of these actors.
To be clear, we don't actually know what this unit within
Hezbollah calls itself. But U.S. law enforcement, for lack of a
better term, came up with a name called the Business Affairs
Component--the BAC--which to be clear is not operating on
behalf of Hezbollah's political wing, for its social welfare
wing, but it is specifically under and providing facilitation
and finance for the terrorist wing, the Islamic Jihad
organization, the external security organization, and was
founded, according to the GOA, by Imad Mughniyah himself before
he was killed in 2008. That's how far back this organization
goes.
In terms of the Western Hemisphere, the BAC has established
working relationships according to DOJ with South American drug
cartels that supply cocaine to drug markets in both the U.S.
and Europe.
The BAC then launders these drugs through well-known black
market peso exchange and other vehicles. This has come close to
the United States as well. One of the most important arrests
we've made was of an individual who we lured to Atlanta, Imam
Kubaisi, in October 2015, just 3 weeks after the end of the 60-
day congressional review period for JCPOA. She was arrested in
Atlanta.
She was arraigned on money laundering conspiracy charges,
unlicensed firearms dealing, conspiracy for laundering funds
she believed to be drug money and for arranging for the sale of
thousands of firearms including military assault rifles,
machine guns and sniper rifles to criminal groups in Iran and
Lebanon, including Hezbollah. She also was trying to procure
airplane parts for Iran.
And meanwhile, as associate of hers, Joseph Asmar, was
arrested in Paris--again, underscoring the tremendous law
enforcement cooperation we're seeing with key European allies.
According to the Department of Justice, Kubaisi and Asmar
explained that they could arrange for places from South
America--planes, that is, from South America laden with multi-
ton shipments of cocaine to land safely in Africa as a transit
point before the drugs were smuggled to the United States and
to Europe.
DEA recording of the conversation of these two individuals
with a DEA undercover discussing their money laundering network
and the services they provided to drug traffickers, terrorist
organizations and other criminal groups including places--in
places like Lebanon, Iran, France, Belgium, again, Bulgaria,
Benin, the DRC, Ghana, Nigeria, Cyprus and, yes, across the
United States.
We see Hezbollah not only engaging in facilitation but also
operational activity, the latest plot to be thwarted in Cyprus
with Hussein Bassam Abdallah, a dual Lebanese-Canadian citizen
involved in the stockpiling of over eight tons of ammonia
nitrate, and according to intelligence officials that was
intended not just for Cyprus but for further operations in
Europe.
The fact is that there are activities here in the Western
Hemisphere we need to be extremely cognizant of. The most
recent plot to be thwarted was in Peru. The individual who was
arrested, Mohamad Amadar, had married a dual Peruvian-American
citizen who was a resident in Miami.
But perhaps the most--the thing we need to be most
concerned about and which perhaps you haven't heard is that the
person who was the handler for Mohamad Amadar, who met with him
personally in Turkey, was Salman Al-Redda.
Salman Al-Redda has been indicted for his role in the 1994
bombing of the AMIA attacks. He came and went throughout South
America in the years followed, never arrested, and he has
become one of the absolute top--perhaps the top three or four
Islamic jihad organization Hezbollah terrorist wing operatives
personally in charge of operations in South America, and those
operations continue.
My time is over, but I'd like--if you're interested I'm
happy to tell you about some of the other things that Treasury,
the State Department and the Department of Justice are doing.
There's good things happening from the United States
regarding Hezbollah. But my time is over. I want to thank you
for having me once more.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We'll make sure that we ask you that.
Thank you.
Mr. Badran.
STATEMENT OF MR. TONY BADRAN, RESEARCH FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Badran. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Ranking
Member Deutch and for the members of the committee for allowing
me to testify today.
I'm going to just briefly talk about, as Matt has talked
about, Hezbollah's global operations. I want to talk
specifically more about how that relates to their position in
Lebanon and Syria specifically.
On the one hand, the Syrian uprising 5 years ago posed a
significant challenge to Iran and Hezbollah by--as you noted,
by threatening to sever their bridge to Lebanon and thereby
denying Hezbollah their strategic depth as well as their
logistical pipeline.
Unfortunately, 5 years on the trend is moving in the
opposite direction. Hezbollah and Iran have secured their core
interests in Syria, albeit at significant cost.
They have managed to secure contiguity between Lebanon and
the regime-controlled areas in western Syria, thereby securing
the ability to continue to move weapons from Damascus to
Lebanon.
A key partner in this effort has been the Lebanese Armed
Forces. In fact, one of the interesting things to note and
troubling things to note over the past 5 years has been the
growing partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, which has
allowed Hezbollah to protect its domestic flank when it was
facing some backlash for its involvement in Syria.
The partnership between Hezbollah and the LAF, however, is
not the only point of Hezbollah control and domination of the
Lebanese state.
It has placed its members or sympathizers in key government
positions which like, for instance, the Lebanese customs office
as well as its financial auditor which allows it all this
activity that we're hearing about globally to be processed
domestically with little oversight or backlash.
In fact, Lebanon has become a critical hub in Hezbollah's
criminal activities. Hezbollah has made Lebanon complicit both
financially and economically as well as militarily because of
all the weapons that it's moving from Syria that it's getting
from Iran and is storing the majority of it in civilian areas.
Hezbollah has essentially painted a big target on the back
of all of Lebanon and this is, unfortunately, has not been
countered by U.S. policy over the last 5 years.
What this threatens to do is to--in addition to all these
strategic weapons that are being moved to Lebanon as well as
the Hezbollah's entrenchment in Syria and its expansion into
the Golan along with the IRGC and the building of new
infrastructure on Syrian soil, it creates a situation for
Israel that will, I think, accelerate an upcoming future
conflict which, as the IDF has been saying to anybody who will
listen for the last few years, is going to be far bloodier than
anything that we've ever seen on both sides.
You talked about the 4,000 rockets that they launched in
the previous war. Now they have the capacity to launch anywhere
between 1,000 to 1,500 a day.
So the IDF is very clear that there's going to be a lot of
dead civilians both in Israel but also in Lebanon. The problem
also has been that Hezbollah has gained operational expertise
in Syria, working alongside the Russian military in combined
weapons operations and in different urban and rural settings.
So it's actually be able to offset its losses with this
experience.
All of this creates a situation on the border of Israel in
the northern border that now combines the Syrian front as well
as the Lebanese front and soon to be not just swimming in
Iranian cash but also potentially soon with an Iranian nuclear
umbrella. This creates an unacceptable position for Israel.
But it's not only Israel's security that has been
challenged by this development. It's also the Arab states and
we've seen the Saudis leading the charge in this regard in
designating Hezbollah but also in pulling the $3 billion aid
that they gave to the Lebanese Armed Forces, citing the fact
that the Lebanese Armed Forces have become an ``auxiliary'' of
Hezbollah and I think this is an accurate assessment.
And although the--there's a tendency on the part of the
administration at least to kind of pressure the Saudis to go
back on that decision, I think actually we should stop and take
and pause and reassess what exactly U.S. materiel support to
the LAF and intelligence sharing--how that can actually go to
sustain and help Hezbollah entrench its grip on Lebanon.
In addition, we should not--because of--the nature of
Hezbollah's control over Lebanon--think about it in the way
that the IRGC is in Iran. It's tentacles are everywhere in the
economy and security apparatus.
So when pushing for the implementation of H.R. 2297, I
think we should be very, very clear about not being taken
hostage by the prospect that this is going to somehow collapse
Lebanon's economy or the assistance to the LAF is going to
collapse Lebanon's security, we have to also be cognizant of
the fact that any nook and cranny and any safe haven that's
provided in the Lebanese system ultimately is going to benefit
Hezbollah because of its dominant position in the state, both
in the security sector as well as in the economic sector.
So I'll stop right here and I'll be happy to flesh this out
in the conversation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Badran follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, sir.
Dr. Byman.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Byman. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, members
of the committee, thank you very much for having me here today.
Hezbollah is in a time of transition and this is in large
part because of the Syrian civil war. Hezbollah forces have
been involved in several of the most important battles in the
war and they have proven a vital ally to the Syrian regime due
to their skill and their discipline, which are often much
greater than those of the Syrian army forces.
Hezbollah has had to expand the overall size of its
military wing, and although it was cautious about entering the
fray, many Lebanese Shi'a now see it as a defender of their
community.
They look at the atrocities that the Islamic State is
perpetrating against their co-religionists and believe that a
strong Hezbollah is necessary to protect their community.
We see extreme voices within the Lebanese Sunni community
including jihadists tied to the Islamic State or al-Nusra, al-
Qaeda's affiliate. They see Hezbollah as the leading or top foe
they face and they've conducted terrorist attacks on Hezbollah
targets in Lebanon and Iranian targets there as well.
Perhaps the biggest negative consequence for Hezbollah
though has been the collapse of its regional reputation and the
associated prestige it's had in the Arab world.
Almost 10 years ago in 2006, Hassan Nasrallah was one of
the most popular men in the Arab world for Hezbollah's military
efforts against Israel.
Today, he's widely hated. Hezbollah's involvement in the
Syrian civil war has largely made it more cautious about taking
on Israel. It's taken close to 1,000 causalities and that's a
huge number for a relative small group, and this is putting a
strain on the organization.
In addition, the organization's Lebanese constituents have
little appetite for yet another confrontation, yet another
draining conflict.
This could change, though, for several reasons. One is that
if there are setbacks in Lebanon or elsewhere the group would
have an incentive to restore its past reputation, and fighting
Israel might be one way to do so.
Also, Israel regularly attacks Hezbollah targets in Syria
and Lebanon to stop the transfer of advanced weapons, as Tony
mentioned, and these strikes have at times killed senior
Hezbollah officials and even a senior Iranian official.
This has the potential to escalate though, fortunately, we
haven't seen that happen yet. And finally, Hezbollah is loyal
to Iran and if there were a collapse in the U.S.-Iran nuclear
deal or another source of tension, Hezbollah would be seen as
part of the Iranian response.
In my judgement, the close relationship between Hezbollah
and Iran is not likely to change with the U.S.-Iran nuclear
deal. It is possible that Iran might step up support to
Hezbollah, taking advantage of the sanctions relief. But at the
same time we must recognize that Iran is diplomatically over
stretched.
It's deploying considerable forces in Syria to prop up the
Assad regime. It maintains a large and clandestine force in
Iraq and it's even established limited ties to the Houthis in
Yemen. These are considerable financial commitments.
You couple that at home with the collapse in oil prices and
add to that decades of economic mismanagement and this has all
come at the same time when ordinary Iranians are expecting an
increase in economic prosperity due to the deal.
So those sanctions relief will put more money into Iran's
coffers. Iran has many, many demands on these scarce funds and
in my judgement the level of support for Hezbollah is not
likely to change significantly barring a significant change in
the regional situation.
For the United States we face a dilemma. Washington, of
course, doesn't want Hezbollah's influence to grow. But at the
same time, Hezbollah is one of the most formidable foes of the
Islamic State and it is fighting the group effectively in
Syria.
A standard recommendation is to build up the Lebanese Armed
Forces and to otherwise strengthen the Lebanese state to help
it counter Hezbollah and I've argued that for quite some time.
For the most part, though, I think we need to recognize
that U.S. efforts to do this have failed. In part, this is
linked to some general problems with U.S. training programs.
But the bigger problem is that Lebanese leaders don't want to
exacerbate tension with Hezbollah right now and as a result
they're hesitant to go for any efforts to try to push them in
that direction.
Part of this is due to fear but Lebanon's situation right
now is quite precarious and the country is, I would say, on
edge because of the neighboring unrest in Syria.
The million plus Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a potential
destabilizing force and I think U.S. aid for the refugees in
Lebanon is vital.
We really don't need another failed state in the Middle
East and Lebanon, unfortunately, is a fairly strong candidate
to be the next one should things get worse.
And finally, as the United States steps up its intervention
in Syria and Iraq, continues its efforts to fight Hezbollah,
coordination with Israel is going to be essential.
The two countries work well together on this and we need to
redouble cooperation to make the most of everything.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to all of you. I'll
start the questions. When the Lebanese justice minister
resigned he stated that Hezbollah's undue influence was ruining
Lebanon's relations with Arab nations.
Saudi cut its military aid to Lebanon. Hezbollah still
wields considerable clout in the Lebanese Government. How can
the U.S. ensure that Iran and Hezbollah do not gain even more
influence in Lebanon and given Hezbollah's relationship with
the Lebanese Armed Forces should the United States reassess the
President's budget request for $105 million in foreign military
financing for Lebanon? Dr. Levitt.
Mr. Levitt. I think one of the significant steps that U.S.
agencies have taken recently is an effort to take the financial
fight to Beirut where Hezbollah until recently has been banking
with impunity.
The Treasury Department has been targeting designations
that go right back to the heart of Beirut and we know that
that's having an impact because Hassan Nasrallah is telling us
so.
So in several of his last speeches including in particular
in December in that speech he used I think 23 out of 55 minutes
to deny that Hezbollah has any businesses whatsoever which, of
course, it does. They're just not listed as Hezbollah,
Incorporated.
Now, armed with the Hezbollah International Financing
Prevention Act, U.S. agencies are really truly empowered to, in
the administration's words, thwart the group's network at every
turn by imposing sanctions on financial institutions that deal
with Hezbollah or key elements.
Tony hit the nail on the head. The ability of Hezbollah to
use Beirut as the core, as the hub of its literally
international organized criminal activities threatens Lebanon's
financial system, which is the backbone of its economy.
We can help Lebanon protect that financial system, not
undermine it--to the contrary protect it, and when you speak to
Lebanese officials who are outside of Hezbollah they beg for
that assistance.
Mr. Badran. I would just add just a couple of points.
First, more broadly, we have to understand--I mean, it's hard
to say this but we have to understand that there is a big level
of complicity, unfortunately, with Hezbollah's criminal acts.
So corruption is widespread and it has affected every
corner of the Lebanese economy down to the micro level. Think
of Florida with the cartels, right, and the drug money that
went through. It corrupts and it infiltrates segments--banks
and other parts of the economy.
It's a similar situation, unfortunately, and they have key
positions and they're very keen on guarding these key positions
that enable them to do this in the government. I mentioned the
customs office, financial auditor, general security, et cetera,
et cetera.
So dealing with Lebanon as though there's a separation
between Lebanon and Hezbollah becomes increasingly difficult.
So we cannot have kid gloves sort of when we're dealing with
this situation.
The Lebanese have to be placed--you know, facing a tough
choice or else this is going to continue indefinitely. With the
LAF, similar things. Why--the Saudi recognition that ultimately
the LAF is acting as an auxiliary as opposed to sort of a
challenge to Hezbollah has made them reach the conclusion we
cannot continue to fund this uncritically. There has to be an
assessment as to how to separate operationally Hezbollah from
the LAF and also to put the LAF in front of its own
responsibilities in safeguarding the United Nations' Security
Council Resolution 1701 or simply in the way it's rounding up
Sunni young men and just putting them in jail and exacerbating
tensions in the country when they're supposed to be a national
institution.
So just a couple of thoughts. I think that an assessment is
certainly due in this case.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Byman. One concern I have is that by the Saudi
withdrawal of aid if the U.S. were to reduce support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces that the winner would be Hezbollah--that
these institutions and Saudi funding that goes to various
places in Lebanon have tremendous flaws--overwhelming flaws.
But they're better than the alternative, which is an unfettered
Hezbollah.
And so I would agree strongly that assessing this regularly
is necessary but we should encourage the Saudis to resume their
aid.
We want countervailing forces to Hezbollah in Lebanon and I
think U.S. ties to Lebanese Armed Forces are also necessary
even though we need to recognize that the Lebanese army is
going to be limited and that's a very polite way of saying that
they're not going to be able to accomplish what we want.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And my last question is
Russia's role. Hezbollah may have advanced Russian weapon
systems. Iran is believed to have transferred some of these to
Hezbollah.
Russia is also working with Iran and Hezbollah to support
the Assad regime in Syria and protect its own interests. What
can you tell us about the Russian-Hezbollah relationship and
what that might mean for the U.S. and for Israel?
Mr. Levitt. If you want to be polite there's just a de
facto relationship between Russia and Hezbollah in their
cooperative support together with Iran for the Assad regime.
I'd argue it's much more than that. You effectively have
Russian air cover for the entire pro-Assad axis which very much
includes Hezbollah, as Dan mentioned.
But it goes much farther than that. It's not just the
obvious things we can see when we're paying attention to the
news and to what Russia is doing in the region, and while they
may have removed some assets from the region they haven't
removed as many as they said they had and Putin himself has
been quite blunt to the fact that they can put them back very
quickly.
I'm no less concerned about some of the illicit procurement
efforts that I alluded to earlier in Europe in particular that
are happening including in places like the former Soviet Union.
Consider the case of Ali Fayyad who, at our request, was
arrested by the Czechs, a dual Lebanese-Ukrainian citizen who
was procuring all kinds of former Soviet Union arms for
Hezbollah.
Hezbollah took notice because Ali Fayyad is important to
them and they kidnapped five people in Lebanon and eventually
those people were released. Ali Fayyad was released.
We still have fingers into this investigation because Ali
Fayyad was arrested together with two Ivorians, dual Lebanese
Ivorian citizens who are still in custody in the Czech
Republic, and while it remains to be seen if anything will
really happen with it, last week the Lebanese Government
announced that they are actually intending to prosecute Ali
Fayyad, who was sent from the Czech Republic back to Lebanon on
arms procurement weapons trafficking charges, not mentioning
the T word, terrorism, the H word, Hezbollah, of course.
But this would be a step forward in demonstrating there
might be some elements of the Lebanese Government with which we
can partner with more than others.
Mr. Badran. I mentioned earlier the Israeli concern
regarding Hezbollah operational experience by working side to
side with the Russians in Syrian.
Because they have gained experience in combined arms
operations and working with new weapons systems that the
Russians introduced to the Syrian theater Russian trainers that
are working with the Syrian military and Hezbollah sitting
there and watching they have also with the Iranians started a
joint operations room in Iraq last year to exchange
intelligence.
So we hear about the Russian communication with the
Israelis on one hand to deconflict in Syria but there's also a
parallel sort of relationship that the Russians are maintaining
with the Iranians who are really the ground troops of the
Russian air force in Syria.
So the Russians, you know, when they're providing close air
support in Aleppo it's--none of the IRGC and Hezbollah were on
the ground checking around.
Now, if this situation transfers--the fear was that this
situation would transfer to the south of Syria in the Golan.
Now, thankfully, it hasn't happened yet. Maybe it will not
happen. Maybe the Russians will balance out their relationship
with the Israelis and that with the Iranians.
But nevertheless it's a risk that should the Russians say
we are going to combat terrorist groups in southern Syria near
Jordan, near Israel, who are going to be the ground troops for
such an operation? It's going to be the IRGC and Hezbollah.
So, clearly, the coast is not yet clear for Israel. For
now, the Russian announcement that they're going to kind of
freeze their operations for a while or reorient them elsewhere
it doesn't seem to include the south of Syria yet. But it's by
no means, I don't think, sort of gone--should be stricken out
of our calculation that something like that is going to happen
in the future.
Mr. Byman. I'll only briefly add that I'm very skeptical
about the degree to which Russia is going to cease its
operations. I think there will be still considerable support
and the number of assets that have been redeployed so far have
been quite limited.
I will also add, however, that Russia has a visceral
distrust and dislike of anything that smacks of Islamic
extremism and the Russians are if anything pragmatic but at the
same time they see that broader community as quite hostile and
they are quite concerned.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madame Chairman.
Dr. Byman, you had said--you described Nasrallah's current
position as one who's widely hated. You also pointed out that
Hezbollah is a formidable foe of Islamic State.
Do those two things--is it likely that because they are a
formidable foe of ISIS that that will have some impact on the
way Nasrallah is viewed?
How do those interrelate and on the ground, more broadly,
how does the population view Hezbollah, given the role they've
played in fighting ISIS?
Mr. Byman. For most people in the Middle East the primary
fight is not between the Islamic State and the United States
but rather between the Syrian regime and what we would call the
moderate opposition.
It's not a term I love because it means 100 different
things. But that said, Hezbollah has been an arm of the Syrian
regime, killing its own people including a range of groups
supported by the United States which whom we have, I think,
reasonable relations and Hezbollah is widely hated in the Sunni
Arab world because it is seen as on the side of an oppressive
minority regime that has killed several hundred thousand of its
own people. It's a staggering number.
Hezbollah's operations against the Islamic State for most
people in the region are a footnote to this, right, where some
would say that's bad, some would say that's good. But they
would focus on their killing of people they regard as much more
mainstream and much more heroic figures and much more
representative.
So that, to me, is the primary reason for its unpopularity
and that's, to me, why so many Arab states that are backing the
moderate opposition are against Hezbollah is they see it really
as an enemy and a tool of Iran.
Mr. Deutch. And does--the decision by GCC and the Arab
League to designate Hezbollah a terrorist organization what's
the impact of that in the region and do you expect another--are
there retaliatory attacks to come from the designation? What
happens next?
Mr. Byman. I think at this point the designation is really
a reflection of the political reality on the ground rather than
a major shift.
These states have been tremendously against Hezbollah for a
while. The designation helps, though, right. It enables us to
garner diplomatic support. A number of things that Matt has
mentioned, for example, are helped diplomatically by being able
to point to a GCC or an Arab League designation to kind of push
along agendas we want.
So I think it's a relatively small impact but nevertheless
symbolic of a bigger shift.
Mr. Deutch. And does the failure--I'll throw this open to
anyone on the panel--does the failure on the part of Europe to
designate Hezbollah--I mean, what does it actually mean?
What are they able to do from a fund-raising standpoint?
What are they able to do from an operational standpoint that
could potentially be stopped if Europe actually does the right
thing and designates them a terrorist organization?
Dr. Levitt.
Mr. Levitt. Yes. Everything. Right now for an EU
designation of Hezbollah you have to make a definitive link to
the terrorist and military wing.
But Hezbollah's no fool. In fact, they're quite good at
layering and obfuscation. So they engage in all kinds of
activities. They just don't put a Hezbollah shingle out there.
The only case we've had since the designation was not an EU
action but a German action against the Orphan Welfare
Foundation, which was a Hamas front organization and was caught
making the mistake of openly providing some of its donations to
the Martyrs Foundation, which can be tied, though some
Europeans would even disagree with this, directly to militancy.
So designation wise, the EU can't really do very much. It
does provide an umbrella so that if member states want to do
something they can say well, Hezbollah is at least partially
designated--if you can find that they're doing arms
procurement, arms procurement, for example, is by definition
probably not for social welfare or political activity. So you
can feel more comfortable doing that.
I would argue they should feel comfortable doing it anyway
since it's black and white criminal activity. Quietly on law
enforcement issues we've seen great cooperation. But the
designation as such doesn't actually empower them to do a whole
lot.
Mr. Deutch. But what would the full designation empower
them to do?
Mr. Levitt. If they found someone or something that was
doing anything for Hezbollah and all you'd have to prove was
Hezbollah that entity could be designated.
Mr. Deutch. And what would that mean to----
Mr. Levitt. Asset freezes, travel bans.
Mr. Deutch. Right. And in terms of--in terms of impacting
their operations, what would the impact be?
Mr. Levitt. Given the huge increase in Hezbollah operations
in Europe including a whole bunch of entities that we have
designated, that the DOJ has indicted there's very good reason
to think that a designation in the EU would empower European
nations to target those activities in Europe.
Let me put it to you another way. Since the July 2013
partial designation of Hezbollah, Hezbollah activities in
Europe have increased. I'm writing a study on it right now.
So that suggests that maybe Hezbollah has kind of called
that bluff and by activities I don't only mean fund raising,
logistics and procurement but operations as well as evidenced
from the--not just the first Cyprus operation which was
predesignation but the second one with over eight tons of
explosive materiel which we believe was going to be sent
farther into Europe.
Mr. Deutch. And Mr. Badran--last question, Madam Chairman.
Is there any--can you foresee anything that would prompt or
what would--that would prompt the Europeans to take the
necessary step, given what Dr. Levitt just laid out, to make
this a full designation?
Mr. Badran. I remain a little--I mean, Matt has expressed
more optimism and I hope--and he would know, certainly, better
than me on this--I hope it actually goes in this direction.
But one of the things, for instance, let's take what the
GCC has done, right, and let's actually help them enforce it
and provide also reassurances for these very vulnerable nations
that the United States will stand with them as they push
against any Iranian and Hezbollah retaliation.
But one of the things, for instance, that they're looking
to do and that could be transferred into the European context
just as easily because it's not just front organizations that
are involved here.
The Saudis leaked, when they made their decision--the
Saudis leaked through the Lebanese media that one of the things
they might consider is actually going after not just Shi'ite
businessmen that may have ties to Hezbollah's financial
operations but also Christian businessmen who have interests in
the Gulf states and those are a lot and they're big interests,
including--they even went so far as to leak that this includes
sitting ministers in the Lebanese cabinet, okay--that they're
willing to go that far I think they waved it as a threat.
We should encourage them to follow through on all of this
because there's a huge amount, especially in the United Arab
Emirates, of financial interests for people who are on the face
of it legitimate businessmen, both Shi'ite and Christian and
Sunni even. In Kuwait especially there are Sunni Kuwaiti
businessmen especially with tremendous ties to Hezbollah's
financial empire.
This is an opportunity to take to squeeze and then to
transfer the same template to the Europeans if they're willing
to go along with it.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Boyle of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Boyle. Thank you. I just have a few questions. When I
was in Israel last August--well, actually, a few years ago and
then again last August, folks I talked to including Israeli
generals talked--they said not if there's a third Lebanon war
but when there's a third Lebanon war, and that really struck
me.
So my question was about the rockets because there's been
quite a change even since I was there 7 months ago. The Israeli
military that was briefing us had used the figure about 85,000
rockets. Then it was revised upwards after that to 100,000 and
now I read upwards of 150,000.
So I guess two questions. First, where exactly do things
stand now in terms of the amount of rockets and their
sophistication. As I recall from 2006, the rockets that they
had were not exactly precise.
So that's the number one, and then number two is what is
our best intelligence that would be the event to trigger a
third Lebanon war?
So I decided to ask all my questions at once and then leave
it to each of you to figure it out which ones you'll want to
take.
Mr. Levitt. Thanks for those questions.
I don't know any Israeli security or military official who
doesn't talk that way, not because they're looking to invite a
third Lebanon war but because you don't stockpile--the numbers
I hear are 130,000 to 150,000 rockets--to keep them as
paperweights.
I don't think that they want to initiate. I had an
opportunity to speak to a senior Israeli official this week. He
said, we will not initiate but we will not allow Nasrallah to
threaten the entire country, as he puts it, not just the north
with all of these weapons.
And what we're dealing with now are more sophisticated
weapons than we saw in 2006, both an increase in the number of
actual guided systems and also maybe even more significantly
because not all rockets are equal and the majority of their
arsenal is not this longer--medium and longer range guided
missiles but the GPS kits that they are reportedly getting from
Iran which you can put on something like which they had in the
past and you can make a dumb rocket smarter.
They're trying to cope with a situation where hundreds of
rockets are fired at specific buildings in Tel Aviv and one can
understand why they won't tolerate that type of a situation and
as Tony said why they've made it very clear from a deterrent
perspective that if it happens their response will be much more
severe than it has been in the past.
Mr. Badran. So Matt covered the issue of the long range
rockets that they've upgraded them--they're now precision
guided. They're no longer dumb rockets. Now they can hit
strategic installations.
They've added also the Russian-made anti-ship--the cruise
missile. Now, those are very, very dangerous. They can hit
strategic installations offshore, installation gas rigs, et
cetera.
So the Israelis have now taken this in such that it's part
of their doctrine, that they're emphasizing defense of the
interior, which is a departure from what it used to be in the
past. It used to be much more offensive minded.
Now they take into consideration that the population is
going to have to suffer and there's going to be prioritization
as to what has to be guarded by the Iron Dome missile defense
system because of the high density of the weapons--of the
rockets that Hezbollah can fire on a daily basis, basically
about 1,000 a day.
Now, not all of these are long range--okay, a lot of them
are actually the shorter range. But there's 1 million other
issues now.
All of this stuff that they're learning in Syria is going
to be translated kinetically in the next war in maybe offensive
operations into the Galilee because now they're on the Golan
Heights, not just in Lebanon.
So you ask what would trigger such a war. See, this is
where the failure of U.S. policy in Syria becomes something
about much more than just Syria.
The Israelis are now warning that any solution to the
Syrian crisis cannot leave Iran in a position of dominance in
Syria and in a position on the Golan Heights.
Unfortunately, the United States--the U.S. President has
said that any solution in Syria has to take into consideration
respecting Iranian equities in Syria. So you can see where now
our policy in Syria and Israel's position in Syria are directly
at odds.
Any position, any movement in the Golan, any movement of
rockets or strategic weapons across the border into Lebanon has
the potential for triggering such a conflict and the more they
entrench themselves in Syria the shorter this time period
becomes of when Israel--of how long Israel can tolerate this
buildup before having to take action.
So the situation in Syria, I think, is critical to the
security. Of course, I mean, it affects Turkey, it affects
Jordan just the same, but very critical as far as Israeli
security is concerned.
Mr. Boyle. My time has expired so I thank the chair and the
ranking member.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
And Dr. Levitt, you wanted to say something and you had run
out of time. So this is a great opportunity right now. Grab it.
Mr. Levitt. Thank you so much.
I don't want to take much time because I've actually
managed to sneak most of it in.
But I did want to just add just as an example of some of
the things that are being done creatively and some of the
European cooperation we're getting, under the Counterterrorism
Partnership Fund, the State Department together with DOJ and
others have been able to put together a series--an
international initiative to raise awareness about Iran and
Hezbollah's broad range of terrorist and criminal activities
around the world, engaging with partners around the world, not
only informing them and teaching them but then teaching them
how to use tools at their disposal and we're seeing actual
cases come out of these including, for example, the U.S. co-led
law enforcement coordination group, which we co-lead with
EUROPOL, getting EUROPOL to focus on Hezbollah activities.
There are EUROPOL cases now. This is not a small
achievement. Clearly, there is much, much more to be done but I
see an interest in the part of Europeans because of Hezbollah's
increased activities there, because of Hezbollah's regional
growth and in particular in Syria and figuring out what they
can do within their system, within their designation partial
regime to work with us on this target.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And gentlemen, are there any parting thoughts that you
would like to leave us with? Mr. Deutch?
Mr. Deutch. No, thank you, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you very much. This
subcommittee is very concerned about doing everything that we
can to cut off the funding to this terrorist organization.
We're going to keep on in that track. Thank you. And with
that, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you to everyone.
[Whereupon, at 4:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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