[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL
SELF DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-152
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats
DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
MO BROOKS, Alabama THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
PAUL COOK, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Paul R. Williams, Ph.D., president and co-founder, Public
International Law and Policy Group............................. 4
Jason Sorens, Ph.D., lecturer, Department of Government,
Dartmouth College.............................................. 21
Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, senior vice president for programs, German
Marshall Fund of the United States............................. 29
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Paul R. Williams, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 7
Jason Sorens, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.......................... 23
Mr. Ivan Vejvoda: Prepared statement............................. 31
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 46
Hearing minutes.................................................. 47
The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida: Prepared statement........................... 48
U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS
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TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Good afternoon. This hearing of the
European Subcommittee is called to order. Today we will discuss
a topic that is dear to me, but quite often overlooked by too
many policy experts, and that is, national self-determination,
and its impact on what is going on in the world today. There
have been many examples since the Second World War of self-
determination movements, galvanizing local support, challenging
their central authorities, and, of course, giving our State
Department headaches in the process.
As advocates of democratic government and human rights, we
cannot help but have sympathy with the grievances of many of
these self-determination movements. They are often based on
legitimate complaints, and aspire to change a political
structure that they quite often had no voice in creating. Yet,
these groups can be cooperated by hostile outside forces, and
used violently against otherwise friendly governments.
The foreign policy of our government, perhaps for no better
reason than for simplicity's sake, has opted to treat questions
of self-determination as internal matters and existing borders
as unchangeable. The word ``stability'' has been invoked more
times than I can count.
During today's hearing, we will discuss another point of
view, that self-determination movements represent a dynamic
force in the history of the world that can be channeled into
peaceful and legitimate political change, but we should not
see--because of the fear that that is not the way it is--we
should not see as tramping them down and suppressing them as
our solution to that type of dynamic that is being created in a
self-determination movement.
Border and other types of change, border change, and the
creation of new states, these are things that will result in
this type of dynamic, the self-determination that we see
popping up in various parts of the world, but what is wrong
with new governments? What is wrong with new states? What is
wrong with changing borders that have been created by monarchs
back two centuries ago?
And after all, our country is a product of the self-
determination movement. Some worry that self-determination
movements will have a domino effect of changes and challenges
to the existing world order that will lead to chaos, and I have
no such fears. And acknowledging these movements and state the
principles by which they should seek progress, by doing that,
we affirm that there is value in the existing global standards,
and we can demonstrate change within those global standards.
Alternatively, by ignoring these groups who are looking for
their own self-identity and united by a national identity, even
though it is subjugated by the boundaries of a country that is
dominated by other people, by ignoring them, we push these
ethnic patriots toward violence and insurrection.
In our recent history, we can see several examples where
self-determination and finding peace were intermingled. We can
see this in Kosovo's experience breaking away from Serbia. Had
that been an election all along and there had been sort of a
relationship established between Kosovo and Serbia, a lot of
violence and people on both sides would have been better off.
We have seen that with the splitup of the Czechs and the
Slovaks, something that needed to happen. It happened, and it
has been good for both of those people. We can see how
Pakistan's refusal to recognize the rights of the Baloch people
creates more conflict and more suffering.
In 2014, the referendum in Scotland allowed the people
there to act in a peaceful way to express their wishes as to
what their future would be, or where their sovereignty would be
placed. And that was a strong example of how democracy can
work.
I am watching now in the cases, for example, in Catalonia,
to see if a peaceful and mutually agreeable process can be made
to work there that satisfies, yes, the rights of self-
determination and, yes, a Democratic and free government. A
change there in Catalonia, through politics and ballots, is
much preferable than violence or terrorism. In many cases, the
continued stubbornness of a ruling ethnic majority fuels
frustrations which leads not just to instability, but also to
chaos, to hatred, and long-term hatred and violence.
We need to look at this powerful concept, self-
determination. What role is it playing in our world today? What
role is it playing in the various regions of the world? Whether
it is in the Balkans, or whether it is in Spain.
We thank you, our witnesses, for appearing today, and
without objection, all the members will have 5 legislative days
to submit any additional written questions or extraneous
materials for the record. And I now turn to our ranking member
for his opening remarks, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
remarks and organizing today's subcommittee hearing on U.S.
policy toward self-determination, a theoretical topic with
practical relevance for current affairs.
You might recall, during our last hearing on the domestic
situation in Turkey, we had an interesting discussion on the
Kurdish question, and their future in the region. Whatever the
resolution to this timely question, the effects will
reverberate throughout the Middle East and Europe. I look
forward to examining some of the examples of self-determination
movements, while keeping in mind--I think we have to still as
we look at these things--international law and our foreign
policy objectives.
Across the world, we see desperate groups clamoring for a
voice, space, and basic human rights from their governments. In
a world where global structures are based on the relationships
between nation states and people, sometimes that can be
overlooked. This poses the essential question: What are the
nation states' responsibilities and obligations to each of its
citizens?
In a best-case scenario, disparaged people work with the
national government to negotiate special rights for even
referenda on their relationship with the capitals. In this
regard, I think of the upcoming U.K. and Scottish referenda. On
the opposite end of the spectrum, the struggle for self-
determination can also lead to conflict, confusion, and even
intervention. And in this category, I think of Kosovo and
Chechnya, two of Eurasia's most tumultuous examples.
However, questions of self-determination in my opinion are
never just black and white. And as outsiders, we must exercise
extreme caution when considering the best policy toward these
movements. One would hope that the reconciliation processes are
consistently peaceful and democratic. Unfortunately, we have
seen, in many cases, that peaceful reconciliation is not always
the ultimate outcome. Even here in the United States, we are
ironing out questions of sovereignty when discussing issues
such as Native American rights, or our relationship with Puerto
Rico.
What rights to self-governance should the people have here
in the United States, the people of Puerto Rico? The Native
Americans? The Virgin Islands? What responsibility does the
United States Government have toward them?
There is no simple answer to these questions, but,
nevertheless, they lie at the heart of how one defines
democracy and nation states.
As these tensions come to a head in Europe, governments and
legislatures across the globe must address the universal
conundrum of self-determination. Recognizing the delicacy and
the complexity of self-determination, what I think I am going
to do at this juncture, and at this hearing, I am going to
leave it to the expert panelists, so that to listen to you and
to hear your thoughts and for you to address this sensitive
issue. And I think that you can do it from both an academic and
policy perspective and historic perspective. So for me, you
know, this is really going to be listening and questions on the
run, but I am looking forward to the dialogue and conversation
and listening to the experts and your opinion. This is a
complex issue, no question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. And, Mr.
Weber, do you have anything to say for an opening statement?
Mr. Weber. Mine is real short about self-determination. I
think the people ought to decide. Let's go.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It is very risky to ask a guy from Texas
to talk about self-determination.
Mr. Meeks. I started to say that.
Mr. Weber. After all, my wife would not let me put on my
pickup truck bumper that ``secede'' bumper sticker.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Got it. All right. We have our witnesses
today. I want to thank them for being here. I would suggest if
you could keep your testimony to 5 minutes, and your written
testimony will be placed into the record, and then we can have
some dialogue on this particular issue.
First of all, we have Dr. Paul Williams, who is the co-
founder and president of Public International Law and Policy
Group, a pro bono firm providing legal assistance to
governments involved in peace negotiations or post-conflict
situations. Dr. Williams has been involved in over 20 self-
determination negotiations, working with either the parent
state, or the self-determination movement. Dr. Williams has
previously served in the Office of Legal Adviser at the
Department of State. He holds a Ph.D. From Cambridge University
and a J.D. From Stanford Law School.
Next, we have Dr. Jason Sorens. He is a lecturer of
Government at Dartmouth College. He is an expert on
secessionism and an author of a book on that topic, which was
published in 2012. He has taught at Yale and the New York
School, and has earned his doctorate from Yale University. We
have with us also Ivan Vejvoda, a senior vice president for
programs at the German Marshall Fund here in Washington, D.C.
From 2010 to 2013, he was executive director of that
organization's Balkan Trust for Democracy Program, so this
really gives him an expertise for this discussion today. Before
that, he was an adviser to the Serbian Government, and a long-
time advocate of democracy in the region.
Thank you all for attending and to enlighten us with your
knowledge and your experience. And, Dr. Williams, you may
proceed.
STATEMENT OF PAUL R. WILLIAMS, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND CO-FOUNDER,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP
Mr. Williams. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman
Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber, for
inviting me here this afternoon to testify. It is a real honor.
The committee has noted that with the growth of Democratic
governance in Europe, questions of national self-determination
have become increasingly prevalent. In response, the U.S.
policy has generally emphasized stability and the status quo of
existing borders. As the chairman noted, the committee has
asked for assistance in examining whether long-term peace and
stability might better be served in supporting national self-
determination. The answer is yes, under a framework of earned
sovereignty. In my remarks, I will briefly highlight the risks
posed by the inherent conflict between status quo sovereignty
and national self-determination in Europe and in Eurasia. I
will then discuss the conflict resolution approach of earned
sovereignty as a means for reducing those risks and as a
pathway to heightened autonomy or independence. I will be
summarizing my written statement, which goes into the approach
of earned sovereignty in more detail.
National self-determination is a global phenomenon that
tugs at the strings of a world order, as we know it, based on
sovereignty and territorial integrity. National self-
determination conflicts are numerous, and they are widespread.
Conservatively estimating, there are over 60 national self-
determination conflicts around the globe, with over a dozen in
Europe, and they afflict some of our most intense and strategic
allies: United Kingdom, France, Spain, Armenia, Georgia,
Ukraine.
Since 1990, half of the world's conflicts, hot conflicts,
involve questions of national self-determination. As a
consequence of the myopic approach of sovereignty, sovereignty,
sovereignty, borders, borders, borders, these conflicts are
deadly, they are destabilizing, and they are durable.
They are deadly. Since 1945, over 20 million individuals
have died as a result of conflicts associated with national
self-determination. They are deadly, in part, because they
require the consent of the parent state as a legal fiction, so
to speak. South Sudan received the consent of North Sudan for a
peace agreement, after 2 million people were killed in that
conflict.
They are durable. Only one-third of national sovereignty
conflicts have been resolved in the past half century. The
average length of a sovereignty-based conflict is 30 years,
twice the length of the duration of a regular conflict. They
are destabilizing, as the chairman mentioned in his remarks,
creating large refugee populations, war economies, and
sometimes giving rise to opportunistic terrorists.
One-third of the designated foreign terrorist organizations
listed by the Department of Treasury have found their way to
associate in areas where there are self-determination
conflicts. This is the case because there is no globally
accepted approach to dealing with national self-determination.
There is a gridlock between sovereignty first, promoted by
states, and self-determination first, promoted by many these
national self-determination movements. Neither one of those
approaches promotes stability. Europe, despite its economic
progress, is no exception. Europe, in fact, has avoided--
Western Europe, in fact, has avoided creating a policy on
national self-determination. The response to the Scottish
referendum and the current response to Catalonia is simply
incoherent and unhelpful.
The European Union has refused to answer the question of
whether new states created out of member states are entitled to
membership automatically, or whether they may have a veto-free
path to membership. They have failed to answer the question of
citizenship, or of a common currency. Europe is stuck in a very
difficult conundrum. States like Belgium, Italy, France,
Romania, Spain, Cyprus, are all opposed to recognizing new
states within the European Union, because they suffer from
their own self-determination movements. Yet, members of the
European Union have recognized over 3 dozen new states in the
last 20 years. So how can you recognize states outside of the
European Union and not recognize those that seek a democratic
path to independence or heightened autonomy within the European
Union?
As the chairman noted, there have been a number of
successes recently. These successes in Serbia, Montenegro, East
Timor, Northern Ireland, Bougainville, Bosnia, Kosovo, the
Sudan, and proposed agreements in Western Sahara, provide a
path for a basis for what I called earned sovereignty. There
are three essential elements of an earned sovereignty approach,
and three optional elements. The idea, however, is to handcraft
a multistage solution to each national self-determination
conflict based, as Congressman Weber pointed out, on the will
of the people.
The first three options would be: Shared sovereignty,
either between the parent state and the sub-state entity, or,
in cases like Kosovo, between the sub-state entity and the
international community. Institution building. Oftentimes, new
states fail or are afraid to have new states because they don't
have the requisite institutions. You are a sub-state entity on
Monday, you are a republic. On Tuesday, you are an independent
state. You don't have the institutions. You are being set up
for failure. And, a set date for determination of final status.
In Serbia and Montenegro, it was 3 years. In Bougainville, it
is window of 10 to 14 years.
There are three additional elements which can be added at
will: Phased sovereignty. There is no reason a new state must
assume all of the rights and obligations on the very first day.
These rights and obligations can be phased in as stability
requires. They can be conditioned. Sovereignty can be
conditioned on human rights protection, minority rights
protection, and democratic development, and sovereignty can
even be constrained. Restrictions on territorial association,
or other destabilizing activities, can be constraints that can
be put on a new state.
To conclude, to promote long-term peace and stability, the
United States should shift from a policy that solely emphasizes
stability in the status quo of existing borders to one of
earned sovereignty. This allows greater flexibility in managing
the aspirations of national self-determination movements, and
reduces the potential for violence and political and economic
instability. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]
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Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We will discuss that.
Mr. Sorens.
STATEMENT OF JASON SORENS, PH.D., LECTURER, DEPARTMENT OF
GOVERNMENT, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
Mr. Sorens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. It is a pleasure to testify for you today, and I
will be summarizing my written remarks.
National self-determination movements seek greater self-
government for a national minority, typically, including the
right to vote on forming a new independent state. Like other
states, the U.S. Government faces decisions about whether to
recognize declarations of independence, to enter into
diplomatic relations with new states, and to engage in
diplomacy with other states about self-determination movements
with their borders.
In my testimony, I will first describe the current state of
self-determination movements around the world, then summarize
what scholars have learned about the relationship between self-
determination claims and violence. I will conclude by assessing
the validity of claims advocating the creation of new states or
changes to national borders.
The current state of self-determination movements. Self-
determination movements generally take one of two forms:
Political parties and armed groups. In Western liberal
democracies secessionist political parties are common. Armed
self-determination movements are typically found in a
developing world, and you can see this in figure 1 of the
written testimony.
Developing countries usually forbid self-determination
movements from organizing as political parties. Western liberal
democracies typically allow secessionist parties to organize,
but not all of them allow secession. Britain, Canada, Belgium,
and Denmark are examples of countries that have allowed some
sort of legal path to independence under some circumstances for
at least some part of their country. On the other side of the
spectrum, you have got France, Spain, and Italy, which have
constitutions defining their countries as indivisible, thus
ruling out self-determination.
Majority support for independence in a population is rare.
In all the high-income democracies of Europe, North America,
and the Pacific Rim, there is only one region in which a party
or group of parties advocating independence in the short run
has actually won an absolute majority of votes, and that is
Scotland, and that happened even before the referendum of 2014,
which, of course, was lost for the independence side.
Using data from the Minorities At Risk Project, I looked at
ethnic minorities around the world, and I found that only 38
percent of them have any secessionist organization of any kind,
no matter how small.
The causes of self-determination conflicts. Popular demand
for independence comes from a combination of a distinctive
cultural identity, territorial coherence, and either political
or economic benefits from independence. Having just one of
those elements is not enough. You need all of them. That is why
the vast majority of minority nations around the world don't
have secessionist movements.
One worry about allowing secessionist movements is the
problem of contagion. But secessionism, according to the best
research, does not appear to be contagious across national
borders. It does have a tendency to spread within a country,
which is why central governments often try to crack down on the
first movement that emerges. Because there is usually no legal
framework for regulating secession, secessionism is strongly
statistically associated with violent conflict.
In general, separatist civil wars last longer than other
kinds of wars, implying that the warring parties cannot find
negotiated settlements even when the conflicts are stalemated.
I find in my own research that providing a legal path to
independence is associated with less ethno nationalist
rebellion. The United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and Belgium
have had much less secessionist violence than France, Italy and
Spain. Clauses permitting secession were also crucial to peace
agreements ending the conflicts in Northern Ireland, South
Sudan, and Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea. The European
Union's Treaty of Lisbon also explicitly guarantees member
states a right to withdraw from that union.
A legal path to independence can promote peace by
constraining secessionists in central governments to pursue
their aims through electoral and legislative means. Central
governments often cannot commit to respecting a negotiated
regional autonomy compromise without also conceding a right to
secede. The South Sudanese and Bougainville secessionists would
probably not have agreed to any peace deal without a referendum
guarantee.
If every country recognized some sort of right to national
self-determination, only a few would exercise such a right.
Moreover, the overall level of global violence would likely
decline by replacing intrastate conflicts with a smaller number
of interstate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts are far more
common that interstate conflicts, and you can see that in
figure 2 of the written testimony. Civil conflicts have killed
seven times more people than interstate conflicts since World
War II. They last much longer than interstate wars, and civil
wars are more common in bigger countries.
So all these findings suggest that reducing the average
size of states over the long run and increasing the number of
independent states would actually reduce deaths from violent
conflict.
There are good reasons for the U.S. Government to avoid
assertively internationalizing other countries' self-
determination conflicts which can look like meddling in other
countries' internal affairs. Nevertheless, once a declaration
of independence is issued, the U.S. Government has no choice
but to respond. In such an event, the U.S. Government might
wish to consider not only the interests of the host state, but
also the interests of the seceding state and the effect of
secession on regional stability. On average, replacing a state-
to-nation relationship with a state-to-state relationship
reduces violence. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sorens follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. You may proceed.
STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
PROGRAMS, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Vejvoda. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking
Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber. It is a real honor to be
here today. I am not a specialist on self-determination. As I
said to one of our co-panelists, I lived it, through the
breakdown of the country I was born into, called Yugoslavia
that no longer exists, and that today constitutes seven
countries, one of the 36 that came out of what happened after
the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think much has been said. As a
former Professor of Political Science, I taught Transitions to
Democracy, and, obviously, this was a key part of what happened
in former Communist Europe as countries sought to seek their
path toward democracy and a stable future. You, yourself,
alluded to the Czechoslovak-Velvet divorce, which was led by
the elites, and a very peaceful and successful example.
I would like to stress, first of all, when we talk about
Europe, the soothing role of the European Union. The existence
of a community of nations that after World War II decided that
it wasn't really good to go to war every 20 years, and to seek
institutions that would be shock absorbers to any friction or
conflict that might appear, and it has not been said without
reason that the European Union is probably the most successful
peace project that the world has seen. And we see that effect
with all the travails that Europe is confronting today. And
Spain has been mentioned as one of them, the Scottish
referendum, the pending Brexit on June 23, that is a sort of
self-determination.
Does the United Kingdom want to stay part of a family that
it chose to join in 1973, and now maybe wants to leave? And
what would be the ripple effects that it would have on a
country like Ireland, for example, or the contagion effect that
was spoken? But as we see, it is mostly a domestic issue.
No one is immune to this issue, whether a Democratic policy
or a non-Democratic policy. And I think Northern Ireland is an
example. It took the mediation of Senator George Mitchell to
achieve the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. But we saw then that
Richard Haass, Dr. Richard Haass, and Dr. Meghan O'Sullivan had
to be expedited to Northern Ireland in 2014 to try and put the
final stitches on that. And after 3 or 4 months and a final
round of 15 hours of negotiation, they did not achieve that
final stitch on the agreement.
What I want to say by that is there are no ancient hatreds.
There are no prejudices. And thus, we have to look, as several
have said already, at each specific situation that is grounded
in historical cultural identity issues.
And so, the fact that we have the European Union has been
in this case between Serbia and Kosovo a very important
element. It gives a framework in which countries that want to
join a bigger family, by choice, voluntarily, of their own
account know that it is only by a peaceful and democratic way
that they must resolve these issues.
There is nothing easy in a compromise. That is what Bernard
Crick has called the high price of peace. Maximos' positions
have to be abandoned and coming to a middle where no one will
be completely happy with the result, but when they reach the
compromise, knowing that it can create stability and lasting
peace. And that is probably the most difficult thing.
As you mentioned, Chairman, I was a Senior Foreign Policy
Adviser to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic who sought to solve
the Kosovo issue as expeditiously as he could by advocating a
possible direct negotiation with Hashim Thaci then, in the
beginning of 2003, where the north of Kosovo would be able to,
itself, have self-determination and possibly independence, and
at the same moment, recognizing the full independence of
Kosovoand, as you said, Serbia needed to put this issue behind
itself as quickly as possible. The rest is history. He was
assassinated, and then we went into a protracted period, and
now the mediation of the European Union is having that soothing
effect as we go forward, and I believe it will be achieved. But
as colleagues have said, these processes take a very long time.
I would just like to, finally, make a point about the
frozen conflicts, that countries such as Russia use a frozen
conflict to keep leverage on international politics, and to
allow or disallow a solution. The frozen conflicts that have
been alluded to in Transnistria, and Abkhazia, and South
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, are ones that have gone maybe on too
long, and maybe we would like to see more leadership from the
European Union in seeking a resolution to these conflicts.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Vejvoda follows:]
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----------
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you all very much for your
testimony. I think today we are launching a dialogue on an
issue that has just been ignored, although it has had dramatic
impact on our world, but they don't want us to talk about it
because to set any new standard on this frightens people. It
just frightens us all that chaos is going to break out if we
have a new international concept of what is right and wrong in
the way to proceed with these issues of sovereignty, and the
issues of self-determination and freedom and democracy, et
cetera.
Let me note that we--first of all, the first thing that got
me involved in this issue was the fact that when I was first
elected to Congress, the issue was whether or not Serbia was
going to permit Kosovo to be an independent entity, or, at that
time, by the way, I might note that Serbia also was claiming
that they had to be the government of Croatia and the other
countries as well.
Let's just put this in perspective. The Serbians, however,
felt that because they had recognized national heritage
treasures within Kosovo, that that meant that they had a right
to keep that part of their jurisdiction under their
jurisdiction, even though the majority of people, clearly, the
majority of people, did not want to be part of Serbia. And that
brought that home to me, and that was a, I think had, and I
think I mentioned this in the opening remarks, had we basically
had a situation where the Serbs at that time would have said,
okay, you are going to be independent, but we are going to have
a free trade zone among all these and open borders, and you
would have had basically the same situation as a sovereign
country, but not having people feel that they were being
subjugated to one particular area of that country.
Let's get back to what my friend from Texas said earlier.
Are we really talking about the majority has a right to
determine what the government is in that part, in that area of
any country, or anyplace in the world where they hold a
majority?
And, by the way, let me preface it by saying we are not
talking about little enclaves of people spread throughout a
country. We are talking about someplace on the periphery of a
country. Do those people have a right, whether it is in
Catalonia, or whether it is in Kosovo or wherever it is, or how
about Biafra? Do these people or a majority of people in that
area say they want to be independent and have their own country
from the country that now governs them with a majority of a
different type of people in another part of the country, is
that their right to have their government? Because the
majority, does the majority decide? And just real quickly, we
will go down the list. Dr. Williams.
Mr. Williams. Yes. The international law is seldom helpful
in these instances, but in your particular question it is
helpful. There are two answers: One, the International Court of
Justice has said that an entity where a majority of the people
decide that they would like to be independent, has a right to
declare independence. It left unaddressed the question of
whether or not there was an obligation of the international
community to recognize them, but at least it gets you halfway
there. The other way in which international law is helpful is
it answers your question about who these people are that you
need a majority determination from. It is pretty clear that
there has to be a political identity, cultural identity, a
history of association.
A lot of the groups that you have been speaking about, as
well the Armenians, and Nagorno-Karabakhs, the Catalonians, the
Kosovars, they have that identity as a people, and you meld
that with modern democratic norms, modern human rights norms,
and they do have a right to seek independence, and then it has
to be managed in a way that it doesn't destabilize. But the
fear of destabilization is not a reason to deny them their
democratic right to determine their own political future.
Mr. Rohrabacher. When you say ``democratic right,'' are we
just talking about what international law as it seems to be
played out today, or are we talking about a theory of natural
rights that our Founding Fathers----
Mr. Williams. I think it is more the theory of
international. As an international lawyer, I can sort of put
international law aside a little and not feel too guilty, but
it is the natural law. It is the democratic norms and
principles that drive this country and, quite frankly, that
drive the self-determination movements around the globe, that
willingness to determine your own political future, which
international laws reflects, but that is not where the right
comes from. It comes from this national right.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that started within the course of
human events. But Dr. Sorens.
Mr. Sorens. Yes. I mean, you could take it back to John
Locke's second treatise, right, that influenced our Declaration
of Independence, the idea that government is legitimate only
when it enjoys the consent of the governed. If you take that
view, then if the majority of people in a territory prefer a
different government to the one that is currently ruling them,
then letting them have that government increases the number of
people living under a government that is legitimate to them.
So that seems like, on balance, a reason to allow them to
secede. But there are some other considerations we should bear
in mind. So if a majority wants to secede in order to oppress a
minority within its borders, that would be a reason not to let
them secede, even if they get majority support. In some
situations, you could do even better by allowing some
negotiation over the borders of a new state. I think Kosovo is
a good example here. The vast majority of people living in
Kosovo wanted to become independent, but there was a small
minority of ethnic Serbs that were very much opposed to that.
If you could have had a situation where you negotiated
Kosovo independence recognized by Serbia and a small part of
Kosovo returned to Serbia if its inhabitants so desired, then,
I think, things would have turned out better for Kosovo. Right
now they are struggling to get recognized by other countries
that don't want to set a precedent. Spain is one country that
hasn't recognized Kosovo, at least the last time I checked.
That has made it hard for Kosovo to join international
organizations. So sometimes we can do better than simply saying
whatever the majority decides goes. It is a good starting
point, but we might want to negotiate from that starting point
to try to protect the rights of everybody involved.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Vejvoda.
Mr. Vejvoda. Just dovetailing on that, I mean, one could
use also Tocqueville's expression of the tyranny of the
majority which he used in a political sense, but it applies
here. You know, if there is this recognition that you want to
be independent, but as Dr. Sorens just said, but there are
minorities within majorities, you know, there was this half-
flippant remark as all this started to unravel which said, Why
should I be a minority in your country when you can be a
minority in mine? And I think we have exactly seen that in
several of these cases.
I think, you know, it is really about the democratic
legitimacy, about the consent of the government, and whether
people feel that those who govern them really are doing a
rather good, or a rather bad job. I would take the example of
Quebec in 1995, when the Canadians and the Quebecers went for
the vote. The difference in that referendum was stunning. It
was 1.16 percent. And people went quietly home and accepted the
result that Quebec had voted to stay in Canada.
That doesn't mean that they won't do it again or the Scots
won't do it again. I think it is the general atmosphere and the
policy. We talked about many of the elements that determine
this default position that it is about state sovereignty, and
everybody wants to be on the side of let's not rock the boat.
But we see in cases like these, it does create heightened
emotions. But if people understand the rules of the game, they
will go home, even if there is a 1-percent difference.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. And I am going to yield to my
ranking member in a moment, but let me just note that the
Czechs and the Slovaks managed to pull this off very quickly,
and we had with us President Klaus, who told us that the reason
he was successful in doing that with so few bumps and so little
suffering in both sides and the reorganizing the economies, et
cetera, was that he did it very quickly, very, very quickly,
and everybody recognized it very, very quickly. And unlike what
happened where we determined that the people in Kosovo, by a
vast majority, did not want to be a part of Serbia, yes, we
helped them free themselves by violence, force and violence.
We, in fact, bombed Serbia in order to prevent their armed
suppression of the Kosovars' self-determination. But then, once
we declared Kosovo, and it was recognized now as independent,
we basically strung it out. They still are not really a fully
recognized government. And for self-determination to work, it
can't be just philosophically correct, but we have got to have
the courage and that principle of consent of the governed, that
we act as a people and a government immediately on it, rather
than letting something string out, which will then just keep
the issue--it is just like tearing the scab off the wound every
other day.
So with that said, also perhaps we need an OSCE mandate
that they would now be responsible, not only for observing
elections in developing countries, or countries where there is
conflicts, but instead, also, to be the entity that goes in to
ensure that a vote on self-determination is a legitimate and
fair vote. That would be something--would be something we could
discuss as time goes on.
And finally, one last point for, in terms of the United
States. I have quite often, I actually take my own tweets; I
tweet it out and sometimes right before I go to bed I will have
a lot of fun debating people all over the world. You would be
surprised. All these people say what about--because I happen to
believe that the Baloch in Pakistan have a right to their self-
determination. And these Indians say what about Kashmir? What
about Kashmir? Yeah, I think they do, too. Yeah, if you believe
in a principle, it is right for both peoples. And it was
especially true when they say what about Texas? I kid you not.
I get this. And I always say--or San Diego.
One of the reasons why I believe that we have to control
our borders to make sure that the people coming into this
country are regulated to the point that they are absorbed into
our society, is that we don't end up in areas of our country
where a vast majority of the people, who come from someplace
else, now have a different point of view as to what our country
should be, and live on the periphery and maybe want to be part
of Mexico.
But I will say that if we permit people into our country
and permit them here legally, they have rights just like we do.
That is why we have to control our borders. And if the majority
of people in San Diego end up being people who would prefer
that they live in Mexico, I'm sorry, they have a right to vote
on it, and it is adios, San Diego.
And this is, of course, a surprise that people are tweeting
me on this. But I do believe that our Founding Fathers actually
had something special that they tapped into when they talked
about rights that are granted. You call them natural law. They
are granted by God. These are things that I believe they have
universal application, and that we shouldn't be at all hesitant
or apologetic about trying to use that as our standard on how
we move forward.
Mr. Meeks, you may proceed.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as I said, there is
a lot of theoretical questions I think also, and I don't know
if there is one box that fits all. I mean, sitting here and
listening and going back and forth, if there was one principle,
we probably wouldn't be here today, because we would be two
different countries, the North and the South, would not be one
unit. And people died in the United States in a Civil War,
because half the country wanted to be governed a different way
than the other half of the country.
And, so, if we just had one principle, then the confederacy
should have been allowed to leave, and we would not be here
today as the United States of America, wouldn't be. And, so,
there are ramifications all over the world to just say, We are
going to let one little minority group do a little--I can just
recall, from my own lifetime, we had it in the African American
community, back during the civil rights struggle, where some
would say, Hey, we didn't want to be part of the United States
anymore. We wanted our own little state. We all come together
because we were mostly one area and said let us create our own
little country.
So how do you define a people, number one? Because people
of the United States are citizens of the United States, no
matter what your background, your ethnicity, et cetera. So what
are the people? I just look at another. You can go to Rwanda
where the Tutsis and the Hutus, they are still one country. But
it would be easy to say separate and make two. And who, then,
recognizes what? And that is the reason why we do have some of
our international organizations, because what is important
about being a country to one degree is being recognized by
another. And then coming together where you do have the lack of
democracy and/or ethnic cleansing where there is a majority
that is just going--so that is when we are supposed to come
together in a unified humanitarian caucus and say we are not
going to allow this to happen in certain areas where that is
happening. That is part of what you, and I think that is part
of, and then protect one another, that is part of what NATO was
all about. So it is not easy. It is not just as simple as
saying the people will decide because it depends upon who the
people are, right? And I can see some context going both ways.
I don't know.
So, Mr. Vejvoda, you lived it in the former Yugoslavia and
Kosovar self-determination movement, and the fight now for
Kosovo to try to get--what do you see? What do you envision?
And are there any lessons that we can learn from the Kosovo
experience since you lived it?
Mr. Vejvoda. Let me start by quoting Isaiah Berlin, whom I
quote at the end of the written testimony, who tried to give a
definition of what good government was, and he put it very
simply. He said: ``To avoid the extremes of suffering.'' I
think that is exactly the opposite of what happened in my
country. Someone called Slobodan Milosevic created the extremes
of suffering with other leaders. He wasn't the only culprit.
And I think, obviously, when I was asked, you know, why my
country disappeared in front of me, big lesson for a social
scientist like myself, that the evil of history can always
return, and we have to be vigilant to these kinds of populists
and other movements, leaders that offer so-called simple snake-
oil solutions to very complex problems. The answer was simple.
We were not a democracy. We were a Communist system, and we
didn't have institutions, and that is why I talk about the
European Union as having, up until today, created at least
institutions that are what democratic institutions are supposed
to be: A framework where you resolve conflict. A conflict will
remain with us, as Machiavelli said, forever. And it is a
question of how we deal with it, and what are the mechanisms by
which we resolve them?
So the experience one draws from the case of the former
Yugoslavia, it is exactly that. It is the need to move out of
the authoritarian dictatorial regime, and to move toward the
creation of stabilization of institutions. That is why Dr.
Williams' earned sovereignty, I think, is a very important one,
because he gives all the elements of what is needed.
Preparing for this, I looked at the recent self-
determination referenda that we talked about, you look at
Eritrea, you look at South Sudan, you look at East Timor, they
all went through processes of a diverse kind. I asked the
question, who is caring for them the day after? There was an
NPR story last week on South Sudan, the reporter said short and
sad 5 years. And I think we need to be cognizant. That is why
the earned sovereignty is so important. People need to be there
the day after, not just in the lead-up to that moment where the
people decide, and I think that is key and that is maybe the
biggest lesson.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Weber.
Mr. Weber. Were you through, Mr. Meeks?
Mr. Meeks. Yes, I know we got votes coming up.
Mr. Weber. There they are. Gosh, I don't know where to
start, guys. You all have brought up so many interesting
concepts. One of you said that--I think it was you, Dr.
Sorens--is that right--that self-determination, there is two
paths, and I basically understand that to be the ballot box or
military, militarily. You said there is a contagion, but that
contagion doesn't usually cross borders. What about the Arab
Spring?
Mr. Sorens. So democratic contagion can definitely go
across borders. So we saw that back, as far as Europe 1848. But
secessionism is fundamentally different because it only happens
when a particular group has particular grievances or fears
about the situation it is in. So we don't see this kind of
thing, even if you look at----
Mr. Weber. So you don't equate secessionism with
democratization necessarily----
Mr. Sorens. I think they are fundamentally different
processes. And any time, even if we look at Eastern Europe, it
doesn't look as if people are looking at Yugoslavia and saying,
oh, we need to do that.
Mr. Weber. Let me interrupt you for a minute because we
have to go to votes. Secession doesn't equate to
democratization, but yet, if self-determination, somebody is
tired of the old ruling order, the avant garde, call it
whatever you want, and they want self-determination, isn't that
democracy?
Mr. Sorens. You could say that it----
Mr. Weber. So secession is a means to an end of democracy?
Mr. Sorens. It can be. It could be that the motivating
principle of democracy might be a reason to recognize secession
happening. So someone isn't trying to secede normally in order
to get democracy. It is normally you are trying to secede in
order to get out from under the thumb of a regime that you feel
is alien or hostile to your interests. So democracy might be a
reason for us to say, okay, the majority has decided we are
going to recognize you, but that is not what is driving these
secessionist movements to happen.
Mr. Weber. You also said that if every country recognized
the people's right to self-determination or secession, I guess,
then few would exercise it, which I thought was interesting.
Why do you say that?
Mr. Sorens. It is. It is surprising. Most people say, one
of the first objections they have to this is, oh, you are going
to get 10,000 new states, and it is just going to be
unmanageable, but all the evidence suggests that even in the
developing world, most people fear big changes to the status
quo. So, you only get strong support for independence when
there is a history of discrimination or violence or other
things that make people fearful to stay in that arrangement.
Even India, I looked at data in India, every Indian state,
trying to figure out the proportion that wanted to secede, the
highest was in Kashmir, and it is only about 20 percent.
Mr. Weber. Let me jump over to your comments about Italy.
You said the Italy constitution defines the country as
indivisible. We would argue that our Pledge of Allegiance has
that same phrase basically in it, but then you said the
constitution had the phrase--it defined, rather, the country as
indivisible, thus ruling out self-determination. But, in point
of fact, hasn't the majority of people who voted for that
constitution self-determined that they wanted to make the
statement that they are indivisible?
Mr. Sorens. It is sort of a philosophical question, but you
could wonder, do the majority of Italian people have the right
to decide for, say, Sardinians? Well, if Sardinians don't want
that----
Mr. Weber. I would argue that they do until the
constitution is changed.
Mr. Sorens. We could wonder what the best constitutional
form should be, should the constitution have this? That is sort
of the debate.
Mr. Weber. That is where self-determination comes in.
Mr. Sorens. Yeah. So we can say maybe the constitution
should recognize self-determination. As long as it doesn't,
yeah, you got to follow the constitution, but maybe the
constitution should be amended.
Mr. Weber. The problem with people voting is that they are
people voting. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. In a couple minutes
here, we are going to have to adjourn. We have a vote on, but
let me just note, one point my dear friend and colleague made
about, well, if the South would have seceded, we would have had
them as principle, if the South wouldn't have been preventing
such a large chunk of their population not to have any rights,
had all the slaves been citizens and been able to vote, yes,
all of those people would then, in my mind, that would have
justified their vote.
Mr. Weber. But aren't those contradictory terms, Mr.
Chairman?
Mr. Rohrabacher. So, anyway, I do believe that is their
right. And the other thing is, let me just note, we have a lot
of these--there are countries all over the world right now,
people, whether it is in Biafra--and there is bloodshed going
on right now for people in Biafra--feel that they should be
independent. We didn't back them up. I remember years ago when
I was a kid, they had that same concept, the Baloch, people of
Baloch, the Kosovars, I think this has not turned out the way
it should have, because we have not had the courage of our
conviction, but we had a little bit, enough to get involved but
not enough to solve the issue of Sudan and the rest of this.
Let me just note one issue that we will discuss in another
hearing, which is, the most complicating factor to me, is that
they are movements of populations by tyrants into people's area
and the people there become overwhelmed because Stalin moves a
bunch of people into Crimea or wherever, and it muddies up this
issue.
But thank you very much for sharing with us, starting this
dialogue on an issue that has been ignored, and today, I
declare that an open issue for discussion of self-
determination, but the end of this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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