    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                              U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL
                          SELF	DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 15, 2016

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-152

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats

                     DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
    TED POE, Texas                       GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Paul R. Williams, Ph.D., president and co-founder, Public
      International Law and Policy Group.............................     4
    Jason Sorens, Ph.D., lecturer, Department of Government,
      Dartmouth College..............................................    21
    Mr. Ivan Vejvoda, senior vice president for programs, German
      Marshall Fund of the United States.............................    29

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Paul R. Williams, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................     7
    Jason Sorens, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..........................    23
    Mr. Ivan Vejvoda: Prepared statement.............................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    46
    Hearing minutes..................................................    47
    The Honorable Lois Frankel, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Florida: Prepared statement...........................    48

                          U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATIONAL
                          SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 15, 2016

                           House of Representatives,

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:44 p.m., in
    room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana Rohrabacher
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Good afternoon. This hearing of the
    European Subcommittee is called to order. Today we will discuss
    a topic that is dear to me, but quite often overlooked by too
    many policy experts, and that is, national self-determination,
    and its impact on what is going on in the world today. There
    have been many examples since the Second World War of self-
    determination movements, galvanizing local support, challenging
    their central authorities, and, of course, giving our State
    Department headaches in the process.
        As advocates of democratic government and human rights, we
    cannot help but have sympathy with the grievances of many of
    these self-determination movements. They are often based on
    legitimate complaints, and aspire to change a political
    structure that they quite often had no voice in creating. Yet,
    these groups can be cooperated by hostile outside forces, and
    used violently against otherwise friendly governments.
        The foreign policy of our government, perhaps for no better
    reason than for simplicity's sake, has opted to treat questions
    of self-determination as internal matters and existing borders
    as unchangeable. The word ``stability'' has been invoked more
    times than I can count.
        During today's hearing, we will discuss another point of
    view, that self-determination movements represent a dynamic
    force in the history of the world that can be channeled into
    peaceful and legitimate political change, but we should not
    see--because of the fear that that is not the way it is--we
    should not see as tramping them down and suppressing them as
    our solution to that type of dynamic that is being created in a
    self-determination movement.
        Border and other types of change, border change, and the
    creation of new states, these are things that will result in
    this type of dynamic, the self-determination that we see
    popping up in various parts of the world, but what is wrong
    with new governments? What is wrong with new states? What is
    wrong with changing borders that have been created by monarchs
    back two centuries ago?
        And after all, our country is a product of the self-
    determination movement. Some worry that self-determination
    movements will have a domino effect of changes and challenges
    to the existing world order that will lead to chaos, and I have
    no such fears. And acknowledging these movements and state the
    principles by which they should seek progress, by doing that,
    we affirm that there is value in the existing global standards,
    and we can demonstrate change within those global standards.
        Alternatively, by ignoring these groups who are looking for
    their own self-identity and united by a national identity, even
    though it is subjugated by the boundaries of a country that is
    dominated by other people, by ignoring them, we push these
    ethnic patriots toward violence and insurrection.
        In our recent history, we can see several examples where
    self-determination and finding peace were intermingled. We can
    see this in Kosovo's experience breaking away from Serbia. Had
    that been an election all along and there had been sort of a
    relationship established between Kosovo and Serbia, a lot of
    violence and people on both sides would have been better off.
    We have seen that with the splitup of the Czechs and the
    Slovaks, something that needed to happen. It happened, and it
    has been good for both of those people. We can see how
    Pakistan's refusal to recognize the rights of the Baloch people
    creates more conflict and more suffering.
        In 2014, the referendum in Scotland allowed the people
    there to act in a peaceful way to express their wishes as to
    what their future would be, or where their sovereignty would be
    placed. And that was a strong example of how democracy can
    work.
        I am watching now in the cases, for example, in Catalonia,
    to see if a peaceful and mutually agreeable process can be made
    to work there that satisfies, yes, the rights of self-
    determination and, yes, a Democratic and free government. A
    change there in Catalonia, through politics and ballots, is
    much preferable than violence or terrorism. In many cases, the
    continued stubbornness of a ruling ethnic majority fuels
    frustrations which leads not just to instability, but also to
    chaos, to hatred, and long-term hatred and violence.
        We need to look at this powerful concept, self-
    determination. What role is it playing in our world today? What
    role is it playing in the various regions of the world? Whether
    it is in the Balkans, or whether it is in Spain.
        We thank you, our witnesses, for appearing today, and
    without objection, all the members will have 5 legislative days
    to submit any additional written questions or extraneous
    materials for the record. And I now turn to our ranking member
    for his opening remarks, Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
    remarks and organizing today's subcommittee hearing on U.S.
    policy toward self-determination, a theoretical topic with
    practical relevance for current affairs.
        You might recall, during our last hearing on the domestic
    situation in Turkey, we had an interesting discussion on the
    Kurdish question, and their future in the region. Whatever the
    resolution to this timely question, the effects will
    reverberate throughout the Middle East and Europe. I look
    forward to examining some of the examples of self-determination
    movements, while keeping in mind--I think we have to still as
    we look at these things--international law and our foreign
    policy objectives.
        Across the world, we see desperate groups clamoring for a
    voice, space, and basic human rights from their governments. In
    a world where global structures are based on the relationships
    between nation states and people, sometimes that can be
    overlooked. This poses the essential question: What are the
    nation states' responsibilities and obligations to each of its
    citizens?
        In a best-case scenario, disparaged people work with the
    national government to negotiate special rights for even
    referenda on their relationship with the capitals. In this
    regard, I think of the upcoming U.K. and Scottish referenda. On
    the opposite end of the spectrum, the struggle for self-
    determination can also lead to conflict, confusion, and even
    intervention. And in this category, I think of Kosovo and
    Chechnya, two of Eurasia's most tumultuous examples.
        However, questions of self-determination in my opinion are
    never just black and white. And as outsiders, we must exercise
    extreme caution when considering the best policy toward these
    movements. One would hope that the reconciliation processes are
    consistently peaceful and democratic. Unfortunately, we have
    seen, in many cases, that peaceful reconciliation is not always
    the ultimate outcome. Even here in the United States, we are
    ironing out questions of sovereignty when discussing issues
    such as Native American rights, or our relationship with Puerto
    Rico.
        What rights to self-governance should the people have here
    in the United States, the people of Puerto Rico? The Native
    Americans? The Virgin Islands? What responsibility does the
    United States Government have toward them?
        There is no simple answer to these questions, but,
    nevertheless, they lie at the heart of how one defines
    democracy and nation states.
        As these tensions come to a head in Europe, governments and
    legislatures across the globe must address the universal
    conundrum of self-determination. Recognizing the delicacy and
    the complexity of self-determination, what I think I am going
    to do at this juncture, and at this hearing, I am going to
    leave it to the expert panelists, so that to listen to you and
    to hear your thoughts and for you to address this sensitive
    issue. And I think that you can do it from both an academic and
    policy perspective and historic perspective. So for me, you
    know, this is really going to be listening and questions on the
    run, but I am looking forward to the dialogue and conversation
    and listening to the experts and your opinion. This is a
    complex issue, no question.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Meeks. And, Mr.
    Weber, do you have anything to say for an opening statement?
        Mr. Weber. Mine is real short about self-determination. I
    think the people ought to decide. Let's go.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. It is very risky to ask a guy from Texas
    to talk about self-determination.
        Mr. Meeks. I started to say that.
        Mr. Weber. After all, my wife would not let me put on my
    pickup truck bumper that ``secede'' bumper sticker.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Got it. All right. We have our witnesses
    today. I want to thank them for being here. I would suggest if
    you could keep your testimony to 5 minutes, and your written
    testimony will be placed into the record, and then we can have
    some dialogue on this particular issue.
        First of all, we have Dr. Paul Williams, who is the co-
    founder and president of Public International Law and Policy
    Group, a pro bono firm providing legal assistance to
    governments involved in peace negotiations or post-conflict
    situations. Dr. Williams has been involved in over 20 self-
    determination negotiations, working with either the parent
    state, or the self-determination movement. Dr. Williams has
    previously served in the Office of Legal Adviser at the
    Department of State. He holds a Ph.D. From Cambridge University
    and a J.D. From Stanford Law School.
        Next, we have Dr. Jason Sorens. He is a lecturer of
    Government at Dartmouth College. He is an expert on
    secessionism and an author of a book on that topic, which was
    published in 2012. He has taught at Yale and the New York
    School, and has earned his doctorate from Yale University. We
    have with us also Ivan Vejvoda, a senior vice president for
    programs at the German Marshall Fund here in Washington, D.C.
    From 2010 to 2013, he was executive director of that
    organization's Balkan Trust for Democracy Program, so this
    really gives him an expertise for this discussion today. Before
    that, he was an adviser to the Serbian Government, and a long-
    time advocate of democracy in the region.
        Thank you all for attending and to enlighten us with your
    knowledge and your experience. And, Dr. Williams, you may
    proceed.

    STATEMENT OF PAUL R. WILLIAMS, PH.D., PRESIDENT AND CO-FOUNDER,
               PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY GROUP

        Mr. Williams. Good afternoon, and thank you, Chairman
    Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber, for
    inviting me here this afternoon to testify. It is a real honor.
    The committee has noted that with the growth of Democratic
    governance in Europe, questions of national self-determination
    have become increasingly prevalent. In response, the U.S.
    policy has generally emphasized stability and the status quo of
    existing borders. As the chairman noted, the committee has
    asked for assistance in examining whether long-term peace and
    stability might better be served in supporting national self-
    determination. The answer is yes, under a framework of earned
    sovereignty. In my remarks, I will briefly highlight the risks
    posed by the inherent conflict between status quo sovereignty
    and national self-determination in Europe and in Eurasia. I
    will then discuss the conflict resolution approach of earned
    sovereignty as a means for reducing those risks and as a
    pathway to heightened autonomy or independence. I will be
    summarizing my written statement, which goes into the approach
    of earned sovereignty in more detail.
        National self-determination is a global phenomenon that
    tugs at the strings of a world order, as we know it, based on
    sovereignty and territorial integrity. National self-
    determination conflicts are numerous, and they are widespread.
    Conservatively estimating, there are over 60 national self-
    determination conflicts around the globe, with over a dozen in
    Europe, and they afflict some of our most intense and strategic
    allies: United Kingdom, France, Spain, Armenia, Georgia,
    Ukraine.
        Since 1990, half of the world's conflicts, hot conflicts,
    involve questions of national self-determination. As a
    consequence of the myopic approach of sovereignty, sovereignty,
    sovereignty, borders, borders, borders, these conflicts are
    deadly, they are destabilizing, and they are durable.
        They are deadly. Since 1945, over 20 million individuals
    have died as a result of conflicts associated with national
    self-determination. They are deadly, in part, because they
    require the consent of the parent state as a legal fiction, so
    to speak. South Sudan received the consent of North Sudan for a
    peace agreement, after 2 million people were killed in that
    conflict.
        They are durable. Only one-third of national sovereignty
    conflicts have been resolved in the past half century. The
    average length of a sovereignty-based conflict is 30 years,
    twice the length of the duration of a regular conflict. They
    are destabilizing, as the chairman mentioned in his remarks,
    creating large refugee populations, war economies, and
    sometimes giving rise to opportunistic terrorists.
        One-third of the designated foreign terrorist organizations
    listed by the Department of Treasury have found their way to
    associate in areas where there are self-determination
    conflicts. This is the case because there is no globally
    accepted approach to dealing with national self-determination.
        There is a gridlock between sovereignty first, promoted by
    states, and self-determination first, promoted by many these
    national self-determination movements. Neither one of those
    approaches promotes stability. Europe, despite its economic
    progress, is no exception. Europe, in fact, has avoided--
    Western Europe, in fact, has avoided creating a policy on
    national self-determination. The response to the Scottish
    referendum and the current response to Catalonia is simply
    incoherent and unhelpful.
        The European Union has refused to answer the question of
    whether new states created out of member states are entitled to
    membership automatically, or whether they may have a veto-free
    path to membership. They have failed to answer the question of
    citizenship, or of a common currency. Europe is stuck in a very
    difficult conundrum. States like Belgium, Italy, France,
    Romania, Spain, Cyprus, are all opposed to recognizing new
    states within the European Union, because they suffer from
    their own self-determination movements. Yet, members of the
    European Union have recognized over 3 dozen new states in the
    last 20 years. So how can you recognize states outside of the
    European Union and not recognize those that seek a democratic
    path to independence or heightened autonomy within the European
    Union?
        As the chairman noted, there have been a number of
    successes recently. These successes in Serbia, Montenegro, East
    Timor, Northern Ireland, Bougainville, Bosnia, Kosovo, the
    Sudan, and proposed agreements in Western Sahara, provide a
    path for a basis for what I called earned sovereignty. There
    are three essential elements of an earned sovereignty approach,
    and three optional elements. The idea, however, is to handcraft
    a multistage solution to each national self-determination
    conflict based, as Congressman Weber pointed out, on the will
    of the people.
        The first three options would be: Shared sovereignty,
    either between the parent state and the sub-state entity, or,
    in cases like Kosovo, between the sub-state entity and the
    international community. Institution building. Oftentimes, new
    states fail or are afraid to have new states because they don't
    have the requisite institutions. You are a sub-state entity on
    Monday, you are a republic. On Tuesday, you are an independent
    state. You don't have the institutions. You are being set up
    for failure. And, a set date for determination of final status.
    In Serbia and Montenegro, it was 3 years. In Bougainville, it
    is window of 10 to 14 years.
        There are three additional elements which can be added at
    will: Phased sovereignty. There is no reason a new state must
    assume all of the rights and obligations on the very first day.
    These rights and obligations can be phased in as stability
    requires. They can be conditioned. Sovereignty can be
    conditioned on human rights protection, minority rights
    protection, and democratic development, and sovereignty can
    even be constrained. Restrictions on territorial association,
    or other destabilizing activities, can be constraints that can
    be put on a new state.
        To conclude, to promote long-term peace and stability, the
    United States should shift from a policy that solely emphasizes
    stability in the status quo of existing borders to one of
    earned sovereignty. This allows greater flexibility in managing
    the aspirations of national self-determination movements, and
    reduces the potential for violence and political and economic
    instability. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:]

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. We will discuss that.
    Mr. Sorens.

       STATEMENT OF JASON SORENS, PH.D., LECTURER, DEPARTMENT OF
                     GOVERNMENT, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

        Mr. Sorens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
    committee. It is a pleasure to testify for you today, and I
    will be summarizing my written remarks.
        National self-determination movements seek greater self-
    government for a national minority, typically, including the
    right to vote on forming a new independent state. Like other
    states, the U.S. Government faces decisions about whether to
    recognize declarations of independence, to enter into
    diplomatic relations with new states, and to engage in
    diplomacy with other states about self-determination movements
    with their borders.
        In my testimony, I will first describe the current state of
    self-determination movements around the world, then summarize
    what scholars have learned about the relationship between self-
    determination claims and violence. I will conclude by assessing
    the validity of claims advocating the creation of new states or
    changes to national borders.
        The current state of self-determination movements. Self-
    determination movements generally take one of two forms:
    Political parties and armed groups. In Western liberal
    democracies secessionist political parties are common. Armed
    self-determination movements are typically found in a
    developing world, and you can see this in figure 1 of the
    written testimony.
        Developing countries usually forbid self-determination
    movements from organizing as political parties. Western liberal
    democracies typically allow secessionist parties to organize,
    but not all of them allow secession. Britain, Canada, Belgium,
    and Denmark are examples of countries that have allowed some
    sort of legal path to independence under some circumstances for
    at least some part of their country. On the other side of the
    spectrum, you have got France, Spain, and Italy, which have
    constitutions defining their countries as indivisible, thus
    ruling out self-determination.
        Majority support for independence in a population is rare.
    In all the high-income democracies of Europe, North America,
    and the Pacific Rim, there is only one region in which a party
    or group of parties advocating independence in the short run
    has actually won an absolute majority of votes, and that is
    Scotland, and that happened even before the referendum of 2014,
    which, of course, was lost for the independence side.
        Using data from the Minorities At Risk Project, I looked at
    ethnic minorities around the world, and I found that only 38
    percent of them have any secessionist organization of any kind,
    no matter how small.
        The causes of self-determination conflicts. Popular demand
    for independence comes from a combination of a distinctive
    cultural identity, territorial coherence, and either political
    or economic benefits from independence. Having just one of
    those elements is not enough. You need all of them. That is why
    the vast majority of minority nations around the world don't
    have secessionist movements.
        One worry about allowing secessionist movements is the
    problem of contagion. But secessionism, according to the best
    research, does not appear to be contagious across national
    borders. It does have a tendency to spread within a country,
    which is why central governments often try to crack down on the
    first movement that emerges. Because there is usually no legal
    framework for regulating secession, secessionism is strongly
    statistically associated with violent conflict.
        In general, separatist civil wars last longer than other
    kinds of wars, implying that the warring parties cannot find
    negotiated settlements even when the conflicts are stalemated.
    I find in my own research that providing a legal path to
    independence is associated with less ethno nationalist
    rebellion. The United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and Belgium
    have had much less secessionist violence than France, Italy and
    Spain. Clauses permitting secession were also crucial to peace
    agreements ending the conflicts in Northern Ireland, South
    Sudan, and Bougainville, part of Papua New Guinea. The European
    Union's Treaty of Lisbon also explicitly guarantees member
    states a right to withdraw from that union.
        A legal path to independence can promote peace by
    constraining secessionists in central governments to pursue
    their aims through electoral and legislative means. Central
    governments often cannot commit to respecting a negotiated
    regional autonomy compromise without also conceding a right to
    secede. The South Sudanese and Bougainville secessionists would
    probably not have agreed to any peace deal without a referendum
    guarantee.
        If every country recognized some sort of right to national
    self-determination, only a few would exercise such a right.
    Moreover, the overall level of global violence would likely
    decline by replacing intrastate conflicts with a smaller number
    of interstate conflicts. Intrastate conflicts are far more
    common that interstate conflicts, and you can see that in
    figure 2 of the written testimony. Civil conflicts have killed
    seven times more people than interstate conflicts since World
    War II. They last much longer than interstate wars, and civil
    wars are more common in bigger countries.
        So all these findings suggest that reducing the average
    size of states over the long run and increasing the number of
    independent states would actually reduce deaths from violent
    conflict.
        There are good reasons for the U.S. Government to avoid
    assertively internationalizing other countries' self-
    determination conflicts which can look like meddling in other
    countries' internal affairs. Nevertheless, once a declaration
    of independence is issued, the U.S. Government has no choice
    but to respond. In such an event, the U.S. Government might
    wish to consider not only the interests of the host state, but
    also the interests of the seceding state and the effect of
    secession on regional stability. On average, replacing a state-
    to-nation relationship with a state-to-state relationship
    reduces violence. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sorens follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. You may proceed.

       STATEMENT OF MR. IVAN VEJVODA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
          PROGRAMS, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

        Mr. Vejvoda. Thank you, Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking
    Member Meeks, and Congressman Weber. It is a real honor to be
    here today. I am not a specialist on self-determination. As I
    said to one of our co-panelists, I lived it, through the
    breakdown of the country I was born into, called Yugoslavia
    that no longer exists, and that today constitutes seven
    countries, one of the 36 that came out of what happened after
    the fall of the Berlin Wall. I think much has been said. As a
    former Professor of Political Science, I taught Transitions to
    Democracy, and, obviously, this was a key part of what happened
    in former Communist Europe as countries sought to seek their
    path toward democracy and a stable future. You, yourself,
    alluded to the Czechoslovak-Velvet divorce, which was led by
    the elites, and a very peaceful and successful example.
        I would like to stress, first of all, when we talk about
    Europe, the soothing role of the European Union. The existence
    of a community of nations that after World War II decided that
    it wasn't really good to go to war every 20 years, and to seek
    institutions that would be shock absorbers to any friction or
    conflict that might appear, and it has not been said without
    reason that the European Union is probably the most successful
    peace project that the world has seen. And we see that effect
    with all the travails that Europe is confronting today. And
    Spain has been mentioned as one of them, the Scottish
    referendum, the pending Brexit on June 23, that is a sort of
    self-determination.
        Does the United Kingdom want to stay part of a family that
    it chose to join in 1973, and now maybe wants to leave? And
    what would be the ripple effects that it would have on a
    country like Ireland, for example, or the contagion effect that
    was spoken? But as we see, it is mostly a domestic issue.
        No one is immune to this issue, whether a Democratic policy
    or a non-Democratic policy. And I think Northern Ireland is an
    example. It took the mediation of Senator George Mitchell to
    achieve the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. But we saw then that
    Richard Haass, Dr. Richard Haass, and Dr. Meghan O'Sullivan had
    to be expedited to Northern Ireland in 2014 to try and put the
    final stitches on that. And after 3 or 4 months and a final
    round of 15 hours of negotiation, they did not achieve that
    final stitch on the agreement.
        What I want to say by that is there are no ancient hatreds.
    There are no prejudices. And thus, we have to look, as several
    have said already, at each specific situation that is grounded
    in historical cultural identity issues.
        And so, the fact that we have the European Union has been
    in this case between Serbia and Kosovo a very important
    element. It gives a framework in which countries that want to
    join a bigger family, by choice, voluntarily, of their own
    account know that it is only by a peaceful and democratic way
    that they must resolve these issues.
        There is nothing easy in a compromise. That is what Bernard
    Crick has called the high price of peace. Maximos' positions
    have to be abandoned and coming to a middle where no one will
    be completely happy with the result, but when they reach the
    compromise, knowing that it can create stability and lasting
    peace. And that is probably the most difficult thing.
        As you mentioned, Chairman, I was a Senior Foreign Policy
    Adviser to Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic who sought to solve
    the Kosovo issue as expeditiously as he could by advocating a
    possible direct negotiation with Hashim Thaci then, in the
    beginning of 2003, where the north of Kosovo would be able to,
    itself, have self-determination and possibly independence, and
    at the same moment, recognizing the full independence of
    Kosovoand, as you said, Serbia needed to put this issue behind
    itself as quickly as possible. The rest is history. He was
    assassinated, and then we went into a protracted period, and
    now the mediation of the European Union is having that soothing
    effect as we go forward, and I believe it will be achieved. But
    as colleagues have said, these processes take a very long time.
        I would just like to, finally, make a point about the
    frozen conflicts, that countries such as Russia use a frozen
    conflict to keep leverage on international politics, and to
    allow or disallow a solution. The frozen conflicts that have
    been alluded to in Transnistria, and Abkhazia, and South
    Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, are ones that have gone maybe on too
    long, and maybe we would like to see more leadership from the
    European Union in seeking a resolution to these conflicts.
    Thank you.
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        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you all very much for your
    testimony. I think today we are launching a dialogue on an
    issue that has just been ignored, although it has had dramatic
    impact on our world, but they don't want us to talk about it
    because to set any new standard on this frightens people. It
    just frightens us all that chaos is going to break out if we
    have a new international concept of what is right and wrong in
    the way to proceed with these issues of sovereignty, and the
    issues of self-determination and freedom and democracy, et
    cetera.
        Let me note that we--first of all, the first thing that got
    me involved in this issue was the fact that when I was first
    elected to Congress, the issue was whether or not Serbia was
    going to permit Kosovo to be an independent entity, or, at that
    time, by the way, I might note that Serbia also was claiming
    that they had to be the government of Croatia and the other
    countries as well.
        Let's just put this in perspective. The Serbians, however,
    felt that because they had recognized national heritage
    treasures within Kosovo, that that meant that they had a right
    to keep that part of their jurisdiction under their
    jurisdiction, even though the majority of people, clearly, the
    majority of people, did not want to be part of Serbia. And that
    brought that home to me, and that was a, I think had, and I
    think I mentioned this in the opening remarks, had we basically
    had a situation where the Serbs at that time would have said,
    okay, you are going to be independent, but we are going to have
    a free trade zone among all these and open borders, and you
    would have had basically the same situation as a sovereign
    country, but not having people feel that they were being
    subjugated to one particular area of that country.
        Let's get back to what my friend from Texas said earlier.
    Are we really talking about the majority has a right to
    determine what the government is in that part, in that area of
    any country, or anyplace in the world where they hold a
    majority?
        And, by the way, let me preface it by saying we are not
    talking about little enclaves of people spread throughout a
    country. We are talking about someplace on the periphery of a
    country. Do those people have a right, whether it is in
    Catalonia, or whether it is in Kosovo or wherever it is, or how
    about Biafra? Do these people or a majority of people in that
    area say they want to be independent and have their own country
    from the country that now governs them with a majority of a
    different type of people in another part of the country, is
    that their right to have their government? Because the
    majority, does the majority decide? And just real quickly, we
    will go down the list. Dr. Williams.
        Mr. Williams. Yes. The international law is seldom helpful
    in these instances, but in your particular question it is
    helpful. There are two answers: One, the International Court of
    Justice has said that an entity where a majority of the people
    decide that they would like to be independent, has a right to
    declare independence. It left unaddressed the question of
    whether or not there was an obligation of the international
    community to recognize them, but at least it gets you halfway
    there. The other way in which international law is helpful is
    it answers your question about who these people are that you
    need a majority determination from. It is pretty clear that
    there has to be a political identity, cultural identity, a
    history of association.
        A lot of the groups that you have been speaking about, as
    well the Armenians, and Nagorno-Karabakhs, the Catalonians, the
    Kosovars, they have that identity as a people, and you meld
    that with modern democratic norms, modern human rights norms,
    and they do have a right to seek independence, and then it has
    to be managed in a way that it doesn't destabilize. But the
    fear of destabilization is not a reason to deny them their
    democratic right to determine their own political future.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. When you say ``democratic right,'' are we
    just talking about what international law as it seems to be
    played out today, or are we talking about a theory of natural
    rights that our Founding Fathers----
        Mr. Williams. I think it is more the theory of
    international. As an international lawyer, I can sort of put
    international law aside a little and not feel too guilty, but
    it is the natural law. It is the democratic norms and
    principles that drive this country and, quite frankly, that
    drive the self-determination movements around the globe, that
    willingness to determine your own political future, which
    international laws reflects, but that is not where the right
    comes from. It comes from this national right.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that started within the course of
    human events. But Dr. Sorens.
        Mr. Sorens. Yes. I mean, you could take it back to John
    Locke's second treatise, right, that influenced our Declaration
    of Independence, the idea that government is legitimate only
    when it enjoys the consent of the governed. If you take that
    view, then if the majority of people in a territory prefer a
    different government to the one that is currently ruling them,
    then letting them have that government increases the number of
    people living under a government that is legitimate to them.
        So that seems like, on balance, a reason to allow them to
    secede. But there are some other considerations we should bear
    in mind. So if a majority wants to secede in order to oppress a
    minority within its borders, that would be a reason not to let
    them secede, even if they get majority support. In some
    situations, you could do even better by allowing some
    negotiation over the borders of a new state. I think Kosovo is
    a good example here. The vast majority of people living in
    Kosovo wanted to become independent, but there was a small
    minority of ethnic Serbs that were very much opposed to that.
        If you could have had a situation where you negotiated
    Kosovo independence recognized by Serbia and a small part of
    Kosovo returned to Serbia if its inhabitants so desired, then,
    I think, things would have turned out better for Kosovo. Right
    now they are struggling to get recognized by other countries
    that don't want to set a precedent. Spain is one country that
    hasn't recognized Kosovo, at least the last time I checked.
        That has made it hard for Kosovo to join international
    organizations. So sometimes we can do better than simply saying
    whatever the majority decides goes. It is a good starting
    point, but we might want to negotiate from that starting point
    to try to protect the rights of everybody involved.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Vejvoda.
        Mr. Vejvoda. Just dovetailing on that, I mean, one could
    use also Tocqueville's expression of the tyranny of the
    majority which he used in a political sense, but it applies
    here. You know, if there is this recognition that you want to
    be independent, but as Dr. Sorens just said, but there are
    minorities within majorities, you know, there was this half-
    flippant remark as all this started to unravel which said, Why
    should I be a minority in your country when you can be a
    minority in mine? And I think we have exactly seen that in
    several of these cases.
        I think, you know, it is really about the democratic
    legitimacy, about the consent of the government, and whether
    people feel that those who govern them really are doing a
    rather good, or a rather bad job. I would take the example of
    Quebec in 1995, when the Canadians and the Quebecers went for
    the vote. The difference in that referendum was stunning. It
    was 1.16 percent. And people went quietly home and accepted the
    result that Quebec had voted to stay in Canada.
        That doesn't mean that they won't do it again or the Scots
    won't do it again. I think it is the general atmosphere and the
    policy. We talked about many of the elements that determine
    this default position that it is about state sovereignty, and
    everybody wants to be on the side of let's not rock the boat.
    But we see in cases like these, it does create heightened
    emotions. But if people understand the rules of the game, they
    will go home, even if there is a 1-percent difference.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you. And I am going to yield to my
    ranking member in a moment, but let me just note that the
    Czechs and the Slovaks managed to pull this off very quickly,
    and we had with us President Klaus, who told us that the reason
    he was successful in doing that with so few bumps and so little
    suffering in both sides and the reorganizing the economies, et
    cetera, was that he did it very quickly, very, very quickly,
    and everybody recognized it very, very quickly. And unlike what
    happened where we determined that the people in Kosovo, by a
    vast majority, did not want to be a part of Serbia, yes, we
    helped them free themselves by violence, force and violence.
    We, in fact, bombed Serbia in order to prevent their armed
    suppression of the Kosovars' self-determination. But then, once
    we declared Kosovo, and it was recognized now as independent,
    we basically strung it out. They still are not really a fully
    recognized government. And for self-determination to work, it
    can't be just philosophically correct, but we have got to have
    the courage and that principle of consent of the governed, that
    we act as a people and a government immediately on it, rather
    than letting something string out, which will then just keep
    the issue--it is just like tearing the scab off the wound every
    other day.
        So with that said, also perhaps we need an OSCE mandate
    that they would now be responsible, not only for observing
    elections in developing countries, or countries where there is
    conflicts, but instead, also, to be the entity that goes in to
    ensure that a vote on self-determination is a legitimate and
    fair vote. That would be something--would be something we could
    discuss as time goes on.
        And finally, one last point for, in terms of the United
    States. I have quite often, I actually take my own tweets; I
    tweet it out and sometimes right before I go to bed I will have
    a lot of fun debating people all over the world. You would be
    surprised. All these people say what about--because I happen to
    believe that the Baloch in Pakistan have a right to their self-
    determination. And these Indians say what about Kashmir? What
    about Kashmir? Yeah, I think they do, too. Yeah, if you believe
    in a principle, it is right for both peoples. And it was
    especially true when they say what about Texas? I kid you not.
    I get this. And I always say--or San Diego.
        One of the reasons why I believe that we have to control
    our borders to make sure that the people coming into this
    country are regulated to the point that they are absorbed into
    our society, is that we don't end up in areas of our country
    where a vast majority of the people, who come from someplace
    else, now have a different point of view as to what our country
    should be, and live on the periphery and maybe want to be part
    of Mexico.
        But I will say that if we permit people into our country
    and permit them here legally, they have rights just like we do.
    That is why we have to control our borders. And if the majority
    of people in San Diego end up being people who would prefer
    that they live in Mexico, I'm sorry, they have a right to vote
    on it, and it is adios, San Diego.
        And this is, of course, a surprise that people are tweeting
    me on this. But I do believe that our Founding Fathers actually
    had something special that they tapped into when they talked
    about rights that are granted. You call them natural law. They
    are granted by God. These are things that I believe they have
    universal application, and that we shouldn't be at all hesitant
    or apologetic about trying to use that as our standard on how
    we move forward.
        Mr. Meeks, you may proceed.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as I said, there is
    a lot of theoretical questions I think also, and I don't know
    if there is one box that fits all. I mean, sitting here and
    listening and going back and forth, if there was one principle,
    we probably wouldn't be here today, because we would be two
    different countries, the North and the South, would not be one
    unit. And people died in the United States in a Civil War,
    because half the country wanted to be governed a different way
    than the other half of the country.
        And, so, if we just had one principle, then the confederacy
    should have been allowed to leave, and we would not be here
    today as the United States of America, wouldn't be. And, so,
    there are ramifications all over the world to just say, We are
    going to let one little minority group do a little--I can just
    recall, from my own lifetime, we had it in the African American
    community, back during the civil rights struggle, where some
    would say, Hey, we didn't want to be part of the United States
    anymore. We wanted our own little state. We all come together
    because we were mostly one area and said let us create our own
    little country.
        So how do you define a people, number one? Because people
    of the United States are citizens of the United States, no
    matter what your background, your ethnicity, et cetera. So what
    are the people? I just look at another. You can go to Rwanda
    where the Tutsis and the Hutus, they are still one country. But
    it would be easy to say separate and make two. And who, then,
    recognizes what? And that is the reason why we do have some of
    our international organizations, because what is important
    about being a country to one degree is being recognized by
    another. And then coming together where you do have the lack of
    democracy and/or ethnic cleansing where there is a majority
    that is just going--so that is when we are supposed to come
    together in a unified humanitarian caucus and say we are not
    going to allow this to happen in certain areas where that is
    happening. That is part of what you, and I think that is part
    of, and then protect one another, that is part of what NATO was
    all about. So it is not easy. It is not just as simple as
    saying the people will decide because it depends upon who the
    people are, right? And I can see some context going both ways.
    I don't know.
        So, Mr. Vejvoda, you lived it in the former Yugoslavia and
    Kosovar self-determination movement, and the fight now for
    Kosovo to try to get--what do you see? What do you envision?
    And are there any lessons that we can learn from the Kosovo
    experience since you lived it?
        Mr. Vejvoda. Let me start by quoting Isaiah Berlin, whom I
    quote at the end of the written testimony, who tried to give a
    definition of what good government was, and he put it very
    simply. He said: ``To avoid the extremes of suffering.'' I
    think that is exactly the opposite of what happened in my
    country. Someone called Slobodan Milosevic created the extremes
    of suffering with other leaders. He wasn't the only culprit.
        And I think, obviously, when I was asked, you know, why my
    country disappeared in front of me, big lesson for a social
    scientist like myself, that the evil of history can always
    return, and we have to be vigilant to these kinds of populists
    and other movements, leaders that offer so-called simple snake-
    oil solutions to very complex problems. The answer was simple.
    We were not a democracy. We were a Communist system, and we
    didn't have institutions, and that is why I talk about the
    European Union as having, up until today, created at least
    institutions that are what democratic institutions are supposed
    to be: A framework where you resolve conflict. A conflict will
    remain with us, as Machiavelli said, forever. And it is a
    question of how we deal with it, and what are the mechanisms by
    which we resolve them?
        So the experience one draws from the case of the former
    Yugoslavia, it is exactly that. It is the need to move out of
    the authoritarian dictatorial regime, and to move toward the
    creation of stabilization of institutions. That is why Dr.
    Williams' earned sovereignty, I think, is a very important one,
    because he gives all the elements of what is needed.
        Preparing for this, I looked at the recent self-
    determination referenda that we talked about, you look at
    Eritrea, you look at South Sudan, you look at East Timor, they
    all went through processes of a diverse kind. I asked the
    question, who is caring for them the day after? There was an
    NPR story last week on South Sudan, the reporter said short and
    sad 5 years. And I think we need to be cognizant. That is why
    the earned sovereignty is so important. People need to be there
    the day after, not just in the lead-up to that moment where the
    people decide, and I think that is key and that is maybe the
    biggest lesson.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Weber.
        Mr. Weber. Were you through, Mr. Meeks?
        Mr. Meeks. Yes, I know we got votes coming up.
        Mr. Weber. There they are. Gosh, I don't know where to
    start, guys. You all have brought up so many interesting
    concepts. One of you said that--I think it was you, Dr.
    Sorens--is that right--that self-determination, there is two
    paths, and I basically understand that to be the ballot box or
    military, militarily. You said there is a contagion, but that
    contagion doesn't usually cross borders. What about the Arab
    Spring?
        Mr. Sorens. So democratic contagion can definitely go
    across borders. So we saw that back, as far as Europe 1848. But
    secessionism is fundamentally different because it only happens
    when a particular group has particular grievances or fears
    about the situation it is in. So we don't see this kind of
    thing, even if you look at----
        Mr. Weber. So you don't equate secessionism with
    democratization necessarily----
        Mr. Sorens. I think they are fundamentally different
    processes. And any time, even if we look at Eastern Europe, it
    doesn't look as if people are looking at Yugoslavia and saying,
    oh, we need to do that.
        Mr. Weber. Let me interrupt you for a minute because we
    have to go to votes. Secession doesn't equate to
    democratization, but yet, if self-determination, somebody is
    tired of the old ruling order, the avant garde, call it
    whatever you want, and they want self-determination, isn't that
    democracy?
        Mr. Sorens. You could say that it----
        Mr. Weber. So secession is a means to an end of democracy?
        Mr. Sorens. It can be. It could be that the motivating
    principle of democracy might be a reason to recognize secession
    happening. So someone isn't trying to secede normally in order
    to get democracy. It is normally you are trying to secede in
    order to get out from under the thumb of a regime that you feel
    is alien or hostile to your interests. So democracy might be a
    reason for us to say, okay, the majority has decided we are
    going to recognize you, but that is not what is driving these
    secessionist movements to happen.
        Mr. Weber. You also said that if every country recognized
    the people's right to self-determination or secession, I guess,
    then few would exercise it, which I thought was interesting.
    Why do you say that?
        Mr. Sorens. It is. It is surprising. Most people say, one
    of the first objections they have to this is, oh, you are going
    to get 10,000 new states, and it is just going to be
    unmanageable, but all the evidence suggests that even in the
    developing world, most people fear big changes to the status
    quo. So, you only get strong support for independence when
    there is a history of discrimination or violence or other
    things that make people fearful to stay in that arrangement.
    Even India, I looked at data in India, every Indian state,
    trying to figure out the proportion that wanted to secede, the
    highest was in Kashmir, and it is only about 20 percent.
        Mr. Weber. Let me jump over to your comments about Italy.
    You said the Italy constitution defines the country as
    indivisible. We would argue that our Pledge of Allegiance has
    that same phrase basically in it, but then you said the
    constitution had the phrase--it defined, rather, the country as
    indivisible, thus ruling out self-determination. But, in point
    of fact, hasn't the majority of people who voted for that
    constitution self-determined that they wanted to make the
    statement that they are indivisible?
        Mr. Sorens. It is sort of a philosophical question, but you
    could wonder, do the majority of Italian people have the right
    to decide for, say, Sardinians? Well, if Sardinians don't want
    that----
        Mr. Weber. I would argue that they do until the
    constitution is changed.
        Mr. Sorens. We could wonder what the best constitutional
    form should be, should the constitution have this? That is sort
    of the debate.
        Mr. Weber. That is where self-determination comes in.
        Mr. Sorens. Yeah. So we can say maybe the constitution
    should recognize self-determination. As long as it doesn't,
    yeah, you got to follow the constitution, but maybe the
    constitution should be amended.
        Mr. Weber. The problem with people voting is that they are
    people voting. I yield back.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. In a couple minutes
    here, we are going to have to adjourn. We have a vote on, but
    let me just note, one point my dear friend and colleague made
    about, well, if the South would have seceded, we would have had
    them as principle, if the South wouldn't have been preventing
    such a large chunk of their population not to have any rights,
    had all the slaves been citizens and been able to vote, yes,
    all of those people would then, in my mind, that would have
    justified their vote.
        Mr. Weber. But aren't those contradictory terms, Mr.
    Chairman?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So, anyway, I do believe that is their
    right. And the other thing is, let me just note, we have a lot
    of these--there are countries all over the world right now,
    people, whether it is in Biafra--and there is bloodshed going
    on right now for people in Biafra--feel that they should be
    independent. We didn't back them up. I remember years ago when
    I was a kid, they had that same concept, the Baloch, people of
    Baloch, the Kosovars, I think this has not turned out the way
    it should have, because we have not had the courage of our
    conviction, but we had a little bit, enough to get involved but
    not enough to solve the issue of Sudan and the rest of this.
        Let me just note one issue that we will discuss in another
    hearing, which is, the most complicating factor to me, is that
    they are movements of populations by tyrants into people's area
    and the people there become overwhelmed because Stalin moves a
    bunch of people into Crimea or wherever, and it muddies up this
    issue.
        But thank you very much for sharing with us, starting this
    dialogue on an issue that has been ignored, and today, I
    declare that an open issue for discussion of self-
    determination, but the end of this hearing.
        [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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