[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-93]
ASSESSING THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL
SECURITY FORCES
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 12, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri, Chairwoman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JACKIE SPEIER, California
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia Georgia
MARTHA McSALLY, Arizona GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
Katy Quinn, Professional Staff Member
Abigail Gage, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Hartzler, Hon. Vicky, a Representative from Missouri, Chairwoman,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations................... 1
Speier, Hon. Jackie, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations........... 3
WITNESSES
Abizaid, Christine S., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia......................... 4
Breedlove, Kent A., Senior Defense Analyst-Afghanistan, Defense
Intelligence Agency............................................ 9
Child, Michael S., Deputy Inspector General for Overseas
Contingency Operations, Department of Defense.................. 13
Michael, COL Stephen, USA, Joint Staff J5 Transregional Threat
Coordination Cell.............................................. 7
Sopko, Hon. John F., Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction................................................. 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Abizaid, Christine S......................................... 37
Breedlove, Kent A............................................ 60
Child, Michael S............................................. 80
Michael, COL Stephen......................................... 50
Sopko, Hon. John F........................................... 63
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Ms. Speier................................................... 99
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mrs. Hartzler................................................ 103
ASSESSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC, Friday, February 12, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Vicky Hartzler
(chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VICKY HARTZLER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MISSOURI, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Mrs. Hartzler. Welcome. I am delighted to convene this
hearing. This is a very important topic and one I know that
Ranking Member Speier finds especially significant. I am happy
to partner with her in exploring this subject.
I also note that the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Jones, is attending the hearing with us today. Therefore, I ask
unanimous consent that Mr. Jones and any other committee
members not assigned to this subcommittee be permitted to
participate in this hearing with the understanding that all
subcommittee members will be recognized for questions prior to
those not sitting on the subcommittee.
Without objection, so ordered.
This morning, we continue the committee's oversight
dialogue with the Department that began last week with the
foundational testimony that General Campbell laid out before
the full committee. General Campbell testified about the
evolving security situation in Afghanistan, and the policy,
strategy, and posture required from our Nation in order to
develop, sustain, and support the people and unity government
of Afghanistan well into the future.
The goal of our hearing is to learn about and assess the
Department's efforts to train, advise, and assist the
Afghanistan security forces as we and our coalition partners
strive to build a capable and lethal Afghan security force.
Afghanistan needs to maintain its sovereignty and protect its
population. And for the benefit of Afghanistan, the United
States, and international community, it must also deny
terrorist safe havens.
In reading the recent Congressional Report submitted by our
witnesses and listening to testimony from General Campbell, the
subcommittee understands that the Afghan security forces are
still in their nascent stages of becoming a professionalized,
self-sustaining, and capable institution. But there is still
various shortfalls and insufficient capabilities and important
functions hindering these goals. The Afghan forces do not have
enough airplanes or helicopters, especially those capable of
providing close air support.
While there clearly has been improvement, the ability to
collect and disseminate ample intelligence is lacking, as is
the ability to maintain and account for equipment. Even the
bread-and-butter administrative issues such as paid leave and
medical services for Afghan forces need attention.
According to last week's testimony, these challenges are
compounded by the fact that 70 percent of the problems facing
Afghan security forces result from poor senior leadership
within the Afghan Ministries of Defense and the Interior. The
Taliban are emboldened. The Haqqani Network continues to
sponsor terrorist attacks, and there is a growing Islamic State
presence in Afghanistan. Thus, it is essential that we ensure
that the Afghan security forces and their civilian leadership
are properly positioned on the critical path of success.
However, I am concerned that the President's current budget
request for aiding the Afghan forces is $200 million less than
last year's amount. And the administration plans to withdraw
U.S. forces down to 5,500 beginning as soon as April of this
year. We must not prematurely reduce our commitment to the
people of Afghanistan. All one needs to do is to look at the
results of premature withdrawal in Iraq to determine what will
happen if we repeat near history and prematurely leave
Afghanistan.
General Campbell noted last week the devotion of the Afghan
people in fighting for their country. This is a positive sign.
While the material and support is something the American people
can assist with, having the heart and willingness to fight is
something the Afghan people must offer. He also suggested last
week that the U.S. should begin instituting a 5-year planning
cycle for the region instead of the unpredictable, 1-year-at-a-
time approach that tends to foster instability, uncertainty,
and insecurity.
General Campbell also readily acknowledged that our
sustained engagement in Afghanistan will continue through 2024,
further strategic partnership agreements signed by the
Governments of Afghanistan and the United States. We must also
ensure there are appropriate mechanisms and governance
structures in place that provide for effective insight in order
to oversee, account for, and safeguard the security assistance
the U.S. and our international partners are contributing to the
Afghans.
We need to limit, as much as possible, opportunities and
activities or operations that would encourage or enable
individuals to exploit or conduct any fraud, waste, or abuse
activities. Activities of this nature can undercut the trust of
the American people, impedes morale of our troops, and fuels
skepticism that we are not seriously committed to effective and
efficient use of our resources.
I look forward to discussing the Department's strategy for
addressing the issues I have outlined, and to hear from some
who have conducted their own assessment of these activities.
But before I introduce the witnesses, I turn to the
Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee ranking member for
any opening remarks she would wish to make. Representative
Speier.
STATEMENT OF HON. JACKIE SPEIER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank you for
joining me in seeking this particular hearing.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for appearing today.
Our troops are in Afghanistan performing an important
mission, which includes training, advising, and equipping the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces [ANDSF] so that
they can sustainably defend themselves against insurgent
groups, such the Taliban. Having said that, I am concerned that
our strategy hasn't yield the positive results that would
inspire confidence that the Afghan security forces can go it
alone any time in the foreseeable future, which leads to the
obvious question, Will we ever leave? Can we ever leave? I am
not convinced that our existing plan is one that we can take to
the American people and assure them that our presence in
Afghanistan is worth the cost in money and in lives.
By many accounts, 2015 was the worst year for security
instability in Afghanistan since 2001. 2015 was the first year
that the Afghan forces took the lead, meaning some level of
instability was expected, but it was alarming, nonetheless. And
I am not convinced that 2016 will be any better. Is there a
clear strategy to support our troops and accomplish our goals?
Or are we just moving chess pieces around the board because we
are forced to make a move? Underpinning these concerns, I don't
get a sense that we are, frankly, addressing the fundamental
challenges we face in Afghanistan. Corruption, weak Afghan
military leadership, and a tenacious insurgency, which seems to
be only getting stronger, are undermining our efforts there,
and I would like to know how these issues get resolved in a way
that allows us to leave in a timely manner without creating a
security vacuum.
Again, the question is, do we ever leave? The American
public has a right to know. One thing is for sure, Congress
needs high-quality information to understand the situation we
are confronting, and effective oversight from inspectors
general is essential to our ability to understand these issues.
Some might argue that this is one of the world's greatest
producers of sheep. I just want to make sure we are not getting
the wool pulled over our eyes.
We need to make sure that the information we are receiving
is reliable, that we are asking the right questions, and are
able to travel the country to assess the conditions.
Here are some bedrock issues that require far more clarity.
We need to know how the Afghan forces' progress is being
measured, what we have learned from the challenges of the last
year, and how gaps in the ANDSF capabilities will be addressed
going forward. Are the Afghan forces on a positive trajectory
for meeting and sustaining their capability objectives? For
now, it is apparent that our assistance is still needed to
build and sustain ministerial institutions to lead the Afghan
forces. They also need a capable Air Force and other key
enablers, including sound operational planning, logistics, and
maintenance systems. Just this week, it was reported that the
U.S. military advisers are being sent to southern Afghanistan
to give additional support to the Afghan National Army in that
region. In short, the Afghans are not yet ready to secure their
own country without assistance from the U.S. and our coalition
partners. And if recent experience is any indication, it could
be years until they are.
We need to be clear-eyed and better informed about the
Afghan forces' abilities, now and in the future, to secure the
country and to reliably prevent extremists from, once again,
using Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists to threaten
the United States. We need to make sure we have realistic goals
and a plausible strategy that fits our goals. Above all, we
need to make sure we are telling ourselves the full story about
our situation so that we could figure out where to go next.
I look forward to all of your testimony and assessments
about the developments of the Afghan forces, which, I hope,
will provide us a fuller picture of the forces' progress,
performance, and capabilities.
And with that, I yield back.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Ms. Speier.
I am pleased to recognize our witnesses today, and I want
to thank them for taking the time to be with us.
We have Ms. Christine Abizaid, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense; Colonel Stephen Michael,
Deputy Director for the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Transregional Threats Coordination Cell from the Office of
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. Kent Breedlove,
Senior Defense Analyst for Afghanistan with the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the Honorable John Sopko of the
presidentially appointed Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction; and Mr. Michael Child, Deputy
Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations from the
Department of Defense.
Thank you, all, again, for being with us today. And we will
now begin with our opening statements.
Ms. Abizaid, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE S. ABIZAID, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
Ms. Abizaid. Thank you very much.
Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, members of the
subcommittee, Congressman Jones, thank you for your steadfast
support for our efforts in Afghanistan, and for inviting me to
discuss the Department of Defense's efforts to develop the
Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, the ANDSF.
I am honored to have the opportunity to update you
alongside my colleagues from the Joint Staff, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Office of the DOD [Department of
Defense] Inspector General [DOD IG], and the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction [SIGAR].
All of the witnesses before you today take very seriously
our responsibility to ensure that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
have the resources, authorities, and guidance they need to
accomplish their mission.
I would also like to acknowledge the 2,236 U.S. service
members who lost their lives while serving in Afghanistan, the
20,115 military personnel who have been wounded in that
country, and the thousands of families who have also sacrificed
for this important mission. Their efforts represent a
strategically significant contribution to the security of our
homeland.
Now, within the Department of Defense, my office provides
overall policy guidance for and oversight of the mission in
Afghanistan, including DOD-funded security assistance for the
ANDSF. We have daily contacts with key theater and person--key
personnel in theater at the Combined Security Transition
Assistance Command, Afghanistan, or CSTC-A, which has primary
responsibility for the execution of the DOD security assistance
mission.
We also work closely with other offices within DOD, the
intelligence community, and the Department of State, as we
continually assess the status of our efforts in Afghanistan.
My office also supports the efforts of the DOD IG and those
of SIGAR, ensuring they have the information and, importantly,
the context required to fulfill their mandates to review our
efforts.
Now, our priority in Afghanistan remains to prevent it
from, once again, becoming a safe haven from which terrorists
can plan attacks against the United States homeland, U.S.
interests abroad, and our international partners. In pursuit of
this objective, we are conducting two complementary missions in
Afghanistan: our counterterrorism mission against the remnants
of Al Qaeda and other extremist groups that threaten the United
States, such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province; and the
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]-led train, advise,
and assist mission with the ANDSF, known as Resolute Support.
In October 2015, following a comprehensive review of the
mission, President Obama announced that we would retain up to
9,800 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan throughout most of
2016, drawing down to 5,500 personnel by January 2017.
Importantly, this presence will not just be based in Kabul, but
also in other locations, including Bagram Air Base, Jalalabad,
and Kandahar. This decision provides U.S. forces with
sufficient capabilities to continue the development of Afghan
ministerial capacities, along with key ANDSF capabilities in
aviation, intelligence, special operations, logistics, and
maintenance.
This presence will also allow the United States to both
pursue counterterrorism targets, and to assist the ANDSF in
further developing those critical counterterrorism capabilities
that we know are critical to our mutual security interests. The
financial support of the United States and the international
community is critical to sustaining the ANDSF. Over the last
decade, congressional appropriations for the Afghan Security
Forces Fund, or ASFF, have been key to the development of
Afghan security forces responsible for the security of
Afghanistan. As we develop the ANDSF, our support is focused on
ensuring that they are able to counter and degrade the Taliban,
and establish a baseline level of security that benefits not
only the Afghan people, but also the international community.
For more than a year, the mission of providing security for
all of Afghanistan has been the sole responsibility of the
Afghan Government. While the security situation remains fragile
and Afghan forces will continue to require U.S. and coalition
assistance for many years, we have witnessed important progress
in their development over the years.
As General Campbell noted in his testimony last week, the
ANDSF have demonstrated the ability to conduct effective,
large-scale, multi-pillar clearing operations against the
country, and when insurgents attempted strategic advances in
places like Kunduz, Ghazni, and elsewhere, the ANDSF proved
able to rally and recapture those areas.
Significant challenges do remain, and our train, advise,
and assist mission is focused on helping the Afghans overcome
them. And it is notable that even in the midst of fighting a
war, the ANDSF and Afghan security ministries continue to
develop their capacities to manage complex tasks such as
budgeting, personnel management, and to address key capability
gaps in aviation and intelligence.
Now, U.S. taxpayers have been generous and patient with the
ANDSF's development, and it is our responsibility to review
carefully how best and most efficiently we can assist our
Afghan partners. Finding the right balance between the
effectiveness and affordability of the ANDSF is a key effort of
this Department.
I would like to highlight a few areas where we think
progress is being made. First, we continue to focus on the
development of the ANDSF's aviation capabilities, including by
addressing their critical close air support needs as well as
their long-term lift requirements. This is very complex, and
represents a significant portion of our investment in the ANDSF
now and going forward. Of note, in 2016, the Afghan aerial
fires capability will nearly triple compared to last year.
Second, we are spending a significant amount on ground forces
equipment, which has relatively high sustainment costs. We
fielded significant numbers of up-armored Humvees and other
vehicles to the ANDSF to improve combat survivability.
Third, Afghan security ministry pay and personnel expenses
are a major cost driver, about 20 percent of the roughly $5
billion total costs for the ANDSF. DOD funds the majority of
this cost for the Afghan Government, and we have been working
with their security ministries to develop an integrated pay and
personnel system that will ensure we can verify that we are
paying the right people for the right jobs.
And, finally, corruption is a critical issue, and President
Ghani is a great partner in addressing its impacts. He has made
procurement reforms to address corruption in MOD [Ministry of
Defense] and MOI [Ministry of Interior], and after we helped
him identify corruption in fuel contracting processes, he fired
those responsible, and now new contracts are in place. He also
pulled up responsibility for procurement to a national level
authority, demonstrating the seriousness with which he takes
these issues. In each of these areas, as well as many others,
DOD IG and SIGAR have helpfully informed our efforts to protect
taxpayers' money and ensure we can achieve our goals in
developing the ANDSF.
In closing, I want to, again, thank the subcommittee for
this opportunity to discuss our efforts to develop the ANDSF,
and to ensure that we are doing so responsibly.
The Afghan Government will continue to rely on large
amounts of financial assistance to the ANDSF until such time as
fighting significantly diminishes. We are in the process of
working with our allies and partners to extend international
funding commitments through at least 2020, and we look forward
to working with Congress to ensure effective oversight of these
efforts to achieve our national objectives in Afghanistan.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Abizaid can be found in the
Appendix on page 37.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Colonel Michael.
STATEMENT OF COL STEPHEN MICHAEL, USA, JOINT STAFF J5
TRANSREGIONAL THREAT COORDINATION CELL
Colonel Michael. Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier,
I am grateful for this opportunity to, you know, talk to
yourself and this subcommittee and provide you information on
the development of the ANDSF. I would ask that you submit my
full statement to the record, and I would like to focus on some
key and essential points.
The first bit is talking about the Chairman's perspective.
So as the Chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] looks at
Afghanistan, he looks at it through a couple lenses. First of
all, Afghanistan is important to us, because it intersects
vital national interests, and the key one, as we highlighted,
is ensuring that nothing that happens there, nothing that
emanates from Afghanistan, threatens the homeland or threatens
our interests. And that is really one of the primary lenses
that the Chairman views this mission.
The second, he looks at the ANDSF, the resiliency of the
ANDSF in its leadership. Is this--is this force well led? Are
they willing, you know, to do what it takes? Are they willing
to sacrifice? Do they want this more than we do? Do they
understand that they serve the people, that they serve the
civilian government? Do they understand that you cannot harm
the people, you know, whom you are trying to protect? Do they
understand how to lead, you know, how to lead, you know, a
force? So the resiliency of the ANDSF, the ability to fight
back in adversity, the ability to lead the--you know, at the
appropriate level, the ability to make the right decisions,
those are all critical to him. So he assesses whether we should
be committed to Afghanistan or not. Those are the questions
that he consistently asks of us.
The second bit that the Chairman looks at is the viability
of the government. Now, the military--the military mission sets
the conditions, you know, for everything else. So all we do is
set the conditions for the political piece, for the whole of
government pieces to work.
So from the Chairman's perspective, understanding whether
this government is viable or not, the same thing, are they well
led? Are they corrupt? Is this government that the people
believe? And those are all the questions that he consistently
asks himself to inform his best military advice. And his
current assessment is that the ANDSF leadership is resilient.
This is a force that we should partner with. This is a force
that deserves our support. And, likewise, he sees in President
Ghani, you know, partner for the nation. So as we look at
Afghanistan and the region, the Chairman's assessment is a
stable Afghanistan meets and supports our interests, and a
stable Afghanistan also lends, you know, to stability in the
region.
As we look at the ANDSF development, so, really, beginning
in 2013, the ANDSF were in the lead, but in 2015 is the first
year they were fully responsible for the security. Our strategy
is focused on they own the tactical fight, and we are focusing
on the things that really guarantee, you know, long-term
sustainability, long-term viability to the force. So the
institutional level, do they have the ability to man, train,
and equip, and field a professional force? Do they have the
ability to sustain that force, direct that force in the
counterinsurgency fight? The tactical fight, they own. And this
has been a pretty tough and contested year.
Probably the biggest difference is they are operating in
areas that cater to the areas that the coalition has been
operating in. So they are fighting all across the country. And
across the board, they are doing well. They are getting their
noses bloodied, but they are also--they are also doing a great
job in securing Afghanistan. And as we look at it across the
board, we can clearly say that most of the major population
centers are secured and controlled by the ANDSF, and that there
are some rural areas that are either controlled by the Taliban
and the insurgency or under the influence of the Taliban and
the insurgency. There are a total of 407 districts, and eight
of those, about 2 percent we can say is under the insurgents'
control, and about 18 of those, or 4 percent, we can say is
under the influence of the Taliban.
This year has also seen an increased amount of casualties
in the ANDSF. And as we look at the numbers, it is probably
about a 26 percent increase. Much of that is felt by the
police. And also, as we look at the numbers, most of the
increases came in some of their directed multi--multicorps
operations, much of it down in the south in their operations in
Helmand, and then there was multicorps operations further to
the north, in Zabul and Ghazni, then in the east, and also
centrally in support of securing the capital in Kabul.
The other impact of their operations is that there is also
an increased amount of casualties that the Taliban has taken.
By conservative estimates, the conservative estimates are that
the Taliban has sustained some of their highest casualties
since their high point in 2011, casualties at a rate two times
of that of the ANDSF.
Our assessment is they own the tactical fight. Our job is,
really, to support and enable them in the tactical fight. But
really we have to focus on the pieces that will sustain us long
term, their leadership, their ability to man, field, and equip
this force and direct this force. The gaps that you
highlighted, close air supports, ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance], and things that are
essential to keeping this force, you know, viable in the long
term.
As we look at--you know, at fighting season--at this
current fighting season, as Ms. Abizaid says, we have a dual
focus to train, advise, and assist, and separately, our
counterterrorism mission. Both of those are tied to our
interest. Training this force and making sure they can secure
Afghanistan is critical to securing our interests, and then,
separately, the counterterrorism mission gives us the ability
to do things that the Afghan force has not--doesn't have the
capability or the resources to do or things that we see that
directly impact our interests.
And as we look at the--at kind of the long term, so the
President made the decision about 5,500 footprint going
forward, and that decision was informed, you know, by the best
military advice of the Chairman, of, you know, the CENTCOM
[Central Command] commander, of the commander in the field, and
that mission, and the critical thing about that mission is one
of the first times the decision was made to where it was really
not necessarily tied, you know, to timeframe. It is an enduring
mission. It is tied to our enduring partnership in Afghanistan,
and to cover and address our strategic interests in the region.
Additionally, as you all know, you know, we are going
through the leadership transition in Afghanistan. General
Nicholson was confirmed by the Senate, and over the next period
of months, he will transition into Afghanistan. And as he said
in his testimony, as he comes in, he will do an assessment, and
then based on his assessment, he will recommend, you know, his
best military advice. And both the outgoing Chairman, General
Dempsey, has said he has access and influence in his ability to
present his best military advice to the Secretary of Defense
and the President and, likewise, General Dempsey has said the
same thing. So as we transition leadership, if General
Nicholson, you know, assesses any requirements or any
adjustments that are needed to be made, he has the latitude to
bring that forward and for the Chairman to present that as his
best military advice.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Michael can be found in
the Appendix on page 50.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
Mr. Breedlove.
STATEMENT OF KENT A. BREEDLOVE, SENIOR DEFENSE ANALYST-
AFGHANISTAN, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Breedlove. Thank you. Madam Chair, Ranking Member
Speier, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to come before you today to discuss
this important topic. My comments this morning will be brief
and build upon my written statement and the previous opening
statements from my colleagues.
Afghanistan continues to face a diverse collective of
threats from insurgent groups to extremist networks, and from
terrorist groups to narcocriminal networks. This includes names
we are familiar with, like the Taliban, the Haqqani Network,
and Al Qaeda, as well as the emergence of groups like the
Islamic State-Khorasan Province, or IS-K, and Al Qaeda in the
Indian Subcontinent, or AQIS. This menagerie of insurgents,
terrorists, and criminals constitute a resilient and persistent
threat to Afghanistan's stability and general stability in the
region.
Their activities range from opium trafficking, extortion
and kidnapping that fuels the insurgency to high-profile
attacks in populated areas and improvised explosive attacks
along road networks that both typically result in high Afghan
civilian casualties. Rural areas of Afghanistan and the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions remains a sanctuary for
these various groups, and the remote and rugged terrain of
these areas only adds to security challenges they pose.
In the first fighting season against an Afghan-led
counterinsurgency, Taliban-led insurgents remain resilient.
Fighting has been nearly continuous since last February,
resulting in increased casualties among both Afghan security
forces and insurgents themselves. The Taliban have proven cable
of taking rural ground and contesting key terrain in areas such
as Helmand and Kunduz provinces while continuing to conduct
high-profile attacks in the capital city, Kabul.
These high-profile attacks, in particular, achieve one of
the Taliban's main objectives of garnering media attention and
creating a sense of insecurity that undercuts perceptions of
the Afghan government's ability to provide security.
Following Pakistani military operations in north Waziristan
last year, many out-of-area fighters, to include some Al Qaeda
leaders, were displaced in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda activities
remain focused on survival, regeneration, and planning future
attacks. The organization has a sustained presence in
Afghanistan, primarily concentrated in the east and northeast
of the country.
Other groups involved in Taliban-led insurgency, the
Haqqani Network remains the greatest threat to the U.S.
coalition and Afghan forces, particularly with the demonstrated
capacity and intent to support and launch these high-profile,
complex attacks across the country, and in particular, the
Kabul region. Haqqani Network leader Siraj Haqqani's elevation
as the new deputy for the Taliban leader, Mullah Mansour, has
further strengthened the network's role in the insurgency.
Over this past year, the Taliban-led insurgency remained
determined, maintained or consolidated its influence in
traditionally rural strongholds, dominated the information
space, and carried out attacks with an increased frequency
compared to last year.
These attacks range from small-scale checkpoint overruns to
the temporary capture of Kunduz City, and their efforts forced
Afghan security forces into a more reactive, rather than
proactive, posture. However, I want to emphasize that the
insurgency is not immune to its environment and faces similar
challenges that my colleagues highlighted with Afghan forces.
The announcement of former leader Mullah Omar's death last
July, and the contentious accession of its new leader, Mullah
Mansour, led to the emergence of a Taliban opposition faction
in late 2015. Infighting between Mansour's supporters and this
opposition is ongoing, and the Taliban has faced competition
from the emergence of ISIL's [Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant] regional affiliate in the region, the IS-K.
While the insurgency mounted larger coordinated attacks,
they were generally outmatched when engaged with Afghan
security forces. They also could not capture or defend key
targets they may have captured, and unable to hold some of
these key areas of terrain for extended period of time, such as
we saw in Kunduz. They also suffered high levels of reported
casualties as well as resource shortfalls.
Let me close with a brief outlook to the coming fight this
year. We expect the Taliban-led insurgency will try to build on
its temporary victory in Kunduz last year by attempting to
surround and pressure other population centers, exploit
vulnerabilities in Afghan security force posture by conducting
mass attacks against vulnerable checkpoints and district
centers, primarily in more remote or isolated rural areas, and
attempt to impede ground lines of communication ahead of these
attacks in these population centers. They will also seek to
continue high-profile attacks against government and civilian
targets in key populated areas, such as Kabul.
Thank you, again, for this opportunity, and I look forward
to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Breedlove can be found in
the Appendix on page 60.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Breedlove.
Mr. Sopko.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. SOPKO, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION
Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much, and good morning.
Chairman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier, and members of
the subcommittee, I am very pleased to be here today to discuss
the development of the Afghan National Defense Security Forces,
or ANDSF. SIGAR has produced a substantial body of work on the
ANDSF over the past 8 years, and has more work in progress.
In addition to audits, inspections, investigations, and
special project reports, SIGAR publishes a quarterly report
that continues to be the single most comprehensive and detailed
source of information on the ANDSF specifically, and on
Afghanistan reconstruction in general.
To conduct this work, SIGAR has the largest single,
investigative, and auditing presence in Afghanistan with more
people on the ground than all other U.S. oversight bodies
combined, and enjoys a unique, direct oversight relationship
with the Afghan Government, and the personal support of
President Ghani and CEO [Chief Executive Officer] Abdullah, who
I meet with on a regular basis.
As we all know, Afghanistan is one of the most difficult
places in the world in which to work and to do business. The
dangers there are very real. And our military, civilians, and
contractors--and we can't forget the contractors--have
accomplished so much over the past 14-plus years that it is
impossible not to be proud and humbled by their efforts and
great sacrifice. Nevertheless, based on our work, we see five
major challenges that could have a significant effect on
whether the United States is able to achieve its strategic
objectives in Afghanistan. We believe that the five questions
provoked by these challenges should be at the center of yours
and other policymakers' discussions.
The first challenge is that the drawdown of troops has
imperiled the U.S. ability to monitor and mentor the ANDSF.
U.S. military advisers and their coalition partners now
have little or no direct contact with ANDSF units below the
Army corps and regional police headquarters level. This
provokes the obvious question, is the current level of U.S.
military personnel in Afghanistan adequate to ensure that the
ANDSF do not fail in their mission?
The second question, the reported floor strength of the
ANDSF is questionable. The U.S. now has no option but to rely
on the Afghans to report on the number of troops and police in
the field. Yet, SIGAR audits indicate that recordkeeping in the
field by the Afghans is generally poor or nonexistent. We
continue to see repeated reports of ghost soldiers, ghost
police, as well as ghost teachers, ghost schools, ghost clinics
throughout Afghanistan, and these are even reported by the
Afghan leadership. This leads to the next question, does the
United States have an adequate understanding of the number of
ANDSF troops and police?
Thirdly, assessments of the ANDSF's capability and
effectiveness have never been reliable, and appear to be
getting worse. SIGAR audits show that over time, U.S.
capability ratings of Afghan military units have become
progressively less demanding and more vague. For example, only
a few years ago, the top rating was, quote, unquote, ``fully
capable,'' which was later changed to, quote, ``effective with
ambassadors,'' and has now declined to, quote, ``independent
with advisers,'' the latter being something of a head-
scratching oxymoron.
This leads to our third question, does the U.S. have a
realistic understanding of the ANDSF's real capabilities?
Fourthly, the Afghan ministries of defense and interior
obviously lack the capability to account for on-budget
assistance, and this is important. Because since 2010, our
government, as well as our allies, have gradually increased,
based upon promises at international meetings, the level of
direct on-budget funding to the Afghan Government. Yet, there
is less U.S. visibility and control over those funds. SIGAR's
work has uncovered several cases in which the MOD and MOI were
incapable of properly managing on-budget assistance. The
question, therefore, is if MOD and MOI lack the capability to
manage on-budget assistance, does CSTC-A [Combined Security
Transition Command-Afghanistan] need to resume more control of
more assistance to the ANDSF?
Now, lastly, a year after the coalition drawdown, the ANDSF
is still far from being sustainable. And remember, that is our
goal, sustainability. The Afghan Government simply does not
generate enough revenue to sustain the ANDSF, or even the rest
of their government now, or at any time in the foreseeable
future.
At the same time, SIGAR's work reveals that the
accountability for funding is lacking in many areas. This leads
us to our last question for you, is the U.S. Government
conducting adequate oversight and management of the billions of
dollars promised in the future to fund the ANDSF?
Now, in recent testimony just this week before the U.S.
Senate, the Director of the National Intelligence predicted
that, quote, ``Fighting in 2016 will be more intense than 2015,
continuing a decade-long trend of deteriorating security,''
unquote.
He went on to say that the ANDSF will, quote, ``probably
maintain control of major population centers; however, it will
cede control of various rural areas.''
He ended by saying, ``Without international funding, the
ANSF will probably not remain a cohesive or viable force,''
unquote.
Now, I think his statement highlights the importance of
honestly answering these five questions and taking realistic
action accordingly.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sopko can be found in the
Appendix on page 63.]
Mrs. Hartzler. All right. Votes are being carried out right
now. We have 11 minutes left, so I am feeling like we probably
ought to suspend the hearing at this point and go vote, it is
supposed to take about 40 minutes, and then come back and
reconvene for your testimony and questions, Mr. Child.
So I apologize for the delay, but thank you for
understanding. We will look forward to hearing you soon.
Mr. Child. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much for your patience and
for waiting until we got done with votes. So, Mr. Child, let's
hear your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL S. CHILD, DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Child. Chairwoman Hartzler, Ranking Member Speier,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss capabilities gaps in the Afghan National
Security Forces. As the Deputy Inspector General for Overseas
Contingency Operations, I manage DOD IG oversight for Operation
Freedom's Sentinel in Afghanistan. And as the chair of the
interagency Southwest Asia Joint Planning Group, I help
coordinate oversight among the several inspectors general in
Afghanistan.
I serve a similar role for Operation Inherent Resolve, the
Iraq-Syria counter-ISIL mission. And I describe that
coordinating role in more detail in my written statement.
Regarding Afghan security forces, my observations are based on
our oversight work and recent published reports. We view the
challenge of developing sustainable Afghan fighting forces as
twofold, balancing the requirement to provide near-term
fighting capability against a longer-term need to build the
Afghans' capacity to sustain their fighting forces, and
building effective national institutions where those have not
previously existed.
Shortcomings in Afghan sustainment capacity are a recurrent
theme in our oversight work. I would like to highlight three
examples: supply and maintenance, property accountability, and
key commodities. As the supply and maintenance for many years
of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. and NATO partners
emphasized rapidly growing the army and police forces. And they
robustly supported them in combat operations, and, therefore,
pushed supplies to Afghan units rather than requiring units to
pull supplies based on need and validated requirements. The
result is, the Afghans have little experience with demand-
driven support systems.
A recent DOD IG assessment found that the Afghan National
Army was unable to properly forecast their material
requirements. Regarding property accountability, we reported in
April of 2015 that the Ministries of Defense and Interior did
not have effective controls to manage the 95,000 vehicles
procured by the U.S. and coalition partners. The long-term
solution to equipment readiness and maintenance should be the
implementation of the Afghan national maintenance strategy.
This strategy will place contractors at 23 key locations to
maintain equipment and train the Afghans to conduct their own
maintenance. The goal is to achieve full Afghan responsibility
for maintenance by 2021.
Regarding key commodities, our oversight has found
significant issues in the management of fuel and ammunition. In
April 2015, we found a lack of adequate internal controls to
manage both fuel and ammunition. Last month, we reported
deficiencies in controls involving fuel procured for the
Interior Ministry. We found that coalition advisers had no
reasonable assurance that all U.S.-funded fuel, valued at $438
million, was used for its intended purpose.
We will conduct a similar audit of fuel procurement for the
Ministry of Defense later this year. Future DOD IG work in 2016
will include assessments of U.S. efforts to build an
independent Afghan special forces and intelligence capability.
We will soon evaluate the progress of U.S. Special Operation
Forces in training, advising, and assisting the Afghan special
forces.
And this month, we will send a team of intelligence
specialists to assess progress in developing effective Afghan
intelligence operations. Looking forward, my office is engaged
in a review of current programs and operations to identify
future oversight work as the lead inspector general for
Operation Freedom's Sentinel. As you may recall, Congress
created the lead IG (Inspector General) for Overseas
Contingency Operations in the fiscal year 2013 National Defense
Authorization Act. The IGs of the Department of Defense,
Department of State, and United States Agency for International
Development, execute the lead IG mandate which was enacted to
provide improved, coordinated, whole-of-government oversight in
overseas contingency operations. We appreciate the support of
this committee, subcommittee as we discharge our oversight
responsibilities. And I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Child can be found in the
Appendix on page 80.]
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Child. I will start the
questions. Ms. Abizaid, I was wondering, what is the rationale
for beginning the drawdown before the upcoming summer fighting
season, and before a new U.S. administration has an opportunity
to conduct its own assessment of the mission and needed troop
levels?
Ms. Abizaid. So my understanding of the drawdown timeline
is not that it will begin in the summer of 2016. The President
has directed that General Campbell try and keep at the 9,800
level through as much as 2016 as possible so we can do what we
can in both our train, advise, and assist mission and our CT
[counterterrorism] mission to get the most out of our
relationship with the Afghans as they improve throughout
fighting season 2016. The rationale for the drawdown to the
5,500 is about how we set ourselves up for a future,
sustainable presence in the country at key locations outside of
Kabul.
The fact that we will maintain facilities in Jalalabad, in
Kandahar, in Bagram, are key differences between the plan that
was originally approved and the one that President Obama
revised, that, I think, provide us the kind of flexibility we
need to adjust the mission accordingly.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Thank you. Colonel Michael,
Afghan security forces have capability gaps, as we have heard
you testify, in helicopter/airplane capabilities. These include
the essential foundational activities and missions that
professional militaries need in order to be efficient,
effective, and lethal. So what limiting factors are precluding
the ANDSF from sufficiently and effectively establishing these
capabilities?
Colonel Michael. Ma'am, I wouldn't say that there's
anything specifically that's limiting them. To build this
capability just takes time. First is the time to get the
material and then time in the training process. So we look
specifically at the CAS [close air support], we're fielding the
A-29s. There are four platforms that are already in country.
There is four more that will be there by April. And then there
is a total of six--correction, eight more that will show up
after that.
So part of it is procuring the equipment on time. And then
the other part is training that capability. As you know,
developing pilots, you know, is something that takes, you know,
it takes a lot of specificity and time.
Mrs. Hartzler. How will the development of these
capabilities be affected by the upcoming drawdown to 5,500 U.S.
troops?
Colonel Michael. Ma'am, as we--the 5,500 also has the
capacity to maintain train, advise, and assist for the Afghan
Air Force. And, in addition, we are also specifically focused
on train, advise, and assist to the Afghan special security
forces. So both of those components will maintain train,
advise, and assist oversight.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Mr. Breedlove, in your professional
opinion, how do you believe the Afghan Taliban would react if
the U.S. and coalition forces were able to target the Afghan
Taliban directly as part of the counterterrorism mission, and
outside the commander's current ability in only extremis-type
situations?
Mr. Breedlove. I think the best way I would phrase it is,
we saw--we have seen how the insurgents, and particularly the
Taliban, do react when we were under the surge, when we had
U.S. and coalition forces in the fight, backed up by their own
air support, as you know. And we saw adjustments in how they
approached their tactics. What your specific questions, I don't
think we would see much of a change as far as the fight on the
ground. I think the fighters on the ground will adjust. They
are an adaptable enemy. They will adjust to their environment,
as we saw this year, same as we saw them adjust when U.S.
combat forces were much larger and much more aggressive than
previous years. But it doesn't stop them from fighting.
So at best, we may see hesitation among some operations. We
may see changes in how they maneuver. But I think at a tactical
level, that would be the most we would expect to see. At a
senior level, I don't think it would have much of an impact.
Most of the senior leaders are not in the country anyways.
Mrs. Hartzler. So would direct targeting bring the Afghan
Taliban to the negotiating table quicker and provide additional
breathing room to the ANDSF and the Afghan unity government?
Mr. Breedlove. Ma'am, in my opinion, I think that would be
a--it could be a factor, one of many tools that could be
applied, but in and of itself, I don't think that's enough. It
would have to be one of many tools to help change their belief
that they're still, they still have the time to win this fight.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Thank you. And Mr. Sopko and Mr.
Child, in your professional opinions, has the Department of
Defense made adequate progress in establishing sufficient
oversight and accountability mechanisms within its command and
governance architectures to minimize opportunities, or identify
quickly, if they occur, fraud, waste, and abuse activities that
have plagued certain aspects of the Department's mission
execution over the recent years?
Mr. Sopko. Very briefly, no. And part of it is because they
don't have the resources for doing so. I think I noted in my
longer statement, which I offer to be made part of the record,
that we have even noted some of the task forces set up to fight
and combat corruption have had to be abolished because there
are no resources. So I would say no.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Mr. Child.
Mr. Child. Ma'am, I believe, from our oversight, that they
have established systems. The challenge is properly and fully
implementing the systems. And I would offer three examples:
They have begun the process of moving the Afghans to electronic
pay and information system; they have--the Department improved
the process for identifying, training the proper, both military
and civilian advisers to conduct the train, advise, and assist;
and they have increased the enforcement of the commitment
letters which apply conditionality to the funds that have been
applied.
But, again, I would not say that they have adequately
progressed in that. This is part of a process. And I think
there are also complicating factors it is real important to
consider. You have got illiteracy, endemic corruption. You have
got the political tribal decisions for selecting commanders.
General Campbell said that 70 percent of the problems that he
saw was based on leadership. Both selecting and being able to
relieve commanders and senior leaders is too often based on
these other factors rather than competency. And I think for
understandable reasons, we don't have the stability of advisers
because the tours are 9 months to a year, it is very difficult
to have that kind of relationship over time. Instead, the
contractor force is really the institutional memory in
Afghanistan. And that is a challenge.
And, finally, as Mr. Sopko very properly pointed out, the
insecurity of Afghanistan to have both the Department and
oversight agencies check, kick the tires, be downrange properly
at the proper level to check, we really are dependent on the
Afghans and their reporting. So without implementing those
types of systems where we can better detect that the money is
being properly used, there is not adequate progress. But I do
believe the systems that have been identified and properly put
in place will provide that kind of progress. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. Ranking Member Speier, questions?
Ms. Speier. Madam Chair, thank you. I want to apologize to
all of the witnesses. Many of the members who were here earlier
wanted to be able to stay. But because this is a getaway day,
people's schedules are such that they have to make planes. I
think this hearing is so important that it should be held as a
full committee hearing.
We are spending so much money in Afghanistan. And from the
testimony we have heard today, there is virtually no
accountability. But let's get to a couple of the points that
you have made. Colonel Michael, you said in your statement
significant, long-term capability gaps remain in the areas of
ANDSF leadership, rotary-wing aviation, combined arms
operation, intelligence collection and dissemination, close air
support, and maintenance. So that is a pretty significant
indictment. If it is not improved in 2016, what are you going
to do differently? Or what are you going to recommend that be
done differently.
Colonel Michael. Ma'am, the key thing to highlight is that
it is a process. So we talk about, you know, there is
capability gaps in leadership. But it is something that is
being developed, you know, developed over time, both at the
tactical level and the corps level. The main thing to
reinforce, you know, we have really been building this force
since 2009. Initially, when we started off, this was an
American fight. We were in the lead. We were pulling----
Ms. Speier. I know all of that.
Colonel Michael. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. The question is, though, we have been there for
a very long time now. At some point, if we don't put conditions
on money coming in, the spigot always being turned on and never
being turned off, then we are not going to get the kind of
results we are looking for. And if you don't develop a plan and
specific expectations that are going to take place in 2016, or
else funds aren't going to available in 2017, we will be there
indefinitely with no success and with the American people
literally pulling out their hair saying what are we doing here?
That is more rhetorical than anything else. But I don't think
your answer, frankly, is adequate. Let me ask all of the others
of you: If 2016 is as bad as 2015, what would you recommend be
done differently?
Ms. Abizaid. Ma'am, first, thanks for the question. I would
start by saying, you know, the capability gaps that you have
identified, that we have all identified in our statements, are
those capability gaps that are among the most sophisticated
aspects of the force that we are still trying to build. We have
always planned for those to be the focus of the long-term
relationship with the Afghan Government and the ANDSF. And the
President's decision to maintain a presence at 5,500 will allow
us to really focus on especially the aviation, the special
operations, the intel development.
So that is an investment that we think is really important
for the long-term future of not only the ANDSF, but the
partnership between the United States and the Afghan Government
on key CT relevant capabilities in that force.
Ms. Speier. Do you anticipate there will be at least 5,000
troops in Afghanistan indefinitely?
Ms. Abizaid. I wouldn't say indefinitely. I think that the
plan is to ensure that they progress. And as they progress, we
can have more and more confidence in reducing our own troop
level, which is part of how we got to the drawdown that we are
currently planning on now. The 30,000 to 9,800 did assume that
the Afghans could assume full responsibility for the security
environment in 2015. And despite very real challenges that we
mostly anticipated, they have performed as expected.
Now, the drawdown to 5,500 does anticipate that capability
gaps will remain, but that we are going to be able to invest to
make up those gaps over time. I don't have a good estimate for
how much time that will take. But I do not think it is an
indefinite investment.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Sopko, what do you think we should do
differently in 2017 if 2016 is as bad as 2015?
Mr. Sopko. Well, I think 2016 will be as bad as 2015. I
support the judgment of the head of National Intelligence who
predicted that. I would say if things look bad, and I think
they do, I would have four suggestions to you. Number one,
fully support and ensure that General Nicholson actually has
the resources and the time to conduct that 90-day assessment, a
true 90-day assessment of what is going on and what his needs
are. And bring him back and have him explain to this committee
and other committees as to what those needs are. He is the
person who is going to be on the ground. He has got to get out
there with his people and see what is going on.
The second thing is I think this Congress should require
USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] and DOD and
the Department of State to actually rate and rack and stack
their programs as to what succeeded, what hasn't, and what do
you want to get rid of in light of we have a fiscal crisis in
the government. Why are we paying for some programs that make
no sense anymore?
They have never really done that. You know, I sent a letter
to the head of AID, State Department, and the Secretary of
Defense after I was on the job for 1 year, that is 3 years ago,
and asked them to rack and stack all of their programs; at a
minimum, just give me some of your success stories and why. And
they weren't able to do it. All I got back was, you know,
balloons and kites and happy talk.
You know, we are helping the Afghan military. Well, great.
What program helped the Afghan military? If you have an
unlimited budget, you can fund everything, but if you have a
limited budget, limited time, and limited security, which
programs are the most important programs? I would think that is
something Congress needs to do. And going into 2016, that is
what you really need to do. And they have to come up with real
measurements of success.
Right now, the measurement of success seems to be do you
spend the appropriations? I am not seeing real measurements of
success in the work I do not only with DOD, but with AID and
State. And I think that is something Congress needs to hold
somebody's feet to the fire on.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Child.
Mr. Child. Ma'am, I can't argue what Mr. Sopko has said, I
think particularly in terms of the agencies. But I do believe
it is beyond my expertise as an oversight organization to
address the actual policy and the prescriptions. When policy is
decided and objectives are declared, I see it as our job as
oversight to see how that is being implemented. But the idea of
providing General Nicholson the opportunity to come back and
to--after his assessment, to make clear what he thinks he needs
to properly do his job, I think that is a proper way forward.
And, likewise, I think it is very important that the agencies,
as they discharge their responsibilities, they will assess what
works. And they may then change their policy. When they do, I
think it is my job, representing the oversight community, to
see how that is being implemented. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. So there were two issues that were brought up
this morning, one was ghost troops and fuel, that I would think
we should be able to get our handle on; $438 million being
spent on U.S. fuel to Afghanistan. And, Mr. Child, you
testified that there really is no accountability. Is this fuel
being sold on the black market? Is that a potential effect of
what is going on?
Mr. Child. Ma'am, to be precise, we found that there was no
reasonable assurance that all of the fuel was being used for
its proper purpose. We couldn't pin down more precisely. And as
to the ghost soldiers, we have a direct funding audit that, in
part, concerns the pay system. And that will address some
portion of the concern that we are paying for troops that are
not actually there.
Ms. Speier. So these troops that could be in provinces that
we don't have the ability because it is so unsafe to send
personnel to audit would suggest that we really have no way of
knowing whether these troops exist or don't exist and whether
they are functioning as members of the Afghan armed services,
correct?
Mr. Child. It is, it is certainly the fact that we can't
properly assess. They clearly have troops in the roll, or on
the rolls, because it has been a tough fighting year, and they
were able to hold their own. So, in fact, they do have, the
question is how many others are we paying for that are not on
the rolls. And that is in part what the pay systems are
designed to address. And as I was saying, I believe we have
established, the Department has established that type of
mechanism to address, but it hasn't been fully implemented.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Sopko is shaking his head.
Mr. Sopko. Well, I mean, I think the, I think my colleague
mentioned it, we have got a program out there. We have got a
contract we have let. But it hasn't been implemented. I mean,
we even tried, and I mentioned it in my statement, to ping the
system, which is supposed to have all this great data now, and
they couldn't give us any answers from it. So that is the big
problem.
The ultimate thing is we are relying still on the Afghans
who have an incentive to lie because they can collect the money
to fill in the data cells. We don't have the people on the
ground. Remember, we are at the level of the corps. We are not
at the level of the brigade or the kandak or the Tooley. We
have no visibility. So at the corps level, it may look good. I
mean, that is like measuring our effectiveness by going over to
the Pentagon or going over to Ms. Abizaid's office and
understanding what is going on in Afghanistan. You have got to
have people out on the ground. And that is the inherent problem
with this.
I don't care how many IT [information technology] systems
you put into place, if the data going in is garbage in, it is
garbage out. And that is what we are seeing, particularly in a
country, in Afghanistan, where there is an incentive. My
concern is we saw in Iraq where there were paper divisions.
And, apparently, if you listen to the reporting coming out of
Helmand by Afghan officials, there were paper units in Helmand
which may explain what the problem is. My concern is how many
of those units are actually just paper units?
Ms. Speier. And we are paying for the salaries of each and
every Afghan soldier. Is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. We and our allies, yes. We are paying the bulk
of it.
Ms. Speier. And the police force as well?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. I have many more questions but I will yield
back. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. Sure. Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ma'am, gentlemen, thank
you for your service. Colonel Michael, I know we are discussing
Afghanistan today. But King Abdullah was here 1 month ago today
and discussed that whole region of the world, if you will,
including Libya and the Saudi and Iran situation. You are in
charge of Pakistan as well as Afghanistan and the transregional
threat. How do you assess the region as a whole right now? The
threat level?
Colonel Michael. I think if you look regionally, the threat
level is fairly high. That is one of the reasons we are there.
We are there to make sure that we set conditions so that what
is happening there doesn't emanate and touch here. So from that
perspective, the fact that we are present, you know, reinforces
the threat level is high. As we look at IS-KP [Islamic State-
Khorasan Province], and you heard Mr. Breedlove's assessment,
and General Campbell himself said IS-KP was operationally
emergent. And we have the, and he has the targeting authority
to target them. And primarily looking at IS-KP from a global
perspective, given the fact that we are fighting the core in
Iraq and Syria, we are making sure we have the ability to
engage and defeat them wherever, wherever they show up.
Mr. Scott. And today we are talking about an individual
country, but it is a regional issue to me. And when you look
across that whole spectrum, Libya, from what I understand, is
in worse shape than Syria. It is just that there is not much
reporting there because the press can't get in there. King
Abdullah was pretty blunt with his statement that the
volatility, I am paraphrasing a little bit, in that part of the
world cannot be overexaggerated, and that the whole region is
very close to, potentially, an all-out war. And that is very
concerning to me. And we need to make sure that we keep our
friends as strong as they can possibly be in that whole region,
I would think, to hopefully bring about some stability.
Mr. Sopko and Mr. Child, this may be more of a statement
than a question, but we talk a lot about individual things, but
it seems we waste a lot of money on not just the process that
seems to be broken, but a procurement system that seems to be
broken. Colonel Michael mentioned earlier the A-29 program. I
am somewhat familiar with that as they are trained at Moody Air
Force Base in my district. And if things had gone as planned,
they would be in country right now. Is that correct? And so
where we sit today, is that they should be there 3 years from
now.
Ms. Abizaid. Sir, there is four A-29s in country. The rest
will wait until 2018 to be fully----
Mr. Scott. I am talking about the completion of the system,
of the whole, they should all be there right now?
Ms. Abizaid. Yes. Contract delays did delay the arrival of
the A-29s.
Mr. Scott. And it will take 3 years from now, because of
those contract delays, to get the rest of the pilots trained
and the units actually in country so they can help carry out
the fight. So that delay came as a result of a lawsuit from
Beechcraft Defense, if I am not mistaken. Is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. I think that is my understanding. It was a
lawsuit. I believe that was the company.
Mr. Scott. In your--in the written statement, it names them
in the footnotes. Is it possible to calculate how much that
lawsuit cost us, cost the United States by delaying that
program for 3 years?
Mr. Sopko. You know, I would have to check on that. I
assume there are some costs involved. But I really don't know.
We could take a look at that if you would like us to, sir.
Mr. Scott. My point is the situation on the ground may be
very different and may be very much more in our favor if we had
been able to get the equipment in that our soldiers and our
friends need to carry out the fight. And this isn't just with
this situation. It is with situations all across the DOD where
contractors are suing us. And those lawsuits are preventing us
from getting the men and women that are out there carrying out
the fight the equipment that they need. And Colonel Michael, if
you had the A-29 that you are supposed to have today, would it
change the fight?
Colonel Michael. Sir, absolutely. The maneuver operations
on the ground that the ANDSF is doing is greatly enhanced by
close air support.
Mr. Scott. Is it possible that what happened on September
28 may have had a different outcome if we had been able to
provide that air support?
Colonel Michael. Sir, I couldn't necessarily, you know,
guarantee the outcome. But the bottom line is that the maneuver
operations on the ground is much better and enhanced with
proper close air support.
Mr. Scott. So these lawsuits that are delaying our ability
to carry out the mission are costing us more than the legal
cost of the suit is my point. And it is costing us in lives as
well.
One last question that I have, if I may, Madam Chair,
before I turn it back over, when we pull down from
approximately 10,000 troops to 5,500 or 6,000, whatever it may
be, when we pull our soldiers out, are we, how many of those
men and women are being replaced with contractors?
Colonel Michael. Sir, it is not a one-for-one exchange. I
think right now the level of contractors are almost about the
same. I think when we go down to 5,500, there will probably be
an increased number of contractors. But if you look at what
they are doing, they are not necessarily, you know, a lot of it
is support capability.
Mr. Scott. Absolutely.
Colonel Michael. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. Maintenance on aircraft, maintenance on
helicopters. And my point is, it seems to me that we have this
number that we say well, we are going to pull this down because
we have this perception that as long as we have fewer men and
women in uniform in the country, that we are not spending as
much, and that we are not engaged as much. But when we pull
down a maintenance unit, for example, and we turn around and we
send contractors back in to do that exact same maintenance, and
we pay those contractors three or four times as much as we are
paying U.S. service personnel, we are not, we are not being
honest, really, about the cost of things. And I would ask Mr.
Sopko, is it possible to calculate how much more, I would think
it would be, we are spending on contractors as we draw down
than we were spending on U.S. troops?
Mr. Sopko. We have not done that type of assessment. But I
am certain we could test that. We could take a specific
contract or a specific program that was run by the military and
then compare the cost. That is something we could do. We have
not done it.
Mr. Scott. If I could make one final point. Colonel, in
talking with soldiers, it creates a problem when you have a
United States soldier who is making a couple of thousand
dollars a month sitting right next to a contractor who is
making $10,000 a month doing the exact same job. And the
soldiers that I talk to, when you get to the point that you
have enough trust that we are honest with each other, that
creates some strife in an operation, because our soldiers are
not treated as well as the contractors are if we are honest
about it. And so that is more of a point than a question, but
something that I am very concerned about and making sure that
we take care of our soldiers.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is very good point, gentlemen. Now, Ms.
Speier, have some more questions?
Ms. Speier. I do. I think in the last round, Ms. Abizaid,
you wanted to say something. Because I thought my time should
be shifted to someone else, I did not give you the opportunity
to speak. So if you have a comment on that last round?
Ms. Abizaid. Sure. I appreciate the opportunity to come
back to it. First of all, I think that the, the ghost soldiers
problem, the problem with accountability for Afghan soldiers
that we are paying for is a real problem and one that, you
know, we worked closely with Mr. Child, Mr. Sopko to
understand. We also worked closely with them to develop a
comprehensive solution to address it. And while it is not fully
in place yet, we are working toward an integrated pay and
personnel system that will mitigate opportunities for
corruption in the system.
I think it is a really important initiative that we are
putting in place. It is one that we are focused on. And it has
taken a while to develop, given the unique terrain that is
Afghanistan. But it is something that we are absolutely focused
on and think is an important aspect of the mission. In terms of
what the difference between fighting season 2015 and fighting
season 2016 and how we are trying to account for those, I do
want to assure you that General Campbell, in speaking with the
Secretary of Defense, with the National Security interagency,
has communicated the work that he is doing already to evaluate
fighting season 2015, and what changes not only the Afghan
National Security Forces need to make to improve for fighting
season 2016, but that we need to make in our train, advise,
assist mission.
So it is a clear focus that we are not sort of blindly
following the template that we started with in fighting season
2015. We are actually looking to improve upon and progress in
the development of the ANDSF, so we do set ourselves up for
success in fighting season 2016 and set the conditions for the
long-term mission in Afghanistan. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. So as it relates to ghost troops, can we be
competent that by the end of 2016, there will be a system in
place that will have retina detection or something so that we
will have a confident understanding of how many troops the
Afghan military service has?
Ms. Abizaid. We will certainly have greater confidence. We
are instituting a biometric ID [identification] card system and
issuing those to all MOD and Afghanistan National Army
elements.
Ms. Speier. So when will they all be distributed?
Ms. Abizaid. I believe by the middle of this year. The
integrated pay and personnel system will be fully implemented I
believe for the MOI in the middle of this year as well. And by
early 2017, we will be transitioning it to the MOD as well.
Ms. Speier. All right. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove, in terms
of our intelligence capability there, we were surprised with
the death of Mullah Omar, and didn't know that he had been dead
for some time. Is that correct?
Mr. Breedlove. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Speier. So with that knowledge, what can you tell us
about what we need to do to have better intelligence?
Mr. Breedlove. Well, I think it is illustrative on that
particular account that we need to keep in mind that somebody
like Mullah Omar was basically in self-exile. He wasn't out
there. He had always been that way. So trying to get at it from
an intelligence perspective, that is going to be, if somebody
wants to stay hidden, and he is surrounded by people that want
to stay hidden, and he doesn't communicate, and he doesn't
move, it makes it very difficult to try to find that needle in
that haystack. And I think that was illustrative of this
particular situation, as well as a conspiracy to perpetuate the
fact that he was alive.
Ms. Speier. I guess my question, though, is, are you
comfortable that we have enough resources being extended on
intelligence in the region, particularly in Afghanistan?
Mr. Breedlove. I am. It is never perfect. It is never
enough. You are asking an intelligence professional if we have
enough information. We can never have enough information. We
are always going to want more information. Our gaps are always
large. In this particular case, they have grown since we have
reduced our footprint. But I think we are adequate to get after
what we need to do. And speaking for my agency, I think we are
sufficient in order to do our mission set, which is support the
warfighter in theater.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Mr. Sopko, is it true that we just built
a new headquarters facility for the Ministry of Defense?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. What was the cost of that facility?
Mr. Sopko. I think the project cost was $155 million. It
was $100 million over budget, and completed 5 years late.
Ms. Speier. Who is the contractor on that?
Mr. Sopko. I don't have that data handy. But I will have to
get back to you.
Ms. Speier. $100 million over budget?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Ms. Speier. And who was watching the store on that one?
Mr. Sopko. Well, I think it was the, and I have to double-
check, maybe Ms. Abizaid would know who was responsible. It was
either an Air Force contract or the Corps of Engineers, I don't
know who in the military----
Ms. Speier. Could you get back to us on that?
Mr. Sopko. Oh, absolutely. Happy to do that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 99.]
Ms. Speier. The maintenance cost, is that going to be able
to be supported?
Mr. Sopko. Well, I wouldn't know since the Afghan national,
I mean, the Afghan Government can't pay for their military, I
don't know if they can pay for the O&M [operation and
maintenance] costs which are about $2.6, $3 million a year to
maintain that building. That is our best estimate.
Ms. Speier. So if they don't have the money to maintain
that building, the building will be a white elephant in short
order?
Mr. Sopko. Well, we will pay for it, like we are paying for
most of the other O&M.
Ms. Speier. How about the Ministry of Interior, did we just
build them a new facility?
Mr. Sopko. We are in the process of building them a brand
new facility which I visited. And that should be completed
soon, I think at the cost of about $100 million.
Ms. Speier. And is that on budget?
Mr. Sopko. No. But I don't have those exact figures since
it is not finished.
Ms. Speier. So the ministries, the ministers want lavish
facilities. And so we say, okay. And we build them. Do we
condition the construction of these buildings on any
accountability?
Mr. Sopko. Not that I know of. And that is an issue. I
remember having a lengthy conversation with General Semonite
who ran CSTC-A, who said that prior to 2013, we did not have
any conditionality on the money that CSTC-A was spending or
giving to GIROA [Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan]. So I think basically 2013 and then he was a big
advocate of conditionality. But I think these buildings, the
construction started before he got there.
Ms. Speier. So moving forward, would you recommend that
there be conditionality on the construction of any palace for--
--
Mr. Sopko. I agree fully with that. And, again, this is
something I have had long conversations with General Semonite
who used to run CSTC-A, he has now been replaced. And it was
the whole issue he had, and I thought it was very good, called
smart conditionality. You can't stop giving the Afghan National
Security Forces guns or bullets because they will lose the war.
But identify the shiny objects that the local official wants,
and then focus on that as your condition. That was General
Semonite's approach to smart conditionality. And I think it is
something we should continue following.
Ms. Speier. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I don't know if you intend
to do another round. I don't want to continue to ask questions
without giving you the opportunity to----
Mr. Scott [presiding.] I have a couple brief ones, but I
don't have anything long. I will be happy to go briefly and
then turn it back over to you. And then we will close out.
Ms. Speier. Okay.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Sopko, Mr. Child, this may be more along the
lines of suggestions that you could make. But in most vehicles
in America that you buy now, you can call the manufacturers, if
the vehicle is stolen, and they can tell you exactly where it
is. And they can actually shut the vehicle down so that it can
be recovered. It seems to me that we could use the same types
of technology in some of our military equipment, that if the
equipment ends up in the hands of somebody we don't want to
have it, that we can stop that equipment from being used
against us with stuff that we have in every GM or Ford vehicle
in the country right now.
Just a suggestion from someone it bothers greatly to see
our enemies riding around in vehicles that the United States
purchased. We are going to be pulling from 9,800 down to 5,500
uniformed personnel over the next 10\1/2\ months. That is the
current plan. Is that correct?
Colonel Michael. Yes, sir.
Mr. Scott. That is approximately 50 percent of the men and
women that we have in uniform. I want to go back to the issue
of the contractors. How many contractors do we intend to hire
over the next 11 months to replace the work that our men and
women in uniform are performing? And will those contractors be
predominantly from the United States? Or will they be local?
Colonel Michael. Sir, we don't have an exact number of
contractors we are looking to hire. And it is not, you know, to
replace, you know, the 5,500 is really designed to accomplish
exactly what we need from our military. So as we draw down, we
are not just increasing contractors to replace the fact that we
have drawn down the military. The assessment is as we go
forward, we need to focus on a regional counterterrorism
platform, as you talked about, a regional threat. It has
regional, is based out of Kabul in the south, in the east. And
that gives us the capability to surge capacity if we need to.
And it gives us the capability to address any threats.
In addition, it focuses advise and assist at the
ministerial level and at the Afghan security institutions, that
focuses advise and assist at the critical capabilities that we
think we need long-term CAS, the Afghan Air Force, and then
also the Afghan special security forces.
So the number of military is, the assessment is that is
exactly what we need. Obviously, we will also be able to
leverage contractors. But the intent was not to draw down
military and just to replace them with contractors, the number
of military's assessment of what we think we will need.
Mr. Scott. But you understand the point. I mean, soldiers
that I talk with were like, you know, they say we are drawing
down, we are losing uniform personnel. But in the end, we are
putting other people in there doing the exact same job. And
contractors aren't necessarily carrying rifles. Many of them
are operating on the equipment, maintenance, and other things.
But I think the soldiers who are flying the aircraft prefer to
have the men and women that are taking care of them in the
United States. And I would point out on the A-29 program, it is
not just training the pilots. When they come to the United
States, they bring the maintenance people as well. And so we
are sending the whole crew back to take care of that system. I
hope we get it to you sooner rather than later. I don't have
any further questions. I will turn it back over to Ms. Speier
if she has any.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Scott. One of the issues that
many of you have raised, that General Campbell raised, was the
fact that the ANDSF have fallen short in terms of their
aviation capabilities. Part of it was referenced by Mr. Scott
in terms of getting the actual platforms there. But it appears
that part of the problem is that you are dealing with a
population that, for the most part, is illiterate.
So I would like your thoughts on whether or not we are
bringing in equipment that is too sophisticated for the
population that we are trying to train in terms of the air
force to be able to commandeer these aircraft.
Ms. Abizaid. Thanks for the question, ma'am. Human capital
shortages are significant when we talk about the aviation
capability that the Afghan Air Force needs. And it is one of
the drivers as we look at how we should build a force that the
Afghan Government can actually afford. We do focus literacy
training, we do focus technical training an those high-end
skills that are associated with aviation maintenance, that are
associated with the piloting of the aircraft to the key
population that we think is going to be necessary for the
Afghans to be able to operate the air force that they need. But
in terms of the sophistication of the system, I think what we
are trying to do is establish a contracted logistics support
system that both incorporates, you know, contracted maintenance
that we, the United States military, often uses for our own
sophisticated systems; but also increases the training of
Afghans to be able to increasingly do the maintenance on their
own, so it becomes a more organic capability. We are aware,
again, of those human capital shortages. And that is a key
driving factor in how we balance and plan for the air force
that is actually absorbable.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Sopko.
Mr. Sopko. Congresswoman, I think you are raising a really
critical point. And it goes beyond just literacy. It goes back
to the sufficiency of our resources that General Campbell and
General Nicholson have. Due to a lack of data, we do not know
right now how many ANDSF personnel are literate. Our best
estimate is it is less than 30 percent. And why? Because even
though we spent $200 million in literacy training, CSTC-A does
not have the ability because they don't have the resources to
measure the effectiveness of the literacy program and determine
the extent to which overall literacy in ANDSF has improved.
Remember, we transitioned the literacy program to the Afghans.
And once we did that, we lost all visibility. So we don't know
how many people have been trained, but, more importantly, how
many of those soldiers and police we trained are still in the
military.
And we make, as you know, our quarterly report is the
largest data call that goes out every year to the U.S.
Government, or every quarter, on what is going on. And when we
ask these questions, we are not getting answers anymore because
CSTC-A, because our resources in the field are not there to
answer them.
So you are on to a very important point that goes beyond
just the literacy issue. It goes to the heart of the issue and
that is, do we have adequate resources to understand the
capabilities of the ANDSF?
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Anyone else want to comment on that?
All right. Compared to 2 years ago, I think the threat to our
personnel who are serving in Afghanistan has grown. And I am
particularly concerned about our embassy and the inability of
our personnel to move around the city of Kabul or anywhere
else. So my first question is, do you think that the danger
there has increased? And what, if anything, can we do to
mitigate those concerns?
Ms. Abizaid. So since the drawdown of U.S. and coalition
forces, the security environment in Kabul I think in general
has decreased. Some of that is the withdrawal also came with it
a lack of capital going into the city. And so some of the
security environment is influenced not by the insurgent threat,
but sort of the economic instability and, you know, increased
threats of kidnappings and other things in country. So no
question, the security environment is diminished in Kabul.
There are different statistics that indicate that the high
profile attacks are actually down overall from last year to
this year. But, you know, what we are very focused on, from the
DOD perspective, but I think it also affects State, is taking
the precautionary measures to ensure that those that are
serving in Afghanistan on our behalf are adequately protected.
There are different costs associated with ground movements
that we can defray by doing more air movements. And so that is
one of the calculations that we make in terms of how much
access and how much freedom of movement we ask those personnel
that are serving in country to sort of take when they are
moving around the city. But no question, it is a difficult
security environment and one that we are very focused, as a
first order of business, on ensuring the force protection of
those that are serving there
Ms. Speier. Colonel Michael, are people in the embassy
moving outside the embassy on foot at all?
Colonel Michael. Primarily when they move, it is by
vehicles. There are a couple spots close to the embassy where
people walk. But for the most part, if you are moving out of
the embassy or you are moving out of any military compound, it
is by vehicles.
Ms. Speier. Is it by vehicles?
Colonel Michael. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Abizaid. Ma'am, it is both vehicles and air movements,
though the air movements have increased over the last year.
Ms. Speier. So the question becomes, what can they do if
they are really isolated within the embassy compound? And are
we placing them at risk by keeping them there?
Ms. Abizaid. I would defer to State. They are going to be
able to tell you the frequency of their movements. I would say
they are not isolated. We at RS, in Resolute Support and USFOR-
A [United States Forces-Afghanistan] are not isolated at
Resolute Support headquarters. The embassy is not isolated at
the embassy. A lot of the government facilities that they need
to visit are within the Green Zone, the International Zone,
where there is a good deal of safety and ability to move
around, to go to the MOD headquarters building, to go to the
MOI headquarters building. So our advisers are getting out and
about. My understanding is that State Department employees are
getting out and about and engaging with their Afghan partners
on those aspects of our relationship that are most critical.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Sopko.
Mr. Sopko. I would beg to differ a little bit with my
colleague in one respect. They are getting about but it is very
limited. And we don't really have an embassy presence to a
great extent outside of Kabul. We used to have senior civilian
representatives located around the country. We no longer have
those people there. We still may have a military presence in
some of these bases. But we don't have the civilian presence.
I go there on a regular basis. And I talk to my colleagues,
not only my staff, we have about 50, but also talking to State
and AID officials. And they are not getting out. There are
people who are assigned to our embassy who never leave the
embassy, except to go for R&R [rest and recuperation] because
they can't get out.
The last time I was in country, went over to the ministry
of narcotics. And the State Department officials from I&L
[Installations and Logistics] have never gotten to the ministry
of narcotics because of the security situation. Now, I don't
want to criticize our security people. As Ms. Abizaid has said,
they are very concerned about the safety of our American
troops, our American civilians, our American contractors. And I
defer to them on security.
So I am not questioning these security things. But the
reality of the situation is you can get assigned to Afghanistan
in the embassy or AID, and you never leave the embassy. Now,
that doesn't mean we should shut down, because doing diplomacy
is not risk free. Just like a soldier takes a risk when he puts
that uniform on and goes overseas, the same thing for AID and
State employees, and DOD IG people and my staff, it is not risk
free. You want to try to measure that risk. But the risk is
taking its toll on the ability to advise and assist, to train,
and to get out and oversee the money. That is the reality of
the situation there.
Ms. Speier. I really appreciate your candor. Because I
think for many of our colleagues, there is an expectation that
there is movement and that it is less dire, frankly, than I
think it is. And the fact that so many of our personnel there
are really not able to move outside of being transferred by air
is, should be of deep concern to us. Mr. Child, do you have any
further comments on that?
Mr. Child. I think Mr. Sopko explained it very well. That
has certainly been my experience and our staff.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, I have one last question but it
is a big one. I would like to ask each member of the panel to
give me two examples of success in Afghanistan, and two
examples of failure.
Ms. Abizaid. I will start.
Ms. Speier. Okay.
Ms. Abizaid. So two examples of success, first of all, I
think that this fighting season, we have talked a lot about the
problems that we are seeing in Helmand with the 215th Corps. We
have talked a lot about the concerns that we saw in Kunduz when
it temporarily fell to the Taliban. What we talked less about
is the successes that we have seen from other elements of the
Afghan National Security Forces. The 203rd Corps, importantly,
one of the corps that we don't cover in as a matter of sort of
daily contact----
Ms. Speier. Could you repeat that again? What is it called?
Ms. Abizaid. The 203rd Corps, which operates in eastern and
southeastern Afghanistan, did a very good job this fighting
season addressing what is a dynamic security environment. They
had ISIL threats to deal with, Al Qaeda threats to deal with.
They had Taliban threats to deal with. They conducted a number
of clearing operations that were multi-pillar, you know, cross,
across multiple different aspects of the complicated force. And
they did quite well--in Operation Iron Triangle, specifically.
I would also say that the special operations capability
that the Afghan National Security Forces are displaying and, in
particular, their aviation capability that supports it has been
a critical aspect of this fighting season, and the one place
where we are sure that that investment is paying off. They
have, they were critical in retaking Kunduz after it
temporarily fell to the Taliban. And they have been critical in
partnered operations like that, which we partnered with them in
Kandahar to disrupt a very significantly sized Al Qaeda in the
Indian Subcontinent training facility.
So showing the investment in that partnership, we really do
see that displayed by that core capability and the special
operations capability and the aviation capability in
particular. Now, I have mentioned some of the difficulties that
we experienced this fighting season. I think that other aspects
of what we do in Afghanistan are also a mixed bag.
There have been very big successes, I think, in our
relationship with the Afghan Government to counter corruption.
I think we have a partner in President Ghani who is very
focused on being able to have control over those aspects of the
government that are prone to corruption. And he wants us to
work together to figure out how to discipline the system.
That being said, as we have seen in places like Helmand,
corruption is a significant problem. As we see with things like
ghost soldiers, that is a problem. And so we are all focused
together and I think for the first time in a very real way with
our Afghan partners in addressing that challenge.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Mr. Breedlove.
Mr. Breedlove. It is a great question, ma'am. Thank you. I
would keep this very simple. So two examples of success, I will
take this at a strategic and a more operational level. At the
strategic level, I think a measure of success would be seeing
the fracture of the Taliban leadership. And that may also be
precipitated, for example, by peace talks or negotiations
between Afghans. Operationally, it would be a very public, or
publicized operational defeats of the insurgency in the field
by Afghan security forces.
My two examples of failure would just be the exact opposite
of those two coins I just highlighted to you. So at the
operational level, that would be the capture, or multiple
captures of several provincial capitals inside Afghanistan. And
at a strategic level, that would be seeing the fracture of the
political elites, that destabilizes the government, and may be
a presage to civil conflict again. Thank you.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Colonel Michael.
Colonel Michael. Ma'am, as soon as we look at successes, I
would say one success is just the ownership that the ANDSF has
taken. As we said, this is a force here that is fully
responsible. You know, the primary land force and the ownership
that they took, I think, and effects that they have had this
year. Not a key success, I would say, would be the ALP [Afghan
Local Police] program. Even though it is not perfect and there
are areas of the ALP program that we have to work, we have seen
some key successes there. One of the things that is significant
about the ALP program is that the folks are from the local
area.
So wherever you find ALP, they are properly secured and
tied in with the rest of the Afghan security. You almost find
green bubbles are created because they know who should be
there, who shouldn't. And it displaces the enemy. The enemy is
no longer [able] to hide in plain sight.
One of the things I think that, failures and things that
they have got to work on, you know, the ability to maintain
some of the small persistent operations that is required to put
pressure on the Taliban.
So to do well in the big multicorps operations, but the
ones that are really, that have the most impact are the ones
that are really being done at the district level by kandak and
the ones that are not telegraphed. In big operations, a lot of
times the enemy can understand that it is coming and have the
ability to shift.
And then the final thing, I think, that they need to--that
they can improve and do better is anticipating where the enemy
is going to be. So, for example, you know, we do well by
typically defending in the east and the south. What we saw this
year, you know, some attacks in the north, Kunduz was an
example and some attacks in the west. So being able to
anticipate and then responding and reacting a little bit
quicker, you know, when the enemy does something that is not
telegraphed or unexpected.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Sopko.
Mr. Sopko. I would like to follow up on Assistant Secretary
Abizaid's comments. And I think the two successes that I would
like to highlight actually deal with the cooperation with the
new, or national unity government. And one has to do with
conditionality. General Semonite, General Davis, and General
Campbell have insisted upon conditionality. They have worked
very closely with the new unity government. And I actually met
with President Ghani, and he says, I accept conditionality. I
want conditionality. Let's work together. And I think that is a
great success.
The prior regime wasn't interested in conditionality, but
the new regime is. And so General Davis, General Semonite, and
General Campbell have really stepped up to the plate and hit a
home run on that. The second success is along the same line,
and I think it is when we work together, we really do succeed.
And that is when my agents uncovered the price-fixing for the
$1 billion MOD fuel case, we immediately went to General
Campbell, we went to General Semonite, we explained what we had
uncovered, because we actually had information of the
conspiracy in Dubai to rig the price, which was going to cost
the Afghans an extra $250 million, which means it was going to
cost the U.S.
They went over as a team. General Semonite and my
investigators briefed the President. The President merely shut
down the contract, fired some generals, did an investigation,
and then set up a procurement commission that they are looking
at other questionable direct assistance contracts, and that is
fantastic. That is a success.
On the failures, Madam Congresswoman, there are so many.
But I think one we have ignored up to now and is the 800-pound
gorilla in the room, and that is the $8 billion we have spent
on counternarcotics, and it has been a total abject failure.
The only reason the amount of narcotics coming out of
Afghanistan are lower this year than last year, has absolutely
nothing to do with any of our programs or that $8 billion. It
has to do with disease and weather.
And that is the 800-pound gorilla. If we ignore that, what
will happen is what Ashraf Ghani warned us about years ago,
Afghanistan will become a narcoterrorist state. And I have not
seen anything announced by the embassy that would somehow stop
that.
The other issue, which I think is an abject failure, and
that is, we really don't know what capabilities are of the
Afghan National Security Forces. We are guessing. And those are
two serious failures and serious concerns.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
Mr. Child. Ma'am, I would discuss as success the
intersection of what I think is a strategic improvement based
on oversight, and that is beginning with Major General Michael
Williamson, as to CSTC-A, sought out from our organization a
look, a hard look, at both the NATO trust fund and the initial
direct funding challenge. And the surprising thing, he was able
to see, and General Dunford as well, President Ghani has said,
the Taliban is not an existential threat. What is an
existential threat is a loss of confidence by the contributing
nations. And General Williamson took our report, which was
quite negative, identified many, many problems, but the fact
that the United States has a system of an independent IG
outside the chain of command reporting only to the Secretary of
Defense and to Congress that could, therefore, independently
assess the problems, General Williamson took that to NATO and
met with contributing nation partners, and it had an impact
that they could then feel at least there is some independent
look, and despite the fact that it was bad, it would mean some
attempt at improvement, and that has continued.
And Mr. Sopko is a very big part of that, but it has
continued to the extent of translating our reports into the
languages--the language of the Afghans, so that they would be
outbriefed along with the command, and is not simply the
command saying, this is a problem, and it has to be improved,
but this is a report that is going to the United States
Congress that appropriates the fund. So we have had several
reports like that. We continue the direct funding. That is what
I would say, two positives.
I would speak only to one negative, and I think it is
dramatic. It is an example of the tragedy there, all the
attempts to do good things and to improve.
On August 5, 2014, I was serving in Bagram and learned that
Major General Harold Green had been killed. He was trying to
demonstrate his confidence in the Afghans, did not wear the
protective equipment. He was meeting with Afghan officials. He
was a follow-on to General Williamson, who was followed by
General Semonite, and now to General Davis. And so attempting
to make a big difference, and he was, in trying to place
beginning conditionality on matters, he lost his life.
Ms. Speier. Thank you. Thank you, all, very much for your
testimony.
I yield back.
Mr. Scott. Ma'am, Gentlemen, thank you for being here. I
can't speak to everyone that we are training, but I can speak
to the men that we are training in the A-29 mission. I have
been down there. I have met with them. I can assure you that
people that are coming through there that are vetted, they are
educated, and they are capable of carrying out that mission.
That is one mission.
But I will speak for that one. And one other suggestion
might be working with the people in that country, the
leadership of that country, the drug--the best way to handle
that drug issue is probably to get some crop dusters over there
and to spray the crops. And if we want to be careful about how
much we spend, come to south Georgia. We will sell you one and
ship it over there at the right price.
Thank you for being here and for your service.
[Whereupon, at 1:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 12, 2016
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 12, 2016
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
February 12, 2016
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER
Mr. Sopko. Contract was issued on April 21, 2009 by the Air Force
Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC), previously the Air Force Center for
Engineering and the Environment, for $48.7 million to Innovative
Technical Solutions, Inc (ISTI). After 14 modifications, the contract
cost was raised to $107.3 million. Construction work was halted due to
lack of funds on December 31, 2013.
On July 30, 2014, AFCEC awarded Gilbane Federal (the new name for
ITSI) a second $47.4 million contract for building completion by July
31, 2015. [See page 24.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 12, 2016
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. HARTZLER
Mrs. Hartzler. In the funding we provide to Afghanistan, $2.1
billion has been designated for Foreign Military Sales. Since American
taxpayers are providing these funds, are there protocols or
instructions which ensure these funds will provide opportunities for
United States manufacturers and workers? What weapons platforms are
being sold to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces and
how does the procurement process work?
Ms. Abizaid. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
executes requirements to procure defense articles for the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) using the Title 10 funds
provided by Congress for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) in
the annual defense appropriations bill. $2.5B of the $3.3B in ASFF
available to the Department of Defense (DOD) in Fiscal Year (FY) 2015
is being executed by DSCA. ASFF procurements are accomplished primarily
by the Military Departments and the Defense Logistics Agency. These
procurements include defense articles as well as services such as
training, advising, and maintenance, and are governed by the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), which generally
requires full and open competition for contracts.
Equipment procurements for the ANDSF using ASFF are largely for
U.S.-made end items. For example, AM General is currently manufacturing
new up-armored HMMWVs for the Afghan Army to replace battle losses and
for the Afghan police to provide combat power; more than 300 have been
delivered in recent months and at least 1,300 more will be delivered
this year. Other US-made equipment procured using ASFF includes
Navistar and Oshkosh trucks; Caterpillar tractors; Textron Mobile
Strike Force Vehicles; MD Helicopters MD530s; Harris and Datron radios;
uniforms; boots; M4 and M16 rifles; 60 and 81 mm mortars; Mk 19 grenade
launchers; M240 machine guns; M203 grenade launchers; and ammunition
for these weapons.
To clarify, DOD does not ``sell'' defense articles to the Afghan
government. Instead, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan
(CSTC-A), in coordination with the leadership of the Afghan Ministries
of Defense and Interior, identifies and validates ANDSF capabilities
and requirements, which are transmitted to DSCA in a CSTC-A-endorsed
Memorandum of Request (MoR). DSCA then assigns the MoR to the
appropriate implementing agency to undertake contracting for the
requirements by either using existing or awarding new DOD contracts.
The items are then procured, delivered to Afghanistan, and transferred
by CSTC-A to the Afghan government for employment by their forces in
combat operations.
Mrs. Hartzler. In light of serious issues concerning the abuse of
children, there have been statements by DOD indicating protocols have
been put in place for handling reports of child sexual abuse. Would you
please explain the protocols and procedures which will prevent these
incidents from going unreported in the future?
Does a soldier have the authority to help a child if they have
direct knowledge abuse is occurring at the time?
Have incidents occurred on U.S. property?
Colonel Michael. On September 22, 2015, General Campbell publicly
stated that he expects that any suspicions of sexual abuse will be
reported immediately to the chain of command, regardless of who the
alleged perpetrators or victims are. He further directed that if there
are any indications that the abuse involves Afghans, a report must be
forwarded to him through operational channels and copied to the Staff
Judge Advocate, so that the Afghan government can be advised and
requested to take action to investigate the allegations. These policies
and procedures will remain in place under the new Commander, USFOR-A,
General Nicholson.
We continue to work to ensure that all U.S. forces in Afghanistan
understand their responsibilities to report human rights violations,
and that Afghan leaders understand their responsibilities to develop a
professional force and hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.
DOD mandates training for U.S. service members to ensure that they
clearly understand their obligations to respect human dignity and to
take appropriate action when confronted with suspected violations of
human rights. Under long-standing principles of law and policy, U.S.
service members may choose but are not required to intervene in the
commission of an imminent or ongoing serious offense which they
observe, including if they witness child abuse, as legally appropriate.
DOD has and continues to review historical reports to identify any
allegations of sexual abuse by ANDSF personnel. In this review, DOD has
not uncovered any alleged incidents that were directly witnessed by
U.S. forces or had occurred on U.S. or coalition facilities.
Mrs. Hartzler. In the funding we provide to Afghanistan, $2.1
billion has been designated for Foreign Military Sales. Since American
tax payers are providing these funds, are there protocols or
instructions which ensure these funds will provide opportunities for
United States manufacturers and workers? What weapons platforms are
being sold to the Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces and
how does the procurement process work?
Colonel Michael. The pseudo-Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process to
procure defense articles for the Afghan National Defense and Security
Forces (ANDSF) is governed by the Defense Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement, which generally requires full and open
competition for contracts.
FMS cases are typically funded either with the participating
countries' organic resources or by Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
funds that are subject to Title 22 requirements. Title 22 funding must
be spent on U.S. materiel and services, with limited waiver authority,
whereas host nations determine how their funds will be spent within the
FMS process. Equipment procurements for the ANDSF using Afghanistan
Security Forces Fund are largely for US-produced end items. Examples
include AM General HMMWVs; Navistar and Oshkosh trucks; Caterpillar
tractors; Textron Mobile Strike Force Vehicles; MD530s Helicopters;
Harris and Datron radios; uniforms; boots; M4 and M16 rifles; 60 mm and
81 mm mortars; Mk 19 grenade launchers; M240 machine guns; M203 grenade
launchers; and ammunition.
The pseudo-FMS process through which these procurements are made
does not involve ``selling'' defense articles to the Afghan government.
Instead, Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A,) in
coordination with the leadership of the Afghan Ministries of Defense
and Interior, identifies and validates ANDSF capabilities and/or
requirements, which are transmitted to the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA) in a CSTC-A-endorsed Memoranda of Request (MoR). DSCA
then assigns the MoR to the appropriate Service Component Implementing
Agency to undertake contracting requirements. It is important to note
that the pseudo-FMS process is not limited to the procurement of
defense articles or end-items but also includes requirements related to
training, maintenance, spare parts, and other long-term sustainment.
Since 2009, the Afghan security forces have spent almost $1.5
billion in FMF funds, all of which were spent on U.S. defense articles
and services. The Afghan government currently has $25 million in
uncommitted FMF funds available.
[all]