    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    .
                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-92]

                                     HEARING

                                       ON

                       NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                              FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017

                                      AND

                  OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                       SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING

                                       ON

         DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 2017 BUDGET REQUEST AND READINESS

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD
                               FEBRUARY 12, 2016

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  _____________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    98-959                     WASHINGTON : 2016

    ________________________________________________________________________________________
    For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
    http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
    U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
    E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

                           SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

                     ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman

    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
    VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
    AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
    ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice    JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
        Chair                            TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SCOTT H. PETERS, California
    MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York      BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
    RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
    BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri
    STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
                    Margaret Dean, Professional Staff Member
                   Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
                            Katherine Rember, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Readiness..............................     2
    Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
      Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Goldfein, Gen David L., USAF, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air
      Force; accompanied by Lt Gen John W. Raymond, USAF, Deputy
      Chief of Staff for Operations, and Lt Gen John Cooper, USAF,
      Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force
      Protection.....................................................     3

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Goldfein, Gen David L........................................    32
        Wittman, Hon. Robert J.......................................    31

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        [There were no Documents submitted.]

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Courtney.................................................    59
        Mr. LoBiondo.................................................    59

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Ms. Bordallo.................................................    64
        Mr. Gibson...................................................    67
        Mr. Wittman..................................................    63

     DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 2017 BUDGET REQUEST AND READINESS POSTURE

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                                     Subcommittee on Readiness,
                             Washington, DC, Friday, February 12, 2016.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 8:04 a.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
    Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
           FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

        Mr. Wittman. Good morning. I want to call to order the
    Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services
    Committee. I want to welcome everybody this morning. I thank
    our witnesses for joining us.
        Before we begin, I would like to recognize a number of our
    great young airmen that are here from Langley Air Force Base. I
    want to welcome you here to Washington. We appreciate all the
    Langley Air Force Association does. We have got a great working
    relationship there, as well as the Langley Civic Association.
        Taylor, thanks so much for your leadership there, and we
    appreciate that.
        I know that I have to compete with Ms. Bordallo, so Ms.
    Bordallo, is there anybody here from Andersen Air Force Base?
        Ms. Bordallo. Is there?
        Mr. Wittman. We have had a little competition going.
    Wherever we go, there is always somebody there from Guam, so I
    want to make sure that we had the opportunity to recognize them
    here this morning, but--yes, yes.
        Ms. Bordallo. Would you kindly stand up, please?
        Mr. Wittman. I knew it. I knew it. I knew it. She always
    does. She always does.
        Well, good morning. I want to thank all of you for being
    here for our Readiness hearing on the ``Department of the Air
    Force 2017 Budget Request and Readiness Posture.'' This is the
    first of four hearings on the services' budget request and
    readiness postures. And, in December and January, the services
    testified on increased readiness risks due to reduced
    installation investments. And, today, I look forward to hearing
    how the Air Force budget request enables a readiness recovery
    plan in where we continue to take risk.
        I would like to welcome all of our members and
    distinguished panel of Air Force experts. This morning, we have
    with us General David Goldfein, U.S. Air Force, Vice Chief of
    Staff; Lieutenant General John Raymond, U.S. Air Force, Deputy
    Chief of Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General John Cooper,
    U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics,
    Engineering, and Force Protection.
        Thank you all for testifying today, and we look forward to
    your thoughts and insights on these important issues. And the
    purpose of this hearing is for the committee to receive
    clarification on Air Force choices for its budget request; to
    address funding priorities and mitigation strategies; and to
    gather more detail on the current and future impacts of these
    decisions on operations and training.
        Once again, I want to thank our witnesses for participating
    in our hearing this morning. I look forward to discussing these
    important topics. And now I would like to turn to our ranking
    member, Madeleine Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
    Appendix on page 31.]

    STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
               RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        And, first, I would like to thank the witnesses.
        General Goldfein, nice to see you again.
        General Raymond and General Cooper and, of course, all the
    airmen that are here and committee people, good morning.
        I have no doubt that your testimony before our subcommittee
    this morning will prove insightful, and I thank all of you for
    your service to our Nation. The Air Force has been engaged in
    constant combat operations overseas for a quarter of a century
    while conducting global transport and mobile operations, and we
    know--we do know--that this has taken a toll on both our airmen
    and their equipment.
        You are accomplishing this feat today with a force that has
    considerably fewer personnel and aircraft than it did 25 years
    ago. Our forces continue to be deployed throughout the world,
    countering threats ranging from terrorist organizations to
    near-peer adversaries. The requirements placed upon the Air
    Force and our military as a whole can never be understated.
        Because of unreliable and unpredictable funding resulting
    from sequestration and numerous continuing resolutions over the
    past several years, you have had to maintain a delicate balance
    between readiness and modernization. At times, this balance has
    cost readiness, and the further we get behind this curve, the
    harder it will be for our force to recover to full-spectrum
    readiness.
        Through our discussion today, I hope that we can gain a
    better understanding of the Air Force's plan to maintain
    readiness through personnel, training, and infrastructure
    improvement. So, again, thank you all for your service, and I
    look forward to your hearing.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you so much.
        I am going to go now to General Goldfein. I understand that
    you will be providing the statement for the panel.
        I just want to remind our panel members, too, that all of
    your statements will be entered into the record, so we will
    have that, and if you would like to add anything, we can do
    that through the questioning period.
        So General Goldfein.

    STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID L. GOLDFEIN, USAF, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
     U.S. AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY LT GEN JOHN W. RAYMOND, USAF,
     DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, AND LT GEN JOHN COOPER,
      USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, ENGINEERING, AND
                            FORCE PROTECTION

        General Goldfein. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking
    Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    On behalf of our Air Force Secretary, and Chief of Staff, it is
    an honor to be with you today and a privilege to sit beside
    these two great airmen and in front of these incredible airmen.
    Together, we are honored to represent the 660,000 total force
    airmen serving today, and we request that our written statement
    be placed in the record.
        A little over 25 years ago, then Captain Dave Goldfein
    piloted an F-16 fighter on my first sortie in the opening hours
    of Operation Desert Storm. During the 100-hour ground war that
    followed the air campaign, the Air Force, along with our fellow
    joint and coalition partners, provided the same blanket of
    airpower that had shielded U.S. forces since April of 1953, the
    last time an American service member was killed by enemy
    aircraft.
        In addition to providing top cover, America's airmen
    defended the base perimeter, refueled and maintained aircraft,
    controlled air traffic, managed supply lines, tended to our
    wounded, air dropped humanitarian aid, and supported the joint
    team with global vigilance, reach, and power. To many Americans
    and to others across the globe, Operation Desert Storm set the
    standard for American airpower, and it is what they remember.
        In the quarter century since Desert Storm, your Air Force
    has remained engaged in combat operations without respite. As
    we sit here today, airmen are standing watch over our nuclear
    enterprise, and they are conducting the lion's share of strike,
    air refueling, and intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance sorties over Iraq and Syria.
        However, 25 years of continuous combat operations, coupled
    with budget instability and lower than planned top lines, have
    made the Air Force one of the smallest, oldest, and least ready
    forces in its history. To put our relative size, age, and
    readiness in perspective, in 1991, we deployed 33 of our 134
    combat-coded Active, Guard, and Reserve fighter squadrons in
    support of Operation Desert Storm. We were 946,000 airmen
    strong. The average age of our aircraft was 17 years, and 80
    percent of the fighter force was ready for full-spectrum
    conflict.
        In contrast, today, we have just 55 total force fighter
    squadrons and approximately 660,000 total force airmen. The
    average age of our aircraft is 27 years, and less than 50
    percent of our combat Air Force is ready for full-spectrum
    conflict. Couple this significant readiness reduction with a
    rising China; Russian aggression in Eastern Europe and Syria;
    Iranian malign influence in the Middle East; North Korean
    nuclear and space ambitions; and our ongoing fight to degrade
    and ultimately destroy ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the
    Levant], and you have an Air Force that is too small, too old,
    and less ready for what the Nation requires.
        Simply put, if we are to remain the most lethal and
    effective air, space, and cyberspace force on the planet, we
    must take steps to rebuild our readiness now. In order to
    accomplish this goal, the fiscal year 2017 budget aims to
    build, train, and equip an Air Force capable of responding to
    today's and tomorrow's threats. It balances capability,
    capacity, and readiness in support of our five core missions:
    air and space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance [ISR]; rapid global mobility; global strike; and
    command and control.
        Our number one priority is our nuclear mission, and our
    budget reflects this importance, including investments in ICBMs
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; command, control, and
    communications; as well as B-2 and B-52 bomber modifications.
    The F-35, KC-46, and LRS-B will change the calculus of any
    potential adversary and will be critical to success in any
    future high-end fight.
        For an Air Force, failing to push the technological edge
    equals failure, and when the Air Force fails, the joint team
    fails. Our fiscal year 2017 budget request includes the funding
    required to recover the manpower needed to ensure the health of
    our nuclear forces, aircraft maintenance teams, battlefield
    airmen, and other critically undermanned and overtasked career
    fields. This budget marks the return of a committed investment
    to global vigilance, global reach, and global power for
    America.
        A return to BCA [Budget Control Act] level funding in
    fiscal year 2018 will further decimate our readiness and
    modernization and will place the Nation at unacceptable risk.
        Mr. Chairman, decisive air, space, and cyberspace power and
    the ability to command and control these forces have become the
    oxygen the joint force breathes and are fundamental to American
    security and joint operations.
        The fiscal year 2017 President's budget and the flexibility
    to execute it, as we have recommended, is an investment in the
    Air Force our Nation needs. America expects it, commanders--
    combatant commanders require it, and with your support, our
    airmen will deliver it.
        On behalf of our Secretary, our Chief of Staff, and the
    660,000 Active, Guard, and Reserve airmen who give our service
    life, thank you for your tireless support, and we look forward
    to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Goldfein can be found in
    the Appendix on page 32.]
        Mr. Wittman. General Goldfein, thank you so much. Thanks
    for your testimony, and thanks for your commitment, as well as
    all the other airmen in getting our Air Force back to where it
    needs to be.
        I want to ask, in that context, where we are in restoring
    readiness. We know that the rebuilding point for readiness is
    set for the Air Force essentially at fiscal year 2020. So if
    you can give us some perspective on, staying on that glide path
    and based on what the budget request is this year and the
    resetting, beginning as a benchmark in 2020, how far are we
    going to be able to go in restoring Air Force readiness? And
    give us some ideas of the timeframes.
        And, along the way, obviously, you are going to have to
    make some tough decisions about risk. Tell us what core
    functions you will have to make some tough decisions about
    where risk will be placed in this readiness recovery effort.
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. So we have stated
    previously that our readiness recovery plan is dependent on a
    couple of key variables. The most important is a reduction in
    deploy-to-dwell time, which actually allows us to have the time
    to do the training that we need for high-end conflict. That is
    something, quite frankly, that we really can't control, given
    the global situation. And while we are incredibly proud of the
    fact that airpower is a requirement in all of the contingencies
    that we face, both current and potentially in the future, it
    has resulted in a demand signal that has reduced our ability to
    do the high-end training we need.
        So while we testified previously that we believed that we
    would be able to achieve full-spectrum readiness on a given
    date, it is actually a rolling timeframe, and as our Chief and
    Secretary have testified, it is about an 8- to 10-year
    timeframe when we actually get the conditions set to be able to
    rebuild that readiness.
        So we--and the last time we testified and we said 2025 was
    about what we were targeting, that was based on some
    assumptions that haven't panned out.
        Mr. Wittman. Right.
        General Goldfein. Some of those assumptions were that we
    wouldn't be increasing our activity in the Pacific, that we
    wouldn't be increasing our activity in Europe, and that we
    wouldn't be increasing the activity that we are now seeing in
    Iraq and Syria.
        So as long as that activity continues and that demand
    signal is there, what you will see from us is a continual
    rolling 8- to 10-year cycle to get to full-spectrum readiness.
        Our prediction right now is that for the next 2 to 3 years,
    we will probably just be able to hold our own in terms of our
    current state of readiness, and as the Chief and Secretary have
    testified, where we currently sit and where I mention in my
    opening statement is we are approximately 50 percent ready
    across the total force for full-spectrum conflict.
        Mr. Wittman. Does your 2017 budget request, does that
    reflect maintaining the necessary effort in core functions
    going forward? And, secondly, does 2017 budget, does that help
    you in setting the conditions for restoring readiness? And if
    not, where are the shortfalls or the things that we need to
    consider as we develop the policy to lay the framework for
    appropriations?
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. So when we submitted this
    budget, we worked to get the best balance we could, given the
    top line we received, between capability, capacity, and
    readiness. And so what you will see in the readiness accounts
    is that we actually funded our readiness accounts to the
    capacity that we can generate.
        And so that, with the addition of OCO [overseas contingency
    operations] funding on top, we are actually able to fly to the
    capacity that we can generate. You had asked before about the
    core functions or about, you know, where we are taking the
    greatest risk. The two core functions of our five where I
    believe we have the greatest risk are in air and space
    superiority and global strike. And the reason for that is that
    is where we have to train to the high-end fight against a peer
    adversary, and that is where we are just not getting the down
    time to be able to train to that level.
        So when we talk about the combat Air Forces and we talk
    about gaining and maintaining air superiority, that requires
    training at a very high level against sophisticated adversaries
    and their capabilities, and that is where we are struggling to
    be able to find the time to do that.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
        Thank you, General Goldfein.
        I am going to go now to Ms. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        General, the Air Force is facing a modernization bubble
    with several major projects competing for budget space as
    evidenced by the F-35 procurement decrease this year and over
    the coming years.
        What is the one thing that Congress can do to improve Air
    Force readiness while addressing the modernization changes?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. So, first, let me tell you
    that you will hear a consistent answer from me in terms of what
    Congress can do, and that is, repeal BCA, because when we go
    back and take a look at what happened to your United States Air
    Force in 2013, when we were sequestered, it devastated our
    readiness, and quite frankly, we are still recovering.
        So now I want to take a look at the budget that we have
    submitted. We did have to make some strategic trades between
    modernization and readiness, and like I said, first of all, we
    funded to our capacity, our current capacity in the readiness
    accounts, but to do that, we had to take some risk in
    modernization that we did not want to do. Deferring F-35
    procurement, deferring C-130 procurement, pushing to the right,
    you know, modernization of our fourth-generation aircraft--all
    required for that high-end fight--are all risk trades that we
    had to make to be able to keep our readiness accounts at
    capacity.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Another question I have. The Air
    Force has been a leader in advocating the total force concept,
    integrating the Active and the Reserve Components.
        General, what opportunities do you see in this and future
    years for leveraging the cost-saving nature of the National
    Guard to contribute to increase readiness, and where can
    Congress play a role in facilitating these engagements?
        General Goldfein. Thanks, ma'am, for an opportunity to
    showcase our Guard and Reserve. You know, we are one force, one
    Air Force, and all three components are actively participating.
    As the former Air Component Commander for Central Command, I
    travelled around the region, as you might imagine. And it never
    ceased to amaze when I would go up in the cockpit of a C-17 and
    one of the questions I would ask is: Okay, which one of you is
    Active? Which one of you is Guard? And which one of you is
    Reserve? And I would often have all three in the same cockpit
    performing that mission. That just gives you one vignette of
    just how closely integrated we are across the force.
        So where we continue to look for opportunity is where we
    can leverage, very often, the higher experience level and the
    stability in the Guard force, in our Reserve force as we look
    to continue to associate in ways that can bring more and more
    capability to the fight.
        The Secretary, in her testimony previously this week, made
    a comment that one of the activities we are looking at is how
    do we take the large number of Active Duty service codes that
    are out there and start combining them to make it easier for
    folks to come into the Guard, Active, Reserve and be able to
    transition between those components so that we can actually
    leverage the most that we can from the individual components.
        I will just give you one quick vignette. So our Chief
    Master Sergeant of the Air Force came back from a visit to
    Lewis-McChord up in Washington, and he noticed a young senior
    airman driving to work in a Tesla, and so he pulled the airman
    over aside and said, ``Okay, you know, talk to me, how is
    this?''
        And he said, ``Well, sir, I'm actually in the Air National
    Guard, but when I am not in the Air National Guard, I am the
    director of security for a Fortune 500 Silicon Valley tech
    company, but I also want to serve. And so when I'm not working
    security for this particular company, I am a senior airman, and
    I am doing cyber business for the United States Air Force.''
        We want to make that easier, and so anything that Congress
    can do to help us to be able to make that continuum easier
    would be extremely helpful, and that is what we want to
    leverage.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much. And I have another one,
    final question for you, General, and I will also say that we,
    as Members of Congress, whenever we travel on our CODELs
    [congressional delegations], when it is a MILAIR [military
    airlift] operation, the Guard is there for us and doing a great
    job.
        The budget request indicates that the Air Force will
    continue to take risk in facility sustainment, restoration, and
    modernization [FSRM]. What impacts will reduced FSRM spending
    have on our airmen's day-to-day quality of life and activities?
        General Cooper.
        General Cooper. Congresswoman Bordallo, I would like to
    field that. The simple truth is: there is not enough money to
    go around. So we did--this budget request does take risk in our
    installations. That is really where we take the risk, at the
    expense of modernization and readiness. So the--what you will
    see as you dive into the budget is that we have constructed our
    installations around military construction and around FSRM,
    facility, sustainment, restoration, and modernization.
        Based on the pause in 2013, we have to get at construction,
    so we focused--we put more money into our military
    construction, and we put less money into our restoration and
    modernization. We kept the same amount, roughly the same amount
    in sustainment because we have got to keep the buildings
    moving.
        That does push us into a strategy of worst first. We have a
    backlog of like $12 billion in facility restoration and
    modernization projects, so we are addressing the worst first.
    The worst first focuses around the mission, so, unfortunately,
    quality of life is competing against mission requirements, and
    we are opting for our mission requirements.
        So, internally, we are working processes on those core
    services to make sure our airmen can get the best we can give
    them, things like child development centers, things like
    gymnasiums and fitness centers and dining facilities. We are
    using transformational efforts to make sure that we can expand
    hours, provide those services so the airmen can conduct the
    mission.
        But at the funding level we are at, we have to focus on
    modernization and readiness.
        Ms. Bordallo. Well, thank you, gentlemen, and thank you for
    your candid answers to our questions.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
        We will know go to Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service,
    and I just wonder, is that plane still flying? What were you
    flying 25 years ago, and is that one still in the air?
        General Goldfein. I am being told it is now being used for
    an unmanned drone. I am hoping not.
        Mr. Scott. But it probably still is in the air. It is
    something most people don't recognize is that while we had that
    many decades edge 25 years ago, the fact that we haven't
    recapitalized has given our adversaries an opportunity to maybe
    not catch us but get a lot closer to us.
        I want to talk to you about the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance
    Targeting and Attack Radar System], which is an ISR platform
    that flies out of Warner Robins. Obviously, there is some money
    in the budget this year for it. There was more money last year
    for it. I am concerned about the reduction in that, but the
    recapitalization of the JSTARS fleet has continued to push a
    year here, a year there, and when I look at the charts that
    show what is going to happen with our current planes that are
    flying, when they go in for depot maintenance, we are going to
    end up with a capability gap that is going to force us to
    either keep very, very old planes, much older than the ones
    that you were flying 25 years ago, in the air or not be able to
    provide that--the moving target indicator and the battle
    management platform to the forces that need it on the ground.
        The other aspect that I see is that the new system would
    save a tremendous amount of money on an annual basis. It is a
    new plane, much more efficient, can gather more data at one
    time, and I just don't understand why a program that uses
    existing mature technology that is relatively inexpensive
    compared to the other platforms that we talked about with
    regard to the recapitalization, has taken so long to deliver,
    and my question is, what are the plans for the capability gap
    that is going to exist when the current planes, which are many,
    many decades old, go in for depot maintenance if the new planes
    are not ready to go? And what plans would you have for
    accelerating the timeline to make sure that we don't have those
    capability gaps?
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. So when we went--when we
    were in--as we have been in discussions about JSTARS, part of
    the discussion has been, do we shift to an unmanned versus a
    manned--large aircraft manned platform. We went out to the
    combatant commanders. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force went
    out to every combatant commander to revalidate individually the
    requirement for airborne battle management as a critical
    component of their war plans, and that was validated across all
    of the combatant commanders.
        That is important because very often when we talk JSTARS,
    we start talking about the sensor, but I would argue that the
    most important thing that JSTARS brings is airborne battle
    management. As the Air Component Commander for Central Command,
    I will tell you that I use that platform in a number of ways,
    in addition to what is traditionally considered, you know,
    airborne battle management of the air-to-ground fight. I used
    it on the naval--in the maritime domain covering the Strait of
    Hormuz.
        So, first and foremost, we have validated that airborne
    battle management is a critical requirement for the combatant
    commanders, and we need to move out on that. Now the challenge
    becomes a technology discussion, which is, at what point do we
    transition and can we transition this to an unmanned platform
    of the future versus a manned platform? And the reality is, is
    the technology that we would need to put on an unmanned
    platform doesn't currently exist to get the same capability
    that we provide to combatant commanders today. It is just not
    miniaturized enough. It just can't give the same level of
    fidelity of the ground moving target indicator that the JSTARS
    does today.
        So the Air Force's position, for two reasons. One, we don't
    have the technology to put it on a manned platform, and two,
    airborne battle management is the critical requirement. We need
    to push forward with a manned airborne platform. We have the
    funding in this budget to do that.
        But that dialogue has slowed us down. And then I will turn
    to General Cooper to talk about covering the gap in the middle.
        General Cooper. Yes, sir. I mean, the JSTARS got its--it is
    an old airplane, 47-years-old, and we are having structural
    issues. And as you know, 50 percent of the airplanes are in
    depot, and the depot takes longer to keep them going, but that
    is emblematic of really our larger fleets, right, is we have to
    recapitalize our fleets.
        We have a number of fleets that are almost as old as
    JSTARS, and we just have to keep on recapitalizing our fleets.
        Mr. Scott. Well, thank you for that. The JSTARS fleet is a
    relatively small fleet, though, and the total cost for
    recapitalization is significantly less than it is for most of
    these other fleets, and it is--it seems to me that if we could
    push forward with an aggressive rapid acquisition process, that
    we could get newer planes, better technology that are going to
    save us money on an annual basis. And instead of spending so
    much money on depot maintenance for planes that we know we are
    going to pull out as soon as we have a new platform, why not
    push this thing up?
        I mean, we are talking about--we are talking multibillions
    for a lot of platforms, hundreds of billions, and this is not
    one that costs anywhere close to what most of the platforms
    cost. And, as you said, it can't be done with any other
    platform, the battle management aspect of it, so thank you for
    your service and----
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
        We will now go to Mr. Courtney.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you to the panel for being here this morning.
        General, last year's NDAA [National Defense Authorization
    Act], we came up with a pretty good arrangement for the C-130
    modernization with the new AMP 1 [Avionics Modernization
    Program] approach that hopefully is going to short-circuit some
    of the problems that existed before.
        On page 14 of your testimony, you mention the C-130
    modernization. I just wonder if you could just sort of talk
    about what is in the budget. I mean, it seems like a relatively
    small number for 2017, and 2020, as you know, is coming up fast
    for the global navigation requirements, so I was wondering if
    you could elaborate.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Thank you. So we have broken up
    the AMP program into, as you know, two increments. So Increment
    1, which actually makes us--makes the C-130 capable of flying
    in all the international airspace and meets FAA [Federal
    Aviation Administration] requirements. The previous budget, we
    actually had that completing in 2022. We were able to, in this
    budget, actually accelerate that to 2020, which allows us to
    actually be in line with the expectations for the FAA on being
    AMP 1 compliant by the timeframe they have given us. So that is
    first.
        We have also been able to fully fund Increment 2, which
    actually does the physical upgrades to the C-130, and that will
    now complete in 2028. So we feel pretty good about the AMP
    program right now. We have actually--Chief of Staff has led an
    effort through our total force to talk to all of the States
    that have C-130s. All of the adjutant generals are part of this
    plan. When we work through the C-130 issues, we actually have
    that dialogue with them so they are part of the process. So,
    right now, going into this budget, we feel pretty good about
    the program.
        Mr. Courtney. And, again, I am sure, you know, later in the
    process, we are going to have more conversations about this
    with you and your team. It is just--so is there any space or,
    you know, possibility that Congress can help in terms of
    accelerating it more or, you know, flexibility in the 2017
    budget to help, again, push this along?
        General Goldfein. Sir, we will take that one to see if
    there is any kind [of] help we would require from Congress.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 59.]
        General Goldfein. Right now, we feel like the program is
    pretty well funded for what industry can support. I will tell
    you where we could use your help, though, and that is, you
    know, we had to take some decisions--make some decisions to
    delay critical modernization to be able to pay readiness and
    get the balance in this budget.
        One of the decisions we made was to defer some C-130J
    procurement, and so any help we could get to bring those back
    would be very much appreciated.
        Mr. Courtney. Thank you very much, General, and again, to
    all the witnesses for your service.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
        We will now go to Mr. LoBiondo.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I thank the panel, and thank you for your service.
        For General Goldfein. General, in procurement line 22 of
    the aircraft procurement account for F-16 AESA [Active
    Electronically Scanned Array] radars, the Air Force requests
    and states an expedited delivery schedule. It is imperative to
    operationally field the AESA radar in support of homeland
    defense against evolving threats.
        Can you please update the subcommittee on how the research,
    design, test, and evaluation as appropriated in last year's
    omnibus is progressing? What phase are you currently in? And
    how will this be completed? And when do you foresee an award
    coming?
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. As you know, we, the
    Department, originally pursued a joint urgent operational need,
    a JUON, from the supporting combatant commander, NORTHCOM
    command [U.S. Northern Command] in this case, to be able to
    procure the AESA radars for those F-16s that we use to do
    defense of the National Capital Region [NCR].
        What a JUON does for us is allows us to actually go sole
    source, which speeds up the acquisition process. That JUON was
    not supported, so, therefore, we are now in a competition for
    those radars.
        The Air Force fully funded 24 of those sets to be able to
    take care of those aircraft that are part of the NCR. But now
    what we will need to do and what we are pursuing is an
    acquisition strategy that allows competition for those 24, and
    the money has been laid in for that.
        The remainder of the fleet will also be able to go into a
    full and open competition so that we can continue to modernize
    the remainder of the F-16 fleet with AESA radars, but we do
    have a strategy to get up to 24, although we are not able to go
    sole source at this time.
        Mr. LoBiondo. So you are attempting to expedite or----
        General Goldfein. Attempting to expedite, but we have to
    follow the acquisition rules for competition, but the money has
    been laid in for those 24.
        Mr. LoBiondo. I recently received word that the Ops 5 and 6
    for the F-35 Air National Guard basing decision criteria, has
    been pushed back to later in the spring of 2016. Can you update
    the subcommittee on how that is progressing?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. So, as you know, we build our
    basing process so that we can be, you know, fully open and
    transparent with all of Congress to ensure that not only do you
    see the criteria but that you see how each base scores out in
    that criteria.
        So what we are looking at right now with the F-35 Ops 5 and
    6 is: What criteria now do we need to make sure that we have
    ready to go? As soon as that criteria is ready, we will then
    put that out, and then we will start the process that goes
    through not only setting the criteria but then actually then
    scoring a certain number of bases against that criteria,
    sharing with Congress how that scoring occurred, and then
    making the final decision that the Secretary makes in terms of
    what that basing will be.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Do you have any idea of timeline on that of
    when we are going to get to see any of that?
        General Goldfein. Let me see if we have all that. Sir, can
    we take that one, and we will get it back to you?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 59.]
        Mr. LoBiondo. Sure. I, obviously, have a great interest in
    that. I like to think that I represent, if not the, one of the
    premier homeland security bases in the country because of our
    strategic location to New York and to Washington, and we think
    fair, objective, and transparent, we would score really well in
    that.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
        General Goldfein. And we will try to get that answer to
    you, I think, even before this hearing ends, if we can.
        Mr. LoBiondo. Okay.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. LoBiondo.
        We will now go to Mr. Peters.
        Mr. Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I wanted you to
    expand on training a little bit in two respects. One is, I
    would like you to explain why it is that a delay in the annual
    budget for--or diminishment in the annual budget for training
    lasts beyond the year. I think people don't often understand
    that there is a permanent effect to underfunding training year
    to year. I also wanted you to address sort of your sense of
    how--what--any additional challenges for the training budget
    are posed by the addition of new airframes like the F-35.
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. So, first, on the delay
    and the lag effect that goes into training. So the way we do
    our flying hour program is we budget in 2-year cycles, as you
    know, sir. And so we project in the future how much we think we
    are going to fly in contingency flying, and given the capacity
    of any weapons system--take the F-16 and Block 50 as an
    example, that is designed for suppression of enemy air
    defenses, so very high-end fight-centered focused community. So
    we look at all of the capabilities in that way to--in our
    weapons system to produce flying hours, and that is a fixed
    capacity. And then we project how much of that we think in that
    weapons system will be flown down range, and that becomes part
    of what we call the OCO.
        And so what--you can't go up because that is the fixed
    capacity of the weapons system, so the only thing that can
    happen with that is that you project--what you project doesn't
    pan out and the assumptions change. And what we found year
    after year is that we actually fly more down range activity
    than we have left for home station training.
        So what that means in the Block 50 F-16, for instance, is
    that air crew that are supposedly--that are trained and
    designed to do high-end peer-to-peer conflict in a contested
    environment are actually focusing more and more of their
    training on the lower end close air support violence extremist
    fight. So they lose their skills over time, and you can't build
    those back immediately because you have got to build them back
    so that they can be in a--that community, they have to be
    wingmen. They have to be flight leads. They have to be
    instructors. They have to be certified for all of those. The
    less amount you have to train to that high-end fight, the less
    readiness that you have, so it actually takes you more and more
    time to actually build that back.
        When it comes to bringing the F-35 and other weapons
    systems, the challenge for us and both the challenge and the
    asymmetric opportunity is that we approach joint warfare from a
    networked perspective. And the vignette I would share with you
    is, you know, I flew the F-117 as the last pilot, and when I
    took off and flew the F-117--first-generation, low-observable
    [LO]--it was a very closed system approach to using LO. I mean,
    I actually had a switch that would turn everything off, you
    know, all of the sensors would stow, and I would, you know,
    lower my seat and go to work.
        In the F-35, when you power up the aircraft, it starts
    doing machine-to-machine collaboration and discussion on the
    initial power up, and it starts comparing amongst it, in the
    network, and it is talking through air, space, cyber. It is
    doing the full-spectrum look, and it is doing a human-machine
    collaboration that actually places symbology on the visor of
    that aircraft.
        And so it is a very networked approach. So when we bring
    the F-35, the F-22 on, it is about the networked approach to
    warfare, and that makes it its own training challenge because
    we have got to be able to simulate that entire network and go
    to training as opposed to a single aircraft going out and
    training on a range.
        Mr. Peters. Just sort of--I know quantitatively, just how
    short are we, given that we have been lagging a little bit
    already?
        General Goldfein. So, as I testified earlier, we are at 50
    percent or less in overall full-spectrum readiness across the
    Air Force, and that vignette I share with you in terms of the
    fact that we are not training at this level, that is exactly
    what that means, meaning that we are not able to train to the
    suppression of enemy air defenses mission because we are using
    that weapon so much in the fight against ISIL.
        So, at 50 percent readiness, the challenge is, if you look
    at what our Secretary of Defense has laid out as the major
    strategic challenges that we face, China, Russia, Iran, North
    Korea, and a condition of violent extremism that we will likely
    have to deal with in the next decade, that covers the spectrum
    of the potential conflict that we may face. So if we, as an Air
    Force, are 50 percent ready, what we are saying is we are 50
    percent ready against the higher end threats.
        Mr. Peters. And, General, I just want you to know that is
    something that has been on my mind since I have been on this
    subcommittee, and it is something that is not easily observed,
    and so I wanted to take a little time to draw it out. I
    appreciate the emphasis on it, and I hope we can be responsive.
    Thank you again for your testimony and your service.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Peters.
        We will now go to Mr. Bishop.
        Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
        General, I appreciate the opportunity of being here.
        Mr. Wittman, I appreciate you having a hearing at 8 a.m. in
    the morning. I realize you think there are no other issues that
    conflict with that. There is one. It is called my mattress. I
    wish you would get one that is comfortable for you so we
    wouldn't be doing this.
        And, General, can I also just--before I ask a question,
    just say one thing. Your complaints about the BCA are spot-on
    accurate, but it is too narrow. There were four other cuts in
    addition to that, as well as the 25 years of constant combat
    flights you had to do. You add all those things together. So
    when you have the criticisms, don't just narrow it to that one
    aspect. There are other things that have screwed you up in
    addition to that, much broader than that.
        Can I ask you a question, though? You did mention in the
    written testimony about Hill, which is important to me for
    obvious reasons. I do have some concern over the transition
    that is going forward, especially as we look in what is going
    in the future.
        Is there any concern--because the 388th is a combined
    unit--is there any concern you have with the Reserve unit
    there? Are they going to be tasked more or less in the future?
        General.
        General Raymond. Thank you.
        Congressman Bishop, thanks for the question. The Reserve
    Component at Hill, like all of our Reserve Components, is
    critical to our force and great, great partners. We do have a
    transition plan. Those F-16s will be transitioning in the 2018
    timeframe, and what we have done in the--to fund that
    transition is to put some funding in to make sure that those
    aircraft can be flown while we are waiting for the transition.
        Mr. Bishop. But the maintainers are still going to be a
    problem that has to be dealt with.
        General.
        General Cooper. If I can field that, Congressman Bishop.
        Yes, maintainers are a problem in our Air Force. We have
    taken great steps to make sure that we are going to transition
    well to IOC [initial operating capability] for F-35, but I am
    concerned on any F-35 beddowns after IOC. We are 4,000
    maintainers short in our Air Force. We are focusing on Hill
    right now to make sure that we can get the maintainers for IOC,
    so, right now, at Hill specific, we moved--as you know, the 4th
    Fighter Squadron came back recently. We moved those maintainers
    over to begin training for F-35, and we received--we have six
    airplanes there. I will be out there next week making sure we
    get IOC right.
        And then we are--the Reserves are taking care of the F-16s.
    When the 421st Squadron comes back, the same will occur. Those
    maintainers will move over to F-35, and then the Reserves will
    manage the F-16s.
        Mr. Bishop. That still seems to indicate there is going to
    be a greater emphasis put on the Reserves taking more capacity.
        General Cooper. Yes. The Reserves will--we are going to let
    the Reserves work on the--use those aircraft at Hill Air Force
    Base until transitions in the following years.
        Mr. Bishop. Can I transition just slightly and see if you
    can do this because I do have a concern about hiring practices?
    I wonder if the Air Force is going into that. I mean, some of
    them are taking up to 160 days just to hire people.
        Is the Air Force looking at trying to devolve some of that
    authority, because once again, I think OPM's [Office of
    Personnel Management's] goal is like 80 days, which seems to be
    an outrageous goal, and if, indeed, you cannot hire those
    people, I understand you have to augment them with contractors
    which may--on the work lines--which may not necessarily be a
    cheaper way of doing it. So is the Air Force moving in
    something to try and deal with civilian hiring practices?
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, our
    Secretary of the Air Force is leading that effort herself. She
    has tasked the--our A1, our Director of Personnel, to look at
    all of our policies across the Air Force relative to civilian
    personnel to see how we can speed up the process of hiring when
    we need to hire, especially for critical skill sets. She is
    also having us take a look at the continuum of service between
    the three components and allowing civilians to be able to come
    into the Air Force, especially where we need critical skills.
        The challenge we have, Congressman, as you know, is that
    most of the rules associated with civilian actually don't
    reside within the service. Most of those are above the service.
        So while we are looking at everything we can and why we are
    brushing all of our individual policies, it is really above us,
    and that is where we can probably use your help.
        Mr. Bishop. Thank you.
        Well, we will try and do that as best we can, help out. I
    appreciate your comments about fourth-generation modifications
    have been delayed. You were very clear on how the readiness
    capacity or capabilities are being lost. I also have a--that is
    not even a question. I am just saying it once again.
        I also have a concern of how it is affecting contracts,
    depot workloads, everything else. I have only got 20 seconds,
    so you don't need to respond to that, but thank you for your
    presence here. And, in an hour, I think I will be awake so I
    can understand what you actually said.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. We will make sure that
    when we have an opportunity, we convene at a later time.
        Mr. Bishop. And then we will talk Indian bills after that.
        Mr. Wittman. Yes, we will. Yes, we will.
        We will now go to Mr. O'Rourke.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I wanted to ask, General, about the nuclear cruise missile
    part of this budget, and I will tell you my limited
    understanding and some of my concerns, which should take no
    more than a minute, and then offer you the remainder to answer.
        My understanding is that this is a $30 billion price tag
    for a weapon that will be carried on the aging B-52 platform. I
    want to know: What would happen should we not pursue this
    strategy? What is the risk to the United States? And, two, what
    are your thoughts on the British decision a few years back not
    to pursue this as a strategy because of their concern that it
    would produce miscalculation and unintended consequences? And
    it kind of departs from traditional nuclear deterrence, where
    each side has a good understanding of the other's capabilities
    and their conditions for using them.
        And so if you would take the remaining 4 minutes to answer
    those concerns and tell us what would happen if we didn't do
    this and where we could apply those $30 billion if we didn't.
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. Just to talk about just
    the funding part of it right now, just to be clear. So the
    long-range standoff weapon that will replace our air-launched
    cruise missile is currently scheduled to be integrated not only
    on the B-52 but also on the B-2.
        So, for us, the way we look at this is it has to do with,
    you know, 21st century strategic deterrence and what the
    nuclear aspect of that is, and we, as an Air Force, we like to
    joke that we are responsible for three of the four legs,
    because if you add nuclear command and control, which we are
    responsible for, it is actually almost a leg in and of itself
    to ensure that we have assured communications.
        So, for us, it is about: How do we ensure that we have a
    reliable, assured, secure nuclear deterrent to be able to hold
    targets at risk so that we can show that we have that capacity
    and capability? And so there are a number of ways you do that.
        You do that through the bomber force. You do that through
    the, of course, the ground-based force, our Minuteman III, and
    then transition into ground--GBSD [Ground-Based Strategic
    Deterrence], and we also do that with the Navy, with our
    submarine force.
        And so, for us, when you take a look at the long-range
    standoff missile, it is about being able to have the right
    standoff to be able to actually go in to be able to service
    targets that the Commander in Chief may ask us to service.
        And so, when we look at it, we need to have both that
    capability, which is standoff, plus we need to have gravity
    capability, plus we need to have penetrating capability with
    gravity, which is why we are putting money into the B-61 as
    well, and we have to modernize the nuclear missile fields. And
    so that is why you see an increase of $4.3 billion in this
    budget to be able to modernize the nuclear.
        So what we would tell you is that we believe that is a
    critical component of the three legs of the triad.
        In terms of, you know, risk that we would have, in terms of
    employment, you know, modernization of a particular weapons
    system does not actually indicate that you would have--you
    would be more susceptible to use. That is a--purely a Commander
    in Chief decision. So we would say, as the employers of the
    nuclear enterprise, that we don't think it increases risk.
        So one of the areas that we are going to need help from
    Congress on is that if you take a look at the nuclear
    enterprise, most of it was billed in the 1940s and 1950s, and
    it is aging significantly, and we have some bills that are
    going to come due after this FYDP [Future Years Defense
    Program], in the 2022 timeframe, that are significant.
        So we are working within the Department to look at all
    aspects of the nuclear enterprise to ensure that we are putting
    the best dollar forward to ensure that we have a safe, secure,
    reliable, nuclear deterrent for the 21st century that has all
    three legs plus the command and control intact.
        Mr. O'Rourke. So you do not share the British concern or
    the concern of former Defense Secretary Perry about the risk of
    miscalculation or unintended consequences. You think this is
    the wisest use of that $30 billion.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir, I do.
        Mr. O'Rourke. And if, for whatever reason, Congress were
    not to support that request, where would that--and still allow
    for that $30 billion to be used within the Air Force, where
    would that money go?
        General Goldfein. Sir, you know, to be honest with you,
    what we would do is we would take a look first at our
    stewardship of the nuclear enterprise, and so the first place
    we would look is, where do we need to place that within the
    nuclear enterprise as our number one priority for our service.
        After that, we would look at it like we look at everything
    else, which is we would look at a planning choice, you know,
    and we would look at the trades that we have to make between
    capability, capacity, and readiness, but I can assure you the
    first place we would look, it would be within the nuclear
    enterprise.
        Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
        We will now go to Mr. Gibson.
        Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
    panelists. Thank you for your service and your sacrifices and
    those of your family. My question has to do with joint
    interoperability, training, and readiness, and specifically
    with regard to the budget, if you could lay out where the
    commitments are in terms of Joint Forcible Entry exercise, how
    many commitments--how many rotations do you see this budget
    year, and then also commitments to the National Training Center
    [NTC] and the scope of that, and any other modeling and
    simulation for the year, if you can lay out where the budget
    is.
        General Goldfein. Thank you, sir. So, you know, 15 years of
    continuous combat has actually produced the most joint force in
    our history, and I can say that also personally, having been
    the Combined Forces Air Component Commander deployed for two of
    those years.
        So what we found is that our forces--soldiers, sailors,
    airmen, marine--who are down range are not only training but
    executing jointly every day, and then when we come back at all
    of our major training venues, if you go out and take a look at
    Red Flag at Nellis, Green Flag at Nellis, Cyber Flag, NTC
    rotations, air warrior rotations, you will have a joint element
    of every one of our exercises, and the service chiefs and the
    ``3s,'' the Directors of Operation, work that hard every day.
        You know, we are very proud of the fact that when it comes
    to training of the United States Army and their Joint Forcible
    Entry capability, when it comes to especially airborne, that we
    provide the lift that they require to do that mission. And so,
    working with, you know, General Abrams in Forces Command and
    working with not only our Army but also our Marine Corps and
    Special Forces, what we ensure is that we understand the
    requirement for a number of jumps that we have to support, and
    then we look across our enterprise at the global mobility to
    ensure we have the C-17s and the C-130s and the H-60s that are
    required to be able to support those jumps.
        Mr. Gibson. You know, I appreciate that. And, as you know,
    and I thank you so much for the incredible career you have had,
    you know, the whole piece of it comes together with electronic
    warfare, with fighters, bombers, and command and control. So,
    specifically, the question is: How many Joint Forcible Entry
    exercises are in the budget for this year?
        General Raymond. We have really focused on putting
    resources to the training effort. In this program, the budget
    that was just submitted, we have over $398 million going to CAF
    [Comprehensive Airman Fitness] readiness training, which are
    those exercises which you talked about. We invested over $235
    million into our training ranges to make sure that those ranges
    are high-end capable, fifth-generation capable, to get the most
    out of those training events.
        We have also spent about $345 million on live, virtual, and
    constructive training, looking at, how do you do that better in
    the simulator to, again, to maximize those--maximize those
    training events?
        Mr. Gibson. So thank you. It sort of--and it may very well
    be my failing in not framing the question right, but I will
    sort of lay out a few points.
        You know, over the years, as we, you know, are working to
    sustain the joint piece of this, the forcible entry piece of
    this, we could have anywhere from 8, in some years 10, Joint
    Forcible Entry exercises. And, last I looked at it, I think we
    are down to about four a year. And I understand, I mean, the
    war has played a big role in that in terms of where the
    resources need to go, understandably.
        But, you know, this is among the reasons why, gentlemen, I
    would say, I am concerned about the decision the Air Force has
    taken with regard to the 440th [Airlift Wing at Pope Field],
    and the reason is, is we are all managing risk. Up here, we are
    managing risk. The Air Force is certainly managing risk. All
    the joint forces are managing risk, but among the things that
    the 440th could do is really allow for smaller units in the
    XVIII Airborne Corps to sustain. As was mentioned, you have a--
    you take--justifiably you are proud of the fact that you do
    help the joint forces maintain their readiness. But it is
    especially difficult today, at the company and battalion level,
    to keep up on the eaches when it comes to their requirement
    knowing that the four major packages that we have, the Joint
    Forcible Entry exercise is important for exercising higher
    level staffs for integration, but it is getting tougher to, you
    know, the one-offs, the people who go to school and come back,
    and that was managed by the 440th actually being at Fort Bragg.
        General Goldfein. Sir, if I could just, very quickly, you
    know, our objective--and we are working this with the commander
    there, General Townsend, you know, we met with him regularly.
    Our objective is that when a soldier walks out to the flight
    line to get on a C-130 for a jump, he doesn't know that the
    440th is gone, because what we have done is we put an aircraft
    there, and he gets the training he needs. That is the
    objective.
        And so we do that for a number of bases around the world
    that do airborne and do training, and so we do that in Vicenza,
    in Italy, we do that across, so we think we have a good
    template for that. The Army leadership agrees, and so if we get
    this right, it will be transparent to your soldiers.
        Mr. Gibson. My time is expired.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
        We will now got to Ms. Gabbard.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Good morning. You spoke a little bit earlier in your
    comments about the investment and the necessity of increasing
    cyber capabilities, and I am wondering if you can talk in a
    little bit more detail about two things, recruiting and
    retention. When we look at the talent that exists and the
    innovation and how quickly evolving this world is in the
    private sector, you know, what kind of creative efforts are you
    taking to be able to bring those folks in, to be able to work
    with us, as well as to retain them once they are there?
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. So we are working,
    quite frankly, very hard with an effort that the Secretary of
    Defense is leading called ``Force of the Future,'' and one of
    the elements of that is permeability and allowing easier access
    to the ingenuity and innovation that is in the private sector
    and the public sector to come into the military when we need it
    and vice versa, right, also sharing what talent and expertise
    and capability we have with the private sector. So we continue
    to look at those capabilities. And, right now, as an Air Force,
    our contribution to the cyber force is 39 teams. It represents
    about 30 percent, as you might imagine. It is about right for
    our contribution, 39 teams. So CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command]
    has laid out three key mission areas they are responsible for:
    defend the Nation, defend the networks, support the combatant
    commanders. We have 13 teams that we are building to support
    each of those requirements in each of those mission areas, so
    13 times 3 equals 39, so that is where we get to. Right now, we
    sit at about 26 teams, and we are on track to complete our
    build of 39 by 2018. So we feel pretty good about where we are,
    where we are going. I will tell you that you can never stop
    looking at managing this talent because we have got to have the
    incentives in place for not only them to want to join us, out
    of more than just patriotism, but because we are a good place
    for them to reside because of how we take care of them and the
    value of their service, so those total force continuum measures
    that we are working on are going to be incredibly important.
        General Raymond. Another thing, if I could add, we have
    done a review of the retention across the cyber force, and we
    are not seeing retention issues with the cyber force. The
    retention levels mirror the rest of the Air Force. They are
    about equal. As General Goldfein mentioned earlier about with
    the vignette of the airman driving the Tesla, I think people
    join the Air Force for a reason. They want to serve their
    country, protect their Nation, and right now, we are not seeing
    those readiness challenges.
        Ms. Gabbard. That is great. Somewhat connected with that
    but really on the overall broader scale is, as you talk about
    the total force integrating the Guard and Reserves, how are you
    integrating those elements in your deployment-to-dwell ratio in
    a way that is sustainable for the future?
        General Raymond. Thank you for the question. We are a
    completely integrated force. As General Goldfein mentioned
    earlier, you go look in a cockpit, and you won't be able to
    tell the difference. There will be Guard, Reserve, and Active
    Duty all blended together, and that is that way across our
    service. When you look at the readiness levels across the
    service, we mirror each other because we operate together. If
    you look at the deployed as well, the same concerns are there
    with the total force as it is with the Active Duty force. We
    about mirror each other in readiness levels, and we watch that
    very closely, but we are the most integrated service with our
    Guard and Reserve, and they are critical partners to us.
        Ms. Gabbard. What is the deploy-to-dwell ratio now?
        General Raymond. Across the board, on average, it is about
    1:2.5.
        Ms. Gabbard. Okay.
        General Goldfein. Ma'am, could I also offer that at some
    point you do get to a capacity stop. So, regardless of how
    integrated we are, we still only have 55 squadrons to do the
    Nation's work. So, at that point, you actually can't get any
    more out of what you have already got. So that is why I go back
    to the point that we are actually too small and you are seeing
    us trying to build back up the force size and our capacity to
    do what we believe the Nation needs.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Gabbard.
        General Goldfein, in your testimony, when you spoke about
    the shortage on maintainers, I would like to get your
    perspective and a little more of a drill down as to the nature
    of that. And you talk about needing to use contract maintainers
    for your A-10s, F-16s, C-130s, in order to get people
    transferred over to spin up to maintain the F-35s. There seems
    to be another aspect to it, though, when you look at the nature
    of the shortage, and that is many of the shortages are
    occurring with your senior NCOs [noncommissioned officers] that
    are, indeed, your trainers for airmen coming in. Tell me: How
    do you address that, because that is a long-term issue? The
    short-term issue is contract maintainers, but the long-term
    issue is, as you bring new Air Force personnel in, how do you
    get them to stay in the Air Force so they can become that
    senior NCO that is a master maintainer but also the trainer for
    the new airmen that are coming into the Air Force? Tell me how
    you address that, because that wasn't related in your
    testimony.
        General Cooper. Chairman, I would like to answer that. So
    we are 4,000 maintainers short across the Air Force, and the
    issue is we are bringing two F-35s in a month, and each F-35
    requires 20 maintainers, so we add to that deficit every single
    month as we go forward. And, next year, it will be three F-35s.
    So we are addressing it fully on how can we grow our fleet. So
    what we have done to date is we balanced as much as we can
    safely do with our legacy fleets, even with our large
    airplanes, moving to fighters because it is most acute in the
    fighting Air Force, in our fighters. So we have moved like crew
    chiefs from C-130s, to F-35s. Congress authorized us to
    transfer up to 18 A-10s--36 A-10s to BIA [back-up inventory
    aircraft] status. We used 18 because we needed the capacity for
    the fighting force as well as the maintainers. We split the
    difference. Moved the maintainers to F-35s, so we have done as
    best we can there.
        We have offered numerous retention incentives to our older
    maintainers, our tech sergeants, and our master sergeants, our
    7-levels, so they will stay in and retain that training
    expertise. And we have seen some growth there. Up to a thousand
    maintainers have taken the retention bonus and have stayed in,
    which is good. But we are digging a continual hole as we go
    forward because we have the force structure that we are not
    able to divest, and we are growing F-35s.
        Internally, since 2013, we under-assessed our maintainers,
    so our new airmen coming in, it was a challenge. We had an $8
    billion challenge after sequestration going 2014 into 2015 on
    how to close that gap, and the first place that we went to, the
    easiest place to go to get dollars that quick that soon is the
    personnel account. So, unfortunately, we under-assessed in the
    maintenance. We are reversing that trend. We did it in 2015 at
    the expense of other critical AFSCs [Air Force specialty codes]
    and career fields in the Air Force. We are doing it in 2016 up
    to a thousand in fiscal year 2016 at the expense of critical
    career fields, not maintenance, in the Air Force, and this
    budget asks for a growth of maintainers in the 2017 budget. And
    part of that, an overall growth for the Air Force, a large part
    of that is maintenance.
        The initiative we just started was looking at the contract
    maintenance in areas across the Air Force where there are not
    combat-coded units. They are mostly training units. They don't
    have a deployment requirement. And we feel that we can
    contract, if the market is right, we can contract in those
    locations, take those maintainers and move them to F-35s. But
    that is a challenge, that is just a short-term challenge, and
    we need to continue to grow, and really that only gets us about
    2 years, and we will have the same problem in 2 years.
        Mr. Wittman. It just seems like a cascading effect,
    especially across the MOSes [military occupational specialties]
    for your maintainers at every level of experience there.
        General Cooper. It is. We are challenged in our, especially
    in our fighter fleets. We have six career fields that are below
    1:2 dwell, meaning they are slightly at home slightly longer
    than they are deployed today on legacy.
        General Raymond. I would just add that when we look at
    readiness and the impact of that, we have critical skills
    availability as a key piece of that readiness, and it is not
    just the numbers of people, but it is the right level of
    people, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman. That is why it takes
    some time to grow that readiness. We have made that initial
    investment, and we bring new airmen into the Air Force, but it
    will take 5 years or so to grow those to a level where we have
    the senior leadership that we need to build that readiness back
    up.
        Mr. Wittman. I just want to make sure that we reflect the
    proper policy so you can continue to grow both the capacity and
    the capability. It has to be grown on both levels. Let me ask a
    quick question about a comment that you made in your testimony
    about infrastructure and capacity and excess capacity. As you
    know, we look at that, there was a requirement from last year's
    NDAA for each of the service branches to provide a report back
    to Congress concerning capacity issues, overcapacity, excess
    inventory, those kinds of things, as well as what we had
    hearings on earlier, and that is: What are we doing to support
    the existing critical infrastructure and facilities support,
    which is one of the elements of what we use to generate
    readiness?
        One of the concerns I have going forward is to make sure
    that we don't get too shortsighted, because everything we have
    done recently has been very shortsighted. What do we do to make
    it to the next budget year? What do we do to move money around?
    And I understand the immediate need to try to generate some
    dollars and the dollars that come out for older facilities. And
    I think that there is a logical way and a risk way to do that.
    My concern is this: on the other side, too, the Air Force with
    its assets is going to continue to grow. We are going to have
    new fighter aircraft coming on board and new Long-Range
    Strategic Bomber, a new tanker fleet, that lift capacity that
    is there, even a few more C-17s, modernized C-130s. So there is
    a need for infrastructure to support that. So my concern going
    forward is saying: Well, let's reduce base structure or that
    infrastructure. We know we need that to generate readiness in
    the support aircraft as it comes on. I want to make sure that
    those two curves don't cross each other, and then we come back
    and say: Guess what, now we have more aircraft than we have
    facilities necessary to keep the aircraft and maintain them.
    So, in my idea, how do you find the right balance in saying we
    need a BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure] in light of saying
    we have got to be building more aircraft?
        General Goldfein. Sir, thanks. I will start, and then I am
    going to turn over to General Cooper to give you a little bit
    more detail on where we are with our infrastructure. A couple
    key points here. First, it will be no surprise to you that, as
    airmen, we project airpower from our bases, so they are
    actually part of our fighting platform. So when we actually
    talk about infrastructure, we are talking about part of how we
    fight, so it shouldn't be surprising that we are going to put a
    significant amount of resources against our infrastructure. In
    this budget, we made a strategic trade and a decision to
    emphasize combatant commander requirements and new mission
    beddown, KC-46, F-35, because as you stated, as you bring on
    new weapons systems, there are unique capabilities that you
    have to build to be able to bed those down. So you will see
    those two priorities.
        As we have testified previously, you have also seen that we
    have taken risks in our facilities, restoration, modernization
    accounts to do that. So, as I transition to General Cooper,
    what I will tell you is that, right now, we are about 30
    percent over in terms of the infrastructure versus our
    capacity. And so, right now, today, we would tell you that we
    are keeping a number of facilities on these large bases up and
    running because we are not going to tear them down, and we
    don't have the force structure to require us to use them, so we
    could use at least a reorganization to be able to get more
    rightsized. But we also look at that through the lens of where
    we are going to be in the future when we get these new missions
    on. Right? So when you take a look at the tanker trade, as you
    will see, we will actually build up to about 479 tankers before
    we actually start coming back down and sort of keep it
    balanced. So we think that 30 percent over capacity that we
    have now will actually continue to exist as we make the trades
    of the future. So let me turn it over to General Cooper.
        General Cooper. Thank you, General.
        Too much, too old, too expensive. I am on the business side
    of the Air Force, and I am responsible for trying to--and the
    readiness side, so we are trying to make sure that we have the
    appropriate readiness so we can give General Raymond and the
    three and the operations the most the Air Force can give
    America. Our infrastructure is too big. We know that. So, I
    mean, I have a litany of testimonials here. I mean, at Keesler
    Air Force Base where we train our pilots, we have a 50-plus-
    year-old drainage system which just gets rid of the water off
    the flight line that can't handle large rains. So about three
    times a year, it floods, and we can't conduct pilot training.
    So, last year, we lost 370 sorties because it rained. That
    facility project is still competing for funds because there are
    other more critical facility projects.
        We avoid $2.9 billion in expenses because of previous BRACs
    every year.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Goldfein, General Cooper.
        Ms. Bordallo.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I just have a couple of questions I would like to ask. The
    first is: To what extent are weapon shortages affecting
    prepositioned munition inventories and, consequently, readiness
    to address other potential conflicts around the globe?
        General Goldfein. Thanks ma'am. So, in this budget, what
    you will see is that we are actually funding munitions to the
    capacity that industry can produce. The challenge we face is
    that while we have the munitions we require for the current
    fight, it takes us upwards of 4 years to actually replenish the
    munition that we drop, just based on how we do a budget cycle
    and the timeframe it takes. As we drop more and more munitions,
    then what happens is--and by the way, as we have more and more
    allies and partners that join the coalition, who are also
    looking at the same preferred munitions, primarily Small
    Diameter Bomb, Hellfire, and JDAM [Joint Direct Attack
    Munition], are the three that we tend to be using in this
    fight, precision-guided all of them. What we do then to be able
    to keep the stocks we need for the current fight, is we do take
    the others around the globe down to a certain extent. Now, we
    have a plan to continue to replenish them, but there is a lag
    factor because of that 4-year period. So part of that readiness
    for contingencies in the high-end fight, if you were to have
    the PACOM [U.S. Pacific Command] commander here or the EUCOM
    [U.S. European Command] commander here, they would probably
    both tell you they are not satisfied with their current stock
    levels that we have had to deplete and towards to have what we
    need for the current fight.
        In addition, when our allies and partners come to us and
    say, ``Listen, we are part of this coalition, and we need your
    support with the munitions,'' and ``oh, by the way, here is
    what we would really like to have, Hellfires, JDAMs, Small
    Diameter Bomb,'' that further exacerbates the challenge we
    have. So what we are working to do is to be able to work to
    project future expenditures based on historical averages. We
    have been in this for 15 years. We think we can probably
    project about what we are going to drop 2 to 3 years from now,
    and then be able to shorten the cycle time to be able to
    replenish those munitions so we can keep our stocks high.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Thank you very much, General. I
    guess now is the $64,000 question. If the current operational
    tempo were to increase, say budget constraints, sequestration,
    whatever else you have out there, what would be the real effect
    on the total Air Force and, of course, readiness, most
    importantly? I mean, I am talking like 2020, or whatever the
    case might be, if you could answer that, General.
        General Goldfein. Yes, ma'am. It will--as I said before,
    the one element that we can't control is demand and demand of
    the things that we look at to generate and sustain readiness
    levers, if you will. It is the demand signal that is actually
    keeping us from doing the high-end training. If that demand
    goes up with the capacity that we currently have, if we don't
    get bigger, if we don't bring these maintainers on, if we don't
    bring our capacity up, we will be less and less ready over time
    for the high-end fight. It goes to, again, if I can fly this
    many sorties, and that is all that I can generate, and I need
    this many sorties here to be able to generate full-spectrum
    readiness, and the reality is the Nation calls on me to do
    this, I am going to have less to do high-end training, and I am
    going to be less ready.
        Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
        We will now go to Mr. Scott.
        Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief about
    this.
        I do want to go back to one of last points Ms. Bordallo
    made, and the munitions--that is hard for us south Georgia boys
    to say; we call it ``ammo.'' It doesn't matter what size it is;
    it is ammo. But our private sector partners that provide a lot
    of those things for us, when we are not able to give them
    consistency in their production, that creates a tremendous
    amount of turmoil on them, and in many cases, we have lost our
    partners in the private sector and ended up with sole source or
    in some cases having to go to other countries that, quite
    honestly, aren't friendly with us to do certain things.
        I do want to encourage you to do one thing. The people on
    the committee, the Armed Services Committee, I think will
    support you regardless of what party they are in. If you look,
    historically, we have been able to work together on these
    issues. But I would ask that you expand and meet with Members
    that are not on the Armed Services Committee. This patch, if
    you will, that is going to temporarily stop the reduction in
    readiness from 50 percent on down, this is a patch, and that is
    all it is. And I think that Members who are not on the Armed
    Services Committee, who are not on Armed Services
    Appropriations, probably don't understand the current
    situation. And some of them are very anxious to cut spending no
    matter where those cuts come from. And my concern is not with
    any of the Members here or on this committee. My concern is
    with Members who have not had the opportunity to listen to
    people who we respect as much as we respect the three of you,
    so I would encourage you to speak with all of the Members as
    well, and take somebody from their State.
        General Goldfein. Yes, sir. Thank you.
        Mr. Wittman. Very good.
        Thank you, Mr. Scott.
        I think that completes our questioning.
        Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us. I want to
    thank not only you but all of your colleagues there, our airmen
    that have joined us today. A great opportunity to see how the
    process works. We appreciate your perspective. It is very
    important as we develop the policy this year, the National
    Defense Authorization Act, to make sure that we get it right,
    restore as much readiness as we can within this particular
    window.
        So, gentlemen, thanks again for your service. We appreciate
    the sacrifice, too, of your families.
        And our subcommittee is now hereby adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 9:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

    =======================================================================

                              A P P E N D I X

                               February 12, 2016

    =======================================================================

                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                               February 12, 2016

    =======================================================================

       [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    =======================================================================

                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                               February 12, 2016

    =======================================================================

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY

        General Goldfein. C-130H AMP Increments 1 and 2 are both fully
    funded in the FY17 PB. In accordance with Congressional guidance, AMP
    Increment 1 has been accelerated to complete in December 2019, prior to
    the January 2020 FAA mandate. AMP Increment 2 is accelerated by 14
    years to modernize the fleet by 2028. C-130H AMP Increment 2 now
    modifies at a rate of 22 aircraft per year; this rate was determined by
    considering expected aircraft downtime during modification and impact
    on current operations. No further assistance is requested at this time.
      [See page 10.]
                                     ______

                 RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
        General Goldfein. We expect the SecAF will approve the enterprise
    and criteria for the F-35A OPS 5, 6, and 7 early this spring.   [See
    page 12.]

    =======================================================================

                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                               February 12, 2016

    =======================================================================

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

        Mr. Wittman. In July 2015, the Marine Corps declared that the F-35
    had achieved initial operational capability (IOC) even though it had
    not met all of the requirements outlined in the Marine Corps IOC
    requirements letter. As the Air Force prepares to declare initial
    operational capability for the F-35A in August 2016, what steps are
    being taken to ensure that the Air Force meets all of the IOC
    requirements outlined in its IOC requirements letter?
        General Goldfein. In his January 30, 2015 IOC requirements letter,
    the Commander of Air Combat Command (COMACC), Gen Carlisle, stated,
    ``USAF F-35A IOC shall be declared when USAF Airmen are trained, manned
    and equipped to conduct basic Close Air Support (CAS), interdiction,
    and limited Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD/DEAD)
    operations in a contested environment. The F-35A shall have the ability
    to conduct operational missions utilizing System Development and
    Demonstration (SDD) program of record weapons and mission systems. The
    war fighter shall be supported with verified tactics detailing core
    mission fundamentals. The first USAF F-35A operational squadron shall
    have 12-24 primary aircraft and shall be capable of deploying and
    performing its assigned mission(s). In-place logistics elements shall
    include personnel, support equipment, spares, munitions, verified
    technical manuals, and training programs. In-place operational elements
    shall include pilots, maintenance personnel, operations support
    personnel, verified technical manuals, mission qualification training
    programs, and training devices. USAF IOC is capability-based and will
    be declared when the above requirements are met.'' Consistent with the
    Integrated Master Schedule, the program is on track for IOC within the
    window of August 1, 2016 (objective) and December 31, 2016 (threshold).
        COMACC reviews program schedule and performance monthly to consider
    status and progress toward IOC. He is closely monitoring three areas:
    software/radar stability, Autonomic Logistics Information System
    software delivery, and Mission Data File delivery. With this increased
    attention we are confident we will achieve IOC requirements within the
    August to December 2016 window.
        Mr. Wittman. Live-fly training, particularly for 5th generation
    aircraft, can be limited due to range restrictions, airspace and threat
    replicator limitations, environmental factors, and other issues. The
    Air Force has identified the integration of live, virtual, and
    constructive (LVC) training as critical to its vision of how best to
    train aircrews in complex environments.
        Is the current range and air space infrastructure sufficient to
    meet the training needs of the Air Force? If not, what aircraft are
    most affected by range and air space limitations?
        General Goldfein. No. We are currently limited in our ability to
    provide relevant and realistic training to 4th Generation and 5th
    Generation aircrews; because our live environment cannot fully
    replicate the conditions they may encounter in future conflicts. Our
    limiting factors include a lack of realistic threat density,
    limitations on spectrum use, and the increasing footprints required for
    new weapons and weapon systems. We are investing across the FYDP to
    upgrade our threat replication capability and develop better synthetic
    training capabilities.
        Mr. Wittman. Are any additional training resources, such as
    adversary air for training purposes, required to support 5th generation
    or legacy aircraft?
        General Goldfein. Yes. Live adversaries using realistic threat
    tactics with appropriately sized threat presentations and realistic
    ground-based threats, range infrastructure, and target sets capable of
    emulating potential adversary defenses are required to provide relevant
    and realistic high end training for 4th Generation and 5th Generation
    aircrews. Additionally, systems capable of emulating adversary jammers
    would further enhance live training.
        Mr. Wittman. What plans, if any, does the Air Force have to make
    investments in training resources before additional 5th generation
    squadrons reach initial operational capability status?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force has significant plans to invest in
    live, virtual, and constructive training environments; live
    capabilities such as ranges, threats, adversary air, and electronic
    attack; simulation capabilities to include a timely fielding
    of F-35 Full Mission Simulators; and a robust investment in Distributed
    Mission Training capability. Our plans for constructive capabilities
    include technology demonstrators such as the Joint Synthetic
    Environment (JSE); a synthetic training environment that will enhance
    future 5th generation training, and Secure Live Virtual Constructive
    Advanced Training Environment (SLATE); which is a live training
    environment with synthetic input that will integrate LVC training
    environments.
        Mr. Wittman. To what extent has the Air Force identified specific
    live-fly training challenges that will be overcome by training in a
    simulated environment?
        General Goldfein. The AF has carefully identified, assessed, and
    understands the growing challenges to live-fly training. In response to
    these challenges, the Air force will increasingly leverage virtual
    simulators to raise the level of overall training effectiveness,
    especially in the highly contested environment. Fifth (5th) generation
    weapon systems offer a unique challenge in that their capabilities
    cannot be fully exercised in the live environment, and will benefit
    greatly using high fidelity synthetic training.
        Mr. Wittman. To what extent has the Air Force developed an
    investment strategy to ensure it will have the resources needed to
    carry out its LVC vision?
        General Goldfein. Currently, the AF is developing an over-arching
    investment strategy at the enterprise level. Air Force Major Commands
    (MAJCOMs) have developed Core Function Master Plans/LVC investment
    strategies leading to the President's Budget input.
        Mr. Wittman. Discuss the linkage between decreased aircraft
    inventory, airframe age and flight hours, manpower and readiness.
        General Goldfein. Twenty-five years of continuous combat
    operations, coupled with budget instability and lower than planned top
    lines, have made the Air Force one of the smallest, oldest and least
    ready forces in its history.
        To put our relative size, age, and readiness in perspective, in
    1991 we deployed 33 of our 134 combat-coded Active, Guard, and Reserve
    fighter squadrons in support of Operation Desert Storm. We were 946,000
    airmen strong. The average age of our aircraft was 17 years, and 80
    percent of the fighter force was ready for full-spectrum conflict. In
    contrast, today we have just 55 total force fighter squadrons, and
    approximately 660,000 total force airmen. The average age of our
    aircraft is 27 years, and less than 50 percent of our combat Air Force
    is ready for full-spectrum conflict.
        If we are to remain the most lethal and effective air, space, and
    cyberspace force on the planet, we must take steps to rebuild our
    readiness now. In order to accomplish this goal, the fiscal year 2017
    budget aims to build, train and equip an Air Force capable of
    responding to today's and tomorrow's threats.
        The F-35, KC-46 and LRSB will change the calculus of any potential
    adversary and will be critical to success in any future high-end fight.
    For an Air Force, failing to push the technological edge equals
    failure, and when the Air Force fails, the joint team fails. Our Fiscal
    Year 2017 budget request includes the funding required to recover the
    manpower needed to ensure the health of our nuclear forces, aircraft
    maintenance teams, battlefield airmen, and other critically under-
    manned and over-tasked capabilities. A return to BCA-level funding in
    Fiscal Year 2018 will further decimate our readiness and modernization,
    and will place the nation at an unacceptable risk.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
        Ms. Bordallo. What percentage of readiness could the Air Force
    reasonably attain and by what time frame? How much of the Air Force's
    capacity is consumed by day-to-day, steady-state operations? What is
    the Air Force's capacity to provide additional ``surge'' forces to
    respond to a major contingency? How would you characterize the Air
    Force's readiness for full-spectrum combat operations?
        General Goldfein. a. Our Nation needs its Air Force to be at least
    80% full spectrum ready. It will take eight to ten years to achieve
    that level of readiness if we actually get the conditions set to be
    able to rebuild readiness. The one variable we don't control is the
    operations tempo, and at current capacity, the current tempo creates a
    rolling timeframe for readiness recovery.
        b. Current readiness capacity is being consumed faster than we can
    rebuild it. The Air Force has approximately 20,000 Airmen deployed
    worldwide and another 71,000 permanently stationed at overseas bases.
    In particular, 2/3 of our fighter squadrons are engaged on a day-to-day
    basis. That's why in this year's budget we valued capacity and
    readiness over modernization.
        c. If required, the AF is postured to provide nearly 100% of its
    combat force in response to a major contingency, however surging to
    that contingency may involve
    disengaging from existing steady-state operations. Because over 50% of
    our forces are not sufficiently ready for a high-end, full spectrum
    fight, it could take longer to get to the fight, if could take longer
    to win, and potentially cost more lives.
        d. Twenty-five years of continuous combat operations and difficult
    decisions in the face of austere budgets has shaved our capacity to the
    point where our strategic reserve is now operationalized to support
    rotational demand, and the Total Force is required to surge in response
    to a major contingency. As of now, less than 50% of Air Force units are
    full spectrum ready.
        Ms. Bordallo. How would you assess ``high-end'' combat skills, such
    as those that would be employed against a near-peer competitor? What do
    you believe are the biggest obstacles in the Air Force's readiness
    recovery? Are there areas that cannot recover even if provided
    additional resources in the future? What is the one thing Congress can
    do to improve USAF readiness?
        General Goldfein. The capability gap is closing. Today's focus on
    counter-insurgency in a permissive environment limits our opportunity
    to train against a high end threat, and our adversaries are not
    standing still. They continue to invest in high end capability and they
    are catching up.
        The biggest obstacle in the Air Force's readiness recovery is the
    Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration. The Air Force's readiness
    recovery depends on the steadfast commitment to time and resources to
    achieve our readiness recovery goals. All areas can recover if provided
    sufficient resources and opportunities to train across the entire range
    of military operations.
        BCA and sequestration have resulted in tens of billions of dollars
    of lost buying power as the Air Force has been forced to make extremely
    difficult decisions to balance today's readiness against tomorrows
    capability. We need repeal of the BCA.
        Ms. Bordallo. If near-term readiness is a priority, what actions or
    resources are being applied to near-term readiness recovery efforts?
        General Goldfein. Readiness growth cannot be accelerated
    substantially with resources alone while ongoing rotational deployments
    continue to consume readiness. The Air Force requires sufficient and
    predictable funding, along with increased manpower in critical skills
    areas, and improved deploy-to-dwell time to improve readiness. Today,
    we are working closely with the Combatant Commanders to maintain
    deployment levels at or below readiness recovery rates.
        Ms. Bordallo. The latest projections for rebuilding readiness are
    based on setting the conditions for readiness recovery in FY 2020. What
    tangible measures can you point to that suggest conditions will be set
    in 2020, particularly in terms of operational tempos?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force's plan provides the resource
    foundation from which to begin growth in FY20 if deployment conditions
    improve. We will regularly analyze actual conditions and adjust the
    resource plan accordingly, but the readiness enterprise depends on
    consistent, predictable funding. The Air Force will fulfill Combatant
    Commander requirements, recognizing that a high deploy-to-dwell rate
    consumes full-spectrum readiness.
        Ms. Bordallo. What, if any, mitigation plan does the Air Force have
    to meet combatant commander requirements if the conditions for
    readiness recovery (decreased deployments/operational tempo and
    predictable funding) are not set in 2020?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force will continue to meet Combatant
    Commander requirements to the best of our ability. Senior Department of
    Defense leaders have made restoring joint readiness a top priority; and
    we continue to work closely with them to ensure readiness is restored
    as quickly as possible. Global Force Management reforms implemented
    within the past year include consideration for force element readiness,
    and they appear to be a promising initiative in assisting with our
    readiness recovery.
        Ms. Bordallo. Are there particular service core function areas that
    are more at risk than others, in terms of their readiness recovery
    efforts?
        General Goldfein. The core functions at greatest risk are those
    under the greatest demand relative to capacity of equipment or
    personnel (supply-demand mismatch). This dynamic prevents growth due to
    constant loss of readiness during rotational deployment (Example:
    Command and Control (C2)). Similarly, core functions with complex
    training requirements or very long-lead resourcing requirements are
    also at risk due to the long timelines associated with the development
    of proficiency in complex tasks or acquisition of materials (Example:
    Personnel Recovery (PR)).
        Ms. Bordallo. There are several communities within in the Air Force
    that have deploy-to-dwell rates below the Secretary of Defense's goal
    of 1:2, and some stressed career fields have rates of 1:1. How does the
    Air Force intend to increase dwell time
    for personnel in its stressed career fields while still meeting
    combatant commander demands?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force has several unique capabilities
    that are low in supply yet very high in demand (Personnel Recovery,
    Intelligence, Air Battle Managers, etc.). We comply with SecDef policy
    established in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF) to
    maintain an active component deploy-to-dwell goal of 1:2 with a
    threshold of 1:1. As a result, 90% of the Active component met 1:2 or
    better deploy-to-dwell in FY15. The FY17 Baseline Global Force
    Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) sources all force elements within
    readiness recovery thresholds to meet Combatant Commanders' most
    important requirements.
        But we remain concerned. Without predictable budgets at levels that
    allow us the flexibility to balance capability, capacity, and
    readiness, we cannot recover full spectrum readiness.
        Ms. Bordallo. What is the plan to get the current deploy-to-dwell
    ratio to a maintainable level? Is there a total force solution to this?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force's plan is to fill Combatant
    Commander requirements at a regain readiness rate in compliance with
    SecDef policy established in the Guidance for the Employment of the
    Force (GEF). The FY17 Baseline Global Force Management Allocation Plan
    (GFMAP) will source all force elements within readiness recovery
    thresholds. Exceptions to this policy are only granted in rare cases
    and at the 3-star level or above.
        Yes. The Air Force fully integrates the Reserve Component into
    sourcing global combatant command requirements. Lack of access to the
    RC, either in activation authority or funding, will severely impact
    USAF's ability to meet Combatant Commander demands while still
    maintaining regain readiness thresholds.
        Ms. Bordallo. To what extent is the Air Force's flying hour program
    properly sized to support completion of training requirements?
        General Goldfein. The FY17 Presidents Budget capped the Air Force's
    peacetime Flying Hour Program (FHP) to 92% of the minimum required
    flight hours. The Air Force is currently unable to execute the minimum
    required flight training to sustain readiness due to limits in capacity
    in several key areas. These areas include: the lack of the proper
    number and skill level of Airmen in critical areas (i.e. aircraft
    maintenance, aircrew); continued high OPSTEMPO; and consistent high
    demand to deploy forces. These factors, levied against a reduced force
    structure, limit our opportunities to train and build readiness.
        To build readiness, the FHP will need to be expanded. But before
    the FHP can be successfully expanded, several limiting factors must be
    rectified. These factors include: improving manning in critical skill
    areas (i.e. aircraft maintenance, aircrew); better management of
    OPSTEMPO; and limitations to the demand to deploy forces. Incremental
    improvements in these areas plus adequate sustainment and training
    resources will eventually allow the AF to expand the FHP to the minimum
    requirement (100%) and beyond to build and sustain a ready force.
        Ms. Bordallo. In instances where the Air Force has been unable to
    execute its flying hour program, what factors contributed to under-
    execution of the program?
        General Goldfein. Two key factors contribute to the Air Force
    inability to execute the full FHP requirement: 1) ongoing rotational
    deployments in support of ongoing combatant command requirements reduce
    opportunity to execute home station flying hours; and 2) manpower
    shortfalls in key areas of the maintenance enterprise impede the Air
    Force's ability to generate training sorties at the levels necessary to
    execute a full flying hour program.
        Ms. Bordallo. Is the current range and air space infrastructure
    sufficient to meet the training needs of the Air Force? If not, what
    aircraft are most affected by range and air space limitations?
        General Goldfein. No. We are currently limited in our ability to
    provide relevant and realistic training to 4th Generation and 5th
    Generation aircrews; because our live environment cannot fully
    replicate the conditions they may encounter in future conflicts. Our
    limiting factors include a lack of realistic threat density,
    limitations on spectrum use, and the increasing footprints required for
    new weapons and weapon systems. We are investing across the FYDP to
    upgrade our threat replication capability and develop better synthetic
    training capabilities.
        Ms. Bordallo. Are any additional training resources, such as
    adversary air for training purposes, required to support fifth
    generation or legacy aircraft?
        General Goldfein. Yes. Live adversaries using realistic threat
    tactics with appropriately sized threat presentations and realistic
    ground-based threats, range infrastructure, and target sets capable of
    emulating potential adversary defenses are required to provide relevant
    and realistic high end training for 4th Generation and
    5th Generation aircrews. Additionally, systems capable of emulating
    adversary jammers would further enhance live training.
        Ms. Bordallo. What plans, if any, does the Air Force have to make
    investments in training resources before additional 5th generation
    squadrons reach initial operational capability status?
        General Goldfein. The Air Force has significant plans to invest in
    live, virtual, and constructive training environments; live
    capabilities such as ranges, threats, adversary air, and electronic
    attack; simulation capabilities to include a timely fielding of F-35
    Full Mission Simulators; and a robust investment in Distributed Mission
    Training capability. Air Force plans for constructive capabilities
    include technology demonstrators such as the Joint Synthetic
    Environment (JSE); a synthetic training environment that will enhance
    future 5th generation training, and Secure Live Virtual Constructive
    Advanced Training Environment (SLATE); which is a live training
    environment with synthetic input that will integrate Live, Virtual, and
    Constructive training environments.
        Ms. Bordallo. If the current operational tempo were to increase,
    what would be the effect on readiness?
        General Goldfein. If operational tempo increases, we would expect a
    further reduction in full spectrum readiness. High operations tempo
    substantially reduces our units' opportunity to train for its FULL
    mission set. A higher ops tempo would further reduce our opportunities
    to train.
        Ms. Bordallo. To what extent are weapons shortages affecting
    prepositioned munitions inventories, and consequently readiness to
    address other potential conflicts around the globe?
        General Goldfein. The increased expenditures of certain munitions,
    along with known budgetary constraints since the August 2014 start of
    Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR) have resulted in reallocation of some
    munitions stocks from pre- and forward-positioned locations to the
    point of need. Replenishment of those stocks will occur through
    existing Air Force munitions prioritization and positioning
    governances. Inventory levels for Precision Guided Munitions will
    continue to decline until new production increases.
        Ms. Bordallo. How, specifically, is your current budget request
    balancing the short-term requirement to repair or rebuild equipment
    with longer-term efforts to replace that same equipment with next-
    generation equipment?
        General Goldfein. This year's budget prioritized capacity and
    readiness over modernization. We sacrificed investments in next-
    generation capability (F-35, C130Js) to fund readiness, grow capacity
    in manpower, and to keep force structure. For example, we are growing
    end strength to 317,000 on a path to 321,000. Also, F-16C/D models will
    undergo multiple offensive and defensive upgrades to ensure capability
    and survivability in the current and future threat environments, as the
    F-35 comes into the field in greater numbers.
        Ms. Bordallo. Do you have a strategy that ensures you do not
    unnecessarily reset equipment you plan to replace? If so, does that
    strategy present any risks to readiness? Please explain why or why not.
        General Goldfein. We have a very robust reset and refurbish plan
    for our equipment. All of our major end items like aircraft and engines
    have structured lifecycle management plans to ensure we get the best
    value when deciding whether to overhaul, modernize, or purchase new.
    For our aircraft we use an economic service life analysis to determine
    whether to overhaul, extend the life, or retire and buy new.
        We apply similar methods for other equipment where we properly
    balance decisions between refreshing equipment, redistributing between
    units, and buying new equipment. This approach ensures the maximum
    service life of our equipment, and prevents a large reset bill.
        Ms. Bordallo. To what extent are reset efforts and schedules
    aligned with unit training plans and supporting, or hindering, the
    achievement of overall unit readiness?
        General Goldfein. High operations tempo (deploy-to-dwell ratios
    below 1:4) hinders our ability to effectively synchronize and schedule
    training events to achieve full spectrum readiness. The current ops
    tempo has compressed training timelines across most Air Force
    communities; forcing units to focus on their next deployment and
    assigned missions, versus completing the training curriculum for all of
    their designed operational capability tasks.
                                     ______

                        QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON
        Mr. Gibson. How many Joint Forcible Entry Exercises are in the FY17
    AF budget?
        General Goldfein. The Joint Forcible Entry Exercise (JFEX) is now
    known as the Joint Operational Access Exercise (JOAX). While the JOAX
    is not a specific line item in the FY17 President's Budget, Air
    Mobility Command uses Operations & Maintenance funding to support four
    JOAX.

                                      [all]