[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-91]
CARRIER AIR WING AND THE FUTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 11, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
98-958 WASHINGTON : 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
Chair HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri Georgia
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Bruce Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Cropsey, Dr. Seth, Director, Center for American Seapower, Hudson
Institute...................................................... 2
Horowitz, Dr. Michael C., Associate Professor of Political
Science, University of Pennsylvania............................ 4
Rubel, Robert C., Professor Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College..... 7
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cropsey, Dr. Seth............................................ 25
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 23
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 21
Horowitz, Dr. Michael C...................................... 41
Rubel, Robert C.............................................. 58
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
CARRIER AIR WING AND THE FUTURE OF NAVAL AVIATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, February 11, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss the
carrier air wing and the future of naval aviation.
We have got a distinguished panel of guests, and they
include Dr. Seth Cropsey, the Director of the Center for
American Seapower, Hudson Institute; Dr. Michael C. Horowitz,
the Associate Professor of Political Science, the University of
Pennsylvania; and Professor Robert Rubel, Navy War College.
The distinguished witnesses that are here today have done
so much to help in furthering this debate and discussion
throughout the years and we welcome you and we are so glad to
have you today.
The subject of our hearing today is the carrier air wing
and the future of naval aviation. And I don't want for our
discussion today to be focused on the past. We want it focused
on the future. But we also have to look at where we have come
in the past and some present realities.
Because of the shortness of time that we have and the fact
that they are going to call votes perhaps at any time, we are
going to dispense with our opening comments. I think Mr.
Courtney has agreed to do the same. We will have those
submitted for the record.
We are going to go right to your opening statements. I told
you at the beginning that we could have votes in the interim.
If so, we will have to excuse ourselves, take a recess, go cast
those votes and then come back.
So, with that, if Mr. Courtney has no comments that he
would like to make, then, Mr. Cropsey, since you are sitting on
the side that you are sitting on, we assume that you are going
to start us today. And we welcome you here and look forward to
your opening remarks.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can
be found in the Appendix beginning on page 21.]
STATEMENT OF DR. SETH CROPSEY, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
SEAPOWER, HUDSON INSTITUTE
Dr. Cropsey. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Forbes. By the way, all of your written testimony will
be submitted for the record, without any objection.
Mr. Cropsey.
Dr. Cropsey. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, and
the distinguished representatives gathered here today, thank
you for the honor of asking me to appear before this committee.
I have been asked to testify on the future of naval
aviation and the carrier air wing specifically, with a focus on
unmanned systems.
The testimony that I have offered for the record is divided
into four parts. I will summarize them very briefly. I have
looked at the evolution of the carrier air wing from 1980 until
today. I discuss gaps in the modern air wing. I elaborated on
the role that unmanned systems could have in the air wing. And
I made broader recommendations about the structure of the air
wing and the carrier platform.
I would like to emphasize that without a discussion of
strategy, the comments offered here are speculative exercises,
useful perhaps, but disconnected from the broader strategic
ideas that ought to govern U.S. and allied security.
The U.S. has not faced such a diverse and dangerous group
of threats since the end of the Cold War. At the high end,
Chinese and Russian military capabilities can challenge
American power globally as they have not in the past, or at
least in the recent past for one of them.
Low-end threats like ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria]
and similar insurgencies cannot destroy U.S. power, but can
undermine regional stability or worse.
Hybrid adversaries, particularly Iran, employ a mix of
conventional and insurgent assets to harass American forces and
exploit critical vulnerabilities.
And I won't go into history here because I think I have
handled it in the written remarks. But what we are looking at
today is not unique, is not new. Great maritime powers have
always experienced problems that overlapping threats present.
Britain serves, I think, as the best example.
On the eve of World War I, First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher and
First Lord Winston Churchill had to counter the powerful
Kaiserliche Marine in the North Sea at the same time defending
British shipping around the world against commerce raiders and
submarines.
To remedy this strategic problem, Admiral Fisher's so-
called ``scheme,'' as it was termed at the time, marshaled
heavy dreadnought battleships for major fleet engagements
against the Germans in the North Sea, along with fast
battlecruisers which were intended to destroy commerce raiders.
Combined with smaller destroyers from other escorts, this mix
of ships was designed to engage in major oceanic battles, at
the same time protecting British shipping around the world.
Without such focused, strategic ideas, analysis and
recommendations about weapons systems or conglomerations of
them don't count as much.
Since its earliest days, naval aviation in the United
States has always been defined by a diversity of platforms. The
carrier platform, with the limitations it imposes on fuel usage
and weight, has always required aircraft designers to create a
diverse number of platforms.
Two factors have shaped the modern carrier air wing: aerial
refueling and sustainable ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] platforms. Aerial refueling extended the range
and flight time of the carrier air wing, allowing it to remain
on-station longer and patrol more airspace. This became
critically important for long-range interceptors and fighter
aircraft, since these platforms could now be designed with less
of a mind to range since range-extending aircraft could be
placed aboard the carrier.
Dedicated airborne early-warning platforms began to enter
the fleet in the 1960s and that allowed the carrier air wing to
monitor even more airspace.
Bringing us up to more recent history, the 1980s carrier
air wing was the pinnacle of naval aviation diversity.
Specialized strike, ISR, air-to-air and anti-submarine warfare
aircraft gave the fleet the ability to respond to the Soviet
threat on all levels. Unfortunately, budget cuts and a self-
enforced ideology of one interpretation of jointness have
forced a decline in diversity in the modern air wing.
Multi-role platforms, like the Hornet and Super Hornet,
replaced mission-specific aircraft such as the A-6 and the F-
14. The carrier also lost its organic tanking capability,
forcing Navy to rely on Air Force tankers, to a certain extent,
launched from potentially vulnerable ground targets.
This state of affairs is untenable considering the anti-
access threats the U.S. faces today. China, Russia, and Iran
have created an overlapping access-denial network supplemented
by insurgent groups in critical regions.
Unmanned systems can greatly improve the carrier air wing's
efficacy by filling critical gaps in tanking, in ISR, and
strike capability.
In the immediate future, U-class [unmanned] programs could
be focused on creating a viable carrier-based tanker
considering the advantages that an unmanned platform has over a
manned tanking platform. The Navy could also benefit from
longer loiter time of current unmanned systems and use them to
amplify ISR and strike/sea control capabilities.
Finally, the Navy would benefit from, I believe, a broad
effort to re-diversify the air wing. It would benefit from
developing a new manned airframe for air-to-air combat, along
with creating a low-end platform to perform cheaper strikes
against long-term insurgency groups, for example.
The Navy might also consider increasing the size of the
carrier air wing to its nominative, its intended strength of 80
or more aircraft, rather than under-equipping each deployed
carrier strike group.
Finally, the Navy would benefit, I believe, from
considering the creation of other platforms to perform
consistent strikes against insurgencies. Small carriers might
be added, not in place of, but in addition to large-deck
carriers as part of this approach, along with low-cost strike
aircraft.
Naval aviation is the cornerstone of the U.S. Navy and, by
extension, the back power of American seapower globally. The
Navy is taking steps to integrate unmanned systems into the air
wing. Focusing on these will improve diversity and the overall
efficacy of manned and unmanned platforms.
Nevertheless, as I said at the beginning, without a proper
strategy, no procurement, operational doctrine or development
project can really preserve the American-led international
order.
Thank you for your patience.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cropsey can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Cropsey, thank you.
Dr. Horowitz.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dr. Horowitz. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
Courtney, other members of the subcommittee and staff and
guests here today for the invitation to testify before you. It
is a real honor to be here to speak about the vital importance
of the carrier air wing and the challenges it faces.
America's global reach relies in no small part on naval
aviation and the carrier air wing. Yet because of long
procurement timelines and moves by potential adversaries, the
decisions made in the next several years, in just the next few
years, will be critical. The United States cannot rest on its
laurels in the carrier domain.
In what follows, I will very briefly describe the rising
threat to the carrier and then three areas where I think this
committee can work with the Navy to try to move the carrier
forward to sustain it as a critical part of the Navy into the
middle part of the 21st century.
We all know that America's aircraft carriers are
increasingly vulnerable. From China's development of an anti-
ship ballistic missile to the proliferation of anti-ship cruise
missiles, like the SSN-22, the risk to U.S. aircraft carriers
is arguably as large as it has ever been since our carriers
were actually out there fighting in the Second World War.
Add to this advances in air-to-air missiles by China,
including the PL-15, and the carrier air wing itself is
increasingly at risk. And the history of military innovations
demonstrates that established powers using established
technologies must continually innovate to keep up.
The dawn of the carrier age itself is an example of this.
The British, who had dominated naval warfare before with the
battleship, viewed the aircraft carrier as a spotter, something
to help find adversary ships. This demonstrates the kind of
failure of imagination that is crucial for the United States
Navy to avoid. By taking seriously these threats to the carrier
itself, and the carrier air wing, Congress and the Navy can
work together to preserve the role of carrier aviation in U.S.
power projection capabilities to assure that what happened to
the British will not happen to the United States Navy.
And here are three areas where I think the United States
Navy could invest and I hope this subcommittee will promote to
help ensure that the carrier air wing remains a strong and
vital part of U.S. military power.
The first is increasing America's investment and the Navy's
investment in munitions. One way to ensure the continued
strength of carrier aviation is extending its range. Range in
this space can mean two things, the range of the airplanes that
launch from the carriers----
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Horowitz, I am sorry to interrupt you,
could you just make sure your microphone is on. And maybe if it
is not, get a little closer.
Dr. Horowitz. Sorry.
Mr. Forbes. That is okay, thank you.
Dr. Horowitz. One way to ensure the continued strength of
carrier aviation is extending its range. Range in this case
could mean two things: increasing the range of the airplanes
launching from the carrier or increasing the range of the
munitions that those planes carry.
But for a variety of bureaucratic and budgetary reasons, it
is often easy to under-invest in munitions, not buying enough
and not investing enough in research and development for the
next generation.
There is good news in this area. The Navy's development of
the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, something this committee has
supported, will critically extend the range of the weapons
launched from current carrier aircraft. But advanced munitions
are expensive. One estimate suggests that the Long-Range Anti-
Ship Missile [L-RASM] may cost $2 million per missile.
That is money well spent, but Congress and the Navy should
think about ways to reduce the unit cost of advanced munitions.
One way to reduce costs is through larger buys that generate
economies of scale, but another is to consider next-generation
systems that might employ more off-the-shelf commercial
technology to take advantage of growth in robotics and related
fields.
The Navy could consider harnessing developments in swarming
technology, to give just one example, to develop lower-cost
munitions where the target is destroyed not by a single
munition that escapes detection, but through overwhelming
adversary defenses through mass.
The second area I think this committee should push the Navy
to invest in more is unmanned or uninhabited systems. The move
by the Navy to convert the U-class system into a tanker might
be a good-news story. It will be a good-news story if that
tanker allows the Navy to experiment with unmanned systems on a
carrier, paving the way for a more advanced, armed platform in
the future. This would be a really good-news story.
It won't be a good-news story if rather than being a bridge
to the future of combat aircraft the purchase of an unmanned
tanker represents a shift away from thinking about uninhabited
systems for carrier-based, deep-strike missions.
If the Navy lacks the bureaucratic appetite to invest
heavily in next-generation systems, it could increase the
structural risks to carrier aviation over the long term. Due to
their ability to loiter, the fact that they are not limited by
human endurance, and that they can operate in more dangerous
missions where American pilots might be at risk, there are
several advantages to having unmanned platforms in deep-strike
missions.
There is good evidence that suggests that senior leadership
of the Pentagon gets it, from the Third Offset Strategy that
Deputy Secretary Work has advocated to Secretary Carter's
preview calling for the potential of microdrones and swarms,
there is a lot to like. But this will require close monitoring,
especially with a new administration entering next year.
Finally, given these changes in the threat environment, it
is worth at least thinking about whether investing in a small
number of large aircraft carriers should remain the optimal
path for the United States Navy over the next generation.
The old aphorism about not putting all of your eggs in one
basket is potentially appropriate here. It may make sense to
diversify risk. One path forward might involve investing in
some number of smaller aircraft carriers.
Though the air wing would be smaller in number than the
current Ford-class aircraft carriers the Navy is building, it
might be possible to extend the capabilities of such platforms
by leveraging uninhabited systems or leveraging the potential
for what is called manned/unmanned teaming or quarterbacking
where one advanced U.S. Navy aircraft would work together
quarterbacking several remotely piloted airplanes. It is a way
to leverage the investment that the United States has already
made and use the aircraft that the United States Navy has
developed over the last generation.
This will be very difficult for the Navy. The Navy is the
best in the world because of its carriers and because of the
carrier air wing. But as the Navy's original investments in
naval aviation and the carrier in the interwar period show,
there is no innovation incubator like the United States Navy
when it puts its mind to it.
And that is something that I hope that this subcommittee
will continue pushing the Navy on to ensure that the carrier
air wing remains a vital part of the 21st century Navy.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Horowitz can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Dr. Horowitz.
And Professor Rubel, we are going to have to wait until we
get back. Fortunately, Speaker Ryan now has made sure that we
are there within the 15-minute mark, so we don't want to take a
chance of anyone missing votes.
So, with that, we will recess until the conclusion of votes
and then we will begin again.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you for your patience during
those votes. And when we left, I think we had Professor Rubel
up next. So, Professor, thank you for being with us and we look
forward to your opening thoughts.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT C. RUBEL, PROFESSOR EMERITUS, U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLLEGE
Mr. Rubel. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Seapower and
Projection Force Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee, it is a distinct honor and privilege to be called to
testify as a witness on the future of naval aviation, just as
it was to be a practicing naval aviator for the first 20 years
of my 48-year Navy career, 30 of which were Active Duty.
You have read my written testimony that lays out my
concerns about the readiness of naval aviation to deal with the
challenges that are emerging.
In my view, the Navy cannot continue to deploy and operate
as it has since the end of World War II. A combination of
rising naval competitors and reduced budgets force a
fundamental rethinking of both force structure or, as Admiral
Richardson, the current CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] puts
it, fleet design, and operational doctrine. This will be a
difficult process for a Navy that has been accustomed to
unchallenged supremacy for the past 25 years.
Among other things, I advocate relieving the carrier force
from routine presence duty so that the Navy can develop
doctrine and training for a concentrated carrier force that can
provide adequate warfighting capabilities in the face of new
threats.
The need to shift from a dispersed, constabulary posture to
a warfighting posture was described by our foremost naval
theoretician Alfred Thayer Mahan in 1911 as he observed the
naval arms races occurring in Europe. A concentrated fleet was,
at that time, needed to support the Monroe Doctrine, the
central U.S. strategic policy of the day. Concentration was
needed for two purposes: deterrence and response.
Today, we observe a certain rhyming of history, rising
naval powers forcing the U.S. Navy to consider military
concentration vice constabulary dispersion. However, in today's
world, the constabulary function is still critical to the
execution of U.S. strategy.
The Navy must deploy where needed to cultivate the global
maritime partnerships to bolster maritime security, to reassure
allies and friends, and generally defend the global system of
commerce and security.
Whereas up to now this presence function could be performed
by most any kind of unit, today the need is for units that
possess credible war-at-sea capabilities in order to deter and
disrupt regional aggression and constitute a viable crisis
response force. The embryonic concept of distributed lethality
holds promise for creating this kind of force.
If the Navy is able to constitute such a force and keep the
carriers substantially in reserves, new approaches to the
design of air wings become possible. I outline some
illustrative ideas in my full testimony statement.
I believe the Nation needs to invest more in its Navy than
currently. But even if funds become available, fleet design
should change along the general lines I advocate. Doing so will
reduce strategic risks by allowing the Navy to harmonize
tactical and operational risks with the stakes involved in any
particular crisis by avoiding placing the national command
authority in an all-or-nothing situation.
I believe in the continuing strategic utility of aircraft
carriers, but they must be used differently than in the past
because geopolitical conditions have changed. I urge the
Congress to support Admiral Richardson as he undertakes the
difficult job of putting the Navy's rudder over and steering a
course for change.
Thank you, sirs.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rubel can be found in the
Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Professor.
I am going to defer my questions until the end.
So, I would like to recognize Mr. Courtney now for any
questions that he might have.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to all the witnesses for, you know, really
great, thoughtful, stimulating testimony. And again, as we are
about to embark on the budget process, the timing is perfect.
And again, you know, your written comments obviously are going
to be made part of the record and circulated to all the
members.
Again, there is a lot to sort of ask questions about. I
guess one I wanted to start with, Captain Rubel, you know,
trying to visualize your concluding remarks about sort of
moving away from a constabulatory role to a more concentrated
use of the carriers and then distributed lethality to sort of
fill the constabulary function.
You know, there has been a lot of heartburn over the last
couple of years or so about carrier gaps, you know, in terms of
not being out there in different parts of the world where, you
know, people have kind of grown accustomed to their presence. I
guess, you know, that is--I wonder if you could just sort of
elaborate a little bit more in terms of how you visualize the
distributed lethality that would sort of reassure our allies
and, obviously, you know, protect our national interests.
Mr. Rubel. It is a challenge. The carrier is sometimes
referred to as an iconic ship type. That is, it is not only its
size and advanced capabilities, but also its reputation from
World War II on give it a status in the eyes of not only
American citizens, but citizens around the world, so that when
one of those things shows up, it means something.
The intangibles involved in that must be overcome as we
work to substitute other types of forces for the carriers. I
see the distributed lethality force as consisting of cruisers,
destroyers, and other types of ships. Whether the LCS [littoral
combat ships] will work out as part of that or not, I don't
know. But our amphibious forces, those are big ships. If we
pack them with lots of missiles and advertise the fact and use
exercises, live-fire demos, et cetera, and work the public
relations part of it in tandem with the development of these
new types of forces, I think we can get there.
It seems to me we don't have much of a choice. I don't see
us going beyond 11 carriers. Maybe we can, but if we can't
there aren't enough carriers to maintain presence like we are
used to, providing presence around the world, so something has
to give. Right now it is creating these unplanned gaps, which
is a strategically risky way of doing business.
The United States has a well-founded grand strategy, I
believe, of maintaining a law-based world order and a free
market, liberal trading economy globally. That kind of system
requires security, it requires comprehensive security, and the
Navy has to be out there with something. If we don't have
enough carriers to do it, we have to do it with something else.
We might as well develop something that allows us to take
the pressure off the carrier force and constitute a force, a
warfighting force that will truly deter China, Russia, or
whoever.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
Dr. Horowitz, again, you talked about the U-class sort of
steps, you know, the stepped-up approach that it appears that,
you know, the Navy is pursuing, starting with the tanker
function, but you obviously were pretty adamant that, you know,
we can't just sort of stop there and that we have got to
really, you know, enhance that technology to take it to a
higher level.
In terms of a timeline, you know, how do you sort of see
that, you know, stepped-up use of unmanned aircraft as far as,
you know, trying to achieve the goals that you laid out?
Dr. Horowitz. Thanks for your question. This area, the
intersection of robotics and military technology, is one where
the technology is advancing quickly. And one of the biggest
challenges, I think, for the United States military as a whole
in this category, to back up a little bit, is how long our
procurement timelines, you know, are.
I mean, like, you know, we could have a whole different
discussion about the acquisition system, but I think if you
want to identify a risk point in the strategy that has been
identified in the budget, from my perspective, it would be that
it takes so long to actually acquire and deploy this tanker and
then so long to use it and feel comfortable with it, so that it
is, you know, 25 years later and we still really haven't made
progress.
In some ways, the early discussions about what the next-gen
[generation] naval fighter look like might be illustrative for
understanding the direction that the Navy wants to move in.
You know, Secretary Mabus made the comment last year, I
believe, that the F-35 was likely to be the last manned naval
fighter. And the rubber will meet the road when the Navy starts
thinking about their plans for what the next-generation fighter
looks like. That, I think, will be a really key decision point
in ensuring that the Navy remains on the right track.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Well, thank you.
And I apologize for missing your testimonies.
Dr. Cropsey, here I am. I am on record as saying we need a
12th carrier. Can you talk to us about how many carriers we
actually need? Is that pie in the sky? I know that may be a
little bit aspirational, but can you talk to us about, from
your perspective, what that would do for today's Navy or 5
years from now maybe when we actually got that 12th carrier in
the water?
Dr. Cropsey. Thanks for the question.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Cropsey, do you have the mike on?
Dr. Cropsey. Yes, I do, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay, that is all right. Sometimes you have to
keep it up----
Dr. Cropsey. I need to talk louder. His point about
carriers meaning something is right, I agree with that. He is
absolutely right. They mean ISR, they mean strike, they mean
sea control, they mean anti-submarine warfare.
I also think that it is correct that one carrier in each of
the areas of contention, as we have today, is insufficient now
and will become more insufficient in the future and does not
include the Mediterranean.
So, it seems to me that we limit ourselves and we limit our
capabilities and ultimately we limit our security by looking at
this in terms of what can we afford. The question is, what do
we have the will to do and what must be done?
Before John Maynard Keynes, the idea of government spending
going into debt was anathema to the rulers of Britain, the
aristocracy, to the House of Commons. And when they looked at
the cost of the Second Boer War, they realized that the sinking
fund, which was meant to pay off limited debt, was not going to
be sufficient and that they were really in the red in a way
that horrified them. And they made changes in their Navy that
started them on the path toward where they are today with 19
surface ships.
I am afraid that if we think of the number of carriers in
those terms, we will find ourselves in the same position in the
future, which is why I think that we need something like 16
carriers, a number of ships that would allow them to operate
together, and that would also require being able to integrate
carrier operations, and a number of ships that would allow us
to once again be present in force in the Mediterranean.
Consider what is happening as we have left, look at what China
and Russia are doing, and you know that.
Mr. Conaway. Let me ask this question. I am currently
reading a book about the First World War in the start and it is
talking about the way the armies of the Germans and the Austro-
Hungarians and Russians continued to train cavalry troops. They
would finish up all of their exercises with a mass cavalry
charge, sabers drawn, flags flapping, wonderful, grandiose kind
of things. Are we at risk of clinging to a carrier concept much
like the other outdated weapon systems have, you know, gone
that direction? Are we at a point or at risk at all of
something like that going on where we just look really foolish
trying to cling to a weapon system like that?
Dr. Cropsey. I think we are always at risk of something
like what you are saying. That is a reasonable question. I
think that it would be that the argument against carriers and
the specific argument against carriers in the future would be
greatly strengthened by showing that there is an alternative
that can perform those functions that well.
And when I see that, then I will be convinced more than I
am now that the risk you talk about is a real one.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Johnson is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Horowitz, while fifth-generation capabilities are
critical in missions involving high-end threats in an anti-
access area-denial environment, they are just as important in a
low-threat environment, like Afghanistan today. The F-35C has
capabilities that exceed the current air wing aircraft, such as
the ability to carry over 30 percent more ordnance and having
around 50 percent more on-station time in a close-air-support
mission.
In addition to the fifth-generation capabilities of
stealth, sensor fusion, combat identification and network
connectivity, do you see these weapons' long range and on-
station time capabilities important in protecting our men and
women on the ground?
Dr. Horowitz. Thank you for your question. I think that the
roll-out of an effective F-35 throughout the fleet is vital for
American naval power over the next generation. We can have, and
a professor like me might be willing to engage in, an academic
debate about an alternative. But where we are now, it is
crucial that the F-35 is made to work and deploys. Because I
think you are absolutely right that in Afghanistan, in many of
these different scenarios around the world, some of which are
not the highest-end combat situations, the capabilities that
the F-35 will bring to the table are important.
And I would say that is also a reason why I think I have
emphasized the necessity of investing in next-generation
munitions, because the platform, in some ways, is only as good
as what it is firing at the end of the day. You know, the
airframe is a means to an end. The means to the end in some
cases might be surveillance, and in some cases it might be
strike.
And one way, to the extent that the F-35 has some
limitations, to try to help it be better in some ways, is to
give it better munitions to work with.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Rubel, do you have anything to add?
Mr. Rubel. The F-35 will bring key capabilities to the
fleet, there is no doubt. I mean, it is the only game in town
right now and it needs to work.
We should not ignore the capabilities of the F-35B. The
Marine Corps model will revolutionize the capabilities of the
10 big-deck amphibious ships we have, essentially, if we choose
to do so, turning them into light aircraft carriers. There is
really no comparison between the F-35B and the AV-8 Harrier.
And so it creates a lot more possibilities for both the
Navy and the Marine Corps having that airplane aboard those
vessels.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Dr. Cropsey.
Dr. Cropsey. Congressman, did I understand correctly that
your question applied also to low-end missions?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Dr. Cropsey. Yes. Well, sir, I don't think that if the
danger that you face on a camping trip is a grizzly bear that
you should bring a 105 mm howitzer along with you. You can
protect yourself with less. And the F-35, I do not disagree
with my colleagues here about its effectiveness. I have had
some questions about its radar cross-section and some questions
about its usefulness as an air-to-air platform.
But I don't have a lot of questions about its applicability
to, for example, ISIS. It doesn't seem to me as though that
makes sense. If the target is an ISIS convoy, do we need a
platform as advanced and as sophisticated as the F-35? I don't
think so.
Mr. Johnson. And what would be the alternative?
Dr. Cropsey. Well, for example, the old OV-10, the
observation plane which can land on aircraft carriers, can
carry ordnance, it is a good design, low speed. Why are we
using such an expensive and powerful platform against such a
relatively small target?
Mr. Johnson. What do you say, Dr. Horowitz?
Dr. Horowitz. My concern is that I am not sure we have a
choice, given the current procurement plans of the Navy. And I
think the F-35 is, as I think my colleague said, perhaps, you
know, the only game in town for those kinds of missions.
I agree that it would be better if there was a lower-cost
option that we could use to deliver strikes in cases where the
full range of capabilities of the F-35 are not needed. But
given current procurement plans, the F-35 will be necessary.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Johnson.
Dr. Cropsey, the Navy seeks to decommission the 10th
carrier air wing in the President's budget for this year. But
the fiscal year 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
directs the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that the Navy
maintains a minimum of 10 carrier air wings and for each such
carrier air wing a dedicated and fully staffed headquarters.
How do you see the decommissioning of the 10th wing? Would
that be running counter to the law? And do you think it is a
good idea to decommission one of our carrier air wings?
Dr. Cropsey. I think you are, Mr. Chairman, in a better
position to answer the question about whether it runs counter
to the law.
On the question of the advisability of the idea, I think it
is another of the salami slicing that the Navy has been forced
to and has chosen to do over the past 10 to 15 years. And the
way I look at it is that the more slices you take away from the
salami, the less salami you have left.
So, this strikes me as an ill-advised idea and one that
will not improve the carrier air wings as a whole or naval
aviation's capability. It is very simple. We keep on reducing
like this and we keep on talking as though the constraints that
we are looking at right now are absolute ceilings, we are going
to end up as the British did. That is a certainty.
Mr. Forbes. Dr. Horowitz, you mentioned earlier that you
believed we should be looking at a smaller-type aircraft
carrier. The Navy has testified before to us that they have
examined that and over and over again come back with the
conclusion that we should not, that we should stay with the
size that we have.
There is some discussion, and I know Professor Rubel has
even talked about, that we may be moving away from what we have
seen of late for our carriers, which is to provide strike
capacity to land targets, and they may actually be involved in
warfare at sea, which would require us to have more planes
coming together.
What advantage do you think the smaller aircraft carrier
would have, given the fact that you would still need the same
platforms to defend the small carrier as you would a large
carrier and it may necessitate having to have more small
carriers to get that kind of mass of planes together?
Dr. Horowitz. That is a great question. And I think that
the potential value of small carriers lies, in part, in the way
that it will help the Navy diversify risk. In a threat
environment where the large carriers are not at risk of being
essentially in naval combat, that it makes a lot of sense to
have a small number of large carriers that act as mobile
airfields for land-based strike more than anything else.
But if losing ships becomes something that is possible in
war once again, as it seems like it potentially is, given the
changes in the threat environment, then from a strategy
perspective, setting aside sort of cost efficiency and budget
for a moment, a diversity through increasing the carrier fleet
through some small carriers makes sense.
I think the Navy is not wrong that it would certainly be
expensive to do.
Mr. Forbes. Professor Rubel, looking at all the roles
unmanned carrier aircraft could fulfill, do you see the need
for a single or multiple types of unmanned aircraft to perform
the ISR, buddy tanker, and long-range strike missions? And how
would you prioritize those missions?
Mr. Rubel. As I outlined in my testimony, I do foresee the
need for a range of different types of unmanned aircraft,
ranging from a high-aspect ratio, in other words a long,
straight, narrow wing that is optimized for high endurance and
high altitude, to act as a relay, line-of-sight relay platform
for the battle force network in case our satellites get taken
out, and other ISR and miscellaneous duties; a low-aspect
ratio, in other words a swept-wing, strike-fighter-like version
that can be used for strike and especially air-to-air work; and
then maybe a third type that would be the tanker, be the ASW,
anti-submarine warfare, platform, do any number of other
support duties around the carrier.
So, just as we had a family of aircraft aboard the old
carriers, I mean, when I started flying we had fighters, two
types of attack aircraft, ASW aircraft plus helos [helicopters]
plus the airborne early-warning airplane, we had a real variety
of specialized aircraft, we should consider specializing our
unmanned aircraft in a similar manner.
Mr. Forbes. And Dr. Cropsey, given the fact that we are
seeing the capabilities and capacities of China to produce and
deploy anti-access weapons, including the DF-21, but obviously
not limited to that one system, is it critical for our air
wings to possess long-range, penetrating strike capabilities to
maintain a credible deterrent? Or is that something that we
should not necessarily be focused upon?
Dr. Cropsey. I think we should definitely be focused on
that. The likelihood is that China's DF-21 capabilities, once
demonstrated, will find their ways into other parts of the
world as well. So, this is not the only place where long-range
penetration is going to be an issue.
We might be able to solve that simply by tanking. I am not
so sure of that. But I am much more certain that we will see
this problem elsewhere. It will multiply. And as all of us have
said here, this is where things are going and this is how
things are changing. Nobody is going to let us amass a force
next to their nation the way we did in Desert Storm. That was
yesterday.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, we told you at the outset, too, that
we wanted to give each of you a few minutes if you needed it to
put anything else on the record that we perhaps haven't
covered, that might be outside of the testimony that you
offered. I would like to offer you that opportunity now.
And Professor Rubel, maybe we will start with you. Anything
else you have in summary for this afternoon?
Mr. Rubel. The United States, one way or another, has to
find a way to achieve strategic efficiency. In other words, our
goals to maintain a law-based, liberal-trading, international
order stays the same. But we are increasingly challenged by
rising threats and deep national debt, so we are getting
squeezed from two sides.
To do this, we need to get more strategically efficient in
all our operations. From the Navy's point of view, like I have
outlined, we relieve the carriers of their station-keeping
duties, substitute a distributed lethality force, I think the
Navy can maintain its support for the national strategy with
that kind of a three-tiered force, which I outline in my
testimony, at a cost maybe not the same as now, the Navy's
going to need augmentation of its budget, but at least an
affordable cost for the United States.
So, we simply have to think about the architecture of our
fleet differently than we have been. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Dr. Horowitz.
Dr. Horowitz. Thanks. And thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before this subcommittee.
I think that the United States Navy is facing something
right now that it has proven historically to be incredibly
hard, even for the best meaning militaries in the world to do,
and that is to reinvent itself on the fly while you are the
best in the world. And that is extremely challenging. And one
of the areas where that will likely have to occur over the next
generation is with the carrier air wing.
I think that it is very fortunate that both through the
advocacy of this subcommittee and the current leadership of the
Pentagon that there is positive momentum for investing in next-
generation systems, particularly, but not limited to, the
unmanned space that I think will be necessary for deep-strike
capabilities in the next generation.
But I think there is a real challenge, given the fiscal
environment, in the next administration that will come up, and
it will be crucial for this subcommittee to ensure that that
administration understands this challenge as well.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Cropsey.
Dr. Cropsey. I would also like to thank you again for the
honor and opportunity to speak here.
We have gone over the major points here about the carrier
air wing, I think, to people's satisfaction. It needs to be
more robust than it is. There need to be more planes on its
decks. Restoring the diversity of the air wing is critical to
the platform's capabilities to its future, extending the air
wing's range, using drones as tankers, and then the follow-on
steps that my colleagues have talked about, providing cheaper
missiles, building them, integrated carrier operations, perhaps
adding smaller carriers to the larger carriers of which I have
said we need more, distributing lethality, increasing the naval
budget.
But I think that one of the most important things that this
subcommittee has done and can do in the future is to tell
people, tell your constituents, tell the country what this
means, what are the stakes here.
I don't like to use this term because I hope that it is not
true, but I fear that we as a nation are becoming sea blind and
that what was known very well by Army generals and merchants
and naval, obviously, people in the Navy at the beginning of
the republic has been lost and is just not understood anymore
and our reliance on strong seapower forces, our reliance on
increasing globalized seaborne trade, that these are all
subjects that are a little bit over the horizon for most
people.
And I think that you play an extremely important role, not
only by your advocacy of seapower, but in your ability to
articulate its importance to the public.
Mr. Forbes. Well, gentlemen, thank you all so much for
being with us. Thank you for your testimony and helping us to
create this record.
We look forward to talking with you in the future as these
questions arise. But we really appreciate you spending your
time today.
And Mr. Courtney, if you have nothing else, then we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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February 11, 2016
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