[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-80]
EFFECTS OF REDUCED INFRASTRUCTURE AND BASE OPERATING SUPPORT
INVESTMENTS ON AIR FORCE READINESS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JANUARY 13, 2016
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
98-889 WASHINGTON : 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Michael Miller, Professional Staff Member
Brian Garrett, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Readiness.............................. 2
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness............................ 1
WITNESSES
Green, Maj Gen Timothy S., USAF, Director of Civil Engineers,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force
Protection, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; accompanied by Maj
Gen Jerry D. Harris, Jr., USAF, Vice Commander, Air Combat
Command, Langley Air Force Base, and Brig Gen Christopher P.
Azzano, USAF, Commander, 96th Test Wing, Air Force Materiel
Command, Eglin Air Force Base.................................. 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Green, Maj Gen Timothy S..................................... 28
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Scott.................................................... 43
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Ms. Bordallo................................................. 51
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 47
EFFECTS OF REDUCED INFRASTRUCTURE AND BASE OPERATING SUPPORT
INVESTMENTS ON AIR FORCE READINESS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Readiness,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, January 13, 2016.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Mr. Wittman. I call to order the House Armed Services
Committee Subcommittee on Readiness.
I want to wish everybody a good morning and thank you all
for being here today for our Readiness hearing on the effects
of reduced infrastructure and base operating support
investments on Air Force readiness.
This is our third hearing on this topic. The Army, the
Marine Corps, and the Navy have previously testified on this
topic, and I look forward to hearing the views of the Air Force
today.
This morning, we have with us Major General Timothy Green,
U.S. Air Force, Director of Civil Engineers, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection,
Headquarters, U.S. Air Force; Major General Jerry D. Harris,
U.S. Air Force, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air
Force Base in the great State of Virginia; Brigadier General
Christopher Azzano, U.S. Air Force, Commander, 96th Test Wing,
Air Force Materiel, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida.
During the last several years, the subcommittee has largely
focused on operational readiness recovery since the drawdown of
forces in the Middle East. The Department of Defense has
implemented plans to correct readiness trends, but those plans
have assumed risk in infrastructure investments and reduced
mission support services to redirect funds from installation
programs to other operational and training budget priorities.
The purpose of this hearing is to clarify the Air Force's
choices for infrastructure and installation services, to
address funding priorities and mitigation strategies, and to
gather more detail on the current and future impacts of these
decisions on operations and training.
As the witnesses testify today, I would ask you to address
existing risks being taken in installation investments and
impacts to operations and training. How will the recent 2-year
budget reshape those risks and impacts? And what will be the
level of risk and impacts over the next 10 years if budget
levels remain constant or return to sequestration levels?
I would now like to turn to our ranking member, Madeleine
Bordallo, for any remarks that she may have.
Thank you, Madeleine.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
arranging this hearing. And I want to thank our witnesses for
being here this morning.
This hearing concludes the first series of hearings we are
conducting to look into how reduced infrastructure investments
affect the readiness of our force. However, I am sure that this
discussion will continue.
And, to the witnesses, again, thank you for all your
service and for being here today.
Over the years, this subcommittee has closely examined
issues affecting the state of our military's readiness and the
devastating impacts that sequestration and unpredictable
funding have had. Although the Air Force is the last service to
be examined in this series of hearings, it is clear that it is
far from immune to the fiscal challenges that have required you
to balance competing requirements with limited funds. And to
that end, it is in these subcommittee hearings that we are
attempting to understand the impact that budget decisions
regarding military infrastructure and installation support are
having and will have on training and readiness.
Now, we have heard evidence from several military
installations that is indicative of adverse impacts to training
and operations due to degraded infrastructure and installation
support. If this is the case and there are indications of a
broader trend, the subcommittee needs to understand what the
impacts are and what needs to be done to address the situation.
Since fiscal year 2013, when the Air Force cut facilities
sustainment funding by nearly $1.2 billion, we have seen FSRM
[facilities, sustainment, restoration, and modernization]
funding consistently below the OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] model of 90 percent. And we will hope to get more
information on what these figures actually are. As a result of
significantly degraded infrastructure and as previous witnesses
have testified, our full-spectrum readiness recovery timelines
now extend beyond 2020, and even that can be accomplished only
with stable funding.
I hope that today our witnesses will provide specific
examples of how risk in the infrastructure enterprise has
affected the Air Force readiness or could affect the readiness
in the future. For example, we need to know if training
opportunities are being lost, scaled down, deferred, or
canceled because range safety and training functions are not
adequately funded. We need to know if training engagements are
no longer realistic or adequate to meet current operational
needs because the facilities in which such training is
conducted are no longer serviceable. Furthermore, we need to
understand the investments in money and manpower which are lost
with each affected exercise.
Without fully equipped, functioning, and well-maintained
installations, we cannot generate the readiness that is needed.
And our men and women in uniform, as well as our civilian
personnel, performing their duties around the country and the
world deserve that.
So, again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. This
concludes the last of the hearings that we will be conducting,
and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
And I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Madeleine.
General Green, I have been told you will be making one
opening statement on behalf of all the witnesses, so please
proceed. And as a reminder, your written testimony has already
been made available to our members and will be part of the
official record.
General Green.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN TIMOTHY S. GREEN, USAF, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL
ENGINEERS, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, ENGINEERING,
AND FORCE PROTECTION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED
BY MAJ GEN JERRY D. HARRIS, JR., USAF, VICE COMMANDER, AIR
COMBAT COMMAND, LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, AND BRIG GEN
CHRISTOPHER P. AZZANO, USAF, COMMANDER, 96TH TEST WING, AIR
FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND, EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE
General Green. Thank you, and good morning.
Mr. Wittman. Good morning.
General Green. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, we are honored to
represent America's airmen as we testify before you today on
the effects of reduced infrastructure and base operating
support investments on Air Force readiness.
For the Air Force, air bases, both enduring and
expeditionary, serve as foundational platforms from which we
project power through air, space, and cyberspace. The
reliability, redundancy, and resiliency of our installation
infrastructure are keys to enabling global vigilance, global
reach, and global power and, therefore, are critical to deter
and defeat those who wish to do us harm.
Recent Air Force budgets have been rooted in necessity and
based upon our long-term strategy and vision supporting the Air
Force's three priorities of taking care of our people,
balancing today's readiness and tomorrow's modernization, and
making every dollar count to help ensure that we can field,
operate, and maintain a credible and affordable future force.
Ready and resilient installations are an important part of
the Air Force vision, but it is only one part. The Air Force's
fiscal year 2016 budget sustains current warfighting efforts
and places the Air Force on a path toward balancing readiness
with necessary modernization in order to meet evolving threats.
It funds vital military construction and aircraft beddown
projects, addresses facilities sustainment shortfalls, and
sustains critical base operating services, albeit at increased
risk.
We make every dollar count by targeting limited
installation resources for requirements which have the highest
consequence on the mission coupled with the highest probability
of failure.
Importantly, the Air Force recently stood up the Air Force
Installation and Mission Support Center to provide an
enterprise view of our installations, leverage lessons learned
from across all of our major commands, and constantly strive to
improve our core business processes in order to make the best
installation investment decisions possible, balanced against
maintaining combat effectiveness.
Finally, a key component to help us close the funding gap
is to leverage third-party financing where it makes sense. Our
current third-party financing efforts are focused on areas that
include housing and utilities privatization, energy savings
performance contracts, and enhanced-use leases.
Your Air Force was born of innovation. From the first time
pioneers of the Army Air Corps found ways to go over and not
through, the Air Force has embraced new ways of thinking, taken
prudent risks to accomplish the mission, and encouraged
innovation to solve hard problems. And we continue to do so
today as we concentrate on effectively and efficiently using
limited installation resources to ensure mission success.
Sir, as you mentioned, joining me today is Major General
J.D. Harris, the Vice Commander of Air Combat Command, who can
give you a warfighter's perspective on our infrastructure.
Notably, he is also the former Wing Commander of the 56th
Fighter Wing at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona and the 8th
Fighter Wing at Kunsan Air Force Base in Korea.
You mentioned Brigadier General Chris Azzano. He is the
Test Wing Commander at Eglin Air Force Base today. He is also
the former Air Base Wing Commander at Tinker Air Force Base in
Oklahoma.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
and for your continued support of our total force airmen and
their families. We look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Green can be found in
the Appendix on page 28.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, General Green.
I want to thank General Azzano also for his efforts there
and want to make sure, too, that we recognize all the great
efforts that go on at our Air Force installations around the
world.
So I want to begin with this just to kind of get it laid
out; then I want to make sure that we go to other members. As
we look at the categories of facilities and the types of
installations that the Air Force has in its inventory, can you
give us a perspective about which ones are most important in
raising and sustaining Air Force readiness?
And I want to begin with General Harris to get his
perspective as Vice Commander there at ACC [Air Combat Command]
at Langley.
Give us your perspective, General Harris, as you look
through the slate of things that you have to do there at
Langley--and I have visited there a number of times--looking at
some of the challenges that are there, whether it is hangars,
whether it is, you know, the lighting systems on the tarmac
there. Kind of give us your perspective on how you prioritize.
Because, obviously, we are in situation where resources
sometimes are short, so you have to figure out, you know, where
do you prioritize. And so give us your perspective, as we
begin, about what categories of facilities and types of
installation services are most important.
General Harris. Yes, sir. Thank you for the opportunity.
When we look at the money that we are given and how we
prioritize that, we have to look at the entire spectrum, as you
have rightly pointed out. So it is the facilities and the
infrastructure from our platforms, being our air bases, that we
concentrate on when it comes to keeping the installation ready.
But it is much more than that. We also need the training
ranges, whether it is an air range over Nevada or Utah or any
of the many States that we are flying over the top of, to our
space ranges that are off the coast near Cape Canaveral and
near Vandenberg. It is very important to us.
And we have also added in the last decade the cyber
training areas that we have to work on, which is all
infrastructure-based.
Mr. Wittman. Sure.
General Harris. It is a balance. We have to be ready and
win today's fight but also modernize, prepare, and be ready in
the future.
And we are constantly making tradeoffs as best we can,
using, as General Green had highlighted, the ``what is probably
going to fail next,'' the highest probability, and the
consequences of those failures. So we have some things that are
just so high in consequences--in our nuclear mission, for
example--we can't let those fail. So we continue to put
emphasis there and on our priority missions.
And that has been our approach, sir. It is: Look at what is
probably going to fail next. If we had additional resources, we
would get into more of the maintenance to extend and get the
preventative work done, but right now we are limited on that.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Green, we have heard from previous witnesses that
fiscal constraints have required commanders at the Pentagon and
in the field to prioritize immediate operational readiness and
limited critical maintenance needs over less-pressing
infrastructure investments but that this comes with some degree
of risk.
So, in your written testimony, you stated that, and I
quote, ``We are already seeing the effects of this risk at many
Air Force installations,'' and that ``failing infrastructure
has had a direct impact on mission capabilities.''
Could you elaborate on this comment and provide specific
examples of these impacts on training and operations and how
the Air Force is trying to mitigate these impacts?
General Green. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
I think I would like to tell a little bit of a longer story
for this one that will relate many aspects, from training to
operations.
So, as General Harris mentioned, we have forces today that
operate from the continental United States, so it is more than
just training for us, although that is an important component.
When we looked at the nuclear enterprise a few years ago
and we began to do some analysis and some work in that area,
led by Secretary James, we found that we had a significant
underfunding or a significant gap in where our capabilities
were and infrastructure in that area. And so, as we looked to
recapitalize the nuclear infrastructure, a part of that was the
nuclear weapons storage areas, and we found that we needed to
recapitalize four and also build a new one, so five facilities.
And that is going to be over a 13-year period and at a cost of
roughly $1.3 billion.
So we can't fix everything all at once. We have to look
forward.
What has been the impact of that? As we go forward, the
committee approved and Congress appropriated funds for fiscal
year 2016 for the weapons storage facility at F.E. Warren,
which is going to be a pathfinder for us. But when I look at
Malmstrom Air Force Base, which I just visited last month, the
missile maintenance facility there was built in 1957. And so
local engineers began planning for new construction all the way
back in 1991.
We are going to be able to do that. It is a $95 million
MILCON [military construction] that we have currently planned
for fiscal year 2019. But in the interim, in the last 6 years,
we have already spent $9 million trying to fix emergency
problems that we have had and gaps, and we expect to spend
another $11 million in the next 2 years, just to get to where
we can have the next MILCON project.
So what is the impact of that? We have had fire suppression
systems that have released. We have had water pipes break. We
have had floor failures. And so, when we do that in a missile
maintenance facility like that, they are not able to do all the
training that they are required to do. We suspended training
and certification, so the certification of nuclear missile
maintenance technicians, for 6 months while we made a repair
last year. When those certifications are suspended, fewer
airmen--you know, as you go out of certification, other airmen
have to come in and do that maintenance. So other airmen were
working more shifts, longer hours, while we had this training
gap.
That, in turn, kind of gets at some third-order effects.
Over the past 5 years, they have seen the retention of those
airmen, those maintainers, drop from 75 percent to 20 percent.
There is a myriad of reasons. We have a nuclear force
improvement plan in place to do that. But, certainly, the
infrastructure and the quality of your life, where you work, is
a part of that price tag.
So it is not just the dollars that we invest trying to get
there. We have difficulty immediately going in and making a
fix, so the fixes will often take years. In this case, it is
going to be a 13-year fix, an investment plan. And there will
be other things that will break and fail in the interim,
getting to that fix, and we don't need to spend millions of
dollars.
So that is kind of how these things can snowball, in
effect, to go forward.
Ms. Bordallo. A key element of the 2014 facilities
sustainment and recapitalization policy memo is the requirement
that the services fund sustainment programs at 90 percent or
higher.
So could you provide information on Air Force budget
request as well at enacted levels for FSRM funding compared to
the OSD model since 2013? And what steps is the Air Force
taking to meet that OSD requirement?
General Green. Yes, ma'am. We have prioritized within the
Air Force the sustainment funding and the model funding at a
high rate. So we have been at 80 percent, on average, over the
years. I think we got up to 81 percent.
And we managed that by taking an asset management approach
to it. So, again, getting back to what General Harris said,
rather than having a straight investment portfolio, we are
trying to understand the condition of our facilities and make
that next investment.
So we believe 80 percent has allowed us to be successful
from the sustainment perspective. We recognize 90 percent would
be desirable, but, again, as we have balanced the risk, we have
found that to be an acceptable alternative.
And we have maintained funding in the sustainment of
facilities at the expense of military construction in previous
years and at the expense of our restoration and modernization
accounts, because it is easier to keep good facilities good, to
take care of the oil changes, to do the things that we need to
do with them. That is a better investment, we believe, than
simply trying to fix things on the other end all the time and
neglecting the day-to-day sustainment required.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, General.
And I will yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
We will now go to Mrs. Hartzler.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen. I have Whiteman Air Force Base in
my district, so I very much appreciate all the good work that
the Air Force does and I understand the challenges. Of course,
we have the nuclear mission there.
And I appreciate the investments that have been made and
also your comments about how you have been creative and
innovative and trying to find ways to make the most with the
amount of money that you have had.
I appreciated the example that you gave of some of the
shortfalls. The purpose of the hearing is to determine if there
has been a decrease in our readiness due to the lack of
investment at the installations and how it has affected our
missions.
So, I guess, first of all, do you have any other specific
examples? So as we are advocating for more money for our
military to help meet some of these shortfalls, do you have
anything else that you could share besides the fire suppression
systems that released and some of those things?
Mr. Green. Yes, ma'am. Since I have talked a lot, I will
see if General Azzano has anything he would like to add.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Great.
General Azzano. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
I think probably the best way for me to start is to give a
little bit of framework for some of the challenges that we have
been facing. I have been an installation commander now for 2\1/
2\ years, first at Tinker Air Force Base and now at Eglin Air
Force Base.
Tinker Air Force Base is a large and diverse installation
that is absolutely critical to our ability to wield national
power. There are about 460 buildings there, a workforce of
26,000 people. There are seven large military units, wing-level
units. Three of those are flying units, and that includes one
command and control unit that is Air Force and a nuclear
command and control unit that is United States Navy.
Seventy-five percent of the 460 facilities at Tinker are
more than 40 years old. We broke ground in Tinker back in 1941,
just before World War II took off.
Eglin Air Force Base is the largest installation in the
Department of Defense. There are over 3,200 buildings across
724 square miles of that installation. Twenty one percent of
those buildings are greater than 40 years old. There is a $10.8
billion infrastructure value of Eglin Air Force Base, a 20,000-
strong workforce, 8 wings. And we conduct daily combat
operations, research and development [R&D], test and training
out of Eglin Air Force Base. Eglin also--in fact, Eglin is a
pre-World War II installation.
Some of the challenges we are seeing as this infrastructure
ages are probably best relayed through some stories of things
that we have seen over the last few years that have gone wrong
with our installations.
In early 2014, a fire suppression system at an Eglin hangar
inadvertently activated, dumping 17 feet of foam across a
90,000-square-foot hangar. Five aircraft were impacted, and the
hangar was unusable for 83 days as a result of cleanup and an
investigation that followed.
The cause of this inadvertent activation was an
insufficient heating in the hangar in cold temperatures. Now,
as a workaround, we must drain the foam suppression system
anytime that there are forecasted to be very cold temperatures
down at Eglin, which, fortunately, is not that often, although
we had that happen again this week.
By draining that system, it reduces our ability to protect
the assets inside the hangar. We still have a water system that
can be used in the event of a fire, but the foam suppression
system is much more effective.
In the year that that system was built, we had a choice. We
could afford to include, to install a fire suppression system
that included foam, or we could afford to upgrade the heating
system for the hangar. We could not afford to do both. So we
chose the item that we thought was going to have greater
payback over the long term, which was the suppression system.
Over at Tinker Air Force Base, a little over a year ago, in
the middle of the night, one of the electrical substations that
powers the largest Air Force depot facility achieved meltdown
temperatures in the middle of the night. And I am told that you
could see the meltdown from space, it was so bright.
As a result, we lost power to the largest building,
Building 3001, at Tinker Air Force Base and many other
buildings along the east side of the complex. That resulted in
the loss of three shifts of work at the depot complex, which
cost the American taxpayer $1 million in productivity for those
three shifts. And it also resulted in at least a day slip in
the depot-level maintenance and repair on dozens of aircraft
that were residing in the building at that time.
The total cost to bring in and replace the new substation
was about $6 million. And the interesting side story to that,
we had a contractor whose expertise is in power generation come
in and take a look and do an assessment of the substation, and
the parts of the substation were so old that the contractor
didn't even recognize them. So here is somebody whose expertise
is in power generation; they did not recognize some of the
infrastructure that we were using to support that very critical
facility.
Another example from Tinker Air Force Base. We had a water
main break under a B-52 that was in depot-level maintenance and
repair. It lifted a large concrete slab that came very close to
the airplane. It did not damage the airplane, but it could
have. And, certainly, if there had been workers there at the
time, it could have resulted in injury to the workers.
When the civil engineers at Tinker were trying to turn off
the water supply and then troubleshoot, it became clear that
the systems, the water systems, underneath the hangars were so
old that they didn't even have schematics to determine where
the pipes were running.
So those are three stories about some of the challenges we
are facing with World War II-era infrastructure. I have others
also.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you very much.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler.
We will now go to Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses.
General, checking back home with the Air Guard in
Connecticut, obviously, you know, at your level and at the
frontline level, everyone has been struggling with the budget
instability over the last 2 or 3 years. The feedback we were
getting is that the sustainment/repair/modernization funds was
kind of a place that they could sort of mitigate some of the
sequestration challenges that are out there.
And I think that is kind of what you were referring to
earlier. I just want to make sure--and maybe not. But maybe you
could just sort of help me sort of understand whether that is
still going to be a strategy that folks are going to have to
continue to look towards, or, you know, is the omnibus going to
create, hopefully, maybe a different type of stability in terms
of going forward.
General Green. Yes, sir. So thanks for the question.
When I was alluding to how we use sustainment dollars, we
essentially have three accounts or three sets of funds that we
try to focus our efforts on: military construction, which are
line-item appropriated; FSRM--and we have restoration and
modernization, which we think of as repair. It is about putting
the new tow bar on your vehicle, it is about improving it and
taking care of things. And then we have sustainment dollars,
which are more your oil changes and taking care of things
consistently.
So we have chosen to take less risk in sustainment over
time and more risk in military construction and restoration and
modernization.
But we have not migrated dollars out of the FSRM account to
support other activities within the Air Force. We still use the
dollars for which they were appropriated by Congress. We treat
that as a floor. And we make sure that at the end of the fiscal
year we have used every dollar as you intended with the
appropriation for our sustainment and modernization.
Mr. Courtney. So the ink is barely dry on the omnibus that
just passed. I mean, clearly, that was preferable to having a
CR [continuing resolution] for 2016. And, hopefully, with the
lifting of the caps in the budget resolution, the 2-year budget
resolution, can you just sort of share with us whether or not--
again, the omnibus and, you know, the hoped-for relief from the
sequestration, you know, what does that mean in terms of your
job compared to about a year or so ago?
General Green. Well, it really means the ability to plan,
which is very, very important for us. As we try to balance the
risk, we try to build a good plan within the budget that we
expect to be able to have, balance the risk across it.
And then the things that emerge late, such as an incident
when the--if you think about the Tinker hangar, when the water
came up through there--we will go ahead and take care of those,
and it just takes money away from whatever we had planned.
But if we don't have a number with which we can plan
against, then everything we are doing, work and rework and
rework, trying to adjust ourselves to the number. So the
omnibus is very important for us to be able to plan. It doesn't
always necessarily give us additional funding, but the planning
is significant for us.
Mr. Courtney. And if we had had a CR for the rest of the
year, I mean, using, I guess, 2015 as the top line, what would
have been the--would that have aggravated your situation, as
opposed to passing an omnibus?
General Green. So if we had multiple continuing
resolutions, it gives us challenges, where we have to put in
place bridge contracts. We have obligation timelines. We have
to obligate 80 percent of our funds by a certain point in the
year, and the money comes late. So I would say the omnibus
certainly helps us avoid those kinds of activities.
For example, we may have to not award a contract for the
full period of the year, if we were going to work something for
an entire year, because we didn't have the funding for the
year. So our contracting officers have to go in and adjust the
performance period, have a set of negotiations. And then, when
we get the next CR, we have to go through and have the same
thing. We negotiate with a contractor for the next performance
period.
So continuing resolutions provide a lot of difficulty for
us across the entire portfolio. It can be a range contract
where we are doing range support. It is not just
infrastructure. It is across every area where we have
contracting and we have dollars.
So we move the dollars around to account for funding, say,
for the first quarter or the first 2 months, and then we have
the same challenge again the next 2 months. So it is a lot of
additional work.
General Harris. Sir, if you didn't mind, I would add to
that.
Part of the time, if it delays for a continuing resolution,
then we end up with a period of time where some of the workers
we could be using are laid idle while they are waiting on that
information.
And at a place such as Guam, where we have a fairly small
population, if they are all working hard as they can for 6
months but then we have to wait again for this 1 October, this
new fiscal year, we can actually reduce the time that we can
get the work done that we are working on.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. That is a very helpful
perspective, that, you know, CR versus omnibus, it is not just
a sort of parlor game in Washington; it has real-life
consequences.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Azzano. Sir, would it be possible to add one other
thought to that?
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Go ahead.
General Azzano. So we have a very busy and relatively
limited engineering staff at each of our large installations,
and the challenge is to divide their time between designing and
fixing issues as they arise, real-time, or planning for
projects that have programmed funding. And with the uncertainty
of funding that is brought about by the continuing resolution,
the challenge for me is, where do I allocate that manpower.
So if at the start of the year there is a lot of
uncertainty, and then I have to have 80 percent of my funds
obligated such that I have 20 percent at the end of the year to
expend, what we find frequently is that prioritizing manpower
on the most important projects becomes a challenge, because we
often don't know whether we are going to get the funding or
when we will get the funding. And what we would hate to have
happen is projects that are the highest priority that don't get
funded because they don't have the adequate design work in
time.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the witnesses. Thank you for your leadership,
for your sacrifices, and for those of your family, as well.
I want to pick up on something that Representative Bordallo
mentioned in her opening remarks. And, particularly, I want to
focus in on joint readiness, with the emphasis on the Global
Response Force [GRF]. You know, to me, I think it is really
important that we fully restore this capability. I think it
plays a key role in peace through strength. And, obviously, the
Air Force is a major player in this--electronic warfare,
fighters, bombers, air mobility, including delivering airborne
forces, and then any kind of resupply operation.
And so, as we look at base operations and even some impacts
on SRM [sustainment, restoration, and maintenance] and MILCON,
please assess for me where you think the reduction in funding
has impacted your ability to support joint readiness, including
the Global Response Force. If you need to do that for the
record, that is fine too.
But then I am interested not only in that but also your
assessment on where we are today, given the realities of where
we are today, your assessment, and your ability to support
joint training and joint operations.
General Harris. Well, sir, thank you for that opportunity
to talk about some of the best units that we have in our
military, such as the 82nd, and what they do for that airborne
force.
We have made choices as we are getting smaller as an Air
Force and pulling back or consolidating some of our forces. You
see that in Europe. We are also doing that in the continental
U.S.--for example, at Pope.
One of the things that have we made our commitment to is
that we will not step away from the joint training, and that is
one of our highest priorities. And as our Secretary continues
to say, it is the airmen first. They are the ones who are
getting the work done, with everything that we are putting on
their shoulders.
Their approach to it is to make sure that, if the unit that
is local or has just changed can't support it, then, as you see
at Pope, C-17s fly in and do much of that heavy lift from that
joint readiness and training, just the way we would do it in
combat. So we do share across, and we have a fantastic
organization in our airlift community that takes care of that.
Part of that joint readiness is to make sure that we are
meeting that mission team. So, for example, when we put in a
major repair to a runway like at Andrews, because we are
reduced on the amount of money that we have, we will probably
fix the runway and then any other emergency items that pop up,
but we won't do everything that probably should be done on that
routine maintenance, such as looking at the airfield drainage.
And we have several of our runways that have truly been flooded
or have additional damage to them because we didn't have the
funds to get to fixing things that were built in the 1950s or
designed in the 1950s and installed at that time that may or
may not be suitable for the conditions that we see now.
Mr. Gibson. Thank you for that, General.
The next area has to do with impacts on retention. I
appreciate the quality of our Air Force. That is certainly
something we share, to make sure that that is sustained going
forward.
So I am interested in your assessments on impacts on
housing, child development, MWR [Morale, Welfare, and
Recreation], and the panoply of support network that we have
and whether or not you have any data that the impacts on the
budget has impacted retention.
General Green. Thank you. I will start, and then I will
probably hand it to Chris to see if he has anything to add from
the installation perspective.
But I think how we manage the quality of life in the force
is much like we described earlier with the Global Response
Force. We focus our resources on those priorities that are most
important to the mission and also then to our airmen.
And so, if you think from a services perspective, you
mention child development centers and MWR facilities. We are
investing in those things that we believe are most important
more than those that are less important.
So, for example, over the past few years, with our child
development centers, working with the Family Child Care and
School Age programs and the off-base partners, we have
increased the number and the availability of child care for our
men and women and our airmen by 41 percent from fiscal year
2010 to 2014. We have expanded operating hours through the
expanded child-care program over the same time period.
If we look at dining facilities, we have expanded the
operations through our what we call FTI, Food Transformation
Initiative, where we have partnered--and if you think of a
traditional dining hall at an installation, that is operated
about 56 hours per week. But by linking them together with
Transformation and having a vendor come in and help us, they
not only operate the dining hall but they may operate the
bowling alley, they may operate the club. And then our airmen,
who used to only be able to take their meal card to that dining
hall, can go to any of those facilities. And so their hours of
operation greatly expand.
And then the last one there is fitness centers. We believe
that is core.
And so we focus on the core. We have maintained the
services in those core areas to a higher degree, but we have
also closed 40 MWR facilities in fiscal year 2014. And so there
are activities that we have sacrificed in order to ensure that
we preserve those things that are most important.
And that gets to the quality of life. Yes, when we make
those other sacrifices and those changes, it affects our
quality of life, but, again, we are focused on those things
that provide the greatest return for our airmen on their
quality of life overall.
So it is on the margins. I don't think I have data today
that would suggest what quality-of-life factors are driving a
retention issue, because I think we are doing a pretty good job
of trying to focus on those areas that are the greatest impact.
General Azzano.
General Azzano. Congressman Gibson, you have hit on a very
important question there, and I appreciate that.
We are constantly struggling with the balance between
executing the mission, between joint readiness, and quality of
life for our airmen and our soldiers and our sailors and their
families.
I have a list, an integrated priority list, that
encompasses the inputs of all the commanders on Eglin Air Force
Base. And there are dozens of items that need work, that need
funding, that are either related to infrastructure, to test and
training, to research and development, to technology
development, or to quality-of-life issues. And, as you might
imagine, when we go through and we prioritize and the cut line
for those items ends up being much higher on the list than we
would like, frequently the quality-of-life items do not make
the cut.
Some examples of that are we have needed a new fitness
center at Eglin Air Force Base for a number of years. Tinker is
the same way. And that has gone unfunded. A way that we have
helped mitigate that is by going to 24/7 access, where with the
proper authentication you can actually enter the building and
make use of the fitness centers.
The challenge there, of course, is upkeep of the facility,
and there is some risk to people using the facilities in the
middle of the night. If they have an issue, then there may not
be anybody there to help them. We try to work around that with
proper training and instruction, and so far we have been very
successful.
Other quality-of-life issues: HVAC [heating, ventilation,
and air conditioning] systems that are old. Very humid
environment in Florida. Lots of people in the middle of the
summer working in very warm and damp buildings, despite our
best efforts.
We actually closed a dormitory a number of years ago, 280
people, because of an HVAC system that was so old we couldn't
find parts for it. There was mold growing in the facility. And,
for a time, we had asked the airmen that were living there to
use a diluted bleach solution and wipe down their walls
regularly to prevent the mold from growing.
So absolutely unacceptable conditions, and we ended up
closing that. But what that meant was that 288 airmen had to
then go and live on the economy. These are 288 airmen that were
given to us by their mothers and fathers to care for them, to
train them, to help them with those first few years of
transition into the military life, which can be difficult for
many people, and we were unable to fulfill that. It also cost
us extra money because we had to issue BAH [Base Allowance for
Housing] to the airmen that normally would have lived in the
dorms. So by no means a situation we want to be in.
The replacement dormitory for that is scheduled to be
funded sometime in the next 5 years. So a high-priority item
that has still not made the cut list over the last few years.
We need a new training and education center.
And believe it or not, we have even prioritized to the
point where roof repairs, roof leaks, are either structural and
could cause potential damage to equipment and cause a threat to
people who are working in the facilities or they are cosmetic.
So there are roof leaks that we are aware of that we have not
fixed. And to be working in an environment where you have to
put buckets under the drips certainly is not helping retention.
Mr. Gibson. And I know my time has expired here.
Gentlemen, thank you for that testimony. I have listened
and taken good notes here. I know it is not easy. You are
balancing risk, and you are making hard decisions. And I
appreciate this testimony here today, which will, I think, be
helpful to us.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
I want to remind our witnesses, in fairness to all of our
members here that would like to ask questions, if you will keep
up with the clock, and when it turns red, if you will look for
the closest opportunity to wrap up your questions.
We will provide a second opportunity for our panelists here
to ask questions, so you will be able to get back to that, so
don't be worried about missing that opportunity.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, thank you for being here.
I represent Robins Air Force Base and Moody Air Force Base
in Georgia. And I have several friends who are contractors, and
one of the things that I hope we are able to deal with is this
issue of forcing things to the lowest bid short-term and that
we will soon find a way to give you a way to accept the bid
that is the best value long-term instead of what meets a short-
term parameter.
But I want to speak to you specifically about the Air
Force, in 2014, said they would shift away from the
longstanding model of decentralized control and execution for
providing installation support and that you were going to stand
up a new command. What progress has been made in standing up
the Installation and Mission Support Center?
General Green. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Great progress. We already have--it is up, and it is
operational. We call it the initial operation capability. And
so they have gone through and they have taken responsibility
for prioritizing our projects, for example, our programs. They
are running all of our service programs for the Air Force. The
engineering programs are the same way.
And so they are already learning lessons from across the
enterprise and able to apply that, to the benefit of the entire
Air Force. So I think they are well on their way and they are
making good decisions today. They are setting their processes,
but I am very comfortable in saying it is accomplishing already
the things that we intended for it to do.
Mr. Scott. So the goal was a reduction in duplication and
efficiencies. Are you seeing any cost savings yet from the new
system?
General Green. So I don't know that we can say there is
cost savings at the installation impacts, because those are
budget-driven decisions. So I would say that the impact, in
that case, is really about the effectiveness or the
appropriateness of the decisions that they are making within
the construct of the AFIMSC [Air Force Installation and Mission
Support Center].
We certainly have significantly reduced the number of
personnel who are performing this work across the Air Force,
and so roughly about 920 folks fewer are doing that work today
than they were previously. And, again, it gets to that
decentralized versus centralized look that we are able to make
now with technology and the tools that we have in place today
that we didn't before.
Mr. Scott. Okay.
So with regard to working capital fund organizations like
the depots, do you have enough flexibility in the sustainment
and restoration and modernization accounts and the base
operations for programs, or is there a need for more
flexibility there?
General Green. I believe we have enough flexibility today.
I have not gone back and looked at the depot funding
specifically in light of your question, so I can do that. But,
today, nobody has come to suggest to us, at my level at least,
that they need more flexibility. We try to make that balance.
So I will check on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 43.]
Mr. Scott. And the conditions at the depots--General, you
spoke a lot about the conditions at one of the depots. The best
depot in the United States is Robins. Could you just speak to
what efforts are being made to improve the facilities at the
depots across the country?
General Azzano. Yes, sir. I am happy to give you my
perspective on that.
Obviously, the best thing to do for our depots would be to
completely recapitalize the infrastructure. And when we have a
new platform, like the KC-46, that requires a significant
amount of space and manpower to sustain that weapons system
over its lifecycle, that is exactly what we are doing. We are
devoting MILCON funds to that program to make that happen.
For our aging fleet, for our B-1s, B-52s, and some of the
other older aircraft, F-15s, those are being maintained,
sustained, many of them, in World War II-era facilities. Those
facilities are large. The recapitalization bill for something
like that would be tremendous.
So what we find ourselves frequently doing is doing the
best preventive maintenance we can and then waiting for things
to break. And when I say ``waiting,'' I mean, expecting that
they are going to break while we are busy doing preventive
maintenance and working some of the sustainment projects that
have actually been funded. We try to get ahead in the design
and the management of some of our sustainment projects in the
event there is fallout money.
So I think we are doing a good job there, but the long-term
challenge is having that 911 capability, if you will--we had a
water main break, we had a roof cave in--that we can address
real-time, and at the same time looking ahead to very large and
complicated facilities and saying, where do we look next? What
is the next most important project? Where will we spend the
next dollar that we have? And we have a fairly robust priority
process that we go through to achieve that.
Mr. Scott. Well, gentlemen, thank you for your service.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Scott.
General Azzano, I want to go back to the response you gave
a couple of questions ago and ask, from your perspective--I
understand that at the corporate Air Force level there are
directives on infrastructure and on installation support
decisions. And we know that those filter down and then, from
that standpoint, there are decisions that are made at the base
level. And you talked about how those decisions are made, where
the shortfalls are, and how you try to cobble together both
resources and decisions to do that.
Give me your perspective on how it affects the mission
support and operations there at Eglin. And then if you can
provide some additional examples. You started on some, with the
barracks there, with some of the older hangars, with water
mains, those kinds of things. But give us your perspective on
how those facility problems that may not be in the direct
funding stream or may only get funded if there is an emergency
affect overall operational readiness.
Because what you are doing is listing them. When you are
saying, these things are tiered and we are going to do those in
order, a number of those at the bottom of the list are not
going to be funded anytime soon. The other way they jump to the
top of the list is for there to be an emergency. Obviously, at
some point, as that list grows, the impact on readiness
continues to grow.
Give me your perspective. And you laid out some examples,
but I would like to hear maybe a few more that are down on the
list that may not even come to fruition because they don't
reach an emergency situation. But give us your perspective
about how that affects operational readiness.
General Azzano. Chairman Wittman, thank you for the
question. You really hit on one of my key day-to-day challenges
and concerns, and that is that at some point the aging
infrastructure will begin to fail at a rate that, whereas today
I can handle the emergency requirements that support day-to-day
mission operations, they are going to fail to a rate at some
point where I will no longer be able to do that.
My sense as an installation commander now for 2\1/2\ years
is we are not there yet, but I would be--I guess I am unwilling
to hazard a guess at this point, but we are not that far off.
And that is based on, I guess, a gut feeling of watching things
over the last 2 years at a very close perspective of the risk
that we are taking in some key areas.
There are a number of base operations support examples of
things that fell below the cut line. One of them, a number of
years ago we canceled our grounds maintenance contract at Eglin
Air Force Base. And we canceled that because the $3 million
contract, we needed it for a higher priority, to sustain a
facility that was in bad need of repairs.
As a result, to offset that, we went and got some help from
the local Federal penitentiary, so we have inmates come in and
do the grounds work now. It is not the same quality as the
contract would have been. They require us to provide
supervision. These are the same people that we have in very
limited numbers that we could be applying to other tasks. And
so it has taken its toll on us.
Another example that concerns me that really illustrates
the balance between risk that we take in each of our
investments is force protection. So I have a very large
installation, and there are a lot of ways to gain access to
that installation. In the aftermath of Chattanooga and the
events in Paris, we are obviously concerned about anti-
terrorism and our ability to protect the people that live and
work there.
We have a very long list of items that could benefit from
focused anti-terrorism funding. And as a result, I, as the
installation commander, am taking risk. What is more important
today; is it more important to repair that airfield or more
important to install a serpentine entryway into one of my
gates? So those are the kinds of questions that I am grappling
with.
Another key investment area that I hadn't mentioned yet is
information technology infrastructure. So we have a lot of
aging network architecture. We have a lot of old copper wire
for our communication systems. In 2017, the existing
communication infrastructure will reach its useful life. The
plan is for us to transition over to Voice over Internet
Protocol. We have not achieved the level of investment that we
need yet to make that happen by 2017, by the time it ages out.
So ongoing challenges there.
Mr. Wittman. Gotcha. Very good. Thanks for that
perspective.
General Green, I want to maybe take a step up, as far as
from the base level to the overall Air Force perspective, on
where we are in restoring full-spectrum readiness and the
association that it has with infrastructure and installations
and facilities support.
Give me your perspective based on where we are right now.
We now have the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015, which lays
out for both 2015 and 2016 the top-line spending elements, so
there is some certainty there about what that number is. Give
me your thoughts about how that affects the rate of ascendence
in getting back to full-spectrum readiness.
So if you can give us, you know, a date about when you
expect to get it back to full-spectrum readiness, the impact
that this new budget agreement has on being able to put in
place or either keep status quo, accelerate, or possibly in
some instances maybe even losing ground on your infrastructure
projects and your facilities and installation support as it
relates to the effort to establish full-spectrum readiness, or
re-establish it.
General Green. Thank you.
So, from a facility perspective, what we believe is that
the current agreement and certainly the fiscal year 2016 budget
has really arrested the decline that we were experiencing. The
challenge will be sustained investment over time. As I alluded
to earlier, we are not going to get well in a year or in 2
years. We can't afford it, we couldn't execute it. And so it is
about an ability to project sustained investment over a longer
period of time.
For us on the installation side of the business, to be
comfortable that we are delivering the capabilities that we
need so that we are not waiting for things to break
unexpectedly, we believe we need about a consistent investment
that would equal to about 2 percent of our plant replacement
value. So if the plant replacement is $100 million, then about
2 percent of that a year should go into our FSRM accounts, our
maintenance and repair, and our MILCON and share that.
And we think a sustained investment like that over a period
of years could help put us back on our feet so that we weren't
worried about the unexpected outages and the breakages that we
have heard described today.
So that is what it would take for us. A 2-year budget deal
gives me some hope, but I would say right now we are just
arresting--I do not see us in an ascent phase and improving
ourselves from an infrastructure perspective.
And, again, as you noted, the infrastructure is only one
aspect of our readiness. And so the Air Force certainly trains
against all components of readiness to deliver capability.
And, General Harris, I don't know if you want to address
any of those others or----
Mr. Wittman. General Harris, I will ask you, too, for you
to share that perspective, but let me ask, too, not just the 2-
year budget perspective and the risks associated with what you
are going through to re-establish readiness, but give us a
longer-term perspective too, because after 2016 we are back
into the realm of sequester.
So give me your perspective not only of where we are with
the risks that you will assume under a 2-year budget plan that
is known, but, if you would, if you will give us some
conjecture about two scenarios past that: level funding or back
to sequester.
General Harris. Well, thank you, sir, for the opportunity
to respond to that.
Readiness is complicated, and we use several different
levers to make sure that we have the right balance of
readiness. Because if we fully funded the flying hours
associated with that, that would come out of our other
modernization or installation accounts. So we are reducing each
one of those to try and maximize that capability so that we get
at what the Secretary and the Chief--is their second priority,
is balancing readiness now versus modernization in the future.
Having that steady plan allows our engineers and our teams
to go out and budget everything that we can for the next year
and a half, 2 years, at the levels that we have and draw that
cut line, having been in that Air Force cooperation that drew
that. We took from the installation commanders; we prioritized
that. We are now able to do that with one voice through IMSC,
discussed earlier. And that is a benefit for us because then it
looks across all portfolios, not just mine and the combat, but
it covers transportation, the cyber, the space, all of the
domains that we work in. And that is a huge help for us that
will come to fruition over the next several years.
Having that, we draw that line, but then the emergencies
that you hear about--the flooding at Laughlin that closes the
base for 3 days--there are second- and third-order effects for
that, but then we have to unfund something that was above the
line and go put the money in that position. So that always
changes our plan, but being able to plan at least gives us a
starting point and allows us to talk about the priorities that
are important for that readiness.
Once we have those portions of the conditions set, we also
need to slow down on our deployment and our combat operations
tempo. And right now the Air Force, we are not being asked
today do less; we are being asked to go more, to push harder,
to make sure that our enemy knows that not only are they not
able to continue attacking but their time on this Earth is
going to be reduced with the way we are taking the fight to
them. That has impacts, then, on our weapons systems
sustainment and our ability to acquire the munitions for that.
Again, that is all balanced on that funding.
But once the conditions are set, deployment ratio, probably
about a 1-to-4 OPSTEMPO [operations tempo], we have the ranges,
the infrastructure that we need, with the threats, the
emitters. We have the talent pool in our maintenance to turn
and make sure that the equipment is ready to go. Then we start
building that 8- to 10-year readiness that is going to take us
a long time, that 8 to 10 years.
If any one of those aren't met, we are still holding that 8
to 10 years further down the road, so instead of being ready by
2023, if it is a delay of another year or two or, as you say,
sir, if we go back to sequestration after the 2-year budget
deal that we have, it will further delay that readiness
picture.
Mr. Wittman. You are on track to re-establish full-spectrum
readiness in 2023. Does the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015
make any impact on that? Does it move that number to the left?
Or does it just help you sustain the course to 2023?
General Harris. I would say, sir, at the PB-level
[President's budget] funding, 2023 is within sight. But, again,
we are not being asked to do less. So, right now, if you were
to look at our warfighters and the installations, we still have
so many airmen downrange; they are not available for the
training, and that is a part of that full-spectrum readiness.
So we are on track, but we are right on that razor's edge.
If we are funded less or we don't get relief from the
deployments doing our Nation's business, then it will push past
2023.
Mr. Wittman. Gotcha. Thank you. I understand the world gets
a vote in that too.
Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have just a single question here for General Green.
In your testimony, you mentioned several examples of
leveraging partnerships with local communities to address
infrastructure needs at the Air Force installations.
Now, how are you determining priorities, deciding which
projects are appropriate for funding through these partnerships
and whether they are truly in the government's best interest to
accept, operate, and maintain? Can you describe the controls
that are in place so that the Air Force's requirements are
being effectively met?
General Green. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for that question.
So who decides really depends on the level or the scope of
the partnership with the community. So there are many
agreements that the communities are able to make a partnership
or have an agreement with the installation that they can
execute at a local level, and so there would not be an Air
Force enterprise look at that.
In other cases, where there are legal authorities involved,
we are evolving toward prioritizing those kinds of efforts as
well. But, initially, as we began exploring this, our wing
commanders really had a lot of flexibility to work with our
staff so we could learn what the art of the possible was. And
now that we have experienced that, we recognize we have a
better understanding and we need to begin prioritizing because
we have limited staff. And so I think you will see over the
next few years we will begin prioritizing those efforts.
One example would be, at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base in
North Carolina, there is a partnership agreement that is being
developed right now. I am not sure if it has been finally
signed. But the community will use some installation land, some
land that belongs to Seymour Johnson, and they will build a
multi-field sports complex of eight fields, do different
things.
And so the community will get to use that the majority of
the time, the installation will get to use it for their rec
[recreation] leagues, their youth leagues, some fitness
training in the mornings, and some weekend tournaments. But
that is about a $6 million to $8 million investment that the
community will make on Air Force property that the Air Force
will then be able to take advantage of those services. So it is
a real win-win.
Other people are involved because it is an enhanced-use
lease. There are authorities and agreements that have to be put
in place. But as we get to those larger-scale agreements, I
think we will begin prioritizing those that today we are not.
Today, we are learning what the art of the possible is, and
then we are going forward with the prioritization.
Other agreements can be done locally. They can reach an
agreement to have our medical personnel trained in the local
emergency room and get some time down there. That does not
require the Air Force to devote resources or identify all those
requirements outside. So it just depends on the scope and the
scale as to who will be making some of those decisions, ma'am.
Ms. Bordallo. So, because of less funding now, are the
partnership agreements--are there more now or less or----
General Green. There is certainly a great deal of interest
now. And so, at many of our wings, I would even say today
probably most of our wings, there is an effort, there are
groups that are working between the installation and the local
community to identify those areas where we can have
partnerships and then spread those around.
So I believe it is the majority of our installations today
that have a partnership program, and they are exploring those
opportunities.
Ms. Bordallo. In your opinion, General, would you say they
are successful in most cases, or all cases, or----
General Green. Yes, ma'am, I think they are successful,
because the process today that we are asking the community and
the wing leadership to go through is to define the art of the
possible and understand our limits. And so we want to go in
with a pretty big aperture to see and think, but before we
reach those specific agreements, we want to make sure they are
win-win.
So I think by the time we are getting to the nuts and
bolts, I think we really are having more win-win scenarios.
And, again, they are not all big dollar, but I think we have
more success than we have failures, because we will identify
the obstacles along the way.
Ms. Bordallo. And I feel it is good public relations when
you are working with the community. I support this.
So I want to thank you very much for your testimonies.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.
And, General Green, General Harris, General Azzano, thank
you so much for your testimony today, and we appreciate your
perspective on this.
This is very important as go into this year's National
Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] to make sure that we address
readiness from an infrastructure, installations, and facilities
support perspective, because many times we get somewhat myopic
in how we see the element of readiness. And we understand that,
in order to generate readiness, you have to have that
foundation to create that readiness. So to be able to get your
perspective and make sure we reflect that in this year's NDAA
is going to be very important.
So, again, we thank you for your time today.
And, with that, our subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:03 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
January 13, 2016
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
January 13, 2016
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
January 13, 2016
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
General Green. Commanders at Air Force depots have sufficient
flexibility within the Working Capital Fund (WCF) to fund needed
Facility Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization (FSRM). However,
requirements have increased significantly. One contributing factor is
the difficulty to obtain needed current mission Military Construction
(MILCON) funding as the Air Force has been forced to prioritize force
readiness and modernization and take risks in installation support.
Budgets for FSRM continue to rise as the facilities get older and the
depots develop long range plans to provide flexible and responsive
facilities. Increases in FSRM spending can increase the WCF rates and
drive greater costs to the warfighter. [See page 15.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
January 13, 2016
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. To what extent do the reported readiness levels of
installations take into consideration the condition of their
facilities? Are there other metrics or data points used to assess the
effect of facility condition on readiness?
General Green. Installation and mission commanders report and track
facility issues that affect mission readiness. This reporting ensures
attention and appropriate resource prioritization to correct
deficiencies. However, formal AF readiness metrics do not include
facility condition as a measure. The primary metric used for facility
condition, the Facility Condition Index, assesses the remaining service
life of facilities, but not readiness impact. Faced with constrained
resources and an environment where budget decisions involve picking the
best of bad choices, we aim to make every dollar count by targeting
limited installations resources toward requirements which have the
highest consequence to the mission coupled with the highest probability
of infrastructure failure.
Mr. Wittman. How has the Air Force attempted to quantify the risks
they are taking by perennially reducing their investments in base
support services and infrastructure, if at all?
General Green. The Air Force uses AFCOLS (Air Force Common Output
Level Standards) as the system to determine levels of service such as
law enforcement and physical security protection; fire and emergency
services; installation food services and Morale, Welfare and Recreation
and other Sub Activity Group Z funded services reported in the PB J-
Books. AFCOLS helps us understand risk, informs Commanders of the
appropriate levels of service needed to support their mission, and
provides a method from which to make resource decisions. For
facilities, the Air Force plans to use Facility Condition assessments
to assess risk and inform prioritization of funding; we are on track to
meet OSD's Sep 2017 deadline for Facilities, Airfield Pavements, and
Rail Systems; however, other Pavements and Utilities won't be done
until Sep 2019.
The Air Force prioritizes infrastructure and facility investment
requirements based on risk within an asset management construct. The
program evaluates facility investment requirements based on risk to
mission and personnel by examining the probability and consequence of
failure of an asset or system (e.g. facility, pavements, utility, etc.)
Our methodology incorporates mission assurance criteria including a
mission dependency index and Commander mission-criticality input. The
prioritization process ensures the Air Force allocates resources to the
right assets, at the right time, which reduces long-term deferred
maintenance costs, allows limited resources to be applied to the
highest mission priorities and retains visibility on deferred
priorities for potential future funding. The Air Force continues to
mature risk-based investment within a constrained resource environment,
targeting mission assurance and posturing resilient installations.
Mr. Wittman. Given consecutive years of funding below the targeted
sustainment model and recapitalization requirements, how is funding
prioritized in terms of which facility investments, both in terms of
FSRM and MILCON, will be supported at a given installation? How have
those decisions impacted military readiness and operation or training
requirements?
General Green. The Air Force (AF) creates an Integrated Priority
List of facility requirements which begin by using scoring models for
both the MILCON and O&M programs. The models capture Commanders'
prioritization, combined with facility condition and mission dependency
to focus the score on probability and consequence of failure. Air Force
personnel then evaluate the lists using military judgement to make any
final adjustments to what will be funded based upon our understanding
of mission requirements. The AF treats many areas of BOS as a must pay
bill and takes risk where it can with decreased levels of service;
however, we expect an increase in FSRM costs over time due to reduced
levels of service.
The Air Force's Base Operations Support and Facilities Investment
strategy is aligned with the Defense Strategic Guidance, as well as the
OSD Fiscal Guidance. In spite of fiscal pressures, we requested, and
Congress authorized and appropriated $2.9 billion in Facilities,
Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (FSRM), $1.6 billion in
Military Construction (MILCON), and $6.1 billion in Base Operating
Support (BOS) funding for FY 2016. This level of resourcing slowly buys
down the $22.6 billion in backlogged maintenance, repair and
recapitalization MILCON requirements exacerbated by Sequestration in
2013, keeps Facilities Sustainment at 81 percent of projected needs in
FY2016 and provides the minimum municipal-type services covered under
BOS which is necessary to keep our installations running like the small
cities they are.
Mr. Wittman. What is the impact of funding sustainment, restoration
and modernization and military construction below requirements over the
long term? What level of investment and over what period of time do you
think will be necessary to fully restore the readiness of our
installations and facilities?
General Green. When we defer recapitalization of existing
facilities, we don't just delay the bill, we bring on increased
maintenance and sustainment costs, until we eventually pay the deferred
recapitalization bill--often at a higher cost. The delay increases
costs in the long run. A return to investment at 2% of plant
replacement value across the maintenance and repair portfolio, as
baselined with leading industries, will over time stem the
deterioration of infrastructure. The length of time to recover will
depend upon how many years underfunding continues.
Mr. Wittman. What impact has the substantial reduction in MILCON
spending had on the ability of installations to support readiness and
serve as power-projection platforms? How has significant new mission
beddown requirements impacted ability to recapitalize existing mission
facilities?
General Green. The reduction in MILCON spending has forced the Air
Force to prioritize and fund more mission critical projects, to include
many new mission beddown projects, at the expense of projects with less
immediate mission impact and support facilities. By prioritizing in
this manner, there is less impact on readiness and power projection and
more impact on quality of life and support facilities. The impact of
large new mission programs has been to essentially replace current
mission MILCON projects. When I think of the available funding for the
MILCON program as a pie plate, the new mission pieces simply fill space
on the pie plate that could have been used for current mission.
The Air Force has experienced mission impacts when unexpected
facility failures occurred during the period in which the Air Force
accepted ``risk.'' For example, as the Air Force delayed recapitalizing
the weapon storage and missile maintenance area at Malmstrom Air Force
Base currently projected in the FY19 MILCON program, the impacts have
been significant. In the last 5 years day-to-day Operations and
Maintenance and labor costs have increased 280 percent and, due to
security system inadequacies, an additional 3,000 man-hours of human
surveillance are required annually. Recent flooding and fire
suppression failures have also cancelled training and certification
operations for six months. Consequently, munitions experts are expected
to work extra shifts, likely contributing to a drop in retention from
75 percent to 20 percent in the last 5 years. While engineers continued
to implement Band-Aid fixes, the acceptance of risk toward
infrastructure reached a tipping point, and the failing facility
negatively affected nuclear mission readiness and resulted in tens of
millions of dollars in repair costs in order to continue operations.
Last year one of the choices the Air Force made was to request the
Cape Canaveral Range Communications Facility that is critical to NRO,
NASA and commercial launches on the Eastern Range and eliminates a
single point of failure. The project was authorized and appropriated in
the FY16 budget. Only time will tell if the new project is completed
before a failure occurs such as we have experienced at the Minot Combat
Arms Facility and the Malmstrom Missile Maintenance Facility.
Mr. Wittman. Why has the Air Force slowed their implementation of
Utilities Privatization efforts? Does the Air Force plan to continue
the program on their remaining utility systems? If not, why?
General Green. The Air Force slowed implementation of Utilities
Privatization (UP) efforts as a result of the effects of constrained
funding anticipated from the Budget Control Act and budget
sequestration in FY13. Good-faith contracting practices required us to
refrain from starting new UP solicitations until funding could be
sourced and identified in specific appropriations. Our foresight proved
correct; we would have been issuing new requests for proposal without
sufficient resources to fund contracts. The Air Force plans to continue
the program and steps have been taken to source and restore funding for
the UP program across the FYDP. This will permit us ensure proper
analysis of each project's business case and privatize each system
where it makes sense to do so.
Mr. Wittman. Are there any legislative gaps or impediments that
hinder implementation of Utilities Privatization? Does the Air Force
need specific funding authority for UP contracts or other changes in
authorities to allow program implementation to be more efficient?
General Green. As currently written, 10 USC Sec. 2688 provides
useful tools for Utilities Privatization (UP). One area that could
streamline and enhance Energy Resiliency efforts is inclusion of
specific language that would authorize the military services to include
the provision of renewable energy systems and facilities in new and
existing utility services contracts, where mission appropriate. Current
authorities for renewable energy projects do not enable the services to
leverage potential efficiencies associated with obtaining renewable
energy from an existing electric system owner located on an
installation. The authority at 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2922a generally
contemplates a separate contract for new facilities requiring Secretary
of Defense approval. This authority is typically used to contract with
third party renewable energy companies to construct free standing
renewable energy production facilities both on and outside of
installations. Significant efficiencies could be leveraged if the
services could contract directly with the installation's privatized
electric utility services provider, who already owns the electric
generation and distribution facilities on the installation. Express
provisions in Sec. 2688 for including renewable energy projects in UP
contracts would significantly improve the military services' ability to
seamlessly implement renewable energy within existing and newly awarded
utility services contracts.
The Air Force recommends and requests statutory authority within 10
USC Sec. 2688 to allow the use of UP funds across fiscal years for the
monthly Utility Services portion of the contract. Often the period of
performance for UP contracts does not align with the fiscal year, and
service contracts which are severable, may not cross fiscal years.
Authority to use funds across FYs for UP contracts would help reduce or
minimize contract modifications, quarterly spending authority
constraints, and delays in system owners receiving funds for services.
Mr. Wittman. How has the Air Force attempted to quantify the risks
they are taking by perennially reducing their investments in base
support services and infrastructure, if at all?
General Harris. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Wittman. Have reductions in civilian- or contract-provided
services for utility system operations; installation equipment
maintenance; engineering services including fire protection, crash
rescue, custodial, refuse collection, snow removal, and lease of real
property; security protection and law enforcement; and motor pool
transportation operations impacted availability of facilities that
support operations and training?
General Harris. Yes, in many instances, reduced funding for
government civilian and contract provided services have impacted
facilities across the Air Force. Despite Air Force and installation
commander efforts to mitigate impacts, reduced funding for these
services has affected the availability of facilities that support
operations and training.
Utility System Operations
Reductions in contract provided utility systems support have
impacted operations at Fairchild AFB. The reduction of civilians
maintaining the utility systems and infrastructure, combined with the
aging and weathering of facilities, have caused a multitude of issues
including: ventilation leaks, roof leaks, and outdated electrical
systems. This has resulted in a problem within the 1940s-era
maintenance facility where a sand blast booth has become inoperable due
to water leaks. Additionally, water leaking in an air handler above the
Engine Shop has caused a whole work center to have to move to an
alternate location.
At Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, the base electrical system is
still pole mounted with aging components. Funding cuts for craftsmen
have slowed the initiatives to replace the aging infrastructure with
newer and more resilient underground systems. In the last six months,
there have been two significant outages affecting the area which
supports the 108th National Guard. On one, an old transformer failed
causing a major outage to the area, impacting a drill weekend. In the
second, a pole failed supporting the same area causing a 4 hour power
outage impacting training and requiring an 8 hour scheduled outage to
complete the repairs.
Lakehurst Naval Air Station, part of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst, has the worst rated electrical system in Air Mobility
Command. Some of the facilities, still used today, pre-date the
Hindenburg which crashed at Lakehurst on 6 May 1937. The main lighter-
than-air hangar is still used today and is a Historical Facility.
However, some of the infrastructure systems are just as old. Current
electric shop staffing and funding is insufficient to maintain the old
system. There are routinely major power outages across Lakehurst due to
the age of the main substation, switchgear, and feeder lines. The
impacts on the R&D mission at NAVAIR, and the retrofit of carrier
launch systems, are significant when power goes out. One recent example
was in August 2015, when a damaged feeder switch caused a power outage
for a few days, resulting in a day-for-day slip for the electro-
magnetic catapult and advanced arresting system test schedule.
Installation Equipment Maintenance Engineering Services
Also at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, the Army CERDEC is using
an old hangar from 1941. They have over $1.2B worth of assets in the
hangar. Reductions in contracted maintenance have resulted in the
hangar doors sagging and jamming. The south end is locked closed and
recently the north end failed. Other facility maintenance issues have
required that overhead netting be installed to prevent falling pieces
of ceiling from damaging the aircraft and injuring people.
Fire Protection and Crash Rescue
Hurlburt Field lost one fire truck mechanic and one heavy-duty
mechanic position in 2013, which contributed to a loss of operations
capacity. These personnel provided operations continuity for special
purpose vehicles, training to new Airmen, and steady production levels
at home station during active duty military deployments. The non-
availability of special purpose vehicle mechanics has impacted the
capability to perform recurring maintenance and repairs contributing to
a work order backlog and extending the time and cost to complete in-
service projects.
Snow Removal
At Fairchild AFB, reductions in contract services for street and
parking lot snow removal have slowed to focus on airfield support.
Where there were once 3 to 4 operators working to keep base streets
plowed, budget cuts now only allow for 1 or 2 operators. This has
directly affected first responder response time to reported emergencies
and has affected Alert Crew response from various base locations when
trying to get back to aircraft upon being alerted. Budget cuts now only
allow for the contractor to be called out in the event of snowfalls of
2 inches or greater. This means that any snowfall less than 2 inches is
the responsibility of in-house forces. Time spent for snow removal
detracts from performing operations and training.
Mr. Wittman. What is the impact of funding sustainment, restoration
and modernization and military construction below requirements over the
long term? What level of investment and over what period of time do you
think will be necessary to fully restore the readiness of our
installations and facilities?
General Harris. When we defer recapitalization of existing
facilities, we don't just delay the bill, we bring on increased
maintenance and sustainment costs, until we eventually pay the deferred
recapitalization bill--often at a higher cost. The delay increases
costs in the long run. A return to investment at 2% of plant
replacement value across the maintenance and repair portfolio, as
baselined with leading industries, will over time stem the
deterioration of infrastructure. The length of time to recover will
depend upon how many years underfunding continues.
Mr. Wittman. Have reductions in civilian- or contract-provided
services for utility system operations; installation equipment
maintenance; engineering services including fire protection, crash
rescue, custodial, refuse collection, snow removal, and lease of real
property; security protection and law enforcement; and motor pool
transportation operations impacted availability of facilities that
support operations and training?
General Azzano. Yes, in many instances, reduced funding for
government civilian and contract provided services have impacted
facilities across the Air Force. Despite Air Force and installation
commander efforts to mitigate impacts, reduced funding for these
services has affected the availability of facilities that support
operations and training.
Utility System Operations
Reductions in contract provided utility systems support have
impacted operations at Fairchild AFB. The reduction of civilians
maintaining the utility systems and infrastructure, combined with the
aging and weathering of facilities, have caused a multitude of issues
including: ventilation leaks, roof leaks, and outdated electrical
systems. This has resulted in a problem within the 1940s-era
maintenance facility where a sand blast booth has become inoperable due
to water leaks. Additionally, water leaking in an air handler above the
Engine Shop has caused a whole work center to have to move to an
alternate location.
At Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, the base electrical system is
still pole mounted with aging components. Funding cuts for craftsmen
have slowed the initiatives to replace the aging infrastructure with
newer and more resilient underground systems. In the last six months,
there have been two significant outages affecting the area which
supports the 108th National Guard. On one, an old transformer failed
causing a major outage to the area, impacting a drill weekend. In the
second, a pole failed supporting the same area causing a 4 hour power
outage impacting training and requiring an 8 hour scheduled outage to
complete the repairs.
Lakehurst Naval Air Station, part of Joint Base McGuire-Dix-
Lakehurst, has the worst rated electrical system in Air Mobility
Command. Some of the facilities, still used today, pre-date the
Hindenburg which crashed at Lakehurst on 6 May 1937. The main lighter-
than-air hangar is still used today and is a Historical Facility.
However, some of the infrastructure systems are just as old. Current
electric shop staffing and funding is insufficient to maintain the old
system. There are routinely major power outages across Lakehurst due to
the age of the main substation, switchgear, and feeder lines. The
impacts on the R&D mission at NAVAIR, and the retrofit of carrier
launch systems, are significant when power goes out. One recent example
was in August 2015, when a damaged feeder switch caused a power outage
for a few days, resulting in a day-for-day slip for the electro-
magnetic catapult and advanced arresting system test schedule.
Installation Equipment Maintenance Engineering Services
Also at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, the Army CERDEC is using
an old hangar from 1941. They have over $1.2B worth of assets in the
hangar. Reductions in contracted maintenance have resulted in the
hangar doors sagging and jamming. The south end is locked closed and
recently the north end failed. Other facility maintenance issues have
required that overhead netting be installed to prevent falling pieces
of ceiling from damaging the aircraft and injuring people.
Fire Protection and Crash Rescue
Hurlburt Field lost one fire truck mechanic and one heavy-duty
mechanic position in 2013, which contributed to a loss of operations
capacity. These personnel provided operations continuity for special
purpose vehicles, training to new Airmen, and steady production levels
at home station during active duty military deployments. The non-
availability of special purpose vehicle mechanics has impacted the
capability to perform recurring maintenance and repairs contributing to
a work order backlog and extending the time and cost to complete in-
service projects.
Snow Removal
At Fairchild AFB, reductions in contract services for street and
parking lot snow removal have slowed to focus on airfield support.
Where there were once 3 to 4 operators working to keep base streets
plowed, budget cuts now only allow for 1 or 2 operators. This has
directly affected first responder response time to reported emergencies
and has affected Alert Crew response from various base locations when
trying to get back to aircraft upon being alerted. Budget cuts now only
allow for the contractor to be called out in the event of snowfalls of
2 inches or greater. This means that any snowfall less than 2 inches is
the responsibility of in-house forces. Time spent for snow removal
detracts from performing operations and training.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. Bordallo. How are you ensuring that there is effective
oversight of local community partnerships which extend beyond
utilities, housing, food, and other general services, that these
partnerships are in the government's best interest, and that Air Force
requirements are being effectively met?
General Green. In the ``make every dollar count,'' campaign the Air
Force has put a concentrated effort to cultivate partnerships between
our installations and the local communities. Subject matter experts
(e.g., legal, contracting, financial management) at the installation,
Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center, and Headquarter Air
Force levels are actively involved in partnership initiative
development and implementation. Additionally, Headquarters Air Force
has established an Executive Steering Group (ESG) comprised of cross-
functional Air Force senior leaders to review and provide unified
direction, guidance, and leadership to efficiently and effectively
manage the overall Air Force Community Partnership (AFCP) program and
appropriate initiatives. The ESG leverages the knowledge and expertise
of its cross-functional membership to develop/modify AFCP policy and to
make informed and sound decisions on large, Air Force-wide initiatives
or individual initiatives that may have implications beyond a single
installation. The ESG ensures partnerships are in the government's best
interest and that Air Force requirements are being met.
Ms. Bordallo. In your testimony you referred to not just primary
impacts, but also second and third degree effects on readiness of
reduced infrastructure investment, especially in Base Operations
Support. Could you provide several notable examples and their resource
costs, financial as well as time and manpower?
General Green. Reduced infrastructure investment has tangible
impacts on installation readiness and Base Operations Support, despite
Air Force and installation commander's best efforts to mitigate
impacts. Some notable examples include:
For example, the Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy at Keesler
AFB, where we prepare NCOs to assume increased front line leadership
responsibilities, continually experiences flooding from water line
breaks, power outages, and mold growth from a failing heating and air
conditioning system. In the last year the facility, which was
constructed in 1941, was closed 3 times for a total of 2.5 months,
which impacted 175 students and required 2,800 man-hours to complete
restoration activities. These closures hamper NCO training and
education and directly impact NCOs growth as leaders in every
organization supported by the school, including aircraft maintainers
responsible for sortie generation.
At Laughlin AFB, the 1953 vintage airfield storm drainage system
has exceeded its useful life and no longer performs as needed. Heavy
storms flood the airfield several times a year, terminating pilot
training for up to 3 days until flood waters recede. Each flood event
typically results in the loss of 375 sorties directly impacting pilot
training, which in turn can impact overall course length.
Another example of failing storm drainage infrastructure is at
Keesler AFB, where the piping and manholes were installed in the 1940s.
The system has exceeded its 50 year life expectancy by 25 years and no
longer provides adequate drainage. At Keesler we find areas of rapid
erosion, surface damage and sinkholes and our deferred maintenance
increased repair costs 40%. Personnel monitor 60 sinkholes each week,
spending 800 manhours and over $56K per year on the effort. Phase I to
repair the drainage system was awarded in FY15 for $3.9M, but phase 2
fell below the funding line in FY16 and is competing again in FY17.