[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE: ARE WE PREPARED?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LIVESTOCK AND FOREIGN AGRICULTURE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-42
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Agriculture
agriculture.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas, Chairman
RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas, COLLIN C. PETERSON, Minnesota,
Vice Chairman Ranking Minority Member
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia DAVID SCOTT, Georgia
FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma JIM COSTA, California
STEVE KING, Iowa TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio
GLENN THOMPSON, Pennsylvania JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
BOB GIBBS, Ohio SUZAN K. DelBENE, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia FILEMON VELA, Texas
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
DAN BENISHEK, Michigan SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
JEFF DENHAM, California ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
DOUG LaMALFA, California PETE AGUILAR, California
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
TED S. YOHO, Florida ALMA S. ADAMS, North Carolina
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
MIKE BOST, Illinois
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina
RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana
JOHN R. MOOLENAAR, Michigan
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
______
Scott C. Graves, Staff Director
Robert L. Larew, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture
DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina, Chairman
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia JIM COSTA, California, Ranking
STEVE KING, Iowa Minority Member
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri FILEMON VELA, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
DAN NEWHOUSE, Washington CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Costa, Hon. Jim, a Representative in Congress from California,
opening statement.............................................. 3
Rouzer, Hon. David, a Representative in Congress from North
Carolina, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Witnesses
Roth, D.V.M., Ph.D., James A., Clarence Hartley Covault
Distinguished Professor and Director, Center for Food Security
and Public Health, College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State
University, Ames, IA........................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Hill, D.V.M., Ph.D., Howard T., large animal veterinarian, Iowa
Falls, IA; on behalf of National Pork Producers Council........ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Parker, William Stephen ``Steve'', Director, Merial Veterinary
Public Health, Duluth, GA...................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Wolf, D.V.M., Cynthia B., Assistant Professor and Small Ruminant
Veterinary Specialist, College of Veterinary Medicine,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN; on behalf of American
Sheep Industry Association..................................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Sjeklocha, D.V.M., David B., Operations Manager of Animal Health
& Welfare, Cattle Empire LLC, Satanta, KS; on behalf of
National Cattleman's Beef Association.......................... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Supplementary material....................................... 51
Submitted Material
Executive Committee, American Association of Veterinary
Laboratory Diagnosticians, submitted letter.................... 52
Kansas Department of Agriculture, submitted statement............ 53
FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE: ARE WE PREPARED?
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture,
Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in
Room 1300 of the Longworth House Office Building, Hon. David
Rouzer [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Rouzer, King, Hartzler,
Yoho, Kelly, Costa, Nolan, and Bustos.
Staff present: Caleb Crosswhite, Darryl Blakely, John
Goldberg, Mollie Wilken, Patricia Straughn, Stephanie Addison,
Mary Knigge, Liz Friedlander, Matthew MacKenzie, Nicole Scott,
and Carly Reedholm.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID ROUZER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM NORTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Livestock
and Foreign Agriculture of the Committee on Agriculture
regarding foot-and-mouth disease: are we prepared, will come to
order. I want to welcome everybody here today, and let me say
at the outset, I have to pardon myself from our hearing at
around 2:20 because we have a Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee markup on the FAA bill and we have votes at 2:30, so
I will step away temporarily, but I will be back.
But to begin, let me welcome each of you. Thank you to each
of our witnesses for being here today. We are going to be
evaluating our preparation in the event of an introduction of a
highly contagious animal disease known as foot-and-mouth
disease, or FMD, and I want to thank everyone for taking their
time to be here, and in particular, our witnesses for their
participation and valuable insights that I know they are going
to provide.
Now I agree with the sentiment expressed by Chairman
Conaway last November in the first of the series of hearings on
American agriculture and national security, that, in fact, our
national security and agriculture are very closely intertwined.
The security of our nation depends on our ability to ensure
that; first, the food coming into our country is disease and
pest-free; second, on our ability to guarantee that farmers and
ranchers have the needed policy tools in place to continue
producing food and fiber; and third, depends on our ability to
meet the nutritional needs of both those within our border and
outside of our borders.
FMD, as you know, is a severe, highly contagious viral
disease which causes illness in cows, pigs, sheep, goats, deer,
and other animals with divided hooves. While not a public
health or food safety threat, FMD remains a worldwide concern
because of its ability to spread quickly and cause significant
economic losses.
I am concerned that an outbreak of FMD in the United States
would have catastrophic consequences for the multi-billion
dollar livestock industry, delivering a very harsh economic
effect that would be felt far beyond just animal agriculture.
In fact, I have seen a recent estimate focusing on the pork
industry, estimating an annual impact of $12.8 billion.
While many countries across the globe are dealing with FMD
in their livestock populations, fortunately for us, the last
case in the United States was in 1929. Because FMD is one of
the most difficult diseases to control, and because it still
occurs in many parts of the world, the efforts to prevent and
manage an outbreak here in the U.S. are robust. The USDA, along
with its partners in the states and the industry, has done
tremendous work to protect this country from FMD.
We recognize that the size, structure, efficiency,
extensive movement inherent to the United States and North
American livestock industries will present unprecedented
challenges in the event of an outbreak. If FMD were to have an
outbreak here, the disease could spread rapidly to all regions
of the country through routine livestock movements, unless we
detect it early and eradicate it immediately.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 issued by former
President Bush provides for a ``Defense of United States
Agriculture and Food.'' This directive establishes a national
policy to defend the agriculture and food system against
terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. HSPD
9 directs that the Secretary of Agriculture, in coordination
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in consultation
with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall
work with state and local governments in the private-sector to
develop a National Veterinary Stockpile containing sufficient
amount of animal vaccine, antiviral or therapeutic products to
appropriately respond to the most damaging animal diseases
affecting human health and the economy, and that will be
deployable within 24 hours of an outbreak.
While there has been a considerable amount of work done to
defend against FMD, today we have asked this distinguished
panel of witnesses from the industry to talk about the
progress, the vaccine capabilities we currently hold, and
possibilities for continued improvement. I look forward to your
insight.
In the near future, we will be continuing this series of
hearings, wherein we will be discussing these and other animal
and plant health issues with Federal agencies.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rouzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David Rouzer, a Representative in Congress
from North Carolina
Good afternoon and welcome to today's Livestock and Foreign
Agriculture Subcommittee hearing. Today we will be evaluating our
preparation in the event of an introduction of a highly contagious
animal disease: Foot-and-Mouth Disease--or FMD. Thank you to everyone
for taking the time to be here and I want to thank, in particular, our
witnesses for their participation and valuable insights.
I agree with the sentiment expressed by Chairman Conaway last
November in the first of a series of hearings on American agriculture
and national security--that, in fact, our national security and
agriculture are closely intertwined. The security of our nation depends
on our ability to ensure that (1) the food coming into our country is
disease and pest free, (2) on our ability to guarantee that farmers and
ranchers have the needed policy tools in place to continue producing
food and fiber, and (3) depends on our ability to meet the nutritional
needs of those both within and outside our own borders.
FMD is a severe, highly contagious viral disease, which causes
illness in cows, pigs, sheep, goats, deer, and other animals with
divided hooves. While not a public health or food safety threat, FMD
remains a worldwide concern because of its ability to spread quickly
and cause significant economic losses.
I'm concerned that an outbreak of FMD in the United States would
have catastrophic consequences for the multi-billion dollar livestock
industry, delivering a very harsh economic effect that would be felt
far beyond animal agriculture. In fact, I have seen a recent estimate
focusing on the pork industry, estimating an annual impact of $12.8
billion.
While many countries across the globe are dealing with FMD in their
livestock populations, the last case in the United States was in 1929.
Because FMD is one of the most difficult diseases to control, and
because it still occurs in many parts of the world, the efforts to
prevent and manage an outbreak here in the U.S. are robust. The USDA,
along with its partners in the states and the industry, has done
tremendous work to protect this country from FMD.
We recognize that the size, structure, efficiency, and extensive
movement inherent to the United States and North American livestock
industries will present unprecedented challenges in the event of an
outbreak. If an FMD outbreak occurs here, the disease could spread
rapidly to all regions of the country through routine livestock
movements--unless we detect it early and eradicate it immediately.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, issued by former
President Bush provides for ``Defense of United States Agriculture and
Food.'' This directive establishes a national policy to defend the
agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies. HSPD 9 directs that ``the Secretary of
Agriculture, in coordination with the [Secretary] of Homeland Security,
and in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, shall work
with state and local governments and the private-sector to develop a
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amount of
animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately
respond to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and
the economy and that will be deployable within 24 hours of an
outbreak.''
While there has been a considerable amount of work done to defend
against FMD, today we've asked this distinguished panel of witnesses
from the industry to talk about that progress, the vaccine capabilities
we currently hold, and possibilities for continued improvement. I look
forward to your insight.
In the near future, we will be continuing this series of hearings,
wherein we will be discussing these and other animal and plant health
issues with Federal agencies.
I now yield to the Subcommittee Ranking Member, Mr. Costa, for his
opening remarks.
The Chairman. I now yield to the Subcommittee Ranking
Member, Mr. Costa, for any opening remarks.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COSTA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM CALIFORNIA
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
United States agriculture industry, particularly the
livestock industry, has been fortunate as foot-and-mouth
disease, otherwise referred to as FMD, has not been a threat
since 1929. But I think many of our memories are good. We
clearly know that in 2001 there was an outbreak in Europe, and
there were challenges and there was fear and concerns as it
related to what took place, and that is a part of the world in
which we have close relations and which we have trade that
takes place on a daily basis. We know it has not been
eradicated. And for myself, three generations of a farm family
in California, we have been involved in both the dairy and
cattle industry for all of those three generations, and I can
remember stories of my father and my grandfather about the
fears and the concerns when they first began to try to make it
work for them, and the lack of protocol and the science and
technology then that we now have today that makes a big
difference.
Foot-and-mouth disease is a very, very serious disease and
would cripple the U.S. livestock industry as we know it if, in
fact, such an outbreak were to take place. And therefore, we
must be prepared throughout the country and in California,
where we have a very significant cattle industry, as well as a
dairy industry that last year was over $7 billion in proceeds
at the farmgate. Clearly, the impacts of both the cattle and
the dairy industry to California, and to any other part of the
country, would be very, very damaging.
The vaccine stockpile is important, but that is only one
aspect of trying to ensure that the United States is prepared
to handle foot-and-mouth disease if, in fact, such an outbreak
were to take place. Several lessons we believe have been
learned in terms of animal husbandry and the science that is
contained therein, as we try to prepare and provide prevention
for other types of contagious issues within our livestock
industry, whether we are talking about high-path avian
influenza, otherwise referred to as HPAI, are approaching
Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus, otherwise known as PEDv--I
always go through this because I give my staff a bad time when
they use the acronyms and I say people never know what you are
talking about. Although some of these words might be preferable
to use the acronyms. So the fact is they are serious, and they
can be devastating if not controlled.
I hope the industries that are represented here today by
these witnesses are prepared to talk about steps that they are
taking to prevent such outbreaks in ways that we can partner
with the United States Department of Agriculture. The USDA, for
farmers, ranchers, and dairymen, for the cattlemen and the
livestock and pork producers in particular, is a very valued
partner, and therefore, that hand in glove relationship is
critical as we look at any current activities and as we look at
ways to ensure that we protect these industries.
I think it will take a strong continued public-private
partnership to ensure that we are adequately prepared to deal
with this, or any other related issues, should such an outbreak
occur. We pray not.
In closing, it is critical that we protect American animal
agriculture against the threat of foot-and-mouth disease. And
it is critical that we use fact-based science to ensure that we
deal with proper risk assessment and risk management that is
always part of the protocol when we are dealing with these
issues. Knowing that as many of us grew up the farms, our
mothers used to tell us an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure, and we are talking about that prevention here today.
The producers who are represented and industry stakeholders
know how critical it is to work collaboratively to identify
ways to achieve the common goals to detect, control, and
contain FMD should it reach the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are quite correct. I think all
of us on this Committee believe truly that the production of
food and fiber in America is an issue of national security; and
therefore, we should treat it as such. So I look forward to
hearing the testimony of our witnesses, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Costa. The chair would request
that other Members submit their opening statements for the
record so the witnesses may begin their testimony, and to
ensure that there is ample time for questions. The chair would
like to remind Members that they will be recognized for
questioning in order of seniority for Members who were present
at the start of the hearing. After that, Members will be
recognized in order of their arrival. I appreciate the Members'
understanding.
Witnesses are asked to limit their oral presentations to 5
minutes, and all written statements will be included for the
record.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to the table. First,
we have Dr. Jim Roth, Director of the Center for Food Security
and Public Health, Iowa State University, College of Veterinary
Medicine. We have Dr. Howard Hill, large animal veterinarian,
Iowa Falls, Iowa. Mr. Steve Parker, Director of Merial
Veterinary Public Health from Duluth, Georgia, and Dr. Cynthia
Wolf, Assistant Professor, College of Veterinary Medicine,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minnesota, and Dr. David
Sjeklocha, did I get that right, Sjeklocha? That is not a
native North Carolina name, so it takes me a little bit longer.
Sorry about that. Operations Manager of Animal Health &
Welfare, Cattle Empire, LLC, Santanta, Kansas, on behalf of
National Cattleman's Beef Association.
Dr. Roth, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF JAMES A. ROTH, D.V.M., Ph.D., CLARENCE HARTLEY
COVAULT DISTINGUISHED PROFESSOR AND
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, COLLEGE
OF VETERINARY MEDICINE, IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY, AMES, IA
Dr. Roth. Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and
Members of the House Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on
Livestock and Foreign Agriculture, as the Chairman mentioned,
my name is Jim Roth and I am with Iowa State University College
of Veterinary Medicine. I want to thank you for recognizing the
importance of foot-and-mouth disease preparation, and for the
opportunity to speak to you. The introductory comments were
very accurate on the situation with foot-and-mouth disease, and
the dangers of foot-and-mouth disease.
I will first highlight some challenges for control of FMD
in the U.S., briefly mention some significant progress that has
been made in preparedness, and then I will discuss the urgent
need for a sufficient stockpile of FMD vaccine to protect U.S.
agriculture.
As has already been mentioned, FMD is the most important
animal disease in the world. It affects cloven-hoofed animals,
and we all must remember, it is not a public health or food
safety concern. This is a livestock disease. It is a bad
livestock disease, but it is not a human health concern.
Ninety-six countries in the world have foot-and-mouth disease,
so more countries have it than don't have it. So our livestock
industry is always under pressure that this virus could come in
from one of those countries by many different ways. The U.S.
has had nine outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease between 1870
and 1929, so in a 60 year period, we had nine outbreaks, and we
haven't had one for 87 years, fortunately.
All nine of those outbreaks were controlled by stop
movement and stamping out, so in the affected area, they
stopped all animal movement. All animals in the infected herd
are depopulated, and any herds nearby, and you have to do that
very quickly to stop the virus from spreading.
It has become apparent that we can't count on a stop
movement and stamping out if we get into a large outbreak,
because agriculture has changed quite extensively. We have very
large herd sizes that are too large to be depopulated within 24
to 48 hours. If you could depopulate them, carcass disposal
would be a massive problem. We have extensive animal movement.
It is estimated there are a million pigs on the road every day
in trucks, 400,000 to 500,000 cattle, and so there is concern
that by the time we find it, the virus may have moved
extensively. And we have to be concerned that wildlife can
spread this virus. Deer and feral swine, we have 30 million
deer, five million feral swine in the U.S. that in many cases
move freely between our livestock herds and could spread the
disease. So unless an FMD infection is detected very quickly
and stamped out, there is a great concern it could spread
relatively widely fairly quickly. And of course, foot-and-mouth
disease is the main disease limiting trade and livestock and
livestock products in the world. We would lose our exports
immediately, and that is about $20 billion a year of beef,
pork, and milk exported that we would lose, and that is just
the loss in exports.
But progress has been made in changing the plans. The USDA
doesn't plan on counting on only stamping out and stop
movement. The USDA has been working with states, industry, and
academia to address the challenges, how would we address an FMD
outbreak, given modern agriculture? And significant progress
has been made in developing secure food supply plans to help
ensure business continuity for livestock producers and
affiliated industries, and provide a continuous supply of safe
and wholesome food for our consumers.
One of the outcomes of that was a document that is called,
Phases and Types of Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreaks, and it
depends on the magnitude of the outbreak, and the response will
change depending on the magnitude. But without sufficient foot-
and-mouth disease vaccine, it is likely that we won't be able
to stop the outbreak at a small outbreak, and it will progress
to a large outbreak. The North American FMD Vaccine Bank is
inadequate. It is shared with U.S., Canada, and Mexico, and
doesn't have enough doses, so we need an adequate stockpile,
and there are methods for producing an adequate stockpile of
FMD vaccine. The livestock industry has asked me to draft a
white paper on how we could have enough vaccine to adequately
manage an outbreak. You need 23 different vaccines. It is not
just one vaccine.
So I urge Congress to provide sufficient funding to enable
the USDA to work with state officials and livestock industry
representatives to develop and implement a plan for
establishing an effective FMD vaccine stockpile to protect
American agriculture and the food supply. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Roth follows:]
Prepared Statement of James A. Roth, D.V.M., Ph.D., Clarence Hartley
Covault Distinguished Professor and Director, Center for Food Security
and Public Health, College of Veterinary Medicine, Iowa State
University, Ames, IA
Impact of an Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in the United
States and the Urgent Need for an Adequate Stockpile of FMD
Vaccine
Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the House
Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign
Agriculture, my name is Jim Roth and I am the Director of the Center
for Food Security and Public Health at the Iowa State University
College of Veterinary Medicine. Thank you for the opportunity to speak
to you about preparedness for the potential introduction of foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD) in the United States. I will first highlight
challenges for control of FMD and some of the significant progress that
has been made, then focus on the urgent need for a sufficient stockpile
of FMD vaccine to protect U.S. agriculture and an approach to begin to
build that stockpile.
Challenges for Control of FMD in the U.S.
Foot-and-mouth disease is the most important animal disease in the
world capable of crossing national boundaries and devastating animal
agriculture (a transboundary disease). FMD affects cattle, pigs, sheep,
goats, deer, elk and other wildlife. Ninety-six countries are either
endemically or sporadically infected with the disease, therefore there
is a constant threat that it will be introduced into the U.S. either
accidentally or intentionally. FMD is extremely contagious and can
spread rapidly with devastating consequences. You probably remember the
outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 which is estimated to have cost
approximately $6 billion. The number of livestock and the agriculture
economy is much smaller in the UK than the U.S. We learned from their
outbreak that we cannot depend on stamping out the disease by killing
all infected and exposed animals.
The size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in
the United States livestock industry will present unprecedented
challenges in the event of an FMD outbreak. No country with a livestock
industry comparable to that of the U.S. has had to deal with an
outbreak of FMD, and the impact would extend far beyond animal
agriculture.
Herd Size
The U.S. has some very large herds including feedlots with greater
than 50,000 head of cattle, dairies with greater than 5,000 lactating
cows, dairy calf ranches with greater than 70,000 head of calves, and
swine farms with greater than 20,000 sows. These premises are too large
to rapidly depopulate to stamp out the disease. If it were possible to
depopulate them, carcass disposal would present enormous environmental
problems.
Animal Movement
Once FMD is detected, an essential tool for control is to stop all
animal movement in the affected area. Livestock production in the U.S.
depends on extensive movement of animals. Approximately 400,000 cattle
and one million swine are estimated to be on the road in trucks each
day, either being delivered to packing plants or to other stages of
production. Approximately 40 million swine are shipped into a new state
each year ( 110,000 each day). Many of those cross multiple state
lines. In an FMD outbreak, State Animal Health Officials may prohibit
animals from an FMD positive area from entering their state. Modern
swine production depends on extensive animal movement on a regular
basis. If animal movement is stopped, animals will need to be
euthanized for welfare reasons because facilities will rapidly become
overcrowded.
There is also extensive movement of people, feed, manure, and
equipment on livestock premises each day. Wildlife, including birds,
can spread disease. There are estimated to be more than five million
feral swine and 30 million deer in the U.S.; these animals are
susceptible to FMD and can often move freely between herds of
livestock. If FMD infection is not detected quickly, it is likely to
spread rapidly due to extensive animal and related movements.
Diversity of Operations
The diversity of herd size also presents problems in FMD control.
In the U.S., 49% of hog operations have fewer than 100 head, whereas
62% of the inventory of swine is on operations with more than 5,000
head. Similarly, 18,800 dairy farms have less than 30 cows; however,
1,800 dairy farms with more than 1000 animals account for nearly 50% of
the U.S. dairy cow population. An FMD control program will need to
include operations of all sizes. Federal and state resources will be
quickly overwhelmed.
Economic Impact of FMD
An outbreak of FMD will shut down exports of fresh beef, pork or
dairy products. In 2014, beef exports totaled $7.1 billion, pork
exports $6.7 billion and dairy exports totaled $7.1 billion.
Approximately 11% of U.S. beef production and 22% of U.S. pork
production are exported. In 2003, beef exports dropped due to a single
case of mad cow disease (BSE); the cumulative loss in U.S. beef trade
is estimated to have been $16 billion. The increasing export of beef
and pork products in recent years significantly contributes to the
value of cattle and swine. As exports increase, the industry becomes
more vulnerable to the sudden and extended loss of exports that would
result from an FMD outbreak. The price for pork and beef will drop
dramatically due to the excess product on the domestic market. That
will also impact the price of poultry products and the price of grain.
In 2011, Dr. Dermot Hayes and colleagues at the Center for
Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University published
``Economy Wide Impacts of a Foreign Animal Disease in the United
States'' which had been funded by the National Pork Board. They
estimated that over 10 years, the cumulative loss due to an
uncontrolled FMD outbreak would be $199.8 billion. Losses estimated
include:
Pork--$57 billion;
Beef--$71 billion;
Poultry--$1 billion;
Corn--$44 billion;
Soybeans--$25 billion;
Wheat--$1.8 billion.
The impact would likely be larger now because of the increase in
the value of exports since 2011. Agriculture is a critical
infrastructure in the U.S. and is severely threatened by the potential
of an FMD outbreak.
Progress That Has Been Made
Because of the challenges outlined above, it became apparent that
an FMD outbreak could rapidly get out of control. As a consequence, the
USDA has been working with states, industry and academia to address
these challenges. Significant progress has been made in developing
Secure Food Supply plans to help ensure business continuity for non-
infected poultry and livestock premises and affiliated industries in a
foreign animal disease outbreak and provide a continuous supply of safe
and wholesome food to consumers. The Secure Egg Supply and Secure
Turkey Supply plans are credited with enabling premises in Highly
Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) control areas to demonstrate that
they are not infected so they could continue to move product to market
in the 2015 outbreak in the Upper Midwest. The Secure Pork, Beef and
Milk Supply plans are intended to help producers whose farms are not
infected with FMD stay in business. However, without adequate FMD
vaccine, it will be nearly impossible to keep farms, especially beef
and dairy farms, from becoming infected.
The USDA working with states, industry and academia, developed
``Guidelines for Classification of Phases and Types of An FMD Outbreak
and Response''.
Six Types of FMD Outbreak
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
These guidelines were developed to aid rapid decision making as an
FMD outbreak unfolds. Strategies for the response to, and management
of, an FMD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses and will
depend upon the magnitude, location, and other characteristics of the
outbreak. The response will shift from an emphasis on stamping out in a
small outbreak to alternative strategies in larger longer duration
outbreaks. Vaccine will be an essential tool to control any outbreak
larger than a small focal outbreak. Without an adequate supply of
rapidly available FMD vaccine, it will be very difficult to prevent the
outbreak from progressing to a catastrophic North American outbreak
(see: FAD PReP Strategy Document: Classification of Phases and Types of
a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response available at:
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/phases-and-types-of-an-fmd-outbreak).
Lessons Learned from Recent Foreign Animal Disease Outbreaks
The U.S. has experienced two recent introductions of devastating
transboundary animal diseases: Porcine epidemic diarrhea virus (PEDv or
Swine Enteric Coronavirus Disease (SECD)) in 2013 and highly pathogenic
avian influenza (HPAI) in 2015. Both viruses apparently had origins in
Asia; FMD is endemic in most countries in Asia. PEDV spread to 27
states and killed at least eight million baby pigs in the first year.
HPAI caused the death of 31.5 million poultry in 2 months in Iowa alone
(including approximately 40% of the laying hens in the state) and cost
the economy of the state approximately $1.2 billion; the USDA spent
nearly $1 billion to assist in controlling HPAI. Disposal of the
poultry carcasses became a serious problem.
These outbreaks occurred in industries with much more robust
biosecurity practices than the beef and dairy industries. An FMD
outbreak would dwarf the PEDV and HPAI outbreaks. No one anticipated
the introduction of PEDV, so there was no vaccine available. It was
more than 15 months before vaccine became available. It is not possible
to have an HPAI vaccine available ahead of a new outbreak because of
rapid unpredictable changes in HPAI viruses. However, it is possible
and essential to have vaccine available at the beginning of an FMD
outbreak. Having an adequate supply of FMD vaccine quickly available
could greatly limit the extent and duration of an FMD outbreak.
In summary, the size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement
inherent in the United States livestock industry will present
unprecedented challenges in the event of an FMD outbreak. It will be
nearly impossible to control an FMD outbreak in livestock dense areas
without the rapid use of tens of millions of doses of FMD vaccine. At
this time, those doses are not available for U.S. use and it would take
many months to obtain the volume of vaccine needed. Without sufficient
vaccine to aid in the response, FMD could rapidly spread across the
U.S., resulting in the destruction and need to dispose of potentially
millions of animals. It would become an endemic disease in livestock
with spread potentially facilitated by deer, feral swine or other free-
living animals. A long term, very expensive and extensive control
program would be needed and it could take many years to eradicate.
Requirements for an FMD Vaccine Bank
The need for FMD vaccine for the U.S. has been recognized for
decades. The U.S. has shared an FMD vaccine bank with Canada and Mexico
since 1982 (The North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank).
The USDA has stated that the amount of FMD vaccine available in the
Bank (which is controlled and shared by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico)
is far below what would be required for an outbreak in a single
livestock dense state. Since the need for vaccine in the U.S. is likely
to be much greater than for Canada or Mexico, additional sources of FMD
vaccines independent of the North American FMD Vaccine Bank are needed
to adequately protect U.S. agriculture.
This was recognized in 2004 in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9. HSPD 9 directed that a National Veterinary Stockpile be
created. The Stockpile was to contain sufficient amounts of animal
vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately respond to
the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and the
economy. The USDA established the National Veterinary Stockpile,
however the stockpile has never received sufficient funding to
stockpile FMD vaccines; consequently there are no FMD vaccines in the
Stockpile.
The USDA, along with many state and industry officials, recognized
that the approach of stamping out and stop movement of animals is
simply not possible given the realities of animal agriculture in the
U.S. The USDA document ``Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccination Policy in
the United States'' (September 2014) illustrates the current capacity
of the U.S. to effectively implement vaccination strategy for control
of different types of FMD outbreaks (available upon request). It
clearly indicates that there is not sufficient vaccine capacity to
assist in controlling an FMD outbreak.
A plan to ensure that adequate supplies of FMD vaccine with
multiple strains of FMD virus are available in the event of an
accidental or intentional introduction of FMD virus into the U.S. is
urgently needed.
At the request of the National Pork Board, National Cattlemen's
Beef Association, and National Milk Producers Federation I produced a
white paper entitled ``FMD Vaccine Surge Capacity for Emergency Use in
the United States'' outlining a potential plan to develop a National
Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) with sufficient quantities of FMD vaccine to
protect U.S. agriculture, food systems, and the economy. The white
paper is available at: www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fmd-vaccine-surge-
capacity-for-emergency-use-in-the-US.
It is possible to have an FMD vaccine stockpile available for
immediate use. However, establishing and maintaining an FMD vaccine
bank is complex. There are seven distinct serotypes of the virus that
are not cross protective and approximately 65 subtypes. Cross-
protection varies between strains within a serotype. The World
Reference Laboratory for FMD recommends that FMD vaccine banks maintain
23 strains of FMD virus in the vaccine bank. Once the virus in the
outbreak is isolated, the serotype can be identified and the correct
vaccine selected for use. (See: NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for
Contagious Diseases. Appendix A: Foot-And-Mouth Disease available at:
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fad-prep-nahems-appendix-a-vaccination-for-
foot-and-mouth-disease).
Costs
The white paper contains recommendations that I hope can be
considered for implementation and funding to better prepare the U.S. to
avoid the worst case scenario which is likely to occur if FMD is
introduced into the U.S. without adequate emergency vaccine supplies.
I estimated in the white paper that development of a robust FMD
vaccine stockpile could require an investment of up to $150 million per
year for 5 years. This number could likely be reduced with additional
planning, the development of new technology vaccines, and negotiation
with vaccine companies. The vaccine capability could gradually increase
during the 5 years, initially focusing on the most common strains of
FMD virus. By the end of 5 years we could have the capability to
respond quickly to any strain of FMD virus introduced into the U.S. The
stockpile could use a rotating inventory strategy so that vaccine would
not expire and need to be destroyed.
Conclusion
I urge Congress to provide sufficient funding to enable USDA to
work with state officials and livestock industry representatives to
develop and implement a plan for establishing an effective FMD vaccine
stockpile to protect American agriculture.
For additional information on FMD see:
http://www.cfsph.iastate.edu/Factsheets/pdfs/
foot_and_mouth_disease.pdf
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fmd-vaccine-surge-capacity-for-emergency-
use-in-the-US
www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fad-prep-nahems-appendix-a-vaccination-
for-foot-and-mouth-disease
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Roth. Dr. Hill.
STATEMENT OF HOWARD T. HILL, D.V.M., Ph.D., LARGE
ANIMAL VETERINARIAN, IOWA FALLS, IA; ON BEHALF OF
NATIONAL PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL
Dr. Hill. Good afternoon, Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member
Costa, and Members of the Subcommittee. I am Dr. Howard Hill, a
veterinarian and pork producer from Cambridge, Iowa, and I am
the immediate past President of the National Pork Producers
Council.
As you have heard, foot-and-mouth disease is a very serious
disease, an outbreak in this country would be economically
devastating to the U.S. pork producers and other food
producers. USDA and the livestock industry has been working to
develop plans to address a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. We,
the Federal Government, and the industry must be better
prepared to deal if we have an outbreak.
As Dr. Roth pointed out, USDA APHIS has changed its policy
on managing foot-and-mouth disease from stamping out or
depopulating to using vaccine in all but the smallest of
outbreaks to limit the spread of this disease. The U.S.
livestock industry supported that change, as it is less costly,
more humane, and more practical, given the enormous size of the
U.S. herd and the movement of livestock around the country.
United States simply cannot kill its way out of a foot-and-
mouth disease outbreak. But under the current structure of the
foot-and-mouth vaccine antigen bank, APHIS does not have the
quantity of vaccine needed to implement the new policy, and it
currently can't obtain vaccine in a timely manner if there were
an outbreak.
U.S. law prohibits foot-and-mouth disease virus from being
on the U.S. mainland, so APHIS contracts with foreign vaccine
production companies to produce finished vaccine from the
antigen that is stored at Plum Island Animal Disease Center off
the coast of Long Island. But only a limited number of foot-
and-mouth disease strains are covered by the antigen stored at
Plum Island. Additionally, based on the current production
contract, after 3 weeks, it is estimated there would only be
2.5 million doses of vaccine, and there would be no surge
capacity to produce more. United States is the only country in
the world that maintains its own antigen bank, requiring
shipping of antigen to a foreign manufacturer to have it
manufactured into a final vaccine, which is complex and time
consuming.
The Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank currently is funded
at $1.9 million, and there have been no requests for a
substantial increase in the President's budget, despite
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9, which requires an
adequate vaccine stock to be maintained. The livestock industry
believes fixing the vaccine bank will require; first, an
offshore vendor maintaining vaccine antigen bank that would be
available for all 23 strains of the most common foot-and-mouth
types currently circulating in the world; second, a vendor-
managed inventory of ten million doses, which it is estimated
to be needed for the first 2 weeks of an outbreak; and then
third, contracting with an international manufacturer or
manufacturers for surge capacity to produce at least 40 million
doses.
Given the potential economic impact on the livestock
industry of a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak and the costs of
dealing with it, APHIS has insisted that the industry share in
a cost of improving the vaccine bank. From our perspective, it
is hard to agree to this until we know what the cost is.
Additionally, the type of outbreak and the location where it is
will determine which sector of the livestock industry is most
seriously affected in the initial phase of an outbreak, and
which sector, therefore, should bear the lion's share of any
costs.
While several options have been discussed, none would
provide significant funds and none have included a way to
equitably assign costs to each sector of the livestock
industry. More work needs to be done in this area, and we are
pleased to hear that APHIS will soon be issuing a request for
information for improvement of the vaccine bank that should
give us an idea of the cost.
The bottom line, though, is that we need to improve the
preparedness for a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak through the
development of adequate vaccine bank, and it must be a
priority, and NPPC urges this Committee and the Congress to
work with the Administration to do that.
I thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions
at the appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hill follows:]
Prepared Statement of Howard T. Hill, D.V.M., Ph.D., Large Animal
Veterinarian, Iowa Falls, IA; on Behalf of National Pork Producers
Council
Introduction
The National Pork Producers Council (NPPC) is an association of 43
state pork producer organizations that serves as the global voice in
Washington. D.C., for the nation's pork producers. The U.S. pork
industry represents a significant value-added activity in the
agricultural economy and the overall U.S. economy. Nationwide, more
than 68,000 pork producers marketed more than 110 million hogs in 2014,
and those animals provided total gross receipts of $23.4 billion.
Overall, an estimated $22.3 billion of personal income and $39 billion
of gross national product are supported by the U.S. pork industry.
Economists Daniel Otto, Lee Schulz, and Mark Imerman at Iowa State
University estimate that the U.S. pork industry is directly responsible
for the creation of more than 37,000 full-time equivalent pork
producing jobs and generates about 128,000 jobs in the rest of
agriculture. It is responsible for approximately 102,000 jobs in the
manufacturing sector, mostly in the packing industry, and 65,000 jobs
in professional services such as veterinarians, real estate agents and
bankers. All told, the U.S. pork industry is responsible for nearly
550,000 mostly rural jobs in the United States. The U.S. pork producers
today provide 23 billion pounds of safe, wholesome and nutritious meat
protein to consumers worldwide.
Exports add significantly to the bottom line of each U.S. pork
producer. U.S. exports of pork and pork products totaled 2.2 million
metric tons in 2014, representing more than 26 percent of U.S.
production, and those exports add more than $62 to the value of each
hog marketed. Exports supported about 110,000 jobs in the U.S. pork and
allied industries.
FMD a Growing Threat to North America
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) is one of the most economically
devastating foreign animal diseases affecting animal agriculture. It is
highly contagious and spreads easily through livestock movement, by
wind currents, on vehicles that have traveled to and from infected
farms and even on inanimate objects that have come in contact with the
virus. It affects all cloven hoofed species, including wildlife such as
deer and elk.
Because North America is free of FMD, an outbreak of the disease in
the United States would immediately shut off all exports of U.S.
livestock, meat and dairy products, creating a precipitous drop in
livestock markets. Because U.S. consumers have no knowledge of the
disease, there also likely would be serious disruptions in the domestic
market because of decreased demand for those products.
FMD is endemic in Africa, Asia, South America and the Middle East.
The FMD virus has seven viral serotypes and more than 60 subtypes, with
wide strain variability. Managing and ultimately eradicating FMD
requires strain-specific vaccines, making vaccination challenging and
very expensive. Sporadic outbreaks with different types continue to pop
up in countries around the world.
Increased travel and trade between affected countries make the U.S.
increasingly vulnerable to introduction of the disease. Now, the United
States has to confront the possibility of terrorists using FMD as a
weapon to inflict significant damage to the U.S. economy that could
also affect food availability.
U.S. Livestock Industry Vulnerable to FADs, Including FMD
The House Agriculture Committee Nov. 4, 2015, held a hearing on
American agriculture and national security, which highlighted the
vulnerability of the U.S. food supply to the potential for foreign
animal disease introduction by terrorists or by accident.
While the United States faces an increasing threat, through
multiple sources, of the introduction of FMD into the U.S. livestock
herd, there is ample evidence to suggest the safety net in place to
prevent such an introduction needs to be improved.
The bipartisan Report of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense,
co-chaired by former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge and former Sen. Joe Lieberman and released Oct. 28, 2015,
highlighted the need for improvements in the U.S. system for protecting
the U.S. livestock herd and the nation's food supply from Foreign
Animal Diseases (FADs).
Since 2013, several diseases affecting swine have been introduced
into the U.S. herd, including Porcine Epidemic Diarrhea virus (PEDv),
Delta Corona Virus and Orthoreovirus. Government officials responsible
for overseeing port-of-entry inspections and disease risk management
have been unable to specifically identify the source or means of
introduction of those viruses even though the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
conducted a root cause investigation. If there is an unidentified gap
in the U.S. safety net that allowed the recent introduction of these
new diseases, it also remains open for FMD.
In USDA's FAD preparation strategy document on the phases and types
of an FMD outbreak, Dr. James Roth, professor and researcher at Iowa
State University, identified four phases of the disease: (1)
confirmation of an outbreak (typically 3 days); (2) surveillance and
epidemiological work necessary to provide timely evidence of the extent
of an outbreak to support decision making by government officials; (3)
recovery from the disease; and (4) freedom from the disease (possibly
with vaccination).
He characterized an FMD outbreak as having six types: Type 1, Small
Focal; Type 2, Moderate Regional; Type 3, Large Regional; Type 4,
Widespread or National; Type 5, Catastrophic U.S.; and Type 6,
Catastrophic North American, which includes Canada and Mexico.
Given the structure of the U.S. livestock industry, the likelihood
of having a Small Focal or Moderate Regional outbreak is remote. The
livestock industry estimates there are approximately one million pigs
and 400,000 cattle moved daily in the United States, some over long
distances. In addition, there are numerous auctions, fairs and exhibits
that concentrate large numbers of animals in a single location,
providing the opportunity for one infected or exposed animal to spread
disease to many animals. Thus, it seems unlikely that, if the United
States had an outbreak, it would be a small focal outbreak that could
be controlled without widespread administration of vaccine.
The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) sets standards for
managing and declaring freedom from FMD. Those standards range from
``stamping out'' (killing all infected and exposed animals) to being
free of FMD with vaccination.
Not Enough Vaccine to Address FMD Outbreak
After watching countries such as the United Kingdom, Korea and
Japan, whose livestock populations pale in comparison to the United
States, struggle to manage an FMD outbreak by killing large numbers of
animals, APHIS changed its existing policy on managing the disease from
``stamping out'' to using vaccine to limit the spread. This policy
change was endorsed by the livestock industry as a cheaper and more
practical alternative given the enormous size of the U.S. livestock
herd and the rapid movement of livestock around the country. The United
States simply cannot ``kill'' its way out of an FMD outbreak!
After reviewing the impacts of the policy change, it became readily
apparent under the current structure of the FMD vaccine antigen bank
that APHIS did not have the quantity of vaccine needed to implement
this new policy, nor could vaccine be obtained in a timely manner in
the event of an outbreak.
At APHIS's request, the U.S. livestock industry began a series of
meetings with its senior officials to develop a strategy for improving
the vaccine antigen bank and vaccine availability. There has been
significant progress in FMD preparedness through the development of
secure supply plans for milk, pork and beef, and APHIS continues to
work with the livestock industry to improve its preparedness
capability. Fixing the antigen bank capacity and improving vaccine
availability must be a priority in future preparedness efforts.
Current U.S. law prohibits live FMD virus from being introduced
onto the U.S. mainland, so foreign production companies are the only
source of finished vaccines. It has been suggested that recombinant DNA
vaccines that do not use live FMD virus can be produced in the United
States, thus avoiding the legal prohibition of having live virus on the
mainland. However, current data is not sufficient to determine how
quickly, and indeed whether, such vaccines provide protection outside
of the laboratory environment and for all species.
The United States likely is years away from the development and
commercialization of such novel vaccines. But the U.S. livestock
industry must have vaccines that are protective against the strain of
FMD that might be in a sample sitting at the Plum Island Animal Disease
Center (PIADC) for analysis at this very moment!
The United States is the only country in the world to maintain its
own antigen bank, located at the PIADC. The bank maintains antigen for
a limited number of FMD strains. APHIS contracts with foreign vaccine
production companies to produce finished vaccine from the antigen
stored at Plum Island. If an outbreak occurs, the antigen is shipped to
Europe to produce vaccine, and the finished product is shipped back to
the United States. Based on the current production contract, after 3
weeks, this process would produce only 2.5 million doses of vaccine,
and there is no surge capacity to produce more.
Iowa State's Dr. Roth estimates that the U.S. livestock industry
would need ten million doses for the first 2 weeks of an outbreak.
The FMD vaccine bank is currently funded at $1.9 million, and there
have been no requests for a substantial increase in the President's
budget despite the fact that Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9
(HSPD 9) requires an adequate vaccine stockpile to be maintained.
Although APHIS is the agency charged with managing and controlling
FADs, there is no logical reason there could not be mutual cooperation
with the Department of Homeland Security on funding an enhanced vaccine
bank and improving vaccine availability.
Another factor complicating upgrades to the vaccine bank is it also
serves as the North American Bank and thus includes Canada and Mexico.
NPPC believes it is appropriate to include those neighboring countries,
but the United States should not wait for negotiations with those
countries to be completed before making necessary improvements that are
so critical to the U.S. livestock industry.
There is concurrence in the livestock industry that fixing the
vaccine bank will require the following actions: (1) Contract for an
offshore, vendor-maintained vaccine antigen bank that would have
available antigen concentrate to protect against all 23 of the most
common FMD types currently circulating in the world; (2) Contract for a
vendor-managed inventory of ten million doses (the estimated need for
the first 2 weeks of an outbreak); and (3) Contract with an
international manufacturer(s) for the surge capacity to produce at
least 40 million doses.
For more than a year, NPPC and others in the livestock industry
have urged APHIS to identify changes needed to modernize the antigen
bank and increase vaccine availability by requesting information from
vaccine producers to identify the cost of fixing the vaccine problem.
The industry anticipates that the agency soon will make that request.
FMD Outbreak Could Be Economically Devastating
NPPC knows that fixing the vaccine shortage will require a
significant increase in budget outlays. However, that cost pales in
comparison to the cost of an FMD outbreak. Iowa State University
economist Dermot Hayes estimates revenue losses to just the U.S. pork
and beef industries from an FMD outbreak at $12.9 billion per year over
a 10 year period; the corn and soybean industries are estimated to lose
$44 billion and $24.9 billion, respectively. A recent study by Kansas
State University estimates cumulative losses to consumers and livestock
producers at $188 billion, with an added cost to the government of $11
billion for eradication efforts if vaccination is not employed.
Depending on the vaccination strategy employed, the study estimates the
losses to consumers and producers could be cut by 48 percent.
Given the huge economic impact on the livestock industry of an FMD
outbreak and the cost of dealing with it, APHIS has insisted that the
industry must share in the costs associated with making improvements to
the vaccine bank. While several options have been discussed, none have
produced a viable method by which equitable contributions from each
sector of the livestock industry could be made. The type of outbreak
and its location will determine which sector of the livestock industry
is most seriously affected in the initial phase of an outbreak.
None of the options discussed thus far would provide any
significant funds, and APHIS has not offered any kind of a plan that
would be equitable among components of the industry. Frankly, the
industry believes it would be impossible to develop such a plan.
The history of government involvement in disasters like an FMD
outbreak is that, once an outbreak occurs, unlimited resources are
committed to getting control of the situation. In the case of FMD,
there is a clear opportunity to invest in a robust vaccine bank that
would limit the economic impact on producers, feed suppliers and
consumers and reduce the government's cost for control and eradication
of the disease.
NPPC urges the Committee and Congress to work with the
Administration to address the alarming gap in the preparedness for an
FMD outbreak. Whether the disease introduction is the result of
terrorism, careless travelers or carried on traded commodities, the
calamitous result is the same: devastation to the U.S. livestock
industry.
Mrs. Hartzler [presiding.] Thank you, Dr. Hill.
Mr. Parker.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM STEPHEN ``STEVE'' PARKER,
DIRECTOR, MERIAL VETERINARY PUBLIC HEALTH, DULUTH, GA
Mr. Parker. Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
provide testimony from the perspective of an FMD vaccine
manufacturer.
At Merial, I am responsible for the interface with the
government on reportable and animal disease management
programs. Merial strives to align our capabilities with the
mission of the government to advance solutions against a
variety of reportable animal diseases. The current North
America FMD Vaccine Bank stockpile is undersized to respond to
anything other than a limited scope outbreak. Thoughtful
consideration should be given to advancing a funding source
that supports building adequate FMD bank stockpiles that are in
line with U.S. FMD vaccine use policy.
Even though the current global FMD vaccine demand grossly
exceeds the ability of conventional vaccine manufacturers to
supply, an optimized vaccine need for the U.S. can be addressed
with advanced planning and investment. Expertise in FMD vaccine
technology is central to Merial's history. For over 60 years,
Merial has produced millions of doses of high quality, high
potent FMD vaccine. This vaccine is made for government clients
in all regions of the world for epidemic disease control
efforts, and for government preparedness programs.
In FMD free countries, vaccine antigen banks are the
standard model for emergency response to FMD outbreaks.
Efficient antigen bank models match the quality and quantity of
bank antigen doses to the disease spread potential in the
target livestock population, combined with the manufacturer's
ability to rapidly respond to conversion of antigen to vaccine.
The North American Bank stores antigen concentrate for
production of emergency vaccine. The bank does not store
finished vaccine, mainly due to the difference in shelf life of
the antigen concentrate, which is 5 years, versus the shelf
life of finished vaccine at 18 months. FMD antigen banks are
the referenced solution that allows FMD free countries to
access rapidly, in outbreak situations, large quantity of
purified and highly potent vaccine. Within 4 working days of
activation of the North America Bank, Merial will produce up to
2.5 million doses of finished vaccine from the North America
Bank vaccine antigen concentrate, and make the vaccine
available for shipment to the USDA for field distribution. The
largest inventory by dose volume and strains in the North
America Bank are Merial antigens.
Merial has the broadest world library of FMD vaccine
strains. These strains are used to produce single strain or
multiple strain vaccines. This capability provides an insurance
of protection against the vast majority of strains circulating
globally.
As new FMD strains evolve, Merial continues to develop and
propose inclusion of those new strains into antigen banks. For
a non-endemic country like the United States, the process of
constantly updating the library of strains is critical because
of the unpredictability of strains in an FMD event.
Merial operates FMD antigen production and vaccine
finishing facilities in the UK, the Netherlands, France, and
Brazil. As the world's leader in FMD bank management, we
maintain vaccine antigen storage facilities in multiple
locations for our global clients as a risk mitigation service.
Our bank management services provide the cost effective
advantages of timely new strain inclusion into banks, perpetual
inventory rotation management, inventory buyback options, just
in time antigen to vaccine conversion, and risk mitigation of
multiple product shipping events.
FMD banks are only a part of the well-developed FMD
preparedness plan. Because FMD antigen banks only serve as a
temporary measure in the face of outbreaks, optimized FMD
preparedness plans should account for a seamless transition to
surge production of millions of doses of finished vaccine, once
the bank inventory is exhausted. The continuous supply of
vaccine is crucial to achieving control and elimination of the
disease.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, Merial has been
a partner with the U.S. Government on disease management
programs for over 20 years. We stand ready to work together to
explore the time and cost needed to supply gold standard
conventional FMD vaccines that support continuity of business
for U.S. livestock producers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
Prepared Statement of William Stephen ``Steve'' Parker, Director,
Merial Veterinary Public Health, Duluth, GA
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Industry Preparedness: Vaccine Capabilities
Testimony Premise Statement: The current North America FMD Vaccine
Bank (NAFMDVB) stockpile is undersized to respond to anything other
than a limited scope outbreak. Serious consideration should be given to
the appropriation amount required for a rightsizing of the stockpiles.
However, the industrial capacity needed to produce these large volumes,
is not available today anywhere. Global FMD vaccine demand grossly
exceeds ability of conventional vaccine manufacturers to supply. This
issue can be remedied through planning and investment but will take a
few years to implement.
Background: Expertise in FMD vaccinology is central to Merial
history as a company. We have produced multiple millions of doses of
high quality, high potent FMD vaccines for a multitude of global
customers for over sixty years. Some countries rely on local production
of FMD vaccines. However, these locally produced vaccines generally
cover only regional strains and needs. All past successful examples of
FMD control and eradication, e.g., Europe in 1991, the Philippines in
2010, have only been achieved thru application of conventional vaccines
at international, high quality standards.
FMD Vaccine Antigen Banks--the solution for emergency situations:
In FMD-free countries the vaccine antigen bank model has become the
standard solution for emergency response to the risk of FMD
introduction.
Established in 1982, the NAFMDVB stores vaccine antigen concentrate
for the production of emergency FMD vaccines. The NAFMDVB does not
store finished vaccine for two reasons, (1) the shelf life of vaccine
antigen concentrate is 5 years versus finished vaccine shelf life of 18
months, and, (2) FMD live viruses are on the Federal Select Agent
Program prohibiting handling of the virus within U.S. territory, with
the exception of Plum Island.
FMD antigen banks are the reference solution that allows FMD-free
countries to access rapidly, in outbreak situations, large quantities
of purified, highly potent vaccine. The purification of FMD viral
antigens provides a ``marker'' system that allows monitoring of the FMD
vaccination program until eradication. The use of highly potent FMD
vaccines has been demonstrated to induce cross-protection against
certain heterologous challenge infections of FMD strains.
Within a week of activation of the NAFMDVB bank, Merial can produce
up to 2.5 million doses of finished vaccine from the NAFMDVB vaccine
antigen concentrate, in either single strain or multiple strain vaccine
formats, and make the vaccine available to the USDA for field
distribution. The largest inventory by dose volume and strains in the
NAFMDVB are Merial antigens. Globally, Merial stores more than 120
million doses of antigens for 14 countries.
Merial has the world's broadest library of FMD vaccine strains that
can be used either as monovalent vaccine--containing one strain--or
polyvalent vaccine--containing several strains. This capability
provides an insurance of protection against the vast majority of the
strains that circulate globally and that could be introduced into the
United States. Merial continues to develop and propose new FMD vaccine
strains for inclusion in antigen banks, concurrent with the evolution
of the FMD virus globally. For a non-endemic country, like the United
States, this is critical because of the unpredictability of an FMD
event.
FMD Vaccine Global Industrial Capability Considerations: Merial
operates FMD antigen production plants at Pirbright in the UK, Lelystad
in the Netherlands and Paulinia in Brazil, as well as vaccine
formulation, finishing and packaging facilities in the UK, France and
Brazil. As the world's leader in FMD bank management, we also maintain
vaccine antigen storage facilities in multiple locations for multiple
international clients and countries.
FMD banks are only a part of a well-developed FMD preparedness
plan. FMD antigen banks serve as a temporary measure in the face of a
disease outbreak. FMD preparedness plans should allow for optimized
bank inventories that supply antigen that support vaccine formulation
needs for up to 14 to 16 weeks post outbreak. The exhaustion of the
bank antigen inventory should then be followed by a seamless transition
to production of finished FMD vaccine and the industrial capacity to
meet demand capacity. The continuous supply of vaccine is crucial to
achieve control and elimination of the disease.
PowerPoint Presentation
Merial Veterinary Public Health
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Other Merial U.S. Veterinary Public Health infectious and
emerging animal diseases areas: Cervid Bluetongue Virus and
Epizootic Hemorrhagic Disease, Rift Valley Fever and other
reportable animal diseases. VPH collaborates with other Merial
entities on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza and Classical
Swine Fever as related to USDA Foreign Animal Disease (FAD)
Planning.
Examples of programs that Merial Veterinary Public Health
collaborates with USDA on are: (1) the North America Rabies
Management Plan through USDA-APHIS-Wildlife Services and the
National Rabies Management Program, and (2) the North America
FMD Vaccine Bank through USDA-APHIS-Veterinary Services.
Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD)
An Old Disease, But a Present Threat
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Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD) is an old disease. FMD is a
present and persistent threat to the U.S. livestock industry.
The last outbreak in the U.S. was in California in 1929. Recent
out breaks, in previously non-endemic countries, include the
UK, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Greece and the Netherlands.
The Importance of FMD
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One of the most contagious diseases of cloven-hoofed animals.
Cattle are most susceptible.
Pigs are very effective in propagating the
disease.
The virus is only present in certain parts of the world
Rarely lethal, but negatively impacts animal productivity
(milk, meat, draft power)
Disease Control Methods:
Sanitary: culling/mass slaughter, stop animal
movement, disinfection.
Medical: mass vaccination:
Need for Inter-governmental and Governmental
FMD Control Programs.
FMD--OIE Official Status
OIE Member Countries Official FMD Status Map
Last Update May 2051
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[http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/official-
disease-status/fmd/en-fmd-carte/]
[OIE 2015.]
FMD outbreaks in countries previously free from FMD has major
effects on the ability to trade animal protein internationally.
FMD free countries experiencing outbreaks may respond initially
with strict restriction of animal movement and livestock
transportation methods.
Virus Transmission Routes
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The FMD virus is easily transmitted (direct contact,
transboundary means of introduction of virus, aerosolized virus
transmission introduced via respiratory or oral routes, virus
in infected milk, or on clothing, trucks, in feed etc.).
Case Study--The South Korea Outbreak
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The South Korea FMD outbreak in 2010 was initially addressed
by culling animals. The disease was not controlled and the
decision was made to mass vaccinate.
Indirect & Direct Impact
Mass Culling and Burial of Pigs in Korea (Nov. 2010-Feb. 11)
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The South Korean livestock industry suffered massive lose due
to culling. The South Korean Government incurred huge direct
and indirect costs in the culling effort. Consider this event
and compare to cost of what the U.S. has recently been through
with HPAI.
The South Korea Outbreak: Vaccine Impact
Nov. 10-Mar. 11--FMD Outbreak Evolution
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When mass vaccination campaigns were initiated in South
Korea, animal outbreaks with FMD were brought under control.
The South Korea situation, as a case study for the United
States, continues to evolve as the introduction of new FMD
strains from border countries prove challenging. Merial
partners with the South Korean Government on FMD vaccine supply
agreements. Merial monitors the local epidemiology of new
emerging virus strain to develop vaccines adapted to evolving
disease conditions.
FMD Cost of Incursion--Control
FMD Outbreak Economic Impact--Major Incursions Into Disease Free
Countries
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The UK, in 2001, did not implement a vaccination program of
control for disease eradication. Costs associated with the UK
FMD outbreak, as compared to countries that used vaccine as
part of a control effort, were magnitudes of degree greater.
Epidemiology & Vaccine Recommendations
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FMD Epidemiology Trends Per Pools/June 2015
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At a global level, seven FMD epidemiologic regions
are
recognized containing specific viral variants (seven
``virus pools''),
requiring specific vaccines targeted against these
variants.
Vaccine demand is different in each of these regions
(no common
product profile).
Recent FMD Outbreaks (Jan. 14-Sep. 15)
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Outbreaks reported to OIE. Courtesy WRL.
Tracking of recent FMD outbreaks show activity in the Middle
East, South Africa and East Asia. New FMD strains are emerging
in the Middle East and East Asia that warrant strain adaptation
for new vaccine development.
FMD Vaccines & Vaccination
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Merial FMD Vaccine Sourcing
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Merial's industrial capabilities to produce FMD vaccine are
broad based and global in scope.
The global industrial demand for high quality conventional
FMD vaccine exceeds manufacturer's ability to supply. It is
generally accepted that the industrial capacity to build
antigen bank inventories or to supply endemic markets beyond
current agreements does not exist at this time.
Additional to the manufacturing capabilities, Merial
maintains FMD Research and Development project in Europe and
North America.
FMD Vaccines
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Merial produces FMD vaccines for specific vaccination program
needs.
Merial FMD Vaccine Supply Alternatives
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Merial offers alternatives, in addition to finished vaccine
for endemic disease situations, for FMD vaccine supply. Merial
can provide bulk vaccine concentrate for local finishing and
packaging. Merial also offers vaccine antigen concentrate banks
as a way for disease free countries to build vaccine supply
inventory by the stockpiling method.
FMDV Antigen Banks--Storage
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FMD antigen storage banks provide an efficient means to build
stockpiles ahead of potential disease outbreaks.
FMD Antigen Banks Supplied by Merial
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Merial maintains and manages many antigen bank stockpiles for
many countries and NGOs. Merial has been a partner to the North
America FMD Vaccine Bank since the 1990s and represents the
majority of inventory doses in the NAFMDVB.
Antigen Bank Mobilization Process
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Typically, once Merial is notified by a country partner of
the need to mobilize their bank antigen stockpile, it takes 4
days to formulate, fill, label, package and release the
finished vaccine for shipment to the country of need.
WRL FMD Bank Recommendations: 7/15
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The World Reference FMD Bank in the UK updates their FMD
antigen bank strain recommendations quarterly.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Parker.
Dr. Wolf.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA B. WOLF, D.V.M., ASSISTANT
PROFESSOR AND SMALL RUMINANT VETERINARY
SPECIALIST, COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE,
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, ST. PAUL, MN; ON BEHALF OF AMERICAN
SHEEP INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
Dr. Wolf. Thank you to this Subcommittee for the
opportunity to speak with you on behalf of the American Sheep
Industry regarding preparedness for FMD. My name is Cindy Wolf.
My family and I raise sheep and beef cattle in Minnesota, and
we sell direct to a variety of end-users. For the past 32
years, I have also been employed as a small ruminant
veterinarian at the College of Veterinary Medicine at the
University of Minnesota.
A few things about the sheep industry are important
relative to FMD, and I would like to point those out. Basically
in this country, sheep and goats move around the country daily,
crossing several state lines in about every type of vessel
made. We hope they have health certificates, but I wouldn't
count on it. The sheep are sold for human consumption at a wide
range of body weights and ages, dependent on the custom of the
end-user. While we have some concentration in our country
regarding sheep production, we do have a tremendous amount of
small numbers moving around in the Northeast United States
processed in a variety of different ways.
The odd thing about sheep is they are very subtle when they
are infected with clinical signs. First, you can't really
notice it. This is in contrast to pigs and cattle. And second,
for much of the year, sheep are covered with wool, making it
even harder to see these lesions, and also, their normal
behavior is that they tend to move with their heads low, so
seeing these lesions makes that even more difficult.
So one thing we learned from the UK outbreak in 2001 is
that sheep carried and distributed the virus around the country
throughout marketing channels, spreading it to other livestock,
before the disease was recognized. So the direction we are
going in this country regarding early detection animal
traceability, movement restrictions, and vaccination is
essential to averting a very large outbreak.
My close friend, Dr. Don Hoenig, who was the State
Veterinarian in Maine for 27 years, if I could quote him, he
said, ``A major development in our response planning is the
acknowledgment that if an outbreak becomes widespread, a large
scale FMD vaccination strategy will need to be implemented.'' I
believe that it is imperative that as a country we continue
along this path, moving away from the singular approach of
stamping out FMD to one of control that relies upon cooperation
to produce and deliver timely, effective vaccination,
communication, and education.
To accomplish FMD control where business continuity will be
possible, we will need to adequately fund vaccine banks to
ensure there is at least one functional FMD vaccine bank at all
time, if not more, and that that bank is ready to launch into
production upon a second's notice. Part of such contract will
need to include making the most likely serotype or serotypes
available, rapid production of the needed number of doses, and
preexisting licensure of manufacturing processes so the vaccine
will be legal to use in the U.S. Also, we--stakeholders and
government--will need to continue the readiness development
process so if we need to execute a control plan, we will know
how to immediately find the herds and flocks that need to be
vaccinated; we will know how to acquire the ancillary supplies,
so ten million needles, syringes, special ear tags, the
handling equipment that we know from other disease examples, we
don't necessarily have in place; the manpower. How are we going
to ID these vaccinates? While we have a plan, but can we make
these 2.5 million ear tags or ten million ear tags in a weeks'
time? And how are we going to ensure that whole farms are
vaccinated as rapidly as possible, because sometimes these
sheep are on thousands of acres at any one time.
While this will not be a small investment, the cost of not
having a vaccine preparedness plan in place, given the risk is
extremely high, and it is essential to the security of U.S.
agriculture and the country that we are fully prepared and
ready to produce the potentially needed doses of the
appropriate serotype in an extremely rapid timeframe.
And last, it is my holistic approach as a veterinarian, we
need to continue to bolster our efforts at any and every entry
point into the U.S. so we rely on improved screening techniques
and additions to the Beagle Brigade, and we continue to educate
and remind the public about not bringing in food or other ag
products from foreign countries, as well as our livestock
producers to be vigilant and proactive regarding suspect cases.
Thank you for your support.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wolf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia B. Wolf, D.V.M., Assistant Professor and
Small Ruminant Veterinary Specialist, College of Veterinary Medicine,
University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN; on Behalf of American Sheep
Industry Association
Impact of an Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) in the United
States and the Urgent Need for an Adequate Stockpile of FMD
Vaccine
Chairman Rouzer, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the House
Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign
Agriculture, my name is Cindy Wolf. My family and I raise sheep and
beef cattle in Minnesota. We sell direct to consumers, restaurants,
auction markets and to a lamb cooperative. For the past thirty-two
years, I have also been employed as small ruminant veterinarian at the
College of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Minnesota. Thank
you for the opportunity to speak to you about our preparedness for the
potential introduction of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) into the United
States.
Sheep Industry Demographics
I included two images in my written testimony, one showing the
numbers of sheep by state in the U.S. and the other one roughly shows
sheep movement. Sheep (and goats) move across the continental U.S.
daily traversing several state lines in about every type of vessel
made. We hope that most of them have Certificates of Veterinary
Inspection but I wouldn't count on it. Sheep sold for human consumption
have a wide range of bodyweights and ages dependent on the customs of
the end-user.
Since FMD transmission can be airborne, there are millions of
livestock at-risk along routes of commerce if even one animal should be
infected. Young lambs are generally concentrated for a few weeks to a
few months while they are being fed prior to processing. The highest
concentration of these lambs at any given point in time but mostly in
the fall through the spring is in feedlots or crop aftermath on the
front range of Colorado, California, Arizona, and Oregon. The larger
commercial lamb feedlots (including grazing operations) range in size
from 20,000 to 80,000 head in one-time capacity. Lambs entering
commercial feedlots tend to come from larger-scale breeding flocks.
There are approximately 80,000 sheep producers in the U.S. and there
are sheep in every state. In general terms, 80 percent of the breeding
ewes are owned by 20 percent of the producers.
All Sheep and Lamb Inventory in the United States: January 1, 2016
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United States Total: 5.32 million head.
Source: Sheep and Goats (January 2016), USDA National
Agricultural Statistics Service.
Sheep Marketing Channels & FMD Risk
If FMD were to be found in one or more of the larger commercial
feedlots, temporary movement restrictions, tracebacks, vaccination,
etc., would be relatively straight forward because of geographic
concentration. However, there are sheep in transport every day of the
year and they are crossing multiple state boundaries through rural
America much of the time with stops along the way. Nearly all of the
sheep in traditional interstate commerce are ear-tagged back to their
flock of origin as required by the cooperative state-Federal national
scrapie eradication program. Many auction barns that buy and sell sheep
also have other species in the same facility. This presents a large
disease exposure risk especially in a species whose FMD clinical signs
are rather subtle.
Sheep Movement
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Sheep the Silent Carriers and Risk to Other Species
There are a few things about sheep and goats that are unique
regarding FMD clinical signs and diagnoses. For example, sheep can be
infected with FMD and not present remarkable clinical signs as seen
with pigs and cattle. Besides the clinical signs being more subtle, for
much of the year many sheep are covered with wool and tend to move with
their heads low so seeing FMD lesions from any distance would be
difficult.
Lessons Regarding Sheep and Other Species from the Outbreak in the UK
One of the lessons learned from the 2001 FMD outbreak in [the] UK
was that sheep were carrying and distributing the virus across the
country and throughout marketing channels, spreading it to other
livestock before the disease was recognized. Therefore early detection,
animal traceability, movement restrictions and vaccination is essential
to averting a very large outbreak in the U.S. Veterinarians break down
the stages of FMD infection into phases that describe virus progression
with phase one being initial infection and the beginning of clinical
signs. From a practical standpoint, by the time someone sees a sheep in
what they believe is phase one, there are other animals somewhere that
are in stage five or full presentation of clinical signs and all of
these infected animals have been spreading virus to susceptible
animals. Immune response to the vaccine takes several days once the
vaccine is given therefore a large and inclusive vaccination program
needs to be done very quickly if a case is diagnosed.
Vaccine Needs
My close friend and colleague who was the State Veterinarian for
Maine for the 27 years, Dr. Don Hoenig has said the following. ``In the
past 13 years, I've been involved in national and regional efforts to
enhance and improve our preparedness and response to FMD. Our response
plans have been dramatically upgraded. State, Federal, and industry
stakeholders have held countless meetings and training sessions and
conducted numerous tabletop and on-farm, functional exercises to test
our plan. A major development in our response planning is the
acknowledgement that, if an outbreak becomes widespread, a large-scale
FMD vaccination strategy will need to be implemented. Unfortunately,
preemptive vaccination is not feasible or practical since there are
seven serotypes of FMD virus and over 65 subtypes. Predicting which of
these viruses might come to the U.S. is impossible.''
I believe that it is imperative that as a country we continue to
move away from a singular approach of stamping out regarding FMD
control to one that relies upon cooperation to produce and deliver
timely effective vaccination, communication, and education. To
accomplish FMD control where business continuity will be possible, we
will need to adequately fund vaccine contracts to ensure there is at
least one functional FMD vaccine bank(s) maintained and ready to launch
into production. Part of these contracts will need to include making
the most likely serotype(s) available, rapid production time of needed
number of doses, and pre-existing licensure of manufacturing processes
so vaccine will be legal to use in U.S. Also we (stakeholders and
government) will want to continue the readiness development process so
the executors of the control plan know how they will immediately find
the herds and flocks needing to be vaccinated, acquire ancillary
supplies (needles, syringes, special ear tags, handling equipment),
manpower, ID vaccinates, and ensure whole farms are vaccinated as
rapidly as possible. While this will not be a small investment, the
cost of not having a vaccine preparedness plan in place given the risk
is extremely high. It is essential to the security of U.S. agriculture
and the country that we are fully prepared and ready to produce
potentially needed doses of the appropriate serotype in an extremely
rapid timeframe. It is our responsibility to protect agriculture as a
component of our country's critical infrastructure of which this one
part.
Last, we need to continue to bolster our efforts at airports and
border crossings with improved screening techniques and additions to
the Beagle Brigade. We must continue to educate and remind the public
about not bringing in food or other agricultural products from foreign
countries as well as livestock producers to be vigilant and proactive
regarding suspect cases.
Conclusion
The American Sheep Industry appreciates the support of this
Committee in furthering a plan to bolster our preparedness for a FMD
outbreak.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. Sjeklocha.
STATEMENT OF DAVID B. SJEKLOCHA, D.V.M., OPERATIONS MANAGER OF
ANIMAL HEALTH & WELFARE, CATTLE
EMPIRE LLC, SATANTA, KS; ON BEHALF OF NATIONAL CATTLEMAN'S BEEF
ASSOCIATION
Dr. Sjeklocha. Mrs. Hartzler, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Costa, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to be here today.
Foot-and-mouth disease is an extremely contagious viral
disease of cloven hoofed animals and some wildlife species. The
United States has not experienced an FMD outbreak since 1929,
yet FMD is still a significant threat to American cattle
producers. International travel and trade pose a substantial
risk for FMD by providing pathways for the virus to enter the
United States. FMD can be transmitted over long distances by
animal products, people, and other vectors. FMD is considered a
potential agent for agricultural terrorism. The size,
structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the
United States livestock industry will have unprecedented
challenges in the event of an FMD outbreak.
An FMD outbreak in the United States would result in
immediate closure of most, if not all, of our foreign export
markets. For the sake of perspective, as the result of a single
BSE case in 2003, we saw our beef exports decline by 2 billion
pounds from 2003 to 2004. We still do not have access to
several critical markets, such as China.
While international trade is a concern, we also expect to
see significant impact to U.S. beef producers due to the
depopulation, restrictions on cattle movements, and a potential
shutdown of overall cattle trade in the affected regions.
Models demonstrate that the impact to the beef industry could
be in excess of $50 billion. Overall, there is a lack of
capability to rapidly depopulate cattle and dispose of
carcasses for large feedyards. A 2007 FMD exercise involving
feedyards in the Texas Panhandle established that it would be a
logistical challenge to depopulate 50,000 to 75,000 head of
cattle within 72 hours, and then dispose of them within 96
hours. With over 3\1/2\ million animals within a 100 mile
radius of that exercise, 75,000 head of cattle is only a small
portion of the region's susceptible livestock population.
Vaccination of cattle against FMD has been practiced with
relatively positive immunity results. Cattle are considered to
be the highest priority for emergency FMD vaccine use. If the
disease is under control in cattle, it should not persist in
other species. In 2001, rapid vaccination of all the cattle in
Uruguay brought that FMD outbreak under control rapidly.
Limitations with FMD vaccinations do exist. Vaccines
provide only serotype specific protection. There are seven
distinct serotypes of the FMD virus, and more than 65 strains.
Vaccination against one serotype may fail to fully protect
against other strains within the serotype.
Novel FMD technologies are currently under development,
using subunit and recombinant DNA. These vaccines do not
utilize live FMD virus, and can be safely produced on the U.S.
mainland. ARS scientists at Plum Island have developed
leaderless FMD vaccines that will allow safe production of FMD
vaccine on the U.S. mainland, and protect livestock against
clinical disease, as well as prevent virus shedding and virus
transmission.
Although work has started for commercialization of the
leaderless FMD vaccine, the cost and timeline for vaccine
production remains highly uncertain. NCBA actively supports a
development of novel FMD vaccine technologies, and also
requests immediate steps be taken to update the current FMD
vaccine supply composed of conventional vaccine technology.
Established in 1982, the North American FMD Vaccine Bank
currently holds vaccine antigen concentrate for use by Mexico,
Canada, and/or the United States. A single livestock dense
state in the United States would deplete this bank's supply of
antigen. The funding that USDA has for the supply of FMD
vaccine in the National Veterinary Stockpile is insufficient to
provide adequate FMD vaccine supplies. An FMD outbreak in South
Korea depleted the banks of FMD vaccines from around the world
in order to vaccinate a population roughly \1/2\ the size of
the livestock population in Iowa.
USDA has funded the development of the secure food supply
plans and incorporated the use of FMD vaccines as an important
tool. Currently, the beef industry is involved in a
collaborative effort with USDA, state animal health officials,
and academic partners to develop a secure beef supply plan to
manage movements of non-infected cattle in the event of an FMD
outbreak, provide business continuity for producers,
transporters, and processors, and to maintain a continuous
supply of safe and wholesome beef for consumers.
We request that the Committee work with USDA and encourage
them to budget the funds needed for the update and
modernization of the National Veterinary Stockpile of FMD
vaccine. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and we
look forward to working with you to ensure that the United
States is prepared for an outbreak of FMD.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Sjeklocha follows:]
Prepared Statement of David B. Sjeklocha, D.V.M., Operations Manager of
Animal Health & Welfare, Cattle Empire LLC, Satanta, KS; on Behalf of
National Cattleman's Beef Association
Foot-and-Mouth Disease Preparedness
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Costa, and Members of the
Subcommittee, my name is Dr. Dave Sjeklocha. I am a veterinarian and
the Operations Manager for Animal Health and Welfare for Cattle Empire,
LLC. Cattle Empire is owned by the Brown family and is located in
southwest Kansas. The company consists of five feedyards, ranging in
size from 18,000 head capacity to 87,000 head capacity, for a total
one-time capacity of approximately 240,000. In addition, there is a
farming and ranching operation associated with Cattle Empire.
I grew up on diversified farming and ranching operations in Iowa
and Missouri and received my degree from Kansas State University's
College of Veterinary Medicine. Before joining Cattle Empire I spent
several years as a practicing veterinarian in Nebraska, Colorado,
Kansas, Texas and Oklahoma with a focus on beef cattle production
management and medicine. I am an active member of the American
Veterinary Medical Association, the Academy of Veterinary Consultants
and the American Association of Bovine Practitioners. In 2011, I was
recognized as the Beef Cattle Institute's ``Beef Cattle Veterinarian of
the Year'' from Kansas State University and in 2013 recognized as the
AVC's Consultant of the Year.
NCBA is the nation's oldest and largest trade association
representing America's cattle producers with a strong and united voice
in our nation's Capital. On behalf of NCBA's membership, I appreciate
the opportunity to share with you more background on Foot-and-Mouth
Disease (FMD), our concerns regarding this disease, and our ability to
respond to a reintroduction of FMD into the United States.
FMD is an extremely contagious viral disease of cloven hoofed
animals and some wildlife species. FMD is present in approximately \2/
3\ of the world and endemic in parts of Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe,
the Middle East, and South America. North America and Central America
are free of FMD, as is Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand. The
United States has not experienced an FMD outbreak since 1929, yet FMD
is still a significant threat to American cattle producers.
International travel and trade pose a substantial risk for FMD by
providing pathways to enter the United States. FMD can be transmitted
over long distances by animal products, people and other vectors. FMD
is also considered as a potential agent for agricultural terrorism. The
size, structure, efficiency, and extensive movement inherent in the
United States livestock industry will present unprecedented challenges
in the event of an FMD outbreak. No country with a livestock industry
comparable to the U.S. has had to deal with an outbreak of FMD.
FMD presents a great economic threat to U.S. livestock producers
and is viewed as the most concerning transboundary disease in the
world. An FMD outbreak in the United States would result in the
immediate closure of most, if not all, of our foreign export markets.
To put this into perspective, we need to only look at the economic
impact of a single case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) found
in a Canadian-born cow located in Washington State on December 23,
2003. As a result of a single case of BSE, we saw U.S. beef exports
decline by 2 billion pounds from 2003 to 2004. It took 8 years for U.S.
beef exports to get back to pre-December 2003 levels. Over a decade
later we still do not have access to several critical markets, such as
China, nor do we have full access to every country we were trading with
prior to December 2003. It's not just the international trade impact
which concerns us. In addition, we expect to see significant economic
impact to U.S. beef producers due to depopulation, restrictions on
cattle movements, and a potential shutdown of overall cattle trade in
the affected regions. There are many variables which affect how we may
see introduction of the disease and its spread. These variables include
the region of the country, the type of operation, the timely reporting
of the disease, and the response time. In the ``Site-Specific Biosafety
and Biosecurity Mitigation Risk Assessment'' conducted for the National
Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, models are used to estimate the economic
impact of an outbreak of FMD. In scenarios that model the economic
impact of FMD on cow/calf operations, feedlots, and livestock markets,
the total economic impact of a case of FMD can reach over $50 billion
in losses to the U.S. beef industry. Again, we must note that this
report was based on 2010 cattle prices where the average fed cattle
price was $95 per hundredweight. Currently, Live Cattle futures are in
the $135 per hundredweight range. Regardless of the model or scenario
used, it is obvious from the information above that the reintroduction
of FMD would cost our industry billions of dollars.
The goals of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS) in managing an FMD outbreak in the United States are to detect,
control, and contain the outbreak in order to eradicate FMD from the
country as quickly as possible. As a result of changes in livestock
demographics and larger herd sizes, the FMD control paradigm at USDA-
APHIS has shifted from ``stamping out'' or total depopulation, to the
use of vaccination to achieve control for type 3 outbreaks or larger.
In September 2014, NCBA joined other animal agricultural stakeholders
attending a meeting called by USDA-APHIS to develop concrete strategies
to improve alignment between USDA's response strategies for FMD and our
current vaccine capabilities. The stakeholders in attendance were
informed that gaps existed in vaccine preparedness for a type 3, (large
regional), or greater FMD outbreak. An immediate need was identified at
this meeting to begin modernization of the current U.S. FMD vaccine
response capabilities. Budgetary shortfalls at USDA for acquiring
sufficient supplies of FMD vaccine present a major hurdle to achieving
modernization of the FMD vaccine capabilities in response to an FMD
outbreak.
There are critical reasons for considering vaccination strategies
in an FMD outbreak. In anything beyond a small, focal FMD outbreak,
stamping out or rapid depopulation is not viable or sustainable. There
is a lack of capability and capacity to rapidly depopulate and dispose
of the large number of carcasses which would be found in feedyards that
can easily feed 50,000 to 100,000 head of cattle. Even the smaller
feedyards would pose a challenge for ``stamping out,'' both
logistically and economically. During the 2007 Palo Duro FMD exercise
in the Texas Panhandle, rapidly depopulating 50,000 to 75,000 head of
cattle was deemed a logistical challenge that would not be possible
within 72 hours for depopulation and within 96 hours for disposal.
Since the Texas Panhandle is a livestock dense region, 75,000 animals
constitute only a small portion of the region's total susceptible
livestock population (over 3.5 million animals in a 100 mile radius).
If FMD spread rapidly prior to detection, it is clear that a stamping-
out strategy would not be feasible or appropriate.
Key objectives have been identified by APHIS Veterinary Services in
regard to FMD vaccine and vaccination policy, and there is definite
recognition that additional response capabilities will be required.
There is an immediate need to increase the guaranteed access to FMD
vaccine. The requirements to achieve response goals include:
identifying the type of vaccine needed (topotypes and strains);
establishing multiple sources or manufacturers; establishing which
vaccines will be used in specified livestock populations; establishing
a desired quantity of vaccine and determining the necessary time to
deliver the vaccine.
Vaccination of cattle against FMD has been practiced with
relatively positive immunity results. Cattle are considered to be the
highest priority for emergency FMD vaccine use. If the disease is under
control in cattle, it should not persist in other species. For example,
in the 2001 FMD outbreak in Uruguay, the outbreak was brought under
control by the rapid vaccination of all the cattle in the country. To
effectively induce immunity in the cattle population, all cattle in the
affected region should receive two doses of normal potency FMD vaccine
1 month apart, or a single dose of high potency FMD vaccine as soon as
possible. Certain limitations of vaccination, however, do exist.
Vaccines provide only serotype specific protection. There are seven
immunologically distinct serotypes of the FMD virus and more than 65
strains. There is a substantial amount of genetic variability in FMD
viruses, and new strains can occasionally develop spontaneously. Also,
vaccination against one serotype may fail to protect fully or at all
against other strains within the serotype. Immunity is not immediate.
Inactivated FMD vaccines may decrease viral shedding and clinical signs
in cattle as early as 4 days with protection improving over the next 2
to 3 weeks. No currently available vaccine provides ``sterilizing
immunity'' which will prevent subsequent infection. It is possible that
individual vaccinated cattle which are infected with FMD virus could
become asymptomatic virus carriers. Differentiating field infected
animals from vaccinated animals, known as DIVA strategy, is critical to
emergency vaccination in an FMD outbreak. DIVA diagnostic techniques
typically use tests for antibodies against viral non-structural
proteins (NSPs) to differentiate animals that are infected with FMD
naturally from those animals vaccinated with FMD vaccine. The
diagnostic DIVA capability of a vaccine is important for an effective
vaccine campaign, business continuity processes, and FMD surveillance.
All FMD vaccines should be DIVA compatible unless the animals are
intended for slaughter.
Currently, FMD virus is listed by USDA as a ``select agent'' on the
Select Agent Program registration list. This means that it is currently
illegal to have FMD virus on the U.S. mainland, even for FMD vaccine
production purposes. As such, there is no conventional, killed virus
FMD production (which requires live FMD virus) in the United States.
The U.S. must rely on the overseas production of FMD vaccine in the
event of an FMD outbreak.
Novel FMD vaccine technologies are currently under development
using subunit and recombinant DNA. These vaccines do not utilize live
FMD virus and can be safely produced in the U.S. mainland. USDA's
Agricultural Research Service (ARS) scientists at Plum Island, New
York, have developed a leaderless FMD vaccine (FMD-LL3B3D) that will
allow safe production of FMD vaccine on the U.S. mainland and protect
livestock against clinical disease as well as prevent virus shedding
and virus transmission. Although work has started for commercialization
of the leaderless FMD vaccine, the cost and timeline for vaccine
production remains highly uncertain. NCBA actively supports the
development of novel FMD vaccine technologies, such as the USDA-ARS
leaderless FMD vaccine technology, for use in meeting future FMD
vaccine needs. In addition, NCBA requests immediate steps be taken to
update the current FMD vaccine supply made up of conventional vaccine
technology in order to meet surge capacity for emergency use and to
safeguard the health of the U.S. cattle herd.
The structure of modern agriculture in the United States, including
large herd sizes and extensive intra- and interstate movement of cattle
and cattle products will make it nearly impossible to control an FMD
outbreak in livestock dense areas without the rapid use of tens of
millions of doses of FMD vaccine. It is estimated that over 400,000
head of cattle are in transit daily in the United States. Established
in 1982, the North American FMD Vaccine Bank currently holds vaccine
antigen concentrate for use by Mexico, Canada, and/or the United
States. The amount of antigen in the North American FMD Vaccine Bank is
far below what would be needed to provide vaccine for a single
livestock dense state in the United States. The funding that USDA has
for the supply of FMD vaccine in the National Veterinary Stockpile is
insufficient to provide adequate FMD vaccine supplies. An outbreak of
FMD occurring in a livestock dense area, such as Iowa, and which was
not contained rapidly with ``stamping out'', could easily exhaust the
world's supply of emergency FMD vaccine. A FMD outbreak in South Korea
depleted the banks of FMD vaccines from around the world in order to
vaccinate a population roughly half the size of the livestock
population in Iowa. For an outbreak in Iowa with over 20 million hogs
and approximately four million cattle, the amount of vaccine needed
could easily exceed 50 million doses in a very short time. Insufficient
vaccination capacity limits the ability of a strategic response to FMD
by USDA. The need for additional supplies of FMD vaccine, as well as
new vaccine approaches and technologies, to help meet this need has
been recognized by USDA and Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
officials. USDA has funded the development of the Secure Food Supply
Plans that incorporate the use of FMD vaccines as an important tool.
Currently, the beef industry is involved in a collaborative effort with
USDA, state animal health officials, and academic partners to develop a
Secure Beef Supply Plan to manage movements of non-infected cattle in
the event of an FMD outbreak; provide business continuity for
producers, transporters, and processors; and to maintain a continuous
supply of safe and wholesome beef for consumers.
NCBA supported the preparation of a white paper by Dr. James Roth,
distinguished professor and veterinary specialist at the Center for
Food Security and Public Health at Iowa State University's College of
Veterinary Medicine entitled: ``FMD Vaccine Surge Capacity for
Emergency Use in the United States.'' * The objectives of the white
paper involved securing and providing information concerning FMD
vaccine that could be used to seek consensus among the stakeholders,
Federal officials, and state officials on the best mechanisms to ensure
vaccine availability to minimize the economic, environmental, animal
welfare, and food security impacts of a large FMD outbreak in the
United States. In the white paper, Dr. Roth concluded that the funds
necessary to enable the surge capacity need for FMD vaccine for
emergency use in the United States would be estimated at $150 million
per year for 5 years to help to protect a $100 billion a year (cash
receipts) animal industry. In September of 2013, the World Reference
Laboratory for FMD at the Pirbright Institute in Pirbright, United
Kingdom, recommended that national antigen banks for FMD maintain 23
strains of FMD virus as live master seeds and inactivated antigen
concentrates.
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* Editor's note: the referenced white paper is available at: http:/
/www.cfsph.iastate.edu/pdf/fmd-vaccine-surge-capacity-for-emergency-
use-in-the-US.
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Subsequent to the agriculture stakeholder meeting held in September
2014 with USDA-APHIS to discuss the U.S. FMD vaccination policy for
response to an outbreak and existing gaps, USDA-APHIS agreed to develop
a Request for Information or ``RFI'' to companies regularly engaged in
FMD vaccine production so that an estimated cost to update the current
FMD vaccine bank for the United States could be determined.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD 9, January 30,
2004) provides for the ``Defense of United States Agriculture and
Food.'' This directive establishes a national policy to defend the
agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters,
and other emergencies. HSPD 9 directs the Secretary of Agriculture, in
coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, and in
consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to work with
state and local governments and the private sector to develop a
National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) containing sufficient amounts of
animal vaccine, antiviral, or therapeutic products to appropriately
respond to the most damaging animal diseases affecting human health and
the economy and that will be capable of deployment within 24 hours of
an outbreak. It is urgent to develop a plan to ensure that adequate
supplies of multiple strains of FMD vaccine are readily available in
the event of an accidental or intentional introduction of FMD virus
into the United States. This action is mandated in Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 9.
We encourage USDA to consider convening a stakeholder community
working group of experts capable of evaluating existing and new
technology FMD vaccines under development to determine the technologies
which can best meet future as well as immediate needs for emergency
response FMD vaccination in the United States. Furthermore, the Federal
Government must conduct research into alternative delivery methods for
FMD vaccines which have been shown in cattle and in swine to
significantly reduce the antigenic mass required for each dose of
vaccine, thus enabling existing and future vaccine antigen concentrate
to be formulated into significantly more doses of vaccine.
The current FMD vaccine bank has several problems. Currently, the
United States does not have access to enough FMD vaccine to handle an
outbreak beyond a very small, localized disease event. APHIS manages
the vaccine bank at Plum Island, New York, where vaccine antigen
concentrate for a limited number of FMD strains is stored. In the event
of an FMD outbreak, the antigen would need to be shipped to Pirbright,
United Kingdom, or Lyon, France, to be turned into finished vaccine and
then shipped back to the United States for use. This bank is currently
funded at $1.9 million annually. The turnaround time from the onset of
an outbreak until finished vaccine product can be delivered to the
field would be weeks for a small FMD event and months for a larger FMD
outbreak. Of equal concern is the limited number of FMD vaccine antigen
strains currently maintained at Plum Island and the limited shelf life
of the vaccine antigen concentrate that would affect the potency of the
finished vaccine, should the expiring vaccine antigen stock not be
rotated out of storage. Additionally, worldwide FMD vaccine production
is limited and there is no surge capacity currently available to
produce the millions of doses needed in the event of a large-scale FMD
outbreak in the United States. Manufacturers with contracts in place
are producing at maximum capacity for their contracted customers and
will not abandon these established customers to produce vaccine for the
United States. Furthermore, the FMD vaccine bank is scheduled to move
in the future to the NBAF facility in Kansas and the storage capacity
may be limited for FMD vaccine. For these reasons, we recommend
consideration for establishing a contract for a vendor-managed,
offshore FMD bank that has the capability to produce vaccine antigen
concentrate for all FMD strains currently circulating in the world. A
contracted offshore FMD bank would provide a vendor-managed-inventory
of vaccine with replacement of outdated product, facilitated vaccine
finishing, and ultimately increased efficiency in FMD vaccine delivery
for use in an FMD outbreak.
Finally, we request that the Committee work with USDA and encourage
them to budget the funds needed for the update and modernization of the
National Veterinary Stockpile of FMD vaccine.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and we look forward
to working with you to ensure that the United States is prepared for an
outbreak of FMD.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Doctor, and for all of you for
your testimony. As a former pork producer and someone who
continues to raise cattle on our farm, this is something that
is very, very important to me and to Missouri's 4th District,
and it is important that we get this right. And I am also a
Member of the Armed Services Committee, and after we go through
the first round, I might want to come back to agro-terrorism
and some questions with that.
But I would like to start off with this question. In a
recent briefing with USDA, they mention public private
partnerships as a possible way to address the funding of a
vaccine stockpile. So has your industry thought about what that
would look like, and what you could support?
So I will just open it up to anyone who might want to
answer that. A public-private partnership to help with the
funding.
So the pork producers, the cattle, sheep, you don't want to
say hey, we will help pay for it? Let's do a show of hands.
Dr. Hill. I mentioned that in my oral testimony a little
bit. I guess it is not that our industry and probably the
livestock industry is opposed to some kind of partnership, but
we would have to have some kind of a plan and know what the
cost is before we would want to commit to it. No matter how you
slice it, this is going to be an expensive program. It is going
to be, and Dr. Roth can probably give you some idea of what he
estimates the cost of developing an effective vaccine bank
would be.
I don't think the industry is totally opposed to some kind
of participation, though.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes, so let's go to Dr. Roth. You mentioned
that you need 23 different vaccines, and so can you talk about
that a little bit, and then what do you anticipate the cost
would be?
Dr. Roth. So the World Reference Laboratory for FMD in
Pirbright, England, puts out a list of the strains that every
country should maintain in their bank, and there are 23 strains
that aren't cross protected, and that is based on active
strains of virus around the world.
In this white paper that I developed for the commodity
groups, we estimated that it would cost about $150 million a
year, and it would take 5 years to build a robust supply for
all 23 strains, so you would have immediate availability,
short-term availability, and long-term availability.
Now I think that can probably be reduced with more people
engaged in planning and working more with the vaccine industry,
and looking at some of these new technologies. So I think that
is a very large number, but if we look at the potential impact
of FMD, it is not such a big number to protect U.S.
agriculture.
Mrs. Hartzler. How long does a vaccine last? What's the
lifespan of the vaccine, and how often do we have to replenish
that?
Dr. Roth. If you have finished vaccine in a bottle ready to
go, that lasts for 18 to 24 months. The vaccine bank is frozen
antigen concentrate, and that can last 5, maybe 10 years. But
in the white paper, we proposed that work with the
manufacturers to use vendor managed inventory, so they keep
finished vaccine in their inventory, and when they make a new
batch, they replace that. So they always might keep 20 million
doses on hand, and then they sell from that inventory to their
current customers. And you would have to pay them for that.
Similarly, with the antigen concentrate, they could
maintain a rotating stock of antigen concentrate. After it
begins to age, then they formulate it to vaccine, sell it, and
replace it with more antigen concentrate. So there would be
uses for most of these strains. You don't have to destroy it.
Mrs. Hartzler. So now that we have at least a figure, $150
million a year, 5 years, so back to the funding thing. One idea
was a check-off. I'm a big supporter of check-offs for
promotion and education. So the idea of a check-off for all
cloven hoofed animals or perhaps a processing fee. So are
either of these something that your industry would support? I
will start with the cattle.
Dr. Sjeklocha. I would say that there are concerns about
earmarking. If the beef industry would put more money into this
check-off to develop this vaccine pool, and we had an outbreak
and there would be some concerns, like if the pork industry
needed X amount of vaccine, the beef industry needed so much,
would there be in-fighting or fighting between those two groups
as to who would get the most vaccine to deal with their
problems.
I think overall some industry involvement would be
acceptable, but that is one of the problems that I think we
would have to face.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yes. Dr. Wolf?
Dr. Wolf. Challenging question, and my thought process is a
little different in that the sheep producers would be
cooperating on a scale they have never before cooperated. We
would be talking about every sheep producer in a large area
doing something that was not scheduled and time consuming, and
complying 100 percent.
And so I look at it as that this isn't just a livestock
industry problem. This is an all of agriculture problem. If we
had FMD in our area today, there would be no grain moving to
all the livestock producers in the area, and think of the
ripple effect, or hay, or maybe there wouldn't even be fuel
coming to your farm because of trucks not being allowed to
move.
And so I think that the public stands to lose so much that
the industry groups would step forward, but that they would
have a difficult time shouldering a majority of the costs,
because their losses are already going to be huge.
Mrs. Hartzler. Good point. Quickly, Dr. Hill, do you have
anything to add for the pork producers?
Dr. Hill. Yes, and I think when you are referring to a
check-off, you are referring to mandatory check-off, and under
the current law, that would not be legal for us to use the
money for that. Our check-off is for research promotion and
education, but again, I would agree with Dr. Wolf. I think the
industry would be willing to participate, but not to the extent
if the $150 million is right, not to that level.
Mrs. Hartzler. All right, thank you very much.
Ranking Member Costa?
Mr. Costa. Thank you very much.
Dr. Sjeklocha, to the last question, doesn't that point out
if there were such an outbreak, that there would need to be
some sort of a protocol that would be established, and hasn't
that been thought out in some fashion between the USDA and the
various industries represented here?
Dr. Sjeklocha. As far as a check-off?
Mr. Costa. No, not a check-off. In terms of how the vaccine
that is in supply that would be readily available and that that
would have to be developed. What is our supply of vaccine
today? Dr. Roth, you talked about 23 vaccines. I would like
some clarification, you are talking about a vaccine or 23
various vaccines needed to----
Dr. Roth. To cover all of the potential strains around the
world, it would take 23 vaccines.
Mr. Costa. But, if we had a strain that would break out
here, do we have a particular vaccine for any of those 23
strains?
Dr. Roth. My understanding is that the North American
Vaccine Bank has about 14 strains, perhaps.
Mr. Costa. Fourteen of the 23?
Dr. Roth. Yes, and they are the most common strains. They
have banked the most common strains.
Mr. Costa. And what is our understanding of the level of
the supply in the event of it?
Dr. Roth. My understanding is for most of those strains, it
is about 2\1/2\ million doses.
Mr. Costa. I see. The issue of animal husbandry of the
stakeholders that are involved, I understand there was a
meeting that began with USDA and APHIS to develop and improve
the current strategies for an effective response. To what
extent is industry involved in this preliminary planning and
implementing for a defense and response program? I mean, it is
too bad we don't have USDA here to respond, are any of you
aware of those efforts?
Dr. Hill. Well, there are ongoing, what do you call them,
practices or----
Dr. Wolf. Exercises.
Dr. Hill. What?
Dr. Wolf. Exercises.
Dr. Hill. Yes, exercises. Thank you, Cindy. There are
exercises, ongoing exercises that the industry cooperates with
USDA looking at everything from movements to slaughter and that
sort of thing. Those plans are in place, but----
Mr. Costa. Do they need to be updated?
Dr. Hill. Pardon?
Mr. Costa. Do they need to be updated?
Dr. Hill. Well, I think they are continually updated.
Mr. Costa. All right. Do they meet on a regular basis with
industry?
Dr. Hill. Pardon?
Mr. Costa. Does USDA and APHIS meet on a regular basis
with----
Dr. Hill. Absolutely.
Mr. Costa. Okay, so maybe it is a better question that we
address to the Department.
In terms of the economic and market concerns, we again know
about the outbreak with sheep in the UK in 2001. Any
estimations in terms of the market aspects and export impacts
to America's livestock industry in the event of an outbreak?
What sort of constraints and confinements might be put in
place?
Dr. Roth. Well, the pork board funded a study using
economists at Iowa State University in 2011, and they estimated
that over a 10 year period--because without vaccine, this could
go on a very long time before we get our FMD free status back,
that it could cost the pork industry about $57 billion, beef,
$71 billion, corn, $44 billion, and soybeans, $25 billion,
because it will impact green markets also.
Mr. Costa. Well, Madam Chair, I think for the record we
ought to get an estimate in terms of the economic impacts, so
we would have a better knowledge of that.
And it was mentioned here again in terms that a couple of
you noted in the event of an outbreak, the ability to deal with
containment. When I chaired the Senate Agriculture and Water
Committee in California, we had in my district a dairy that had
an unfortunate circumstance with poison in the feed, and out of
what is considered a smaller size herd, 500 milking cows, 300
were lost. Just trying to deal within a 24, 48 hour basis with
300 carcasses and the disposal and the complications. Dairies
in California are anywhere from 1,000 to 5,000 head operations
where you have cattle, 100,000, 50,000, 100,000 head of cattle
are not unusual. What is the preparation to deal with that
amount of cattle in the event that you have to deal with the
eradication and the disposal and all the health and safety
requirements that come with it?
Dr. Roth. The new response indicates that when the outbreak
gets that large, if it gets in a large feedlot or large dairy--
--
Mr. Costa. Yes, feedlot, large dairy.
Dr. Roth.--you just can't kill them. It would take too
long. And if you could kill them, you can't dispose of them. So
the recommendation is not to kill them, and to let them live
and we go from stamping out to other strategies hopefully
involving vaccine to control it. Because most adult cattle will
recover from FMD, most adult pigs, too. It can be fairly lethal
in calves and baby pigs.
Mr. Costa. But at that point, and my time has expired, you
would have to do some sort of isolation, I would think, from
those, whether it be pork or livestock of any kind, so that
they would not contaminate the other herds.
Dr. Roth. So there would be major efforts made in
biocontainment, and that is difficult, especially in animals
outdoors like beef and dairy animals.
Mr. Costa. Well yes, most of these are outdoors.
Dr. Roth. Yes, so it would be very, very difficult if it
gets into those big units to contain it without vaccine.
Dr. Hill. I might just add, though, in an outbreak
situation, what you always try to do is you create circles, and
the circles would be controlling movement but also if we had
vaccine available, it would be vaccinating those animals in
that circle, and the vaccine would help with the shedding of
the virus. It drastically reduces the amount of virus that is
shed by animals that are exposed or infected. That is part of
this plan.
Mr. Costa. So when the animals recover, are they useful?
Dr. Hill. Yes, many of them do recover.
Mr. Costa. My time has expired. Do you want to say
something?
Dr. Sjeklocha. Yes. I work for Cattle Empire feedyards. Our
largest feedyard is 87,000 head, and the other end of that is
that we have to keep in mind that when we are trying to contain
that area, that 87,000 head feedyard uses about 35 truckloads
of corn every day. So that is going to be a logistical
nightmare on top of getting animal health supplies in, and that
sort of thing. So it is a big issue.
Mr. Costa. Protocols and preparedness are absolutely
essential.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you. The gentleman from Iowa, Mr.
King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I thank the
witnesses. I would pick up where Mr. Costa was on this, that
you envision, directly to Dr. Hill first, you turn first to the
concept of containing this virus in as localized an area as
possible with concentric circles growing out from that as you
begin to see how broad it might be growing. What I don't know
is how quickly the vaccine is effective, and if it is effective
at all against an infected animal.
Dr. Hill. Well, the whole thing is based on developing
immunity, and so immunity takes time. This is a kill vaccine,
so for maximum production of immunity, you are going to have to
give two doses. So there is a time delay, but still, I think
developing that circle and getting out far enough, a lot of
times an outbreak situation has happened in England, the circle
was too small. Then all of a sudden you have an outbreak here
so you make a circle around that, making the circle bigger at
first if we had enough vaccine to really encompass a large
population in a bigger circle, we would have a better chance of
controlling the spread of the disease.
But you are right, it does take time to develop immunity.
Mr. King. And just taking that in the picture, let's just
suggest that we drew the circle big enough to contain the virus
and I guess it doesn't matter for our discussion purposes how
broad, but I am just going to say a a 10 mile radius. And if we
are working within that circle and we have contained the
livestock within that circle, then if you are not going to
euthanize the animals, but vaccinate them, there will be an
infectious spreading period of time until the vaccine might
begin to contain it. What happens to the animals that are
infected? Can you ever get them cleaned up where they can go to
market? Do you allow the infected animals to go to market?
Dr. Hill. Yes, the adult animals will recover. With pigs,
your suckling pigs, small pigs are probably more severely
affected and mortality is going to be higher in those pigs. But
the adult animals, any finishing pigs, for example, most of
those would recover and being as it is not a food safety issue,
could go to market.
Mr. King. I know that we have done that in the past, like
pseudo-rabies, for example, can go to market safely. What about
livestock identification traceability? How much of a factor is
that in addressing this?
Dr. Hill. Well, I can speak for the pork industry. We now
have identification of sows, mandatory identification of sows
going to slaughter, and we can identify our slaughter pigs by
batching systems that are very effective. So we do have a good
identification program in the swine industry, and I will let my
friends in the cattle and sheep industry speak for themselves.
Mr. King. I am about to ask him, but first I want to follow
up on this. From the moment that you might recognize a disease
and issue an order to quarantine that radius we talked about,
let's say a 10 mile radius, how long does it take before that
quarantine order could be effective? And then I am going to ask
you how far has some of that livestock been hauled in that
period of time?
Dr. Hill. Well, I will answer your last part of your
question first. That is whole rub on this thing. We import a
lot of pigs into Iowa, as you well know. If we had a shipment
of pigs that came from North Carolina, for example, or out of
Canada, they can be in transit for 24 hours. They could spread
virus all the way across the United States. The first part of
your question again?
Mr. King. Was how long does it take to implement a
quarantine order? How long does it take for the information to
get out? If you say we are going to stop the transport of pigs
as quickly as we can, how long would it be before we can expect
that can happen?
Dr. Hill. Well, every situation is going to be different,
and that is probably a question we need to ask APHIS.
Mr. King. Yes.
Dr. Hill. But with the state health officers and the
Federal people, it would be fairly quick, as we had with high
path AI. And I will just mention, Dr. Roth talked about how to
get rid of these animals. That was one of the biggest problems
in Iowa and Minnesota that we had was how to dispose of these
birds.
Mr. King. Indeed, and that is a bigger question, of course,
with livestock, and I wanted to get to that. But I would like
to direct a question over to Dr. Sjeklocha.
The question to traceability that I asked Dr. Hill, what
about traceability of cattle, and what is our capability, and
how much does that help us address a disease outbreak?
Dr. Sjeklocha. At this point, I would say traceability of
cattle: first, traceability of cattle would be helpful. It is
not widely followed. There is not a real good system ever since
the eradication program went away. There are some people that
do have source and age verified cattle in their feedyards.
Those are usually producers, cow/calf producers that want to,
for instance, track their carcass data all the way to the
slaughter plant, that sort of thing.
There isn't a good traceability system in place right now.
I would say at our place, we probably receive cattle from ten
different states just last week, so yes, it would be a big
issue.
Mr. King. Let me just submit that when the industry is
ready, I have a good framework to look at for a traceability
bill that a lot of the industries looked at and agreed with. I
don't intend to move it until the industry is ready, but when
you are, let's talk.
I appreciate the testimony of all the witnesses, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Now we go to someone who
certainly knows this, a veterinarian from Florida, Mr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate you all
being here, and I can relate real well with what you are
talking about. I just want to express how thankful I am that
you are here bringing this up as the importance of it, how it
would affect this market. The billions of dollars that it would
cost production here, the food supply here, plus our export
markets. It would be hard to really comprehend or tabulate
that. It would be in the hundreds of billions of dollars from
what I have seen, just on the beef side. Again, I want to thank
you for this. The thing I do feel good about in asking fellow
veterinarians is knowing how rapidly we respond with the
diagnostics, getting that word out, reporting that, and that is
imperative that we let all of our associations know that, and
then on the other side is to make sure that countries that have
active cases, they don't come in here. Because as you brought
up, Dr. Hill, did you bring up about the BSE, how that one case
that happened--or you did over there, Dr. Sjeklocha, how you
brought up that one case from 2003 and how it cut down $2
billion worth of exports, which that was one case. And so we
can imagine the detrimental effect this would have. And so I
feel good that we would jump on the quarantine. The circle
would be there. We would vaccinate on the perimeter of that
first, I would think, and then follow up.
Mr. Parker, you are with Merial, correct? What is the
turnaround time if you had the specific serotype diagnosed,
what is the turnaround time from diagnosis, starting
production, and getting it out in the vaccine form? Did you say
4 days for 2\1/2\ million doses?
Mr. Parker. I am sorry?
Mr. Yoho. Did you say 4 days for 2\1/2\ million doses?
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. Once we receive official notification
of a confirmation of diagnosis from the USDA, that starts the
process. We are prepared to begin the gearing up to make our
production facilities available to receive, as in today's
situation, they would need to take that antigen that is in Plum
Island, send it over to us in England or in France, and while
that is in transit, we are preparing our abilities to convert
that antigen into----
Mr. Yoho. Are there any restrictions on that new serovar or
one you haven't used? Is it already FDA approved? Does it have
to go through all the regulatory hoops and that, or is it ready
to go in 4 days?
Mr. Parker. Not at this time. Anything that is in the North
America Bank is up to the point of registration, so that there
is the willingness of the USDA to accept that, because we have
demonstrated with our outline of production, as with approved
vaccines here in the United States----
Mr. Yoho. Okay.
Mr. Parker. We have gone up just short of the point of
approval.
We can convert. Once we receive it in our facility, we can
convert that antigen within 4 days to finished vaccine.
Mr. Yoho. And so we have those banks and we have 14
serovars here that we can--or the antigens stored that we could
go into and find out pretty quick as soon as diagnostics are
done, start producing that, and if it is a serovar that is in
another country, we can bring that over here? There are no
restrictions as far as you know?
Mr. Parker. Well if it is not in the bank and we do not
have the strain, then we have to adapt to that strain to a
vaccine master seed. So that is a little bit longer process,
but anything in the bank, we have the ability to turn that
around within that 4 day time period, once we receive it.
Mr. Yoho. All right, and then on the new technology with
the DNA recombinant vaccines, and I know we are looking at the
leaderless ones, which in my understanding, that would be
almost like a multivalent type of vaccine, is that correct?
Mr. Parker. Jim, do you know?
Dr. Roth. You have to make multiple monovalent vaccines,
and them combine them with that leaderless. There is also a
human adenovirus 5 vectored vaccine, too, and those are one
strain at a time also.
Mr. Yoho. I was over at the NSF and we were talking to the
researchers over there, and they are developing a monovalent
influenza vaccine that they are taking a glycoprotein out for
the cell wall, and it was for all strains of influenza and that
is cutting edge. And if that is where we need to go or if that
is possible with this type of infection, this type of viral
infection, if that is possible, that is something we need to
put the R&D in and make sure that is readily available.
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir, Congressman, as far as I am aware
right now, there is not that universal vector platform for new
vaccines; however, that does not mean that there is not work
being done in that area. There is plenty of effort within many
company's R&D effort to look at the most optimal solution.
Mr. Yoho. All right, and then just one last question. I
know FMD is the one we are most concerned about right now, but
we have African swine fever and all the ones we haven't thought
about coming here. I hope the research and development is being
done on that, and I would like to see a private-public
partnership done in that so that we are ready, that we are
never set with a national food security crisis in this county.
So I appreciate your time here, and I appreciate your
efforts in bringing this to our attention. Thank you.
Mrs. Hartzler. I thank the gentleman.
Now we have the gentleman from Mississippi, Representative
Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. And this first question, Mr. Parker, is directed
to you, and you probably have answered this. I am just trying
to get it clear in my mind. If you have the antigen, 4 days
until you can get the vaccine, is that correct?
Mr. Parker. I am sorry, repeat that?
Mr. Kelly. If you have the antigen available, it is 4 days
until you have an effective vaccine that is available to start?
Mr. Parker. Once we receive it back from USDA, then we can
turn it around for delivery back to the U.S. within 4 days.
Mr. Kelly. Okay, and if you don't have an adequate supply
of antigen, then how long does it take to go, I guess, from
scratch to a vaccine, if you know the strain?
Mr. Parker. To characterize the strain and develop a new
master seed, I would have to check with my industrial ops
folks. I can't answer that specifically, but it is an extended
period of time.
Mr. Kelly. You are not talking days, you are talking at
least weeks?
Mr. Parker. Yes, sir. Yes.
Mr. Kelly. Okay, and then the other question, and this is
for anybody on the panel, but probably Mr. Parker again, you
are probably going to be in a better position to answer this.
When you are counting the number of doses that you have on hand
or the antigen that you have on hand, is that for the initial
dose or is that for both doses that an animal will have to
have?
Mr. Parker. What is in the bank now, that would be up to
USDA and the industry to determine what the dose regimen is,
and in general, swine typically require two doses. There are
some situations for ruminants where you can get away with a
single dose, but then again, that is going to be up to APHIS
and working with the industry to make that determination.
Mr. Kelly. And again, this is to anyone on the panel. One
of the things that concerns me most is kind of like with the
avian flu. It is not so much the trucks that go across this
country carrying animals, okay, domesticated animals, but the
actual wildlife, the feral swine and the deer. There are more
deer in Mississippi than there are people, and there are a lot
of other states that are like that. What is our plan to deal
with those which; first, aren't as easy to depopulate. If they
were, there wouldn't be any deer or wild swine in Mississippi,
because the feral swine are very destructive in our state. So
what is the plan to keep those from spreading and to keep them
in those concentric circles?
Dr. Roth. That would be very difficult to do, as you can
imagine. The deer and feral swine, especially the feral swine,
move pretty freely, and they can be infected with the virus and
they can also transmit it just as fomites on their feet and so
forth. So movement of wild animals between herds of livestock
would be a real risk, and pretty hard to stop.
Mr. Kelly. And then again, this is probably something I
should understand, in what way is it passed from one animal to
another? Is it airborne, is it through mites or mosquitoes or
ticks? In what ways can it be transmitted from one animal to
another?
Dr. Roth. So it's not vector-borne through ticks and
mosquitoes and that kind of thing. It is mostly direct contact,
and animals that are infected shed high concentration of virus
in their saliva and feces, so anything they contaminate that
another animal touches, they can pick it up.
Mr. Kelly. And then this is my final question, and it is to
anyone on the panel. The avian flu hit Minnesota and some other
states pretty hard. There was a lot of cross talk between the
spring and the fall when we thought it would come to
Mississippi or to other southern states with the migratory fowl
and those things. So I guess my question is have you studied
the outbreak of the avian flu, and what are the lessons learned
from the way they handled either well or poorly that we can use
for this similar foot-and-mouth disease, or for any other
disease that can be transmitted through our livestock?
Dr. Roth. We have also worked on the secure egg and turkey
supply plans, and what we learned is that the biosecurity that
was adequate for the normal diseases in poultry was not
adequate for high-path avian influenza. Biosecurity is
expensive and inconvenient, and we would pretty quickly find
that the biosecurity we have in the cattle industry isn't
adequate for foot-and-mouth disease. And to implement enough
biosecurity in the cattle industry would be pretty difficult
for animals like yours.
Dr. Sjeklocha. It would be a monumental task to tackle
biosecurity in the beef industry.
Dr. Hill. If you still have some time, I would like to go
back to your question about vaccines.
Mr. Kelly. Absolutely.
Dr. Hill. Okay. So what Mr. Parker was talking about was
developing this vaccine in 4 days, but he's talking about
developing 2.5 million doses. We need 40 million doses, okay.
And the other thing is in regards to the question about
different DNA types of vaccines, yes, we are working on those.
The industry is working on them. Do we need more money and
research to do that? Yes, but those are down the road type
things. Those are not vaccines that are going to be available
next year or the next year, or maybe within 5 years. So when we
are talking about this vaccine bank, we are talking about doing
something now, rather than waiting for one of these newer
vaccines. Thank you.
Mr. Kelly. I thank all you gentlemen and lady for your
expertise and you coming here to help us with this, and your
preparation, and Madam Chair, I yield back.
Mrs. Hartzler. You have good questions. I want to build on
some of your questions there.
So how long does the virus last, if it is transmitted
through saliva and feces?
Dr. Roth. So an infected animal will shed virus for up to a
week or so, and if that virus is frozen in the winter, it will
last a very long time. In the middle of summer with a sunny
day, it doesn't last very long at all. So it depends on the
climatic conditions.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay, and we have talked about the problem
with disposal. So how would that typically--if you did do
that--I know you said we are not going to try to do that
anymore, but would it be burying them or incinerating them, or
what types of things?
Dr. Hill. Well, we wish we had the answer to that question,
because we did not have the answer to that question with high-
path AI. I mean, there were all kinds of problems. Some people
didn't want to bury them on the farms. Some of them were taken
in closed trucks down the interstate to a landfill. I mean,
there was all kinds of different problems. And that is one of
the issues that APHIS has addressed is that even if we could
kill all these animals, how do we dispose of them? It is a
monumental problem. That is one of the reasons they decided
that vaccinating and living for another day is the plan of
choice.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. I wanted to build on what you said
earlier, Dr. Wolf. I thought that was very insightful about the
need for in addition to the vaccines, to have a vaccine
preparedness plan that includes making sure you have enough
needles and ear tags, and those type of things. So first of
all, do we have a vaccine preparedness plan? Is there one?
Dr. Wolf. There is a plan in place that Dr. Roth has with
him. It is extremely well-written and I encourage all of you to
go to the Iowa State site and read that, and then APHIS also
has a published plan. But the challenge is, from my experience,
for instance, when we had bovine TB in northwest Minnesota,
when we were ready to enact the TB control plan, we found
producers didn't have handling facilities, for example, and so
going back to where we are in today's economy, if all of a
sudden we order, whether it is 2\1/2\, 10, or 40 million
needles, I don't think that our suppliers would have that on
hand.
Mrs. Hartzler. So is that part of the plan to have those in
place, in addition to the need for the vaccine itself? Is that
what Congress potentially--and industry, because you all are
going to support chipping in--but anyway, is that all something
that we would fund? Have enough vaccine have enough needles,
have enough ear tags, all of that, or not? That is just a side
issue, and by the way, we need these other things.
Dr. Roth. The National Veterinary Stockpile is stockpiling
needles and syringes and personal protective equipment, and
those sorts of things. Their funding has not been adequate to
have a really robust stockpile, but they are stockpiling a lot
of equipment that might be needed. They haven't had the funding
to stockpile the vaccine yet.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay, and my last question, and I know Mr.
Yoho has a question, so back to my statement earlier that I am
on the Armed Services Committee as well. I am very concerned
about terrorism and agro-terrorism is certainly involved in
that. That is why I was trying to get to how is it spread. I
know this has been talked about. Some are local meetings that
have been held, don't want to talk too much to give people
ideas, but how concerned are you of this virus being used
potentially as a terrorism threat to hurt our economy, just
like terrorists hijacked airplanes and impacted Wall Street,
our whole economy with that type of attack. If they were to
attack our livestock industry in this way, it would have a huge
detrimental impact on our country. And so how concerned, let's
say from a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being this is extreme threat to
0, probably not. How concerned are you of this potentially as a
terrorism threat?
Dr. Hill. Twelve.
Mrs. Hartzler. Wow. Wow.
Dr. Wolf. I would agree.
Mr. Parker. I think most terrorists are interested in
killing people, but yes, it is a huge concern. I would put it
up there maybe not at 12, but definitely at 10.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. I think that adds impetus to the
importance of this, not just from important to agriculture, but
then to our entire economy as well.
All right, Mr. Yoho?
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair, and again, I appreciate
you guys being here.
That is something I would like to talk to you more about,
but I would rather not talk about it on the record. You were
talking about the cost of this, and I want to bring up a couple
things. The RFID identification tags, I have been kind of
reluctant with my clients, because you just hate to have a
mandate or force them into something. But on something like
this, when we see the potential and the potential damage that
it could do, it is something as you go back to your industries,
talk about that and the hog industry just seems to have a lot
better tracking system, it seems like the way you manage. I
have complete confidence that we can contain, get our circles
in there with modern husbandry practices and get the vaccines
out there. We would have a little lag in there. The thing we
can't control is the wild movement of animals, and I know in
Florida there is a feral hog behind every pine tree or oak
tree, and it is hard to contain all of those. And so when we
are talking about the cost, and the 2008 Farm Bill established
a program of plant, pest, and disease management and disaster
prevention. Mandatory funding has been used very effectively
through the program for the benefit of the specialty crops. To
what extent has each of your organizations discussed the
possibility of creating a similar program within the Animal
Health Protection Act, and should it be mandatory or would it
be voluntarily through your associations, and put into a trust
fund for R&D and let it grow, at some point the best case
scenario is we don't have to use it for a long, long time, and
have it becoming self-perpetuating possibly. What are your
thoughts on that?
Dr. Hill. Are you referring to the Commodity Credit
Corporation? Is that what you are talking about?
Mr. Yoho. The Animal Health Protection Act from the 2008
Farm Bill.
Dr. Hill. Yes.
Mr. Yoho. With plant, pest, and disease management and
disaster prevention, there was a mandatory funding used in that
to benefit the specialty crops for research and development.
Dr. Hill. We would support that, at least in the swine
industry, and it needs to be mandatory, not just advisory.
Mr. Yoho. That is right.
Dr. Hill. And so that money possibly could come from the
Commodity Credit Corporation.
Mr. Yoho. Well, that is something. If you take it back
because nobody wants to put more money into a program like
that, but the penny a day doubled theory every day, in a
months' time or 31 days, a penny if you double it every day
becomes $10.3 million. And if you can come up with some minute
formula and just put a little bit in there, but we're doing it
on every head that gets sold on all livestock, not that I am
mandating or recommending a mandate from the Federal
Government, because we need less of those in my opinion, but to
be prepared for that day when it comes, and hopefully we don't
ever see it. But it is better to be prepared for that, because
it is hard to play catch up, especially in the situation this
country is in now economically. And so if we can have that
lead-in from industry and say, ``You know what, we would like
to do this, and it could be cross species or animal
disciplines.'' Just more food for thought, than even an answer,
but if you have any other different thoughts, let us know.
Dr. Sjeklocha. I think we would be interested in any and
all options. We are certainly open to discuss any of that.
Mr. Yoho. Yes. Worst thing is when you go to a farm and you
pull out, you see an animal and you don't have the right
antibiotic or the right vaccine there, and it is like well,
didn't do much good here. So we don't want to be caught short
like that. I appreciate your time. Go ahead.
Mr. Parker. Congressman, just one follow up on some of the
premise behind your question. It is not just a question of the
money to do this. There is a time element.
Mr. Yoho. Yes.
Mr. Parker. As I stated in my testimony, it is not only my
company, but any other conventional manufacturer of FMD vaccine
today. We have no excess capacity. We have to build to meet a
demand that is the size of the United States. That would be
larger than anything that we consider, so as of today, there is
no excess industrial capacity for FMD vaccine manufacturing. If
we have an outbreak today, it may be 2 to 3 years before we can
get you the vaccine that you need to address this.
Mr. Yoho. See, I didn't know that. I mean, that is just
coming out now. Is it almost like something the Federal
Government maybe ought to have on hand, ready to go, ready to
produce something?
Mr. Parker. That is the vaccine bank. That is in a
coordinated effort in partnership with the government, we can
work towards something like this, but we need to know what we
need to shoot at. Right now, we have not been asked the
official question, so we don't know what to shoot at, but if we
are asked the question, we can work with the government to
achieve some notion of optimization.
Mr. Yoho. I can't speak for the Chairman, but I would
recommend you send those recommendations up here to this
Committee, and I am sure he would be happy to look at those.
And with that, I yield back, and thank you for your time.
Mr. Parker. Thank you.
The Chairman [presiding.] Well, I want to thank everybody
for attending the hearing. I am sorry that I missed a good
portion of it. We had a Transportation and Infrastructure FAA
markup, and had about six amendments to vote on that took a
little while. But I want to thank all the Members that came,
and their participation. I want to thank all the witnesses for
your time and your expertise. I understand that a lot of the
questions that I had have already been asked, so I am not going
to go into all of that. I will catch up with it in the record
myself.
But I want to thank each of you again for your time and
your interest in this. I think this is a very, very, very
important issue to stay out in front of, to stay ahead of the
curve on, and I really appreciate your time and attention and
working with the Committee to do everything we can to make sure
that we don't have an issue in this country.
Under the rules of the Committee, the record of today's
hearing will remain open for 10 calendar days to receive
additional material and supplementary written responses from
the witnesses to any questions posed by a Member. This hearing
of the Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture of the
Committee on Agriculture is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:21 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
Supplementary Material Submitted by David B. Sjeklocha, D.V.M.,
Operations Manager of Animal Health & Welfare, Cattle Empire LLC,
Satanta, KS; on Behalf of National Cattleman's Beef Association
Responses to Questions Raised During the Hearing
Question 1. In a recent briefing with USDA, they mentioned public-
private partnerships as a possible way to address the funding of a
vaccine stockpile. Has your industry thought about what that would look
like and what you could support?
Answer. The beef industry remains committed to identifying
solutions to strengthen and improve our country's Foot-and-Mouth
disease (FMD) preparedness plans. Together with the National Pork Board
and the National Milk Producers Federation, the National Cattlemen's
Beef Association financed a white paper, written by Dr. Jim Roth at
Iowa State University, to explore the FMD vaccine supply for emergency
use and surge capacity in the United States. The current FMD vaccine
supply for the United States was found to be inadequate for control of
a type 3 or larger FMD outbreak. The white paper estimated a financial
need of $150 million/year for 5 years to acquire the necessary vaccine
antigen concentrates (VAC) for the most common FMD serotypes viewed as
potential threats to the United States. In a stakeholder meeting with
representatives from USDA-APHIS, held in September 2014, discussions
for financing the needed FMD vaccine included proposals for developing
funds through the commodity check-off programs or through user fee
systems. Unfortunately, the Beef Promotion and Research Order (1986)
does not authorize for Beef Check-off funds to be used to directly
finance a national FMD vaccine program. Furthermore, the user fee
vehicle, upon further discussion at the meeting, was believed by many
in attendance to be inadequate for producing the necessary funding in a
timely manner. It is our understanding that in order to secure the
necessary FMD vaccine, working within the current market supplies, a
significant financial commitment would need to be made by the United
States Government to a vaccine manufacturer to produce the FMD vaccine
product and most likely, a new facility for vaccine production would be
required from the vaccine sponsor to meet the production demands. With
the knowledge that significant and readily available funding would be
needed, the animal agriculture industry seeks to increase Congressional
awareness for FMD vaccine supply problems and requests consideration
for ways to increase funding at USDA-APHIS to meet the agency mission
to protect animal health.
Question 2. What are some of the activities that the livestock
industry has been involved with to prepare for the event of an FMD
outbreak? Any focus on consumers or business continuity?
Answer. The beef cattle industry has been involved in a variety of
FMD preparedness activities. The beef industry quality assurance
program, Beef Quality Assurance (BQA), contains biosecurity components
that are focused at the individual farm level with discussions for
prevention and control of possible disease agents, biocontainment, and
managed movements. Individual farms are encouraged to develop
biosecurity plans. The beef industry is currently working with
governmental and academic partners to develop a secure food supply plan
for the beef cattle industry in the event of an FMD outbreak. The
Secure Beef Supply plan would provide managed movements for non-
infected animals and products in an FMD outbreak situation and would
function to maintain continuity of business for producers and to ensure
a safe food supply for consumers. Collaboratively, the beef industry
works with other commodity groups and state and Federal animal health
officials to develop FMD preparedness action and communication plans.
The industry has been involved in a variety of FMD preparedness drills
which occur in the various states. Additionally, the beef industry is
actively involved with the Cross Species FMD Communications group,
whose goals are to create a unified FMD crisis response plan; share FMD
messaging; and form government partnerships for a coordinated FMD
response. The group works to prevent supply disruptions to consumers
and to ensure consumer confidence in meat and milk products during an
FMD outbreak. Finally, the Cross Species FMD Communications group
maintains an informational website, www.FootandMouthDiseaseInfo.org.
Question 3. FMD presents a great economic threat to U.S. livestock
producers and is viewed as the most concerning transboundary disease in
the world. If an FMD outbreak were to occur in the United States, what
would be the result with regards to our export markets?
Answer. FMD presents a great economic threat to U.S. livestock
producers and is viewed as the most concerning transboundary disease in
the world. An FMD outbreak in the United States would result in the
immediate closure of most, if not all, of our foreign export markets.
Commodity group exports for 2014 for beef were at $7.1 billion, for
pork at $6.7 billion, and for dairy at $7.1 billion. To put this into
perspective, we need to only look at the economic impact of a single
case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) found in a Canadian-born
cow located in Washington state on December 23, 2003. As a result of a
single case of BSE, we saw U.S. beef exports decline by 2 billion
pounds from 2003 to 2004. It took 8 years for U.S. beef exports to get
back to pre-December 2003 levels. Over a decade later, we still do not
have access to several critical markets, such as China, nor do we have
full access to every country we were trading with prior to December
2003. It's not just the international trade impact which concerns us.
In addition, we expect to see significant economic impact to U.S. beef
producers due to depopulation, restrictions on cattle movements, and a
potential shutdown of overall cattle trade in the affected regions.
Question 4. USDA has worked with some industries to ensure the flow
of products and animals in the event of an animal disease outbreak. Can
you discuss those efforts and at what stage your preparedness plan is
with USDA?
Answer. The Secure Beef Supply Plan is intended to identify and
address issues to better prepare government and industry to enable
business continuity for the beef industry in the event of a Foot-and-
Mouth Disease outbreak in the United States. A component of the Secure
Food Supply Plans, the Secure Beef Supply Plan is currently under
development by a number of partners who are being led by the Center for
Food Security and Public Health at Iowa State University. Initial work
on the Secure Beef Supply plan is focused on the feedyard sector of the
beef industry as well as the transporters and processors. Later, work
will take place to include planning for the cow/calf sector, dairy beef
and the stockers/backgrounders. The current work in the feedyard sector
is being divided among six working groups: biosecurity, surveillance,
communications, data management, managed movements, and continuity of
business for infected feedyards. It is important to remember that
during an FMD outbreak in the United States, it will not be business as
usual for cattle producers. In addition to meeting specific biosecurity
performance standards, beef cattle operations within a FMD Control Area
will need to conduct daily surveillance of cattle and keep records of
all observations. Since FMD has not occurred in the United States since
1929, it will be important to train cattlemen to know what clinical
signs to look for in examining their animals. Early recognition of FMD
will be critical to preventing disease spread and limiting the negative
impact on cattle health and performance. One goal of the Secure Beef
Supply Plan for the feeding and packer/processing sectors is to allow
feedlots with cattle with no signs of clinical FMD to be able to
receive a permit to move finished cattle to processing.
Question 5. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the greatest risk,
what does the industry feel is the risk for the use of FMD virus as a
weapon of bioterrorism?
Answer. The beef industry believes that FMD virus could easily be
used by terrorists against this country and would rank the bioterrorism
risk as being the greatest at 10. Although FMD has no real public
health consequences, the virus does carry an extreme potential to
create monumental economic and animal health consequences that could be
devastating to the United States. FMD virus is viewed by USDA as a
Select Agent and it is restricted from being present on the U.S.
mainland. FMD virus is highly contagious among cloven-hoofed livestock
and some wildlife species and able to persist in the environment for
significant periods of time as well as being able to be disseminated
for long distances by wind.
Question 6. Where is the industry with regard to animal
identification and traceability in the event of an FMD outbreak?
Answer. In the feedyard sector of the beef cattle industry, where
the highest concentration and greatest numbers of animals exist in a
single location, there is a good system of animal identification in
place. Cattle 18 months of age and older are moving interstate under
the guidance and movement regulations for animal disease traceability
as outlined in phase 1 of the USDA-APHIS ADT rule. Cattle under 18
months of age will come under phase 2 of the ADT rule when it is
developed and finalized by APHIS.
______
Submitted Letter by Executive Committee, American Association of
Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians
February 19, 2016
Hon. David Rouzer,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign Agriculture,
House Committee on Agriculture,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Congressman Rouzer,
We would like to comment on testimony before your Committee on
Thursday February 11, 2016 regarding Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD). We
fully agree with comments on the importance of the National Veterinary
Stockpile and the urgent need to increase the amount of vaccine for
FMD. Unfortunately, none of the witnesses commented on the importance
of early detection of FMD in minimizing the dissemination and impact of
FMD. Early detection means less spread and less need for vaccine. The
most important and effective tool we have in the United States for the
early detection of FMD and other foreign animal diseases is the
National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN). The NAHLN, composed
of Federal, university, and state veterinary diagnostic laboratories,
is an established surveillance and emergency response system that
provides critical and ongoing resources for laboratory testing,
surveillance, information management including data analysis and
sharing, quality assurance and the development and validation of new
tests. Member labs of the NAHLN receive thousands of samples on a daily
basis and perform early analysis and testing for a variety of animal
diseases and therefore are the most likely point of early
identification if FMD entered the U.S.
In addition to vaccination, another important aspect of FMD control
and recovery will be the need to differentiate animals infected with
natural virus versus those that have been vaccinated. Current serum
based tests cannot make this differentiation. However, there has been
early testing within the NAHLN of methods that will help in
Differentiating Infected versus Vaccinated Animals (DIVA methods). The
full development and validation of these methods will be vital in
recovering from an FMD incursion.
The NAHLN played a critical role during the 2015 Highly Pathogenic
Avian Influenza (HPAI) outbreak that devastated the U.S. poultry
industry. NAHLN laboratories operated 24/7 to test poultry samples
which provided results needed to allow for rapid depopulation of
infected flocks, surveillance testing of samples from surrounding areas
to halt [the] spread of the virus and testing to establish freedom from
disease to allow continuity of business during the outbreak and
repopulation of farms and resumption of trade after the outbreak.
However, in some states the NAHLN was stretched to its maximum and with
HPAI the labs were only testing poultry. With FMD we will be dealing
with an agent that is easily transmitted through the air and which
infects all cloven hoofed livestock--some of which can serve as silent
amplifiers of the virus.
When the NAHLN concept was first developed (2004) it was calculated
that annual Federal funding of $30M would be required to maintain this
surveillance network. The network has never been funded at this level.
The American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians
(AAVLD) has been advocating for full funding of this network for
several years. Authorization for funding of the NAHLN was included in
the 2014 Farm Bill but appropriation of the full amount has not been
forthcoming. More funding for a stronger NAHLN will be critical to the
success of an effective detection and response to introduction of FMD.
Current funding for NAHLN is simply not adequate to assure FMD will be
caught early before it spreads broadly in U.S. livestock and wildlife.
We respectfully request that the Members of your Committee help secure
full funding ($30M) of the NAHLN.
Respectfully,
Executive Committee of the AAVLD
______
Submitted Statement by Kansas Department of Agriculture
The Kansas Department of Agriculture submits the following
statement to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Livestock and Foreign
Agriculture for its February 11, 2016, hearing on foot-and-mouth
disease (FMD) preparedness. This statement, submitted on behalf of
Secretary Jackie McClaskey on February 10, 2016, is for consideration
by the Subcommittee and for inclusion in the printed record of the
hearing.
Introduction
The Kansas Department of Agriculture, the nation's oldest
department of agriculture, is committed to a balanced approach of
serving the entire agricultural industry and providing an environment
that enhances and encourages economic growth, advocating for and
promoting agriculture, while helping ensure a safe food supply and
protecting natural resources, and human and animal health. This is a
charge we take seriously, as agriculture is the largest industry,
employer and economic driver in Kansas, accounting for 43 percent of
the state's total economy and employing 12 percent of the entire
workforce.
Within agriculture, the beef cattle industry is the largest sector,
with 6.25 million head of cattle and calves on ranches and in feedyards
as of January 1, 2016, an increase of six percent from a year ago. In
2014, cattle generated $7.77 billion in cash receipts. Further, our
state's dairy industry has been one of the fastest growing regions in
the nation, and we are ranked tenth in the nation in hog production.
Kansas is also among the nation's top states for red meat production,
processing more than 5 billion pounds of red meat in 2014 for an
estimated value of $9.15 billion. Finally, in addition to being a
leader in raising livestock and processing meat, Kansas, along with our
neighbors in Missouri, is located within the Kansas City Animal Health
Corridor, the single largest concentration of animal health and
nutrition companies in the world. In fact, companies within the Animal
Health Corridor represent 75 percent, or $19 billion, in worldwide
animal health sales.
FAD Preparedness
It is no stretch to say that the health of the Kansas economy is
dependent upon a healthy and thriving livestock industry. As such, the
Kansas Department of Agriculture is committed to working alongside our
partners in the livestock industry and within the Federal Government,
other state agencies and local entities to be as prepared as possible
to respond to animal health emergencies, including foreign animal
diseases like foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). Over the course of the past
15 years, the department has put an increased focus on FAD preparedness
and strives to be the best prepared state in the nation when it comes
to an FAD response.
This is not a goal arrived at overnight. In the aftermath of the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the FMD outbreak in the
United Kingdom, the department, in cooperation with the Kansas Division
of Emergency Management and other state agencies, developed the first
state level food and agriculture response plan, which recognized the
uniqueness of food and agriculture incidents as compared to other
``traditional Emergency Support Function 11 Agriculture and Natural
Resource'' (ESF 11) emergencies.
While an ESF 11 Function incident focuses on response to natural
disasters, the root cause of the emergency in a food and agriculture
incident is food contamination, plant pests and diseases, and livestock
diseases.
At that time, the department also joined with other states to form
the Multi-State Partnership for Security and Agriculture. Between 2001
and 2008, the department added a Homeland Security Specialist to the
Office of the Secretary and worked to provide Incident Command System
(ICS) training for key staff at both the Department of Animal Health
and the Department of Agriculture. The department's plan recognizes
that food and agricultural emergency situations are highly complex,
with jurisdictional issues affecting private industry as well as local,
state and Federal entities, and that most food and agricultural
incidents are interstate issues.
Through our state's work on FAD preparedness, especially in our
efforts working with neighboring states, we know that, from the state's
perspective, we will be on the front lines carrying out the response
plan and that each state's plan must fit their respective industry
needs. There is no doubt that there will be policy challenges, with
regard to specific authorities and actions taken to stop the spread of
FMD or other animal diseases, that will have to be addressed state by
state. However, it is also incumbent upon states to take their FAD
preparedness responsibilities seriously and to do their part.
FAD Exercises
In Kansas, we recognize even the best and most comprehensive
response plan is without use unless that plan is regularly exercised
and practiced. While the words on paper may sound good, if we are not
able to stop the spread of the disease and return to normal business
operations as quickly as possible, we have not accomplished our goal of
providing total support to the industry and protecting animal health.
Further, we also recognize that a response to an FMD outbreak would be
the most challenging, given the highly contagious nature of the
disease, its ability to spread rapidly through susceptible species, and
the complex challenges that could arise with feed and food scenarios as
well as international trade implications. This is why each time the
department exercises our plan, we focus on an FMD response, and we
include as many of our partners outside the department as possible,
including farmers and ranchers, other state agencies, local partners
and the Federal Government.
Beyond the highly complex nature of an FMD response, we also know
that an introduction of FMD in the United States would be economically
devastating to the livestock industry. According to a recent study
published in the Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics about
the economic impact of FMD vaccination strategies, without an emergency
vaccination strategy, producer and consumer losses of an FMD outbreak
in the Midwestern United States would likely approach $188 billion, and
government costs would likely exceed $11 billion. Even with a high-
capacity emergency vaccination strategy together with a large
vaccination zone, producer and consumer losses are projected to reach
$56 billion, and government costs could reach more than $1 billion.
According to Kansas policy, the Animal Health Commissioner has
access to any department staff necessary to response to an animal
disease incident. The Commissioner can assign personnel to the Division
of Animal Health until demobilized by the Commissioner. This is a
policy that has been instrumental in our ability to expand our response
team. Today, more than 70 department staff have attended ICS training
and volunteered to serve on the response team. This is a policy model
that could be replicated in other states to help build a larger
response team that is prepared and trained to implement each state's
plan.
Since 2009, the department has hosted three major, multi-day FMD
response exercises and more than 20 smaller, tabletop-setting or
regional response exercises. The first major exercise was in October
2009, and was focused on movement control at state borders as we know
that this will be one of the most challenging aspects in an FMD
response. This exercise included local government, four Kansas counties
and three Oklahoma counties, seven state-level agencies in both Kansas
and Oklahoma, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the FBI, and industry
association partners and representatives from academia. The goal was to
evaluate each state's plan for a stop movement order and the
communication and coordination issues related to the order, to
determine resource needs, and to achieve consensus from border states
on the most practical and effective method for routing livestock-
related transports during an FMD outbreak. As a direct result of this
exercise, Kansas has worked with our neighboring states to establish
clear plans for which state has authority over checkpoints at each
state and Federal highway that crosses the state line in order to
maximize the use of limited resources.
Between 2009 and the next major exercise in 2013, not only did
Kansas elect a new governor, but the Department of Animal Health merged
with the Kansas Department of Agriculture, and the Kansas Department of
Agriculture moved its headquarters from Topeka to its current location
in Manhattan. During this time, we also developed a 5 year strategic
plan to improve our ability to respond to animal disease emergencies,
with specific goals related to stakeholder engagement, business
continuity, information management, response readiness, traceability
and communications. We also made changes to the response plan based on
learnings in the 2009 exercise regarding the permit management system,
and the delivery and sharing of data information from the border
checkpoints to the Incident Command Post, from the Incident Command
Post to the surveillance branch in a timely fashion, and sharing
information with border states.
The 2013 exercise, also based on an outbreak of FMD where the index
case was in the southeastern United States, was a 2 day exercise with
more than 250 participants and focused on practicing the new permit
management system with specific objectives related to the resource
needs, the development and communication of movement control orders,
the use of phone banks to respond to public inquiries, and more. This
exercise also fell during the 2013 Federal Government shutdown. Rather
than postpone the exercise until that situation was resolved, we
implemented our plan without immediate Federal assistance. While we
learned there will be specific information requests and declaration
requests states will need during an FMD response, we realized we were
able to implement our plan without a lot of Federal personnel
assisting.
In 2014, two regional exercises were held with groups of Kansas
counties and focused in the local response. In December 2015, the
department hosted its largest exercises to date, a 4 day functional FMD
response exercise. Similar to previous exercises, participants included
industry, local emergency responders, multiple state agencies and the
Federal Government. From that exercise, we know that challenges remain
regarding the stop movement of susceptible species. We are currently in
the process of finalizing the after action response plan and
identifying key learnings, including challenges and successes, that
will drive changes and updates to the Kansas response plan. We will
have an opportunity to exercise those changes in December 2016 at our
next scheduled FMD exercises.
Exercises like those we've undertaken in Kansas require time,
financial resources and cooperation among many different stakeholders.
But the lessons we have learned in Kansas from regularly exercising our
plan has resulted in a better plan and has made us better prepared to
implement our response. It has also helped us identify resource,
logistic and policy issues, both intrastate and interstate, that need
resolved.
Resource Challenges
Whether it was during an exercise setting or during the state's
actual response to highly pathogenic avian influenza in spring 2015, a
key challenge we have continually identified is human resources. We
know that there will simply not be enough local, state and Federal
personnel to adequately carry out the response plan. This is a
challenge Kansas is currently working to address.
Multiple states throughout the country and even USDA have
veterinary volunteer response corps, which can be activated to assist
with an animal disease outbreak. It is without doubt that there will be
a need for additional veterinary support, but we also know there will
be a need for case specialists, appraisers, manual laborers,
information technology specialists, communications professionals and
more. We will need assistance with data entry and record management,
behavioral health specialists, and other trained volunteers to
adequately carry out a response. That is why Kansas is working to
develop a Kansas Agricultural Emergency Response Corps, which will
recruit volunteers with key skills and training necessary in a
response. We will provide them with ICS training and education
regarding the Kansas plan. Then, in the event of an animal disease
outbreak, we will activate the volunteer corps to work alongside our
response team to carry out the plan.
Our goal is to begin recruitment and training of Response Corps
volunteers later this year and include them in the December 2016
exercises.
One factor contributing to our ability to continually improve our
FAD preparedness is our effort to secure resources in the form of
grants and cooperative agreements to implement our strategy.
Preparedness itself takes resources and many states have not been as
fortunate as Kansas to find the necessary funding to implement their
own strategies. If the nation is to be prepared for FMD and other
animal diseases, all states must also be prepared. FMD will not stop at
the state line, and if Kansas is prepared but our border states are
not, we will ultimately fail in stopping the spread of FMD and
protecting our states' livestock industries.
FAD Preparedness in Kansas Feeding Sector
Kansas has a robust cattle feeding sector, with more than 2.2
million head of cattle on feed as of January 1, 2016. With the
transient nature of the cattle feeding sector, with multiple loads
arriving and leaving individual yards each day, FMD preparedness at the
feedyard level is critical. The department, in direct collaboration
with our partners in the industry, met with more than 20 individual
feedyards in summer 2015 to identify strengths and challenges related
to FMD preparedness at that level in the industry. Based on those
meetings, we are working not only with our feedyards, but also with
veterinarians who work with feedyards, to provide FMD response planning
resources they can implement.
Additionally, it is our goal to base the December 2016 exercise on
the cattle feeding and dairy sectors.
Conclusion
While the state-level response plan is just one element of FMD
preparedness in the United States, it is and will continue to be a
critical component of an overall response and recovery effort. We
recognize the critical need for a viable FMD vaccination strategy in
the United States and encourage all efforts in that regard. We also
cannot stress enough how important our partners in the livestock
industry have been and continue to be in our state's FAD preparedness
efforts.
Finally, we commend the Livestock [and Foreign Agriculture]
Subcommittee for holding this hearing and we will continue to work
toward improving FAD preparedness efforts in Kansas.
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