[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE FUTURE OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 11, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-153
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
98-605 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio AMI BERA, California
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
Ms. Susan A. Thornton, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East
Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State............ 8
Mr. Randall Schriver, president and chief executive officer,
Project 2049 Institute......................................... 24
Ms. Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia, director of China
Power Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies.. 32
Shelley Rigger, Ph.D., Brown professor and assistant dean for
educational policy, Davidson College........................... 43
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Susan A. Thornton: Prepared statement........................ 10
Mr. Randall Schriver: Prepared statement......................... 27
Ms. Bonnie Glaser: Prepared statement............................ 34
Shelley Rigger, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................ 45
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 56
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 58
THE FUTURE OF U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt
Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. Subcommittee will come to order.
First of all and foremost, my heart goes out to Taiwan as
it deals with the aftermath of the shocking magnitude 6.4
earthquake on February 6th that claimed 63 lives and injured
551, and that was in the city of Tainan, where I lived for 7
months, and I have a really special place in my heart for the
people of Tainan.
I am so saddened to hear about the damage that the
earthquake wreaked and I know I am joined with my colleagues of
the subcommittee in continuing to support Taiwan in this
difficult time.
Today, we celebrate Taiwan's democracy, given its recent
Presidential and parliamentary elections in January. In this
regional context, Taiwan's free and fair elections, vibrant
free market economy and open society have definitely set an
example for the region and for the world.
With the Democratic Progressive Party, DPP, victory, the
party has won its first ever absolute majority in the
Legislative Yuan which until--which has until now been
controlled by the Kuomintang, KMT. President-elect Tsai Ing-wen
will also be Taiwan's first female President and I think that
is pretty exciting.
This third peaceful transfer of executive power is an
indication of the maturation of Taiwan's democracy. The recent
election presents the United States with more opportunities to
improve our political security and economic relationship with
Taiwan.
We are here to parse out the priorities of President-elects
Tsai's administration and understand the prospects and
potential for the U.S., Taiwan and the cross-Strait
relationships and to discuss how the United States can continue
to honor our commitments to Taiwan. I look forward to hearing
from our distinguished witnesses on these important issues.
The cross-Strait relationship has been relatively stable
under the sitting Kuomintang President Ma Ying-jeou. President
Ma took strides to build closer relationships with China,
especially in trade.
To his credit, President Ma negotiated the Economic
Cooperation Framework Agreement, ECFA, with China in 2010 and
this paved the way for Taiwan's expanded trade ties under
similar economic cooperation agreements with New Zealand and
Singapore.
The suspension on the cross-Strait Trade in Services
Agreement, TISA, as a result of domestic protests in 2014 may
have indirectly contributed to China's tightening on further
trade agreements between Taiwan and other countries.
With slow economic development, untapped potential due to
political constraints and heavy reliance on trade, I look
forward to hearing from our distinguished panels, especially
our administration witness, about Taiwan's economic and trade
prospects and how the United States can help Taiwan overcome
some of these challenges.
I also worry about the potential for cross-Strait stability
as China has not hesitated to remind us that it is still
willing to use military force against Taiwan.
Of note, China continues to press President-elect Tsai and
her administration to acknowledge the 1992 consensus, something
President Ma has adhered to.
President-elect Tsai will continue to face pressure here,
given her party's own interpretation of the agreement. Despite
underscoring her intention to maintain the status quo and
saying there won't be provocation and there won't be surprises,
we cannot say the same for China.
A steady stream of threats toward Taiwan's national
security are an everyday reality for Taiwan and its people and
I hope our panelists can shed light on how we can continue to
support Taiwan's security under the Taiwan Relations Act and
through increased cooperation.
I admire outgoing President Ma and all that he was able to
accomplish for Taiwan. I look forward to seeing how we can
continue to work with President Tsai for the mutual benefit of
the United States and Taiwan.
Members of Congress have always shared a strong interest in
supporting Taiwan's security and democracy. Having lived there
for a few years myself while serving a church mission, I am one
of its big supporters--hopefully, its biggest.
At a time when Taiwan's presence in the international arena
is constantly being threatened, at a time when Taiwan's
security is not insured from coercion and potential attacks, I
urge our administration to continue to support Taiwan.
We must prioritize Taiwan's active and meaningful
participation on the global stage, ensure its self-defense
capabilities are sufficient and ensure that its economy
continues to grow vibrantly and compete with other major powers
in the region.
Members present today are going to be permitted to submit
written statements to be included in the official hearing
record.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
5 calendar days to allow for statements, questions and
extraneous material subject to the length limitation in the
rules.
And I am going to recognize Chairman Royce and then Ranking
Member Sherman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Chairman Salmon.
And let me first say on behalf of our members here we have
all visited Tainan and been in Taiwan and our hearts go out to
the people of Taiwan, to the victims of this earthquake. Fifty-
nine perished so far. Hundreds and hundreds have been injured.
There is a great knowledge here in the United States in terms
of how much the Taiwanese go to the rescue with volunteers all
over the world after international incidents whenever an
earthquake or some other disaster hits. We saw how quickly the
authorities, but also how quickly the volunteers, rushed to the
scene to begin to rescue people.
So we have traveled--our committee together since I have
been chairman--has traveled three times down to Taiwan in the
last 3 years. We visited Kaohsiung and we have visited Tainan,
as I mentioned, and Taipei, of course, and we are just
devastated to see the destruction. But the American people
stand by the Taiwanese people in their time of need and we are
ready to assist in any way we can.
Taiwan is one of our most important friends to the U.S. in
the Asia Pacific and I know that supporting Taiwan is a
critical issue for members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. As
chairman, I have made the strengthening of this relationship
with Taiwan one of the committee's top priorities.
I want to again congratulate the people of Taiwan for their
free and fair elections last month. I think the U.S. and Taiwan
share a very important commitment to democracy, to human
rights, to the rule of law and these values, I think, serve as
a bedrock to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. And I think the
election demonstrated the strength and vibrancy of Taiwan's
democracy and their democratic system, hopefully serving as a
model for other countries in the region.
Last year, Chairman Salmon joined me, as I said, in the
delegation where we spent some time in Taipei working to
strengthen the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. We met with the
sitting President, Ma. We met with President-elect, Dr. Tsai
Ing-wen, and as the Taiwan Government changes hands during its
transition period it is important that the U.S. continues to
emphasize its steadfast commitment to Taiwan and that the
players in Taiwan also make responsible decisions that are in
the best interest of the people of Taiwan.
A stable and prosperous Taiwan is, of course, in the best
interests of the United States and that is why I look forward
to working closely with President-elect Tsai's new government
to strengthen all aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan bilateral
relationship. And in particular I have a enthusiasm--I have
long been an advocate for Taiwan's inclusion into the Trans-
Pacific Partnership. Taiwan's economic security is just as
important as its physical security, so its inclusion in the
second round of the agreement will be critical to Taiwan's
stability. I know that Dr. Tsai will be willing to do the work
in Taiwan needed to seriously begin a bilateral investment
agreement with the United States with an eye toward TPP and so
I encourage the administration to work with the new government
to create a pathway for Taiwan to be integrated into these
trade deals.
I am also committed to upholding the letter and spirit of
the Taiwan Relations Act, which has underpinned the
relationship now for 37 years.
Last year, we worked tirelessly to pressure the
administration to finally follow through with the arms sales
that it had promised Taiwan. The sales were finally set in
motion in December but I remain deeply skeptical about the
administration's delays that needlessly drag out the arms sales
process for Taiwan.
So over the next year both the U.S. and Taiwan will be
working on these types of issues, and I thank Chairman Salmon
again--he is among the strongest friends of the Taiwanese
people--and I also thank Congressman Brad Sherman and the other
members of this committee for their engagement on the issue of
Taiwan.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
The chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Chairman, thank you for holding these
hearings. I know we have a classified briefing for the full
committee on the same subject as these hearings and then I know
that we have votes.
So we will have a limited amount of time here in this room.
Our hearts go out to the people of Taiwan and I join with your
statement, the statement of our full committee chair, in
sympathy for the people of Taiwan where this disaster has cost
60 lives.
And as the chairman noted, the people of Taiwan are there
again and again and again when there is a disaster elsewhere in
the world.
While the regime in Beijing is currently engaged in a
concerted effort to restrict human rights, we look only at
Taiwan as a country where democracy flourishes, and we will
once again see the peaceful and democratic transfer of power
from one party to another.
The United States has a strong interest in supporting the
people of Taiwan and those interests are enshrined in the
Taiwan Relations Act, which is an important statement that the
U.S. to resolve that the people of Taiwan will be able to
determine their own fate permanently and peacefully.
The clear message should be that the United States believes
in the power of dialogue and we unequivocally support the right
of the people of Taiwan to determine their own fate.
In that spirit, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for bringing up
the Taiwan Naval Support Act and I thank the administration for
finally delivering the frigging frigates.
While our commitment to our friends in Taiwan should not be
doubted, I was very impressed to meet Dr. Tsai when she was in
opposition on the trip led by Chairman Royce and I am confident
that the people of Taiwan will rejoice when they inaugurate
their first woman President and it is a joy that I look forward
to the American people experiencing just a year later.
And I know the people of Taiwan will enjoy living under a
woman President and I know my constituents look forward to that
joy as well.
I look forward to hearing how we can help diversify the
economy of Taiwan so it is less reliant on and dependent on and
subject to manipulation by the People's Republic of China.
I support Taiwan joining TPP if that is what the people of
China want--the people of Taiwan want. What I don't support is
the United States joining TPP, and I will point out that every
candidate for President that is able to get more than 3 percent
of the vote has taken a stance against TPP because they know
that the American people wouldn't dream of seriously
considering a candidate that supported this trade pact which
will hurt the American people so significantly while helping
the People's Republic of China establish that the rules of
trade for the world are that currency manipulation is, as my
people say, kosher.
It is a tremendous negotiating victory for the People's
Republic of China to enshrine in the rules of the road that
their practices of currency manipulation are to be sacrosanct,
not to mention the fact that the rules of origin are of such
tremendous assistance to the People's Republic of China.
Taiwan could play a useful and larger role in international
organizations, sharing its expertise, sharing its experience.
The United States needs to continue to advocate broader
participation for in Taiwan international organizations,
whether it be those organizations like Interpol, that keep us
safe from dangerous criminals, and that's why I have
cosponsored legislation to direct the President to develop a
strategy to obtain observer status at least for Taiwan and
Interpol.
Similarly, I have advocated Taiwan's participation in other
international organizations. There is no reason why the fine
points of international sovereignty should get involved in the
practicality of Taiwan's membership in WHO.
Even the People's Republic of China has it in their
interest to stop criminals and stop disease and the practical
way to do that is to involve Taiwan to the maximum extent in
the international organizations that are focused on human
health and international crime.
So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses here in
this open setting and to then adjourning for the classified
briefing.
And I don't know if anyone else on our side has an opening
statement. But I hope the chairman would indulge at least one
member on our side.
Mr. Salmon. Sure. I think Mr. Chabot has an opening
statement.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important hearing. Considering the recent
elections in Taiwan, I want to commend the subcommittee for
calling this hearing.
I met with President-elect Tsai several times in the past,
both here and in Taiwan, and I congratulate her and the people
of Taiwan for their continued support of democracy.
And I want to say that I agree with my colleague, Mr.
Sherman, which sometimes we agree and sometimes we don't, but I
certainly agree with his sentiment about how wonderful it is
that Taiwan has its first woman President.
As far as here in the U.S., I also share the sentiment of
having the first woman President sworn in next year except that
unfortunately----
Mr. Connolly. Here in the United States?
Mr. Chabot [continuing]. Because of New Hampshire Tuesday
evening Carly Fiorina already dropped out. But in any event----
Mr. Sherman. Hence, there is only one way to achieve the
goal that you and I both have for the United States.
Mr. Chabot. And we may both have them this year. You never
know.
Mr. Connolly. Gee, Mr. Chairman, I was just about to give
Mr. Chabot a big hug.
Mr. Chabot. There you go.
Mr. Salmon. Yeah. He was talking about a brokered
convention. I'm sorry.
Mr. Chabot. But getting back to Taiwan, I would like to
quickly address the restrictions on high-level visits by high-
ranking Taiwanese officials, something that I have always felt
was both insulting and counterproductive.
Years ago, I joined a number of my colleagues and we flew
to New York City one evening to meet--after votes here to meet
with then President Chen, who is a great friend of America.
We had to travel to New York because President Chen was not
allowed to enter Washington, DC. This is U.S. policy, our own
self-imposed restrictions, and I have long said that this
policy is nonsense and should be changed.
In fact, then Foreign Minister Mark Chen when he was in the
legislature I had met with him in Washington. He was appointed
foreign minister and a few weeks later when we were going to
get together I had to drive to Baltimore to meet with him there
because he wasn't allowed--since he was one of the four top
officials wasn't allowed to meet here in Washington, DC. That
is outrageous. It is an insult to Taiwan and the United States
should change this immediately.
I also urge the administration to have direct dialogue with
the democratically-elected President of Taiwan and, as you all
know, international diplomacy face-to-face meetings are an
important component in ensuring a sustainable relationship.
And finally, I would like to note that I introduced H. Con.
Res. 88 last fall. This legislation reaffirms that Taiwan
Relations Act and the six assurances together form the
cornerstone of U.S. relations with Taiwan. I would urge my
colleagues to join in that support.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just real briefly, as a member of the committee and
subcommittee and also as the co-chair of the Taiwan caucus,
this is a very important hearing and events in the Strait are
also very important.
We all can celebrate free and democratic elections that led
to the change in government from one party to another and with
the first female President of Taiwan, both welcome
developments, and to watch the free transfer of power is a very
powerful model in the region, one we hope will evolve and be
replicated.
I agree with Mr. Chabot that the cornerstone of our
relationship is the Taiwan Relations Act and the six assurances
and that act includes interalia, a defensive military support
posture on the part of the United States, to ensure that peace
prevails in the Taiwan Straits and that whatever the evolution
politically it will be a peaceful one, not any other kind of
kinetic option.
So these are important hearings. Lots of changes going on
including, tragically, the earthquake in Tainan and the loss of
life there, and I am happy to be here and joining in these
hearings.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and our ranking member, Mr.
Sherman, for holding them.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Ms. Meng.
Ms. Meng. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, to our Ranking Member
Sherman and all our distinguished witnesses who are here today.
Thank you for attending this important hearing.
Before I go forward with my remarks, I also want to take a
moment to acknowledge the earthquake in Taiwan this past
Saturday.
It was a terrible tragedy and I know people, not just in
Taiwan and around the world, but my constituents in New York
are very concerned as well.
I know that rescue efforts are ongoing and I too want to
thank all the volunteers and people who have come forward to
help.
Both my colleagues and I will be keeping a close eye on the
progress.
The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the future of
U.S.-Taiwan relations, particularly in light of the January
16th Presidential elections, and I too want to extend my
congratulations to Dr. Tsai as the first female President in
Taiwan.
I congratulate the people of Taiwan for their steadfast
adherence to democracy and I look forward to improving our
robust relationship.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Mr. Bera, if you would like to make a quick
opening statement. You good?
Mr. Lowenthal, did you want to make a quick statement?
Mr. Lowenthal. I concur. First, I thank you for being here.
You know, and I also want to extend my condolences to the
families of all those that were killed and injured by the
earthquake. I want to congratulate the people of Taiwan on the
successful elections.
It is a welcome example of democracy in a region that at
the same time has seen a great backsliding on human rights.
That is not true in terms of Taiwan.
We have seen the gradual improvement in the relationships
between the cross-Strait relations.
I think it is beneficial for the security of all to have
that stability and I look forward to the hearing today. Thank
you, and I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much.
We are going to go ahead and introduce our first panelist.
Thank you so much for being here today, Ms. Thornton.
We are pleased to have Ms. Susan Thornton here today,
deputy assistant secretary of state in the State Department's
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. And we would like to
have you give your opening statement and have some questions
and then we will excuse you and we will seat the next panel.
You understand the lighting system. Not real complicated.
When it goes amber you got a minute and when it goes red, most
of the time people keep talking around here, but you should
stop.
Thank you. Ms. Thornton.
STATEMENT OF MS. SUSAN A. THORNTON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of
the subcommittee for having me here today and giving me the
opportunity to discuss our very strong relationship with
Taiwan.
The story of Taiwan is, of course, an impressive one.
People on Taiwan have built a prosperous, free and orderly
society with strong institutions worthy of emulation and envy.
And before I go any further, I would also like to offer my
sincere condolences to everyone in Taiwan that was affected by
the recent earthquake, especially the families of those who
were injured or lost their lives. The American people stand
with the people on Taiwan during this difficult time.
Last month's free and fair elections were yet another
victory for Taiwan's vibrant democracy. These elections not
only represent Taiwan's third peaceful transition of
Presidential power and the first transfer of power in its
legislature but, as has been already remarked, will also lead
to the inauguration of Taiwan's first female President.
In this administration we have worked to strengthen and
deepen the bonds between the people of the United States and
Taiwan to build a comprehensive, durable and mutually
beneficial partnership.
As one of Taiwan's strongest partners, we are working side
by side to increase our mutual economic prosperity, tackle
global challenges and ensure effective security to support
continued stability and dynamism for Taiwan and the region.
On trade issues, Taiwan has developed a well-earned
reputation for having a diversified economy that has built its
prosperity on the openness of the global trade system.
Taiwan has grown to become our ninth largest trading
partner and our seventh largest destination for agricultural
exports.
In 2015, our two-way trade in goods with Taiwan reached $66
billion, up 4\1/2\ percent in just the last 2 years. The United
States has also moved up to be Taiwan's second largest trading
partner in the last year.
Aside from these big business links, people-to-people ties
between the United States and Taiwan also continue to grow.
Travel for business and pleasure from Taiwan to the United
States jumped 35 percent in 2013 alone after Taiwan became a
member of the U.S. visa waiver program in November 2012.
The United States remains committed to supporting Taiwan's
confidence and dignity through increased participation in the
international community and enhanced security.
We continue to support Taiwan's membership in organizations
that do not require statehood and to urge meaningful
participation in those that do.
At a time when pressure to squeeze Taiwan out of
international organizations is growing, we are finding new ways
for Taiwan to earn the dignity and respect that its
contributions to global challenges merit.
These include new innovations such as the establishment of
our Global Cooperation and Training Framework. The GCTF is a
vehicle for the United States to help showcase Taiwan's
strengths and expertise by making it a hub for helping other
countries to address global and regional concerns.
At the same time, we remain just as committed to Taiwan's
meaningful participation in organizations like Interpol, ICAO,
WHO and the U.N. climate framework.
We will continue to match Taiwan's growing capacity to
serve the international community with equally innovative
approaches to enabling and highlighting Taiwan's contributions.
On the security front, the United States makes available to
Taiwan defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense which is consistent with our
responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act.
During the Obama administration, we have notified Congress
of over $14 billion in arms sales to Taiwan including a sale of
$1.83 billion that was notified in December of last year.
Our efforts at supporting Taiwan's self-defense
capabilities extend beyond arms sales, however. We also support
Taiwan's capacity-building efforts through visits, maintenance
programs, and exchanges.
Due in part to these stepped-up contacts and strong U.S.
partnership, Taipei has gained more confidence in its
engagements with Beijing.
In recent years, the two sides have pursued constructive
dialogue to reach agreements on economic and people-to-people
exchanges that promote peace and stability across the Taiwan
Strait.
Last year in November, we welcomed the meeting between
leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the historic
improvement in cross-Strait relations that it symbolized.
The United States remains committed to our one-China policy
based on the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations
Act, a policy that has remained consistent over several decades
and many administrations.
We will continue to call on both sides of the Strait to
engage in dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect after
Taiwan's new administration takes office in May.
In conclusion, we have developed a vital partnership with
Taiwan that is filled with many opportunities for cooperation
in the future.
We are committed to ensuring that this relationship will
continue to thrive as we find new ways to deepen our unofficial
ties.
The innovative spirit, democratic dynamism and courageous
vision of the people on Taiwan make us proud to be their friend
and partner.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I would like
to thank you again for inviting me here today and I'm happy to
answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Thornton follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Ms. Thornton.
Regarding the recent earthquake, what kind of assistance
are we planning to offer them as they look to find missing
people or rebuild?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that
question.
We have already in the process of last weekend's earthquake
received a declaration of the disaster from the authorities on
Taiwan and have responded to that with a contribution that we
are making through the Taiwan Red Cross that will go to help
the families of those affected by the earthquake.
We have also had a member of our Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance regional team fly to Tainan to inspect the work that
was ongoing and to keep coordination with people in the Taiwan
authorities to see if there is any additional assistance that
would be needed.
So far, the judgment has been made that the Taiwan rescue
authorities are fully capable of conducting the onsite rescue.
But we are maintaining close contact with them.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
In your opening statement at the close, you were
reaffirming our commitment to the one-China policy as spelled
out in the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act and I
really appreciate that. I think that is valuable.
Let me just quote--right after Secretary of State John
Kerry had his first meeting with his Chinese counterpart, the
Foreign Minister, after the elections he said this to
reporters:
``Let me just say with respect to one of the issues
that the Foreign Minister raised on Taiwan that since
they just had an election and a new party has won, the
United States does reaffirm the three communiques,
which have been the basis of our policy, we remain
committed to a one-China policy but we encourage cross-
Strait dialogue for resolution of that issue.''
Now, in his comments he didn't mention the Taiwan Relations
Act, that our one-China policy is not just based on the three
communiques but also the Taiwan Relations Act.
As you aptly pointed out, the Taiwan Relations Act states
that it is U.S. policy to consider any effort to determine the
future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to peace
and security of the Western Pacific area and a grave concern to
the United States.
How significant, if at all, do you consider the omission to
have been and what if any are the implications?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would say that Secretary Kerry, in speaking at the press
conference, if he omitted the mention of the Taiwan Relations
Act in that construct it was certainly unintentional.
We, as a matter of constant practice when we are describing
our one-China policy, always try to pair the adherence to the
three joint communiques with our strong commitment to the
Taiwan Relations Act as a cornerstone of our policy and as,
really, the framework within which we conduct our unofficial
relationship with Taiwan.
Of course, it also provides for the establishment of the
American Institute in Taiwan, which provides for a cadre of
experts both in Taiwan and here in Washington, to pursue this
relationship with a laser focus on trying to expand our
cooperation.
So I want to assure you that Secretary Kerry's omission, if
it happened, was completely inadvertent. We have seen President
Obama, standing next to President Xi at least twice since I've
been in this job at a press conference, mention the Taiwan
Relations Act. So I know that it is firmly, you know, part of
our----
Mr. Salmon. And we wanted to give you the opportunity to
make sure that that was part of the package, that that is a
strong commitment and that is a strong part of our policy.
After President Tsai got elected, she said that maintaining
the status quo is her commitment to the people of Taiwan
regarding the cross-Strait relations and the international
community and there won't be provocation and there won't be
surprises.
Meanwhile, directly after the election, China broadcast
images of archived live-fired military drills. How confident
are you, if at all, that the DPP and the Chinese leadership
have workable communication channels that might help them avoid
misunderstandings and manage the tensions?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much for that very important
question.
As you know, in the lead-up to the elections, the United
States hosted both of the major Presidential candidates. And in
that respect we were able to have a very good conversation with
Dr. Tsai about her plans for her administration, about her
positions on things like cross-Strait negotiations. And she
reaffirmed for us that she is committed to continuing the
status quo, that she understands the obligation to continue to
pursue a policy that will enable cross-Strait peace and
stability and that she intends to work with the authorities in
Beijing to try to continue in the manner under which President
Ma Ying-jeou has managed to pursue cross-Strait relations.
We also have been, of course, in touch with Chinese
officials. As you noted, Secretary Kerry was there just
recently meeting with the Foreign Minister and also with
President Xi Jinping.
The week before that Deputy Secretary Tony Blinken was also
in China meeting with his counterparts and we had a chance in
those discussions also to make our very strong desire to see a
continuation of cross-Strait stability but also cross-Strait
exchanges continue.
We, in those exchanges, counselled restraint, creativity,
flexibility in working with the new administration in Taiwan to
come up with a basis upon which to continue those negotiations.
And they indicated that they were looking to see what Dr.
Tsai was going to propose in that regard. So I am hopeful that
they will be able to come up with such a basis for continuing
these exchanges.
I think there is a will on both sides to do so.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. With the notable exception of our own State
Department, every foreign ministry I have talked to--almost
everyone--has said that their number-one goal is trade and
exports.
And we have a persistent double digit in billions trade
deficit with Taiwan. What has the State Department done? What
have you personally done to create a circumstance where we are
running a trade surplus with Taiwan, at least one that will--a
surplus for enough years to the--so that our trade relationship
this century will be at a balance?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much, Mr. Congressman, for
that question.
And I hope that the State Department has not left you with
the misimpression that we are not serious about promoting
trade.
Mr. Sherman. I will relate to you something that happened
in this subcommittee.
The person who--I now mention his name to you privately--
probably is the most respected Assistant Ambassador we have had
in Asia sat there and said that when he was the Ambassador to
South Korea he helped America by putting out on the lawn, and
he listed a number of cars that he thought were made in
America, and one of the cars he was promoting was 99 percent
made in Germany. It had an American nameplate on it.
So and this was someone who hadn't made a stupid mistake in
20 years. Anybody who actually cared about promoting our
exports would know whether the car they were trying to get
South Koreans to buy was built in America or just labelled in
America.
But when you don't care, you know, things fall through the
cracks. So yes, indeed, I have a belief that the State--So what
have you done, when are we going to get a trade surplus with
Taiwan?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you. Having many years ago worked on
auto negotiations with the South Koreans I can well appreciate
where you are coming from. But turning to Taiwan, one of the--I
mean, I talked a bit in my opening statement about our focus
with Taiwan on expanding our economic ties. We work with
Taiwan----
Mr. Sherman. Yes. We will point out almost always when I
talk about the State Department of economic ties, they are
more--they are as interested in creating more imports as more
exports and I have had State Department officials testify that
the trade deficit isn't a problem for American families and
that in fact expanding imports is just as wonderful as
expanding exports. So please don't talk about trade ties. Talk
about exports.
Ms. Thornton. Okay. I mean, the other thing that the
Taiwans have been doing in recent years that we have seen is
significant inbound-to-the-United-States investment, creating a
lot of U.S. jobs here by building manufacturing plants, by
creating ties with technology companies in California, et
cetera.
But we work on expanding access--market access for U.S.
exports to Taiwan through our Trade and Investment Framework
Agreement with Taiwan. This is ongoing intensive dialogue that
we have to try to----
Mr. Sherman. So we have this intensive dialogue but we're
failing every year. Every year we run a trade deficit. Do you
know why we are failing? Do you think of it as failure? Or is
it success to run a trade deficit?
Ms. Thornton. No. I mean, this is a constant ongoing
problem that we're working on. We are working every year to try
to break down additional barriers.
We are working on--for example, this last round in October
that Deputy USTR Holleyman led in Taiwan we made some progress
on IPR issues that had been posing market barriers to some U.S.
exports. We made some progress on pharmaceutical market access
on financial services access, so----
Mr. Sherman. I am going to reclaim my time. I mean, we are
working hard. We are making progress. We are failing every year
and we do not have a target date that you can reveal as to when
we will reach a trade balance. We will continue to work hard.
We will continue to fail.
What additional weapons assistance has Taiwan requested an
opportunity to buy in the United States? This is both in the
interest of preserving the rights of the Taiwanese people.
I know it is juxtaposed with my question about a trade
deficit. Doesn't hurt there either. What have they asked for
that we have not green lighted yet?
Ms. Thornton. Yes, thank you very much for that question.
Mr. Sherman. Including what they have asked for informally
and you have told them not to ask for formally.
Ms. Thornton. As I mentioned in my statement, we have sold
over $14 billion worth of arms to Taiwan in this administration
to date.
We are, of course, making available to Taiwan those
articles that are necessary for its self-defense. So we do that
in closed consultation with the Taiwanese themselves. And try
to base proposals for sales and requests on things----
Mr. Sherman. I know all that. Can you answer the question?
What are they asking for formally or informally?
Ms. Thornton. Well, we don't comment actually--yeah, I
mean, I can't really comment on ongoing----
Mr. Sherman. Will the classified briefing tell me this or
will the process of not letting me know be consistent both
for----
Ms. Thornton. I would be happy try to address in more
detail in the classified meeting but we don't generally talk
about things that are under----
Mr. Sherman. Okay. But how are we doing on the F-16s, the
mine sweepers? I believe my time has expired. But those are
the--I got an answer from my staff. I hope to get an answer
from you. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Mr. Royce--Chairman Royce.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, one of the issues that I have become concerned
about over time is this issue of the lack of regularity or
consistency in the discussions between U.S. and Taiwan on the
Taiwan Relations Act requirements to provide for the articles
for Taiwan's defense needs. I head the legislation to reaffirm
the act that passed the House and transferred the four guided
missile frigates to Taiwan and I have been down on some of
those frigates, one of them, to see it outfitted and so we are
moving forward. But there isn't any consistency to this
dialogue, and under the act I would interpret it as sort of
requiring that. So I would urge the administration to look at
that. But there are a couple aspects of this. When you look at
cyber attacks, no country is more targeted than Taiwan and so
there is an area also where the United States, I think, has a
certain responsibility to assist in helping Taiwan deter these
cyber attacks.
I just give you an opportunity to comment on that, if you
want. And then I know on the discussion to support Taiwan's
indigenous submarine program with the Navy, is there a plan to
allow the U.S. Navy and defense industries here to support
Taiwan's indigenous program there?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I guess what I would mention with regard to the ongoing
conversations in the defense area, I mean, we have more than
doubled the number of sort of working level contacts that we
have with Taiwan in this space.
We also have, under the Obama administration and, you know,
which is coincident, of course, with the administration of Ma
Ying-jeou in Taiwan we have also increased markedly the number
of high-level exchanges that we've had back and forth. And on
the defense sector in particular, I think I would prefer to
respond to your questions in detail in the closed session.
But let me assure you that we are working with Taiwan very
closely on all of the issues that you raise.
Mr. Royce. And the F-16 issue that Mr. Sherman also raised,
I think, is also of concern.
One of the objectives that I think we have all had who have
looked at Taiwan's economic strength is that its inclusion in
TPP would allow Taiwan greater diversification in terms of its
exports of Kaohsiung and Tainan. You know, you see what they
produce and also would allow for greater imports around the
Pacific Rim and also, obviously, if Taiwan gets a seat at the
table for the second round you could also help Taiwan protect
its long-term interests should we do a trans-Atlantic agreement
with Europe because then it could be folded in eventually, if
it's folded into the Pacific Rim.
I assume the long-term goal here, as I understand it, is an
agreement with very high standards and a high standard
agreement serves the interest of the United States. There are
really two different competing theories on liberalized trade.
One theory--for those who believe in trade--one theory is
that you will try to drive policies of free trade and no
standards. The United States doesn't benefit under that.
We benefit under the rule of law, the establishment of the
rule of law. And in Taipei also, Taiwan is advantaged by high
standard agreement.
Increasingly, as we travel--and I think we've had four
trips of our delegation to Asia in the last 3 years--we hear
this feedback across southeast Asia and east Asia that, you
know, somebody needs to be pushing this concept to very high
standards on intellectual property protections and all the
indigenous innovation, all these issues that we're mutually
concerned about and that the Europeans are also concerned
about.
And if we get a major trans-Atlantic and Pacific Rim
agreement we will have the ability to enforce that.
But if Taiwan doesn't have that seat at the table and
doesn't get to diversify its imports and exports, then I think
this would be problematic. That is why I keep encouraging our
administration and the government to move forward on getting
the base bilateral investment agreement done.
How do things look on that front?
Ms. Thornton. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We do know, of course, that Taiwan has expressed interest
in joining high standards trade agreements, regional agreements
in part because it is so good at enforcing and holds itself up
to a high rule of law standards, also because of the concern
that they have about diversification of their economy, wanting
to ensure that they are integrated into the region and also
that they expand their network of trading partners so they
don't become overdependent on one particular trading partner,
and we certainly support that objective, generally, that
strategic objective that they have.
As far as sort of our working with them, what we have said
is that we want to work with them to get them ready to exceed
to a high standard trade and investment agreement in the future
and that is what we have been doing for the Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement is they have already recognized
that they have certain structural changes that they need to
make in order to move in that direction. And we have told them
that we will be happy to help them with that first by working
on some of the structural and market access barriers that they
already have that are going to be an impediment to them joining
these high standards trade agreements, and then further down
the road helping them to prepare for that.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Ms. Thornton.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me begin by besides welcoming you, Ms. Thornton,
agreeing with Chairman Royce. We need a high standard
liberalized trade regime and I would add, and I know the
chairman would agree, three more words--enforceable and
enforced--because only then is free trade credible here at home
and abroad.
But in my view, there is no question that our helping to
set those high standards is far preferable to the alternative
in the Trans-Pacific Region and I certainly look forward to
supporting the agreement.
Taiwan, Ms. Thornton, should it be--if it asks should it be
incarnated into the TPP? What is the U.S. position? Could you
speak into the mic a little?
Ms. Thornton. Yes. So, I mean, our position has been to
welcome Taiwan's interest in the TPP and, as I mentioned in
response to the chairman's question, to let them know that they
have a number of things that they need to do to prepare and get
ready to accede to a high standards trade agreement and that we
are willing to work with them on sort of moving ahead on
reforms that they need to make in order to be ready and make
themselves an attractive partner for other members in those
high standards----
Mr. Connolly. But what I hear you saying is, given its
status, the U.S. position is not to exclude its potential
membership in the TPP.
Ms. Thornton. That is not our position, correct.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. You would agree that the Taiwan
Relations Act of 1979 codifies the relationship with Taiwan
post recognition of China and included in that codification is
a defensive military support framework, correct?
U.S. is committed to providing defensive military support,
correct?
Ms. Thornton. Well, there is--I mean, it is very clear in
the TRA but yes, we are committed to providing defensive
articles to maintain Taiwan's self defense.
Mr. Connolly. Now, Taiwan has requested, among other items,
mine sweeping capability, F-16 combat aircraft, diesel
submarines and frigates, which we are providing.
How long ago did Taiwan make those defensive military
requests to the United States Government?
Ms. Thornton. I am going to have to defer, I think, this to
the closed session. I am sorry.
Mr. Connolly. No, it is a matter of public record, Ms.
Thornton. It is not a matter of closed anything.
When, for the record, did Taiwan ask for those--that
equipment? There's nothing classified about it. Been in the
newspapers. And by the way, that hearing has been cancelled so
you can't--I'm not going to let you do that. I mean, I wouldn't
ask you a classified question. It's not classified. Matter of
public record.
Ms. Thornton. There are stories in the media about things
that Taiwan desires to procure from the United States but as
far as----
Mr. Connolly. The question was when did they first request
these equipment--this equipment.
Ms. Thornton. To my knowledge, some of these things have
not been requested formally.
Mr. Connolly. Evasive, Ms. Thornton. Did Taiwan--let's pick
one. How long ago did Taiwan--because we do know this one--ask
for diesel submarines?
Could the clock--Mr. Chairman, could I just ask the
indulgence of the chair while apparently the witnesses have to
consult?
Ms. Thornton. So yes, my assist from the rear says that we
announced in April 2001 that we were going to cooperate with
Taiwan on developing a plan for diesel submarines.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Okay. Fifteen years ago. Why has
it taken 15 years to adjudicate that request, one way or the
other? Kind of a long time, wouldn't you think?
Ms. Thornton. It is a long time and we've been working on
it for 15 years and we're continuing to work on it today.
Mr. Connolly. Oh, well. We're all reassured, Ms. Thornton.
Well, let me just say for Members of Congress I think on
both sides of the aisle it does raise questions about who's
making U.S. policy and who's writing the answers to legitimate
defensive military requests from the Government of Taiwan
pursuant to a statute that you yourself just acknowledged does
indeed undergird the relationship.
And included in that statute is a codification of our
support for defensive military equipment to ensure that
whatever the ultimate resolution is in the Taiwan Strait is a
peaceful one and I think you--would you not agree that a 15-
year wait for any answer on any item on that list seems to be
an awfully long time?
Ms. Thornton. I certainly agree that it's a long time but
I'll just say that it is complicated and that I could go into
more detail in the closed session if we ever have that
opportunity.
Mr. Connolly. I appreciate that. But we do understand this
complication but, you know, the king of Siam used to say it's a
puzzlement. But 15 years--my goodness.
Okay. Final question, if I may, Mr. Chairman. What is the
U.S. position with respect to Taiwan joining, being accepted
into international organizations? Do we support that bid?
Ms. Thornton. Yes. We support Taiwan's membership in
international organizations where statehood is not a
requirement for membership and we support their active
participation in organizations where they do require statehood
for membership.
Mr. Connolly. Do we support Taiwan's bid to be a member of
Interpol?
Ms. Thornton. We support Taiwan's active participation in
Interpol and we have been working on that.
Mr. Connolly. Status to be determined?
Ms. Thornton. Yeah. I mean--yeah.
Mr. Connolly. Okay. Got it. Because obviously that's one
that's very practical irrespective of status and we want more
cooperation.
Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time.
Mr. Salmon. Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Thornton, let me follow up on my colleague from the
Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, on the submarine and
defense issues in general.
As a former chairman of this committee and as one of the
cofounders of congressional Taiwan caucus and a long time
friend of Taiwan, my recollection is with respect to the
submarines in particular.
One of the problems is nobody makes diesel submarines any
more, that we know. I think there was some talk about maybe the
French could still do it but that was one of the problems, you
know, with nuclear submarines.
But in order--because of the expense, the fact that you
don't necessarily need nuclear submarines in that part of the
world, et cetera, that diesel--in fact, I saw the--I guess they
have a World War II era submarine out there.
I think it was down at the naval base in Kaohsiung, I
believe is where I saw that--I've seen a few nodding of heads
in the audience with folks who know a lot more out this than I
do.
But in any event, I know that was one of the problems. But
here is my question to you about this whole thing. You know,
the planes and the anti-missile system and the submarines,
improving the defensive abilities of Taiwan in case the PRC did
decide to get even more belligerent and hostile than they have
been over the last couple of decades, it's critical that Taiwan
does strengthen their military and their defenses.
But one of the problems--you know, we had a hard time
getting this stuff through here but when we finally did we ran
into a roadblock with Taiwan because even though you had a DPP
President, President Chen Shui-bian, who wanted to move ahead
with this, you've had KMT who has controlled the legislature,
you know, since martial law, I believe.
Is that correct? And Speaker Wong, I think, would try to
get it through the legislature and just couldn't get it. When
we weren't willing to act, you know, they wanted it and when we
finally got around to doing it then they couldn't get it
through there, and I'm seeing some nods from some of your
assistant folks here too.
So is that one of the issues that we face? And then I guess
the real question is this. We just had a pretty important
election in Taiwan recently and the DPP now is not only going
to have the presidency but they're also going to control the
Legislative Yuan for the first time ever.
So is there maybe some light at the end of the tunnel in
actually getting this defense that Taiwan so desperately needs
and actually make it happen? Do you want to comment on it?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you. Yeah, no, no. That's an excellent
comment and thank you for the question.
You know, we certainly work very closely with the Taiwan
side to make sure that the capabilities that we're providing
are augmenting its asymmetric and innovative security approach.
And so within that we have to look at different systems and
see which things are going to make the most sense for what
Taiwan needs.
It is true that the expenditures that they have to dedicate
to these capabilities do, you know, have to be factored in on
the Taiwan side and I'll just note that, you know, $14 billion
in arms sales over the last several years is a considerable
amount to absorb and to, you know, to fund through their
defense budget.
Of course, Taiwan has also recently gone to an all-
volunteer force, which has also expanded its personnel costs
and caused it to need to do some restructuring of its budget
so----
Mr. Chabot. If I could cut you off there for just a minute.
I have only got 1 minute left. I had two more things I wanted
to ask you real quickly. If I could get a quick response.
Can you think of any other countries that we deal with that
we bar their top four leaders from coming to our capital,
Washington, DC?
Ms. Thornton. I am not sure. But I just want to point out
on that note that we have actually--you know, we have
Presidential transits for the safety, dignity, comfort and
security of the traveler. We had the Vice----
Mr. Chabot. Right. They can go to--they can go to San
Francisco, they can go to New York.
Ms. Thornton [continuing]. Vice Premier in California
earlier this year.
Mr. Chabot. President Tsai isn't going to be able to come
here to Washington, DC, unless we change our policy. Is that
correct?
Ms. Thornton. That has been the policy.
Mr. Chabot. We ought to change our policy.
And then finally, I got 10 seconds left. President Chen
Shui-bian was finally released about a year ago on medical
parole. How is he doing?
Ms. Thornton. As far as I understand, he's doing well and
he's still on medical parole as far as I know.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. I yield back my time.
Ms. Meng. Ms. Thornton, there is a sense that part of the
momentum toward President-elect Tsai's election was a response
to a slowing of Taiwan's economy, particularly with exports and
imports.
President-elect Tsai has specifically mentioned plans to
have a closer economic relationship with the United States.
However, U.S. businesses in Taiwan report facing inadequate
or outdated laws, government bureaucracy, inconsistent
regulatory interpretations and a lack of regulatory
transparency, et cetera, as barriers to further economic
development.
What is your sense of the political will of President-elect
Tsai and the newly-elected DPP majority in the Legislative Yuan
to address these issues directly?
Ms. Thornton. Thank you very much for that question.
In our conversations with Dr. Tsai and with her team, it is
my sense that this is an area that she is very well aware of
that is inhibiting Taiwan's economic potential and that she is
looking to move as a priority once she takes office to try to
address.
And we have been very keen to work with her under--in the
new administration, again, through our Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement process which her team is well aware of and
has been briefed on to try to move forward on some of the
intractable market access barriers that we've seen in Taiwan
and also some of these regulatory problems that do create a lot
of constraints for our businesses and our potential investors.
Ms. Meng. And my second question on a different topic, our
relation to the South China Sea. How do recent reports of
possible joint naval patrols by the U.S. and India in the South
China Sea work into the U.S.'s priority to de-escalate tensions
there?
Ms. Thornton. Yes. I can't really comment on the story
about the joint patrols between the U.S. and India. As far as I
am aware, there is no concrete plan in that regard.
But certainly the U.S. policy for the South China Sea is to
call on all of the claimants and regional players to try to
reduce tensions, to preserve freedom of navigation and
overflight and to try to resolve disputes peacefully and
conduct themselves in accordance with the rule of law.
And I don't--so I don't think that there's a--I mean, our
presence in that part of the world has been longstanding. It's
a part of our security presence in that region, which has
helped maintain peace and stability in Asia for--ever since the
second--end of the second World War and I think we don't see
any problem with patrols or other things that are in keeping
with freedom of flight and freedom of navigation.
Ms. Meng. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Ms. Meng.
That will conclude the first panel.
We will have the second panel be seated. I just also wanted
to say that we are trying to reschedule the classified briefing
because we are going to have votes called in about 15 minutes.
We might just get through the testimony of the second panel
when we get called for votes. But thank you so much, Ms.
Thornton, for coming and thank you for all your attention. So
we'll seat the next panel now.
I think we'll go ahead and move on with introductions. I
know we're kind of clearing the room out but we want to make
sure we get your testimony before we have to go vote.
We are really pleased to be joined today by three excellent
panelists. First, Mr. Randall Schriver, president and CEO of
the Project 2049 Institute; Ms. Bonnie Glaser, good to see you
again, senior advisor for Asia and director of the China Power
Project and Center for Strategic and International Studies; and
Dr. Shelley Rigger, Davidson University's political science
department.
We are really grateful for these witnesses joining us today
to lend their expertise and we'll start with you, Mr. Schriver.
STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL SCHRIVER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much appreciate
the invitation and I appreciate being seated alongside Dr.
Rigger and Ms. Glaser, who I have enormous respect for as well.
I want to join others who express condolences and thoughts
and prayers. Certainly, it's a difficult time and we wish them
well in the recovery efforts.
It's a very timely hearing, as has been noted, due to the
recent election and I think it's appropriate that we
acknowledge the significance of this event.
It's a young democracy. They are under tremendous pressure.
So just carrying out a free and fair election is something
worthy of our praise.
In your instructions you asked me to speak specifically
about economic and trade issues, which I will do. Before doing
that I think it's also appropriate to note President Ma and the
fact that he's coming to the end of his tenure.
He's been a great friend of the United States, has done a
terrific job promoting peace and stability in the region, I
think often not given credit for his South China Sea peace
initiative--the East China Sea peace initiative.
So as we move into a new administration we should reflect
on his accomplishments. Dr. Tsai is somebody who's very
experienced on trade matters. She herself has been a trade
negotiator and I think she campaigned on economic reform and
promoting trade. I think that gives us opportunities that we
would be very smart to seize upon.
As mentioned by others, she has a keen interest in joining
TPP. I'm of the view that we should not only welcome that
interest but be very clear that we want Taiwan in a second
round, should there be one, and I hope there is, and that we
will work with them to identify a clear pathway to entry.
I listened carefully to the administration statement. We
welcome their interest. I believe we should welcome more than
their interest. I think we should work with them to have a
concrete path to inclusion in TPP.
I agree with previous comments made about the investment
environment and the need for a bilateral investment agreement.
Taiwan is a significant investor in the United States and, of
course, vice versa.
That can be strengthened. There are too many barriers still
in place so we should keep these delegations going but more to
the point work through the various fora to try to create a
better environment for mutual investment.
I think there are other areas of our economic relationship
that could also be strengthened. I think defense industrial
cooperation is something we should consider.
There were, I think, some very good questions about the
submarine program--why 15 years. Certainly, if Taiwan does
determine to go the path of an indigenous diesel electric
submarine, there are opportunities for our industry to get
involved in that and I think the administration could send
clear signals that we welcome that kind of defense industrial
cooperation and it could really give a boost to this program
and maybe it won't be another 15 years until we see a submarine
there in Taiwan.
I think in the S & T area as well this has been one of the
past areas of success. Taiwan is a very innovative country.
They are a global leader in patents and, to use an overused
phrase, there are a lot of win-win opportunities, I think, if
we really strengthen our S & T cooperation not only in defense
but beyond that and into that high-tech sector.
This is all going to unfold under an environment where I
expect there to be increasing pressure, not only military
pressure in the missiles that we're all aware of but there are
rumors that China is preparing for a more coercive path,
cutting back tours, cutting back flights, et cetera.
We can do these things irrespective of the positions China
takes but, of course, it becomes more challenging, at least
politically and diplomatically, to do that in face of more
pressure.
But I think we have to remember to keep the onus on
Beijing. They are the ones who have a policy that's failing.
They're the ones that have the military posture opposite
Taiwan, threatening them and intimating the people there and
they are the ones that also need to show some flexibility
So people regard this election as a potential inflection
point but we need to remember that the real core of the problem
is Beijing's intransigence and the positions that they're
taking.
So just to conclude very briefly, I think there are five
things. I think TPP in a very clear path is important. I think
more on bilateral investment to include not only the bilateral
agreement but the promotion of these delegations. I think on
the defense side, there is much more that can be done and I
think several of the systems were mentioned--F-16s, mine
sweepers. But I have a particular interest in the submarine
program because I think there's an opportunity for defense
industrial cooperation. The S & T area is a fourth area I think
is very promising and then finally in our diplomacy keep some
balance. This election is one of the reasons we're here
talking. But if you pull that thread too far some people might
be oriented toward blaming democracy or blaming Taiwan for the
instability.
The problem is in Beijing and we need to keep that in mind
as we go forward and continue to put our emphasis on their need
to de-escalate, to demilitarize and to have some flexibility.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Ms. Glaser.
STATEMENT OF MS. BONNIE GLASER, SENIOR ADVISER FOR ASIA,
DIRECTOR OF CHINA POWER PROJECT, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member
Sherman and distinguished members of the committee. I too would
like to offer my thoughts and prayers to the people of Taiwan
as they recover from this earthquake.
The United States has a deep and abiding interest in the
preservation of Taiwan's security and democracy. The Taiwan
Relations Act remains an important touchstone for Congress, for
policy makers and the executive branch and to ensure Taiwan's
security the U.S. Government must actively seek to use all the
tools of U.S. policy and implement not only the letter but also
the spirit and the intentions behind the TRA.
I have been asked to address my remarks to Taiwan's
security and the threats to Taiwan's security are numerous and
they are growing.
Efforts to sustain the island's economic prosperity which
is a critically important component of national security are
facing challenges.
Taiwan is largely excluded from the Asia Pacific regional
economic integration process. The U.S. can and should do more
to advocate for Taiwan's increased participation in
international organizations and especially those that would
enhance the safety and welfare of Taiwan's citizens and I
commend Chairman Salmon for introducing the legislation that
urges the Obama administration to support Taiwan's efforts to
obtain observer status in Interpol from which it was expelled
in 1984.
Without question the greatest and most direct threat to
Taiwan's security is, of course, posed by the Chinese military.
U.S. security assistance including but not limited to arms
sales to Taiwan is vital to deter China from coercing or
attacking Taiwan and to enable Taiwan's armed forces to fight
effectively in all possible contingencies.
Cooperation with China reviewing presents important
opportunities for the United States, for example, to reverse
global warming and prevent nuclear proliferation, and the U.S.,
of course, should seek to work with Beijing to address regional
and global challenges where possible.
However, it is harmful to American interests to be so eager
for Chinese cooperation that it appears willing to sacrifice
Taiwan for better U.S.-China ties. Such an approach sends the
wrong signal to Beijing.
It creates anxiety in Taiwan and it fosters doubt
throughout the region about America's willingness to withstand
Chinese pressure in support of its commitments.
The KMT defeat in the election Tsai Ing-wen created some
uncertainty about the future of cross-Strait relations. The
mainland insists that Tsai Ing-wen accept its definition of the
existing political foundation, which is essentially opposition
to Taiwan independence and support of the 1992 consensus.
Tsai Ing-wen has recently defined this existing political
foundation differently. For her, it includes a historical fact
of the 1992 talks, the prevailing Republic of China
constitutional order, the accumulated outcome of more than 20
years of cross-Strait interaction and importantly democratic
principles and the will of the Taiwanese people.
The U.S. Government can play a role, I believe, to help
narrow the gap between mainland China and Taiwan by encouraging
each side to provide assurances to the other to assuage their
respective fears.
The U.S. should strongly discourage Beijing from using
coercive measures to pressure Tsai and the DPP to concede to
its demands.
Punitive actions by China could compel Tsai Ing-wen to
respond and perhaps result in a negative spiral that could
produce a cross-Strait setback and even a crisis.
Beijing appears to be deliberating how to respond to the
DPP's return to power in Taiwan. I think the Xi Jinping has not
yet made a decision. But if he adopts the more coercive and
even aggressive approach to Taiwan, the U.S. response will be
widely viewed as an indicator of the credibility of American
commitments.
And not only Japan but also countries in Southeast Asia
would be alarmed if Washington fails to provide to Taiwan in
the face of Chinese coercion or aggression.
For more than two decades the U.S. has insisted the
decisions about Taiwan's future must have the assent of the
people of Taiwan in a democratic manner and public opinion
polls show that a majority of the people of Taiwan yes, they
favor talks with mainland China but dwindling numbers favor
reunification. In 2015, a record low of 9.1 percent of
respondents in Taiwan favoured unification either now or in the
future.
And this polling data, combined with the outcome of the
election, suggests that there could be a realignment of
political forces and attitudes underway in Taiwan and it is
imperative that the U.S. help Taiwan to preserve the autonomy
that its people desire and ensure that the differences between
Taipei and Beijing be managed peacefully.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Glaser follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Dr. Rigger.
STATEMENT OF SHELLEY RIGGER, PH.D., BROWN PROFESSOR AND
ASSISTANT DEAN FOR EDUCATIONAL POLICY, DAVIDSON COLLEGE
Ms. Rigger. Thank you very much for allowing me to be here.
It's a pleasure to have this opportunity.
Taiwan's January elections were a watershed in the island's
democratic development. For the first time, the Kuomintang lost
control of both branches of the national government.
The DPP has won national elections only twice before when
Chen Shui-bian was elected President in 2000 and 2004, and many
in Washington remember the Chen presidency as a time of
turbulence.
Chen began his presidency with efforts to reach out to
Beijing and to the KMT but both the PRC and the KMT stonewalled
and he eventually gave up on seeking their cooperation and
began pursuing an agenda aimed more at pleasing his core
supporters.
Nonetheless, the Chen presidency left many voters feeling
disillusioned and that helped give the KMT's Ma Ying-jeou an
easy win in 2008.
Under Ma, the Taiwan Strait has been relatively calm.
Taiwan has signed almost two dozen economic agreements with the
PRC while cross-Strait trade, investment and people to people
flows have increased to unprecedented levels.
So now that the DPP is about to return to power, people are
asking whether we are about to enter another era of tension in
the Taiwan Strait.
While I understand why these questions are being asked, I
do not believe we are about to enter an era of confrontation.
Under Tsai's leadership, the DPP has adopted moderate positions
that align with the preferences of Taiwan's people.
Throughout her campaign she made it clear that her goal is
to preserve the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. She does not
intend to move Taiwan toward independence but neither does she
intend to rush headlong into Beijing's embrace, either
politically or economically.
So, in short, the January elections affirmed Taiwan's
democracy and confirmed the fundamental rationality of Taiwan's
electorate.
Promoting democracy is a core interest and objective of
U.S. foreign policy. During the Cold War, Taiwan's Government
persuaded the U.S. to overlook its authoritarian nature but in
the '70s and '80s U.S. officials, especially Members of
Congress, joined with democracy activists in Taiwan to urge the
KMT-led government to implement democratic reforms. Taiwan's
democratization was achieved with almost no bloodshed or
instability, making it an example to other nations.
Supporting Taiwan's democracy is an important element of
U.S. policy, therefore, and it is critical that we not confuse
Taiwan's people's active defense of their democracy with
trouble making.
An overwhelming majority of Taiwanese recognize that
pursuing formal independence is both unnecessary and risky but
they have no interest in being absorbed into the People's
Republic of China.
Their goal is to remain a self-governing democratic entity
while working toward peaceful and cooperative relations with
their neighbors on the Chinese mainland.
These goals, which are represented well now that Tsai has
been elected the U.S. should redouble its efforts to keep
channels of communication open.
U.S. policy precludes Washington from engaging in high-
level official interactions with Taipei, although it seems that
not everyone in this room thinks that's a good policy.
But the U.S. is free to choose a less restrictive
interpretation of its policy. Overly rigid adherence to the
one-China policy will not serve the U.S. well in a period of
uncertainty and transition.
The task for the U.S. in the next few years will be to
support Taiwan's continued democratic development. Washington
should recognize and reward the DPP-led government's moderate
positions and encourage all parties to seek opportunities for
cooperation and avoid confrontation.
Given Taipei and Beijing's incompatible goals in some
areas, a degree of tension is unavoidable. However, attentive
management can prevent that tension from ripening into
conflict.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rigger follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
When I first came to Congress in the '90s, Warren
Christopher was the Secretary of State and I remember him
coming before one of our committees and testifying that our
policy with China and Taiwan was one of strategic ambiguity.
I thought that was the stupidest thing I'd ever heard in my
life, and my understanding is that's still our policy. Is it or
isn't it? Dr. Rigger, do you want to take a stab at that?
Ms. Rigger. Sure. Yes, it is our policy and the--I think
part of the reason it continues to be our policy is that it
has--whatever its merits on the face of it actually served us
very well for a long time.
So it might not be the policy that a political scientist
would design but I don't recommend government by a political
scientist. So I think in practice it has allowed the U.S. to
calibrate its actions and positions toward both the PRC and
Taiwan in ways that have successfully maintained the balance in
the Strait.
Mr. Salmon. But what it's yielded is really idiotic
policies like when Lee Teng-hui couldn't visit his alma mater
at Cornell and we had to pass special legislation encouraging
or allowing him to do so.
Or Taiwan virtually being kicked out of every international
body and now we have to try to assert in the name of common
sense that they be allowed to participate in bodies like
Interpol when we're all--we want all hands on deck to fight
international terrorism and international crime and
trafficking--in human trafficking.
It just makes sense to have all hands on deck. And why in
the world would anybody in Taiwan ever want to follow up on
China's offer of peaceful reunification with a one-China two
systems when they see how they hoodwink the people of Hong
Kong?
Universal suffrage--you know, the folks in Hong Kong
believe that claptrap that Beijing was throwing at them that,
you know, it's going to be one-China, two systems when in
reality the leader of Hong Kong gets picked by Beijing. Why
would Taiwan ever want to yield to that?
Ms. Glaser, do you have any thoughts?
Ms. Glaser. Well, I think that that's exactly the reason
why the polls show that the people of Taiwan--very few of them
actually support reunification as they observe Hong Kong, as
they witness the crackdown on dissent and the squeezing of the
ability of average people on the mainland just to access
Internet, to conduct protests, to publish their views.
I think it's clear that people in Taiwan do not want to be
part of the mainland and do not support one country, two
systems.
Mr. Salmon. Oh, and in Taiwan proselytizing is legal.
People can share their religious views freely. They have
freedom of the press.
You have peaceful transitions from one, you know, party to
the next in leadership and the President's office and in the
seat of government, and they see the vast differences when you
speak about your--with conviction.
I guess you can believe in something as long as you don't
really believe it in China and that's--you know, that's the
problem. If you really believe in something then you're a
fanatic and you get imprisoned.
And so, you know, the people of Taiwan watch this stuff
happening and they're very cautious. Look, I was as concerned
as anybody with some of the statements that Chen Shui-bian was
making, you know, later on in his administration.
But Tsai Ing-wen has said that she intends to promote the
status quo. She's not trying to upset the apple cart but she's
made it clear that her first interest and first duty is to the
people of Taiwan, not to the people on mainland China. I don't
think that's all that extreme. I think that's just common
sense.
And so as they go forward, how can we monitor, you know, in
our relations with the cross-Strait? What indicators should we
be monitoring for a sense of how the cross-Strait relationship
is being handled between China and the DPP, whether or not
they're going to stonewall her like they did Chen Shui-bian?
I guess that's one thing we could probably see pretty
readily. But the other one is what do you expect will happen to
current formal official contact between the two sides of the
Strait? Do you think there's going to be any degradation of
that?
Ms. Glaser. Thank you, Congressman Salmon.
I think those are very important questions. As to
indicators, one of the early indicators we can look at is
whether the mainland is restricting tourists that are
travelling to Taiwan. There are already some signs of that.
This could damage Taiwan's economy and the mainland, of course,
claims some deniability. They say oh, maybe the people of
mainland just don't want to go. But we know that this is in
fact government control.
I particularly worry about the possibility of Beijing
trying to steal away some of Taiwan's diplomatic allies. Taiwan
now has 22 and there are some countries who have indicated a
desire to shift their diplomatic allegiance.
So far Beijing has respected this tacit diplomatic truce.
But I think that this could put pressure on President Tsai once
she is inaugurated to respond in a negative way that could lead
to that downward sort of negative spiral that I talked about.
As for the formal communications, I think that so far
Beijing has not said publically that they are going to cut
those off but privately there are some indications that the
semi-official white glove organizations, SEF and ARATS on both
sides of the Strait could be suspended and also the
communications between the Taiwan affairs office and the
mainland affairs council where they recently set up a hotline
and those could also be suspended. I think any suspension of
communication and dialogue channels would be a very negative
sign.
Mr. Salmon. I'm just going to close with this and then
yield to Mr. Sherman. But, you know, a position of strategic
ambiguity would be when a Member of Congress asks the panelist,
you know, how do you feel about Taiwan participation in the
second round of the TPP and the answer coming back, we welcome
their interest in that, that's a position of strategic
ambiguity out there in the ozone.
A strategic clarity statement would be yes, we welcome
their involvement, their participation--not their interest. But
we--like you said, Mr. Schriver, would you agree with that?
Mr. Schriver. Absolutely, and I think that a lot has
changed since Warren Christopher was secretary of state and I
think the very positive developments on Taiwan should be
recognized and rewarded but also the threat posture that China
poses I think would be served with more clarity when it comes
to defense commitments and security in a whole host of areas
including these trade agreements and international
organizations.
I think ambiguity maybe had its time and place but more
clarity is probably appropriate at this juncture.
Mr. Salmon. Yes, let's just stop parsing words and say what
we mean.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. I'll make a couple of political science
comments.
First, in defense of strategic ambiguity, Donald Trump is
not known for has ambiguity yet he has spoken often in favor of
not saying what he would do because that gives--would give
him--a Trump presidency--more leverage in the negotiations.
The problem with it I find with strategic ambiguity is that
it means that if you're going to keep the foreign power
guessing as to what our policy is then you cannot inform the
American people of what.
So I think if we had a dictatorship there would be--in the
United States it would fit with strategic ambiguity and I don't
know if that's what Mr. Trump has in mind but he doesn't talk
to me.
Mr. Salmon. He doesn't talk to me either.
Mr. Sherman. Also, the second political science comment is
political scientists live in this world where you figure out
what is the interest of the country as if this was a game of
Risk or something where the country was a single entity
determining its interests.
My own belief is that countries make foreign policy
decisions to respond to short-term domestic political needs,
and right now China needs nationalism to explain why a party
that is no longer the vanguard of the proletariat should
continue to rule in the absence of 7\1/2\ percent growth.
Dr. Rigger, what--putting pressure on Taiwan, is that
popular with Joe Six-pack in Shanghai?
Ms. Rigger. It's extremely difficult for us to know what is
popular with the citizens of the People's Republic of China
because it is not an open information environment.
What is more troubling even than that though is that there
is a certain kind of Joe Six-pack in the mainland who is
allowed to speak and is allowed to speak loudly and
perpetually.
Mr. Sherman. Well, we know that nationalism over the islets
or rocks or whatever we're going to fight World War III about
in the South Pacific that's popular nationalism. Is it
consistent with popular nationalism in China to say we're going
to be tough on Taiwan or--I mean, you're being tough on Chinese
people.
So is a--does it fit with jingoistic popular nationalism in
China to try to kick Taiwan out of Interpol?
Ms. Rigger. It does. But it's hard for--it's impossible to
understand what that really means in terms of China's long-term
domestic political situation because----
Mr. Sherman. You need to study political science by running
for office. There are no long-term political objectives. There
are short-term political objectives.
Ms. Rigger. Can I explain though what my logic is? So the
problem is that in China there are few things that you can say
out loud and all of them are I hate Japan, we should be more
aggressive in the South China Sea, Taiwan must be reunified
with the mainland.
But we don't know whether people would be saying those
things as loudly and energetically as they are if they could
say other things.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Ms. Rigger. But because they can't say other things, these
are the things they say.
Mr. Sherman. What--okay. Ms. Glaser talked a little bit
about the things China can do to show its displeasure with the
fact that the Taiwanese people voted for what they consider to
be the wrong political party.
Those all seem like little nitpicking. Is there anything
China might do to Taiwan in the next year that is more
significant than trying to get a Latin American country to cut
off diplomatic relations or giving Taiwan the cold shoulder and
stopping communication with various mainland entities?
Anything----
Ms. Rigger. Within the next year, probably not. But those
small things, especially added together, can have a really
profound effect on the confidence of Taiwan people and their
ability to go forward strongly and to advocate for their own
interests. So they do matter.
Mr. Sherman. If five Embassies closed in Taipei from
countries that many Taiwanese could not find on a map would
that shake confidence?
Ms. Rigger. Yes, and if ten closed that would be half of
Taiwan's diplomatic partners in the world.
Mr. Sherman. Well, that's why I asked about five.
Ms. Rigger. And that would deeply shake people's
confidence, absolutely.
Mr. Sherman. Ah, there are a few islands that are so small
that they would appreciate even modest aid from Taiwan. New
Embassies could be opened by countries that are even harder to
find on a map.
Okay. What factors do you believe contributed to the DPP
winning the elections and, just as significantly, the KMT's
weak showing?
Ms. Rigger. I think the biggest issues were domestic issues
for Taiwan. Economic issues--the sense that Taiwan's economy
can produce aggregate growth at a slow but reasonable rate but
that it can't produce jobs or the kinds of jobs that Taiwanese
people are preparing themselves to do as they emerge from
school and it can't produce the kind of egalitarian
distribution of income and wealth that Taiwanese have come to
expect as the fruit of development.
Mr. Sherman. Sounds like Bernie Sanders won the election.
Ms. Rigger. Well, I think that the problems that Taiwan
faces are not Taiwan's alone.
Mr. Sherman. Okay. And what can the DPP Government and
Taiwan in general do to lessen its dependence on mainland
China?
Ms. Rigger. This is the great task facing Taiwan to figure
out the answer to this question. The DPP has published lots of
white papers and statements about what they plan to do. But
most of those are pretty vague and piecemeal.
The best thing that Taiwan could do, I think, is to improve
its accessibility to international trade and investment. Taiwan
still has a lot of parts of its market and economy that are not
very open and I think that's really what we are talking about
when we talk about getting ready for TPP.
The international business community has been asking a long
time for Taiwan to open its economy more and I think perhaps
Taiwan can make some progress there.
Mr. Sherman. I have gone over time. I don't know if the
other witnesses have any quick comments.
Ms. Glaser. I would just make one quick comment and that is
that the mainland China has a pretty robust toolbox to use to
pressure Taiwan.
There's economic tools, there's preferences that they give
to Taiwan businesses on the mainland, there's fish that they
buy from southern Taiwan fisherman.
They can cut all of these. Only two countries have been
really permitted, and I put that in quotation marks, to
negotiate bilateral free trade averments with Taiwan.
That's Singapore and New Zealand, and there are other
countries that had started informal talks, those who want to
begin talks, and Beijing has basically shut that down.
They have diplomatic economic influence directly on Taiwan
and then indirectly through other countries so--and then, of
course, there's the whole toolbox of military coercion. So I
think there's a lot to be concerned about.
Mr. Schriver. Briefly on that last point, we shouldn't
forget about the military piece of this because throughout this
8-year period of peace and stability what has China done on the
military side?
They have continued to build up more missiles, more
capabilities, more training. They have a mock-up of the
presidential palace that they're exercising against. I mean,
countries that equip, train, prepare----
Mr. Sherman. They have a mock-up of Taiwan's presidential
palace so they can train special forces into how to go in and
seize the President or something like that?
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Oh. I might point out, if we really cared
about Taiwan's defense we would just amend the law that
provided most favoured nation status to China and say this law
is void if China takes military action against Taiwan, its
ports and its shipping.
And some of us tried to do that back when we first gave
affirmative MFN--that it's not too late. That one--they
wouldn't need the frigates if we did that.
Mr. Salmon. I thank the panel. This has been very, very,
very helpful. Thank you very much.
One just last question. You had mentioned that there were
four things and I think we got three. Would the fourth be
Tibet?
I mean, are they still--because every time I ever met with
senior Beijing officials the two things that, you know, was
like drilling on their teeth without novocaine was Taiwan
Strait and Tibet. Is that still pretty much the same thing.
Ms. Rigger. You can say anything you want to about those
issues and not get in trouble. So if you want to speak out on
those topics, it's fine.
Mr. Salmon. Right. Right.
Well, thank you very much. I really appreciate the panel
and thank the ranking member. It's been very edifying and I
want to congratulate the people of Taiwan again on a
wonderfully successful and peaceful election and transition
that's about to happen and also let them know that we're with
you in spirit and in every other way in relationship to
rebuilding after the earthquake.
So thank you very much.
Mr. Sherman. I agree.
Mr. Salmon. This committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]