[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFTER SAN BERNARDINO: THE FUTURE OF
ISIS INSPIRED ATTACKS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2016
__________
Serial No. 114-137
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board,
Institute for the Study of War................................. 5
The Honorable Alberto M. Fernandez, vice president, Middle East
Media Research Institute....................................... 16
Christopher Swift, Ph.D., adjunct professor, Edmund A. Walsh
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University............... 30
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement............. 8
The Honorable Alberto M. Fernandez: Prepared statement........... 18
Christopher Swift, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 33
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 57
AFTER SAN BERNARDINO: THE FUTURE OF ISIS-INSPIRED ATTACKS
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WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2016
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to
submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the
record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
On December 3, 2015, husband and wife, Syed Farook, 28, and
Tashfeen Malik, 29, carried out the worst terror attack in the
United States since 9/11. They killed 14 people, seriously
injured at least 22 others in San Bernardino, California. This
was not the first ISIS inspired attack in the United States,
nor would it be the last.
On October 23, 2014, a man believed to be self-radicalized
attacked four police officers in New York City with a hatchet.
On May 3, 2015, two men opened fire outside of a Prophet
Muhammad cartoon contest in a Dallas suburb, at least one of
the gunmen appeared to have contact with ISIS operative via
social media. Last month, a man was arrested in Philadelphia
after shooting and wounding a police officer. The attacker
claimed to have committed the attack on behalf of ISIS.
In all, ISIS has conducted over 60 attacks in 20 countries.
The map that is to the General's right, and I think all of you
have a copy of that map--I don't know if you can see this or
not. The map shows where these attacks have taken place, and
they stretch from California to Australia and many places in
between. The fact is the death toll from terrorism is on the
rise. The chart shows global deaths from terrorism since 2001.
Global deaths from terrorism are three times higher than when
the President took office, and it is hard to say that the world
is a safer place because it is not.
One of the main questions of this hearing is can these
kinds of ISIS inspired attacks be stopped? If they can't be
eliminated entirely, is there more that we can be doing to make
sure that there are less of these ISIS attacks? ISIS feeds on a
narrative of strength. If we can puncture the narrative and
show that ISIS is on the run and collapsing, that could
significantly impact ISIS' ability to inspire attacks in the
United States and the world.
Our current strategy is not doing that, in my opinion. In a
national televised address in September of '14, the President
stated that the United States would degrade and ultimately
destroy ISIS. Today, 17 months later, we have not accomplished
that goal. It took a year from the President's speech before he
finally allowed air strikes to target the oil infrastructure
that ISIS is using to rake in millions of dollars a day.
The number of strike sorties flown per day against ISIS are
a quarter of what we flew in Libya in 2011, and only 2 percent
of what we flew in Iraq in 2003. Of the sorties that did fly
out, 76 percent returned to base without dropping any
munitions. While we all know air strikes alone can't defeat
ISIS, we have yet to corral a ground force in Syria that will
fight against ISIS. And the $500 million train and equip
program was a failure, and the President even admits that it
was a failure.
The President has been unsuccessfully getting the Sunnis in
Iraq to fight against ISIS mostly because he has been equally
unsuccessful in getting the Iranian Government in Baghdad to
stop its sectarian ways. The latest round of peace talks were
seen as so dismal that they were delayed until later this
month, but the war rages on.
Part of ISIS' strength comes from its ability to
disseminate its propaganda online. Following the San Bernardino
attack, it was revealed that the attackers had been
communicating online where they bonded over their commitment to
jihad before Malik was granted a visa to come into the United
States.
Malik had also advocated jihad and her desire to join the
fight in several private messages on social media to her
friends in Pakistan. It was later discovered that at roughly
the same time of the shooting, Malik declared allegiance to
ISIS on Facebook.
The other main question of this hearing is what role social
media is playing in the fight against ISIS. In October, ISIS
issued a new instruction manual on how terrorists can use
social media. Are private companies doing enough to stop this?
Facebook and Twitter both have policies prohibiting the
promotion of terrorism on their platforms. While we have seen a
dramatic drop of terrorist content on Facebook, there are still
over 40,000 Twitter accounts used by ISIS supporters.
What is the role the U.S. Government has in all of this?
The administration promised a strategy to counter online
radicalization 5 years ago, but we don't have that strategy
yet. I have introduced legislation requiring the strategy that
passed the House unanimously in December and is currently
pending in the U.S. Senate. The administration's strategy
leaves us with little confidence that it would be enough to
defeat ISIS.
The amendment to the Omnibus that was signed into law in
December required the President to come up with a strategy that
would actually defeat ISIS, and that strategy must be given to
the American people and Congress in the summer of this year.
ISIS has American blood on its hands. What are we going to do
about it?
I will now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating from
Massachusetts, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting the
hearing today. I would also like to thank our witnesses,
General Keane, Ambassador Fernandez, and Dr. Swift, for being
here to discuss this very important topic, and for their
flexibility in rescheduling for today's panel.
As details emerged of the December 2, 2015, cold-blooded
attack in San Bernardino, we were left shocked and horrified by
the calculation and the savagery. Fourteen innocent Americans
died and dozens more wounded at the hands of two self-
radicalized assailants. Let us keep in mind those that lost
their lives, their family members and their loved ones again
here today as we conduct this hearing.
While the severity of the attack caused it to resonate so
strongly, we are reminded that San Bernardino is not the first
attack inspired by ISIL in the United States. In fact, there
have been three attacks in the U.S. dating back to 2014, which
were carried out by individuals inspired by ISIL.
It is clear that ISIL poses a threat to the United States
through its ability to appeal to a vulnerable demographic
predominately of young adults. As of last October, FBI Director
Comey reported that his agency is pursuing over 900 active
investigations against homegrown violent extremists, the
majority of which are linked to ISIL.
Separately, over 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to
join rebel or terrorist groups in Iraq, Syria, including ISIL.
These movements are increasingly difficult to track in our
globalized world, and the risk of their return to the U.S. is a
great challenge to agencies overseeing foreign fighter travel.
As the title of this hearing suggests, it is critical that we
understand the nature of the threat posed by ISIL, be it an
evolving threat, and in order to degrade and ultimately defeat
a foreign terrorist organization like ISIL, we need to bring
together various stakeholders such as federal, state, and local
first responders and investigatory agencies, and equip them
with the best resources necessary to respond.
To this end, I have been proud to partner with my
colleagues both on this committee and Homeland Security to
study the threat posed by foreign fighter travel and authorize
the Department of Homeland Security to develop a strategy in
response while bolstering the arsenal of fusion centers and
intelligence agencies. Coordination and support from the
private sector is also necessary, since many ISIL members use
technology and social media platforms for communication,
fundraising and recruitment.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
the threat posed by ISIL, and how the United States and its
partners can work together to overcome it. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. The
Chair will yield a minute to General--not General, excuse me--
Colonel Cook for his opening statement.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The promotional system was
seriously flawed when I made colonel. Didn't make it any
higher. Anyway, this is a very, very important hearing. Many
years ago, I was part of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, 1983.
I left that and they went afloat and went into a place called
Lebanon. There was a group called Hezbollah that went in there,
blew up the barracks, and over 260 Marine-Army-Navy personnel
were killed that day. And then it always stayed in my head, and
then recently in my home county that I represent, San
Bernardino County, had almost deja vu all over again with, once
again, Islamic terrorism.
The one thing I did want to comment on, and I will talk
more about knowing your enemy and everything else, was just the
tremendous job that the local police department, the sheriff's
office, the state, the county, everybody worked together. It
was like we have a terrorist incident and they knew right away
and instead of 14 killed, and I don't know how many wounded, it
changes. We could have had even more.
So this is an extremely important hearing. Obviously it is
right in my backyard, and I want to thank you very much for
calling such an important hearing. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will yield a minute to Mr. Higgins from
New York for his opening statement.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
think when we are talking about terrorism in the United States,
I think it is very important to distinguish between fact and
fiction. The fearmongering that goes on this country is
extraordinary, and public polling indicates that it is very,
very effective.
But I think when you look at the most recent book by Peter
Bergen, ``The United States of Jihad,'' who is a CNN national
security analyst, wrote four other books on terrorism, you see
that there is a real distinction between Islamic terrorists and
how many people have been killed in the United States since 9/
11. It is 45. The neo-Nazi and anti-government terrorists have
killed over 48 people.
The profile that we presume about terrorists, I think, has
been shattered at least in terms of perception, and not enough
credit is given also to our counterterrorism and law
enforcement efforts, be it at the fusion level, at the local
level. On 9/11 there were 16 people on the no-fly list, today
there is 47,000. One-point-five million people, if they tried
to get on a plane bound for the United States, would be set
aside for secondary screening. So I think it is also important
to recognize the effectiveness of our counterterrorism
activities.
And, unfortunately, in counterterrorism you never get
credit for what didn't happen, and in counterterrorism it is
all about what didn't happen. So I think we should give
recognition to those facts as well as we move forward with this
discussion. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from New York. I will
introduce each witness and let them give their opening
statements. General Jack Keane is a retired four-star general,
former vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and currently
serves as chairman of the Institute for the Study of War.
Ambassador Alberto Fernandez is vice president of the
Middle East Media Research Institute. Ambassador Fernandez
served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer and as the State
Department's coordinator for the Center for Strategic
Counterterrorism Communications.
And then we also have Dr. Christopher Swift. He is an
adjunct professor of National Security Studies at Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service. Dr. Swift has conducted
extensive research on terrorism, armed conflict, and the
intersection between international law and national security.
General Keane, we will start with you for your opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, CHAIRMAN OF THE
BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
General Keane. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
Keating, distinguished members of the committee, for inviting
me back today to talk about such an important subject. I am
honored to be here on the panel with my distinguished
colleagues. Please refer to the map that we provided by the
Institute of the Study of War, which I will reference in my
remarks.
The primary objective of the United States Government
remains protecting the homeland and the American people,
including safeguarding American values both in the homeland and
abroad. The San Bernardino attack following the Paris attacks,
the downing of the Russian airliner, and multiple attacks by
ISIS in Lebanon and Turkey, all once again dramatically
emphasize the danger and vulnerability of civilian population
to terrorism.
The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in his
recent report to the Congress stated that homegrown extremists
pose the most significant threat to the United States homeland
in 2016. While I believe this is a daunting task to prevent all
such attacks, I am confident in the United States law
enforcement and intelligence capabilities to rise to the
challenge. Having the best defensive security system in America
is not sufficient. We must have as good an offense to stop and
defeat ISIS, which is where I will concentrate my remarks.
While the United States' offensive capability is there, the
strategy is not. Indeed, without an effective strategy we are
destined to prolong the barbarism and the killing in the region
while driving up the risk at home. Radical Islam is morphing
into a global jihad with the expansion of al-Qaeda and the
extraordinary success of ISIS which has rapidly become the most
successful terrorist organization in modern history.
ISIS has three major goals. The first is to defend Syria
and Iraq. While ISIS has lost some territory, it views
operations in Syria and Iraq as largely successful because it
still controls large swaths of territory, it is recruiting
well--1,500 to 2,000 per month--it is maintaining initiative,
and it is able to logistically sustain its forces.
The second goal is to use its headquarters in Syria to
expand in what ISIS terms the near abroad--it is in orange on
your map with black or blue stars--by establishing affiliate
organizations with a formal relationship in nine countries and
regions, with three in the blue about to be formed. ISIS
provides guidance and resources to most of these affiliates.
The third major goal is to influence the far abroad--on
your map see areas in yellow--which are Muslim lands and
countries that are supporting the coalition against ISIS, the
United States, Europe, and Australia to name some. ISIS does so
by inspiring, motivating or directing followers to kill their
fellow citizens, by averaging thousands of social media posts
per day, and by returning fighters from Syria who are trained
and motivated to attack their own citizens at home. ISIS
attempts to divide and polarize these societies by weakening
the people's resolve to support their government's effort and
to fragment and polarize the non-Muslim and Muslim populations.
What can be done? First, defeat the idea. National leaders
and Muslim clerics must undermine the political and religious
ideology with not just what is wrong, but what is right. The
battle is within Islam itself, where in the Arab world this
battle is intersecting with authoritarian regimes and family
monarchy's failure to politically reform and to adjust to the
needs of their societies. Therefore, we are fighting a
political and religious ideology which draws its origin from
the very strict interpretation of the Quran and Hadith as well
as the intolerance of Wahhabism and Salafism.
Political leaders such as el-Sisi and King Abdullah have
referred to it as a religious revolution, yet U.S. policy fails
to define radical Islam or explain it nor understand it. How
can we possibly defeat radical Islam if we don't understand it?
Knowing the kind of war you are fighting is the first priority
of a national or military leader. We must challenge ISIS not
simply in mosques and schools and other gathering places, op-
eds and the like, but also, certainly, on the Internet.
Second, destroy the safe havens. No insurgency was ever
defeated where a safe haven existed. The major lesson of 9/11
was that the al-Qaeda safe haven was allowed to exist in
Afghanistan for many years even after the al-Qaeda successfully
attacked the U.S. Embassy in Africa and the USS Cole. The
longer terrorists are allowed safe haven, history advises that
terrorists become more experienced, more lethal and more
ambitious. Iraq and particularly Syria are ISIS safe havens.
Recognize that the current strategy of relying on local
defense forces without sufficient numbers, arms, training, and
not maximizing effective air power, protracts the war against
ISIS for years unnecessarily. In my judgment, throw out
strategic patience and replace it with strategic urgency to
defeat ISIS. While the military effort in Iraq and Syria is
significantly under-resourced, the political effort which is so
necessary to achieve a military victory is also flawed. I would
be willing to take that on in Q&A.
Third, marginalize the affiliates. The 9-11 Commission
recommended a global alliance to defeat radical Islam. In
parallel with destroying ISIS safe havens in Iraq and Syria,
partnering with allies to marginalize and, where possible,
defeat affiliates is critical. Otherwise, ISIS will reemerge at
an affiliate location, now likely, Libya. The U.S. is beginning
an effort in Libya against ISIS. Sharing intelligence,
technology, equipment and training is a proven winner in
harnessing the collective resources of an alliance in defeating
a common enemy.
In conclusion, ISIS and al-Qaeda pose the most imminent
threat to the security and values of the United States and
Europe. The success of these radical Islamist military
organizations comes only partly from their own strength and
will. It results also from a general collapse of the
international order driven partly by the withdrawal of the
United States from supporting that order, partly by the
irresponsible passivity and free-riding of most European
states, partly by the unrealized expectations of the people of
the Middle East, and partly from the active attempts of Iran,
China, and Russia to dismantle all or part of a global order
designed to favor our values and interests and to replace it
with one that favors theirs.
Understanding what is happening and why is the basic
ingredient to developing achievable strategies. The United
States is facing global security challenges on a scale not seen
since the rise of the Soviet Union post World War II. While
complex and difficult, it is certainly not hopeless and the
world has never needed American leadership more than it does
today.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, General Keane.
Ambassador Fernandez.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ALBERTO M. FERNANDEZ, VICE
PRESIDENT, MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE
Ambassador Fernandez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, members of the committee for having me today. It is great
to be back again.
Measured in comparison with most other terrorist groups and
insurgent movements, the ISIS brand is a major success. The
fact that it has mobilized tens of thousands to flee their
countries, thousands of them leaving very comfortable
circumstances in the West, is testimony to the enduring power
of its message. It most certainly does represent a
revolutionary, contemporary appeal. This is not going back to
the Middle Ages.
But despite being so new, its success now is that it is not
a specific video or statement or act that mobilizes, but rather
the concept, the image of the organization. This is an idea and
a symbol which has matured and has been internalized by those
people that support it. That is one of the lessons of San
Bernardino and other places.
One result of these attacks is to make the Islamic State
look even more ubiquitous, powerful and conquering than it
actually is. It is something that we see in the West, including
in the government and media, sometimes unwittingly helping to
suggest that they are actually more powerful than they are.
They are actually quite extraordinary, but we make them look
even more than they are.
While the actual state in its Syrian-Iraqi heartland is
slowly, all too slowly weakening, the virtual caliphate, the
idea of the state, its image, its sense, remains relatively
intact and powerful. The ISIS victory narrative has been
sustained to this day by two elements, the actions and growth
of the ISIS franchises and these continued attacks in the West
such as Paris, which mimic and, in a way, replace the preferred
image of ISIS of military victory on the ground. They would
rather be marching into Baghdad and Damascus, but in lieu of
that they will take what they can get, whether in San
Bernardino or Paris or Sinai or wherever.
This image can still be sustained for awhile, especially if
a continued progress against ISIS on the ground remains slow
and gradual. As long as the idea of the ISIS caliphate remains
plausible, it will continue to attract recruits, spawn
terrorist operations focusing on targets of opportunity
worldwide, and spin off copy cat operations. You cannot contain
the ISIS brand if the ISIS caliphate is merely contained.
So you see this seeming paradox. The best way to weaken the
ISIS brand is to crush it in the field militarily, but the more
you push the greater the incentive they will have to lash out
in both planned operations and encourage zealous, young
devotees to act. That is the price we are going to have to pay.
Success in planned operations will no doubt lead to attempts by
lone wolves in the future.
So obviously ISIS needs to lose and even more importantly
to be seen to lose. In addition to military progress powerfully
and graphically portrayed, technical means used by both social
media companies and government need to shrink the size of the
online state. But while those two things are important, the
core message of the ISIS brand also needs to be answered. Some
of this work is beginning, albeit all too slowly and weakly.
Given the importance of Iraq and especially Syria in the
ISIS discourse and how it is sold to Westerners and even to
people in the Middle East distant from the front, there is real
value in empowering Syrian and Iraqi Sunni Muslim voices who
can speak directly to wavering individuals outside the Middle
East. This hasn't been done yet. The voices of recanters and
defectors need to be raised much higher than they have been.
Governments receiving returnees from ISIS ranks should find
creative ways to incentivize counter-radicalization media
outreach as much as integration and law enforcement. And we
actually have a great template because we have ISIS' own way of
producing these personal testimony videos. There should also be
room for a well-funded effort promoting tolerant, liberal Arab
Muslim values in contradistinction to the vision of Salafi
jihadism. ISIS is a really important phenomenon, but it is part
of a much wider phenomenon occurring.
Governments should also look to empower and expand the
scope of nongovernmental messaging platforms and organizations
within the Middle East with the goal toward building
sustainable messaging efforts against Salafi jihadism. It is
not something that only the U.S. Government or friendly
governments can do. So the ISIS brand or way of doing things
has now metastasized and been internalized. But it can at least
be chipped away by a combination of military, technical and
counter-messaging efforts.
I am concerned that steps have been too little and too late
so far, but I see that we are slowly beginning to move in the
right direction, and I look forward to your questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Fernandez follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador Fernandez.
Dr. Swift.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER SWIFT, PH.D., ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Swift. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, honorable
members, it is a pleasure to be here before you today and to be
with my esteemed colleagues. I agree with General Keane that
the first step in any war is to know your adversary and to know
the nature of the war you are embarking upon, not changing it
to or turning it into something alien to its own nature.
And I agree with Ambassador Fernandez that ISIS has a
remarkable tendency to amplify its own importance and influence
through messaging and narrative. But at the same time, we have
to see the messaging as a symptom of the disease and understand
the disease in its own context. And so what I would like to do
with my statement today is provide you with a framework for
understanding how individualized action contributes to and
aggregates global jihad.
And so what I would like to do is start with a discussion
of two major shifts in the global Salafi jihadi movement, and
then put them into a practical context in terms of what we are
seeing with ISIS-inspired attacks not just in the United States
but also in western Europe.
There are two major trends in the Salafi jihadi movement
today. The first is the localization of global jihad, and the
second is the atomization of global jihad. These two things are
distinct but complementary. This is how they work. Localization
is a product of a generational shift in leadership from the
individuals who started al-Qaeda and fought the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan to the deputies that survived al-Qaeda's failures
and fought against the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq.
We see this generational shift and we see with it a
geographic shift in this focus of the Salafi jihadi movement
from the cultural and geographic periphery of the Islamic world
to the Sunni Arab core. In fact, if you look at the map
provided by the Institute for the Study of War, you can see the
drawing in to the Sunni Arab core as a fundamental part of this
localization strategy.
Now what does localization do? Well, for the first time in
nearly two decades, Salafi jihadi groups are fighting in Arab
countries with a Sunni majority, where they speak the language,
recognize the local tribal structure and can build roots,
something that al-Qaeda was never able to do. This is why al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, initially, in Yemen, and now
ISIS in Syria and Iraq has become the true base that al-Qaeda
was never able to become. It has a population, it has a way of
generating resources, it has a way of deploying and organizing
manpower, money and materiel.
At the same time, we see the atomization of global jihad,
and that is to say, violence undertaken by individuals who have
a desire to become part of a broader imagined community. We see
this in the attacks that we have experienced in the United
States over the space of the last two decades, we see it in the
messaging that Ambassador Fernandez was discussing earlier, and
we see it in the tragic events of San Bernardino.
How is this different? Well, unlike the localization of
global jihad it doesn't build on organizations, it builds on
ideas. And so while the localization of global jihad creates a
political caliphate, a political community that provides a
foundation, as Ambassador Fernandez noted the atomization of
global jihad thrives on an imagined caliphate, an imagined
community.
If you look at the thing that distinguishes ISIS from every
single transnational terrorist syndicate in the world today it
is the combination of this political community that has a
foundation in real places and real people and this imagined
community that exists online. What are the consequences
strategically? Well, they are twofold. The first is, ISIS can
organize, recruit and direct violent force to serve its ends.
It uses direct action in the places where it has direct access.
But ISIS can also recruit, inspire and direct indirect action
through social media, through print media and through broadcast
media. And that allows them to operate in our strategic depth
without the need to commit their regular forces.
There are three implications for that, honorable members,
and they are as follows. The first is we need to understand
that ISIS is opportunistic. It uses different tools in
different theaters depending on what its capabilities are in
those places. Chairman Poe, if you look at the map you
presented earlier, the number of direct ISIS attacks in Europe
is substantially higher while the number of ISIS inspired
attacks in the United States is substantially higher.
That breakdown is not surprising at all. Europe has closer
proximity to the Syrian civil war, it is in the middle of a
major refugee crisis, and they have large, alienated, domestic
Muslim populations that are not well integrated into European
society. Contrast that with the United States where we have a
much more diffuse Muslim population, we are not proximate to a
major conflict, and we are not experiencing a major refugee
crisis.
The tools that ISIS uses here to influence, disrupt and
intimidate are much more tools of facilitation and resonant
effects, inspiring people online or engaging in recruiting them
through online chat rooms, through Skype and through other
sorts of mediated or facilitated dialogues.
So for the United States, the risk of terrorist
infiltration is somewhat lower than it is compared to our
European allies, but the risk of the homegrown radical, of the
individual we are not able to identify early on is much, much
higher, in part because that is the strategy ISIS is using here
versus the strategy of infiltration that we have seen them use
in Paris and elsewhere. This is why the trends we are seeing
look so different, even though the underlying motives and
ideology and psychology are the same.
Honorable members, I would like to conclude with one last
thought before we get to question and answer, and that is that
success in one theater does not necessarily create security in
another. And here is what I mean by that. Terrorism is a low
risk, high return strategy that weaker organizations use to
reach beyond their grasp and punch above their weight.
Organizations use terrorism when they are not able to confront
and defeat their adversary directly.
So the more we contain, degrade, isolate ISIS in the Middle
East, the more effective our strategy becomes in places like
Iraq and Syria--and I agree with General Keane that we do need
a more effective approach--the more likely it is that ISIS will
lash out using indirect effects, using unconventional means in
western Europe and the United States. Success in one area does
not necessarily yield security in the other, and if we are
going to turn up the temperature on ISIS in the Middle East we
should anticipate, plan, and prepare for, on a whole of
government basis, more terrorism here at home. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Swift follows:]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. It was
excellent. I will yield 5 minutes to myself for some questions
and get your answers.
I agree with you, Dr. Swift, that this is a multifaceted
issue. We need a strategy to combat ISIS, but not just in the
United States or not just in Syria, not just in North Africa,
but online and all of the other avenues where we see ISIS
creeping its ugly head up. We need strategy for all of the
above, not just for one area.
General Keane, there has been some talk about--and I see
your map and it is very disturbing, got all of North Africa
under some part of an influence in areas of ISIS. What is the
situation with ISIS' rumored movement toward Libya and moving
their headquarters, if I can use that word, to Libya? Explain
to us what is taking place here.
General Keane. Well, first of all, it is much more than a
rumor. It is a fact they have been putting fighters and
resources into Libya for over a year now. And certainly, the
social and political upheaval that is taking place in the
Middle East is known to the committee members and certainly
everybody at this table that radical Islamist groups take
advantage of those events.
And Libya is by definition a failed state, and don't want
to revisit why that happened but it is, and they are there
taking huge advantage of that. I mean, conservative estimates
are somewhere around 3,000 to 4,000 are now there and other
estimates are as high as 10. I am skeptical about the higher
number, but I don't have access to top secret information. But
they have several thousand in there and they intend to expand
it. They have put their own leaders on the ground there to
assist with training and also with equipping, and I am
confident they will be providing guidance to them.
Certainly they can be predators in terms of what is taking
place in Africa itself. They have a movement already in the
Sinai challenging Egypt and el-Sisi, and certainly they can
influence that from Libya. They can also influence Tunisia. But
most significantly, I think the thing that concerns most of us
is the access it would give them to Europe, because they are a
small body of water away from influencing Europe and bringing
terrorism there.
So it is a potentially dangerous situation. I think the
United States, here, is doing absolutely the right thing by
recognizing that we just cannot take away the safe havens,
which we are doing as I indicated not with the sense of urgency
I think it needs; that we have to look at these affiliates as
well, prioritize them in what are the most dangerous and work
with partners as much as we can to deal with this. This should
not be the burden of the United States military exclusively
when we have so many people in the region who are concerned
about this threat as much as we are. And that is why I believe
that partnering is essential to do this.
But I do believe our special operations are on this. I
think the CIA has been collecting on this for some time, and
there is also al-Qaeda groups in Libya that are dangerous as
well. So that is, I think, where we are. We will make some
progress against some of these groups. But I think until we
partner with others in the region to take a more holistic
approach to it, it won't be nearly effective as we can be.
Mr. Poe. Two more questions. I would like for you to define
the enemy more than just the name. I mean, they have been
called ISIL, ISIS, Daesh, and all types of different names. But
how would you define the enemy?
General Keane. I mean, they are clearly a radical Islamist
organization that is grounded in a political and theological
ideology. They base it on a very strict interpretation of the
Quran and Hadith, and they have huge geopolitical objectives in
terms of not only dominating Muslim lands, but also in terms of
ISIS stimulating an apocalyptic event in Europe which would
carve out a rather large caliphate for them with also
eventually seeking world domination.
They are somewhat similar to the al-Qaeda in that respect,
but the methodology that they go about achieving it are
somewhat different. And so I think ISIS in that terms is the
best way to describe it, and I would agree with the Ambassador
of how they have been able to achieve success in what they are
doing as well.
Mr. Poe. My time has expired. I will yield to the ranking
member, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. One thought I had
when we talk about our coalition. We can all get up and sign on
together, take pictures together, issue statements together,
but one of the things that really doesn't line up and I think
it is critical, is the hierarchy of interests in terms of ISIL
with our coalition. Now let us set Europe aside as a separate
example. I am going around the Mideast region and Northern
African region, and who among our coalition has ISIL ranked
number one as their concern? Turkey, I think, it is number
three or four. Saudi Arabia, it is not number one, in my
opinion. So we are lining up with this coalition, but that is
primary concern right now in terms of our own. Name another
country and the other region outside of our European allies
that ranks at number one. Can you?
General Keane. I think in the Middle East, the country, I
believe, that puts ISIS ahead of the Iranian influence in the
Middle East, most all these other countries consider, Sunni
Arab countries consider Iran the greatest threat, and I agree
with that assessment. But Egypt would put it number one.
Mr. Keating. Any other thoughts on that, the imperfect
coalition?
Mr. Swift. Ranking Member Keating, I would say that Russia
probably puts ISIS number one for the purposes of propaganda,
but not for the purposes of operations. And to the extent that
ISIS is a threat, it is a threat to a proxy rather than a
threat to Russia's own interests.
Mr. Keating. Ambassador?
Ambassador Fernandez. I would just add, sir, that obviously
Iraq would put it as number one. Not out of any special
devotion to eliminate ISIS, but because it obviously represents
an immediate national security threat. The problem with Iraq
seeing it that way is it sees it within the lens of the problem
of sectarianism within Iraq. The only problems of the Iraqi
Government itself it has with its own Sunni Arab population.
Mr. Keating. Just to make another observation when I look
at the map, General. King Abdullah met with a group of us not
long ago, and he said here is the battlefront, and he had 17
points but they almost juxtapose over your regions as well. I
mean, it is important to defeat ISIL, to take away their
territory obviously, but we can't lose that perspective that
this map presents and what King Abdullah said as well. I mean,
that is also our front line and it is spread all over the
place. Isn't that an important perspective?
General Keane. Well, I agree. I mean, I have another map
that shows the influence of Iran and put it in red, the
countries they are dominating in green, essentially Sunni Arab
countries. Most of the Middle East countries look at that map
and take that as their largest threat.
I mean, what I was trying to say at the end of my remarks,
is that certainly ISIS exists and is succeeding, but it is part
of a larger story that is taking place in the Middle East with
the collapse of the order that is there, and also a much larger
geopolitical story where Iran, Russia, and China are also
pushing back on international order which has some impact. I
don't think you can look at these threats in isolation that I
believe is what you are suggesting.
Mr. Keating. Yes.
General Keane. And I would agree with that, Congressman
Keating. But nonetheless, as you are working with these threats
it does take some intellectual muscle to determine how best to
meet these challenges.
Mr. Keating. This is a great topic and so expansive, but
let me just jump to something more recent. The siege in Aleppo,
how is that going to change the landscape going forward? Some
of the people, they are pretty much--pretty tough choices for
people in that area. There is the Assad government, and then
the Syrian rebels are now taking a very important hit here. And
what about the influence of al-Nusra in this?
Ambassador Fernandez. Sir, if I could add, I think that is
a really important question and it goes to what General Keane
just said. ISIS is the most prominent part of a larger
phenomenon of radical Sunni Arab revivalism. But ISIS' success
has also done something else. It has ignited a political,
ideological, military arms race among the al-Qaeda franchises.
When al-Qaeda, when ISIS rose in al-Qaeda, it was kind of
dumbfounded. Al-Qaeda central was these old men in Waziristan.
But the franchises have learned, they have adapted, some better
and some worse. The Nusra Front has been in the forefront of
being smart, creative, and planning really, really well.
Obviously, and by the way, the fall of Aleppo, one thing
that of course it does is it discredits the West, it discredits
the United States, and it simplifies both for the two best
worst actors' remaining standing, the Assad regime on the one
hand and ISIS on the other. That is actually good for them and
it is bad for us.
Mr. Keating. That is a terrible choice.
Just quickly, Dr. Swift.
Mr. Swift. Ranking Member Keating, I wanted to go back and
ask, point out a broader issue about the map. I think when we
look at this particular map we have to distinguish between
ISIS' ambitions and their operations, and then we need to
distinguish between their operations and their traction.
Traction requires building roots in a society, knowing
where the bodies are buried, how to raise money, who the
stakeholders are, who the political players are, what tribes to
interface with. And if you look at what some of the most
successful al-Qaeda successor organizations have done, they
have really built themselves into whatever the local political,
social and economic framework was in a particular place. That
is the localization of global jihad that makes it possible for
these organizations to do things that al-Qaeda and other
transnational terrorist syndicates were never able to do.
When we are looking at where ISIS is going and what it can
do, we really need to be looking at how far it has dug into the
societies where it is operating versus the light touch or the
ambition we see in their messaging, and break that down very
consistently.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. I am going to yield back. My time
is over. But I hope that threat can be picked up by other
members' questions because that is very important. Thank you.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Cook.
Mr. Cook. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am going to switch gears
a little bit. And I understand, by the way, it is a great
hearing and everything, but why San Bernardino? I mean, in
terms of the impact on it, it just seems--I could understand a
military base. I can understand a hospital. But going into a
county building and killing 14 people, they are certainly going
to have all of San Bernardino County and the city, probably 99
percent of them, they might have been neutral on some of these
issues but now to do that and particularly in an area where we
have had some success where the different agencies have worked
together as opposed to other states, cities, where it was very
disjointed.
And as I said, I thought the police response was good. Even
though 14 died, I think it could have been in the hundreds if
it was a different objective. And could you just comment on
that?
General Keane. Well, I think all the three of us can do is
speculate, but yes, there are certainly more vulnerable
targets, greater targets for them to access. There has to be
some relationship with the fact that Farook was an employee
there, and I would suspect the relationship there was in the
equation in making the decision. Familiarity is another.
But certainly there are other targets that would have had a
significantly greater impact--thank God. And also, I think we
all know also, because the police and the FBI reported it, they
did intend to kill more people with the bombs that they had,
but fortunately they did not go off.
Mr. Cook. General, I agree with you. And you had made a
comment about intelligence, and I am not sure if I have a warm
and fuzzy feeling. I understand national intelligence and
everything else, but some of these things, getting down to
local agencies in terms of--and any threat assessment is real,
real iffy, but if I am somebody down there in the San
Bernardino Police Department or the sheriff's department, I am
interested if there is a threat on a terrorist activity,
whether it is radical Islam, neo-Nazi, you name it, whether we
can take action. Do you have any recommendations or suggestions
on that?
General Keane. Well, you are moving out of my expertise,
but in dealing with law enforcement leaders, I mean, clearly,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as many of our
major cities have very good intelligence systems. I think when
you get beyond some of that and I believe that is what you are
talking about, then there are issues there certainly.
And every time I have had a problem like this in the United
States military, what I have always thrown at that problem is
training and education and it usually has a payoff. So we have
the expertise and we have got to get that expertise out to
others, and certainly there is no lack of motivation and how
you build effective intelligence systems and what the cues are,
et cetera, and I think we can do that. But there is a problem.
Mr. Cook. Do you think it gets down to that level or do we
need to do that? Because my experience, sometimes it is
classified, we can't talk to you about this or it is too
compartmentalized. And I don't know whether that would solve
the problem or at least give them a warning, because it is
going to happen again someplace. We have had it in Boston and
some other place, and I am just wondering whether we have got
to do that.
General Keane. Well, I mean, it shouldn't surprise us when
you get beyond major urban centers where they have the
resources to be able to put together, actually, intelligence
systems--obviously New York is the most notable--that smaller
sheriff's departments are not going to have that resource. But
also what they have is human intelligence because they are on
the ground out there.
And I think the awareness that we are trying to build in
this country, when you see something say something and work
through the issues that the FBI has reported out that 80
percent of the school shootings and terrorist activities that
have taken place in our country, the shooters have spoken to
somebody about what they were going to do before they executed
the act. So that means there is intelligence out there. Now
whether we can educate the public enough so that peers, family
members, those in the circle of relationships are willing to
come forward is another issue.
Mr. Cook. Dr. Swift, you were going to comment real quick.
Mr. Swift. Representative Cook, I have had the pleasure
working in fusion centers when I was doing financial
intelligence at the Treasury Department and also the pleasure
of advising joint terrorism task forces on some of these
issues. There were two questions you asked, sir. The first, why
San Bernardino, and the second, what can we do about it?
So the answer to the first question is the adversary picks
the fight. They pick the weapon and the pick the terrain. And
when you are dealing with inspired violence as opposed to
directed violence, the terrain is going to be where the person
who is inspired and self-motivated happens to find themselves.
The weapon is going to be what they can acquire in that place,
and the target is going to be whoever they think is the most
appropriate target given those circumstances.
So when we are dealing with the self-radicalization
phenomenon as opposed to something that is directed, it could
be anywhere because what matters is not the direction that a
command and control system is providing, but what exists in the
mind of the person who is creating the act.
Mr. Cook. Thank you. I have got to yield back. They are
giving me that evil eye.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There was a hearing
earlier today in Foreign Affairs where it was disclosed that in
the past year ISIS has had their footprint reduced in both Iraq
and Syria. Iraq it was 40 percent, Syria it was 10 percent,
with excessive air strikes led by the United States.
But what is, I think, most disturbing, and I think, General
Keane, you had alluded to it is, is ISIS' introduction to the
African continent. And there is a lot of instability to exploit
in the African continent. There are 55 countries, the newest of
which is South Sudan. There are more failed states in that
continent than anywhere else, and as you also made reference
to, its close proximity to Europe.
And when you look at the United States, I think we have
done, again law enforcement and others have done a good job in
integrating the Arab Muslim community. It is not the case in
most European countries. In fact, Muslims make up about 10
percent of the French population, but they represent about 70
percent of the prison population. That is a disaffected group.
That is a group that is ripe for radicalization.
So just if you could elaborate a little bit further on your
concerns about the African continent and the ISIS presence in
Libya, I think that would be very helpful to us.
General Keane. Thank you. Well, clearly--by the way, ISW
produces this map but this is ISIS' map. This is their graphics
not ours. And clearly they are interested in North Africa and
they are putting resources into it. I believe part of that is
Egypt and part of that is also Europe. I believe they are going
to continue to put those resources in there unless we counter
them.
And remember, when they go into Europe they are very
sensitive to what you just suggested; that there are Muslim
communities in Europe that are not assimilated and they really
want to foment the Muslim and non-Muslim divide. They want to
take advantage of it. That is the apocalyptic event that they
are describing. They bring Europe--in their minds; this is
their goal--to a calamitous war based on that divide.
And one of the things that we must do in our own country
and also in Europe is not overreact to this threat. What I mean
by that is over-policing, taking away people's civil liberties,
creating the sense of alienation in communities. We have got to
be careful about how we deal with this.
So when the French President stands up and he is proud of
the fact that he has conducted 800, 800 raids into Muslim
communities, well, on the surface of that that sounds like a
good thing. But I am willing to speculate that most of those
raids did not yield much of anything, and yet he is busting
down doors where kids are living and families are living and
the rest of it.
I mean, we have the scars of this ourselves in the United
States military because we were doing that in the beginning
when we were dealing with al-Qaeda and the Sunni insurgency in
Iraq and we learned quickly from our mistakes. But that is
exactly what ISIS wants. They want this overreaction. They want
over-policing. They want them to take civil liberties away.
They want that sense of alienation in Muslim communities to
grow and fester to the point where more people are willing to
take up arms.
So they are very interested in Europe because they want to
take advantage of what is taking place there in those Muslim
communities that do feel a sense of isolation. That is what
they are about in going to Europe.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from New York. The gentleman
from California, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. This hearing's title focuses us on ISIS. There
is also the Shiite alliance headed by Tehran including
Hezbollah, Assad and many of the forces in the Baghdad
government. And I believe that that Shiite alliance is more
dangerous. I think, General Keane, you agreed with that. They
have killed more Americans starting with our Marines in Beirut,
and including those they killed with IEDs given to the Taliban
and given to forces fighting against us in Iraq. And just the
Assad wing of that alliance--and I should mention the alliance
also includes the Houthi in Yemen--but just the Assad wing has
killed perhaps 200,000 innocent Sunnis. So they have killed
more Arab civilians, they have killed more Americans.
But I think the chief difference is when ISIS kills 50
people they put it on YouTube. When Assad, he murders 1,000
civilians, he has the good taste to deny it. And so of course
we are focused on ISIS as being the enemy and the great evil.
Twitter has announced that they are going after sites that
are being used to recruit. They used to do a much worse job
than Facebook; they are now apparently getting better.
Gentlemen, I don't know if you have had enough time, because it
has been a recent announcement, but do any of you have an
opinion on whether Facebook and especially Twitter is going a
good job in interrupting terrorist recruitment?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Fernandez. Yes, sir. This is something that both
when I was in the government and now at the Middle East Media
Research Institute we study very closely. Facebook has actually
led in efforts to clean up those platforms that it has, so it
has really been a leader. We have seen that over the past year
in kind of policing itself rather well.
Twitter was the happy hunting ground of ISIS a year ago. I
remember in government it was basically a completely unpoliced
state. They have taken these steps very recently. It is not the
solution, but it is a very large step in the right direction
and they are to be applauded for that.
Mr. Sherman. So if Facebook has done a----
Ambassador Fernandez. Great job.
Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Great job, what phrase should
today's Twitter deserves?
Ambassador Fernandez. I would give them a C+.
Mr. Sherman. Ah, okay. I am going to move to the topic we
dealt with at the full committee and that is defeating ISIS
where it is, because the existence of a caliphate, even if one
that is shrunk, is an inspiration to demented minds in Paris,
San Bernardino and elsewhere.
General, in World War II we carried out a serious strategic
bombing campaign. And I was told by the French Ambassador we
killed 90,000 French civilians in occupied Europe and yet we
were greeted as liberators when we arrived. Yet our approach to
strategic efforts against ISIS' economics and war building
capacity is very different. For example, in the testimony today
the administration did not disagree with the decision of the
Iraqi Government to provide free electricity to Mosul and other
areas controlled by ISIS. I don't remember us trying to provide
free electricity, fuel or food to occupied Europe during World
War II.
There is also, up until recently, ISIS has been paying
persons who live in ISIS area and are subject to their
taxation. I don't remember Charles de Gaulle parachuting bank
notes into occupied France in order to pay people working for
the government there.
And then of course we have had the zero--that we heard the
testimony today that when it comes to hitting their tanker
trucks, which allow them to sell petroleum, we are only willing
to bomb the tanker trucks if we find them parked with the
drivers away. We are not willing to hit the tanker trucks while
they are moving because that would kill the driver or might
endanger the driver.
What language would we be speaking here today if during
World War II we had not hit any Nazi train or truck unless it
was parked?
General Keane. Well, I know. I mean, you are frustrated
with that, the absurdity of all of it. Look at it. We live in
literally different times and our values have shifted.
Roosevelt and Churchill made a decision as you well know that
it was not enough to defeat the German army and the Nazi
military force. They believed they had to defeat the German
people so it would not give rise to this kind of behavior for a
third time in Europe. So we ran continuous bombing campaigns
against major German cities that had no military value.
Mr. Sherman. If I can that is no----
General Keane. We have to put that aside.
Mr. Sherman. I am talking about our bombing of occupied
Europe where we were hitting strategically useful economic
targets in occupied France.
General Keane. When we bombed targets in Europe certainly
we went after their war industry, and certainly most of the
people who were working in their war industry were in fact
civilians. And it is an absurdity that we would not take down
ISIS' economic infrastructure even though civilians are working
in it. That is number one.
Number two, and you alluded to it, the bombing campaign is
different. I mean, even though I am very critical of this
campaign because the rules of engagement is what you just
described, in military terms are overly restrictive, the
President made a policy decision he wanted zero civilian
casualties. He was told that is very unrealistic.
Even though we have the most sophisticated precision
guiding munitions and the most sophisticated system to protect
the loss of civilian life, when you are fighting a war in and
amongst civilians, civilian deaths are not avoidable.
All that said, we go out of our way to avoid civilian
casualties, but the bombing campaign still is not what it
should be. Now when people tell you that in the Gulf War in '91
or in the Gulf War in 2003 or in Afghanistan we did thousands
and thousands of attacks a day, remember what we were doing. We
are going after a nation state's infrastructure which is
largely a physical based system that supports a nation state.
In going after ISIS, most of those structures that they are
using they have civilians in those structures with us and we
know that so we have been unwilling to go after that. That is
why I have been a proponent for a long time of conducting large
scale, special operation forces raids, probably using rangers
to do it, surprise attacks that take down these physical plants
that ISIS is occupying in doing its business, all of the things
that we have described that a safe haven does.
Some risk involved in that. That is direct combat. We have
got the skill sets to do this and we could truly start to
handicap this organization in a way that air power cannot.
Mr. Poe. I thank all three of you for being here. Very
informative, very fascinating. And the committee members may
have some more questions for you and they will put those in
writing and send them to you and then would expect some answers
quickly. So the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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