[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS: DESIGN, LOGISTICS, AND SHIPMENT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 1, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-82
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG WALDEN, Oregon GENE GREEN, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas LOIS CAPPS, California
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
Vice Chairman JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio DORIS O. MATSUI, California
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington KATHY CASTOR, Florida
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey JERRY McNERNEY, California
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky PETER WELCH, Vermont
PETE OLSON, Texas BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia PAUL TONKO, New York
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
BILLY LONG, Missouri Massachusetts
RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina TONY CARDENAS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
BILL FLORES, Texas
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois
Chairman
GREGG HARPER, Vice Chairman PAUL TONKO, New York
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania GENE GREEN, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio LOIS CAPPS, California
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio JERRY McNERNEY, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana TONY CARDENAS, California
BILL FLORES, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina officio)
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hon. John Shimkus, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Illinois, opening statement.................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Paul Tonko, a Representative in Congress from the State of
New York, opening statement.................................... 4
Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Michigan, prepared statement................................... 5
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 5
Witnesses
Christopher Kouts, Managing Partner, Kouts Counseling............ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Edward R. Hamberger, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Association of American Railroads.............................. 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Kelly Horn, Co-Chairman, Midwestern Radioactive Materials
Transportation Committee....................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Answers to submitted questions............................... 99
Robert Quinn, Vice President, Cask and Container Technology,
Energysolutions; Chairman, Spent Fuel Transportation Task
Force, U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure Council..................... 39
Prepared statement........................................... 41
Answers to submitted questions............................... 102
Franklin Rusco, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 46
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Kevin J. Kamps, Radioactive Waste Watchdog, Beyond Nuclear....... 61
Prepared statement........................................... 63
TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIALS: DESIGN, LOGISTICS, AND SHIPMENT
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 1, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy,
Committee on Energy and Commerce
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:54 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John Shimkus,
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shimkus, Harper, Latta, Johnson,
Bucshon, Flores, Tonko, McNerney, and Pallone (ex officio).
Staff Present: Will Batson, Legislative Clerk; Rebecca
Card, Staff Assistant; David McCarthy, Chief Counsel,
Environment and Economy; Chris Sarley, Policy Coordinator,
Environment and Economy; Greg Watson, Legislative Clerk; Andy
Zach, Counsel, Environment and Economy; Jacqueline Cohen,
Minority Senior Counsel; Tiffany Guarascio, Minority Deputy
Staff Director and Chief Health Advisor; Rick Kessler, Minority
Senior Advisor and Staff Director, Energy and Environment;
Aledander Ratner, Minority Policy Advisor, and Timia Crisp,
Minority AAAS Fellow.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN SHIMKUS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
Mr. Shimkus. If I can get the door closed in the back
there, and call this hearing to order and welcome our guests, I
will start recognizing myself for 5 minutes for an opening
statement.
Good morning, and welcome to today's hearing to examine
issues associated with the transportation of nuclear materials.
Annually, over three million packages containing radioactive
material are transported throughout the United States.
Privately shipped items are safely regulated and Federally
overseen by both the U.S. Department of Transportation and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the NRC. The NRC must approve
any package used for shipping nuclear material before shipment.
To secure the necessary approval, the package must be shown to
withstand a series of accident conditions which are
sequentially performed to determine cumulative effects on the
package. The rigorous testing and monitoring of these items
highlights the lack of technical issues to transport nuclear
material.
State authorities also play a key role in the
transportation system by identifying highway routes and
assuring emergency responders are adequately prepared. Regional
organizations such as the Council of State Governments'
midwestern office extensively communicates with the public to
prepare communities. They also provide lessons learned from
historical nuclear transportation activities to continually
improve the radioactive material transportation planning
process and public outreach. The successful track record is a
testament to the established guidelines and system.
The Federal Government also has a significant experience
shipping nuclear material. For example, the Department of
Energy ships spent nuclear fuel from Naval ships to Idaho for
storage and transports radioactive material across the country
for nuclear research and development activities. The DOE has
managed thousands of safe shipments of low level radioactive
waste for disposal in New Mexico, and even disposes of nuclear
material at the Nevada National Security site located directly
adjacent to Yucca Mountain.
However, much of the material that is currently shipped is
less hazardous and in smaller quantities than high-level
radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, and defense nuclear
waste which must be permanently disposed of. Congress directed
DOE to appropriately plan for a transportation campaign to move
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for
permanent disposal when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was signed
into law in 1982. Yet 33 years later, many nuclear experts
recognize transportation may still be the long pole in the
tent.
In 2006, the National Academies of Science published a
comprehensive report including findings and recommendations to
develop and execute a national transportation campaign for
spent nuclear fuel disposal.
In 2012, the Obama administration's Blue Ribbon Commission
evaluated DOE's implementation of these recommendations and
noted much work remains to be accomplished. While DOE has made
limited progress, much of the planning has been undone over the
last 6 years, and DOE now is treading water by conducting only
generic non-site specific planning.
The scale and necessary coordination for shipment will
require persistent effort from Federal, state, local, and
tribal governments, and the private entities. DOE has planned
to transport 3,000 tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel a
year, while the fleet of nuclear power plants continues to
annually generate about 2,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel. A
2008 life cycle system analysis for the Yucca Mountain project
included a $20 billion, 70-year national transportation
campaign.
While Congress potentially considers amending the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, we must evaluate whether marginal safety
gains from temporary consolidating used fuel justifies the
financial cost to transport used fuel twice.
As this committee continues to engage in the conversations
with national stakeholders to identify a path forward for
permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel, I hope DOE revisits
previous recommendations and lays a foundation for a national
campaign.
One constructive step is the recognition to procure a fleet
of rail cars to ship spent fuel. In August, DOE signed a
contract for the design of a rail car that could meet the
Association of American Railroads' requirements for
transporting spent fuel and high-level waste. However, after
the prototype rail car is acquired, it still must undergo
rigorous testing to demonstrate performance.
DOE estimates that overall timeframe for the development of
the entire train system is 7 to 9 years. That lead time is a
reminder Congress and the DOE must remain attentive to
comprehensive issues associated with used fuel management
policy.
Today we will hear from expert stakeholders about the
experience we have in moving nuclear fuel, such as engaging
with State and local stakeholders to share information,
identify routes, and train emergency responders. We will hear
DOE's previous activities and discuss the next steps for the
Department to implement.
I thank all of our witnesses for being here today, and now
I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Tonko, for his open
statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Shimkus follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. John Shimkus
Annually, over three million packages containing
radioactive material are transported throughout the United
States. Privately shipped items are safely regulated and
federally overseen by both the U.S. Department of
Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
NRC must approve any package used for shipping nuclear material
before shipment. To secure the necessary approval, the package
must be shown to withstand a series of accident conditions
which are sequentially performed to determine cumulative
effects on the package. The rigorous testing and monitoring of
these items highlights the lack of technical issues to
transport nuclear material.
State authorities also play a key role in the
transportation system by identifying highway routes and
assuring emergency responders are adequately prepared Regional
organizations, such as the Council of State Governments
Midwestern Office, extensively communicates with the public to
prepare communities.
They also provide ``lessons learned'' from historical
nuclear transportation activities to continually improve the
radioactive material transportation planning process and public
outreach. The successful track record is a testament to the
established guidelines and system.
The Federal government also has significant experience
shipping nuclear material. For example, the Department of
Energy (DOE) ships spent nuclear fuel from naval ships to Idaho
for storage and transports radioactive material across the
country for nuclear research and development activities. DOE
has managed thousands of safe shipments of low-level
radioactive waste for disposal in New Mexico and even disposes
of nuclear material at the Nevada National Security Site,
located directly adjacent to the Yucca Mountain site.
However, much of the material that is currently shipped is
less hazardous and in smaller quantities than high-level
radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, and defense nuclear
waste which must be permanently disposed of. Congress directed
DOE to appropriately plan for a transportation campaign to move
spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste for
permanent disposal when the Nuclear Waste Policy Act was signed
into law in 1982. Yet 33 years later, many nuclear experts
recognize transportation may still be the ``long pole in the
tent.''
In 2006, the National Academies of Science published a
comprehensive report, including findings and recommendations,
to develop and execute a national transportation campaign for
spent nuclear fuel disposal. In 2012, the Obama
Administration's Blue Ribbon Commission evaluated DOE's
implementation of these recommendations and noted much work
remains to be accomplished. While DOE had made limited
progress, much of the planning has been undone over the last
six years and DOE now is treading water by conducting only
generic, nonsite specific planning.
The scale and necessary coordination for shipment will
require a persistent effort from Federal, State, local, and
tribal governments and private entities. DOE had planned to
transport 3,000 tons of commercial spent nuclear fuel a year,
while the fleet of nuclear power plants continues to annually
generate about 2,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel. A 2008 life
cycle system analysis for the Yucca Mountain Project included a
$20 billion, 70-year National Transportation Campaign.
While Congress potentially considers amending the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, we must evaluate whether marginal safety
gains from temporarily consolidating used fuel justifies the
financial costs to transport used fuel twice. As this Committee
continues to engage in conversations with national stakeholders
to identify a path forward for permanent disposal of spent
nuclear fuel, I hope DOE revisits previous recommendations and
lays the foundation for a national campaign.
One constructive step is the recognition to procure a fleet
of railcars to ship spent fuel. In August, DOE signed a
contract for the design of a railcar that could meet the
Association of American Railroads requirements for transporting
spent fuel and high-level waste. However, after the prototype
railcar is acquired, it still must undergo rigorous testing to
demonstrate performance. DOE estimates the overall timeframe
for the development of the entire train system is seven to nine
years. The lead time is a reminder Congress and DOE must remain
attentive to comprehensive issues associated with used fuel
management policy.
Today, we will hear from expert stakeholders about the
experience we have in moving nuclear material, such as engaging
with state and local stakeholders to share information,
identify routes, and train emergency responders.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL TONKO, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning. And good
morning to our witnesses. Thank you for participating in the
hearing this morning. It is valuable input.
Transportation of nuclear waste certainly is a vital
component of any long-term storage program. There has been a
great deal of discussion about the challenges and the delays of
construction of a long-term storage site at Yucca Mountain. But
significant challenges remain in the planning for
transportation of this waste, both technical and social.
As I understand it, additional work is needed to develop
casks that are sufficiently robust to ensure this waste will be
transported safely from individual generation facility sites to
the permanent storage area.
We have transported nuclear waste. That is true. But I
think we will hear today that some of this waste requires
special handling over and above what is needed for the waste
that moves today. And then there is public acceptance. This is
probably an even bigger challenge than the technical matters at
hand. I think the current public concern and opposition to the
drastic increase in transportation of oil by rail offers a
small window into this problem. And we have been transporting
oil by rail and by pipeline for a much longer time than we have
for spent fuel from nuclear plants.
Many of my constituents, as well as the state and local
governments, do not believe that we are taking adequate safety
precautions with the transportation of oil. And they are asking
for better, safer rail cars for this cargo that is passing
through numerous populated areas and vital land and water
resources. Their demands for safe transit pathways and secure
transport containers will be even more insistent. And I believe
they are right in these demands.
Much of the remaining work to devise an acceptable, safe
process for moving this waste will fall to the U.S. Department
of Transportation. And obviously there is also an ongoing role
for our Department of Energy as well. State and local
governments will need to be very involved in these discussions
as plans move forward also. And all of these tasks need to be
done regardless of whether we decide to establish some interim
sites or not.
So, the message is we have a lot of work to do. Again, I
thank the witnesses for being here this morning. I look forward
to your testimony, and hopefully we can move forward.
With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.
I have a statement for the record that we would submit from
the chairman of the committee, Mr. Upton. Without objection, so
ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton
Transportation is a critical component of our national
responsibility to safely handle and dispose of spent nuclear
fuel and high-level nuclear waste from our nuclear national
defense programs.
Spent nuclear fuel is stored at 75 sites around the country
including on the shoreline of Lake Michigan at both the Cook
and Palisades plants. Sixteen of the 80 sites no longer
generate electricity and await repurposing for community use or
commercial development. Unfortunately, these sites cannot be
put to use until the spent fuel has been shipped away.
The experts testifying today bring important perspectives.
Among them are the states, which have primary authority for
highway safety and community protection; the railroad industry,
which develops technical standards for transporting nuclear
materials, and understands system capacity limitations; and a
former federal official who has literally lived the history of
planning for transportation of spent fuel and high-level
defense waste.
Whether we authorize temporary away-from-reactor storage,
focus on finishing out the permanent repository, or pursue both
simultaneously, we must address the underlying transportation
issues. There are many issues and questions to take into
consideration and we must work to understand them in order to
build an efficient and effective transportation system.
How quickly can the federal government start shipping spent
fuel? What are the repackaging issues? Is the railroad designed
to ship spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste? What
are the state and local stakeholders' primary concerns? Are the
obstacles technical, institutional, or political? I hope
today's hearing will answer some of these questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Does anyone else on the majority side seek
time?
Seeing none, the chair now recognizes the ranking member of
the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 made the
transportation and long-term storage of nuclear waste the
responsibility of the Secretary of Energy. The subcommittee has
held several hearings on long-term storage, but has been less
focused on transportation issues. No matter what site or
combination of sites are eventually chosen for storage,
transportation issues will have to be addressed. So I welcome
the opportunity to focus on those issues today.
Over the last decades as political fights have brewed over
Yucca Mountain and its alternatives, spent nuclear fuel has
generally been left onsite at the nuclear power reactors where
it has been generated. It is stored in cooling pools and then
eventually in dry casks. For many communities around nuclear
power plants, this onsite storage raises serious concerns, and
as the inventory of spent fuel stored on site grows, so do
those concerns.
In New Jersey, we have several operating nuclear reactors
that provide carbon-free electricity. This includes Oyster
Creek, the Nation's oldest operating plant which will soon stop
providing power but will continue to provide a home to spent
nuclear fuel until a long-term plan for managing nuclear waste
is finalized. Like the challenge of siting permanent and
interim repositories, the challenge of transporting nuclear
waste involves both technical and societal concerns.
Transportation must be done safely with robust protections,
even in the case of intentional malevolent acts and exceptional
accidents.
Technical issues include the suitability of storage casks
for transportation, safety of transporting high burnt-up fuel,
and the safety of repackaging spent fuel currently in storage
onsite. The Department of Energy and stakeholders must work
together to address these technical issues. But addressing the
technical concerns is not enough. Transportation must also be
done with public acceptance, which can only be built with
transparency and outreach. And I think all levels of
government, state, local, and tribal, must be involved for
these efforts to be successful. And I expect the witnesses on
today's panel to agree.
So again, I thank the chairman and our ranking member, Mr.
Tonko, for convening this panel, and I look forward to the
witnesses.
I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time.
Now the chair likes to again formally or informally welcome
you all to the hearing. We have got a big panel. Your full
statement is in the record. You have 5 minutes. We are not
going to be, obviously, militant about the time, but when the
red light pops up, if you can know to start summing up. And I
will just introduce you as your time to speak is.
So, first starting from my left, your right, we have Mr.
Christopher Kouts, managing partner of Kouts Consulting. Sir,
you are recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF CHRISTOPHER KOUTS, MANAGING PARTNER, KOUTS
COUNSELING; EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS; KELLY HORN, CO-
CHAIRMAN, MIDWESTERN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION
COMMITTEE; ROBERT QUINN, VICE PRESIDENT, CASK AND CONTAINER
TECHNOLOGY, ENERGYSOLUTIONS; CHAIRMAN, SPENT FUEL
TRANSPORTATION TASK FORCE, U.S. NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE COUNCIL;
FRANKLIN RUSCO, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT,
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND, KEVIN KAMPS,
RADIOACTIVE WASTE WATCHDOG, BEYOND NUCLEAR
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER KOUTS
Mr. Kouts. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member
Tonko, and members of the subcommittee. I am Christopher Kouts,
former principal deputy director and acting director of the
Department of Energy's Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste
Management, OCRWM. I appreciate the invitation to appear before
the subcommittee to provide my perspective on high-level
radioactive waste materials transportation planning.
As background, for 25 years I served in various technical
and management positions in virtually every program area within
OCRWM. In those positions I was responsible for nuclear waste
transportation, interim storage, disposal, systems analysis, as
well as activities related to the management of the standard
contract with nuclear utilities. I became the principal deputy
director of the program in 2007, and was the acting director
from 2009 until I retired in early 2010 after 35 years of
Federal service. The program was terminated later in 2010 by
the current administration after nearly 30 years of existence;
a program established by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,
as amended, the NWPA.
The transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste materials has been safely undertaken both
nationally and internationally for over 40 years. The
containers within which the materials are carried are the most
robust in the commercial transport world. The designs for
transportation casks must be certified by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the NRC, to meet rigorous standards that
encompass, with safety margins, the envelope of potential
accidents that a railway or trail carrier could experience.
Over the long history of high-level waste shipments, there have
been accidents, but none of those accidents released
radioactive materials.
The routing of truck and rail shipments is well understood
and well practiced. Truck shipment routing is regulated by the
U.S. Department of Transportation, DOT, which requires that the
shipments must be routed primarily on the Interstate highway
system unless State-designated alternatives are submitted to
DOT. Since railway lines are privately owned, railroad carriers
coordinate across various rail lines to determine routing
between the point of origin and the destination.
Planning for spent fuel transportation campaigns to an
interim storage facility or geologic repository will require
continued effort for more than a decade before a facility is
planned to begin operation. Procuring the necessary
transportation casks, rail cars, truck trailers and other
equipment will require sustained and adequate funding to assure
that the necessary equipment will be available and tested to
meet the shipping rates required for the receiving facility.
The greatest challenge regarding transportation planning in
the current highly uncertain policy environment is to discern
what level of activities are appropriate given the status of
the development of the receiving facility. Two of the obvious
critical needs of meaningful transportation planning are
knowledge of the point of origin and knowledge of the
destination point for the shipments.
In this case, the points of origin are well known. Focusing
on commercial spent nuclear fuel, approximately 74,000 tons are
currently being stored at 73 sites in 33 States. However, no
amount of transportation planning can overcome the lack of a
definitive destination for these shipments. Until this
administration came into office, this Nation had a potential
destination for commercial spent fuel and defense high-level
radioactive waste that had been under study for over 35 years,
Yucca Mountain.
The Yucca Mountain site was developed in accordance with
the requirements of the carefully crafted NWPA. The site
underwent nearly 20 years of intense scientific site
characterization, was recommended to the President in 2002 for
further development, and was approved by Congress that same
year, overriding the statutorily submitted notice of
disapproval by the Governor of Nevada, and was well into the
NWPA-mandated 3-year license review process by the NRC when the
project was halted.
The administration tells us that a pilot spent fuel interim
storage facility will be available for shut-down reactors in
2021, a larger interim storage facility in 2025, and a new
geologic repository in 2048. Yet the required legislation for
implementing those facilities is not even on the horizon for
enactment, making those dates notional at best and fantasy at
worst. Over 30 years of experience tells me that the most
certain path for the Nation to find an eventual destination for
these materials is already in place and has been since 1982.
The only ingredients we lack are the leadership and the resolve
to make it happen.
Thank you for this opportunity to discuss these issues, and
I would be pleased to answer questions the subcommittee might
have at this time.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kouts follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Now I would like to turn to Mr. Edward
Hamberger?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shimkus. I messed up Kouts' name. So I want to make
sure I get that right.
President and chief executive officer of the Association of
American Railroads. Again, you are welcome and recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Tonko. On behalf of the members of the Association of American
Railroads, thank you for the opportunity to be here this
morning to discuss the transportation of spent nuclear fuel.
Before I get into my prepared remarks, I would like to
thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you, Congressman Flores, for your
early co-sponsorship of H.R. 3651, the Positive Train Control
Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015, which I hope will
see the House floor perhaps as early as next week. Thank you.
If policymakers determine that it is in the public interest
for meaningful amounts of spent nuclear fuel to be transported
to one or more repositories, railroads will most likely be
called upon to handle most of those movements. The Department
of Energy has long indicated its preference for using rail to
transport spent nuclear fuel, and the Yucca Mountain project
had formally established a mostly rail policy before the
program was cancelled.
In 2006, the National Academy of Sciences Committee
reaffirmed the preference for using rail, saying that it,
``strongly endorses DOE's decisions to ship spent fuel and
high-level waste to the Federal repository by mostly rail using
dedicated trains.'' And in January 2012, the Transportation and
Storage Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's
nuclear future repeated the National Academy's point to,
``mostly rail has clear advantages.''
The preference for rail is based predominantly on safety.
Nothing is more important to railroads than our safety, and the
industry's commitment to safety is reflected in safety
statistics from the Federal Railroad Administration. The train
accident rate in 2014 was the lowest ever, down 80 percent from
1980, and down 44 percent from 2000. Rail safety extends to
hazardous materials as well. In fact, railroads are the safest
mode for transporting hazardous materials.
In 2014, 99.999 percent of rail hazmat shipments reached
their destination without a release caused by a train accident.
Rail hazmat accident rates in 2014 were down 95 percent since
1980, and 66 percent since 2000. Although no firm in any
industry can guarantee that it will never suffer an accident,
the railroads' overall safety record should give this
committee, and hopefully the public, confidence in the rail
transport of spent nuclear fuel if policymakers decide that the
public interest requires its transportation.
Railroads recognize that public concern over radioactive
materials requires that all parties involved in the transport
take special measures to ensure safe movement. In particular,
the Departments of Energy and Defense, as shippers of the spent
nuclear fuel, the NRC and Department of Transportation, as the
regulators of the safety aspects of hazmat transport, and of
course the railroads themselves must work together to design
the safest possible transportation system for spent nuclear
fuel.
That system must include the use of dedicated trains. That
is, trains with no other freight than spent nuclear fuel
carefully monitored and traveling directly from origin to
destination. Dedicated trains offer numerous safety advantages
that would reduce the already very small possibility of an
accident involving spent nuclear fuel. Advantages of dedicated
trains include, eliminating the need to switch the shipments in
rail yards, the ability to use cars with special safety
features designed to handle the extreme weight of spent nuclear
fuel shipments, and reduce time in transit. Dedicated trains
can be transported with greater security. Escorts which are
required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for all spent
nuclear fuel movements are able to monitor the spent fuel much
more easily on dedicated trains than in general freight
service.
Equipment standards for spent nuclear fuel trains are
exceedingly stringent. As we have just heard from Mr. Kouts and
will later hear from Mr. Quinn, spent fuel requires transport
in massive steel casks that are several feet in diameter and
are able to withstand a range of extreme forces.
In addition, the AAR has developed a rail car standard with
special designed features exclusively for spent nuclear fuel.
Many of the issues surrounding the transportation of spent
nuclear fuel and other high-level wastes are controversial. And
many issues remain to be resolved. What isn't controversial is
that the transportation of spent nuclear fuel requires extreme
care. If policymakers determine that a single or several
regional repositories for spent nuclear fuel are in the public
interest, the railroads stand ready to work with the relevant
entities on all issues regarding its transportation.
Railroads are confident they can provide the necessary
level of care. But doing so will require close cooperation and
extensive planning involving DOE, DOT, state and local
governments, and others if safety and security is to be
maximized. One example of that is this past summer we were
pleased to host the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board at our
transportation technology center in Pueblo, Colorado, where we
were able to demonstrate some of the new technologies we are
working on to improve safety at our emergency response training
center, which would be available for training for spent nuclear
fuel as well.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. The State of Illinois has a new
administration. So I think I am welcoming the first member from
the new administration in Illinois to testify before a
committee in the House of Representatives.
So being from Illinois, I am particularly pleased to
welcome Mr. Kelly Horn from the Illinois Emergency Management
Agency, co-chairman of the Midwestern Radioactive Materials
Transportation Committee, Council of State Governments. We are
glad to have you here, and you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF KELLY HORN
Mr. Horn. Thank you. Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member
Tonko, members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the great
State of Illinois and the Council of State Governments,
Midwestern Radioactive Materials Transportation Committee,
thank you for inviting me to talk about the transportation of
spent fuel and the important roles that states have in this
matter. My testimony today is strictly for informational
purposes.
As a region, the Midwest has a very large stake in the
future Federal program to transport spent fuel from commercial
nuclear power plants. As noted in my written testimony, we have
a large nuclear fleet and a sizeable inventory of spent fuel in
storage. In addition, our geographical location makes it likely
we will be affected by shipments traveling from other regions
to any site for waste management.
Transporting the spent fuel is not a new concept. As a
Nation, we have been doing it safely for the past 40 years. The
U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission have primary oversight for spent fuel
shipments. Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the U.S.
Department of Energy is responsible for moving commercial spent
fuel to authorized facilities. States are involved because we
are co-regulators of transportation. We bear the primary
responsibility for protecting the public health, safety, and
environment, as well as enforcing State-specific laws with
regards to shipments. We are responsible for training emergency
personnel and serve as the intermediary between Federal and
local governments.
Several States including Illinois have experience with
spent fuel shipments on a small scale. However, since 1999,
many states have gained firsthand experience with the very
large national program to move a different type of radioactive
waste, transuranic, or TRU waste, from defense-related
facilities. The Department of Energy disposes of TRU waste at
its Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, WIPP, outside of Carlsbad, New
Mexico. As noted by the National Academies and others, the WIPP
transportation program is a good model for a national spent
fuel transportation program because it is large, complex,
highly successful, and has the support and buy-in of affected
states and tribes.
While WIPP is a good model, there are many differences
between the TRU waste shipments and spent fuel shipments that
go beyond just the type of material being shipped. One critical
difference is the Federal assistance available to states and
tribes. Section 180(c) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and
16(d) of the Land Withdrawal Act, both require Federal
financial and technical assistance for states and tribes that
will be affected by shipments. Section 180(c) refers to this
assistance being intended for training, and DOE has interpreted
this provision very narrowly.
Grants that may be available someday under Section 180(c)
are not likely to allow states to recoup operational costs. In
contrast, Section 16(d) of the Land Withdrawal Act refers to
transportation programs, thereby allowing states to do more
than just train. We have the flexibility to effectively manage
and mitigate all impacts we experience from WIPP shipments.
A second difference between TRU waste shipments and spent
fuel shipments is that DOE will transport spent fuel mostly by
train, whereas WIPP shipments travel solely by highway. For
WIPP shipments, the states conduct rigorous safety inspections
following the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance Level VI
enhanced inspection procedure. The DOT-required Level VI
inspection identifies the items to be checked, standardizes the
process for logging findings and sharing results, and assures
accountability from a duly certified state inspector who
performs the inspection.
For rail shipments of spent fuel, we do not yet have an
enhanced reciprocal inspection program analogous to what we
have for trucks. Another impact of mode-related difference is
that states have the authority to designate routes for highway
shipments of radioactive material, but we do not have the
authority over routes for rail.
The states recognize that the public will hold large-scale
shipments of spent fuel to a higher standard than that of other
DOE shipments. And so we feel strongly DOE must adopt
reasonable measures to minimize public risk and maximize public
confidence in the transportation program. These measures
include, but are not limited to, state involvement in route
identification, the development of a reciprocal rail inspection
program, and a financial support system for a transportation
safety program that is consistent with the WIPP model.
All these elements have DOE's TRU waste transportation
program become the model it is today. The states believe DOE
will need to implement, at a minimum, the same elements in
order to achieve the goal of transporting spent fuel in a
manner that is safe, secure, efficient, and merits public
confidence.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the great State of Illinois and
the Council of State Governments, Midwestern Radioactive
Materials Transportation Committee, I thank you for hearing my
testimony.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Horn follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Next we will turn to Mr. Robert Quinn, who is
vice president, Cask and Container Technology Energy Solutions,
chairman of the Spent Fuel Transportation Task Force, U.S.
Nuclear Infrastructure Council. You are recognized for 5
minutes. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT QUINN
Mr. Quinn. OK. Thank you, and good morning. My name is Bob
Quinn. I am the vice president, as you said, of Cask Container
Technology at EnergySolutions, which is a U.S.-based
internationally operating nuclear services company,
specializing in safe recycling, processing, and disposal of
nuclear material. And EnergySolutions is a member company of
the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure Council, which is a leading
business association advocate for new nuclear energy and global
engagement of the U.S. supply chain.
I am currently serving as the chair of the council's spent
nuclear fuel transportation task force, and I must note that my
statements today reflect the consensus views of the council and
the Spent Fuel Transport Task Force, but do not necessarily
reflect the specific views of any individual member, company,
or organization.
Transportation of nuclear materials, including spent
nuclear fuel, is not new or novel, and has, in fact, been done
for the last 70 years with an outstanding safety record. And
for 40 years of that we have been shipping spent fuel. Nuclear
materials are transported on an ongoing basis all over the
world by public highway, rail, barge, ocean vessels, and air.
About three million packages of radioactive materials are
shipped each year in the United States.
Spent fuel shipments from commercial nuclear power plants,
research reactors, and the Navy have been made safely for
decades. The U.S. Navy has completed about 850 shipments
totalling 1.6 million miles of transport. And since the mid-
1970s, there have been over 1,300 safe shipments of commercial
spent fuel in the United States. Between 1990 and 2012, 60
shipments, including more than 250 transportation casks of
foreign research reactor fuel have been shipped to and within
the United States by sea, land, and air. Shipments continue
today.
Just recently two shipments arrived at Savannah River.
There is a long history of safe, successful transportation of
spent fuel globally as well. Over 70,000 metric tons of spent
fuel have been transported by road, rail, and sea within and
among the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Japan, and
other nations. In all these shipments, there has been no
failure of a package and no release of radioactive materials.
Spent fuel is transported in packages which are also often
referred to as shipping casks that are designed and fabricated
to provide shielding of the radiation that is emitted by the
fuel, and also to prevent the release of radioactive material
even in severe accidents. The standards for the transportation
packages are regulated by Federal law, which is enforced by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for domestic shipments.
For international shipments, there are similar regulations
that are promulgated by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
An independent review of these current international and U.S.
standards and regulations performed by the National Academies,
as documented in their 2006 Going the Distance report,
concluded that these regulations are adequate and proven to
ensure package containment effectiveness during both routine
transport and in severe accidents. And the Blue Ribbon
Commission on America's nuclear energy future also noted that
the standards and regulations for spent fuel transportation are
proven and functioning well.
The regulations require that the demonstration of the
package meet demanding criteria for normal operating and
accident conditions, including impact, fire, submersion, and
puncture resistance before the NRC will certify them for use.
These prescribed hypothetical accident conditions are
challenging and have been demonstrated to be bounding of
realistic real world accident scenarios.
Demonstrations that the regulatory requirements are
satisfied by a package design is done by detailed computer
simulation analyses using state of the art analytical and
modeling tools, and by confirmatory testing of specific
features or details, scale models, or in some cases, even full
scale casks. The NRC review of certification applications for
spent fuel transport casks is extremely thorough, and typically
takes 1 \1/2\ to 2 years to complete. And these certificates
must be renewed every 5 years.
Resulting spent fuel transportation packages that receive
NRC certification are extremely robust, state-of-the-art
containers. They are typically comprised of multiple layers of
steel and radiation shielding. Current generation spent full
casks weigh well in excess of 100 tons. And there have been
extreme demonstrations of the robustness of these packages that
have been performed in the United States and the United Kingdom
showing casks being hit by trains and plowing into solid
concrete bunkers at high rates of speed.
In each of these demonstrations, the casks maintained their
integrity and suffered only superficial damage. The U.S.
Nuclear Infrastructure Council believes that the history of
nuclear materials and spent fuel transportation demonstrates a
commendable safety record. Transportation of nuclear materials,
including spent fuel, is not new or novel. The facts speak for
themselves. For more than 70 years of nuclear material
transport, and 40 years of spent fuel transport in the U.S. and
worldwide, no member of the public has ever been harmed from a
radioactive release.
This is a testament to the effectiveness of the regulatory
requirements and processes which are adequate and well proven,
and the industry's implementation of the regulatory
requirements in partnership with regional and local
governments. The rigorous engineering methods, manufacturing
processes, ongoing operational and periodic maintenance
requirements, and implementing procedures have provided and
will continue to provide assurance of safety of spent fuel
transportation.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Quinn follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Next we will turn to Mr. Franklin Rusco,
director, Natural Resources and Environment with U.S.
Government Accountability Office. You are recognized for 5
minutes. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN RUSCO
Mr. Rusco. Thank you. Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member
Tonko, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here
today to discuss GAO's work on spent nuclear fuel management,
and particularly challenges associated with transporting spent
fuel.
In our past work we have identified three key challenges to
transporting spent nuclear fuel. First, DOE does not have clear
legislative authority for either consolidated interim storage
or for permanent disposal at a site other than Yucca Mountain.
Specifically, provisions in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982, that authorized DOE to arrange for consolidated interim
storage have either expired or are unusable.
For permanent disposal, the amendments to the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982 directed DOE to terminate work on sites
other than Yucca Mountain. Without clear authority, DOE cannot
site an interim storage or permanent disposal facility and make
related site-specific transportation decisions for commercial
spent nuclear fuel.
Second, there are multiple technical challenges to safely
transporting spent nuclear fuel. These challenges can be
resolved, but it will take time and could be costly.
Specifically, there are uncertainties about the safety of
transporting what is considered to be high burn up spent
nuclear fuel, newer fuel that burns longer and at a higher rate
than older fuel because of potential degradation while in
storage. Also, NRC guidelines for dry storage of spent nuclear
fuel allow higher temperatures and external radiation levels
than do guidelines for transportation of such fuel. As a
result, spent nuclear fuel already in dry storage is not
readily transportable without being re-casked.
In addition, the current transportation infrastructure,
particularly for a mostly rail option of transportation, which
is DOE's preferred mode, may not be adequate without procuring
new equipment and costly and time-consuming upgrades on the
rail infrastructure.
Third, and perhaps the most daunting challenge, is
achieving societal acceptance of any plan to move or store
spent nuclear fuel. Specifically, in order for stakeholders and
the general public to support any spent nuclear fuel program,
particularly one for which a site has not yet been identified,
there must be a broad understanding of the issues and risks
associated with management of spent nuclear fuel, as well as
what can be done to mitigate these risks. Also, some
organizations that oppose DOE have effectively used social
media and other means to promote their agendas to the public.
But DOE has no coordinated outreach strategy to reflect their
own views on this.
Given these challenges, it may take many decades to
implement a storage strategy and transport the fuel that will
almost all be in dry storage by then. So the question is what
can DOE and other agencies do to prepare to take possession of
spent nuclear fuel as required by law? With regard to building
societal consensus around transport and storage of spent
nuclear fuel, we believe DOE has authority and should be doing
more public outreach to try to build such consensus.
What else can be done? Can DOE, NRE, and DOT identify spent
nuclear fuel dry storage and transportation options that are
not dependent on a specific interim or permanent storage
strategy, but that will save time and money once the issue of
siting an interim or permanent storage site have been resolved?
Can they ask Congress for authority to pursue such storage site
neutral efforts to resolve technical challenges? Hopefully,
this hearing can begin to answer these questions.
Thank you. This ends my statement. I would be happy to
answer questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rusco follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Last but not least, we have got Mr. Kevin
Kamps, Radioactive Waste Watchdog with Beyond Nuclear. You are
recognized for 5 minutes. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN J. KAMPS
Mr. Kamps. Thank you, Chairman Shimkus, Ranking Member
Tonko, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Kevin Kamps.
I serve as Radioactive Waste Watchdog at Beyond Nuclear based
in Takoma Park, Maryland.
Our country needs to avoid radioactive waste wrecks, both
figurative of policy, as well as literal on our roads, rails,
and waterways. We need to just say no to unwise irradiated
nuclear fuel transport, storage, and disposal schemes that have
more to do with offloading nuclear utilities' liabilities onto
the public than on protecting health, safety, and the
environment.
Transporting high-level radioactive waste by truck, train,
and barge through 45 States and the District of Columbia to the
unsuitable Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site would take unnecessary
risks and violate consent-based and environmental justice
principles.
Yucca is the worst site ever studied for high-level
radioactive waste disposal. It has been kept alive by double
standards. When Yucca can't meet the standards, they are either
weakened or gotten rid of. Yucca is an earthquake and volcanic
zone. If radioactive waste is ever buried there, it will leak
massively into the groundwater, creating a large nuclear
sacrifice zone downstream.
Nevada has not consented to being railroaded into becoming
this country's radioactive waste dump. The Western Shoshone
Indian Nation who live downstream have accused Federal
officials of environmental racism.
Consolidated interim storage also makes no sense. Take
private fuel storage targeted at the Skull Valley Goshutes
Indian reservation in Utah. If that de facto permanent parking
lot dump had ever opened and imported 4,000 casks of
radioactive waste, they would have been returned to sender when
Yucca was cancelled. Fifty casks from Maine would have traveled
5,000 miles roundtrip for nothing.
High-level radioactive waste shipments are potential mobile
Chernobyls. Risks include long-lasting high temperature fires,
as NAS acknowledged in 2006, which could breach shipping
containers and release disastrous amounts of hazardous
radioactivity in heavily populated areas.
Barge shipments on the Great Lakes, California's Pacific
coast, the waters of New Jersey, and numerous other rivers and
seacoasts, including in New York, are potential floating
Fukushimas, risking radioactive contamination of vital drinking
water supplies and the food chain, and even deadly nuclear
criticality accidents if submerged.
A quality assurance meltdown in industry and at NRC
revealed by whistleblowers and accidents adds to the risks of
shipments. Calling into question, as but one example, Holtec
casks' structural integrity sitting still, let alone traveling
60 miles per hour or faster on the rails.
NAS also emphasized that risks of terrorist attacks need to
be addressed. A 1998 test of a TOW anti-tank missile on a
shipping container conducted at the U.S. Army's Aberdeen
Proving Ground showed that casks are potential dirty bombs on
wheels. Combined with an incendiary device, such breaches could
cause a large-scale radioactivity release.
Incredibly, DOE is throwing caution to the wind, proposing
unprecedented liquid high-level radioactive waste truck
shipments from Chaulk River, Ontario, to Savannah River, South
Carolina, with little to no environmental assessment. Even
after the Blue Ribbon Commission heard many calls for
environmental justice, it nonetheless kept Native American
communities on the target list for centralized interim storage.
But as Keith Lewis of the Serpent River First Nation put it,
there is nothing moral about tempting a starving man with
money.
As President Obama honored Grace Thorpe for helping 60
Native communities, six-zero, Native communities, fend off
DOE's parking lot dumps, such radioactive racism must stop.
Through sheer luck, the Los Alamos barrel that burst in the
WIPP underground do not do so while being shipped, or
astronomically costly and hazardous radioactive releases to the
environment and worker or public alpha inhalation doses could
have been much worse. Waste control specialists in Texas, a
lead contender for a parking lot dump, hastily hosted similar
potentially explosive barrels in the open air, which could put
not only the Ogallala Aquifer at risk, but also the radioactive
waste storage targeted at that site.
Savannah River site and Dresden Nuclear Power Plant in
Illinois are also inappropriate targets for parking lot dumps,
as they are already heavily burdened by radioactive
contamination and large-scale radioactive waste storage.
So if Yucca and parking lot dumps are bad ideas, what are
some solutions? We should phase out nuclear power, stop the
generation of high-level radioactive waste, and replace the
electricity and jobs with renewables and efficiency. For the
high-level radioactive waste that already exists, 200 groups
representing all 50 states have been advocating hardened onsite
storage for well over a decade. Vulnerable pools need to be
emptied into quality dry casks that are built to last,
safeguarded against accidents and natural disasters, and
fortified against attacks.
Thank you.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kamps follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Shimkus. Now I will open the round of questions. I will
start by recognizing myself for 5 minutes.
And I would like to start with Mr. Horn, of course, from
the great State of Illinois. Your testimony notes that the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act authorized the Department of Energy to
provide technical assistance and funds to States for training
of public safety officials. Is DOE providing the funding as the
law directs?
Mr. Horn. Mr. Chairman, the way the 180(c) of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act states is that once a site is determined and
states have the opportunity to analyze routing through their
states and determine how affected their state will be, then
they can submit to the DOE a funding mechanism asking for money
under 180(c). So to date, since we do not have a facility to
ship to, states and regional groups are not getting money under
180(c).
Mr. Shimkus. What additional recommendations do you have
for DOE with respect to implementing the provision?
Mr. Horn. Once the 180(c) money and we as States and
affected communities have the ability to petition the Federal
Government for funding, it is the regional office's belief that
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act should mirror that of the Land
Withdrawal Act.
And in my written and oral testimony, I alluded to that. If
we looked at the Land Withdrawal Act, we see that states have a
comprehensive ability to look at their programs and determine
more than just training issues. We have the ability to provide
first responders with equipment. We have the ability to reach
out and do public outreaches to communities along the affected
shipment routes. Where under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
180(c), all we can do is train those first responders. And
although we find that to be very helpful, it does not get us to
where we need to be.
Mr. Shimkus. Would further congressional direction assist
organizations such as yours to be fully prepared for the
transporting of spent fuel?
Mr. Horn. As I stated in my oral testimony, my comments
here today are strictly for informational purposes. However,
with that stated, I would direct you to the Blue Ribbon
Commission study and Section 9.4, which has some very well-
thought-out recommendations, and they took a lot of those
recommendations from state testimony.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
Mr. Kouts, advocates for interim storage often neglect to
acknowledge the complicated efforts associated with a national
transportation campaign. Given your professional experience at
the Department of Energy, if Congress were to pass a bill
authorizing interim storage of used fuel, what is the earliest
that DOE could adequately develop a routing, procure the rail
cars, and ship commercial spent fuel to an interim storage
site?
Mr. Kouts. Well, that is a fascinating question, Mr.
Chairman. And thank you for it. I actually used to do those
kinds of estimates when I was at the Department, and I will--we
used to develop success-oriented schedules. And I will walk you
through the steps in that schedule very quickly. I am going to
make some assumptions about the legislation you pass because
that will be critical in determining the timeframe.
Let's assume for the first piece about the siting of the
facility that Congress would need to approve the site and also
approve any benefits agreement associated with that site
because that would require appropriated funds to be given to
the localities around the site or the State. My sense is that
that would be probably, if we are going at warp speed here,
probably at a 4-year process.
To find the site, and the rage these days is consent-based
siting, to negotiate with them, to get an agreement, to get it
to Congress, and get the Congress approve it. So we are
probably 4 years away from identification from a site.
The next step would be, this is a major Federal action, it
would require an EIS. And since this would be a very
controversial facility, as you can tell from some of the
comments from the panel here, my sense is that warp speed to do
a major EIS would probably be about 4 years. So you are up to
eight right there.
During that same timeframe you could be doing the design of
the facility, you could be doing the preparation of a license
application. And I am going to assume that the legislation also
requires the NRC to review the license.
So at the end of the 8-year period you submit the license
application. I am also going to assume that the legislation
will limit the amount of time that NRC has to review the
license, just as it did with Yucca Mountain. So let's say there
is a 3-year process that the NRC is given, or a 3-year
timeframe. You are up to 11 years.
At that point, assuming that the licensing goes well, you
begin to build the facility. At that point it is probably a 2-
to 3-year construction period. Probably 2 years to construct it
if everything is ready to go on day one, and about a year to
shake it down to make sure everythingis good. So basically you
are at 13 to 14 years, 14 years into the future.
Now let me just say this about these kinds of facilities.
Nothing goes as planned. Back when the people were drafting the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982, they assumed that we would
have an operating repository by January 31, 1998. They thought
16 years was plenty of time to do a repository. OK. So that
turned out to be wrong. And had Yucca Mountain continued, the
earliest we could have started would have been 2021. So
basically there is going to be schedule drift. And since
interim storage facilities are simpler, if you will, than
repositories, I would say you are at least, let's say, a 50
percent schedule drift. So you are anywhere between 14 and 21
years assuming you had legislation today, before that facility
would begin to operate.
Mr. Shimkus. My time is expired.
Now I will turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee,
Mr. Tonko, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Nuclear waste transport is an essential component of any
long-term waste management strategy. Although some on this
panel have suggested that this practice is well established and
understood, large-scale transportation required under a long-
term strategy will pose serious challenges. We must ensure that
this transportation can be done and done safely.
Mr. Rusco, GAO identified several technical challenges for
transporting spent nuclear fuel in its recent study. Would you
please briefly explain some of the remaining technical
challenges involved in repackaging spent fuel from storage
casks to transportation casks?
Mr. Rusco. So much of the spent nuclear fuel now is stored
in dry casks that themselves are designed to be temporary, and
to sit on these pads until an interim site is found, developed,
and then they will have to be re-casked, for shipment. And
while there are casks that have shipped spent nuclear fuel
before, there are different kinds of spent nuclear fuel. As we
get more high burned up fuel that has different
characteristics, it will have to be casked differently than the
other fuel.
One of the main issues is that to re-cask something you
have to have a facility to re-cask it in. And you could use a
wet pool that is on a nuclear power plant facility. But as time
passes and these nuclear facilities close, then they will start
decommissioning. Those pools will be shut down, and at some
point you are going to have to then build a re-casking facility
in order to move these things. These are all things that can be
dealt with, but the clock is ticking, and so the longer it
takes to start that process, the more fuel will be out there
without a ready place to re-cask it.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
In recent years, some reactor operators have used fuel that
is burned longer in the reactor which results in that high burn
up fuel. This spent fuel is both hotter and more radioactive
than other forms of nuclear waste. Are there outstanding
technical questions about how to safely transport that fuel
element, the high burn up fuel?
Mr. Rusco. In our most recent report, we talked to a number
of experts, and they said that there were remaining technical
issues that needed to be resolved. Everyone thinks that they
can be resolved. But no oneis going to invest the amount of
money to do so until there is an actual reason to do it.I21Mr.
Tonko. And do you have additional concerns about the
sufficiency of current infrastructure to support
transportation?
Mr. Rusco. Certainly there will need to be enhancements to
the rail infrastructure if we are to transport fuel from many
of the sites where it currently resides because there is not
sufficient rail infrastructure there at the time. Again, these
are challenges that can be addressed, but they will take time
and money.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you.
In 2006, the National Academies released a report on safe
transport of nuclear waste and raised concerns about severe
accidents which may involve long-duration fires. Mr. Kamps, is
that a theoretical concern or are long-duration train fires a
real possibility?
Mr. Kamps. It is a very real world possibility. So one
example was July of 2001 there was a train without radioactive
waste onboard traveling through the Howard Street Tunnel
downtown Baltimore that caught fire and burned for days. And
the beginning of that fire was very hot. There were toxic
materials that fueled that fire. And a study that was
commissioned by the State of Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects
afterwards looked at the potential what if, hypothetical
question, what if a Holtec transport container with high-level
radioactive waste had been in the middle of that fire? And the
results were shocking and concerning.
Radioactivity would have breached out of that container
over a course of hours, and would have entered that smoke that
was pouring out both ends of the tunnels. Would have inevitably
exposed people at the baseball stadium, living in downtown
Baltimore. And let's see if I can remember the figures. The
latent cancer fatalities that would have been inevitable would
have been counted in the many hundreds. If people continued to
live in contaminated areas in downtown Baltimore for a year,
the number of latent cancer fatalities would have then grown to
something like 1,500.
And this is very expensive to clean up. Billions of
dollars. In fact, $13 billion was the figure for the cleanup
that would have been required. And then if people continued to
live in that contamination for 50 years, five-zero, the
casualties were over 30,000 latent cancer fatalities. And that
is an accidental severe fire.
The fire standards that are applied to these casks go back
many decades. They have never been updated in all those
decades. It is a 30-minute fire at around 1,500 degrees
Fahrenheit. Less than that. This fire burned hotter than that
for a longer period of time. So it is a very serious issue that
the NAS itself documented.
Mr. Tonko. And I would assume that DOE needs to ensure that
transportation casks can withstand such fires?
Mr. Kamps. Well, one would hope. Right now the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission requirements do not require that casks
survive more than 30 minutes in a relatively low-temperature
fire. So real world accident conditions are much more severe
than what these criteria call for.
Mr. Tonko. Thank you. I have gone beyond my time. I
appreciate the chair being tolerant, and with that I yield
back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentlemen yields back his time.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Latta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Latta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks for holding
today's hearing. And to our panelists, thanks very much for
being here.
Mr. Hamberger, if I could start with you, assuming a
permanent repository such as Yucca was given the green light
today, how long do you think it would take to transport the
nuclear waste in the United States to that site in which it was
supposed to store?
Mr. Hamberger. In conversation before the hearing began, I
believe the plan from DOE was to move 3,000 tons a year. So I
don't know how many years it would take to move.
Mr. Kouts. If I could help you with that----
Mr. Latta. Yes, Mr. Kouts.
Mr. Kouts [continuing]. Congressman. Basically, it would
take approximately 24 years to ship all the waste, up to the
statutory limit, which is the 70,000 metric ton limit that
exists in the act today. So the plan was the shipping campaigns
would take 24 years. It would be about two to three train
shipments per week.
Mr. Latta. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger, if I could also follow up with that, does
the rail industry today have the cars available to transport
that much right now?
Mr. Hamberger. I believe that the standard that we adopted
almost 10 years ago, S-2043, is still in development.
So I believe it would be several more years before the car
meeting that standard would be available.
Mr. Latta. OK, Mr. Quinn, the Department of Energy recently
stated it will need at least 7 to 9 years to design and procure
a fleet of rail cars for the spent nuclear fuel shipment.
Again, how long do you estimate it would take for the DOE to
procure those necessary components, do you think, for the
testing and everything else to get that done? Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. Oh, sorry. As far as the transportation casks
themselves, which is what I do for a living, once we have the
specification from the Department of Energy of what casks they
want, it would be about a 1.5- to 2-year effort to get them
designed and to get the safety analysis report and license
application ready to submit to NRC.
It is about another 1.5 to 2 years to get that approval. So
we are up to 3 to 4 years and then we can begin to construct
the casks. Typical casks take about a year to fabricate. So
depending on the size of the fleet that is required, it could
take 2 to 3, or 4 years.
Mr. Latta. Do we have the manufacturing capacity out there
right now to be able to do that?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, there are fabricators in the U.S. and
overseas who have the capability to fabricate these casks.
Mr. Latta. OK, thank you. Mr. Rusco, I found kind of
interesting in your statement that you were talking about the
DOE has no coordinated outreach strategy including social
media. And there is a question it sounds like they are losing
the information war out there in your research, and when you
were looking at this, why is that? Did you ask the question,
``why is that?'' when you were talking to the folks?
Mr. Rusco. I think DOE feels that it doesn't have the
authority to really take on this issue. They feel like they
don't want to get too far down the path of discussing any
specifics about a strategy until they have a consensus with
Congress about where to go with it.
Mr. Shimkus. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Latta. Yes, absolutely, to the chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. So is it true to say to say that DOE doesn't
feel that they have the backing to comply with the law as it is
written today?
Mr. Rusco. I am not sure that is how they would put it,
but----
Mr. Shimkus. That is how I would put it, so I yield back.
Mr. Latta. Thank you very much. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Kouts, if I could go back to you. DOE has five major
computer-based tools to assist in integration and analysis of
spent nuclear fuel storage and transportation programs. Are you
aware if any of these tools has been integrated from the DHS'
highly-developed risk-informed routing model?
Mr. Kouts. I have been briefed on some of the DOE models
that exist, and I don't know the answer to your question. The
model I was briefed on was a tool for stakeholders to route
shipments from point A to point B. And I think it had some work
that still needed to be done, but in terms of the other models,
I really can't comment on.
Mr. Latta. OK, thank you. And Mr. Hamberger, in the last
bit of time that I have, can you discuss the logistics of
transporting nuclear waste by way of rail across the country
from the East Coast or the Midwest to Yucca?
Mr. Kouts. I don't have the specifics of what that route
would be. I would prefer to answer that for the record if I
might.
Mr. Latta. OK. Well, thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman.
My time is expired and I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus [presiding]. The gentleman yields back his
time. The chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
McNerney for 5 minutes.
Mr. McNerney. I thank the chairman. I just want to follow
up on the chairman's comment about the DOE not having the
backing. But the DOE needs the Federal resources allocated and
appropriated by Congress to do that.
Mr. Hamberger, you mentioned about a pretty sophisticated
network to ship nuclear waste including casks and monitoring
the trains and all that. How long would it take if you had the
mandate--would the rail take to do that, how much would it
cost, and would it have to share a cost with the Federal
Government?
Mr. Hamberger. I do not have the cost of the S-2043 car. I
was told in preparation of this hearing it would be several
hundred thousand dollars for each car, but I can, again, try to
get that more specific.
Mr. McNerney. Well, how long would it take to develop that
technology? You had a whole network of----
Mr. Hamberger. Two to three years.
Mr. McNerney. Two to three years. Well, that is pretty
fast. That is a lot faster than we could be ready in terms of a
disposal site.
Mr. Rusco, I want to ask a couple of rhetorical questions,
but you mentioned how important it is for the public acceptance
of the implementation of a relocation plan and the selection of
relocation sites, and routes, and so on. You just affirmed that
those require public acceptance?
Mr. Rusco. Yes, I think a lot of the delays that we have
seen that have gone past the expected completion in past
strategies, particularly with the Yucca Mountain, much of that
was the result of the lack of public acceptance, and I think
transporting nuclear fuel through communities will, you know,
engender some----
Mr. McNerney. It is going to take transparency, I think as
the chairman mentioned. Also, what steps do you think the DOE
should take to build that acceptance? What would it take if we
started today with the DOE? What steps should it take?
Mr. Rusco. Obviously, as many of the witnesses have said
today, we have been shipping nuclear radioactive waste for a
number of decades. And to start with, one would want to examine
that record and to make public what that record is, and how do
we deal with the risks. To identify what the risks are, to be
transparent about them, and to effectively transmit a strategy
for mitigating those risks and stating, you know, how they will
be mitigated.
Mr. McNerney. And it is going to take a certain amount of
resources to do that. Are we talking about just putting stuff
on Web sites, or advertising on billboards, or how would you go
about making the public aware?
Mr. Rusco. I don't have a specific strategy for them. We
really recommended that they develop a strategy for that, and
we are not particularly specific on exactly how.
Mr. McNerney. Well, transportation of nuclear waste is
going to take acceptance at the Federal and at the state level.
Mr. Horn, what do you think the States' role should be in
implementing an outreach strategy?
Mr. Horn. As I stated, the States when material is ready
for transport and we know what routes are going to be affected,
and those communities that are going to be affected, the States
are going to be the intermediary between the Federal Government
and the stakeholders, those local communities.
So we ask that DOE and the Federal Government work in a
cooperative, consultative manner with the states, and the
states can be that intermediary between the two and we can go
out and work with the local communities and do the training,
the public outreach. We could be that tool that allows that
message to be conveyed.
Mr. McNerney. That is a pretty good role. States have
better acceptance than the Feds in many communities. That is
for sure.
Let's see. Mr. Kamps, I had a question. You referred to a
cruise missile test against a shipping container. Is that
publicly available information, or is it classified
information?
Mr. Kamps. It was not a cruise missile. It was a TOW
antitank missile and the test was in June of 1998 at Aberdeen
Proving Ground in Maryland. It was kept quiet for a long time,
but it came out right about the time of the Yucca Mountain
votes in 2002.
There was video that ABC News played and the specific
results were that a hole about as big around as a grapefruit
was shot through the side of a German CASTOR cask which is 15
inches of die cast iron, which is much thicker than our U.S.
shipping casks. That would have been the release pathway for a
disastrous amount of radioactivity combined with an incendiary
fire that would have driven the radioactivity out of the fuel.
Mr. McNerney. So that might be our biggest threat in terms
of shipping is a terrorist attack?
Mr. Kamps. And the NAS, in 2006, said they did not have
access to the classified and restricted information about the
terrorism aspects of nuclear waste shipping. But yes, very much
so, there are, I believe, thousands of TOW antitank missiles on
the black market worldwide, and these train shipments would go
through places like downtown Chicago within a quarter mile of
the Art Institute. And I know that there is talk of dedicated
trains bypassing major metropolitan cities, but they are still
going to pass through the major population centers of our
country.
Mr. McNerney. OK, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Let me, without objection, just--a
TOW missile is a tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guided
missile that was really developed about 20 years ago and I
fired one. They are very difficult and they are guided by a
wire.
So if you have a moving target that is moving like on a
train track, it would be very, very difficult. So I know there
is new weapons in development today, but----
Mr. Kouts. If I could also just supplement something.
Mr. Shimkus. I am taking my colleague's time and if one of
my colleagues would like to follow up, I would do that. But the
chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas Mr. Flores for 5
minutes.
Mr. Flores. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hamberger, I have
a quick question for you. You have testified that the use of
dedicated rail trains is essential to the safe operation--
excuse me, the safe transportation of radioactive materials. In
fact, this conclusion was affirmed in a recent Department of
Transportation report in 2005, also in a 3-year study by the
National Academy of Sciences in 2006, and also in the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission response to the National Academy of
Science's report in 2008.
However, while the Department of Energy stated in 2005 that
it planned to use dedicated trains for shipment to Yucca
Mountain, the agency has neither proposed nor adopted a
regulation requiring dedicated trains for high-level waste and
spent nuclear fuel. This appears to leave open the possibility
that the DOE could ship these materials in regular mixed
freight trains in the future.
And so my question is this: Do you believe that the DOE
should adopt a formal requirement and regulation calling for
the use of dedicated trains?
Mr. Hamberger. Absolutely, Mr. Flores. I am pleased that
they did announce that that was their policy for Yucca, but I
think it would be important to make it a formal policy for all
shipments.
Mr. Flores. OK, thank you. Mr. Horn, a question for you.
The Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board recently recommended
that DOE expedite its effort to finalize and publish
documentation supporting its integration and planning tools
associated with the transportation of spent nuclear fuel, and
release a modeling tool to the public to ``increase their
understand of the constraints of routing options for the
transportation of spent nuclear fuel.''
Will you please describe how DOE is engaging with regional
organizations as they develop the required routing models?
Mr. Horn. Yes, sir. For about the past 10 to 15 years, DOE,
through the cooperative agreements with the State
organizations, Council of State Governments being one of them,
has been working on rail routing issues and highway routing
issues together. And just recently, DOE has been formulating a
new routing model called START. It stands for Stakeholder Tool
for Assessing Radioactive Transportation; not a whole lot known
to the general community about this tool right now.
However, I will say that I have a meeting with DOE next
week where I am going to be for the first time, introduced to
this tool and will sit down and look at it. And I will be able
to take that information back and share it with my State--our
organizational groups as a whole.
Mr. Flores. OK, I appreciate that. If you have any
observations after you have looked at that tool if you would
like to share those with us, that might be helpful.
Mr. Horn. I would love to, sir, thank you.
Mr. Flores. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Harper [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. I will
now recognize myself for questions for 5 minutes. Thanks to
each of you for being here. This is such a critically important
topic.
First, and this question will be directed to Mr. Quinn and
Mr. Kouts, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act states that the
Secretary of Energy shall utilize by contract private industry
to the fullest extent possible in each aspect of spent nuclear
fuel transportation. And the Secretary shall use direct Federal
services for such transportation only upon a determination of
the Secretary of Transportation in consultation with the
Secretary of Energy that private industry is unable or
unwilling to provide such transportation services at reasonable
cost. And so this would be to Mr. Kouts, or Mr. Quinn. Are you
aware if that determination has been made, Mr. Kouts?
Mr. Kouts. I have no idea what sections of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act DOE still believes are applicable to its
activities. They seem to pick and choose what they want to
utilize and/or accept, if you will, but I really don't have the
answer to that question, and again, that guidance is for NWPA
shipments.
And I think the Department would want other authority other
than under the NWPA, but if there is new authority given to
DOE, I think that would be an excellent section to put in there
because all of the expertise, if you will, of moving these
materials resides with private industry.
Mr. Harper. Mr. Quinn.
Mr. Quinn. I am not aware that any determination to that
effect has been made. And as a member of an industry that
actively transports nuclear materials today, we stand ready,
willing, and able to do so when DOE comes and asks.
Mr. Harper. So we would really like to have DOE come and
ask. Would that be a fair statement and assessment, Mr. Kouts?
Mr. Kouts. Yes, it is.
Mr. Harper. OK. Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Harper. OK. Given your experience, are there actions
that private industry is unable or unwilling to undertake, Mr.
Kouts.
Mr. Kouts. In terms of the movement of these materials, no.
I think there will be an issue in terms of if there is public
concern, whether or not you want to talk to the contractor. I
think ultimately DOE will be the responsible entity or whatever
entity there is for implementing this.
But ultimately, I think there needs to be some Federal
presence. So if someone has a problem, they would go to the Fed
as opposed to going to a contractor. But in terms of all of the
movements----
Mr. Harper. So you believe private industry is ready,
willing, and able to move forward given the proper
instructions?
Mr. Kouts. I have high confidence they are.
Mr. Harper. Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. I will categorically state that industry is
ready, willing, and able.
Mr. Harper. And Mr. Kouts, if I could ask you a follow-up
here. Where in the transportation planning process should DOE
provide funding to states for training of its first responders
and other personnel for spent fuel shipments?
Mr. Kouts. When I was running the program, we looked at a
time period of about 3 to 5 years before shipments when we
would identify routes and provide funding, which would be
supplemental to the already existing funding for existing
training for State and local officials and Indian tribes.
Mr. Harper. OK. Mr. Rusco, if I could ask you. As a part of
a national transportation campaign, when is it appropriate for
DOE to make funding available for training?
Mr. Rusco. I am sorry, I just don't have an answer for
that.
Mr. Harper. OK. All right. Anybody want to reply to that,
sir?
Mr. Horn. Could you repeat that question real quick?
Mr. Harper. Yes. The question was, as part of a national
transportation campaign, when is it appropriate for DOE to make
funding available for training?
Mr. Horn. Again, if we go back and look at the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act, it stipulates that 180(c) funding will be let
4 years prior to the first shipment. So as a state and regional
group, we are going to need more lead time than that, want to
analyze those routes that we are going to have to train to, and
then to have more outreach with affected communities along
those routes.
So we are looking probably a total 7 to 10 years, somewhere
in that timeframe before the first shipment moves because we
are going to have to analyze the routes, go out and determine
which communities need to be trained, and then that will drive
our funding mechanism to apply for funding. And then once we
receive that funding, then we can effectively start that.
Mr. Shimkus. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Harper. I yield to Chairman Shimkus.
Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Horn, would the state approve a route next
to the Art Institute of Chicago?
Mr. Horn. We would not, sir. We would highly oppose it.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you very much.
Mr. Harper. And reclaiming my time. I now recognize the
gentleman from Ohio Mr. Johnson for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it. And
Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today.
Mr. Hamberger and Mr. Kouts, your testimony discusses the
development and use of the Rail Corridor Risk Management
System, which is a sophisticated statistical routing model
designed to help railroads analyze and identify the overall
safest and most secure routes for transporting highly hazardous
materials. Has the Department of Energy communicated with the
Department of Homeland Security to discuss whether this model
would be adequate for the shipment of spent nuclear fuel?
Mr. Hamberger. I will defer to the former member of DOE.
Mr. Kouts. I really am not a member of the Department and I
can't say at this point what the Department is doing in that
area. I think that would be an excellent suggestion. But again,
I have no information as to whether or not the Department is
doing that or not doing that.
Mr. Hamberger. When we developed that, Mr. Johnson, it was
under contract with the--we had an advisory committee of 15
different agencies. I believe the Department of Energy was one
of those. It is a 27-factor model. And so they are aware of it.
It is unclear to us whether in developing what Mr. Horn was
just referring to, the START program, whether that had any
cross-pollenization or not.
Mr. Johnson. OK, so, well then I think I heard Mr. Kouts
say it would be a good idea. Would you recommend that DOE use
the DHS model?
Mr. Hamberger. I certainly would recommend that they use it
if they want to add on to it, or if there are additional things
that they want to use. But yes, it took a great deal of effort
to come up with that. We used it for all of our hazardous
material shipments.
Mr. Johnson. OK, Mr. Kouts, the Department of Energy has
five major computer-based tools to assist in the integration
and analysis of spent nuclear fuel storage in transportation
programs. So are you aware if any of these tools have been
integrated with DHS' highly-developed risk-informed routing
model?
Mr. Kouts. I have only been briefed on one of those tools
and I don't believe that was, but that was a stakeholder tool.
The others I really can't comment on.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right. Mr. Kouts, a final question for
you. The Department of Energy planned for a 70-year, $20
billion transportation campaign for Yucca Mountain. If Congress
authorizes DOE to pursue interim storage, do you have any idea
what the cost implications for having to ship spent fuel more
than once would be?
Mr. Kouts. Well, it will be $20 billion plus; whatever it
takes to move that fuel to your interim facility, if you will,
and then moving that fuel to an ultimate destination which
would be--it could be Yucca Mountain, it could be another
repository. But it would be an added cost, and----
Mr. Johnson. Would you say that cost would be significant?
Mr. Kouts. Significant depends on the amount of fuel that
is sent to the interim storage facility. If you are sending 10-
to 15,000 tons, yes, it would be very significant.
Mr. Johnson. OK. All right, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Shimkus. The gentleman yields back his time. I want to
thank you for coming and appreciate your response to our
questions. The question period will be open for 10 legislative
days. Members will be able to submit questions for the record
in writing. We would ask that you respond to those within 10
business days of receiving any additional questions.
Having said that, again, I want to thank the witnesses for
being here. With that, I am going to adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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