[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-73]
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 8, 2015
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RICK LARSEN, Washington
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOHN GARAMENDI, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
ROB BISHOP, Utah PETE AGUILAR, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Mike Gancio, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Acton, James, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment............... 6
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S.
Strategic Command.............................................. 2
Scheber, Thomas, Independent Consultant.......................... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Acton, James................................................. 52
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 25
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 23
Scheber, Thomas.............................................. 38
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Slides displayed by Mr. Rogers............................... 69
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 78
Mr. Rogers................................................... 73
PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 8, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Rogers. I want to call this hearing of the Armed
Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. We are
going to have our hearing today on ``Prompt Global Strike:
American and Foreign Developments.''
I want to welcome our panelists and guests with us today.
And is Ms. Cooper here? Martha is here. I want to welcome
the ranking member's wife, Martha Cooper, for being with us
today. I had a chance to travel with her recently. She is
wonderful. I don't know how she puts up with Jim, but she is
wonderful.
But we are happy to have our witnesses with us today. We
have got a fine bunch. And I am happy to dispense with my
opening statement.
If Jim wants to do the same, so we--unless you just feel
compelled or something.
Mr. Cooper. You didn't even say ``Roll Tide'' or anything.
Mr. Rogers. Don't stir me up.
Because of the vote series, what is happening is there is a
series of procedural votes that have been happening, will be
happening all day, so we will probably be interrupted. So to
ensure that we can get to the witnesses for their statements
and questions, we will just dispense with the reading of our
opening statements and submit them for the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 23.]
Mr. Rogers. With that, we have testifying before us today
General C. Robert Kehler, retired former commander of Strategic
Command, U.S. Strategic Command; Mr. Tom Scheber, independent
consultant; and Dr. James Acton, senior associate, Carnegie
Endowment.
I want to thank you for your time and energy that you put
in to preparing for these hearings and for traveling up here on
your own dime. I appreciate that.
And, General Kehler, if I bet you money 2 years ago that we
would be able to get you to sit in this chair again, what would
the odds have been? Not good?
General Kehler. Very high.
Mr. Rogers. Oh, really? Well, good.
General Kehler. Of course, of course.
Mr. Rogers. We appreciate you being here.
So, with that, I will recognize General Kehler for his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.), FORMER
COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored
to join you today.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do
is submit my full statement for the record and then provide a
brief summary now.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
General Kehler. This is the first time I have appeared
before a congressional committee since retiring from active
service in December of 2013, and I am pleased to be here to
offer my personal perspective today on the topic of
conventional prompt global strike [CPGS].
We live in challenging times, and I continue to believe
that a strong strategic deterrent composed of effective
defenses, modern conventional and non-kinetic capabilities, an
updated nuclear triad, and highly trained and well-led people
will be needed to underwrite our national security and assure
the security of our allies and partners well into the future.
The potential threats to our security and the security of our
allies are diverse, can arrive at our doorsteps rapidly, and
can range from small arms in the hands of terrorists to nuclear
weapons in the hands of hostile state leaders. The possible
intersection of violent extremism and weapons of mass
destruction remains a significant concern that requires
constant vigilance. State and non-state actors alike can stress
our intelligence capabilities and contingency plans by
employing highly adaptive hybrid combinations of strategies,
tactics, and capabilities, and by using the speed of
information to mask their activities behind a veil of deception
and ambiguity. New capabilities, like cyber weapons and
unmanned vehicles, are emerging, and familiar weapons, like
ballistic missiles and advanced conventional capabilities, are
more available, affordable, and lethal.
I can't recall a time during my professional career when
potential threats to our homeland were more varied or
pronounced than they are today. The tragic events in New York
on 9/11 and more recently in Paris, San Bernardino, and
elsewhere remind us that we must continue to pursue and destroy
violent extremists and their networks while remaining
constantly on guard to prevent and respond to attacks from
them.
Beyond violent extremists, state adversaries are seeking to
change the strategic situation in their favor by improving
their ability to threaten the U.S. and allied homelands with
attack by long-range conventional, cyber, and, in some cases,
nuclear weapons. When used in concert with capabilities
designed to degrade our key operational advantages--things like
space-based ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] and communications--and negate our conventional
superiority, they believe a credible threat to escalate a
conflict of a strategic level against our homeland will raise
the risks and costs of our intervention and to do so to
unacceptable levels, thereby enabling more assertive foreign
policies and aggressive actions.
In my view, dealing with today's varied threats from actors
with widely different capabilities and motivations requires the
flexible application of a range of capabilities within
strategies and plans that are tailored to specific adversaries
and scenarios. Violent extremists and nation-states are not the
same, and we cannot deal with any of them in a one-size-fits-
all manner.
Deterrence strategies that are the preferred approaches to
counter nation-states will likely not be effective against
violent extremists, where direct action is often the only
recourse. Nuclear weapons may not be the most credible
deterrence tool against some targets and in some scenarios
where they were once the preferred option. Therefore, it is
increasingly clear to me that we must carefully match our
strategies and plans to individual actors and deploy a range of
conventional and nuclear capabilities that can either deter, if
possible, or defeat them in multiple scenarios.
The capability to hold at risk and promptly attack a subset
of high-value targets with a long-range conventional weapon is
one such capability. What I said when I advocated for this
capability while still on Active Duty in 2013 remains true now.
Today, the only prompt global strike [PGS] capability to engage
potentially time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be a
ballistic missile system armed with nuclear weapons.
We continue to require a deployed conventional prompt
strike capability to provide the President a range of flexible
military options to address a small number of highest value
targets, including in an anti-access and area-denial
environment. In my view, such a capability would both enhance
strategic deterrence and improve our ability to react quickly
in a time-critical scenario by providing the President with an
option to promptly deliver a nonnuclear weapon against a
limited but vitally important target or subset of highest value
targets at long ranges. Such targets might be presented either
by violent extremists, rogue or other nation-states; could
emerge in a day-to-day or conflict scenario; and would most
likely be highly defended, be found in the most challenging
geographic locations, or be mobile--perhaps all three.
While it is impossible to predict with 100 percent
certainty what these targets might be, it is likely that they
would fall into several general categories: Those that pose an
immediate threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; those that
involve the imminent use or movement of weapons of mass
destruction; those associated with key extremist leaders; or
those that represent a critical node in an important system
that must be eliminated early in a campaign. Such a
conventional prompt global strike system would complement, not
replace, other strike capabilities by filling a gap in the
capabilities of both existing and planned systems.
The analysis is simple. Traditional systems are
insufficient if they cannot deliver weapons in an operationally
relevant timeframe. And in many plausible scenarios,
traditional conventional forces may not be close enough or in a
position to do just that. While 1 hour and global range do not
have to be absolute criteria for CPGS, the need remains to
provide the President with the means to strike certain targets
quickly with a conventional weapon and in the face of the most
challenging time and distance circumstances.
Conventional prompt global strike is intended to prevent an
adversary from using time and distance as a sanctuary. Over the
last several years, research and development efforts on CPGS
have highlighted both the promise and challenges of fielding
such a capability. As many have pointed out, beyond the
technical challenges, CPGS systems also raise policy, doctrine,
and operational concerns that would have to be resolved prior
to deployment. Additionally, important enabling capabilities,
such as ISR and battle management and command and control, must
also be addressed in order to field a viable operational
system.
The U.S. would also need to carefully assess the role of
CPGS in strategic deterrence. While it is U.S. policy to reduce
our reliance on nuclear weapons, I do not believe conventional
weapons generally and CPGS specifically can serve as a large-
scale replacement for nuclear weapons.
Finally, I remain concerned, Mr. Chairman, about investment
priorities. I am mindful of the difficult budget environment
you are facing and worry that a robust CPGS effort could delay
or eliminate other necessary modernization efforts. In my view,
CPGS cannot and should not take the place of the vitally
important nuclear or other strategic modernization efforts this
subcommittee has worked hard to help craft and support. While I
believe there is a real gap in our ability to strike promptly
at long range with conventional weapons and that CPGS could
definitely help close that gap, I would recommend caution as
you consider elevating this need against others.
Sir, I remain an advocate for CPGS as a complementary
capability to enhance both deterrence and contingency response
in the 21st century, but in this budget environment, I
personally do so with a caveat. There are many important
investment priorities that contribute to sustaining and
enhancing our deterrence posture and ensuring our military
people and civilian partners remain the envy of the world. A
prudent CPGS investment profile seems to me to be a sensible
way to preserve future decision space while respecting budget
realities.
Thank you again for inviting me to appear, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, General. I think that is a
reasonable and prudent caveat, by the way.
You are having microphone problems. I am having microphone
problems. We have got somebody working on that. I just wanted
the people to realize that we are trying to get it fixed.
So, with that, Mr. Scheber, we recognize you for a summary
of your opening statement. And we hope your microphone works.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS SCHEBER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Mr. Scheber. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the House Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.
As many of the committee members are aware, over the past
15 years, the thinking about the roles served by strategic
weapons and the collection of capabilities needed has undergone
a significant transformation. This transformation in
conceptualizing strategic force needs--plus newly available
technology--has provided the catalyst for prompt global strike.
Strategic capabilities are more than destroying the
adversary forces; they are, in general, capabilities that can
affect the decision calculus of leaders of other countries in
peacetime and can become game changers if used in wartime.
General Kehler has certainly outlined the complex security
environment we face and for which CPGS would be, in many cases,
an important contribution.
Longstanding national security goals remain important, and
these goals include four, which I will address very briefly:
One, deterring adversaries from specific actions; two, assuring
U.S. allies and friends; three, discouraging further military
competition; and four, should deterrence fail, limiting damage
and defeating an adversary. PGS can provide unique benefits in
each of these four policy goals.
Of specific interest to this hearing today is a proposal to
develop long-range nonnuclear strike capabilities as a
supplement to--not a replacement for--nuclear strike. The
potential scenarios requiring use of such a weapon are often
the primary focus of inquiries such as the discussion we will
have today. However, if the late James Schlesinger were among
us today and on the panel, he would insist on commenting that
PGS would be used every day during peacetime and then only if
needed in wartime. Let me explain briefly.
Of the four policy goals, PGS could be helpful in deterring
adversaries. In some situations, advanced conventional strike,
such as PGS, could pose a more credible offensive threat to
adversaries than a nuclear threat. Uncertainty over just how
the United States might respond to an immediate provocation
without resorting to nuclear weapons would enhance overall U.S.
capabilities for deterrence. PGS would also help assure allies.
Allies in high-threat regions have expressed concerns about
U.S. nuclear reductions and other military cutbacks, while at
the same time they see their adversaries modernizing or
developing nuclear and other WMD [weapon of mass destruction]
capabilities. From the perspective of allies, threats to them
are increasing, and allies want to know how the United States
will carry out its extended deterrence commitments to them, to
deter and defeat adversaries while limiting damage. Some allies
may be reassured by the knowledge that the United States has a
prompt nonnuclear strike capability should the need arise.
And, third, PGS can help discourage strategic force
competition. Developing and deploying a global or near global
precision strike capability would demonstrate to potential
adversaries the technical prowess and resolve of the United
States. Some potential adversaries could be dissuaded from
competing militarily because of the tangible display of U.S.
technical superiority as well as the cost and challenge of
military competition.
And, finally, should deterrence fail, to help and defend
the United States and its allies, PGS can play a useful role. A
PGS capability would provide one additional option for the
President's consideration, a unique strategic capability that
we do not have today. One or more PGS weapons could be employed
promptly to degrade, disrupt, or destroy adversaries'
capabilities, which need to be neutralized promptly and for
which other options would not be timely and effective. Those
who argue against developing prompt global strike would
foreclose such an option from those available to a future
President.
In my written statement, I have addressed these issues in
greater detail. With your permission, I ask that it be made
part of the record, and hope that this material is of use to
the subcommittee as it considers the need for prompt global
strike. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scheber can be found in the
Appendix on page 38.]
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, that full statement will be
submitted for the record.
Dr. Acton, you are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize
your statement.
STATEMENT OF JAMES ACTON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT
Dr. Acton. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of
the committee, it is a genuine honor to testify before you
today, and thank you for the opportunity. I hope I can be of
help to the committee both today on this issue and in the
future. With your permission, I would like to submit my full
statement for the record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Dr. Acton. While I will focus my testimony on the U.S.
conventional prompt global strike program, I would be very
pleased to answer questions about both Russian and particularly
Chinese developments in this area too.
Let me emphasize from the start that I am genuinely
undecided about whether the United States should acquire CPGS
weapons. The capability would unquestionably convey potential
benefits, but it would also carry potential risks. Today, in my
opinion, the relative magnitudes of those benefits and risks
are unclear.
The difficulty of reaching a definitive conclusion about
whether to acquire CPGS weapons stems in part from
technological immaturity. The underlying technology is
extremely challenging, and further research and development,
including flight testing, is required prior to any procurement
decision. However, it also stems from what I believe are flaws
in the Department of Defense's approach to CPGS development.
Most importantly, the Pentagon has no official policy that sets
out the specific military missions for which CPGS weapons might
be acquired.
The frequently repeated statement that the program's
purpose is to develop high-precision conventional weapons,
capable of reaching targets anywhere on Earth within an hour,
is not only an increasingly inaccurate description of the
technology that is actually being developed, but it does not
speak to the specific military missions for which CPGS weapons
might be acquired. Until the Department of Defense specifies
these missions, there can be no yardstick against which to
judge the likely effectiveness of different potential CPGS
technologies. The tradeoffs associated with acquiring other
weapons for the same purposes also cannot be properly assessed.
To compound the problem, I believe there is evidence that
the Department of Defense has failed to properly consider the
enabling capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment, needed to ensure
the effectiveness of CPGS weapons as well as the full range of
escalation risks.
Not only do these flaws make it impossible at this time to
reach a conclusion about the ultimate desirability of CPGS
weapons, but they also create three real risks. They are that
the United States will develop weapons that, first, are not
optimized from a military perspective for the missions for
which they might be employed; second, are not the most cost-
effective way of prosecuting those missions; and, thirdly,
unnecessarily exacerbate escalation risks with Russia and
China.
Fortunately, I believe there is still time for a course
correction by the Department of Defense, and in my written
testimony, I suggest how the Department might proceed.
Thank you for your attention, and I yield the balance of my
time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Acton can be found in the
Appendix on page 52.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank all the witnesses for their opening
statements.
We have been called for another vote. So, again, it is just
one procedural vote, so we will recess for about 15 minutes to
go and cast that vote and come right back. I apologize, but I
am not running the trains around here.
With that, we are in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. I call this hearing back to order. I don't know
how this process is going to work as far as votes, but I will
start the questioning while we wait on Mr. Cooper to get back.
General Kehler, in your opening statements, you talked
about, while in the service, that you supported prompt global
strike, and you offered a caveat. Could you walk us through the
capability gap that you thought--that you believe exists that
caused you to have that support?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that
Strategic Command [STRATCOM] was responsible for, of course,
was for planning for global strike, and so it was our job to
look at various scenarios and to assess those scenarios for
targeting and for the kind of capabilities we could match
against those scenarios and those sorts of targets. The obvious
ones that STRATCOM has been planning for years and years
involved nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. We were very
supportive of the notion that we should be looking to employ
conventional weapons in times and places where we would once
have used nuclear weapons as much as was feasible. We also
were--so we picked up a responsibility for conventional global
strike as well. That also forced us to take a hard look at the
kinds of issues that the regional combatant commanders have and
that we had at STRATCOM, the kinds of targets that were defined
by being time urgent and at such distances that we could not
quickly get a traditional conventional weapon there. Those
scenarios are typically as I outlined in my opening comments.
Those scenarios exist when there is an immediate threat to the
homeland, for example, or the homeland of our allies, and we
are talking about WMD, those kinds of things, terrorist-related
threats that can pop up quickly, be identified and need to be
addressed. So we had nothing that was nonnuclear in order to go
after those kinds of targets.
Once U.S. forces are in place or when U.S. forces are in
place, this gap doesn't look the same at all. It is when they
are not in place or when the timing--even with the in-place
forces, when the timing is such that they just can't get there
in an operationally necessary or relevant time. Is that 1 hour?
Is that global distance? I think those are--are good benchmarks
for the start of this conversation. I don't think they are
absolutes. So is 2 hours sufficient? I think in some cases it
is. You know, the shorter, the better, I would say. The best we
can do, the better the capability.
So this was a matter of looking at a set of needs that we
described as niche needs where other forces are not available,
where the use of a nuclear weapon is inappropriate. And when I
sat back and looked at what options I would present to the
President in those kinds of scenarios, I didn't have anything
in our quiver that we could immediately offer.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you. When you think about
that, compare where we are to Russia and China, particularly
China has tested hypersonic glide vehicles six times already
this year. And I know in conversation I had earlier with Mr.
Scheber, he had talked to me about China's more aggressive
schedule. Do you see them confronting this gap in a more
aggressive fashion than the United States did? Tell me more
about it, if you can.
General Kehler. Sir, I will just offer a quick comment and
then defer to my colleagues here if that is okay.
Mr. Rogers. Sure.
General Kehler. I don't have--since my retirement, I don't
have in-depth knowledge of what the Chinese and the Russians
are both doing. I will say this: I do believe that they are
both interested in pursuing a long-range prompt conventional
strike means as part of their strategies. It is a strategy, in
the case of the Chinese, to enhance what we call their anti-
access, area-denial capabilities, their capabilities against
ships and other conventional platforms where we have an
advantage.
I think in both of their cases, it is also a means for them
to hold targets in our homeland and those of our allies at
risk, and I think they do that strategically in order to cause
us to assess the risk of our intervention in a crisis or a
conflict in a different way. So I know they are pursuing those
kinds of capabilities. It isn't quite clear to me, and I know
you are receiving a briefing a little bit later, a classified
briefing, that will get into that more deeply, but I do believe
they are both interested in those kinds of capabilities, and I
think that they are pursuing R&D [research and development]
efforts to try to bring those capabilities to some level of
decision point where they can decide on deployment.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Scheber, I know you and I talked about this
a little bit earlier. Do you want to add something to what
General Kehler just offered?
Mr. Scheber. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of--my
research has been focused on open sources, so it is all
unclassified research, what is available in the press, what the
Chinese wish to have revealed to us, and as well as
unclassified DOD [Department of Defense] reports.
Regarding China, as General Kehler has outlined, the
Chinese appear to be developing prompt nuclear and nonnuclear
strike capabilities that fit with their anti-access and area-
denial strategies out to the second island chain. Just
specifically regarding conventionally armed ballistic missiles,
they have over 1,200 short-range missiles that are ballistic,
the DFs 11 and 15 that are deployed opposite Taiwan; they have
medium-range missiles, such as the DF-21 family, which includes
an anti-ship version; they have a DF-16, which can target
Okinawa, which we have our forces deployed there; and they are
in the process, at least according to open-source reports, of
developing a longer range, classified as an intermediate-range
missile, the DF-26, which Chinese reports refer to as the
``Guam killer.'' The name is pretty self-explanatory.
So if we look at what we know of the Chinese strategy to
dominate the western Pacific and deny the United States access
to that area, these capabilities look like they are pretty well
designed to help them with that strategy, and as far as we
know, at least at the unclassified level, those missiles have
the capability to be either nuclear or conventionally armed.
Mr. Rogers. Great. My final question before I turn it over
to the ranking member is for General Kehler. You and I have
talked about this before, but I wanted to visit the subject.
The disarmament advocates believe that we should get rid of one
leg of the triad. They say we don't need the ICBMs
[intercontinental ballistic missiles] anymore, so we shouldn't
pursue the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, or that we
don't need air-launched cruise missiles, so we shouldn't pursue
the long-range standoff weapon. In fact, these people say that
these systems are dangerous and destabilizing.
What are your thoughts about the suggestions that we hear
from these advocates?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I remain a supporter of the
triad, and I remain a supporter because I think the triad does
some very important things for us. Number one, it gives to any
President a range of options. It is very difficult, I think,
post-Cold War to envision the scenarios we are going to find
ourselves in, in the future. We typically get that wrong, as a
matter of fact.
And so I think that one thing the triad does for us is it
gives us a range of options to present to any President to deal
with a crisis or a conflict. The second thing it does is it
provides insurmountable problems for an adversary, either
attack problems to try to eliminate our forces or defense
problems. And it forces them to invest in all kinds of ways
that, when you start to eliminate legs of the triad, I think
they don't have to invest any longer. By the way, I think it
diminishes our deterrent value as well.
The third thing it does, the triad does, is it provides the
United States with a hedge--a hedge against technical failure
or a hedge against geopolitical change. Again, it is an
uncertain world, and if we had, for example, let's say we
decided to do away with the ICBM leg of the triad--I am a fan
of the ballistic missile submarine force. Ballistic missile
submarine force--and by the way, when New START [Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty] is finally brought into full force, most of
our deployed weapons will be aboard submarines. That works this
issue about survivability of the land-based ICBM force and
whether or not we are in a use-or-lose kind of scenario. We
have taken steps to avoid that.
But having said that, without the ICBMs, we are one
potential technical failure, in either a ballistic missile
system or a warhead, away from having no ballistic missiles.
And while we would still have nuclear capable aircraft, those
are not on alert on a day-to-day basis. We would be putting a
future President in a position of having to make that decision
as well. I think for hedge purposes, it makes sense to retain
all three legs.
Finally, I think it has been cost-effective.
So, yes, we need to be mindful, I believe, of the concerns
about stability and ambiguity and those kind of things, but I
believe that the concerns that have been raised about ICBMs,
that they are on a hair trigger, that--because of use or lose,
I believe you have to remember that there is one finger on the
trigger, and that finger belongs to the President and only the
President.
The second thing I think you have to remember is the use-
or-lose issue is not the same issue today as it was during the
Cold War. There are additional nuclear adversaries beyond--
potential adversaries beyond the Russians. Only the Russians
can threaten the ICBM force in total. So I think the use-or-
lose problem looks different today, and I think that the world
situation puts a different light on that as well.
Finally, the idea about unauthorized or--you know,
accidental launch, I think for ICBMs there are layers of
safeguards, and while, yes, it is important for us to continue
to focus on that and make sure that we constantly get better in
that regard, I believe that we work that problem pretty well.
Cruise missiles. You know, cruise missiles have proven
their value. At least from my perspective and certainly my last
job's perspective, they prove their value both in deterrence
value, that you can arm a bomber, whether that bomber is
penetrating, in the case of LRSB [long-range strike bomber] in
the future, or whether it is standoff, what you are doing is
you are increasing the effectiveness of the bomber. And to me,
there is tremendous value in being able to do that. When you
look at the land masses that are potentially involved here,
even a penetrating platform benefits from having a longer range
missile, that it doesn't have to get close to the target area
if it doesn't want to, or it can hold multiple targets at risk
at varying ranges while it is penetrating. I think there is
tremendous value there for deterrence, and there is no question
the value--the combat value we have gotten out of using
hundreds of conventional cruise missiles.
So I don't understand some of the argument here about why
we shouldn't go ahead with a replacement for the ALCM [air-
launched cruise missile]. To me, it makes all the sense in the
world. It makes even more sense if that replacement for ALCM
eventually becomes dual-capable, and then I think we have done
exactly what we have done with the air-launch cruise missile. I
do not believe that we are changing either the stability or the
ambiguity issues here. These are issues--you know, when we use
B-52s today--I am taking too much time--but when we use B-52s
today, we use B-2s today, and we have only ever operationally
used them, thank heaven, in conventional modes. And we have
been able to work the ambiguity issue when a cruise missile
lifts off a surface ship, or when it drops out of a B-52 bomb
bay, or if it comes out of an SSGN [guided missile submarine],
no one believes that we have just launched a nuclear weapon.
Now, we need to be careful with that. I agree that that is
an issue that we have to be mindful of and continue to work to
reduce that risk and continue to reduce the risk as much as we
possibly can, but I do not believe that we are changing the
game here with LRSO [long-range standoff weapon]. I think what
we are doing is continuing our--both our deterrence and our
conventional warfighting capability.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am most interested in that netherworld between nuclear
and conventional, and we probably can't call it conventional
anymore since hypersonic weapons are stretching the limits of
conventionality, so maybe we should say ``nuclear,
nonnuclear.''
I think everyone agrees that due to the speed and precision
of these conventional warheads, they can have a devastating
impact on the target. I think we can also all agree that many
poorer nations are encouraged to turn nuclear because that is a
more affordable way to get devastating capabilities because
they have less hope of achieving a hypersonic capability.
So I was interested in Mr. Acton's book ``Silver Bullet''
when he talked about how even our bunker buster bomb, the
massive ordnance penetrator, can go a certain depth, but these
things can go probably twice as deep, due to the speed and
precision. So it seems to me to be an interesting inflection
point for the world. Several leading nations are pursuing these
weapons, but we don't know quite how to classify them. And the
chairman has pointed out that we have been kind of slow
developing them, given the lead time, and I hope we can get to
the bottom of that in the Pentagon, but to me, it is a
fascinating category because they are not nuclear, but yet they
have super capabilities, and they tempt other nations to do
some extreme reactions.
Mr. Acton also noted that Putin comments five times in
recent years. He seems to pay particular attention to these.
The potential for these weapons is remarkable. So I am hopeful
that we can develop the capability and do so in a sensible way
that does not exacerbate the difficulties in the world that we
have already.
I would welcome comments from any of the witnesses on this.
Am I off base in classifying the weapons these ways, as not
really conventional but certainly not nuclear?
Dr. Acton. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
And these are certainly weapons that have significantly
greater potential to destroy certain kinds of targets than
existing conventional weapons. Unclassified figures put the
depth that the massive ordnance penetrator can go to at about
20 meters of reinforced concrete. My calculations suggest that
hypersonic weapons might be able to go to 40 meters. With
nuclear weapons, you are talking about weapons that can
potentially destroy targets hundreds of meters in hard rock. So
there [is] still, as you absolutely rightly point out, quite a
big difference there between even these penetrating weapons and
nuclear weapons.
I think one of the important questions that this raises,
and this is a question that is impossible to answer at the
unclassified level, that is, how many additional targets are
there that are out of the reach of existing conventional
weapons but would be in the reach of hypersonic weapons. I just
don't know the answer to that question, but that is, I think,
the type of thing that needs to be considered at the classified
level, and as you say, sir, thinking about how to do this
sensibly.
I would just raise a couple of points about some of the
escalation risks involved with these weapons. So much of the
debate so far has been swallowed up by the so-called problem of
warhead ambiguity, which when the administration of President
George W. Bush had a plan to take nuclear warheads off some
Trident missiles and replace them with conventional warheads,
Congress was concerned that an observing state, most likely
Russia, would see the launch of one of those weapons and
misinterpret a conventional for a nuclear weapon.
I think we have placed far too much emphasis on the warhead
ambiguity problem. There are other escalation risks with
conventional prompt global strike weapons that I think haven't
had adequate attention. So to give you one, the Department of
Defense is interested in these boost-glide weapons precisely
because they don't fly in ballistic trajectories, and so DOD
argues that an observing state could tell this was nonnuclear
because it was in a different trajectory, and I think that is
exactly right. However, these weapons are also highly
maneuverable, and if one fires them, say, in the direction of
Iran, Russia might not know whether that weapon was heading for
Russia or Iran, or if one fired them at North Korea, then
Russia or China, for that matter, might not know whether the
target was Russia or China. This is what is termed destination
ambiguity.
So there are real tradeoffs here in terms of risk reduction
in that technologies that exacerbate one risk can reduce
another. These escalation risks are risks to be considered. I
don't necessarily argue that they are by any means the only
factor that needs to be considered, but from everything I have
seen, DOD is very largely focused on the warhead ambiguity
problem and hasn't given adequate attention to those other
kinds of risks.
Mr. Cooper. How would you classify a weapon that had in its
glide phase only 48 percent?
Dr. Acton. Well----
Mr. Cooper. That seems to be a pretty arbitrary distinction
between 50 percent glide phase.
Dr. Acton. I would make two points there. I mean, the
distinction comes from arms control definitions where the--if a
weapon is ballistic over the majority of its trajectory, then
it is deemed to be a ballistic missile. And that, I think, is
unquestionably the correct interpretation of the existing arms
control treaties we have. The extent to which that mitigates
ambiguity problems, though, I think is more of an open
question, but what I would say is another issue with DOD's
argument is that if you are Russia, you would see the launch of
a boost-glide weapon if you had a satellite in the right place
looking. You wouldn't, then, see a weapon flying in a
nonballistic trajectory. What you would actually see is nothing
at all after the launch because boost-glide weapons fly at too
low an altitude to be detected by early warning radar.
So DOD's argument is that Russia could see that the weapon
was flying in a nonballistic trajectory; whereas, in fact, I
think Russia would see nothing at all after the launch.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In view of the shortness of time, I yield to other members.
Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Okay. Thank you. I will ask a
question or two and then turn it over to my colleague from
California, depending on when we have to go vote here.
General Kehler, there is a letter that I saw that one of
the Senators is circulating urging the administration to stop
any thought about developing a nuclear-tipped air-launched
cruise missile. And I know that that is not the subject of our
conversation here today, but it is related, but I realize it is
on the other side of the bright line between conventional PGS,
and this is on the other side. This is nuclear air cruise
missile. But it is important, because that letter's
circulating, and yet when I see what the President certified
when he addressed the Senate on the New START treaty back in
the year 2011, among other things, he certified under point 3
that he intended to modernize or replace the triad of strategic
nuclear delivery systems, which is a heavy bomber, an ICBM, et
cetera, et cetera, add an air-launched cruise missile. So the
President in the past is on record saying that a nuclear-tipped
air-launched cruise missile is part of our strategic
deterrence.
In light of that, would you agree or disagree with a letter
urging the administration to drop any development of a nuclear-
tipped air-launched cruise missile, long-range standoff, let's
say.
General Kehler. Sir, I continue to support the need to have
a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile that would be a
replacement for today's ALCM. As I mentioned to the chairman, I
think we have--there is great deterrent value. It not only
provides the ability to stand off with a bomber, depending on
the scenario here, but it also allows the bomber to penetrate
and still extend the range and effectiveness of the bomber, the
penetrating bomber. So I think it still provides us with
deterrent value. And, as I also mentioned, I think we have seen
in combat the value of a dual-capable cruise missile, a cruise
missile that can also be used in a conventional sense.
The letter--I have seen the letter that you are mentioning.
There are a number of issues that are raised. Some of these are
ambiguity issues. I know that there have been some op-eds and
other things written that I have read here over the last
several months about raising the ambiguity concern. And, again,
while I believe that you always have to be mindful of those
concerns, I think those are workable, and we have worked those
with the cruise missiles that we have today and the bombers as
well, that I don't think those are insurmountable issues.
I do think that the value we get out of an air-launched
cruise missile and a gravity weapon also is greater than the
risks that are raised here because specifically I believe that
those risks are all--either have been worked or are workable.
Mr. Lamborn. And in response to that, one of you, maybe it
was you, General Kehler, had said that every time we launch a
Tomahawk cruise missile from the Persian or Arabian Sea or
something like that, the Russians or Chinese don't have any
confusion about what is going on, you know, that that is
strictly a conventional armed cruise missile. Why do we have
that situation today?
General Kehler. Well, number one, I think it is scenario
dependent. I mean, they don't believe that we are shooting at
them, one. So I take Dr. Acton's point here that if a conflict
involves Russia or China, I think you would have to be mindful
of those concerns. I think you work those in advance. I think
you work those with the way you deploy these weapons. I think
you work them with the way you test them. I think you work them
in a lot of ways because I believe that you would have this
issue in multiple ways. You will have this issue with the B-2,
by the way. If we are involved in a fight with either Russia or
China, I think today we would use the B-2 in that kind of a
conflict, but the B-2 is dual-capable. I think those issues
have been around for a long time about a stealthy platform and
whether or not it would be carrying nuclear weapons, whether
they would know it, et cetera, but I think that our operational
behavior with B-2s has done something to help alleviate those
concerns, and I think you would have to work those concerns
here as well.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am going to turn the gavel back over
to the chairman. But, lastly, General Kehler, so you would
disagree with the letter I read earlier?
General Kehler. I do disagree.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And I yield to the chairman.
Mr. Rogers [presiding]. Great.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I noticed the bell
rang, and I decided that I didn't want to prove that Pavlov was
quite right about ringing bells and dogs salivating. So I think
that this is probably far more important than voting on another
motion to adjourn, so let me go ahead and have at this.
General, your point about ambiguity and the cruise missile
thus far and the B-2 bomber thus far not creating a problem, in
that Russia or China previously understood that it wasn't
coming at them, but we have not been involved in a conflict
with either of those two countries.
Now, in a conflict, and you were getting to this with
your--at the end of your last comments, in a conflict with
those countries, when their doctrine is one--at least Russia's
doctrine--is one of escalate to de-escalate, I think we have a
completely different situation, in which the ambiguity level
significantly increases. So if we are launching a cruise
missile, as was just discussed a moment ago, from the Persian
Gulf to, I don't know, some place in Iraq, or Russia is
launching a cruise missile from the Caspian Sea into Syria, we
understood what was going on. We were not engaged in a war with
Russia. So I think we have got a very, very different
situation, and I think it is Mr. Perry's letter, former
Secretary Perry's letter that is being discussed here, and the
question of ambiguity really arises to its highest state of
uncertainty in a conflict with a nuclear country such as Russia
or China.
So I will just make that comment to come back at what you
were saying. I think ambiguity can be a very, very serious
problem under those circumstances, and hopefully, we never find
ourselves under those circumstances, but that is why we have
the triad, is it not? It is not to deal with Iraq or Syria.
Dr. Acton, in what way might the CPGS undermine strategic
stability, and what should we do to mitigate this risk?
Dr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, sir. As I
suggested already, I think that----
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Acton, is your microphone working?
Dr. Acton. Ah. I am sorry. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
As I suggested already, there is a series of different
escalatory risks that I am concerned about. There has been a
lot of focus on warhead ambiguity, which is not my major
concern unless, as you rightly point out, we are in a conflict
with Russia or China. There is destination ambiguity,
uncertainty about where a CPGS weapon will land. One has----
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. And that is because it can be
redirected in flight?
Dr. Acton. Because it is inherently maneuverable. Because
with a ballistic missile, from the moment the motor burns out,
you can predict where it is going to land. With a CPGS weapon,
because it is maneuverable and can be redirected in flight, you
don't know where it is going to land.
You have crisis instability. So the--Russia, I think,
incorrectly believes that the United States wants conventional
weapons in order to attack Russia's nuclear weapons, but I
believe that belief is genuine. And on Russia's part, the
belief that the United States might preemptively attack its
nuclear forces could lead Russia to use nuclear forces first.
I have two suggestions about how to proceed. The first one
is I very strongly agree with General Kehler that this is a
problem that needs to be worked. The Department of Defense is
only focused on warhead ambiguity to date, and I think that the
first thing it should do is focus on the full range of
instabilities. It should red team those instabilities, create
models of how those instabilities could arise, and factor those
instabilities into planning decisions.
Secondly, if the U.S. does decide to go forward with
conventional prompt global strike, I think cooperative
confidence-building measures, things such as launch
notifications, mutual inspections, are likely to be much more
effective than the unilateral measures that DOD has placed a
focus on to date.
Mr. Garamendi. General Kehler and Mr. Scheber.
Mr. Scheber, you seem to want to have at it, so why don't
you go first.
Mr. Scheber. Thank you. The issue of strategic stability is
certainly a serious issue. I think I am the only one old enough
in this room to remember the debate in the 1980s that went on
at the time when all of our cruise missiles were nuclear armed
and the consideration was in developing a conventionally armed
missile for just that reason. Today, if we saw cruise missiles
launched in most situations, as you pointed out, people would
have assumed that they are conventional in nature because those
are how the weapons have been used. We have demonstrated them,
informed people, and so there was a whole different context.
And so I think it is instructive to see how the world views
changed as the arsenal changed and other countries were made
aware of it.
Regarding strategic stability and the potential for
misunderstanding, it is certainly a topic that is serious. And
the National Academy study report that reported out in 2008
found conclusions similar to other studies that have been
conducted by the Department of Defense, that while a serious
issue, there are a variety of measures, and Dr. Acton mentioned
confidence-building measures, which I wholly agree with, of
briefing the Russians and the Chinese as to what we are doing,
having hotlines available. We have a variety of hotlines
already available, so if questions arise, the phone
communication can be prompt and straightforward and clear up
any uncertainty. And both the National Academy study and a
variety of DOD studies concluded that they believe that these
series of measures would be sufficient to keep the risk of any
misunderstanding very low.
Now, certainly you can never totally eliminate that risk--
given that humans are involved, but there is a variety of
material on which we can already draw and then build upon to
resolve the nuclear ambiguity strategic stability issue.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I am out of time. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Rogers. If you need a few more minutes, go ahead. You
and I are it right now.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good. General----
Mr. Rogers. Well, now the ranking member came back, but go
ahead.
Mr. Cooper. Go ahead, John.
Mr. Rogers. Go ahead, John.
General Kehler. I agree with what has been said. I agree
with your point as well that this is an issue that you have to
work. And the point about Russia and China not believing that
we are launching a nuclear-armed cruise missile today if we use
one in combat is situationally dependent. I concede that point
as well, but what I also know is that now for--I can't tell you
the first time we used a conventional cruise missile in combat.
Certainly in Desert Storm, we used them. So let's just say for
20 years or 20-plus years, we have used them, what that does is
it changes the situation in these other more dire scenarios
where I don't believe that Russia, Chinese, or American leaders
would knee jerk a reaction in a conflict that was at that kind
of a level.
So, having said that, again, I go back to I think you have
to work this issue, and you have to be mindful of it, and I
think it has to shape your behavior in a given scenario as
well. So I am agreeing.
And, by the way, I have tremendous respect for Dr. Perry,
and when Dr. Perry says we ought to be concerned about
something, I would agree with that. We ought to be concerned
about it, but I do think it is workable.
Mr. Garamendi. Yeah. I will take just another, maybe a
minute here. The principal problem that I perceive here is that
we are developing weapons that are by their nature very, very
difficult to observe. They are stealthy and extremely dangerous
in that they can carry nuclear weapons or very dangerous
conventional weapons as we are discussing here. And an
adversary, given the uncertainty, the hair trigger becomes much
more finely tuned, and that is a concern, particularly given
the Russian doctrine at the moment, which may change in the
future. We are headed down a path that is, I think, increasing
the danger and creating a new paradigm for which we are, by the
conversation here, not prepared for. The previous paradigm was
one in which we spent 30--almost 50 years developing an
understanding and a communication process.
The new weapons, however, by their nature will require a
different paradigm, which we do not presently have. Could we
develop it? If I recall the height of the Cold War, we were
very lucky. And perhaps we were very good, but I suspect more
so we were lucky, and that is my concern.
Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
General Kehler, you and I have talked about this before,
but I am real concerned about the saber-rattling from Russia,
and this couple--this recent disclosure of an autonomous
underwater giant nuclear weapon is deeply troubling to me. And
this weapon, according to Russia, would provide a new
capability that, quote, ``the important components of the
adversary's economy in coastal areas and inflicting
unacceptable damage to the country's territory by creating
areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be
unsustainable for military, economic, or other activities for a
long period of time,'' close quote.
You put this together with their public--what we know
publicly about their military doctrine, it is of concern to me.
What do you make of this, and what does it tell you about their
mindset, Russia's mindset? Or do you have an opinion?
General Kehler. Well, my opinion now, Mr. Chairman, is sort
of shaped from being on the outside looking in, but I think--
and I haven't spoken with any senior Russians lately, so I
can't speak for them. It looks to me as though they have got
two objectives here: One is to remind us and NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization], and the world really, that we
have to take their concerns into account. And I think the
second is, as part of a broader strategy to try to change the
strategic game here, I think that they want to make sure that
they can remind us that they are holding us at risk and that
they can do so with conventional weapons, now long-range
conventional weapons. You know that in Syria they launched
long-range cruise missiles off of surface ships and off of Tu-
95s here not so long ago. So I think they are reminding us that
they can hold our homeland at risk in a variety of ways and, as
a result, are reminding us that us getting involved in things
or acting with impunity, the risk is too high. But what
troubles me about this is I think it smacks of returning to a
Cold War kind of an approach here that maybe I naively had
thought we were past all of that.
So while I can understand why they would do this, what
concerns me is if this is real security concern on their part
that they are vulnerable somehow, then I do think you begin to
get stability concerns. And so I think that is what troubles me
as much as anything else, is that if--someone said once, and I
don't know who said this or I would give them credit for it--I
didn't, but someone said this, and it stuck with me--that
insecurity begets instability, and so the flip is security
begets stability. And so if they are insecure, fundamentally
insecure here, then I think that that is a concern to me in
trying to come up with strategies for how we deal with all of
that.
Mr. Rogers. Thanks.
And, General, we have talked about hypersonic boost-glide
programs. I want to call your attention to the monitors, the TV
monitor that we have up there. This is an unclassified slide
that we have been provided that shows French cooperation with a
Russian arms manufacturer to develop hypersonic boost-glide
capability.
[The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 69.]
Mr. Rogers. If you were still at STRATCOM, what would you
be urging the Department of Defense and the Department of State
to say to our French allies about their cooperation with Russia
to develop what could be a new nuclear weapon delivery system?
General Kehler. Well, I think as with any tech transfer
kind of an issue, I would hope that the United States would
express its concerns to anyone out there where technology
transfer is an issue. We have some pretty strict technology
transfer laws and processes and procedures, and I would be
hopeful that we would express our concerns as well.
I am not overly familiar with this. I see the chart. I am
not overly familiar with this, and so I would hate to make a
blatant statement about it, but I would just say in general
terms, I would be concerned about technology transfer to any
potential adversary. And whether Russia is an enemy, I think,
is open for some conversation, but I would be very concerned
about technology transfer to any of the potential adversaries.
Mr. Rogers. That is all the questions I have.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Well, it looks like we have reached
the end. And I thank the witnesses very much for their patience
and for their contributions. It is very helpful to this
committee.
And, with that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
December 8, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 8, 2015
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
December 8, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
December 8, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. In your opening statement you stated, ``we continue to
require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the
President a range of flexible military options to address a small
number of highest value targets, including in an anti-access and area
denial (A2/AD) environment.'' Do you believe a CPGS system could
enhance our power projection capacity in a manner that is unique to and
entirely outside the capabilities of other conventional systems
General Kehler. CPGS is envisioned to be unique from other
conventional weapons both in range and time to effect and would
definitely enhance U.S. power projection capacity as a precursor to
other systems. Existing conventional systems could address the highest
value targets in an A2/AD environment if they can respond in an
operationally relevant timeframe, have sufficient range, and can
penetrate sophisticated defenses. However, existing systems typically
lack one or more of these attributes against the type of targets and
scenarios envisioned for CPGS.
Mr. Rogers. Considering the growing risk upon our conventional
forces when it comes to projecting power in an A2/AD environment: (1)
how might the availability of a CPGS system mitigate or overcome such
risks and (2) in your judgment, are there potential force-multiplier
benefits from integrating a CPGS capability from a platform based in
the continental U.S. (or far from the area in question) with the
capabilities of an expeditionary force operating in an A2/AD
environment?
General Kehler. In my view, the A2/AD strategy can be defeated
through a combination of strong alliances and coalitions, updated
operational concepts, improvements in the resilience of U.S. forces
(especially cyber networks and space-based ISR and communications), and
enhancements to our power projection capabilities (increased range and
penetration capabilities). CPGS could contribute to this by providing
commanders with a conventional strike capability that addresses high
value targets early in a campaign and from outside the range of enemy
kinetic forces. Before a conflict such a capability could contribute to
deterrence by eliminating enemy sanctuaries. When used in coordination
with other kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities early in a
conflict, CPGS could help enable and enhance the effectiveness of
subsequent U.S. power projection forces.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the U.S. should prioritize the
development and acquisition of a specific type of CPGS with specific
attributes? If so, which type and with what attributes?
General Kehler. At this point I would not prioritize a specific
type of CPGS with specific attributes. I believe the most effective way
to proceed is to develop a variety of potential CPGS approaches and
allow performance to determine the way ahead. In my view there is value
in continuing research into high-tech means to bring prompt, long-range
strike into ``third wave'' consideration.
Mr. Rogers. What security challenges do you foresee potentially
arising if China successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.?
General Kehler. We cannot allow our qualitative military advantages
to decline or disappear. At the strategic level, virtually the entire
U.S. defense strategy (to include the reduced role for U.S. nuclear
weapons in non-nuclear scenarios) is based on the presumption of
continued U.S. conventional superiority. Such superiority is based on a
significant qualitative vice quantitative edge. Allowing any country to
assume a position of qualitative military superiority over the U.S.
would erode the credibility of our strategic deterrent and extended
deterrent and threaten our freedom of action in a crisis or conflict.
At the operational and tactical levels, a Chinese CPGS could threaten
critical targets in the U.S. and allied homelands as well as critical
targets associated directly with military operations in the Pacific
region.
Mr. Rogers. In Mr. Acton's opening statement, he raised the concern
that, ``the Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific
military missions for which CPGS weapons might be acquired.'' Is that
correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you
consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of a CPGS
system?
General Kehler. As I mentioned in my prepared remarks, CPGS would
be valuable in missions against targets that might be presented either
by violent extremists or nation-states, that could emerge in day-to-day
or conflict scenarios, and would most likely be highly defended, be
found in the most challenging geographic locations, or be mobile
(perhaps all three). While it is impossible to predict with 100%
certainty what these targets might be, it is likely that they would
fall into several general categories: those that pose an immediate
threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; those that involve the imminent
use or movement of weapons of mass destruction; those associated with
key extremist leaders; or those that represent a critical node in an
important system that must be eliminated early in a campaign.
Mr. Rogers. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control
to limit hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think
of these suggestions as national security policy? Do you foresee
challenges in undertaking such a policy and what are they?
General Kehler. I don't favor placing arbitrary ``speed limits'' on
our military capabilities. We have hypersonic weapons today in the form
of ballistic missiles. Hypersonic speed presents both opportunities and
challenges for us and our potential adversaries and I fully understand
the desire to avoid an ``arms race'' competition in this type of
weapon. However, I would be very concerned about the difficulty of
establishing transparency and sustaining high-confidence verification
in a treaty-type approach.
Mr. Rogers. How do you characterize and assess foreign
development--primarily Russian and Chinese--of CPGS capability compared
to our own?
General Kehler. I am not current on the classified details of
Russian and Chinese activities in this area. While still on active duty
I was interested in their progress and concerned about the general
inadequacy of U.S. intelligence priorities and resources associated
with adversary hypersonic activities (as well as with many other
intelligence areas). Again, while still in my active duty capacity I
had some concern that Russia and China were seemingly moving faster
than the U.S. in this area but had yet to see any material change in
military capabilities as a result.
Mr. Rogers. What does foreign--Russian and Chinese--development of
this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if
China and/or Russia have this capability and we do not?
General Kehler. In my view, having a unique military capability
does not automatically translate into a military advantage. I would be
very concerned if China or Russia had a hypersonic or CPGS capability
that the U.S. was unable to counter. While it isn't necessary in my
view for the U.S. to equal China or Russia in individual military
capabilities or size, deterrence and crisis stability depend on those
countries not achieving an overall military advantage over the U.S.
Mr. Rogers. You were a military planner. How would you plan for
dealing with such a non-nuclear or nuclear capability and would you
want to have a defensive capability to deal with it?
General Kehler. I would first plan to deter it. Deterring conflict
remains the preferred approach and is the number one objective of the
combatant commands. Deterrence is based on an adversary's belief that
the U.S. has both the capability (forces, plans, command and control)
and resolve (policy, declaratory statements, visible demonstrations) to
deny their objectives or cause unacceptable costs if they try to
achieve them. In my view, deterrence will remain credible in the
Twenty-first Century if the U.S. tailors its plans and operations to
the specific objectives and motivations of individual adversaries and
brings a complementary set of offensive (conventional kinetic, non-
kinetic, nuclear) and defensive tools to the equation.
Mr. Rogers. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this
capability with a nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead?
General Kehler. I think it does matter. Regarding Russia, nuclear
arms are controlled by various treaties that, so long as the parties
abide by those treaties, provide a mechanism to address nuclear CPGS
matters. We do not have similar arrangements with China; in my view a
potential cause for concern if U.S. nuclear arms are further reduced.
In effect, all long-range nuclear ballistic missiles are CPGS weapons.
Hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles present additional challenges.
Mr. Rogers. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch
capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is
to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to
the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS have a role to play in
such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is it a role
that could easily be served by another military capability at less
cost?
General Kehler. I believe CPGS could serve a particularly important
role in holding a small number of rogue-state ballistic missile
launchers at risk. When combined with missile defenses, such a
capability would provide the President with options below the nuclear
threshold, even if the enemy ballistic missiles are nuclear-tipped. In
my view, CPGS would be ideally suited for this mission since it would
meet the following criteria: imminent use of a weapon of mass
destruction that posed on immediate threat to the U.S. or allied
homelands; located in a challenging geographic place that is likely to
be highly defended; and will move soon. This is not a role easily
served by other military capabilities at less cost. Of course, this
approach will not work with larger, near-peer or peer nations where the
scope and scale of their ballistic threat cannot be held at risk or
negated by CPGS and limited defenses.
Mr. Rogers. What security challenges do you foresee potentially
arising if China successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.?
Mr. Scheber. China is currently developing several versions of
precision, prompt strike weapons to support its military strategy which
calls for being able to control the western Pacific region out to ``the
second island chain.'' If China deploys effective prompt strike weapons
and the United States does not, the potential implications for the
United States and its allies could be far reaching. Such a capability
could strengthen China's anti-access/area denial capabilities and
increase the challenge for the United States to defend its allies and
protect free access to maritime trade routes in the Pacific. In
particular, a Chinese CPGS capability, without an appropriate U.S.
response, could weaken the ability of the United States to deter
Chinese aggression, to assure U.S. allies in the region, and to limit
damage in the event deterrence fails.
Deterrence weakened: Without an effective and appropriate U.S.
response, Chinese leaders could be emboldened to continue their
``coercive diplomacy'' and threaten U.S. allies with non-nuclear
strikes from PGS-type systems if they resist China's policies. A U.S.
CPGS capability, if available, would provide a capability--a non-
nuclear capability--to promptly preempt China's offensive command and
control capabilities and could increase the uncertainty of success for
China's military leaders. This would likely have the effect of
strengthening deterrence.
Assurance weakened: Allies would likely feel threatened by Chinese
CPGS capabilities if the United States cannot provide assurances that
it can meet its obligations as specified in U.S. mutual defense
treaties with western Pacific allies such as Japan, the Republic of
Korea, and Australia. China would possess the capability to launch
prompt, non-nuclear strikes to degrade U.S. and allied military
capabilities in the region, thereby making more difficult for the
United States the task of defending U.S. allies and projecting military
force in the western Pacific. Effective U.S. counters would include
U.S. prompt conventional strike capabilities to degrade Chinese ISR and
command and control capabilities. In addition, additional U.S. missile
defenses would be needed to intercept any Chinese PGS missiles that are
launched and threaten allied assets, on land and at sea. A U.S. CPGS
capability would help assure allies that the United States is not
falling behind in twenty-first century military technology and that the
United States has the competence and capabilities to meet its mutual
defense commitments to allies in the face of a hostile China.
If Deterrence fails: Should military conflict erupt between China
and the United States and its allies, the United States would be
disadvantaged by the asymmetry in which China possessed CPGS-type
weapons and the United States did not. China could use these weapons in
support of its anti-access/area denial strategy and degrade U.S.
military capabilities as far away as Guam, and in the future perhaps
farther. U.S. CPGS capabilities, if developed and deployed, could, in
combination with cyber and other capabilities, help degrade the Chinese
strategy by damaging key elements of its surveillance and command and
control capabilities, damaging offensive missile capabilities, and
improving the survivability of U.S. and allied military forces being
brought to bear on China. This could help to convince its leaders to
cease China's aggressive military actions.
Mr. Rogers. In Mr. Acton's opening statement, he raised the concern
that, ``the Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific
military missions for which CPGS weapons might be acquired.'' Is that
correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you
consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of a CPGS
system?
Mr. Scheber. Skeptics of certain military capabilities sometimes
use such assertions to try to refute DOD statements that the military
capabilities in question are needed and well conceived. Then, after DOD
officials describe a potential scenario in which a capability, such as
CPGS, might be of value, the skeptics then try to explain why such a
hypothetical situation is unlikely and the proposed capability
unnecessary. This type of debating tactic is ill conceived when applied
to CPGS.
First, while Dr. Acton often raises valid questions that should be
addressed regarding CPGS, he errs in asserting that the DOD has not
documented the potential missions for which CPGS would provide a unique
and valuable capability. The most recent Congressional Research Service
report on Prompt Global Strike summarizes the DOD documents which
discuss the rationale for and potential uses of CPGS. For example, the
CRS report states, ``The need for prompt long-range, or global, strike
capabilities has been addressed in general defense policy studies, such
as the 2001, 2006, and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Reports.''
\1\ In addition, DOD has submitted several reports to the Congress on
the need for and programs planned to develop a CPGS capability. And
finally, in 2006 the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the Prompt Global
Strike (PGS) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). This requirements
document was reviewed again in 2013 and revalidated. The mission need
for CPGS is well documented. Second, secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
and other senior DOD officials have recently stressed the important
attributes of flexibility and adaptability. This is because war is
often accompanied by surprises--surprises in an adversary's technology,
tactics, and decisions--and military plans must be rapidly modified.
Military history is replete with examples. And, as recently articulated
by the congressional testimony of the Director of National Intelligence
and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the global threat
assessment is extremely complex, diverse, and the future uncertain. The
concept of developing prompt, non-nuclear strike capabilities that are
global, or near global, in range is to fill a gap in existing U.S.
offensive strike capabilities and, thereby, increase the flexibility of
U.S. strategic strike capabilities. U.S. CPGS capabilities could prove
of immense value against a variety of serious threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range
Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, CRS Report R-41464, October
2, 2015, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Rogers. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control
to limit hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think
of these suggestions as national security policy? Do you foresee
challenges in undertaking such a policy and what are they?
Mr. Scheber. In my opinion, calls for the United States to
negotiate limits on hypersonic weapons, such as current U.S. concepts
for CPGS, are ill conceived and should not be pursued.
First, the countries with which the United States would seek to
negotiate such an agreement, Russia and China, are unlikely to
negotiate in good faith or to abide by signed arms control agreements.
China is actively developing several types of prompt strike
capabilities that employ hypersonic delivery vehicles. These weapons
appear to provide important capabilities for China's anti-access/area
denial strategy. In addition, China has never shown an inclination to
enter into a negotiation with the United States on limiting strategic
capabilities. Indeed, China appears to be working hard to narrow the
gap and neutralize several areas of U.S. military superiority. Russia,
on the other hand, has been willing to negotiate strategic arms control
agreements with the United States but has not proven to be a good-faith
partner in complying with such treaties once they are signed. Arms
Control Compliance Reports from the Department of State have documented
Russia's poor record of compliance. And, nongovernmental organizations
have documented the consistent pattern of Russian violations of arms
control agreements.\2\ Therefore, the prospect a negotiation on such
weapons being concluded successfully and with lasting. positive
security benefits for the United States and its allies is, in my
opinion, extremely remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For example, Keith Payne, et al., Russian Strategy, Crisis and
Conflict (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2016), pp. 83-102.
http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL -FOR-WEB-
1.12.16.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, any effort to initiate negotiations limiting the
development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons and other
prompt strike capabilities is likely to cause U.S. development
activities for CPGS capabilities to be slowed further or curtailed
entirely. Given the importance of developing U.S. CPGS capabilities to
strengthen deterrence and assurance and to provide unique capabilities
in the event deterrence fails, the United States should increase, not
decrease its efforts to develop CPGS capabilities.
As a matter of policy, I recommend that the United States not seek
to initiate an arms limitation negotiation that includes limitations on
hypersonic or other non-nuclear prompt strike weapons.
Mr. Rogers. How do you characterize and assess foreign
development--primarily Russian and Chinese--of CPGS capability compared
to our own?
Mr. Scheber. In a word, I would characterize the United States CPGS
development efforts as anemic when compared to similar development
programs of China and Russia. After more than a decade of research and
a general concept for CPGS capabilities endorsed by both Republican and
Democratic administrations, DOD does not yet have a plan for deploying
such a capability. In contrast, both China and Russia have claimed to
have deployed conventional prompt strike concepts and are continuing to
develop improved concepts.
China: China's leaders appear to be pursuing multiple applications
for conventional prompt strike weapons for its military strategy in the
western Pacific. According to one China analyst, the PLA's conventional
prompt ballistic missile inventory includes about 1,200 short-range
missiles (DF-11/CSS-7 and DF-15/CSS-6), medium-range missiles such as
the DF-21/CSS-5 family which includes an anti-ship version and the DF-
16/CSS-11 which can target Okinawa, and development of an intermediate-
range missile, the DF-26, to be able to target U.S. capabilities as
distant as Guam. In fact, one Chinese Communist Party newspaper has
reportedly referred to the DF-26 as the ``Guam killer.'' These missiles
do not need to be of global reach to support China's anti-access/area
denial strategy in the western Pacific. In addition, in November 2015,
China reportedly conducted its sixth flight test of a hypersonic glide
vehicle (HGV), designed to be launched from an ICBM missile booster. In
general, China appears to have a very active collection of programs to
develop and deploy advanced prompt strike weapons--both conventional
and nuclear.
Russia: For the twenty-first century, Russian military strategists
appear to be increasing reliance on nuclear forces and, in particular,
new types of low-yield nuclear weapons, as well as precision
conventional weapons, that can be delivered by ballistic or hypersonic
glide vehicles. For example, press reports from Russia state that
Russia is capable of outfitting its newer submarine-launched ballistic
missiles with either low-yield nuclear warheads or conventional
warheads with precision delivery. In December 2012, the Commander of
Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev
said that Russia was also considering developing a conventional payload
for its new powerful, liquid-fueled ICBM.\3\ Finally, Russian news
reports state that Russia has been working with China, France, and
India on developing hypersonic missiles. And, a new type of hypersonic
delivery vehicle, referred to as the Yu-71 and carried by ICBMs, has
reportedly been tested at least four times since late 2011 with mixed
results.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Mikhail Fomitchev, ``Russia to Develop Precision Conventional
ICBM Option,'' RIA Novosti, December 14, 2012.
\4\ See http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/
summary_of_the_project_4202_de.shtml. Also, Bill Gertz, ``Russia Tested
hypersonic Glide Vehicle in February,'' The Washington Free Beacon,
June 25, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tested-
hypersonic-glide-vehicle-in-february/
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, a decade ago the United States appeared to be the clear
leader in military technology for CPGS-type capabilities. Based on open
source reports on Chinese and Russian development activities, that no
longer seems to be the case.
Mr. Rogers. What does foreign--Russian and Chinese--development of
this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if
China and/or Russia have this capability and we do not?
Mr. Scheber. In short, Russian and Chinese development of prompt
strike capabilities, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, and the absence
of such capabilities from the U.S. military force, would have
significant negative implications for the United States and its allies.
First, the ability of Russian and Chinese missiles to deliver
offensive payloads at hypersonic speeds and delivery vehicles that can
rapidly change course would complicate U.S. efforts to defend against
such incoming missiles. In fact, senior Russian military officers have
said that new Russian missiles were being designed to be able to
counter U.S. missile defenses.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``US Missile Shield Unable to Repel Massive Russian ICBM
Attack--Chief of Strategic Missile Forces,'' Russia Today news,
December 16, 2015. https://www.rt.com/news/326121-us-missile-shield-
russian-icbm/
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Second, modern guidance technology for hypersonic reentry vehicles
can significantly improve the delivery accuracy of long-range missiles
and makes feasible the potential military employment of low-yield
nuclear and even conventional warheads. Such weapons could be launched
at U.S. or allied capabilities with little warning or time to respond.
If the United States does not have its own CPGS capabilities, this
would cede an asymmetric military advantage to Russia and China. Such
adversary weapons could be used to degrade U.S. or allied capabilities,
support China's area denial plans, intimidate U.S. allies in the
region, and accomplish a fait accompli to the ultimate benefit of the
country employing such weapons. Adversary leaders could well be willing
to gamble that their U.S. counterparts would be unwilling to escalate
the conflict by responding with U.S. ballistic missiles which currently
carry only high-yield nuclear warheads.
As mentioned in my response to question #5, this asymmetry could
disadvantage the United States in ways that would weaken deterrence
vis-a-vis Russia and China and also cause allies to question the
ability of the United States to meet its security commitments.
Mr. Rogers. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this
capability with a nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead?
Mr. Scheber. Russia and/or China may decide to use hypersonic glide
vehicles and long-range missiles to deliver nuclear warheads. Both
already have a prompt global strike nuclear capability inherent in
their nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.
Development of maneuvering, hypersonic glide vehicles could be
motivated to increase the probability of penetrating U.S. missile
defenses. In addition, if these newly developed weapons also provide
significantly improved accuracy when compared to existing ballistic
missiles, these countries may perceive a military advantage to
deploying some delivery vehicles with lower-yield nuclear warheads.
Deploying more accurate, prompt weapons with low-yield warheads could
be used to threaten the United States and its allies with escalation
during a conventional conflict. Adversary leaders may even be willing
to launch some low-yield nuclear weapons to degrade U.S. capabilities
and, with no similar U.S. response capability, gamble that U.S. leaders
would be unwilling to escalate a conflict and respond with U.S.
missiles armed with high-yield warheads. This would certainly put the
United States at a disadvantage. Effective U.S. capabilities to counter
such Russian and Chinese threats and negate the effectiveness of these
weapons would appear to be a high priority for the United States.
Development of a U.S. CPGS capability would contribute significantly
toward that goal.
Mr. Rogers. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch
capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is
to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to
the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS have a role to play in
such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is it a role
that could easily be served by another military capability at less
cost?
Mr. Scheber. CPGS capabilities could prove extremely valuable in
executing a ``left-of-launch'' strike against an imminent threat. For
example, countries possessing WMD and/or the ability to launch one or
more missiles against the United States and/or its allies would likely
have key enabling capabilities that would be exposed and vulnerable to
a limited non-nuclear strike by the United States. U.S. CPGS
capabilities could perform such a mission with little warning for an
adversary and with high probability of successful penetration of enemy
defenses. If follow-on strikes are needed, CPGS weapons in combination
with cyber and other capabilities might be employed to degrade enemy
defenses and enable heavier and more sustained follow-on strikes with a
decreased risk of loss to enemy defenses. For such a tactic, CPGS
weapons could be targeted against ground-based downlink nodes that
distribute information to and from space-based assets. This would
likely be coordinated with cyber and space defense capabilities.
It is my opinion that by raising the uncertainty in the minds of
adversary leaders over whether or not they might be able to
successfully execute a surprise attack, the probability of deterring
these leaders from attempting such a strike would be improved.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing
cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful
to reduce the risk of misperception or miscalculation. Specifically
what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered
as the CPGS technologies are developed?
General Kehler. I believe any steps (diplomatic or military-to-
military) we can take with adversaries or potential adversaries that
allow us to better understand intentions, motivations, capabilities and
decision-making processes will help build confidence. Regarding CPGS
specifically, I believe it is important to build confidence around
capabilities, numbers, and the attributes that would clearly separate
these weapons from nuclear weapons.
Mr. Cooper. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing
cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful
to reduce the risk of misperception or miscalculation. Specifically
what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered
as the CPGS technologies are developed?
Dr. Acton. The first-order task is for the United States to engage
Russia and China in dialogues with the goal of reaching a shared
understanding about which escalation risks need to be addressed. At the
moment, these three states have quite different perceptions. For
example, U.S. officials and analysts tend to worry about the
possibility of Russia's or China's misidentifying a conventionally
armed missile as nuclear armed (warhead ambiguity). By contrast, their
Russian and Chinese counterparts have tended to stress concerns about
the survivability of their nuclear forces. Realistically, such a
dialogue is likely to be both difficult to start and difficult to
conclude, but it is a necessary pre-requisite to confidence building.
The following are examples of confidence-building measures that
could help to address concerns about warhead ambiguity:
The United States could notify Russia and China of the
launch of a CPGS weapon. (If such notifications also included the
approximate location of the target, they could help reduce the
likelihood of Moscow's or Beijing's reaching a mistaken conclusion that
they were under attack from highly maneuverable CPGS weapons).
The United States could permit inspections of CPGS
weapons (almost certainly by Russia) to verify that their warheads were
nonnuclear. Naturally, such measures could be reciprocal either in the
sense that Russia and/or China agreed to provide similar notifications
or permit similar inspections, or in the sense that Russia and/or China
took asymmetric steps to ease U.S. concerns about their strategic
modernization programs.
To address concerns about the survivability of Russian and Chinese
nuclear forces, confidence-building measures such as the following
could be useful:
Joint studies (possibly conducted by national academies
of science) into the extent to which high-precision conventional
weapons can undermine the survivability of nuclear forces.
Data exchanges about plans for acquiring specified types
of long-range, hypersonic, conventional weapons.
The accountability of specified types of long-range,
hypersonic, conventional weapons under the central limits of future
nuclear arms control treaties.
It is extremely important that the possibility of cooperative
confidence-building be considered at the same time that CPGS
technologies are developed. If they are not, certain confidence-
building measures may be foreclosed, or at least made much more
difficult. For example, Congress has previously expressed
understandable concern about basing CPGS weapons on SSBNs because it
would lead to the colocation of nuclear and conventional weapons.
However, since SSBNs are already subject to arms control inspections,
it would be straightforward to permit inspections to verify that any
CPGS weapons they carried were indeed nonnuclear. By contrast, such
inspections would be much more difficult to orchestrate if CPGS weapons
were based on SSNs, which are not subject to any arms control
verification regime.
[all]