    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            [H.A.S.C. No. 114-73]

            PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                DECEMBER 8, 2015

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                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair   LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     PETE AGUILAR, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
                             Tim Morrison, Counsel
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Acton, James, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment...............     6
    Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S.
      Strategic Command..............................................     2
    Scheber, Thomas, Independent Consultant..........................     5

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Acton, James.................................................    52
        Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................    25
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    23
        Scheber, Thomas..............................................    38

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Slides displayed by Mr. Rogers...............................    69

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................    78
        Mr. Rogers...................................................    73

              PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE: AMERICAN AND FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                             Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 8, 2015.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:18 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Rogers. I want to call this hearing of the Armed
    Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to order. We are
    going to have our hearing today on ``Prompt Global Strike:
    American and Foreign Developments.''
        I want to welcome our panelists and guests with us today.
        And is Ms. Cooper here? Martha is here. I want to welcome
    the ranking member's wife, Martha Cooper, for being with us
    today. I had a chance to travel with her recently. She is
    wonderful. I don't know how she puts up with Jim, but she is
    wonderful.
        But we are happy to have our witnesses with us today. We
    have got a fine bunch. And I am happy to dispense with my
    opening statement.
        If Jim wants to do the same, so we--unless you just feel
    compelled or something.
        Mr. Cooper. You didn't even say ``Roll Tide'' or anything.
        Mr. Rogers. Don't stir me up.
        Because of the vote series, what is happening is there is a
    series of procedural votes that have been happening, will be
    happening all day, so we will probably be interrupted. So to
    ensure that we can get to the witnesses for their statements
    and questions, we will just dispense with the reading of our
    opening statements and submit them for the record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 23.]
        Mr. Rogers. With that, we have testifying before us today
    General C. Robert Kehler, retired former commander of Strategic
    Command, U.S. Strategic Command; Mr. Tom Scheber, independent
    consultant; and Dr. James Acton, senior associate, Carnegie
    Endowment.
        I want to thank you for your time and energy that you put
    in to preparing for these hearings and for traveling up here on
    your own dime. I appreciate that.
        And, General Kehler, if I bet you money 2 years ago that we
    would be able to get you to sit in this chair again, what would
    the odds have been? Not good?
        General Kehler. Very high.
        Mr. Rogers. Oh, really? Well, good.
        General Kehler. Of course, of course.
        Mr. Rogers. We appreciate you being here.
        So, with that, I will recognize General Kehler for his
    opening statement.

        STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF (RET.), FORMER
                   COMMANDER, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

        General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored
    to join you today.
        With your permission, Mr. Chairman, what I would like to do
    is submit my full statement for the record and then provide a
    brief summary now.
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
        General Kehler. This is the first time I have appeared
    before a congressional committee since retiring from active
    service in December of 2013, and I am pleased to be here to
    offer my personal perspective today on the topic of
    conventional prompt global strike [CPGS].
        We live in challenging times, and I continue to believe
    that a strong strategic deterrent composed of effective
    defenses, modern conventional and non-kinetic capabilities, an
    updated nuclear triad, and highly trained and well-led people
    will be needed to underwrite our national security and assure
    the security of our allies and partners well into the future.
    The potential threats to our security and the security of our
    allies are diverse, can arrive at our doorsteps rapidly, and
    can range from small arms in the hands of terrorists to nuclear
    weapons in the hands of hostile state leaders. The possible
    intersection of violent extremism and weapons of mass
    destruction remains a significant concern that requires
    constant vigilance. State and non-state actors alike can stress
    our intelligence capabilities and contingency plans by
    employing highly adaptive hybrid combinations of strategies,
    tactics, and capabilities, and by using the speed of
    information to mask their activities behind a veil of deception
    and ambiguity. New capabilities, like cyber weapons and
    unmanned vehicles, are emerging, and familiar weapons, like
    ballistic missiles and advanced conventional capabilities, are
    more available, affordable, and lethal.
        I can't recall a time during my professional career when
    potential threats to our homeland were more varied or
    pronounced than they are today. The tragic events in New York
    on 9/11 and more recently in Paris, San Bernardino, and
    elsewhere remind us that we must continue to pursue and destroy
    violent extremists and their networks while remaining
    constantly on guard to prevent and respond to attacks from
    them.
        Beyond violent extremists, state adversaries are seeking to
    change the strategic situation in their favor by improving
    their ability to threaten the U.S. and allied homelands with
    attack by long-range conventional, cyber, and, in some cases,
    nuclear weapons. When used in concert with capabilities
    designed to degrade our key operational advantages--things like
    space-based ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance] and communications--and negate our conventional
    superiority, they believe a credible threat to escalate a
    conflict of a strategic level against our homeland will raise
    the risks and costs of our intervention and to do so to
    unacceptable levels, thereby enabling more assertive foreign
    policies and aggressive actions.
        In my view, dealing with today's varied threats from actors
    with widely different capabilities and motivations requires the
    flexible application of a range of capabilities within
    strategies and plans that are tailored to specific adversaries
    and scenarios. Violent extremists and nation-states are not the
    same, and we cannot deal with any of them in a one-size-fits-
    all manner.
        Deterrence strategies that are the preferred approaches to
    counter nation-states will likely not be effective against
    violent extremists, where direct action is often the only
    recourse. Nuclear weapons may not be the most credible
    deterrence tool against some targets and in some scenarios
    where they were once the preferred option. Therefore, it is
    increasingly clear to me that we must carefully match our
    strategies and plans to individual actors and deploy a range of
    conventional and nuclear capabilities that can either deter, if
    possible, or defeat them in multiple scenarios.
        The capability to hold at risk and promptly attack a subset
    of high-value targets with a long-range conventional weapon is
    one such capability. What I said when I advocated for this
    capability while still on Active Duty in 2013 remains true now.
    Today, the only prompt global strike [PGS] capability to engage
    potentially time-sensitive, fleeting targets continues to be a
    ballistic missile system armed with nuclear weapons.
        We continue to require a deployed conventional prompt
    strike capability to provide the President a range of flexible
    military options to address a small number of highest value
    targets, including in an anti-access and area-denial
    environment. In my view, such a capability would both enhance
    strategic deterrence and improve our ability to react quickly
    in a time-critical scenario by providing the President with an
    option to promptly deliver a nonnuclear weapon against a
    limited but vitally important target or subset of highest value
    targets at long ranges. Such targets might be presented either
    by violent extremists, rogue or other nation-states; could
    emerge in a day-to-day or conflict scenario; and would most
    likely be highly defended, be found in the most challenging
    geographic locations, or be mobile--perhaps all three.
        While it is impossible to predict with 100 percent
    certainty what these targets might be, it is likely that they
    would fall into several general categories: Those that pose an
    immediate threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; those that
    involve the imminent use or movement of weapons of mass
    destruction; those associated with key extremist leaders; or
    those that represent a critical node in an important system
    that must be eliminated early in a campaign. Such a
    conventional prompt global strike system would complement, not
    replace, other strike capabilities by filling a gap in the
    capabilities of both existing and planned systems.
        The analysis is simple. Traditional systems are
    insufficient if they cannot deliver weapons in an operationally
    relevant timeframe. And in many plausible scenarios,
    traditional conventional forces may not be close enough or in a
    position to do just that. While 1 hour and global range do not
    have to be absolute criteria for CPGS, the need remains to
    provide the President with the means to strike certain targets
    quickly with a conventional weapon and in the face of the most
    challenging time and distance circumstances.
        Conventional prompt global strike is intended to prevent an
    adversary from using time and distance as a sanctuary. Over the
    last several years, research and development efforts on CPGS
    have highlighted both the promise and challenges of fielding
    such a capability. As many have pointed out, beyond the
    technical challenges, CPGS systems also raise policy, doctrine,
    and operational concerns that would have to be resolved prior
    to deployment. Additionally, important enabling capabilities,
    such as ISR and battle management and command and control, must
    also be addressed in order to field a viable operational
    system.
        The U.S. would also need to carefully assess the role of
    CPGS in strategic deterrence. While it is U.S. policy to reduce
    our reliance on nuclear weapons, I do not believe conventional
    weapons generally and CPGS specifically can serve as a large-
    scale replacement for nuclear weapons.
        Finally, I remain concerned, Mr. Chairman, about investment
    priorities. I am mindful of the difficult budget environment
    you are facing and worry that a robust CPGS effort could delay
    or eliminate other necessary modernization efforts. In my view,
    CPGS cannot and should not take the place of the vitally
    important nuclear or other strategic modernization efforts this
    subcommittee has worked hard to help craft and support. While I
    believe there is a real gap in our ability to strike promptly
    at long range with conventional weapons and that CPGS could
    definitely help close that gap, I would recommend caution as
    you consider elevating this need against others.
        Sir, I remain an advocate for CPGS as a complementary
    capability to enhance both deterrence and contingency response
    in the 21st century, but in this budget environment, I
    personally do so with a caveat. There are many important
    investment priorities that contribute to sustaining and
    enhancing our deterrence posture and ensuring our military
    people and civilian partners remain the envy of the world. A
    prudent CPGS investment profile seems to me to be a sensible
    way to preserve future decision space while respecting budget
    realities.
        Thank you again for inviting me to appear, and I look
    forward to your questions.
        [The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
    the Appendix on page 25.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank you, General. I think that is a
    reasonable and prudent caveat, by the way.
        You are having microphone problems. I am having microphone
    problems. We have got somebody working on that. I just wanted
    the people to realize that we are trying to get it fixed.
        So, with that, Mr. Scheber, we recognize you for a summary
    of your opening statement. And we hope your microphone works.

          STATEMENT OF THOMAS SCHEBER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT

        Mr. Scheber. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
    distinguished members of the House Subcommittee on Strategic
    Forces, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.
        As many of the committee members are aware, over the past
    15 years, the thinking about the roles served by strategic
    weapons and the collection of capabilities needed has undergone
    a significant transformation. This transformation in
    conceptualizing strategic force needs--plus newly available
    technology--has provided the catalyst for prompt global strike.
        Strategic capabilities are more than destroying the
    adversary forces; they are, in general, capabilities that can
    affect the decision calculus of leaders of other countries in
    peacetime and can become game changers if used in wartime.
        General Kehler has certainly outlined the complex security
    environment we face and for which CPGS would be, in many cases,
    an important contribution.
        Longstanding national security goals remain important, and
    these goals include four, which I will address very briefly:
    One, deterring adversaries from specific actions; two, assuring
    U.S. allies and friends; three, discouraging further military
    competition; and four, should deterrence fail, limiting damage
    and defeating an adversary. PGS can provide unique benefits in
    each of these four policy goals.
        Of specific interest to this hearing today is a proposal to
    develop long-range nonnuclear strike capabilities as a
    supplement to--not a replacement for--nuclear strike. The
    potential scenarios requiring use of such a weapon are often
    the primary focus of inquiries such as the discussion we will
    have today. However, if the late James Schlesinger were among
    us today and on the panel, he would insist on commenting that
    PGS would be used every day during peacetime and then only if
    needed in wartime. Let me explain briefly.
        Of the four policy goals, PGS could be helpful in deterring
    adversaries. In some situations, advanced conventional strike,
    such as PGS, could pose a more credible offensive threat to
    adversaries than a nuclear threat. Uncertainty over just how
    the United States might respond to an immediate provocation
    without resorting to nuclear weapons would enhance overall U.S.
    capabilities for deterrence. PGS would also help assure allies.
    Allies in high-threat regions have expressed concerns about
    U.S. nuclear reductions and other military cutbacks, while at
    the same time they see their adversaries modernizing or
    developing nuclear and other WMD [weapon of mass destruction]
    capabilities. From the perspective of allies, threats to them
    are increasing, and allies want to know how the United States
    will carry out its extended deterrence commitments to them, to
    deter and defeat adversaries while limiting damage. Some allies
    may be reassured by the knowledge that the United States has a
    prompt nonnuclear strike capability should the need arise.
        And, third, PGS can help discourage strategic force
    competition. Developing and deploying a global or near global
    precision strike capability would demonstrate to potential
    adversaries the technical prowess and resolve of the United
    States. Some potential adversaries could be dissuaded from
    competing militarily because of the tangible display of U.S.
    technical superiority as well as the cost and challenge of
    military competition.
        And, finally, should deterrence fail, to help and defend
    the United States and its allies, PGS can play a useful role. A
    PGS capability would provide one additional option for the
    President's consideration, a unique strategic capability that
    we do not have today. One or more PGS weapons could be employed
    promptly to degrade, disrupt, or destroy adversaries'
    capabilities, which need to be neutralized promptly and for
    which other options would not be timely and effective. Those
    who argue against developing prompt global strike would
    foreclose such an option from those available to a future
    President.
        In my written statement, I have addressed these issues in
    greater detail. With your permission, I ask that it be made
    part of the record, and hope that this material is of use to
    the subcommittee as it considers the need for prompt global
    strike. Thank you, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Scheber can be found in the
    Appendix on page 38.]
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, that full statement will be
    submitted for the record.
        Dr. Acton, you are recognized for 5 minutes to summarize
    your statement.

     STATEMENT OF JAMES ACTON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT

        Dr. Acton. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, members of
    the committee, it is a genuine honor to testify before you
    today, and thank you for the opportunity. I hope I can be of
    help to the committee both today on this issue and in the
    future. With your permission, I would like to submit my full
    statement for the record.
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
        Dr. Acton. While I will focus my testimony on the U.S.
    conventional prompt global strike program, I would be very
    pleased to answer questions about both Russian and particularly
    Chinese developments in this area too.
        Let me emphasize from the start that I am genuinely
    undecided about whether the United States should acquire CPGS
    weapons. The capability would unquestionably convey potential
    benefits, but it would also carry potential risks. Today, in my
    opinion, the relative magnitudes of those benefits and risks
    are unclear.
        The difficulty of reaching a definitive conclusion about
    whether to acquire CPGS weapons stems in part from
    technological immaturity. The underlying technology is
    extremely challenging, and further research and development,
    including flight testing, is required prior to any procurement
    decision. However, it also stems from what I believe are flaws
    in the Department of Defense's approach to CPGS development.
    Most importantly, the Pentagon has no official policy that sets
    out the specific military missions for which CPGS weapons might
    be acquired.
        The frequently repeated statement that the program's
    purpose is to develop high-precision conventional weapons,
    capable of reaching targets anywhere on Earth within an hour,
    is not only an increasingly inaccurate description of the
    technology that is actually being developed, but it does not
    speak to the specific military missions for which CPGS weapons
    might be acquired. Until the Department of Defense specifies
    these missions, there can be no yardstick against which to
    judge the likely effectiveness of different potential CPGS
    technologies. The tradeoffs associated with acquiring other
    weapons for the same purposes also cannot be properly assessed.
        To compound the problem, I believe there is evidence that
    the Department of Defense has failed to properly consider the
    enabling capabilities, such as intelligence, surveillance,
    reconnaissance, and battle damage assessment, needed to ensure
    the effectiveness of CPGS weapons as well as the full range of
    escalation risks.
        Not only do these flaws make it impossible at this time to
    reach a conclusion about the ultimate desirability of CPGS
    weapons, but they also create three real risks. They are that
    the United States will develop weapons that, first, are not
    optimized from a military perspective for the missions for
    which they might be employed; second, are not the most cost-
    effective way of prosecuting those missions; and, thirdly,
    unnecessarily exacerbate escalation risks with Russia and
    China.
        Fortunately, I believe there is still time for a course
    correction by the Department of Defense, and in my written
    testimony, I suggest how the Department might proceed.
        Thank you for your attention, and I yield the balance of my
    time.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Acton can be found in the
    Appendix on page 52.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank all the witnesses for their opening
    statements.
        We have been called for another vote. So, again, it is just
    one procedural vote, so we will recess for about 15 minutes to
    go and cast that vote and come right back. I apologize, but I
    am not running the trains around here.
        With that, we are in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Rogers. I call this hearing back to order. I don't know
    how this process is going to work as far as votes, but I will
    start the questioning while we wait on Mr. Cooper to get back.
        General Kehler, in your opening statements, you talked
    about, while in the service, that you supported prompt global
    strike, and you offered a caveat. Could you walk us through the
    capability gap that you thought--that you believe exists that
    caused you to have that support?
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, one of the things that
    Strategic Command [STRATCOM] was responsible for, of course,
    was for planning for global strike, and so it was our job to
    look at various scenarios and to assess those scenarios for
    targeting and for the kind of capabilities we could match
    against those scenarios and those sorts of targets. The obvious
    ones that STRATCOM has been planning for years and years
    involved nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. We were very
    supportive of the notion that we should be looking to employ
    conventional weapons in times and places where we would once
    have used nuclear weapons as much as was feasible. We also
    were--so we picked up a responsibility for conventional global
    strike as well. That also forced us to take a hard look at the
    kinds of issues that the regional combatant commanders have and
    that we had at STRATCOM, the kinds of targets that were defined
    by being time urgent and at such distances that we could not
    quickly get a traditional conventional weapon there. Those
    scenarios are typically as I outlined in my opening comments.
    Those scenarios exist when there is an immediate threat to the
    homeland, for example, or the homeland of our allies, and we
    are talking about WMD, those kinds of things, terrorist-related
    threats that can pop up quickly, be identified and need to be
    addressed. So we had nothing that was nonnuclear in order to go
    after those kinds of targets.
        Once U.S. forces are in place or when U.S. forces are in
    place, this gap doesn't look the same at all. It is when they
    are not in place or when the timing--even with the in-place
    forces, when the timing is such that they just can't get there
    in an operationally necessary or relevant time. Is that 1 hour?
    Is that global distance? I think those are--are good benchmarks
    for the start of this conversation. I don't think they are
    absolutes. So is 2 hours sufficient? I think in some cases it
    is. You know, the shorter, the better, I would say. The best we
    can do, the better the capability.
        So this was a matter of looking at a set of needs that we
    described as niche needs where other forces are not available,
    where the use of a nuclear weapon is inappropriate. And when I
    sat back and looked at what options I would present to the
    President in those kinds of scenarios, I didn't have anything
    in our quiver that we could immediately offer.
        Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you. When you think about
    that, compare where we are to Russia and China, particularly
    China has tested hypersonic glide vehicles six times already
    this year. And I know in conversation I had earlier with Mr.
    Scheber, he had talked to me about China's more aggressive
    schedule. Do you see them confronting this gap in a more
    aggressive fashion than the United States did? Tell me more
    about it, if you can.
        General Kehler. Sir, I will just offer a quick comment and
    then defer to my colleagues here if that is okay.
        Mr. Rogers. Sure.
        General Kehler. I don't have--since my retirement, I don't
    have in-depth knowledge of what the Chinese and the Russians
    are both doing. I will say this: I do believe that they are
    both interested in pursuing a long-range prompt conventional
    strike means as part of their strategies. It is a strategy, in
    the case of the Chinese, to enhance what we call their anti-
    access, area-denial capabilities, their capabilities against
    ships and other conventional platforms where we have an
    advantage.
        I think in both of their cases, it is also a means for them
    to hold targets in our homeland and those of our allies at
    risk, and I think they do that strategically in order to cause
    us to assess the risk of our intervention in a crisis or a
    conflict in a different way. So I know they are pursuing those
    kinds of capabilities. It isn't quite clear to me, and I know
    you are receiving a briefing a little bit later, a classified
    briefing, that will get into that more deeply, but I do believe
    they are both interested in those kinds of capabilities, and I
    think that they are pursuing R&D [research and development]
    efforts to try to bring those capabilities to some level of
    decision point where they can decide on deployment.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Scheber, I know you and I talked about this
    a little bit earlier. Do you want to add something to what
    General Kehler just offered?
        Mr. Scheber. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Most of--my
    research has been focused on open sources, so it is all
    unclassified research, what is available in the press, what the
    Chinese wish to have revealed to us, and as well as
    unclassified DOD [Department of Defense] reports.
        Regarding China, as General Kehler has outlined, the
    Chinese appear to be developing prompt nuclear and nonnuclear
    strike capabilities that fit with their anti-access and area-
    denial strategies out to the second island chain. Just
    specifically regarding conventionally armed ballistic missiles,
    they have over 1,200 short-range missiles that are ballistic,
    the DFs 11 and 15 that are deployed opposite Taiwan; they have
    medium-range missiles, such as the DF-21 family, which includes
    an anti-ship version; they have a DF-16, which can target
    Okinawa, which we have our forces deployed there; and they are
    in the process, at least according to open-source reports, of
    developing a longer range, classified as an intermediate-range
    missile, the DF-26, which Chinese reports refer to as the
    ``Guam killer.'' The name is pretty self-explanatory.
        So if we look at what we know of the Chinese strategy to
    dominate the western Pacific and deny the United States access
    to that area, these capabilities look like they are pretty well
    designed to help them with that strategy, and as far as we
    know, at least at the unclassified level, those missiles have
    the capability to be either nuclear or conventionally armed.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. My final question before I turn it over
    to the ranking member is for General Kehler. You and I have
    talked about this before, but I wanted to visit the subject.
    The disarmament advocates believe that we should get rid of one
    leg of the triad. They say we don't need the ICBMs
    [intercontinental ballistic missiles] anymore, so we shouldn't
    pursue the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program, or that we
    don't need air-launched cruise missiles, so we shouldn't pursue
    the long-range standoff weapon. In fact, these people say that
    these systems are dangerous and destabilizing.
        What are your thoughts about the suggestions that we hear
    from these advocates?
        General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I remain a supporter of the
    triad, and I remain a supporter because I think the triad does
    some very important things for us. Number one, it gives to any
    President a range of options. It is very difficult, I think,
    post-Cold War to envision the scenarios we are going to find
    ourselves in, in the future. We typically get that wrong, as a
    matter of fact.
        And so I think that one thing the triad does for us is it
    gives us a range of options to present to any President to deal
    with a crisis or a conflict. The second thing it does is it
    provides insurmountable problems for an adversary, either
    attack problems to try to eliminate our forces or defense
    problems. And it forces them to invest in all kinds of ways
    that, when you start to eliminate legs of the triad, I think
    they don't have to invest any longer. By the way, I think it
    diminishes our deterrent value as well.
        The third thing it does, the triad does, is it provides the
    United States with a hedge--a hedge against technical failure
    or a hedge against geopolitical change. Again, it is an
    uncertain world, and if we had, for example, let's say we
    decided to do away with the ICBM leg of the triad--I am a fan
    of the ballistic missile submarine force. Ballistic missile
    submarine force--and by the way, when New START [Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty] is finally brought into full force, most of
    our deployed weapons will be aboard submarines. That works this
    issue about survivability of the land-based ICBM force and
    whether or not we are in a use-or-lose kind of scenario. We
    have taken steps to avoid that.
        But having said that, without the ICBMs, we are one
    potential technical failure, in either a ballistic missile
    system or a warhead, away from having no ballistic missiles.
    And while we would still have nuclear capable aircraft, those
    are not on alert on a day-to-day basis. We would be putting a
    future President in a position of having to make that decision
    as well. I think for hedge purposes, it makes sense to retain
    all three legs.
        Finally, I think it has been cost-effective.
        So, yes, we need to be mindful, I believe, of the concerns
    about stability and ambiguity and those kind of things, but I
    believe that the concerns that have been raised about ICBMs,
    that they are on a hair trigger, that--because of use or lose,
    I believe you have to remember that there is one finger on the
    trigger, and that finger belongs to the President and only the
    President.
        The second thing I think you have to remember is the use-
    or-lose issue is not the same issue today as it was during the
    Cold War. There are additional nuclear adversaries beyond--
    potential adversaries beyond the Russians. Only the Russians
    can threaten the ICBM force in total. So I think the use-or-
    lose problem looks different today, and I think that the world
    situation puts a different light on that as well.
        Finally, the idea about unauthorized or--you know,
    accidental launch, I think for ICBMs there are layers of
    safeguards, and while, yes, it is important for us to continue
    to focus on that and make sure that we constantly get better in
    that regard, I believe that we work that problem pretty well.
        Cruise missiles. You know, cruise missiles have proven
    their value. At least from my perspective and certainly my last
    job's perspective, they prove their value both in deterrence
    value, that you can arm a bomber, whether that bomber is
    penetrating, in the case of LRSB [long-range strike bomber] in
    the future, or whether it is standoff, what you are doing is
    you are increasing the effectiveness of the bomber. And to me,
    there is tremendous value in being able to do that. When you
    look at the land masses that are potentially involved here,
    even a penetrating platform benefits from having a longer range
    missile, that it doesn't have to get close to the target area
    if it doesn't want to, or it can hold multiple targets at risk
    at varying ranges while it is penetrating. I think there is
    tremendous value there for deterrence, and there is no question
    the value--the combat value we have gotten out of using
    hundreds of conventional cruise missiles.
        So I don't understand some of the argument here about why
    we shouldn't go ahead with a replacement for the ALCM [air-
    launched cruise missile]. To me, it makes all the sense in the
    world. It makes even more sense if that replacement for ALCM
    eventually becomes dual-capable, and then I think we have done
    exactly what we have done with the air-launch cruise missile. I
    do not believe that we are changing either the stability or the
    ambiguity issues here. These are issues--you know, when we use
    B-52s today--I am taking too much time--but when we use B-52s
    today, we use B-2s today, and we have only ever operationally
    used them, thank heaven, in conventional modes. And we have
    been able to work the ambiguity issue when a cruise missile
    lifts off a surface ship, or when it drops out of a B-52 bomb
    bay, or if it comes out of an SSGN [guided missile submarine],
    no one believes that we have just launched a nuclear weapon.
        Now, we need to be careful with that. I agree that that is
    an issue that we have to be mindful of and continue to work to
    reduce that risk and continue to reduce the risk as much as we
    possibly can, but I do not believe that we are changing the
    game here with LRSO [long-range standoff weapon]. I think what
    we are doing is continuing our--both our deterrence and our
    conventional warfighting capability.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am most interested in that netherworld between nuclear
    and conventional, and we probably can't call it conventional
    anymore since hypersonic weapons are stretching the limits of
    conventionality, so maybe we should say ``nuclear,
    nonnuclear.''
        I think everyone agrees that due to the speed and precision
    of these conventional warheads, they can have a devastating
    impact on the target. I think we can also all agree that many
    poorer nations are encouraged to turn nuclear because that is a
    more affordable way to get devastating capabilities because
    they have less hope of achieving a hypersonic capability.
        So I was interested in Mr. Acton's book ``Silver Bullet''
    when he talked about how even our bunker buster bomb, the
    massive ordnance penetrator, can go a certain depth, but these
    things can go probably twice as deep, due to the speed and
    precision. So it seems to me to be an interesting inflection
    point for the world. Several leading nations are pursuing these
    weapons, but we don't know quite how to classify them. And the
    chairman has pointed out that we have been kind of slow
    developing them, given the lead time, and I hope we can get to
    the bottom of that in the Pentagon, but to me, it is a
    fascinating category because they are not nuclear, but yet they
    have super capabilities, and they tempt other nations to do
    some extreme reactions.
        Mr. Acton also noted that Putin comments five times in
    recent years. He seems to pay particular attention to these.
    The potential for these weapons is remarkable. So I am hopeful
    that we can develop the capability and do so in a sensible way
    that does not exacerbate the difficulties in the world that we
    have already.
        I would welcome comments from any of the witnesses on this.
    Am I off base in classifying the weapons these ways, as not
    really conventional but certainly not nuclear?
        Dr. Acton. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
        And these are certainly weapons that have significantly
    greater potential to destroy certain kinds of targets than
    existing conventional weapons. Unclassified figures put the
    depth that the massive ordnance penetrator can go to at about
    20 meters of reinforced concrete. My calculations suggest that
    hypersonic weapons might be able to go to 40 meters. With
    nuclear weapons, you are talking about weapons that can
    potentially destroy targets hundreds of meters in hard rock. So
    there [is] still, as you absolutely rightly point out, quite a
    big difference there between even these penetrating weapons and
    nuclear weapons.
        I think one of the important questions that this raises,
    and this is a question that is impossible to answer at the
    unclassified level, that is, how many additional targets are
    there that are out of the reach of existing conventional
    weapons but would be in the reach of hypersonic weapons. I just
    don't know the answer to that question, but that is, I think,
    the type of thing that needs to be considered at the classified
    level, and as you say, sir, thinking about how to do this
    sensibly.
        I would just raise a couple of points about some of the
    escalation risks involved with these weapons. So much of the
    debate so far has been swallowed up by the so-called problem of
    warhead ambiguity, which when the administration of President
    George W. Bush had a plan to take nuclear warheads off some
    Trident missiles and replace them with conventional warheads,
    Congress was concerned that an observing state, most likely
    Russia, would see the launch of one of those weapons and
    misinterpret a conventional for a nuclear weapon.
        I think we have placed far too much emphasis on the warhead
    ambiguity problem. There are other escalation risks with
    conventional prompt global strike weapons that I think haven't
    had adequate attention. So to give you one, the Department of
    Defense is interested in these boost-glide weapons precisely
    because they don't fly in ballistic trajectories, and so DOD
    argues that an observing state could tell this was nonnuclear
    because it was in a different trajectory, and I think that is
    exactly right. However, these weapons are also highly
    maneuverable, and if one fires them, say, in the direction of
    Iran, Russia might not know whether that weapon was heading for
    Russia or Iran, or if one fired them at North Korea, then
    Russia or China, for that matter, might not know whether the
    target was Russia or China. This is what is termed destination
    ambiguity.
        So there are real tradeoffs here in terms of risk reduction
    in that technologies that exacerbate one risk can reduce
    another. These escalation risks are risks to be considered. I
    don't necessarily argue that they are by any means the only
    factor that needs to be considered, but from everything I have
    seen, DOD is very largely focused on the warhead ambiguity
    problem and hasn't given adequate attention to those other
    kinds of risks.
        Mr. Cooper. How would you classify a weapon that had in its
    glide phase only 48 percent?
        Dr. Acton. Well----
        Mr. Cooper. That seems to be a pretty arbitrary distinction
    between 50 percent glide phase.
        Dr. Acton. I would make two points there. I mean, the
    distinction comes from arms control definitions where the--if a
    weapon is ballistic over the majority of its trajectory, then
    it is deemed to be a ballistic missile. And that, I think, is
    unquestionably the correct interpretation of the existing arms
    control treaties we have. The extent to which that mitigates
    ambiguity problems, though, I think is more of an open
    question, but what I would say is another issue with DOD's
    argument is that if you are Russia, you would see the launch of
    a boost-glide weapon if you had a satellite in the right place
    looking. You wouldn't, then, see a weapon flying in a
    nonballistic trajectory. What you would actually see is nothing
    at all after the launch because boost-glide weapons fly at too
    low an altitude to be detected by early warning radar.
        So DOD's argument is that Russia could see that the weapon
    was flying in a nonballistic trajectory; whereas, in fact, I
    think Russia would see nothing at all after the launch.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        In view of the shortness of time, I yield to other members.
        Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Okay. Thank you. I will ask a
    question or two and then turn it over to my colleague from
    California, depending on when we have to go vote here.
        General Kehler, there is a letter that I saw that one of
    the Senators is circulating urging the administration to stop
    any thought about developing a nuclear-tipped air-launched
    cruise missile. And I know that that is not the subject of our
    conversation here today, but it is related, but I realize it is
    on the other side of the bright line between conventional PGS,
    and this is on the other side. This is nuclear air cruise
    missile. But it is important, because that letter's
    circulating, and yet when I see what the President certified
    when he addressed the Senate on the New START treaty back in
    the year 2011, among other things, he certified under point 3
    that he intended to modernize or replace the triad of strategic
    nuclear delivery systems, which is a heavy bomber, an ICBM, et
    cetera, et cetera, add an air-launched cruise missile. So the
    President in the past is on record saying that a nuclear-tipped
    air-launched cruise missile is part of our strategic
    deterrence.
        In light of that, would you agree or disagree with a letter
    urging the administration to drop any development of a nuclear-
    tipped air-launched cruise missile, long-range standoff, let's
    say.
        General Kehler. Sir, I continue to support the need to have
    a nuclear-capable, air-launched cruise missile that would be a
    replacement for today's ALCM. As I mentioned to the chairman, I
    think we have--there is great deterrent value. It not only
    provides the ability to stand off with a bomber, depending on
    the scenario here, but it also allows the bomber to penetrate
    and still extend the range and effectiveness of the bomber, the
    penetrating bomber. So I think it still provides us with
    deterrent value. And, as I also mentioned, I think we have seen
    in combat the value of a dual-capable cruise missile, a cruise
    missile that can also be used in a conventional sense.
        The letter--I have seen the letter that you are mentioning.
    There are a number of issues that are raised. Some of these are
    ambiguity issues. I know that there have been some op-eds and
    other things written that I have read here over the last
    several months about raising the ambiguity concern. And, again,
    while I believe that you always have to be mindful of those
    concerns, I think those are workable, and we have worked those
    with the cruise missiles that we have today and the bombers as
    well, that I don't think those are insurmountable issues.
        I do think that the value we get out of an air-launched
    cruise missile and a gravity weapon also is greater than the
    risks that are raised here because specifically I believe that
    those risks are all--either have been worked or are workable.
        Mr. Lamborn. And in response to that, one of you, maybe it
    was you, General Kehler, had said that every time we launch a
    Tomahawk cruise missile from the Persian or Arabian Sea or
    something like that, the Russians or Chinese don't have any
    confusion about what is going on, you know, that that is
    strictly a conventional armed cruise missile. Why do we have
    that situation today?
        General Kehler. Well, number one, I think it is scenario
    dependent. I mean, they don't believe that we are shooting at
    them, one. So I take Dr. Acton's point here that if a conflict
    involves Russia or China, I think you would have to be mindful
    of those concerns. I think you work those in advance. I think
    you work those with the way you deploy these weapons. I think
    you work them with the way you test them. I think you work them
    in a lot of ways because I believe that you would have this
    issue in multiple ways. You will have this issue with the B-2,
    by the way. If we are involved in a fight with either Russia or
    China, I think today we would use the B-2 in that kind of a
    conflict, but the B-2 is dual-capable. I think those issues
    have been around for a long time about a stealthy platform and
    whether or not it would be carrying nuclear weapons, whether
    they would know it, et cetera, but I think that our operational
    behavior with B-2s has done something to help alleviate those
    concerns, and I think you would have to work those concerns
    here as well.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am going to turn the gavel back over
    to the chairman. But, lastly, General Kehler, so you would
    disagree with the letter I read earlier?
        General Kehler. I do disagree.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. And I yield to the chairman.
        Mr. Rogers [presiding]. Great.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Garamendi, for any questions he may have.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I noticed the bell
    rang, and I decided that I didn't want to prove that Pavlov was
    quite right about ringing bells and dogs salivating. So I think
    that this is probably far more important than voting on another
    motion to adjourn, so let me go ahead and have at this.
        General, your point about ambiguity and the cruise missile
    thus far and the B-2 bomber thus far not creating a problem, in
    that Russia or China previously understood that it wasn't
    coming at them, but we have not been involved in a conflict
    with either of those two countries.
        Now, in a conflict, and you were getting to this with
    your--at the end of your last comments, in a conflict with
    those countries, when their doctrine is one--at least Russia's
    doctrine--is one of escalate to de-escalate, I think we have a
    completely different situation, in which the ambiguity level
    significantly increases. So if we are launching a cruise
    missile, as was just discussed a moment ago, from the Persian
    Gulf to, I don't know, some place in Iraq, or Russia is
    launching a cruise missile from the Caspian Sea into Syria, we
    understood what was going on. We were not engaged in a war with
    Russia. So I think we have got a very, very different
    situation, and I think it is Mr. Perry's letter, former
    Secretary Perry's letter that is being discussed here, and the
    question of ambiguity really arises to its highest state of
    uncertainty in a conflict with a nuclear country such as Russia
    or China.
        So I will just make that comment to come back at what you
    were saying. I think ambiguity can be a very, very serious
    problem under those circumstances, and hopefully, we never find
    ourselves under those circumstances, but that is why we have
    the triad, is it not? It is not to deal with Iraq or Syria.
        Dr. Acton, in what way might the CPGS undermine strategic
    stability, and what should we do to mitigate this risk?
        Dr. Acton. Well, thank you for the question, sir. As I
    suggested already, I think that----
        Mr. Rogers. Dr. Acton, is your microphone working?
        Dr. Acton. Ah. I am sorry. Sorry, Mr. Chairman.
        As I suggested already, there is a series of different
    escalatory risks that I am concerned about. There has been a
    lot of focus on warhead ambiguity, which is not my major
    concern unless, as you rightly point out, we are in a conflict
    with Russia or China. There is destination ambiguity,
    uncertainty about where a CPGS weapon will land. One has----
        Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. And that is because it can be
    redirected in flight?
        Dr. Acton. Because it is inherently maneuverable. Because
    with a ballistic missile, from the moment the motor burns out,
    you can predict where it is going to land. With a CPGS weapon,
    because it is maneuverable and can be redirected in flight, you
    don't know where it is going to land.
        You have crisis instability. So the--Russia, I think,
    incorrectly believes that the United States wants conventional
    weapons in order to attack Russia's nuclear weapons, but I
    believe that belief is genuine. And on Russia's part, the
    belief that the United States might preemptively attack its
    nuclear forces could lead Russia to use nuclear forces first.
        I have two suggestions about how to proceed. The first one
    is I very strongly agree with General Kehler that this is a
    problem that needs to be worked. The Department of Defense is
    only focused on warhead ambiguity to date, and I think that the
    first thing it should do is focus on the full range of
    instabilities. It should red team those instabilities, create
    models of how those instabilities could arise, and factor those
    instabilities into planning decisions.
        Secondly, if the U.S. does decide to go forward with
    conventional prompt global strike, I think cooperative
    confidence-building measures, things such as launch
    notifications, mutual inspections, are likely to be much more
    effective than the unilateral measures that DOD has placed a
    focus on to date.
        Mr. Garamendi. General Kehler and Mr. Scheber.
        Mr. Scheber, you seem to want to have at it, so why don't
    you go first.
        Mr. Scheber. Thank you. The issue of strategic stability is
    certainly a serious issue. I think I am the only one old enough
    in this room to remember the debate in the 1980s that went on
    at the time when all of our cruise missiles were nuclear armed
    and the consideration was in developing a conventionally armed
    missile for just that reason. Today, if we saw cruise missiles
    launched in most situations, as you pointed out, people would
    have assumed that they are conventional in nature because those
    are how the weapons have been used. We have demonstrated them,
    informed people, and so there was a whole different context.
    And so I think it is instructive to see how the world views
    changed as the arsenal changed and other countries were made
    aware of it.
        Regarding strategic stability and the potential for
    misunderstanding, it is certainly a topic that is serious. And
    the National Academy study report that reported out in 2008
    found conclusions similar to other studies that have been
    conducted by the Department of Defense, that while a serious
    issue, there are a variety of measures, and Dr. Acton mentioned
    confidence-building measures, which I wholly agree with, of
    briefing the Russians and the Chinese as to what we are doing,
    having hotlines available. We have a variety of hotlines
    already available, so if questions arise, the phone
    communication can be prompt and straightforward and clear up
    any uncertainty. And both the National Academy study and a
    variety of DOD studies concluded that they believe that these
    series of measures would be sufficient to keep the risk of any
    misunderstanding very low.
        Now, certainly you can never totally eliminate that risk--
    given that humans are involved, but there is a variety of
    material on which we can already draw and then build upon to
    resolve the nuclear ambiguity strategic stability issue.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I am out of time. Thank you very
    much.
        Mr. Rogers. If you need a few more minutes, go ahead. You
    and I are it right now.
        Mr. Garamendi. Very good. General----
        Mr. Rogers. Well, now the ranking member came back, but go
    ahead.
        Mr. Cooper. Go ahead, John.
        Mr. Rogers. Go ahead, John.
        General Kehler. I agree with what has been said. I agree
    with your point as well that this is an issue that you have to
    work. And the point about Russia and China not believing that
    we are launching a nuclear-armed cruise missile today if we use
    one in combat is situationally dependent. I concede that point
    as well, but what I also know is that now for--I can't tell you
    the first time we used a conventional cruise missile in combat.
    Certainly in Desert Storm, we used them. So let's just say for
    20 years or 20-plus years, we have used them, what that does is
    it changes the situation in these other more dire scenarios
    where I don't believe that Russia, Chinese, or American leaders
    would knee jerk a reaction in a conflict that was at that kind
    of a level.
        So, having said that, again, I go back to I think you have
    to work this issue, and you have to be mindful of it, and I
    think it has to shape your behavior in a given scenario as
    well. So I am agreeing.
        And, by the way, I have tremendous respect for Dr. Perry,
    and when Dr. Perry says we ought to be concerned about
    something, I would agree with that. We ought to be concerned
    about it, but I do think it is workable.
        Mr. Garamendi. Yeah. I will take just another, maybe a
    minute here. The principal problem that I perceive here is that
    we are developing weapons that are by their nature very, very
    difficult to observe. They are stealthy and extremely dangerous
    in that they can carry nuclear weapons or very dangerous
    conventional weapons as we are discussing here. And an
    adversary, given the uncertainty, the hair trigger becomes much
    more finely tuned, and that is a concern, particularly given
    the Russian doctrine at the moment, which may change in the
    future. We are headed down a path that is, I think, increasing
    the danger and creating a new paradigm for which we are, by the
    conversation here, not prepared for. The previous paradigm was
    one in which we spent 30--almost 50 years developing an
    understanding and a communication process.
        The new weapons, however, by their nature will require a
    different paradigm, which we do not presently have. Could we
    develop it? If I recall the height of the Cold War, we were
    very lucky. And perhaps we were very good, but I suspect more
    so we were lucky, and that is my concern.
        Thank you very much for the time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        General Kehler, you and I have talked about this before,
    but I am real concerned about the saber-rattling from Russia,
    and this couple--this recent disclosure of an autonomous
    underwater giant nuclear weapon is deeply troubling to me. And
    this weapon, according to Russia, would provide a new
    capability that, quote, ``the important components of the
    adversary's economy in coastal areas and inflicting
    unacceptable damage to the country's territory by creating
    areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be
    unsustainable for military, economic, or other activities for a
    long period of time,'' close quote.
        You put this together with their public--what we know
    publicly about their military doctrine, it is of concern to me.
    What do you make of this, and what does it tell you about their
    mindset, Russia's mindset? Or do you have an opinion?
        General Kehler. Well, my opinion now, Mr. Chairman, is sort
    of shaped from being on the outside looking in, but I think--
    and I haven't spoken with any senior Russians lately, so I
    can't speak for them. It looks to me as though they have got
    two objectives here: One is to remind us and NATO [North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization], and the world really, that we
    have to take their concerns into account. And I think the
    second is, as part of a broader strategy to try to change the
    strategic game here, I think that they want to make sure that
    they can remind us that they are holding us at risk and that
    they can do so with conventional weapons, now long-range
    conventional weapons. You know that in Syria they launched
    long-range cruise missiles off of surface ships and off of Tu-
    95s here not so long ago. So I think they are reminding us that
    they can hold our homeland at risk in a variety of ways and, as
    a result, are reminding us that us getting involved in things
    or acting with impunity, the risk is too high. But what
    troubles me about this is I think it smacks of returning to a
    Cold War kind of an approach here that maybe I naively had
    thought we were past all of that.
        So while I can understand why they would do this, what
    concerns me is if this is real security concern on their part
    that they are vulnerable somehow, then I do think you begin to
    get stability concerns. And so I think that is what troubles me
    as much as anything else, is that if--someone said once, and I
    don't know who said this or I would give them credit for it--I
    didn't, but someone said this, and it stuck with me--that
    insecurity begets instability, and so the flip is security
    begets stability. And so if they are insecure, fundamentally
    insecure here, then I think that that is a concern to me in
    trying to come up with strategies for how we deal with all of
    that.
        Mr. Rogers. Thanks.
        And, General, we have talked about hypersonic boost-glide
    programs. I want to call your attention to the monitors, the TV
    monitor that we have up there. This is an unclassified slide
    that we have been provided that shows French cooperation with a
    Russian arms manufacturer to develop hypersonic boost-glide
    capability.
        [The slides referred to can be found in the Appendix
    beginning on page 69.]
        Mr. Rogers. If you were still at STRATCOM, what would you
    be urging the Department of Defense and the Department of State
    to say to our French allies about their cooperation with Russia
    to develop what could be a new nuclear weapon delivery system?
        General Kehler. Well, I think as with any tech transfer
    kind of an issue, I would hope that the United States would
    express its concerns to anyone out there where technology
    transfer is an issue. We have some pretty strict technology
    transfer laws and processes and procedures, and I would be
    hopeful that we would express our concerns as well.
        I am not overly familiar with this. I see the chart. I am
    not overly familiar with this, and so I would hate to make a
    blatant statement about it, but I would just say in general
    terms, I would be concerned about technology transfer to any
    potential adversary. And whether Russia is an enemy, I think,
    is open for some conversation, but I would be very concerned
    about technology transfer to any of the potential adversaries.
        Mr. Rogers. That is all the questions I have.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. All right. Well, it looks like we have reached
    the end. And I thank the witnesses very much for their patience
    and for their contributions. It is very helpful to this
    committee.
        And, with that, we stand adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                 A P P E N D I X

                                December 8, 2015

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                December 8, 2015

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. In your opening statement you stated, ``we continue to
    require a deployed conventional prompt strike capability to provide the
    President a range of flexible military options to address a small
    number of highest value targets, including in an anti-access and area
    denial (A2/AD) environment.'' Do you believe a CPGS system could
    enhance our power projection capacity in a manner that is unique to and
    entirely outside the capabilities of other conventional systems
        General Kehler. CPGS is envisioned to be unique from other
    conventional weapons both in range and time to effect and would
    definitely enhance U.S. power projection capacity as a precursor to
    other systems. Existing conventional systems could address the highest
    value targets in an A2/AD environment if they can respond in an
    operationally relevant timeframe, have sufficient range, and can
    penetrate sophisticated defenses. However, existing systems typically
    lack one or more of these attributes against the type of targets and
    scenarios envisioned for CPGS.
        Mr. Rogers. Considering the growing risk upon our conventional
    forces when it comes to projecting power in an A2/AD environment: (1)
    how might the availability of a CPGS system mitigate or overcome such
    risks and (2) in your judgment, are there potential force-multiplier
    benefits from integrating a CPGS capability from a platform based in
    the continental U.S. (or far from the area in question) with the
    capabilities of an expeditionary force operating in an A2/AD
    environment?
        General Kehler. In my view, the A2/AD strategy can be defeated
    through a combination of strong alliances and coalitions, updated
    operational concepts, improvements in the resilience of U.S. forces
    (especially cyber networks and space-based ISR and communications), and
    enhancements to our power projection capabilities (increased range and
    penetration capabilities). CPGS could contribute to this by providing
    commanders with a conventional strike capability that addresses high
    value targets early in a campaign and from outside the range of enemy
    kinetic forces. Before a conflict such a capability could contribute to
    deterrence by eliminating enemy sanctuaries. When used in coordination
    with other kinetic and non-kinetic strike capabilities early in a
    conflict, CPGS could help enable and enhance the effectiveness of
    subsequent U.S. power projection forces.
        Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the U.S. should prioritize the
    development and acquisition of a specific type of CPGS with specific
    attributes? If so, which type and with what attributes?
        General Kehler. At this point I would not prioritize a specific
    type of CPGS with specific attributes. I believe the most effective way
    to proceed is to develop a variety of potential CPGS approaches and
    allow performance to determine the way ahead. In my view there is value
    in continuing research into high-tech means to bring prompt, long-range
    strike into ``third wave'' consideration.
        Mr. Rogers. What security challenges do you foresee potentially
    arising if China successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.?
        General Kehler. We cannot allow our qualitative military advantages
    to decline or disappear. At the strategic level, virtually the entire
    U.S. defense strategy (to include the reduced role for U.S. nuclear
    weapons in non-nuclear scenarios) is based on the presumption of
    continued U.S. conventional superiority. Such superiority is based on a
    significant qualitative vice quantitative edge. Allowing any country to
    assume a position of qualitative military superiority over the U.S.
    would erode the credibility of our strategic deterrent and extended
    deterrent and threaten our freedom of action in a crisis or conflict.
    At the operational and tactical levels, a Chinese CPGS could threaten
    critical targets in the U.S. and allied homelands as well as critical
    targets associated directly with military operations in the Pacific
    region.
        Mr. Rogers. In Mr. Acton's opening statement, he raised the concern
    that, ``the Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific
    military missions for which CPGS weapons might be acquired.'' Is that
    correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you
    consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of a CPGS
    system?
        General Kehler. As I mentioned in my prepared remarks, CPGS would
    be valuable in missions against targets that might be presented either
    by violent extremists or nation-states, that could emerge in day-to-day
    or conflict scenarios, and would most likely be highly defended, be
    found in the most challenging geographic locations, or be mobile
    (perhaps all three). While it is impossible to predict with 100%
    certainty what these targets might be, it is likely that they would
    fall into several general categories: those that pose an immediate
    threat to the U.S. or allied homelands; those that involve the imminent
    use or movement of weapons of mass destruction; those associated with
    key extremist leaders; or those that represent a critical node in an
    important system that must be eliminated early in a campaign.
        Mr. Rogers. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control
    to limit hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think
    of these suggestions as national security policy? Do you foresee
    challenges in undertaking such a policy and what are they?
        General Kehler. I don't favor placing arbitrary ``speed limits'' on
    our military capabilities. We have hypersonic weapons today in the form
    of ballistic missiles. Hypersonic speed presents both opportunities and
    challenges for us and our potential adversaries and I fully understand
    the desire to avoid an ``arms race'' competition in this type of
    weapon. However, I would be very concerned about the difficulty of
    establishing transparency and sustaining high-confidence verification
    in a treaty-type approach.
        Mr. Rogers. How do you characterize and assess foreign
    development--primarily Russian and Chinese--of CPGS capability compared
    to our own?
        General Kehler. I am not current on the classified details of
    Russian and Chinese activities in this area. While still on active duty
    I was interested in their progress and concerned about the general
    inadequacy of U.S. intelligence priorities and resources associated
    with adversary hypersonic activities (as well as with many other
    intelligence areas). Again, while still in my active duty capacity I
    had some concern that Russia and China were seemingly moving faster
    than the U.S. in this area but had yet to see any material change in
    military capabilities as a result.
        Mr. Rogers. What does foreign--Russian and Chinese--development of
    this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if
    China and/or Russia have this capability and we do not?
        General Kehler. In my view, having a unique military capability
    does not automatically translate into a military advantage. I would be
    very concerned if China or Russia had a hypersonic or CPGS capability
    that the U.S. was unable to counter. While it isn't necessary in my
    view for the U.S. to equal China or Russia in individual military
    capabilities or size, deterrence and crisis stability depend on those
    countries not achieving an overall military advantage over the U.S.
        Mr. Rogers. You were a military planner. How would you plan for
    dealing with such a non-nuclear or nuclear capability and would you
    want to have a defensive capability to deal with it?
        General Kehler. I would first plan to deter it. Deterring conflict
    remains the preferred approach and is the number one objective of the
    combatant commands. Deterrence is based on an adversary's belief that
    the U.S. has both the capability (forces, plans, command and control)
    and resolve (policy, declaratory statements, visible demonstrations) to
    deny their objectives or cause unacceptable costs if they try to
    achieve them. In my view, deterrence will remain credible in the
    Twenty-first Century if the U.S. tailors its plans and operations to
    the specific objectives and motivations of individual adversaries and
    brings a complementary set of offensive (conventional kinetic, non-
    kinetic, nuclear) and defensive tools to the equation.
        Mr. Rogers. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this
    capability with a nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead?
        General Kehler. I think it does matter. Regarding Russia, nuclear
    arms are controlled by various treaties that, so long as the parties
    abide by those treaties, provide a mechanism to address nuclear CPGS
    matters. We do not have similar arrangements with China; in my view a
    potential cause for concern if U.S. nuclear arms are further reduced.
    In effect, all long-range nuclear ballistic missiles are CPGS weapons.
    Hypersonic nuclear cruise missiles present additional challenges.
        Mr. Rogers. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch
    capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is
    to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to
    the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS have a role to play in
    such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is it a role
    that could easily be served by another military capability at less
    cost?
        General Kehler. I believe CPGS could serve a particularly important
    role in holding a small number of rogue-state ballistic missile
    launchers at risk. When combined with missile defenses, such a
    capability would provide the President with options below the nuclear
    threshold, even if the enemy ballistic missiles are nuclear-tipped. In
    my view, CPGS would be ideally suited for this mission since it would
    meet the following criteria: imminent use of a weapon of mass
    destruction that posed on immediate threat to the U.S. or allied
    homelands; located in a challenging geographic place that is likely to
    be highly defended; and will move soon. This is not a role easily
    served by other military capabilities at less cost. Of course, this
    approach will not work with larger, near-peer or peer nations where the
    scope and scale of their ballistic threat cannot be held at risk or
    negated by CPGS and limited defenses.
        Mr. Rogers. What security challenges do you foresee potentially
    arising if China successfully fields a CPGS system before the U.S.?
        Mr. Scheber. China is currently developing several versions of
    precision, prompt strike weapons to support its military strategy which
    calls for being able to control the western Pacific region out to ``the
    second island chain.'' If China deploys effective prompt strike weapons
    and the United States does not, the potential implications for the
    United States and its allies could be far reaching. Such a capability
    could strengthen China's anti-access/area denial capabilities and
    increase the challenge for the United States to defend its allies and
    protect free access to maritime trade routes in the Pacific. In
    particular, a Chinese CPGS capability, without an appropriate U.S.
    response, could weaken the ability of the United States to deter
    Chinese aggression, to assure U.S. allies in the region, and to limit
    damage in the event deterrence fails.
        Deterrence weakened: Without an effective and appropriate U.S.
    response, Chinese leaders could be emboldened to continue their
    ``coercive diplomacy'' and threaten U.S. allies with non-nuclear
    strikes from PGS-type systems if they resist China's policies. A U.S.
    CPGS capability, if available, would provide a capability--a non-
    nuclear capability--to promptly preempt China's offensive command and
    control capabilities and could increase the uncertainty of success for
    China's military leaders. This would likely have the effect of
    strengthening deterrence.
        Assurance weakened: Allies would likely feel threatened by Chinese
    CPGS capabilities if the United States cannot provide assurances that
    it can meet its obligations as specified in U.S. mutual defense
    treaties with western Pacific allies such as Japan, the Republic of
    Korea, and Australia. China would possess the capability to launch
    prompt, non-nuclear strikes to degrade U.S. and allied military
    capabilities in the region, thereby making more difficult for the
    United States the task of defending U.S. allies and projecting military
    force in the western Pacific. Effective U.S. counters would include
    U.S. prompt conventional strike capabilities to degrade Chinese ISR and
    command and control capabilities. In addition, additional U.S. missile
    defenses would be needed to intercept any Chinese PGS missiles that are
    launched and threaten allied assets, on land and at sea. A U.S. CPGS
    capability would help assure allies that the United States is not
    falling behind in twenty-first century military technology and that the
    United States has the competence and capabilities to meet its mutual
    defense commitments to allies in the face of a hostile China.
        If Deterrence fails: Should military conflict erupt between China
    and the United States and its allies, the United States would be
    disadvantaged by the asymmetry in which China possessed CPGS-type
    weapons and the United States did not. China could use these weapons in
    support of its anti-access/area denial strategy and degrade U.S.
    military capabilities as far away as Guam, and in the future perhaps
    farther. U.S. CPGS capabilities, if developed and deployed, could, in
    combination with cyber and other capabilities, help degrade the Chinese
    strategy by damaging key elements of its surveillance and command and
    control capabilities, damaging offensive missile capabilities, and
    improving the survivability of U.S. and allied military forces being
    brought to bear on China. This could help to convince its leaders to
    cease China's aggressive military actions.
        Mr. Rogers. In Mr. Acton's opening statement, he raised the concern
    that, ``the Pentagon has no official policy that sets out the specific
    military missions for which CPGS weapons might be acquired.'' Is that
    correct? Regardless, what specific mission or missions would you
    consider a reasonable justification for the acquisition of a CPGS
    system?
        Mr. Scheber. Skeptics of certain military capabilities sometimes
    use such assertions to try to refute DOD statements that the military
    capabilities in question are needed and well conceived. Then, after DOD
    officials describe a potential scenario in which a capability, such as
    CPGS, might be of value, the skeptics then try to explain why such a
    hypothetical situation is unlikely and the proposed capability
    unnecessary. This type of debating tactic is ill conceived when applied
    to CPGS.
        First, while Dr. Acton often raises valid questions that should be
    addressed regarding CPGS, he errs in asserting that the DOD has not
    documented the potential missions for which CPGS would provide a unique
    and valuable capability. The most recent Congressional Research Service
    report on Prompt Global Strike summarizes the DOD documents which
    discuss the rationale for and potential uses of CPGS. For example, the
    CRS report states, ``The need for prompt long-range, or global, strike
    capabilities has been addressed in general defense policy studies, such
    as the 2001, 2006, and 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Reports.''
    \1\ In addition, DOD has submitted several reports to the Congress on
    the need for and programs planned to develop a CPGS capability. And
    finally, in 2006 the Joint Chiefs of Staff validated the Prompt Global
    Strike (PGS) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). This requirements
    document was reviewed again in 2013 and revalidated. The mission need
    for CPGS is well documented. Second, secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
    and other senior DOD officials have recently stressed the important
    attributes of flexibility and adaptability. This is because war is
    often accompanied by surprises--surprises in an adversary's technology,
    tactics, and decisions--and military plans must be rapidly modified.
    Military history is replete with examples. And, as recently articulated
    by the congressional testimony of the Director of National Intelligence
    and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the global threat
    assessment is extremely complex, diverse, and the future uncertain. The
    concept of developing prompt, non-nuclear strike capabilities that are
    global, or near global, in range is to fill a gap in existing U.S.
    offensive strike capabilities and, thereby, increase the flexibility of
    U.S. strategic strike capabilities. U.S. CPGS capabilities could prove
    of immense value against a variety of serious threats.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Amy F. Woolf, Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range
    Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues, CRS Report R-41464, October
    2, 2015, p. 3.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rogers. Some have suggested we seek to negotiate arms control
    to limit hypersonic weapons, including their testing. What do you think
    of these suggestions as national security policy? Do you foresee
    challenges in undertaking such a policy and what are they?
        Mr. Scheber. In my opinion, calls for the United States to
    negotiate limits on hypersonic weapons, such as current U.S. concepts
    for CPGS, are ill conceived and should not be pursued.
        First, the countries with which the United States would seek to
    negotiate such an agreement, Russia and China, are unlikely to
    negotiate in good faith or to abide by signed arms control agreements.
    China is actively developing several types of prompt strike
    capabilities that employ hypersonic delivery vehicles. These weapons
    appear to provide important capabilities for China's anti-access/area
    denial strategy. In addition, China has never shown an inclination to
    enter into a negotiation with the United States on limiting strategic
    capabilities. Indeed, China appears to be working hard to narrow the
    gap and neutralize several areas of U.S. military superiority. Russia,
    on the other hand, has been willing to negotiate strategic arms control
    agreements with the United States but has not proven to be a good-faith
    partner in complying with such treaties once they are signed. Arms
    Control Compliance Reports from the Department of State have documented
    Russia's poor record of compliance. And, nongovernmental organizations
    have documented the consistent pattern of Russian violations of arms
    control agreements.\2\ Therefore, the prospect a negotiation on such
    weapons being concluded successfully and with lasting. positive
    security benefits for the United States and its allies is, in my
    opinion, extremely remote.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ For example, Keith Payne, et al., Russian Strategy, Crisis and
    Conflict (Fairfax, VA: National Institute Press, 2016), pp. 83-102.
    http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/FINAL -FOR-WEB-
    1.12.16.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, any effort to initiate negotiations limiting the
    development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons and other
    prompt strike capabilities is likely to cause U.S. development
    activities for CPGS capabilities to be slowed further or curtailed
    entirely. Given the importance of developing U.S. CPGS capabilities to
    strengthen deterrence and assurance and to provide unique capabilities
    in the event deterrence fails, the United States should increase, not
    decrease its efforts to develop CPGS capabilities.
        As a matter of policy, I recommend that the United States not seek
    to initiate an arms limitation negotiation that includes limitations on
    hypersonic or other non-nuclear prompt strike weapons.
        Mr. Rogers. How do you characterize and assess foreign
    development--primarily Russian and Chinese--of CPGS capability compared
    to our own?
        Mr. Scheber. In a word, I would characterize the United States CPGS
    development efforts as anemic when compared to similar development
    programs of China and Russia. After more than a decade of research and
    a general concept for CPGS capabilities endorsed by both Republican and
    Democratic administrations, DOD does not yet have a plan for deploying
    such a capability. In contrast, both China and Russia have claimed to
    have deployed conventional prompt strike concepts and are continuing to
    develop improved concepts.
        China: China's leaders appear to be pursuing multiple applications
    for conventional prompt strike weapons for its military strategy in the
    western Pacific. According to one China analyst, the PLA's conventional
    prompt ballistic missile inventory includes about 1,200 short-range
    missiles (DF-11/CSS-7 and DF-15/CSS-6), medium-range missiles such as
    the DF-21/CSS-5 family which includes an anti-ship version and the DF-
    16/CSS-11 which can target Okinawa, and development of an intermediate-
    range missile, the DF-26, to be able to target U.S. capabilities as
    distant as Guam. In fact, one Chinese Communist Party newspaper has
    reportedly referred to the DF-26 as the ``Guam killer.'' These missiles
    do not need to be of global reach to support China's anti-access/area
    denial strategy in the western Pacific. In addition, in November 2015,
    China reportedly conducted its sixth flight test of a hypersonic glide
    vehicle (HGV), designed to be launched from an ICBM missile booster. In
    general, China appears to have a very active collection of programs to
    develop and deploy advanced prompt strike weapons--both conventional
    and nuclear.
        Russia: For the twenty-first century, Russian military strategists
    appear to be increasing reliance on nuclear forces and, in particular,
    new types of low-yield nuclear weapons, as well as precision
    conventional weapons, that can be delivered by ballistic or hypersonic
    glide vehicles. For example, press reports from Russia state that
    Russia is capable of outfitting its newer submarine-launched ballistic
    missiles with either low-yield nuclear warheads or conventional
    warheads with precision delivery. In December 2012, the Commander of
    Russia's Strategic Missile Forces, Colonel-General Sergei Karakayev
    said that Russia was also considering developing a conventional payload
    for its new powerful, liquid-fueled ICBM.\3\ Finally, Russian news
    reports state that Russia has been working with China, France, and
    India on developing hypersonic missiles. And, a new type of hypersonic
    delivery vehicle, referred to as the Yu-71 and carried by ICBMs, has
    reportedly been tested at least four times since late 2011 with mixed
    results.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Mikhail Fomitchev, ``Russia to Develop Precision Conventional
    ICBM Option,'' RIA Novosti, December 14, 2012.
        \4\ See http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/06/
    summary_of_the_project_4202_de.shtml. Also, Bill Gertz, ``Russia Tested
    hypersonic Glide Vehicle in February,'' The Washington Free Beacon,
    June 25, 2015, http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tested-
    hypersonic-glide-vehicle-in-february/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In summary, a decade ago the United States appeared to be the clear
    leader in military technology for CPGS-type capabilities. Based on open
    source reports on Chinese and Russian development activities, that no
    longer seems to be the case.
        Mr. Rogers. What does foreign--Russian and Chinese--development of
    this capability mean to the U.S.? Put another way, does it matter if
    China and/or Russia have this capability and we do not?
        Mr. Scheber. In short, Russian and Chinese development of prompt
    strike capabilities, such as hypersonic glide vehicles, and the absence
    of such capabilities from the U.S. military force, would have
    significant negative implications for the United States and its allies.
        First, the ability of Russian and Chinese missiles to deliver
    offensive payloads at hypersonic speeds and delivery vehicles that can
    rapidly change course would complicate U.S. efforts to defend against
    such incoming missiles. In fact, senior Russian military officers have
    said that new Russian missiles were being designed to be able to
    counter U.S. missile defenses.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ ``US Missile Shield Unable to Repel Massive Russian ICBM
    Attack--Chief of Strategic Missile Forces,'' Russia Today news,
    December 16, 2015. https://www.rt.com/news/326121-us-missile-shield-
    russian-icbm/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Second, modern guidance technology for hypersonic reentry vehicles
    can significantly improve the delivery accuracy of long-range missiles
    and makes feasible the potential military employment of low-yield
    nuclear and even conventional warheads. Such weapons could be launched
    at U.S. or allied capabilities with little warning or time to respond.
    If the United States does not have its own CPGS capabilities, this
    would cede an asymmetric military advantage to Russia and China. Such
    adversary weapons could be used to degrade U.S. or allied capabilities,
    support China's area denial plans, intimidate U.S. allies in the
    region, and accomplish a fait accompli to the ultimate benefit of the
    country employing such weapons. Adversary leaders could well be willing
    to gamble that their U.S. counterparts would be unwilling to escalate
    the conflict by responding with U.S. ballistic missiles which currently
    carry only high-yield nuclear warheads.
        As mentioned in my response to question #5, this asymmetry could
    disadvantage the United States in ways that would weaken deterrence
    vis-a-vis Russia and China and also cause allies to question the
    ability of the United States to meet its security commitments.
        Mr. Rogers. Does it matter if Russia and/or China have this
    capability with a nuclear warhead as opposed to a conventional warhead?
        Mr. Scheber. Russia and/or China may decide to use hypersonic glide
    vehicles and long-range missiles to deliver nuclear warheads. Both
    already have a prompt global strike nuclear capability inherent in
    their nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles.
    Development of maneuvering, hypersonic glide vehicles could be
    motivated to increase the probability of penetrating U.S. missile
    defenses. In addition, if these newly developed weapons also provide
    significantly improved accuracy when compared to existing ballistic
    missiles, these countries may perceive a military advantage to
    deploying some delivery vehicles with lower-yield nuclear warheads.
    Deploying more accurate, prompt weapons with low-yield warheads could
    be used to threaten the United States and its allies with escalation
    during a conventional conflict. Adversary leaders may even be willing
    to launch some low-yield nuclear weapons to degrade U.S. capabilities
    and, with no similar U.S. response capability, gamble that U.S. leaders
    would be unwilling to escalate a conflict and respond with U.S.
    missiles armed with high-yield warheads. This would certainly put the
    United States at a disadvantage. Effective U.S. capabilities to counter
    such Russian and Chinese threats and negate the effectiveness of these
    weapons would appear to be a high priority for the United States.
    Development of a U.S. CPGS capability would contribute significantly
    toward that goal.
        Mr. Rogers. We have been hearing a lot about left-of-launch
    capability and shooting the archer in addition to the arrows, which is
    to say, focus on destroying ballistic missile launchers in addition to
    the ballistic missiles themselves. Does CPGS have a role to play in
    such a military capability space? Is that role unique, or is it a role
    that could easily be served by another military capability at less
    cost?
        Mr. Scheber. CPGS capabilities could prove extremely valuable in
    executing a ``left-of-launch'' strike against an imminent threat. For
    example, countries possessing WMD and/or the ability to launch one or
    more missiles against the United States and/or its allies would likely
    have key enabling capabilities that would be exposed and vulnerable to
    a limited non-nuclear strike by the United States. U.S. CPGS
    capabilities could perform such a mission with little warning for an
    adversary and with high probability of successful penetration of enemy
    defenses. If follow-on strikes are needed, CPGS weapons in combination
    with cyber and other capabilities might be employed to degrade enemy
    defenses and enable heavier and more sustained follow-on strikes with a
    decreased risk of loss to enemy defenses. For such a tactic, CPGS
    weapons could be targeted against ground-based downlink nodes that
    distribute information to and from space-based assets. This would
    likely be coordinated with cyber and space defense capabilities.
        It is my opinion that by raising the uncertainty in the minds of
    adversary leaders over whether or not they might be able to
    successfully execute a surprise attack, the probability of deterring
    these leaders from attempting such a strike would be improved.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing
    cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful
    to reduce the risk of misperception or miscalculation. Specifically
    what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered
    as the CPGS technologies are developed?
        General Kehler. I believe any steps (diplomatic or military-to-
    military) we can take with adversaries or potential adversaries that
    allow us to better understand intentions, motivations, capabilities and
    decision-making processes will help build confidence. Regarding CPGS
    specifically, I believe it is important to build confidence around
    capabilities, numbers, and the attributes that would clearly separate
    these weapons from nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Cooper. The three hearing witnesses agreed that pursuing
    cooperative measures (or confidence building measures) would be helpful
    to reduce the risk of misperception or miscalculation. Specifically
    what kind of measures would be helpful, and should these be considered
    as the CPGS technologies are developed?
        Dr. Acton. The first-order task is for the United States to engage
    Russia and China in dialogues with the goal of reaching a shared
    understanding about which escalation risks need to be addressed. At the
    moment, these three states have quite different perceptions. For
    example, U.S. officials and analysts tend to worry about the
    possibility of Russia's or China's misidentifying a conventionally
    armed missile as nuclear armed (warhead ambiguity). By contrast, their
    Russian and Chinese counterparts have tended to stress concerns about
    the survivability of their nuclear forces. Realistically, such a
    dialogue is likely to be both difficult to start and difficult to
    conclude, but it is a necessary pre-requisite to confidence building.
        The following are examples of confidence-building measures that
    could help to address concerns about warhead ambiguity:
          The United States could notify Russia and China of the
    launch of a CPGS weapon. (If such notifications also included the
    approximate location of the target, they could help reduce the
    likelihood of Moscow's or Beijing's reaching a mistaken conclusion that
    they were under attack from highly maneuverable CPGS weapons).
          The United States could permit inspections of CPGS
    weapons (almost certainly by Russia) to verify that their warheads were
    nonnuclear. Naturally, such measures could be reciprocal either in the
    sense that Russia and/or China agreed to provide similar notifications
    or permit similar inspections, or in the sense that Russia and/or China
    took asymmetric steps to ease U.S. concerns about their strategic
    modernization programs.
        To address concerns about the survivability of Russian and Chinese
    nuclear forces, confidence-building measures such as the following
    could be useful:
          Joint studies (possibly conducted by national academies
    of science) into the extent to which high-precision conventional
    weapons can undermine the survivability of nuclear forces.
          Data exchanges about plans for acquiring specified types
    of long-range, hypersonic, conventional weapons.
          The accountability of specified types of long-range,
    hypersonic, conventional weapons under the central limits of future
    nuclear arms control treaties.
        It is extremely important that the possibility of cooperative
    confidence-building be considered at the same time that CPGS
    technologies are developed. If they are not, certain confidence-
    building measures may be foreclosed, or at least made much more
    difficult. For example, Congress has previously expressed
    understandable concern about basing CPGS weapons on SSBNs because it
    would lead to the colocation of nuclear and conventional weapons.
    However, since SSBNs are already subject to arms control inspections,
    it would be straightforward to permit inspections to verify that any
    CPGS weapons they carried were indeed nonnuclear. By contrast, such
    inspections would be much more difficult to orchestrate if CPGS weapons
    were based on SSNs, which are not subject to any arms control
    verification regime.

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