[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: BOLSTERING DHS TO COMBAT PERSISTENT
THREATS TO AMERICA
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 14, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-26
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
John Katko, New York Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Will Hurd, Texas Norma J. Torres, California
Earl L. ``Buddy'' Carter, Georgia
Mark Walker, North Carolina
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia
Martha McSally, Arizona
John Ratcliffe, Texas
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Joan V. O'Hara, General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
John Ratcliffe, Texas, Chairman
Peter T. King, New York Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Curt Clawson, Florida James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Brett DeWitt, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Christopher Schepis, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Martha McSally, Arizona, Chairman
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark Walker, North Carolina Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey
Barry Loudermilk, Georgia Kathleen M. Rice, New York
Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Ratcliffe, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
The Honorable Martha McSally, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........ 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
WITNESSES
Panel I
Dr. Reginald Brothers, Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Dr. Kathryn H. Brinsfield, Assistant Secretary, Office of Health
Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Dr. Huban A. Gowadia, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 11
Panel II
Mr. Alan D. Cohn, Counsel, Steptoe & Johnson LLP:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Mr. Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson, Senior Associate, Homeland Security
and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Mr. Warren Stern, Former Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
APPENDIX
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for the Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 51
Question From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Kathryn H.
Brinsfield..................................................... 54
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Reginald
Brothers....................................................... 55
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Reginald Brothers 56
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Huban A. Gowadia. 57
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Alan D. Cohn... 57
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Warren Stern... 59
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Rick ``Ozzie''
Nelson......................................................... 59
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: BOLSTERING DHS TO COMBAT PERSISTENT
THREATS TO AMERICA
----------
Tuesday, July 14, 2015
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies, and
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:09 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Ratcliffe
[Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies] presiding.
Present from Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies: Representatives
Ratcliffe, Perry, Donovan, Richmond, Jackson Lee, and Langevin.
Present from Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications: McSally, Walker, Loudermilk,
Payne, Watson Coleman, and Rice.
Mr. Ratcliffe. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies and the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order.
Both subcommittees are meeting jointly to consider the
Department of Homeland Security's proposal to reorganize its
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
activities into a consolidated CBRNE office.
During the Cold War years, the threat of nuclear
annihilation was universally recognized. Today, there is an
equally terrifying but persistent WMD threat. But the forms
that such weapons could take and the bad actors seeking to
obtain them have vastly expanded. Today's threat comes from
Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon, as well as the rise of ISIS
and other terrorist organizations that are seeking to acquire
chemicals, biological agents, radiological or nuclear material
to use it to set off a bomb in one of our major cities.
While such an attack may not result in total annihilation,
it would be a major public health and safety catastrophe, as
well as an economic and psychological blow to the entire
country.
Today's threat is illustrated by several evolving
situations unfolding across the globe. The current nuclear deal
just announced today with Iran, if approved, could increase the
amount of nuclear material throughout the volatile Middle East
if Iran is in fact allowed to retain a certain amount of
enriched uranium.
Separately, Russia has recently announced it's pulling out
of a decades-old Reagan administration INF Treaty which limited
the number of nuclear weapons between the two countries. Russia
has since moved to modernize and increase its stockpile,
thereby making the availability of nuclear and radiological
material that much greater.
Simultaneously, Middle Eastern countries, like Saudi
Arabia, are building 16 new nuclear plants even as they
struggle to battle radical Islamists within their own borders.
While these are greater geopolitical issues, the
implications of the WMD threat to the U.S. homeland are
immense. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has
struggled to keep tabs on its radiological and nuclear material
across Eastern Europe. The current nuclear negotiations with
Iran and the proliferation of nuclear material across the
Middle East raises similar concerns of operational control of
these sensitive materials.
This is all happening at a time when ISIS is propagating a
call for terrorist plots here in the United States and is
taking control of large pieces of territory across Iraq, Syria,
and North Africa. Terrorists and militant groups have long had
an interest in using a WMD to attack U.S. interests, especially
those including chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
materials. ISIS has made its ambition known that it wishes to
obtain WMD material and use it in an attack.
Underscoring the very real possibility of this threat,
Australian intelligence officials have publicly stated their
belief that ISIS has already seized enough material from
government facilities, hospitals, and universities in Iraq and
Syria to build a dirty bomb.
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is organized
to address the WMD threat through several different offices and
directorates: The Office of Health Affairs, or OHA, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, and elements of the
Science and Technology, or S&T, Directorate.
This fragmentation is in contrast to other departments and
Federal agencies across the U.S. Government that have
centralized WMD defense programs and have clear focal points
for interagency collaboration. One of the major concerns we've
heard with the current structure is that DHS doesn't have the
stature and voice that it should among all of the agencies that
are working to address these threats.
In September 2013, DHS was directed by Congress to
undertake an in-depth review of its WMD programs. The review
also required recommendations to improve its organizational
structure to be more effective. Unfortunately, the committee
only received this report less than a month prior to this
hearing, meaning that it's nearly 2 years late.
I've had the opportunity to sit down with Dr. Gowadia, the
director of DNDO, numerous times during my short tenure as
Chairman and as part of my oversight responsibilities to learn
how DNDO operates and works with its stakeholders, both
domestically and internationally. One thing that I have
concluded and have heard repeatedly from others is that the
current DNDO model works, something which, unfortunately, can't
be said right now about every DHS office.
In support of the opinion that DNDO is one of the most
effective offices within the Department, the most recent 2014
edition of ``The Best Places to Work in the Federal
Government'' ranked DNDO 11th out of 314 agency subcomponents.
This success is built on leadership, a clear mission, and a
well-functioning organizational structure. While DNDO hasn't
always been a benchmark of success, the organization has
certainly matured, and it's matured into a model that I think
should be replicated throughout the Department.
Now, Chairman McSally and I have convened our subcommittees
here today to examine whether the DHS proposal to reorganize
will support the shared opinion of most that the Department of
Homeland Security should be doing more to guard against WMD
threats. While the proposal to Congress lays out several
different options and a proposed recommendation for how the
Department would reorganize, we hope to hear more today about
this proposed reorganization and how it will address gaps and
strengthen the Department's posture towards WMD threats, and
we, frankly, hope to hear some specifics.
I want to thank Chairman McSally for joining me in this
effort, and I thank the witnesses for being here today.
[The statement of Chairman Ratcliffe follows:]
Statement of Chairman John Ratcliffe
July 14, 2015
During the Cold War years, the threat of nuclear annihilation was
universally recognized. Today, there is an equally terrifying and
persistent WMD threat, but the forms such weapons could take and the
bad actors seeking to obtain them have vastly expanded. Today's threat
comes from Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapon, as well as the rise of
ISIS and other terrorist organizations that are seeking to acquire
chemicals, biological agents, radiological, or nuclear material to use
it to set off a weapon in one of our major cities. While such an attack
may not result in total annihilation, it would be a major public health
and safety catastrophe, as well as an economic and psychological blow
to the entire country.
Today's threat is illustrated by several evolving situations
unfolding across the globe. The current nuclear deal being negotiated
with Iran could increase the amount of nuclear material throughout the
volatile Middle East if Iran is allowed to retain a certain amount of
enriched uranium. Separately, Russia has recently announced it is
pulling out of a decades-old Reagan Administration INF treaty, which
limited the number of nuclear weapons between the two countries. Russia
has since moved to modernize and increase its stockpile, thereby making
the availability of nuclear and radiological material that much
greater. Simultaneously, Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia are
building 16 new nuclear plants even as they struggle to battle radical
Islamists within their own borders.
While these are greater geopolitical issues, the implications for
the WMD threat to the U.S. homeland are immense. Since the collapse of
the Soviet Union, Russia has struggled to keep tabs on its radiological
and nuclear material across Eastern Europe. The current nuclear
negotiations deal with Iran and the proliferation of nuclear material
across the Middle East raises similar concerns of operational control
of these sensitive materials.
This is all happening at a time when ISIS is propagating a call for
terrorist plots in the United States and taking control of large pieces
of territory across Iraq, Syria, and North Africa. Terrorists and
militant groups have long had an interest in using a WMD to attack U.S.
interests, especially those including chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear materials. ISIS has made its ambition known
that it wishes to obtain WMD material and use it in an attack.
Underscoring the real possibility of this threat, Australian
intelligence officials have publicly stated their belief that ISIS has
already seized enough material from Government facilities, hospitals,
and universities in Iraq and Syria to build a dirty bomb.
Currently, the Department of Homeland Security is organized to
address the WMD threat through several different offices and
directorates, the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), and elements of the Science and Technology
(S&T) Directorate. This fragmentation is in contrast to other
Departments and Federal agencies across the U.S. Government that have
centralized WMD defense programs and have clear focal points for
interagency collaboration. One of the major concerns we have heard with
the current structure is that DHS does not have the stature and voice
that it should among all of the agencies working to address all of
these threats.
In September of 2013, DHS was directed by Congress to undertake an
in-depth review of its WMD programs. The review also required
recommendations to improve its organizational structure to be more
effective. Unfortunately, the committee only received this report less
than a month prior to this hearing, meaning that it's nearly 2 years
late.
I've had the opportunity to sit down with Dr. Gowadia, director of
DNDO numerous times during my short tenure as Chairman as part of my
oversight responsibilities to learn how DNDO operates and works with
its stakeholders, both domestically and internationally. One thing that
I have concluded, and have heard repeatedly from others, is that the
current DNDO model works; something which unfortunately can't be said
about every DHS office. In support of the opinion that DNDO is one of
the most effective offices within the Department, the most recent 2014
edition of the Best Places to Work in the Federal Government ranked
DNDO 11th out of 314 agency subcomponents. This success is built on
leadership, a clear mission, and a well-functioning organizational
structure. And while DNDO hasn't always been a benchmark of success,
the organization has certainly matured into a model that I think should
be replicated throughout the Department.
Chairman McSally and I convened our subcommittees here today to
examine whether the DHS proposal to reorganize will support the shared
opinion of most that the Department of Homeland Security should be
doing more to guard against WMD threats. While the proposal to Congress
lays out several different options and a proposed recommendation for
how the Department should reorganize, we hope to hear more today about
how this proposed reorganization will address gaps and strengthen the
Department's posture towards WMD threats and we hope to hear some
specifics. I thank Chairman McSally for joining me in this effort, and
I thank the witnesses for being here today.
Mr. Ratcliffe. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member
of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for
his opening statement.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon. I also want to thank Chairman McSally,
along with you, for holding today's hearing to evaluate the
Department of Homeland Security's proposal to reorganize
certain chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, and
explosive counterterrorism programs. I understand that the
committee may consider a Department of Homeland Security
authorization bill later in this Congress, potentially as early
as this fall, and that pending reorganization plan may be
included in that.
I caution against acting too swiftly. Experience tells me
that the reorganizations can be distracting, disruptive, and
demoralizing to a workforce. Indeed, the Department itself
continues to struggle with the morale challenges that date back
to its inception. Before acting, it is imperative that this
committee have an understanding of the full implications and
can ensure that the benefits outweigh the costs.
As Ranking Member on the Subcommittee for Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, I have particular
concerns about how the proposed reorganization will affect
legacy offices' relationships with the State and local response
partners. My subcommittee has devoted a significant amount of
time to assessing what DHS does well and what it needs to do
better with respect to helping State and local governments
bolster their ability to respond to biochemical threats.
Although local first responders and the public health
officials have noted that the Office of Health Affairs has
improved its engagement activities in the recent years, they
urge better coordination and more timely information sharing
related to chemical biothreats. I'd be interested to hear what
safeguards would be in place to prevent disruption of these
important relationships and whether this reorganization is
necessary to deliver the improved coordination information
sharing that State and local responders have been seeking for
quite some time.
Additionally, I am interested to learn how DHS will ensure
that there will not be winners and losers with respect to
resources for the various CBRNE threats. For example, for the
past several years, the Office of Health Affairs' Chemical
Defense Program has been operating on a shoestring budget of
about $800,000 out of an overall $125 million budget, whereas
NBIC and BioWatch collectively eat up over $90 million.
Meanwhile, DNDO's budget is more than double OHA's budget.
DNDO does its own research and development and OHA does not.
Regardless, I'll be interested to understand how the
reorganization will affect the distribution of resources among
the various CBRNE threat-related activities. Moreover, I'd like
to note the proposed reorganization appears to be a bit
lopsided. While the new CBRNE office would have R&D
responsibilities and radiological and nuclear activities, the
Science and Technology Directorate would retain R&D for
chemical and biological activities.
Accordingly, I'm interested to know whether it indicates
that the future reorganizations may need to be down the road;
specifically, we can expect the Department to come back in a
year or 2 and ask for CBRNE and R&D be fully realigned in their
S&T or CBRNE office.
Finally, I would like to express my concern regarding the
impact of the proposed reorganization on the activities of the
chief medical officer. I am particularly concerned about the
risk that CMO would lose a direct line to the Secretary and
that the CMO's DHS workforce health responsibilities would get
lost in a larger CBRNE office.
In closing, there are four fundamental questions that we
need answered as we consider the Department's proposal: How
will the proposed reorganization advance CBRNE missions while
preserving existing relationships? What savings or additional
costs will be incurred with the proposed reorganization yield?
What improvements to oversight and management of the activities
within this new office are expected to be realized? Finally,
what steps will be taken to contain the negative impacts of
such a reorganization on employee morale?
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the
witnesses for being here today, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, the
gentlelady from Arizona, Ms. McSally, for her opening
statement.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased our
subcommittees are meeting today to consider the optimal
organization of the Department of Homeland Security to meet the
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
threats that face our Nation.
We know terrorist groups have long strived to employ
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRNE
materials in their attacks. The director of national
intelligence testified in February that weapons of mass
destruction continue to be a major threat to the security of
the United States. He noted that biological and chemical
materials and technologies, as well as personnel with their
expertise to use and design them, move easily in the economy.
The DNI also stated that infectious disease continues to
threaten our security and that a more crowded and
interconnected world is increasing the opportunities for human
and animal diseases to emerge and spread globally.
Experts suggest the terrorists' interests in utilizing
chemical agents has also increased. In fact, reports indicate
ISIS may be currently conducting attacks using chemical agents
in Syria and Iraq. Last summer, the laptop reportedly retrieved
from an ISIS hideout in Syria contained plans for weaponizing
bubonic plague and a document discussing the advantages of
using biological weapons.
Earlier this year, the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee
held hearings on chemical and biological threats. In addition
to the severity of the threat, these hearings highlighted a
number of crosscutting themes. Witnesses testified about the
need for more robust information sharing among all levels of
government, and I introduced a bill to address this aimed at
enhancing CBRNE intelligence and information sharing, which
recently passed the House.
We also repeatedly heard about the importance of strong
coordinated leadership to counter these threats, which brings
us to the purpose of our hearing today. DHS must play a leading
role in defending our homeland from these CBRNE threats. In my
first 6 months in office, I've gained an appreciation of the
work of the Office of Health Affairs in this particular space.
As the coordinator for chemical defense at DHS, OHA works with
Federal, State, and local partners to enhance preparedness and
response capabilities for an attack or an incident involving
chemical agents, as we recently saw in a chemical defense pilot
with the city of Baltimore mass transit system.
In addition to managing biological surveillance and
detection systems for the Nation, OHA coordinates the
Department's efforts related to biological threats, such as
anthrax or Ebola. OHA also completed an interagency effort to
develop guidance for emergency response providers to increase
survivability of victims, as well as safety of responders after
an attack using an improvised explosive device.
Despite this good work, the Department's chemical and
biological efforts have not been without their challenges.
These are serious threats, and I really look forward to hearing
from our witnesses today from DHS on how the Department is
proposing to address them. I'm also interested in hearing from
both panels how the proposed reorganization will elevate the
CBRNE mission and provide the strong leadership to ensure the
Department is able to meet these threats.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Chairman McSally follows:]
Statement of Chairman Martha McSally
July 14, 2015
We know that terrorist groups have long strived to employ chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRNE, materials in their
attacks. The director of national intelligence testified in February
that weapons of mass destruction continue to be a major threat to the
security of the United States. He noted that biological and chemical
materials and technologies, as well as personnel with the expertise to
use and design them, move easily in the economy. The DNI also stated
that infectious disease continues to threaten our security and that a
more crowded and interconnected world is increasing the opportunities
for human and animal diseases to emerge and spread globally.
Experts suggest that terrorist interest in utilizing chemical
agents has increased. In fact, reports indicate that ISIS may currently
be conducting attacks using chemical agents in Syria and Iraq. Last
summer, a laptop reportedly retrieved from an ISIS hideout in Syria
contained plans for weaponizing bubonic plague and a document
discussing the advantages of using biological weapons.
Earlier this year, the Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee held
hearings on chemical and biological threats. In addition to the
severity of the threat, these hearings highlighted a number of cross-
cutting themes. Witnesses testified about the need for robust
information sharing among all levels of Government, and I have
introduced a bill to address this aimed at enhancing CBRNE intelligence
and information sharing, which recently passed the House. We also
repeatedly heard about the importance of strong, coordinated leadership
on these threats.
Which brings us to the purpose of our hearing today: DHS must play
a leading role in defending our homeland from CBRNE threats. In my
first 6 months in office, I've gained an appreciation of the work of
the Office of Health Affairs (OHA) in this space.
As the coordinator for chemical defense at DHS, OHA works with
Federal, State, and local partners to enhance preparedness and response
capabilities for an attack or incident involving chemical agents, as we
recently saw in a chemical defense pilot with the city of Baltimore
mass transit system.
In addition to managing biological surveillance and detection
systems for the Nation, OHA coordinates the Department's efforts
related to biological threats, such as anthrax and Ebola.
OHA also recently completed an interagency effort to develop
guidance for emergency response providers to increase survivability of
victims as well as safety of responders after an attack using an
improvised explosive device.
Despite this good work, the Department's chemical and biological
efforts have not been without their challenges.
These are serious threats and I look forward to hearing from our
DHS witnesses on how the Department is addressing them. I am also
interested to hear from both panels how the proposed reorganization
will elevate the CBRNE mission and provide strong leadership to ensure
the Department is able to meet these threats.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentlelady.
Other Members of the subcommittees are reminded that
opening statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 14, 2015
Good afternoon. I thank the Chairmen and Ranking Members of these
two subcommittees for holding this important hearing.
I welcome today's witnesses, and look forward to their detailed
testimony.
The Department of Homeland Security has approached this committee
with a reorganization proposal to establish a central headquarters
office responsible for assessing and responding to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives threats (CBRNE) to
the Nation.
The Department's proposal recommends merging the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO) and the Office of Health Affairs, which is
currently headed by the Department's chief medical officer.
The threat from a weapon of mass destruction is complex and the
potential harm that could affect our citizens is unimaginable.
First responders need a Federal partner who can help them address
these threats.
I believe the Department of Homeland Security can be that Federal
partner and throughout my tenure on this committee, I have supported
bipartisan legislation to assist in these efforts.
However, I still have concerns about the consequences of this
realignment structure.
For instance, after Hurricane Katrina, it became apparent that the
Secretary of Homeland Security needed the counsel of a doctor who would
be able to provide advice on threats with public health consequences,
provide necessary medical guidance on workforce health, and serve as a
resource to components.
As Congress worked to draft the Post-Katrina Emergency Management
Performance Act, I worked closely with the Department of Homeland
Security's first chief medical officer to ensure that the role of the
Chief Medical Office was appropriately defined.
In the past, I have expressed concern that the CMO's mission as
primary medical advisor to the Secretary and her workforce health and
component support responsibilities have been overshadowed by challenges
posed by managing BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration
Center.
The Department's proposal to move the chief medical officer to the
new CBRNE office does not relieve my concerns.
In fact, I am concerned that if moved to a new CBRNE office, the
chief medical officer may lose her direct line to the Secretary, which
would be a step backward.
The chief medical officer's role as the Secretary's doctor is vital
and must be preserved.
Additionally, I would note that while the Office of Health Affairs
struggled with the now defunct BioWatch Gen-3 acquisition, it is
unclear whether and how this reorganization would address the
acquisition challenges experiences by not only OHA but also DNDO.
DNDO also has a history of flawed acquisitions programs that have
wasted taxpayer dollars.
For instance, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portals were intended to
detect illicit nuclear materials and devices that could be shipped in
cargo entering the United States.
The Government Accountability Office determined that DNDO
underestimated the cost of this acquisition, overstated its benefits,
and provided misleading information to Congress.
Although I am not rejecting the DHS proposal, it would be
irresponsible for this committee to act on it in a hasty manner,
without giving due consideration to why the reorganization is
happening, how it will affect the missions currently carried by the
existing offices, whether and the degree to which it will improve DHS's
CBRNE mission, and how it will affect workforce morale.
To legislate without careful consideration of these important
issues could undo a decade's worth of this committee's work in that
mission space.
Thank you, and I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Ratcliffe. We're pleased to have a very distinguished
panel before us today on this important topic. Dr. Reginald
Brothers is the under secretary for science and technology at
the United States Homeland Security.
Dr. Brothers, good to see you again. Thank you for being
here.
Dr. Kathryn Brinsfield is the assistant secretary and chief
medical officer with the Office of Health Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security.
Good to have you, Doctor.
Dr. Huban Gowadia is the director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
Welcome back, Dr. Gowadia.
I'd now ask the witnesses to stand and raise your right
hand so I can swear you in to testify.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Ratcliffe. You may be seated.
Let the record reflect that the witnesses all answered in
the affirmative.
The witnesses' entire written statements will appear for
the record. The Chair now recognizes Dr. Brothers for 5
minutes.
TESTIMONY OF REGINALD BROTHERS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Brothers. Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman McSally, Ranking
Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Department of
Homeland Security's approach to weapons of mass destruction and
formation of a potential CBRNE office within the Department. I
would also like to thank the Members of the subcommittees for
their longstanding interest in and support of the Department
and the Science and Technology Directorate and our work to
combat CBRNE threats.
On April 22 last year, Secretary Johnson announced the
Strengthening Departmental Unity of Effort Initiative. Through
this initiative, the Secretary has directed the Department to
improve internal processes, increase joint operational planning
in DHS operations, and better coordinate and align departmental
capabilities.
Consistent with the Unity of Effort Initiative, the
Secretary directed the Department to revisit recommendations
from 2013 regarding the Department's posture toward chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear threats. The purpose was
to see if there existed an opportunity for the Department to
define roles and responsibilities to maximize CBRNE visibility
and focus.
The ultimate recommendation to Congress signed by Deputy
Secretary Mayorkas last month was to form a new CBRNE office in
DHS headquarters led by an assistant secretary. The proposed
office would focus specifically on coordinating CBRNE strategy
and planning within the Department, reborn largely from
integration of DHS's Office of Health Affairs and Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, along with specific elements of the
Science and Technology Directorate, the National Protection and
Programs Directorate, Office of Policy, and Office of
Operations Coordination and Planning.
The intent of the proposed structure is to form a center of
gravity for CBRNE functions within DHS headquarters in order to
drive greater awareness, alignment, and joint action in the
Department.
For almost any homeland security challenge in the
Department, CBRNE or otherwise, the innovative technical
solutions growing out of research and development will be
essential to our continued success. R&D has changed a great
deal over the last several decades. Before, experts in diverse
fields could work independently from one another and create
stand-alone products of great value, like a pair of reading
glasses.
In the complex world we live in now, filled with advanced
and rapidly-evolving technology, successful R&D requires a
convergence of a once-fragmented field and dispersed knowledge.
For example, a team bringing together electrical engineering,
human biochemistry, neurosurgery, nano materials, and advanced
manufacturing can create a hybrid bionic eye that uses a
digital camera to help blind patients see. In fact, the FDA
approved the first bionic eye for use in February 2013.
At S&T, one of the challenges we face is ensuring that our
operators and end-users have steady access to innovation
regardless of how the overall landscape transforms. In the
Department, S&T is one of the few organizations that works with
multiple operational components and across a full range of DHS
missions. In support of the CBRNE mission area, for example, we
work not only with OHA and DNDO, but also with multiple
operational components in the Department and interagency,
including the Secret Service, FBI, and State and local
responders and hazardous material teams.
The range of expertise at S&T, combined with our reach
across the Department, provides a unique opportunity to
contribute to the unity of effort through numerous projects
across organizational and technical areas.
To begin with, we have a stable portfolio of R&D projects
to address long-term enduring focus areas for the Department,
such as border aviation security. The portfolio also meets
statutory responsibilities, such as to transition technology to
State, local, Tribal, and territorial first responders. In this
capacity, we act as a Federal sponsor and voice in mission
areas from wildfires to CBRNE events.
As a complement to our longer-term R&D portfolio, S&T also
plays an important role in helping the Department address
immediate needs and pop-up issues. In the last year, we have
been a go-to asset and source for on-demand science-based
assessment on a range of urgent homeland security issues the
Secretary and components have faced. That has included
contributions to important Unity of Effort activities ranging
from analytical support to the Department's Joint Requirements
Council to independent assessments in critical Departmental
mission areas.
To fulfill our immediate and long-term obligations to the
Department, we must have strong relationships across the
innovation ecosystem. The concept of a homeland security
industrial base, a greater business community around homeland
security missions is one we've work hard to advance over the
last year-and-a-half.
Wider use of prize challenges, innovation, integration of
technology accelerators that focus on small business innovation
research enables us to target small businesses, start-ups, and
other innovators that before may not have imagined Government
as a customer for their business.
I can personally attest to the interest in this community
in providing public safety and homeland security solutions that
will make their children and children's children safer, and S&T
will continue engaging them.
Our success in all the areas and initiatives I describe
today is fueled by S&T's ability to maintain a workforce with
diverse skill sets and expertise that is capable of serving as
technical experts for the Department, and when needed, quickly
interfacing with and tapping into the S&T ecosystem.
On almost any Homeland Security issue that emerges, S&T has
become a reliable resource for independent, scientifically
sound technical assistance. We work every day to ensure our
value to our customers and end-users. We'll bring the same
enthusiasm to supporting a CBRNE office when and if it becomes
an entity in the Department.
Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Brothers, Dr.
Brinsfield, and Ms. Gowadia follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Reginald Brothers, Kathryn H. Brinsfield,
and Huban A. Gowadia
July 14, 2015
Chairmen McSally and Ratcliffe, Ranking Members Payne and Richmond;
and distinguished Members of the Subcommittees on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications, and Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, thank you for
inviting us to speak with you today. We appreciate the opportunity to
testify on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) work to
strengthen Departmental Unity of Effort with regard to chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) threats to our
Nation. As the leaders of three of the organizations involved in the
consolidation of CBRNE functions into one office within DHS, we
appreciate your interest in this matter. We also appreciate the
attention Secretary Johnson and Deputy Secretary Mayorkas have given to
the issue of aligning the CBRNE mission within their vision of a
streamlined Department, and we have worked closely with them to put
forward a proposal that enhances coordination and Unity of Effort.
background
The Senate Explanatory Statement accompanying the fiscal year 2013
DHS Appropriations Act directed that DHS review its chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRNE) programs and functions.
The Secretary of DHS at the time, Janet Napolitano, directed the DHS
Office of Policy (PLCY) to lead a review team in conducting an
impartial, collaborative assessment of potential alignment options. The
review team identified realignment criteria and desired outcomes,
conducted an independent analysis, and consulted with the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), Office of Health Affairs (OHA),
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), leadership of other DHS
components and select interagency partners.
The review team analyzed organizational models ranging from
informal coordination to mission integration and identified several
alignment options for DHS leadership to consider, each with its own
benefits and drawbacks. The then-existing organizational structure was
deemed by review participants to be insufficiently robust to achieve
future goals and outcomes in the CBRNE area. The results of the review,
including the recommendation to establish a consolidated mission
support organization, were presented to Secretary Napolitano in August
2013. No decision was implemented at that time due to the limited
remaining duration of Secretary Napolitano's tenure.
unity of effort
On April 22, 2014, Secretary Johnson directed the ``Strengthening
Departmental Unity of Effort Initiative'' to improve the planning,
programming, budgeting, and execution processes and the DHS joint
operational planning and joint operations through strengthened
Departmental structures, increased capability, and smart DHS
headquarters realignment. As part of the initiative, DHS established a
new DHS Joint Requirements Council and strengthened the existing DHS
budget and acquisition processes.
In addition, the Department indicated, in briefings to select DHS
appropriations and authorizing committee staff, the Secretary's intent
to realign DHS PLCY and the Office of Operations Coordination and
Planning (OPS) based on their core functions and consolidate certain
DHS headquarters external affairs functions. These changes are intended
to focus headquarters offices on the principal objectives of the Unity
of Effort initiative, including to integrate the broad and complex DHS
mission space and empower DHS components to effectively execute their
operations. The Department's commitment to the Secretary's Unity of
Effort initiative drove the Department to re-visit the recommendations
from the 2013 CBRNE review.
proposed structure of cbrne organization
The ``DHS Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Functions
Review Report'' was signed by Deputy Secretary Mayorkas on June 17,
2015, pursuant to the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the
fiscal year 2013 DHS Appropriations. The report is based on the initial
2013 review, and is further informed by the Secretary's Unity of Effort
initiative and DHS's recent review of the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD). If agreed to by Congress, the recommended
structure for a CBRNE office is as follows:
(1) The DHS CBRNE office would be led at the assistant secretary
level, as a direct report to the Secretary. The assistant
secretary position (A/S CBRNE) would be empowered to coalesce
and elevate CBRNE issues to the Secretary in support of the DHS
operating components and represent DHS on these matters within
the Federal interagency as well as with external stakeholders
at the State and local levels and with private-sector partners.
The A/S CBRNE would be the Department-wide lead representative
at appropriate internal, interagency, and international venues
related to DHS CBRNE strategy, policy, planning, programming,
budgeting, investment, and joint operational planning and joint
operational matters. The DHS CBRNE office shall not conflict
with other DHS component legislative mandates to conduct
appropriate internal, interagency, and international
engagements related to CBRNE.
(2) The A/S CBRNE would be responsible for coordinating and
maintaining Department-wide CBRNE-related strategy, policy,
situational awareness, threat and risk assessments, contingency
planning, operational requirements, acquisition formulation and
oversight, and preparedness across all elements of Presidential
Policy Directive 8, ``National Preparedness'' (i.e.,
prevention, protection, mitigation, response and recovery),
consistent with relevant statutory authorities and extant
Presidential directives, including but not limited to
Presidential Policy Directive 2 and Homeland Security
Presidential Directives 10, 18, 21, and 22. This work will
complement the capability-building and sustainment efforts
managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
(3) The new office would be primarily comprised of the
consolidation of DNDO and OHA, including the BioWatch Program.
The director of DNDO and the DHS chief medical officer (CMO),
as well as other relevant supervisory positions depending on
the final organizational construct, would report to the A/S
CBRNE on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
explosives, and emerging infectious diseases and workforce
health issues within their cognizance. Under this
reorganization, the director of DNDO and the CMO would have
necessary access to the Secretary and deputy secretary as
representatives in DHS Senior Leader Forums, when their
leadership and technical expertise on CBRNE or other workforce
health issues are needed. However, these leaders would no
longer be formal direct reports to the Secretary.
(4) Specialty CBRNE personnel from DHS PLCY and DHS OPS would
permanently transfer along with the DHS policy and operations
support functions they perform, to the CBRNE office to further
strengthen the center of gravity of the new office.
(5) Chemical, biological, and integrated risk assessment,
functional responsibilities from S&T would be permanently
transferred to the CBRNE Office.
(6) NPPD's Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP), which builds
capabilities to counter the use of explosives in the homeland,
would also be permanently transferred.
Under the recommended structure, DHS is creating a coherent nexus
for DHS CBRNE functions within the DHS HQ. The structure will foster
greater harmony of effort for priority CBRNE issues and greater
awareness by external and internal organizations regarding the
appropriate CBRNE DHS focal point for most CBRNE issues. In addition to
better aligned support programs and activities, the new structure will
strengthen DHS CBRNE-related operational activities in DHS's operating
components. FEMA specifically has indicated the establishment of the A/
S CBRNE role will support their efforts to leverage CBRNE analytic and
technical capabilities to enhance component operations related to
CBRNE. Additional benefits will likely be realized as the Department
matures its planning, programming, budgeting and execution system,
joint operational planning, and joint operations over time.
anticipated impacts
The new Departmental structure will have demonstrable impacts
across the CBRNE spectrum of activities for prevention, protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery. This will be accomplished in two
ways: (1) The inclusion of CBRNE policy and operational support
personnel within the CBRNE Office, and (2) establishing strong linkages
between the CBRNE office and the new DHS Joint Requirements and Joint
Operational Plans processes. DHS OHA, DNDO, S&T, and the Office for
Bombing Prevention will be realigned in sum or part to ensure the CBRNE
office has all tools available for a cohesive, competent, and
functional organization.
OHA.--The CBRNE office will subsume OHA in total, and will expand
beyond the historic OHA purview to additionally encompass the broader
impact of chemical and biological threats. Under the current structure,
OHA's experts advise and support DHS leadership, its workforce, and
public and medical health officials Nation-wide to prepare for, respond
to, and recover from threats to the Nation's health security. This role
will continue in the CBRNE Office. In addition, the CMO will be able to
add the capability to leverage existing highly-skilled experts that had
previously been in other parts of DHS to further the Department's end-
to-end planning for CBRNE threats. Existing health and medical
expertise will be leveraged to build connections between current and
emerging health and medical issues and contribute to CBRNE decision
analysis. Further, OHA's current mission of medical advice and support,
workforce health protection, support for the first responder community,
medical quality management, and interagency coordination on health/
medical issues will be further enhanced as the medical expertise will
be better informed of CBRNE-related policy decisions, planning, and
programs that may impact the Department's--and Nation's--medical needs.
DNDO.--The CBRNE office will subsume DNDO in total with all current
functions remaining intact. DNDO was chartered, in law and Presidential
directive, using an interagency construct to coordinate efforts across
the U.S. Government (USG) to detect and protect against radiological
and nuclear threats. Similarly, the National Technical Nuclear
Forensics Center was established within DNDO to provide centralized
stewardship, planning, assessment, exercises, improvement, and
integration for all Federal technical nuclear forensics activities. The
U.S. interagency and DHS operational components detail staff to DNDO to
ensure priorities of their home agencies are accounted for and their
activities are integrated in all aspects (architecture, risk analysis,
research and development (R&D), acquisition, training, exercises, etc.)
to improve coordination across the USG. DNDO conducts a holistic
program of end-to-end efforts in nuclear detection and nuclear
forensics, including planning, research and technology development,
technology acquisition, and support for Federal, State, and local
operators.
OBP.--The CBRNE office will subsume OBP in total with all current
functions remaining intact. OBP accomplishes its mission to protect
life and critical infrastructure by coordinating counter-improvised
explosive device efforts, performing capabilities analysis, planning
and decision support, and providing training and awareness. Moving the
bombing prevention activities into the office will allow better
coordination with State and local outreach without disrupting the
capabilities the Department provides to critical infrastructure owners
and operators and the private sector across the CBRNE space.
S&T.--S&T will transfer to the CBRNE office the chemical,
biological, and integrated risk assessment and material threat
functions. This will allow appropriate consolidation between risk
determination and strategy and policy development, enhancing cohesion
between these functions. The chemical and biological R&D functions
within S&T and the facilities at which the work is conducted will not
transfer to the CBRNE Office. However, as the center of gravity for the
Department on matters related to CBRNE, robust and consistent
coordination between DHS S&T and the CBRNE office will be required to
ensure accountability and transparency of R&D efforts in alignment with
the Secretarial strategic guidance to achieve operational results, a
principal tenet of Departmental Unity of Effort.
conclusion
The Department's proposed CBRNE reorganization will foster Unity of
Effort across the Department by integrating and strengthening DHS CBRNE
coordination, roles, and responsibilities for improving outcomes and
accomplishing goals. We look forward to working with Congress in
turning the Department's intent into reality. Thank you for your time
and interest in this issue. We look forward to answering your
questions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Dr. Brothers.
Dr. Brinsfield, you've got 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF KATHRYN H. BRINSFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE
OF HEALTH AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. Brinsfield. Thank you, sir.
Chairmen Ratcliffe and McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
attention to this matter. I appreciate the opportunity to speak
to you alongside my colleagues about CBRNE threats and the
health needs of our agency and Nation. My remarks today will
focus on the importance of the DHS focus on CBRNE and health
threats and how a unified office can support and amplify the
work we do at the Office of Health Affairs.
OHA has an important mission space. Led by an assistant
secretary and chief medical officer, OHA is a headquarters
office built to fill the need of the Secretary and component
leadership for expert advice and guidance on biological,
chemical, and health issues that affect our workforce and
security.
Our programs encompass biological detection and
surveillance, chemical defense, and health and medical-related
guidance on workforce mission effectiveness and risk
mitigation. We also provide guidance for State and local
preparedness and response efforts related to chemical,
biological, or medical threats. Our staff of doctors, nurses,
scientists, veterinarians, and first responders have years of
real-world experience and are uniquely capable of providing
expert advice to senior decision makers and front-line
employees.
There are threats and risks to our Nation related to CBRNE
and health, and those that wish to do us harm continue to try
new methods and approaches. Chemical agents can kill,
incapacitate, cause long-term harm, and contaminate critical
infrastructure. OHA has received directed funds for chemical
defense demonstration projects in subways, ports, and large
venues. When completed, these projects will provide critical
analysis of emergency response systems, identify community-
relevant solutions, and develop best practices. We appreciate
Congress' attention on chemical threats and hope to work
collaboratively in the future with you on this issue.
A catastrophic biological event, whether natural or
intentional, could cause thousands or in some cases hundreds of
thousands of casualties, weaken the economy, and threaten
National security. Radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats
are similarly dangerous, and all of these together present a
risk of both mass destruction and mass disruption.
Our mission to prepare for weapons of mass destruction is
critical. Threats that are low probability with high
consequence require daily preparation and planning.
Similarly, the mission to prepare for threats of mass
disruption is critical. Recent events in the United States and
the world have shown us that these incidents can wreak havoc on
economies, impact public trust and infrastructure, and cost
human lives. The near-daily rhythm of these threats strengthens
our response as we learn by practice and reinforce our working
relationships.
Our partners in the Office for Bombing Prevention do
important and complementing work to that of OHA and DNDO. They
focus on capability and capacity building for State, local, and
private-sector stakeholders so they may counter improvised
explosive devices. They are a small office with a big impact,
and in partnership with our DOJ counterparts are helping to
keep us safer.
The first response to any incident is local. From big
chemical attacks to major disasters, local communities need
help to ensure that they have the right systems in place to act
when a threat occurs. The CBRNE office will create an
environment that can foster stronger coordination between OHA's
chemical, biological, and health programs, DNDO's radiologic-
and nuclear-focused programs, and the Office for Bombing
Prevention's work. By bringing together our offices into this
new organization, we'll be able to leverage our existing
detection capabilities, protocols, and expertise to help
facilitate coordinated Federal, State, and local detection,
response, and recovery.
The chemical, biological, and integrative risk assessment
and material threat functions currently performed in S&T will
also be an important element within the CBRNE office. The risk
assessments inform the work done by our chemical and biological
programs and are critical to the decisions and priorities made
by us and our partners at all levels of Government.
OHA currently addresses all incidents, whether a major
hurricane or disease outbreak, from an integrative perspective
using both technical threat-based expertise and health
knowledge. OHA supports front-line responders as they protect
communities and helps incorporate health considerations into
the National response to a threat.
For example, OHA led DHS's coordinated Ebola response
efforts and worked closely with Customs and Border Protection
to set up screening protocols that helped keep our officers and
traveling public safer.
OHA manages the DHS medical countermeasure stockpile so it
is best able to protect our workforce. We have embedded
physicians in more than half of the operational components
supporting their work. For example, they teach front-line
personnel how to mitigate the spread of disease among detainees
at the border, they train our paramedics on how to provide care
in remote locations, and they support best practice development
for the safe monitoring of internal drug smugglers. We look
forward to taking this integrated capability and further
applying it to radiological, nuclear, and explosive mission
spaces.
I am proud of what OHA and our talented staff have already
accomplished and look forward to elevating the CBRNE mission,
continuing health support to our components, and working across
the enterprise to create efficiency of action. When an agency
such as FBI or DOD reaches out to DHS, we will be coordinated
and ready to work with their equivalent offices. When State,
local, non-Governmental, and private partners reach to us for
help, we can assist them regardless of the incident or the
changing nature of the threat they face.
As our world grows more complex, we need to leverage our
capabilities and expertise to work together seamlessly. I thank
you for your time and look forward to answering any questions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Dr. Brinsfield.
Dr. Gowadia, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Good afternoon Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman
McSally, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for inviting my colleagues and me to
discuss the proposed reorganization of the Department of
Homeland Security's CBRNE programs. Through this merger, and in
concert with the Secretary's Unity of Effort Initiative, the
Department seeks greater coordination across its CBRNE
missions, enabling the articulation of its priorities.
As evident in the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review, nuclear and bioterrorism remain high priorities for the
Department. I would like to emphasize that the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's structure, mission, and functions will
continue intact in the new CBRNE office.
DNDO was established in 2005 as an interagency office and
has two missions, nuclear forensics and nuclear detection.
DNDO's holistic end-to-end approach includes developing
strategies, conducting research and development, and deploying
its supporting capabilities for our operational partners.
To maximize the ability to detect and interdict threats,
and to attribute threat materials to their sources, we are rely
on a critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and
technology. We work with our Federal, State, and local
partners, as well as those in the National laboratories,
industry, and academia to make that triad a reality.
For technical nuclear forensics, DNDO leads centralized
planning and integrates interagency efforts. In response to an
in extremis National capability, we are investing in the next
generation of U.S. nuclear forensic scientists. In fact, we
have already exceeded our goal at 35 new Ph.D.s into the
workforce by 2018.
For nuclear detection, DNDO coordinates the U.S.
Government's interagency efforts to develop a global nuclear
detection architecture and assess its current and planned
capabilities against evolving threats. To develop breakthrough
technologies and provide significant operational improvements,
we conduct transformational research.
Determined to learn from and never repeat prior missteps,
DNDO has implemented a disciplined approach to acquisition and
deployment that involves our end-users at every step of the
way. Today, we have provided thousands of radiation detectors
to the Department's operational components so they can perform
their nuclear detection missions at ports of entry, along our
land and maritime borders, and in the interior of the United
States.
Importantly, all systems under consideration are subjected
to rigorous testing and evaluation before deployment. Critical
to mission success is supporting partners with more than
technology. DNDO works with Federal, State, and local
stakeholders to build and enhance their detection capabilities
through pilots, training, exercises, and cross-jurisdictional
protocols.
Additionally, our Red Team assists operational agencies in
evaluating their systems and associated tactics, techniques,
and procedures. Through these operations, law enforcement and
public safety officials gain critical experience with uncommon
nuclear sources leading to improve readiness and performance.
Hence, DNDO's unique end-to-end approach ensures critical
functions are integrated and synchronized from gap
identification to concept development to use in the field.
This approach has yielded great dividends for the Nation
and the Department. For instance, through our Securing the
Cities program, we have established a robust nuclear detection
capability in the New York City, Jersey City, and Newark
region. Over time, the region's operational familiarity with
the mission has grown, and we are now positioned to collaborate
on the demonstration of an advanced concept whereby radiation
detection systems will be integrated with other sensors to
provide an early warning system for nuclear threats.
Another example is our technical contribution to reduce the
operational burden to CBP Officers in responding to nuisance
alarms from benign radioactive sources without the loss of
sensitivity to threats. Collaborating closely with CBP, we have
reduced radiation portal monitor nuisance alarms by
approximately 75 percent on average, thereby facilitating the
flow of legitimate commerce and freeing up CBP Officers to
support other National security efforts.
My teamed, ranked No. 11 overall out of more than 300
agency subcomponents in the 2014 ``Best Places to Work in the
Federal Government'' and ranked No. 2 in the innovation
category, looks forward to the merger, expecting that new
opportunities will arise as we seek creative synergies with our
partners across the Department. For instance, we would
collaborate more closely with the Office of Bombing Prevention
on the detection of dirty bombs.
DNDO's comprehensive approach ensures a range of effective
solutions to meet our Congressionally-mandated responsibilities
to prevent nuclear terrorism. The very real and evolving threat
demands an informed, agile, and networked Federal, State, and
local capability. We will continue to advance the nuclear
detection and forensics mission as we share best practices
along with our colleagues addressing other threats.
A consolidated CBRNE office allows us to build on our
strengths, combine expertise, and learn from one another. We
look forward to working with the subcommittees on this effort.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Dr. Gowadia.
The Chair now welcomes and recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will just submit
my opening for the record. I'd ask unanimous consent to do
that.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Without objection.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
July 14, 2015
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, and Chairwoman McSally, and I want to
welcome my fellow Ranking Member, Mr. Payne to this joint subcommittee
hearing.
I also want to thank our witnesses today, the Department officials
on our first panel, and the practitioners on the second panel who have
specialized knowledge of how our nuclear and biological detection
programs work.
As the Chairman noted, today's hearing will focus on the
administration's plans to merge the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
or DNDO, with the Office of Health Affairs, or OHA, to form a ``Weapons
of Mass Destruction'' office in headquarters.
This merged office, as proposed, would focus on the challenges we
face from an array of chemical, biological, nuclear, and explosives
threats, commonly referred to as CBRNE.
I applaud Secretary Johnson's pledge to elevate CBRNE focus and
visibility within DHS. These are serious threats, and our efforts to
combat them must be equally serious.
The history of this proposal shows how important careful
consideration is. Even though the original proposal for the creation of
DHS in 2002 included a specific office and Under Secretary for
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures,\1\
Congress chose to direct many of those functions to the Under Secretary
for Science and Technology (S&T).\2\
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\1\ Title III of H.R. 5005, as introduced, in the 107th Congress.
\2\ Pub. L. 107-296, Title III.
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And, over the past few years, the Committees on Appropriations have
instructed the Department to take a ``holistic approach toward
realignment,'' suggesting that simply merging offices may not fully
address CBRNE deficiencies, or might create new inefficiencies.
As we examine the proposal today, I hope we will focus on the heart
of the issue: How can we best protect the American people from
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive threats.
We should not simply approve changes to an organizational flow
chart and call it a day. We must make sure that those changes are made
with proper planning and fully thought-out so that we strengthen and
improve the Department. As GAO puts it, `` . . . the end result of a
government reorganization should not simply be a collection of
component units, but the transformation to an integrated, high-
performance organization.''\3\
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\3\ Government Accountability Office, Government Efficiency and
Effectiveness: Opportunities for Improvement and Considerations for
Restructuring, GAO-12-454T, March 21, 2012.
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As we are going to hear today in testimony, the scale of the
reorganization may itself pose a challenge. The results of both policy
and operational choices made during this reorganization may affect its
eventual short- and long-term success.
The key factors for the Department, and for our subcommittees to
consider include: Identifying the optimal structure for an office
focusing on weapons of mass destruction and the mission, scope, and
appropriate leadership of that new office.
Additionally, we should keep in mind the message this committee
delivered in 2010, under then-Chairman Thompson, when it offered a
combined S&T and DNDO authorization in the belief that there can be
conflicts of interest between research & development and procurement,
so those are best left to separate organizations. While not all goals
of that legislation were achieved, the message was clearly delivered.
What I hope we are going to hear today is, ``How can the
Department's overall mission be better defined''?
Let me finish with this thought. On the ground, and every day, our
nuclear deterrence and biodefense effort as a Nation depends on
motivated and vigilant officers across the globe, supplied with the
best equipment and intelligence we can give them.
Officers working at our Nation's ports of entry have an especially
complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions are made every day
all across our borders, ports, and airports, to clear a container or a
vehicle for transit into the United States. These are vital components
in the flow of commerce in the world's premier and largest trading
market, the United States.
Other cargo requires further inspection, or even denial of entry or
and interdiction action taken on a vehicle or person. That is the hard,
cold, repetitive, and everyday reality of our mission to prevent a
violent nuclear or chemical attack, or biological event or outbreak.
We are grateful for all of our dedicated men and women in the field
who protect us from weapons of mass destruction. I yield back.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Dr. Gowadia, I'm going to start with you--
well, actually, first of all, I'll recognize myself for 5
minutes.
Dr. Gowadia, I'm very much a believer in not fixing what
isn't broken, and based on the testimony that we've already
heard today, I think everyone here today would agree that we
don't want to provide a solution that creates a problem,
particularly with respect to DNDO and the good work that's
being done there. So now that I've got you under oath, I'd like
to ask you the impact that you think this proposed
reorganization and the effect that it would have on DNDO, and
would it affect the current high operations and morale that
you're enjoying right now?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Chairman.
I have strongly supported and continue to believe very much
in the Secretary's Unity of Effort Initiative. In fact, I would
posit that DNDO is the very instantiation of that Unity of
Effort concept. To that end, I think bringing DNDO over to the
new office intact also adheres to one of the principles for the
reorganization on preserving a program that is working.
With our singular focus--and I am truly blessed to work
with an incredible team who gets their reward in serving the
front-line operator--we will not be interrupting their ability
to do that based on the concept we have for the new
organization, and so I think we will be able to manage their
morale. That will also be up to us in leadership to make sure
that we allow them to do that which they do best and enjoy the
most while we take care of the reorganization at our end.
Mr. Ratcliffe. So in follow-up to that, Dr. Gowadia, I
assume that having research and development within your office,
you see that as a critical function when you talk about keeping
things intact?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. Yes, Chairman, we do. The end-to-end
focus is important for a technically challenging mission like
radiation and nuclear detection. Every piece along the way
needs strong technical input. In this day of hard fiscal times,
we can little afford the redundancy of recreating technical
expertise in multiple parts of the Department.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you.
So following up on that, I want to ask both Dr. Brothers
and Dr. Brinsfield about that very issue. It was a concern that
was also voiced by Ranking Member Payne in his opening.
Because, as you both know, when DNDO was created, in order
to focus the organization and give the director all of those
end-to-end tools needed, radiological and nuclear research and
development was moved from S&T to DNDO. In fact DNDO is
statutorily authorized to conduct that R&D.
But in this proposed reorganization, the chemical,
biological, and explosives office, the R&D functions there were
not moved from S&T. So I would like your perspectives on that.
I'll start with you, Dr. Brothers.
Mr. Brothers. Absolutely. Thanks for the question.
So I think there are different models and that's come up in
some of the opening testimony. I think both models can coexist
and both models have shown themselves to be effective. Both
models being the end-to-end model that Dr. Gowadia has and the
interdisciplinary model that S&T has right now.
I think if you look historically, a number of years ago,
science and technology, research and development was really
based on disciplines being in different silos, physical science
in one silo, life science in another silo, engineering in
another silo.
What you're finding right now in both industry and academia
laboratories throughout, what you find is the focus now on
interdisciplinary research. In fact, you find a convergence,
actually, of the life sciences, physical sciences, and
engineering. Why is this? It's really because when you get
people of different types of backgrounds together, they might
make insights that wouldn't have been previously possible.
But, again, we can talk about different types of models. So
in S&T, because we have such a wide range of stakeholders, from
Transportation Security Administration, Customs and Border
Protection, Secret Service, et cetera, we go across the gamut,
it's important that we're able to cross-fertilize our
innovative ideas with disciplines from across the entire range
of disciplines that we have.
So from a perspective of an organization that can look
across a broad area, it's fundamental, it's essential that we
have interdisciplinary type of staff. However, that said, for a
very specialized area, and particularly when we start
considering trying to minimize disruption, other models can
work as well.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Dr. Brothers.
Dr. Brinsfield, I want to give you an opportunity to
respond on that as well, about not having the R&D functions for
chem and bio in the new office and the effect that that might
have.
Dr. Brinsfield. Thank you, sir.
We have been of an opinion since the beginning of these
discussions that there are many correct ways to do this, and
that we see our role in the chem and bio space as setting the
requirements and working with the interagency, State, and local
partners to set those requirements and let the R&D be done in a
component such as S&T.
Mr. Ratcliffe. My time has expired. I'd now like to
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to yield
my time to the gentleman from--my co-Ranking Member on another
subcommittee and the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. I would like to thank the gentleman from
Louisiana for yielding.
I would like to start off, Dr. Brinsfield, I understand
that DHS plans to expand the scope of its biodefense
capabilities. Later this summer, the post-9/11 Commission Blue
Ribbon Study Panel on Biodefense will release a report finding,
among other things, there is a lack of National leadership in
biodefense.
Do you envision this reorganization as a means to bolster
DHS's role as a National leader in biodefense?
Dr. Brinsfield. Certainly we hope that this reorganization
will elevate the mission space of CBRNE in whole, and with that
we need to make sure that we are doing our requirements in the
bio space. As you look through the QHSR report, you'll see that
we've spent a great deal of time working with our partners in
DHS and other parts of the interagency to define DHS' role and
to make sure that we adequately and completely fulfill that
role in support of the work that goes on in the inter-
Government space.
So, yes, sir, we hope to continue to advance and promote
that work.
Mr. Payne. Past history in some of these areas that we've
discussed, the ability or the lack of the ability for some of
these different departments to work together, but what I'm
hearing now, there's a new spirit of cooperation that is
permeating the work that's being done in some of your
departments.
In my opening statement I observed that proposed
reorganization is not a complete realignment of CBRNE
activities at DHS. There are CBRNE functions from across the
Department, from FEMA to NPPD, that are not included in the
realignment.
How did the Department decide to include certain activities
but not others in the reorganization proposal?
Dr. Brinsfield. I think the decision was made after careful
consultation across the different groups within DHS that the
new organization should be a mission support office. To that
end, it will be our job to enable the operational components to
succeed at their mission spaces.
We view ourselves as subject-matter experts who can help
components such as FEMA, CBP, the chemical program, and NPPD
continue to do their jobs and do them well. In fact, we have
provided subject-matter experts doing real-world events to help
support those programs.
Mr. Payne. There's always a concern when you have these
realignments what the outcome is going to be and how it impacts
the morale of people that have been at the Department for
years, that have worked diligently on their projects, and then
to have it kind-of reorganized and lost in the shuffle does not
tend to lead to great morale.
I have some questions about the practical implications of
the proposed CBRNE reorganization. I understand that the
Department does not anticipate any cost savings, but I am
wondering if there might be some new costs incurred. For
example, would the over 200 employees of the new CBRNE defense
office be collocated? If so, where? What effect would this have
on the existing leases?
Dr. Brinsfield. So, sir, we believe that as we continue to
elevate this mission space and define this mission space
clearly and settle this question, our experts that work in
these areas will be able to continue to function, do their job,
and we're looking forward to being able to support them doing
that. We also note that no programs have been cut from this. As
a matter of fact, one of the things that we feel most
comfortable about is that the offices are moving in toto, and
as Dr. Gowadia has stated, we'll be able completely combine all
that work.
Dr. Gowadia and I operate our offices within a very short
distance apart. In fact, our buildings are very close together.
We have no plans for the future on movement until our current
leases are up.
Mr. Payne. Okay. Thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, I'll yield back.
Mr. Ratcliffe. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Arizona,
Colonel McSally, for 5 minutes.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Dr. Brinsfield, as you know, the Emergency Preparedness
Subcommittee held a hearing earlier this year on chemical
threats. Dr. Kirk testified. The Chemical Defense Program
accounts for only $800,000 of OHA's $125 million budget. So
will the reorganization bolster chemical defense activities? Do
you think the Secretary intends to then have resources more
equitably allocated towards chemical defense as the
reorganization happens? Or how do you see that moving?
Dr. Brinsfield. So, certainly we share your concern and the
knowledge that the chemical threat has become more prominent,
and we watch that closely. We also note and thank you for all
the additional funding that Congress has provided to the
chemical program.
We think that it's very important to make these kind of
decisions on a risk basis, and so we look forward to working
with our colleagues across the area so that we can do our best
job to use the funding that we're provided.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks.
For Dr. Brinsfield and Dr. Gowadia. So a common theme in
our subcommittee's hearings earlier this year on both chemical
and biological terrorism was a need for robust information
sharing. This is always a challenge both horizontally and
vertically, as you know.
I recently visited our Arizona's counterterrorism fusion
center and to learn more about the vital work that they are
doing there to support, obviously, any counterterrorism
activities in the State of Arizona.
Can you share your perspective on how you think this new
office will coordinate with the Department's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis and others in the intelligence
community to ensure that the threat information is shared with
fusion centers, emergency responders, other relevant State and
local stakeholders? This is a challenge whether you're
reorganizing or not, as you know. But how do you see it getting
better with the reorganization?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, ma'am, for that question.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we rely
significantly on that fusion of intelligence, law enforcement,
and technology. So our ties to the intelligence community are
strong and must continue. We have close and collaborating ties
not just with the intelligence and analysis function, but
across the board. In fact, we exchange detailees back and
forth. We have Coast Guard intelligence officers at DNDO, and
we have placed some detailees out into the intelligence
community as well.
Working through I&A, we inform our State and local partners
through the fusion center, as well as through publications,
weekly and monthly publications on the state of affairs, lost
and stolen sources, and very similarly with the
counterterrorism community. So I only see it as continuing. I
do not envision any change thereby.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
Dr. Brinsfield. We consider it an important part of our
mission space as well. As you know, we staff various positions
as details within I&A to both support the State and local
program office and the CBRNE health space. We hope to continue
that coordination.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I know there has been some
concerns talked about as far as managing the change and how
that impacts morale, the management of human capital, keeping
talent. Having been in the military 26 years, I've been through
a lot of reorganizations, and I've seen them go well and seen
them go poorly.
It seems like some of the best ones are done with the
collaboration at the beginning of coming up with the better
organization, if that makes sense, that there's collaboration
as part of the process instead of a top-down one that you could
then potentially have people resisting that change.
It sounds like, just from reading the documents, hearing
your testimony today, that there's been a lot of collaboration
to identify what are the best courses of action that will help
you all do your jobs better, that won't lead to change
resistance or competition between the specialties.
So I just want your perspectives on how that, how this has
come about, because that can have the mission succeed or fail,
if people are resisting the change. Do you see any challenges
in managing people and cultures as you're meshing your
different subparts together?
Dr. Brinsfield. So I think one of the things that we've
always strived in our office for is to understand the many
different and important cultures within DHS and to be able to
provide coordination and support across those different
subcultures of the organization. We've been coordinating and
speaking to our staff about the discussions on-going, getting
their input and feedback in different leadership meetings, and
we believe they're engaged and will continue to be engaged as
this process goes forward.
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman, I have been at the Department from
the very start, and I can tell you I have seen mergers and
stand-ups and all of it all come together. Yes, there are very
different cultures from legacy organizations as opposed to
stand-up organizations.
With Secretary Johnson coming to the Department, I think we
have struck a good balance, allowing legacy organizations to
maintain some of their culture while ascribing to a unified
mission at the Department level. I imagine we will reflect that
exactly as we move forward with the new CBRNE office.
Ms. McSally. Okay. Great.
My time has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey,
Mrs. Watson Coleman, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for being here today and sharing your
information with us. I have a few questions, kind-of all over
the place, but a couple of times you mentioned those who have
expertise that made a decision about this reorganization. What
was the entity, or who are the ``they'' that determine what
this reorganization would look like?
Ms. Gowadia. The Department undertook a review led by the
Office of Policy in response to Congress' direction for us to
take a look at this potential reorganization.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Is that Mr. Mayorkas?
Ms. Gowadia. No ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Who is that?
Ms. Gowadia. Back then it was under Assistant Secretary
Heyman. But ultimately the decision was made by a deputy
secretary and Secretary.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay. I'm a member of--actually, I'm
the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Management Efficiency, and we've heard a lot about the struggle
that we've had in certain of the components with regard to
acquisition management. So what protections will be in place in
this new organizational configuration that will ensure that we
have improved acquisition management and accountability?
Dr. Brinsfield. So, ma'am, I think as we look forward to
working with the Department on the Joint Requirements Council,
having decisions made in a coordinated fashion across the
Department, that will help to inform the process. Also, Dr.
Gowadia and I both intend to do responsible acquisition, and in
fact, we are looking forward to working closely with Dr.
Gowadia's staff, who have developed a certain amount of
expertise in the acquisition area.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. A quick question. Dr. Gowadia referred
to her staff, as her place of work, as the 11th best place to
work and the second-best something.
Ms. Gowadia. Second-best in innovation, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Thank you. So you all neglected to
mention your ranking. Do you know what your ranking is with
regard to whether or not it's one of the best or one of the
least in terms of morale of that nature places to work?
Dr. Brinsfield. Ours is embedded somewhere within
headquarters and it is somewhere around the middle of the area.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Dr. Brothers.
Mr. Brothers. We know. We were rated 314, so we were on
the--we're near the bottom, yes.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Okay. Are there any additional costs
associated with this reorganization? Will there be a request
for additional funds? If so, how much?
Ms. Gowadia. We do not envision that at this time, ma'am.
Mrs. Watson Coleman. Alrighty. Thank you.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentlelady, and recognize the
newest Member of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, gentleman
from New York, Mr. Donovan, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope no one
recognizes my newness to the committee by my question.
I'd like to thank you all, Dr. Brothers, Dr. Brinsfield,
for coming.
Dr. Gowadia, thank you so much for coming to my office and
briefing me.
As you know, I represent the 11th Congressional District of
New York, which encompasses New York City, and we face a
persistent terrorist threat in our city. In fact, Commissioner
Bratton of the New York City Police Department stated that he
believes that this time period is one of the most significantly
dangerous periods since September 11, 2001.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has worked closely
with New York City in improving the ability for local law
enforcement and public safety agencies to detect the
transmission of nuclear and radiological materials through the
Securing the Cities program. This program is viewed as one of
the most successful and it allowed New York to dramatically
improve its capabilities to secure existing radiological
materials and increase its detection capabilities.
My question, because I know, Chairman, we might be called
for votes any time now, I just have one question. With that in
mind, how is the new office going to impact Securing the Cities
program, and do you anticipate any changes or disruptions in
that program?
Ms. Gowadia. No, sir. Insofar as we are moving to the new
office intact, we will continue our support for the Securing
the Cities program, which has yielded tremendous results, as
you know, not just in the New York City, Jersey City, and
Newark region, but also in Los Angeles, right here in the
National capital region, and very soon we will select our
fourth implementation.
Mr. Donovan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from Rhode
Island, Congressman Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and your
testimony.
One of the criteria that the CBRNE functions review
measured against was to define clear roles and responsibilities
for DHS HQ and operational components. However, listening to
your testimony and reading the report, I'm not sure it's
completely clear to me. So can you help me to understand what's
unclear about the current roles and responsibilities and what
would be different under the restructuring?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, under the new office, a lot of the
authorities, in fact all the authorities off the various
offices that are moving together would come together in the new
office. Certainly, we have clear delineation for the work that
operational components do and the work that we do within the
headquarters function.
We envision the new office to be a mission support office.
So we would get requirements from our operators in rad, nuke
line and provide them capability. Dr. Brinsfield and her team
would certainly give requirements to Dr. Brothers so that they
could develop capabilities in support of the bio and chem
mission.
So we do actually have fairly well-defined roles and
responsibilities, and it should not see a disruption moving
forward.
Dr. Brinsfield. It's our hope that it will be a one-stop
shop, whether it be for an operational component of DHS or for
State and locals looking for assistance in any of these areas.
Mr. Langevin. We're confident that we're not going to be
duplicating efforts? My question in follow-up would be, are
there other offices in DHS or in other agencies that operate in
a similar fashion to the proposed CBRNE office?
Dr. Brinsfield. So there are other offices. We are
specifically looking at this office encompassing the DHS
mission and the DHS roles and responsibilities in the CBRNE
space.
But I think it's also important to note when we work with
the first responder communities, it behooves us, as Members of
the Federal Government, to make sure we are coordinated well
across the interagency. Therefore one of the things our offices
strive to do is actually work towards common guidance and
common information for first responders and State and locals in
these areas.
Mr. Langevin. I certainly hope when it moves forward that
it is comprehensive, inclusive, and not duplicative.
The DHS Office of Policy serves as a central resource for
DHS policy development and review. It's responsible for
developing DHS-wide policies, programs, and planning. In the
proposed reorganization, CBRNE-related policy positions would
be transferred from the Office of Policy to the new office.
So what benefits does DHS expect to achieve from moving
policy staff out of the Department-wide Policy Office and into
a more narrowly-focused office?
Dr. Brinsfield. So I think the Policy staff that are
currently on detail to OHA right now provide expertise in
coordinating CBRNE policies across the Department. They have
provided that expertise. We continue to coordinate well with
them and make sure that they are well-coordinated with the
subject-matter experts in both OHA and DNDO, and we hope to
continue that.
It is also a critical need for us to make sure that their
work in the CBRNE policy space continues to coordinate with big
DHS Policy and that we as leaders in these areas continue to
work across that.
Mr. Langevin. How would policy staff in the new CBRNE
office coordinate and integrate their decisions with those in
the Department-wide Office of Policy? Also what factors make
CBRNE policy different from the other topics that remain in the
Office of Policy? Should policy positions in other topic areas
also be decentralized throughout the Department?
Ms. Gowadia. So the policy aspects, we have always worked
very closely with our partners from Policy, whether they are
detailed to OHA or resident up at the Office of Policy. We have
enjoyed very good collaborations with them. They have provided
for us Department-wide perspectives and allowed us to speak
with a unified voice in the interagency and policy fora.
The CBRNE missions have a technical element to them. So
sometimes it does help to have closer proximity for the policy
people to the subject-matter experts. That is one advantage of
having our policy partners sit closer to us.
Mr. Langevin. All right. Thank you very much.
I'll yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the panelists for
taking the time to be here today. I think I'll turn to Dr.
Brothers for the first question.
In addition to managing operational detection and
surveillance programs for CBRNE threats, the role of DHS
headquarters is to enable the operational components to achieve
their missions. Can you tell us how your offices are engaging
components such as CBP and TSA on these threats currently?
Mr. Brothers. Yes, I can. In fact, we're developing a
structure, you may have heard. So under the Secretary's Unity
of Effort initiative, we've developed a Joint Requirements
Council, and under this Joint Requirements Council, we have a
membership of cross principals of all the components that
discuss issues around acquisitional requirements, et cetera. As
part of that council, S&T plays a fundamental role in terms of
looking at and evaluating technical issues, system engineering
as well.
So I think with the Joint Requirements Council that that's
a big picture on how we're developing requirements across the
organization, but we're also about to set up IPTs, which are
teams that are made up of the different components for us to
get down go into what kind of research and development should
be done across the Department.
So under the Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative, we are
really pulling the Department together to, we want one
organization to develop requirements and acquisition policies
going forward.
Mr. Perry. So from an operational standpoint for a layman
or somebody that's, you know, not working there every day, can
you kind-of describe--I understand the Joint Requirements
Council and the IPTs, but operationally, like, what happens on
a regular basis? How often do you get together once you
determine actions and potential threats, and then who exactly
is in charge?
Who do you report to, how often, and then how do you
adjudicate the actions in the past through an after-action
review process and then make modifications, if you know any of
the answers? That was a few questions at one time, but----
Mr. Brothers. It's a few questions--right. I think from my
perspective, the research and development perspective, our
interaction with the operational components really is through
the Joint Requirements Council, and we then are setting up
structures where we actually interact on a daily basis with
those operational components. That's a work in progress.
Mr. Perry. But it's just from a research----
Mr. Brothers. From my perspective------
Mr. Perry [continuing]. From your perspective.
Mr. Brothers. It's a research and development exercise,
that's right. Now, S&T is also involved in the--we're getting
more involved in the acquisition process in order to make sure
the Department has a system engineering look at acquisitions
going forward. So we're moving in there as well. I think
perhaps Dr. Gowadia----
Mr. Perry. Yeah, can you, if you can, and if you can answer
those questions from a kind of a tactical standpoint, you know,
event management.
How does it work? How does the current system work? Because
I think the purpose--one of the purposes for the hearing is it
seems like it's--there's no point--there's no point to the
spear. It's--there are many points to the spear, but who's
coordinating the effort? How does that occur?
Ms. Gowadia. All right. So I can speak to what we have done
on the Rad and Nuke threat. First and foremost, we are an
interagency office and we exchange detailees. So the operators
sit with us and help shape our plans, help shape everything we
do. Help even in the design of systems. We leave detail people
out into the field so that scientists, technical personnel can
get out and appreciate the operational world. It establishes a
healthy tech pull, tech push.
In concert with Dr. Brother's office, we certainly try to
build systems that are as multifunctional as possible, but we
involve our end-users from start to finish. So whether it's
analyzing the risk, understanding the threat, receiving their
operational requirements, turning it into strategies testing
the equipment out into the real world, once we buy and deploy
these systems for them, we support them with alarm adjudication
help if they need, training and exercises, et cetera.
So this whole loop does play through over and over again,
and I can promise you I don't make a single investment decision
without my operational components sitting right there at the
table with the catcher's mitt ready to catch what we are
building for them.
Mr. Perry. But from a time frame, how often do you
reevaluate your process?
Ms. Gowadia. Annually, sir. We annually re-elicit the
intelligence community. It forms a basis of our terrorism risk
assessment. From that we are able to analyze what the blue team
has, what the red team capabilities are likely to be, what our
gaps and vulnerabilities are, and what our portfolio mix needs
to be.
Much of our investment is based on this risk assessment. It
is also coupled with technology maturity, what the operators
really want and need, and how they will choose to use the
systems in the field. So annually we sit down to go through our
portfolio and every acquisition decision milestone we follow a
very deliberate process that's reflective of the departments
and the management directive 102-01 every milestone along the
way. They sit with us as necessary, test with us constantly,
sit with us to develop the strategies. So it's pretty much
constant.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank the gentleman. The Chair now
recognizes the Ranking Member, gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. In an effort to finish before we have votes,
and to keep you all for waiting for us to vote and come back, I
will really just make a statement and hope that it's something
we can all agree on.
To an answer to an earlier question, you mentioned that
there really--this was a top-level decision and that the top-
level people came together, and, you know, I just want to make
sure this is not something that is a great idea in theory but
in reality, for the people who have to implement it, it's not
so manageable. So in recognizing that on the ground every day
our nuclear deterrence and biodefense effort as a Nation
depends on motivated and vigilant officers across the globe
supplied with the best equipment and intelligence we can give
them.
Officers working at our Nation's ports of entry have an
especially complex and difficult job. Thousands of decisions
are made every day all across our borders, ports, and airports
to clear a container or a vehicle for transit into the United
States. These are vital components in the flow of commerce in
the world's premiere and largest trading market, the United
States.
Other cargo requires further inspection or even denial of
entry or interdiction action taken on a vehicle or person. That
is the hard, cold, repetitive, and every-day reality of our
mission to prevent a violent nuclear or chemical attack or a
biological event or outbreak.
So I want to make it clear that we are very grateful to all
of our dedicated men and women in the field who protect us from
weapons of mass destruction on a daily basis and to make sure
that they are involved in this process, to make sure that it's
not just in theory that it's a great idea, but all the way to
the bottom where our officers serve that they're also included
and they make sure that they can do their goal and their tasks.
So with that, thank you all for coming, and, Mr. Chairman,
I will yield back.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank the gentleman. I thank all of you for
being here for giving your testimony today. It's greatly
appreciated. You all as a panel are dismissed.
The committee is going to recess for votes, and we'll
reconvene immediately after the votes with apologies to the
second panel for the inconvenience, but with appreciation for
your indulgence. So we will recess to be back here in about 30
minutes. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Ratcliffe. The Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, Security Technologies and
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will now reconvene and come to order.
At this time I would like to welcome our second panel to
today's hearing. I very much appreciate your participation
today and I, again, I appreciate your indulgence with the vote
schedule, and we will have additional Members hopefully coming
back here, but I've been given the green light to go ahead and
start receiving your testimony.
So with that I would like to welcome the panel. With us
today we have Mr. Alan Cohn, who's a principal at Steptoe &
Johnson LLP. He is the former assistant secretary for strategy,
planning, analysis, and risk at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Ozzie Nelson is a senior associate for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Mr. Warren Stern is a former director of the Department of
Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Thank
you all for being here today. Again, at this time I'd ask all
of you to stand and raise your right hands, and I will swear
you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Ratcliffe. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative, and the witnesses' full
written statements will appear in the record.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cohn for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALAN D. COHN, COUNSEL, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
Mr. Cohn. Thank you. Chairman Ratcliffe, Ranking Member
Richmond, distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank you
very much for the opportunity to present testimony today.
As you noted, you have my written testimony, so I'll just
shortly summarize that briefly here.
As you noted, I served at the Department of Homeland
Security for 9 years. Seven of that as the head of strategy.
The last year dual-hatted as the Deputy Head of Policy. In that
time I was privileged to work with several leadership teams,
including multiple leaders of each of the organizations that
you saw before.
I commend these subcommittees for ensuring continued focus
on the question of the best approach to defending against
weapons of mass destruction. As has been noted, biological
threats and hazards and the use of an improvised nuclear device
and the terrorist's use of explosives against transportation
targets and mass gatherings remain among the threats, hazards,
and persistent challenges that pose the most strategically
significant risks to the Nation.
Having been at the Department for over 9 years before I
left, I can say definitively that organizational changes are
rarely the first solution or the most effective solution to any
problem. That said, in this case, DHS is faced with the problem
that its weapons of mass destruction leadership, its expertise,
and its personnel, and resources are dispersed across numerous
organizations just in its headquarters, let alone its
operational components. That dispersal has resulted, as this
committee has rightfully recognized, in unclear assignment of
responsibilities and suboptimal engagement with Federal
interagency partners, and with external partners. It has also
contributed to less-than-effective oversight and execution of
major acquisitions aimed at combatting weapons of mass
destruction.
Three principles should guide any consideration of DHS
functions--any consolidation of DHS functions and
organizations. No. 1, there should be a single center of
gravity within the Department's headquarters for any major
function.
No. 2, headquarter's entities should perform the
integrating functions necessary for the Department as a whole
to be effective.
Third, operating entities should carry out operating
responsibilities. For these reasons, I support the
reorganization of the Department's headquarter's weapons of
mass destruction's functions as the Department has proposed,
but I would highlight two points.
First, the Department must go beyond placing the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, the Office of Health Affairs, and the
Office of Bombing Prevention into the same organization.
Instead, it must fully integrate all of those functions to be
transferred into the new offices. Each of these offices will
perform certain functions well, but the Department will benefit
most by taking the best practices of each and adopting them
across the CBRNE functions. So for that reason, I believe
Congress should set the overall responsibilities and
authorities for the new CBRNE office, but empower the Secretary
to integrate the functions of the new office in the most
effective manner possible.
Second, Congress must ensure that the Department
effectively assesses its current models for CBRNE research and
development and determines the best manner in which to pursue
CBRNE programs and major acquisitions.
As you heard, DNDO, OHA use different models for their
programmatic execution and for acquisition. Both of these
models have achieved successes and both of these models have
resulted in failure and termination of major acquisitions over
time. It's difficult to say with certainty which of these
models or a third model, is best suited to ensuring effective
mission execution and guarding against the failure of major
system acquisitions. However, that is an answerable question,
and Congress and the Department should partner to actively seek
that answer.
DHS has been traumatized in its short life-span by a series
of reorganizations. However, that does not mean that the
Department cannot benefit from a thoroughly-examined, well-
considered reorganization and consolidation, particularly of
its headquarters functions. In this case, the time has come for
Congress and the Department to reorganize and consolidate its
CBRNE headquarters functions to better effectuate the
Department's CBRNE responsibilities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this
testimony, and I'm happy to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Alan D. Cohn
July 14, 2015
Chairs McSally and Ratcliffe, Ranking Members Payne and Richmond,
distinguished Members, thank you very much for the opportunity to
present testimony today regarding how the Department of Homeland
Security can best organize itself to meet the challenge of weapons of
mass destruction.
I commend these subcommittees for ensuring continued focus on the
question of the best approach to defending against weapons of mass
destruction. As a former first responder and official at the Department
of Homeland Security, I know the challenges we face as a Nation in
confronting this threat. While organizational change is rarely the
first solution to a problem, in this case, the Department is rightfully
examining the effectiveness of its organization with respect to this
challenge. The Department's headquarters needs to be consolidated in
many aspects, ensuring consolidation of similar headquarters functions
and integration by the headquarters with respect to the Department's
National responsibilities, while ensuring that the Department's
operational components and its external operational partners--rather
than the Department's headquarters--are entrusted with operations. To
that end, I support the consolidation of DHS's headquarters weapons of
mass destruction functions into a single office reporting to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. A fuller explanation of these points
follows.
While cyber threats, geopolitical conflicts, and instability and
terrorism overseas have rightfully captured the interest and
imagination of the American public and the media at this time, this
committee has correctly ensured that we remain focused on the range of
security challenges facing the United States. As stated in the report
on the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, biological threats
and hazards, the use of an improvised nuclear device, and the terrorist
use of explosives against transportation targets and mass gatherings
remain among threats, hazards, and persistent challenges that pose the
most strategically significant risks to the Nation. In addition,
chemical weapons and accidents involving chemical facilities and
chemicals in transit, and radiological dispersal devices or ``RDDs,''
are risks that must continually be assessed and addressed.
I am currently of counsel with Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, the
principal of my own consulting firm, and a non-resident senior fellow
with the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the
Atlantic Council, focusing on issues at the intersection of security,
technology, innovation, and government. I am proud to have served with
the dedicated men and women of the Department of Homeland Security in
the Department's Office of Policy for 9 years, from 2006 to 2015, 7 of
those as the head of strategy and strategic planning, the last 3 as
assistant secretary for strategy, planning, analysis & risk, and the
last year dual-hatted as the deputy head of policy for the Department.
Before that, I practiced law, was a member of the Fairfax County Urban
Search & Rescue Task Force and a disaster assistance employee for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency's urban search and rescue program,
and served as an emergency medical technician for the 9-1-1 emergency
ambulance system in New York City. I recognize the deep need for
Congress and the Department to get its job done efficiently and
effectively. This is important for the Nation, but also for the first
responders across the country who rely on the Department for effective
risk assessment, National strategy and policy, grants and grant
guidance, scientific information, and protection, detection, and
response and recovery equipment to supplement their own efforts and
that of their departments and jurisdictions.
As noted above, organizational changes are rarely the first
solution to any problem. However, in this case, the Department of
Homeland Security does not lack for leadership, expertise, or dedicated
personnel and resources focused on these challenges. Rather, the
Department is faced with the problem of dispersing that leadership,
expertise, and personnel and resources across numerous organizations
just in its headquarters, let alone its operational components. That
dispersal has resulted, as this committee has rightfully recognized, in
unclear assignment of responsibilities and suboptimal engagement with
Federal interagency partners and external stakeholders on weapons of
mass destruction issues, and has contributed to less-than-effective
oversight and execution of major acquisitions involving programs aimed
at combatting weapons of mass destruction. This is not unique to
weapons of mass destruction; the Department's headquarters is in need
of overall consolidation, and an overall sharpening of roles and lines
of authority.
For that reason, Congress should be commended for directing, and
the Department should be commended for conducting, a study of the
Department's organization with respect to its weapons of mass
destruction functions, and for making difficult decisions that will
require organizational transition and consolidation within the
Department. During my time as an assistant secretary at the Department,
I led portions of this review process, and helped facilitate
discussions that resulted in the report that was provided to Congress
by the Department. However, the views expressed today are my own, and
are not intended to represent the Department of Homeland Security or
the organizations with which I am currently associated.
I believe that there are three principles that should guide any
organizational changes at the Department of Homeland Security, given
the Department's structure as a multi-divisional organization, a
corporate form of organization in which semi-autonomous component
entities perform interconnected functions and responsibilities, and
where a headquarters exists to support the organization's senior
leadership in effectively integrate and optimize cross-Departmental
activities and decision making in order to best meet the organizations
overall goals and responsibilities.
1. Consolidation.--There should be a single center of gravity
within the Department's headquarters for any major function,
whether in an integrated policy, management, or other
directorate, or in a specialized office, recognizing that most
if not all of the Department's operating components will likely
have a role in carrying out that function.
2. Integration.--Headquarters entities should perform the
integrating functions necessary for a multi-divisional
organization to be effective: Conducting risk assessments and
associated analysis, leading to the development of integrated
strategy and policy, against which research and development,
programmatic activity, major acquisitions, joint operational
planning, and joint operations can be conducted.
3. Operations.--Operating entities should carry out operational
responsibilities, whether the Department's own operating
components or the myriad State, local, territorial, Tribal,
private sector, non-governmental, and other partners with
operational roles.
It goes without saying that any entity's organization should be as
lean as possible, with clearly delineated mission responsibility and
authority, a clear leadership structure, effective recruiting,
training, and retention programs, progressive opportunities for
advancement into either leadership or senior technical positions, and a
robust interchange of personnel and information between headquarters
entities, the Department's operating components, and the Department's
external stakeholders. This testimony assumes those steps will follow
any reorganization of the Department's weapons of mass destruction
functions.
With those elements as the backdrop, I believe that the time has
come for the Department to undertake a reorganization of its weapons of
mass destruction activities, with Congress's direction and
authorization, to best serve its constituents and help safeguard the
Nation. Specifically:
Congress should authorize the consolidation of the functions
currently performed by the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
the Office of Health Affairs, and certain functions performed
by the Science & Technology Directorate, the Office of Policy,
the Office of Operations Coordination, and the National
Protection and Programs Directorate to create a single office
in the Department's headquarters, headed by an assistant
secretary and reporting directly to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, to best support the Department's responsibilities to
combat chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosive (CBRNE) threats and hazards.
Congress should ensure that this new office is clearly
authorized and empowered to perform the range of headquarters
functions associated with the Department's CBRNE
responsibilities, to include effectively assessing CBRNE risk,
formulating and communicating consistent and integrated
Departmental CBRNE strategy and policy, ensuring effective
oversight and execution of major CBRNE-related programs and
acquisitions, communicating effectively with the Department's
partners and stakeholders concerning CBRNE risks and the most
effective ways to manage those risks, and enabling the
Department's operational components to effectively carry out
their CBRNE-related responsibilities.
Congress should direct the Department to study, and should
also direct an independent study, to determine the best model
for integration of CBRNE-related research and development
functions conducted by the Science & Technology Directorate
with the functions to be performed by the new CBRNE office, and
should revisit that issue once those studies have been
completed.
The Department has now proposed many of these steps to Congress, so
I will elaborate on two points: (1) The integration of CBNRE functions
within a new CBRNE headquarters office; and (2) the process for
determining the best model for integration of CBNRE-related research
and development functions within the Department's headquarters.
First, the Department must go beyond placing the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, the Office of Health Affairs, and the Office of
Bombing Prevention into the same organization, and must fully integrate
the functions to be transferred into the new office. Both the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office and the Office of Health Affairs perform
certain functions well, but both could benefit from taking the best
practices of each and adopting them across CBRNE functions. Moreover,
the functions to be transferred from the Office of Policy and the
Office of Operations Coordination, as well as the Office of Bombing
Prevention, should be integrated in full into the new organization.
Congress should set the overall responsibilities and authorities of the
new CBRNE office, and empower the Secretary to integrate the functions
to be incorporated into the new office to achieve the best effect
across CBRNE functions, and not simply place the offices whole into
what might be nothing more than a new shell organization.
Second, Congress must ensure that the Department effectively
assesses its current models for CBRNE research and development, and
determines the best manner in which to pursue CBRNE programs and major
acquisitions. Currently, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office uses a
``systems command'' approach, similar to Naval Sea Systems Command,
performing ``end-to-end'' systems development including research and
development. The Office of Health Affairs uses a model that separates
research and development from programmatic execution and acquisition,
with research and development functions performed by the Science &
Technology Directorate. Both models have achieved successes, and both
models have resulted in the failure and termination of major
acquisitions. It is difficult to say with certainty which of these
models, or a third model, is best suited to ensuring effective mission
execution and guarding against the failure of major systems
acquisitions. However, there is an answer to this question, and
Congress and the Department should actively seek that answer.
For that reason, Congress should mandate that the Department assess
the effectiveness of each of these models under the new organizational
structure, perhaps on a yearly basis, until a specific date in the
future, say 3 years from the creation of the office. In addition,
Congress should mandate than an independent study be conducted by an
organization with familiarity with the different research and
development models currently in use by the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office and the Office of Health Affairs, as well as those of other
Federal departments and agencies and corporate entities, and make a
recommendation to Congress and the Secretary as to the best model for
the new CBRNE organization to employ. Congress can then revisit this
last CBRNE-related organizational piece once both the Department and an
independent organization have completed their review.
DHS has been traumatized in its short lifespan by a series of
reorganizations. However, this does not mean that the Department cannot
benefit from thoroughly-examined, well-considered reorganizations and
consolidations, particularly of its headquarters functions. In this
case, the time has come for Congress and the Department to reorganize
and consolidate its CBRNE headquarters functions to better effectuate
the Department's CBRNE responsibilities.
Thank you again for the opportunity to provide this testimony.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Cohn.
The Chair will now recognize Mr. Nelson for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICK ``OZZIE'' NELSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Nelson. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Ratcliffe,
McSally, Ranking Members Richmond and Payne, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.
As we've noted today, terrorist groups continue to pursue
CBRNE weapons. For almost 20 years we have seen al-Qaeda and
its affiliates pursue unconventional weapons. Most recently
I've seen reports of ISIL seizing chemical weapons facilities
and radioactive material in Iraq. Domestic efforts designed to
detect and respond to a CBRNE incident are a critical component
of our Nation's security, representing the last and perhaps the
most vital line of defense against these weapons. No department
has a greater role in this effort than the Department of
Homeland Security.
While the Department has succeeded in building a number of
offices, programs, and capabilities designed to detect and
respond to CBRNE events, its effectiveness continues to be
hampered by a variety of challenges. Primarily its fragmented
organization and approach through which the Department executes
its efforts.
Responsibility for CBRNE within the Department is spread
across no fewer than six separate offices. This fragmented
architecture demands unachievable levels of coordination and
makes the implementation of common Department-wide policies and
activities unnecessarily difficult.
Most U.S. Government departments and agencies, with the
exception of DHS, have a streamlined approach to CBRNE with a
central office that oversees WMD policy and programs. Not only
does DHS continue to be the outlier with this fractured
approach, but it has also resisted efforts to address this
issue. The benefits of the Department for maintaining its
current structure seem elusive. DNDO was created in 2005 as a
stand-alone entity to focus Government efforts on the nuclear
threat. While the office has succeeded in remaining focused, it
has struggled to develop a strategic guidance and to manage
large acquisition programs.
Recently DNDO has seen significant improvements efforts
such as the Securing the Cities initiatives have flourished,
and the organization's morale is the highest in the Department.
However, issues still remain, many of which are beyond the
control of the director. For example, the director of the
science and technology maintains its own portfolio of nuclear
radiological R&D programs which should fall under the purview
of DNDO.
The other primary CBRNE entity within DHS is the Office of
Health Affairs probably has suffered the most from DHS's
fragmented approach. The Department's chemical and biological
defense programs are tucked in the office whose primary
responsibility is health and medical expertise. The
relationship between chemical and biological threats in public
health is clear, but they are by no means the same. This
arrangement fails to recognize the nature of the treat and the
organizational efforts required to address it.
The office's flagship program, BioWatch has been shrouded
in controversy since its inception. In total, the Department
has spent over $1 billion on BioWatch, and it at best has
provided questionable results. The Department's chemical
defense efforts are similarly lackluster. They are severely
fragmented and generally ineffective at least in part because
the issues worked in various small offices spread throughout
the Department.
While OHA retains the overarching responsibility, these
other offices own key aspects of the chemical defense
portfolio, making OHA's charter seemingly unmanageable. The
Department and Congress must act now to address these
shortcomings by unifying and elevating DHS CBRNE capabilities
into one departmental entity. Specifically, DNDO and OHA should
be merged along with the Department's CBRNE policy and
operations capabilities. This new office should be headed by an
assistant secretary who reports directly to the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
The decentralized nature of CBRNE efforts within DHS has
lead to an equally decentralized system to develop associated
technologies, which has contributed to many of the deficiencies
in CBRNE and R&D and acquisition programs. As such, CBRNE, R&D
efforts within DHS also should be unified under the centralized
office. With responsibility for the Department's entire range
of CBRNE efforts, the new entity would have the clear charter
for establishing the Department's priorities.
Perhaps most importantly, the assistant secretary would
solely be accountable for all CBRNE acquisition programs
allowing for a more streamlined and agile approach that is
directly connected to both policymakers and operators. It also
would enhance external coordination issues by providing a
primary entry point for outside entities seeking to coordinate
with the Department on CBRNE issues.
The idea of consolidating DHS WMD efforts has long be
discussed, and now is the time for action. We as a Nation have
no excuse for not making this change as it will only improve
the Department's ability to defend against the threat while
eliminating redundancies. Through integration there exists an
opportunity to forge more efficient and effective CBRNE
enterprise and strengthen our Nation's security against these
devastating weapons.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson
July 14, 2015
Good afternoon Chairmen McSally and Ratcliff, Ranking Members
Richmond and Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be discussing
how the Department of Homeland Security can be better organized to
defend the United States against chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear (CBRNE) weapons. I am here today under my CSIS affiliation
however I am also employed by Crossmatch Technologies, an identity
management company, as well as Georgetown University where I teach
classes on Homeland Security and Counterterrorism as part of the
Biohazardous Threat Agents and Emerging Infectious Disease Program
within the Microbiology and Immunology Department.
the threat
In the midst of a seemingly perpetual terrorism threat and a time
of constrained fiscal resources, the United States Government faces
difficult questions regarding how to best prepare for National security
threats that may be viewed as relatively unlikely or low probability
yet could have potentially devastating consequences, specifically the
use CBRNE weapons on American soil. Though they may require
comparatively more time and skill to build or acquire than conventional
weapons, the proportional effects of CBRNE weapons are significantly
greater. The ``Amerithrax'' attacks of 2001, for example, involved only
a small amount of anthrax yet succeeded in paralyzing portions of the
U.S. Government. And the consequences of a terrorist group detonating a
low-yield nuclear weapon in a major U.S. city would change America
forever. Although the probability of terrorists using simpler means--
such as mass shootings--to strike the United States appears much
higher, the impact of a successful CBRNE attack demands that the Nation
prioritize and resource this threat.
Terrorist groups continue to pursue CBRNE weapons, despite the
challenges they face developing these capabilities, at least in part
because they can provide these terrorists with a disproportionate level
of power, and even prestige, relative to their actual capabilities or
standing. For almost 20 years, we have seen al-Qaeda and its affiliates
pursue unconventional weapons. Osama bin Laden in 1998 declared that
acquiring and using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)\1\ was his
Islamic duty. More recently we have seen reports of the Islamic State
of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seizing chemical weapons facilities and
radioactive material in Iraq. Deterrence strategies have no effect
against these enemies--If they acquire a WMD then we should expect them
to use it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For the purposes of this testimony CBRNE and WMD are used
interchangeably.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These types of weapons are game-changers for a terrorist group, and
we should expect such groups to pursue these capabilities with
continued vigor. While 30 years ago, state-level WMD programs were far
and away our primary concern, the rapid spread of technology and
increasing availability of information on the internet has made the
development of such weapons simpler for terrorist groups by further
lowering the barriers to development of CBRNE capabilities. Further,
instability in nations that possess CBRNE weapons, such as Syria and
Pakistan, raises the risk of existing stockpiles falling into dangerous
hands. Faced with these threats, the United States has little choice
but to work to defend itself against CBRNE weapons.
the challenge
Since 9/11 the United States has developed a robust series of
measures intended to counter CBRNE weapons at multiple points before
they reach U.S. shores. Yet these efforts continue to fall short. The
Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center in its 2011 Bio Response
Report Card gave the Federal Government failing grades in its
assessment of the Nation's ability to respond to a large-scale
bioterrorism event. This report is only one of many that indicates the
Federal Government writ large has failed to posture itself to
adequately detect and disrupt CBRNE threats or incidents. And
ultimately, regardless of Governmental efforts at any level, the
possibility always will remain that a device or agent could evade
detection or even be manufactured within the United States itself. As
such domestic efforts designed to detect and respond to a CBRNE
incident are a critical component of the Nation's security,
representing the last and perhaps most vital line of defense against
these weapons.
No department has a greater role in this effort than the Department
of Homeland Security. While the Department has succeeded in building a
number of individual offices, programs, and capabilities designed to
detect and respond to CBRNE events, its effectiveness continues to be
hampered by a variety of challenges. First among these is simple but
critical--the fragmented organization and approach through which the
Department executes its CBRNE efforts. Currently responsibility for
various elements of CBRNE detection and response within the Department
is spread across no fewer than six separate offices including the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), the Office of Health Affairs
(OHA), the Office of Policy, the Office of Operations Coordination, the
Science and Technology Directorate, and the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD). This fragmented architecture demands
unachievable levels of coordination and cooperation, and makes the
implementation of common, Department-wide policy and activities
unwieldy and difficult. Moreover it runs contrary to the Department's
program to improve Department-wide unity of effort.
While organizational dynamics may seem trivial they are critically
important when countering such complex threats as terrorism and CBRNE.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States--
the 9/11 Commission--presents a scathing critique of U.S. Government
inter-departmental coordination. More recently the 2008 Commission on
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism, cited inefficient Government organization as a serious
problem--with dozens of overlapping offices and officials responsible
for addressing CBRNE issues.
The challenge of coordinating CBRNE detection and response is
significant. Not only must Federal agencies coordinate across the
Government but also with State and local governments, who likely will
be the first responders in such an event, and with industry and
academia, who provide valuable research and development (R&D) and other
technical support. Such coordination requires that department and
agencies be unified and well-coordinated internally. Without effective
internal coordination, departments and agencies cannot expect to
succeed with external coordination.
Most departments and agencies, with the exception of DHS, have a
streamlined approach to CBRNE with a central office that oversees WMD
policy and programs. These entities, among others, include the
Department of Defense's Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, the Department of State's
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and
Nonproliferation, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Weapons of
Mass Destruction Directorate. The unity and strength of these elements
with their clear assignment of responsibilities and clean lines of
communication has enabled these organizations to effectively coordinate
internally within their agencies and external with the interagency.
Not only does DHS continue to be the outlier with its fractured
approach to CBRNE but it also, for unknown reasons, has resisted--or
just simply failed to prioritize--efforts to correct the issue. In the
fiscal year 2013 Homeland Security Appropriations Act the Secretary of
Homeland Security was tasked by the Congress to review the Department's
WMD coordinating mechanisms and provide recommendations by September 1,
2013. Yet the Department failed to respond to this request until June
2015--almost 2 years later.
The benefits to the Department for maintaining its current
structure seem elusive. DNDO was created in 2005 as a separate, stand-
alone entity to focus Government and DHS efforts on the nuclear threat.
While the office has succeeded in remaining focused it has struggled to
develop strategic guidance and direction and to manage large
acquisition programs. The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture--a
framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other
radioactive materials--has floundered, and hundreds of millions of
dollars have been wasted on radiation detection programs that have
fallen well short of expectations, such as the Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal (ASP) and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography Systems
(CAARS).
Recently under the leadership of Director Huban Gowadia DNDO has
seen significant improvement. Efforts such as the Securing the Cities
initiative--a program to assist States in establishing capabilities to
detect radiological and nuclear materials in major cities--have
flourished, and the organization's morale is the highest in the
Department.\2\ However, issues still remain, many of which are beyond
the control of the director. For example the Directorate of Science and
Technology, with a lackluster record of coordinating effectively within
the Department, maintains its own portfolio of nuclear and radiological
R&D programs that arguably should fall under the purview of DNDO.
Additionally key nuclear/radiological policy and operations elements
reside within other DHS directorates detached from DNDO. While Dr.
Gowadia's strong leadership and vision have improved DNDO, the
organization's efficacy cannot be dependent upon personality or
leadership alone. It must be strong enough not only to stand on its own
merit but also to execute its charter both inside and outside of the
Department.
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The other primary CBRNE entity within DHS, the Office of Health
Affairs (OHA), probably has suffered most from DHS's fragmented
approach. The Department's chemical and biological defense programs are
tucked into the office whose primary responsibility is ``health and
medical expertise.'' The relationship between chemical and biological
threats and public health is clear--but they are by no means the same.
Having chemical and biological programs as a subset of public health
fails to recognize the nature of the threat and the organizational
efforts required to address it, which can be seen in OHA's execution of
its programs.
The office's flagship program, BioWatch, which aims to detect the
presence of high-risk biological agents, has been shrouded in
controversy since its inception. In 2011 the National Academy of
Sciences questioned the effectiveness of the currently deployed
Generation Two (Gen-2) system. Last year the Department cancelled the
acquisition of the next generation biosurveillance technology (Gen-3),
which was to replace the fielded Gen-2 systems. The program was moved
from OHA back to S&T for further development. The Government
Accountability Office (GAO) identified a number of deficiencies with
the Department's management of the Gen-3 program noting that the
Department failed to conduct sound mission needs analysis and to follow
good acquisition processes. In total, the Department has spent over $1
billion on BioWatch and has at best provided questionable results. Over
$150 million was spent on the Gen-3 technology alone before it was
cancelled.
The Department's chemical defense efforts are similarly lackluster.
They are severely fragmented and generally ineffective at least in part
because the issue is worked in various, small offices spread throughout
the Department. While OHA retains the overarching responsibility, these
other offices own key aspects of the chemical defense portfolio. The
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program, which regulates
high-risk chemical facilities, is managed by NPPD. And the Chemical
Security Analysis Center (CSAC), which assesses chemical threats and
vulnerabilities, is led by the S&T office. With a variety of disparate
chemical programs spread throughout component agencies, OHA's chemical
defense charter is seemingly unmanageable.
DHS' fractured approach to CBRNE has resulted in inefficient
operations, insufficient accountability, and wasted taxpayer dollars,
ultimately increasing the risk to the American homeland. Fortunately,
many of these shortcomings can be addressed simply by reorganizing and
elevating the Department's CBRNE efforts into single, consolidated
entity. Such an approach will make it possible for the Department to
have a focused CBRNE detection and response capability with clear roles
and responsibilities in order to improve reaction times and
accountability, and eliminate redundancy and inefficiencies.
the solution
The Department and Congress must act now to address these
shortcomings by unifying and elevating DHS's CBRNE capabilities into
one Departmental entity. Specifically DNDO and OHA should be merged
along with the CBRNE policy and operations capabilities and the NPPD
Office of Bombing Prevention. The new office should be headed by an
assistant secretary who reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland
Security. The Department also should align R&D programs under this new
office. Given that CBRNE detection and response is inherently a
technology-intensive venture, there are numerous challenges associated
developing and acquiring the needed technologies. The decentralized
nature of CBRNE efforts within DHS has led to an equally decentralized
system to develop associated technologies, which has contributed to
many of the deficiencies in DHS CBRNE R&D and acquisition programs. To
increase both the tactical and strategic integration of the CBRNE
detection and response, the new consolidated enterprise must focus on
both policy and technology. As such, CBRNE R&D efforts within DHS also
should be unified under this centralized office.
The consolidated office also would be able to provide a holistic
approach to the Department's WMD programs and eliminate duplication of
efforts. With responsibility and visibility into the Department's
entire range of CBRNE efforts from policy to technology to operations
the merged entity would ensure continuity and effective prioritization
of this highly complex threat. Moreover the experiences of the
Department's entire WMD expertise could be leverage on a routine and
daily basis. The new entity would have the clear charter for
establishing and articulating the Department's CBRNE priorities and
strategies to both internal and external audiences. Perhaps most
importantly the assistant secretary would be solely responsible and
accountable for all CBRNE acquisition programs allowing for a more
streamlined and agile approach that is directly connected to both
policy-makers and operators.
In addition to raising the profile and priority of CBRNE in the
Department, and consolidating capabilities and eliminating overlap, the
new entity would enhance external coordination by providing a primary
entry point for outside agencies and entities seeking to coordinate on
CBRNE issues with DHS. In today's security environment there are very
few single agency threats and there are even fewer single agency
solutions. This is especially true with CBRNE where coordination
between Federal, State/local, academia, and the private sector is an
absolute necessity. Under the current DHS structure it is uncertain as
to who in the Department has the lead for CBRNE efforts and at what
moment in the process.
Interagency or inter-departmental coordination is critical when
dealing with complex transnational threats such as CBRNE. In
interagency meetings, including at the National Security Council level,
each Department normally gets a single seat at the table. Individuals
that are knowledgeable in a broad range of topics, yet still
technically conversant, often prove to be the most effective
participants in these policy discussions. Regarding CBRNE, departments
must have a cadre of individuals who can speak with one voice on the
whole of the issues. With DHS's expertise currently stove-piped into
disparate parts of the organization, they lack a robust group of
individuals that has the responsibility and authority to speak to the
whole of their efforts against CBRNE threats.
The consolidated entity also would serve as the home base for all
DHS CBRNE personnel allowing them to benefit from each other's
background and experience not only in technology but also in management
and acquisition programs. A larger, consolidated cadre of talent also
would provide DHS CBRNE professionals with greater career opportunities
and positions for growth. By raising the profile of CBRNE within the
Department and the interagency, and leveraging the recent leadership
efforts in DNDO that have resulted in such high morale, DHS CBRNE could
become one of the most sought-after places to work for WMD
professionals. Instead of internal components competing against one
another for prioritization and resources they could be working together
for mutual and greater benefit.
conclusion
DNDO and OHA have struggled with effectively communicating and
facilitating a common understanding of the Department's CBRNE efforts
and have ineffectively managed major CBRNE acquisitions. The idea of
consolidating DHS WMD efforts has long been discussed, and now is the
time for action. We as a Nation have no excuse for not making this
change as it will only improve the Department's ability to defend
against the WMD threat while eliminating redundancies and
inefficiencies. The current model is also inconsistent with the
Department's Unity of Effort initiatives. There is simply no reason to
maintain the current structure. Ultimately, there is no consolidated,
single architecture that would perfectly address the multitude of
challenges associated with CBRNE detection and response. However, the
various offices, programs, and capabilities currently spread across the
Department can and should be integrated. Through integration, there
exists an opportunity to forge a more efficient and effective CBRNE
detection and response enterprise and strengthen our Nation's security
against these devastating weapons.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Nelson.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Stern for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WARREN STERN, FORMER DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Stern. Good afternoon, Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman
McSally, Ranking Member Richmond, Ranking Member Payne, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
I'm pleased to testify today about the Department of
Homeland Security plan to establish an office responsible for
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive
threats. I am currently the R&D manager at Brookhaven National
Laboratory. However, I'm not here today as a Brookhaven
employee. I am here as an individual to provide testimony based
on my experience in this field.
From 2010 through 2012, I was the director of DNDO. I have
also worked in related U.S. Government positions over 25 years,
and have been part of several Government reorganizations. I
draw my insights from these experiences.
In general, I favor the creation of a weapons of mass
destruction organization within DHS. Weapons of mass
destruction threats, which are exceedingly infrequent, can be
easily forgotten in the day-to-day work of Government agencies.
A strong organization focused on the work necessary to prevent
and respond to events of low frequency but very high
consequence is necessary to prevent a terrorist attack using
weapons of mass destruction in the United States. However, I
also believe that a reorganization of the scale and scope being
considered by the subcommittee would be a significant--would be
significantly disruptive to the work of the those involved.
This does not mean that a reorganization should not be pursued.
It simply means that such reorganization should only be pursued
if the benefits significantly outweigh the costs. If there is a
clear objective, and if Congress and the administration have
the willingness and the ability to devote the resources needed
to ensure the objectives will be met.
If a reorganization is to be done, it should be done to
make a substantially stronger organization. Reorganization
should not be pursued simply to make a cleaner organizational
chart. While DNDO has had difficult periods in its relationship
with Congress, I believe that when I left DNDO, Congress was
generally pleased with and supportive of its work. I also
believe that under the current leadership this is still true,
and I've heard that today also.
As such, as Congress considers any reorganization plan, it
should consider which specific problems with respect to DNDO it
is trying to fix, as DNDO will be the largest part of the new
CBRNE unit. Within the context of these cautions, I'd like to
highlight three specific points regarding the specific
reorganization plan presented by the administration.
The first is at the bureaucratic level. The proposed
structure would place each of the functional units, nuclear,
chemical, biological, explosive, below an assistant secretary.
This would mean that the head of all nuclear functions would no
longer have a direct link to the Secretary and would become the
equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary or an office head.
This structure has the potential to diminish rather than to
strengthen the role of DNDO.
For example, when I started at DNDO, one of the main
Congressional criticisms was that the organization had not been
able to create a Government-wide strategic plan for the global
nuclear detection architecture. Within 3 months we were able to
create such a plan. The plan reflected the hard work, insights,
dedication, and diplomatic skills of the DNDO's many employees.
However, it is clear to me that this could not have been done
if it had not been for my ability to reach out to assistant
secretaries in other agencies as an equal partner and to have a
direct line to the Secretary to call upon when there were
problems.
My second specific comment relates to the functions of the
new office. DNDO has a narrowly-defined function, nuclear
detection and nuclear forensics. This allows the office to do
what it does well. The DHS plan suggests that the new office
would address a much broader span of nuclear topics. The
subcommittee should recognize that this would have a
fundamental and transformative effect on DNDO.
My final point relates to this change in scope. The DHS
plan notes that the expansion in DNDO's mission would be
accomplished by the inclusion of CBRNE policy and operational
support personnel within the new CBRNE unit. The shift in
personnel into the new nuclear organization appears quite
small, perhaps a few people. It in no way reflects a
fundamental shift in the scope of the organization. I urge that
the actual scope of the new office be clear, carefully
considered, and related to the manpower it needs for each of
the new areas to be included in DNDO's mandate.
In conclusion, I would once again like to thank the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today, and to
emphasize that if a CBRNE organization is going to be created
in DHS, it should be created in a way that makes its
constituent parts stronger than they are today. I appreciate
your consideration of this issue, and am happy to answer any
questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Warren Stern
June 14, 2015
Good afternoon Chairman Ratcliffe, Chairman McSally, Ranking Member
Richmond, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I am pleased to testify today about the Department of
Homeland Security's plan to establish a central headquarters office
responsible for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
explosives (CBRNE) threats.
I am currently senior advisor and R&D manager at Brookhaven
National Laboratory. However, I am not here today as a Brookhaven
employee or representative of Brookhaven or the Department of Energy.
Rather, I am here as an individual, to provide testimony based on my
experience in this field. The views I express today are my own.
Furthermore, I am not being reimbursed by my employer for the time or
expense incurred by this testimony.
From 2010 through 2012, I was the director of DHS's Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office. This is the office that would comprise the
largest part of the new CBRNE office being considered by the
subcommittees. I have worked in other related U.S. Government positions
over a 25-year career and have been part of several Government
reorganizations. I draw my insights from these experiences.
At the outset, I would like to be clear that, in general, I favor
the creation of a strong WMD organization within DHS. DHS focuses its
efforts on threats that manifest themselves frequently. WMD threats,
which are exceedingly infrequent, can easily be forgotten in the day-
to-day work of Government agencies. A strong organization focused on
the work necessary to prevent and respond to events of very low
frequency but very high consequence is necessary to prevent a terrorist
attack using WMD.
I believe that a reorganization of the scale and scope being
considered by the subcommittees would be significantly disruptive to
the work of those involved. This is not unique to DHS. It is simply
what happens during any large-scale reorganization. There are winners
and losers; civil servants and others will spend time wondering what
will happen to them and debating the details of the new structure. A
reorganization such as this will set the organization back for a time
as the new structure transitions.
This does not mean that reorganizations should not be pursued; it
simply means that such reorganizations should only be pursued if the
benefits outweigh the costs, if there is a clear objective, and if
Congress and the administration have the willingness and ability to
devote the resources needed to ensure the objective will be met.
DNDO and OHA are two of the smallest components in DHS, and some
have argued that the two should be consolidated to make a more
streamlined structure at DHS. In my opinion, the Secretary's office
does have too many direct reports. However, because of the costs
involved in reorganization, reorganization should not be pursued simply
to make a cleaner organization chart.
Some assert that reorganization should be pursued to reduce costs.
However, while DNDO and OHA work cooperatively when there is a common
issue, the missions of DNDO and OHA are very different. Nuclear
detection and monitoring and response to biological threats are
distinct disciplines. While there may be small administrative savings
in combining the two, it is hard for me to imagine that the benefits
would be significant enough to justify the costs of reorganization. If
reorganization is going to be done, it should be done well and done for
the right reason: To make a substantially stronger organization.
DNDO is a unique interagency organization, as it is focused on two
main areas of nuclear terrorism prevention: Nuclear detection and
nuclear forensics. DNDO works with Federal, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, international, and private-sector partners to fulfill its
mission. It works in coordination with partners from across the U.S.
Government (USG), including DHS components, the Departments of Energy
(DOE), State (DOS), Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), the intelligence
community, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
DNDO develops the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and
implements the domestic component of the architecture. DNDO also works
with its partners to coordinate interagency efforts to develop
technical nuclear detection capabilities, measure detector system
performance, ensure effective response to detection alarms, integrate
USG nuclear forensics efforts, and conduct transformational research
and development for advanced detection and forensics technologies. DNDO
is charged with being the primary Government entity to develop,
acquire, and support the deployment of an enhanced domestic system to
detect and report on attempts to import, possess, store, transport, or
use a nuclear explosive device or unauthorized radiological material in
the United States.
While DNDO has had difficult periods in its relationship with
Congress, primarily surrounding the work related to the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) and its lack of a strategic plan, I believe
that when I left DNDO, Congress was generally pleased with and
supportive of its work. I also believe that, under its current
leadership, this is still true. As such, as Congress considers any
reorganization plan, it should consider what specific problem with
respect to DNDO it is trying to fix, as DNDO will be the largest part
of the new CBRNE unit.
Within the context of the above cautions, I would like to highlight
three specific issues on the reorganization plan presented in the ``DHS
Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Functions Report.''
The first is the bureaucratic level of the CBRNE office and its
units. The proposed structure would place each of the functional units
(nuclear, chemical, biological) below an assistant secretary who would
be responsible for all of the units and overall CBRNE policy. This
would mean that the head of all nuclear functions would no longer have
a direct link to the Secretary and deputy secretary and would become
the equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary. Presumably, managers
below the new nuclear head would become the equivalent of office
directors or team leaders.
This structure has the potential to diminish rather than strengthen
the function of DNDO. Interagency relationships are at the heart of
DNDO's work. Stepping down the level of the director and those below
her could impact the effectiveness and efficiency of DNDO.
For example, when I started at DNDO, one of the main Congressional
criticisms of DNDO was that the organization had not been able to
create a Government-wide strategic plan for the GNDA, despite a strong
recommendation from Congress to do so. I agreed with Congress that such
a plan was necessary and was determined to create such a plan. Creating
any plan across the five or six relevant Departments with overlapping
responsibilities is an extremely complex task, and my first step was to
appeal to my counterparts in the other agencies to personally ask for
their help in creating this strategic plan. I asked each of my
counterparts at the assistant secretary to show flexibility and
consider overriding obstruction by lower-level officials in their
organizations if necessary. My next step was to explain to the
Secretary and deputy secretary that I needed their help managing the
interagency and, more importantly, in managing the larger components
within DHS.
Within 3 months, we were able to create the first GNDA strategic
plan and deliver it to Congress with concurrence and input from the
White House and all relevant agencies. To be clear, the plan reflected
the hard work, insights, dedication and diplomatic skills of DNDO's
many talented employees. However, it is also clear to me that this
could not have been done if I had not been able to reach directly out
to my interagency counterparts at the assistant secretary level to
resolve problems and directly leverage the Secretary's office.
My second specific comment relates to the function of the new
office. As I mentioned earlier, DNDO has a narrowly-defined function--
nuclear detection and forensics--and that limitedness has both positive
and negative elements. On the positive side, it allows the office to do
what it does well. There are several places in the Government that work
on nuclear detection, but no other agency or department covers the
detection field so comprehensively or competently, from R&D and testing
to acquisition and architecture.
On the other hand, detection and forensics is only a slice of U.S.
efforts to prevent a nuclear or radiological terrorism. The DHS plan
suggests that the new structure offers the opportunity for the nuclear
office to more robustly address the span of nuclear topics, to include
prevention, protection, response, mitigation, or recovery. The
subcommittee should recognize this relatively small part of DHS's plan
could have a fundamental and transformative effect on the work of DNDO.
My final point is related to the change in scope. The DHS plan
notes that the expansion in DNDO's mission would be accomplished in two
ways: By inclusion of CBRNE policy and operational support personnel
within the new CBRNE office and by establishing strong linkages between
the CBRNE office and a new DHS Joint Requirements Joint Operational
Plans Process. To me, this seems wholly inadequate given the potential
scope of the new organization. The shift in personnel into the new
nuclear organization appears quite small, perhaps a few people, and it
in no way reflects the fundamental shift in scope of the organization.
Indeed, even with the shift, important elements of the CBRNE
mission will remain in other parts of DHS. For example, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and National Protection and Programs
Directorate (NPPD) will retain key nuclear missions and personnel that
appear to be within the new scope of the nuclear part of the new CBRNE
office. I urge that the actual scope of the new office be clear,
carefully considered, and related to manpower needs for each of the new
areas to be included in DNDO's new mandate, which could be substantial.
In conclusion, I would once again like to thank the subcommittees
for the opportunity to testify today and to emphasize that if a CBRN
organization is going to be created in DHS, it should be created in a
way that makes its constituents--in particular DNDO--stronger than they
are today. I appreciate your careful consideration of this issue and am
happy to answer any questions.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank you, Mr. Stern.
I'd now like to recognize the gentlelady from Arizona,
Congresswoman McSally for 5 minutes.
Ms. McSally. Thank you, gentlemen. I really appreciate your
testimony today and your experience as outsiders but also
former insiders, in some cases, on what's the best way for us
to be combatting these threats. I agree with you, I spent 26
years in the military, I said this to the last panel, I've
reorganized for reorganizing sake or been a part of those in
the past. Managing change is something that is, you know,
sometimes doesn't end up with a better result. So, I mean, I
appreciate your perspectives on that, Mr. Cohn, and, Mr. Stern,
especially your comments on that.
So can we talk a little bit more about that? Just elaborate
a little bit on your perspectives of how you think this change
would be managed. I hear you say it needs to happen, and so how
do you think it would be managed so it is for the good and it
isn't like a bureaucracy that then resists the change and ends
up less capable to actually address the issue that we were
trying to do because bureaucracies have an ability to resist
change.
So just wondering about your perspectives, and also, Mr.
Stern, having been there on if this is, you know, the right
thing to do, how that should be managed so that we don't have a
dip. Because sometimes there's a dipping capability as you're
moving to a new order, and what you think we can learn from
your insights on how to do it well if it goes into force?
Mr. Cohn. So I think the most important thing in any
organization, whether you're leading as it is or reorganizing
it is a clear sense of mission, strong leadership who are
empowered to carry out that mission, and a workforce that
clearly understands what is expected of it in that new
organization.
So I think that the most important pieces--and so in this
way I agree with Warren that the reorganization should not be
undertaken for reorganization's sakes. But the Department has
set out some key reasons why the reorganization needs to take
place. People within the Department and outside the Department
need to know where they go for this source of expertise, people
within and outside of the Department, and that may be its
operating components down to the individual CBP Officers or
others, as Ranking Member Richmond has mentioned. Whether that
is State and local officials from Texas or Arizona or Louisiana
or wherever they are, or from the Federal interagency to be
able to have one place to go. As was pointed out, that there is
one official who is accountable for making decisions based on
risk across these entities.
So I think that it's imperative in this reorganization, and
Congress has the opportunity to clearly set the mission,
clearly set the authorities, and clearly direct the new office
in a task to carry out the Department's National and overall
responsibilities in an integrated way.
Ms. McSally. Mr. Stern, you got any perspective?
Mr. Stern. Yeah. So I think the most important thing,
assuming a transition is going to occur, is to ensure that the
objectives which Mr. Cohn mentioned are linked to the means.
That it's clear to the individuals involved how this change
relates to those objectives.
So, for example, if the objective is to strengthen the
organization, then presumably there should be an elaboration of
how this strengthens the organization and how the individuals
in the existing units fit into that strengthened organization,
and although the administration or the DHS plan is not very
detailed, understandably at this point, I think at some point
before Congress approves of this it should be well explained
and it should be explained to the staff.
The other thing that I would suggest in order to ensure
that it's not too disruptive is to ensure that in DNDO's case
that it moves as a unit. For example, I think there's been
discussion of moving the R&D part of DNDO, and that was in play
when I was director also, and I fought strongly against it.
DNDO acts as a unit and acts together and is structured that
way, and the objective would be to minimize that transition in
the creation of this new organization.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. I heard you talking about, and
I totally agree, if people don't know who to call, if there's
not one place or somebody who's responsible at the right level,
then that can be confusing both within the Department and the
interagency and then with us. But having an assistant secretary
as an answer, we're marking up a bill later this week to create
potentially another assistant secretary about countering
violent extremism.
So how many direct reports--or how many assistant
secretaries will there be when we're done with this, and is
there a down side as we try and elevate those many different
missions that it--you know, that we have too many chiefs and
not enough Indians, so to speak, you know, just to use that
example.
Mr. Cohn. My experience in the Department is that when an
office like this is created, it's not at the diminution of the
sub offices that are incorporated, but rather when you have
heads of individual offices all reporting to the Secretary, it
diminishes the impact that any one of them has. So in this case
you are taking two direct reports and pieces of other entities
and combining them into a single organization with a single
leader at a level of stature who can then have the level of
impact directly with the Secretary, the deputy secretary, and
the Department's leadership that you would want for this
function.
Ms. McSally. Great. Thanks. My time's expired. Thanks, Mr.
Chairman, for yielding to me so I can go to the floor and talk
about National security. Another important issue.
Mr. Ratcliffe. I thank the gentlelady for yielding back,
and the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. I guess I'll start with Mr. Stern, because I
think you touched on it a little bit, and then as Mr. Nelson
and Mr. Cohn want to chime in, you're more than welcome.
I'm trying to get a feel for what extent you think the
proposed consolidation represents a departure from existing
technologies acquisition review processes for each office or
component. Let me give you an example. Would you recommend that
the newly-minted assistant secretary scrutinize current
activities and re-assess or re-prioritize their relevance or
need? Second, how would you form a CBRNE office? Feel free to
take a minute to expand on a your thoughts too.
Mr. Stern. Yeah, thank you. Following in answering this
question and following on the last answer, the consolidation
within DHS and removing direct reports from the Secretary
doesn't necessarily require the diminution of the directors
below the assistant secretary level. So now you'll have an
assistant secretary and/or some perhaps under secretary with
several independent yet cooperative elements below it.
It doesn't fundamentally affect the way acquisition is
done, although it provides the opportunity for joint
acquisitions between the different components within this new
CBRNE unit. So it has the potential to improve acquisition
processes, but that can't be taken as a foregone conclusion.
Mr. Nelson. To the earlier point as well, we could make it
an under secretary as well. I think the Department's probably
short two under secretaries to begin with, and raise them up.
Again, not all departments are going to be equal either. All
assistant secretaries wherever we are regarding Government
aren't weighed.
But as far as the acquisition, I think having that one
individual that is responsible for these complex--technically
complex acquisition programs, having that charter is critically
important. Right now, as I said in my comments, the acquisition
in the R&D is so fragmented throughout the Department and
agency, and with these programs moving through the system and
exchanging hands, there's really no one to go to and say: Okay.
Who is ultimately responsible for X, Y, and Z, and who's
following it through? That's what that under secretary--
assistant secretary is going to give you, the single belly
button that is oversight inside the Department and oversight to
you here in Congress.
Mr. Cohn. I think that this is a departure from the way
that the Department is currently operating, and that is for the
better. I think it is an opportunity to combine the best of
what you heard from each of the three panelists on the first
panel.
No reorganization, as Mr. Nelson said, change--or Mr. Stern
said--changes acquisition oversight or other things
automatically. It simply sets the conditions for that. But this
type of integration allows you to take that focus that Dr.
Gowadia spoke of and expand it across the CBRNE space.
It allows you to take the risk-oriented approach that Dr.
Brinsfield noted, invest the assistant secretary with the
ability to look across this portfolio and make decisions based
on risk in consultation with and in service to, the Department
and its external stakeholders. It gives the assistant secretary
in the office the opportunity to take that integrated view that
Dr. Brothers said was so important, especially when you're
dealing with technical subjects.
Mr. Richmond. As they embark on this creation and, really,
the goal of getting unity of effort, and you talk about focus,
what would your advice be in terms of the maybe not so obvious
but pitfalls that may be in there or unintended consequences
that you would want to give just a heads-up that they should
look for? We can start in same order. Fine with me.
Mr. Nelson. Sorry. I apologize for interrupting. I would
say, somebody's mentioned it, but this is critical, again,
having spent 20 years in Government, you have to merge them. It
can't just be reorganization on a piece of paper. It has to be
a full integration, and, as Alan pointed out, a very clear
charter, that there can't have been DNDO inside this
organization and OHA inside this organization. It has to be a
blending, a full blending, of the organization. That's probably
the biggest pitfall.
Mr. Stern. I would say the biggest pitfall is not
adequately defining the function of the new organization that
is--in the administration plan, it suggests that this new
nuclear unit will be doing a lot more than DNDO currently is
doing. The nuclear security field is vast, and nuclear
detection and nuclear forensics, which are narrowly what DNDO
does, are a small part of that, and they do it well. But if
that's going to be broadened, then that should be done
intentionally with the resources devoted to the new areas of
consideration.
Mr. Cohn. I think the other point I would add to those
points, and it's as you pointed out, there are dedicated
employees across the Department of Homeland Security. Whenever
there's a reorganization, clear direction should be given and
the leaders have to lead. Leaders have to lead in the direction
of the mission as it is set forth because that is what's owed
to the employees of the Department.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Thank the gentleman. I yield myself as much
time as I may consume.
I'd like to start with an issue that we discussed with the
prior panel. You all were present in the room and were able to
hear the testimony talking about DNDO functioning well, and one
of the reasons given for that success was the ability of DNDO
to achieve end-to-end solutions in part because the research
and development component was contained therein.
I asked a question of Dr. Brothers about the reorganization
and the fact that, as it's proposed, the chem/bio research and
development would not transfer. His response to that question
was essentially different models work well. I want to start
with your perspective on that, whether or not you agree with
that?
Mr. Cohn. I'll start with that. I do think that, as I said
in my testimony, there are different models at play here. They
have succeeded in some ways. They have failed in others. I
think actually that both Mr. Stern and Dr. Gowadia underplay
their own role in the success of DNDO. DNDO has been very well
led in the past several years, and that has contributed
substantially to its success. Because DNDO was organized in the
same way since its inception and had significant failures at
that point as well.
I think in this instance I wish there was an answer to give
to this committee where the work had been done and to be able
to say model A is correct or model B is correct. I don't
believe that it is right to have multiple models running
simultaneously. I do not know which of those models is the best
for the Department. But I do believe--and I believe that this
opportunity gives Congress the chance to mandate and the
Department to carry out an examination, both itself and with an
outside independent entity that knows how these different
models work in the Department, in other Federal agencies, in
private-sector organizations and determine which is the best
model for the Department.
Because mixed multiple models in different areas I think is
more of a reflection of the desires of the individuals now than
what is the most durable solution over time.
Mr. Nelson. I agree with what Alan is saying. I don't think
you can have this mixed model. I also think that one of the
reasons why you've had such success at DNDO is because you have
that tail to nose entire system in process, in place. Alan and
I were talking earlier. You know, the original intention of the
Department was to have a WMD office that has S&T focus when it
was originally thought of, and instead we ended up with an S&T
department with a WMD sub-focus.
So we now find ourselves trending back to the original
model that was conceived by the people that thought about this
originally. So I would like to see those R&D efforts moved over
into this entity. I think it is such a critical issue, and the
understanding of the topic is so technical that it has to be
placed under the experts to understand its information.
Mr. Stern. Thank you. Well, nuclear detection and, for
example, biological response, are very different beasts, even
in concept. For example, in the area of nuclear detection,
we're trying to detect things before they're released. Most of
what in the bio world they consider prevention they're actually
calling prevention for things in the nuclear world we would
call response.
So they're already different concepts. In that context, I
guess I really wouldn't have a problem with two different
approaches to development existing in the same organization. I
do know, however, that for DNDO the integrated model is the
right one. When I first started 5 years ago, there was, in
fact, a push in legislation to take the R&D portion out of
DNDO. I felt then and I feel now it's the wrong approach
because it's very, very difficult to separate R&D from testing
to acquisition in the overall--in the global architecture that
DNDO is in charge of.
So I know that the existing approach is the right one for
DNDO. I don't necessarily know if it's right or wrong for the
bio and chem world, but I don't know that they necessarily have
to have the right--the same approach just to be a little bit--
make a slightly separate concept.
One way to resolve this is to put this all including R&D
under one big under secretary, the under secretary of science
and technology, and turn that into a weapons of mass
destruction unit.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Terrific. Thank you. Mr. Cohn, as you know
and as you just mentioned, both DNDO and OHA have had major
acquisition failures in the past, and those acquisition
failures have, frankly, cost taxpayers millions of dollars. I
assume that you think that the current structure of the CBRNE
components contributed to that problem.
But do you think--is it your opinion that this new CBRN or
CBRNE office will address those types of failures in the
future?
Mr. Cohn. I think that office as proposed poses a better
chance of preventing those failures than the current model. As
Dr. Brothers and others mentioned during the first panel,
Secretary Johnson has embarked on the strengthening the
departmental Unity of Effort Initiative which includes
implementing a virtual management system within the Department
and empowering the Department's leadership. It's a more
closely-examined major program execution and major acquisitions
through strategy, joint requirements, programming, and
budgeting, and major acquisition oversight.
Creating an assistant secretary who has full scope
responsibilities across CBRNE issues, placing that individual
into the leadership and really empowering that individual to
speak definitively, on the one hand, in those fora, and to
engage with the heads of the operational components and with
the external stakeholders who, as was mentioned, are the source
of the requirements, and who will be the end-users of what is
developed, I think gives a better chance of creating success in
acquisition oversight and not wasting--not leading to the same
program cancellations and terminations that we've seen than the
current model.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Terrific. Thank you, Mr. Cohn.
Mr. Nelson, given your experience in the field and in the
interagency, I just want to make sure I have your testimony
very clearly on how the current CBRNE structure negatively
affects DHS's role and stature within the interagency.
To that point, I'd like you to speak to the importance of
DHS having a strong focal point for interagency collaboration.
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's critically
important. You know, as I said in my written testimony, today
there are very few single agency problems, in there are even
fewer single agency solutions. So interagency coordination with
Federal, and with State and local, is critically important. On
the very basic end, you have to be able to--if I have a
question who do I call, who do I pick up the phone and call at
what point in that process? Right now it's so fragmented in the
industry, in DHS, you don't know where it is on the S&T side,
or whether it's with DNDO or with OHA. That makes it
extraordinarily difficult.
Moreover, when you're talking about interagency
coordination, whether it's a meeting at the White House or any
other interagency meeting, you usually get one seat at the
table per department. Those individuals need to be able to
speak for the whole of the issue. It's not convenient and
useful to inject subject-matter experts for every single policy
meeting. You have to have people that can go into those
meetings that are aware of the full breadth of what is going on
inside the Department.
Right now there isn't a cadre of individuals inside DHS
that can represent the Department in meetings regarding WMD
issues at large. They have to determine what the subject is and
then pull those individuals in.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Okay. Thank you. So, Mr. Stern, let me
follow up with you in that regard. Because in your testimony,
one of the things you--to quote you, you said that the proposed
structure, ``has the potential to diminish rather than
strengthen the function of DNDO.''
I'm wondering whether you think that the way this creating
an office with the assistant secretary sort-of better evaluates
the importance of the mission and gives DHS CBRNE programs a
better stature and voice within the interagency?
Mr. Stern. Yeah. So after 25 years of working, actually
more, in the interagency, most WMD-related important meetings
aren't WMD at large. They're nuclear, biological, chemical,
separate. So if the nuclear part of DHS is what would in the
new structure be a deputy assistant secretary or an office
director, that individual might not even be invited to some of
these meetings.
So, yeah, I believe that in order to maintain, if not
strengthen the role of nuclear in the DHS's structure, in fact,
the individual in charge needs to be elevated, not diminished,
in his or her role. It may sound overly bureaucratic, but
having, again, worked for many years in interagency, there's a
big difference between an office director and an assistant
secretary and what that individual can get done.
Mr. Ratcliffe. Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. I
know I speak on behalf of everyone that your testimony's been
very valuable. Obviously a number of the subcommittee Members
weren't able to return after votes, but Members of the
subcommittee will likely have some additional questions for you
since they weren't able to return, that we would ask you to
respond to those in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will
remain open for a period of 10 days. Without objection, the
subcommittees now stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for the Department of
Homeland Security
Question 1. It has been observed that there are CBRNE functions
from across the Department--from FEMA to NPPD--that are not included in
the proposed realignment. How did the Department decide to include
certain activities but not others in the reorganization proposal?
Answer. The proposed reorganization of the Department's chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) functions is
intended to focus headquarters offices on the principal objectives of
the Unity of Effort initiative, including integrating the broad and
complex Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission space and
empowering DHS components to effectively execute their operations.
Other CBRNE functions exist within the Department, including those at
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Alignment of the Department's headquarters CBRNE-
related support programs and activities will strengthen DHS operational
activities. Since this was a reorganization of headquarters' functions
to create a mission support office and to minimize disruption of
operations, we did not consider programs and efforts currently executed
by the above-mentioned operational components.
Question 2a. The Department does not anticipate any cost savings
from reorganization, but there is potential for new costs to be
incurred.
For example, would the over 200 employees of the new CBRNE Defense
Office be co-located at some point in the future?
Question 2b. What other costs could result from the proposed CBRNE
Defense Office?
Answer. The Department intends to undertake major movements of
personnel associated with the proposed CBRNE reorganization in concert
with the expiration of current office leases. Physical consolidation of
the new CBRNE office may occur as early as 2018, pending approval of
requested funding for DHS Headquarters moves to the St. Elizabeths
Complex.
The Department is committed to responsibly identifying ways to
reduce its overhead costs, as exemplified by the new facilities
consolidation pilots being undertaken in the Seattle and Boston areas,
in order to ensure we make every dollar available to directly enable
operations in the field. DHS will consider the new CBRNE Office, along
with other DHS headquarters offices, as we explore other efficiencies
proposals.
Question 3. Dr. Brinsfield, as DHS plans to expand the scope of its
biosurveillance capability, what impact will this have on
prioritization and investment decisions across the biosurveillance
enterprise for the core biosurveillance functions called for in the
National Strategy for Biosurveillance?
Answer. DHS is committed to countering biological threats and
hazards and implementing the National Strategy for Biosurveillance. The
2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review included biological
threats and hazards as a top homeland security risk. Since the
Department's biosurveillance activities are performed by the OHA, which
is being brought into the new CBRNE entity in its entirety, the
reorganization will not have an immediate effect on biosurveillance. In
the longer run, bringing the Department's biological risk assessment
activities within the CBRNE entity should improve our ability to ensure
that our biosurveillance efforts are optimally informed about the
evolving nature of biological risks and hazards. However, these efforts
will also be informed by CBRNE-related projects and expertise remaining
in the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate and other parts of DHS,
and maintaining the close working relationships between the CBRNE
entity and the rest of the Department will be necessary to optimally
inform biosurveillance and other activities.
This CBRNE reorganization is focused on making smart choices in
consolidating DHS headquarters functions to address threats. The goal
is not to change the scope of our biosurveillance capability but rather
to be better able to adapt and adjust to threats as they evolve.
Further, the reorganization will help amplify existing efforts by
looking across the entire space to find the gaps and work together to
address them.
Question 4. Dr. Brinsfield, this year, the Office of Health Affairs
Chemical Defense Program conducted a Chemical Demonstration Project in
Baltimore, Maryland. Within the next year, the Demonstration Project
will be expanded to four new cities.
How will the Department ensure that on-going activities, such as
the Chemical Demonstration Project, are not interrupted?
Answer. Since the Chemical Demonstration Project is conducted by
the OHA, which is being brought into the new CBRNE entity in its
entirety, the reorganization will not have an immediate effect on this
program. Rather, this reorganization is intended to integrate the broad
and complex DHS mission space and empower DHS components to more
effectively execute their operations. The Chemical Defense Program will
continue to pursue its projects and provide invaluable insight and
expertise to DHS senior leaders, the Federal Government, and State and
local communities. OHA chemical demonstration projects are currently
underway in four cities: Houston, TX; Boise, ID; New Orleans, LA, and
Nassau County, NY. These four cities were chosen through a competitive
selection process evaluating their chemical threat risk (city and
venue) and community interest and goals to improve chemical incident
preparedness. I can assure you that, as a critical portion of our
chemical defense portfolio, the demonstration projects will not be
interrupted due to the forming of the new CBRNE office. It is our
intent through the consolidation of the CBRNE missions to increase
awareness of the Chemical Defense Program.
The demonstration projects focus on improving information flow,
enhancing decision making and aligning resources to optimize emergency
response. At the completion of all the demonstration projects, OHA will
have examined in detail where the leverage points within the emergency
response system exist and will have identified where specific solutions
can address the greatest challenges, limitations, and gaps each
community faces. Our analysis is intended to lead to the delivery of a
set of preparedness tools, shared best practices, and guidance for
comprehensive community preparedness to a large-scale chemical
incident.
Question 5. Dr. Brinsfield, does the Department anticipate that the
consolidation would have an effect on the mission of the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center?
Answer. Since the National Biosurveillance Integration Center is
located within the OHA, which is being brought into the new CBRNE
entity in its entirety, the reorganization will not have an immediate
effect on its operations or mission. Rather, this reorganization is
intended to integrate the broad and complex DHS mission space and
empower DHS components to effectively execute their operations. OHA's
programs, including the National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC), will continue within the new CBRNE organization. In meeting its
mission to integrate information about threats to human, animal, plant,
and environmental health, NBIC already shares information with its
partners regarding a variety of CBRNE and emerging infectious disease
threat sources which will continue and complement the activities of the
new organization. For example, past reporting has occurred during
nuclear power plant disasters, chemical spills, natural disasters, and
novel disease outbreaks such as Ebola. NBIC frequently taps into the
subject-matter expertise resident within OHA to field a range of
requests from its stakeholders. This reach-back capability will only be
strengthened within the new structure as NBIC will have more ready
access to the considerable radiological, nuclear, and explosive SMEs
consolidated in the new organization. The Department sees the
reorganization as an opportunity to capitalize on the concentration of
CBRNE expertise to enhance the mission of NBIC.
Question 6. Dr. Brinsfield, the current BioWatch system has been in
the field for over a decade and the National Academies and the GAO have
raised questions on the value this type of biosurveillance adds across
the broader threat arena. What impact will expanding the scope of DHS's
traditional biosurveillance efforts have on the BioWatch program?
Answer. DHS is committed to countering biological threats and
hazards. The 2014 DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review included
biological threats and hazards as a top homeland security risk. The
BioWatch Program is the only early warning system for aerosolized
biological threats and is a key element of DHS's strategy to manage
biological risk, per the 2014 QHSR. BioWatch helps build the
preparedness of local jurisdictions in case of a biological attack,
informing and equipping decision makers at the local, State, and
Federal levels with the information they need to make decisions that
can save lives and mitigate damage. The goal of this CBRNE
reorganization is not to change the scope of our biosurveillance
efforts or the role for BioWatch, per se, but rather to be better able
to adapt and adjust to threats as they evolve. BioWatch will benefit
from the enhanced coordination, as will all of OHA's programs. In
addition, the Secretary identified BioWatch as the DHS Program of
Record for biosurveillance and directed that the technology used in the
BioWatch Program be updated. Consistent with the Secretary's decision,
the OHA BioWatch Program is actively working with DHS S&T, our Federal
partners and partners at the State and local level to identify new and
better technologies and field them as soon as possible.
The use of biodetection, while complementary with surveillance,
provides certain advantages over medical surveillance alone. Medical
surveillance detects the presence of disease in the population after
people become symptomatic. Biodetection detects the presence of a
potential attack prior to the population becoming symptomatic and
allows for the dispensing of antibiotics before symptoms appear, making
for a more efficient response. These benefits of biodetection were
reinforced by an independent analysis conducted by both the Institute
for Defense Analyses in 2013 and Sandia National Laboratory in 2012. In
addition, the environmental surveillance provided by BioWatch provides
more precise information on timing, specific location and the type of
agent used in an attack.
Question 7. If Congress were to approve the reorganization
proposal, what specific steps would the Department take to limit the
negative impact on employee morale?
Answer. The morale of our employees is a priority for the
Department. The deputy secretary is undertaking a number of initiatives
to find innovative ways to engage employees, share employee ideas, and
address concerns regarding transparency in hiring, promotion, and
training opportunities. These principles will be practiced within the
new CBRNE office. Specifically, the Department will engage employees
and provide avenues for information sharing and feedback between
leadership and staff throughout the reorganization process. The
Department will develop a change management and communications plan to
help make the process as smooth as possible for all employees.
Open communication throughout the included organizations and two-
way information forums will reduce the negative impact on morale.
Effective change management will be important as this reorganization
takes place, and we have been keeping our employees apprised and
engaged in the process. We are committed to helping our employees
achieve our mission through this new organization, and we will continue
to support them and help them in moving the mission forward.
Question 8. Two years into the realignment, what should this
committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was
a success?
Answer. The new CBRNE office should be judged on how well the
Department's CBRNE policies, strategies, plans, budgets, acquisitions,
and other activities are synchronized across the breadth of DHS
stakeholders and how they are driving improved operational results. We
will not be judging the new organization solely by the publication of
new guidance documents. Rather, we will assess the effectiveness of the
new CBRNE Office, as we do with other elements of DHS, on the success
of: CBRNE capability requirements development; sustainable investment
in CBRNE-related capabilities; CBRNE acquisition program health; CBRNE
operational plan development and exercises; and ultimately, our
response effectiveness to CBRNE threats and incidents, whether
naturally-occurring or man-made.
Question 9. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears
a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and
nuclear activities, but S&T will keep researching chemical and
biological technologies.
Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to
further align CBRNE R&D functions?
Answer. The Department does not have future plans to further align
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives Research
and Development (R&D) functions. One of the driving principles for this
reorganization has been to ``preserve programs and activities that are
currently working.'' Therefore, the proposed structure for R&D seeks to
minimize the disruption to CBRNE R&D activities. Due to the current
synergies between chemical and biological R&D within S&T and the
facilities at which the work is conducted, the R&D function will not
transfer to the CBRNE Office. The CBRNE office would provide
requirements and work closely with S&T for the needed chemical and
biological R&D for the office. Radiological and nuclear R&D, which is
currently performed extremely effectively in DNDO, would move to the
new CBRNE office and continue to receive R&D requirements from the DHS
operating components.
Question 10a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization
would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have
with stakeholder groups.
Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision
sustaining relations with stakeholder groups?
Question 10b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined
that the BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat
picture and decide to nix the program, how would the Department go
about sustaining its partnerships with the State and local public
health officials who participated in BioWatch?
Question 10c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal
interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization?
Answer. OHA, S&T, and DNDO, and the other offices included in this
reorganization, will continue to provide the same level of support to
their Federal, State, and local stakeholders and will work to ensure
minimal disruption to their partners. One of the focus areas of the new
organization is to ensure strong coordination processes and procedures
both internally and with other Departmental and interagency partners to
advance the DHS CBRNE agenda through a single point of contact on CBRNE
issues. In this new structure, when an agency reaches out to DHS, we
will be coordinated and ready to work with their equivalent offices.
Similarly, when State, local, non-Governmental, and private partners
reach to DHS for help, we can assist them regardless of the issue, or
the changing nature of the threat they face.
The BioWatch Program is the only early warning system for
aerosolized biological threats and is a key element of DHS's strategy
to manage biological risk, per the 2014 QHSR. There are no plans to
cancel the BioWatch program. Further, the assistant secretary for CBRNE
would use strategic prioritization documents and Departmental review
processes when implementing the Department's priority programs. It
should be noted that a major strength of the BioWatch Program is the
interaction that it has at virtually all levels of Government. The
BioWatch Program is building preparedness by coordinating and/or
participating in 30-plus exercises/drills annually, creating guidance
documents, providing essential training and technical assistance to
stakeholders Nation-wide, and enabling a forum for Federal, State, and
local stakeholders to share all types of relevant data and information
during an act of bioterrorism. Also, the BioWatch Program has forged
strong ties at the Federal level, expanding cooperation and
strengthening ties with a number of agencies. This capability will be
maintained and further leveraged within the new CBRNE office.
Question From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Kathryn H. Brinsfield
Question. Biological threats like Ebola can cross our borders
without notice. An apparently healthy person that enters the United
States can become infectious within 21 days. Ebola is not the worst of
the highly infectious diseases--only an example of one of the
challenges of a biological early detection system. We have hoped for an
automated system that could detect chemical and perhaps biological
agents on a person through an early detection system. The experience of
the last year with Ebola raises questions about the role first
responders play in early detection and containment.
The focus of much of the work on detection and containment efforts
may focus on emerging infectious diseases, which can be defined as
those infectious diseases that have newly appeared in a population or
have existed but are rapidly increasing in incidence or geographic
range, or that are caused by one of the NIAID Category A, B, or C
priority pathogens.
Ebola is designated as a Category A infectious disease along with
anthrax, botulism, plague, and small pox. It is likely that should a
terrorist attack come in this form, it would likely be discovered after
people start to become ill.
Should we be more focused on training, equipment, and protocols for
first responders on the local and State level to better prepare for
biological threats?
Would a survey conducted by local health departments of hospitals
be helpful in learning how prepared they may be to address highly
infectious diseases that may arrive without notice?
Answer. The training, equipment, and protocols for first responders
are of primary importance for the Department. For example, in the past
year OHA has published two guidance documents for first responders in
collaboration with our interagency partners: Patient Decontamination in
a Mass Chemical Exposure Incident: National Planning Guidance for
Communities; and First Responder Guidance for Improving Survivability
in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and/or Active Shooter Incidents.
Past guidance has focused on protecting responders against the anthrax
threat. In addition to providing guidance, OHA is also developing a
pilot initiative to educate first responders about anthrax and offer
them voluntary access to the anthrax vaccine.
OHA collaborates with National emergency medical service (EMS)
organizations and Federal Government entities to help identify EMS
system needs and possible solutions and engages EMS stakeholders
Nation-wide to improve response coordination between jurisdictions and
agencies, across State lines, and with the Federal Government. Through
these collaborations, OHA contributed to interagency guidance on
personal protective equipment for first responders in response to the
Ebola threat; and worked with FEMA to make sure communities can use
their grant dollars to purchase personal protective equipment for non-
law enforcement personnel responding to Improvised Explosive Device
(IED) or active-shooter incidents. OHA also participates in the
Interagency Board, a group of emergency preparedness and response
practitioners who assist in the development and implementation of
performance criteria, standards, test protocols, and requirements for
all-hazards incident response equipment.
The BioWatch program works with State and local officials and
responders in jurisdictions across the country to develop clear and
detailed plans to respond to biological agent detection, and the NBIC
distributes reports on emerging and current biological threats to
approximately 1,500 State and local officials. We are also developing a
set of preparedness tools, shared best practices, and guidance for
comprehensive community preparedness to a large-scale chemical incident
through our chemical demonstration projects. We will continue to
prioritize supporting first responders, in coordination with our DHS
and interagency partners, to ensure they get the tools, resources, and
training they need to act as the Nation's first line of defense.
In the event of a National health threat/emergency the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response (ASPR) and HHS's Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) have substantial responsibilities. ASPR is the chief
advisor on public health and medical preparedness for and response to
emergencies. It maintains a database of hospitals and associated
resources, as well as other facilities capable of providing health
care; it also manages a program that can obtain near-real-time counts
of available beds under several bed categories. Among CDC's public
health responsibilities, specifically in the response to Ebola, were
designing the tiered health care system approach (front-line
facilities, assessment hospitals, and Ebola treatment centers),
deploying teams of experts to hospitals at the request of States, and
working with States and hospitals to identify any operational gaps and
recommend improvements. The CDC also issued Interim Guidance for
Preparing Frontline Healthcare Facilities for Patients Under
Investigation for Ebola Virus Disease.
Question From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Reginald Brothers
Question 1a. Dr. Brothers, historically, the Science and Technology
Directorate struggled to get its footing in the Department, but seems
to have made progress in recent years.
How does the Department plan to address the unavoidable employee
morale implications for workers impacted by the stripping of chem-bio
risk assessment responsibilities from S&T?
Answer. As stated previously, the morale of our employees is a
priority for the Department. The Deputy Secretary is undertaking a
number of initiatives to find innovative ways to engage employees,
share employee ideas, and address concerns regarding transparency in
hiring, promotion, and training opportunities. These principles will be
practiced within the new CBRNE office.
S&T's workforce is committed to the Department's missions and the
Secretary's Unity of Effort initiative. We anticipate minimal morale
impact, but S&T leadership is committed to open and transparent
communication with any affected staff to address concerns and mitigate
any negative perceptions. Open communication throughout the included
organizations and two-way information forums will also reduce the risk
to negative impact on morale. We are committed to helping our employees
achieve our mission through this new organization, and we will continue
to support them and help them achieve their goals moving forward.
S&T has initiated several broader morale initiatives which we
believe will also mitigate any potential negative effects. We have
established, for example, an Employee Council with several
subcommittees, all comprised of employees from a cross-section of the
S&T to develop solutions and improved procedures in key areas of our
business.
Question 1b. How will losing the risk assessment component of its
work affect S&T's chem-bio R&D responsibilities?
Answer. The Terrorism Risk Assessments and Biodefense Knowledge
Center are integrated elements of S&T's Chemical and Biological Defense
R&D portfolio and help inform projects dealing with emerging and future
threats. With the proposed move to a new CBRNE office, certain changes
and additional coordination will need to be made to ensure the
continued operation and success of the R&D portfolio. S&T would work
closely with the proposed CBRNE office to ensure that S&T's needs for
longer-term assessments are still met.
Question 1c. If DHS expanded its bio-surveillance capability, how
would it ensure its efforts do not duplicate those performed by other
agencies, such as the Departments of Health and Human Services,
Agriculture, the Interior, and the Environmental Protection Agency?
Answer. As stated previously, this CBRNE reorganization is focused
on making smart choices in consolidating DHS headquarters functions to
address threats. The goal is not to change the scope of our
biosurveillance capability, but rather to be better able to adapt and
adjust to threats as they evolve. The reorganization should not cause
any duplication of efforts performed by other agencies, and
biosurveillance activities will continue to be coordinated with other
Federal agencies through established mechanisms like working groups,
interagency policy committees, and requirements generation activities.
We believe the CBRNE office will help to strengthen and streamline
interagency relationships and collaboration to advance the DHS CBRNE
agenda, by creating one place in DHS headquarters where all Federal
agencies can go to find the right expertise on CBRNE-related issues.
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Reginald Brothers
Question 1. Dr. Brothers, the Science and Technology Office over
the course of its existence had difficulty developing a Federal
laboratory testing process that certifies technology for its ability to
perform as needed. You have an exceptional background in science and
technology which includes extensive experience in the management of DOD
laboratories.
What have you been able to do to improve the laboratory
accreditation and testing process?
Answer. S&T is responsible for research, development, testing, and
evaluation in DHS. To assist the under secretary in fulfilling
responsibilities for test and evaluation, the Secretary delegated
authorities to the director of operational test and evaluation (DOT&E).
The DOT&E has well-established procedures for supporting program
development of realistic operational tests. However, this type of
testing typically occurs late in the acquisition process, after initial
production has begun, in order to approve proceeding to full rate
production. It has been our observation that a key determinant of
successful acquisition is ensuring the program properly sets the
conditions to begin initial production. We continue to work with our
partners in the DHS management directorate and in DHS components to
improve early engagement and strengthen acquisition processes by
involving S&T in developmental testing and evaluation activities, and
providing systems engineering support for assessment of technical
risks. If you are interested in more information, we would be happy to
provide you or your staff a more in-depth briefing on the subject.
Question 2. Has the Office of Science and Technology been able to
compete for and recruit the top talent you need? If no, why not?
Answer. Human Resources S&T managers have used a variety of hiring
authorities to attract qualified applicants. For example, S&T makes
optimal use of Homeland Security Act of 2002 Section 307 to hire
eminent experts in science and engineering under the Administratively
Determined (AD) hiring authority, with 27 AD employees on-board now or
in the application pipeline. We also use the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act authority to augment our ability to obtain experts in
science and engineering for temporary appointments. S&T has also
utilized a host of short-term detail assignments, both reimbursable and
non-reimbursable, to be able to acquire individuals with specific
program-related skills and experience when needed.
Question 3. Is there something that the committee can do to improve
the ability of your office to identify technology needs and to inform
the committee on what innovations are needed but are not currently
available?
Answer. S&T appreciates that Congress has been supportive of the
organization and the need in the Department for wider use of better
technology. Through Unity of Effort-focused bodies like the Deputy's
Management Action Group and Joint Requirements Council, S&T has made
great strides to draw closer to the components and more effectively
identify and address their technology gaps and needs. New S&T efforts
underway such as the Targeted Innovation Technology Acceleration
Network (TITAN) along with enduring efforts such as the Centers of
Excellence are ensuring that S&T connects the Homeland Security
Enterprise to innovation communities in small businesses, at
universities, and elsewhere around the country and abroad. As S&T
continues to implement new and better ways to deliver innovative
solutions, we will also continue to work with Congress to keep Congress
informed of the progress we are making. If you, or your staff, are
interested in more information on S&T's vision for the future of the
organization, we would be happy to provide a more in-depth briefing on
the subject.
Questions From Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee for Huban A. Gowadia
Question 1. Dr. Gowadia the 18th Congressional District of Texas is
located in the city of Houston. Houston is the Nation's fourth-largest
city, and has one of the largest ports in the Nation, an international
airport and a complex State and inter-State highway system.
As you know, nuclear threats may involve taking radiological
materials that are used for beneficial medical or industrial purposes
such as fuel or spent fuel for a nuclear power plant, radiological
material used in diagnosis or treatment of patients, or industrial
material. The tracking and management of these materials would be of
importance to National, State, and local authorities.
Should the materials come under the control of terrorists could
they be combined with an explosive device?
Answer. If stolen or otherwise acquired radiological materials came
into the possession of a terrorist, it is possible they could be used
in an explosive radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a
``dirty bomb.''\1\ Such a bomb uses conventional explosive to disperse
radiological material.
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\1\ National Academies and U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Radiological Attack: Dirty Bombs and Other Devices. Washington, DC
(2004), 1. Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/publication/radiological-
attack-fact-sheet.
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Question 2. Could a weapon like this contaminate a large area while
also exposing people to immediate and long-term health risks?
Answer. It is extremely difficult to design a dirty bomb that would
deliver radiation doses high enough to cause acute radiation health
effects or fatalities in a large number of people. Near-term injuries
from a dirty bomb would primarily occur from the heat, debris and force
of the conventional explosion used to disperse the radioactive
material, affecting only individuals close to the site of the
explosion.\2\ In addition, however, a dirty bomb is expected to have
economic and behavioral health consequences. For example, radioactive
contamination from a dirty bomb could deny use of the area and
necessitate an expensive clean-up, thereby causing a disruption to
lives and commerce. It would also likely cause anxiety to those in the
immediate and surrounding areas who believe believed they had been
exposed to radiation.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
\3\ Ibid.
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The long-term health effect of exposure to radiation from a dirty
bomb is the elevated risk of developing cancer later in life,
commensurate with the level of radiation dose incurred, although the
risk is limited.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
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Question 3. What can be done to track the use and disposal of
radiological materials found in industrial, research, and medical
devices that could pose a threat if obtained by terrorists?
Answer. To monitor the use and disposal of radiological materials
found in industrial, research, and medical applications, the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) uses the National Source Tracking
System (NSTS), a secure web-based database that tracks Category 1 and 2
radioactive sources \5\ regulated by the NRC and the Agreement
States.\6\ NSTS tracks data spanning the life cycle of the source from
manufacture through shipment receipt, to decay, and burial. This system
fulfills the U.S. Government's commitment to implement a National
source registry, as described in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and
Security of Radioactive Sources, which the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) issued in January 2004.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ International Atomic Energy Agency, Categorization of
Radioactive Sources, Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.9 (2005).
\6\ Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement State Program, http://
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/state-tribal/agreement-states.html (June 30,
2015).
\7\ International Atomic Energy Agency, Code of Conduct on the
Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. Vienna, Austria. (2004) 6.
Retrieved from http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/code-
2004_web.pdf.
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Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Alan D. Cohn
Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization
proposal, what specific steps would the Department take to limit the
negative impact on employee morale?
Answer. Reorganization of DHS's headquarters CBRNE functions is an
opportunity to improve morale across the Department's CBRNE functions.
Employee morale is enhanced in any organization when:
Mission responsibility is clearly defined and matched with
appropriate authority;
The leadership structure is lean and sensible;
The organization's leaders are held accountable for
excellence and hold their subordinates accountable for
excellence;
The organization recruits, trains, and focuses on retaining
top talent, creates progressive opportunities for advancement
into either leadership or senior technical positions, and
ensures a robust interchange of personnel and information
between headquarters entities, the Department's operating
components, and the Department's external stakeholders.
Reorganization gives the Department and the leaders of the
Department's CBRNE functions the opportunities to implement or enhance
these elements.
Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this
committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was
a success?
Answer. The Department has put forward a set of goals for the
proposed consolidation of its CBRNE headquarters functions, which
provide the foundations for outcomes and metrics such as the following:
Provide Clear Roles and Responsibilities for DHS HQ and
Operating Components.--The Secretary has formally delegated
CBRNE-related authorities and designated CBRNE-related
responsibilities, and DHS headquarters offices and operating
components publicly identify and rely on the DHS CBRNE
headquarters office for those responsibilities assigned to the
CBRNE office.
Enable DHS to Formulate and Communicate Consistent
Departmental Positions on CBRNE Issues.--Department offices and
operating components, interagency partners, external
stakeholders, and Congress consistently identify the CBRNE
office as the source for consolidated, integrated, and sensible
CBRNE-related Departmental positions on CBRNE issues.
Provide DHS the Ability to Effectively Structure, Oversee,
and Execute Major CBRNE-Related Acquisitions.--The CBRNE
office, working with the relevant component Chief Acquisition
Executives, the DHS Management Directorate, the DHS Joint
Requirements Council and Investment Review Board, and the
Department's overall governance bodies (i.e. the Deputy's
Management Action Group and the Senior Leadership Council), has
ensured that all CBRNE-related programs on the DHS Major
Acquisition Oversight List are properly aligned to mission,
have clearly-defined joint requirements responsive to
operational needs, are funded at the levels specified in their
acquisition program baselines, and are performing at the level
anticipated in their program designs.
These or similar metrics can serve as effective proxies for the
success of the consolidated DHS headquarters CBRNE office.
Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears
a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and
nuclear activities, but S&T will keep researching chemical and
biological technologies.
Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to
further align CBRNE R&D functions?
Answer. As a private citizen, I do not know and cannot speculate on
whether the Department anticipates requesting future reorganizations of
the Department's CBRNE R&D functions. As discussed at the hearing, it
is difficult to say with certainty whether the current R&D model for
radiological and nuclear activities, the current R&D model for chemical
and biological activities, or a third model, is best-suited to ensuring
effective mission execution and guarding against the failure of major
systems acquisitions. However, this is an answerable question, and
Congress and the Department should actively seek that answer. For that
reason, Congress should mandate that the Department assess the
effectiveness of each of these models, and should mandate than an
independent study be conducted by an organization with familiarity with
these models as well as those of other Federal departments and agencies
and corporate entities. Congress can then revisit this last CBRNE-
related organizational question once both the Department and an
independent organization have completed their review.
Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization
would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have
with stakeholder groups.
Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision
sustaining relations with stakeholder groups?
Question 4b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined
that the BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat
picture and decide to nix the program, how would the Department go
about sustaining its partnerships with the State and local public
health officials who participated in BioWatch?
Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal
interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization?
Answer. As a private citizen, I do not know and cannot speculate
about the Department's plans for how a consolidated CBRNE organization
would interact with its partners and stakeholders. However,
consolidation of the Department's headquarters CBRNE functions provides
the opportunity to enhance the Department's relationships with those
partners and stakeholders. Consolidation of these functions allows the
Department to make decisions concerning its portfolio of CBRNE programs
and activities in a consolidated, integrated, and transparent way.
Consolidation also provides a single senior official with true
responsibility and authority across the Department's CBRNE headquarters
responsibility to serve as the senior point of contact for the
Department's partners and stakeholders, and the spokesperson for the
Department with respect to external partners and stakeholders. So, for
example, should the Department decide that a specific program--or
approach for executing a program--is no longer sound, the Department
would need to make such a decision and determine the best path forward
in conjunction with its interagency and non-Federal partners and
stakeholders. A single DHS headquarters CBRNE official, working
together with the Department's leadership and the Department operating
components that maintain the operational relationships with the
relevant partners and stakeholders, would better enable the Department
to enhance its stakeholder engagement in such a situation.
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Warren Stern
Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization
proposal, what specific steps would the Department take to limit the
negative impact on employee morale?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this
committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was
a success?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears
a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and
nuclear activities, but S&T will keep researching chemical and
biological technologies.
Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to
further align CBRNE R&D functions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization
would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have
with stakeholder groups.
Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision
sustaining relations with stakeholder groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. For example, if the assistant secretary determined
that the BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat
picture and decide to nix the program, how would the Department go
about sustaining its partnerships with the State and local public
health officials who participated in BioWatch?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal
interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr. for Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson
Question 1. If Congress were to approve the reorganization
proposal, what specific steps would the Department take to limit the
negative impact on employee morale?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Two years into the realignment, what should this
committee be looking for, in the way of metrics, to know whether it was
a success?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. The proposed consolidation for the CBRNE office appears
a bit lopsided. The CBRNE office will do R&D for radiological and
nuclear activities, but S&T will keep researching chemical and
biological technologies.
Does the Department anticipate requesting future reorganizations to
further align CBRNE R&D functions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. There are concerns about how the CBRNE reorganization
would affect the existing relationships that OHA, S&T, and DNDO have
with stakeholder groups.
Under the reorganization, how does the Department envision
sustaining relations with stakeholder groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. For example, if the Assistant Secretary determined
that the BioWatch program no longer aligned with the current threat
picture and decide to nix the program, how would the Department go
about sustaining its partnerships with the State and local public
health officials who participated in BioWatch?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4c. Similarly, how does the Department expect Federal
interagency relationships to be affected by the reorganization?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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