[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
YEAR IN REVIEW: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A CHANGING WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 9, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-129
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
MATT SALMON, Arizona GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida ALAN LOWENTHAL, California
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Roger Noriega, visiting fellow, American Enterprise
Institute (former Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere
Affairs, U.S. Department of State)............................. 6
The Honorable Mary Beth Long, founder and chief executive
officer, Metis Solutions (former Assistant Secretary for
International Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense).... 23
Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D., director, Latin American Program,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars............... 30
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Roger Noriega: Prepared statement.................. 9
The Honorable Mary Beth Long: Prepared statement................. 26
Cynthia J. Arnson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 32
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 52
Hearing minutes.................................................. 53
YEAR IN REVIEW: U.S. POLICY TOWARD A CHANGING WESTERN HEMISPHERE
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WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Duncan
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Duncan. We will go ahead and call the meeting to order.
Take your time, Dr. Arnson. That is fine. We are going to have
votes shortly. So I want to try to get as far along as we can.
And a quorum being present, the subcommittee will come to
order.
And I would like to recognize myself for an opening
statement. This year, we have seen many changes in the Western
Hemisphere, economic and security factors, migration, natural
disasters, and deepening ties with Iran, China, and Russia have
greatly impacted the region. Elections in multiple countries
have shifted governments and political power. The Organization
of American States has a new Secretary General who has affirmed
a commitment to revitalizing the organization, and his public
statements related to Venezuela have underscored that
commitment. Panama hosted the Seventh Summit of the Americas.
And it had the inclusion of Cuba for the first time. And the
United States began its 2-year chairmanship of the Arctic
Council. Furthermore, Colombia has made progress in its peace
talks with the FARC. And both houses of its legislature voted
this month to approve a proposal for a referendum on an
eventual peace deal. In Brazil, economic woes continue. And
impeachment proceedings against a sitting President have begun.
Moreover, crime and violence in the region have also risen with
an ever-proliferating network of transnational criminal
organizations. This year, Latin America has also experienced
its worst economic performance since 2009.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the Obama
administration's policies and programs in the Western
Hemisphere, to assess their impact, and to consider the
progress of the countries in the region in furthering
democracy, freedom of religion, and of the press; strengthening
the rule of law and judicial institutions; growing economic
prosperity; and providing a safer and more secure region.
As a side note, I would like to congratulate the ranking
member on passage, in the Foreign Affairs Committee, of a bill
dealing with freedom of the press. Hopefully that bill will
make it to the floor, and we will get to vote on it. I was a
proud cosponsor, no doubt.
This subcommittee has held 16 hearings this year to provide
oversight of the Obama administration's efforts in the
hemisphere and bring public awareness to key developments in
the region. Of the hearings this subcommittee has held this
year, two have focused on the budgetary issues and the $1
billion request for Central America. Two have examined the
energy opportunities in the Western Hemisphere, focusing on
Canada and Mexico in particular. Three highlighted the
challenges to press freedoms, religious liberties, and human
rights abuses in Cuba and Venezuela. Two focused on the U.S.-
Cuba policy shift, the impact on U.S. citizens and national
security, and the unresolved property claims issue. And one
hearing explored the opportunities the United States has on
arctic issues in the region.
In January, the death of special prosecutor Alberto Nisman
in Argentina raised questions about Iran's networks in the
region and the Kirchner government's relationship with Iran and
Venezuela. This subcommittee has maintained a focus on Iran and
Hezbollah's activities in the region and expanded our oversight
to include hearings on China and Russia's growing presence, as
well. Whereas these countries have shown great attention to the
Western Hemisphere, the Obama administration's own response has
been minimal. With the exception of altering the U.S.
relationship with Cuba without requiring any substantive
changes from the Castro regime in return, a tactical response
to the migration crisis in Central America, and an emphasis on
LGBTI and climate change initiatives, the Obama administration
has shown little strategic vision for United States leadership
and has failed to make an effective case for why countries in
the region should make the United States their partner of
choice. That has got to change.
In my view, the United States should be prioritizing
relations with the democratic free countries in the region
instead of capitulating to leftist governments in Cuba,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Brazil. Rather than
rejecting the Keystone pipeline with Canada, limiting U.S.
economic potential, and ignoring important security dimensions
in the U.S. relationship with Mexico, the United States should
recognize that North America's greatest potential lies within
even stronger relations with Canada and Mexico.
In Central America, we have seen no changes in the root
causes of migration to the United States. And I remain
concerned with the high levels of migrant flows we have seen
within the last few months into Mexico from Central America and
at the U.S. southern border. In addition, we are seeing, from
my understanding of a meeting with the Panamanians today, a
large number of Cubans also transiting. The $1 billion request
from the Obama administration will not solve these problems
without active U.S. leadership and tight oversight of U.S.
taxpayer dollars; real and measurable political will from the
countries themselves to address the rampant corruption; and
strong and independent national institutions that are
transparent and accountable to the people.
In addition, I believe we are missing opportunities to
create stronger partnerships on trade and energy issues in the
hemisphere. In particular, we ought to consider ways to more
highly prioritize U.S. relations with the Pacific Alliance
countries of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru, which
reportedly represent 36 percent of Latin America's economy, 50
percent of its international trade, and 41 percent of all
incoming foreign direct investment. In addition, energy
cooperation in North America, Central America, the Caribbean,
and South America should be more foundational for U.S. policy
and underscore our efforts in the region. With the Western
Hemisphere home to nearly a third of the world's oil, U.S.
reserves of oil and natural gas and shale gas resources, and
the growing investment opportunities for U.S. businesses in
multiple countries in the region, energy is a positive area for
cooperation that we simply have not explored enough.
Indeed, with this year's elections in the hemisphere, I am
hopeful that we will see greater economic and security
partnerships between the United States and many more countries.
Longtime ruling parties were kicked out in Trinidad and Tobago,
Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis. Mexico saw several surprise
victories from independent, nonparty candidates in its June
legislative and local elections. And Guatemala saw a rare
victory against corruption with the unseating of a sitting
President, the resignation of a Vice President, and the
election of a political outsider as the President in October,
one who promised to clean up corruption. After years of delay
and extended political crisis, Haiti has had two rounds of
elections this year, with a final round scheduled for later
this month. Even our best partner on trade and energy issues,
Canada, saw the turning out of the incumbent government, after
several years of consecutive leadership. With the results of
center-right Mauricio Macri's victory in Argentina last month
and the first-ever runoff election in Argentina's history, I am
excited about the possibilities of improved bilateral relations
and greater Argentine leadership in the hemisphere. In
addition, this past weekend's election in Venezuela marked an
important turning point for that country with the opposition's
landslide victory over Chavismo or the Maduro government.
So we are going to see--and I look forward to you guys
talking, Ambassador, about that a little bit more, by the way.
Our subcommittee began this year by engaging with regional
Caribbean leaders over the issue of finding better ways to
partner on energy issues and looking at how the energy boom in
the United States could benefit our friends who have
historically depended on Venezuela to meet their energy needs.
Next year, I look forward to deepening U.S. engagement in the
region and maintaining our attention on Iran, China, and
Russia's actions in the hemisphere and particularly focusing on
energy, business, and trade opportunities, terrorism, border
security threats, and counterdrug efforts in the region.
As we take time today to assess the Obama administration's
approach to the Western Hemisphere and the status of specific
countries in the region, I look forward to using the
perspective shared here today by our panel of witnesses in
order to help shape and sharpen U.S. engagement in the region
next year.
So, with that, I look forward to the hearing.
And I will turn to the ranking member from New Jersey, Mr.
Sires, for any opening statement he may have.
Mr. Sires. Good afternoon.
Thank you, Chairman, for holding this timely hearing. And
thank you to the witnesses for joining us today.
The Western Hemisphere has seen a significant change over
the past year. The region has undergone multiple elections at
both the head of states and legislative level. Elections are
bringing about change in Argentina, Guatemala, Haiti, and
Venezuela, just to name a few. In Argentina, voters went to the
polls on November 22 and voted for change by electing Mauricio
Macri of the opposition. Macri's election ends the rule of the
so-called ``Kirchnerismo,'' which has been the ruling ideology
for 12 years. In Guatemala, massive corruption schemes
uncovered by the United Nations' International Commission
Against Impunity in Guatemala led to the resignation and
indictment of both the President and Vice President.
Most recently, Venezuela's opposition coalition, known as
Democratic Unity Roundtable, MUD, triumphed in the country's
December 6, 2015 legislative elections, despite Maduro's
efforts to imprison and eliminate the opposition and intimidate
voters. The MUD Party won a decisive victory by capturing a
supermajority over Maduro's ruling party. The elections
represent a major defeat for Chavismo and signal a potential
shift away from the failed and oppressive socialist policies to
a more progressive society. Despite these agents for change,
there are still troubling changes facing the region. Cuba still
remains as oppressive and dictatorial as ever, imprisoning
innocent civilians at an alarming rate and making no effort to
shift its attitude to more equitable policies. The
administration's misguided effort to reengage with the island
has prompted record numbers of Cubans to flee the island,
spurring a migrant crisis in Central America as thousands await
passage.
Additionally, Central America is continuing to deal with
its own crisis as children and women continue to flee to the
northern triangle to escape violence engulfing their home
states. Mexico has greatly increased its enforcement efforts on
the southern border. And we must help build that capacity so
they can adequately screen and process these people, who are
overwhelmingly eligible for asylum. We must stay committed to
addressing the root causes of this crisis and ensure Central
America is making strident efforts to reform its institutions
and absorb a potential increase in U.S. funding through the
Alliance for Prosperity proposal.
These are just a few examples of changes undergoing in the
hemisphere over the past year. I have always said that the U.S.
must prioritize engagement with our neighbors. And I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on this year's activities
and how we can improve relations in the coming year.
Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. I will allow a brief opening statement if any
other members would like to.
Mr. DeSantis from Florida is recognized for a brief
statement.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The title of the hearing is the ``Changing Western
Hemisphere,'' but the one place still stuck in its totalitarian
past is Cuba. It was almost a year ago when the President
announced major, major changes in our policy toward the Castro
regime. I think we can see now that these were essentially a
list of unilateral concessions that really represent an
unprecedented surrender to an anti-American regime that
continues to oppress its own people.
Think about it. Cuba got a massive influx of cash that
really props up the intelligence services and the regime. It
provided legitimacy to the Castro regime by opening the
Embassy, as if they are just one of a community of nations. We
released the last members of the Cuban Five terrorists and, of
course, removed Cuba from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism. Those were major concessions.
And, yet, a year later, what have we gotten in return? Cuba
released 53 political prisoners. Most of them have been re-
arrested now. There has been no extradition for terrorists like
Joanne Chesimard, who remains on the FBI's Most Wanted
Terrorists list. No political reforms. In fact, the crackdown
is probably worse today than it was prior to this deal.
So there are a lot of changes in the Western Hemisphere. I
appreciate all the subjects you brought, Mr. Chairman, before
us. But freedom in Cuba is not a change that we have seen. And
this is not a policy that has succeeded.
And I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. Absolutely. Thanks for recognizing that. I will
now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, a few decades ago, Latin America and the
Caribbean was a region known more for political turmoil and
dictatorship than for political and economic advancements.
Times have changed in my estimation. There have been sustained
democratic advancements in the region for years now. And I
think that we should acknowledge that and applaud that shift.
It is also important that we adjust our policies to reflect
these advancements. I commend the Obama administration for
demonstrating to the region that our Nation is interested in a
real partnership, a partnership with mutual interests and
benefits on security, trade, immigration, human rights, and so
much more.
While Cuba is the one exception to the democratic trend,
the Obama administration's decision to formally engage Cuba, in
my estimation, is promising. And it puts America in sync with
our allies in the region that have long urged more mature U.S.
policy in the Western Hemisphere. I also appreciate the
administration's commitment to diplomatic engagement, even
where there have been challenges in our relationship. For
example, as I was just talking with my good friend, the ranking
member, here, and recent elections in Venezuela confirm that
the democratic process in that nation remains very much alive.
And it is good to see that there is change happening there. And
I think that is important. And it reinforces the need for the
United States to stay engaged. That is the key. We must be
engaged. There are many elections ahead in the coming months.
And there are notable challenges remaining.
Haiti held elections in October rather peacefully. But
subsequent violence and protest over the election results is
deeply concerning. But we have got to stay focused on it.
Democracy is not just about elections. Citizens of any
nation don't just want to vote; they want to feel that their
representatives are making a difference in their lives and
livelihoods. For that reason, focus on poverty reduction and
now on the equality gap is similarly an important regional
trend. I have seen for myself the success that dedicated
governments in Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Chile, Jamaica, and others
have had on this front. It has been remarkable. Economic
reforms, trade liberalization, and innovative and cost-cutting
approaches are making positive change for vulnerable
populations. The most affected communities for too many
generations have suffered benign and deliberate neglect and
discrimination.
The progress I have seen can and has been instructive to
our struggle to eliminate poverty and achieve a more equal and
just society here in the United States. Our hemisphere is more
consequently connected than ever before in both our struggles
and successes.
And I look forward to hearing the perspectives of our
witnesses.
And I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for
holding this timely and critical review.
Mr. Duncan. I want to thank the gentleman from New York for
his participation in the hearings this year. A lot of times in
Congress, we have subcommittee hearings that members just don't
show up for. So I appreciate your participation, and as well as
Ron and some of the others.
So we are going to go ahead and get started. They are going
to call votes at some point in time. We will get as far as we
can. And I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. We
don't have a lighting system. I am going to ask you to try to
stay within 5 minutes. I will be timing here. If I start
tapping the gavel, that is just to try to wrap up as soon as
possible. And we will try to stick to that 5-minute rule. Then
members will be able to ask questions.
The witnesses are the Honorable Roger Noriega, visiting
fellow with the American Enterprise Institute and former
Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere at the U.S.
Department of State; the Honorable Mary Beth Long, founder and
chief executive officer of Metis Solutions, a former Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs at the U.S.
Department of Defense; and Dr. Cynthia J. Arnson, director of
Latin America Program at the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars.
So, Ambassador, I will recognize you for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROGER NORIEGA, VISITING FELLOW,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Ambassador Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
members of the committee. I thank you for this opportunity to
review an eventful year in the Americas and to discuss the
future of our policy. I believe we have a significant
opportunity to recapture the initiative where our priorities
are at stake: Democracy, security, and prosperity.
In the last 15 years, representative democracy has been
undermined by authoritarian populism, statist economic
policies, and unsustainable government spending. In some very
dramatic cases in the last year, some of our neighbors have
decided to change course. Sunday's parliamentary elections in
Venezuela gave the democratic opposition a landslide victory
and a supermajority in the national assembly beginning in
January. President Maduro had no choice but to accept the
results of those elections. But his history suggests that his
regime will resort to any means necessary to deny the
opposition its rightful authority. That is why friends of
democracy must do what we can to help.
And to get straight to the point, for example, some of the
same men who menace Venezuela's democratic opposition today
also shovel tons of cocaine into the United States. And I
believe we should move quickly to identify and punish these
thugs to put them on the defensive. In Argentina, a majority of
the voters rejected the statist, authoritarian, and
economically ruinous policies of the Kirchners. As a result,
the pro-free-market candidate, Mauricio Macri, was elected to a
4-year term. He has pledged to lift currency and price
controls, to lower taxes, to restore Argentina's credit
worthiness, and to pursue a positive relationship with the
United States. And I note that just today, his Foreign Minister
said that she would be open to the renewal of a regional trade
agreement, like was pushed 10 years ago. Argentina's new
President has an opportunity to show that free market remedies
can right size government and jump start stagnant economies.
In Brazil, the decision last week to impeach Dilma
Rousseff, impeach the President reflects the anxiety about the
future that permeates South America's most populous country and
largest economy. Several parallel investigations are continuing
as well, which are being led by independent prosecutors and
judges. This political crisis is, obviously, not good for
Brazilians. However, the fact that they are confronting their
challenges by relying on the rule of law and checks and
balances shows that when it comes to answering to popular will,
constitutions are more reliable than caudillos.
A second major point, one of the greatest threats to U.S.
security in the Americas today is the breakdown of regional
consensus to confront illegal drugs and transnational organized
crime. In the last 15 years, key drug-producing and transit
countries, among them, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, have
effectively ended their cooperation with U.S. antidrug efforts.
Now, Colombia intends to make peace with the guerilla group
that is the world's largest producer of cocaine. It has
already, at the peace process, gutted the government's coca
eradication program and ended extraditions to the United
States. For the first time in memory, if not ever in history,
Colombia refused to extradite someone sought by the United
States. In the face of this crumbling regional alliance, U.S.
foreign policy has failed to respond effectively, leaving us
more vulnerable to the onslaught of illegal drugs than we have
been in decades.
On a related front, the deadly terrorist attacks in San
Bernardino and Paris underscore the vital contribution of
neighboring governments to our own security. In the last
several weeks, including in the last day or so, border
officials in the region have interdicted at least a dozen
Syrian nationals with false or stolen documents bound for the
United States. These particular people are not suspected of
being terrorists, but they relied on a criminal network that
terrorists can use to enter the United States.
One of our biggest vulnerabilities in this regard in this
hemisphere emanates from Venezuela, which supports Syria's
Assad regime and provides resources, recruits, and safe haven
to Hezbollah and Iranian operatives, groups that have vowed
publically to carry their asymmetrical war to our homeland.
Venezuela also has provided thousands of phony IDs, passports,
and visas to persons of Middle Eastern origin.
Mr. Chairman, U.S. security demands much more vigorous
efforts to confront that criminal regime as well as, in
general, transnational organized crime that is destabilizing
our neighborhood. The President must use all of his tools in
his toolkit, including investigative cooperation, intelligence
sharing, and sanctions to identify, isolate, and prosecute
traffickers, money launderers, complicit officials, and corrupt
businesses. To help put the region back on the road to
prosperity, we should invigorate the positive, proactive
partnerships that encourage countries to adopt policies that
bring spending under control, incentivize private sector led
development, root out corruption, and put capital in the hands
of innovative entrepreneurs.
One final point, Mr. Chairman. None of our pressing
priorities in this region--democracy, security, and free market
prosperity--are advanced, in my opinion, by the ongoing U.S.
capitulation to the Castro dictatorship. Arguably, things have
gotten worse for the Cuban people on the island since President
Obama moved to normalize diplomatic ties with Castro.
Reasonable terms for restoring normal economic relations with a
post-Castro Cuba were approved by a three-fourths majority of
this House and our Senate and signed by President Clinton. The
awful reality is that Cuba is the only country in the Western
Hemisphere that cannot meet any of those standards in terms of
the defense of democracy, human rights, and labor rights. The
benefits of normal economic ties with the United States should
be used to encourage a post-Castro government to treat its
people decently, not to reward a government that refuses to do
so.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Noriega follows:]
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Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
And we will get to the questions and be able to elaborate a
little bit more.
Ms. Long, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARY BETH LONG, FOUNDER AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, METIS SOLUTIONS (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)
Ms. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members
of the committee. I appreciate being invited to be here today.
A stable if not more peaceful, democratic, and prosperous
Western Hemisphere is in the interest of all the citizens of
the Americas and is in our interest. Unfortunately, in the last
year, by having failed to consistently and meaningfully engage
our hemispheric neighbors, we have managed to make the United
States and our neighbors neither more secure, nor more
prosperous.
This has been a challenging year for our near and far
hemispheric neighbors. Just in November, an unanticipated surge
in immigration of Cubans through Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador has nearly overwhelmed our Customs and Border
officials and made the United States and its neighbors even
more vulnerable to the problems that these individuals
represent and bring with them. The economic ills and lack of
stability suffered by many of our southern neighbors are, and
will continue to be, transmitted to the United States in the
form of child immigrants and refugees, violence, the spread of
criminal activities, and opportunities for terrorists and state
rivals from undergoverned or ungoverned spaces, who could
operate there in order to do us harm.
It is not much of a stretch, and certainly not as much of a
long possibility, as it used to be. Just in 2010, Abdul Kadir,
a Guyanese convert to Islam, under the guidance of the Iranian
cultural attache in Argentina, Mr. Rabbani, was sentenced to
life for planning to detonate bombs in pipes lines leading to
the JFK network. Rabbani was the leader of the recruiters for
the Iranian Islamic radicals and was one of those people that
was responsible for the 1994 bombing of the cultural center in
Argentina. The sudden death of Argentine special prosecutor Mr.
Nisman the day before he was scheduled to testify on this
matter remains unsolved and certainly hints to continued
Iranian involvement in Argentina.
Mexico's Zetas employ drug traffickers and launderers Mr.
Harb and Ayman Joumaa, both of whom have channeled some of the
proceeds to Hezbollah. And don't forget that the Zetas were
involved in a nexus with terrorist planning and threatened the
life, in the United States, of the Ambassador from Saudi
Arabia.
More recently, Muamad Armadar, a Guyanese arrested in Lima
just in October of last year, was identified as a likely
Hezbollah operative, who was stockpiling explosives in his
apartment. This year, Argentina arrested six Syrians who
arrived on a flight bearing false Greek passports. And before
that, five Syrian men were also carrying passports and were
detained in Honduras on the way to the U.S. having already
passed through Brazil, Argentina, and Costa Rica on their way
north.
In October, Brazil detained eight Iraqi nationals also
bearing Greek passports. And while there is no open information
indicating that these individuals were either involved in
terrorism or had violent thoughts, the fact is the networks
that have long been used by drugs and illicit activities are
now open and smuggling people, weapons, and drugs, and are
available to terrorists.
In the last decades, Latin America and the Caribbean have
experienced generally positive trajectories in internal
reconciliation, interstate peace, and growing democratic
processes and institutions. Regrettably, this progress is
counterbalanced--and perhaps even threatened--by worsening
problems. Most notably, in the last months alone, Cuban
migration that represents approximately three times the Cuban
migration of 1994 and perhaps the largest since the Mariel
boatlift has come across the borders and have overwhelmingly
threatened Panama, Ecuador, and other Central American states.
Relations with key allies, such as Mexico and Canada in
particular, have been strained. At one point, in fact, one
observer describing the upcoming meeting between the
administration and Mexico said, ``There is really not much to
talk about,'' in relation to U.S. policy. The escape of Mexican
drug cartel leader Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman exasperated the
existing chill. In extraditions, President Pena Nieto's
government is proceeding at a rate that will be substantially
less than half of the extraditions of his predecessors.
In Canada, our largest trading partner is increasingly
looking to Asian markets. And although Canada no doubt remains
a steadfast military ally, its newly elected Prime Minister,
Mr. Justin Trudeau, recently followed through with early
indications that he would end Canada's participation in
airstrikes against ISIS targets and restrict its military
efforts to training alone.
Sadly, what stands out in many observers' minds as symbols
of American engagement in the hemisphere in the last few years
are our executive order on immigration; outreach to anti-
American governments, such as Cuba, with very little to show
for it, and Venezuela; the Department of Justice welcomed
investigation of FIFA; and, with few exceptions, not much else.
The region simply has not been a priority for U.S. efforts or
U.S. engagement.
Meanwhile, from a security perspective, China and Russia
have joined Iran in reaching out to countries in the
hemisphere, seeking its allies and its markets. These
interactions go well beyond the interactions of those countries
with the Cuba regime. They are, in fact, actively engaged in
anti-U.S. activities and rhetoric. While China has been busy
undercutting the region's multilateral organizations, they have
moved to take a naval flotilla across the Pacific, where for
the first time, it conducted combat exercises with bilateral
nations.
Moving forward to security cooperation, while Colombia has
long been the recipient of rigorous U.S. security assistance
and related support, SOUTHCOM is limited in its ability to
engage. Furthermore, as to resettlement, disarmament, and
reintegration of the FARC, many of whom, even if they reconcile
from a political perspective, are criminals and will continue
to engage in criminal activity.
Meaningful engagement from the United States is necessary
to mitigate the impact of these and other threats. Security
cooperation should be enhanced. It promotes cooperation in the
hemisphere, encourages transparency, and even interoperability.
And we need to do more along these lines, particularly through
the Combating Terrorist Fellowship Program, the drug
interdiction and other programs, the Ranger School training,
and the training of additional Colombian and Mexican military
to engage in more U.S. support. Looking ahead, the biggest
issue is to immediately reinvigorate our national engagement
and signal unwavering support and attention to our continental
partnerships.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Long follows:]
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----------
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
They have called votes. We will go ahead and try to get Dr.
Arnson--welcome back--and probably one question per side.
And then we will go--Ron, if you want to stay, I am going
to defer to you first because I am coming back. So if you want
to hang and ask a question after Dr. Arnson, whatever you want
to do.
Okay.
Dr. Arnson.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, LATIN AMERICAN
PROGRAM, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Ms. Arnson. Thank you, Chairman Duncan, Ranking Member
Sires, other members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity
to testify about the challenges in the Western Hemisphere over
this past year and per U.S. policy.
I share and identify myself with the comments of others
that have spoken before me that the recent elections in
Argentina and Venezuela are historic and represent a
fundamental change in the region. They have a common
denominator of the failure of populist economics, which
sustained generous but inefficient social programs, that were
based on high commodity prices. Now that those prices have
plummeted, along with other macroeconomic imbalances, the
economic distress has had a major impact on the pocketbooks of
average households, leading to the vote to punish existing
leaders.
The fall in commodity prices has had different effects
across the hemisphere. But it has contributed to an overall
economic slowdown in most parts of the region. Regional growth
projections have dropped, now for the fifth consecutive year,
to under 1 percent this year and next. There is, therefore, the
deep concern over the ability of people who left poverty over
the last decades to remain out of poverty; little chance that
those who are still impoverished, the tens of millions of
people who are still in poverty, to leave poverty; and there
will be a reversal of the modestly improving patterns of social
mobility. And I think these trends will have important
political consequences.
It should not be surprising that the countries that have
fared best over the last 2 years, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, and
Peru, precisely the countries that are part of the Pacific
Alliance, are those that have pursued economic opening and
liberal international trade among themselves and with other
partners in North America, in Europe, and especially in Asia.
Economic and social change in the region has contributed to
higher living standards. But it has also contributed to civil
societies that increasingly demand more of their political
leaders and institutions. From Chile to Guatemala, Brazil,
Peru, we have seen millions taking to the streets in recent
years to demand better quality education, improvements in
public services, from transportation to garbage collection.
What would appear as a negative--the seeming epidemic of
corruption scandals in numerous countries in the region--I
think can also be viewed positively as a reflection of
citizens' demands for higher ethical standards and more
accountable and transparent government.
The free press has played a critical role in bringing these
scandals to light. In looking at the challenges ahead, I would
note that U.S. relations with the hemisphere--and here I think
I differ with those who have spoken before me--have improved
significantly over the last year. Part of that has to do with
the normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations, which removed what
many countries in the hemisphere saw as an outdated relic of
the Cold War. I think this was seen most dramatically at the
Summit of the Americas in Panama in April, a meeting that many
heads of state had actually threatened to boycott if Cuba was
excluded one more time.
The Obama administration's commitment to working
multilaterally on a range of issues, from protecting the
environment to promoting Venezuelan democracy, has also been
viewed favorably. There is a recent poll by the Public Opinion
Project, LAPOP, based at Vanderbilt University, which
demonstrates that 51 percent of citizens in the region believe
that the United States is the most influential country in Latin
America. The comparable figure for China is 12 percent.
I want to briefly highlight three areas where I think U.S.
policy and engagement are critical. One has to do with
relations with Colombia. If there is a peace accord that is
signed early next year, whether or not it coincides with the
deadline that has been announced, there will be a need for
continued U.S. assistance and engagement. This is something
that did not happen after the end of the Central American wars.
And I believe that once the FARC has demobilized and has
transformed itself as a political actor subject and under
Colombian law, it would be appropriate for the U.S. Government,
the Congress, and the executive branch to review the FARC's
designation as a terrorist organization.
Several of you have mentioned the Central American policy.
I agree that more border enforcement is necessary. But there
must also be a concerted effort to improve the conditions on
the ground, the insecurity, and lack of opportunity that
continue to impel Central American youth, in particular, to
take this perilous journey.
I see that people are looking to head out. I would say that
it would be critical to maintain high-level but very discreet
U.S. engagement on Venezuela. There are important new allies in
the effort in the hemisphere, including OAS Secretary General
Luis Almagro, President-elect Macri, who will be inaugurated
tomorrow. They have demonstrated that they will take a leading
role in pushing for respect for human rights and democratic
freedoms.
The U.S. administration and Congress, and here I conclude,
should speak out publicly and frequently on important matters
of principle but also be mindful that the Venezuelan Government
currently thrives on confrontation and has used accusations of
foreign interference to its own political advantage.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Arnson follows:]
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----------
Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
And the committee looks forward to asking some questions
and digging into this a little bit more. But, unfortunately, we
are going to recess and go vote and come back. It is a two-vote
series. It shouldn't take long. They are already into the time
for the first one.
So we are going to stand in recess pending call of the
chair. And we will be back shortly.
[Recess.]
Mr. Duncan. All right.
The subcommittee will come back to order.
I thank the witnesses for your patience.
And we will enter into the questioning phase. Each member
will be given 5 minutes to ask questions. Since there are only
two of us right now, we may exceed that a little bit.
I have to figure out what I want to ask you here a little
bit. There has been a series of recent large-scale and high-
profile corruption scandals in Latin America, whether it is
Petrobras in Brazil or whether it is Guatemala and the deposing
of the President and Vice President and regime change there. So
the question I have is this: Is corruption getting worse in the
region? And is it spiraling out of control? Let's talk about
corruption. And I will start with Ambassador Noriega.
Ambassador Noriega. Well, Mr. Chairman, when governments
settle in for a long spell, when they are undemocratic, for
example, as in the case of Venezuela or in Brazil, where the PT
managed to stay in power for a considerable period of time and
then in Argentina where the Kirchners handed the Presidency
between them, the culture becomes about satisfying the
President and the President's inner circle or the President's
political party. So, yes, I think corruption, when there isn't
this alternating of power, alternancia, corruption tends to
build up and become a bigger problem. Certainly the oil
revenues--I mean $1.3 trillion in oil revenue since Chavez took
power in Venezuela. Where did all that money go? When you look
at the disintegrating infrastructure and about $250 million in
the central bank reserves looted. Astronomical levels of
corruption in Venezuela. And then the involvement also in
narcotrafficking precisely because there are no checks and
balances. There is no Congress that can hold officials
accountable.
Mr. Duncan. Ms. Long, do you think just changing the guy at
the top or the female at the top, the President in Guatemala or
President in Argentina, possibly in Brazil, you think that is
enough to change corruption in these countries?
Ms. Long. No, I don't. And I think one of the things that
we do as Americans is we tend to look at corruption at the top
of a government. And one of the changes probably in the last
decade, I believe, is that because of a lack of U.S.
involvement and lack of emphasis on the traditional drug or
counternarcotics or counternarcoterrorism activities, that the
corruption at the top, for all the reasons the Ambassador
explained, has gotten worse. But the types of corruption have
gotten worse. It is not just drugs any more. It is all kinds of
movements of transnational crimes. It is involvement of Russian
mafia. It is involvement of Hezbollah. It is involvement of
Chinese triads in addition to Chinese markets. And then they
have spread, as well. I think there is a study, actually from
the Mexicans, that some 75 percent of Mexican municipalities
are either totally corrupt or unreliable to the central
government. So because of the frustrations of the economic--
lack of economic opportunities, the constant flow across
borders, the sieve that has become at least Central America,
you have worse corruption at the top; you have the spread of
corruption throughout the bureaucracy; you have got the types
of corruption that has gotten worse. And all of that bears very
ill.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this just as a quick followup.
Do you think the economic situation exacerbates that or doesn't
change it any?
Ms. Long. It certainly exacerbates it. And one of the good
things about some of the changes that we have been talking to
at the top is there are opportunities. But those opportunities
have got to be pushed all the way down. And they are going to
have to have U.S. support. But as the doctor mentioned, even
with the economic opportunities, the expectations have really
risen where there has been change. I think there is going to be
tremendous expectations of advancements in Argentina with Macri
and in Venezuela. And being able to deliver that is going to be
a challenge.
Mr. Duncan. Dr. Arnson, with what you have heard, knowing
that changing the person at the top isn't dramatically going to
affect anything, what are some of the solutions as you answer
this question?
Ms. Arnson. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
With respect to your question about whether corruption is
getting worse, I think the answer is yes and no. I don't think
the world has seen anything on the scale of the Petrobras
scandal, the billions of dollars that have been--that were not
accounted for or used for purposes other than the correct ones.
So that is--I think my colleague in the Brazil Institute has
described that as a corruption scandal of biblical proportions.
And I think that is an accurate statement. I also think that it
is true for all the good reasons that I pointed out in my
testimony, that we are finding out more about corruption now
than almost ever before because of the demands from civil
society, because people are fed up, especially at a time when
they feel that the quality of the services or the amount of
benefits that they are receiving is extremely poor.
The check, or the improvement in combating inequality, has
to do with what I think political scientists call mechanisms of
horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability is from the
voters to the people that they elect. Horizontal accountability
is within a government and refers to having checks and balances
and institutions within a state that can serve to monitor and
control and investigate. The bodies, such as the Congress,
asking the executive branch for information, whether
voluntarily or by subpoena, the Congress has that power. The
GAO also can investigate and is an investigative arm of the
Congress. So reinforcing those kinds of institutional
mechanisms--and I think people have referred to them earlier
today--to the sort of pervasive weakness of institutions of
democracy, that has to be a fundamental focus of our efforts in
the region.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you all for that. The new President of
Argentina, who gets sworn in and takes office tomorrow at
night, won 51.4 percent of the vote. His party doesn't have a
majority in the Argentine Congress. So he is going to have some
challenges. How long do you think the Argentine people will
give him to turn things around?
Ambassador Noriega. I think there will be a honeymoon of
some duration because the dissatisfaction comes, as well, from
others in Peronism. He could not have won unless there was a
good part of Peronism that was disgusted by the levels of
corruption and the authoritarian ways of the Kirchners. So he
will have some who are within Peronism who are willing to
cooperate with him. He will have to cobble together sort of ad
hoc coalitions in order to have initiatives move through the
Congress. But it was a closer than expected result. And so the
Peronists bounce back pretty quickly. They already took steps
to sort of pass some Kirchner-supported measures through the
lower house in defiance of what the President-elect had asked.
So the Peronists have the bit in their teeth, and they are
going to put up a fierce level of opposition, that is to say,
those that are particularly loyal to Kirchner and the outgoing
government. But there are some, for example, Mr. Massa, who
competed in the first round, was a rebel within the--or a
dissident within Peronism. So I think people from his bloc will
be looking for opportunities to cooperate with Macri and get
the economy moving again.
Mr. Duncan. Ms. Long, do you want to chime in on that?
Ms. Long. I don't really have much to add except for I
think a little bit of time may have been bought to the extent
that the population that voted for Macri are disgusted by the
latest 2 days of machinations of money transfers and other
measures that have at least attempted to tie his hands from a
fiscal and other sense. Perhaps there will be some sympathy
there.
Mr. Duncan. Before Dr. Arnson answers, so I traveled for
the first time to Argentina in 2002, March, early April. The
day before I got there, they devalued their currency, went from
1 to 1, to 3 to 1 with the dollar. I know they have done it at
least one other time since 2002. Inflation is extremely high in
Argentina. Anyone that has traveled there prior to 2002 and
traveled there now has experienced that. Plus, there are a lot
of dead issues out there with bondholders and what not. So how
do you think--and maybe this was a campaign issue during the
Presidential campaign. I don't know. I didn't follow it that
closely. So we have got this bond issue that Argentina needs to
really pay, and we have got rampant inflation. So how do you
think, from an economic standpoint, does President-elect Macri
address that?
Dr. Arnson.
Ms. Arnson. Sir, you have added a difficult question on top
of a difficult question, but I will try my best. You were right
in pointing out that President-elect Macri does not control the
Congress. In point of fact, the Argentine Senate is dominated
by the FPV, the ruling party of President Fernandez de
Kirchner. But there are large areas of economic policymaking
that are in the purview of the executive branch.
And I think that is where, in conjunction with his advisers
and his cabinet and his senior ministers, he will have to take
some very prudent steps to control inflation, to unify the two
exchange rates. The official exchange rate right now, if it was
3 to 1 back in 2002, the official rate now is about 9.5 to 1.
But can you walk to any street corner and exchange dollars for
15 to 1? So that contributes to inflation. And one of his goals
is to have a unified exchange rate and prevent that parallel
black market. In bringing those together, he has also
announced, as a way of restoring the confidence of the private
sector and of the international investor community, that he
would lift controls on repatriation of capital. He has to do
that very carefully because to simply allow a mass exodus of
dollars would create even more deflationary pressures on the
currency. And if Argentines go through another massive
devaluation as a product of the kind of adjustment that he
trusts to put into place, he is very rapidly going to lose
political support. And people like Scioli, the principal
opposition candidate, will be pointing their fingers and
saying: See, I told you so. We told you this was going back to
the days when the IMF and neoliberalism ruled the day. So I
think he has to be very careful.
Mr. Duncan. Let me ask you this. You mentioned repatriation
of capital. What is attractive about Argentina giving high
inflation for Argentine investors to bring money back--maybe
from U.S. investments, maybe from other investments--to Buenos
Aires or to anywhere in Argentina? What is attractive?
Ms. Arnson. Well, there is a very extensive middle class.
There is a consumer base in the country that is extremely
broad. The levels of education in Argentina are really, I
think, at the top of the list of the hemisphere. It is an
extremely wealthy country in terms of natural resources, both
land, oil and gas, which has been exploited only in the last
few years. So there are enormous opportunities. Buenos Aires,
for all of the things you could say, happens to be one of the
most active tech and innovation hubs in Latin America,
something that it shares with Santiago, Chile, Montevideo in
Uruguay, and Guadalajara in Mexico. But there is enormous
capacity and enormous human talent and human capital. So it is
a very attractive country for investment. There is an internal
market. There is also the ability to export within Mercosur,
although Brazil's ability to absorb exports from other
countries is very limited.
But the real question is that there is not only a pent-up
demand for dollars but also a pent-up demand to get pesos out
of the country because the current regime has made that very
difficult. And so all of those capital controls and adjustments
in the exchange rate are going to need to be done slowly so
that you don't see just a massive----
Mr. Duncan. My time has expired, but I agree with you that
it is a very attractive country. If the government can get it
right, I absolutely believe there will be investment coming
back. I don't believe you are going to see, at $40 a barrel, I
don't think you are going to see a whole lot of oil and gas. We
can't even get oil and gas investment at $40 a barrel in this
country right now. So, as oil prices creep back up, assuming
that they do over time, absolutely. There was oil and gas
prospecting going on in Argentina in 2002, and I know it has
probably continued. But it is hard for that at $40 a barrel.
So I am going to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey for
as much time as he needs.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, to continue this conversation, I just find it
very difficult for people to invest in Argentina if they don't
pay their debt. Why would I, as a businessman, even consider
going into some sort of a partnership when they have the issue
that they don't pay what they owe now? So I think it is almost
a catch-22. You know, you want the investment, but you don't
want to pay.
But my question really is toward Venezuela more because I
was very excited about the elections. I am very concerned where
we go from here. Actually, I was talking to my colleague, and I
told him, I said: You know, I was very surprised how far away
the army stood from this election. And I was wondering if you
have any ideas? Because you know, as we know, usually the army
controls a lot of the elections or the process. So why do you
think it was an advantage to them to stay far away from this
election? Although I had heard rumors that Maduro was trying to
create problems there.
Ambassador Noriega. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Sires, if I
could jump in there, I believe that first off, a 2-to-1 margin,
67 percent of the vote going one way, even the most clever or
sophisticated corruption couldn't have overcome that deficit.
But, having said that, the last several seats were settled by
less than 100 votes. So the electoral apparatus was allowed to
proceed in a normal fashion. But it didn't just happen. The
information I have from sources on the ground in Venezuela, all
that day, the ruling party was expecting a massive defeat. And
as it became more and more clear, there were some people--and
one of them whose name I already mentioned, Diosdado Cabello,
who is President of the National Assembly, who has perhaps the
most to lose for various different reasons because he can't
withstand the kind of accountability that will come from an
opposition Congress--was urging that the party put people on
the street to stress the vote using these colectivos, these
armed people that go around on motorcycles and shooting into
crowds to disrupt the day and to sort of provoke some sort of a
crisis. And the information I got was that the military
establishment, particularly the Minister of Defense, Padrino
Lopez, said if that happens, the military will deal with those
people who are trying to incite violence. And so there was sort
of a tense standoff up until just after midnight, when they
announced these devastating results. But Padrino Lopez is no
longer the Minister of Defense, from what I have been told, in
the last 24 hours. He--along with the other Cabinet Ministers--
he is being replaced in that case by someone--Reverol, General
Reverol, who used to head the National Guard as Minister of
Defense now. You know, in 2013 he did put National Guardsmen on
the streets to attack these student demonstrators. So you
already see this tug of war going on. The military did play a
decisive role apparently by preventing the ruling party from
putting sort of this thuggish apparatus on the street to
suppress the vote. We will see now where that balance will be
as the opposition begins to assert itself and make moves as a
supermajority in the National Assembly can hold the executive
more accountable, to call for the amnesty of these political
prisoners and other moves.
Mr. Sires. Ms. Long, do you have anything to add to that?
Ms. Long. No. In fact, the one thing I would add is it
really is a double-edged sword. And I think it is one of those
places where U.S. active engagement, although in a subtle and
productive way, is really needed. I agree with the Ambassador.
I think the military is in very much a wait-and-see mode. I
don't think they wanted to go against the population where the
politics were trending. I do think that with the recent
changes, they will come out if there is violence in order to
maintain the social order in their minds. But I think most
people who actually know the individuals within the Venezuelan
military will actually tell you that they are very interested
in closer relationships with the United States. They have had
them in the past. They have some U.S. equipment. They don't
believe they have been well supported over the years. They see
themselves as having been deteriorating. And this could be
under a new regime, if it gets legs underneath it, a real
opportunity for us to engage them in a productive manner.
Ms. Arnson. If I could first address your question, your
statement about Argentina and the holdouts, I think Mr. Macri
has made it clear that he wants to move quickly early in the
new year to begin to negotiate with the holdouts. Ninety-three
percent of bond holders that held Argentine debt did settle
with the Argentine Government. And it was 7 percent that have
resisted that or refused to do it. And I think to come to an
agreement is going to take some real compromise on both sides.
It is just, I think, unrealistic to think that 100 percent of
the face value of the bonds that were bought at very, you know,
favorable rates and were seen as high risk, you know, which is
part of the risk is that they are going to lose value, I think
it is unrealistic to think that the holdouts, the so-called
holdouts will get 100 cents on the dollar.
Mr. Sires. You don't think they sell because they thought
she was going to win?
Ms. Arnson. No, I think they decided that it was a deal
they could accept, that there was some number--I haven't spoken
directly with people who took that buyout, but there was a
sense that this was a government that went into default, that
was destroyed economically back in 2001 and 2002, that it was
unable to pay the face value of the debt. And so as you do with
bad debts everywhere, you renegotiate and you come up with some
terms that you can live with. And there was a certain number of
people--again, a very small minority, 7 percent--who refused to
do that. And it is a priority of the new government to come to
some agreement precisely to be able to re-access international
capital markets because they have been frozen out of financial
markets over the holdout issue.
If I could address the Venezuela issue just briefly, I
think that it is important to understand that Chavismo has
always depended for part of its legitimacy on the sense that it
is an elected government. Elections have been a feature, in
fact an all-too-frequent feature, referendums on this, that,
and the other thing, something like 12 elections between the
time that Chavez was first elected and the time that he died,
where people are called, and the elections serve as a way for
the regime to almost hold a plebiscite on its own rule. So
there is a sense that elections are ways that political change
happens, but also the way things are legitimized. So I was,
frankly, quite surprised to see the very prudent and moderate
language that President Maduro used in accepting the electoral
defeat. This was a man who only 10 days before had said, you
know, we will see you at the ballot box or we will see you in
the streets, raising this fear that there would be post-
electoral violence and that an opposition victory would not be
respected.
I also think that the actions of the electoral council, the
CNE, were in my view very surprising. I would have never
imagined that the two-thirds majority would have been ratified
so quickly. I expected that there would be prolonged protests,
accusations of fraud between the opposition and the CNE. So I
am not saying that Venezuelan institutions function, but I just
would say the results and the way that they happened were, to
me, a pleasant surprise.
Mr. Sires. Do you think that this populist ideology is
dead?
Ambassador Noriega. Absolutely not. But as a columnist--I
will give him credit for this, although I should steal the line
myself--Andres Oppenheimer said, ``Populism runs out of steam
when the politicians run out of money.'' And that is precisely
what has happened in a couple of these countries. The tide has
gone out, and now there are the repercussions as some of these
institutions step up and point out corruption, as what has
happened in Brazil, or the fact you have had an economic
meltdown----
Mr. Sires. It is always interesting to me because the
President, the speaker--I don't know what they call the
speaker--he calls for the President to be----
Ambassador Noriega. Impeached.
Mr. Sires [continuing]. Impeached. Yet he is under
investigation himself. He may wind up being kicked out.
Ambassador Noriega. Right. There was some horse trading
going on. That is why the decision took so long because the
word was that he was trying to get people to sort of get off
his back if he sort of didn't go along with the impeachment of
the President. So it is a political process. But as I mentioned
in my statement, there are parallel investigations and various
levels of corruption by the courts that will have ramifications
no matter what happens with this impeachment.
Mr. Duncan. I want to follow up on that. Brazil is going to
be in the world's spotlight--is in the world's spotlight--due
to the Olympics. We have got a terrorist attack in Paris,
threatened to blow up--terrorists threatened to blow themselves
up in a stadium. It has got to be a huge issue of concern for
Brazil, as it is for all the countries attending the Olympics,
sending their star athletes there in the wake of a corruption
scandal that is going to possibly bring down the President and
the speaker of the house. We see impeachments just hanging out
there. Not been impeached yet, but--and little things like the
inability to clean up areas where swimmers and kayakers are
going to be, the inability to provide water to a major city in
Sao Paulo last year.
So what does the Petrobras government corruption scandal
and the impeachment mean for security? Let's just focus on
security. What does it mean? Because if I was the head of an
Olympic committee in the United States--or maybe even Spain or
somewhere else--thinking about sending my athletes down to swim
in the waters of Brazil, I would be concerned about their
health. And I would be concerned about my soccer players and
the fans that are going to attend the games in the stadiums. So
we saw the World Cup. Did they learn anything from that? And
how has that applied? Let's delve into that for just a second.
Ms. Long, I am going to start with you.
Ms. Long. Absolutely. I don't think it bodes well. And I
think, as a practical matter, the political maneuverings
regarding the Petrobras and other scandals are on a much larger
scale status quo. But it really doesn't have any favorable
outcome for security. There are two things, and you hit upon
them both. While the U.S. is distracted a lot with ISIS and
other Middle East events, the populations on the tri-border
area, that have long been suspected as Hezbollah enclaves, have
increased significantly. And, in fact, neither Argentina,
Paraguay, nor Brazil can speak to exactly what is going on in
those areas. We know that they have long served perhaps as
resting areas for Hezbollah. They certainly have served as
places where moneys and funds are laundered, if not
transportation hubs. But there has been very little attention
and almost no sincere ability on the part of Brazil to actually
understand what is happening in that border area and to gauge
what implications it will have for the Brazil games.
As to the games, if you speak to any of the U.S. entities
that are normally engaged at this period in time for internal
security for helping with the favelas, with taking a look at
immigration, the fact that these events will be taking in 12 or
16 different fora and require trains and significant airplane
and other movement of athletes and spectators is a nightmare.
And there is very little planning that has been done just on
the transportational issues alone, not to mention the fact that
there are health and other concerns.
Mr. Duncan. Stadiums and that sort of thing.
Ms. Long. Yeah. At this point, I think they are housing or
planning to house a number of the athletes offshore, with very
little significant plans, upgrade in activity and coordination
on the maritime security that will be required just to guard
these--I think they are going to use former cruise ships in
order to put the athletes on them. It is going to be a
disaster, and it is going to go to the last minute, and then
everyone is going to rush.
Mr. Duncan. Anyone else like to--Ambassador?
Ambassador Noriega. For example, the FIFA that they hosted,
it was a bit of a carrier landing; that is to say a controlled
crash: I mean, the Brazilians waiting to the very last minute
until they took measures and involved some foreign advisers to
get things up to snuff. But as you mentioned, the Petrobras
corruption scandal, part of the problem is the fiscal crisis.
The country is now in a 4-percent contraction. A recession
started a couple years ago. So the resources may not be there
for this to--well, they are going to have to take extraordinary
moves to find the resources to get the sort of advice, do the
sort of physical improvements at some of these sites. But I
think, again, it is going to be a bit of a carrier landing.
Mr. Duncan. I think the Brazilians generally get security
right. A little heavier hand than maybe the U.S., but
generally, I think they do so. Everyone is holding out hope
that we do.
We could talk about Chile and their economy and the
downturn in mining. We could talk about Peru and private
property rights, civil society all over Latin America. You
know, the GTMO six, attempted terrorist attack in Montevideo.
I mean, there is so much we could delve into. I think our
committee has done a good job this year talking about the FARC;
and talking about energy; and talking about Venezuela and Cuba
and changes there; and Mexico and energy opportunities there;
but also the children that were killed. We have delved into so
much. But there is so much left uncovered.
We could talk about your trip to Colombia recently, Ms.
Long, and the FARC, and what you think--let me ask you that.
Just briefly, tell us your experience and what the U.S. can do
with regard to the FARC negotiations just quickly because I
know you were just there, right?
Ms. Long. I think there is a lot of optimism in the
government about the FARC negotiations, and expectations are
high. And I think that certainly the will on the government's
side to get there will be--will get them there. I think that
expectations are going to be very difficult to meet. And there
will be resource strain on the government that will sort of
pull from traditional security and other expenditures that may
be significant. I worry, more importantly, about--the FARC has
long since, I believe, been a theological bulwark for political
organizations, and they are significantly criminal
organizations. And those people are not going to lay down their
arms, and they are not going to integrate, and they are not
going to be willing to accept jobs. And what they are going to
do is become a different kind of threat, a domestic threat that
is basically either stealing the gold, or engaging in
narcotrafficking, or basically running ungoverned areas.
Mr. Duncan. But now they want to be part of the government.
They want to have the opportunity to run for elections and be a
viable political party. Is that being cut out of this deal? I
don't think the Colombian people will go along with that,
personally.
Ms. Long. I don't think the Colombian people will go along.
And, frankly, why would they take that harder path to actually
be elected and hold office when the path that they have right
now, frankly, is working very well for them?
Mr. Duncan. Is there going to be jail time for any of the
FARC leaders?
Ms. Long. I don't think that has been determined. I doubt
it.
Mr. Duncan. Well, we are looking forward to hearing more
about that. The last question I have, and that is for each of
you, going forward, you have heard all of the things we have
done this year in this committee and things we have delved
into, but we have got a whole nother year in this session of
Congress. So give me just a brief, real brief, your ideas on
what we should delve into going forward. I have got a year to
plan here.
Ambassador Noriega. Great. Two things. Focusing on the
threat of transnational organized crime, the crosscutting
impact that criminality has in the hemisphere and transit
zones, weak states in Central America, even a strong state in
Mexico, sorely tested to meet that international threat. And it
is an asymmetrical threat that has asymmetrical responses; that
is to say, rifle shots, executive sanctions, OFAC sanctions
against individuals who are laundering money. You could have a
dramatic impact with that sort of move.
And then an emphasis on the economic revitalization. Start
talking about how do you get--encourage countries to retool
their economies? You know, we are not going to be talking about
grand international trade agreements, but we have to get back
to basics. All prosperity is local. These countries need to
retool their economies so they can invite investment; they can
incentivize sustainable private sector growth, create jobs, and
start to meet the basic needs of their people. That happens,
you know, with free market policies. And I think we should be
unabashed advocates for that kind of program.
Mr. Duncan. Ms. Long, your top one or two.
Ms. Long. I will adopt the Ambassador's number one.
Number two is we are quickly losing our role as the
security cooperation partner of choice, in part because we
haven't engaged, and one would argue we can't engage. But there
is going to be real implications, not to what China is doing in
the Pacific and not to what Russia is doing in Ukraine, but
those two actors are moving in significant ways into the
region. It is still nascent, and we haven't seen the results of
it yet, but when you have 140 or 170-plus Russian advisers in
Nicaragua, which we can all count on that being at least 10
times that amount--and it is not the numbers; it is the roles.
One recent person just told me there are Spetsnaz. Whatever
they are doing, we have got artillery delivered. We certainly
know there are artillery advisers. Just having that in our
backyard--with all of the problems that we have got with porous
borders, corruption, money, and other flows--is really
dangerous. And that chicken will come home to roost when it is
too late. And we have an opportunity now to reengage and
reengage effectively, and we need to do so.
Mr. Duncan. Doctor?
Ms. Arnson. I would say that a key priority is to support
the peace process in Colombia and the post-accord era. I think
it is unrealistic to expect that a peace accord is going to
mean the end of violence; it is going to mean that all FARC
members are going to lay down his or her weapons. That did not
happen with the AUC paramilitary demobilization, many of whom
have recycled into the so-called bacrim, the criminal bands.
And I think some portion of the FARC will do that. I also think
that there is an ongoing threat from the ELN and that there
will be an important role in trying to end the insurgency by
the ELN. In a bipartisan way, the United States has provided
approximately $9 billion to Colombia. A big mistake would be to
reduce our assistance in the post-accord era to the current
levels of maintaining a couple of hundred million a year.
Colombia is going to face enormous challenges. The resources
available to the state at a time of low oil prices are much
diminished. And I think it will be incumbent on the
international community, including the United States, to
support, financially and politically, the peace process.
I think another important issue for the committee will be
to pay attention to what is happening to those who became
middle class during the boom decade of the 2000s, those who
remained as vulnerable, and what is happening to them both
economically and, more importantly, politically in the coming
year or two, in the foreseeable future.
And then a third, if I might permit myself, is to continue
to help with institutional strengthening, to bolster the
ability of governments and civil societies to combat corruption
through strengthening of institutions and independent
mechanisms for control and oversight.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I want to thank each of you for that. I
mean how many committee chairmen ask for your input on what we
should look at going forward? But I think it is important
because of your expertise in the region.
I look at Latin America this way. We spend a lot as a
Nation, we spend a lot of time and money and effort in parts of
the world where people don't like us very much; where they
don't speak the language; we have different cultural
backgrounds. I look at Latin America and I see a shared
culture; I see a shared religion than I see in most countries;
and I just see a lot of commonality and a lot of opportunity
for America, not only American businesses, but for American
Government to get reengaged in this region with our friends and
our neighbors here. And that is really what I hope we will
continue to push forward in this subcommittee.
And so I appreciate your excellent testimony here today. I
apologize more members weren't here to ask questions because I
think they missed a very prime opportunity to delve into some
of the key issues in the region.
But I will say the ranking member and I are focused. We
work very well together, and I look forward to working with him
going forward and each of you.
And with there being no further business, we will stand
adjourned.
The ranking member.
Mr. Sires. Before we end, I just want to thank you,
Chairman, for the work that we have done throughout the year.
It has been a very bipartisan, very good relationship. I was
very fortunate; I had Matt Salmon also as chairman. And it is
the best times that I have had here in Congress, regardless of
being in the minority, working with these two chairmen.
And South America, Central America, and, obviously, being
from Cuba, I am very concerned about what is happening in Cuba.
You know, since all this--over 7,000 people put in jail, and
everything that is going on on the island--it is becoming more
oppressive than before. And it is funny, we mentioned Brazil,
because I was in Brazil a month--we were in Brazil with the
previous chairman and almost a month to the day when all the
riots started. And they took us through Maracana Stadium, where
they spent $500 million, to see the construction. And it was
chaotic, but they got it done. But I think one of the things
that ignited a lot of the people in the area was that they took
away the ability of the common people to go to this Maracana
Stadium and watch the football games because it became more
expensive. Whereas, before, you had the common people--I
shouldn't say ``common people''--but you had people able to
afford to go into the football games. And, you know, they
showed us everything. They showed us all the railroads and
everything else. Then, when we came back, we were very excited.
But a month later, all hell broke loose. People started
demonstrating. I think it hasn't stopped, quite frankly.
But, again, Chairman, thank you very much. It has been a
great year.
And I look forward to having you in the future as panelists
with us.
Mr. Duncan. I assure the ranking member we aren't going to
take our eye off Cuba, and look forward to continuing to look
into that.
You know, you are talking about cutting the common man out
of being able to go a sports game, a soccer or football game in
Brazil; I would say the NCAA here is about to price the common
person out of going to a college football game. It is crazy.
With that, there being no further business, we will stand
adjourned. And Merry Christmas to everyone.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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