[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 8, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-124
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BRAD SHERMAN, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TED POE, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
MATT SALMON, Arizona KAREN BASS, California
DARRELL E. ISSA, California WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
PAUL COOK, California ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas GRACE MENG, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CURT CLAWSON, Florida BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
DANIEL DONOVAN, New York
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DARRELL E. ISSA, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
PAUL COOK, California BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
His Excellency Husain Haqqani, director for South and Central
Asia, The Hudson Institute..................................... 5
Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D., senior research professor, School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University....... 18
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, executive director, Nonproliferation
Policy Education Center........................................ 24
George Perkovich, Ph.D., vice president for studies, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.............................. 34
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
His Excellency Husain Haqqani: Prepared statement................ 8
Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 20
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski: Prepared statement........................ 26
George Perkovich, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................... 36
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 54
Hearing minutes.................................................. 55
Mr. Henry D. Sokolski: Material submitted for the record......... 56
CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN: PROSPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit
statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record,
subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Since the United States entered into a civil nuclear
cooperation agreement with India in 2005, Pakistan has pressed
for a similar arrangement. Pakistan sent a 56-page document to
the U.S. officials in 2010 reiterating its request for U.S.
support for its civilian nuclear program. Since 2010, U.S.
officials have hinted at the possibility of this prospect. U.S.
Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson commented at the time
that we were ``beginning to have a discussion with Islamabad
about this issue.'' She noted that, while the U.S. had serious
nonproliferation concerns, we are beginning to pass on those.
Nothing came out of those discussions. This past October,
news outlets suddenly reported that the administration was
allegedly revisiting this possibility. Administration officials
quickly denied these claims, but this serious and recurring
topic requires more examination. Discussions about a potential
nuclear deal could send the wrong message to Pakistan, in my
opinion, the Benedict Arnold of American allies.
Pakistan crossed the nuclear weapons threshold in 1985
under the direction of the notorious scientist A.Q. Khan. In
the very early years of the network, Khan established an
extensive clandestine network in order to obtain necessary
technologies and materials. Later on, Khan used similar
channels to make a profit by selling nuclear designs and
materials to other countries.
The A.Q. Khan network is believed to have sold sensitive
nuclear technology to the most unstable countries on the
planet. It was the Khan network that allowed North Korea to get
its uranium enrichment program up and running. Khan also sold
Libya design secrets and nuclear weapons components during the
same time. In 1987, Iran admitted to international inspectors
that Khan's network provided scientists with centrifuge
specifications and equipment.
So we have North Korea, we have Libya, and we have Iran.
Pakistani scientists even met with Osama bin Laden in 1998 to
discuss how to create a nuclear bomb. The full extent of the
network's illicit proliferation remains unknown because
Pakistan just won't come clean.
Pakistan's ties to terrorists do not end with the
discussions about nuclear weapons. Pakistan has a long history
of supporting terrorist proxies as a way of increasing its
leverage in the region. Pakistan maintains close links with the
Afghan Taliban, even allegedly holding direct meetings with
senior leaders and coordinating attacks.
There is evidence that Pakistan worked closely with Al
Qaeda, helping the terrorists move arms and fighters in and out
of Afghanistan to kill U.S. troops. In 2011, Admiral Mike
Mullen, then Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
testified before Congress that Pakistan supported numerous
terrorist attacks by the Haqqani network in Afghanistan against
American troops. What an indictment.
One truck bombing at the NATO outpost south of Kabul on
September 10, 2011, killed at least 5 people and wounded 77
coalition soldiers. The attack was one of the worst tolls for
foreign troops in a single attack in the war. Another Pakistan-
supported Haqqani network was an assault on the U.S. Embassy
that killed 16 Afghan police officers and civilians. Mullen
said, ``The Haqqani network acts as a veritable arm of the
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency.''
Meanwhile, Pakistan is among the leading recipients of U.S.
foreign assistance post-9/11. Congress has appropriated more
than $30 billion in assistance to Pakistan between 2002 and
2015. Instead of talking about the possibility of rewarding
Pakistan with a nuclear deal, we should be enforcing the
consequences for Pakistan's bad behavior. It seems ironic to me
we keep sending money to Islamabad while Pakistan continues
supporting terrorist groups that have killed American troops.
This has got to cease.
There are more steps in stopping its support for terrorists
that Pakistan needs to take before we could even entertain the
possibility of some kind of new type of nuclear agreement with
them. They should start with disclosing exactly who they have
given nuclear technology to. They need to fess up.
Pakistan should slow down its rapid production of nuclear
weapons. Pakistan already has 110 to 130 nuclear warheads and
enough material to bring that total up to 400 to 500. If it
continues on its current pace, it will surpass the United
Kingdom as the fifth-largest nuclear-weapons state in the
world.
A civilian nuclear cooperation agreement would legitimize
the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and reward Islamabad for
its long history of bad behavior. We have already signed a bad
agreement with Iran; we cannot afford to enter into another bad
nuclear agreement that would further endanger not just American
security but global security.
And that's the way it is.
I will now yield to the ranking member from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating, for his opening statement.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to the witnesses who appear today.
As we consider the issue of possible future civil nuclear
cooperation with Pakistan, it is important to keep in mind that
no agreement of any kind is on the table or appears very likely
in the near future. Recent talks between the United States and
Pakistan on this subject seem to be preliminary, and there is
little indication at this juncture that Pakistan would agree to
the sorts of constraints on the nuclear arsenal on which the
United States would insist. Any arrangement allowing for U.S.
civilian nuclear cooperation with Pakistan is hypothetical at
this point.
With that said, Pakistan's security situation and its
disputes with India present many serious risks. And I look
forward to the testimony today on how best the United States
can act to manage these risks. Many analysts view Pakistan's
nuclear weapons and the risks that these weapons could fall
into the hands of terrorists or be used by Pakistan in an armed
conflict with India as one of the world's most dangerous
problems.
In addition to being a nuclear-arms state in an extremely
dangerous neighborhood, Pakistan presents other difficulties,
as well. Pakistan has a history of proliferation. The network
led by one of the founders of its nuclear program, A.Q. Khan,
sold nuclear-weapons-related equipment and technology to Iran,
Libya, and North Korea.
Further, while the United States partners with Pakistani
counterterrorism activities, Pakistan has sometimes failed to
tackle and elements of the government have lent even active
support to violent extremist organizations, such as LET in
Kashmir and Haqqani and the network that it organizes in
Afghanistan. Perhaps most disturbingly, Pakistan's intelligence
service, the ISI, is reported to have provided considerable
assistance to LET in planning the November 2008 terrorist
attacks in Mumbai that killed 166 people, including 5 U.S.
citizens.
To be sure, Pakistan is a difficult partner in
counterterrorism, just as it can be with respect to
counterproliferation. Yet the issues of the security of
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the prevention of further
proliferation of Pakistan's nuclear equipment and technology,
and deescalating nuclear tensions with India are not issues the
United States can ignore. We must engage with Pakistan on these
critical subjects.
I look forward to the information and discussion today of
our witnesses on how best we can work with Pakistan and other
stakeholders on these issues.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair will recognize the gentleman from California, Mr.
Sherman, for a 1-minute opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was once chairman of this subcommittee. I see the ranking
membership is in great hands. But one of the reasons why I
moved over to Asia is I believe the greatest threat we have of
the use of nuclear weapons is indeed in South Asia.
I don't think that there is any chance that a civil nuclear
deal would be approved by Congress, but that doesn't mean that
we shouldn't be talking to the Pakistanis about it. And I think
our focus should be not to punish Pakistan for the
proliferation of the past but to see if we can get an
improvement in Pakistani behavior in the future.
Pakistan is the world's only schizophrenic nuclear power.
Pakistan doesn't just confuse anyone who studies it, it is, in
fact, confused. Just the military elements are simultaneously
fighting terrorists on the ground, at great cost, and
supporting terrorists at the same time.
And we see India, which needs to be persuaded that if there
is a terrorist attack it cannot respond by pushing its military
across the border, and Pakistan, which must be persuaded that
no matter what happens with conventional weapons they cannot
cross the line to nuclear. And there is no such thing as a
small nuclear weapon.
So I look forward to the gentlemen in front of us telling
us how we can easily solve this problem.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. Without objection, all members will have 5 days to
submit statements and questions and extraneous materials for
the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.
Without objection, all the witnesses' prepared statements
will be made part of this record.
I ask that each witness will keep their presentation to no
more than 5 minutes.
As you probably heard, the bells are ringing. We are voting
again. We will adjourn at some appropriate time, or recess at
some appropriate time, so that we can vote.
I will introduce each witness and then give each of you
time to summarize your statements.
Ambassador Haqqani is a Pakistan scholar and public figure
who served as Pakistan's Ambassador to the United States from
2008 to 2011. He is widely credited with managing a difficult
period of U.S. and Pakistan relations during the global war on
terrorism.
Mr. Ambassador, welcome for being here.
Dr. Daniel Markey is a senior research professor at the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International
Studies. Previously, he was a senior fellow for India,
Pakistan, and the South Asia at CFR, where he specialized in
security and governance issues.
Mr. Henry Sokolski is currently the executive director of
the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. He previously
served in the Pentagon as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy
and received a medal for outstanding public service from the
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney.
It is good to have you back before our subcommittee.
And Dr. George Perkovich is vice president for studies at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he
focuses on nuclear strategy, nonproliferation issues, and South
Asian security. He is also the author of the prize-winning
book, ``India's Nuclear Bomb.''
At this time, the subcommittee will be in recess until this
series of votes are over. We will be back, and then we will get
to hear what you have to say about this complex issue. Thank
you, gentlemen.
We will be in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Poe. The subcommittee will come to order.
For everyone's information, it is my understanding that
this series of interruptions will continue for the foreseeable
evening, but let's see how far we can go.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR FOR SOUTH
AND CENTRAL ASIA, THE HUDSON INSTITUTE
Ambassador Haqqani. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
this opportunity to share with you and members of this
committee my views on U.S.-Pakistan relations in general and
the civil nuclear cooperation in particular.
My written statement is already in front of the committee.
Fundamentally, my point is that, although the Obama
administration and Pakistani officials have both officially
stated that formal negotiations are not currently underway for
a civil nuclear deal for Pakistan, it is obvious that at least
some elements of the current administration think that they can
secure a change in Pakistan's policies by offering it a nuclear
accord along the lines offered to India.
It is argued that, in return for Pakistan agreeing to
restrict its nuclear program to weapons and delivery systems
that are appropriate to its actual defense needs against
India's nuclear threat, quote, deg.``the United
States might support an eventual waiver for Pakistan by the 48-
nation Nuclear Suppliers Group.''
Pakistani officials have already said that, since they
already get their nuclear materials from China, there is no
advantage to them of membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
The expectation that Pakistan would limit its nuclear
arsenal is similar to the unrealistic expectation during the
1980s that supplying Pakistan with large amounts of economic
aid and state-of-the-art military equipment, including F-16
aircraft, would lead to Pakistan stopping short of developing
nuclear weapons altogether.
In my written testimony, you will actually find exact
quotes from American officials who at that time reassured and
assured Congress several times that support for Pakistan's
conventional military buildup was the only way to save Pakistan
from going nuclear. And we all know where that led us.
The reason why such mistakes have been made--and I have
written an entire book on the subject--is because American
officials often fail to understand Pakistan's ambitions in
South Asia and the policies that follow from those ambitions.
If the purpose of Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons
had been just to ensure that Pakistan was not overrun by a
superior Indian military force, which is a legitimate defense
goal, that objective was met by Pakistan nuclear tests
conducted in 1998. Pakistan has refused to abjure first use of
nuclear weapons in a conflict, a position similar to that of
North Korea, which also claimed that it feared being overrun by
a superior conventional force.
The most likely scenario for nuclear conflict or military
escalation on the subcontinent at the moment involves
escalation resulting from terrorism of the kind we all
witnessed in Mumbai in 2008.
Notwithstanding attempts in the United States to sell the
prospect of a deal as a restraint on Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities, Pakistan's leaders see parity with India as the
only reason they should seek a civil nuclear deal with the
United States. Ever since the U.S.-India's nuclear deal of
2005, as Mr. Chairman, you pointed out, Pakistan's leaders have
sought a similar deal to affirm that the two South Asian
neighbors are equal in status and prestige.
American readiness to look the other way at Pakistan's
conduct, such as support for jihadi terrorists, including the
Afghan Taliban and the discovery of Osama bin Laden in a
Pakistani garrison town, as well as U.S. willingness to offer
aid to Pakistan even without fulfillment of conditionality
mandated by Congress on the basis of Secretary of State's
waivers has often ended up as an enabler of Pakistan's
dysfunction.
I would argue that Pakistan's dysfunction stems from its
desire to compete with India. Instead of discussing civil
nuclear deals and selling more military equipment to Pakistan,
U.S. officials should convince Pakistan that its ambitions of
rivaling India are akin to Belgium trying to rival France or
Germany. India's population is 6 times as large as Pakistan's,
while India's economy is 10 times bigger and growing. India's
$2 trillion economy has managed consistent growth, whereas
Pakistan's $245 billion economy has grown sporadically and is
undermined by jihadist terrorism and domestic political chaos.
Pakistan also continues to depend on Islamist ideology
through its school curricula, propaganda, and Islamic
legislation to maintain internal nationalist cohesion, which
inevitably encourages extremism and religious intolerance.
It must be understood that, like all nations, Pakistan has
a right to defend itself, and nobody denies it that right.
Pakistan's concern about resolution of the dispute over Jammu
and Kashmir also deserves attention, albeit by peaceful means.
But Pakistan's security needs should be judiciously
examined. Unlike other countries, Pakistan did not raise an
army to match the threats it faces. Pakistan inherited 33
percent of British India's army, raised for the Second World
War, at independence in 1947, and has sought to identify
threats that matched the size of that army.
Pakistan is the sixth-largest nation in the world by
population but only 26th by size of GDP on a purchasing power
parity basis and 42nd in nominal GDP. It has the world's sixth-
largest nuclear arsenal and eighth-largest army but performs
poorly in most nonmilitary indices. Pakistan's literacy rate
stands at 52 percent, and the country has one of the highest
percentages of out-of-school children in the world.
The military and intelligence services that dominate
Pakistani national security decision making have sacrificed
their country's prosperity and progress in their relentless
pursuit of military competition with India. Forcing New Delhi's
hand on Kashmir has become more important than educating
Pakistan's children.
Since the 1950s, U.S. policy has ended up nurturing
Pakistan's military and keeping alive its dream of parity with
India----
Mr. Poe. Summarize your comments, Mr. Ambassador. We have a
long way to go. Your statements are in the record, so summarize
your final comments.
Ambassador Haqqani. My final comment is that raising the
prospect of a civil nuclear deal with Pakistan without
addressing the country's dysfunction and militarism will aid
neither U.S. policy objectives nor the people of Pakistan, who
are perhaps the biggest victims of the national elite's
erroneous policies.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Haqqani follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Dr. Markey, you have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. MARKEY, PH.D., SENIOR RESEARCH
PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS
HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Mr. Markey. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to
testify about the potential ramifications of a civil nuclear
agreement with Pakistan.
Obviously, this has already been submitted for the record,
so I will give some brief remarks now. Let me jump right to my
bottom line.
A nuclear deal of the sort that is reportedly being
discussed with Pakistan is hardly the blockbuster that some
commentators in the media would have us believe. It is less
than meets the eye. Even so, discussions of a nuclear deal are
poorly timed and, if pursued further, would be more likely to
prove counterproductive to other near-term security interests
than to deliver significant benefits.
Now, in the abstract, I can imagine a good nuclear deal
with Pakistan. And we should expect that diligent and creative
American diplomats are exploring various options for securing
and limiting the expansion of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. And
if, as some analysts propose, Pakistan could be encouraged to
commit to important limits on its nuclear program, then U.S.
policymakers would have more and better reasons to think
seriously about ways we could bring Pakistan into the world's
nuclear order.
But I don't think that Washington or Islamabad is actually
ready to have serious conversations along these lines. I see no
indication that Pakistan's military leadership is inclined to
place voluntary limits on the growth of its nuclear arsenal.
That arsenal has always been justified as a deterrent against
Indian aggression, and Indo-Pakistani relations are stuck in
hostility.
India, as a rising power, is expanding its military. This
will continue because India competes not only with Pakistan but
also with China. Any Indian military sized to deal with
Pakistan alone would be insufficient to defend against China,
while any program sized to deal with China would pose a
menacing threat to Pakistan. And because Pakistan uses its
nuclear program to make up for India's superior conventional
military power, the chances of Islamabad accepting nuclear caps
while India's military grows are slim.
In sum, this triangular security dilemma between China,
India, and Pakistan, or maybe even quadrilateral security
dilemma if you include the United States, is a structural
dynamic that favors persistent competition, most of all by the
weakest player--that is, Pakistan.
Now, even if Pakistan were to take incremental steps to
limit the future growth of its nuclear program, I suspect and I
think the comments already made here today reinforce the notion
that that would not be sufficient reason for the United States
to champion Pakistan's mainstreaming in the global nuclear
order. Placing limits on future nuclear growth would do too
little to address our current concerns about Pakistan's nuclear
arsenal. And that arsenal poses significant and serious
threats, including that of insider theft, onward proliferation,
accident sabotage, or unauthorized use.
So, in other words, I doubt our own ability or our
interests in delivering on even limited diplomatic benefits
that Pakistan would expect if it committed to slowing or
stopping the growth of its arsenal, which I already said is
unlikely.
Now, worst of all, the nuclear discussion shifts attention
away from the other issues that worry us in Pakistan. Now, at
present, the U.S. State Department has trouble certifying that
Pakistan's military has targeted the Haqqani network that has
so viciously attacked U.S., Afghan, Indian, and coalition
partners in Afghanistan. And U.S. officials do not believe that
Pakistan has seriously tried to go after Lashkar-e-Taiba, the
terrorist group responsible for Mumbai.
Now, several other pressing issues also deserve more
attention in a U.S.-Pakistan dialogue than does a nuclear deal.
To start, Washington needs Islamabad's commitment to advance
any hope of a reconciliation process with the Afghan Taliban--
again, an unlikely thing but something that is currently an
essential pillar in the Obama administration's war-termination
strategy in Afghanistan.
And relations between Pakistan and India are also troubled.
U.S. officials would be smart, I think, to encourage a
resumption of their formal and back-channel dialogues, if
principally as a tactic to forestall a future crises. And I was
happy to see the news just this past week of NSA-led-level
talks in Bangkok between India and Pakistan.
And Washington also has much to discuss with Pakistan about
the state of its own counterterror and counterinsurgency
operations inside Pakistan, from its tribal areas to its major
urban centers.
Now, if these short-term agenda items were somehow
exhausted, Pakistan's current condition raises other
fundamental questions about its long-term relationship with the
United States. Its fragile economy, its troubled civil-military
relations, its bloody sectarian cleavages, anti-U.S. prejudices
all inhibit trust-based partnership.
In sum, this is a big country, an important location, with
nearly insurmountable challenges at home and with its
neighbors. And my concern is that, by turning senior-level
attention to a nuclear deal, Washington sends a wrong and
counterproductive message to Pakistan, as we have in the past.
We are too likely to come across as distracted, unable to set
and maintain priorities, and suffering from unfounded
expectations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Dr. Markey.
Mr. Sokolski, 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY D. SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. Sokolski. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, thank
you for inviting me to testify today.
I ask that, in addition to my testimony, one two-page
addition be entered into the record, if that is okay.
Mr. Poe. Without objection.
Mr. Sokolski. Thank you.
I would like to focus on two points: First, why offering
Pakistan civilian nuclear incentives is self-defeating; second,
why implementing title 5 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of
1978, which calls for nonnuclear cooperation and energy
assessments for developing states, would make more sense.
Several U.S. analysts recently championed offering Pakistan
civilian nuclear incentives like those we have extended to
India. They argue the U.S. could offer Pakistan a 123 agreement
as it did for India or sponsor Pakistan's entry into the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, as it is now trying to do with India.
This would enable Islamabad to acquire Nuclear Supplier Group-
controlled nuclear goods and a portion of the equal treatment
that it seeks.
Short of NSG membership, they argue, the U.S. might push
the NSG to waive restrictions on NSG-controlled exports to
Pakistan, something the NSG has already done at Washington's
urging for India. This line of thinking appears to have been
behind the administration's recent talks with Pakistani
officials.
In the end, however, no deal was cut. This should not be
surprising. First, offering civilian nuclear incentives to
moderate Pakistan's nuclear posture is diplomatically risky.
Pakistan and China may object to the U.S. pushing for India's
membership in the NSG, but trying to address their concerns by
offering Pakistan NSG membership or an NSG waiver is not only
certain to upset India but Pakistan, which demands being
treated in an identical fashion with India.
This, though, would require sealing a formal nuclear
cooperative agreement that would upset India even more and
cause a possible backlash here on the Hill. It would also
likely prompt Israel to ask for similar treatment, which, in
turn, would complicate nuclear restraint efforts in the Middle
East.
Second, it undermines nuclear restraint. The U.S. tried
trading civilian nuclear incentives with India in 2008.
Washington persuaded the NSG to allow India to import uranium
for its civilian nuclear program. Yet this has only allowed
India to dedicate more of its meager domestic uranium
production to military purposes. Bizarrely, then, our peaceful
nuclear initiative with India now is enabling India to make
more bombs. Thus, Chairman Corker of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee recently noted that his vote in favor of
the deal back in 2008 was a mistake, that it has only
undermined international nuclear restraint. Certainly,
Pakistan's military would benefit no less from access to
internationally available advanced nuclear technology and
goods.
Finally, nuclear power is a poor form of energy assistance.
The USAID, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank,
institutions dedicated to upgrading Pakistan's energy system,
have all focused on nonnuclear projects. These include
Pakistan's electrical distribution system--only roughly half of
Pakistanis are able to connect to the central grid; reforming
the financial management of its utilities, which continually
fail to collect payment for electricity supplied; increasing
energy efficiency--Pakistan's rating is among the world's
worst; and preventing electrical theft, which accounts for a
disturbing percentage of the electricity consumed; increasing
utilization of natural gas, hydropower, solar, and wind
resources, of which Pakistan has a considerable amount; and
development of gas and oil pipelines.
These outfits understand what several detailed energy
assessments have determined: Nuclear power can only supply a
small fraction of Pakistan's electrical needs and is extremely
expensive. By now, we should all know this.
Much of New Delhi's nuclear weapons program was a direct
result of Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Program. I note this is
the 62nd anniversary today of that program. India's first bomb
came from plutonium produced in a Canadian reactor, moderated
with U.S.-supplied heavy water, reprocessed in a U.S.-designed
plant. India promised material to be strictly used for peaceful
purposes. The rest is history.
Recently, though, we compounded matters with the 2008 India
nuclear deal. We need to stop pushing such deals. At a minimum,
Congress should demand that the Executive implement title 5 of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which calls for nonnuclear
cooperation and energy assessments with developing states.
Much of this work is currently done by AID but not under
the act. The act calls for country-specific assessments, annual
reports, and the creation of a nonnuclear energy peace corps.
Unfortunately, it has never been implemented. After 37 years
and the recent events regarding Pakistan, Congress should hold
a hearing and find out why.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]
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Mr. Poe. And Dr. Perkovich.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE PERKOVICH, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR
STUDIES, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Perkovich. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member
Keating.
I won't repeat what my colleagues have said, and I agree
with much of it. Fundamentally, there is not going to be a
nuclear deal like was reported in the press for reasons that my
colleagues have mentioned. But I think that the very idea and
the discussion that we are having is useful because it allows
us and you to elucidate and think through some of the issues
that are involved.
I would begin by saying that the proliferation damage done
by the Khan network is an enormous fact. It is an enormously
important fact. But, at some point, the question then arises
whether and when to learn from this fact and try to create new
facts that are more propitious. Because if we have the status
quo that happened in the past and that becomes the future, it
is not anything that any of us would welcome.
Now, one way to deal with it is to propose new punishments
to try to change Pakistan's behavior. But I am not aware of
anybody who suggests doing that over nuclear policy in Pakistan
today, in part because Pakistan's actions to secure its nuclear
arsenals and cooperate with the U.S. and the Department of
Energy in that domain, which is very important for
counterterrorism, has largely been positive. So what we are
most worried about now is actually the expansion and future
growth of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and the implications of
that for stability.
So the question, then, is, you know, what can and should be
done to motivate Pakistan to continue to improve its controls
over nuclear materials and facilities and also to limit the
growth of its nuclear arsenal?
One answer is to just continue to isolate Pakistan and not
deal with them. And that could go on forever as a policy.
Indeed, that is the implication of a number of policies that we
are practicing. The problem with that is obvious, which is, if
Pakistan is facing that forever, what incentives do they have
to change the course they are on?
So another answer is to try to offer Pakistan ways to end
its isolation by building international confidence that it is
managing its nuclear program to standards comparable to those
of other nuclear-armed states and that it is going to limit its
nuclear forces. And I think that is the objective that the
Obama administration reportedly pursued. And for reasons that
we have talked about, Pakistan is not going to agree to that.
Now, there is another way that you could begin to pursue
these objectives, and that would be to convey that no states
that possess nuclear weapons outside of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty--so that means Israel, India, and Pakistan--none of
those states would be offered membership in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group without having met criteria that the NSG would
have established. And those criteria, at a minimum, would deal
with the security of nuclear facilities and materials but also
could cover the nonexpansion of the nuclear arsenal.
These NSG criteria would be established, and so only states
that met those criteria could be admitted. But it also would
mean that any state that did get admitted, such as India,
wouldn't be able to then block any other state forever from
joining. Because the Nuclear Suppliers Group operates by
consensus. Once India is in, as Obama is proposing, they can
block Pakistan forever. And that is, in a sense, an incentive
for unwelcome behavior in Pakistan.
Now, my colleagues have talked about some of the reasons
that Pakistan won't agree, actually, to any of the things that
could plausibly be proposed. I agree with all that. The
fundamental issue is that Pakistan insists upon having what
India has. And Ambassador Haqqani has written books on this;
his testimony is elucidating on this.
And the problem here is that the nuclear deal that we made
with India puts no limits on India's strategic nuclear
capabilities. There are no limits on its fissile material
production for weapons. There are no limits on the growth of
its nuclear arsenal. There are no limits on its missile program
and trajectory. And because of those reasons, the Pakistanis
say, well, we want that, but the United States is never going
to agree to no limitations in such an arrangement, and never
the twain shall meet.
So the only way to get at this problem is what Dan alluded
to, is you would need a process with China, with India, with
Pakistan and the U.S., all of us dealing with not only our
nuclear and missile programs but new programs like conventional
prompt global strike--the whole array of conventional and
nuclear weapons that drive all of these players in this
multifaceted competition. Anything less than that is not going
to actually get the kind of limitations the administration is
seeking.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perkovich follows:]
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----------
Mr. Poe. Thank you all for all of the information, valuable
information. And, of course, your official statements are part
of the record.
I will say this at the outset. Many members may have
questions in writing that will be submitted to you. They are
not in attendance. But look forward to, during the holidays,
answering some of those questions and sending them back to us.
I will start and yield myself 5 minutes for questions.
Dr. Markey, what is the name of the terrorist organization
responsible for the Mumbai terror attack?
Mr. Markey. Lashkar-e-Taiba.
Mr. Poe. And are they in Pakistan?
Mr. Markey. I believe, so, yeah.
Mr. Poe. How big are they?
Mr. Markey. Thousands.
Mr. Poe. And has Pakistan done anything to hold them
accountable for that attack?
Mr. Markey. Not nearly as much as we would like.
Mr. Poe. What have they done, briefly?
Mr. Markey. In brief, what they----
Mr. Poe. Nobody has been arrested, have they?
Mr. Markey. Well, yes, they have, but they weren't kept
locked up.
I think what they have done is they have tried to put a lid
on LET, on its operations, particularly any operations that
would cross into India, and to--they would claim, that is--try
to keep their violent activities to a minimum.
But what they haven't done and what is quite obvious to
anybody watching is keep a lid on LET's leadership or keep it
out of the media and keep it from organizing and from
conducting large-scale rallies in major Pakistani cities that
Indians, of course, and others see as profoundly troubling.
Mr. Poe. A question regarding nuclear proliferation. We
talked about what Pakistan--I mentioned about Pakistan helping
North Korea, Iran, and Libya develop nuclear weapon capability.
What about currently? Are they still sort of a rogue nation
helping deliver any type of nuclear capability to anyone,
terrorist organizations or nation-states?
Yes, sir, Mr. Sokolski?
Mr. Sokolski. The big question is what connection, if any,
will they possibly have in the future to Saudi Arabia. And
pundits love to say that will never happen, and pundits love to
say it will happen. We don't know.
Mr. Poe. So there is that possibility.
Mr. Sokolski. There is.
Mr. Poe. And if we agree to this type of nuclear agreement
with Pakistan, who is I don't think an ally of the United
States, then allies of the United States, such as Israel, will
want the same deal. Is that correct? Is that what you said, Mr.
Sokolski?
Mr. Sokolski. It is a problem.
I used to work for a man who just died, Harry Rowen, who
was Assistant Secretary of Defense, had to deal with these
problems. He always said that whenever he talked with Indians
and they brought up the topic of nuclear reactors or rockets he
would try to change the subject. Very good counsel. I think
changing the subject here is important.
In the case of Pakistan, one of the things they want is
equality at some level or recognition of their nuclear systems.
One of the things we probably would have to do if we wanted to
try to moderate their posture is think about some limit that we
could enter into as well as them.
One such thought, having to do with Saudi Arabia, is
perhaps it is time that we agree not to send nuclear weapons on
other countries' soil, beyond what we have already done, to any
additional countries, and they should agree to do so, as well.
I actually brought this up with some Pakistani generals. They
were very excited about the idea. That was some time ago. We
should take it up again, I think.
Mr. Poe. What is the effect of our continuing to give
foreign aid, military reimbursement to Pakistan? I understand
they are in the top five of all the countries that we give
foreign aid to. Has that done anything to bring Pakistan, their
rogue activities, whether it is support of terrorism or
anything else, to the table to deal candidly with the United
States?
Ambassador?
Ambassador Haqqani. The simple answer is no.
There have been some half-hearted and insufficient
measures. Right after 9/11, General Musharraf promised a
complete turnaround. You might recall that, at that time, the
administration believed that Pakistan had turned around, only
to find a few years later that support for Afghan Taliban was
continuing. Later on, of course, one faction of the Afghan
Taliban, the Haqqani network, became the big issue.
The problem there is that Pakistan's own view of its
national interest prompts it in acting very differently from
what it says that it will do to the United States, which are
commitments it has to make to Washington primarily to keep
getting that aid. So I have, in many of my writings, argued
that, in effect, that aid serves as a subsidy to Pakistan for
bad policies that the United States thinks it wants to have
changed.
Mr. Poe. One question, just yes or no. Should the United
States reevaluate its commitment to sending $1 billion,
approximately, a year to Pakistan?
Ambassador Haqqani. Yes. It should reevaluate.
And the reevaluation should be based on Pakistan's actual
needs. Pakistan's real needs right now are not more military.
Pakistan already has the world's eighth-largest military. But
48 percent of Pakistan's school-going-age children don't go to
school. So if American money was to be sent to Pakistan to help
Pakistan, it should be directed at those 48 percent school
children, not at the Pakistani military.
Unfortunately, money is fungible. That is why Congress, in
its Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, made it very clear
that the military should no longer control decision making
because then that enables the military to get the money
diverted to itself. Unfortunately, the provisions of the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act have all been subjected
to waivers rather than to the certification that Congress
desired.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Ambassador.
I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you.
We have another rollcall. I don't want to have you come
back for another series, so I am going to ask you to be very
brief. But a couple of things.
We were just approaching this, Ambassador. You wrote an
article in the Wall Street Journal. You know what it is,
obviously. But I want to ask you, in a sense, you are saying
part of the problem with Pakistan is the delusion that it is
the equal of India.
What is the U.S. doing to add to that delusion? What should
we be doing to change that delusion?
Ambassador Haqqani. In all Pakistani attempts at getting a
strategic calculus, there is always an assumption that they
will continue to have military assistance from the United
States in one form or another. So military assistance from the
United States makes Pakistan think that it can actually
qualitatively compete with the United States--although that is
becoming increasingly difficult, with American military
equipment being available to India as well. Previously, it was
not, especially during the Cold War. But I think that military
assistance does lead to that delusion, number one.
Number two, on almost all occasions, the administration, in
particular, tries to always try and assuage Pakistani feelings
whenever something happens in India-U.S. relations.
I think both those things need to change.
Mr. Keating. Let me just comment quickly, too. If we were
ever, hypothetically, to do a negotiation, it sounds very
naive, but who are we really dealing with in Pakistan? Is it
the ISI? Who is making the decisions?
Ambassador Haqqani. It is the Pakistani military, which
also controls the ISI. And, unfortunately, the military always
uses the excuse that the civilians are there, so it negotiated
with the civilians when the military doesn't want to deal. But
when the military wants something to be decided, they come do
you directly.
And, unfortunately, that is something you have encouraged
by talking to both separately, not insisting on civilian
control of military institutions as was provided for in the
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.
Mr. Keating. I also think that at the nucleus of a lot of
these issues is the fact that Pakistan, to be a modern and
thriving country, to compete with the countries they want to
compete with, they have to get control of their own economy and
their own revenue.
We have been there. I know the chair has been there. I have
been there. The revenue system there is incapable of supporting
any kind of modern economy.
Now, don't you think, before we are talking about these
other issues, or to not deal with these issues, we can't even
really begin to talk about the issues that are the centerpoint
of this hearing. I honestly think that is the starting point
there. And you touched upon it with the aid we have.
So could anyone comment on that? To me, that seems the
primary issue.
Ambassador Haqqani. Basically, aid has become a substitute
for revenue in Pakistan. Pakistan has one of the worst tax-GDP
ratios of any country in the world. And although every few
years, when the American direct aid is less than quantum and
the IMF is dealing with Pakistan, the IMF always insists on
Pakistan enhancing its tax base, but it is almost never done.
And for strategic considerations--which basically means
Pakistan is too big to fail, so, therefore, let's bail them
out--those considerations are always set aside.
Mr. Keating. I am reminded, in our own country, the former
Chair of the Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, at the end of his
nomination process, he was asked what was the most important
issue for the U.S. security or military, and he said, ``Our
economy.'' And I think this holds true here.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
We will be in recess for another vote. And as soon as that
vote is over, we will resume this hearing. Thank----
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, would you object if I asked
questions while you gentlemen are voting? Because I voted on
this Capps motion.
Mr. Poe. I will need to be here when you do it. So we won't
be gone long.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rohrabacher [presiding]. The subcommittee will come to
order.
And now you can see why American foreign policy is right on
target every time.
Mr. Perkovich. Now you are in charge.
Mr. Rohrabacher. There you go.
And I now call on my good friend from California, Mr.
Sherman, for his questions.
Mr. Sherman. I will address this one to Ambassador Haqqani,
but others can chime in, as well.
There has always been some dispute between Shiites and
Sunnis in Pakistan. As I understand it, General Bhutto was a
Shiite at a time when that did not preclude him from leading
Pakistan. There is cooperation sometimes between Iran and
Pakistan. At the same time, you see an intensification of
Shiite-Sunni terrorist acts in Karachi. Worldwide, the split
between Shiites and Sunnis has gotten considerably deeper as
the Alawite in Damascus has killed at least 200,000 Sunni
Muslims.
Is it politically difficult for Islamabad to cooperate with
Tehran given the worldwide intensification of the split between
the Shiites and the Sunnis?
Ambassador Haqqani. The short answer to the last part of
your question, Congressman, is that, yes, it is difficult for
Pakistan to cooperate with Tehran, although that hasn't stopped
individuals within the Pakistani Government, different branches
of the government, from cooperating.
Shias constitute 15 percent of Pakistan's population, but
relations between Shias and Sunnis generally have not been bad
since independence. The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, was Shia. Many members or Prime Ministers, specifically
Bhutto's government, were Shia. General Yahya Khan, who was one
of Pakistan's several military dictators, was Shia.
This is more of a recent phenomenon in the last 20, 30
years. It has evolved as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and
Iran that has resulted in sectarian killings in Pakistan.
The good part of it, of course, is that still we don't see
a bloodbath between Sunnis and Shias in towns where they live
together. And, as far as policies are concerned, Pakistan has
generally tended to side with Saudi Arabia rather than Iran on
most questions.
Mr. Sherman. But on proliferation issues, has Pakistan
cooperated with Iran?
Ambassador Haqqani. Well, the A.Q. Khan network certainly
supplied designs and equipment to Iran, although the Pakistani
Government took the position that those were unauthorized.
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Pakistan is 72-percent Punjabi--or correction, the military
is 72-percent Punjabi. The country is about 54-percent Punjabi.
And I would assume the officer corps is more than 72 percent;
and the generals, probably far, far more than that.
Does this cause dissatisfaction among the other ethnic
groups in Pakistan? And does that pose a risk for the military?
Do you see the military perhaps changing and making a point of
bringing in Sindhis and Baloch and Mohajir and other into the
military?
Ambassador Haqqani. The makeup of the Pakistan Army, in
particular, has changed very little since independence because
it was based on British Government's martial racist theory.
They basically thought that certain ethnic groups were more
martial than others, and they precluded groups such as the
Sindhis from joining the military.
Now, even if they make an attempt to try and have the army
reflect the ethnic makeup of the country, it would take many,
many years before a Sindhi who joins as a second lieutenant now
or a Baloch who joins as a second lieutenant now, that he will
have a shot at becoming a general.
Pakistan has not had a single Sindhi general ever in its
history, and it has had only one Baloch three-star general in
its history.
Mr. Sherman. Not even a one-star Sindhi? Wow.
Ambassador Haqqani. Not that I know of.
Mr. Sherman. And you say even if the Pakistani Army tried
to open it up it would take them a long time. Are they trying?
Ambassador Haqqani. They say that they are, but we all know
that on a lot of occasions and on a lot of subjects what they
say is not what is happening on the ground.
Mr. Sherman. We cooperate with Pakistan in a variety of
different categories. Does it make sense to compartmentalize
our relationship on nuclear issues and keep that separate from
our relationship on other issues--for example, terrorism?
Ambassador Haqqani. Personally, I think that it does not
make sense, for the simple reason that all cooperation feeds
into what I call Pakistan's military's delusion of equality,
not ``equality'' in a principle sense but ``equality'' in a
weapons-system-for-weapons-system sense, which is not easy to
do for a country as poor as Pakistan.
Mr. Sherman. They view themselves as the military equal of
the United States? Of India?
Ambassador Haqqani. Of India.
Mr. Sherman. Of India. Yeah.
Ambassador Haqqani. But I am sure that my colleagues here
would have some opinion on this matter, as well, because there
are many people who think that nuclear issues can be
compartmentalized from other issues. And I think it would be
fair to----
Mr. Sherman. Let's hear from Dr. Markey on that.
Mr. Markey. I think that you have to be careful about the
question of linkage across all of these issues. And, you know,
there is the Pakistan that we wish it would be, and it is
nothing like the Pakistan that really is. And that Pakistan is
a Pakistan that is deeply troubling. And it is also a Pakistan
that could be significantly worse. And so we are always caught
in a situation of just what kind of risk do we want to run.
With respect to stovepiping nuclear issues, there is
certainly the issue of just how sensitive they are, and there
is also the issue of the, sort of, technical aspects, which
leads then necessarily to this kind of stovepiped area that is
separate from others.
But with respect to how they fit into our broader concerns,
I think it has typically been the case that U.S. policymakers
have placed them at the top of our list and yet have seen that
our ability to reach in and do anything about it seriously--and
that is, you know, a lot of the topic that we are here to
discuss today, our ability to actually change their nuclear
policy--is very, very limited.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Perkovich?
Mr. Perkovich. I think you have to be prepared to separate
the issues and treat them separately, especially when there is
an opportunity to do something constructive. And there, it
would be self-defeating to link.
And just do the thought experiment. We are very concerned
about terrorism, for example. So if there were a new Al Qaeda
in Pakistan and we were aware of it, and all of a sudden they
were prepared to cooperate with us, we would do what it would
take to facilitate that, regardless of whether they improved
their tax collection or whatever else they are doing.
And so, on nuclear policy, both from the standpoint of
securing materials and facilities against terrorism or in a
crisis where you are worried about a nuclear war with India,
that becomes front and center, and you deal with that as you
have to, and you forsake linkage. So I think, you know, we
shouldn't be naive about the need to do that.
It is not exactly correct to say nuclear has always risen
to the top. And Henry knows this very well, as well. When the
Soviets invaded Afghanistan, for very understandable reasons,
beginning 1979 throughout the 1980s, the U.S. put
nonproliferation to the side and put driving the Soviets out of
Afghanistan as the number-one priority, and so didn't exercise
all of the leverage or even the legal authorities that it had
at the time to pressure Pakistan on nonproliferation.
Now, we don't need to relitigate that; there was a good
reason to do it. But it hasn't always been the case that
nuclear is the most pressing issue.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much.
And, as I am in the chair, I will yield myself whatever
time is necessary.
First and foremost, let me just note that I have had a
long, long relationship with Pakistan and with that part of
world. I was probably elected as Pakistan's best friend in
Congress. And I have to say that, during the 1980s, I was
involved with Pakistan at the highest level, in terms of
supporting the mujahideen fight against the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.
Even then, there were reasons for concern. The lion's share
of the supplies that we provided for the mujahideen went to
Hekmatyar Gulbuddin. And the ISI, which is the intelligence
unit there and their military intelligence in Pakistan,
intentionally gave the most radical of the elements most of the
weapons and supplies that we were providing.
I found that, even then, to be, you know, upsetting and not
thinking in terms of the long run, except I had assumed that
because the ISI military people I was working with were all
clean-shaven and looked like British officers that they were
not radicals. I think I made a mistake.
And so, after the Soviet Union was eliminated from
Afghanistan--which I am proud to have played a part in that
effort--there was a period of chaos, and the Taliban emerged.
Why did the Taliban take power? Taliban took power because the
people in Pakistan set it up and organized and supported and
supplied the Taliban and then cut a deal with the Saudis to
finance the Taliban. And, thus, the people of Afghanistan had
radicalism, the Taliban version, shoved down their throats and
started this whole cycle that has been so damaging.
Let me note, after that, after 9/11 and all the way up
until 9/11, the Pakistani ISI was deeply involved in supporting
the Taliban and, thus, terrorism--terrorism--throughout the
region and throughout the world.
And, after 9/11, yes, I am told that the Pakistanis became
very cooperative. I don't know the details about that. I would
assume they were cooperative at some point because we were, at
that point, willing to really do some damage to people who were
getting in our way of seeking revenge for the slaughter of
3,000 Americans on 9/11.
However, during that same period of the greatest height in
our concern, the Pakistani Government saw fit to give safe
haven to Osama bin Laden.
First of all, is there anyone on the panel who believes
that the high-level Pakistani authorities did not know that
Osama bin Laden was in their country? Is there anyone here who
could say, no, no, they didn't know, we got to give them the
benefit of the doubt?
No, I have never met anybody willing to say that.
And then, of course, since Osama bin Laden was brought to
justice, we have Dr. Afridi, the man who helped us bring him
to--he his been arrested by the Pakistani Government and thrown
into a dungeon. And, to me, that is an insult, an intentional
insult, to the American people, who have just seen our people
slaughtered, that they are going to do harm to the person who
helped us bring to justice the murderer of our people.
So all of those things lead me, kind of, to think that
maybe the Pakistan that I was supporting during the Cold War
because they were supporting the United States is--that was
either a really bad decision on my part back then, or we have
evolved into a situation where Pakistan was once our friend and
is now an enemy.
And I will let you guys comment on that. But let me note
one of our greatest adversaries now in the world, not an enemy
of ours but an adversary, is China. And it is not Russia
anymore. I mean, a lot of people want to have Russia as our
enemy again, but it isn't, as compared to China is our
adversary, possibly enemy. And Pakistan's Government is what?
Trying to have as a close a relationship to China has they can.
And that leaves us, then, with what other analysis can
they--we are talking about nuclear materials here today. We
have a country with all of that background, and we have to ask
ourselves, do they deserve our trust for a civilian nuclear
program?
And I am going to let each one of you answer that question,
but I want to leave one last item on the table. And that is the
Pakistani Government has to be judged on what they have done
and why that have done some of these things. Those things that
I just outlined are damaging to the security of the United
States and the peace of the world. But what they are doing, it
seems to me, to their own people, the Baloch, the Sindhis,
Christians, is unforgiveable and unconscionable.
And we have let it ride. We have just let it slide. We
continue giving them weapon systems that are used to destroy
Baloch villages. We give them weapons that, instead of being
used against the Taliban, are being used against people in
their own country who oppose their government. And I think that
is something that--all of these things are important
considerations.
So let me ask the panel, number one, none of you decided to
say that Pakistan probably didn't know that Osama bin Laden was
there. So let me just ask right down the line: Does the
Pakistani Government today deserve our trust when it comes to
this nuclear development?
If you could just give me about a 30-second answer on that,
and go right on down the line, that is fine.
Ambassador Haqqani. Congressman, I have already laid out my
views in my written testimony and in two books in which I make
the point that the focus of Pakistan has been--and American
interests and Pakistani interests do not converge. They have
not converged for a while.
During the Cold War, Pakistan was interested in getting
American military and economic assistance to compete with
India, and it made some concessions to America in return. The
problem is that in Washington there are always people who are
willing to see the Pakistani glass as half-full, and they don't
see it from the view of the Pakistani people.
Pakistan's children don't go to school, or 48 percent of
them don't go to school. The Baloch are being repressed. The
Mohajirs in Karachi are being repressed. Sindhis have their own
set of complaints. The support of the Taliban has actually
resulted in blow-back that has disrupted our own society. And
one institution, which is the Pakistani military, dominates all
others. That is not a healthy situation.
American policy should be directed at trying to force or
make or convince Pakistan into becoming a normal country where
schools run, where electricity is available, where the
aspirations of the people are answered, and not just some dream
of the military of great conquests, which it hasn't been able
to fulfill except when it is oppressing and repressing its own
people.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So the answer was ``no''?
Ambassador Haqqani. Absolutely. That was a rather long
``no,'' but yes, Congressman Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
Doctor?
Mr. Markey. Thank you.
I think the question about nuclear negotiations with
Pakistan should be judged--the utility of those negotiations
should be judged on whether they are realistic and whether they
could serve U.S. interests.
And I think, right now, the answer to the first question of
realism is ``no,'' it is unrealistic on both sides. And, at the
moment, the answer to the second question is also ``no.''
Mr. Sokolski. As I made clear in my testimony, I think it
is a bad idea generally to go running around the world with
nuclear carrots, particularly in the subcontinent. I would not
limit it to Pakistan. I don't think the India deal was a winner
either. And it seems to me, you can actually make things much
worse by playing with this.
If you need to negotiate, I would do it on the merits. And
I would, as you have laid out, expect performance as a function
of what it is you are willing to offer. And I don't think the
nuclear area offers very much practically, and it can be really
militarily dicey--that is to say, self-defeating. I would stay
clear of it.
Mr. Perkovich. I don't think these things are done on the
basis of trust. If they were, the answer would be a simple
``no.'' But as your former colleague or Governor first in
California--I am a Californian--President Reagan--you know,
``Trust but verify.'' I would always say, ``Distrust and
verify.'' And so that would be the proposition here.
And I don't think we are going to have an agreement, so I
don't think it is going to be an issue really.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, there are two factors.
Number one, we do have the technological capabilities of
building nuclear reactors today that will not have the waste
left over, like the Iranian reactor will, producing nuclear
weapons. And there is a whole new generation possible of
nuclear power plants. So, no matter what we would ever do, we
should--in fact, not just Pakistan but anyone that we are
involved with, expanding the realm of nuclear power should be
based on the new technology rather than the old technology.
Because we don't need no leftover material that can be used for
nuclear bombs. We don't need that anywhere. So that is the
number-one thought.
And let me just suggest that we give hundreds of millions
of dollars every year to Pakistan. I would hope that we come to
our senses and, number one, treat Pakistan as it deserves to be
treated by the decisions they have made that affect us. And all
of their recent decisions have been contrary to America's
security needs and contrary to the peace of the world.
So I would hope that we would--then I would hope that, if
we make those decisions, that the Pakistani people themselves
will understand what is going on, the repercussions of it, and
start insisting on people to govern them who are more
consistent with these values that we are expressing today.
So I would call on my colleagues to join me in eliminating
that aid that we are giving to Pakistan, at least until Dr.
Afridi is set free as a sign of good faith to us.
And, with that, I would recognize my good friend, who is
almost as outspoken as I am.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, panel, for being here today.
I am really grateful to be here with Congressman
Rohrabacher. I appreciate his persistence in regard to the
doctor, and that really should be so important for the
relationship that we have with Pakistan. Additionally, I
appreciate his expertise on nuclear reactors, as we just heard.
And so that is just very helpful.
My association and appreciation of South Asia is that my
dad served in the Flying Tigers during World War II. And of all
things--even Dana doesn't know this--but he departed by boat,
of all things, from Miami, Florida, went through the Suez Canal
in 1944 and landed at Karachi, and then went to service to
protect the people of China and South Asia. So I am just very
grateful, with that background.
And then I had the opportunity to actually see a remarkable
effort of cooperation, the earthquake relief in Muzaffarabad,
where American and Pakistani military worked together. And
there was a field hospital set up for female doctors to serve
the injured female citizens of that region. It was a remarkable
situation which I had hoped the people of Pakistan would see
the hopes that we have for their country.
And then, finally, a remarkable opportunity that I had that
is very sad in retrospect, Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto
visited my home community of Lexington, South Carolina, and was
a speaker at a dinner there for a local medical foundation. She
made such a great impression. My wife was so impressed. Sadly,
I was at her home in December 2007 and had breakfast, and 10
days later she was assassinated.
So it just is heartbreaking to think--and then, Ambassador,
for you to keep citing, correctly, the lack of education, that
just breaks your heart for a country that should be doing well.
Putting that in mind, Ambassador, would cooperation with
the U.S. be valuable enough for Pakistan for it to consider
joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
Ambassador Haqqani. While it would be in Pakistan's
interest to consider all options of joining nuclear restraint
regimes--because, very frankly, the pursuit of nuclear
competition will not necessarily be in Pakistan's interest--I
do not see that happening.
The opposition to joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty as
well as the CTBT has been very entrenched. And, so far,
Pakistan's establishment, as it is called, the Pakistani
military and the intelligence service, have shown no interest
in encouraging participation in those restraint regimes.
Mr. Wilson. And I appreciate you pointing out that it would
certainly be in the interest----
Ambassador Haqqani. Yes.
Mr. Wilson [continuing]. Of the people. It would actually
be in the interest of the military, the government, whatever.
But thank you for raising that.
And, Mr. Sokolski, with the three pillars of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, being nonproliferation,
disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear
technology, is it wise for the United States to enter into a
123 agreement with countries that cannot agree to these basis
tenets?
Mr. Sokolski. The three pillars you refer to is a doctrine
that was promoted first by the Italians and the South Africans.
It is not really in the treaty or even in the negotiating
record.
But just taking it nonetheless, I think, in general, you
have to have standards for the NPT to mean anything. And we
have been backing away from those standards too steadily over
the last, I would say, 20 years.
The key one--and I think a lot on the panel will agree on
this--was the India deal. I think that was a step backwards. So
we are a little bit on our back heels right now. But you do
want to insist on certain restraints that I don't think
Pakistan will agree to.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you for your insight.
And for any of you or all of you, currently, the Pakistani
civilian nuclear program consists of three operational
reactors. And we know that they have already entered into a 123
agreement with the Chinese.
Is the nuclear energy market in Pakistan large enough to be
attractive to the U.S. nuclear industry?
Mr. Sokolski. I would like to take that.
Most of the money that those reactors cost is financed by
China. Without that financing, there would be no construction.
So it is a negative market. In other words, you have to--
listen, you don't sell the reactor so much as the financing.
And I don't think that is a market that--I mean, I would
hesitate to speak on behalf of the industry, but I doubt they
are interested in going in.
Mr. Wilson. And, to me, that is very unfortunate.
Well, go ahead, please, Dr. Perkovich.
Mr. Perkovich. Just to add, Henry is right. And I think for
your thinking about this, too, there is no vendor other than
the Chinese who would seek to build nuclear power plants in
Pakistan for the reasons that Henry mentioned. Pakistan doesn't
have the money, and it is not a secure enough environment.
Now, one of the problems that that raises is that is why
the incentive that would be offered to the Pakistanis to
control their nuclear program, if it is, ``We will sell you
nuclear power plants,'' it is not really an incentive because
they know they can't buy these plants either. And so it is
another reason why this kind of deal won't actually work.
Mr. Wilson. Well, that is disappointing because I know, in
my home State of South Carolina, over 60 percent of all
electrical generation is clean, green nuclear. And it has
enabled us to compete with the rest of the world in terms of
manufacturing and living standards.
And I just hope that something can be done to address the
extraordinary issue of reliable electrical generation for the
people of Pakistan. And whatever that is, I am happy to try to
back each of you up.
Mr. Sokolski. Last night or, I guess, two nights ago, one
does research before they come here I hope, and I did. So what
do you do? You go on Google. And I plugged in ``USAID,''
``World Bank,'' ``Asian Development Bank,'' and I put in
``electrical generation.''
And what I got was really very disturbing. What you got
were IG reports on all of the fraud associated with the aid
that had been expropriated by the Pakistanis in ways that you
couldn't even get to, well, what were we trying do? When you
got to the third page of the entry, you were able to see that
USAID is trying to do a lot of sensible things. So is the Asian
Bank. But it is all non-nuclear. And as I explained in the
testimony, there are good reasons for that. It has to do with
the expense and the availability of things like natural gas.
So it is certainly something to hope for, but it certainly
is not something to start with. I think that is sort of the
basic point.
And the good-governance question overrides all economic
questions here. I mean, it is quite obvious. It is just
embarrassing that we have to see IG reports before you get to
what USAID wants to tell you. You know, it was a whole page of
them. It was very disheartening.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you for your research.
Thank you, each of you, for your insight.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you.
And Congressman Wilson has been a wonderful person to work
with over the years. And he takes this job very seriously, as
we all do.
And this issue today, I think, is of--it should crystalize
in our minds what we are dealing with in terms of Pakistan. Can
we trust the Pakistani Government to engage with us in a deal
concerning nuclear power? And if we can't, which is what I am
understanding today and which my common sense tells me, why are
we then giving so much aid, providing military equipment to a
government, a regime, that we can't even trust to deal with a
civilian electricity through nuclear energy program?
We need to reassess. The time is far past when we should
have made the decision. But today we need to make the decision
of reassessing our strategic position with Pakistan, trying to
push them in the right direction by letting them know there are
consequences to bad behavior and behavior that hurts other
people.
And so, with that said, I appreciate your testimony, the
insights you have given us today. I appreciate Congressman
Wilson being with us today and, of course, Judge Poe for
calling this hearing.
With that said, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Record
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Material submitted for the record by Mr. Henry D. Sokolski, executive
director, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
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