    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-70]

                         RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING:

                        VIOLATION OF THE INF TREATY AND

                         THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES

                                 ONE YEAR LATER

                                   __________

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   before the

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                              meeting jointly with

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     of the

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                              [Serial No. 114-138]

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                DECEMBER 1, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                       ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair   LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     PETE AGUILAR, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
                             Tim Morrison, Counsel
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                                     ------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          BRAD SHERMAN, California
    PAUL COOK, California                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
      Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed
      Services.......................................................     4
    Keating, Hon. William, a Representative from Massachusetts,
      Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
      and Trade, Committee on Foreign Affairs........................     4
    Poe, Hon. Ted, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
      Committee on Foreign Affairs...................................     2
    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services..     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
      International Security, U.S. Department of State...............     5
    McKeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
      Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.................     7

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    35
        Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E....................................    36
        McKeon, Hon. Brian P.........................................    43
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    33

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Graphic displayed by Mr. Rogers..............................    55
        Letter from Mr. Rogers and Mr. Poe to the Chairman of the
          Joint Chiefs of Staff......................................    56

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................    63
        Mr. Poe......................................................    63
        Mr. Rogers...................................................    59
        Mr. Turner...................................................    65

      RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING: VIOLATION OF THE INF TREATY AND THE
                   ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES ONE YEAR LATER

                                  ----------

            House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
                Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                Meeting Jointly with the Committee on Foreign
                Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism,
                Nonproliferation, and Trade, Washington, DC,
                Tuesday, December 1, 2015.

        The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
    room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on
    Armed Services) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
    ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE
                           ON ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome
    everyone to this joint hearing of the House Armed Services
    Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and the House Foreign Affairs
    Subcommittee on Terrorism, Trade, and Nonproliferation on
    ``Russian Arms Control Cheating: Violation of the INF Treaty
    and the Administration's Responses One Year Later.''
        Testifying today are the following witnesses: The Honorable
    Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary of State for International
    Security, Department of State; the Honorable Brian McKeon,
    Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,
    Department of Defense.
        This is an update to last year's hearing with these
    witnesses, and we are eager to learn what the administration
    has been doing since we met in open and closed sessions on this
    topic last December. Congress, as I promised last year, has not
    been sitting idle. The recently enacted fiscal year 2016 NDAA
    [National Defense Authorization Act] included section 1243,
    which directs the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff to begin the research and development of
    military response options to Russia's violation.
        INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] is, of course, not
    the only treaty or agreement that Russia is violating. We
    learned from Ms. Gottemoeller during last year's hearing that
    on 8 of 12 treaties and agreements, Russia is not in compliance
    or is in outright violation of those obligations.
        INF has earned a lot of attention, but what of the Chemical
    Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Open
    Skies Treaty? Are we less concerned about Russian chemical or
    biological weapons that can be used against the United States
    than intermediate-range missiles that cannot? No, of course
    not.
        And this hearing is also the first opportunity for many
    members to ask the administration about the recent Russian
    disclosure of a nuclear-powered nuclear warhead that occurred
    during review of Russia's nuclear forces that included its
    President, Vladimir Putin. According to the Russian
    translations of what was disclosed, this weapon would provide
    Russia with a new capability to damage, quote: ``The important
    components of the adversary's economy and coastal area, and
    inflicting unacceptable damage to the country's territory by
    creating areas of wide radioactive contamination that would be
    unsustainable for military, economic, or other activity for
    long periods of time,'' close quote.
        [The graphic displayed can be found in the Appendix on page
    55.]
        Mr. Rogers. What does that say about a country that feels
    that nuclear weapons are such a significant tool of its
    military and diplomatic strategy that it discloses systems in
    this manner? And what does it say about a country that would
    invest resources in such a weapon? It is just nuts.
        Yet the only time the President talks about--our President
    talks about nuclear weapons is when he wants to propose
    reducing them. The world is paying attention. We need our
    President to change his rhetoric.
        So we have a lot to talk about today. I am looking forward
    to learning what the administration has been up to since this
    time last year. I am looking forward to hearing, to learning
    about the military assessment and review of military options
    that the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
    Dempsey, produced, whether in the open hearing or the closed
    session.
        With that, I would like to turn things over to Chairman Poe
    for any opening statement that he may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 33.]

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED POE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS,
      CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND
                  TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

        Mr. Poe. I thank the chairman. Last year we held a hearing
    on this same topic in December of last year. It seems like it
    is Groundhog Day. Here we are again, and we all agree that
    Russia violated the treaty, but we are still talking about what
    the appropriate response should be. Russia is not someone that
    is our friend or ally, and we certainly can't take them for
    their word.
        In 2008, the same year Russia violated the INF Treaty, it
    invaded a sovereign country, Georgia. I have been to Georgia. I
    have seen the Russian tanks on the hills. Seven years later,
    Russia still occupies a third of that nation.
        Last year Putin was at it again. He told the world that
    Russian troops were not in Crimea while the world watched
    Russian tanks and little green men come into that area.
        Russia is now conducting strikes in Syria to prop up a
    dictator who has murdered thousands of Syrians.
        Putin seems to want to expand his empire, and the Russian
    bear is out of the cage, and it is time we recognize them for
    what they are doing. They are being aggressive.
        It is no surprise that Russia is once again breaking its
    word when it comes to a signed arms control treaty. The
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty is a treaty between
    the United States, which places limits on ground-launched
    ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges up between 500 and
    5,500 kilometers. The United States has held up our bargain.
    The Russians have not.
        Just according to press reports, it appears the Russians
    have tested a ground-launched cruise missile. They have
    responded that this is a sea-based missile, which does not fall
    under the treaty. That is nonsense. According to press releases
    also, the administration seems to have known about the
    violations back in 2008. It took 3 years for the administration
    to report concern about the Russian compliance in Congress;
    took 6 years for the State Department to officially find the
    Russians in violation; and this year the State Department
    repeated its findings that the Russians are in violation of the
    treaty.
        Chairman Rogers and I have made several appeals to the
    State Department and Department of Defense about this issue.
    Candidly, the responses we have gotten back lead me to believe
    that we are not taking the issue as seriously as we should. We
    have so far made no substantial progress in bringing the
    Russians back into compliance. After 7 years, there have been
    no consequences for the violation of the treaty. We have told
    the Russians our concerns. And their response: the Russians
    deny they are violating the treaty.
        What I would like to know is what I asked last year: What
    are the next steps? How are we going to convince the Russians
    that we do mean business--if we do mean business? What is the
    administration going to do to hold the Russians' feet to the
    fire and hold them accountable? There are some who want to go
    easy on the Russians in that they want to ignore this
    situation. I don't think that that is the appropriate response
    the United States should have toward the Russians and the
    stockpiling of these violations.
        So I look forward to what the witnesses have to say, to be
    upfront, candid, blunt about what is the strategy? What are we
    doing? What is the United States and our allies doing? And then
    we have the problem of two rogue nations already developing
    very similar weapons that we and the Russians have supposedly
    agreed not to develop, and that would be Iran and Pakistan
    developing similar weapons. So what is the United States
    response going to be, and what do we plan to do about it?
        And I will yield back to the chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from
    Tennessee, the ranking member of the Strategic Forces
    Subcommittee, Mr. Cooper, for any statement he might have.

    STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
    RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, COMMITTEE ON
                             ARMED SERVICES

        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we would all
    like to welcome our colleagues from the Foreign Affairs
    Committee. We hope that they will treat us kindly at the next
    NDAA when it comes to sequential referrals or any issues like
    that. But you are always welcome in the Armed Services
    Committee room.
        I also hope that our friends from Foreign Affairs can join
    us in the classified session to follow this hearing. In fact,
    it would be good if this public portion were kept as short as
    possible so that we can learn as much as possible in the
    classified session. Everyone knows that Mr. Putin doesn't
    conduct his business in public, and why give him an advantage
    by displaying our deliberations.
        We have before us today two very distinguished public
    servants. I look forward to hearing their testimony, and I also
    hope that our colleagues will bear in mind that international
    relations are not black and white, particularly when it comes
    to Russia. I know that our chairman is very sensitive to the
    issue of the RD-180 rockets, which, unfortunately, we depend on
    quite heavily for U.S. assured access to space.
        And it is kind of an amazing thing throughout the perils of
    the Cold War, we have always had a pretty reliable supply of
    those rockets. So nothing is black or white. No one is
    defending Mr. Putin. We know that they cheat. We are outraged
    by their takeover of Crimea, the invasion of Ukraine, their
    bombing of anti-Assad forces in Syria. But it is very important
    that really the meat of this hearing be held in the classified
    session that will be upcoming. So I look forward to seeing all
    of my colleagues upstairs in a few minutes.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 35.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts,
    Mr. Keating, for any opening statement he may have.

       STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM KEATING, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
       MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
       NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Chairman
    Poe, Ranking Member Cooper, for conducting this timely hearing.
    I also would like to thank our two witnesses for being here
    today to discuss the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty,
    both in this hearing and later on in the classified briefing to
    follow.
        I understand that they are limited to what you can say and
    disclose in this setting, but I appreciate the opportunity to
    discuss publicly the issue of Russia's compliance with the INF
    Treaty, something I think that is important for the public to
    know but not necessarily details that will advantage the
    Russians.
        Twenty-eight years after the INF Treaty was signed, it
    remains one of the most important nuclear treaties that the
    United States has ever signed with Russia. State Department and
    numerous observers have stated that Russia has developed,
    produced, and flight tested a ground-launched cruise missile in
    clear violation of the INF Treaty. Russian violation of the INF
    Treaty, as with the violation of any treaty, would be a serious
    matter. I look forward to further details regarding the
    particular Russian weapon system at issue, and a discussion of
    what its deployment would mean for Russia in terms of its
    military strategy and how it would impact the security in
    Europe and in Asia, importantly.
        If Russia is found noncompliant with the treaty, the United
    States, in conjunction with our allies, should use all of the
    tools at our disposal to pressure the Russians into ending
    these offending activities. While the question of noncompliance
    by Russia must squarely and seriously be dealt with, it is
    critical that the United States for the time being continue to
    observe the treaty. A withdrawal would only free Russia to
    legally pursue testing and deployment of intermediate-range
    missiles that currently violate the terms of the treaty.
        I look forward to hearing from our panel this afternoon on
    the threat posed by Russian development, production, and
    testing of intermediate-range cruise missiles; Russia's
    intention with respect to the INF Treaty; and, importantly,
    U.S. responses.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Gottemoeller for 5 minutes to
    summarize your opening statement.

      STATEMENT OF HON. ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
      ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
                                 STATE

        Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
    Poe, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Members Keating and Cooper, and
    distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
    and Armed Services Committee, thank you for hosting this
    hearing and for having me here today. This subject is one on
    which I previously briefed these same committees, including
    last year at around this time as was already indicated. To
    permit time for a good discussion today with your permission, I
    would like to abbreviate my remarks and submit my full
    testimony for the record.
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
        Let me begin by saying that the United States does not
    undertake arms control and disarmament as an end to itself, nor
    do we look at arms control and disarmament in isolation from
    deterrence in the general strategic environment, including the
    changing security environment in Europe. Together, arms control
    and deterrence help to create the conditions for a more durable
    and predictable form of strategic stability. Therefore,
    together, they benefit U.S. national security. Arms control
    frameworks are one available and important instrument in our
    foreign policy toolkit to advance global stability and the
    security of the United States, our allies, and our partners.
    This has been true for over four decades for both Republican
    and Democratic administrations, for a wide variety of nuclear
    and conventional security issues of concern. We have worked
    closely with our allies and our partners to develop the arms
    control framework that we have today, and both we and our
    allies and partners continue to see enormous value in these
    agreements.
        Over the last three decades, there have been compliance and
    implementation issues with first the Soviets and then the
    Russians on a variety of agreements. Former officials of both
    Republican and Democratic administrations and their colleagues
    in Congress were forced to grapple with many of the same
    problems we face today. How do we resolve violations when faced
    by blatant denials? How do we work with allies and partners on
    these challenges to ensure a unified and proportionate
    response? These are not easy questions to answer. This is not
    easy work to accomplish.
        Let me assure these committees once again that the
    administration takes compliance with all arms control
    agreements extremely seriously. For this reason, this
    administration worked hard to produce a compliance report in
    July of 2010, the first delivered to Congress after a 5-year
    lapse, and has produced one every year since as required by
    statute.
        The focus of today's hearing is Russia's violation of the
    INF Treaty, so I would like to focus my remaining remarks on
    that important topic. As a first comment and in response to
    some of our opening comments, I just wanted to say that we had
    no information or indication in 2008 that the Russian
    Federation was violating the treaty. That information emerged
    in 2011, and I know we will want to discuss this more during
    the hearing and also in our closed session, but I did want to
    put that out right at the beginning.
        In May of this year, in the unclassified portion of the
    annual compliance report, the United States repeated its
    determination that Russia is in violation of its INF Treaty
    obligations. Since 2013, we have raised with Russia our serious
    concerns regarding conduct that we ultimately determined to be
    a violation of the INF Treaty and have held senior-level and
    technical-level bilateral discussions with the aim of returning
    Russia to verifiable compliance with its treaty obligations.
    Throughout the course of this year, we have raised this issue
    with Russian officials on repeated occasions and at various
    levels and in various departments within the Russian Government
    in order to resolve U.S. concerns. We have made very clear that
    this is not a technicality, a one-off event, or a case of
    mistaken identity.
        Again, it was mentioned, the notion of this being a sea-
    launched cruise missile. However, this is a serious Russian
    violation of one of the most basic obligations under the INF
    Treaty. While the United States is engaging diplomatically with
    Russia as noted above, we have devoted a great deal of
    attention in 2015 to consulting with our allies and partners in
    the interest of pursuing a coordinated response to the Russian
    violation. Our allies have made clear their interest in
    preserving the INF Treaty, and their continued wish that the
    United States remain in the treaty and seek to bring the
    Russian Federation back into compliance.
        Russia continues to be unwilling to acknowledge its
    violation or address our concerns. We have shared more than
    enough information with Russian officials for them to look
    through their own records and identify the relevant program.
    Their denials and counteraccusations clearly attempt to deflect
    attention from their own violation. Therefore, we continue to
    work closely with allies on a series of diplomatic, economic,
    and military measures to protect the interests of the United
    States and our allies, and I know that my colleague Mr. McKeon
    will want to say more about the military aspects of this.
        I assure this committee that the Obama administration is
    committed to bringing Russia back into compliance with the INF
    Treaty. While our public determination and diplomacy has yet to
    lead to Russia returning to compliance, our announcement of
    Russia's violation and reaffirmation of continued U.S.
    commitment to the treaty has imposed significant costs on
    Russia. Its covert GLCM [ground-launched cruise missile]
    program has been exposed, and Moscow is not free to pursue this
    effort unconstrained, as this would confirm for the world that
    Russia has been violating an agreement that has been a key
    instrument of stability and security for nearly three decades.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Gottemoeller can be
    found in the Appendix on page 36.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. McKeon for 5 minutes.

       STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman
    Rogers, Chairman Poe, members of the committee, I appreciate
    the opportunity to testify before you today.
        I will not belabor the point that you already know and
    which Under Secretary Gottemoeller has already discussed, that
    the Russian Federation is in violation of its obligations under
    the INF Treaty. Since making this determination, our objective
    has been to preserve the viability of the treaty by convincing
    Russia to come back into compliance. We believe it is in our
    national security interest and our allies' interest that the
    treaty remain in force and that Russia remain a state party to
    the treaty and complies with its obligations. This means that
    Russia must cease its noncompliant activity and eliminate all
    INF Treaty-prohibited missiles and launchers in a verifiable
    manner.
        Equally important, our approach is focused on ensuring that
    Russia gains no significant military advantage from its
    violation. Doing so will ensure that our efforts to bring
    Russia back into compliance will not come at the expense of our
    security or that of our friends and allies.
        As a result of Russia's actions, in 2014 the Joint Staff
    conducted a military assessment of the threat posed by Russia
    if it were to deploy an INF Treaty-prohibited ground-launched
    cruise missile in Europe or the Asia-Pacific. This assessment
    tells us that the deployment of such a system would increase
    the risk to our allies and pose an indirect threat to the
    United States. My Joint Staff colleague can address this in
    more detail in the closed session. This assessment led us to
    review a broad range of military response options and to
    consider the effect each option would have on convincing the
    Russian leadership to return to compliance with the treaty and
    on countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited
    system. This assessment occurred at the same time we were
    confronting the new strategic reality in Europe: a Russia that
    is modernizing its military capabilities, a Russia that has
    destabilized the European security order by purporting to annex
    Crimea, and a Russia that is actively seeking to undermine NATO
    [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]. Finally, Moscow's nuclear
    saber-rattling has raised questions about Russia's commitment
    to strategic stability.
        In light of this new strategic reality, the administration
    determined that we needed to consider Russian actions with
    regard to the INF Treaty in the context of its overall
    aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts international
    legal norms and destabilizes the European security order.
    Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its
    overall aggressive behavior. Therefore, we concluded that our
    responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty. Stated another
    way, this is not just an arms control issue, but it represents
    a broader challenge to transatlantic security. Accordingly, we
    are developing a comprehensive response to Russian military
    actions and are committing to investments now that we will make
    irrespective of Russia's decision to return to compliance with
    the INF Treaty.
        And while we do not seek to make Russia an enemy, and we
    will cooperate with Russia where it is in our interest to do
    so, such as in the P5+1 [China, France, Russia, the United
    Kingdom, and the United States, plus Germany] negotiations with
    Iran, the President has made clear that we will uphold our
    Article 5 obligation under the North Atlantic Treaty. Our core
    objective remains the same: to ensure that Russia does not
    obtain a significant military advantage from its INF violation.
        We believe that our overall efforts to prepare for the
    defense of Europe can achieve this goal and ensure that the INF
    violations do not leave Russia with any appreciable advantage
    over us or our allies. As we consider the changed strategic
    environment in Europe we are factoring Russia's increased
    cruise missile capabilities, including its INF violation, into
    our planning. Our responses to Russia's activities in Ukraine
    as well as the complex security challenges in the south of
    Europe involve a broad range of efforts within the Department,
    bilaterally with the allies and partners, and within the NATO
    Alliance.
        First, we have focused on posture and presence. In the last
    year, under the European Reassurance Initiative, for which
    Congress generously provided nearly $1 billion in fiscal 2015,
    we have maintained a persistent rotational air, land, and sea
    presence of U.S. forces in the Baltics and Central Europe to
    reassure our allies and build up their capacity.
        We are also transforming our posture in Europe to be more
    responsive and sustainable for the 21st century. American
    rotational forces need to move more quickly and easily to
    participate in training and exercises in Europe. That is why we
    are prepositioning tanks, artillery, infantry fighting
    vehicles, and other equipment to rapidly respond to crises and
    provocation. Six states in Europe, the three Baltic states plus
    Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, have agreed to host company- to
    battalion-sized elements of this equipment, which will be moved
    around the region for training and exercises.
        Second, the United States and the alliance are focused anew
    on planning and shaping our future military activities in
    Europe. We have energized planning and resourcing efforts in
    response to the changed security environment in and around
    Europe.
        Third, we are working to improve our defensive measures to
    deny Russian offensive capabilities by modifying and expanding
    air defense systems, including addressing the difficult
    challenge posed by cruise missiles. As Secretary Carter stated
    in a recent speech, we are investing in the technologies that
    will be most relevant to Russia's provocations, developing new
    unmanned systems, a long-range bomber, a new long-range
    standoff cruise missile, and a number of innovative
    technologies.
        Fourth, we are leading the alliance to prepare for the new
    challenges posed by Russia and instability and terrorism in
    itself in the south of Europe. We are working to implement
    agreements made at the Wales Summit and to plan for the next
    summit of leaders in Warsaw next July. NATO has reorganized the
    NATO Response Force, set up new command centers, and
    established the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. We are
    pressing our allies to fulfill the commitment made at Wales to
    invest more in defense with a particular focus on new
    capabilities.
        We continue to look for ways to improve alliance
    capabilities and decisionmaking. With regard to NATO's nuclear
    deterrence mission, allies remain strongly committed to burden
    sharing as a foundational element of NATO's deterrence and
    defense posture. Our dual-capable F-35A is on track and should
    complete operational testing of its dual capability in 2024.
    The B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb life-extension program, a
    critical element in both our NATO commitment and our strategic
    forces, is on schedule and on budget to meet a March 2020 first
    production unit goal.
        In confronting this challenge, we will take a strong and
    balanced approach. We will not go back to the old Cold War
    playbook of having hundreds of thousands of forces in Europe.
    We are also mindful that we do not need to, nor should we,
    return to a world where we match every Russian action with a
    direct and mirror-imaged reaction. We will use a smaller
    footprint, high-impact rotational presence, build partner
    capacity, and integrate planning between space, cyber,
    conventional, and nuclear forces.
        In some, we will take the necessary steps to build U.S. and
    NATO capabilities, posture, and plans to deter Russia's
    destabilizing influence, coercion, and aggressive actions, all
    while keeping the door open for cooperation when and if Russia
    is willing. These efforts will require expenditures we were not
    planning to make and which will be challenging under a
    constrained budget. But make no mistake, we will undertake
    these efforts. Our security and that of our NATO allies
    requires an effective response and comprehensive strategy.
        Let me conclude by reiterating that the pursuit of
    strategic stability remains in the interest of both the United
    States and Russia. And we hope Russia will remember why the
    Soviet Union signed the treaty in the first place. By agreeing
    to the treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union ensured
    that both parties benefitted from the removal of weapon systems
    that posed a real and credible threat to regional and
    international security.
        We appreciate the attention of the Congress to these
    issues, and we will keep you informed of developments. Thank
    you again for the opportunity to be here.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
    Appendix on page 43.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank both the witnesses, and I will
    recognize myself now for the first series of questions.
        Ms. Gottemoeller, I was just listening to your opening
    statement, and you made the point that you didn't realize that
    Russia was violating the INF Treaty until 2011. I am looking at
    an interview you did with The Denver Post 2 weeks ago on the
    13th--it was published--of November, and you stated, ``Russia
    tested starting in 2008 a ground-launched cruise missile that
    flies to ranges banned by the treaty.'' And you go ahead and
    explain what a ban means. If you didn't know until 2011, how do
    we reconcile that statement in The Denver Post with what you
    testified a few minutes ago?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we saw that they were starting
    to test a cruise missile during that time period, but this is,
    you know, a situation where it was only over time did we
    accumulate the information that it was a ground-launched cruise
    missile. So the testing series--and again, this is something we
    can talk about in more detail--the testing series did begin in
    2008, but it was only later in that time period did we see that
    it was a ground-launched cruise missile. So I was not aware of
    how The Denver Post had put that information together, but that
    was not correct in the way they quoted the information.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. But you do recognize that disparity, and
    it raises concerns for me that it took us 3 years. If we knew
    they started testing in 2008, it took 3 years for us to realize
    that they were violating the ranges that were committed under
    the INF Treaty.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. It is worth bearing down on this
    point for a moment, sir, because under the INF Treaty, sea-
    launched cruise missiles and air-launched cruise missiles are
    permitted. And there is no reason why the Russians could not
    have been developing during that period a new sea-launched or
    air-launched cruise missile. We simply did not know until later
    in the test series that it was a ground-launched system.
        Mr. Rogers. Was any of that data shared with the Senate
    during the 2010 hearings on the New START [Strategic Arms
    Reduction] Treaty.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we did not understand at that
    point of time, and again, I would like to talk about this
    further in our closed session along with some of our
    colleagues, but we did not know that it was not a sea-launched
    or air-launched system and completely in accord with the INF
    Treaty.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. This question will be for either one of
    you. We were told last year in our hearing on this topic that
    there were a range of responses that had been prepared and were
    ready for consideration at the principal level. And these joint
    committees then wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs urging action on those range of responses. And I will
    introduce that letter for the record. Did the principals ever
    meet to consider those responses? If so, when, and what did
    they decide? If not, why not?
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 56.]
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I will start. I will say that we
    have had a series of interagency meetings on this matter up to
    the senior level of principals, so it hasn't been a single
    event by any means. And I will turn to Mr. McKeon to pick up on
    what is next.
        Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, some of the things I have
    described in my opening statement are decisions and responses
    that we are undertaking. I can say more in closed session about
    a couple of specific matters that involve the NATO Alliance
    that are also decisions of the government.
        Mr. Rogers. Okay. Well, I won't belabor that in open
    session because I do want to pursue it in closed session, and
    my guess is you are going to tell me you couldn't say it
    anyway. But I am interested in knowing exactly how you are
    proceeding and when you are going to proceed and if we need to
    do any reprogramming in fiscal year 2016 or 2017 to accommodate
    those measures.
        Mr. McKeon. Well, part of what I should underscore, Mr.
    Chairman, from my opening statement, is as we looked at the INF
    issue, we were also confronting the broader Russia challenge
    and how to respond to it, and didn't think it was appropriate
    to respond just specifically to the possibility of a new
    ground-launched cruise missile in Europe, but a broader
    challenge to European security. So many of the things that I
    outlined are part of a response to broader Russian behavior,
    including the INF violation.
        Mr. Rogers. You see, that is my fear: is that this set of
    responses that have been prepared a year ago for consideration
    are now going to just blend into the new challenges that we
    have to face. And we are going to get no action on the
    violations of the INF Treaty. That is a longstanding violation
    that needs an appropriate response by this Nation, and it
    should not be impeded or blended into any other concerns that
    we are having with Russia's new activity.
        Let me ask this, Ms. Gottemoeller, is it in America's
    interest to continue to unilaterally comply with the INF and
    these other treaties when Russia is not doing so?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we judge this treaty to be in
    our national security interest, and I should say, sir, that
    this is not a bilateral treaty. All of the successor states of
    the Soviet Union are also signatories of this treaty. So it is
    a significant treaty sustaining stability in Eurasia. We
    judge--and our partners and allies in Asia and in Europe--judge
    it to be in their national security interests as well. So I
    will say that--and by the way, we judge that Russia in some
    ways has had itself brought up short by our calling them out on
    this violation of the treaty.
        Mr. Rogers. I would love to know how.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, they have been saying quite
    regularly and publicly that they are in compliance with the INF
    Treaty, which we don't buy, but also that they are not
    preparing to withdraw from the treaty, which I think is a good
    thing because it allows us to continue to drive forward
    pursuing them diplomatically as well as with other responses
    and countermeasures.
        Mr. Rogers. I don't know why they would want to withdraw.
    They are not having to comply with it anyway. They don't have
    any pressure on them. We are the only ones that are in
    compliance, and I just think it is foolhardy.
        But, with that, I will stop and turn to Chairman Poe.
        Mr. Poe. I agree with the chairman's comments about we are
    the only ones complying.
        Let's talk about the specific types of missiles in a
    broader scale. The United States and Russia and the former
    Soviet Republics have agreed to limit the number of missiles.
    Is that correct?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, that is.
        Mr. Poe. However, there are other countries that are
    pursuing these very specific types of missiles, such as Iran,
    Pakistan, North Korea, China, possibly. So, to your knowledge,
    either one of you, are those four countries and maybe others
    pursuing the development of these very types of missiles?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. It is common knowledge, sir, and
    indeed the Russians have said publicly that there are other
    countries developing intermediate-range nuclear and ballistic
    and cruise missiles. So they do talk about that publicly as
    being a reason why they have a debate going on in the Russian
    Federation today about the treaty.
        Mr. Poe. It is not a gotcha question. I am just looking at
    the global situation. The United States has said, we are going
    to do this. We are going to limit the number of missiles we
    have. We are working with the Russians and the former Soviet
    Republics. We all agree, we are going to limit, but out there
    in the world, you have got probably some rogue countries, like
    North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, and then you have the Chinese who
    are not bound by this treaty or any other treaty to limit these
    types of missiles. Is that a concern of the United States?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Let me recollect for just a moment,
    and then I will turn to Mr. McKeon for what he would like to
    add. But say for just a moment that it is useful to remember
    the reason we entered into this treaty in the first place back
    in 1988. That is that these types of missiles represent very
    short flight time to target. And, therefore, they do pose a
    threat of short-warning attacks on important targets. That is a
    very great concern for our allies in both Europe and Asia, and
    for that reason, we continue to believe that it is important to
    sustain this ban on the treaty with regard to the Russian
    Federation.
        Now, I will note that we have other means of responding to
    intermediate-range nuclear missiles being developed elsewhere
    or conventional missiles, for that matter, and I will turn to
    Mr. McKeon now.
        Mr. Poe. Well, I don't know that I understood your answer.
    Does that concern us that these types of missiles--North Korea
    could send them to South Korea. Pakistan could send them to
    India. China could send them to Russia. I mean, there are all
    different scenarios of the short-range capability of these
    missiles. Does that fact alone concern us as a nation? Mr.
    McKeon, you can answer it.
        Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, if I could first address part of
    your question which is, the INF Treaty only bans a type of
    missile, a ground-launched cruise missile and associated
    launcher. It doesn't ban a number of other types of missiles.
    And we have an ample supply of sea-launched and air-launched
    conventional cruise missiles in our inventory. So we are not
    limited in any respect from those capabilities.
        As Under Secretary Gottemoeller said, Iran has a missile
    program which we are quite concerned about, medium-range
    program that they have engaged some testing and they have
    ambition for a longer-range system. That is part of the reason
    for the European Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in
    Europe, which is progressing. We are concerned about North
    Korea's missile program. There is no question about that. It is
    why we made some of the investments we have made in the
    homeland missile defense in the last few years.
        Mr. Poe. I am not suggesting that we should get out of the
    treaty. I am just suggesting that we are bound by a treaty to
    limit certain types of missiles. Russia is the only other
    country and the former Soviet Republics are the only other
    entities that are bound by this. Other nations are not. That
    was my question. And does that concern us as a nation?
        Mr. McKeon. Sir, as a matter of our ability to protect the
    United States and our allies, as I noted in the statement, the
    Russian capability does pose a threat, but it continues to be
    our view in the Department that we have sufficient capability
    to meet our defense requirements at present.
        Mr. Poe. How about our allies like South Korea?
        Mr. McKeon. Our work with our allies in South Korea is an
    ongoing, continuing project. They are doing well in investing.
    We are having conversations with them about certain
    capabilities which--and they are worried more about short-range
    missiles, not any medium-range missiles that exist, and
    wouldn't, even if this treaty applied to the Koreans, wouldn't
    affect the short-range system.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Cooper for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Gottemoeller, I believe in your testimony you said that
    there was a 5-year lapse in reporting that the State Department
    had to Congress. There were no reports between 2005 and 2010,
    but then reporting was resumed.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. That is correct. I will
    underscore that the so-called annual compliance report is an
    interagency effort. It is not just the Department of State that
    carries it out, although the Department of State is responsible
    for leading the effort. But there was a period between 2005 and
    2010 when it was not published on an annual basis.
        Mr. Cooper. But since 2010, the reports have been made
    annually.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Cooper. The Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty is of
    primary benefit to our allies, for example, in NATO and in
    Asia. What is their reaction from your diplomatic experience?
    Do they want us to stay members of the treaty? Are they urging
    Russian compliance? What is their general attitude?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, they have been very keen to
    ensure that the INF Treaty remains in force. They have been
    very keen to see Russia reenter into full compliance with the
    INF Treaty, and they have really been very eager to work with
    us in this regard.
        Mr. Cooper. Can you refresh my memory, since you have been
    on duty at the State Department, how many times you have
    briefed Congress or informed us of what is going on in this
    area? Because I think some of my colleagues have the mistaken
    impression that we have been uninformed on these issues. And I
    think it is a number of times. Could you refresh my memory on
    that?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, we went back and looked it
    over. In my experience, we have not briefed any issue more than
    we have briefed this particular issue, and it is not only me
    alone, but a number of colleagues at both the political and
    expert level, and the number of briefings, hearings, and
    meetings amounts to about 60.
        Mr. Cooper. Sixty. Like six-zero?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
        Mr. Cooper. That is quite a number. And there are many
    disturbing Russian activities, as my colleagues have pointed
    out, so for this issue to have received disproportionate
    attention would seem to indicate that Ukraine, Syria, Crimea,
    other issues, such as Russian military doctrine talking about
    escalatory dominance, the preemptive use of nuclear weapons,
    that would be a topic nuclear related that we should perhaps
    give as much attention to as this.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, there are many troubling
    issues with the Russian Federation right now. And this is among
    a number of very troubling issues. I will only say that.
        Mr. Cooper. I thank you.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. I look
    forward to the classified session.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I would agree this issue
    has received a lot of talk. Unfortunately, it has received no
    action.
        The Chair now recognizes Mr. Keating for any questions he
    may have.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I am curious how much you could comment on the fact that,
    in my view, Russia has an enormous stockpile of strategic and
    other nuclear weapons already, and I am just trying to think of
    a real good reason why this is so strategically important to
    them. I am just curious what your thinking might be. What are
    Russia's real gains doing this, given their stockpile and the
    other assets that they have at their disposal already?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. It is a very good point, Mr.
    Keating, that all of the potential targets around the Eurasian
    periphery for intermediate-range, either cruise or ballistic
    systems, could be handled by their central strategic forces.
    The Russians have also been developing very capable cruise
    missiles, both air-launched and sea-launched. So to be honest
    with you, sir, we are puzzled as to why they think they need a
    ground-launched cruise missile that is in violation of this
    important treaty because we see they have, in our view,
    adequate capabilities to cover these threats with other systems
    at their disposal and that are entirely in accord with the INF
    Treaty.
        Mr. Keating. Yeah, do you see any, you know, in terms of
    Asia, in terms of Japan, South Korea, China, are they worried
    at all that, you know, those countries are advancing somehow
    and getting a strategic edge? Is that part of what their
    thinking might be? I know you are asking to get yourself inside
    of Putin's head. We have had many hearings trying to do that
    with little success.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I can only say, sir, following on
    my earlier answer, Mr. Putin himself said in public last August
    that he is concerned about the emergence of intermediate-range
    systems--missile systems in China, in India, and Pakistan, and
    in Iran. So, you know, I understand that there is that concern
    that has been perhaps present in the Kremlin, in Moscow, but I
    am only really speculating and based on what he had to say
    publicly.
        Mr. Keating. And then it is very tricky especially at a
    hearing dealing with verification issues. But it is clear that
    the evidence is there. They can deny it and then seek more
    information, and in doing so, we might be giving our sources
    and means of intelligence that we don't want to give to them
    indirectly.
        But, you know, looking at things, has there been discussion
    to set up an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Special
    Verification Commission [SVC] as provided for in the INF
    Treaty? Has that been a source of discussion?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Mr. Keating, if we had some inkling
    that the Russians would acknowledge this missile and would
    engage productively in an SVC discussion to try to resolve
    these concerns, we would be happy to convene an SVC session.
    Recognizing the complexities I mentioned earlier, saying this
    is a multilateral treaty with a number of countries who are now
    members of the treaty from across the former Soviet Union, but
    nevertheless, if we had some inkling that it would help, we
    would be delighted to convene an SVC session.
        Mr. Keating. That leads us to the issue of responses, which
    I am afraid is going to really be a subject matter in the
    classified setting.
        So I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Nebraska, Mr. Oklahoma--the gentleman from Oklahoma--I have got
    too many people talking to me up here--Mr. Bridenstine. Sorry
    about the Nebraska comment.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just had a question. Of course, the INF violation is of
    high importance to everybody here, but I think it is emblematic
    of many larger issues that I think this committee is bringing
    up and I think appropriately so. One is a question that I have
    about the Open Skies Treaty. Admiral Haney, commander of U.S.
    Strategic Command, stated quote: ``The treaty has become a
    critical component of Russia's intelligence collection
    capability directed at the United States. In addition to
    overflying military installations, Russian Open Skies flights
    can overfly and collect on DOD and national critical
    infrastructure. The vulnerabilities exposed by exploitation of
    this data and costs of mitigation are increasingly difficult to
    characterize,'' unquote. Do you agree with Admiral Haney that
    Russia can use Open Skies to surveil national critical
    infrastructure? Ms. Gottemoeller.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, the Open Skies Treaty is
    designed, in fact, for overflight of other territories. We
    overfly the Russian Federation in the same way. In fact, we
    find it quite useful to overfly their rail lines, for example.
    I wanted to stress that one of the advantages of the Open Skies
    Treaty is that information, imagery that is taken is shared
    openly among all of the treaty parties. So one of the
    advantages with the Open Skies Treaty is that we know exactly
    what the Russians are imaging because they must share the
    imagery with us. So that has an advantage over the so-called
    national technical means of the Russian Federation, where we
    are not sure exactly what they are imaging.
        Mr. Bridenstine. So are they imaging national critical
    infrastructure that has nothing to do with defense?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. What I can say is, based on, again,
    the Open Skies Treaty regime is producing imagery that is open
    to all, and they have imaged a number of sites around the
    country.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Does possible surveillance of U.S.
    national critical infrastructure fit with Russia's warfighting
    doctrine?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I would say that under
    the Open Skies Treaty, we are all basically opening up our
    territory so that the other countries can have a chance to
    overfly and observe, you know, what is going on in the country.
    That was the original idea behind President Eisenhower's
    proposal of the treaty back in the late 1950s, that it would
    permit predictability and confidence-building among all the
    parties to the treaty. So it has been very valuable from that
    perspective.
        Mr. Bridenstine. So a lot of technological advancements
    have happened since Eisenhower was President. Will the
    administration permit Russia to fly over the United States with
    a new advanced digital electro-optical sensor?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, sir, the digital sensors that
    are permitted under the Open Skies Treaty are permitted to all
    parties to the treaty. So----
        Mr. Bridenstine. So will the administration permit Russia
    to fly over the United States with a new advanced digital
    electro-optical sensor?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. As I said, sir, digital sensors are
    permitted to all treaty parties. Not only to Russia----
        Mr. Bridenstine. So the answer is yes?
        Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. The United States and
    our European allies and partners; to all treaty parties.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Would information on U.S. national
    critical infrastructure facilitate targeting of that
    infrastructure with a Russian cruise missile, for example?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I think it is worthwhile
    considering, sir, in this context what increment of information
    the Russia Federation receives from the Open Skies Treaty to
    all of the other sources of information that they have,
    including their national----
        Mr. Bridenstine. So you are suggesting that maybe we don't
    need it anymore?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir, I am not. I am
    suggesting----
        Mr. Bridenstine. But it is not of value?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I am suggesting that you need to
    look at the incremental value of the treaty in particular
    settings. I can say it has been of enormous value over Eastern
    Ukraine, in that setting in this current crisis. And it is
    important again to bear in mind the importance that our allies
    and partners place upon this treaty and to make a good
    calculation of what particular risks predictability and
    openness have for our national security. We judge that this
    treaty does not pose such risks to our national security.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Regarding our allies that you mentioned,
    to the extent that allies value the imagery that they collect
    from Open Skies, has the administration assessed what
    commercial imagery the United States could provide to allies
    without exposing us to the risk of Russian aircraft with
    Russian sensors being allowed to overfly the United States?
    What other could we provide our allies using other sources,
    other methods to our allies that do not include us having to
    give up overflight rights of the United States?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think it is a good point,
    sir, to underscore that a lot is available on commercial
    imagery now to everyone--every country around the world,
    whether it is the Russian Federation, or our allies and
    partners. What is valuable, again, about the Open Skies Treaty,
    is that every image is taken by any plane flying, by any party
    over any territory, is that all parties have it available to
    them. And, for that reason, we know exactly what is being
    gained by overflights of our territory.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Last question in my last few seconds. Have
    you asked the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency for their
    analysis on this?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, again, I think this is the
    kind of discussion that would be good to have if you wish to
    pursue it in our closed session.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Roger.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Sixty times we have gone through this, and
    still I am not sure we really recognize the long history of
    these treaties, compliance and noncompliance over a long, long
    period of time, dating back to Ronald Reagan and the question
    of enforcement at that time of the treaties. And so we have
    gone back and forth. There really has been a tit for tat over
    these maybe almost 40 years now. But the bottom line is
    significant progress has been made, a very, very significant
    reduction in nuclear weapons, warheads, as well as delivery
    systems. And while this INF issue is a big one, it is not the
    only one.
        And, Mr. McKeon, I am taken by your testimony, and----
        Mr. McKeon. In a good way, I hope.
        Mr. Garamendi. And, frankly, it is a testimony that
    basically says: We are going to go at this in a very aggressive
    way. And I am looking here at--``Russia does not obtain a
    significant military advantage from its INF violation.'' And
    then you go on to discuss how we can do that. Would you like to
    elaborate a bit on how we can be assured that they do not have
    a significant military advantage from their INF violation?
        Mr. McKeon. Congressman, as I explained in my opening
    statement, and there is a longer statement for the record, we
    are looking at the challenge posed by Russia's military
    modernization and its activities in Europe, including the INF
    violation, as a whole, and looking at the Department as to what
    investments we are already making, what new investments we will
    need to make in the coming years to come to grips with that
    challenge. I would not--I have characterized it as aggressive,
    but prudent planning in response to what we see in terms of
    Russian capability, Russian intent.
        Mr. Garamendi. So this is from your testimony, new unmanned
    systems, new long-range bomber, new long-range standoff cruise
    missile, a number of innovative things, including the B61 bomb
    life-extension programs and on and on. Bottom line, are we at a
    disadvantage vis-a-vis Russia with our military standing today?
        Mr. McKeon. Congressman, we still have the most capable
    military on the planet.
        Mr. Garamendi. And these additional investments would make
    us even more so?
        Mr. McKeon. We need to keep pace with the modernization of
    both Russia and China and militaries of both countries as we
    look around the globe. Those are the two peer or near-peer
    competitors. And as I said, we see capability on the part of
    Russia that is growing as well as the Chinese. It is hard to
    measure President Putin's intent, but we have seen some of his
    actions in Europe, so we can----
        Mr. Garamendi. There is an interesting line in one of your
    testimonies--I will ask this question of both of you--that
    Russia thinks that we have violated the INF. Could you quickly
    tell us why, what Russia thinks we have done that violates it?
        Mr. McKeon. Yes, when we met with them in Moscow a year ago
    September, we went through this in some detail. A couple of
    things that they raised. One, they complained about our armed
    unmanned aerial vehicles, saying that they violate the terms of
    the treaty. Secondly, they claim that our Aegis Ashore
    capability, which we are putting in place under the European
    Phased Adaptive Approach----
        Mr. Garamendi. That would be both Romania and Poland.
        Mr. McKeon. The one in Romania is essentially nearing
    completion, and it will reach operational capability later this
    year, and IOC [initial operational capability] next year, and
    Poland is a couple of years away.
        Mr. Garamendi. That is an anti-missile system. How can that
    be considered to be anything but?
        Mr. McKeon. Their claim, which we have rebutted, is that it
    is simply a Tomahawk cruise missile system set off, that is not
    on a ship but is on land, and can be postured to fire cruise
    missiles in their direction.
        Mr. Garamendi. Are they right?
        Mr. McKeon. They are not right.
        Mr. Garamendi. Why?
        Mr. McKeon. It doesn't have all of the same capabilities
    and fire control system that you see on a Tomahawk setup on a
    Navy ship.
        Mr. Garamendi. How long did it take Ronald Reagan to get
    Russia back in compliance with the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty]?
        Mr. McKeon. I believe it was 7 or 8 years. It is some time
    in the mid-1980s where we identified the Krasnoyarsk radar as a
    violation, and it was worked through, to the end of the Reagan
    administration and into the first Bush administration before in
    negotiations. It was before the Soviet Union collapsed. I think
    it was in 1989 and conversations between Secretary Baker and
    then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze where they came to an
    agreement----
        Mr. Garamendi. When did the United States withdraw from the
    ABM Treaty?
        Mr. McKeon. In 2001 or 2002, under President Bush.
        Mr. Garamendi. Was that a unilateral withdrawal?
        Mr. McKeon. It was, yes, sir.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Perry for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Gottemoeller, or Secretary Gottemoeller, about a year
    ago, as I recall, we had a very similar hearing to this one.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Perry. And you had enumerated, and through the course
    of the conversation, we came to an understanding of the alleged
    violations. And I think, at that time, we kind of realized or
    kind of confirmed that it took years--I mean, the
    administration knew years had passed at that point that the
    violation had been made, but we hadn't been made aware of them.
    And at that time I asked you very specifically what was going
    to be done? What was the panoply of options that might be
    available to us? And I think we reserved that for an executive
    session, but I am wondering at this point, because it is also
    my understanding that by now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
    has offered a series of options to remedy the situation to
    bring Russia back into compliance, is there any plan to
    implement any of them? And if there is a plan, is it available
    to be heard in open session?
        Mr. McKeon. Well, Congressman, I have laid out in my
    opening statement our overall response to Russia's behavior,
    including its INF violation. There is more that I can say in
    closed session about some measures we are going to undertake in
    partnership with our NATO allies.
        Mr. Perry. Is there a plan to implement it, though? I know
    there are options, but is there a plan to implement it with a
    timeline? The administration seems to be happy to give our
    adversaries timelines when we will withdraw from countries and
    combat, et cetera. Is there a timeline when Russia can expect
    implementation of this plan?
        Mr. McKeon. Sir, there are a number of capabilities that we
    are investing in, some of which were already on the books, some
    of which will be new or increased in the fiscal year 2017
    budget and built into the Future Years Defense Program. And so
    it will be a continuing effort, as I said, to respond to what
    we see in terms of Russia's growing military modernization and
    its capabilities and its behavior, including its INF violation.
    So there won't be a specific point where you will say, ``Aha,
    everything is in place.'' We are working to counter what we see
    as the threat posed by Russia's activities, including the INF
    violation.
        Mr. Perry. So we don't have milestones that we can measure
    their accountability and their compliance, are there
    milestones?
        Mr. McKeon. Well, sir, I am outlining for you what the
    Department of Defense is going to be doing over the coming year
    and into the future past this administration, assuming these
    plans are carried forward. We continue to have a separate
    conversation with Russia about coming into compliance with the
    treaty. They will see these activities, and they will see them
    in our budget, and they will start to understand, we believe,
    that this response is not making them any more secure.
        Mr. Perry. Well, with all due respect--and I will end my
    questioning--it seems to me that our response years and years
    in the making without any forced compliance, without any
    repercussions to failure of compliance, is just going to lead
    Russia to believe that they can continue to be in noncompliance
    without any accountability. And that is what I have seen. That
    is what I learned a year ago, and it doesn't seem to me that
    much has changed in the year between now and then, with all due
    respect.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes Ms. Kelly for 5 minutes.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. McKeon, in your assessment, other than the INF Treaty,
    are there any arms control obligations that Russia is not
    complying with or is in violation of treaty agreements with the
    United States?
        Mr. McKeon. Congresswoman, I would probably defer to Under
    Secretary Gottemoeller, who controls the pen on the compliance
    report. The Conventional Forces in Europe [CFE] Treaty is one
    of them. We have concerns, compliance concerns, about other
    treaties, including the Open Skies Treaty.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Ma'am, I will only add that as far
    as the additional treaties, we have long-standing concerns
    about the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological
    Weapons Convention. We cannot confirm Russian compliance with
    those treaties because they have not provided, as we believe,
    full information and data about Soviet-era programs, their past
    programs before the Soviet Union fell apart.
        Nevertheless, they are good treaty partners. In the
    Chemical Weapons Convention, they are continuing to destroy
    tons and tons of Soviet-era chemical weapons and are doing so
    according to an agreed schedule. So--and they are working with
    us in Syria to bring to final conclusion Syria's destruction
    and elimination of its chemical weapons arsenal.
        Ms. Kelly. Where they are not good partners, what are we
    doing about that?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Where they are not good partners,
    in my world, we are continuing to make sure that they are aware
    that they must come back into compliance with the INF Treaty
    specifically, that that is in their interest as well as for the
    rest of the international community.
        In the case of the CFE Treaty, we actually took
    countermeasures inside the treaty context and ceased
    implementing the treaty with regard to the Russian Federation,
    but, again, the CFE Treaty, the Conventional Forces in Europe
    Treaty, brings a lot of predictability and mutual confidence to
    other partners and signatories of the treaty, especially during
    this period of crisis, not only in Ukraine but in other places
    such as Georgia and so forth. So it is helpful to continue to
    ensure that information is flowing, that inspections take
    place, and notifications of activities are flowing.
        Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Arizona, Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for both for being here.
        Ms. Gottemoeller, I understand that Ambassador Thomas
    Graham has suggested publicly that the administration is
    looking to circumvent the Constitution and allow--or actually
    pursue a prohibition of nuclear testing through a U.N. Security
    Council resolution. I, obviously, would recoil at any security
    council dictating American defense policy.
        Can you assure this committee that the administration is
    not pursuing this idea?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I have been in constant battle
    with our NGO [nongovernmental organization] colleagues over
    this issue. We do not agree with this notion.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, and I appreciate that. And you
    are assuring me that that is not being pursued?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
        Mr. Franks. Okay. That is good. See, answers can happen.
        Knowing that, since the 1996 era, three countries have
    broken the de facto comprehensive nuclear test ban moratorium
    and tested nuclear weapons--that is India and Pakistan in 1998,
    and then North Korea in 2006 and 2009 and again in 2013. Your
    compliance report this year states that each state with a
    testing moratorium complied with it in 2014. So is it--in other
    words, is it correct now to state that no state last year
    conducted a nuclear weapons test that produced a nuclear yield?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, within this century, the only
    state that has tested nuclear weapons is--in a way that
    produced a nuclear yield--is North Korea, so since the
    beginning of this century.
        Mr. Franks. So are you saying India and Pakistan in 1998,
    that did not occur?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir. Since 2000, is what I am
    saying.
        Mr. Franks. Oh, I am sorry.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The only state that has tested to
    nuclear yield is North Korea.
        Mr. Franks. And so no state last year conducted any nuclear
    yield tests or any tests that resulted in any nuclear yield?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Correct.
        Mr. Franks. All right. Well, listen, that is all the
    questions I have.
        And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Fleming for any
    questions he may have.
        Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        For both of our panelists today, I would like to ask this
    question. You both mentioned in your testimony that the
    administration continues to reiterate to Russia its need to
    come into compliance with the INF Treaty. Do you have any
    specific details of actions taken by Russia to suggest that
    Russia actually intends to come into compliance with the INF,
    that the administration's urgings are having any effect?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, what I can say is that the
    Russian Federation claims that it is in full compliance with
    the treaty. It does not acknowledge this violation that we have
    regularly expressed grave concerns to it about, it does not
    acknowledge the missile, the ground-launch cruise missile. So
    it claims it is in compliance with the treaty, number one, and
    it also in that context asserts its commitment to continue for
    the present time to stay in the INF Treaty. And so that is the
    position that we hear from the Russians time and time again.
        Dr. Fleming. I assume you confront them with the actual
    data. How do they respond when you actually show it to them?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I have told them, you know, that
    they have received from us sufficient information to be able to
    determine what missile we are talking about, but they claim
    that they cannot tell what missile we are talking about.
        Dr. Fleming. Do you feel like their unwillingness to comply
    with INF may actually get worse; they may actually continue in
    the wrong direction?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, one, I think, benefit of
    calling them out on their violation of the INF Treaty is that
    they are aware that the world is watching, watching very
    closely, and that we are watching very closely their continued
    behavior with regard to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty, so I do believe that it is having an effect upon them.
        Dr. Fleming. Has the U.S. implemented any economic
    sanctions because of their failure to comply with INF?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. We have been working with our
    allies to consider economic sanctions. And you are aware, sir,
    that we have imposed a wide range of economic sanctions in
    complete agreement with the European Union [EU] to respond to
    their incursion into Crimea, and that, I think, has been
    extraordinarily effective. We continue to consider economic
    measures with regard to the INF Treaty, but up to this point,
    we have not pursued it.
        Dr. Fleming. When you say ``effective,'' what is the metric
    for that? How do you know that is being effective?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think effective is, in the
    case of economic sanctions, it is clear that it is having an
    economic impact.
        Dr. Fleming. It is hurting their economy, you are saying?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Right. Right.
        Dr. Fleming. Is that mostly in the oil and gas type of
    venue or is----
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, when we look across the range
    of sanctions, and this is a topic that if you are interested in
    deserves a separate briefing, but when we are looking across
    the range of sanctions undertaken with the EU, it is not only
    the oil and gas sector. It is manufacturing. It is across the
    board, really.
        Dr. Fleming. Mr. McKeon, you mentioned in a hearing last
    year that the DOD [Department of Defense] is examining a range
    of military options to respond to Russia's INF violations.
    Congress has moved this process along. This year's NDAA just
    signed by the President last week included language to require
    the DOD to make plans of, again, development of the kind of
    systems that you outlined in your testimony. So what can you
    tell me about that?
        Mr. McKeon. Well, in terms of the report, Congressman, we
    are aware of the reporting requirement and will endeavor to
    meet it on time, although I will confess I know we are not
    always the best at being timely with our reporting because we
    have a lot of reporting requirements.
        In terms of capabilities that we are looking at, I outlined
    those in some detail in my statement, and I will go into a
    little bit more in closed session on some ideas that we are
    going to pursue in Europe.
        Dr. Fleming. Okay. So if the administration's urgings to
    Russia regarding INF compliance are not changing Russian
    behavior, we see that it may have some effect on their economy,
    but not their behavior, and in fact, Russia's behavior may be
    moving in the opposite direction. Why is the administration
    delaying other economic and military lines of effort that would
    actually have an effect on the diplomatic line of effort? For
    either one or both.
        Mr. McKeon. Well, sir, I don't think we are delaying
    implementation of military measures, and we can talk about that
    in the closed session. These investments we are--some of these
    investments we are going to make, we weren't planning to make 2
    or 3 years ago. They are in response not just to the INF
    violation but other Russian activity.
        In terms of economic measures, I would defer to Rose on
    that, but if we continue down this course and the measures we
    are taking do not lead to Russian compliance, we can always
    assess whether to take other measures.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. If I may just very quickly comment,
    sir. In addition to the points that Mr. McKeon has made about
    denying Russia any significant military advantage if it
    persists in its violation of the INF Treaty, so that is at the
    top of the list, but nevertheless, I do believe that it is
    important to back diplomacy up with strong action in these
    other areas.
        Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. McKeon, I want to clarify something--or get
    clarification on something you just talked about. You are not
    just required to present a report. Aren't you supposed to start
    carrying out the responses under 1243?
        Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, I will defer to you on what your
    language says because I have not studied it closely. So I will
    get back and read it when I get back to the Department. I am
    generally aware of a list of requirements that you have put
    into the new NDAA, but I will confess I have not read them
    closely.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank you. The Chair now recognizes Mr.
    Turner for any questions he may have for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Gottemoeller, you were very, very prepared with the
    question from the ranking member as to how many times you have
    been here, and I appreciate the quantification of the number of
    times that you and people from your office, as you said, have
    made themselves available. I think what you understand is it is
    not how many times you appear before us; it is what you say.
    And on the ``what you say,'' there are two categories that are
    important to us. One, action. That is what most of our
    questions to both of you today have been: What are we doing,
    and what is going to happen as a result of the change in the
    circumstances in the world or what our non-allies, what Russia
    is doing? The second is information. It is, what do you tell
    us? If you come before us and you are not telling us the whole
    story, then it doesn't matter if you are here 170 times. If we
    don't get the whole story, it is a worthless exchange of
    dialogue between us.
        And we all know that there is considerable consternation
    between this administration and this committee on the fact that
    the administration knew in intelligence information of Russia's
    violation in 2008 of the INF Treaty and waited until 2014 to
    announce the violation publicly. And as we all know, as we were
    going through the critical negotiations of the New START
    Treaty, that type of information was incredibly important. So,
    action and information.
        So my first question is about information. Ms.
    Gottemoeller, Russia recently has admitted to the disclosure of
    the existence of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea
    delivery system. It is not really necessarily a missile because
    it is not coming off of a sub or of a ship. It is its own
    undersea delivery system. It is not an ICBM [intercontinental
    ballistic missile] because it is not in the air, but it is in
    effect the same thing; it is only traveling under the water.
        So back to our two concerns with this dialogue. Ms.
    Gottemoeller, were you aware of the existence of this system
    when you were in negotiations with the New START Treaty?

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         The Department of State witness at this hearing
    misunderstood the nature of the question and later provided a detailed
    response to the closed hearing. The administration, through the work of
    the Intelligence Community, regularly provided Congress assessments of
    what the U.S. knows and does not know on this topic. The Director of
    National Intelligence has a responsibility to protect sources and
    methods while being as transparent as possible. The public's interest
    is considered to the maximum extent possible while protecting
    information as necessary, protecting the safety of those who work in or
    with the IC, or otherwise protecting national security.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, if I may, I would just like to
    say the answer to that question is an unequivocal no, but if
    you want to get into talking about this system in more detail,
    it is very good to do so in our closed session, and we will
    be----
        Mr. Turner. Well, I would be glad to do it in closed
    session, but one of the great aspects of having this
    conversation with you--because it is always so much more
    convenient for us to talk behind closed doors because the
    accountability obviously isn't as difficult for you--is that
    this is something that is openly being discussed. I didn't hear
    of this from a classified briefing from you where I am now
    asking you a question about it. It is in the news, and Russia
    is admitting or is apparently, you know, indicating that it has
    been developing the system.
        So I want to ask you, though, if you say unequivocally no--
    that means you didn't know--if you didn't know, should it have
    been included in the treaty? I mean, is this system a problem
    when you look at the overall balance that you were trying to
    accomplish in the New START Treaty?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Well, I think, sir, that it will
    have to be, you know, considered in the context of where the
    Russians go with the system.
        Mr. Turner. Well, their intention is to go here, ma'am. I
    mean, let's be clear. Right?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. No.
        Mr. Turner. I mean, it is not--they are not going from, you
    know, one area of Russia to another. Their intent is to go
    here.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I know we are concerned about it,
    of course we are concerned about it as a threat to the United
    States, but if it turns into a system that is widely put into
    operational deployment, you know, that is----
        Mr. Turner. Widely. One would probably be sufficiently
    troubling, right?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I think it is a troubling system,
    sir. There is no question about it.
        Mr. Turner. Now we are going to get to the second aspect of
    this communication of the over 60 times that you and your staff
    have been here, is action. It is in the public. It is not like
    no one knows that it is occurring. What have you done? What has
    the State Department done in communicating to Russia concerning
    this system? I mean----
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I can assure you, sir, that I never
    hesitate to raise issues of concern, including----
        Mr. Turner. I didn't ask you if you hesitate.
        Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. Including about this--
    --
        Mr. Turner. I asked you, what did you do?
        Secretary Gottemoeller [continuing]. Including about this
    system with my Russian counterparts.
        Mr. Turner. You have? What did you do? Did you----
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I never hesitate to raise issues of
    concern.
        Mr. Turner. What does ``raise'' mean? I mean, you are this,
    you know, Under Secretary of State for International Security.
    ``Hey, I saw this in the news''?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. It makes it clear to them that it
    is a concern, an official concern of the United States of
    America.
        Mr. Turner. I think you probably didn't need to tell them
    that. I think they probably understood it was a concern.
        Did you tell them anything else about what our official
    policy was, what action the United States might be taking, what
    consequences would occur as a result of this being a threat to
    the United States?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I will be very happy to talk to you
    more about this, sir, in closed----
        Mr. Turner. I am looking forward to that.
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And thank both the chairmen for having this hearing.
        Thank you both for being here.
        I want to dwell a little bit more on what we knew about the
    INF violating the--excuse me, Russia violating the INF Treaty
    before 2011, that you said just now that that is when you knew
    for sure that they were in violation, but you had suspicions
    before 2011, didn't you?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir. As I said, the system
    could be sea-launched, air-launched. And it is perhaps
    worthwhile to say that, starting in 2011, we had the
    opportunity to talk to the Hill about it, but we have never--we
    have never ever kept any information back about this system at
    all, and I want to assure these two committees of that matter.
    We have been very upfront and come up here repeatedly to inform
    you when we knew about this system being not in compliance with
    the INF Treaty.
        Mr. Lamborn. When did you first have suspicions?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I have said it was the end of
    2011 when we first had indications that this missile was a
    missile of concern.
        Mr. Lamborn. I am not sure that is my recollection of what
    we have talked about in earlier hearings. You haven't--you
    didn't even have suspicions before 2011?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. No, sir.
        Mr. Lamborn. Let me visit another subject here. You stated
    recently that the Russians have been pretty good partners over
    the years, frankly, yet you have also said that they, the
    Russians, are cheating or are not in compliance with the INF
    Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons
    Convention, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the
    Open Skies Treaty, the Budapest Memorandum, and other
    agreements. So with that track record, how can you say they
    have been, frankly, pretty good partners over the years?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Sir, I think it makes sense to look
    at specifically where the partnership has been effective. The
    list that you just read out is attached to certain nuances,
    which is very important to understand. They are in outright
    violation of the INF Treaty and the Conventional Forces in
    Europe Treaty. In certain areas, like the Open Skies Treaty, we
    have what we call compliance concerns, and that is natural in
    any treaty environment. There are concerns that come up in its
    implementation, and those are discussed in the implementation
    bodies of those treaties. We work to resolve them. And so that
    is why there are some differences here.
        In the case of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
    Biological Weapons Convention, actually, we have never been
    able to confirm the Soviet-era holdings. They have never
    provided us information on that. But it is in that context I
    said that they have been a good partner in the Chemical Weapons
    Convention. They really worked with us to get 1,300 tons of
    chemical weapons out of Syria, which I am very glad are no
    longer in Syria at this moment. We continue to have concerns
    about what Syria is doing with chemical weapons, and we will
    continue to wrestle with that problem. But it is in that
    context that I said the Russians have been a good partner.
        Mr. Lamborn. Well, in view of all those violations, I guess
    we have different definitions of what makes a pretty good
    partner.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair would point out that we have just been called for
    votes. I apologize. They didn't ask me about when to call them.
    But we will recess temporarily while we go vote, and then
    reconvene immediately after votes in room 2216. We now stand in
    recess.
        [Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittees proceeded in
    closed session.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                December 1, 2015

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                December 1, 2015

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. On what date did Secretary Kerry last discuss Russian
    non-compliance with the INF Treaty with his Russian counterpart?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Secretary Kerry has discussed Russian non-
    compliance with the INF Treaty with his Russian counterpart on several
    occasions. For specifics with regards to dates, I would refer to you
    the relevant portions of the Report on Noncompliance by the Russian
    Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty, required by
    Congress in response to Subsection 10(c) of the Ukraine Freedom Support
    Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272), where this information is provided in
    detail.
        Mr. Rogers. Is there a Circular 175 that has been approved covering
    discussions or negotiations with Pakistan on nuclear weapons or related
    matters?
        If so, as of what date was it approved?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The Administration is not pursuing
    negotiations on a legally-binding international agreement with Pakistan
    on nuclear weapons or related matters and has accordingly not engaged
    in the Circular 175 process for authorizing the negotiation or
    conclusion of an international agreement.
        Mr. Rogers. Does the administration assess Russia plans to remain
    in the INF Treaty?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The Administration believes that it is in
    the mutual security interests of all parties to the INF Treaty that
    Russia and the other 11 successor States to the Soviet Union remain
    parties to the Treaty and comply with their obligations. All levels of
    the Russian government have repeatedly reaffirmed Russia's commitment
    to the INF Treaty.
        Mr. Rogers. Is the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) the only
    system under development or in some stage of planning that could
    violate the INF?
        If not, how many systems are you personally aware of?
        How many systems do they (the Russians) have to be developing or
    plan to develop to suggest they don't plan to return to compliance with
    the INF treaty?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. There is an interagency process in place
    for assessing Parties' compliance with regard to systems under
    development or in some stage of planning that may have INF Treaty
    implications. This process involves the Intelligence Community's
    reporting on potential systems of concern, discussions and
    determinations by the interagency Verification and Compliance Analysis
    Working Group, and, ultimately reporting of compliance findings in the
    Annual Report to Congress on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
    Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments.
    I would refer to you the annual Compliance Report for questions on
    violations.
        Mr. Rogers. Please list your meetings with Russian officials to
    resolve it compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
    Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Presidential Nuclear
    Initiatives (PNI).
        Secretary Gottemoeller. As the former Assistant Secretary for the
    Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) and now as
    Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, it
    continues to be a top priority of mine and of the Administration to
    regularly consult with Russia on matters pertaining to compliance with
    arms control obligations and commitments. During my tenure as the
    Assistant Secretary for AVC, and since 2009, it has been my practice to
    directly engage the Russian Ambassador to the United States on matters
    of compliance, particularly in connection with the public release of
    the annual compliance report. At those meetings, I discussed U.S.
    concerns regarding Russia's compliance on a number of treaties,
    including the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological
    Weapons Convention (BWC) and extended the opportunity for expert level
    discussions to resolve them. The United States has a consistent record
    of pursuing concerns with Russia regarding its compliance with the CWC
    and BWC, as both Treaties contribute to international stability and
    security. Since entry into force of the CWC in 1997, we have inquired
    and engaged Russia on numerous occasions regarding its obligations
    under the CWC. On matters regarding the BWC, U.S. experts at my
    direction engaged their Russian counterparts in November at the UN in
    Geneva on issues specifically related to the implementation of the BWC
    and on identifying areas of commonality to advance our shared
    interests. Nevertheless, Russia has declined to respond positively or
    constructively to U.S. efforts to cooperate in resolving CWC and BWC
    compliance concerns. We will, however, continue to pursue opportunities
    for engagement. We have not held any meetings with Russian officials
    aimed specifically at resolving questions relating to Russia's
    adherence to the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs). The PNIs were
    non-legally binding, unilateral commitments made by the United States
    and Russian Federation. These commitments did not provide for a
    verification regime to confirm that either side has fully implemented
    their pledges.
        Mr. Rogers. Under what circumstances is Russia, under the New START
    treaty, required to exhibit a new type of missile to the United States?
        Does the RS-26 Rubezh meet that standard?
        As of what date did it meet that standard?
        Have State Department or other employees of the United States
    government asked Russia to exhibit it to the United States?
        On what date? What was Russia's response?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Paragraph 2 of Section VIII of Part Five of
    the Protocol to the New START Treaty provides that ``[e]ach Party shall
    conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right to take part in the
    exhibitions conducted by the other Party, in order to demonstrate the
    distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of
    each new type, variant, or version of an ICBM, SLBM, heavy bomber
    equipped for nuclear armaments, and, as provided for in Part Two of the
    Protocol, an ICBM launcher, in the periods of time specified in
    corresponding notifications.'' These exhibition requirements apply to
    the RS-26 Rubezh as a new type of ICBM. The Russian Ministry of has
    made public statements concerning an expected exhibition of the RS-26
    ICBM in 2016.
        Mr. Rogers. What are the economic activities of the Russian firms
    Novator and Titan in the U.S.?
        In terms of dollars, how much economic activity do they conduct in
    the U.S. each year?
        Are they banned today from economic activity in the U.S. by any
    sanction or other U.S. Government action?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. While OKB Novator and Holding Titan-2 are
    not on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, they are subject
    to existing U.S. export control policies, including restrictions for
    any high technology defense articles or services for export to Russia,
    such as those announced on April 28, 2014. We are happy to discuss
    further details of U.S. policies in this area in the appropriate
    setting.
        Mr. Rogers. Following up on Mr. Franks's question, is it your
    belief that neither Russia nor China conducted any nuclear test-
    activity that produced any--I repeat any--nuclear yield (down to the
    level of even single or double digit tons of yield) since 2000?
        Does the Intelligence Community share this view?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System has
    not detected any nuclear test by Russia or China since 2000. The Office
    of the Director of National Intelligence would be happy to provide
    further information on the subject as needed.
        Mr. Rogers. The INF Treaty prohibits flight-testing and production
    of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles between a certain
    range. It does not prohibit deployment, right?
        We know from the administration that Russia has flight-tested a
    ground-launched cruise missile, but has Russia also produced any
    quantity of these systems? How many?
        Do you agree that if Russia was training any of its forces in the
    use of this system, that would suggest that Russia intends to deploy
    it?
        Does the administration have any reason to believe any of these
    systems have achieved an initial operating capability?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The INF Treaty prohibits the possession,
    production, and flight-testing of ground-launched ballistic and cruise
    missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The Article-by-
    Article Analysis for the Article VI of the INF Treaty noted that a
    flight-test ban is a natural element in any treaty that eliminates an
    entire class of missile systems and serves to strengthen the production
    ban, as any covertly produced missile could not be adequately flight
    tested without likely U.S. detection. The analysis further noted that
    without realistic testing, a Party's confidence in the operational
    capability of any covertly produced missile system would be degraded.
    The INF Treaty prohibits the possession of missile systems whether
    deployed or non-deployed. In regards to your specific questions
    pertaining to the Russian ground-launched cruise missile, I would refer
    to you the relevant portions of the Report on Noncompliance by the
    Russian Federation with its Obligations under the INF Treaty, submitted
    to Congress in accordance with Subsection 10(c) of the Ukraine Freedom
    Support Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-272).
        Mr. Rogers. The President committed to modernize the U.S. nuclear
    triad, including the LRSO, which is the replacement of our air-launched
    cruise missile, as an element of ratification of the New START treaty,
    did he not? Do you believe there is anything inconsistent with the LRSO
    and the President's Prague Legacy? Do you believe dual-capable cruise
    missiles are destabilizing?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. As certified to the Senate in accordance
    with the New START Treaty Resolution of Advice and Consent to
    Ratification, the President is committed to modernizing U.S. nuclear
    forces, including replacing the air-launched cruise missile with the
    LRSO. The LRSO is not destabilizing and not inconsistent with the
    President's Prague Agenda. In his Prague speech, the President declared
    that ``make no mistake: as long as these weapons exist, the United
    States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any
    adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.'' The LRSO cruise
    missile is a key element of our plan for ensuring our nuclear deterrent
    remains effective.
        Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me, during the period the JCPOA was being
    reviewed by the Congress, did the administration or any administration
    official receive any notification from or gain from any other means
    reason to believe that any other country in the region would seek a
    right to enrich uranium or possibly renegotiate its 123 Agreement with
    the United States? If so, were you one of those officials?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. I did not have any discussions with
    countries in the region regarding a right to enrich uranium or the
    renegotiation of a 123 Agreement during this time period. At your
    request, the Department of State would be happy to provide a classified
    briefing on any relevant conversations with other State Department
    officials that occurred during that time.
        Mr. Rogers. On what date did the Secretary of Defense last discuss
    Russian non-compliance with the INF treaty with his Russian
    counterpart?
        Mr. McKeon. Then-Secretary of Defense Hagel discussed Russian non-
    compliance with the INF Treaty with Defense Minister Shoygu on August
    15, 2014, during a phone call that focused on events in Ukraine. As a
    result of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the Department of
    Defense suspended military-to-military cooperation with the Russian
    Ministry of Defense and curtailed engagement to a bare minimum. In
    keeping with this, in September 2015, Secretary Carter spoke with
    Minister Shoygu to emphasize the importance of the safety for U.S.
    personnel in light of Russian air operations in Syria. No other topics
    were discussed during this phone call.
        Mr. Rogers. Does the administration assess Russia plans to remain
    in the INF Treaty?
        Mr. McKeon. Russian officials have repeatedly and publicly affirmed
    Russia's commitment to the INF Treaty, although it is uncertain at this
    point whether Russia will take the necessary steps to make good on that
    commitment. The Administration believes that it is in the mutual
    security interests of all parties to the INF Treaty that Russia and the
    other 11 successor States to the Soviet Union remain parties to the
    Treaty and comply with their obligations.
        Mr. Rogers. Is the Russian ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)
    the only system under development or in some stage of planning that
    could violate the INF?
        If not, how many systems are you personally aware of?
        How many systems do they (the Russians) have to be developing or
    plan to develop to suggest they don't plan to return to compliance with
    the INF Treaty?
        Mr. McKeon. We would be happy to provide a classified briefing on
    this subject. I would additionally refer you to the Annual Report to
    Congress on Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control,
    Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, which
    reports on compliance questions and compliance findings.
        Mr. Rogers. Please take a look at Ms. Gottemoeller's answer to Mr.
    Keating's question: Is there a military benefit to Russia from its
    violation of the INF Treaty?
        Does it help fill what Russia believes is a capability gap or
    targeting gap?
        Mr. McKeon. DOD's core objective remains the same: to ensure that
    Russia does not obtain a significant military advantage from its INF
    Treaty violation. Russia may gain some military benefit from its
    violation; however, that gain is limited since the Russian Federation
    already possesses deployed air- and sea-launched intermediate-range
    cruise missiles. Statements made by Russian officials over the last
    decade or more indicate that Russia believes that it has a capability
    gap that can only be filled by fielding missiles currently prohibited
    under the INF Treaty.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe your understanding of the Department of
    Defense's obligations under section 1243 of the FY 2016 NDAA regarding
    the INF Treaty?
        Mr. McKeon. The Secretary of the Defense and the Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff are obligated to submit the notifications and
    reports delineated in subparagraphs (c), (d)(5), and (d)(6) of Section
    1243 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2016.
        Section 1243 also obligates the Department of Defense to submit a
    plan for the development of the military capabilities listed in
    subparagraphs (d)(1)(A), (d)(1)(B), and (d)(1)(C) unless the conditions
    of subparagraph (d)(1) have been met. The Secretary of Defense is to
    carry out the development of those capabilities that are recommended by
    the Chairman, using amounts authorized to be appropriated for FY 2016
    by Section 201 of the NDAA for FY 2016.
        Mr. Rogers. Would you please explain why the modernization of the
    LRSO is a key component of the President's program to modernize our
    nuclear forces?
        Mr. McKeon. The Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile is a key
    element of our plan for ensuring our nuclear deterrent remains
    effective. The LRSO replaces the aging Air-Launched Cruise Missile
    (ALCM), which is our only air-launched standoff nuclear capability and
    which is already decades beyond its planned service life. The LRSO
    strengthens our overall survivable deterrence capabilities and provides
    the President with credible options for signaling U.S. resolve and
    responding across a broad spectrum of crises. The LRSO will also
    provide an important hedge against technical problems in other parts of
    the Triad, and against problems with generating other nuclear forces to
    alert. The LRSO will extend the service life of our current bomber
    force by extending the effective range of stealthy and non-stealthy
    bombers through standoff. Finally, cruise missiles create an extremely
    difficult air defense problem for anyone seeking to negate the air leg
    of our deterrent.
        Mr. Rogers. Why did it take the U.S. a full six years from the time
    of Russia's violation of the INF Treaty in 2008 and three years from
    our determination in 2011 that it was a violation until we notified our
    NATO allies in 2014?
        Mr. McKeon. The United States did not have information in 2008 that
    the Russian Federation was violating the INF Treaty. We have repeatedly
    noted that prior to the ratification in December 2010 of the New START
    Treaty, the Intelligence Community was not aware of any Russian
    activity inconsistent with the INF Treaty. Information regarding this
    system's testing history, the intelligence reporting associated with
    this program, the compliance determinations, and our work with allies
    has been made available to Congress many times through appropriate
    channels. We are happy to again provide a briefing to clarify the
    timeline of the verification regarding Russia's violation.
        Mr. Rogers. It has now been 7 years since Russia first violated the
    INF Treaty. Last year, when we were in this same room, Ms. Gottemoeller
    and Mr. McKeon, you testified that a list of responses was being
    prepared for a principals meeting. Were any of those responses ever
    approved? If so, what is the plan to implement those responses? Will we
    see anything in the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget request?
    Will any of the fiscal year 2016 funds be re-appropriated to implement
    these responses? If not, when can we expect a decision on those
    responses?
        Mr. McKeon. The Department has reviewed a broad range of military
    response options and, with the interagency, considered the effect each
    option could have on either convincing Russian leadership to return to
    compliance with the INF Treaty or on countering the capability of the
    prohibited ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) system. This
    assessment was conducted at the same time as we began confronting new
    strategic realities in Europe--a Russia that is destabilizing the
    European security order by purporting to annex Crimea and conducting
    illegal activities in eastern Ukraine, a Russia that is actively
    seeking to undermine NATO, and a Russia that is modernizing its
    military capabilities across a range of systems.
        In 2015, the Administration determined that the United States
    needed to consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the
    context of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts
    international legal norms and destabilizes the European security order.
    Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in isolation from its overall
    aggressive behavior; therefore, the Administration concluded that
    responses cannot focus solely on the INF Treaty.
        U.S. responses to Russia's increased aggressive actions, including
    its violation of the INF Treaty, involve a broad range of efforts--
    within the Department, bilaterally with allies and partners, and within
    the NATO Alliance. These responses include increasing posture and
    presence, refocusing planning and shaping of future military activities
    in Europe, and improving defensive measures to neutralize or undercut
    Russia offensive capabilities.
        For example, DOD plans to continue the European Reassurance
    Initiative (ERI), with $789.3 million requested in Fiscal Year (FY)
    2016. Under the ERI, the United States has increased our persistent,
    rotational air, land, and sea presence in the Baltics and in Central
    Europe to reassure Allies and to deter Russian aggression. ERI also
    enables the United States to expand bilateral and multilateral
    exercises in Europe in order to improve interoperability and to
    strengthen U.S. warfighting capability in the face of newer threats
    from Russia. DOD will continue to seek funding for ERI in FY 2017.
                                     ______

                         QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. POE
        Mr. Poe. You stated in your testimony that ``the Administration
    will continue its work to identify and implement appropriate response
    options.'' The INF Treaty established the Special Verification
    Commission to address compliance concerns. Why have we not yet called a
    meeting of the Special Verification Commission to address Russia's
    violation?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. If we had any indication that the Russians
    would acknowledge this missile and engage productively in a Special
    Verification Commission (SVC) discussion to try to resolve these
    concerns, we would consider convening an SVC session. We have yet to
    see the political will from Moscow that would make such an experts-
    level meeting productive. An additional complexity comes from the fact
    that an SVC session would be multilateral in nature, with additional
    countries, such as Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, participating.
    That is because all the Soviet successor states became parties to the
    INF Treaty after the demise of the USSR. We will continue to raise our
    concerns bilaterally on multiple occasions and at various levels and
    departments with the Russian government.
        Mr. Poe. Why did it take the U.S. a full 6 years from the time of
    Russia's violation of the INF Treaty in 2008 and 3 years from our
    determination in 2011 that it was a violation until we notified our
    NATO allies in 2014?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The United States did not have information
    in 2008 that the Russian Federation was violating the treaty. We have
    repeatedly noted that prior to the ratification in December 2010 of the
    New START Treaty, the intelligence community was not aware of any
    Russian activity inconsistent with the INF Treaty. Information
    regarding this system's testing history, the intelligence reporting
    associated with this program, the compliance determinations, and our
    work with allies has been made available to Congress many times through
    appropriate channels. This Administration believes that it is extremely
    important that this timeline be properly described and understood.
    Misunderstandings about the timeline could serve to confuse our allies
    or inadvertently obscure the nature of the Russian violation. We are
    happy to again provide a briefing to clarify the timeline of the
    violation.
        Mr. Poe. It has now been 7 years since Russia first violated the
    INF Treaty. Last year, when we were in this same room, Ms. Gottemoeller
    and Mr. McKeon, you testified that a list of responses was being
    prepared for a principals meeting. Were any of those responses ever
    approved? If so, what is the plan to implement those responses? Will we
    see anything in the administration's fiscal year 2017 budget request?
    Will any of the fiscal year 2016 funds be re-appropriated to implement
    these responses? If not, when can we expect a decision on those
    responses?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. We continue to consult with allies and
    review a range of appropriate options, including diplomatic, economic,
    and military options should Russia persist in its violation. Mr. McKeon
    can better speak to any potential budget requests and appropriations
    matters.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. Is it still the administration's position that Russia
    should return to compliance with the treaty? Why is this in our
    interests versus withdrawing from the treaty now?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. The INF Treaty benefits the security of the
    United States, our allies, and the Russian Federation and contributes
    to stability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions. Accordingly, the
    priority of the United States is to return Russia to compliance with
    the INF Treaty and to ensure the Treaty's continued viability. Since
    2013, the United States has raised its concerns on multiple occasions
    and at various levels and departments within the Russian government in
    an effort to resolve this violation. It is in our national security
    interest and in our allies' interest that the INF Treaty remains in
    force and that Russia remains a State Party to the Treaty and complies
    with its obligations. We have made clear to Russia, however, that the
    United States will protect our security and the security of our allies
    and that Russian security will not be enhanced by continuing its
    violation. U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty at this time would be
    detrimental to the interests of the United States, our allies, and our
    partners for several important reasons. First, as Mr. McKeon noted in
    his testimony, the United States currently has sufficient capability to
    meet our defense requirements through sea-launched and air-launched
    cruise missiles which are not prohibited by the INF Treaty. Second,
    withdrawal would allow Russia to proceed unconstrained with the
    production and deployment of this ground-launched cruise missile
    system. Russia remains under limitations associated with covertly
    producing a reliable system, while more and more public scrutiny and
    knowledge builds with respect to this ground-launched cruise missile
    program. Third, a U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty would free Russia
    from its legal obligations under the Treaty, essentially letting Russia
    off the hook for its violation. Russia now has to make the political
    decision whether to come back into compliance with its obligations by
    eliminating the missiles and launchers in question or to withdraw from
    the Treaty and accept the damaging consequences for European and Asian
    security while attempting to proceed with the development of a ground-
    launched cruise missile system under conditions of increased public
    visibility. We should not relieve Russia of the need to make this
    decision and allow it to attempt to shift blame to the United States
    for the demise of this Treaty.
        Mr. Cooper. How long did it take for Russia to return to the ABM
    Treaty when President Reagan urged the Soviet Union to return to
    compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in the 1980s? Did we
    stop nuclear weapons reductions and related negotiations during the
    Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. It took six years for the Soviet Union to
    take any significant steps to return to compliance with the ABM Treaty
    after the United States first revealed in the summer of 1983 that it
    had detected a large early warning radar under construction at
    Krasnoyarsk in the Soviet Union. This installation was roughly 800
    kilometers from the nearest border and thus in violation of the ABM
    Treaty (which required that all such radars be located on a party's
    periphery and oriented outward). The United States raised the issue
    with the Soviet Union in the fall 1983 Standing Consultative Commission
    (SCC) session dedicated to the ABM Treaty's second five-year review. In
    the autumn of 1989, the Soviet Union conceded that the Krasnoyarsk
    radar was a violation of the ABM Treaty and agreed to eliminate the
    radar without preconditions. Negotiations on both the Strategic Arms
    Reduction Treaty (1981-1991) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
    Treaty (1981-1987) continued during the period of the Soviet violation
    of the ABM Treaty.
        Mr. Cooper. Is it still the administration's position that Russia
    should return to compliance with the treaty? Why is this in our
    interests versus withdrawing from the treaty now?
        Mr. McKeon. The INF Treaty contributes to the security of the
    United States, our allies and partners, and the Russian Federation
    while also enhancing stability in Europe and the Asia-Pacific regions.
    Accordingly, the priority of the United States is for Russia to return
    to compliance with the INF Treaty and to ensure the Treaty's continued
    viability. Since 2013, the United States has raised its concerns on
    multiple occasions and at various levels within the Russian Government
    in an effort to address this violation. We have also made clear to
    Russia that the United States will protect its security and the
    security of our allies and partners and that Russian security will not
    be enhanced by continuing its violation.
        U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty at this time would allow Russia
    to proceed unconstrained with the production and deployment of this
    ground-launched cruise missile system. A U.S. withdrawal from the INF
    Treaty would free Russia from its legal obligations under the Treaty,
    essentially eliminating the consequences of Russia's violation.
        Russia now has to make the decision whether to come back into
    compliance with its obligations by eliminating the missiles and
    launchers in question or to withdraw from the INF Treaty and accept the
    damaging consequences for European and Asian security. We should not
    permit the Russians to avoid the onus of making this decision.
        Mr. Cooper. Is there a military requirement to respond to the
    Russian violation?
        Mr. McKeon. The deployment of an INF Treaty-prohibited ground-
    launched cruise missile system by the Russian Federation would increase
    the risk to U.S. allies and pose an indirect threat to the United
    States. As a result, the Department reviewed a broad range of military
    response options to consider the effect each option could have on
    countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-prohibited system.
        The Administration determined that the United States needed to
    consider Russian actions with regard to the INF Treaty in the context
    of its overall aggressive and bellicose behavior that flouts
    international legal norms and destabilizes the European and global
    security order. Since Russia is not violating the INF Treaty in
    isolation from its overall aggressive behavior, the Administration
    concluded that U.S. military responses cannot focus solely on the INF
    Treaty violation.
        More broadly, DOD continues to develop a comprehensive response to
    Russian military actions, taking into account the broader strategic
    environment and Russia's aggressive behavior, including its violation
    of the INF Treaty. U.S. responses involve a broad range of efforts--
    within the Department, bilaterally with allies and partners, and within
    the NATO Alliance. These responses include increasing posture and
    presence, refocusing planning and shaping of future military activities
    in Europe, and improving defensive measures to neutralize or undercut
    Russia offensive capabilities.
        DOD's core objective remains the same: to ensure that Russia does
    not obtain a significant military advantage from its INF Treaty
    violation.
        Mr. Cooper. Does the Russian violation undermine U.S. military
    advantage or capabilities?
        What additional target coverage does Russia's INF noncompliant GLCM
    provide that cannot be covered by Russia's existing air- and sea-
    launched cruises missiles?
        Does the Russian violation pose additional threats to the United
    States or its allies? What kind?
        Does the Russian violation undermine U.S. nuclear deterrent
    capabilities in any way?
        Mr. McKeon. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
        Mr. Turner. During the December 1st hearing before the House Armed
    Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, I asked you a question
    regarding Russia's recent disclosure of the existence of a nuclear-
    armed, nuclear-powered undersea delivery system. Specifically, I asked
    you whether or not you were aware of the existence of this system when
    you negotiated the New START treaty?
        During the open session, you stated that the answer to my question
    was an ``unequivocal no!''.
        At this time, would you like to retract or revise your original
    answer?
        Were you aware of the existence of a Russian nuclear-armed,
    nuclear-powered undersea delivery system when you negotiated the New
    START treaty?
        Secretary Gottemoeller. Thank you for your question. During the
    hearing, I misunderstood the nature of your question and I apologize
    for any confusion this may have caused. I appreciated the opportunity
    to be able to discuss this issue in detail during the closed session
    that immediately followed the open session. It was helpful to be able
    to talk in that environment, given the sensitivity of this issue. I
    understand that the Intelligence Community (IC) has reached out to the
    Committee regarding this issue, and I appreciate your attention to this
    matter. Further background information on this topic is also being
    provided to this Committee by the IC under separate cover as a
    classified annex. The Administration, through the work of the IC,
    regularly provides Congress with authoritative assessments of what the
    United States knows and does not know regarding Russian nuclear weapons
    systems. This sharing of information is done regularly to keep staff
    and members abreast of these issues, to better inform our diplomacy and
    policymaking in the Administration, and to aid in the legislative
    process. Following the December 1 public hearing, Administration
    briefers, including me, provided members and staff with information in
    a closed setting to respond in detail to a number of sensitive issues
    raised during the open hearing, in order to (1) inform both
    subcommittees with the most substantive, detailed information possible,
    and (2) best protect the sources and methods by which the IC obtains
    information. We are happy to continue to discuss this issue in the
    appropriate setting.

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