    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

     IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: FUELING MIDDLE EAST TURMOIL

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 2, 2015

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 114-135

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TED POE, Texas                       BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 KAREN BASS, California
    DARRELL E. ISSA, California          WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    PAUL COOK, California                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            GRACE MENG, New York
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania
    SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin
    DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan
    LEE M. ZELDIN, New York
    TOM EMMER, Minnesota Until 5/18/15 deg.
    DANIEL DONOVAN, New York As of 5/19/15 deg.

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Ali Alfoneh, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of
      Democracies....................................................     5
    Mr. Scott Modell, managing director, The Rapidan Group...........    57
    Mr. Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. director, The John
      Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth
      College (former Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for
      Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State)....................    65

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Ali Alfoneh: Prepared statement..............................     7
    Mr. Scott Modell: Prepared statement.............................    59
    Mr. Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement..........................    67

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................   102
    Hearing minutes..................................................   103
    The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of California: Material submitted for the record.........   105
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........   112
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey: Questions submitted for the
      record.........................................................   114

     IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS: FUELING MIDDLE EAST TURMOIL

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2015

                           House of Representatives,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order. Iran and
    its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps have really been on a
    roll, and that is the subject of this hearing today. And I want
    to thank our witnesses for being with us.
        Let me start by just giving my observations on recent
    events. So over the last few weeks, the IRGC has tested a new
    long-range ballistic missile, and that test is in violation of
    the U.N. sanctions. They also released a video of dozens more
    of these ICBMs staged in an underground bunker. The IRGC Quds
    Force has stepped up efforts in support of the murderous Assad
    regime in Syria, and we have seen those attacks on the ground.
    And by all accounts it appears that the IRGC has prevented
    international investigators from assessing the information
    needed to conclusively finish a report on the possible military
    dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. It is on IRGC territory,
    so.
        From nuclear proliferation to support of international
    terrorism, to human rights abuses, the IRGC has made Iran the
    global menace that Iran is today. The IRGC is responsible for
    squashing democracy movements at home, for spreading the
    Iranian regime's revolutionary ideology abroad, and for
    sparking turmoil throughout the Middle East. Its forces operate
    again, independent of Iran's regular army. It answers directly
    only to one man, Iran's Supreme Leader.
        While most understand the role of the IRGC in fueling
    conflict throughout the region, its hidden grasp on the Iranian
    economy is just as important. People don't realize that most of
    the major businesses were nationalized basically and turned
    over to the IRGC to control. So they have about 30 percent of
    the Iranian economy. The IRGC has been labeled Iran's ``most
    powerful economic actor'' by the U.S. Treasury Department,
    which has noted its deep reach into ``critical sectors of
    Iran's economic infrastructure.'' The IRGC's biggest, largest
    entity is this construction arm which controls 800 affiliated
    companies. That it also controls billions of assets, is often I
    think lost, on the public here. The fact that much of the money
    that is held in escrow that when released is going to flow
    through the IRGC, I think that point has been lost on us. These
    activities in turn fund Iran's ballistic missile program, its
    military activities, its regional aggression.
        Of course none of this appears to disqualify Iran from
    receiving sanctions relief under a nuclear deal that allows
    Iran to keep a path to a weapon. Within months Iran could have
    access to tens of billions in new cash as this money comes out
    of escrow. And this, what I call a ``stimulus package,'' this
    stimulus package for the Supreme Leader will only strengthen
    the IRGC. And as trade restrictions with Iran loosens, that in
    turn of course, will increase its access to dual-use technology
    for its military and its missile programs.
        An IRGC with more cash means more threats to the United
    States and our allies. Even when Iran's sanctions were fully in
    place, Iran's support to the Assad regime in Syria totaled
    every year $6 billion. I am going to guess now that that is
    going to go up. IRGC support on the ground, combined with
    Russian air support, worsened the already horrible conflict in
    Syria, drawing in foreign fighters and giving ISIS room to
    grow.
        And more resources for the IRGC also promises to create
    problems in Iraq, and in Yemen--where the guards are backing
    Shia militias responsible for violence against Iraq's Sunni
    minority and against the Houthi rebels fighting Saudi forces in
    Yemen. This combined with Iran's continued support for
    terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas--and I will just
    remind people that the other story that surfaced a few months
    ago, was that the IRGC will now try to transfer--and I think
    this is in direct violation of the agreement--try to transfer
    guidance systems, GPS guidance systems, to the 90,000 rockets
    and missiles that are already in Hezbollah's inventory, and has
    also offered to resupply the inventory that Hamas spent in the
    Gaza war and rebuild the tunnels to boot. So, the major source
    of instability in that region is the IRGC.
        In selling its flawed nuclear deal to Congress, I believe
    Secretary Kerry testified, that there would be no let up on
    Iran's terror and destructive regional behavior. That was my
    takeaway as I listened to his words, but I want to now
    understand how that is going to be followed with action. We
    have yet to see any effective strategy from the administration
    to pushback against IRGC's regional advances which have
    emboldened Iran, which have undermined our allies, and this
    morning we will hear from our witnesses on what such a strategy
    might look like, and how Congress can help.
        And I will now turn to the ranking member for any opening
    comments he may have. Mr. Engel.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling
    this hearing, and I want to welcome all witnesses to the
    Foreign Affairs Committee. In the wake of the Paris attacks,
    the world is focused on the fight against ISIS, and
    announcements yesterday by the Secretary of Defense, about new
    measures that we are taking to fight ISIS are welcome, and I
    think that there is obviously a lot more to go.
        We are reminded of the ongoing threat posed by terrorism,
    and so I am glad our committee is focusing on the world's
    leading state sponsor of terrorism, Iran. I want to echo the
    concerns the chairman just mentioned, the fact that Iran is the
    leading state sponsor of terrorism. And in the past several
    years when Iran had no money, it still found money to be the
    leading state sponsor of terrorism.
        Under the deal negotiated with Iran, they will be awash in
    cash. They will have lots of money, and imagine how much
    destruction they can do in support of terrorist activities and
    terrorism. That is very deeply troubling to me, and it was and
    has been throughout our discussions about U.S. relations with
    Iran and the entire nuclear deal with Iran.
        Now, since ceding power in 1979, the Iranian regime has
    built an ugly record supporting terrorist proxies. Let's
    remember this: The seizure of our Embassy in Tehran 1979, the
    bombings of our Embassy in the Marines barracks in Beirut in
    the early 1980s, killing nearly 300 Americans, the attacks in
    Buenos Aires that targeted Israel's Embassy and a Jewish
    community center, the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia,
    which also cost American lives, and just a few years ago, a
    plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador right here in
    Washington. And every one of these horrible events is covered
    in Iran's fingerprints.
        The Iranian regime uses the Quds Force, an elite unit of
    the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a tool to support
    terrorist proxies and spread instability throughout the region.
    And in recent years, Iran's leaders have doubled down on this
    reprehensible policy, and let's just look at what is going on
    today. In Syria, Iran is committed to propping up the Assad
    regime and now is working with Putin in pursuit of that
    objective. So much for P5+1. It has mobilized Hezbollah and
    organized militias composed of Shi'ite fighters from Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and Pakistan to support the regime. It has also
    deployed hundreds if not thousands of the Quds Force fighters
    in a direct combat roll. And the result of Iran's actions, a
    longer, more costly war, a graver humanitarian crisis, and more
    and more innocent lives lost.
        In Iraq, the Quds Force continues to support hard-core Shia
    militias, some of which were involved in targeting American
    troops during the Iraq war. These violent groups drive
    sectarian division, making it harder to build the inclusive
    Iraqi Government necessary to help defeat ISIS. And in Yemen,
    Iran's support for Houthi rebels has fomented a bloody civil
    war that is now spilling over Yemen's borders. Chaos in that
    country has hampered U.S. counterterrorism efforts, focused on
    AQAP, one of the most dangerous Al Qaeda affiliates. Iran also
    supports Shi'ite elements in other Gulf states, including
    Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, that are involved in efforts to
    destabilize those governments. And, of course, the Iranian
    regime has repeatedly expressed its support for wiping Israel
    off the map. By providing a steady flow of missiles to
    Hezbollah and arms to Hamas, Iran is a grave threat to our
    close ally Israel.
        Finally, it is important to note that Iran's support for
    terrorism is not just limited to the Middle East. Just this
    past week Kenyan security forces arrested two men suspected of
    working with the Quds Force to plan attacks in that East
    African nation. This dangerous pattern is one of the reasons I
    remain concerned about the Iran nuclear deal. Once the nuclear
    sanctions on Iran are lifted, the regime will have access to
    tens of billions of dollars in new wealth, and I will bet my
    money that some of it will end up in terrorist coffers.
        So I agree with what the chairman said: Iran was a leading
    and has been a leading state sponsor of terrorism when they had
    no money. Imagine now when they are going to have sanctions
    lifted, how much money they have which will directly go to
    terrorist activities. So in my view, these factors all point to
    the likelihood of greater case and instability in the years
    ahead. So today I hope we can discuss what can be done to
    counter Iran's maligned activities in the region beyond.
        I want to mention just a few areas I think are most
    important. First, we must aggressively enforce terrorism,
    proliferation, and human rights sanctions on Iran. This
    includes existing sanctions on the IRGC, and we should continue
    to designate all entities connected to Iran's support for
    terrorism. We need to send a clear message that working with
    Iranian firms linked to the IRGC is risky business.
        Next, we need to keep making our case to our EU allies and
    others that Hezbollah as an organization, not just its military
    wing, is a terrorist organization and should be treated like a
    terrorist organization. Our friends in Europe try to split
    hairs by saying that only part of Hamas is a terrorist
    organization. The other part is a humanitarian organization.
    Baloney. It is a terrorist organization, and we should say it,
    and our allies should say it.
        We should ramp up our efforts to track the resources Iran
    receives as a result of sanctions relief. We need to know just
    how much money Iran is funneling to these violent groups. We
    need final closer cooperation with our Gulf allies on defense
    intelligence, counterterrorism, maritime security, and other
    key areas. And, lastly, we need to maintain a very close
    security relationship with Israel, our closest ally in the
    region. This includes the negotiation of a new memorandum of
    understanding, or MOU, that reflects the new security
    environment in the region.
        We must also redouble our commitment to supporting missile
    defense systems, including Iron Dome, so that Israel is able to
    defend itself. And I hope going forward Congress and the
    administration do what is needed to pursue those aims. I look
    forward to ideas and insight from our witnesses, and I yield
    back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. So this morning we
    are joined by a distinguished panel. We have Mr. Ali Alfoneh.
    He is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of
    Democracies. He is an expert on civil military relations in
    Iran as well as the author of ``Iran Unveiled: How the
    Revolutionary Guard is Transforming Iran from a Theocracy into
    a Military Dictatorship.''
        Mr. Scott Modell is managing director of the Rapidan Group,
    and prior to this he served at the Central Intelligence Agency
    where he conducted operations throughout the Middle East,
    including as part of the post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan.
        And we have Ambassador Daniel Benjamin with us. He is the
    Norman E. McCulloch director at Dartmouth College. Previously
    Ambassador Benjamin served as the Ambassador-at-Large and
    Coordinator for Counterterrorism where he was the principal
    advisor on counterterrorism to Secretary of State Clinton.
        And we welcome our panel. Without objection, the witnesses'
    full prepared statement will be made part of the record here.
    And members will have 5 days to submit statements or questions
    or any extraneous materials for the record. And Mr. Alfoneh,
    please summarize your remarks.

      STATEMENT OF MR. ALI ALFONEH, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
                         DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES

        Mr. Alfoneh. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
    Engel. Thank you very much for your kind invitation, and thank
    you for providing me with the opportunity to share my analysis
    with you, along with the members of this distinguished panel.
        You mentioned, sir, the Iranian revolution of 1979 as a
    historical event of the past, and that is, indeed, the American
    perception of the revolution. In Iran, however, the leaders of
    the Islamic Republic, they subscribe to Trotsky's theory of a
    permanent revolution. For them the revolution of 1979, is not a
    historical event of the past which took place and is over. From
    their perspective, the revolution is permanent, is happening
    every single day, and the engine of that revolution, Mr.
    Chairman, is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
        This is also why I do not share the optimism of some of my
    colleagues here in Washington who believe that the emergence of
    President Rouhani, his promise of engaging in bilateral talks
    with the U.S., the nuclear negotiations and the deal which was
    negotiated, and even emergence of a common threat of Islamic
    State, is going to make life easier in the Islamic Republic of
    Iran. Because of the very simple reason that President Rouhani
    and his technocratic government, they are not in charge of the
    portfolios which are of interest to us today. The Islamic
    Revolutionary Guards Corps is in control of Iran's regional
    policies.
        Let's take a quick look at the problems that I see. First
    of all, as the chairman and the ranking member pointed out, the
    Revolutionary Guard not only is in control of the policy, they
    have also benefitted most financially from the nuclear deal.
    Much of the money which the Government of the Islamic Republic
    has received is going to be channeled to companies owned by the
    Revolutionary Guards, or directly to the military budget of the
    Revolutionary Guards. Apart from this, the Islamic
    Revolutionary Guard is pursuing policy objectives in the Middle
    East region which are in contrast and totally opposed to U.S.
    objectives.
        The United States desires to see a future of Syria in which
    Bashar al-Assad, who is personally responsible for destruction
    of his own country, does not play a role. The Revolutionary
    Guard's goal is to keep Bashar al-Assad in power, and to that
    effect they are trying to mobilize, and they have managed to
    mobilize, a pan-Shi'ite international brigade to Syria, and
    that deployment of course is increasing the risk of spread of
    the conflict in Syria to other countries. The home countries of
    those militia men, which is primarily Lebanon, Iraq,
    Afghanistan, and even distant and geographically far away
    Pakistan.
        The United States desires to fight ISIL. That is not the
    case with the Revolutionary Guards. From their perspective, it
    is fine that there is an enemy called the Islamic State. Which
    is not really threatening the existence of the Islamic Republic
    of Iran, and at the same time, is the only alternative to
    Bashar al-Assad and his dictatorial regime in Syria. This is
    why we see that the Iranian forces and unfortunately also the
    Russian forces in Syria, are not targeting the ISIL threats.
    They are targeting the secular opposition to Mr. Assad.
        We also see that these mechanisms are perpetuating the war
    in Syria. Because of the exact presence of the Revolutionary
    Guards in Syria, we see more and more Sunni radicals from all
    over the world travelling to Syria to fight the Shia threat,
    and to counter it, and this is, of course, something which is
    perpetuating the conflict and keeping ISIL, in its existence,
    it is prolonging the existence of ISIS.
        So some of the policies which I believe the United States
    could apply in order to counter those measures is first and
    foremost to attack those units of the Revolutionary Guards
    which were deployed to Syria by designations. Those groups of
    the Revolutionary Guards, they are engaged in support to Mr.
    Assad's regime. They are engaged in terrorist activities, and
    they should be designated as such. And also I believe that the
    United States should never accept demands of the Islamic
    Republic of Iran or others that Mr. Bashar al-Assad should be
    kept in power in Syria because that would only serve the
    interests of the Revolutionary Guards. And will perpetuate not
    only the war in Syria, but also the revolution, the permanent
    revolution which I mentioned in the beginning of this
    presentation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Alfoneh follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

     STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT MODELL, MANAGING DIRECTOR, THE RAPIDAN
                                 GROUP

        Mr. Modell. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, members
    of the committee, fellow panelists, good morning. Thank you for
    the opportunity to speak today.
        As the Middle East continues to burn, the U.S. and its
    allies have numerous reasons to believe that Iran really hasn't
    changed all that much since President Rouhani took office in
    September 2013. President Rouhani was elected to rescue Iran's
    economy. That was his mandate, and he is on his way to
    achieving that. Rouhani may appear moderate next to outspoken
    hardliners in the IRGC, but I believe that both continue to be
    driven by the same revolutionary ideals that inspired the
    Ayatollah Khomeini to create the Islamic Republic in 1979.
    Rouhani has been outspoken in his disagreement with some of the
    methods chosen by the IRGC, but there is little that he can do,
    as Mr. Alfoneh has said, to stop the IRGC.
        The recent unwillingness of the Obama administration to
    weaken the IRGC seems to me incompatible with its apparent
    belief that the JCPOA will strengthen moderates in Iran who
    favor internal reform and rapprochement with the West. I think
    it is worth it to look at some of the core missions of the
    IRGC, particularly it is Quds Force in the region, some of
    which are not regularly mentioned, others which were mentioned
    by the chairman and the ranking member.
        In addition to some of the lethal activities that were
    suggested and the more destabilizing military activities that
    the IRGC engages in, they are heavily involved in covert
    influence, grass roots foundation building across the region,
    via culture, socioeconomic, political, and business
    organizations, and in my testimony I have given a graphic of
    some of the ways in which they approach the whole of
    government, grass roots, bottom-up approach to building
    influence across countries, which is sectarian driven.
        The IRGC is also working very closely with Lebanese
    Hezbollah to build a global commercial apparatus that is
    designed to acquire new technologies, assist with covert action
    programs, create new sources of revenue, and actually add to
    Iran's existing threat facilitation networks. The importance of
    covert action to Iran's revolutionary export strategy has been
    clear from day one, particularly in the last 4 years.
        Since May 11, there have been dozens of terrorist plots
    attributed to Iran, from an attempt to murder the Saudi
    Ambassador in the U.S., to a foiled bomb plot in Kenya, covert
    action continues to remain a key tool of Iranian foreign
    policy.
        The Quds Force is engaged in various nonkinetic activities,
    as I said, and they will continue to play a role in its
    external resistance mission, whether it is front companies
    religious foundations, cultural centers, and so on.
        Some of the ways in which IRGC is destabilizing the region
    have already been mentioned. I would like to point out a couple
    of things that are given less attention I think, and that is
    the IRGC is part of a sectarian repopulation strategy across
    the region. Few people are talking about the IRGC's leading
    role in Iran's strategy to alter the sectarian balance across
    the region, beginning in the Levant. So when and where it can,
    Iran-sponsored militias are creating Shia support bases across
    Iraq and Syria and even getting to the point of pressuring
    Sunni's entire communities to relocate. It perpetuates Sunni
    distrust, hatred, and organized opposition to Iran, Iran-backed
    militias, and even Shiites.
        Bahrain is mentioned also. I think it is a particular
    problem. The propaganda war between Manama and Tehran continues
    to intensify as a result of persistent messaging on the part of
    Iranian hardliners that Bahrain actually belongs to Iran. The
    recent arrest of 36 Bahraini Shiites on charges of spying for
    the IRGC, the 400 or so others in prison on similar charges,
    and the dozens of incidents over the years, almost always lead
    back to the IRGC.
        In Saudi Arabia while President Rouhani and Foreign
    Minister Zarif have made some attempt at diplomatic outreach to
    the Saudis, the IRGC has been on a much more confrontational
    path, both openly and covertly. Saudi Government continues to
    uncover IRGC attempts to penetrate and militarize Shia
    communities in its oil-rich eastern province. The IRGC's
    Department 1000 operating out of Basrah continues to play a key
    role in these and other efforts against the Kingdom.
        I look forward to talking about some of my policy
    recommendations as well. Thank you for the opportunity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Modell follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you. Ambassador.

       STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL BENJAMIN, NORMAN E. MCCULLOCH JR.
       DIRECTOR, THE JOHN SLOAN DICKEY CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL
     UNDERSTANDING, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (FORMER AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE
    AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)

        Ambassador Benjamin. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
    the opportunity to speak today about Iran's Revolutionary Guard
    Corps, and more broadly, the country's destabilizing behavior
    in the Middle East. As a prefatory note though, I want to
    mention that the United States has over recent decades compiled
    a record of success in dealing with Iran. We have certainly had
    our losses, such as at Khobar Towers in Beirut in 1983, but
    overall our Nation has, together with our partners in the
    region and around the world, prevented the Islamic Republic
    from causing far greater damage to regional stability and the
    security of some of our closest friends.
        And today I am convinced that we are on a course to
    continue the success and, indeed, to strengthen security in the
    region through the JCPOA, which if Iran fulfills its
    obligations, will end the country's pursuit of a nuclear weapon
    for at least 15 years.
        As President Obama has said on many occasions, this deal
    does not address all of Iran's behavior, nor was it intended
    to, but it does address one of the foremost security challenges
    of our time, and that is Iran's nuclear aspirations. And as we
    consider the other ways in which Iran challenges us, we should
    be mindful of the JCPOA achievement and leery of anything that
    would undermine it, and we should also recognize that, the
    problems we face would be, without the JCPOA, far more
    problematic if we were facing off against a nuclear-armed Iran.
        The charge has been made that Iran is going to get a vast
    influx of cash with which to carry out terrorist attacks and
    subversion. We certainly have well-founded fears of Iranian
    plotting, and we must continue to show vigilance, but the
    argument I think needs to be examined in two ways. First, how
    likely is it that Iran will devote massive resources to such a
    course, and second, to what extent does the Islamic Republic's
    behavior, current behavior, represent a continuation of earlier
    conduct. It seems to me that the hypothesis is flawed in two
    ways--In several ways excuse me.
        First, the Iranian leadership's goal in negotiating the
    JCPOA was to improve economic conditions at home that were
    eroding support for the regime. So much seems clear from the
    rhetoric and the behavior of Iran's leaders. It would follow,
    therefore, that the bulk of the money will be used to
    ameliorate domestic concerns. According to press reports, the
    U.S. intelligence community has arrived at the same conclusion.
    And I would add here that Iran usually makes rational
    calculations about advancing its interests, and having invested
    the time, energy, and political capital in the JCPOA, it is
    undoubtedly aware that a new and enhanced campaign of terrorism
    or subversion would risk scuttling the agreement.
        Second, as has been mentioned before, the country has never
    restricted resources for its foreign policy, especially not for
    such activities as its direct support to the Assad regime and
    Iranian fighting in Syria. I think that suggests that it
    considers those areas to be well-funded. It is unlikely to
    spend vast new sums. It will certainly continue pouring money
    into those activities, but it is also important to remember
    that terrorism and subversion are inexpensive activities, and
    we have learned that through hard experience.
        Iran, of course, remains by significant margin the foremost
    state sponsor of terrorism, and we have seen no indication that
    there has been any change in the belief that terrorism is a
    legitimate instrument of policy. But what I would like to note
    is that, to pick up on what Mr. Modell was saying, you know,
    the sectarian dimension of all this requires an awful lot of
    attention, and I would suggest that the situation that we
    confront today is far different from one that we have seen in
    the past. And I think it is one we really need to examine
    closely. Whether we are talking about what is going on in
    Yemen, in Bahrain, in Syria, these reflect dynamics in the
    region that have changed dramatically.
        And it is important to recognize also that the trigger for
    sharpening in revival of sectarian tensions was our invasion of
    Iraq, which destroyed the region's fragile equilibrium and
    upended the regional politics. And the second trigger was the
    Arab Spring, which opened up a new opportunity in Syria for
    Sunnis to even the score having lost the capital in Baghdad.
        There is a lot more to say, but I want to just close my
    remarks by saying that I don't think there is any expectation
    that Iran is going to be a good global citizen, but I think
    that the United States is well postured to deter and to prevent
    increased subversive and terrorist actions through a raft of
    different sanctions regimes, both as well as U.N. Security
    Council resolutions that enable all kinds of actions to
    constrain Iran, and I think that we are in a good position to
    manage the problems that we face. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]
        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

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        Chairman Royce. Let me go to a question that I think
    impacted all of us back in October. October 15 you had the
    missile launch, the most advanced missile yet in the IRGC's
    inventory, and 2 months later there has still been no action in
    the wake of that test, which I think clearly violated United
    Nations Security Council Resolution 2331.
        So Mr. Modell, if I could ask you here, about next steps,
    because given that the EU sanctions are going to be lifted
    against the traditional home of their ballistic missile
    programs, which is the IRGC Air Force at their Ghadar missile
    command, what are the chances that the administration will
    actually implement sanctions against Iran for this advancement
    in its ballistic missile program?
        Mr. Modell. I don't see any indications that there is a
    good chance that the Obama administration is going to take any
    punitive actions with regard to this ballistic missile launch.
    It was clearly in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution
    1929 and the updated resolution as you said. I think it is
    worth pointing out that the IRGC's aerospace force has not
    gotten a lot of attention when you look at the IRGC's role in
    externalizing this revolution throughout the region. And if you
    look at the development of Iran's missiles, it has been a key
    part of their conventional military buildup over the last 20
    years, particularly since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. They
    believe it goes hand in hand with their idea of self-
    sufficiency in promoting the revolution.
        And I think when you look at the pace at which they are
    developing new missiles, the pace at which they are trying to
    use precision-guided technology, not only in the missiles that
    you mentioned that are going into the hands of Hezbollah and
    Palestinians, it could be used against Israel but throughout
    the region, I think it is something that needs to be addressed.
    And I----
        Chairman Royce. Let me change directions then, because
    obviously with the IRGC being the most probable economic actor
    in the equation there in the government in Iran, what is the
    risk of any company looking at reentering the Iranian market,
    from major Asian firms in Japan or in South Korea with U.S.
    exposure to small companies in eastern Germany? What is the
    risk of doing business with the IRGC?
        Mr. Modell. One of the things I would say, I am glad it was
    mentioned that companies going back, particularly the European
    companies going back into Iran, should be well advised to look
    at the fact that the IRGC is not going away, and the IRGC has
    deeply penetrated every corner of every industry in Iran for
    the most part.
        And I think that one of the things that needs to be talked
    more about is the fact that IRGC-linked companies and
    businesses have already started the process of hiding their
    IRGC links in anticipation of trying to get into business deals
    with European companies and Asian companies and others who are
    going to be reentering Iran. There is a process underway, among
    IRGC individuals and entities, that are sanctioned, to ensconce
    themselves in companies that are clean, in business deals that
    are clean, so that means erasing old contracts, erasing records
    and business registries, and different things. So I think it is
    a very dangerous proposition for any company going back into
    Iran not knowing exactly who they are going to be dealing with.
        The other issue, Mr. Chairman, that I would mention is over
    the last decade, you have seen a terrible problem in the growth
    of corruption in Iran. So if you believe that the Foreign
    Corrupt Practices Act should be any deterrent for companies
    going back in, again, Oil Minister Zanganeh 2 days ago, at the
    launch of a global meeting, to talk about the reemergence of
    the Iran's oil and gas industry, had to go out of his way to
    say any companies doing business with Iran who are asked to pay
    bribes, those contracts will be null and void. He had to go out
    of his way because it is a tremendous problem, and the IRGC is
    at the heart of that problem.
        So, what I would advise companies going back into Iran, one
    thing, what has emerged is there are a number of data analytic
    firms here in DC and elsewhere that are specializing in due
    diligence, so the idea of enhanced, know-your-customer measures
    that will need to be taken for anybody going back into Iran
    will require outside support.
        Chairman Royce. Let me ask Mr. Alfoneh the last question
    here, and that goes to the two goals that you talked about in
    your testimony that they are seeking in Iran.
        First, they are working to keep Bashar al-Assad in power by
    coordinating Shi'ite militias to maintain control over western
    Syria. By the way, I would add to that something that Mr.
    Modell mentioned in his testimony, but I have been briefed on
    the fact that they are even bringing in militia from Hezbollah
    and their families into Sunni-dominated neighborhoods in
    Damascus and running the Sunni population out as they basically
    do an ethnic cleansing campaign. But that is part of it.
        And secondarily, you said they are combatting secular
    opposition in Syria while maintaining ISIS is a worse
    alternative to al-Assad. Can you explain how the IRGC is
    accomplishing that dual mission?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Yes, Mr. Chairman. If we look at the combat
    fatalities of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria, we see that
    the place of death is usually the places which have been bombed
    by the Russian Air Force, so in other words, the Revolutionary
    Guard is in practice acting at the infantry force, the ground
    force, of Russia. And we also know from U.S. Government sources
    that Russia is not bombing the Islamic State. Russia is bombing
    the secular opposition to Bashar al-Assad's regime, and then
    after Russia has bombed those specific areas, we see an influx
    of Revolutionary Guards members going into those areas, and
    also the place of death is reported in those exact areas. So
    unfortunately, this is a very, very cynical strategy that the
    Assad regime and the Revolutionary Guards are pursuing in
    combination.
        Concerning your comment about the role of the Revolutionary
    Guards and the economy, Mr. Modell is absolutely right. If you
    look at the assets of the Revolutionary Guards on Tehran's
    stock exchange, it is more than $17 billion worth of companies
    registered on Tehran's stock exchange that the Revolutionary
    Guard has purchased during the time that the government of
    President Ahmadinejad was privatizing these companies. So the
    Revolutionary Guards' claims that its front companies are
    private sector actors and they do not belong to the public
    sector. This is why they were allowed to bid for ownership of
    those companies, and they acquired, they purchased those
    companies on Tehran's stock exchange.
        Just to mention one example, Iran Telecommunication, which
    is the largest phone company in Iran, was purchased by the
    Revolutionary Guards in 2009 for $7 billion. Back then in 2009,
    the military budget of the Revolutionary Guards on an annual
    basis was only $5 billion, but they could pay for the company,
    the phone company, $7 billion cash because of all the other
    economic activities that they have.
        Chairman Royce. I assume that makes it easier for the IRGC
    to monitor citizens' communications as well. We will go to Mr.
    Engel.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you very much, and thank you
    for your excellent testimony. Ambassador Benjamin, I agree with
    you when you said that the invasion of Iraq really changed,
    upset the apple cart, and really in hindsight, we eliminated
    Iran's major adversary. Therefore, we helped unfortunately to
    make Iran the hegemony power in the region, and I think that is
    very, very true. But I couldn't disagree with you more when you
    say that the fact that Iran has been the leading state sponsor
    of terrorism when they had no money doesn't necessarily mean
    that now that they have money, they will continue or increase
    their terrorist activities. I think that logic says that if the
    goal of the Iranian regime, the Revolutionary Guards and the
    entire regime, is to sponsor terrorism to destabilize the
    region, now that they have money and it is not going to be a
    sacrifice, they are going to use it for terrorism.
        When the Rial, their currency was in the toilet, when their
    people clamored for more freedoms or more things that they
    needed, Iran, the government, the regime didn't care. The
    regime made sure, though, that groups like Hezbollah and even
    Hamas, which of course is the other side of the Sunni-Shia
    spectrum, had enough money. So now that Iran has money and it
    is not going to be so painful, I think that it is very easy to
    imagine, and it is not imagination, that they will have more
    money to support more terrorism.
        And finally, you had mentioned the Security Council
    resolutions. I don't think that Iran cares about Security
    Council resolutions. They had a resolution had been passed at a
    Security Council which demanded, I think there were six or
    seven or five resolutions that Iran stop spinning centrifuges,
    that Iran stop spinning. And one of the problems I had with the
    negotiations with Iran is that we didn't make a precondition of
    our sitting down with them and talking with them that they stop
    spinning. And once we didn't demand that as a prerequisite to
    sit down with them, you knew that in the conclusion of any
    agreement we had with them, the demand that they stop spinning,
    as the Security Council resolution said, would not be a final
    decision in any kind of agreement. So I think we essentially
    ceded that.
        I just want to mention this because Members here are very
    thoughtful, and some voted no, and some voted yes. I voted no.
    I respect every Member's thoughtfulness. But I think that what
    really bothers me is I think that we have almost stamped the
    fact that the Iranian regime is going to be there for a long
    time to come. We have helped them. We have given them all kinds
    of relief, and any hope we had of regime change so the Iranian
    people could live in a democracy I think, went out the window
    because frankly regimes that have lots of money are able to use
    it.
        So I just wanted to point that out, and if you care to
    answer, I would be grateful.
        Ambassador Benjamin. Mr. Engel, you have put a lot of
    issues on the table. Let me just try to answer a few of them
    quickly. You mentioned your skepticism about Security Council
    resolutions. Well, the issue is not what Iran thinks of them.
    It is that they empower the international community to take
    certain actions. And so for example, at the end of September, a
    weapons system from Iran to Yemen was seized on the high seas
    under the provisions of the relevant Security Council
    resolution. So the point is we can have an effect, a real
    material, concrete effect on Iran's ability to play the kind of
    role that everyone here deplores because of those instruments.
        You mentioned the money issue. So I think that there is a
    few things to say. One is that there is basically an absorption
    issue. There is just not that many different things to spend
    the money on. They have been spending lots of money on these
    activities for a long time. They will pour more in. I expect to
    see that more resources will make their way in particular to
    Syria. And by the way, although we all deplore what is going on
    in Syria, I think it is important to remember that Iran's
    policy there is fundamentally a conservative one. They are
    trying to preserve the status quo. Trying to preserve their one
    important ally in the international community. And----
        Mr. Engel. I might say----
        Ambassador Benjamin. I am sorry?
        Mr. Engel. I might say they are trying to preserve it, and
    in trying to preserve it, they are using the terrorist group
    Hezbollah to do the fighting and to guarantee that they can
    preserve it, so that is another element of support for----
        Ambassador Benjamin. Without a doubt, and they have been
    funding Hezbollah for many, many years, and I don't dispute
    that in any way. I am just saying that, first of all, one of
    the main constraints has been manpower and not money, and, you
    know, you don't need $50 billion to fund your terrorism or
    subversive activities.
        I do find it hard to imagine why Iran would make a quantum
    leap in its provocative behavior if that would throw into doubt
    the future of the agreement that they worked so hard to get. I
    think that the Iranian leadership definitely saw that their
    position was eroding as a result of public discontent. And so I
    think that those resources will primarily, although not
    exclusively, go to ameliorate social conditions and to restart
    the economy.
        I would just also point out, because several people have
    mentioned Hamas, that Hamas has been essentially cut off by
    Iran because Hamas refused to support Iran's policy toward
    Syria. And I think that this is an absolutely perfect
    illustration of how the sectarian upheaval in the region has
    changed the rules of the game. And we should remember that King
    Salman, the new king of Saudi Arabia, didn't find time to come
    to the United States for a meeting at Camp David with President
    Obama, but he did have time to entertain a Hamas delegation in
    the hope of bringing Hamas under the Saudi wing. So things are
    in dramatic flux, and I think we need to think very hard and
    fast about what America's role is in the context of this
    sectarian conflict.
        Finally, just on the issue of IRGC benefits from the deal,
    you know, it has gone unmentioned that there is still a raft of
    U.S. unilateral sanctions on IRGC, Treasury sanctions, which if
    we want can have secondary effects and which are levied against
    IRGC for terrorism, for proliferation, for human rights
    violations, and the like. And I do believe that actually
    companies around the world recognize that we have these
    sanctions, that we may reassert them in a stronger sense, that
    is in a secondary sense, and therefore they are going to be
    cautious about getting involved with IRGC-dominated entities.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Engel. I just want to ask one quick question to anybody
    who would care to answer. We have seen some recent reports that
    have been unconfirmed that the head of the Quds Force,
    Soleimani, was severely injured in Syria. Have any of you heard
    that? Have you had any confirmation or lack of?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Sir, we only have heard the rumors, but he
    seems to be alive, and of course the Islamic Republic
    propaganda machinery is trying constantly to communicate the
    message that Major General Soleimani is still alive, so there
    is no news of the contrary and certainly not proof.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. So we go to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Excellent hearing, Mr.
    Chairman and ranking member. As we have heard, and I agree with
    the chairman and the ranking member that the administration
    downplays concerns that Iran will use the sanctions relief it
    gets from the nuclear deal for its terror activities, instead
    of arguing that the money will be used to shore up a failing
    Iranian economy. But as we have heard, the IRGC is one of the
    major actors in the Iranian economy with a presence in nearly
    every sector.
        It has a particularly large presence in the same sectors
    that the administration is arguing that sanctions relief will
    go to: Construction, infrastructure, energy, finance. The
    administration is telling only one small part of the story and
    that we have only scratched the surface of what we should be
    sanctioning, including designating the IRGC and the Quds Force
    as foreign terrorist organizations.
        And, Mr. Alfoneh, in your written testimony, you mention
    your colleague Dr. Ottolenghi, who testified at our Middle East
    subcommittee on this IRGC issue 2 months ago, and you both
    argue that the administration should be reporting on the IRGC
    in much greater detail, including the subsidiaries of IRGC
    parent companies, the companies that have an IRGC controlling
    interest, and the exact nature of the IRGC support to Assad.
    How effective can our remaining sanctions be if we are not
    targeting the IRGC subsidiaries and commercial interests?
        And for Mr. Modell, you highlighted the nonkinetic
    activities of the Quds Force, including its work in setting up
    religious organizations, foundations, cultural centers, and
    testified that progress on U.S. efforts to counter this
    irregular warfare has been very limited. And as Mr. Duncan
    continually points out, we have seen a lot of Iranian activity
    in the Western Hemisphere throughout the Middle East to set up
    these types of influence, destabilization, recruitment centers,
    but very little effort by us in the United States to counter
    this.
        What is Iran's strategic goal in all of this, and where has
    it been more active, and why have our efforts to counter
    Iranian influence in this arena been so ineffective? Mr.
    Alfoneh.
        Mr. Alfoneh. Thank you. This is a very, very important
    point that you are raising, madam. The Revolutionary Guard, of
    course, is trying to hide its assets. There are so many front
    companies that the Revolutionary Guard is constantly creating,
    and, therefore, the Treasury here in the U.S. must, of course,
    also be extremely vigilant and be careful that they do not
    create companies that we are unaware of.
        One of the good allies of the U.S. in this cat-and-mouse
    game of course is what remains of the private sector in Iran
    because they certainly do believe that the Revolutionary Guard
    is trying to make their business impossible in Iran. And they
    also would be willing to cooperate identifying some of those
    companies of the Revolutionary Guards which is constantly
    popping up.
        And as you also pointed out, many of these activities are
    going to, you know, the money that flows into Iran goes back to
    the Revolutionary Guards because of their activities,
    particularly in the construction sector. Khatam al-Anbia
    construction headquarters of the Revolutionary Guards is the
    largest contractor in the entire Islamic Republic of Iran. Most
    of the public projects, development projects, in Iran, are
    handed over to the Khatam al-Anbia construction base on no-bid
    basis. So the private sector has no say. If they do participate
    in those projects, it is as subcontractors to the Revolutionary
    Guard.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, and I am going to interrupt
    you here to give a minute to Mr. Modell.
        Mr. Modell. Thank you for your question. One of the things
    is, when you think about the way that Iran externalizes
    revolution, when you think about when Iran goes into a place
    like Iraq or Syria or Yemen or anywhere else, there is a lot of
    building from the ground up. So when I mentioned religious
    centers, mosques, cultural centers, and so forth, I think that
    that is a firm belief that, like Mr. Alfoneh suggested, it is
    more than just about terrorism and subversion. It is about
    actually altering the fabric of the places where they want to
    have control and influence in.
        So when they go and do this, it requires a lot of money.
    So, you know, when you think about the money that it takes to
    do this, one thing I would mention is a lot of people are
    speculating as to whether or not the Iranian Government is
    going to take this windfall that it is going to get from
    sanctions relief and direct it into the IRGC or the MOIS and
    other security elements of the government. I think, and Mr.
    Alfoneh might be among them, people have written about the fact
    that after the negotiations began in 2014, the IRGC budget went
    up. The Ministry of Intelligence budget went up, and this was
    just in anticipation of sanctions relief. This was publicly
    stated. This was publicly declared.
        So I think if you are asking yourself how the Iranians are
    going to spend the money, they have already been very clear in
    indicating it. But again it is not--and I agree with Ambassador
    Benjamin that it is cheap to pull off a terrorist attack or to
    do subterfuge, but we are talking about something that is much
    more transformational than that.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ileana. Mr. Brad Sherman of
    California.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Terrorism may be cheap. War is
    expensive. One of the things that happened, just as soon as it
    was clear to those observing Congress that this deal would go
    through, and Iran would get its hands on $130 billion is Russia
    deployed sources to Syria. There was like a day between when I
    concluded--and I watch Congress--that this deal would be
    implemented and when Russia began its planning and deployment.
    I won't ask you gentlemen whether there is any proof that Iran
    is paying some or all of Russia's costs because my guess is
    that the Iranians don't share that information with you.
        Ambassador Benjamin when you say that we are on course to
    continue our success, you may be out of step with what
    Americans are seeing and feeling about the Middle East. Mr.
    Alfoneh, you say that Iran is moving from a theocracy to a
    military dictatorship. In a real short answer, can you tell me:
    Is the next generation going to be run by clerics who are true
    scholars of Islam based in Qom, or are guys with guns going to
    select the next grand Ayatollah?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Thank you for the fantastic question, sir.
    About the next generation of rulers in Iran, I think that
    Ayatollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader of Iran, has committed
    the worst mistake any civilian politician can make, and it is
    that he is systematically using the Revolutionary Guards to
    suppress his domestic opposition. And of course what happens is
    that when you invite a military organization to participate and
    intervene in domestic politics, you cannot throw them out again
    because they have guns and you are a civilian and do not have.
        Mr. Sherman. Got you. I do want to agree with some that
    have pointed out the dangers of the Quds Force and the Iranian
    regime in general. The Shi'ite alliance has killed hundreds of
    thousands of innocent people in Syria and killed far more
    Americans in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Marines in Beirut, than
    ISIS has ever aspired to. The difference is that ISIS when they
    kill 50 people, put it on YouTube. When Iranian-paid-for barrel
    bombs kill 1,000 villagers in Syria, Assad has the good taste
    to deny it. And for that reason, we tend to be focusing on ISIS
    as the most dangerous enemy.
        The question, I think it was Lenin asked, is what is to be
    done? You have convinced us that the Guard Force is a bad
    organization. We still have sanctions that are allowed under
    the nuclear agreement, tough sanctions on banks that conduct
    business on behalf of companies designated as a proliferator of
    WMD, which includes the IRGC, the Quds Force, many others. And
    what is often not mentioned in Section 302 that remains in
    force that provides for sanctions of those who engage in any
    significant activity with an IRGC entity.
        One problem is that we are not applying this to the
    National Iranian Oil Company, which I think you would agree is
    heavily involved with the IRGC. I am going to be distributing
    to all members of the committee a discussion draft of a statute
    aimed at the IRGC, and we now have a menu of sanctions that can
    be imposed against a bank or a company that does business with
    the IRGC. It shouldn't be a menu where maybe they just get some
    parsley, but rather an absolute ban on doing business in the
    United States which then can be lifted with specific licenses.
    So that a company that does any significant business with the
    IRGC would feel that it is going to lose all access to the U.S.
    market in doing business in the United States, and then it
    would have to go ask the administration for a license to go do
    this or that.
        And, second, in order to avoid neglect of the statute, it
    would have the GAO give Congress a list of those organizations
    that appear or are most likely to be doing business with the
    IRGC or its front groups, and those companies would be
    sanctioned unless the President within 6 months came to
    Congress and said, well, we shouldn't sanction this one and we
    shouldn't sanction that one. So if the administration did what
    the last three administrations have done, and just ignore
    Iran's sanctions, those sanctions would go into effect.
        So I look forward to working with the chairman and all the
    members and the ranking member on this discussion draft, and I
    also want to distribute it to our witnesses and ask you to
    comment on it for the record. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. And I want to thank Congressman Brad
    Sherman for that draft. We will circulate it to all the members
    of the committee. We go now to Congressman Dana Rohrabacher of
    California.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This
    hearing sort of cements my view that we are entering into a new
    historic era, and the cold war is over, and now I think the
    post-cold war is coming to a close, and I don't know what we
    are going to call this new era that we are in. Perhaps history
    will record it as the era of Islamic terrorism or Islamic
    resurgence, depending on how we see what unfolds in the next
    few years. But we are in a different world than we were 10 and
    20 and 30 years ago.
        And I want to thank Chairman Royce. I want to thank Ranking
    Member Engel. We are facing a whole new era, and they are
    providing leadership so that we can understand the challenges
    that we face in this new era, and they both in sort of a
    bipartisan spirit and a spirit of getting to the facts, and I
    appreciate their leadership.
        Let me ask some specific questions, then about--knowledge
    questions. How many members does the IRGC have? What are we
    talking about in Iran? Talking about 50,000 people? What are we
    talking about there?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Sir, estimates are between 120 and 150,000
    active members, active duty members of the Revolutionary----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Are they armed or are just others--anybody
    who is in a business owned by them or are we talking about the
    armed people?
        Mr. Alfoneh. These are the armed people, sir, in uniform.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. What is the regular army in Iran,
    and what is its size and how does it interact with this IRGC?
        Mr. Alfoneh. The regular military is sightly larger, but
    its bases are alongside the international boarders of Iran. And
    that is because of the constitution of Iran which gives a
    different mission to the regular military. The regular military
    has the mission of protecting the territorial integrity of the
    Islamic Republic of Iran. The mission of the Revolutionary
    Guards, according to the constitution, is to protect the
    revolution and its achievements in the abstract.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Does the regular army get along with that?
    Is there any friction points there?
        Mr. Alfoneh. There are many ideological political
    commissars, in the regular military, which is, you know, a
    classical military organization. It is not ideological.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Which would then be friction--cause
    friction between the two.
        In the IRGC, what ethnic makeup is that? We know in Iran
    about half the people are not Persian, but is the IRGC
    basically a Persian group, or do they have Kurdish people in it
    or Azeris, or Baluchs or Azeris or whoever? What is the makeup
    of----
        Mr. Alfoneh. Yes, sir. We do believe that it actually
    reflects the ethnic composition of Iran as a whole.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. So there are Kurds who are----
        Mr. Alfoneh.--yes, sir.
        Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Members of that as well as--
    --
        Mr. Alfoneh. Shiite Kurds, yes.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. Now, in terms of the support of the
    IRGC for terrorism around the world, how many missiles, for
    example, we have all seen these rockets that go off and are
    shot by--out of the Gaza Strip into Israel, and I consider that
    to be a terrorist act. Anytime you shoot rockets into a
    country, especially if it is indiscriminately to try to just
    murder people, I would say that is terrorism.
        How many of these terrorist rockets that are going into
    Israel from the Gaza Strip and elsewhere, were either
    manufactured or paid for by the IRGC?
        Mr. Modell. Thank you for the question. I think the vast
    majority if not all of them. And not only that, the next
    generation is actually providing them with the ability to
    manufacture them themselves.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I didn't catch that last part.
        Mr. Modell. I would say the vast majority have been
    provided to them by Iran. They are linked to Iran, Iranian
    manufacturers, but what Iran's next phase of support in
    providing missiles to groups operating in the West Bank and in
    southern Lebanon is to actually give them the capacity to
    develop those missiles themselves.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I see. And we might note Congressman Engel
    and myself, and Ed--I am not sure if Ed was with us on that
    trip or not, but I remember when we crawled in--you were with
    us, when we crawled into these tunnels that were dug. And that
    was--they were not just crawl spaces. These were very expensive
    construction projects. Are those things being paid for by the
    IRGC?
        Mr. Modell. You know, from years ago I can tell you that
    the intelligence community I think was divided on that
    question. But I think the Iranians were working very closely
    with Lebanese Hezbollah in developing those, those tunnels. But
    as far as financing goes----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. These terrorists, whether they are people
    who are Palestinians who are conducting terrorism on Israel or
    these other, they don't have really a large source of money and
    what we are talking about when we say financing. This is a
    vital component to the existence of these terrorists.
        One last note, Mr. Chairman, and I know my time is running
    out, is that we have a similar situation from what you
    described in China, where you have the People's Liberation Army
    controls and actually receives the profit from a large number
    of commercial operations. And if people are investing in that
    and those companies are making a profit, it is going to the
    People's Liberation Army and not to the people of China. So go
    ahead.
        Mr. Modell. I would just like to make one comment on that.
    I think you raise a very important point. And if you go back in
    time to the origin of Lebanese Hezbollah when Iran was--in the
    early 1980s when Iran was instrumental in figuring out what is
    the grand vision going to be for this organization, what is
    their mission going to be, one of the things that took years
    and years for them to develop was a global commercial apparatus
    that was composed of businesses, that was composed of a lot of
    things you just mentioned, that actually create independent
    streams of revenue that they are off the books. And Iran is
    doing it. Hezbollah is doing it. And Hezbollah's dependence on
    Iranian official funds over the years has gone down for that
    reason.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Yes. You raised the point, Mr. Rohrabacher,
    on those tunnels and who paid for their construction. I would
    just make the point, myself, and Mr. Engel, and Mr.
    Rohrabacher, and Mr. Gregory Meeks, were in those tunnels
    shortly after the Gaza operation. And it was reminiscent to me,
    in 2006, the Iranian constructed tunnels done for Hezbollah,
    their engineers were involved in that. We know that from ID
    badges that were picked up after the 2006 second Lebanon War. I
    was there during that conflict. And in this particular case,
    not only do you have indication that Iran was involved in also
    the tunnels under Gaza, this particular tunnel that we were in,
    came up underneath a village. And the plan apparently was to
    capture students, because it was a school. It was an elementary
    school that it was under. And to pull them back into Gaza so
    that the IDF would have to fight house by house.
        But the most important point is that after the conflict was
    over, the report surfaced which was in the Wall Street Journal,
    as I recall, in which Iran committed to rebuilding those
    tunnels that were closed, some 30 plus were discovered, for
    Hamas. Now, we understand Iran also supports, you know, the
    Palestinian Islamic jihad. In other words, they are not just
    supporting Hamas in Gaza. They have a secondary organization
    that they would prefer. But they are providing Hamas. The story
    also mentioned they committed to providing again to resupply
    the rockets to Hamas.
        So, you know, it is an on-again/off-again depending on
    geopolitics in the area in terms of how much support they
    provide Hamas. They clearly would prefer Islamic jihad as an
    organization, but I think it is unquestionable that they have
    been involved in this enterprise. And, indeed, those reports
    regularly appear in the media. So I would just, Ambassador,
    point that out for posterity.
        Ambassador Benjamin. If I may, Chairman Royce, historically
    there is no question that Iran was a principal sponsor of
    Hamas, and I believe the exclusive sponsor of Hezbollah.
    However, I believe the best information we have today is that
    Iran is not transferring any resources to Hamas now. And Hamas'
    budget is dependent entirely on its international fundraising
    efforts.
        And that includes money that it receives from Qatar and
    from Turkey, that is to say, from the Sunni side of the
    equation. And it doesn't appear likely after repeated meetings
    between Hamas and Saudi Arabia that Iran is going to forgive
    Hamas, what it views as treasonous activities. So I think it is
    important that these distinctions be recognized.
        Chairman Royce. Well, thank you. Hopefully they don't
    follow through on their commitment to rebuild those tunnels.
        We will go, then, to Albio Sires from New Jersey who is
    next in the queue.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being
    here today.
        You know, I have been to a number of hearings, and every
    time I sit here and sooner or later the comment is made that
    the Supreme Leader is losing support from the Iranian people.
        I was just wondering, after the nuclear deal, have the
    Iranian people lost hope that there could be a change, or has
    the Supreme Leader solidified his position, and have the
    Revolutionary Guards solidified their positions now that they
    have a deal, and they are going to get all this money? Sir?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Sir, it is an important point that you are
    making and a good question. I am not sure if I know the answer,
    but I will try my best. Mr. Khomeini needed someone, a
    technocratic type, like Mr. Rouhani to get people to vote for
    the regime in order to secure some degree of legitimacy for
    this regime. And the only reason Mr. Rouhani was elected as
    President of the Republic was because that he promised the
    Iranian public a nuclear deal with the U.S. This is why the
    Iranian people elected him.
        However, now that he is elected and now that the nuclear
    deal is made, Mr. Khomeini no longer needs Mr. Rouhani. He no
    longer needs the technocratic elites of Iran. So I think the
    best test is going to be the parliamentary elections of
    February. Is Mr. Khomeini going to allow Mr. Rouhani and his
    technocratic elites of Iran to be elected into the Parliament,
    for example? Or is he systematically going to filter every
    single supporter of Mr. Rouhani among those candidates? And if
    he does that, and I strongly suspect it is going to happen,
    then we will see the rise of the Revolutionary Guards and a
    reaction among the Iranian public which is one of hopelessness.
        So in one sense, yes. The Iranian public has lost faith
    twice; once during the Green Revolution of 2009 when
    unfortunately the administration extended a hand of friendship
    to the regime, to Mr. Khomeini and not to the Iranian public,
    and second time when a nuclear deal was made where the greatest
    beneficiary is the Revolutionary Guards and not the Iranian
    public.
        Mr. Modell. Thanks for your question. The only thing I
    would add to that is I think that there is somewhat of a
    misconception when you talk about Khomeini as being an all
    powerful figure in Iran. I think there is--to a certain degree
    he is weak in the sense that he is constantly forced to balance
    conflicting factions of a very, very--in fact, much more
    developed series of political factions than when he took over
    in 1989. You have a much more mature playing field that he has
    to balance. And he needs the IRGC just as much as the IRGC
    needs him.
        So, you know, if Iranians ask themselves was the election
    of Rouhani and the JCPOA, do those give us hope or not, I think
    the Iranians are hopeful. If you look at polls, Iran is
    hopeful. But they don't equate it to a simple will Khomeini
    allow us to continue to have freedoms and advance or not. The
    Iranians recognize the complexity that Khomeini has to balance,
    and it is not an easy thing to do. And like Mr. Alfoneh pointed
    out, I think next February is going to be very critical in
    seeing just how much the IRGC has done to actually push back
    and ensure that, you know, if there is any momentum toward
    Rouhani, it slows down.
        Mr. Sires. Ambassador?
        Ambassador Benjamin. Both of my colleagues have made very
    insightful remarks. I would just add that if there is one tried
    and true pattern in history, it is that the frustration of
    rising expectations is profoundly dangerous for rulers. And
    expectations have been raised dramatically in Iran. Rouhani is
    extremely popular. The notion that Iran is going to have an
    opening to the West, that the Iranian economy will get a new
    rush of oxygen, and that they will see greater prosperity I
    think is now quite clear. And so I think that the Supreme
    Leader, you know, has to walk a fine line if he wants to
    maintain his own standing while not disappointing the
    expectations of the Iranian people.
        This brings me back to something actually that Mr. Engel
    said before about regime change. I think that we found over the
    last 30-plus years that regime change anywhere in the world is
    a perilous course of action. And I think that the virtues of
    the JCPOA have largely been underestimated in terms of creating
    a 15-year period, which is a significant period of time, in
    which those expectations can arise, flourish, and shape the
    course of the Iranian future. To be sure, we have to be
    vigilant about bad behavior, but I think this is no small
    achievement.
        And we can't say for certain that in 15 years Iran will be
    a more hopeful place, but we, I think, can say with some
    certainty that without it we would be facing a very dire
    situation. And now we have given the Iranian people, you know,
    some reason to, shall we say, vote with their feet.
        Mr. Sires. Thank you very much. My time is up.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Matt Salmon.
        Mr. Salmon. Thank you. In your view, and this question is
    to all panel members, is the administration's growing
    diplomatic outreach to Iran, and some might say acquiescence,
    particularly considering Iran's support for strife in the
    region, undermining U.S. credibility in the region? Start with
    you, Ambassador.
        Ambassador Benjamin. Well, I think it is an interesting and
    important question. There is no question--there is no doubt
    that among our Sunni allies our, Sunni partners, there is
    significant doubt about this, and they are committed to a
    policy, by and large, of not talking to Iran although they do
    themselves, and of doing everything they can to beat back what
    they see as the Shia tide. Having said that, it is not entirely
    clear to me that their perception of what is going on is
    accurate.
        You know, the Sunnis are also culpable, it seems to me,
    particularly the Gulf Sunnis, for the humanitarian catastrophe
    that is Syria, because they have been pouring more and more
    resources in at every juncture to try to topple the Assad
    regime. And there has been very little desire to find an off
    ramp there. Similarly, although the, you know, the
    Yemenconflict is extremely complicated, what has I think been
    lost sight of is that one of the critical changes was that
    longtime strongman Ali Abdullah Saleh, which sides essentially,
    and tried to relitigate what happened in the Arab Spring and
    the election of--or the installation of President Hadi, and so
    this has been seen as another bit of Iranian perfidy. It is
    true that we don't like what they are doing with the Houthis,
    but this has also led, you know, to a campaign against, you
    know, an outside war against Yemen that has caused another
    humanitarian catastrophe.
        So I think that the situations is very complicated. I
    think, you know, the Israeli Government's view was quite clear.
    But having said that, it is impressive how much of the Israeli
    defense establishment, I think, has come around to approve of
    the JCPOA and has been encouraged by the direction things are
    taking.
        Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I am going to shift gears because I
    have a couple of other questions. I did want to get that one
    out there. But I have a question for you, Mr. Alfoneh, and then
    one for you as well, Mr. Modell, if I can just throw them both
    out.
        First to you, you recommend that the U.S. should still
    pursue the dual goal of toppling Assad regime and fight ISIS at
    the same time. Even if we are able to topple the Assad regime,
    which will be increasingly difficult with the overt support of
    Assad by Russia and the covert support by Iran, what next? And
    wouldn't the most likely outcome be an Iranian or Russian
    puppet or a controlled puppet regime? Or perhaps even worse a
    fractured lawless Syria that will give ISIS a larger power base
    and more territory to control? Is this really the policy that
    is going to bring stability to the region?
        And my add-on question to you, Mr. Modell, is very similar.
    Do you think Iran or ISIS poses the bigger threat to national
    security, our national security, both in the short and the long
    term? I would like your thoughts on that.
        Mr. Alfoneh. Sir, I do believe that one of the reasons that
    the Alawite elites in Syria are backing Bashar al-Assad is that
    they have absolutely no alternative as things are right now. If
    they are given an alternative, if there are security guarantees
    that there is not going to be genocide of Alawites after the
    Sunnis also take part in government. And if a government like
    the United States is willing to give that type of guarantees to
    the Alawites, why should they stick with someone who has led to
    destruction of their own countries? I do believe that there is
    dissatisfaction even among Alawite elites in Syria, but they
    have honestly nowhere else to go.
        Mr. Salmon. Mr. Modell.
        Mr. Modell. As to your question as to what presents a
    greater short- or long-term risk to U.S. national security
    between Iran and ISIS, you know, I guess it depends. I mean,
    you know, if you are talking about lone wolf terrorist attacks
    in the United States or, you know, bombings like 9/11 or the
    Paris attacks, obviously ISIS. But at the same time, I think if
    you look at the heart of what Iran is doing, okay, the
    ideologically driven externalization of its Islamic revolution
    and everything that represents, if you believe the vast
    majority of our allies, our current allies at least, in the
    Gulf and elsewhere, are never going to be okay with that. And
    they are going to always be opposed to that in a fundamental
    way, then I think as long as we have a long-term fundamental
    reason to stay in the Middle East, that is the bigger term of
    threat in terms of creating a permanent destabilizing presence
    in the region.
        Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. David Cicilline of Rhode Island.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our
    witnesses. And I think all of us, particularly after viewing
    your testimony and several other hearings we have had on this
    issue understand that we have to do everything that we can and
    use all of the tools available to us to keep the pressure on
    and really took to confront the IRGC and Iran and the region.
        So my questions are first to you, Mr. Modell. You said the
    Obama administration has demonstrated an unwillingness to
    weaken the IRGC. So I am asking you what you think the
    administration should be doing to effectively weaken the IRGC?
        Mr. Modell. One of the things that I mention in my
    recommendations was the fact that the IRGC, if you want to look
    at one of the things that concerns the IRGC and the Supreme
    Leader and the conservative establishment in Iran, is that is
    the ongoing credibility of the IRGC. The IRGC--we have had one
    serious kingpin designation against the Iranians, against an
    IRGC general who was involved in narco trafficking with the
    Taliban and others. He is based in Balochistan and----
        Mr. Cicilline. I have limited time so can----
        Mr. Modell. Oh, sorry.
        Mr. Cicilline [continuing]. You just tell me, you know,
    what you think we should do.
        Mr. Modell. Recommendations? I think naming and shaming. I
    think there needs to be a campaign, a media campaign, not a
    covert. I think an open media influence campaign that points
    out all the things that the Iranian--that the IRGC, in
    particular, is doing to destabilize the region. I don't think
    we have done nearly enough of that.
        Mr. Cicilline. Okay. And with respect to the designation of
    the IRGC as a foreign terrorist organization, does anyone on
    the panel think they don't meet that definition? And if you
    don't, why not? And what would be the implications of that
    designation, particularly on Americans being held, but on any
    other facets of this conflict? Ambassador?
        Ambassador Benjamin. So the designation of the IRGC as a
    State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization,
    would be at odds with the entire history of designations, first
    of all, in that it would be a designating a state organ, a
    state entity. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism, and as such
    is covered by a wide raft of different sanctions that are
    extremely comprehensive. And to add the IRGC to this, it seems
    to me, would add, practically speaking, nothing to our arsenal
    of tools, nothing meaningful.
        And what is more is that there remains in effect a large
    array of Treasury designations against the IRGC as I mentioned
    before for terrorism, proliferation, human rights violations.
    We have all the instruments we need. And I think that to do
    something additional like this would both be unnecessary from a
    functional standpoint. And from a signalling standpoint, I am
    not sure that it is exactly what we need at precisely the
    moment that we want to see more--we want to see an effective
    implementation of the JCPOA.
        Mr. Cicilline. Well, with respect to that, Ambassador
    Benjamin, you said in your testimony that additional terrorism
    campaign or an additional terrorist campaign by Iran would
    scuttle the agreement, referring to the JCPOA. Why do you think
    that would scuttle the agreement? I don't see anything in the
    agreement that would, in fact, be in violation if they engage
    in terrorism.
        But the argument was made that it is better to confront a
    nonnuclear Iran than a nuclear Iran, which I agree. And you
    said the U.S. is in a good position to deter and prevent
    increased terrorist activity. Through what means? What do you
    think would be the most effective way for the United States to
    do that, particularly since I don't think engaging in terrorism
    is a direct violation of the JCPOA.
        Ambassador Benjamin. I think as a political matter if there
    were a widespread perception that Iran was using this
    opportunity to carry out a widespread--a massive terror
    campaign, I think that it would inevitably cause a reaction by
    Washington. I think that is just pure commonsense politics.
        In terms of being able to deter, let's just break it down.
    And I will recap some of my testimony. So Iran has, since 1996,
    not carried out a terrorist attack against the United States,
    and has only had one major plot revealed, and that was the
    very, very strange Arbabsiar plot involving the desire to kill
    the Saudi Ambassador here in Washington.
        I think that the Iranians have a healthy respect for our
    counterterrorism capabilities, for our intelligence gathering,
    and for our law enforcement, and are unwilling to be caught and
    to risk the kind of global opprobrium that they experienced
    after the Arbabsiar plot when there was an overwhelming U.N.
    general assembly resolution condemning them.
        I do believe that they will continue to try to provoke
    Israel, and I think that they will try to show that they can do
    two things at once and that they are still the leaders of the
    resistance. And I think for that reason our commitment to
    Israel's security has to be unwavering. We have to continue
    funding Iron Dome and continue the very robust support for
    Israeli defense, intelligence, and counterterrorism activities.
        And as for how we work with our Arab partners, you know, I
    think that the solution, the secret of our success has been
    excellent intelligence. And I think that we should deepen that
    intelligence cooperation with these countries. But, you know, I
    just note that the circumstances are becoming more difficult as
    some of these countries are themselves doing things that cross
    red lines for us, including, for example, their support of
    extremist groups in Syria.
        And so to come back to my main theme, we are living in a
    different Middle East. And I think that we need to think long
    and hard about what America's role is in the midst of this
    sectarian conflict.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. And my time is up. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
        Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador Benjamin, I want to go to your statement for
    just a minute which I thought was spot on in so many ways. But
    you say that Iran remains by a significant margin the foremost
    state sponsor of terror today. You go on to talk about Iranian
    terrorist activity focused primarily on support to groups like
    Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic jihad. And then you
    say roughly 5 years ago Iran and its proxy Hezbollah appeared
    to be laying the groundwork for a renewed campaign of terrorism
    outside of the Middle East. Notable arrests in places like
    Thailand, Kenya, India, Azerbaijan, Cypress, Bulgaria, and that
    operatives responsible were traced back to Lebanon and
    Hezbollah.
        So we are very familiar with the Iranian Hezbollah
    connection. So let's take a moment, and I chair the Western
    Hemisphere Subcommittee. Let's bring this closer to home.
    January 8 of this year there was an attempted bombing in
    Montevideo, Uruguay, that targeted the Israeli Embassy. A few
    days later, an Iranian diplomat Ahmed Sabatgold, 32, a
    political consultant of the Iranian Embassy suspected of being
    involved in placing the explosive device, fled the country.
    Wasn't expelled, but fled the country. We also know that very
    close to Uruguay is the tri-border region, which is heavily
    Lebanese Hezbollah. Lot of financial transaction and other
    things. You could tie that into the bombing in Buenos Aires.
    You could go back a long ways, but just keeping it present day,
    January in Uruguay.
        And then we had five Syrian refugees, migrants, whatever
    you want to call them, who traveled on fake Israeli passports
    to, hello, the tri-border region where they were able to
    purchase, through Hezbollah, other fraudulent passports which
    turned out to be Greek passports. After travelling a little bit
    in South America, made their way to Honduras on fake Greek
    passports. Now, they may have been farmers, may have been
    students. We don't know what their plans were, but there is a
    connection between illicit activity in the tri-border region
    and Hezbollah, which is an Iranian proxy organization, tied to
    terrorism all over the globe, not just the ones that I
    mentioned in Uruguay and Argentina. And if you think about what
    you mentioned in your statement about, and I can't pronounce
    his name, but the Iranian that was implicated in the
    assassination attempt of October 2012--is that right--trying to
    come across the southern border with the help of the Mexican
    cartel, and lo and behold, it was a DEA agent. We got lucky.
    May not always get lucky.
        Then you factor in the issue that General Kelly at SOUTHCOM
    brings up that Iran has opened 80 cultural centers in Latin
    America in the last, what, 15 years or less, where there is not
    really a large Muslim population. Okay? So we got tri-border
    region and Hezbollah. We have got 80 cultural centers in Latin
    America. We got an attempt by a Quds Force operative to
    assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by coming across our southern
    border working with the drug cartel. We have got General Kelly
    pointing out the cultural centers and raising the alarm.
        So I just want to hear your thoughts on how we combat Iran
    and the Quds force here in the Western Hemisphere knowing all
    of this. And am I wrong to start raising the flag about this
    issue? Ambassador.
        Ambassador Benjamin. So Hezbollah has been present in many,
    many countries around the world since, really, the 1980s. And
    their presence is overwhelmingly in the Western Hemisphere and
    in West Africa where there are lots of Hezbollah operatives. It
    has been overwhelmingly about economic activity, but we still
    need to be very vigilant about the possibility that they may
    seek to get involved in violence.
        The United States has close liaison relations with most of
    the countries in the hemisphere, and takes the responsibility
    to surveil these operations very, very seriously. With the
    exception of Venezuela, I think we have had very good
    cooperation from most of our partners. And of course you didn't
    mention Venezuela which has been a subject of concern regarding
    Hezbollah, in particular Iran, for many years. And I think
    that, you know, this is the world we live in.
        I have written and said on many times that we need to
    continue our investments in intelligence and in law
    enforcement, and work with these countries to ensure that we
    have tabs on everyone who is doing anything, and then to prompt
    them when the time comes to take legal action or to expel these
    people. And on many occasions they have done so. I actually
    think that the level of Hezbollah infrastructure, and I haven't
    had an intelligence community assessment on this in some time,
    and I am no longer in the government, but I think the level of
    Hezbollah infrastructure is somewhat diminished from what it
    was in, say, the 1990s.
        And we have had some really impressive successes against
    Hezbollah. For example, the case involving the Lebanese
    Canadian Bank which led to the forfeiture of I believe $140
    million in assets, including the uncovering of this large-scale
    operation that involved sending used cars to West Africa in
    which--from the Western Hemisphere where they were then sold
    across Africa and the profits were mingled with Hezbollah drug
    money, for example, and then passed on to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
        So, we can't eliminate all of these bad actors everywhere
    at once, but I think that we have shown over time that we have
    a very, very capable intelligence community and our leaguettes
    around the world are working very, very hard, our FBI
    representatives, and I think that we continue this to keep the
    pressure on the group. Right now it is a group that is somewhat
    stretched by its involvement in Syria, and a group that I think
    wants to avoid being embroiled in an even wider conflict than
    the one it is. So it is, for example, being careful vis a vis
    Israel.
        But, you know, at the State Department when I was
    coordinator, we kept a very close eye on this and were in touch
    with our colleagues around the world whenever we felt there was
    a need. And I think that we can continue those policies to curb
    Hezbollah activity. I believe you have to go back to the
    bombings in Argentina to find any violent activity in this
    hemisphere by Hezbollah.
        Mr. Duncan. And for your information, for the record, the
    State Department now doesn't take the Iranian activity,
    Hezbollah's activity in the Western Hemisphere much of a
    threat. And I have got the report that shows they did a very
    poor job in evaluating that. So----
        Ambassador Benjamin. Well, I think--so I would have to go
    back and look at the country reports or anything that they have
    submitted to you. I think that it is probably justified to say
    that the threat level is low but that the economic activity
    remains a matter of concern.
        Compared to the Sunni threat, compared to ISIS, compared to
    Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, I think that the threat from
    Hezbollah to Americans specifically is quite low.
        Mr. Duncan. Okay. I am out of time. I appreciate your
    frankness and I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
        We go now to Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
    witnesses for being here. And, Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding
    this hearing and giving us the opportunity to be reminded of
    Iran's sport for terrorism and the actions of the IRGC in
    particular.
        And I would like to focus in on one part of the JCPOA that
    we have touched on briefly, but I really want to understand
    better. We are moving forward under this deal, and there is a
    long list of individuals and entities who will see sanctions
    relief under the JCPOA. Coming off of the sanctions coming off
    are nuclear proliferation sanctions.
        This hearing is about Iran's support for terrorism. And we
    know that under existing law, individuals and entities can and
    should be sanctioned for their support for terrorism and for
    violation of human rights. So the question for all three of you
    is, shouldn't we, in advance of providing any sanctions relief
    to those individuals or entities for proliferation sanctions,
    shouldn't we go through all of them, determine which ones
    should still be sanctioned for their support for terrorism and
    never let them off to begin with?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Sir, I think in this context we need to
    distinguish between U.S. sanctions and EU sanctions because
    what we see is that most of the--actually all, every single
    individual and entity owned or connected by the Revolutionary
    Guards, still remains sanctioned by the U.S. Government.
        But when it comes to the European sanctions regime, they
    are going to remove actually most of the Revolutionary Guards
    units and personnel 8 years from the time of the implementation
    day. So the Europeans 8 years from now may be doing, engaging
    in----
        Mr. Deutch. I understand that, Mr. Alfoneh. But I am
    focused on those individuals and entities who will get
    sanctions relief when sanctions relief is initially granted,
    not 8 years from now, but when they meet their nuclear related
    obligations. And from everything that I have read, there are--
    everyone will acknowledge that some of them are on that list,
    some may be on there and are on there dual sanctioned for
    proliferation and for terrorism, but there are others who are
    on the list because it is easier to put them on the list for
    proliferation than it would have been to prove their support
    for terrorism.
        But if we are serious about stopping Iran from supporting
    terrorism, have any of you looked at that list and identified
    the individuals and entities who support terrorism and who
    should not be considered for sanctions relief at all? Mr.
    Modell.
        Mr. Modell. Let me just say one of the recommendations I
    made the last time I testified which addressed this same
    question was, Treasury, which does a lot of great work, one of
    the things they either--and when asked by me directly to some
    people over there: Have you ever undertaken a comprehensive
    study to look at all the people who have been sanctioned and
    designated on the SDN lists, sort of where they are today,
    where that are now, how have they been impacted, are they still
    in business, how are they subverting sanctions, so forth. And
    the answer is, you know, they are poorly resourced. That is a
    different issue.
        But the answer I think to your question is is yes they
    should because a number of the people that are coming off the
    list, and I have seen a few that I haven't--that I am thinking
    of in particular were part of what is nothing short of a global
    trends national organized crime effort on the part of Iran. And
    in this case it was to circumvent sanctions and nuclear related
    issues. But those people were willing to commit crimes on
    behalf of the Iranian Government then. Now that you are taking
    them off the list, they are not going to stop being part of
    this global apparatus that is involved in illicit procurement
    activities.
        Mr. Deutch. Right. And, Ambassador Benjamin, there was a
    statement within the past few weeks from the Supreme Leader who
    said--I think it was the Supreme Leader who said that any
    effort to re-impose sanctions will be a violation of the deal.
    But clearly that wouldn't be a violation of the deal. The
    terror related sanctions were never meant to be a part of the
    deal. That is what we were told throughout. That is clearly the
    view of this committee, of the administration. So shouldn't we
    be, before granting sanctions relief, shouldn't we be pushing
    back to disabuse anyone in Iran of the notion that lifting of
    sanctions for nuclear proliferation means lifting of sanctions
    altogether?
        Ambassador Benjamin. Well, I think your point is well
    taken. I think that the administration has been doing that
    pretty clearly in statements by the President, Secretary Kerry,
    Wendy Sherman, and the like. No one has been, to my mind,
    delisted for terrorism activities. If anything, everyone has
    been reaffirming that Iran is and will remain designated as a
    state sponsor.
        I cannot really say anything informed about the listings
    the Treasury has on individuals for terrorism, but I have
    certainly never heard that there have been people listed under
    proliferation because it was easier to do that than to do them
    for reasons of terrorism. Obviously these lists should be
    scrubbed regularly. There are issues of resources, but I think
    we just continue to repeat the message over and over again that
    bad behavior absolutely will not be tolerated.
        Mr. Deutch. Right. I understand. But, Ambassador Benjamin,
    shouldn't we scrub that list now, before sanctions relief is
    granted, to any of those individuals or entities to make sure
    that if someone on that list has been supporting terrorism and
    should be subject to sanctions that they continue to be subject
    to sanctions and they never come off that list?
        Ambassador Benjamin. I think that is self-evident. I think
    that if you find people who are sanctionable because of
    terrorist activity, they should be sanctioned, and we have made
    it clear that we will do that. We did it before and we should
    do it again.
        Mr. Deutch. And we should do it before there are sanctions
    relief granted. I appreciate it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Engel [presiding]. We will go to Mr. McCaul.
        Mr. McCaul. I thank the chairman.
        Mr. Engel. That sounds nice, Mr. McCaul. We have a good
    chairman right now.
        Mr. McCaul. Yes, we do.
        Let me just--in 2012 the Obama administration basically
    admitted that the IRGC was one of the most powerful economic
    actors within Iran, that they own a network of front companies
    all over the world, essentially. And so while they claim that
    upon implementation day that the sanctions will still be in
    place on the IRGC.
        Wouldn't these front companies that are owned by the IRGC
    benefit? And, therefore, wouldn't the IRGC benefit directly
    from the lifting of these sanctions? I will start with you, Mr.
    Alfoneh.
        Mr. Alfoneh. Yes, sir. You know, to the extent that the
    Revolutionary Guards manages to establish new front companies,
    it would of course benefit, you know, by sanction evasion from
    the United States, but would also most directly benefit from
    the sanctions relief because the Iranian Government is funding
    the Revolutionary Guards' engagement in the economy of Iran.
        Even during the Presidency of Mr. Rouhani who certainly
    does not seem to be a fan of the Revolutionary Guards, there
    seems to be more Revolutionary Guards participation in
    development of Iran's economy, in many public projects which
    have been granted to the Revolutionary Guards, and I also think
    that this is the miscalculation of President Rouhani. He
    thought that he could buy and bribe the Revolutionary Guards
    not to oppose a nuclear deal. But what of course what will
    happen now is that the Revolutionary Guards takes the money and
    they will oppose the nuclear deal during the implementation
    phase.
        Mr. McCaul. That is interesting.
        Mr. Modell? I am sorry. Let's go down the--okay.
    Ambassador.
        Ambassador Benjamin. I would just point out that there is
    sort of this belief that we are headed into a completely binary
    change. And the fact is, as I think has been well demonstrated
    over the years, the threat of Treasury sanctions is an enormous
    threat and a big hammer. We have unilateral sanctions remaining
    on lots of IRGC entities. And I think that the likelihood that
    foreign investors--of course no Americans will be investing
    because of the retention of our sanctions.
        But the likelihood that, say, European or Asian investors
    are going to suddenly strike deals with these entities if there
    is any shadow hanging over them is quite limited. Because in
    the end, the U.S. is still going to be prepared to cut those
    companies off from credit markets, and our ability to do so is
    quite remarkable.
        So, yes, in theory there is a danger there, and it is one
    we need to be vigilant about. But the Treasury has never been
    particularly shy about sharing information about those
    connections. And I expect they will be very aggressive in the
    future too.
        Mr. McCaul. And maybe, Mr. Modell, I will let you comment,
    and I will just throw out the last question because my time is
    running out. And that is there has been some discussion that
    under the section 219 of the Immigration Nationality Act that
    the IRGC should qualify as a foreign terrorist organization. I
    think that would give complete certainty that the lifting of
    sanctions would not benefit the IRGC. But I would throw that
    out to you.
        Mr. Modell. One of things I want to mention on your front
    company question before was that when you look at the ability
    of--and this is based on my own experience, but with the
    experience in talking to people who are serving--U.S.
    Government officials serving in the region now. When they
    approach our allies, particularly in the Southern Gulf, and ask
    for cooperation on trying to dismantle front companies, try to
    get more cooperation in working against front companies,
    working closely with the financial intelligence units to learn
    more about how they are moving men and money and material
    throughout the region, a lot of walls are put up.
        And I think if you are going to get serious about it, you
    need to go to places like the Emirates where there are hundreds
    and hundreds of companies that are springing up all the time
    that are in very few ways deterred by any sanctions that have
    been going on. So that is something I think needs to be
    addressed.
        Mr. McCaul. That is a great point. What about the
    designation as a foreign terrorist organization? Would you
    agree that they should be?
        Mr. Modell. You know, I just think it is so intertwined. I
    appreciate, you know, Ambassador Benjamin's point earlier that
    it would go against historical precedent, but I think when you
    look at the way the dimensions of the IRGC and how interwoven
    they are with regard to a singular mission of--that happens to
    overlap with terrorism and a lot of the illicit activities they
    do around the world, I just don't know how you are going to
    deter them otherwise.
        And I think one point that needs to be made is the Iranians
    have been very clear in saying, maybe not explicitly, but their
    main goal has always been to get rid of European sanctions.
    That is how it was before 2012. They were perfectly fine to
    live with a comprehensive trade ban. They can survive with it
    or without it.
        So I think if you are going to get--you know, it is worth
    exploring that if you did do that you would have an extra
    deterrent for Europeans to do business with them, and that
    might be an extra way of prodding them to change their
    behavior----
        Mr. McCaul. Mr. Alfoneh, do you have any opinion on that?
        Mr. Alfoneh. My organization agrees with Mr. Modell's
    suggestion that the entire organization should be designated as
    a foreign terrorist organization. I have a slightly different
    approach in this regard because I would like to punish those
    entities of the Revolutionary Guards which take part in the war
    in Syria. And we can document their presence in Syria.
        And the difference, I think, hopefully, and both are
    methods, I think, you know, have their own, you know, merits,
    but I also believe that my approach would have the added value
    of starting a process and discussion hopefully within the
    Revolutionary Guards. So they try to understand the price that
    they are paying for supporting Basar al-Assad's regime and
    keeping on his throne of blood.
        Mr. McCaul. And, Ambassador, I presume you would be opposed
    to that designation?
        Ambassador Benjamin. Yes. I did summarize my reasons
    before. Again, it would be, on the one hand, a complete break
    with our tradition of how we do foreign terrorist
    organizations. We have never designated at the State Department
    a government organ. And I think that actually the existing
    sanctions under the designation of Iran as a state sponsor of
    terrorism, as well as the whole array of other executive order,
    Treasury designations and the like, are more than ample
    currently for--certainly for enforcement purposes. And I don't
    see any additional messaging purpose that would be fulfilled
    through this.
        Mr. McCaul. I see my time has expired.
        Chairman Royce. Lois Frankel of Florida.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you. This has been
    a very interesting discussion. And I have some very, I will
    say, simplistic questions.
        First of all, in terms of--we have been saying IRGC, and
    then we are talking about Iran. For the funding of Hezbollah,
    is it the IRGC that funds Hezbollah, or is it Iran, or is it
    both? How does that exchange happen?
        Mr. Alfoneh. I only do my analysis, you know, in open
    source. So it is very difficult for me to give you a precise
    answer. But, you know, the way that it operates is usually
    indirect.
        So the Iranian Government, in the old days, in the 1980s,
    for example, they would on the national budget tell the entire
    world that Iran is supporting, let's say, Islamic jihad or
    Hezbollah, and be so and so many millions of dollars. But then
    in mid-1980s there were several lawsuits against the Government
    of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the U.S. because there were
    victims and family members of victims of terrorists who could
    refer to the national budget of the Islamic Republic of Iran
    and prove that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorists.
        So ever since mid-1980s, the Islamic Republic has been
    trying to hide the mechanisms through which they send money to
    Hezbollah. So we do not have open source information available
    for you. But some of that money is through Revolutionary
    Guards. Some of that money is through the office of the Supreme
    Leader. Some of that money is through the cultural centers.
    Even the construction base of the Revolutionary Guards, Khatam
    al-Anbia, is engaged in housing projects in Lebanon,
    particularly after the 2006 war. So there are multiple channels
    through which the Islamic Republic is funding Hezbollah.
        Ms. Frankel. Did you want to answer? Because I have a
    couple other questions.
        Ambassador Benjamin. I would just say very quickly, I think
    it is a kind of distinction without a difference. Hezbollah is
    funded because it is a national priority of the Government of
    Iran.
        Ms. Frankel. Okay. So my next question really has to do
    with, I guess, the relativity of Hezbollah's efforts in the
    Middle East toward the conflict. If Hezbollah was not present
    in Syria, how much difference do you think that would make?
        Mr. Alfoneh. Well, the Bashar regime would have collapsed
    because the Islamic Republic was not ready a few years ago to
    deploy large-scale forces of the Revolutionary Guards in Syria.
    Hezbollah has been doing the job of the Revolutionary Guards
    and seems also to have been suffering a large number of
    casualties.
        My study of the Iranian casualties shows me that since
    January 2012, 201 Iranians have been killed in combat in Syria.
    The number for Lebanese fighters, Hezbollah fighters in Syria,
    in the same period of time seems to be above 1,000, possibly
    1,500.
        Ms. Frankel. So does anyone else want to take a stab at
    that? So let me say, if Hezbollah was removed or if--let me put
    it this way: If Hezbollah was not being funded by Iran, would
    there be more likely a collapse of the Assad regime?
        Ambassador Benjamin. I think I would only say, and we are
    in a very hypothetical world here----
        Ms. Frankel. Yes.
        Ambassador Benjamin [continuing]. That it is kind of hard
    to imagine what that world would be like because Iran's
    interest in Syria is above all about the resupply and the
    connection with Hezbollah. So, you know, we would be taking the
    heart out of the jigsaw puzzle.
        Ms. Frankel. No, no, the reason I guess--well, my motive
    for asking that question is because I think a lot of us were
    concerned with this Iran agreement because we saw a direct
    connection between Iran getting money, more money, funding
    Hezbollah, and creating this horrible conflict in Syria. So let
    me just ask another question if I could follow up. If Iran was
    not funding Hezbollah, what would you think would be the affect
    on peace in Israel?
        Mr. Modell. Again, that is a big hypothetical, but let me
    just--let me make a couple of comments on the Iran/Hezbollah
    relationship, the way I have seen it evolve, particularly since
    2012. Point number one is when sanctions really started to hit,
    okay, entire operational units of the IRGC itself had to--their
    funding levels went down. Their activities, as a result, went
    down. And not only IRGC, but Hezbollah as well and other groups
    that were on the receiving end of Iranian Government funding
    also were put on hold.
        So before the JCPOA took place and the Iranians were
    feeling the brunt of this pain of sanctions, their operational
    activity did decline, and but I would also say that Hezbollah
    has evolved into its own organization. It has its own identity.
    And to a certain extent by Hezbollah--over the last decade, if
    not more, Hezbollahhas developed its own ways of generating
    revenue. They don't depend entirely on Iran as they did in the
    earliest years of the revolution.
        Ms. Frankel. Okay. Well, that was really what my question
    was. So you are saying now that--well, what would you say
    percentage-wise their own funding versus relying on Iran?
        Mr. Alfoneh. The open source, I cannot give you a precise
    estimate, madam, unfortunately.
        Ms. Frankel. Mr. Chairman, I have one more--I think it is
    like--well, three of us are left here. We have had so many
    different meetings in the last month or 2 months or whatever,
    or the year, about what is going on in Syria. In your opinion,
    will the IRGC be okay with a transition out of Assad?
        Mr. Alfoneh. The clear answer is no, madam. They have
    invested in the person of Bashar al-Assad. All the commanders,
    senior commanders, of the Revolutionary Guards have supported
    Bashar al-Assad personally in the Iranian press. It would be a
    terrible loss of face for them. But there seems to be
    discussions within the regime. So the President of Iran,
    President Rouhani, he has sent some signals which we could
    interpret as some degree of readiness to cooperate with someone
    else, you know, than Bashar al-Assad. But that is not the
    signals we hear from the Revolutionary Guards.
        Ms. Frankel. Anybody else?
        Ambassador Benjamin. I would just say that it is very hard
    to conceive of any Iranian acquiescence in a peace plan that
    involves both the removal of Assad and his non-replacement by
    one of his inner circle allied senior leaders, I think that
    that is--that is kind of a non-starter for the Iranians, even
    if they do come to the conclusion that the person himself does
    not have to stay there forever.
        Ms. Frankel. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. All right. Mr. Curt Clawson from Florida.
        Mr. Clawson. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Ambassador Benjamin, you have stated that the
    administration will still be able to rely on U.N. Security
    Council resolutions that levy arms embargoes against key areas
    of concerns such as Shia militias in Iraq, Hezbollah, and
    Lebanon, and in folks in--Houthis in Yemen.
        Now, Iran does billions of dollars' worth of trade with the
    Gulf States. They do billions with Europe. No oneis going to
    stop that unless it is us. I mean, you know, I don't know all
    the different lists. This list, that list, the other list, the
    Treasury Department. But I know everybodyis doing business with
    everybody. And if we were serious and we really wanted to stop
    it, we would stop it.
        Last time I checked, we were almost a third of the global
    GDP. Our trade deficit is $40 billion a month. And a lot of
    that goes to the people that we would need to cooperate with us
    from Europe and from that region. And no one can survive
    without our financial system. No one. If we wanted to stop
    Iranians enriching themselves, we wouldn't be talking about
    lists, and we wouldn't be talking about the U.N. We would just
    say: Hey, anybody doing business with you-all can't do business
    with us. And that is going to shut your economy down. And
    anybody taking their money can't do business with our banks,
    and that would shut their financial access down.
        It seems to me that this is just some sort of economic
    charade. I wouldn't depend on the U.N. to shut down the money
    into Iran. We have a third of the global GDP. Why would we go
    to the Security Council? If we wanted to stop these folks from
    getting guns to point at Israel and to point at our allies, we
    ought to get serious about economic sanctions and economic
    leverage that we have. And it just always make me irate when we
    go through these lists when we just allow everyone to trade
    with these folks. You know we do. You know we do.
        Are we ever going to get serious about stopping the trade?
    Because if we wanted to, we are the only folks--now, I know
    Russia won't, but our friends in Europe trade with them. And so
    do folks in the region. And we all know it. We just allow it to
    happen. Are you going to tell me they are not doing trade or
    that we couldn't stop them? What are you going to tell me here?
        Ambassador Benjamin. Well, first of all, your points about
    America's economic power I think are largely on point, and it
    was because we exercised that economic power that we got the
    Iranians to the table to negotiate over their nuclear program.
        What I said about the, and what I testified about the
    Security Council resolutions, is that they give us the
    authority under international law to stop certain kinds of
    trade. So for example, as I mentioned before, weapons from Iran
    designated for the Houthis in Yemen were seized on the high
    seas because we had the right under a Security Council
    resolution.
        Mr. Clawson. But my question, Ambassador, is why would we
    outsource our economic leverage to someone else? We have the
    largest market in the world. I don't want to ask permission
    from somebody else to use my market access as leverage. We will
    only get a fraction of our leverage.
        You are saying that we are making progress by using the
    U.N. and all these things you are talking about today. It may
    be a little bit, but why wouldn't we use the full force of our
    financial system and the full force of our market leverage with
    everyone that does business with Iran? Because I don't think
    the U.N. uses the full force of our economic leverage due to
    our market capacity.
        Ambassador Benjamin. I am not sure, sir, to what end you
    want to use all that?
        Mr. Clawson. To keep Israel safe and our friends from
    getting killed and thousands or millions of refugees. That is
    what I would like to use it for.
        Ambassador Benjamin. Well, I think that history has shown
    that a mixture of different instruments, diplomacy, sanctions,
    military pressure, and the like, are the way to go. When we
    have tried in the past to have far-ranging secondary sanctions,
    we have had some success, but we also have encountered some
    very, very serious resentment from our allies, and it puts us
    in a very difficult position when we want to get other things
    from them as well. So the policymakers' job is to mix the
    instruments in a way that produces the desired effect. I think
    that our European friends if we suggest that we cut off all
    trade would say that is fine for you but not fine for us.
        Mr. Clawson. And you know what, I would say that if they
    wanted to do business in our big box retailers, which they all
    do, they may not like it; but they will go along.
        Do the other two of you all have anything to add? On what
    my point is? Am I off point here in any way? Am I wrong? Am I
    overstating the case of American power of economic leverage?
        Mr. Modell. No, I don't think you are overstating the
    economic leverage we have. I just think we have taken a
    dramatic shift to doing things in the way that Ambassador
    Benjamin has laid out in a multilateral sense, and we are not
    making----
        Mr. Clawson. Well, it is not working. It is not working.
        Mr. Modell. Until the Europeans see that doing business
    with Iran is not in their interests, and we can't convince them
    otherwise, I don't see any way of how it is going to go
    otherwise.
        Mr. Clawson. I yield back. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you. I thought I would return just
    with the panel here to a couple of news reports from April of
    this year. One includes a report from Israel's Security
    Service, publishing details of information on Hamas'
    preparation for war with respect to new tunnels being dug, and
    the Security Service said they had obtained from a Hamas
    fighter and tunnel digger arrested in that month, he provided a
    wealth of information on the terror groups' tunnel digging in
    the Gaza Strip, as well its methods for obtaining cash from
    Iran for the purpose of digging those tunnels. Iranian support,
    according to the report, came in the form of cash, weapons, and
    sophisticated electronic equipment meant to interfere with
    control signals for drones over the coastal enclave.
        And then the second report in the Wall Street Journal,
    according to a senior Western intelligence official, Iran's
    Revolutionary Guards during the last few months have
    transferred tens of millions of dollars to Hamas' brigades.
    Intelligence reports show that the funds have been transferred
    on the direct orders of General Soleimani, the commander of the
    Revolutionary Guards elite Quds Force who also directs the
    annual budget to finance Hamas' military operation.
        The funds, according to the intelligence reports, are being
    used primarily to help Hamas rebuild the network of tunnels
    that were destroyed during the Israeli defense forces response
    to rocket attacks launched by Hamas, militants from Gaza last
    summer. So at least one or two intelligence agencies have a
    different assessment. Just for the record since we had a
    dialogue on that, Ambassador, I raise that point again.
        Ambassador Benjamin. I would just say that those reports,
    so there were signs of rapprochement. You know, Hamas was
    expelled from Tehran some years ago. There were signs of a
    rapprochement earlier this year. I believe that rapprochement
    didn't happen during the summer because of Hamas' extensive
    meetings with the Saudis. But I am relying here on open source,
    and I strongly recommend that you request a briefing from the
    CIA on the subject.
        Chairman Royce. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador. I
    appreciate that. And, again, I appreciate the testimony of all
    of our witnesses here today. And so with that, we will stand
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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