[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
OVERSIGHT FAILURES BEHIND THE RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT AT DOE'S WASTE
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2015
__________
Serial No. 114-54
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
energycommerce.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-612 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
FRED UPTON, Michigan
Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Chairman Emeritus Ranking Member
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG WALDEN, Oregon GENE GREEN, Texas
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas LOIS CAPPS, California
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
Vice Chairman JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio DORIS O. MATSUI, California
CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington KATHY CASTOR, Florida
GREGG HARPER, Mississippi JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey JERRY McNERNEY, California
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky PETER WELCH, Vermont
PETE OLSON, Texas BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia PAUL TONKO, New York
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida KURT SCHRADER, Oregon
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
BILLY LONG, Missouri Massachusetts
RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina TONY CARDENAS, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana
BILL FLORES, Texas
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina
CHRIS COLLINS, New York
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
_____
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
Chairman
DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
Vice Chairman Ranking Member
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee KATHY CASTOR, Florida
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia PAUL TONKO, New York
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
BILL FLORES, Texas YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma Massachusetts
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina GENE GREEN, Texas
CHRIS COLLINS, New York PETER WELCH, Vermont
KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey (ex
JOE BARTON, Texas officio)
FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Colorado, opening statement................................. 4
Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Tennessee, opening statement.......................... 6
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
State of New Jersey, opening statement......................... 51
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Witnesses
Madelyn Creedon, Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Additional information for the record........................ 57
Answers to submitted questions \1\........................... 77
Mark Whitney, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, Department of Energy............................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Additional information for the record........................ 63
Answers to submitted questions \1\........................... 77
Theodore A. Wyka, Chief Nuclear Safety Advisor for the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Safety, Security, and Quality Programs,
Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy, and
Former Chairman, Accident Investigation Board, Department of
Energy \2\
Answers to submitted questions \1\........................... 77
Allison B. Bawden, Acting Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, Government Accountability Office.................. 28
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Answers to submitted questions............................... 101
Submitted Material
Invitation of June 5, 2015, from Mr. Murphy to Ernest Moniz,
Secretary, Department of Energy, submitted by Mr. Murphy....... 73
Invitation of June 5, 2015, from Mr. Murphy to Gene L. Dodaro,
Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office,
submitted by Mr. Murphy........................................ 75
Subcommittee exhibit binder \3\
----------
\1\ The Department of Energy provided a joint response to
questions submitted to Secretary Ernest Moniz.
\2\ Mr. Wyka did not offer an oral or written statement for the
record.
\3\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
is available at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103595.
OVERSIGHT FAILURES BEHIND THE RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT AT DOE'S WASTE
ISOLATION PILOT PLANT
----------
FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 2015
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:47 a.m., in
Room 2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Murphy
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Members present: Representatives Murphy, Burgess,
Blackburn, Bucshon, Brooks, Mullin, Collins, Upton (ex
officio), DeGette, Green, Welch, and Pallone (ex officio).
Also present: Representative Lujan.
Staff present: Charles Ingebretson, Chief Counsel,
Oversight and Investigations; John Ohly, Professional Staff
Member, Oversight and Investigations; Chris Santini, Policy
Coordinator, Oversight and Investigations; Dan Schneider, Press
Secretary; Peter Spencer, Professional Staff Member, Oversight
and Investigations; Jessica Wilkerson, Oversight Associate;
Christine Brennan, Democratic Press Secretary; Jeff Carroll,
Democratic Staff Director; Ryan Gottschall, Democratic GAO
Detailee; Christopher Knauer, Democratic Oversight Staff
Director; Elizabeth Letter, Democratic Professional Staff
Member; and Timothy Robinson, Democratic Chief Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Mr. Murphy. All right. Good morning. I apologize for the
delay, but we are here now. This is the hearing on the
``Oversight Failures Behind the Radiological Incident at DOE's
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.''
Today we will review a costly series of oversight failures
at two important Department of Energy sites. These failures
contributed to a radiological leak last year at one of the
sites, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, known as WIPP, which
serves to dispose in mined salt caverns certain types of
radiological waste from our Nation's nuclear weapons programs.
This leak, along with a separate truck fire the week
before, exposed management and oversight shortcomings both at
WIPP and at one of the Nation's premier national laboratories,
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos, it turns out,
was the source of the radiological material and the errors that
caused a reaction in the material that burst a container in
WIPP's underground facility.
Since the incident, WIPP has been shut down, and the
Department has embarked on remediation, training, and
rebuilding that will cost taxpayers an estimated $240 million
just to restart limited operations next year. All told, it may
ultimately cost more than $500 million before full operations
are estimated to commence in 2018, and there are reports of DOE
fines or settlements of some $73 million.
This was no small oversight failure, and the issues we will
examine today raise broader questions about the state of the
Department's oversight framework for operations and its various
cleanup at nuclear sites.
The root cause of the radiological incident was established
in a DOE report this past April. Basically, hundreds of
containers were inappropriately packaged for WIPP disposal by
workers at Los Alamos. They packaged waste mixtures with
organic absorbants, which created reactive and ignitable waste
forms.
The specific culprit was off-the-shelf organic kitty
litter, and the use of this organic material was traced to
someone writing down ``organic'' instead of ``inorganic''--a
simple human error. But this is more than what happens when you
don't pay attention in high school chemistry and spelling
classes. This failure to catch an error reflected a much larger
systemic failure.
Two years before the incident, Los Alamos actually stopped
work that had been mixing waste with organics precisely because
of the reactivity and ignition risks. The lab's so-called
Difficult Waste Team, along with Federal site officials,
directed a safety process change that would use inorganics as
absorbants.
The problem was, over the next year and a half, no one in
management or among Federal overseers made sure the new
procedures were followed, so what they thought was fixed
wasn't. And no one in management or at the Federal level
reviewed the process to determine why workers had been creating
dangerous mixtures in the first place--a basic practice of an
effective safety system.
As the Los Alamos Lab's own review noted, the fact that so
many critical management, safety, and oversight mechanisms all
failed simultaneously over an extended period of time are of
significant concern.
Also of significant concern are patterns of oversight
failure found to have occurred at the WIPP site. For example,
at WIPP, both the contractor and Feds failed to identify or fix
shortcomings in equipment and degraded conditions in the mine
over a period of years. These errors led to the environmental
release and added tens of millions to the cost of recovery
operations.
The failures at these sites contribute to a long story of
DOE struggles to conduct adequate oversight of its management
and operating contractors, which are responsible for much of
the core activities of the Department.
Just over 2 years ago, DOE and National Nuclear Security
Administration, NNSA, officials came before this committee to
explain security failures at the Y-12 National Security Site in
Tennessee. The failures were notoriously exposed when several
elderly peace activists penetrated the security perimeter of
the most secure section of the site.
What was clear from that incident sounds very familiar
today: What the Feds thought was working wasn't. Site officials
trusted that contractors were doing what they were supposed to
do without checking. Federal line oversight had failed.
We were told then that the successful reliance on
department contractors depends on strong and clear lines of
accountability and on meaningful and consistent measurement of
contractor performance. We were promised that actions would be
taken to address the shortcomings. Yet we have again learned
from GAO that the DOE and NNSA have yet to make significant
progress to make the necessary reforms with regard to
measurement of contractor performance, and this is not
acceptable.
Today we will hear from department officials and the GAO,
all of whom can explain the costly oversight failures at WIPP
and Los Alamos, what is being done, and what must be done to
fix these problems at the sites and across the complex. I hope
this hearing helps to identify what is necessary for DOE to
develop an oversight system that can effectively identify,
address safety issues and security issues before they become
costly mistakes.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Tim Murphy
Today we will review a costly series of oversight failures
at two important Department of Energy sites. These failures
contributed to a radiological leak last year at one of the
sites, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, known as WIPP, which
serves to dispose in mined salt caverns certain types of
radiological waste from our nation's nuclear weapons programs.
This leak, along with a separate truck fire the week
before, exposed management and oversight shortcomings both at
WIPP and at one of the nation's premier national laboratories--
the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos it turns out was
the source of the radiological material and the errors that
caused a reaction in the material that burst a container in
WIPP's underground facility.
Since the incident, WIPP has been shut down and the
Department has embarked on remediation, training, and
rebuilding that will cost taxpayers an estimated $240 million
just to restart limited operations next year. All told, it may
ultimately cost more than $500 million before full operations
are estimated to commence in 2018.
This was no small oversight failure. And the issues we will
examine today raise broader questions about the state of the
Department's oversight framework for operations at its various
cleanup and nuclear sites.
The root cause of the radiological incident was established
in a DOE report this past April. Basically, hundreds of
containers were inappropriately packaged for WIPP disposal by
workers at Los Alamos. They packaged waste mixtures with
organic absorbents, which created reactive and ignitable waste
forms.
The specific culprit was off-the-shelf organic kitty
litter. And the use of this organic material was traced to
someone writing down ``organic'' instead of ``inorganic''--a
simple human error. Yet the failure to catch this error
reflected a much larger systemic failure.
Two years before the incident, Los Alamos actually stopped
work that had been mixing waste with organics precisely because
of the reactivity and ignition risks.
The lab's so-called ``difficult waste team'' along with
Federal site officials directed a safety process change that
would use ``inorganics'' as absorbents.
The problem was, over the next year and one-half, no one in
management or among Federal overseers made sure the new
procedures were followed. So what they thought was fixed
wasn't. And no one in management or at the Federal level
reviewed the process to determine why workers had been creating
dangerous mixtures in the first place--a basic practice of an
effective safety system.
As the Los Alamos Lab's own review noted ``the fact that so
many critical management, safety, and oversight mechanisms all
failed simultaneously over an extended period of time.are of
significant concern.''
Also of significant concern are patterns of oversight
failure found to have occurred at the WIPP site. For example,
at WIPP, both the contractor and feds failed to identify or fix
shortcomings in equipment, and degraded conditions in the
mine--over a period of years. These errors led to the
environmental release and added tens of millions to the cost of
the recovery operations.
The failures at these sites contribute to a long story of
DOE's struggles to conduct adequate oversight of its management
and operating contractors, which are responsible for much of
the core activities of the Department.
Just over two years ago, DOE and National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) officials came before this committee to
explain security failures at the Y-12 National Security Site in
Tennessee. The failures were notoriously exposed when several
elderly peace activists penetrated the security perimeter of
the most secure section of the site.
What was clear from that incident sounds very familiar
today: what the Feds thought was working wasn't. Site officials
trusted the contractors were doing what they were supposed to
do, without checking. Federal line oversight had failed.
We were told then that the successful reliance on
Department contractors depends on strong and clear lines of
accountability and on meaningful and consistent measurement of
contractor performance. We were promised that actions would be
taken to address the shortcomings.
Yet we have again learned from GAO that the DOE and NNSA
have yet to make significant progress to make the necessary
reforms with regard to measurement of contractor performance.
This is not acceptable.
Today, we'll hear from Department officials and the GAO,
all of whom can help explain the costly oversight failures at
WIPP and Los Alamos, what is being done and what must be done
to fix those problems, at the sites and across the complex.
I hope this hearing helps to identify what is necessary for
DOE to develop an oversight system that can effectively
identify and address safety and security issues before they
become costly mistakes.
Mr. Murphy. I now recognize the ranking member from
Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO
Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I want to thank you for your comity in holding
the hearing till I got here. As you know, the President was
briefing the Democratic caucus, and I felt like I owed him to
listen to what he had to say.
And I am particularly glad you waited for me because when I
heard your opening statement it was deja vu all over again to
me, because I have been on this O&I panel for most, if not all,
of the incidents that you discussed.
We have had over a dozen hearings since I have been here to
examine oversight failures and contractor mismanagement at the
DOE NNSA Nuclear Complex. A perusal of the GAO testimony today
reveals a string of mishaps and management failures over the
last decade involving these sites. And that is why, for years,
DOE and NNSA have remained on the agency's high-risk list for
Federal programs highly susceptible to mismanagement and waste.
The problems have been costly and disruptive. For example,
in 2004, which was over a decade ago, there were so many
incidents at Los Alamos that the lab director shut down the
entire facility for several weeks to address them. A few years
later, at a hearing on lab security, our beloved chairman
emeritus, John Dingell, observed, quote, ``I feel a little bit
like this is the movie 'Groundhog Day.' For some reason or
another, DOE has proven itself incapable of managing this
critical security and preventing recurring problems.'' That was
in 2007.
Now, as you mentioned, in July 2012, the DOE NNSA complex
was in the news again because these protestors with basic tools
managed to cut the fence at Y-12 and gain access to the area
surrounding a highly enriched uranium storage facility. This
was supposed to be one of the most secure facilities in the
country, but, as you said, a small group of aging activists,
including an 82-year-old nun, were able to access the compound
uninterrupted by security. And if you haven't seen those
videos, just watch them. It is chilling.
As I said in a hearing about that incident, without good
oversight, serious issues won't be identified and fixed, and
the results could be disastrous. I can't think of any reason
why we would want to decrease our oversight of these
facilities, inhibit the ability of oversight to review site
actions, or reduce accountability for those responsible for
keeping the nuclear sites safe. That was in 2012.
Now, we quickly learned that the Y-12 fiasco was not an
isolated event. Last year, a waste drum packed by a Los Alamos
contractor managed to burst open and contaminate the Nation's
only transuranic waste repository. Called the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant, or WIPP, this facility is supposed to house most
of the Nation's low-level, cold-war-generated nuclear waste.
This incident resulted in closing the facility perhaps for
years. It will also cost the taxpayer millions of dollars to
clean up.
In the last several decades, we have seen the DOE use a
range of strategies to oversee their contractors. And I do want
to say I think the DOE has made some efforts. After concerns
that hands-on oversight was burdensome and ineffective, DOE and
NNSA adopted a less intrusive oversight strategy. The new
model, which had reliance on contractor assurance systems, was
supposed to let contractors assess performance and provide data
for Federal oversight efforts.
Nonetheless, since the implementation of this strategy 5
years ago, we continue to have incidents that make me question
this approach. I mentioned the security incident at Y-12. Y-12
was one of the first facilities NNSA affirmed as having in
place an effective and mature contractor assurance system
capable of identifying risks and weaknesses. But this system
failed, and the committee had several hearings to see what went
wrong. We received assurances from the DOE that they had
learned lessons from the past and were committed to
implementing the new management and performance measures.
Nonetheless, the more recent incidents involving WIPP suggest
this oversight framework is not where it needs to be.
So where are we now? I think it is safe to say this new
oversight framework needs major retooling. Mr. Chairman, I
don't know if we are back to square one. I certainly hope we
are not. But, at a minimum, we need to establish a clear path
forward. I hope DOE and NNSA will share some ideas so they can
actually make progress in implementing the new framework. If
excessive transactional oversight is not the answer and
reliance on a contractor assurance system is not the answer,
then what is the answer?
And we need to figure this out pronto, Mr. Chairman, not
just because of these two incidents but because the missions at
NNSA sites are critical to our Nation's security.
In response to the GAO report, NNSA outlined plans for a
new corporate policy that will form a comprehensive framework
for a contractor assurance system. I don't even know what that
means, Mr. Chairman, but I hope we can get some answers today
about how that new policy will result in significant and
effective changes at the agency.
We have been going in circles, and we have to stop doing
that. So I hope we can see some changes come out of the WIPP
accident investigations and GAO's latest report. We are going
to be vigilant, but I have to be honest, I am not overly
optimistic.
Thanks, and I yield back.
Mr. Murphy. The gentlelady yields back.
I now recognize the gentlewoman from Tennessee and the vice
chair of the full committee, Mrs. Blackburn, for 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE
Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I am not going to take 5 minutes, and I will yield the
time to whomever would like it. But I am going to pick up right
where Ms. DeGette left off, talking about Y-12.
And as we conducted that hearing and the assurances that we
were given that things were going to be more closely watched,
and now we find ourselves, as Chairman Murphy said, looking at
a hearing where someone either wasn't paying attention in
spelling class or science class or didn't know the difference
and went on to inappropriately use an organic kitty litter.
The problem for us is, not only is this expensive--you are
talking about $551 billion being the estimate to clean this up,
to clean it up, and to get the facility operational--you also
look at the impact that this has on nuclear-generated power and
on storing that waste.
And in Tennessee, where Y-12 is located--and I was up at
Oak Ridge the week before last and over at TVA and out at the
Watts Bar Plant. And the safe storage of that nuclear waste, as
we bring the second Watts Bar reactor on line--it is about 95
percent complete right now--this is something of tremendous
concern.
So we are looking for answers. And I think, more than just
answers, we are looking for responsible action and a way to
solve this so that best practices and protocols are in place
and we are not finding ourselves back at a hearing saying,
well, we learned a lesson, but we really didn't learn a lesson,
and we took no actions from the lesson we were supposed to
learn.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the gentleman from
Texas.
Mr. Burgess. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
I have been on this subcommittee for over 10 years now.
This has been a recurrent theme that comes up over and over
again. So I want to echo what other members have said, that it
is important to get this right and to get this solved. We are
talking about the Nation's nuclear secrets. This should be the
most closely guarded and where the greatest attention to detail
should be placed to security issues, and we keep having to come
here and discuss breaches.
I do want to acknowledge the help of the Government
Accountability Office and, in particular, Allison Bawden, who
is one of our witnesses today, who has been enormously helpful
to our staff through this and other issues.
And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Murphy. The gentleman yields back.
We are waiting for the ranking member, Mr. Pallone, to come
in, but while we are waiting for him, I thought I would at
least take the time to introduce the witnesses, unless anybody
else on this side wants the rest of his time? I suspect not.
All right. We will save some time here.
Today's panel is the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, the
Principal Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
Welcome.
Mark Whitney, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office
of Environmental Management at the Department of Energy.
Mr. Whitney is also accompanied by Theodore Wyka--did I
pronounce that correctly?--the Chairperson of the Accident
Investigation Board and the Chief Nuclear Officer in DOE's
Office of Environmental Management.
We also have Allison Bawden, the Acting Director of the
Natural Resources and Environment team at the Government
Accountability Office.
Maybe I will just proceed, if that is OK with you, Ms.
DeGette----
Ms. DeGette. Yes.
Mr. Murphy [continuing]. Just to go ahead and start with
the swearing in?
Ms. DeGette. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. All right. So let's do that.
So you are aware that the committee is holding an
investigative hearing and, when doing so, has the practice of
taking testimony under oath. Do any of you have an objection to
testifying under oath?
Everyone agrees to do that.
The Chair then advises you that, under the rules of the
House and rules of the committee, you are entitled to be
advised by counsel. Do any of you desire to be advised by
counsel today?
All the witnesses say no.
In that case, if you will please rise and raise your right
hand, and I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Murphy. The witnesses have answered ``yes,'' so you are
now under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title
18, section 1001 of the United States Code.
I will let our first witness start a 5-minute summary. At
any point, we may have the ranking member then give--so I will
recognize you now, Ms. Creedon, for 5 minutes.
If you want to turn on the mic, pull it close, and watch
the lights in front of you.
Thank you.
STATEMENTS OF MADELYN CREEDON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
MARK WHITNEY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY THEODORE A.
WYKA, CHIEF NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISOR FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR SAFETY, SECURITY, AND QUALITY PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND FORMER
CHAIRMAN, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY;
AND ALLISON B. BAWDEN, ACTING DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
STATEMENT OF MADELYN CREEDON
Ms. Creedon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
DeGette, and members of the subcommittee. I want to thank you
for the opportunity today to discuss the radiological release
at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP.
I am pleased to be joined today by Mark Whitney, the Acting
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management. We
have provided written testimony to the subcommittee and
respectfully ask that it be submitted for the record.
On February 14, 2014, a radiological release occurred in
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico when a drum,
which had been shipped from Los Alamos National Laboratory,
experienced an exothermic reaction that led to
overpressurization and breach, causing a release of a portion
of the drum's contents.
The specifics of this radiological release at WIPP and the
subsequent restart activities will be addressed by Mr. Whitney.
While the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration, NNSA, holds the overall management and
operating contract for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the
Department of Energy's Office of Environmental Management is
the program lead for legacy waste cleanup activities performed
at LANL and for the operation of WIPP. NNSA is, however,
responsible for the overall site operations.
That said, I want to assure you all that all of us at DOE
take this unintentional release of radioactive material very
seriously, as we do all significant events.
What is most troublesome about this event is that, as the
accident investigation determined, it was preventable. It will
also be costly to fix and has left us without a true waste
repository for an indeterminate period of time. And this is
simply unacceptable.
Today I will focus on the actions that the NNSA has taken
since the event and highlight a few ongoing initiatives we are
pursuing to improve the governance and oversight at NNSA sites.
NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management have taken
corrective actions in response to the WIPP incident. This
includes both long-term and short-term compensatory measures.
These measures will address the underlying issues and problems
that contributed to the errors in packaging the legacy waste.
NNSA and EM, working with the other components of the
Department of Energy, have realigned the Federal program and
oversight responsibility for legacy waste materials. The
responsibility has been transferred from the local NNSA field
office to a newly established environmental management field
office.
We have also held our management and operating contractor
at the Los Alamos National Laboratory responsible and
accountable for their part in allowing conditions to develop
that led to this event. The M&O's fee for operating the
laboratory was reduced drastically. We did not grant a year of
award term, and we took back a year of award term that had
previously been awarded. Award term is a year of the contract.
So we did not give them an additional year on the contract, and
we took back a previously awarded additional year on their
contract. We are also in the process of modifying this M&O
contract to allow EM to have more direct control over their
work at Los Alamos in the near term and then to modify their
contracting strategy in the long term.
NNSA is also working on several fronts to improve our
overall approach to site governance. We have kicked off two
specific initiatives. The first is to examine our contracting
strategy to ensure that we incentivize the right behaviors
while also holding our labs and sites accountable. The second
initiative is to better define the NNSA site governance model,
with specific attention to identifying clear expectations
regarding contract management and oversight and clarifying the
roles and responsibilities between the NNSA field and
headquarters elements and, in the case of Los Alamos, the
Office of Environmental Management as well.
In conclusion, I want to assure you that the Department
understands the seriousness of this event. We have taken
numerous concrete and aggressive actions to address the
specific events and are also looking at governance generally.
These actions will help us ensure that we do not repeat the
mistakes that gave rise to this incident and help improve
operations across the entire NNSA enterprise.
With that, I thank you, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Whitney, we will have you go next.
STATEMENT OF MARK WHITNEY
Mr. Whitney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
DeGette, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for the opportunity to share our commitment and vision on
the Department of Energy's ongoing recovery of the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant.
Safe performance of work is our overriding priority, and
the Department's first responsibility is to protect the
workers, the public, and the environment. Safety first is the
clear expectation behind all of our decisions and our
activities. The Secretary and I continue to set the expectation
for the EM workforce that safety is integral to accomplishing
the mission.
WIPP's primary mission is to safely and permanently dispose
of the Nation's defense-related transuranic waste, which is a
byproduct of nuclear weapons research and production, facility
dismantlement, and site cleanup.
On February 5, 2014, a vehicle used to transport salt
caught fire in the WIPP underground. Workers were safely
evacuated, and the underground portion of WIPP was shut down,
but the fire resulted in minor smoke inhalation to six workers.
It did not adversely, however, impact the public or the
environment.
On February 14, 2014, a second unrelated event occurred
when an air monitor measured airborne radioactivity close to
the location where waste was being emplaced. No employees were
underground at the time. The next day, low levels of airborne
radioactive contamination were detected, the result of when a
small amount of radioactivity leaked by the exhaust duct
dampers through the unfiltered exhaust ducts and escaped
aboveground.
As a result of these events, the WIPP repository is shut
down and is currently not accepting waste shipments.
The Department established an Accident Investigation Board
to fully investigate the event and understand the causes and
factors that contributed to the radiological release. The AIB
identified direct causes, root causes, and contributing causes
to the radiological release.
While the investigation focused on the activities that
contributed to the breached drum in the WIPP underground, the
conclusions and analyses represent an opportunity to assess and
benchmark all of our operations and apply lessons learned
across the EM complex.
We have made considerable progress towards safely
recovering WIPP over the last 16 months, including the
immediate response to the incidents, our investigation to the
incidents, the development of corrective action plans, and the
issuance and implementation of the WIPP recovery plan.
We are strengthening safety management programs such as
nuclear safety, fire protection, emergency management, and
radiological control, reestablishing a bounding safety
envelope, and responding to all of our oversight organizations'
concerns.
Underground entries were necessarily limited in the weeks
following the incidents, but they are now safely performed
daily. Restoration of the underground includes radiological
surveys, radiological buffers in noncontaminated areas, ground
control stability inspections, roof bolting, and equipment
maintenance.
Work is being performed also safely in contaminated areas.
Adequate ventilation is required, however, for habitability of
the underground, including dust removal during mining and
removal of exhaust fumes during diesel engine operations.
Increasing ventilation capacity is a principal requirement for
the safe underground operations, and our plan is to increase
ventilation over the next year to support resumption of
operations and ultimately to increase the airflow back to pre-
incident rates, although that will take several years.
EM has worked diligently to improve oversight at the
headquarters and field level. To ensure continued health and
safety to the workers, the public, and the environment, the
Department must provide effective, comprehensive oversight of
work at every phase and level. EM is committed to strengthening
Federal and contractor oversight competencies. Many of these
actions have already been implemented.
In summary, WIPP is an important national resource that we
are working hard to recover. DOE will resume disposal
operations at WIPP but only when it is safe to do so. The
safety of workers, the public, and the environment is first and
foremost. And we continue to keep the community and
stakeholders, including Congress, informed of WIPP recovery in
a transparent manner.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitney follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Mr. Wyka, we understand you are not testifying today but
you are going to be available to answer questions. Thank you.
Ms. Bawden, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ALLISON B. BAWDEN
Ms. Bawden. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to
discuss GAO's report on the framework established by the
Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security
Administration for overseeing management and operating
contractors. These M&O contractors are trusted by the
Government to achieve some of its most sensitive national
security missions.
GAO has reported for decades on the management challenges
DOE faces for contract administration and oversight. My
testimony today highlights three findings from GAO's recently
completed work on NNSA's framework for overseeing its M&O
contractors, as well as preliminary observations from GAO's
ongoing work that includes examining oversight of WIPP.
These findings from our work and the parallels drawn to
oversight of WIPP are particularly important in light of two
competing narratives about DOE oversight of M&O contractors.
On the one hand, there are the series of safety and
security incidents on which GAO and others have reported for
years. Many of these incidents have indicated the need for
better oversight, such as the 2012 security incident at Y-12,
2008 security performance issues at Livermore, and safety and
security performance issues at Los Alamos in 2004 and 2006.
On the other hand, there is discussion of Federal
micromanagement of M&O contractors and excessive and burdensome
requirements that affect productivity.
DOE's current oversight framework, which was established in
2011 to bridge these two narratives, requires M&O contractors
to develop assurance systems, or CAS, that provide data to help
contractors drive continuous improvement in their operations
and that can be leveraged, when appropriate, to improve the
efficiency of Federal oversight by relying on the contractor-
generated information from CAS.
A 2011 NNSA policy elaborates on DOE's framework by
identifying assessments Federal overseers should conduct to
determine when it is appropriate to leverage CAS for oversight.
These are: the risk of an activity, the maturity of the
contractor's CAS or a way of thinking about the reliability of
the information provided by the contractor systems, and the
contractor's past performance.
NNSA's policy describes balancing the oversight approaches
that can result from these assessments. On one side is
transaction-based oversight or direct oversight, such as
inspections and performance testing, particularly for high-risk
or high-hazard activities. And on the other side is system-
based oversight, where NNSA can rely on contractor-generated
information it receives from contractor systems.
In our recently completed work regarding NNSA's
implementation of the framework for overseeing M&O contractors,
we found the following:
First, NNSA has not fully established policy or guidance
for implementing its framework to oversee M&O contractors.
Specifically, at the headquarters level, NNSA does not have
guidance to fully support conducting the three assessments
required by its policy. While NNSA has some guidance for
assessing risk, it has no policy or guidance for assessing the
maturity of CAS or for evaluating past performance. We
concluded that, without this policy or guidance, oversight
approaches could over-rely or under-rely on information from
CAS.
Second, NNSA field offices have developed their own
procedures for conducting assessments of risk, CAS maturity,
and contractor past performance; however, these procedures are
not complete and differ among field offices. We concluded that
differences among these procedures affect NNSA's understanding
at the enterprise level of how oversight is conducted. For
example, when field offices use different procedures for
assessing CAS maturity, it is difficult to compare the maturity
of these systems.
Third, NNSA no longer uses the process it established in
2011 policy to review the effectiveness of oversight approaches
in place at each contractor site and field office, including
how CAS is being used for oversight. This process was
discontinued after the Y-12 security incident and has not been
replaced, in essence eliminating the one process NNSA had that
would have allowed the agency to determine whether oversight
approaches are consistently applied.
Regarding WIPP, our preliminary observations on oversight
of WIPP underscore the importance of having clear guidance on
when and how to rely on contractor information for oversight.
Notably, according to DOE's Accident Investigation Board
report, NNSA's Los Alamos field office, responsible for
overseeing waste packaging, was over-reliant on CAS for
environmental compliance oversight and that this reliance was
not consistent with an NNSA review that observed CAS was still
maturing.
Thank you again for having me today. I look forward to
responding to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bawden follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee,
Mr. Pallone, for his opening statement of 5 minutes.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me, you
know, go a little late here.
Today's hearing obviously focuses on oversight failures at
the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or
WIPP. And the incidents there raise broader questions about how
to conduct effective oversight across the DOE and NNSA Nuclear
Complex.
On this committee, there has long been bipartisan support
for congressional oversight to ensure that DOE is effectively
managing its contractors and keeping the nuclear complex safe.
And DOE and NNSA have shown repeatedly that our continued
oversight is needed.
For nearly two decades now, this committee, GAO, and DOE's
inspector general have identified a wide array of safety and
security issues facing DOE at NNSA sites. I was going to
mention them. Some of them, perhaps all of them, have already
been mentioned, but I did want to mention again.
In 2004, Los Alamos National Laboratory suspended
operations after a student was partially blinded in a laser
accident and classified information went missing. In 2006, a
drug raid in a mobile-home park found a large number of
classified documents that had been removed from an NNSA lab. In
2007, a GAO report revealed that NNSA weapons laboratory
workers had faced nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses
over the previous 7 years. In 2008, GAO found security and
protection of weapons-grade nuclear material severely lacking
at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory due in part to NNSA's
deficient oversight. And then, in 2012, three trespassers
managed to gain access to a secure area directly adjacent to
some of the Nation's critically important weapon-related
facilities at Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee.
This committee has held a number of hearings on these
topics to understand what went wrong and what DOE and NNSA were
doing to ensure this didn't happen again in the future. But now
we find ourselves dealing with today's topic, which has been
mentioned already, in February 2014, when WIPP experienced both
an underground truck fire and a radiological release from a
nuclear waste drum within a 9-day period, and operations at
WIPP were subsequently shut down. The facility obviously has
not reopened, and it may cost over half a billion dollars to
make it fully operational again.
I just think it is an alarming record. The DOE and NNSA
facilities guard some of the Nation's most dangerous nuclear
materials, and for too long the DOE and NNSA have allowed
mismanagement and oversight failures to continue, and we need
answers today about how that will change.
Effective contractor oversight is a key component of those
changes. DOE and NNSA rely heavily on contractors to carry out
their missions' activities. In 2010, DOE changed its system for
contractor oversight to be more hands off, and they planned to
rely on the contractor assurance systems developed by the
contractors themselves to catch problems and provide data for
Federal oversight efforts.
In our 2012 hearing on the Y-12 incident, the committee
concluded that DOE and NNSA needed to do a better job of
overseeing their contractors. Yet here we are today with recent
documentation from GAO and DOE's own accident investigation
boards that contractor assurance systems across the DOE and
NNSA complex may not be capable of identifying risks and
weaknesses.
Obviously, we have heard the GAO, and I hope to hear
concrete plans from DOE and NNSA for amending their systems for
contractor oversight.
I just want to close by talking about how many billions of
dollars we have spent to fix these repeated problems across the
DOE. DOE's Office of Environmental Management and NNSA have
been on GAO's high-risk list for a long time, largely due to
their struggles to stay within cost and schedule estimates for
most major projects.
Regarding what happened at WIPP, NNSA's written testimony
today says, and I quote, ``The release, which was subsequently
determined to have been avoidable, will be costly to fix and
has left us without a transuranic waste repository for an
indeterminate period of time,'' unquote.
The bottom line here is that, when these projects go off
the rails, taxpayer dollars are at risk, and so are important
projects that national security depends on. We need to make
sure taxpayers' money is spent more wisely.
And I want to thank our witnesses and this panel.
You know, the committee spent decades doing oversight on
these issues. Both of our chairmen and our Ranking Member
DeGette have been involved in this for a long time, and we do
intend to keep a close eye as we move forward. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr.
Today's hearing will focus on oversight failures at the
Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant--or WIPP.
The incidents there raise broader questions about how to
conduct effective oversight across the DOE-NNSA nuclear
complex.
On this committee, there has long been bipartisan support
for congressional oversight to ensure that DOE is effectively
managing its contractors and keeping the nuclear complex safe.
And DOE and NNSA have shown repeatedly that our continued
oversight is needed.
For nearly two decades now, this committee, GAO, and DOE's
Inspector General have identified a wide array of safety and
security issues facing DOE and NNSA sites. Let me walk through
just a few of those.
In 2004, Los Alamos National Laboratory suspended
operations after a student was partially blinded in a laser
accident and classified information went missing.
In 2006, a drug raid in a mobile home park found a large
number of classified documents that had been removed from an
NNSA lab.
In 2007, a GAO report revealed that NNSA weapons laboratory
workers had faced nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses
over the previous 7-year period.
In 2008, GAO found security and protection of weapons-grade
nuclear material severely lacking at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, due in part to NNSA's deficient oversight.
In 2012, three trespassers managed to gain access to a
secure area directly adjacent to some of the nation's most
critically important weapon-related facilities at Y-12 National
Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
This committee has held a number of hearings on these
topics to understand what went wrong and what DOE and NNSA were
doing to ensure this did not happen again in the future.
But now we find ourselves dealing with today's topic.
In February 2014, WIPP experienced both an underground
truck fire and a radiological release from a nuclear waste drum
within a nine-day period. Operations at WIPP were subsequently
shut down. The facility has still not reopened, and it may cost
over half a billion dollars to make it fully operational again.
This is an alarming record. The DOE and NNSA facilities
guard some of the nation's most dangerous nuclear materials.
And for too long, the DOE and NNSA have allowed mismanagement
and oversight failures to continue. We need answers today about
how that will change.
Effective contractor oversight is a key component of those
changes. DOE and NNSA rely heavily on contractors to carry out
their mission activities. In 2010, DOE changed its system for
contractor oversight to be more hands-off. They planned to rely
on the contractor assurance systems--developed by the
contractors themselves--to catch problems and provide data for
Federal oversight efforts.
In our 2012 hearing on the Y-12 incident, the committee
concluded that DOE and NNSA needed to do a better job of
overseeing their contractors. Yet here we are today with recent
documentation from GAO and DOE's own accident investigation
boards that contractor assurance systems across the DOE-NNSA
complex may not be capable of identifying risks and weaknesses.
I look forward to hearing GAO share their findings today,
and I hope to hear concrete plans from DOE and NNSA for
amending their systems for contractor oversight.
I want to close by talking about how many billions of
dollars we have spent to fix these repeated problems across
DOE. DOE's Office of Environmental Management and NNSA have
been on GAO's ``high risk'' list for a long time, largely due
to their struggles to stay within cost and schedule estimates
for most major projects.
Regarding what happened at WIPP, NNSA's written testimony
today says, ``The release, which was subsequently determined to
have been avoidable, will be costly to fix, and has left us
without a transuranic waste repository for an indeterminate
period of time.''
The bottom line here is that when these projects go off the
rails, taxpayers' dollars are at risk and so are important
projects our national security depends on. We need to make sure
taxpayers' money is spent more wisely.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
This committee has spent decades doing oversight on these
issues, and I assure you we will keep a close eye moving
forward.
Thank you.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.
First of all, Mr. Wyka, you ran the Accident Investigation
Board and determined that the radiological incident was
preventable. Am I correct?
Mr. Wyka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you also determined the systemic root cause
was that site offices, or the Feds, I think you said failed to
ensure that Los Alamos adequately implemented hazard controls
in waste packaging. Is that correct?
Mr. Wyka. Close. It's that they inadequately developed and
implemented the repackaging and treatment procedures that
incorporated suitable hazard controls and included a rigorous
review and approval process.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
And that contributing cause was failure of oversight from
line officers at headquarters; is that correct?
Mr. Wyka. There were several contributing causes, or what I
would call missed opportunities. And those included the
characterization and certification program and process itself,
the land safety procedures that they use, the hazard
identification and control mechanisms and processes that they
used at the lab, as well as the training and qualification of
both the workers and the first-level supervisors, the
contractor assurance system, and oversight at all levels,
including the Federal office and headquarters.
Mr. Murphy. So multiple levels of failures of oversight.
Mr. Wyka. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Ms. Creedon and Mr. Whitney, if you could answer this, too.
Do either of you have any disagreements with the Department's
Accident Investigation Board findings?
Ms. Creedon. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Whitney?
Mr. Whitney. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. So you agree that this incident was preventable
if handled differently?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Now, Ms. Creedon, you were confirmed for your position last
July 2014, but you actually have long experience with DOE and
NNSA and are generally familiar with the Department's oversight
challenge. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Creedon. That's correct.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
So testimony before this committee over the years has
identified numerous security problems--you heard that stated by
multiple members up here--but also safety process problems at
Los Alamos which go back 15 years. And we heard a partial list
in the GAO testimony this morning.
To take another example, in testimony just 2 years ago, we
learned that the Los Alamos site office--the Feds had closed
half of 62 safety system corrective actions without adequate
verifications.
So is it truly any surprise to you that Los Alamos Feds did
not know that workers spent a year and a half incorrectly
mixing hundreds of barrels of radiological waste?
Ms. Creedon. Mr. Chairman, one of the fundamental problems
with this particular failure is that--well, there are many, as
the report indicated, but one of them is clearly the failure of
the CAS approach and the CAS system at Los Alamos. So Los
Alamos did not have a mature CAS system, and it had not picked
up these issues.
One of the primary weaknesses in the CAS system, as we have
now gone back and looked at it, was it was inadequate with
respect to overseeing subcontractors. And this is a fundamental
problem.
The other problem--and this is a problem that we have begun
to address already--is that the lines of oversight at Los
Alamos were not clear. So one of the Secretary's initial
actions and responses was to clarify these lines of authority
and responsibility for oversight at Los Alamos.
And the first action that we took was to take the
Environmental Management personnel who were imbedded in the
NNSA field office and Mr. Whitney, at the direction of the
Secretary, established a standalone EM field office. And then I
will let him go into the details of that particular field
office.
But the other thing that we are doing is also changing the
way that they oversee the contract itself so they will have
more authority and responsibility so these lines will be
clearer in the future.
Mr. Murphy. So, along those lines, let me probe a little
bit deeper. So, from your experience, what is it that makes
ensuring effective safety systems oversight so difficult to
sustain at Los Alamos?
Ms. Creedon. So one of the things that I think we have to
look at is ensuring that the contractors really do have in
place for their own purposes an internal oversight capability.
The Department historically and NNSA historically has
focused on those very high-hazard activities of the
criticality, safety, and those are the ones that have had the
focus and attention. NNSA historically has had to balance some
of its oversight responsibilities. So we have about 75 people
in the Los Alamos and NNSA field office, and there are on the
order of 12,000 contractor employees at Los Alamos. So, with
that ratio, we have to make sure that our initial focus, our
most intense focus is associated with those high-hazard
activities.
And these activities that were associated with the
repackaging of this legacy waste in this overarching construct
were considered to be low-hazard activities. So for that, we
rely on the systematic approach at Los Alamos.
Mr. Murphy. So it being low--well, I see I am out of time.
I will follow up with that later on. Thank you.
Ms. DeGette, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. DeGette. I want to thank all of our witnesses for
coming today. And this is an issue that we have been grappling
with for many years, as you heard in my opening statement.
I wanted to ask you, Ms. Bawden--I understand that DOE
contract management, specifically EM and NNSA, have been on the
high-risk list for a long time. Is that correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, that is a list that GAO places agencies
and programs on that are at increased risk for waste and
mismanagement; is that right?
Ms. Bawden. That's right.
Ms. DeGette. Now, in 2010, the Department launched an
effort to reform its approach to oversight. I know you are
familiar with this memo, the 2010 memo from Deputy Secretary
Poneman called ``Department of Energy Safety and Security
Reform Plan''; is that right?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, in the safety reform section, it states
that DOE will provide contractors with, quote, ``the
flexibility to tailor and implement safety programs in light of
their situation without excessive Federal oversight or overly
prescriptive departmental requirements.''
Are you familiar with that section?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, it says the same thing for security
reform. Is that right?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, Ms. Bawden, under this new system, NNSA
was supposed to be able to rely on information from contractor
assurance systems put into place by the M&O contractors,
correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. And the NNSA was supposed to affirm that the
systems were mature and effective. Is that right?
Ms. Bawden. That's correct.
Ms. DeGette. Now, one of the first NNSA sites to receive
that affirmation was the Y-12 facility in Tennessee, correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, after that facility was affirmed, that is
when we had the security fiasco where the nun and the other
people were able to penetrate the compound. Is that right?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. So I understand that after that failure they
scrapped the affirmation process, correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. And so, really, they had no way of affirming
the maturity or usefulness of these systems.
Ms. Bawden. They do not have a current process in place.
Ms. DeGette. All right.
Now, let me talk to you for a minute about WIPP. I
understand when the DOE conducted its accident investigation it
found that the contractor assurance systems for the two M&O
contractors affiliated with WIPP and Los Alamos failed to
identify the risks associated with that disaster. Is that
right?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, your team just completed a comprehensive
audit, and you found that the NNSA doesn't have the capability
to evaluate which sites have viable contractor assurance
systems capable of giving the agency the data that it needs to
oversee the contractors that run these critical facilities,
correct?
Ms. Bawden. They do not have policies in place. That's
correct.
Ms. DeGette. OK.
And the contractor systems at Y-12, Los Alamos, and WIPP
all failed to prevent major security and safety incidents,
correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. Now, you raised concerns about these
contractor assurance systems across the entire NNSA complex,
correct?
Ms. Bawden. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. So, at this point, what approach or system is
NNSA using to conduct oversight at its sites, where literally
billions of dollars are being spent?
Ms. Bawden. Thank you for the question.
NNSA is utilizing many different approaches at its sites
across the spectrum of available transactional and systems-
based options. What we found is that you really have to go to
each individual site to figure out whatever site approaches
they're taking, and information about oversight broadly was not
available at the headquarters level
Ms. DeGette. So it is really just sort of, now, catch as
catch can, whatever people think at the different sites. Would
that be a fair----
Ms. Bawden. The field offices are making their decisions at
each site.
Ms. DeGette. The field offices are making their decisions
at each site.
Ms. Bawden. Uh-huh.
Ms. DeGette. So does that approach give you confidence the
Federal Government is applying effective oversight over its M&O
contractors?
Ms. Bawden. I think the recommendations that we made that
were aimed at improving policy, consistency, and fully fleshing
out this framework would help give us that confidence.
Ms. DeGette. Now, you know, Ms. Creedon, I know that you
are all trying to grapple with this, and it has been a complex
and difficult problem that people have been trying to grapple
with, really, ever since I have been on this committee, which
is 1997.
But I have to say that, since 2002, DOE policies and orders
have required that all these contractors have these systems.
But you hear Ms. Bawden say that the compliance is sort of
catch as catch can among the different agencies.
What is your response to that?
Ms. Creedon. As Ms. Bawden said, when the Y-12 event
occurred, the CAS system at Y-12 had been affirmed. And my
understanding at the time was that NNSA then determined that,
clearly, the approach that they had taken to affirming these
contractor assurance systems was not working and they set it
aside.
Since I started at the Department of Energy--I was
confirmed in July and started in August--one of my
responsibilities is as the fee-determining official, and part
of that is to look at how all of these contractors are
performing. So, among other things, we at the Department have
changed some of the methodologies with respect to the
contractor and the contract and have changed some of the
performance criteria.
But what I have started to do, which in some respects is a
compensatory measure for some of these differences, is I meet
for an entire day with all of our field office managers every
quarter, and we go through exactly what's going on----
Ms. DeGette. OK. I don't mean to stop you, but my time has
expired, and I think it would be really helpful if you could
supplement your answers to deal exactly with this problem that
we have of now no cohesion.
[The information follows:]
Our oversight policies are implemented through Department of
Energy (DOE) Directives that are issued at the department
level, and followed by all offices of the DOE, as required.
Where specific directive language includes contractor
requirements, they are included in DOE contracts. These
directives are consistent with statutes and regulations.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you for your comity.
Mr. Murphy. We let you go because it was important
questions you were asking.
Dr. Burgess, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wyka, I have here, I think, three accident
investigation reports from the Department of Energy Office of
Environmental Management, and in each one there is a judgment-
of-need list at the end of the report. And I haven't added them
up myself, but I am told by staff that there are 122 judgments
of need in these three reports that the Department and the
contractors will need to address.
So let's just ask the obvious question. This is 122
judgments of need. Is that a lot?
Mr. Wyka. It's a big number, but I actually don't go for a
quota for a number. I look at the issues and develop the
conclusions and judgment of needs based on what we find until
we sort or resolve the problems.
A lot of those judgment of needs are more extensive than
others. Some of them are extent of conditions rather than just
looking at the event at Los Alamos. It's going to require, you
know, the Department to look at it from a programmatic
perspective as well as enterprise-wide.
Mr. Burgess. But, say, going back over the last 10 years,
many of these things seem to be recurrent themes. Am I wrong to
make that assumption?
Mr. Wyka. No, sir, you are correct. And that's what the
board concluded in all three investigations, that a lot of
these issues were brought up in other reviews and assessments,
both internally and externally, and they weren't addressed as
repeatable issues, which was another missed opportunity----
Mr. Burgess. Well, why not?
Mr. Wyka [continuing]. In several functional areas.
Mr. Burgess. Why not? I mean, again, I have been on this
subcommittee for 10 years. We have been dealing with these
problems every year that I have been on the subcommittee. The
obvious question is why not, or what is it going to take to get
these things brought up to standards where we won't be reading
these types of headlines and, quite honestly, putting our
workers and contractors at risk?
So do we have an answer for that?
Please.
Mr. Whitney. If you don't mind, sir, I will answer that for
the Office of Environmental Management.
Yes, Ted was exactly right. Even with respect to the EM
contractor at the WIPP site, there were assessments over the
past years, corrective actions put in place, and they were not
tracked accordingly.
We are going to resolve that issue. Among many other things
that we are doing with respect to oversight at headquarters, we
have developed a more robust corrective action tracking system,
a corrective action software hub, and we will assure the
followthrough on all corrective actions.
We are also increasing resources in the oversight area for
headquarters for our Safety, Security, and Quality Programs
office that really did not have the staffing to implement a
robust headquarters oversight program.
We have done the same at the Carlsbad Field Office,
increasing resources, but, just as importantly, we have
reorganized the office there. The office previously had the
production or the waste emplacement group, the folks that were
responsible for the program, and the folks that were
responsible for oversight in the same office. And, in fact,
unfortunately, some folks wore two hats. They were responsible
for emplacing the waste and for oversight of that activity,
which is clearly not the right way to approach it.
So we have reorganized it into an Office of Program
Management and an Office of Oversight, to ensure that all the
position descriptions accurately reflect the oversight
responsibilities. And those are being pulled into performance
plans of the Federal employee.
We are doing this across the board at headquarters and
revamping our oversight program in response to the AIB reports
and part of our corrective action planning process to include
really developing a more robust oversight arm. There will be a
baseline program as well a program that looks at trends across
the complex and ensures that when a trend develops----
Mr. Burgess. Yes. If I can just interrupt you, because I am
going to run out of time. This all sounds wonderful, and I have
the transcript from the hearing we had after the Y-12 incident
2 \1/2\ years ago, and I think the same thing was said to us
then. So, I mean, again, that is the question.
And, I mean, is Secretary Moniz satisfied with this? Does
he think this is acceptable from your department, from the
Department of Energy?
Mr. Whitney. Sir, I won't speak on behalf of the Secretary,
but I believe, as Madelyn and I both endorse the
recommendations from the AIB report and realize things need to
be corrected, we are taking an approach that I know the
Secretary is supportive of, which is ensuring that the
recommendations, and the findings from the Accident
Investigation Board reports, we are sharing across the complex
with the EM folks.
We have worked directly--Ted has--with each site office to
give individual briefings of the AIB findings, to talk about
lessons learned, where there may be extent-of-condition issues
at that site, as well. And then, later this month, we will have
all of the field offices managers in to----
Mr. Burgess. I don't mean to be rude, but I am going to
interrupt, because they are going to cut me off here in a
moment.
Acting Secretary Poneman, last time we had this discussion,
over 2 years ago, he said: Our management principles say that
we will only succeed by continuous improvement. That was part
of the process, so it wouldn't just be mindlessly continuing to
check the box, but it would be vigorous and aggressive. I am
sorry. We missed the mark, and we need to do better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Murphy. I thank the gentleman.
I now recognize Mr. Pallone for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pallone. Thank you.
Mr. Whitney and Administrator Creedon, since 2002, DOE
policies and orders have required that each DOE M&O contractor
have a contractor assurance system.
In 2011, DOE sought to increase its reliance on these
systems for oversight purposes; is that correct?
Ms. Creedon. That's correct.
Mr. Pallone. OK.
Now, let me just read from the WIPP accident investigation
report. It says, and I quote, ``Nuclear Waste Partnership, the
contractor that packed the drum, has not fully developed an
integrated contractor assurance system that provided assurance
that workers perform compliantly, risks are identified, and
control systems are effective and efficient.''
And then, I quote, ``The Los Alamos National Security
Contractor Assurance System was not effective in identifying
weaknesses,'' end of quote.
So, again, to both of you, why were valid risk systems not
in place, and aren't they required to have them?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
One, just a correction. Nuclear Waste Partnership did not
pack the drum. They operate the WIPP facility.
Mr. Pallone. OK.
Mr. Whitney. But you're exactly right, and we agree with
the AIB findings, which stated they did not have an adequate
contractor assurance system in place.
Unfortunately----
Mr. Pallone. And they were required to have them?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pallone. OK.
So let me ask Ms. Bawden, then, given these findings, the
Accident Investigation Board made recommendations that M&O
contractors, NNSA, and the Department put in place viable
contractor assurance systems and improved field office and
headquarters oversight of them. Your recent report, however,
found that NNSA's efforts to do this across the nuclear complex
has not been adequate or complete.
So if I could ask Ms. Bawden, weren't these contractors
already supposed to have the contractor assurance systems in
place?
Ms. Bawden. Yes. They were required.
Mr. Pallone. And what gives the GAO confidence that NNSA or
EM, for that matter, can adopt the accident report
recommendations on approved oversight, given the findings of
your recent report?
Ms. Bawden. Our findings, similar to what the Accident
Investigation Board report found, were that revisions to
policies, improvements in policies are needed. And the proof is
really going to be in the implementation of those policies once
they're completed. And we will look at that as part of the
followup on the recommendations that we've made.
Mr. Pallone. But what--you know, so, again, I will ask
Administrator Creedon and Mr. Whitney.
I mean, I guess you've, you know, been kind of answering
this question already, but, you know, why should we have any
confidence that, you know, things are going to change?
Ms. Creedon. You know, that is an extraordinarily difficult
question. And it is certainly something that the Secretary is
committed to, the Administrator is committed to, I am committed
to, is trying to get this right.
It's pretty clear that the processes that were in place
when this event happened weren't right. They didn't catch the
events. The contractor assurance system didn't catch what was
going on. We didn't catch what was going on.
And so now we've done a bit of a pause, and we are now in
the process of once again trying to put in place these policies
that will figure out how to ensure that this contractor
assurance system is reliable.
One of the measures, I think, going forward is to see if we
begin to agree with them. So, even in the last year, it's
pretty clear that the contractor assurance systems at some
sites are better than other sites. And it's putting these
processes in place, which we've embarked on doing again. We
hope we get it right this time.
Mr. Pallone. All right.
Let me just ask Mr. Whitney, you know, about the cost. I
mentioned in my opening--there's only a minute left here.
How much is it going to cost to make WIPP fully operational
again? And when do we expect that to happen? And what are we
losing by shutting down WIPP for several years? How much is
that going to cost the Department?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
We anticipate the cost to resume operations--which,
initially, our target for that is by the end of March of 2016--
will be approximately $242 million.
To resume operations at the pre-incident pace will require
additional ventilation, and that will require a capital
construction project. And the rough order of magnitude of where
we are in the planning process for that project is between $77
million and $310 million.
So I can't say exactly how much it will cost to get to the
point where we were pre-incident, but it will take several
years to get to that point.
Mr. Pallone. All right. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
Now I recognize Mr. Bucshon for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bucshon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, this is another instance, I think, that maybe a lot
of good people are put in a bad spot. And I appreciate all your
testimony and what you are trying to do to improve the
situation.
From your testimony, Ms. Bawden, it appears that the
oversight framework shifts from one administration to the
other. This is not a criticism of any administration in
general. My concern is that come a new administration, whomever
that may be, that somebody may want to develop a whole new
approach to oversight.
I fully understand that political appointees carry out
policy issues of whatever administration is in place. However,
it seems to me on critical issues like this that maybe there
needs to be people in charge that span administrations, that
don't have the ability to change policy every time something
changes. That doesn't make any sense to me.
And the reason I say this, because across the Government
what happens is agencies wait you out. If the agency itself, as
a whole, doesn't like what you are trying to do, they just wait
you out until the next people come, and they sustain a problem
that just keeps happening.
You have heard from many of the members who have been on
this subcommittee for years, maybe decades, that this is a
recurring theme. It is going continue to recur. We are going to
be here probably 2 or 3 years from now, and people in your
positions, who are from the next administration, are going to
be, unfortunately, put in front of us trying to explain what an
agency has been doing, literally, for decades that you can't
change, and that is unfortunate.
So, Ms. Bawden, do you think this is wise, this is a wise
way to run something as critical as this? I mean, is this wise?
Ms. Bawden. What we looked at in the course of our review
was the policy that was in place and how it has been
implemented. With respect to part of the question that you
asked on sort of leadership and political leadership, the Mies-
Augustine panel that was commissioned by Congress to review
governance did look at that issue, but GAO has not.
Mr. Bucshon. Again, it is not a criticism of political
appointees. This is a criticism of a system that may not be
wise in certain critical areas of agencies. I get you are going
to have a secretary of energy, I get you are going to have
people appointed down the line, but certain areas, maybe, it is
just not appropriate.
I mean, Ms. Creedon, what do you think? First of all, you
are a graduate of University of Evansville, which is in my
hometown, so welcome.
What do you think?
Ms. Creedon. So I think one of the issues now is the NNSA
has been the subject of a number of investigations over the
last several years--I mean, for decades actually, but a lot of
them over the last several years--and they are all very
critical. And one of the things that we have been seeing is we
do, the Federal Government does an annual Federal Employees
Viewpoint Survey, and by and large the workforce at NNSA is
very good. The workforce at our labs are----
Mr. Bucshon. And, again, I want to make it clear, I am not
criticizing the workforce. It is the system, right?
Ms. Creedon. Exactly. They are very good. But part of the
problem is, they are not very happy and they are not very happy
with the state of affairs. So I am very hopeful this time that
they want to get out of this hole. Everybody wants to get out
of this hole.
Mr. Bucshon. And I am sure they do.
Ms. Creedon. So hopefully as we work towards it this time,
we can get something in place that will be enduring and
everybody gets out of this hole so that they are not
continually the subject of very unflattering reports.
Mr. Bucshon. Understood.
Mr. Whitney, do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Whitney. Only that I am a career employee.
Mr. Bucshon. Then you have a very good view of this, which
you probably can't say here publicly, but I understand.
Mr. Whitney. I started this assignment in May of last year.
My predecessor was also a career employee. We haven't had a
confirmed Assistant Secretary for several years. But we do have
a very dedicated, strong workforce, as you pointed out, that is
competent.
Mr. Bucshon. Yes.
Mr. Whitney. And I completely agree, it is not the
workforce. We have systemic issues that were brought out by the
AIB report that we need to fix.
Mr. Bucshon. I think that is accurate.
One of the other things that frustrates me is you can never
put your finger on who actually is responsible at the end of
the day, right? And we need to hold people more responsible,
whether that is career or political appointees.
Any time we try to ferret that out here in oversight
hearings, at the end of the day, there is no one person that we
can put our finger on, and that is very frustrating.
Quickly, the cost, $70 million in contractor fines, half a
billion dollars for the taxpayer potentially. I mean, is that a
fair way to divvy that up? I mean, if we determine who is
responsible, it seems to me if it is the agency responsible,
then fine. If it is the contractor responsibility, then they
should pay the whole thing. You can submit that answer for the
record.
[The information follows:]
Fines are levied against the contractor in different ways, but
the most common approach is through a mutual agreement of the
parties. A bilateral agreement addressing the terms and
conditions associated with the fine/penalty is normally
incorporated into the contract via modification. The bilateral
agreement will outline the methodology for reaching the amount
of the fine. Payment of the fine is normally a reduction to the
available fee pool included in the existing contract. For
example, because of the impact of the Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (WIPP) incident National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) withheld $57.2M of fee in FY14, which included the
entire award, at-risk fee, and fixed fee available to the
contractor for work performed for the Department of Energy
(DOE)/NNSA. Absent existing funds on the contract, the
contractor will issue a check to the US Treasury to cover the
fine.
DOE and NNSA Management and Operating contracts are cost
reimbursement, level of effort contracts. This means that
although the contractor may lose the fee for unsatisfactory
performance, generally, unless determined unallowable under the
standards identified in the FAR, the costs for cleanup and
repair are covered as they would be under any other cost
reimbursement contract.
Mr. Bucshon. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy. The gentleman yields back now.
Now we recognize Mrs. Brooks for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you.
Continuing a bit on that line of questioning, I am a former
U.S. Attorney, and so I have led a Federal office where career
prosecutors and career other staff, obviously, are there day in
and day out through administrations, and different priorities
come from different administrations and different leadership
styles and so forth.
But I think that because those of you who are the career,
Mr. Whitney and Mr. Wyka, both career people, this is a bit of
an opportunity for you to--and because I think other people of
this panel--I am new to this committee, so I have not been here
time and time again asking these questions like our chair and
our ranking member have been. And I think this is a great
opportunity for you to share with us what you would like to see
happen in the best-case scenario, what are the improvements
that you believe need to be made.
For instance, looking at GAO's report and seeing what their
recommendations have been and seeing that we just cannot seem
to get this right, site after site and different sites, and I
appreciate, Ms. Creedon, that you are spending days at each
site now each quarter, but, yet, when you leave someday, how
will that be institutionalized? And so while you might be
really moving it in the right direction, how will we get to it
being so systematic and so institutionalized that the oversight
of this most critical infrastructure in our country is not left
to random changes in how the oversight is conducted?
And so I would really like to hear from the career folks
what you would like to see improved and what policies you would
like to see in place with respect to the contractor oversight
or whether or not there should be more direct oversight. And so
I would like to get your thoughts in my now 2 \1/2\ minutes
left from both of you what your--and not that I don't
appreciate what the others have to say, but this is an
opportunity for career folks to tell us what needs to be fixed
and how do we make sure these things don't happen again. What
is it?
Mr. Whitney, start with you, and then Mr. Wyka.
Mr. Whitney. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
I think, most importantly, for the EM program, we cannot
treat this as an opportunity only to fix WIPP and the incident
there. We have to use this as an opportunity to fix our
oversight across the EM complex.
Mrs. Brooks. Agreed.
Mr. Whitney. We very much are focusing in that area and
making sure that not only are we sharing lessons learned,
engaging directly with all our site managers, all our Senior
Executive Service folks in the field to go over the lessons
learned, and thankfully Mr. Wyka has agreed to work with us on
that and to really engage and look at lessons learned, but also
the oversight function.
The contractor assurance system is one component of our
overall oversight function. It is an important component. It is
a contractor's component. But we have to make sure that as we
move forward and we build a more robust oversight element at
headquarters, that we are doing that in the field too and not
just at WIPP, but at each of our field sites.
Mrs. Brooks. Mr. Wyka.
Thank you.
Mr. Wyka. Thank you for the question.
I think probably a key is to make sure that we have
acceptance at all levels, not only at the senior level, but the
mid-levels, as well as the worker level, that we have problems
to fix, and to use this as an opportunity, as Mark mentioned,
to almost look at ourselves in the rearview mirror and look at
the analysis conclusions, the judgment of needs, the program
processes, oversight breakdowns at all levels, look at our
respective programs, no matter what they are, to sort of see if
we are seeing those same type of precursor-type activities.
Mrs. Brooks. And how does that occur now when you need to
do those evaluations at your sites? Is it just with the top
level? Or how do those process improvements, self-examination
exercises take place now?
Mr. Wyka. I think one way is to look at the way we look at
our CAS systems. Rather than to look at them in terms of an
affirmation or are they in place, the way we did it with the
Accident Investigation Board--we didn't do a CAS assessment, we
looked at the event--is to look at them in terms of the
functional areas--Radcon, work controls, nuclear safety--and to
look at the elements with respect to those functional areas,
are they actually working effectively.
Mrs. Brooks. But then how is that shared with every single
person in the facility?
Mr. Wyka. There is a lessons-learned program, and through
what we are doing now and through debriefings and bringing our
field managers together and having them required to read the
documents and then we will discuss what are our corporate next-
step options as an enterprise.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you. My time is up.
I yield back.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Now I recognize Mr. Collins for 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am new to this committee and shocked, I guess would be a
good word, from what I am hearing. I come from the private
sector. I am an ISO guy. I am an ISO 13485, my biotech. I run a
select agent operation. We deal with all the bioterrorism
agents. I deal with anthrax. We inactivate it. We make sure it
is inactivated. My folks wear spacesuits. We have double
airlocks. We don't make mistakes.
Why don't we make mistakes? Because we have people in
charge who know what they are doing. Clearly, that can't be
said for your agency.
Now, let me just state a fact: You can't defend the
indefensible. But would any of you like to try, or should we
move on?
So the next question is, who was fired over this, and how
many people?
Ms. Creedon. The NNSA held responsible the contractors, the
contractor operator.
Mr. Collins. Were they fired?
Ms. Creedon. So we did two things----
Mr. Collins. Did you fire them?
Ms. Creedon. We did not fire them, but what we did is we
took all their fee and we did not----
Mr. Collins. Did you sue them?
Ms. Creedon. Well, we took all of their fee, and we took
back a year of contract award that had been previously given.
Mr. Collins. Oh, my goodness. And you think that was good
enough?
Ms. Creedon. It is all of their fee.
Mr. Collins. That is not enough. The taxpayer is on the
hook for $500 million. Did we sue them?
Ms. Creedon. The laboratory director also relieved the
seven senior managers who were responsible for the work that
was done at Los Alamos.
Mr. Collins. So he, obviously, wasn't involved or
responsible because we didn't fire him? I am just saying, this
is an example. I am somewhat surprised you are trying to defend
this. You can't defend the indefensible.
In the private sector, you would probably be fired. The
contractor would be relieved. The contractor would be sued for
the $500 million. We would put him into bankruptcy, if that is
what it took, because I think what you are hearing me saying is
through his incompetence and the incompetence of the people who
didn't have the--this is procedures.
Are you familiar with lockout-tagout? Well, when
electricians, we would run the risk of them getting
electrocuted if they are working on electrical equipment. It is
fail-safe. You have keys. You have training. You can't be
working on a live box with these procedures in place.
This is fundamental. I mean, I am new to this committee. I
am just beyond any comprehension that this occurred, that
anyone involved is still working there. And it rests with the
person in charge, the Secretary, yourself and others, the
contractor. In the private sector they would have been
terminated, they would have been sued, two or three levels of
people would have been fired, a fix would have been in place,
an emergency SWAT team would have been put in.
Industry operates, my business operates in areas of
critical--I mean, we are growing bioterrorism agents. We have
people wearing spacesuits. We have to know nothing can go
wrong. I mean, nothing can go wrong. And when people say, ``Why
don't you sleep well at night some nights?,'' that is some of
the reasons.
But I hear this very nonchalant--we took away--I mean, do
you realize how ludicrous it is that the organization in charge
of this did what they did and cost the taxpayers $500 million
and they are still there? And you think that taking away a year
of their extension works? I just don't know what world you guys
live in other than the bureaucratic world the public gets so
upset by. I just would not only expect more, but I am surprised
you are still working there.
I mean, do you see where I am coming from? The taxpayers
deserve more. And is there a reason we haven't sued the company
to reclaim our $500 million? Our Government sure went after
Toyota. We are going after GM for other things like that. Why
aren't we going after this contractor?
Ms. Creedon. So on the Los Alamos operating contractor, we
did everything that we can do under our contract with them. We
took all of their fee, and we took back a previously awarded--
--
Mr. Collins. So we have a contract that doesn't state that
they are responsible for something? When you breach a
contract--and I would think this would be considered some
breach of the contract--whatever the contract says is out the
window. Taxpayers lost $500 million. You are saying we have a
contract that doesn't allow us to recover that, or we can't sue
on another basis, of gross incompetence? I would think gross
incompetence and negligence would allow you to move forward on
a suit. Maybe you lose the lawsuit, but I guess what I am
hearing, we didn't even bring it. Did we?
Ms. Creedon. No.
Mr. Collins. No.
I just find this whole thing unacceptable and would not
only ask you to do better in the future, but somebody should be
looking in mirrors and deciding, if they are not capable of
doing the job, do us a favor and resign. If someone else is in
charge and they are willing to put up with this level of
incompetence within our own organization and the contractor, I
think, again, they need to look in the mirror, and for the good
of the Nation think about whether they should go to work
tomorrow.
Anyway, my time is over. I yield back.
Mr. Murphy. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Creedon, just to clarify, who was in charge at the time
this last problem occurred? Who had your position as a
Principal Deputy Administrator of NNSA?
Ms. Creedon. At the time that this event occurred, well,
neither I nor the current Administrator were in place at that
time. And I am trying to remember. I think at the time this was
in place Tom D'Agostino was the Administrator and Neile Miller
was the Principal Deputy Administrator. And they are,
obviously, no longer in those positions.
Mr. Murphy. And, Mr. Whitney, who had your position at that
time?
Ms. Creedon. Neile Miller.
Mr. Murphy. Oh, Neile Miller.
Ms. Creedon. Sorry.
Mr. Murphy. OK.
Mr. Whitney, I just want to make sure I understand who was
in charge. Because Mr. Collins is bringing up a question. I
just want to know what was the chain of command at that time.
Ms. Creedon. I stand corrected. The previous Principal
Deputy Administrator had already left at that point in time.
And there was an Acting Administrator. Tom D'Agostino had also
left at the time of this event. So at that point we had an
Acting Administrator for NNSA, and there was no one in my
position at the time of this event.
Mr. Murphy. And, Mr. Whitney, about your position?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. We did not have a confirmed
Assistant Secretary at the time. I believe the most senior
person was a senior advisor for environmental management at the
time.
Mr. Murphy. It doesn't sound like anybody was in charge at
the time.
Mr. Green, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk about the effectiveness of DOE's
oversight across various sites of the nuclear security complex
and the reliability of related contractor assurance programs.
Is it safe to say that the WIPP accident investigations prove
that the Federal oversight and the contractor assurance systems
were ineffective at WIPP and at LANL? The Y-12 security breach
also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of oversight and
contractor assurance.
For both our DOE witnesses, what do you know about the
contractor assurance systems at the other nuclear weapons
research facilities and cleanup sites? Are there any that you
can point to that we can rightly say are effective for DOE
oversight purposes?
Ms. Creedon. At the NNSA sites we have contractor assurance
systems in place. We are looking at those again. We have been
looking at those. They are a tool, as we look at how we
evaluate our contractors. Right now we believe that some of
them are actually pretty good and others clearly need work,
like the one at Los Alamos.
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. For the environmental management
program, we did conduct a review of the contractor assurance
systems at our largest sites. This was prior to the WIPP
incident. We looked at the elements, operational elements of
the CAS system to see if they were there and to see if they
were being implemented appropriately and if the field office is
then providing that independent oversight. For those sites, we
did find that they had effective systems in place, but now we
are moving forward to reevaluate all of our sites' CAS.
Mr. Green. All of us would hope this would be an exception
of the rule. So you are evaluating that now with your other
sites to see if there has been any followup. I understand the
GAO report, that NAP-21 established a process for NNSA
headquarters to review the effectiveness of contractors'
implementation of assurance systems and field offices'
oversight approaches called affirmation. However, after the Y-
12 security breach occurred at a facility whose contractor
assurance system had been affirmed as effective, NNSA
discontinued the process of affirmation reviews. Is that true?
Ms. Creedon. That is correct.
Mr. Green. If you don't like the answer, you don't review
it?
Ms. Creedon. No. What happened was the contractor assurance
system at Y-12 had been affirmed, and then it was shortly after
that contractor assurance system had been affirmed we had the
incident at Y-12. So it was clear that there was a fault in
that affirmation process, and we discontinued that process.
Mr. Green. OK. GAO has also recommended that NNSA establish
a process of reviewing the effectiveness of field offices'
oversight approaches, including the use of contractor assurance
information. NNSA's response letter to the GAO report states
that the new corporate policy and guidance will outline an
approach for validating the effectiveness of the oversight
approaches by March of 2016.
Administrator, does this mean that just the process will be
established by March of 2016, not that the actual reviews will
be conducted?
Ms. Creedon. So that is when the implementation guidance
will be issued, and the process will actually be established
sometime earlier. So we will have it implemented and up and
running by then.
Mr. Green. OK. So how long after that will it take to
conduct and complete the actual effectiveness reviews?
Ms. Creedon. I don't know, because we haven't put those
implementation processes in place yet. But even in this interim
period, we still continue to look at our contractor assurance
systems. We work with our field office managers in other ways
to ensure that we have got adequate oversight and that these
are providing us with reliable information.
Mr. Green. So you are actually looking at a range of
facilities to make sure these effectiveness reviews are
conducted hopefully as soon as possible.
Ms. Creedon. Yes.
Mr. Green. And will that be before March 16?
Ms. Creedon. So a formal process has not yet been
reestablished. But even in advance of the reestablishment of a
formal process, we are looking at whether or not these
contractor assurance systems are providing us accurate and
timely information.
Mr. Green. And this is systematic, I guess, of all the
sites?
Ms. Creedon. On the NNSA sites, yes. And I will let Mr.
Whitney speak to his sites.
Mr. Green. OK. On EM's effectiveness.
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. We believe that it is a systemic
issue, and that is why we are revamping our oversight program
at headquarters with a strong focus on all the oversight
elements, including the contractor assurance system at all our
sites and our field offices' oversight of those contractor
assurance systems.
Mr. Green. So in your testimony, it is a systemic and not
just an exception. But you are working to fix it, I hope.
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Green. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I am out of time.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
Now we welcome and recognize Mr. Lujan for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lujan. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. And I
really appreciate, Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member
bringing us together for this important hearing pertaining to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and Los Alamos National
Laboratory EM, as well as the NNSA.
Mr. Whitney, as we work on these issues, I think it is
important to remember that in executing the mission of these
projects, as well as to Ms. Creedon, that we also work with
these local communities. And, Mr. Whitney, are you committed to
engaging and involving the surrounding local community in the
prioritization and procurement of environmental cleanup efforts
at Los Alamos National Laboratory?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. I have had an opportunity actually
to meet with the community on several occasions now. And now
that we have formally stood up the EM field office, our senior
manager there has also done that, and we are committed to
continuing that relationship.
Mr. Lujan. And as you increase Federal oversight positions
at LANL, what are you doing to ensure that the funding for
cleanup efforts does not adversely impact it?
Mr. Whitney. As we move forward with EM, the transition
from NNSA to EM, we are looking at the entire program. Of
course you know the consent order with the State for the
cleanup program was to be completed by the end of 2015, and
that is not going to happen. So we are looking at the program,
rebaselining the program, and also we will be working very
closely with the State over the next several months, and we
will assure that we have resources requested to do the cleanup
work at the site based on that.
Mr. Lujan. And, Mr. Whitney, as conversations are had with
various States around the country based on what we saw with the
incident here, are we going to also take into consideration
that the time lines that we are working with are going to
ensure that the safest protocol associated with completing
these projects is included?
Mr. Whitney. Yes, sir. Safety is our overriding priority,
and that is, as the Secretary has said, that is an integral
part of accomplishing our mission. That comes first, and then
the mission will follow.
Mr. Lujan. I appreciate that very much.
And, Ms. Creedon, what is your agency's intent for CAS? Do
you believe that CAS is still the right tool for the objective
that we are talking about today?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir. Contractor assurance systems are an
important element. They should provide the contractor, our M&O
partners, with an opportunity to be able to have their own
internal strong assessment program, which is an absolutely
essential element of effective management. And it, hopefully,
if it is effective, will provide the same information to us.
Mr. Lujan. So in order to work with the contractors and
with the leadership at the various laboratories in NNSA's case,
does NNSA have a responsibility to make sure that proper
policies and guidance are given for the implementation of the
CAS systems?
Ms. Creedon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lujan. And what is your response to GAO where one of
the GAO reports includes that NNSA did not fully establish
policies or guidance for using CAS information for oversight
leading to inconsistency in oversight and GAO also stated that
NNSA did not adequately monitor the effectiveness of the CAS
process?
Ms. Creedon. So we agree with GAO. As we have discussed,
the NAP-21 affirmation process was halted after the events at
Y-12. And now that the Administrator, the new Administrator,
Frank Klotz and I are both in place, we are taking a look at
this again and trying to get all of us back on the right track.
Mr. Lujan. Very good. I would just note as well that in a
separate GAO report, April 15, 2015, ``Observations on
Management Challenges and Steps Taken to Address Them,'' the
report also, quote: ``As noted in GAO's 2015 high risk report,
NNSA has a long history of identifying corrective actions and
declaring them successfully resolved, only to follow with the
identification of additional actions. As GAO has reported, this
suggests that NNSA does not have a full understanding of the
root causes of its contract and project management
challenges.''
So I think it is critically important, as we look over the
series of these, that we have to get this right. Above all, we
also not only have national security responsibilities to all
the workers, to all the communities that are in this space, to
ensure their safety, as Mr. Whitney has as well, and we have to
get this right.
And with that being said, Mr. Chairman, I know that several
of our members today have spoken about or asked questions about
governance structure as well, and I know my office is reaching
out to the majority staff and minority staff so we can have
those conversations based on the Mies-Augustine report, the
Academy of Sciences, various amendments that have come through
the House and Senate in this structure. And I think that there
is an important responsibility that we have in the committee,
but also for those that are interested, I would certainly
appreciate getting a chance to work with them.
And then also, as we noted, Mr. Chairman, as my time
elapses, or has elapsed, with making sure that we are able to
work with our Senate counterparts that through the process of
making sure that we have the right people in the right jobs at
the right time. As we saw, there was a lapse here with a lot of
acting administrators and acting directors, acting secretaries
in this space as well.
I don't think that is an excuse, though, Mr. Chairman, but
every layer of oversight that we can work on to make more
effective, I would certainly appreciate being able to work with
anyone, and especially yourself and the ranking member on that.
Thank you again for allowing me the time to speak today,
sir.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you. And I want to offer my gratitude not
only for your offer, but your continued help for this
subcommittee. We recognize your concern about your district
there, as is the other members from the other districts which
this covers.
And along those lines, Ms. DeGette, I would like to get on
the record a request that we discussed as a sidebar, that this
subcommittee continues to follow up. And we would ask the
support of the Department of Energy not just in the hearing
mode, but really we want to continue oversight and briefings
with you and get some updates. We know your invoking a lot of
changes, but we recognize these problems have gone on too long,
too far.
We appreciate your candor. I will tell you, nothing goes
better than having a committee hearing where people come in
here and say, ``We have got a problem.'' That is helpful. And
we recognize your motivation in trying to fix this. We want to
continue to work with you, so we would like to have further
briefings in the future.
Ms. DeGette. If I may, I also want to add our thanks to
GAO, which has really been bulldogging this for many, many
years now.
Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
We do appreciate it. Let everybody know at GAO that we find
your reports very valuable and pretty straightforward. So thank
you.
Ms. Bawden. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy. Along those lines, too, I also ask unanimous
consent that the contents of the document binder be introduced
into the record and to authorize staff to make any appropriate
redactions. And without objection, the documents will be
entered into the record with any redaction the staff determines
are appropriate. \1\
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\1\ The information has been retained in committee files and also
is available at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/
ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103595.
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Mr. Murphy. In conclusion, I want to thank all the
witnesses. Thank you so much for your participation in today's
hearing. It has been very helpful.
And I remind members, they have 10 business days to submit
questions for the record. And I ask all that the witnesses all
agree to respond promptly to the questions.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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