    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                             [H.A.S.C. No. 114-65]

                          FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE U.S.

                            NUCLEAR DETERRENT--VIEWS

                               FROM PROJECT ATOM

                                   __________

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  HEARING HELD

                                NOVEMBER 3, 2015

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

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                        SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                         MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

    TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Vice Chair   LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
    MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               RICK LARSEN, Washington
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARK TAKAI, Hawaii
    J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
    ROB BISHOP, Utah                     PETE AGUILAR, California
    MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
    JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana
                     Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
                             Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                               Mike Gancio, Clerk

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                  STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

    Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
      Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                                   WITNESSES

    Blechman, Dr. Barry, Co-Founder, Stimson Center..................     8
    Colby, Elbridge, Robert M. Gates Senior Fellow, Center for a New
      American Security..............................................     6
    Mount, Dr. Adam, Independent Consultant..........................     9
    Murdock, Dr. Clark A., Senior Advisor, International Security
      Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies........     3
    Payne, Dr. Keith, Professor and Department Head, Graduate
      Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State
      University.....................................................     4

                                    APPENDIX

    Prepared Statements:

        Blechman, Dr. Barry..........................................    75
        Colby, Elbridge..............................................    61
        Cooper, Hon. Jim.............................................    39
        Mount, Dr. Adam..............................................    91
        Murdock, Dr. Clark A.........................................    40
        Payne, Dr. Keith.............................................    50
        Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    37

    Documents Submitted for the Record:

        Excerpts from ``Project Atom: A Competitive Strategies
          Approach to Defining U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Posture for
          2025-2050''................................................   103

    Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

        Mr. Aguilar..................................................   135

    Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

        Mr. Cooper...................................................   155
        Mr. Garamendi................................................   159
        Mr. Rogers...................................................   139

     FUTURE OPTIONS FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT--VIEWS FROM PROJECT ATOM

                                  ----------

                      House of Representatives,
                           Committee on Armed Services,
                              Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                             Washington, DC, Tuesday, November 3, 2015.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:29 p.m., in
    room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
          ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

        Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This subcommittee will come to
    order.
        Welcome to our hearing on ``Future Options for the U.S.
    Nuclear Deterrent: Views from Project Atom.''
        For those who haven't read it yet, Project Atom is a unique
    and very timely study on the future of the U.S. nuclear
    deterrence. It is unique because it brings together
    perspectives from across the policy and political spectrum to
    examine this most important of national security issues.
        Four different think tanks participated and had what
    appears to be a spirited debate of the critical issues. And
    Project Atom is timely because it is so sorely needed. As some
    of the materials for the study say, it helps fill, quote--``the
    current deficit in the national security attention paid to the
    continued relevance and importance of the U.S. nuclear strategy
    and force posture,'' close quote.
        This committee has been striving to correct this deficit as
    well. And we welcome Project Atom and its contributing authors
    in support of that cause.
        Chairman Thornberry's nuclear deterrence week of hearings
    and classified briefings this summer was a step along that same
    path. This subcommittee will continue to work to inform
    Congress and the public on the requirements for a robust and
    credible nuclear deterrence long into the future.
        My hope is that Congress and the executive branch,
    particularly in the next administration, will take a hard look
    at Project Atom and what it is trying to tell us, because the
    bottom line is that the world is not standing still. We are not
    returning to the Cold War, but we are also not returning to the
    1990s when so many people believed international peace and love
    would reign indefinitely.
        We need a clear-eyed view of the world's other nuclear
    states and would-be nuclear states and what we must do to
    ensure nuclear deterrence holds and nonproliferation prevails.
        In the short term, we need to focus on building a nuclear
    strategy, posture, and enterprise that is flexible and
    responsive. Our witnesses have lots of suggestions on that
    front and this committee has advanced legislation toward that
    goal.
        In the long term, I believe we need to rethink the logic
    behind a policy that keeps the United States indefinitely
    maintaining a nuclear capability we had in the 1990s.
        As other nations, Russia, China, North Korea, Pakistan,
    continue to research and deploy new nuclear capabilities over
    the coming decades, the logical question that we must ask is,
    will the nuclear deterrence capabilities the United States had
    in the 1990s be credible in 2040?
        Unless you believe global zero is going to happen any day
    now, and if you do then I have a bridge to sell you, we are
    going to have to reexamine that policy. A choice will be made
    on this front, not right now, but sometime in the coming years.
    In the meantime, we can discuss all of this with our panel of
    witnesses.
        Thank you all for being here today and contributing to the
    study. We know it takes a lot of time to prepare for these
    hearings and we really appreciate your commitment.
        The witnesses are Dr. Clark Murdock, senior adviser, Center
    for Strategic and International Studies; Dr. Keith Payne,
    professor and department head, Missouri State University; Mr.
    Elbridge Colby, Robert M. Gates senior fellow, Center for a New
    American Security; Dr. Barry Blechman, co-founder of the
    Stimson Center; and Dr. Adam Mount, independent consultant.
        With that, I will turn to my friend and colleague, the
    ranking member from Tennessee, for any statement he may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
    Appendix on page 37.]
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
    this important hearing. And I look forward to the testimony of
    the witnesses and ask that my statement be inserted for the
    record.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
    Appendix on page 39.]
        Mr. Rogers. We will now ask each of our witnesses to make
    an opening statement, summarizing their prepared testimony, and
    ask to keep that to 4 or 5 minutes.
        Your written testimony will be, without objection, entered
    into the record. Also without objection, I want to enter into
    the record the full Project Atom report.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         Excerpts from the Project Atom report can be found in the
    Appendix beginning on page 103. The full Project Atom report is
    available at http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20151103/104109/
    HHRG-114-AS29-20151103-SD001.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
        We have provided a copy of that report to each of the
    members and have a few available for others as well.
        Now, let us hear from the witnesses in this order. First,
    Dr. Murdock, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF DR. CLARK A. MURDOCK, SENIOR ADVISOR,
       INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
                         INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

        Dr. Murdock. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
    very much, Ranking Member Cooper. It is a great opportunity to
    come here and talk about the Project Atom study.
        It was designed as a sort of blue-sky look into the future
    without constraints, policy constraints or strategy
    constraints, as to what kind of nuclear needs, what kind of
    strategy the United States should follow in the 2025 to 2050
    timeframe.
        So as I said before, this was unconstrained either by
    current strategy, by which I mean reducing the role of nuclear
    weapons, as an example, or by current policy, which is no new
    nuclear capabilities, no new nuclear weapons.
        So we are out into the 2025 and beyond timeframe. The
    approach we took was a competitive strategies approach. This
    was funded by Smith Richardson [Foundation] in part because we
    took the competitive strategies approach to it. So I went out
    and recruited three independent think tank teams to participate
    in this.
        The first was headed by Keith Payne from the National
    Institute for Public Policy, Bridge Colby from the Center for a
    New American Security, and Barry Blechman from the Stimson
    Center. And each of them formed a small, analytic team that
    operated throughout and attended the working group, members,
    and then presented their views, defended their views.
        And then once that process was complete, then I stepped
    back and wrote what I thought was the right approach to take
    towards a nuclear strategy and its postured needs. And then I
    defended that in another working group meeting consisting of
    outside experts and the members of the various independent
    study think tank teams.
        So the approach was one of develop a common analytic
    framework, think through what are the requirements of that
    security environment, what kind of adversary strategies would
    be followed, what kind of technological possibilities would be
    open in the nuclear realm in the 2025 to 2050 timeframe, and
    then each of us took a separate look at what should be our
    strategy.
        My dynamic that I thought was most important were the
    dynamics that flowed essentially from U.S. conventional
    superiority. That is, in a world in which nations are seeking
    to deal and cope with a conventionally superior adversary,
    namely the United States in this case, would increase their
    reliance upon nuclear weapons as a way to deter us.
        And essentially, our conventional superiority, in a sense,
    lowers the nuclear threshold because it increases the
    incentives for other nations to resort to nuclear weapons as a
    way of trying to prevent our intervening in, say, regional
    adventurism that they might be following.
        So my belief is, is that in order to counter other nations'
    potential interest in using nuclear weapons early in a conflict
    is that we need to develop a set of robust, discriminate
    nuclear options in order to be able to respond both
    proportionally and in kind to any possible use of a nuclear
    weapon against the United States and its allies.
        I am concerned about the fact that we have a force
    structure largely and a posture largely determined by Cold War
    needs. The warheads are larger, many of them are less
    discriminate, many of them carry high collateral damage. And if
    confronted with the situation where an adversary used a
    special-effects, low-collateral weapon, nuclear weapon, against
    the United States or one of its allies, that we may be self-
    deterred from responding because we do not have a discriminate
    or a proportional or an in-kind response that is suitable to
    that use of a nuclear weapon.
        So one stress is on what kind of nuclear response options
    we have. We need to be able to deny the attractiveness of
    nuclear escalation to our potential adversaries. So we need a
    new set of capabilities in that area.
        Another area that I think is particularly important is to
    look at the requirements for extended deterrence. During the
    Cold War, the United States coupled its security to the
    security of our allies, both in the European theater and the
    Pacific theater.
        We tend to forget that during the height of the Cold War
    the United States had forward deployed 7,000 nuclear weapons in
    Europe during that time, so that when the Soviets looked at
    what would happen if they engaged in major conventional
    aggression, because we perceived, correctly so, that our
    conventional forces were inferior to the Warsaw Pact forces,
    they knew that a conflict would go nuclear because there were
    7,000 nuclear weapons there.
        We also had a thousand nuclear weapons deployed on the
    Korean Peninsula because we wanted to protect the security of
    South Korea, and they wanted those nuclear weapons there
    because they knew that the presence of nuclear weapons on their
    territory would be credible in terms of potential adversaries.
        So I think another aspect of our force structure as we move
    forward, our nuclear force structure as we move forward, is the
    need to have rapidly deployable and rapidly deployed nuclear
    weapons that can be either deployed forward during peacetime or
    can be rapidly moved forward during a moment of crisis in order
    to provide the nuclear umbrella that we are talking about.
        So with those two comments, I will let the other think
    tanks speak for themselves and pass the floor to Dr. Payne.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Murdock can be found in the
    Appendix on page 40.]
        Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT HEAD,
    GRADUATE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI
                            STATE UNIVERSITY

        Dr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
    Cooper. It is an honor to be here.
        The assessment by my colleague Tom Scheber and myself is
    based on----
        Mr. Rogers. You need to turn your microphone on.
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir.
        The assessment by my colleague Tom Scheber and myself is
    based on the proposition that the size and character of the
    U.S. nuclear force posture needs to be driven first and
    foremost by a realistic appraisal of international conditions
    and threats. That is a key presumption because today's
    international threat environment is extremely dynamic and
    challenging.
        The comforting assumption of a relatively benign new world
    order and a perpetual peace dividend has been overtaken by the
    reality of multiple, highly threatening developments, including
    new nuclear threats. And as Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
    recently noted, there is no apparent end in sight for these
    developments.
        Given this threatening and indeed surprising security
    environment, the United States must prepare its forces to deter
    foes and assure allies through many possible negative shifts in
    international relations, including the erosion of U.S.
    conventional superiority, at least in some key areas.
        We need to plan our deterrence and assurance strategies and
    capabilities according to these realities, not past unrealistic
    hopes and expectations.
        In this context, the proposition that the goal of nuclear
    disarmament should be the overarching driver of U.S. nuclear
    policies, I believe, is misguided and even dangerous. Why?
    Because nobody has offered even the vaguest credible outline of
    how to make nuclear disarmament a reality in an international
    system that is characterized by hostility, mistrust, and
    conflict. And no nuclear power has followed the U.S. lead in
    this regard.
        So what are the pertinent implications of these realities?
    The U.S. force posture must be sufficiently adaptable,
    flexible, and resilient to deter a variety of threats and foes
    in many possible contingencies now and in the future.
        As former STRATCOM [Strategic Command] Commander General
    Robert Kehler has observed rightly, and I quote--``Surprise is
    a problem in a constantly changing world. In my view, the
    future requires adaptive and flexible U.S. capabilities to
    respond to unanticipated threats.'' Precisely right.
        The U.S. must work to sustain or expand these force posture
    qualities: adaptability, flexibility, and resilience. That is
    the primary standard of adequacy we need to meet now and for
    the future.
        There are several steps that could be taken to increase the
    adaptability of U.S. forces, particularly including modernizing
    the U.S. nuclear triad and forward-based forces. Further deep
    reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, however, would likely
    instead undercut these very qualities that may be critical to
    being able to deter war and assure nervous allies.
        In addition, I should add that if you care about
    nonproliferation you must care about maintaining the capability
    and the credibility of the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent. The
    U.S. nuclear umbrella is the single most important
    nonproliferation tool that we have.
        In conclusion, U.S. forces must be able to adapt to an
    increasingly dangerous and unpredictable threat environment,
    not geared to past, set expectations of a benign new world
    order, enduring U.S. conventional force superiority, a never-
    ending peace dividend, or an overarching goal of nuclear
    disarmament.
        The now-apparent dangers of the post Cold War threat
    environment have come to many as a big surprise. For two
    decades, Western defense thinking in general has been geared to
    a new world order in which nuclear weapons would play an ever-
    smaller role on the path to nuclear zero.
        General Breedlove, NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty
    Organization's] Supreme Allied Commander, recently acknowledged
    that for two decades the U.S. has treated Russia as a potential
    ally. That belief has been the backdrop for decades of deep
    U.S. nuclear reductions and a general lack of attention to U.S.
    nuclear forces.
        Now, however, as General Breedlove said further, we must
    readjust. The realities of contemporary threats now argue
    strongly in favor of modernizing U.S. nuclear forces and
    emphasizing their adaptability, not further reductions and
    greater rigidity.
        That is the primary takeaway from the assessment that my
    colleague Tom Scheber and I provided. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the
    Appendix on page 50.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Payne.
        Mr. Colby, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF ELBRIDGE COLBY, ROBERT M. GATES SENIOR FELLOW,
                   CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

        Mr. Colby. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper, and
    distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for
    inviting me to testify on the future of America's nuclear
    deterrent.
        It is an honor to speak to you today on this matter of the
    greatest importance to our Nation's security.
        We are entering a period of significant and possibly
    dramatic change in both the geopolitical and the military
    technological spheres. In brief, the United States is likely to
    confront more significant challenges to its interests from
    countries like China in Asia and Russia in and around Europe.
        At the same time, U.S. conventional military advantages
    over its plausible opponents will likely narrow. This will have
    major implications for U.S. defense strategy writ large, but
    also for our nuclear deterrent. Accordingly, the United States
    needs to adapt its nuclear policy and posture.
        What in particular should change? If the United States
    continues to want to extend deterrence effectively, as I
    believe it should, U.S. nuclear weapons need to do more than
    threaten unhindered devastation. Thus, while the ultimate
    source of U.S. deterrence should, of course, remain the threat
    of overwhelming destruction, the United States should also
    prepare for and make clear that it would, as appropriate, use
    its nuclear forces in more limited fashion for more focused
    effect.
        In particular, the United States should adapt its nuclear
    forces to be able to fight a limited nuclear war more
    effectively than its plausible adversaries. Such superiority
    would give the United States important and possibly crucial
    leverage to defend its interests in both peace and war.
        The U.S. nuclear force of today is not, however, optimally
    designed for this demanding set of criteria. To optimize its
    nuclear force, the United States should do the following.
        Invest appropriately in an improved nuclear command and
    control system such that U.S. nuclear forces can perform their
    missions reliably under any plausible conditions and do so in
    sufficiently controlled and deliberate ways.
        Maintain the nuclear triad to ensure a resilient,
    redundant, and highly capable nuclear deterrent.
        In addition to fully funding the SSBN [ballistic missile
    submarine] replacement and replacing the Minuteman III, the
    United States should maintain and modernize its fleet of
    nuclear-armed bombers. This modernization effort is
    particularly important in light of the unique attack
    capabilities found in the bomber force, but also in the growing
    challenges to stealth and its ability to penetrate. This effort
    should include procuring the LRSB [Long-Range Strike Bomber] in
    sufficient numbers, maintaining the B-52H and B-2A, buying
    sufficient dual-capable F-35s for regional deterrence and
    assurance and acquiring the Long-Range Standoff [LRSO] option
    missile.
        The United States should also move in the direction of
    providing most or all of its nuclear forces with variable-yield
    warheads or weapons that can provide a variety of types of
    effects, such as electromagnetic pulse, different height of
    bursts, use at sea and so forth, so that the United States can
    more effectively tailor strikes from the full range of its
    available platforms.
        The United States should in particular focus on making the
    ballistic missile force more capable of discriminate strikes.
    The United States should accordingly render at least some
    portion of the Trident II D5 SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic
    missile] arsenal capable of lower-yield strikes, for instance
    by using primary-only warheads.
        The United States should also ensure that the LRSO is
    capable of discriminate employment by arming it with a
    variable-yield warhead.
        Given the proliferation of hardened and deeply buried
    targets, or HDBTs, earth penetration should be a special focus
    of long-term research and development and ultimately
    procurement. This is vital, I emphasize, both for deterrence
    and for stability.
        The size and composition of the nuclear force should be
    determined based on strategic considerations. Arms control
    should be pursued where and so it contributes to stability, but
    not for the sake of reductions.
        In closing, the world is changing in ways that dictate that
    U.S. nuclear policy and posture should also change. The United
    States should grasp the opportunity to make such changes while
    unfavorable trends are still nascent and susceptible to
    counteraction. I believe a modernization program along these
    lines would add to a favorable stability and ultimately to the
    kind of peace we and our allies justifiably seek.
        I look forward to any questions you might have. Thank you
    very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Colby can be found in the
    Appendix on page 61.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Colby.
        Mr. Blechman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Dr.
    Blechman, I apologize.

      STATEMENT OF DR. BARRY BLECHMAN, CO-FOUNDER, STIMSON CENTER

        Dr. Blechman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cooper, members
    of the subcommittee. This is a good opportunity.
        I have a rather different view than my colleagues in this
    project and I will briefly summarize it.
        Now, in my view, U.S. security benefits by seeking to
    minimize the importance and roles of nuclear weapons in the
    perceptions and actions of foreign leaders. For the United
    States, nuclear weapons serve only to deter nuclear attacks on
    ourselves and on our allies.
        Maintaining U.S. conventional superiority is the key to
    U.S. security, and our nuclear weapon programs harm this by
    raising the prospect of false alternatives, such as being able
    to fight controlled nuclear wars, and by their direct effects
    on budgets and on the training of U.S. military personnel.
        So in summary, I believe the U.S. should work
    diplomatically to constrain nukes as circumstances permit,
    adopt policies and doctrines and work politically to strengthen
    the nuclear taboo and adjust force posture and modernization
    programs to reduce expenditures.
        Our security depends mainly on political leadership, on
    diplomacy, and on our economic instruments of power, private
    and public. And it also depends on our conventional
    superiority, which is due to the scale and longevity of our
    investments and advanced technologies and systems on the size
    of our forces and on the quality and training of our people.
        We can't do everything with military force, but we can
    defeat any conventional threat we face currently. China and
    Russia are making advances, but I believe the U.S. should be
    able to maintain superiority if our citizens remain willing to
    allocate sufficient resources. And I would be happy to debate
    this point during the questions.
        Maintaining our technological and quantitative conventional
    edge should be our highest priority. And this will be hampered
    increasingly by the bow wave of nuclear spending that we are
    facing in the next decade.
        In my view, the primary goal of our nuclear policy should
    be the elimination of nuclear weapons from all nations. I
    recognize this is not going to be achieved until many, many
    political conflicts are resolved and may never be achieved, but
    it is certainly a goal that I think should be a vision that
    should be underneath our policies.
        Until elimination becomes feasible, if it ever does, the
    U.S. should, one, stress a firm commitment to nuclear
    retaliation for any nuclear attack, be clear that any nuclear
    attack on the U.S. or our ally will result in retaliation no
    matter how small the yield of the attack, no matter what the
    target might be or whatever the range of the launcher which was
    used to fire the weapon, but we should also make clear that
    this deterrent role is the only purpose of U.S. weapons.
        Deterrence, in my mind, depends not on nuclear
    capabilities, but on boots on the ground. If we are concerned
    about the possibility of Russian incursion in the Baltic
    states, we should and I believe we should greatly improve
    NATO's presence on the ground in those countries so that the
    Russians never come to the misperception that they can perform
    a fait accompli before NATO can respond to that. And there are
    ideas around to put the equipment, pre-deploy equipment, for
    U.S. armored brigades in those countries, and I strongly
    support those ideas as well as related things.
        So the implications of this policy for U.S. nuclear forces
    are, one, as the current generation ages out I believe we can
    reduce the number of our forces unilaterally. I think we should
    maintain a triad, but that could be reduced to perhaps 8 to 10
    submarines, to 2 Minuteman wings with only modest investments
    can be maintained viable until the 2040s.
        I believe we should put a high emphasis, high priority on
    the new bomber, primarily for its conventional role, but also
    for a nuclear role. I think we should phase out tactical
    nuclear weapons as their service lives expire, because there is
    nothing those weapons can accomplish that could not be
    accomplished by a long-range strategic bomber armed with a
    variable-yield weapon.
        And finally, I think we should divert the resources we save
    by making those reductions to our conventional capabilities,
    particularly command and control survivability, which I agree
    with Bridge on that, on continued R&D [research and
    development] on defenses, missile defenses, and deploying such
    defenses as the technologies mature, and on cyber and EW
    [electronic warfare] capabilities and on advanced conventional
    technologies.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Blechman can be found in the
    Appendix on page 75.]
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Blechman.
        Dr. Mount, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF DR. ADAM MOUNT, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT

        Dr. Mount. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Congressman Cooper,
    members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
    discuss this with you today.
        The world that we are entering is indeed a period of
    strategic competition. However, this does not mean we are in a
    new Cold War. Today's challenge is one of maintaining stability
    in regional contexts and defending the core interests of U.S.
    allies against limited, but persistent, encroachment.
        Both China and Russia are engaged in extensive programs to
    modernize their nuclear arsenals. But with a few important
    exceptions, both countries are replacing legacy systems that
    have reached the end of their service lives. Neither country
    plans to operate a submarine force capable of maintaining boats
    continually on station near our shores and neither plans to
    construct a low, observable bomber platform. For the
    foreseeable future, U.S. nuclear forces will remain markedly
    more capable.
        Recent calls to build new nuclear weapons and to deploy
    them closer to potential zones of conflict represent a dramatic
    departure from longstanding, bipartisan consensus nuclear
    policy. Since the 1980s, Presidents of both parties have worked
    to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in our military
    planning, to gradually reduce our nuclear stockpile and to
    refrain from procuring new capabilities.
        New nuclear weapons are unlikely to be effective
    instruments for deterrence or defense in this new era of hybrid
    conflict. Both Russia and China are likely to continue to
    pursue their objectives with operations that remain well below
    the threshold of war. Nuclear weapons, no matter what kind and
    no matter where they are stationed, cannot deter this kind of
    threat. They cannot help to roll back Russian occupation of
    Crimea or put a halt to Chinese land reclamation in the South
    China Sea.
        At the same time, it is far from certain that low-yield and
    special-effects nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence or
    escalation control. The United States cannot be certain that
    these weapons will deter better than the strategic arsenal or
    that they will restrain an adversary from conducting further
    nuclear strikes.
        The enormous strategic and diplomatic costs of employing a
    tactical weapon make it unlikely that they would be utilized,
    which in turn decreases their utility as instruments of
    deterrence. China and Russia are already threatened by American
    superiority. New nuclear programs would likely cause them to
    accelerate their modernization efforts, contributing to what
    former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry recently warned is a new
    round in the nuclear arms race.
        For these reasons, imbalances should be addressed through
    verifiable arms control agreements. For this reason, the United
    States should press Russia to engage in negotiations, not only
    to limit existing nuclear systems, but also the procurement
    programs that each country finds most threatening.
        Initiating new nuclear procurement programs in the United
    States would also have serious effects on the national defense
    budget. If history is any precedent, Congress is unlikely to
    obligate funds for a hundred new bombers and 12 new Ohio-
    replacement submarines on top of numerous other outlays.
        Unexpected cuts to core systems of the triad will require
    changes in strategy and operations. At the same time, nuclear
    modernization plans also place significant pressure on other
    military priorities, especially in Navy shipbuilding and the F-
    35 program.
        Congress and the White House should seek prudent cuts to
    the modernization plans in advance so that the services can
    plan for the future. Specifically, Congress should require the
    Department of Defense [DOD] to generate studies that explain
    the need for a new cruise missile, examine the effect of moving
    to a force of 8 to 10 ballistic missile submarines and to
    provide regular cost estimates of new spending on nuclear
    systems, especially the new Long-Range Strike Bomber.
        Lastly, the costs of seeking new nuclear capabilities are
    not only monetary. Reneging on the U.S. commitment not to build
    new nuclear capabilities could stress a beleaguered nuclear
    nonproliferation treaty regime to the breaking point, and
    thereby deprive the United States of important tools to prevent
    the spread of nuclear weapons.
        At the same time, new procurement efforts would encourage
    the other countries to seek these capabilities. It is far safer
    to maintain that nuclear weapons are not an effective means of
    controlling escalation.
        In conclusion, current and projected strategic conditions
    do not warrant major changes to longstanding nuclear force
    structure. It is critical to national security and the Nation's
    standing in the world that the United States maintain its
    commitment not to seek new nuclear capabilities and to continue
    gradual negotiated reductions of its nuclear arsenal.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Dr. Mount can be found in the
    Appendix on page 91.]
        Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Dr. Mount.
        And I thank all of the witnesses.
        And I would like to recognize myself now for the first
    round of questions.
        As you heard me say in my opening statement, I am worried
    that the current U.S. nuclear strategy and posture is not
    suited to the world we are finding ourselves in during the 21st
    century. It seems to be based on what you might call the
    hopeful aspirations of the mid to late 20th century.
        Dr. Murdock, you served in the Clinton administration's
    Department of Defense during those heady days. Your bio has
    pegged you as a long-range planner. So let me ask you, do you
    think the current nuclear strategy and posture keeps us secure
    for the long run? And if not, what do you suggest we change and
    what action should this committee take to get us back on the
    right track?
        Dr. Murdock. Thank you for the question. I have described
    myself as a long-range planner. It is one of the reasons why we
    put the horizon for Project Atom out to 2025 to 2050 because we
    have to think about systems that will take 10 to 15 years to
    develop, systems that will have lifetimes of 35 to 50 years. So
    you have to think in terms of a longer-range perspective.
        As I look into the deeper future, the longer-range future,
    I think that the risks of proliferation are higher. We are
    already dealing with potential near-term risks of nuclear
    proliferation in the Middle East, but there are similar
    pressures in other regions of the world. And in a more highly
    proliferated world, I think we have to develop the kind of
    capabilities that can deter the kinds of nuclear employments
    that our adversaries may make against us.
        It means, in my mind, that we have to develop discriminate,
    low-yield, variable-yield, special-effects weapons so that we
    can respond in kind and respond proportionally to any potential
    use of a nuclear weapon against the United States or its
    allies. I think that this emphasis upon being able to respond
    proportionally and in kind is critical for deterrence during
    this time.
        As I said before in my statement, I worry about the
    prospect that if we are confronted with a limited nuclear use
    against us, that because of the character of our weapons, that
    we may be self-deterred from responding in kind because we
    would have to go too high up the escalatory ladder, use too
    large a yield bomb or missile or warhead, and it is important
    that we develop the robust set of options so that a President
    can respond proportionally and in kind to any use of a nuclear
    weapon against us.
        This is not saying that we have to go out and seek
    superiority. Right now we are in a position of inferiority when
    it comes to nonstrategic nuclear forces, otherwise known as
    tactical nuclear weapons. The Russians have somewhere between
    2,000 and 4,000. I am sometimes not sure they even know how
    many they have. We have forward deployed approximately a couple
    of hundred, and very small inventories back here in the United
    States.
        So my feeling is that we do not have to address this
    quantitative superiority that the Russians have maintained in
    this class of systems, but I do believe we have to develop a
    range of options so that we can respond discriminately to any
    potential use of those tactical nuclear weapons by the
    Russians.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
        Dr. Payne, you were a primary author of George W. Bush's
    administration in his Nuclear Posture Review. How has Russia as
    an actor on the world stage, in particular in nuclear affairs,
    changed since then?
        Dr. Payne. Well, we first saw evidence of a change in
    Russian behavior and Russian doctrine in 2008 where, according
    to senior Russian officials, Russia was ready to call a nuclear
    alert with their actions and operations against Georgia in
    2008.
        We have more recently seen Russia back up its operations
    against Crimea and the occupation of Crimea with what President
    Putin himself said was a nuclear escalation threat.
        So what we have learned since those days of writing the
    2001 Nuclear Posture Review is that Russia has moved in a
    direction in some ways much harsher, particularly in terms of
    its potential use of nuclear weapons, than we anticipated at
    the time.
        We have seen the evolution of Russian doctrine, we have
    seen the evolution of Russian strategy and the evolution of
    Russian forces to where at this point I think you can honestly
    and quite fairly say that Russia has a nuclear first-use
    policy, a limited nuclear first-use policy, that is meant to
    backstop its territorial grabs in Central Europe and Southern
    Europe.
        And given that, it seems to me that we need to move in the
    direction that Clark just outlined, if only to be able to
    deter. I mean, I am not interested in being able to respond,
    per se, to a nuclear war, but we want to be able to deter the
    nuclear war in the first place. So we want to be able to deter
    the Russian Federation from believing it can get anything
    useful out of a first-nuclear-use threat. And in my opinion,
    that requires exactly the type of capabilities that Dr. Murdock
    was just describing.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        And Mr. Colby, your testimony suggests that the U.S. should
    make its nuclear forces more flexible and create the ability to
    tailor nuclear strikes in a narrower fashion than available
    today. You mentioned low-yield warheads, tailored effects like
    EMP [electromagnetic pulse], earth penetration, et cetera.
        Compared to what our current strategic arsenals provide,
    how would these types of new capabilities provide increased
    deterrence toward adversaries, and why do we need them?
        Mr. Colby. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would like to build on a
    previous comment which I generally agreed with. I think the
    basic problem here is that we are extending deterrence far and
    wide as part of our Nation's grand strategy, and that includes
    countries like the Baltic States, like the Philippines, to some
    extent maybe Taiwan, countries very close to our potential
    adversaries and adversaries that have not only increasingly
    powerful conventional militaries, but also survivable nuclear
    forces. So whatever they do to us, to some extent they could
    hit us back very seriously.
        The problem is, as Clark and Keith described, is an
    adversary may think that he can escalate, especially if he
    creates favorable conditions on the ground, for instance
    through the use of little green men in the Baltics, and then
    use his conventional forces to create a favorable situation,
    such as a fait accompli, and then threaten to escalate to
    deescalate of some kind, basically say I dare you to come at me
    and go big, even just conventionally, but you are going to have
    to go big in such a way that it is going to look really
    escalatory and really dangerous.
        And if we do that, he may decide, you know, just to take
    one scenario, he may decide to use nuclear weapons in a very
    tailored, very limited way, specifically designed not only to
    hurt us militarily, but also to scare not only us, but all our
    allies in this endeavor.
        And the problem is that if we only have big response, you
    know, as Clark put it, we are very potentially going to be
    self-deterred, but also even if we executed it, the Russians,
    for instance, would have a way of responding in a very dramatic
    and catastrophic fashion.
        So far better for us and far better for deterrence if we
    have roughly proportionate, same order of magnitude ways of
    saying don't think it is going to make sense for you to
    escalate to the nuclear level, even in this sort of clever
    escalate-to-deescalate way. We have a way of defeating that
    strategy.
        I mean, to put it kind of bluntly, an adversary is less
    likely to raise on you if he knows you have good cards. And I
    think that these kinds of capabilities are basically good
    cards.
        Mr. Rogers. Great, thank you.
        The Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
    questions he may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        First, Dr. Murdock, I appreciate your leading a very
    provocative report. It is very helpful to get this discussion
    started.
        I was wondering first off when you picked three other think
    tanks, what points of view are left out? What think tanks or
    viewpoints could have or should have been included?
        Dr. Murdock. That is an interesting question, sir. What I
    was trying to do was to get what I refer to as think tanks that
    were representative across sort of the broad middle of the
    spectrum of opinion. There are many people in this town who are
    more conservative than Keith Payne. There are many people in
    this town who are more liberal than Barry Blechman.
        But I do know that first of all the two of them can be in
    the same room and talk to each other. That is not true of
    people that are further divided on the spectrum of opinion. And
    since I am holding a lot of working group meetings, I want to
    make sure that people can come in and talk to each other.
        So what I was looking to do was to bound the range of
    opinion to what I would say was the reasonable left and the
    reasonable right, although people may disagree in that kind of
    characterization, they may even themselves disagree on that
    characterization, and then find somebody who was a bit more
    centrist.
        I probably should have done a little bit more research on
    this because Bridge, who I did want to include because he is a
    member of the next generation of thinkers that are coming up
    and I do a lot of work on that level as well, that Bridge was
    probably a bit closer to where Keith was than he was to where
    Barry was. That is true.
        And it turned out that both of them were closer to--that I
    was closer to where both of them were than I was to Barry.
        But there are clearly--we bounded the middle of the
    spectrum of opinion with Keith Payne, that I did, with Keith
    Payne and Barry Blechman, that did not go further out onto the
    margins.
        Mr. Cooper. In the report, it seems that everybody agrees
    on keeping the triad. Everybody agrees on improving command and
    control. And most of you want basically every weapon in the
    arsenal that we don't have, you know, with varying the yield
    and other criteria.
        So on the yield, on page 20 of your report, you talk about
    how the massive ordnance penetrator, the MOPs, at 30,000 pounds
    is about 20 times smaller than our smallest nuke. So presumably
    you want to fill that gap with something that would be
    proportionate and discriminate.
        Are there key points within that? Do we need a mid-way
    weapon? Do we need--what exactly are you looking at sub-
    kiloton?
        Dr. Murdock. I think it depends entirely, from my
    perspective, it depends a great deal on what we know about what
    the Russians are developing. We know that the Russians are
    doing experimentation in the very lower end of the nuclear
    yield.
        I personally believe that the deterrent impact of a nuclear
    weapon partially resides in its ability, you know, in terms of
    how much damage it can effect, the blast heat, the
    fragmentation that is associated with any weapon, but it is
    also a nuclear weapon. It has a radioactive signal. It
    indicates a willingness to break a threshold.
        Barry referred to the nuclear taboo that has essentially
    been in existence since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, so that there
    are those who believe that we can have a complete continuum
    from conventional to nuclear.
        I am happy to have a break between conventional weapons and
    nuclear weapons. Perhaps the Russians have developed a system
    that is somewhat larger than our largest conventional bomb and
    somewhat smaller than our smallest nuclear weapon. If that is
    the case and they feel that by using it under certain
    circumstances that they can go nuclear without threatening our
    spectrum of responses, that is something I want to be able to
    respond to in kind.
        So my belief is, is you design, you know--it is our
    adversaries, because of our conventional superiority, who are
    increasing their reliance upon nuclear weapons, who have been
    experimenting and developing nuclear capabilities that are more
    varied than ours. And I think that that is the principal driver
    of what kind of capabilities we need to have.
        Mr. Cooper. How do you define what is a new nuclear weapon
    as opposed to a refurb?
        Dr. Murdock. Well, it is a little bit like angels dancing
    on the head of a pin. When you are talking about a life
    extension program where you replace many, many elements, the
    conventional elements that are part of the warhead, at what
    point do you have a new weapon?
        Well, if it is still the physics package, the nuclear
    portion of it is still within the range of what existed there,
    you know, people say, well, it is not a new weapon.
        I mean, my belief is is that when we are going into an
    environment where there is an increased risk of our potential
    adversaries breaking the nuclear threshold, I want a new
    weapon. I could say, well, we can adapt this particular weapon
    we have so it comes pretty close to it.
        I want to be able to convince our adversary we have already
    thought about what you want to do, we are developing new
    weapons to counter that, we are going to ensure that those
    weapons work to our stockpile stewardship system, and we are
    going to train with them and exercise with them so that it will
    be credible and our adversaries believe that if they use a
    nuclear weapon we will use one in response.
        You don't do that by just saying it. I believe you have to
    do it by fielding the appropriate weapons, by practicing with
    them, by training with them so that our adversaries will
    understand if you go nuclear we are prepared to deal with that,
    too.
        Mr. Cooper. You used the analogy of angels dancing on the
    head of a pin. I assume you are not discounting the distinction
    between what is new and what is a refurbishment of an older
    weapon.
        Could we, using our existing stockpile, create enough sub-
    kiloton weapons or other special effects to achieve this? Or
    are we forced to create new weapons?
        Dr. Murdock. I am not familiar enough with the classified
    details of how variable our variable yields are. There are a
    number of ideas that are out there. For example, when you talk
    about a primary-only weapon where they use just the fissionable
    aspect of it and not the thermonuclear one, they have suggested
    that that is a way of varying the yield of some of the largest
    warheads that we have on ballistic missile defenses during that
    time.
        My belief is, is that when deterrence, when you are talking
    about deterring adversaries who are thinking about using
    nuclear weapons to deter you, you want to think about, well,
    what are the kind of capabilities I need to deter that?
        And a new weapon indicates to the adversary that we are
    serious about this, that we are designing a weapon to counter
    his potential use of a nuclear weapon against us.
        I personally don't have an allergy against new nuclear
    weapons. So there is a reason why, as I look to the future of
    the kind of capabilities we need, I think of the prescription
    of no new weapons and no new nuclear capabilities as a self-
    defeating one.
        And so from a perspective of developing a deterrent that
    works, I don't think we should be bound by those kind of rules.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the
    next rounds of questions.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the ranking member.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
    Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
    hearing.
        And thank you all for being here and for your hard work.
        I would like to ask something to Dr. Clark Murdock, Dr.
    Keith Payne, and Mr. Elbridge Colby in particular.
        There was some talk that there was consideration of further
    unilateral cuts beyond what New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
    Treaty] called for. And I am not sure that that has died down
    or not, I hope it has. But should that kind of talk be
    resurrected, would you or any of the three of you advocate for
    further unilateral cuts on the part of the U.S. of our nuclear
    stockpile?
        Dr. Payne. I would not, sir.
        Mr. Colby. I would not, sir.
        Dr. Murdock. No.
        Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Given the open sources that have
    reported that there could be cheating by the Russians on the
    INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, does that call
    into question on the parts of you three gentlemen, again, our
    adherence to the New START Treaty? And my thought is that we
    are handicapping ourselves in some ways through New START.
        If it is reciprocated that is one thing, but if they are
    cheating in other areas, will it even be reciprocated? And
    should we continue handicapping ourselves? That is my question
    and I would like to get your perspective.
        Dr. Murdock. My belief is that each of the agreements that
    we have reached with the Russians are separate agreements and
    that we should abide by an agreement that we have reached with
    them on New START unless there is clear evidence that they are
    not abiding by that same agreement on New START.
        My belief is, is that I think there is pretty clear
    evidence that they have cheated on the INF Treaty, and I think
    that we have to think through how to respond to that in a way
    that is in the field of INF, and responds directly and
    proportionally, in some way, to the violation of that treaty.
        It is not something that we should ignore, nor that we
    should deny that it existed.
        I think we have to respond to it, but I would not respond
    to it by violating New START because, in part, that takes the
    onus off the Russians for violating arms control agreements
    that they have agreed to.
        Dr. Payne. Yes, sir, I don't recommend withdrawing from the
    New START Treaty. I agree with Clark, we ought to look at these
    things individually. I do think that there are some options
    that we can take with regard to Russian violations of the INF
    Treaty, as you described, but withdrawing from the New START
    Treaty, I don't believe is one of them we should exercise.
        But I will add that I think that it is possible that the
    Russians are not going to adhere to the New START Treaty. There
    have been a number of statements coming out of senior Russian
    officials setting, in a sense, the basis for not abiding by the
    New START Treaty limitations in 2018.
        This is what they did with the INF Treaty in earlier parts
    of 2007, for example, where recently the former Secretary of
    Defense mentioned that the Russians had talked to him and
    indicated they were interested in withdrawing from the INF
    Treaty.
        You do see Russian officials now sort of setting the same
    base for the New START Treaty. It doesn't mean they are going
    to withdraw from it. Doesn't mean that they are not going to
    abide by it. But I would at least keep in the back of my mind
    that they are now talking along those lines, and watch very
    carefully to see what they do.
        Mr. Colby. I pretty much agree with Dr. Payne, sir. I would
    say I think Russian violations of INF are extremely serious and
    require really concerted action. I am actually somewhat
    mystified why the administration is not more alarmed by this
    sense.
        You know, I see arms control as a strategic tool, as a way
    that we can or may advance our interests in the world. And so
    if a country violates that, we can go back to not having it.
    But if you are committed to a world without nuclear weapons,
    you need to make sure that the treaties are sacrosanct. And
    yet, there doesn't seem to be a lot of concern, which mystifies
    me.
        But it is very serious because of the military dimension.
    And there are, you know, when I spoke about these escalatory
    options, INF may give them potential there, so we really need
    to be putting pressure on them. I think at the very least we
    should be looking at R&D that is legal under the treaty, to see
    what our options are. Other kind of countervailing options
    should be looked at and talked about, at least in principle,
    openly.
        And ultimately, we should make sure that the Russians bear
    the costs and the diplomatic and political costs of their
    violations and misbehavior.
        At this time, I think, you know, we do benefit from New
    START in terms of predictability and some data exchange, that
    kind of thing. It is not, you know, it is not any kind of
    dramatic thing. And also it allows us to do the fundamental
    things that we need to do in terms of the modernization of our
    forces.
        But if, as Dr. Payne mentions, we do detect Russian
    noncompliance or circumvention, we should look at that very,
    very carefully. And the Russians should understand if they
    violate or circumvent treaties that we will be prepared to call
    them on that and respond.
        Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you all.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Aguilar, for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Aguilar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you for being here, gentlemen.
        This one is for the group.
        And as it was mentioned in the Wolfsthal and Lewis, the
    Trillion Dollar Triad report, Dr. Mount, you mentioned that in
    your testimony a few times, and the cost estimate of a trillion
    dollars to upgrade our nuclear triad over the next 30 years.
        Based on this mind-boggling figure, how can we, regardless
    of the strategic argument, realistically talk about developing
    and deploying lower-yield weapons when clearly now and in the
    future some of these serious investments that we need to make,
    some serious investments in our conventional capabilities, with
    finite dollars available to us, it is imperative that they be
    invested wisely.
        And I give you some credit because in your testimony you do
    talk about some of the financial implications as well. Can you
    expand on that?
        Dr. Mount. Yes, thank you for that, Congressman. I would be
    glad to. It is important to realize that there is a bound in
    these estimates, anywhere between $800 billion and $1.1
    trillion, depending on what you include and how you include
    potential figures for cost growth.
        That having been said, I think it is important to realize
    that these funds are not likely to be appropriated in their
    entirety. And it is important to sort of plan ahead and allow
    the services to plan ahead and make sure they know what is
    coming so that they are not caught unawares with abrupt changes
    to nuclear force structure that are mandated by Congress.
        I think it is important for the White House and the
    services to sort of together cultivate a plan to bring these
    modernization plans under control. And I outlined a couple of
    ways to do that.
        It is important to realize that I think there are some
    areas where the modernization plans can be pared back without
    deleteriously impacting our ability to deter our adversaries or
    to respond to a wide range of conflicts.
        So these include the new cruise missile I think we should
    take a serious look at, and also the large number of submarines
    that we are planning to build.
        Now, that is not to say that we ought to throw the plans
    out the window. We will buy a new bomber, and we should. We
    will buy new submarines, and we should. And it is important to
    prioritize and protect appropriations for those systems that
    are critical to national deterrence and deterrence operations,
    while looking for areas that bring these modernization plans
    sort of back into the fold of reality.
        Mr. Aguilar. Anyone else?
        Dr. Blechman. I would just note that I think we are already
    seeing the effects of the greater burden of nuclear
    modernization on the budget. I noticed that in the $5 billion
    reduction that was necessitated by the budget agreement, there
    were substantial cuts in Army readiness, which is not a choice
    that I would make.
        I think far more important than the full extent of the
    nuclear modernization program is to ensure that our ground
    forces and other conventional forces are as ready and as
    capable as they might be.
        Mr. Aguilar. I think the chairman would also convey that
    that reduction to readiness was a reduction of the increase to
    readiness, which a lot of other members advocated for as well.
        One additional point. Instead of--are any of you concerned
    about, you know, with the lower-yield weapon that we are
    discussing, you know, that this investment would give other
    countries more of a reason to invest in their own nuclear
    arsenals and maintaining this constant drumbeat of the arms
    race?
        And some of you allude to that in your testimony, but would
    anyone like to expand on their concerns with respect to that
    point?
        Mr. Colby and then Dr. Murdock.
        Mr. Colby. Sure. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
    I think it is an important one. I mean, you know, in my
    statement I emphasize the need for change, but I also think
    that it is very important for the United States to appear and
    to act in a way that is responsible and kind of a good steward
    of its nuclear weapons.
        But I think, Congressman, the main, you know, the main
    challenge to U.S. interests and to stability really is not so
    much from a kind of mimicking of what we do, but of a potential
    opening of vulnerability.
        And I think the world is changing, our adversary, our
    potential adversaries, I should say, have been increasing their
    military budgets abundantly, both in the conventional and
    nuclear realm.
        And I think if we don't respond, it is actually
    vulnerability creates an instability of its own. And that is
    what concerns me.
        There are other universes. There is the world of the 1990s
    in which the problem was different. So I would not always say
    that this is the right course of action.
        Dr. Payne. If I might go back to the cost question, just
    because I would like to add a point to that, and that is, the
    best study I have seen on cost has been done by CSBA [Center
    for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments], came out a few months
    ago.
        What that study said is that the budget for nuclear
    modernization and recapitalization will range from 3 to 4.9
    percent of DOD's budget, reaching a top of 4.9 percent in 2029.
    It then concluded that unless we talk about eliminating an
    entire leg of the triad, trying to find money in that budget
    is, and I quote--``the hunt for small potatoes.''
        And every study that is represented in this assessment that
    Dr. Murdock led calls for maintaining the triad, not
    eliminating the triad.
        So I would suggest that, given the priority of nuclear
    deterrence and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has said nuclear
    deterrence is DOD's first priority, that those types of cost
    structures obviously have to be managed well, but given that it
    is DOD's first priority to maintain a credible nuclear
    deterrent, it seems to me that the recapitalization is not
    going to be too expensive. It is a matter of will and it is a
    matter of priorities.
        On the action/reaction question, sir, that you asked, the
    general notion, as you put it forward and as put forward
    frequently, is, if the United States goes forward with the type
    of capabilities that Bridge talked about or Clark talked about,
    that this might encourage, say, the Russian Federation to
    respond more in that direction as well.
        Let me----
        Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired. I am going to
    have to--sorry. But I would ask you this. It is a very
    provocative question. Any of the witnesses that would be
    willing to provide us a response in writing, I would appreciate
    that for the record. That would be very helpful.
        [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
    on page 135.]
        Mr. Rogers. Let me try to keep us on schedule and go to Mr.
    Fleming, of Louisiana.
        Mr. Aguilar. Apologies, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. I am sorry?
        Mr. Aguilar. Apologies.
        Mr. Rogers. No, you asked a good question. That is why I
    appreciate it. I would like everybody to respond to it.
        Mr. Fleming is recognized.
        Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And I am glad to hear, it is very interesting to hear that
    really a debate that is going on right in front of our eyes,
    the panel, of where we go with our nuclear deterrence. And I do
    appreciate the fact that it seems there is a consensus that we
    maintain our nuclear triad, and I certainly agree with that. We
    want to make our potential adversaries the most complex problem
    possible. That is how deterrence works.
        Dr. Payne, I have a question for you. How do long-range
    bombers factor into your call for greater adaptability and
    flexibility in our future nuclear posture? And could you
    explain why we need the new Long-Range Strike Bomber that will
    eventually replace portions of our current bomber force?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, I am very much in favor of both the new
    bomber and also the new cruise missile specifically because
    they contribute to the adaptability that I think is so
    important for deterrence.
        To go back and set the stage, if we don't have a deterrent
    that can adapt to changing circumstances, we may have a
    deterrent that fails. And our most important priority is having
    a deterrent that does not fail to the extent that we can
    produce a deterrent that won't fail.
        And having a bomber and the LRSO, the new cruise missile
    that would be with that bomber, allows the United States to be
    able to adapt to many different circumstances. It allows
    different options for the President to respond or to threaten
    to respond. It is just a key part of having an adaptable force
    structure.
        Dr. Fleming. Okay, thank you.
        Mr. Colby and Dr. Murdock, can you give us a succinct and
    compelling case for why we need the Long-Range Strike Standoff
    weapon, the long-range bomber, which will replace our current
    air-launched cruise missile? Do you believe this is an
    important capability, and why or why not?
        Mr. Colby. I do, sir. And thank you for the question. I
    think at least two major factors. One is that stealth, which is
    the basis for the B-2 and low observability which will be the
    basis for the long-range penetrating bomber, are both, you
    know, it is a critical capability, but we don't know the future
    of it. We know our adversaries are making a lot of progress in
    detection and targeting of these weapons.
        And even if we can still partially operate, there may be
    constraints on what we can do. So we want to have a backup
    option, we want to be able to penetrate, especially given the
    plenitude, the panoply of targets we may be going after.
        The second and related point is a cost-imposition point. We
    want our adversary to have to prepare for a weapon with a
    totally different trajectory. And this is as true in the
    conventional realm as it is in the nuclear realm.
        So I think, given the amounts we are talking about with the
    Long-Range Standoff option, it makes abundant sense.
        And I also think, this is more of a rebuttal to some of the
    arguments that are out there, that this is not a destabilizing
    weapon. In fact, the United States traditional position was
    that cruise missiles were generally stabilizing. And we have
    been using conventional cruise missiles without incident,
    without somebody thinking it was the prelude to a nuclear
    attack, for 40 years.
        You know, obviously if we use them in certain ways that we
    would, probably wouldn't do, we would want to be really careful
    about it. It would raise those kinds of questions. But I think
    that it is a bit of a canard.
        Dr. Fleming. Yes, Mr. Colby, do you have a----
        Dr. Murdock. I think you asked the question of me. Mr.
    Colby spoke first.
        Dr. Fleming. Sorry, Dr. Murdock, yes.
        Dr. Murdock. That is all right. I fully agree----
        Dr. Fleming. I can't see your nameplate so I am not sure
    who is who up there. Thank you.
        [Laughter.]
        Dr. Murdock. I fully agree and support the statements that
    Mr. Colby made at that time. I think the particular aspect is
    that it is a hedge against the failure of stealth. The B-52 has
    been our most reliable bomber platform for decades. It
    requires, it depends upon standoff weapons to survive, both
    conventionally and in nuclear mode.
        And to me, to give up the flexibility, as Keith Payne would
    refer to, of having a standoff missile, a standoff penetrating
    missile, it is easier to penetrate with a missile than it is
    with an aircraft during that time, plus they are a lot cheaper
    when you are talking about the number of missiles you need
    versus the number of platforms you might need to penetrate
    with, that it is affordable.
        And as Keith also pointed out, the CSBA study makes it
    clear, 30-, 35-year projection of $1.1 trillion sounds like a
    lot. Well, military capability is expensive. It costs, you know
    a billion dollars a year just simply to operate a carrier and
    that is not even talking about buying it, just to operate a
    carrier. So these capabilities are very expensive.
        But the issue, as the CSBA report points out, is, what is
    the priority of this? Can we afford to spend 5 percent of the
    U.S. defense budget on anything? Of course, we can. The
    question is, is that 5 percent more important than other
    competing priorities? And I would argue, when you are talking
    about a foundational capability like our deterrent, which is
    the bedrock of national power, we can afford that.
        Dr. Fleming. And I would agree. I mean, it is not only
    saving money through dividends, but it is saving lives through
    wars not fought. So I thank you.
        And I yield back.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
    Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garamendi. Chairman Rogers, thank you so very, very
    much.
        This is an extraordinarily important policy issue. It is a
    policy that we will be dealing with, I think, in the next--this
    year and on into probably the next 5 years. But we will set in
    place, one way or another, an extraordinarily important
    process.
        We have heard from, what I would call, the advocates of a
    greater nuclear. I would like to have Dr. Blechman take about
    3\1/2\ of my 5 minutes and come back with your arguments as to
    what you have heard here.
        Dr. Blechman.
        If you can pull that microphone down in front of you. There
    you go.
        Dr. Blechman. Yes, thank you. Well, my arguments are
    several fold. One, the idea that we can fight controlled
    nuclear wars is based on theology. It has never happened, no
    one knows what would happen once a nuclear weapon is used. And
    the notion that we can only match a nuclear weapon with a like
    kind of nuclear weapon is, to me, it is not based on any
    empirical fact, it is ideas. And they have their ideas and I
    have a different idea.
        For example, if there were, say, a conventional conflict in
    Estonia, that NATO had built up its conventional forces there,
    the Russians intervened nonetheless, there was a big
    conventional war, the Russians facing conventional defeat used
    a nuclear weapon, the U.S. could respond with a nuclear weapon
    delivered by a B-1 bomber, which perhaps previously had been
    deployed to Europe, with a variable yield. And there is no
    reason to think, in my mind, that such a response would not be
    just as compelling as being able to respond with a tactical
    weapon delivered by a fighter jet.
        In fact, I would have doubts as to whether the current
    tactical fighters would be able to penetrate the Russian air
    defenses to deliver that weapon, and also that the European
    crews would be authorized by their governments to deliver those
    weapons.
        So I think we are much better off depending on our
    strategic forces. So that was a view shared by the former Air
    Force Chief of Staff General Schwartz, for example.
        Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that. I must say this is
    extraordinarily disturbing to me personally. I don't know if
    any of us have actually seen a nuclear explosion. I suppose we
    have seen films of it. It seems to me that if we really want to
    deter a tactical nuclear option that Russia might deploy we
    simply say you use it and you are history; you use a nuclear
    weapon in any form, in any circumstance, and you are history,
    we could certainly do that. We have plenty of nuclear weapons
    and delivery systems to accomplish that goal.
        So if this is about deterrence, it seems to me a flat-out
    statement of our policy, use a nuclear weapon in a tactical
    mode or any other way and you are history, period, that is
    deterrence. I think that also happens to be the French view of
    it.
        So why do we need to build all these new nuclear weapons?
    Once you start that process, it seems to me that we head down a
    road that is not particularly safe in any way, shape, or form.
        Dr. Mount, would you like to take my remaining minute and
    10 seconds and respond to the arguments on the other side of
    the table, which would be the right-hand side of the table?
        Dr. Mount. I would be glad to. I don't want to put words in
    my colleague's mouth, but as I understand it the argument for
    new nuclear capabilities is that a threat to utilize a large
    nuclear weapon in sort of a limited war scenario would be
    incredible.
        And I would dispute that, seriously. It is not clear to me
    that we would ever use a tactical nuclear weapon under any
    plausible circumstance. As Barry mentioned, delivering a
    tactical nuclear weapon through a tactical fighter has serious
    trouble. I don't know that we would authorize it. We couldn't
    be sure that it would reach its target in the right way.
        And most importantly, as you mentioned, any use of a
    nuclear weapon would have enormous diplomatic costs and it
    would give any President very serious pause. And the fact that
    we would incur such massive diplomatic and strategic costs,
    while plausibly not sort of having any outcome on the military
    situation on the ground, in turn, decreases the credibility of
    a threat to use one of these weapons.
        So I would seriously question whether they are needed in
    specific circumstances.
        Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, I will take another 30
    seconds.
        It just seems to me that we really need to have a
    continuing and a full debate on this issue because we will be
    making decisions this year and on into the future, in fact we
    are doing so today with the Long-Range Strike Bomber and the
    cruise missile that goes presumably with it.
        That is all part of this process, and it will lead us down
    a path that we need to understand what the implications of that
    path are. And the gentlemen here are certainly important in
    elucidating that path.
        I thank you for the additional 40 seconds.
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
    Franks, for 15--for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Franks. For 15 minutes, that would be perfect.
        Mr. Rogers. You would like 15, though.
        Mr. Franks. That is perfect, Mr. Chairman.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Franks. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. This is a
    discussion of profound gravity. And I find myself with the
    persuasion of the gentlemen, the first three on my left, simply
    because I believe it is important to be able to meet a
    potential enemy with whatever options may be necessary. And
    they do get a vote in the equation.
        So Dr. Blechman, your recommended strategy makes a basic
    assumption that U.S. conventional military superiority will
    continue indefinitely. And I hope you are correct.
        On the other hand, Mr. Colby's recommended strategy is
    based on an assumption that U.S. conventional superiority may
    not continue and that it is eroding fast in places like
    maritime Asia. And I think that reports and intelligence that I
    see seems to be on his side of the ledger, to say the least.
        If it turns out Mr. Colby is correct, doesn't that make
    your recommended strategy and posture somewhat invalid?
        Dr. Blechman. Yes, sir, you are correct. If the U.S. does
    not maintain conventional superiority, then we would have to
    look at alternative strategies.
        However, for my sins, I have worked on defense issues in
    Washington for 51 years now, and I have seen threats inflated
    at least three times over that period. Yes, Russia is making
    some progress, much less than China. And yes, China is making
    substantial progress.
        But if you look at Chinese technological capabilities or
    the size of their forces, it doesn't compare to what the U.S.
    already has publicly and what we are building for the future.
        Mr. Franks. Well, perhaps it is a situation at this point
    where, you know, just the leadership posture is responsible for
    some of the issues in the Ukraine and Crimea. But it seems to
    me like they are handling themselves, at least strategically,
    pretty wisely.
        And it seems to me that you are recommending cuts in the
    U.S. nuclear force would be difficult if not impossible to
    reverse in the face of a growing peer threat.
        And if you are wrong, I think we are imposing a limited
    response in U.S. nuclear capability. I think it is a dangerous
    direction to go in.
        Mr. Murdock, part of your recommended strategy of
    structuring accordingly our deterrence and extended deterrence,
    you outlined both of these SDF [strategic deterrent force] and
    EDF [extended deterrent force]. And I wanted to draw your
    attention to your table on page 20 and the last category of
    massive ordnance penetrator being carried aboard a B-2A and a
    B-52H.
        I know that this--part of the penetration capabilities is
    simply the velocity and the inertia involved. And given that
    these two platforms have wildly different airspeeds, can you
    help me understand that?
        And I am hoping to get one more question in quickly here,
    if it is possible.
        Dr. Murdock. The purpose of the chart was to show the
    relative destructive power of nuclear and conventional warheads
    largely on the nuclear side. But I included the largest
    conventional weapon in there so that the reader would recognize
    that the range is very great among nuclear weapons, but there
    is also quite a significant gap between nuclear weapons and the
    largest of conventional weapons.
        Mr. Franks. Yes, it makes----
        Dr. Murdock. In my mind, they are not substitutable.
    Politically, they are really not substitutable, but just even
    in the conventional fragmentation they are not.
        Mr. Franks. I think that is extremely reasonable and
    couldn't agree with you more.
        Dr. Colby, you mentioned, if I heard it right, that some of
    the different ways or some of the mid-range where you can
    incrementally escalate could include things of an EMP nature.
    And can you help us understand that a little bit better?
        Mr. Colby. Sure. Thanks, sir. Well, I think if we are
    talking about the adversary, EMP can be used in a very
    destructive way to basically negate or really undermine the
    U.S. ability to project power through destruction of
    electronics, space assets, and et cetera. So an EMP scenario is
    one that we do need to think very seriously about.
        Mr. Franks. Do you have any suggestions?
        Mr. Colby. Well, sir, I think in this kind of context, you
    know, proportionality, you know, I don't think we should tie
    ourselves to being precisely proportionate, but having those
    kinds of responses to be able to demonstrate to a potential
    adversary that he can't make a move and leave us in a place
    where we don't have a sensible way to respond is a
    recommendation.
        Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I think the man makes a very
    important point.
        I am sorry?
        He makes a very important point and I think it is important
    that we don't maintain the kind of grid that is so vulnerable
    that it invites that scenario. So thank you very much.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
        The Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Bridenstine,
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Every day I am in Congress I am surprised, most recently by
    Mr. Garamendi, my good friend from California, who I have high
    regard for, who I think is a great thinker, although we might
    not always agree, if very often at all. I don't know.
        But you know, his declaratory policy of if you use a
    nuclear weapon you are history, it is very Reaganesque and I am
    impressed by that. And I would--I say that very complimentary.
        What I would like to discuss are some of the things that we
    have in common. The ranking member mentioned that the command
    and control element seemed to be an issue where there is a lot
    of commonality, which is very important for us because where
    there is commonality we can start looking at budgets, at
    policy, at programs that we can put together.
        And when you look at the command and control, it seems like
    everybody is in agreement that we need resiliency, that we need
    survivability.
        You know, we have, you know, a space-based architecture for
    command and control that would be survivable and resilient.
    There is an AOA [analysis of alternatives] that has been in the
    Pentagon now for a long time. We have been trying to get that
    from the Pentagon. It has been very difficult getting it.
        But I wanted to draw on a statement from Mr. Colby. You
    recommend that the United States develop, quote--``more
    resilient space assets, more terrestrial and air-breathing
    platforms for C4ISR [command, control, communications,
    computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and
    more modular and disaggregated architecture.''
        I think I would agree with all of that assessment. Can you
    describe specific investments you would support? And do we need
    a layered architecture to back up the current system?
        Mr. Colby. Well, thank you, Congressman. You know, I think
    this is actually a really important focus. I think it is one
    that crosses the aisle because it is vital for the
    survivability issue and it is also increasingly in jeopardy
    because of not just intent on the part of our potential
    adversaries, but the nature of technological change in the
    space, counter-space, cyber domain, and so forth.
        I think disaggregating the architecture is one thing,
    making our space capabilities more survivable. But also
    potential things like air-breathing, unmanned aerial systems or
    airborne platforms that can do relay so that if your space
    assets are vulnerable, as they may inevitably be to some
    degree, to some earnest ASAT [antisatellite weapon] attack,
    then we have other options.
        Also, you know, we can look at a wide variety of different
    options. I don't have a particular set of A, B, C, D in terms
    of recommendations.
        But actually, it is funny you mentioned something I am
    thinking about right now, so it is good to hear because I will
    redouble in my efforts to think it through.
        Mr. Bridenstine. Well, thank you.
        Dr. Blechman, one of the things I am interested in that you
    recommended is that the United States develop low-cost space-
    launch capabilities to help with reconstitution. Can you
    describe how this committee might be helpful in those low-cost,
    what are the investments that might be necessary to get low-
    cost, space-launch capabilities?
        Dr. Blechman. Well, I think this is an area where our
    commercial, where our private sector can make the largest
    contribution. And we are seeing increasing competition for
    developing space-launch capabilities in the private sector. And
    this committee can encourage the Air Force and the Department
    of Defense to open competition for launching satellites.
        There has been some limitations placed on that in the past.
    And things are changing a little bit, but they can be
    encouraged to move more quickly so that these companies have
    the incentives to invest their own funds and to push their
    technologies as fast as they can.
        Mr. Bridenstine. So in my last minute, I have a provocative
    question that might make my colleague from California upset
    with me.
        Mr. Garamendi. Who will give me 15 seconds?
        Mr. Bridenstine. The Comprehensive [Nuclear] Test-Ban
    Treaty is something that Secretary Kerry has been pushing for
    the Senate to ratify historically. And I think there are very
    challenging implications if we were to go that direction.
        And I was wondering if I could hear from Mr. Colby, Dr.
    Murdock, and Dr. Payne. I have got 30 seconds remaining, so
    maybe I can take that for the record.
        But Dr. Murdock, would you be willing to take that
    question? The implications if we go forward with a
    Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, and instead of testing we rely
    on, I guess, computer models?
        Dr. Murdock. Well, the computer model that you refer to, a
    science-based stockpile stewardship program, it has actually
    greatly enhanced our understanding of how nuclear weapons
    actually function.
        And while there was a considerable amount of controversy at
    the outset of that program, there is very little controversy
    now that in the scientific community when it comes to our
    ability to certify whether nuclear weapons will work.
        There is a question in terms of my bias, my recommendation
    for developing new capabilities and new weapons with those that
    you will be departing from the experiential record of previous
    nuclear weapons and that will raise a question, again, the
    issue of, do you need to test a weapon in order to be sure that
    it works?
        Nuclear weapons have been employed twice; one of them had
    been tested before and one of them had not, and they both
    worked. Now we are in an age of considerably greater
    sophistication than the first two nuclear weapons and so I
    think as we go into the 2025 and beyond, the issue of
    developing and having confidence in the reliability of nuclear
    weapons that you develop to deal with new security challenges
    would make, in my mind, ratifying the Comprehensive Test-Ban
    Treaty now unwise.
        Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Thank you very much.
        Dr. Blechman, you suggest that we allow several hundred
    U.S. tactical nuclear weapons we have, our B61 nuclear bombs,
    to simply age out and go away, that we shouldn't modernize
    them.
        But it is openly discussed that Russia has many thousands
    of tactical and nuclear weapons, landmines and air defense
    missiles, artillery shells and many other types.
        We eliminated our other forms of tactical nuclear weapons
    in the 1990s, but Russia didn't follow suit. And now Russia is
    violating the INF Treaty with ground-launched cruise missiles.
        So isn't your proposal simply unilateral nuclear
    disarmament by the United States, something we tried in the
    1990s and have direct evidence that it didn't work?
        Dr. Blechman. Well, let me say first that I do think we
    need to respond strongly to the Russian violation of the INF
    Treaty, not by doing anything to violate the START agreement,
    but I think it is essential that they be held to account to
    treaties that they are parties do.
        On the question of eliminating the tactical weapons, I
    don't believe that the European allies are likely to authorize
    their crews to be the first ones to deliver a nuclear weapon in
    the event the Russians use a nuclear weapon in a conflict in
    Eastern Europe. I think we can get ourselves in a terrible
    political bind in such a situation.
        Now, I believe we should depend on our strategic forces,
    our long-range bomber, and I certainly support the new long-
    range bomber as a very high priority, and we can deliver the
    B61 bomb which has a variable yield with the long-range bomber
    perhaps based forward in Europe, but not necessarily, and be
    much more confident that, one, it would penetrate the Russian
    air defenses and, two, that the political decision would be
    made in that situation.
        Mr. Rogers. Great. You also suggested eliminating one-third
    of our ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and
    eliminating two SSBNs, which means we cannot sustain our
    continuous at-sea deterrence. With Russia totally uninterested
    in following such reductions, aren't those dangerous positions?
        Dr. Blechman. I don't believe so. I think that we have more
    than enough weapons to deter a Russian attack on the United
    States or on any of our allies. I think we can go down to, I
    don't know what the number is, 1,200, 1,000, weapons and still
    have more than enough destructive capability that the Russians
    would be crazy to attack us or our allies.
        I think deterrence depends lots more on demonstration of
    political will and leadership and on the conventional forces
    and the knowledge of the adversary that if they take a
    threatened action they will confront American military forces
    and allied military forces on the ground. That is what I think
    deterrence depends on.
        Mr. Rogers. All right.
        Dr. Payne, the final report of the Perry-Schlesinger
    commission on the strategic posture of the United States
    stated, quote--``Working with partners in the intelligence
    community, the laboratories should be in a position to advise
    national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons' activities
    bearing on the interests of the United States and its allies.
    In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be
    allowed to design, simulate and experimentally assess foreign
    nuclear weapons designs for the purposes of defense analysis,''
    close quote.
        Why, in your opinion, is this important?
        Dr. Payne. Sir, it is important because----
        Mr. Rogers. Your microphone.
        Dr. Payne. It is important because we need to know what
    types of capabilities other folks may be developing. And if our
    labs don't have the ability to try and replicate designs and
    look at those capabilities, we may not be very familiar with
    the type of capability that Russia is deploying or China is
    deploying. And ignorance at that level could be profoundly
    dangerous.
        So I think it is extremely important that our labs be able
    to have that capability to go look at foreign systems, see how
    they are designed, understand those foreign systems in every
    way possible so that we are smart about what our opponents have
    and not dumb.
        Mr. Rogers. Anybody else have any thoughts as to why that
    is important or not important?
        Let the record reflect, no.
        I now turn to the ranking member for any final questions he
    may have.
        Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        It is a fascinating and terrifying debate and words like
    ``discriminate'' and ``proportional'' sound so good and they
    are used in this debate to possibly have a whole new class of
    weapons that we thought we had discarded decades ago.
        And it certainly gives you an advantage over the others who
    could then be alleged to favor indiscriminate and
    disproportional responses.
        But I wonder, in a nuclear exchange, how good are we at
    knowing what in fact has happened? Like could an adversary
    think a low-yield weapon that we are so proud of because it was
    discriminate and proportional was in fact a dud? And how do you
    know? And I know there are seismic detectors and there are lots
    of ways to kind of tell. But in the panic of war, the fog of
    war, who really knows, and the world's fate could hang in the
    balance.
        So when Mr. Colby advocates switching out D5s for primary-
    only missiles or, you know, dialing these things down to
    variable yield so presumably we get in Mr. Murdock's sweet spot
    of between MOPs and, you know .3 kiloton, like, that is--I
    don't know, how do people know this?
        Dr. Payne. I think, as you said, sir, the fog of war does
    not allow us to promise what you are going to know or not know.
    The question, though, in my mind is, does that mean that you
    don't prepare to have the type of options that Clark and Bridge
    have suggested? Because if you don't prepare to have those
    types of options, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy. All you are
    going to have are the type of large nuclear options that cause
    potentially much more damage than anybody would think
    reasonable under a circumstance.
        And again, I am not talking about the employment of nuclear
    weapons, I am talking about the importance of having those
    capabilities to deter the opponent.
        You know, Churchill said, no matter how mature you are in
    your sophistication, every now and then you should take the
    enemy into account. And let me just suggest, if you take the
    enemy into account in this very discussion, what we know from a
    number of open Russian sources, I am not saying anything here
    that isn't available in the Russian press, is that the Russian
    military has said they are going in the direction, they have
    gone in the direction that both Bridge and Clark have talked
    about, because they see that as a way of getting under the
    horizon of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
        This isn't us just coming up with this stuff. The Russians
    have said that that is the kind of deterrent they want to have
    because it beats our deterrent strategy.
        And so what we are suggesting is we want the capabilities
    to fill in the blanks, not because we want to use them, but we
    want to make sure that the Russians know that use is not an
    option for them, so that deterrence works.
        That is the argument that you have heard from this left
    side of the table, from your perspective.
        Mr. Cooper. Preparation is a very seductive argument. And I
    as a Boy Scout, an Eagle Scout, am all for being prepared. But
    capability can translate into survival, it can also translate
    into temptation. You know, you build a series of perfect
    hammers, then you are going to use that hammer and every
    problem will start looking like a nail.
        And it is interesting how many times Russia has come up in
    the discussion, because in terms of population Pakistan is now
    larger and may be a less predictable nuclear power, but we like
    to demonize; Dr. Blechman pointed out three times in his
    career, we have exaggerated the capabilities of different enemy
    categories.
        It is really important we get this right.
        Mr. Colby. If I----
        Mr. Cooper. Yes.
        Mr. Colby. Could I comment, Congressman? Because I think it
    is a very important question. And honestly, I think it is a--I
    mean, look, these are horrible weapons that could kill untold
    numbers of people. I mean, they are the absolute catastrophic
    weapon and so they need to be treated with the utmost
    seriousness.
        And I certainly don't come here and recommend this lightly.
    But I think and I particularly say I don't think we should be
    thinking about escalation control or escalation dominance. We
    are thinking about an inherently risky and potentially
    catastrophic endeavor. But as Dr. Payne points out, we don't
    really have a choice.
        At a grand strategic level, we extend deterrence to
    countries around the world, over 30 countries, including ones
    where we are conventionally vulnerable to a nuclear-armed
    adversary with serious conventional forces that he can use very
    rapidly and who has evinced the willingness to use them.
        And so we have to have a way to fight wars and defend these
    countries in ways that are not suicidal. And with respect,
    Congressman, I think the problem with that strategy that your
    declaratory policy is, first of all, it is not credible, the
    guy is not going to believe it and it may even invite a
    challenge because he really won't believe that we will follow
    through on it and it will be a way to puncture our credibility.
        And I am struck by a famous example that was in Fred
    Kempe's book on ``Berlin 1961'' where there is actually a
    debate in the central committee of the communist party in
    Moscow about the percentage of probability of whether nuclear
    war would result if they pushed the ball forward in Berlin.
        And Mikoyan, the defense minister, was saying it is 10
    percent, we shouldn't do it. And Khrushchev says, no, it is
    something more like 5 percent so we can do it. So people gamble
    even under the nuclear shadow.
        And I think that if an adversary can say, hey, I can see a
    way where, yes, I am going to take risk on, but I am going to
    be willing to do it anyway, the Arabs, the Egyptians and the
    Syrians invaded Israel in 1973, which they knew was very
    dangerous potentially, but they did. And so I think what I say
    to you, Congressman Cooper, is absolutely, we need to be
    restrained, we need to be serious, we need to be sober about
    this.
        But I think that if, you know, the problem here is not that
    we are going to invent these and use them. I think the problem
    here is that we are potentially leaving open gaps that create
    vulnerabilities that can actually spur the ambition of people
    like Vladimir Putin.
        Dr. Mount. Congressman, if I might comment. I think it is
    exactly right to say that we ought to prepare for this new era
    of strategic competition. I think that it is vital to do so.
    But I think in shifting the bounds of this competition into the
    nuclear domain, you legitimize Vladimir Putin's reckless
    movement of nuclear capabilities and his sort of--and his very
    reckless risk-taking.
        I think it is vital that the United States and its allies
    prepare to counter these hybrid strategies in the domain where
    they started, so we prepare robust, layered, conventional
    responses so that we can combat these strategies with
    strategies of our own that actually have a plausible chance of
    stopping this kind of aggression on the ground where it starts.
        I think we have every interest in maintaining a resolute
    and unified response to Russian aggression at those levels and
    no interest at all in allowing Russia to shift the game to the
    strategic area where he is more capable, relatively more
    capable.
        Mr. Cooper. Well, we need to make sure we don't mistake
    nationalist bluster for serious intent, and when you are
    leading a nation that is declining in population, has a problem
    with alcoholism, you have to use extraordinary measures to try
    to be popular in a country like that.
        I am in no way defending Mr. Putin. But it is so important
    that we get this right. A copycat approach, a monkey-see,
    monkey-do approach could well be what they are most interested
    in when so often we have been on the short end of asymmetric
    warfare.
        It seems to me that the ideal response is not a
    proportional one, but a hugely worse one, but nonlethal. You
    know, it is amazing what the capabilities of the militaries are
    and the capabilities of warfighting, not just nuclear-nuclear.
        So I hope that we will be able to explore these issues. I
    appreciate Dr. Murdock leading this very interesting study and
    getting the debate going again because it has been too long
    since we have had one like this. And it is very important that
    the members of this committee and the Congress be more versed
    in these issues.
        And the final point would be, Dr. Blechman's, we have heard
    a lot of hawkish comments today. But as the National Journal
    reminds us today, we are about to pass a defense bill that uses
    pay-fors that are, quote--``almost universally regarded as
    gimmicky.'' That is a real sign of a national strength. That is
    a real sign of commitment.
        And everybody talks tough, but you have got to be able to
    pay the bills. And when we are borrowing so much of this money
    from China to do this, it has a certain ironic touch.
        So Dr. Murdock's entirely right. We can pay for this if we
    have the will to do it. It is a very small percentage of our
    defense budget. But we haven't been paying for our defense
    budget. And it goes without saying what our NATO allies have
    done to shirk their responsibilities. You know, they enjoy our
    umbrella, but they don't want to pay the bills either.
        So we have serious issues in the West of willpower and
    determination. And I hope that debates like this can not only
    focus on the technical, military aspects, but also the social
    aspects that are required to have a genuinely strong defense.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
    California for a final set of questions.
        Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And once again, thank you for this extraordinarily
    important discussion and debate which will go on for a long
    time.
        My concern here is that the advocates of advancing our
    nuclear forces basically put us down a path where we would be
    developing multiple delivery systems and multiple weapons on
    those systems, all of which would enable us to engage in a
    limited nuclear war. And I think that is exactly where this
    would go, presumably for the purposes of deterrence.
        Now, if that is where we want to go to be able to wage a
    limited nuclear war, then we will make those investments.
        On the other hand, if our goal is deterrence, that is to
    not have anybody use a nuclear weapon, either in a tactical way
    or in a strategic way, which is a kind of a, in my mind, a
    foolish dichotomy, but nonetheless if that is our goal, then is
    there another way of achieving it? And I guess I laid out
    another way of achieving it. You use a weapon, then you are
    history. I mean, that is a deterrence.
        Are we willing to do it? Which Mr. Colby suggested perhaps
    we would not be. Well, time will tell. Hopefully, we will not
    have to pass time to find out if there is going to be a moment
    of truth.
        But it just seems to me extremely dangerous to accept the
    path that we will create new delivery and new weapons for the
    purposes of engaging in a limited nuclear war, which I think
    the three of you are suggesting we should be prepared to do.
        On the other hand, there is the--what seems to have almost
    been forgotten is that we have made extraordinary progress in
    limiting nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that we have gone
    from several tens of thousands to significantly less than that,
    probably less than 10,000.
        Yes, Russia does have a lot of tactical nuclear weapons.
    But is there a possibility that they would use them in Estonia?
    Now, if NATO decides to invade Russia, that is another matter.
    Would Russia use it in that case? Well, I am sure they would.
    But then why are we invading Russia? Well, why is NATO invading
    Russia? Or maybe it is China and Russia going at this, I don't
    know.
        But it just seems to me that we need to be very, very
    thoughtful here before we accept the policy that the United
    States is going to develop a series of tactical nuclear weapons
    for the purposes of engaging in a limited nuclear war.
        All right. Is that really what we want to do? And is there
    such a thing as a limited nuclear war? I think there isn't.
        Now, it may be that the first nuclear war is limited, but
    the next one and the next one and the next one?
        There has been a policy for some years now that nuclear
    weapons are off the table for war. They are on the table for
    deterrence for sure. And I think that is good and I think they
    ought to be there. Now, what does it take for us to maintain a
    reasonable deterrence?
        So I would like to see this in two--I see it in two
    different ways. One, advocacy for the ability of the United
    States to create the ability to engage in a limited nuclear war
    presumably for deterrence of a limited nuclear war. And the
    other is the traditional deterrence that we have had for more
    than 50 years.
        I am deeply concerned that this nation would lead us and
    the world down the path that we would develop the capability to
    engage in a limited nuclear war. I don't want us to go there. I
    think it is extremely dangerous.
        So with that, I yield back and----
        Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
        And I thank the witnesses for being here, for a very
    thought-provoking hearing. It has been very worthwhile.
        I would remind you that we are going to leave the record
    open for 10 days for members who couldn't be here, to get their
    questions submitted to you. And I would ask you to respond to
    those in writing in a timely fashion if you could.
        With that, we are adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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                                A P P E N D I X

                                November 3, 2015

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                  PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                November 3, 2015

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                       DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                                November 3, 2015

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                  WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                                  THE HEARING

                                November 3, 2015

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                 RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. AGUILAR

        Dr. Payne. For decades, one of the common assumptions apparent in
    the U.S. public debate about nuclear weapons and policy has been that
    U.S. acquisition of a particular type of nuclear capability would serve
    only to inspire other states to do likewise. The typical claim based on
    this assumption is that the U.S. acquisition of a nuclear capability
    ultimately will lead nuclear-armed states to further expand their
    nuclear arsenals and inspire nuclear proliferation. In U.S. academic
    jargon, this thesis has come to be known as the ``action-reaction''
    theory of the arms race, i.e., the U.S. acts, and others react
    similarly. It suggests that the U.S. ought not to move forward with new
    capabilities because doing so will harm U.S. security by initiating an
    ``action-reaction'' cycle of nuclear weapons that would not otherwise
    take place. Corresponding is the frequent claim that if the United
    States does not acquire a nuclear capability, others will refrain from
    doing so as well. This thesis has become accepted wisdom in many
    quarters in the United States. It posits a seemingly logical and
    obvious connection between U.S. actions and others' reactions. The
    problem with this thesis, however, is that the actual facts of the
    history of the Cold War and subsequent history point in a different
    direction. The now-declassified (previously Top Secret) Cold War study,
    History of the Strategic Arms Competition: 1945-1972, Part 1, by the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office concludes as
    follows: ``No consistent pattern can be found. That is the first
    important generalization to emerge from the history. The facts will not
    support the proposition that either the Soviet Union or the United
    States developed strategic forces only in direct immediate reaction to
    each other. . . . No sweeping generalizations about action-reaction
    cycles or inexorable Soviet designs or the momentum of science and
    technology can survive detailed examination of the sequence of
    events.'' Despite this finding, the notion of an inexorable ``action-
    reaction'' U.S.-led nuclear arms race cycle has continued to dominate
    U.S. public policy debate. More recent available evidence similarly
    does not support the contention that U.S. acquisition of nuclear
    capabilities inspires nuclear proliferation. In fact, to the extent
    that there are identifiable linkages, it appears that: 1) some
    proliferant states seek WMD capabilities in response to superior U.S.
    conventional military capabilities, not U.S. nuclear capabilities; and,
    2) that maintenance of a credible U.S. nuclear ``extended deterrent''
    is a key to successful non-proliferation because it helps to assure
    some non-nuclear allies and friends of their security and thus reduces
    their incentives to seek their own independent nuclear capabilities.
    Maintaining a credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent makes a
    tremendous contribution to nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, to
    suggest that a U.S. move toward the acquisition of ``low-yield''
    weapons would inspire others to do so ignores the reported, decades-old
    Russian drive to acquire precisely such capabilities. In short, the
    United States cannot inspire Russia to move in that direction, because,
    according to available open information, Russia already has moved in
    that direction. And, in general, the Russian and Chinese nuclear
    modernization programs appear to precede by many years the Obama
    Administration's fledgling nuclear modernization efforts. At this
    point, the United States cannot credibly be charged with leading an
    arms race. In short, the ``action-reaction'' thesis does not survive
    historical analysis in general; nor does the corresponding current
    characterization of prospective U.S. nuclear programs as inspiring a
    new ``arms race.''   [See page 19.]
        Dr. Blechman. I believe that the Russians have set a strategic trap
    for us and we are blindly falling into it. The Russians' emphasis on
    nuclear weapons and nuclear war-fighting is the result of their
    conventional weakness. Despite their on-going modernization program
    (now being cut back due to their economic problems), they are well
    behind the U.S. and its allies in advanced conventional technologies--
    from ISR to precision munitions to stealthy platforms to robotics, etc
    etc. They therefore emphasize nuclear weapons, to deter conventional
    warfare, just as NATO did in the 1950s and 1960s when it was in a
    similar position vis a vis the Soviet Union. But nuclear weapons are
    terrible weapons for fighting wars, regardless of their yield. Too many
    have to be used to defeat dispersed armored formations, and their use
    complicates communications, surveillance, guidance, etc--not only by
    the enemy, but by the side that uses them, as well. Instead of
    diverting resources to nuclear forces, the U.S. and its allies should
    be exploring even more advanced conventional technologies to ensure we
    maintain our current advantages, as well as maintaining the high
    readiness of our forces. To my mind, the line between conventional and
    nuclear warfare should be kept as bright as possible. The U.S. should
    be clear it would respond to any nuclear use against its forces or its
    allies, no matter the yield of the weapons used, no matter the launch
    platform (long-range or short-range), with a devastating retaliatory
    nuclear response--not necessarily on the battlefield (which would
    mainly kill civilians in allied nations) but against military targets
    in Russia itself.   [See page 19.]

    ?

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                                November 3, 2015

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                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

        Mr. Rogers. Please explain why you believe the United States needs
    an accurate, lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ``gap'' in U.S.
    capability between our lowest-yield nuclear weapons and our largest
    conventional weapons? How might Russia or another nuclear adversary
    exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. having these
    types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon--by either side
    in a crisis--more likely or less likely? Why?
        Dr. Murdock. The principal role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter
    nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies. Deterring
    discriminate attacks at the lower end of the nuclear continuum depends
    critically on the United States having nuclear response options that
    are proportional to how an adversary might employ nuclear weapons
    against the United States and its allies. If the United States were
    only capable of disproportionate, high-collateral-damage retaliatory
    attacks, an adversary could believe that that the United States would
    be ``self-deterred'' and would not respond-in-kind to a nuclear attack.
    Having credible nuclear response options across the nuclear continuum
    raises the nuclear threshold because it reduces the likelihood that an
    adversary will resort to nuclear weapons in the first place. There is a
    capability ``gap'' between our lowest-yield nuclear weapons and our
    largest conventional weapons. While the smallest variant of the B61
    bomb is ``only'' 0.3 kt, that is still 20 times (21.5) more powerful
    than the largest-yield conventional weapon (the 30,000-pound Massive
    Ordnance Penetrator [MOP]). The B61-3/4 is slated to be replaced by the
    B61-12, which is also a variable-yield weapon with options that are not
    yet known. The ``life-extension'' program for the B61 bomb will likely
    result in a weapon that has at least two kiloton-or-smaller variations,
    but aside from greater accuracy, no additional ``special effects'' such
    as enhanced-radiation, earth-penetration, or low radiation, all of
    which appear to be in active development in Russia (and elsewhere). The
    United States is simply not preparing to counter how its potential
    adversaries are (or may be) preparing to counter its conventional
    superiority. Russia has explicitly adopted a first-use declaratory
    policy for its nuclear weapons as part of its ``escalate-to-de-
    escalate'' strategy that envisions employing a nuclear weapon to
    extricate itself from a conventional conflict that it is losing. By
    having discriminate, proportionate nuclear response options, the United
    States denies its potential adversaries the attractiveness of ``going
    nuclear'' and, in effect, makes it less likely that the nuclear
    threshold will be breached.
        Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to
    this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and
    assessments of the future strategic and threat environment, yet you all
    basically agree on the broad future contours of the best U.S. nuclear
    force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among
    experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us?
        Dr. Murdock. As several senior-level DOD officials have observed,
    U.S. nuclear weapons were our ``first offset'' as the U.S, and NATO
    coped with the conventional threat posed by the Warsaw Pact. Today,
    other nations (such as Russia) are increasing their reliance on nuclear
    weapons or seeking nuclear weapons (such as Iran) to ``offset'' or
    ``counter'' U.S. conventional superiority. For those of us in the
    policy community who take this dynamic interaction seriously, I do
    believe there is a growing consensus that the United States needs to
    develop and deploy new nuclear capabilities to ensure the credibility
    and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent in the 21st century. A
    nuclear posture designed for the Cold War threat of the 1980s is
    almost, by definition, not the right nuclear posture for 2025-2050.
    However, I would not characterize this view as representing ``a broader
    developing consensus among experts in the field.'' Nuclear issues have
    always been controversial and hotly debated in the American policy
    community, even during the height of the Cold War. There are those who
    believe, as President Obama stated in his 2013 Berlin speech, that the
    United States will never be ``truly secure'' as long as nuclear weapons
    exist. Since I believe nuclear weapons will always exist, unless
    mankind invents a more lethal and effective instrument of destruction
    that makes them obsolete, I prefer to focus on increasing the safety
    and security of Americans in the nuclear era rather than on the
    fruitless (in my opinion) pursuit of a world without nuclear weapons.
    In my judgment, which I believe is increasingly shared by those who
    believe (as I do) that the prospects of a highly proliferated world
    consisting of fifteen and more nuclear powers are increasing, the
    United States needs a nuclear strategy, policy and posture designed for
    these challenging times, not those in an increasingly distant past.
        Mr. Rogers. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible
    and prudent or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and
    perhaps even incentivize use of nuclear weapons? Why isn't what you
    propose simply too dangerous?
        How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United
    States the ability to deter an opponent's attempt to use nuclear
    capabilities in a limited fashion?
        Dr. Murdock. The danger to be deterred is the employment of a
    nuclear weapon against the United States and its allies. Much as it did
    during the 1950s when it was opposed by the conventionally-superior
    Warsaw Pact, the United States and NATO deliberately did not adopt a
    no-first-use (NFU) policy with respect to nuclear weapons and, while
    remaining ambiguous about precisely what circumstances under which it
    would resort to the employment of nuclear weapons, relied upon its
    nuclear forces to deter major conventional aggression by the Soviet-led
    Warsaw Pact. At the height of the Cold War, the United States deployed
    about 7,000 nuclear weapons (often referred to as ``tactical nuclear
    weapons'' or TNWs) in NATO-Europe, which ensured that the Soviets knew
    that any major war in Europe would ``go nuclear.'' While this had the
    effect of lowering the nuclear threshold, it was ``responsible and
    prudent'' to do so, because it deterred major aggression in Europe and
    helped keep the Cold War cold. Today, our potential adversaries are
    exploring how nuclear weapons could help them cope with the challenge
    of U.S. conventional superiority. Russia's military doctrine has
    already embraced the first-use of nuclear weapons to prevent losing a
    conventional conflict with a conventionally-superior adversary (the so-
    called ``escalate-to-de-escalate'' strategy). It would be imprudent and
    irresponsible for us not to consider how to counter this strategy.
    Developing and deploying discriminate nuclear capabilities raises the
    nuclear threshold because it reduces the attractiveness of nuclear
    escalation to our potential adversaries. The so-called ``correlation of
    forces'' has changed since the height of the Cold War, and our nuclear
    strategy, policy and posture must adapt to new strategic realities. Not
    doing so, in my view, is not only irresponsible, it raises nuclear
    risks and is potentially dangerous.
        Mr. Rogers. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on
    the need for a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The
    administration seems to largely agree with us but has been glacially
    slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe we need a
    nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to
    geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should
    we define ``responsiveness'' of our nuclear enterprise going forward?
    What metrics should we use to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive
    infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries?
        Dr. Murdock. The need for a ``responsive'' nuclear infrastructure
    has been highlighted ever since it was named as one of the ``legs'' of
    the ``New Triad'' depicted in the 2001-2 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
    Although the term ``New Triad'' did not survive the passage of time,
    recognition that a responsive infrastructure is a critical enabler of a
    safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear deterrent has survived. As
    I have advocated elsewhere (e.g., in QFRs 1-3) [preceding answers], I
    believe that the United States must develop and deploy new nuclear
    capabilities that are bettered suited for the strategic realities of
    the 21st century. This will not be possible without a healthy
    infrastructure capable of developing and producing new nuclear weapons.
    While it is the capabilities themselves, plus, of course, the will to
    use them if circumstances require it, that deter our adversaries,
    maintaining the necessary infrastructure for developing, acquiring and
    sustaining nuclear capabilities is necessary enabler. While defining
    the technical requirements of a ``responsive'' nuclear infrastructure
    is beyond my expertise, the recommendations contained in Project Atom
    are predicated on the assumption that the U.S. does, in fact, sustain
    the nuclear complex which, in turn, designs, develops and produces U.S.
    nuclear capabilities that are the foundation of nuclear deterrence.
        Mr. Rogers. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the
    force postures the teams recommended must be possible within
    ``approximately $35 billion per year in constant 2013 dollars,
    comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.'' Do you believe your
    recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent
    of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on
    nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation's ``highest priority
    defense mission''?
        Dr. Murdock. In a report issued after Project Atom was released,\1\
    Todd Harrison and Evan Braden Montgomery conclude that even with the
    ``bow wave'' spending of $12-13 billion per year during the 2020s for
    nuclear maintenance and sustainment, nuclear spending will ``at most''
    account for only 5 percent of total defense spending. At this level of
    spending, they conclude that the U.S. nuclear program is not
    ``unaffordable'' and that ``In the end, what the United States can or
    cannot afford depends on the priorities set by policymakers,'' making
    the issue a ``matter of strategy rather than cost.'' I agree completely
    with this statement. Moreover, I do not believe that the ``appropriate
    amount to be spending on nuclear deterrence'' should be linked to a
    level of spending (such as 4, 5, or 6 percent) of the defense budget,
    but should be determined by the nature of the strategic environment and
    the role and value of U.S. nuclear weapons in that strategic context. I
    believe that the ``overarching constraint'' set by the Project Atom
    study the 2025-2050 nuclear posture should be possible within
    ``approximately $35 billion per year in constant 2013 dollars,
    comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget'' is both reasonable
    and achievable.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Todd Harrison and Evan Braden Montgomery, The Cost of U.S.
    Nuclear Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave and Beyond (August 2015),
    Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rogers. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on
    the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ``Working with
    partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a
    position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons
    activities bearing on the interests of the United States and its
    allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be
    allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear
    weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.'' A. Why, in
    your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The
    Department of Energy is approximately 10 months late in submitting to
    Congress an annual report on how it will implement such a program. How
    important do you think it is that the Department promptly begin to
    implement this program?
        Dr. Murdock. While I believe that the tracking and assessment of
    foreign nuclear weapons activity is primarily the responsibility of the
    intelligence community, I think that the laboratories have an important
    role to play, both from an intelligence perspective and as part of
    defense planning. Having a clear and technically competent
    understanding of non-U.S. nuclear weapon activity is critical for
    effective policymaking, intelligence analysis and weapons development
    and procurement. While I do not follow this issue closely and do not
    consider myself a subject-matter expert (SME) in this area, I support
    the Perry-Schlesinger recommendation and believe it should be
    implemented.
        Mr. Rogers. Please explain why you believe the United States needs
    an accurate, lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ``gap'' in U.S.
    capability between our lowest-yield nuclear weapons and our largest
    conventional weapons? How might Russia or another nuclear adversary
    exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. having these
    types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon--by either side
    in a crisis--more likely or less likely? Why?
        Dr. Payne. The current condition, in my opinion, is highly
    destabilizing--in part because of a ``gap'' in U.S. capabilities as
    perceived by Moscow. This gap is illustrated by the self-described
    Russian nuclear strategy of ``escalating to de-escalate.'' This
    strategy, as described by Moscow, in fact, is a nuclear first-use
    strategy, and would be used in situations in which Russia would
    threaten to employ, or employ a limited number of low-yield nuclear
    weapons. The apparent paucity of credible, low-yield U.S. nuclear
    options with which to deter such actions is a capability gap that, I
    believe, should be corrected. In short, Russia has a nuclear first-use
    strategy and a near monopoly in the associated relatively-limited
    tactical nuclear capabilities. Moving to correct that gap would be a
    stabilizing U.S. step. Flexible U.S. nuclear options, including an
    accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could contribute to stability by
    helping to counter Russian nuclear strategy and deter Russian nuclear
    first use in a regional crisis. An accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon
    could be particularly helpful in this regard because Russian leaders
    appear now to expect that Russia would be able to employ accurate, low-
    yield tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis without triggering a large-
    scale U.S. nuclear response via central U.S. strategic systems. That
    Russian confidence appears to be based on the expectation that Russian
    employment of tactical nuclear weapons with relatively limited effects
    would not be sufficiently provocative and destructive to trigger a
    large-scale U.S. strategic nuclear response because U.S. leaders would
    be paralyzed by fear of subsequent Russian nuclear escalation. Russia
    appears to base this first-use strategy, at least in part, on the
    relative lack of available U.S. limited, tactical nuclear options. For
    deterrence purposes, whether this Russian expectation seems reasonable
    to U.S. leaders is far less relevant than is the apparent Russian
    confidence in that expectation. This situation reflects a potentially
    critical gap in U.S. deterrent capabilities as perceived by Russian
    leaders and codified in reported Russian strategy. U.S. tactical
    nuclear capabilities that are relatively limited and discriminate could
    help fill that gap and deter Russia's first-use nuclear strategy.
    Movement in this direction by the United States would not be a matter
    of thoughtlessly mimicking Russian tactical nuclear deployments; rather
    it would be a step to counter Russian nuclear strategy in terms that
    are pertinent to Russian strategy and Russian leaders. The continuation
    of the current gap in U.S. capabilities, as apparently perceived by
    Russia, will likely validate Russian confidence in its tactical nuclear
    first-use strategy. Russia has been adamant that it will not give up
    its tactical nuclear capabilities, presumably because they are
    essential to its nuclear first-use strategy. Consequently, closing this
    gap via a renewed U.S. focus on forward-based tactical systems and
    accurate, low-yield nuclear options on a U.S. missile may well be
    critical to counter this Russian strategy and for U.S. efforts to deter
    nuclear war in a future crisis with Russia.
        Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to
    this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and
    assessments of the future strategic and threat environment, yet you all
    basically agree on the broad future contours of the best U.S. nuclear
    force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among
    experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us?
        Dr. Payne. Yes, it appears that a policy consensus is developing in
    support of modernizing the U.S. nuclear triad and U.S. forward-deployed
    nuclear capabilities. An increasingly broad spectrum of expert opinion
    recognizes that this modernization is now necessary because the
    realities of the contemporary threat environment are far from the
    optimistic post-Cold War expectations of a new and benign world order.
    A relatively broad and bipartisan consensus is developing that U.S.
    military capabilities, including nuclear, must adjust to the new
    realities of the post-Cold War era, including an aggressive,
    expansionist Russian grand strategy that is backed by coercive nuclear
    threats and an aggressive, expansionist Chinese grand strategy. Given
    the extraordinary costs of completely redesigning a new U.S. nuclear
    force for the twenty-first century, the modernization of the existing
    force posture seems to be the more affordable option for which a broad
    consensus of support is forming.
        Mr. Rogers. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible
    and prudent or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and
    perhaps even incentivize use of nuclear weapons? Why isn't what you
    propose simply too dangerous?
        How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United
    States the ability to deter an opponent's attempt to use nuclear
    capabilities in a limited fashion?
        Dr. Payne. The strategy and reforms my colleagues and I propose are
    highly prudent. They would, I believe, be much more likely to raise
    ``the bar to nuclear use'' than lower it. They would likely reduce the
    incentives for tactical nuclear first use, as perceived by Russia and
    others. The reason why I believe this to be the case is presented in my
    answer to Question 7, which is repeated below.
        The current condition, in my opinion, is highly destabilizing--in
    part because of a ``gap'' in U.S. capabilities as perceived by Moscow.
    This gap is illustrated by the self-described Russian nuclear strategy
    of ``escalating to de-escalate.'' This strategy, as described by
    Moscow, in fact, is a nuclear first-use strategy, and would be used in
    situations in which Russia would threaten to employ, or employ a
    limited number of low-yield nuclear weapons. The apparent paucity of
    credible, low-yield U.S. nuclear options with which to deter such
    actions is a capability gap that, I believe, should be corrected. In
    short, Russia has a nuclear first-use strategy and a near monopoly in
    the associated relatively-limited tactical nuclear capabilities. Moving
    to correct that gap would be a stabilizing U.S. step. Flexible U.S.
    nuclear options, including an accurate, low-yield U.S. weapon could
    contribute to stability by helping to counter Russian nuclear strategy
    and deter Russian nuclear first use in a regional crisis. An accurate,
    low-yield U.S. weapon could be particularly helpful in this regard
    because Russian leaders appear now to expect that Russia would be able
    to employ accurate, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons in a crisis
    without triggering a large-scale U.S. nuclear response via central U.S.
    strategic systems. That Russian confidence appears to be based on the
    expectation that Russian employment of tactical nuclear weapons with
    relatively limited effects would not be sufficiently provocative and
    destructive to trigger a large-scale U.S. strategic nuclear response
    because U.S. leaders would be paralyzed by fear of subsequent Russian
    nuclear escalation. Russia appears to base this first-use strategy, at
    least in part, on the relative lack of available U.S. limited, tactical
    nuclear options. For deterrence purposes, whether this Russian
    expectation seems reasonable to U.S. leaders is far less relevant than
    is the apparent Russian confidence in that expectation. This situation
    reflects a potentially critical gap in U.S. deterrent capabilities as
    perceived by Russian leaders and codified in reported Russian strategy.
    U.S. tactical nuclear capabilities that are relatively limited and
    discriminate could help fill that gap and deter Russia's first-use
    nuclear strategy. Movement in this direction by the United States would
    not be a matter of thoughtlessly mimicking Russian tactical nuclear
    deployments; rather it would be a step to counter Russian nuclear
    strategy in terms that are pertinent to Russian strategy and Russian
    leaders. The continuation of the current gap in U.S. capabilities, as
    apparently perceived by Russia, will likely validate Russian confidence
    in its tactical nuclear first-use strategy. Russia has been adamant
    that it will not give up its tactical nuclear capabilities, presumably
    because they are essential to its nuclear first-use strategy.
    Consequently, closing this gap via a renewed U.S. focus on forward-
    based tactical systems and accurate, low-yield nuclear options on a
    U.S. missile may well be critical to counter this Russian strategy and
    for U.S. efforts to deter nuclear war in a future crisis with Russia.
        Mr. Rogers. Should we have a U.S. deterrence strategy based on a
    declaratory policy of ``You use a nuclear weapon against us or our
    allies, and you are history!?'' Would such a policy--and a force
    structure designed to carry it out--increase or decrease the deterrence
    provided by our nuclear capabilities? Would it lead to more security
    and stability or less?
        Dr. Payne. A U.S. nuclear threat that says to an opponent ``you are
    history'' may sound robust, but it essentially would recreate the long-
    since rejected ``Massive Retaliation'' policy of the 1950s. ``Massive
    Retaliation'' should not be revived at this point as declaratory policy
    because it would, I believe, undermine U.S. deterrence goals, decrease
    stability and increase the potential for nuclear first use by a
    determined opponent. There are two fundamental reasons why such a U.S.
    deterrence policy has, for over four decades, been rejected by every
    Democratic and Republican administration.
        First, the indiscriminate nuclear destruction of an opponent's
    population would be a gross violation of the Just War Doctrine and
    international law. This may seem to some to be a tangential matter when
    the subject is nuclear deterrence; but it rightly is taken seriously by
    leaders and military planners. Republican and Democratic
    administrations have agreed for decades that the U.S. should not
    intentionally engage in or base its planning on such indiscriminate
    nuclear targeting policies. The Obama administration's most recent
    unclassified nuclear employment policy continues this long-standing
    rejection of such deterrence strategies.
        Second, an indiscriminate ``you are history'' declaratory policy
    would likely be insufficiently credible to deter effectively in many
    plausible circumstances. The United States can make nuclear threat
    declarations for deterrence purposes. But, the critical deterrence
    point is not whether the United States makes a nuclear threat that
    sounds robust to U.S. leaders, but whether U.S. threat declarations are
    judged by opponents to be credible enough to deter, i.e., do opponents
    actually believe the threat? If not, U.S. deterrence strategies cannot
    work by design.
        To claim that U.S. nuclear deterrence goals can now be supported
    adequately by an old ``Massive Retaliation''-type nuclear threat is to
    presume that opponents will believe that the U.S. would actually employ
    it as threatened. Yet, since the 1960s every U.S. administration has
    concluded, rightly in my opinion, that such a threat is unlikely to be
    credible to opponents in many plausible circumstances in which the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent must be effective--particularly including the
    extension of nuclear deterrence for allies, i.e., the U.S. ``nuclear
    umbrella.'' The fundamental concern is that nuclear-armed opponents
    simply will not believe that the U.S. would execute such a massive
    nuclear strike unless U.S. cities had first been attacked massively
    because to do so would likely result in a massive nuclear reply against
    U.S. cities--a move no U.S. president would make. Thus, such a threat
    has been deemed incredible for many U.S. deterrence objectives.
        In short, the credibility of a ``Massive Retaliation'' deterrence
    threat may be limited to a single type of nuclear threat to the United
    States. Yet a much broader spectrum of nuclear threats must be
    deterred, such as the use of tactical nuclear weapons against U.S.
    allies. To deter the many plausible nuclear threats that are short of a
    massive nuclear attack against U.S. cities, the U.S. has long judged
    that more limited and more flexible U.S. response options would be more
    credible, and thus more deterring. This is why U.S. force posture
    ``flexibility'' has long been considered a key ingredient for U.S.
    deterrence strategies.
        Consequently, an alternative to ``Massive Retaliation,'' known as a
    policy of ``Flexible Response,'' was initiated by Secretary of Defense
    McNamara in the 1960's and codified in policy by Defense Secretary
    Schlesinger in 1974. It has had bipartisan support and rightly remains
    a fundamental element of reported U.S. policy. The basic point of
    Flexible Response is that the United States must have more diverse
    threat options than simply telling an opponent that ``you are history''
    because such a threat may, in many important cases, lack the
    credibility necessary for effective deterrence. The goal of having
    diverse options below a ``Massive Retaliation'' threshold is to
    strengthen the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and reduce the
    prospects for war. This approach seems particularly critical in the
    context of Russian nuclear strategy which emphasizes limited nuclear
    threats against U.S. allies and the employment of nuclear weapons in
    regional war, as discussed in my answers to Questions 7 and 9.
        Mr. Rogers. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on
    the need for a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The
    administration seems to largely agree with us but has been glacially
    slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe we need a
    nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to
    geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should
    we define ``responsiveness'' of our nuclear enterprise going forward?
    What metrics should we use to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive
    infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries?
        Dr. Payne. A responsive infrastructure, if achieved, could make a
    critical contribution to U.S. deterrence goals. It is particularly
    important in the contemporary highly-dynamic threat environment. A
    responsive infrastructure would help the United States to adjust its
    force posture in a timely way to challenging political or technical
    developments. Such developments could, for example, include the rapid
    appearance of an unforeseen political or technical threat that would
    demand a corresponding adjustment in U.S. deterrence capabilities. The
    lack of a responsive infrastructure leaves the U.S. little able to
    respond in a timely way to such potential developments and, as a
    result, may contribute to the apparent attractiveness of an opponent's
    ``breakout'' strategy. Such a strategy could appear particularly
    attractive to an opponent in certain situations, such as if a
    reliability problem in one or more legs of the U.S. triad occurs and
    cannot be corrected promptly. Deterrence is destabilized to the extent
    that an opponent sees a breakout strategy as a potentially viable
    option.
        The standard of useful responsiveness is not fixed; it is
    determined by several factors--the most important of which is the
    character of the threat environment, political and technical. In the
    past, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has had
    metrics for its responsiveness to be able to address unexpected
    problems. For example, in the early 2000s, NNSA reportedly set the goal
    of being able to design and develop a new type of nuclear warhead
    within five years.\1\ Such metrics may provide useful measures against
    which to posture the nuclear infrastructure. It is not apparent if the
    NNSA has specific responsiveness metrics at this time.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ John Gordon, Under Secretary of Energy for Security and
    Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of
    Energy, Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services, February 14,
    2002, pp. 2, 5.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Given the highly-dynamic contemporary threat environment and the
    diverse spectrum of threats, a responsive infrastructure should be
    considered a key component of U.S. deterrence capabilities.
        Mr. Rogers. You describe ``adaptability'' as the fundamental
    characteristic of your recommended nuclear strategy and posture. You
    define adaptability as ``the combination of flexibility and
    resilience.'' Why is adaptability your #1 requirement in a force
    structure? What are some actions we could take that increase
    adaptability in our nuclear force? What actions would you say decrease
    adaptability? Should we avoid actions that are irreversible--or at
    least very, very difficult to reverse?
        Dr. Payne. Adaptability is the combination of the flexibility and
    resilience of the U.S. force posture (including infrastructure) and
    planning. Flexibility includes U.S. possession of a diversity of threat
    options; resilience includes the survivability or U.S. forces against
    the spectrum of threats and the ability to reconstitute U.S. forces in
    a timely manner. Some commentators recently have suggested that U.S.
    nuclear force posture flexibility should be avoided--labeling it a
    ``Cold War'' and ``war-fighting'' concept. This position reflects a
    complete misunderstanding of the value of adaptability as a U.S. force
    posture attribute to meet deterrence requirements in the 21st century.
    Adaptability, including flexibility is, in my opinion, the single most
    important metric for measuring the adequacy of U.S. forces for the
    deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies. The value of U.S. force
    posture adaptability is particularly apparent in its potential
    contribution to the credible deterrence of an opponent's threats of
    nuclear escalation. The effectiveness of U.S. deterrence strategies to
    prevent war resides in their credibility, and nuclear deterrent threats
    that are rigid and narrow, vice flexible, are unlikely to be credible
    in many circumstances. Deterrent threats must be adaptable to the
    opponent and the contingency at hand and not structured rigidly as if
    for a single type of opponent and single type of crisis. In a highly-
    dynamic threat environment such as exists today, the U.S. requirements
    to deter foes and assure allies are diverse and can shift rapidly, and
    the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats may correspondingly depend on
    U.S. capabilities and planning that are sufficiently adaptable to shift
    as necessary to deter. As noted in the answer to question 10 above, a
    return to the rigidity of the U.S. ``Massive Retaliation'' deterrent
    threat would be destabilizing in those plausible cases wherein such a
    deterrent threat would simply lack credibility.
        There are numerous steps that will strengthen adaptability,
    including for example, modernizing the triad with its diversity of
    platforms, adding U.S. advanced conventional force capabilities (e.g.,
    CPGS), modernizing forward-based systems and increasing the
    responsiveness of the U.S. infrastructure. Adaptability is degraded by
    eliminating diverse U.S. options and capabilities in ways that are
    essentially irreversible. Unfortunately, U.S. strategic arms control
    policy often embraces the ``irreversibility'' of reductions as a
    measure of success. That is a realistic perspective only in the context
    of an essentially fixed and predictable threat environment in which it
    can be known that the capabilities eliminated will never again be of
    critical value. That is not the contemporary threat environment.
        I should add that adaptability has been stressed by DOD officials
    as increasingly important for military capabilities in general. This is
    because of the significant expense of developing a new military weapons
    system which is expected to remain in service for decades. This,
    coupled with a highly dynamic environment and diverse threats, makes
    adaptability a prudent and effective approach to maintaining needed
    U.S. deterrence capabilities and U.S. military capabilities in general.
        Mr. Rogers. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the
    force postures the teams recommended must be possible within
    ``approximately $35 billion per year in constant 2013 dollars,
    comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.'' Do you believe your
    recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent
    of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on
    nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation's ``highest priority
    defense mission''?
        Dr. Payne. My colleagues and my recommendations in the base case of
    Project Atom fit within the budget constraints designated in the study.
    The study also includes a case wherein we were asked to think outside
    those budget constraints. In general, the level of spending for the
    deterrence of foes and assurance of allies cannot reasonably be
    determined by identifying a fixed percentage of the DOD budget. A
    review of funding for U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities shows the
    cyclic nature of funding requirements. A large outlay was required in
    the early 1960s to create what became known as the nuclear triad. In
    the 1980s, another significant outlay was needed to modernize the aging
    triad. At present, we are facing a situation similar to that of the
    1980s--although with a much smaller U.S. force posture. The existing
    triad has been life-extended and modernization is again needed. As
    noted in my answer to question #12, employing adaptability as a metric
    can help control costs and develop a nuclear force for deterrence and
    assurance that is relevant for the dynamic threat environment of the
    twenty-first century.
        Identifying the most effective deterrence strategy cannot be done
    prudently on the basis of first defining the percentage of the DOD
    budget that will be devoted to this priority goal--budgets should
    follow strategy and strategic priorities, they should not be the
    driving factor. Rather, the character of the threat environment and the
    priority of various defense programs are the basic determinants of the
    appropriate budget share. This is a key point because ensuring
    effective nuclear deterrence has been identified as the highest defense
    priority by senior U.S. officials and the corresponding requirements
    for deterrence can shift dramatically depending on the threat
    environment. This prioritization is a reflection of severe emerging
    threats, including developments in Russia's foreign policy, nuclear
    doctrine and forces, and the basic fact that the deterrence of nuclear
    war must be considered an enduring priority goal. Indeed, if nuclear
    deterrence fails dramatically, many other U.S. goals and capabilities
    become irrelevant. Correspondingly, within broad margins, U.S.
    capabilities intended to deter severe threats warrant whatever budget
    commitment is needed to provide and sustain the capabilities judged
    critical to support that goal. Indeed, it is extremely fortunate that
    the goals of nuclear deterrence and assurance may be adequately
    supported at this point by a nuclear modernization program that demands
    such a modest percentage of the DOD budget--reportedly under 5 percent
    annually per current nuclear modernization plans through 2030. But, at
    the end of the day, that budget percentage should not be considered
    fixed because it must shift according to the threat environment and the
    continuing priority need for effective nuclear deterrence and
    assurance.
        Mr. Rogers. Why do we need a stand-off cruise missile like the LRSO
    if we will also have a penetrating bomber and a nuclear gravity bomb in
    the B61?
        Dr. Payne. In general, a multiplicity of platforms and threat
    options contributes to the adaptability of the U.S. deterrent, which
    may be extremely important for credible deterrence in a highly-dynamic
    threat environment as discussed in the answers to questions 10 and 12
    above. Correspondingly, the United States needs a stand-off cruise
    missile like the LRSO to preserve and strengthen the flexibility and
    resilience of the U.S. deterrent in plausible circumstances. Stand-off
    weapons, for example, may be critical, now and in the future, to
    support a credible deterrent threat if enemy air defenses would
    essentially preclude the potential of U.S. bombers to threaten
    penetration to critical targets for deterrence purposes. In such
    circumstances, and others, stand-off cruise missiles could help ensure
    the effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent threat. In their absence, the
    bomber leg of the U.S. triad could be effectively shut down as a
    credible deterrent instrument. Such a condition would, in my opinion,
    be destabilizing because the bombers offer unique and important options
    for deterrence purposes. Specifically, the LRSO would provide a U.S.
    stand-off capability that adds to the inherent flexibility of the
    bomber capabilities and are accurate, discriminate, and, for an
    opponent, unpredictable in its route of flight. Given the long expected
    operational lifetime of a new U.S. strategic bomber, it would be highly
    imprudent to assume that LRSO is redundant because the bomber itself
    will be able to penetrate with gravity bombs throughout that lifetime
    in all potentially important contingencies.
        Mr. Rogers. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on
    the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ``Working with
    partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a
    position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons
    activities bearing on the interests of the United States and its
    allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be
    allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear
    weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.'' A. Why, in
    your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The
    Department of Energy is approximately 10 months late in submitting to
    Congress an annual report on how it will implement such a program. How
    important do you think it is that the Department promptly begin to
    implement this program?
        Dr. Payne. I strongly support this effort because a critical
    ingredient of any effective deterrence strategy is an understanding of
    opponents' goals, intentions, determination and capabilities.
    Ignorance, misperceptions and misunderstandings of opponents are the
    basic reasons why deterrence strategies fail and wars take place that
    otherwise might have been deterred. This U.S. understanding of
    opponents seems particularly important with regard to opponents'
    nuclear capabilities because we must make our nuclear deterrence
    strategies as effective as possible. The ability of the U.S. national
    laboratories to understand foreign nuclear weapon designs, and thus
    foreign nuclear capabilities, is critical to understanding opponents'
    capabilities and intentions, and thus to establishing the most
    effective deterrence strategies possible. In addition, according to
    open reports by subject matter experts, design and development skills
    at the national laboratories have been atrophying as the result of no
    new development efforts for nuclear warheads. Having the design teams
    at the national laboratories design, assess, and analyze foreign
    nuclear capabilities would help maintain a skilled nuclear development
    workforce for the United States. This could be of great value in the
    future.
        Mr. Rogers. Please explain why you believe the United States needs
    an accurate, lower-yield nuclear option? Is there a ``gap'' in U.S.
    capability between our lowest-yield nuclear weapons and our largest
    conventional weapons? How might Russia or another nuclear adversary
    exploit this in a crisis? In your opinion, does the U.S. having these
    types of capabilities make the use of a nuclear weapon--by either side
    in a crisis--more likely or less likely? Why?
        Mr. Colby. The United States greatly benefits from having nuclear
    weapons that can be used relatively discriminately and with some
    potential for the control or manipulation of escalation (although such
    control can never be assured).
        The ultimate deterrent threat of nuclear weapons lies in their
    capacity to wreak the most grievous, swift, and sure destruction upon
    an adversary, largely irrespective of the state or result of the sub-
    nuclear contest. Yet the execution of such a threat would be an act of
    the most brutal violence, an act that could only be justified--and
    likely would (and should) only be seriously considered--under the most
    extreme circumstances. Perhaps more to the point, such strikes would
    very plausibly call forth the matching response of an adversary
    possessed of nuclear weapons himself. The direct threat of nuclear
    attack against an adversary's urban infrastructure is therefore of only
    partial credibility, and of little credibility in situations short of
    the catastrophic.
        This is a particular problem for the United States, which extends
    nuclear deterrence to several dozen allies. This extension of its
    ``nuclear umbrella'' means that the United States pledges to use
    nuclear weapons in situations that are very grave for its ally but not
    necessarily for itself. Washington extends its nuclear deterrent in
    this fashion because it sees substantial stability, nonproliferation,
    and political benefits arising from bringing friendly states within its
    defensive envelope, and sees nuclear weapons as unique instruments of
    deterrence, particularly against the most serious forms of attack. Yet
    if large-scale nuclear strikes were the only options the United States
    possessed to respond to such attacks, this would mean that any nuclear
    use on behalf of an ally or for any important but still partial
    interest against the likes of Russia or China would immediately and
    directly raise the question of whether the United States should
    sacrifice New York for Tallinn, Los Angeles for Tokyo, or Washington
    for Warsaw.
        This problem is particularly and increasingly important because
    potential U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China have survivable
    nuclear weapons of their own as well as sophisticated conventional
    forces. At root, the problem proceeds from the reality that the United
    States cannot realistically hope to destroy or eliminate the nuclear
    forces of these major power adversaries without running too great a
    risk of incurring a massive nuclear attack. We therefore must find ways
    of prevailing over these formidable potential opponents (even in
    limited terms) while inducing them to avoid using or at least to
    restrain their use of their nuclear arsenals. This is especially hard
    because these states appear to be planning to be able to employ their
    militaries against the United States--or, more specifically, its
    exposed allies and partners--in order to create and exploit political
    and military circumstances in which Washington may be unwilling to run
    the risks and incur the costs necessary to respond effectively. In
    brief, they hope to shift the burden of escalation onto the United
    States through the use of nuclear weapons, conventional forces, or
    both, in the hopes that the United States will ultimately decide to end
    the conflict on terms favorable to them.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ For the author's fuller description of his conception of this
    problem, see Elbridge Colby, ``Preparing for Limited War,'' The
    National Interest (November/December 2015), 11-22. NB: Given the
    relatively limited space available in these answers, references to the
    author's additional work in this and ensuing footnotes are provided in
    case the reader is interested in the author's further elaboration of
    the points raised.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This is not merely a theoretical challenge. Russia appears to be
    developing or refining a nuclear strategy modeled around precisely this
    logic. In the event of conflict with the West, Moscow appears to plan
    to have the option to ``escalate to deescalate'' the war by using
    nuclear weapons in limited ways designed to spook the West into halting
    the fight in a manner tantamount to acceding to the Kremlin's demands.
        The United States therefore needs ways of making its nuclear
    weapons relevant and effective as deterrents in situations short of
    those touching on its own survival yet in which its adversaries can
    inflict the most terrible harm upon it. How can the United States
    square this circle? The answer--albeit an inherently imperfect one--
    lies in a nuclear strategy that enables limited, graduated, and
    deliberate escalation. This strategy should be designed to demonstrate
    the determined U.S. will to respond to major attacks, including nuclear
    ones, against its allies and farther interests; impose targeted but
    increasingly severe harm on an opponent; and at the same time evidence
    the willingness to allow a tolerable de-escalation. Such a strategy of
    intelligent and focused escalation stands the best chance of
    demonstrating to an adversary that the United States has the ability
    and will to impose increasingly searing costs on him without launching
    a massive strike that could well amount to suicide.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ For a fuller description of the author's logic for such a
    posture, see Elbridge Colby, ``Reconciling Stability and Deterrence''
    in Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations, ed. by Elbridge
    Colby and Michael Gerson (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College
    Press, 2013), 47-83.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To pursue such a strategy, the United States needs limited nuclear
    options--that is, options designed to allow the use of nuclear weapons
    in ways that exploit the fear of but do not necessarily lead to general
    nuclear war. Such limitation of nuclear strikes can come in many
    forms--including the target type selected, the location of the target,
    the destructiveness of the weapons, and the number of weapons used, to
    name a few. The United States should therefore develop strategies,
    capabilities, and plans for the use of nuclear weapons in limited
    fashion, including ones suited for the emerging military-technological
    era, which means updating and modernizing our nuclear posture and
    architecture.
        The role of such limited nuclear options, it is important to
    emphasize, is not to encourage nuclear use, let alone general nuclear
    war. Rather, it is to enable the United States to be able to gain the
    deterrent and stability benefits of nuclear weapons in such a way that
    their employment does not necessarily result in utter destruction.
    Possessing such an ability is vital because, if nuclear weapons cannot
    be used in any situations short of the cataclysmic, enterprising and
    risk-acceptant adversaries may well seek to gain advantage by raising
    the stakes against Washington and daring us to respond massively. For
    instance, Russia might seek to establish a fait accompli in Eastern
    Europe and then employ limited nuclear strikes to compel the West to
    back down. Or China might try something similar in the Western Pacific
    with respect to the territory of U.S. allies. Without comparable
    capabilities, the United States could be left without a rational and
    effective riposte to such a strategy.
        How, some will ask, would such a strategy not devolve into a
    nuclear tit-for-tat? Ideally, it would not because the United States
    would be better at limited nuclear war than its potential adversaries.
    Possessed of superior capacity for discrimination, control, and the
    infliction of harm in a nuclear war, the United States should have
    greater leverage over its potential adversaries, which will be the ones
    left forced to choose between de-escalation and a nuclear strike that
    will call forth a most devastating response. This is particularly
    relevant with respect to China, over which the United States still
    enjoys substantial advantages in these attributes.
        But what about Russia, over which the United States does not enjoy
    such advantages, or a more formidably nuclear-armed China? How would
    such a strategy end or at least deescalate a war with an opponent over
    which the United States does not have meaningful nuclear leverage?
        Much of the answer lies in the fielding of non-nuclear forces that
    can prevent the adversary from making gains, particularly easily and
    quickly, that can then be protected by nuclear escalation. If
    adversaries cannot take territory or valued things--or very much of
    them--from the United States and its allies, then a strategy of using
    limited nuclear attacks to force a war termination in place will yield
    them little or nothing.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ For an elaboration of this logic in the NATO-Russia context,
    see Elbridge A. Colby and Jonathan F. Solomon, ``Facing Russia:
    Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe,'' Survival, (December
    2015/January 2016), 21-50.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        More broadly, however, we must bear in mind that no one knows how
    assuredly to control a limited nuclear war, and that it is widely
    understood that the attempt to control such a war could only ever be a
    highly uncertain and always combustible thing. Both sides in such a
    contest would have every incentive to find ways to avoid large-scale,
    let alone total, destruction. Accordingly everyone, even the most risk-
    tolerant gamblers, should be exceedingly reluctant to embark on such a
    course, and be particularly loathe to press a limited nuclear war too
    far. The Russians and Chinese both know this, as do we.
        Thus, a nation should only embark on employment of such a perilous
    strategy that would risk its annihilation if it thinks it has dramatic
    advantages in the capability to conduct a limited nuclear war, if it
    perceives its adversary as basically bluffing over the issue at hand,
    or if the adversary has crossed a fundamental redline. The United
    States can prevent the Russians or Chinese from thinking any of these
    is the case if it has serious limited nuclear options, makes clear its
    resolve to defend its allies, and avoids crossing a redline that would
    prompt Moscow or Beijing to employ nuclear weapons to vindicate its
    most vital interests.
        It must be admitted that the posture advocated here sounds
    extremely dangerous--and that its actual execution surely would be. But
    if the United States is resolved to continue its traditional extended
    deterrence and forward engagement approach, this is the most
    appropriate strategy to effectively deter aggression against U.S.
    allies and thereby promote stability and a tolerable peace. If we
    recall that war is generally a product of one side's perception of
    vulnerability or opportunity, this posture would diminish the
    likelihood of conflict by demonstrating to potential U.S. adversaries
    that any attempt to exploit through arms perceived U.S. weaknesses or
    deficit of resolve would invariably result in failure or the most
    painful loss.
        Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne, Dr. Murdock, and Mr. Colby, you each come to
    this problem from somewhat different strategic perspectives and
    assessments of the future strategic and threat environment, yet you all
    basically agree on the broad future contours of the best U.S. nuclear
    force. Does this consensus reflect a broader developing consensus among
    experts in the field? If so, what does this tell us?
        Mr. Colby. Defense experts are increasingly coalescing around the
    recognition of the emergence of a more adversarial international
    political environment, particularly exhibited by Russia, China, Iran,
    and North Korea, and of a more contested military-technological
    landscape. Among defense specialists who believe the United States
    should maintain its traditional international position, this is leading
    to a sense that the United States needs to redouble its efforts to
    maintain its military edge.
        In the nuclear realm, this appears to be leading to a growing
    consensus that disarmament is decreasingly credible and relevant.\4\
    Substantial consensus appears to have formed supporting the
    modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, albeit with debate about the
    advisability of how or whether to modernize certain elements. While
    affordability is an issue, the general view increasingly appears to
    view this as more of a challenge of how best to manage concentrated
    costs in the 2020s rather than as an issue of the basic ability to pay
    for the systems as such.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ For the author's critique of the feasibility and advisability
    of nuclear abolition, see Elbridge Colby, ``World Order Critique of
    Nuclear Abolition,'' in the forthcoming Global Nuclear Disarmament
    Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, ed. by Nik Hynek and
    Michael Smetana (London, UK: Routledge, 2016).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        With respect to more discriminate nuclear capabilities, most
    nuclear specialists recognize that the United States maintains such
    capabilities today and believe that the country should retain some
    capability for discriminate use going forward. Debate tends to center
    around how much discrimination and tailoring are required and how much
    investment is needed to address military-technological challenges posed
    by potential adversaries.
        Mr. Rogers. Are the strategy and reforms you propose responsible
    and prudent or would they too greatly lower the bar to nuclear use, and
    perhaps even incentivize use of nuclear weapons? Why isn't what you
    propose simply too dangerous?
        How do you specifically see these capabilities as giving the United
    States the ability to deter an opponent's attempt to use nuclear
    capabilities in a limited fashion?
        Mr. Colby. There is a long-recognized inherent paradox in the
    reality that the most effective way to prevent war on acceptable terms
    is to be well-prepared to fight it. The Romans, for instance, captured
    this in their dictum that ``if you wish for peace, prepare for war.''
    It is this simple but compelling logic that underpins the longstanding
    consensus in the United States that the nation should field a peerless
    military, one that can fight and prevail not only in wars touching on
    our own particular concerns but also in those impinging upon the vital
    interests of our many allies and partners.
        If U.S. and allied conventional forces could reasonably be expected
    to perform this daunting task at acceptable cost and risk over the
    long-term, then we would be bound to seriously consider relegating
    nuclear weapons to a relatively marginal role in our national security
    posture. This is not, however, a responsible expectation in light of
    the nature of the emerging international geopolitical and military-
    technological environments.
        Politically, we continue to have fundamental disagreements with
    nations possessed of the most serious kinds of military capability--
    disagreements that could worsen and even result in war.\5\ In light of
    this reality that war is possible, the United States needs a meaningful
    and effective defense policy and posture to deal with the formidable
    militaries these nations are developing.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ For a fuller argument for this point, see Elbridge Colby, ``Why
    Nuclear Deterrence is Still Relevant,'' in Thinking About Deterrence:
    Enduring Questions in a Time of Rising Powers, Rogue Regimes, and
    Terrorism, ed. by Adam Lowther (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University
    Press, 2013), 51-74.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This policy and posture must include a nuclear component because of
    the actual and latent military strength--both nuclear and
    conventional--of these potential adversaries. Russia, for instance, is
    thinking of ways to use nuclear weapons in discriminate and pointed
    ways to terminate a conflict with the United States and NATO on terms
    it prefers. China, meanwhile, may over the longer term gain
    conventional advantage in areas touching on the vital interests of U.S.
    allies, leading the United States to want to rely more on its nuclear
    forces for extended deterrence.\6\ Finally, North Korea is also
    developing a larger and more sophisticated nuclear force potentially
    capable of surviving U.S. attacks and being employed in a targeted and
    iterated fashion against U.S. and allied targets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ See Elbridge Colby, ``Asia Goes Nuclear,'' The National
    Interest (January/February 2015), 28-37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        These adversary strategies all raise the chances that, in the event
    of conflict, the United States would feel impelled to consider use of
    nuclear weapons--either in response to adversary employment or in order
    to ``escalate to deescalate'' a conventional conflict the United States
    and its allies were losing. If the United States only had totalistic
    options for employing nuclear weapons in such circumstances, or even if
    it lacked sufficient confidence in the precision with which it could
    deliver limited strikes, it might find itself without a sensible way of
    responding to very clever--but also very plausible--adversary
    strategies.
        For instance, Moscow might think that it could establish a
    conventional fait acccompli in NATO territory and then threaten to use
    or actually employ nuclear weapons in a limited way to try to frighten
    the West into backing down. Or China might seek to seize the territory
    of U.S. allies in the Western Pacific using conventional forces, block
    U.S. attempts to intervene, and then dare the United States to resort
    to nuclear weapons. In both cases, the adversary would seek to push the
    onus of escalation onto the United States. Left only with large-scale
    nuclear options, this burden would seem even heavier than it would
    already be--and perhaps too heavy.\7\ In such a case, the United States
    and its allies might determine that concession would be a more prudent
    course than deliberate escalation.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ For a fuller exploration of this logic, see Colby, ``Preparing
    for Limited War.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To avoid this disastrous outcome, the United States should arm
    itself with capabilities and strategies, including limited nuclear
    options, to respond appropriately to any such attempts on the part of
    its potential opponents. By demonstrating that the United States cannot
    realistically be left without effective recourse to adversary
    strategies, such strength should help deter potential adversaries from
    embarking upon such challenges in the first place.
        This is because, while it may be true that wars sometimes happen
    because of accident, it is far more common that they result because at
    least one side believes that it has a strategy that can work. Thus, the
    best way to dissuade an opponent from embarking on military action is
    to persuade him that such an endeavor will result in outright defeat
    or, at least, will result in costs and risks out of proportion to
    whatever gains he might win. This is precisely the logic of having
    tailorable nuclear options, which demonstrate to potential U.S.
    opponents that the United States cannot be forced to choose between
    capitulation and catastrophic escalation.
        Mr. Rogers. Why doesn't the existing U.S. nuclear force have
    sufficient capacity for discrimination? Why do we need to change from
    today's posture, platforms, and arsenal? How do you specifically see
    these capabilities as giving the United States the ability to deter an
    opponent's attempt to use nuclear capabilities in a limited fashion?
        Mr. Colby. The current U.S. nuclear force has substantial elements
    of discrimination, including variable yield weapons, and the ability to
    deliver such weapons in a relatively controlled fashion with relatively
    tailored effects. But these capabilities are relatively modest and in
    key respects are declining in effectiveness and relevance in light of
    the evolving military-technological environment and particularly the
    improving military power of potential adversaries. The U.S. posture for
    flexible nuclear use thus needs to be updated.
        Specifically, greater variability of effects (particularly yield)
    should be introduced into the U.S. weapons arsenal; U.S. nuclear forces
    should be equipped to penetrate increasingly sophisticated adversary
    air defense networks; and the aging U.S. nuclear-related command,
    control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
    reconnaissance (C4ISR) system should be modernized to support limited
    nuclear operations.
        The ideal U.S. posture should allow the President to order nuclear
    strikes to conform to specific requirements with very high confidence
    that such strikes will penetrate and achieve the desired effect. That
    is, the President should be able to command that strikes hit a certain
    target or set of targets with a particular (especially lower) level of
    destructiveness, with particular types of effects, and should have very
    high confidence that the attacks will result in the kinds of results
    anticipated. Lacking confidence that such strikes will penetrate enemy
    defenses or that they will have the desired effect upon penetration,
    the United States may feel compelled to launch larger strikes in order
    to achieve even rather limited effects--potentially undermining or even
    negating the purpose of having capabilities for discriminate attack.
        Accordingly, and particularly in light of advances in potential
    adversary air defenses, the United States would benefit from having
    more capacity for discriminate strikes across the force, including the
    ballistic missile force. Thus the United States should equip some
    portion of the Trident II D5 SLBM force for lower-yield attack, and
    should ensure that the future airborne leg of the Triad can deliver
    lower-yield strikes as well as strikes of varying effect from multiple
    platforms, including via gravity bombs and the long-range standoff
    missile (LRSO). Such a multiplicity of attack options should give more
    optionality for attack typologies and also give higher confidence that
    such strikes would penetrate and take place as planned. This should
    give the United States greater leverage in ``manipulating risk'' or
    matching and blunting an adversary's ability to do so.
        At the same time, the United States should ensure that its aging
    C4ISR capabilities are modernized and optimized to enable support to
    limited nuclear operations through crucial functions such as ISR,
    battle damage assessment, command and control, and communications both
    with friendly forces and an adversary.
        Mr. Rogers. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on
    the need for a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The
    administration seems to largely agree with us but has been glacially
    slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe we need a
    nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to
    geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should
    we define ``responsiveness'' of our nuclear enterprise going forward?
    What metrics should we use to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive
    infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries?
        Mr. Colby. A responsive nuclear infrastructure and enterprise able
    to meet the country's national strategic requirements are vital for the
    nation's deterrent and thus for our national security. Responsiveness
    should be defined as the capability, capacity, and agility to turn over
    the stockpile roughly every ten years and to respond to emerging
    threats over the medium term.
        Mr. Rogers. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the
    force postures the teams recommended must be possible within
    ``approximately $35 billion per year in constant 2013 dollars,
    comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.'' Do you believe your
    recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent
    of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on
    nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation's ``highest priority
    defense mission''?
        Mr. Colby. I did not perform the budgetary analysis required to
    answer this question. In my report, I supported the replacement,
    modernization, or sustainment of the nuclear Triad, the associated
    warheads, and the nuclear command and control system and related
    components. This modernization effort has been budgeted to consume less
    than five percent of the defense budget over the next few decades,
    which I believe is a more than reasonable price to pay for the
    cornerstone of the nation and our allies' security.\8\ The additional
    expenditures stemming from my emphasis on discrimination, control, and
    flexibility in the nuclear force would, I assess, cost a relatively
    small additional amount compared to the total cost of nuclear forces.
    This is because such capacities are often largely resident in existing
    warheads, modern C4ISR systems, and contemporary delivery platforms.
    Fuller exploitation of these capabilities would be more a matter of
    developing latent capabilities rather than of initiating wholly new
    programs or pursuing revolutionary technologies, which are commonly
    culprits behind cost overruns.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ See, for instance, the study by leading experts from the Center
    for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments on costs of nuclear forces,
    Todd Harrison and Evan Branden Montgomery, ``The Cost of U.S. Nuclear
    Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave and Beyond?'' (Center for Strategic and
    Budgetary Assessments, 2015), 33.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Mr. Rogers. Why do we need a stand-off cruise missile like the LRSO
    if we will also have a penetrating bomber and a nuclear gravity bomb in
    the B61?
        Mr. Colby. The nation would greatly benefit from having a standoff
    cruise missile replacement in the LRSO for two main reasons. First, we
    cannot be sure of the penetration capability of low-observable aircraft
    in light of advancing adversary air defenses. This means we would be
    ill-advised to place all our bomber leg eggs in the basket of the long-
    range penetrating bomber, as important and promising as that program
    is. Instead, a standoff penetrating nuclear-armed munition will give us
    much greater assurance that the United States can attack targets
    throughout an adversary's territory, and can do so discriminately. It
    is therefore highly important that the LRSO be mounted with a warhead
    capable of variable yield settings.
        Second, investment in a standoff munition is likely to be an asset
    from a cost competition point of view. That is, adversaries will have
    their air defense challenge significantly complicated by the need to
    defend not only against low-observable bombers but also standoff
    munitions with different characteristics, concepts of operations, and
    signatures. Given the central importance of airpower to our nation's
    way of war, burdening adversaries' air defense problems as much as
    possible in a cost-competitive way is an important objective for the
    United States.
        More broadly, we must maintain considerable humility about the
    nature of technological change in the coming decades. Given the
    absolutely central importance to our nation's security and geopolitical
    posture of fielding a nuclear force able to respond reliably and also
    capable of conducting limited operations, we are well-served by erring
    on the side of redundancy. If the LRSO program threatened to break the
    back of the defense budget, we might come to a different judgment. But
    it will not. The weapon appears to build on an established concept--the
    standoff penetrating missile--and carries that forward, adapting it to
    a new technological era. Such a program can both benefit and draw from
    comparable conventional programs--and may sensibly include a
    conventional variant itself. It therefore seems well worth the
    investment required.
        Mr. Rogers. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on
    the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ``Working with
    partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a
    position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons
    activities bearing on the interests of the United States and its
    allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be
    allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear
    weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.'' A. Why, in
    your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The
    Department of Energy is approximately 10 months late in submitting to
    Congress an annual report on how it will implement such a program. How
    important do you think it is that the Department promptly begin to
    implement this program?
        Mr. Colby. I firmly support this effort. While I have not made a
    special study of this problem, the United States requires a solid
    understanding of what adversaries may be doing with their nuclear
    forces, including the effects produced by their weapons. The United
    States should be prepared for the potential that an adversary may seek
    to use nuclear weapons not simply in well-understood but also in
    surprising or unconventional ways--for instance with very little
    kinetic effect--that could nonetheless have gravely negative
    implications for U.S. forces or interests. The United States is highly
    unlikely to be adequately prepared without allowing the national
    laboratories to conduct design efforts for the purpose of defensive
    analysis.
        It is therefore very important for the Department to begin promptly
    to implement this program.
        Mr. Rogers. During the hearing you indicated that you think that
    the United States could respond to a limited Russian nuclear strike
    with a comparable strike of its own using a strategic bomber--and that
    this response would be ``just as compelling as being able to respond
    with a tactical weapon delivered by a fighter jet.'' Does this indicate
    that you think a limited nuclear war is possible? If so, what
    implications does this have for U.S. nuclear force planning? If not,
    why do you think such a response would be prudent or advisable?
        Dr. Blechman. If Russia were to carry out a limited nuclear strike
    it would be essential for the U.S. and, if in Europe, NATO to respond
    in kind. If the U.S. did not respond it might encourage Russian leaders
    to believe they could regain territory once part of the Soviet Union
    through nuclear coercion and, when necessary, use. I believe that any
    use of nuclear weapons would carry with it a grave risk of continuing
    escalation--the normal fog of war would multiplied many times on a
    nuclear battlefield. Even so, I support the NATO policy of deterring,
    and, if necessary responding to, nuclear use with its own nuclear
    forces.
        The question is whether such a response should be made with
    tactical weapons pre-deployed in Europe. Maintaining such a capability
    will require significant expenditures at a time when security budgets
    face many competing needs. Moreover, it is hard for me to believe that
    the German, Belgian, or Dutch governments would permit their crews and
    aircraft to respond to a Russian nuclear use--presumably in Eastern
    Europe, with nuclear weapons now stored on their territory. Indeed,
    their fighters would have a hard time penetrating Russian air defenses.
    Far preferable in my view, would be to deploy U.S. nuclear-armed B-2
    bombers to bases in Europe during the crisis that led up to the
    conflict, both to signal to the Russians that we are prepared for a
    nuclear exchange and, if necessary, to conduct nuclear strikes in
    response to the Russian first use.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe what response you would recommend if
    Russia carries out, in a regional confrontation with the U.S. in, say,
    the Baltics, their ``escalate-to-deescalate'' doctrine and used a
    single, low-yield nuclear weapon? If the U.S. responds with increased
    conventional forces, what response do you recommend if Russia continued
    to use discriminate, low-yield nuclear strikes on such U.S. forces as
    they deploy? Should we respond in a conventional-only fashion, a
    limited nuclear fashion, or with a large and comprehensive nuclear
    retaliation?
        Dr. Blechman. First, I believe it is essential to strengthen NATO's
    capabilities in the Baltic nations and adjoining countries so that
    Russian leaders do not misperceive an opportunity to carry out a quick
    and successful strike. This strengthening should include rapid
    implementation of the European Very High Readiness Taskforce and the
    stationing of advanced elements and equipment in Poland, the deployment
    of equipment for one U.S. armored brigade in each of the Baltic states
    and the rotational deployments of battalions from those brigades to
    exercise with local forces, the deployment of the divisional
    headquarters and support forces to fill out the division in Poland, the
    rotational deployment of U.S. fighter squadrons to the Baltic nations,
    Poland, and Romania, and the stationing of necessary Air Force support
    units for those squadrons in those countries.
        Second, if despite these pre-deployments, a conflict were to break
    out in the region and the Russians, facing conventional defeat utilized
    one or more nuclear weapons in conformance with their stated doctrine,
    I believe the U.S./NATO should respond with the same number of weapons
    against Russian military targets in the battle zone. As nuclear weapons
    are not particularly effective war-fighting weapons, hopefully, the two
    sides would come to their senses after only a few had been used and
    negotiate an end to the conflict. If the Russians continued to use
    nuclear weapons after the U.S./NATO had responded in kind, I would
    recommend that we consider striking military targets in Russia itself,
    recognizing this would raise the danger of a Russian strike against the
    U.S.
        Mr. Rogers. This subcommittee has spent a lot of time focused on
    the need for a responsive U.S. nuclear infrastructure. The
    administration seems to largely agree with us but has been glacially
    slow in implementing actions to fix it. Do you believe we need a
    nuclear infrastructure and enterprise that can quickly respond to
    geopolitical changes or technical failures in the stockpile? How should
    we define ``responsiveness'' of our nuclear enterprise going forward?
    What metrics should we use to measure responsiveness? Does a responsive
    infrastructure contribute to deterrence of potential adversaries?
        Dr. Blechman. I disagree with the premise of the question. The
    administration has been modernizing the nuclear infrastructure across
    the board, in line with the requirements agreed to by the secretaries
    of defense and energy at the end of the second George W. Bush
    administration. The apparently ``glacial'' pace has more to do with the
    underestimates of the time and money required to implement the plan
    made at the time it was put together than any reluctance on the part of
    the current administration to carry out the plan.
        Personally, I believe the plan is too far-reaching. Given the
    planned size of U.S. nuclear forces under the START agreement, and the
    possibility of further reductions in the future, I believe that several
    elements of the infrastructure modernization plan could be modified and
    reduced in cost.
        The responsiveness of the infrastructure depends on the resources
    allotted to it. If there were a change in the geo-political environment
    well beyond the changes we have seen already, it would be possible to
    modernize and expand the infrastructure rapidly by throwing resources
    at it--just as we did in the Manhattan Project. Personally, I don't see
    any need for such actions now or in the future, but it would be
    possible.
        I have never seen any evidence that adversaries pay any attention
    to the infrastructure in the context of deterrence. Leaders of all
    nations believe the U.S. is a very wealthy and resourceful country that
    will do whatever is necessary to ensure its security.
        Mr. Rogers. Project Atom had an overarching constraint that the
    force postures the teams recommended must be possible within
    ``approximately $35 billion per year in constant 2013 dollars,
    comprising 4 to 5 percent of the defense budget.'' Do you believe your
    recommendations meet this constraint? Do you believe 4, 5, or 6 percent
    of the defense budget is an appropriate amount to be spending on
    nuclear deterrence, which DOD says is the nation's ``highest priority
    defense mission''?
        Dr. Blechman. The nuclear force posture I recommend could be
    implemented and maintained for less than $35 billion per year, freeing
    resource for more pressing needs, such as modernizing conventional
    forces and maintaining a high state of conventional readiness. That is
    not the case, I believe, for the force postures recommended by my
    colleagues in Project Atom nor for the nuclear modernization plans now
    being pursued by the Department of Defense which will like reach or
    exceed $50 billion per year in the 2020s if fully implemented on the
    schedules now contemplated.
        Nuclear deterrence is certainly a high priority defense mission,
    but there are many other needs to ensure our security. It is imperative
    to replace the aging fighter force at a rapid pace, to maintain a ship-
    building budget adequate to stem further reductions in the size of the
    navy, and to avoid reductions in ground forces greater than those
    already planned, as well as to modernize the Army's helicopter fleet.
    In addition, we should be spending more, not less as now planned, on
    advanced research and development of new technologies so that we can
    maintain our conventional advantages over potential enemies. We also
    should be allocating greater resources to homeland security, the FBI,
    and to the State Department--all crucial in the fight against
    terrorism. These needs are far more important than the rapid, cross-
    the-board modernization now planned for the nuclear forces.
        Mr. Rogers. During the hearing you stated, ``If the U.S. does not
    maintain conventional superiority, then we'd have to look at
    alternative strategies.'' Can you elaborate on what is meant by
    alternative strategies?
        A. Considering the widespread employment and increasingly effective
    nature of the anti-access/area-denial platforms fielded by potential
    adversaries, particularly China, aimed solely at degrading U.S.
    conventional superiority in local spheres of influence, such as the
    Taiwan Straits, how does this trend affect your proposed
    recommendations for U.S. nuclear force structure and posture given your
    assumption of U.S. conventional superiority through 2050? If U.S.
    conventional forces are unable to operate, thus unable to deter, in
    certain areas, do the policies you recommend in Project Atom change?
        Dr. Blechman. An alternative defense strategy would be to return to
    the Eisenhower Administration of massive retaliation, building larger
    strategic nuclear forces and threatening their use if our or our
    allies' vital national interests are threatened. This should be coupled
    with an all-out effort to develop boost-phase missile defenses,
    probably involving massive satellite constellations equipped with laser
    weapons. I'd hasten to add that this would be a very dangerous world--
    remember the several Berlin confrontations in the 1950s, as well as
    confrontations with China over the Offshore Islands, etc.
        With regard to ``A'', I believe the anti-access/area-denial
    capabilities of our potential adversaries have been exaggerated in the
    public literature. They are certainly working on them, but Russia is
    nowhere near such technical capabilities and China has a long way to
    go. Locating, targeting, and hitting an aircraft carrier in a war-
    fighting configuration (i.e., emissions limited) is not nearly as easy
    as some make out, and there are other many other systems that could be
    used to defend allies in regions close to China. Needless to say,
    China's capabilities will improve over time, even if far more slowly
    than many postulate. The way to respond, in my view, is NOT to allocate
    additional resources to nuclear forces but, rather, to invest in
    advanced capabilities--such as ISR, EW, cyber, lasers, and space
    defense--that can enable us to maintain our conventional superiority.
        Mr. Rogers. The Final Report of the Perry-Schlesinger commission on
    the Strategic Posture of the United States stated that, ``Working with
    partners in the intelligence community, the laboratories should be in a
    position to advise national leadership on foreign nuclear weapons
    activities bearing on the interests of the United States and its
    allies. In short, the commission recommends that the laboratories be
    allowed to design, simulate, and experimentally assess foreign nuclear
    weapon designs for the purposes of defensive analysis.'' A. Why, in
    your opinion, is this important? Do you support this effort? B. The
    Department of Energy is approximately 10 months late in submitting to
    Congress an annual report on how it will implement such a program. How
    important do you think it is that the Department promptly begin to
    implement this program?
        Dr. Blechman. I'm sorry, but I'm not sufficiently familiar with
    warhead designs or the capabilities of our laboratories to answer this
    question.
        Mr. Rogers. Please describe what response you would recommend if
    Russia carries out, in a regional confrontation with the U.S. in, say,
    the Baltics, their ``escalate-to-deescalate'' doctrine and used a
    single, low-yield nuclear weapon? If the U.S. responds with increased
    conventional forces, what response do you recommend if Russia continued
    to use discriminate, low-yield nuclear strikes on such U.S. forces as
    they deploy? Should we respond in a conventional-only fashion, a
    limited nuclear fashion, or with a large and comprehensive nuclear
    retaliation?
        Dr. Mount. Any decision to employ a nuclear weapon would depend
    substantially on the circumstances. A nonlethal demonstration blast is
    a very different circumstance than a large strike that produces mass
    casualties. Properly calibrating the U.S. response will depend on a
    great deal of information about the initial strike--including location,
    target, military casualties, civilian casualties, yield, delivery
    vehicle, and other factors. In any event, the United States has strong
    reasons to refrain from nuclear use. The need to favorably resolve the
    conflict at hand, the desire to preserve a reputation that will serve
    the United States in future crises, and the enduring U.S. interest in
    the stability of the international system may in some circumstances
    favor a solely conventional response. First, nuclear retaliation could
    harm the ability of U.S. policymakers to prevail in the conflict at
    hand by damaging alliance cohesion, diluting international opprobrium,
    and complicate the maneuver of U.S. forces. Because a nuclear strike
    would be an inefficient and ineffective means of defending allied
    territory, a conventional response may be a better means of prevailing
    in the conflict at hand. Secondly, the United States would not want to
    suggest to other states that they could force a nuclear response from
    Washington at will. Thirdly, the United States has a deep interest in a
    world where nuclear weapons remain confined to the margins of
    international interaction. Developing and using low-yield nuclear
    weapons would make it more likely that other countries followed suit.
    In many circumstances, these reasons in favor of restraint may be
    outweighed by reasons in favor of nuclear use. At each step in the
    escalation ladder, the U.S. president will attempt to prevent a wider
    nuclear exchange. It is not clear--and there may be no way of knowing--
    whether retaliation or restraint is likelier to precipitate a nuclear
    war. The regrettable fact is that follow-on nuclear use will remain a
    possibility whether or not the United States retaliates with nuclear
    weapons. In short, there is no simple or automatic answer to the
    question of nuclear retaliation. The decision should weigh all U.S.
    interests at stake, including the long-term U.S. interest in a world
    where nuclear proliferation and use is rare and stigmatized. Given
    these interests in nuclear restraint, retaliation should certainly be
    authorized as a last resort, when the leadership is has a reasonable
    certainty that nuclear use is strictly necessary to secure vital
    national security interests.
        Mr. Rogers. During the hearing you warned against ``shifting the
    bounds of this competition into the nuclear domain,'' because ``you
    legitimize Vladimir Putin's reckless movement of nuclear capabilities
    and his sort of--and his very reckless risk-taking.'' You suggest we
    counter Russia's hybrid strategy with conventional strategies of our
    own. An old maxim occurs to me here: ``the enemy gets a vote.'' What
    happens if Mr. Putin votes and is not deterred by our conventional or
    hybrid counter-moves, and carries out his ``escalate-to-deescalate''
    strategy? Where does that leave us?
        Dr. Mount. It is certainly true that Mr. Putin gets a vote in
    strategic competition. However, the United States also gets a vote
    about the domain in which that competition takes place--and we ought to
    cast in a way that advantages our interests. In recent years, Russia
    has repeatedly made destabilizing and irresponsible statements
    regarding its nuclear arsenal. At tense moments, it has threatened to
    alert its forces and to deploy them close to NATO territory. However,
    U.S. and NATO responses should continue to emphasize the strength of
    our conventional deterrent. Russian rhetorical strategy hopes to
    provoke a nuclear response from the United States in order to shift the
    competition from the conventional level (where Russia is weak) to the
    nuclear level (where Russian capabilities are relatively more
    developed). If the United States takes the bait and deploys new systems
    closer to Russian territory, it will only legitimate Putin's gamble and
    provoke further nuclear brinksmanship, including arms racing behavior.
    This would create a divide in the alliance between countries that favor
    a nuclear response and those that do not, distracting attention from
    the difficult task of formulating a robust package of steps to promote
    conventional deterrence. Furthermore, it would dilute international
    disapproval of Russia's nuclear brinksmanship, creating new problems
    for U.S. diplomats who are attempting to hold together an ailing
    nonproliferation regime. Russia's strategy is specifically designed to
    cover aggression at the subconventional level by generating friction at
    the nuclear level. U.S. nuclear forces cannot deter paramilitary
    operations, low-level cyber operations, or other hybrid actions
    designed to destabilize the countries that form NATO's eastern borders.
    The United States should continue its current policy for confronting
    Russian hostility--by prepositioning equipment, training allied
    militaries, and improving readiness to ensure that NATO can defend
    itself if challenged.
                                     ______

                       QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
        Mr. Cooper. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic
    stability?
        Dr. Murdock. While there is little consensus on how to define
    ``strategic stability,'' most would agree that strategic stability is
    desirable, particularly for status quo powers like the United States.
    In my most recent work (as yet unpublished), I've characterized the
    current and near-term security environment as ``Growing Great Power
    Competition in an Age of Rising Disorder.'' In my assessment, the three
    greatest near-term threats to international order and stability are
    Russia, China and Islamic Extremism, with the latter taking two forms:
    as a state-like actor threatening regional stability and as an
    ideological movement that conducts and inspires terrorism. Nuclear-
    armed regional ``rogue'' states (such as North Korea today and perhaps
    Iran in the future) also pose significant challenges to stability, both
    global and regional. While nuclear terrorism has been elevated by some
    as the top ``nuclear danger,'' I believe that the risks to strategic
    stability from nuclear-armed states is rising and constitute the
    ``greatest'' risk, in part because the effort involved in non-state
    actors' acquisition of a nuclear device is both harder than initially
    thought and getting harder because of improved nuclear material
    security.
        Mr. Cooper. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic
    stability?
        Dr. Payne. The greatest risks to contemporary strategic stability
    are the expansionist goals, nuclear doctrines and growing nuclear
    capabilities of states hostile to the United States and allies, as
    discussed in Question 7 above. In particular, the nuclear doctrines of
    key states suggest the belief that their threats of nuclear employment
    or actual nuclear employment are viable options in support of
    expansionist foreign policies designed to enlarge their respective
    areas of geopolitical dominance. I believe that Russia and China seek
    to use nuclear coercive threats and their significantly growing nuclear
    arsenals to support expansionist foreign policies that are intended to
    destroy the geopolitical structures in place in Europe and Asia since
    the end of World War II. These Russian and Chinese goals and means
    place key U.S. allies and interests in increasingly vulnerable and
    risky positions, and create the prospects for regional crises that
    could escalate to nuclear war in the absence of a strong U.S.
    deterrent. In short, I believe the greatest threats to stability stem
    from the prospects that Russia and/or China will overreach in their
    respective expansionism and use of nuclear coercion in the belief that
    the United States and allies will concede to their threats and military
    activities. The greatest risks to stability follow from these Russian
    and Chinese goals and the apparent fact that both intend to support
    those goals with coercive nuclear threats. The large expenditures
    Russia and China have been devoting to developing and deploying new
    nuclear forces underscores the apparent high value they place on these
    capabilities.
        Mr. Cooper. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic
    stability?
        Mr. Colby. I understand strategic stability to be a situation in
    which, between two states possessed of survivable large-scale nuclear
    forces, neither side has an incentive to use nuclear weapons except for
    vindication of its vital interests.\9\ That is, unlike some conceptions
    of strategic stability, I am as concerned about specifying the
    conditions under which nuclear use would be appropriate as those under
    which they would not. This is because, for strategic stability to be a
    constructive concept, it must capture the positive elements of the so-
    called ``nuclear revolution''--those that promote peace and stability--
    while seeking to minimize or eliminate the essentially ancillary or
    accidental reasons that states might employ nuclear weapons. Without
    serving both masters, carrying through on such a conception risks
    focusing too much on narrowing the legitimate uses of nuclear weapons
    to the extent that major sub-nuclear aggression could become
    increasingly ``thinkable''--which would itself be the most likely route
    to nuclear use.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ For a fuller description of my understanding of ``strategic
    stability,'' see Colby, ``Reconciling Stability and Deterrence.''
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In a ``strategically stable'' situation, the presence of nuclear
    weapons would effectively deter war, aggression, and coercion, but the
    weapons themselves would only be used for these purposes rather than
    for essentially peripheral or accidental reasons. We should want a
    situation in which both we and those nations with which we are in a
    relationship of strategic stability--essentially Russia and China--
    would only use nuclear weapons because we really wanted to telegraph to
    the other side that it had crossed a most fundamental red line--and not
    for any other reason.
        I therefore see threats to strategic stability arising from two
    sides. On one side are the very real and increasingly serious risks
    that certain capabilities, postures, and actions of one or both sides
    might result in miscalculation, accident, misperception and emotion
    leading to nuclear escalation that nobody really seeks. These are the
    kinds of peripheral or accidental reasons to use nuclear weapons that
    we should want to eliminate or at least minimize as a potential cause
    of employment.
        Because of the rapidly evolving military-technological environment
    and the unfortunately growing possibility of conflict between the
    United States and China or Russia, I am increasingly worried about the
    potential for such factors to lead to unnecessary nuclear use. In
    particular, I fear that the evolution of military technology and
    national military postures pose a rising possibility of generating
    misperception, misunderstanding, or undue anxieties on the part of one
    or more of these states with respect to their core capabilities or
    valued assets to such a degree that such concerns could lead to the
    fearful side using nuclear weapons without the other side understanding
    that its actions would generate such a response.
        For instance, I am concerned that the introduction of new
    technologies and capabilities into domains such as cyberspace and
    space/counterspace could cause one or more of these states to worry
    about the effectiveness and reliability of its/their nuclear command
    and control systems, which might impel it/them to consider using
    nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict--even if the other side did not
    intend to undermine this vital capability. Likewise, I fear that the
    United States and these other states do not share common perceptions of
    what is and what is not escalatory--including which targets are
    considered of particular value and which are not--which could also lead
    to this kind of essentially unnecessary or accidental nuclear
    employment.
        Because of these concerns, I believe that governmental (especially)
    and non-governmental efforts to understand, develop, and shape U.S.,
    Russian, and Chinese perceptions of these risks, and to minimize each
    state's reasons for nuclear use while protecting U.S.--and, to the
    degree obligatory--other states' interests is an increasingly valuable
    exercise. Ideally, each of these states should think of using its
    nuclear forces only to vindicate its truly vital interests--and not for
    ``use or lose'' or other such solely military-operational reasons.
        I also worry, however, about the risks to the other side of the
    strategic stability balancing equation. For instance, I am worried that
    nuclear weapons will be so marginalized in national--particularly
    U.S.--policy that an adversary may unduly discount the probability of
    U.S. use in the event the United States is seriously challenged. As
    crucial as it is to minimize the chances that nuclear weapons will be
    used for less than fundamental reasons, it is equally critical to
    reinforce the perception that nuclear weapons could very well be used
    on behalf of precisely such fundamental reasons. If adversaries--
    particularly U.S. adversaries--do not fully understand or believe this,
    then we run the risk that they are more likely to do things more
    inimical to U.S. interests, things that could well lead to war and
    indeed nuclear war. Thus if we do not adequately foreshadow our will to
    use nuclear weapons in the face of acts that gravely threaten our vital
    interests, we risk courting the very circumstances we seek to avoid by
    sidelining nuclear weapons in our national policies.
        For this reason, I believe that we should shift our discussion of
    and policies regarding nuclear weapons away from a focus on
    ``reducing'' their role and on actively pursuing a world without
    nuclear weapons. These stances, coupled with much of the discourse
    about nuclear weapons in and around the U.S. government, telegraph--
    sometimes quite strongly--to friend and foe that the United States
    might balk at using nuclear weapons, even in the ``extreme
    circumstances'' the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report rightly set as
    the only conditions under which the United States would contemplate
    such employment. Instead, the United States should concentrate on
    ``minimizing'' its reliance on nuclear weapons and talk about the
    importance of promoting ``stability'' and responsible stewardship of
    such destructive weapons--objectives that are consistent with the
    equally important emphasis the United States should give to
    telegraphing its will and capability to use nuclear weapons if
    sufficiently provoked. Under this rubric, capabilities, such as those
    for discriminate use, that indicate the U.S. resolve and ability to use
    nuclear weapons can thus contribute to rather than detract from
    stability.
        Mr. Cooper. Former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
    Winnefeld noted in a June 2015 hearing before our subcommittee that ``I
    would say that it is very important that the Russians understand that
    far from being deescalatory, first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict
    like that, it risks uncontrolled escalation . . . it is almost
    impossible to completely predict what the outcome would be of such a
    use of nuclear weapons, however small.'' What are the odds that we
    could control escalation? And what are the risks of using a small
    nuclear weapon to ``de-escalate'' a conflict? And what are the risks of
    introducing more ``usable'' weapon into the nuclear deterrent?
        Dr. Blechman. Any use of any nuclear weapon, no matter how small,
    would raise grave risks of uncontrolled escalation. The ``fog of war,''
    present in any conflict, would be multiplied many times if nuclear
    weapons were used because of their effects on sensors and
    communications. In addition, it's hard to understand how the two sides
    would bring the conflict to a close. If Russia initiated nuclear use,
    NATO would almost certainly feel compelled to respond in kind. Perhaps
    the two sides would come to their senses at that point, but it's just
    as compelling to assume that the Russians might try again, this time
    escalating against new types of targets. We recently simulated a
    conflict in Estonia in which the Russian side used two nuclear weapons
    against NATO military targets and NATO responded with two weapons of
    its own against Russian military targets, all on Estonian territory. We
    assumed that the war ended at that point. Even such a small conflict (4
    weapons total) resulted in roughly 100,000 fatalities, 70 percent of
    which were civilians, and the destruction of one-half of Estonia's GDP.
    Nuclear weapons are not particularly effective weapons against military
    targets; precision conventional munitions are. Nukes are good for one
    thing--destroying large areas and killing everything within the area.
    On the other hand, I do not believe that introducing lower yield or
    more accurate weapons (``more usable'') makes nuclear use any more
    likely. A decision to use a nuclear weapon would be such a historic and
    difficult one, because of the risks of escalation, that questions about
    yield etc pale in comparison.
        Mr. Cooper. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic
    stability?
        Dr. Blechman. Currently, I believe the greatest risks to strategic
    stability come from the irresponsible statements and nuclear threats of
    Russian leaders, and from the provocative behavior of their nuclear-
    capable aircraft, ships, and submarines. During the Cold War, military
    commanders on the two sides worked out arrangements to avoid
    inadvertent accidents or provocations by their forces. The Russians now
    seem to be deliberately violating those agreements and risking
    clashes--using this bravado to cover up their conventional inferiority.
    In response, some government officials and so-called ``experts'' in
    NATO countries are urging that the alliance reemphasize its tactical
    nuclear posture and even move tactical nuclear weapons farther to the
    East. Any such action only plays into the Russians' game. The more
    effective NATO action would be to strengthen its conventional
    capabilities to promptly defend the Baltic states and other member
    nations east of Germany, and to provide Ukraine with the means to
    defend itself from further Russian aggression.
        Mr. Cooper. Do you believe we need to forward-deploy additional
    nuclear weapons? Why/why not?
        Dr. Blechman. I do not think we need to deploy additional nuclear
    weapons overseas and, in fact, think we should permit the weapons we
    now deploy in Europe to live out their natural lifetimes (about ten
    more years) and then withdraw and dismantle them. When Soviet armored
    forces threatened NATO on the intra-German border, stationing U.S.
    nuclear warheads in Germany and other NATO members made some sense to
    add credibility to the Alliance's then-first use policy. Now, however,
    that any Russian aggression would take place far to the East of
    Germany, it is unrealistic to believe that the countries in which these
    U.S. warheads are stationed would permit their aircraft and crews to
    deliver nuclear strikes in a war with Russia. Moreover, the aircraft
    planned to deliver them would have a difficult time penetrating Russian
    air defenses. Deterrence of Russian nuclear use and, if necessary,
    response to any such use can be carried out by U.S. strategic forces
    far more effectively than by the handful of U.S. tactical weapons now
    in Europe. If a crisis were to break out threatening a war involving
    Russia and a member of NATO, U.S. B-2 bombers armed with nuclear
    weapons could be stationed in Europe as a signal to Russia not to
    consider initiating a nuclear conflict and, if necessary, to be used in
    response to a Russian attack. Forward-deploying nuclear weapons in the
    Pacific would be particularly counter-productive as it would be viewed
    as extremely provocative by China and make diplomatic solutions to the
    conflicts in that region virtually impossible.
        Mr. Cooper. What are the benefits for the United States of
    ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?
        Dr. Blechman. China has stated repeatedly that it would ratify the
    CTBT if the U.S. does it first. As China has had only a fraction of the
    nuclear tests than the U.S., and has never tested the warhead now being
    deployed on its new ICBMs, it would be a real advantage to the U.S. to
    place an obstacle in the way of further nuclear tests by China.
    Further, if the U.S. and China were to ratify the Treaty, it would put
    additional pressure on the six additional states necessary for the
    treaty to enter into force--placing a permanent ban on further nuclear
    developments. This would reinforce the taboo on nuclear use and make
    the world a far safer place.
        Mr. Cooper. Former Vice-Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral
    Winnefeld noted in a June 2015 hearing before our subcommittee that ``I
    would say that it is very important that the Russians understand that
    far from being deescalatory, first use of nuclear weapons in a conflict
    like that, it risks uncontrolled escalation . . . it is almost
    impossible to completely predict what the outcome would be of such a
    use of nuclear weapons, however small.'' What are the odds that we
    could control escalation? And what are the risks of using a small
    nuclear weapon to ``de-escalate'' a conflict? And what are the risks of
    introducing more ``usable'' weapon into the nuclear deterrent?
        Dr. Mount. In June, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work warned
    Russia that, ``anyone who thinks they can control escalation through
    the use of nuclear weapons is literally playing with fire.'' This
    applies to the U.S. defense planners as well, who have long understood
    that nuclear escalation is unpredictable and hazardous and should be
    employed only as a last resort. Russia developed this policy of
    escalate-to-deescalate as a means of compensating for conventional
    inferiority (like we did with President Eisenhower's New Look policy in
    the 1950s)--the United States has a far stronger hand at the
    conventional level and as a result has less need to resort to highly
    risky nuclear gambits. The introduction of new ``usable'' weapons holds
    tremendous risks. They would demonstrate to the rest of the world that
    even with our enormous advantage in conventional forces, we feel that
    it is necessary to procure usable nuclear forces. Nonnuclear countries
    would feel emboldened to seek nuclear weapons, while nuclear countries
    would race to make their forces more usable. Work continued by saying,
    ``escalation is escalation, and nuclear use would be the ultimate
    escalation.'' There is scant evidence that either we or the Russians
    would understand a ``tactical'' nuclear strike any differently from one
    delivered by other means. For this reason, it is not clear that any
    nuclear weapon is more or less usable than another: any use of a
    nuclear weapon would hold enormous risks and would provide no assurance
    that it would have a positive or calculable effect on a crisis.
        Mr. Cooper. What do you view as the greatest risks to strategic
    stability?
        Dr. Mount. Almost by definition, the greatest risk to strategic
    stability is the belief that nuclear deterrence can be denied,
    circumvented, or overcome. There are many examples of this today. The
    urge to conduct a nuclear or nonnuclear preventive strike against an
    enemy's arsenal, the development of nonnuclear weapons that threaten
    nuclear systems (including cyber and hypersonics), refusals to accept
    mutual vulnerability, development of new nuclear capabilities, and the
    belief that nuclear escalation can be controlled--each of these trends
    to a greater or lesser extent undermines nuclear deterrence to the
    detriment of strategic stability. Strategic stability between nuclear
    powers depends on a willingness to accept vulnerability; refusal to do
    so does not increase a country's security but only increases the risk
    that a nuclear weapon will be used.
        Mr. Cooper. Do you believe we need to forward-deploy additional
    nuclear weapons? Why/why not?
        Dr. Mount. Absolutely not. The United States currently possesses an
    ability to strike any point on earth at short notice with a variety of
    warhead yields. Forward deployment of nuclear weapons, whether in Asia
    or in Europe, would not enhance this capability. The political signal
    it would send to our allies in either region would be that conventional
    deterrence and defense is impossible and it would alienate allies like
    in both regions who are skeptical of the utility of nuclear weapons.
    Instead, new deployments to either region would almost certainly
    provoke reciprocal steps from adversaries, which would in turn be seen
    as threats to the United States. The United States should not send the
    signal that it believes its strategic capabilities are incredible as
    threats and require enhancement: instead, we should maintain that
    nuclear weapons are not useful tools for the resolution of political
    disputes and resolutely demonstrate our ability to defend against any
    attack with conventional means. ?
        Mr. Cooper. What are the benefits for the United States of
    ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty?
        Dr. Mount. Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is
    critical to national security over the long term. The United States has
    a very strong interest in minimizing the influence of nuclear weapons
    and to prevent the spread of nuclear technology around the world.
    Ratifying the CTBT would decrease the likelihood that U.S. adversaries
    would develop new capabilities and make it almost certain that the
    international community would detect and punish any clandestine nuclear
    test. The International Monitoring System requires that the CTBT enter
    into force in order to proceed to complete, test, and validate its
    extensive network of monitoring stations and laboratories, 282 of which
    are currently in place--84% of the total system. With 337 facilities
    planned in 89 countries, the IMS is truly a wonder of the modern world
    and an indispensable tool in the effort to prevent the world's most
    dangerous weapons from being used against the U.S. homeland or the U.S.
    Armed Forces. Moreover, ratification of the CTBT would strengthen the
    U.S. commitment to the global nuclear nonproliferation regime at a time
    when it is highly vulnerable. Every year, the NNSA's Stockpile
    Stewardship program yields new knowledge about the physics of nuclear
    explosions, a program which is unmatched anywhere in the world. In this
    way, ratifying the CTBT would help to lock in the American advantage in
    nuclear technology, preventing other countries from developing
    efficient and miniaturized warheads. By any measure, the CTBT is in the
    American interest.
                                     ______

                      QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
        Mr. Garamendi. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4-5% of
    the defense budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg
    the question: what would you do with less? How would your plans change
    with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the
    least important part of your nuclear posture?
        Dr. Murdock. As I have indicated in QFR #5, I believe that 4-5% of
    the defense budget to sustain and modernize a safe, secure, reliable
    and effective nuclear deterrence is certainly affordable, and as, in
    the words of former Secretary of Defense Hagel, the nation's ``highest
    priority defense mission'' should be adequately sourced. In my opinion,
    the defense budget would have to be cut well below the Budget Control
    Act caps before I would consider reducing the U.S. nuclear budget
    significantly below the $35 billion per year in 2013 dollars level
    assumed in the Project Atom study effort. That having been said and in
    the spirit of being responsive, not all elements of the current nuclear
    posture (SLBMs, ICBMs, dual-capable bombers and tactical aircraft) are
    of equal value in my opinion. Since the United States must retain an
    assured retaliation capability, the survivability of U.S. nuclear
    forces is a key requirement. Currently, the U.S. relies on SLBMs to
    meet this need, but there are alternatives such as mobile ICBMs, an
    option that I believe should be explored, in part because replacing the
    SLBM ``leg'' consumes over 60 percent of the nuclear modernization
    budget. ICBMs provide both stability (by raising the bar for any pre-
    emptive attack) and a hedge against possible SLBM vulnerability, plus
    the near-term cost of sustaining ICBMs is low. The U.S. Air Force is
    already committed to a new fleet of penetrating bombers for
    conventional attack missions, and making it nuclear-capable is
    relatively inexpensive, in part because the B61 bomb life extension is
    well under way. I think it is critical that the Air Force plans for
    making F-35A nuclear capable be implemented, since I believe that the
    risks of a highly-proliferated world are increasing, which will
    increase the need for forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons. While cost
    considerations should be a factor in determining what the future U.S.
    nuclear posture should be, I repeat what I said before--the U.S. needs
    a safe, secure, reliable and effective nuclear force and can afford to
    pay the price for it at levels of defense spending anywhere near the
    current budget.
        Mr. Garamendi. What role do conventional strike capabilities play
    in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies'
    expectations about the weapons with which we will respond in the event
    that mutual defense is necessary?
        Dr. Murdock. U.S. conventional precision strike capabilities are
    critical to how this nation conducts military operations and are a key
    contributor to the margin of military superiority that the United
    States currently possesses. However, when it comes to the deterrence of
    nuclear attacks against the United States and its allies, I do not
    believe that U.S. conventional strike capabilities play much of a role,
    if any. It is the threat of nuclear retaliation that deters nuclear
    attacks. In the event that an ally under the ``U.S. nuclear umbrella''
    was attacked with a nuclear weapon by a regional adversary, that ally
    would be disappointed if the United States responded with a
    conventional-only attack. The principal, but not sole, purpose of U.S.
    nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. and its
    allies. U.S. conventional strikes, in my view, do not figure in this
    equation, although they may increase the need for U.S. nuclear
    deterrence--to counter U.S. conventional superiority (particularly in
    precision strike), potential adversaries will increase their reliance
    on nuclear weapons to ``offset'' the U.S. conventional advantage,
    which, in turn, makes it necessary for the United States to increase
    the credibility and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.
        Mr. Garamendi. Current policy states that the United States will
    respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with
    nuclear weapons. Should the United States adopt a ``no first use''
    policy, which would deemphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in
    our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our interactions
    with other nuclear weapons states?
        Dr. Murdock. The United States has always maintained a policy of
    ``strategic ambiguity'' with respect to the precise circumstances under
    which the President would authorize the employment of a U.S. nuclear
    weapon. This made sense during the Cold War, when our deterrent posture
    in NATO clearly implied that we would use a nuclear weapon in response
    to major Soviet conventional aggression; and it makes sense today, even
    though U.S. conventional superiority makes it unlikely that the United
    States would be the first to employ a nuclear weapon in a non-nuclear
    conflict. No one can predict with great confidence what future
    contingencies might be so stressful, urgent and existential in nature
    that a President might contemplate employing a nuclear weapon.
    Moreover, those circumstances are so exceptional that what we say
    during peacetime about what our policy would be under those
    circumstances has little foundation in past history. In a fundamental
    sense, we really don't know what a future President would or should do
    in that unprecedented situation. Conflicts between nuclear-armed states
    will always have a ``nuclear shadow'' over them, which, as far as I am
    concerned, makes ``strategic ambiguity'' both prescriptive (as a policy
    recommendation) and descriptive (as a description of the circumstances
    in which a nuclear weapon might be employed).
        Mr. Garamendi. What importance do our NATO allies place in the
    presence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be
    satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian
    allies?
        Dr. Murdock. I believe that the importance of forward-deployed U.S.
    nuclear weapons has been undervalued both today and during the Cold
    War. At the height of the Cold War, the United States had about 7,000
    nuclear weapons deployed in NATO-Europe and 3,000 nuclear weapons
    deployed in the Pacific theater, including almost 1,000 weapons on the
    Korean peninsula. The physical presence of these nuclear weapons
    ensured that a major war would ``go nuclear'' and possibly involve
    nuclear attacks on the homelands of the Communist aggressors without
    directly involving the American homeland. The ``coupling'' of the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent and the security of our allies worked. Russia's
    aggressive behavior toward Ukraine (including the illegal seizure of
    Crimea) and North Korea's ascension to the world's ``nuclear club'' has
    raised nuclear anxieties both in Europe, particularly in the
    ``frontline states'' on Russia's border, and in Asia. I quote from my
    Project Atom report: When security anxieties are acute, ``reassurance''
    or ``assurance'' is most reliably provided by credible extended
    deterrence--if the adversaries of American allies are deterred, the
    allies will be assured. Deterring regional adversaries from ``going
    nuclear'' requires credible nuclear responses to their nuclear attack
    options. Forward deploying a robust set of discriminate nuclear
    response options conveys the message that the United States will
    ``respond in kind'' and proportionately to nuclear attacks on its
    allies. The credibility of that message is reinforced because the U.S.
    homeland would not be engaged in the U.S. response to a nuclear attack
    on a regional ally, which leaves the burden on the regional aggressor
    to escalate to the level of ``homeland exchanges.'' The price, however,
    for this more credible U.S. ``nuclear umbrella,'' is likely to the
    ally's willingness to host U.S. nuclear weapons. This is what will
    constitute ``nuclear burden sharing'' in 2025-2050. An Asan Institute
    public opinion poll taken at the same time that a U.S. B-2 overflew
    Seoul indicated that over half of the Japanese public wanted U.S.
    nuclear weapons re-deployed to South Korea and, failing that, would
    want their own nuclear weapon. If security circumstances should worsen
    as the competition between the great powers intensifies, I expect that
    none of our allies ``will be satisfied with the nuclear force structure
    we currently offer our Asian allies.''
        Mr. Garamendi. How would you recommend the United States structure
    our forces to respond to Russia's nuclear deescalation policy? How
    could the United States respond without developing new tactical nuclear
    capabilities?
        Dr. Murdock. In my Project Atom report, I made the following
    argument: In ``the second nuclear age,'' potential U.S. adversaries are
    thinking through how they might actually employ a nuclear weapon, both
    early in a conflict and in a discriminate manner, to get the United
    States to ``back off'' in a conflict. U.S. nuclear forces were designed
    for a global conflict involving the exchange of thousands of high-yield
    weapons, not limited exchanges of low-yield weapons. Since most U.S.
    nuclear response options are large, ``dirty,'' and inflict significant
    collateral damage, the United States might be ``self-deterred'' and not
    respond ``in kind'' to discriminate nuclear attacks. U.S. conventional
    superiority establishes escalation control for the United States at the
    conventional level and causes its adversaries to think about breaking
    the nuclear threshold. The United States needs discriminate nuclear
    options at all rungs of the escalation ladder to make that option
    unattractive as well. Russia's ``nuclear deescalation policy''
    envisions that Russia will employ a nuclear weapons (that is, nuclear
    escalation) in order to de-escalate a conflict with a conventionally-
    superior adversary. I believe that a credible and effective deterrent
    to this policy is a robust set of discriminate options so that the
    United States can ``respond in kind'' and proportionately to any
    Russian employment of a nuclear weapons. I believe this means
    developing new nuclear capabilities because the Russian are known to be
    developing and procuring nuclear weapons that are not in the current
    U.S. nuclear inventory. While I have never liked the term ``tactical
    nuclear weapon'' because any use of a nuclear weapon will have
    strategic consequences, I believe that an effective and credible
    response to Russia's ``nuclear deescalation policy'' will require that
    the United States develop ``new tactical nuclear capabilities.'' Doing
    so will communicate to the Russians that we are preparing for this
    contingency and are ready to respond with a proportionate nuclear
    response to any Russian nuclear attack. This will strengthen the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent; failing to do so will weaken it.
        Mr. Garamendi. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4-5% of
    the defense budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg
    the question: what would you do with less? How would your plans change
    with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the
    least important part of your nuclear posture?
        Dr. Payne. Part of my response to Question 13 also is pertinent in
    response to this question and thus is repeated here. Identifying the
    most effective deterrence strategy cannot be done prudently on the
    basis of first defining the percentage of the DOD budget that will be
    devoted to this priority goal--budgets should follow strategy and
    strategic priorities, they should not be the driving factor. Rather,
    the character of the threat environment and the priority of various
    defense programs are the basic determinants of the appropriate budget
    share. This is a key point because ensuring effective nuclear
    deterrence has been identified as the highest defense priority by
    senior U.S. officials and the corresponding requirements for deterrence
    can shift dramatically depending on the threat environment. This
    prioritization is a reflection of severe emerging threats, including
    developments in Russia's foreign policy, nuclear doctrine and forces,
    and the basic fact that the deterrence of nuclear war must be
    considered an enduring priority goal. Indeed, if nuclear deterrence
    fails dramatically, many other U.S. goals and capabilities become
    irrelevant. Correspondingly, within broad margins, U.S. capabilities
    intended to deter severe threats warrant whatever budget commitment is
    needed to provide and sustain the capabilities judged critical to
    support that goal. Indeed, it is extremely fortunate that the goals of
    nuclear deterrence and assurance may be adequately supported at this
    point by a nuclear modernization program that demands such a modest
    percentage of the DOD budget--reportedly under 5 percent annually per
    current nuclear modernization plans through 2030. But, at the end of
    the day, that budget percentage should not be considered fixed because
    it must shift according to the threat environment and the continuing
    priority need for effective nuclear deterrence and assurance.
        My recommendation for dealing with any unavoidable budget cuts
    follows from my basic conclusion that the most important metric for the
    adequacy of the U.S. nuclear posture is its flexibility and resilience.
    Consequently, if cost reductions must be taken from the already small
    fraction of the DOD budget devoted to U.S. nuclear capabilities,
    reductions should be done so as to preserve as much as possible the
    flexibility and resilience of the U.S. nuclear posture. Thus, for
    example, in my view, sustaining the nuclear triad, forward-based DCA
    and a diversity of threat options would be priorities in any necessary
    budget reductions because those capabilities contribute significantly
    to U.S. adaptability.
        Mr. Garamendi. What role do conventional strike capabilities play
    in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies'
    expectations about the weapons with which we will respond in the event
    that mutual defense is necessary?
        Dr. Payne. Conventional strategic threat options are an important
    ingredient in a flexible U.S. deterrent force posture. Indeed, one of
    my recommendations is for greater U.S. emphasis on CPGS threat options.
    Depending on the case, optimal deterrence strategies may take advantage
    of U.S. non-military threats, conventional force threats, nuclear
    threats, or a combination of these. The importance of U.S. conventional
    threats in any particular contingency will depend on the unique details
    of that contingency. But, in some plausible cases U.S. conventional
    deterrent threats may be sufficiently credible and lethal to support
    U.S. deterrence goals. In those cases, it will be fully reasonable for
    the United States to rely on conventional capabilities to support its
    deterrence goals. It should be noted, however, that in those cases
    wherein conventional forces are adequate for the immediate deterrence
    task, U.S. nuclear capabilities may remain critical to deter a nuclear-
    armed opponent (or an opponent armed with chemical or biological
    weapons) from escalating to WMD use as the means of overcoming U.S.
    conventional threats. Relying on U.S. conventional threats for
    deterrence may have the unintended consequence of leading opponents to
    plan increasingly on employing WMD capabilities as the most likely
    means of overcoming U.S. conventional-based deterrence strategies.
    Russia certainly appears to have moved in that doctrinal direction.
    Consequently, even in those cases where U.S. conventional forces are
    deemed adequate for immediate deterrence purposes, U.S. nuclear
    deterrent capabilities may be critical to control an opponent's
    escalation to WMD use as the means to trump U.S. conventional
    capabilities.
        Key U.S. allies expect and rely on the United States to provide the
    combination of deterrent threats necessary to preserve their security.
    This includes the full spectrum of U.S. capabilities. This approach can
    be clearly seen in the most recent open NATO strategy document, which
    by consensus calls for a combination of nuclear and conventional
    capabilities for deterrence.
        Mr. Garamendi. Current policy states that the United States will
    respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with
    nuclear weapons. Should the United States adopt a ``no first use''
    policy, which would deemphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in
    our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our interactions
    with other nuclear weapons states?
        Dr. Payne. The United States should not adopt a ``no first use''
    declaratory policy. Doing so would contribute to opponents' possible
    perceptions, encouraged by such a U.S. policy declaration, that they
    could use chemical or biological weapons against the United States and
    allies without fear of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Given public reports
    that some prospective foes retain chemical and/or biological weapons
    (CBW), effectively undermining the U.S. nuclear deterrent of opponents'
    CBW would be imprudent in the extreme. Indeed, it should be noted that
    U.S. leaders stated openly in the past that the United States was able
    to go forward with the international conventions against CBW
    specifically because the United States would retain nuclear weapons to
    deter CBW threats. A ``no first use'' policy would destroy that logic.
        Adopting a ``no first use'' policy also would undermine U.S.
    assurance goals for many key allies who rightly consider themselves
    vulnerable to their opponents' conventionally superior forces. Such a
    U.S. declaratory policy would essentially tell opponents that the U.S.
    nuclear deterrent does not apply to their prospective use of
    overwhelming conventional force against our allies, or their use of CBW
    against our allies. That is why I consider a ``no first use'' policy to
    be highly destabilizing in some cases, and also why many of our allies
    have warned against U.S. adoption of such a policy. I should add that
    there is no evidence whatsoever that a U.S. ``no first use'' policy
    would promote good will and benign behavior by opponents that might
    mitigate these problems.
        Mr. Garamendi. What importance do our NATO allies place in the
    presence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be
    satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian
    allies?
        Dr. Payne. NATO allies are somewhat divided in opinion regarding
    the value of U.S. forward-based nuclear systems (FBS)--with the
    division generally following understandable geographical lines. In
    particular, those NATO members that neighbor Russia and were former
    members of the Warsaw Pact, and those NATO members that were located
    within the Cold War borders of the Soviet Union, appear to place great
    significance on the deterrence and assurance value of U.S. FBS. In
    fact, these countries have recently been the target of numerous nuclear
    threats from Russian leaders. There is considerable evidence from open
    leadership comments in these cases that these NATO members do not
    believe that they can be assured adequately by U.S. central strategic
    nuclear systems alone. It should be noted that there also appears to be
    increasing concern shown by Asian allies, particularly including South
    Korea, about U.S. reliance on central strategic nuclear systems alone
    for deterrence and their assurance. Public opinion polling in South
    Korea, for example, has revealed considerable popular support for the
    return of U.S. nuclear forces to South Korea.
        Mr. Garamendi. How would you recommend the United States structure
    our forces to respond to Russia's nuclear deescalation policy? How
    could the United States respond without developing new tactical nuclear
    capabilities?
        Dr. Payne. The Russian nuclear ``de-escalation'' strategy is, in
    reality, a nuclear first-use strategy. And, as discussed in Questions 7
    and 9 above, the premise underlying this strategy is that Russia could
    threaten to employ, or in fact employ nuclear weapons in a limited,
    discriminate fashion without triggering a U.S. strategic nuclear
    response. The U.S. would, in effect, be expected to be deterred from
    responding in a forceful way to a severe Russian regional provocation,
    and would, instead, concede to Russian limited nuclear threats or
    limited nuclear use for fear of further Russian nuclear escalation. If
    so, U.S. and NATO deterrence strategies would have failed. U.S. leaders
    may find this an unreasonable expectation on the part of Moscow, but
    Russian leaders appear increasingly confident and have openly applied
    this strategy to its military occupation of Crimea.
        I believe that there are two main requirements to address this
    dangerous and destabilizing Russian nuclear first-use strategy. First,
    NATO and U.S. conventional capabilities need to be sufficiently robust
    in front-line areas to deny Russia the possibility of presenting the
    U.S. and NATO with a fait accompli following a rapid advance into NATO
    or other neighboring territories. In effect, NATO needs to counter
    President Putin's claim that Russian troops could be in five NATO
    capitals within two days.
        Second, U.S. and NATO nuclear capabilities need to be able to deny
    Moscow any confidence that the United States would have so few local
    nuclear options that limited Russian nuclear employment would
    essentially be followed by U.S. and NATO conciliation. Sustaining U.S.
    FBS and flexible nuclear threat options would likely be an important
    contribution to this goal: Western reliance on central strategic
    nuclear systems and conventional forces for deterrence in the region
    could simply confirm the apparent Russian expectation that its nuclear
    threats or employment would defeat a Western conventional defense and
    operate below the Western strategic nuclear deterrence threshold. I
    have not concluded at this point that ``new'' Western tactical nuclear
    weapons are necessary for this purpose. Matching the B-61 modernization
    program with forward-deployment of the F-35 may provide much of the
    needed flexibility and deterrent effect. There are other potential
    deployment options for a nuclear-capable F-35 that also could help
    address this problem without developing new U.S. tactical capabilities,
    as could adapting a number of U.S. missile warheads for a highly-
    discriminate, low-yield option.
        Mr. Garamendi. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4-5% of
    the defense budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg
    the question: what would you do with less? How would your plans change
    with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the
    least important part of your nuclear posture?
        Mr. Colby. The amount of spending allocated to nuclear forces and
    their associated capabilities, such as command and control, represent a
    relatively modest proportion of total national spending on defense--
    generally considered to be around five percent or less of the defense
    budget over the coming decades.\10\ Given the cornerstone importance of
    U.S. nuclear forces for our security and that of our allies, this is a
    very reasonable amount to spend on their modernization and maintenance.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ See Harrison and Montgomery, ``The Cost of U.S. Nuclear
    Forces: From BCA to Bow Wave and Beyond?'' 33.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For this reason, should the defense budget decline or other needs
    become more pressing, I would recommend protecting expenditures on
    nuclear forces and sacrificing investments in other areas of our
    military that serve more discretionary or elective rather than
    essential interests. That is, in such circumstances, we should not make
    a ``haircut'' across the defense budget. Rather, we should prioritize
    maintaining spending on those forces that are most important to our
    fundamental interests, such as nuclear forces, long-range strike and
    surveillance, and counter-terrorism capabilities, and decrease
    expenditures on less vital capabilities such as those oriented to
    stabilization and counterinsurgency operations or that have limited
    value in a more contested anti-access/area denial environment.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ For a similar view, see Andrew Krepinevich, ``Strategy in a
    Time of Austerity,'' Foreign Affairs (November/December 2012), 58-69.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        If the defense budget were to decline to a point at which decisions
    about which elements of the nuclear forces were to be retained became
    necessary, I would recommend maintaining the Triad and existing warhead
    plans but reducing the total numbers procured and/or altering their
    deployment schedules to reduce costs. It is important to note, in this
    respect, that proposals to remove a leg of the Triad may not even end
    up saving significant sums of money.
        Mr. Garamendi. What role do conventional strike capabilities play
    in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies'
    expectations about the weapons with which we will respond in the event
    that mutual defense is necessary?
        Mr. Colby. Conventional forces play an elemental role in our
    deterrence and extended deterrence strategies. Fundamentally, we
    reasonably seek to rely when possible and prudent on conventional
    forces to deter adversary attack and coercion against ourselves and our
    allies. We can do so both through the outright threat of defeat--so-
    called deterrence by denial--as well as the threat of punishment
    through the use of conventional forces--so-called deterrence by cost-
    imposition. Using conventional forces for these functions is, of
    course, preferable because one of the most compelling ways to try to
    keep a conflict from escalating to the nuclear level is by refraining
    from using our own nuclear weapons.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ It is important to note that conventional forces can prompt
    nuclear use, however, particularly if they are used to pursue ``total''
    objectives such as regime change or territorial conquest. Conventional-
    only strategies therefore, unless appropriately limited, can also drive
    nuclear use.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        This effort to rely on conventional forces for deterrence and
    defense is well-understood and a long-term aspiration of U.S. policy.
    Paul Nitze remarked during the INF hearings in 1988 that the first
    conversation he heard in government about replacing some degree of U.S.
    reliance on its nuclear arsenal with augmented conventional forces took
    place in 1949.\13\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ As Nitze put it: ``We have been working hard for a long period
    of time, for many, many years, to get closer balance in the
    conventional field. In fact, that goes back all the way to my personal
    experience in 1949, when we began this effort to improve the
    conventional balance and reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons. We
    tried and tried and tried.'' Testimony of Paul H. Nitze to the Senate
    Committee on Foreign Relations, January 28, 1988, available in The INF
    Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
    United States Senate. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office),
    311.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The issue today is not that conventional forces' role is
    underestimated in U.S. defense posture, planning, and policy--but
    rather that nuclear forces' role is. Indeed, not a few prominent policy
    leaders and government officials openly or privately express the view
    that the United States should not respond to adversary nuclear use with
    a nuclear strike of its own--let alone in the face of large-scale
    conventional attack that the United States and its allies cannot
    successfully repel.
        It is for this reason that a significant number of U.S. allies--
    particularly those that feel imperiled--privately and sometimes
    publicly plead or insist that the United States make clearer that it
    would use nuclear weapons if these allies were sufficiently attacked--
    and not only in cases of nuclear attack. It is well known, for
    instance, that Japan and South Korea strongly opposed efforts within
    the Obama Administration for the United States to adopt a ``no first
    use'' posture.\14\ Similar views are common elsewhere in the Asia-
    Pacific as well as in Eastern Europe and other parts of the NATO
    Alliance more concerned about the threat from Russia.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ See, inter alia, ``Japan Balks at Limits on U.S. Nukes,'' The
    Japan Times, September 15, 2009 and George Perkovich, Do Unto Others:
    Toward a Defensible Nuclear Doctrine (Washington, DC: Carnegie
    Endowment for International Peace, 2013), 2 and 21.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        It should be noted that, as in our own system, there are often
    differing views within allied governments and publics on extended
    nuclear deterrence and the conditions under which the United States
    should use nuclear weapons. Generally speaking, ministries of defense
    and security-conscious political leaderships tend to be more concerned
    about maintaining the salience of nuclear weapons in U.S. extended
    deterrence, while ministries of foreign affairs (especially disarmament
    bureaus) and disarmament-focused political leaderships tend to be more
    focused on minimizing their role.
        Mr. Garamendi. Current policy states that the United States will
    respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with
    nuclear weapons. Should the United States adopt a ``no first use''
    policy, which would deemphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in
    our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our interactions
    with other nuclear weapons states?
        Mr. Colby. The United States should not adopt a ``no first use''
    policy regarding nuclear weapons. Such a posture would be ill-advised
    for several reasons, especially in an era when our conventional
    military advantages are being challenged and in many respects are
    eroding.
        First, the United States benefits from the deterrent power of the
    possibility that it may use nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances
    not involving nuclear attack. Potential adversaries must calculate that
    the United States might well use nuclear weapons even if they find ways
    to do great damage to us, our allies, or our interests without
    resorting to nuclear weapons themselves. This means that adversaries
    can never hope to ``outwit'' U.S. nuclear deterrence and therefore adds
    to their caution in challenging the important interests of the United
    States. It is largely for this reason that many U.S. allies,
    particularly those that feel more threatened, tend strongly to oppose
    U.S. adoption of a ``no first use'' pledge.
        Second, the benefits of a ``no first use'' policy are not
    outweighed by its costs and risks. It is true that such a policy can
    strengthen an adversary's confidence that a war with the United States
    that it agrees to keep conventional is unlikely to go nuclear. This can
    reduce ``use or lose'' and instability pressures in the midst of a war.
    Yet this is not a dramatically different perception than is currently
    the case: the United States consistently gives the impression that it
    will only use nuclear weapons under ``extreme circumstances'' and has
    never employed them since 1945 despite being involved in several major
    conflicts. Adversaries very likely understand that the United States
    will only seriously consider employing nuclear weapons under such
    ``extreme'' conditions.
        There is a deeper problem with such a pledge, however. A ``no first
    use'' pledge can never be verified or enforced. Any state pledging a
    ``no first use'' policy--including the United States--can, therefore,
    always change its mind and renege on such a promise in the midst of a
    conflict.\15\ This means that an adversary, knowing this, may simply
    discount the value and scope of the ``no first use'' policy, in which
    case serious questions arise about the purpose and significance of the
    policy. What is the point of such a policy if an adversary acts as if
    it is irrelevant?
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ The United States quickly abandoned its nearly two centuries-
    old insistence on the protection of neutral shipping at the beginning
    of World War II in favor of pursuit of unrestricted submarine warfare.
    See, for instance, Joel Ira Holwitt, ``Execute against Japan'': The
    U.S. Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare (College
    Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2013).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Or, worse, an adversary may actually believe the policy and judge
    it sufficiently necessary or attractive in the midst of a war to take
    steps that compromise the most important interests of the United States
    or its allies without resorting to nuclear weapons. In such an
    eventuality, the United States will likely be pressed--including by its
    allies whose vital interests are the most likely to be at stake--to use
    nuclear weapons. In other words, an opponent that actually takes such a
    pledge at face value may be incentivized to create the very conditions
    that would provoke nuclear weapons use by the United States.
        Thus a ``no first use'' policy is likely either to be, at best, of
    marginal value or, at worst, to encourage the very conditions likely to
    prompt U.S. nuclear weapons employment. Accordingly, the United States
    should instead maintain ambiguity about the conditions under which it
    would use nuclear weapons, but emphasize that such a step would only be
    considered under ``extreme circumstances'' that impinge on the vital
    interests of itself or its allies. Thus U.S. adversaries and allies
    alike will continue to understand that the United States would only
    employ such terrible weapons under the most severe challenge, but that
    an adversary can never hope to ``end run'' U.S. restraint with respect
    to its nuclear forces to take advantage of the United States or its
    allies.
        Mr. Garamendi. What importance do our NATO allies place in the
    presence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be
    satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian
    allies?
        Mr. Colby. Given the size of and the diversity of perspectives
    among member-states within the Atlantic Alliance, there is substantial
    variation within NATO regarding the value of U.S. nuclear weapons
    forward-deployed in Europe. On the whole, member-states farther to the
    east that perceive themselves as more under threat, particularly from
    Russia, tend to place greater value on these weapons than those farther
    west. Moreover, there tends to be a divide within European governments
    and populaces, with ministries of defense and security-conscious
    political leaderships emphasizing the importance of such weapons, and
    ministries of foreign affairs (especially their disarmament bureaus)
    and disarmament-minded political leaderships underlining their
    demerits. This disagreement resulted in the somewhat mixed message
    about these weapons reflected in the 2012 NATO Deterrence and Defense
    Posture Review, which affirmed that NATO is ``a nuclear alliance'' but
    referred to the forward-deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons only in
    the context of expressing a willingness to reduce them in the context
    of mutual reductions with Russia.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ NATO, Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (May 20, 2012).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On the whole, however, it is worth observing that member-states
    have agreed that U.S. nuclear weapons should continue to be forward-
    deployed in Europe, testifying to their value. Moreover, calls for
    withdrawing these weapons have quieted and have fallen in credibility
    in light of Russia's threatening behavior and rhetoric since early
    2014.
        U.S. allies that perceive themselves as threatened by Russia have
    made it clear that they would not judge a force posture that the United
    States has pursued in Asia as attractive. While much of the value of
    U.S. forward-deployed weapons is symbolic, this symbolism is
    nonetheless important as it gives concrete evidence of the nuclear link
    between the United States and NATO/Europe and demonstrates the
    collective involvement of the Alliance member-states in the nuclear
    mission. Indeed, in point of fact, key U.S. allies in Asia,
    particularly in South Korea and Japan, are increasingly questioning the
    suitability of the U.S. model of extended nuclear deterrence in their
    region.
        Mr. Garamendi. How would you recommend the United States structure
    our forces to respond to Russia's nuclear deescalation policy? How
    could the United States respond without developing new tactical nuclear
    capabilities?
        Mr. Colby. While I strongly recommend that the United States
    modernize and adapt its nuclear forces to enable discriminate and
    relatively controlled employment, this is by no means the only
    important step needed to deal with Russia's de-escalation and broader
    military strategy. The nuclear element is the coup de grace of Moscow's
    strategy--but it only makes sense if Russia can use it to terminate a
    conflict to reap gains. To do this, Moscow needs conventional and
    irregular forces able to gain positions which can then be locked in
    through a nuclear ``escalate to deescalate'' strategy.
        To deal with this problem, the United States and NATO as a whole
    should focus on substantially strengthening their conventional military
    posture in Eastern Europe, including by forward-deploying more
    substantial forces in the Baltic States and Poland, strengthening
    Allied forces' ability to more effectively contest Russian anti-access/
    area denial capabilities, and enabling U.S. surge and reinforcement
    forces.\17\ It is worth emphasizing that at least some of these
    recommended steps, particularly the substantial reinforcement of the
    Baltic states, could be coupled with arms control proposals to
    Moscow.\18\ At the same time, eastern NATO member-states should focus
    on strengthening civil order capabilities to make it more difficult for
    Russia to create or exploit local conditions through the use of
    ``little green men,'' disinformation, and the like.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ For further development of these recommendations and the
    underlying problems they seek to address, see Colby and Solomon,
    ``Facing Russia: Conventional Defence and Deterrence in Europe.''
        \18\ For further development of this proposal, see Elbridge Colby,
    ``Step Up to Stand Down: The United States, NATO, and Dissuading
    Russian Aggression,'' Foreign Affairs, August 13, 2015, https://
    www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2015-08-13/step-stand-down.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Together, a discriminate nuclear posture, a more formidable
    conventional deterrent, and improved civil capabilities will present
    Moscow with a less inviting target than is the case today, and will
    accordingly make NATO safer.
        Mr. Garamendi. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4-5% of
    the defense budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg
    the question: what would you do with less? How would your plans change
    with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the
    least important part of your nuclear posture?
        Dr. Blechman. The minimal deterrent that I advocate would not
    require more than 3 percent of the defense budget. By reducing the
    submarine buy to 8 or 10 boats, reducing the ICBM force from 400 to 300
    missiles, making the minor improvements necessary to keep Minuteman
    effective into the 2040s, rather than replacing it with a new missile,
    withdrawing the tactical weapons from Europe and dismantling them, and
    cutting back current plans to modernize the nuclear infrastructure, I
    believe we can save a considerable amount of money that could be used
    to maintain the readiness and effectiveness of our conventional forces,
    and to invest in advanced technologies that can assure our continued
    conventional superiority.
        Mr. Garamendi. What role do conventional strike capabilities play
    in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies'
    expectations about the weapons with which we will respond in the event
    that mutual defense is necessary?
        Dr. Blechman. U.S. conventional strike capabilities are the central
    element in both our deterrent posture and in our capabilities to
    protect our allies from attacks--both in their perceptions and in fact.
    Although the allies see U.S. strategic nuclear forces as essential to
    deter nuclear attacks, they understand the primary threats to their
    security will come from conventional forces and the ability of their
    armed forces, combined with those of the U.S., to respond effectively
    to any such attack dissuades potential adversaries from even
    contemplating such actions.
        Mr. Garamendi. Current policy states that the United States will
    respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with
    nuclear weapons. Should the United States adopt a ``no first use''
    policy, which would deemphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in
    our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our interactions
    with other nuclear weapons states?
        Dr. Blechman. Personally, I don't believe that doctrinal statements
    are nearly as important as the actual capabilities and behavior of
    nations. Nonetheless, I believe the U.S. should adopt a policy that
    states that the only role of our nuclear weapons is to deter and, if
    necessary, to respond to a nuclear attack on ourselves or our allies. I
    believe this would strengthen our hand non-nuclear states and the Non-
    proliferation Treaty and would have no real effect on relations with
    nuclear weapon states.
        Mr. Garamendi. What importance do our NATO allies place in the
    presence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be
    satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian
    allies?
        Dr. Blechman. Prior to the Russian seizure of Crimea and
    intervention in Eastern Ukraine, many NATO allies were beginning to
    urge the removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Since
    then, however, and particularly in view of Russian threats and
    provocative military behavior in northern Europe, the members of NATO
    east of Germany, have put new emphasis on the need to maintain and even
    strengthen NATO's tactical nuclear posture. This is irrational in my
    view, as these weapons serve no military purpose, would be unlikely to
    be used in any conflict (as the host nations--Germany, Belgium,
    Netherlands, and Italy--would have to authorize their aircraft crews to
    deliver them), and their deterrent effect is negligible compared to
    that provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Still, one should
    expect considerable attention to be paid to these weapons at the NATO
    meeting in Warsaw in May and steps taken to re-energize attention paid
    to exercises and planning for these weapons.
        Mr. Garamendi. How would you recommend the United States structure
    our forces to respond to Russia's nuclear deescalation policy? How
    could the United States respond without developing new tactical nuclear
    capabilities?
        Dr. Blechman. The United States should make clear that any nuclear
    use--whatever the launching vehicle, range of the weapon, or it yield--
    will be met with an at least comparable nuclear response from U.S.
    strategic (long-range) nuclear forces. There is no need, in my view, to
    match Russian tactical forces when our strategic capabilities are far
    greater than necessary to completely destroy Russia and thereby deter
    any nuclear attack. If desirable, during a crisis in Europe that seemed
    to be leading to a conflict, the U.S. could deploy nuclear capable of
    long-range bombers to bases in Europe to signal the Russians that we
    were prepared for such a conflict and that they should not consider any
    nuclear use.
        Mr. Garamendi. Former Secretary of Defense Perry and former
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber recently wrote an op-ed
    calling on the president to cancel the planned acquisition of the Long-
    Range Standoff weapon, because it would be destabilizing. Do you
    believe this weapon is needed? Why or why not?
        Dr. Blechman. I believe the U.S. should give a high priority to
    developing and rapidly producing the new long-range stealthy,
    penetrating bomber. This alone should ensure the ability of the bomber
    leg of the triad to carry out its mission for years to come. Although I
    don't see why developing the LRSO would be ``destabilizing,'' I simply
    do not see a need for it at present. Moreover, given the huge cost of
    the nuclear modernization program already underway, the LRSO is an
    unaffordable luxury. I would keep this program in a very small research
    program until such time, if ever, the DOD determines that even the new
    bomber is unable to penetrate Russian air defenses. If that is the case
    already, then we should not be developing a penetrating bomber.
        Mr. Garamendi. Would you favor continuing to press for potential
    nuclear weapons reductions negotiations with Russia, even though Russia
    is not in compliance with its INF Treaty obligations? Why or why not?
        Dr. Blechman. I would continue to press Russia to comply with the
    INF Treaty by not conducting any further tests of the missile that
    apparently violated its term and, particularly, by not deploying any of
    those missiles. If the Russians do not violate the treaty again, I
    would press for renewed negotiations to reduce nuclear arms--to cover
    both long-range and shorter range weapons. We lived for many years with
    a clear Russian violation of the ABM Treaty and still continued to
    negotiate with them to reduce nuclear forces, to both sides benefit.
        Mr. Garamendi. Your plans all assume constant funding of 4-5% of
    the defense budget over the next 30 years. Uncertain fiscal times beg
    the question: what would you do with less? How would your plans change
    with 10%, 30%, or 50% less funding? Asked another way, what is the
    least important part of your nuclear posture?
        Dr. Mount. That funding for the current nuclear modernization
    program will be cut from its requested levels approaches a certainty.
    The overwhelming trend in Major Defense Acquisition Programs over the
    last several decades is that the military services do not receive
    appropriations to fund the requested number of units. Such was the fate
    of the Zumwalt destroyer, the Comanche helicopter, the B-2 stealth
    bomber, the Seawolf attack submarine, and several other programs. In
    all likelihood, this pattern will repeat itself in the Ohio Replacement
    Program, the Long Range Strike Bomber, and for other Air Force
    procurement programs. To expect otherwise in a period of intense fiscal
    pressure is simply unrealistic. As a result, the United States should
    accept that the current modernization plans are unsustainable and pare
    them back. Only prudent cuts that are planned in advance can ensure
    that U.S. Strategic Command can plan and execute a rational strategy
    for nuclear deterrence. If the United States does not review and limit
    current plans at an early date, it is likely that the services will be
    forced to hurriedly modify nuclear targeting plans and operational
    concepts in order to keep up with cuts imposed by the U.S. Congress. In
    short, nuclear strategy would be heavily influenced by whichever
    program happens to face cost overruns, a circumstance which is
    certainly not in the national interest.
        Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Mount, I fear that future U.S. nuclear posture,
    especially with the recommendations in this report that the U.S.
    develop new tactical nuclear capabilities, rather than deter the small
    number of states who fear U.S. conventional dominance will instead push
    a much larger number of states to seek nuclear weapons which they see
    as militarily useful. Can you speak about the current state of the
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and what the strategic environment
    might look like if current non-weapons states begin to withdraw from
    the NPT, due in part to a perceived non-commitment to disarmament?
        Dr. Mount. I share your concern. The Nuclear Nonproliferation
    Treaty (NPT) stands at a critical and precarious juncture. A number of
    countries--many of which are allies--are seriously concerned that the
    United States is not living up to its commitment under Article VI of
    the treaty to make concerted progress toward a world without nuclear
    weapons. Whether or not one believes that this goal is useful or viable
    in the foreseeable future, the centrality of the Nonproliferation
    Treaty to the stability of the international system requires that the
    United States makes credible efforts in this direction. There are a
    number of steps that the United States can take in this regard without
    dropping below the aggregate strategic warhead limits of the New START
    treaty. For example, the national laboratories could renovate
    facilities to meet Safeguards By Design (SBD) standards and construct
    new facilities in a way that facilitates international inspection. The
    Departments of Energy, Defense, and State can compile datasets on
    nuclear materials and weapons and lodge this data in encrypted form
    with the IAEA or with allies or can selectively release this data
    publicly. And the Department of Defense can limit the numbers and types
    of dual-capable weapons systems. In these ways, the United States can
    show that it is working towards a verifiable nuclear disarmament treaty
    without dismantling warheads. In addition, the United States can and
    should continue to press Russia to make further verifiable reductions
    in both countries' stockpiles. The international movement on the
    humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has garnered global
    interest in a ban on nuclear weapons. If successful, a ban treaty might
    well undermine the Nonproliferation Treaty, as many countries would
    come to see a ban as an alternative forum for governing the nuclear
    world. At worst, this could precipitate the withdrawal of countries
    from the NPT, who believe that the nuclear weapons states' (NWS)
    abrogation of their commitments to disarm thereby relieves non-nuclear
    weapons states (NNWS) of their obligations not to proliferate. If this
    came to pass, it would seriously damage the longstanding U.S. effort to
    prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Garamendi. What role do conventional strike capabilities play
    in U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence? What are our allies'
    expectations about the weapons with which we will respond in the event
    that mutual defense is necessary?
        Dr. Mount. Nuclear weapons are poor instruments for defense. In the
    event a U.S. ally faces subconventional efforts to destabilize their
    government or an invasion from regular forces, the United States and
    the ally would hope and expect to resist that invasion with
    conventional forces. At the nuclear level, we would face a choice
    between employing a nuclear weapon against enemy troops on allied
    territory (which would likely cause widespread casualties of allied
    civilians) or to engage in a countervalue strike against the enemy
    homeland (which would expand the geographic scope of the engagement,
    thereby increasing the risk to neighboring states and to the U.S.
    homeland). As a result, U.S. allies have a right to expect and a
    responsibility to assist the United States in planning and
    prepositioning forces for a conventional defense of their territory.
    Though this might incur serious human and financial costs, these almost
    certainly pale in comparison to the increased risk of nuclear exchange
    if we succumb to the idea that reliance on nuclear weapons is necessary
    and sufficient to defend our allies.
        Mr. Garamendi. Current policy states that the United States will
    respond in exceptional circumstances to non-nuclear attacks with
    nuclear weapons. Should the United States adopt a ``no first use''
    policy, which would deemphasize the role that nuclear weapons play in
    our overall strategic posture? Would it help or hurt our interactions
    with other nuclear weapons states?
        Dr. Mount. I believe the United States could safely adopt a ``no
    first use'' policy without deleteriously affecting our ability to
    maintain deterrence. The only circumstances in which the United States
    would contemplate the first use of nuclear weapons are if a close ally
    faced an existential threat that could not be halted with conventional
    means. Given the military capabilities of the U.S. and its allies, this
    possibility is remote. If faced with an invasion, nuclear first use
    would be a desperate gambit with little hope that it could preserve the
    territorial integrity of an ally at acceptable cost. Neither a strike
    on allied territory nor one on enemy territory would be likely to
    compel an aggressor to cease an ongoing military option that stood a
    good chance of succeeding. The doubtful success of such a strike makes
    its execution less likely, which in turn decreases its deterrent
    utility. By issuing a commitment to abstain from first use of nuclear
    weapons, the United States would modestly stabilize any militarized
    dispute with a regional nuclear power and lower the risk of nuclear
    war. If necessary, a ``no first use'' policy could be revised later as
    conditions require.
        Mr. Garamendi. What importance do our NATO allies place in the
    presence of forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe? Would they be
    satisfied with the nuclear force structure we currently offer our Asian
    allies?
        Dr. Mount. According to consistent reports in the unclassified
    press, the United States currently deploys about 180 B61 gravity bombs
    at a handful of bases located in select NATO countries. These forces
    reportedly operate a very low level of readiness and would take several
    weeks to activate, arm, and deploy. In any event, it is doubtful that a
    U.S. president would choose provide release authorization to an allied
    pilot in a tactical aircraft when several more prompt and survivable
    options exist in the U.S. force. If the weapons are not likely to be
    used, their power to assure allies and deter adversaries is
    correspondingly diminished. Moreover, Washington observers often
    overlook the differences of opinion within NATO regarding the presence
    of U.S nuclear weapons in Europe. A number of U.S. allies have voiced
    skepticism about the NATO nuclear mission and have suggested that the
    weapons be removed. As a result, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons
    is a low-level but unnecessary irritant to the alliance. As NATO states
    agreed in the Wales Summit Declaration of September, 2014, ``The
    strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the
    United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the
    Allies'' (as opposed to nonstrategic nuclear forces). The weapons are a
    relic of the Cold War, when the United States faced an imminent threat
    of invasion by a numerically superior Soviet force. Today, the weapons
    serve little purpose. The 180 weapons could be removed without
    deleterious effect to the U.S. deterrent posture or to allied cohesion.
    As a result, the B61 Life Extension Program and the program to create
    nuclear-capable variant of the F-35 Lightning II are simply not worth
    the expense, which could better be directed to ensuring that the
    services can adequately fund programs that are critical to deterrence
    operations.
        Mr. Garamendi. How would you recommend the United States structure
    our forces to respond to Russia's nuclear deescalation policy? How
    could the United States respond without developing new tactical nuclear
    capabilities?
        Dr. Mount. Russia's policy of nuclear ``deescalation'' is intended
    as a means of offsetting American conventional superiority. By issuing
    incredible nuclear threats, Russia's leadership hopes to deter the
    United States from bringing the superior power of its armed forces to
    bear. Developing, deploying, or using tactical nuclear capabilities
    would only prove to Russia that it could successfully shift the
    strategic competition onto more advantageous grounds, and encourage it
    to behave more recklessly at the nuclear level. The United States
    should disabuse Russia of the notion that its irresponsible rhetoric
    can alter our resolve to defend our allies with conventional power and
    reverse any gains that Russia hopes to secure. With the time,
    attention, and resources it would take to build new nuclear
    capabilities, the United States and its allies should rededicate
    themselves to improving conventional deterrence. U.S. officials should
    consistently maintain that the use of nuclear weapons can never be
    deescalatory and reiterate the commitment to defend the territorial
    integrity of our allies in any eventuality.
        Mr. Garamendi. Former Secretary of Defense Perry and former
    Assistant Secretary of Defense Andrew Weber recently wrote an op-ed
    calling on the president to cancel the planned acquisition of the Long-
    Range Standoff weapon, because it would be destabilizing. Do you
    believe this weapon is needed? Why or why not?
        Dr. Mount. I do not believe the Long-Range Standoff weapon is a
    necessary system for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence or for the
    assurance of our allies. It will be a major challenge to fund nuclear
    modernization. To protect core systems, we should minimize expenses on
    extraneous ones. By the time the LRSO is ready to come online, we
    should already have a next-generation penetrating bomber that can
    deliver similar yields from locations in theater. Additionally, the
    Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile-Extended Range (JASSM-ER)
    recently entered service and is sufficient to hold most targets at
    risk; those targets that require a nuclear yield are held at risk with
    ballistic nuclear missiles, launched from land or from sea.
    Furthermore, information released to the public suggests that the
    program runs the risk of violating a longstanding pledge of presidents
    from both parties not to procure new nuclear capabilities. To the
    extent that the LRSO improves upon the ALCM's range, stealth, and
    accuracy, it would reverse this policy. This, in turn, would cause
    tension with certain allies and further damage to the nonproliferation
    regime. In short, the system is simply not required and not worth the
    diplomatic or fiscal costs of developing it. We should retain the
    option to procure the system in the future but cancel the current
    program. Making these kinds of difficult decisions is necessary to keep
    from falling into a new nuclear arms race.
        Mr. Garamendi. Would you favor continuing to press for potential
    nuclear weapons reductions negotiations with Russia, even though Russia
    is not in compliance with its INF Treaty obligations? Why or why not?
        Dr. Mount. Yes. The Russian violation of the Intermediate Nuclear
    Forces Treaty is a serious challenge to the arms control regime. It
    should make us highly skeptical of Russia's ability to negotiate in
    good faith on arms control. The United States should undertake a whole-
    of-government approach to ensure that Russia does not realize strategic
    gains from its violation. However, Russia is rigorously and
    consistently abiding by the terms of the New START agreement. Recently,
    the two sides exchanged their 10,000th notification as required under
    the terms of the treaty. These notifications are a major source of
    information on the Russian nuclear arsenal and help to stabilize the
    relationship even when other lines of communication are endangered by
    poor relations. Furthermore, the United States retains very real
    concerns over the size and structure of the Russian nuclear arsenal. An
    agreement that limits the number and variety of Russia's tactical
    nuclear systems or places greater constraints on deployed strategic
    systems could very well be in the national interest. Though the
    Russians have so far refused the Obama administration's offers to
    negotiate along these lines, the offer should remain on the table.
    Throughout the Cold War, U.S. presidents of both parties continued to
    press the Soviet Union to engage in mutual verifiable arms reductions
    and these efforts helped to promote deterrence and stabilize an
    acrimonious relationship. As we move into a period of increased
    geopolitical competition, arms control becomes more important, not
    less. Arms control is not a reward for a stable world; it is a means of
    building one.

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