[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-64]
AIRCRAFT CARRIER--PRESENCE AND
SURGE LIMITATIONS AND EXPANDING POWER PROJECTION OPTIONS
__________
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
meeting jointly with
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 3, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia RICK LARSEN, Washington
DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
Chair HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri Georgia
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana GWEN GRAHAM, Florida
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
STEPHEN KNIGHT, California
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Vice JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Chair TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York BETO O'ROURKE, Texas
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
SAM GRAVES, Missouri
STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma
Craig Collier, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Research, Development, and Acquisition; VADM John C. Aquilino,
USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Operations, Plans and
Strategy (N3/N5); RADM Thomas J. Moore, USN, Program Executive
Officer, Aircraft Carriers, Department of the Navy; and RADM
Michael C. Manazir, USN, Director, Air Warfare (OPNAV)......... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Courtney, Hon. Joe........................................... 39
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 37
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM John C. Aquilino,
RADM Thomas J. Moore, and RADM Michael C. Manazir.......... 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[Responses provided were classified.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 55
Mr. Hunter................................................... 55
AIRCRAFT CARRIER--PRESENCE AND SURGE
LIMITATIONS AND EXPANDING POWER
PROJECTION OPTIONS
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, Meeting Jointly with the
Subcommittee on Readiness, Washington, DC,
Tuesday, November 3, 2015.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Today the subcommittee meets to discuss our
aircraft carrier fleet and the challenges we face in meeting
presence and surge requirements and sustaining our ability to
project power overseas. We thank all of our panelists for their
patience in these votes. I am sorry we are getting started just
a little bit later.
Because of that, all of us have agreed to basically waive
our opening statements. We are going to put them in the record,
and so we can get directly to Mr. Stackley's opening comments,
and then we can go to questions.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can
be found in the Appendix beginning on page 37.]
Mr. Forbes. We have a distinguished group of panelists
today that includes the Honorable Sean J. Stackley, Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and
Acquisitions; Vice Admiral John C. Aquilino, Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Operations, Plans, and Strategy; also,
Rear Admiral Michael C. Manazir, Director for Air Warfare; and
Rear Admiral Thomas J. Moore, Program Executive Officer for
Aircraft Carriers.
Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to our country.
Thank you for being willing to be here to testify for us today,
and thank you so much for your willingness to help us and guide
us as a subcommittee in making sure we are doing the right
thing for our national defense.
With that, I would like to look to see if Mr. Courtney has
any comments? Mr. Wittman? Mrs. Davis?
If none, then we go directly to Mr. Stackley. Thank you,
Mr. Secretary for being here, and we look forward to your
opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY, RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ACQUISITION; VADM JOHN C.
AQUILINO, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, PLANS
AND STRATEGY (N3/N5); RADM THOMAS J. MOORE, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY; AND RADM
MICHAEL C. MANAZIR, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE (OPNAV)
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Forbes, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Courtney,
Representative Davis, distinguished members of the Seapower and
Readiness Subcommittees, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today to address the capability provided by our Nation's
aircraft carriers. And with your permission, I would like to
make a brief opening statement and submit a full formal
statement for the record.
Mr. Forbes. Without objection.
Secretary Stackley. Before remarking on the topic of this
hearing, I do want to express gratitude on behalf of the
Department of the Navy with regards to you all's heavy lifting
in giving us a budget deal, and your work towards the National
Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] for 2016. A 2-year deal goes a
long, long way in terms of providing stability for planning,
and now we will work with the deltas between the President's
budget request and the top line that we receive, but I know it
is a heavy lift on everybody's part, and it is much, much
appreciated.
Today's Navy is a balanced force of 272 ships, near half of
which is routinely underway, and of that number, from the
Eastern Med [Mediterranean] to the Sea of Japan to the South
Atlantic and points beyond, about 100 ships and more than
75,000 sailors and marines are typically deployed.
They are the providers of maritime security around the
world. They are our first responders to crisis, in the
aftermath of natural disaster to provide relief, in the face of
regional turmoil to weigh against aggression, and when called
into action to defeat our foe. They are our surest defense
against the threat of ballistic missiles and they are the
Nation's surest deterrent against the use of strategic weapons.
Their effectiveness in providing stability is a product of
their presence, their response time, and their ability to
project power.
Accordingly, in determining the requirements for building,
operating, maintaining, and modernizing our Navy, as necessary
to conduct the full range of military operations assigned to
the naval forces, we placed a priority on forward presence,
current readiness, investment in those future capabilities
critical to our technical superiority, and stability in our
shipbuilding plan.
Against the backdrop of today's force, the Chief of Naval
Operations' [CNO] Force Structure Assessment outlines the
requirement to build to a 308-ship Navy by the post-2020
timeframe to meet our requirements against the projected threat
of that day. We are on that path.
Inarguably, as an instrument of American diplomacy, power
projection, and global security, the centerpiece of both
today's and the future naval force is the aircraft carrier. In
recent years, from combat operations over the skies of
Afghanistan, to Iraq, to Libya, and Syria, to relief operations
in response to natural disasters in Pakistan, in Japan, and the
Philippines, to operations providing stability and assurance to
our friends and allies around the globe, the Navy's aircraft
carrier force provides the combatant commanders [COCOMs] with a
first, a flexible, and a sustained response that can be scaled
to meet the Nation's needs around the globe.
George Will summed it well in a recent column:
``The Navy's operations, on which the sun never sets, are
the nation's nerve endings, connecting it with the turbulent
world. Although the next president may be elected without
addressing the Navy's proper size and configuration, for four
years he or she will be acutely aware of where the carriers
are.''
Consistent with the 2007 National Defense Authorization
Act, the 308-ship Navy outlined by the CNO's Force Structure
Assessment, includes a requirement for 11 aircraft carriers.
With the inactivation of the USS Enterprise [CVN 65] in 2013
and pending the delivery of Gerald R. Ford, CVN 78, in 2016,
the Navy is operating at a deficit with a 10-carrier force.
This will effectively be the case until the Ford is ready for
her first deployment currently projected in 2021.
In the interim, balancing presence and surge requirements
with a 10-carrier force has become more challenging with
increased combatant commander demand for carrier presence
during the same period. The Navy has adjusted maintenance and
operational schedules by extending carrier deployment lengths
to mitigate operational impacts during this period.
This increased frequency and duration of deployments,
however, has resulted in increased maintenance and repair
requirements back home such that not only have deployments been
extended but so, too, the time required in a shipyard to make
ready for the next deployment. These challenges have been
further exacerbated in recent years by the budget uncertainty
and impacts caused by sequestration.
The net effect of operating with fewer than 11 aircraft
carriers for an extended period of time, is a degradation to
the Navy's ability to provide the balanced presence and surge
capacity. So to provide much needed stability across the
spectrum of maintenance, training, and operations, the Navy is
implementing what is referred to as the Optimum Fleet Response
Plan, or O-FRP.
In simplest terms, the O-FRP targets improved planning and
discipline for the conduct of maintenance and training in
support of carrier and amphibious groups deployments. Adherence
to the plan helps balance the tension between the demand for
presence and need for surge capacity, which will be greatly
relieved with the entry of Ford in the deployment cycle.
The Ford, the first new design aircraft carrier since the
Nimitz more than 40 years ago, will bring a significant
increase in carrier capability to the fleet: 33 percent
increase in the rate at which we launch and recover aircraft; a
propulsion plant three times the electrical generating
capacity, and 25 percent more energy than Nimitz; increased
service life allowances for power, weight, and stability to
enable future modernization; increased survivability; improved
combat systems, firefighting systems, weapons handling, and the
basic hull design. And importantly, a $4 billion reduction per
ship in total ownership cost over the ship's 50-year service
life.
Those members who have visited the Ford under construction
fully appreciate the daunting numbers that measure her. Tens of
thousands of tons of structure, thousands of miles of cable and
fiber optics, hundreds of miles of pipe, thousands of
compartments, hundreds of ship systems, tens of thousands of
sensors integrated to drive a greater than thousand megawatt
nuclear power plant across the globe to its life. It is a
remarkable demonstration of what American industry is able to
achieve, and it is a quantum increase in capability for our
warfighter, capability required by our Navy in the century
ahead.
To be clear, the challenges associated with concurrent
development, design, and construction of the advanced
warfighting aviation and propulsion systems on [CVN] 78, has
resulted in cost growth and some delay. Cost growth has been
arrested, was arrested early in the ship's construction, and
today, with the ship's design effectively complete and
production near 95 percent complete, we are focused on
completing the test program and delivering the ship next
spring.
Equally important, while we confront the impacts associated
with concurrency on the [CVN] 78, we made essential changes to
eliminate these causes for cost growth and further improve
performance on CVN 79 and 80.
In summary, the Navy is committed to providing the Nation
with a force needed to perform assigned naval missions around
the world, around the clock, every day of the year. From
peacetime presence to crisis response to power projection, the
carrier is the backbone of that force. We are working with the
Joint Staff and combatant commanders to mitigate impacts to
operations and maintenance in response to current demands
during this 10-carrier period, while we also work to improve
performance of new construction and maintenance to restore the
11-carrier force, and with it, our ability to fully meet our
presence and surge commitments, and we look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Forbes. Secretary, thank you for your comments.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
Admiral Aquilino, Admiral Moore, and Admiral Manazir can be
found in the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Forbes. It is my understanding, Admirals, that none of
you have opening statements that you wish to make at this
particular point in time.
I am going to defer my questions to the end because I have
a number of them, but Mr. Secretary, if I could just ask you.
You have got a very impressive team with you today. Could you
just let all the two subcommittees know about the team you
brought with you today, and then as soon as you have done that,
I am going to ask Mr. Courtney for any questions that he might
have.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Thank you. I refer to these
as our aircraft carrier brain trust. To my far left is Rear
Admiral Manazir. He is our requirements officer on the CNO
staff responsible for naval aviation, both carrier force as
well as the aviation side of the carrier force.
Rear Admiral Tom Moore is the program executive officer for
carriers. He is responsible for construction and in-service
complex refueling overhauls, lifecycle support for our aircraft
carriers.
And Vice Admiral Aquilino is our head of operations for the
Department of the Navy, working directly for the CNO as well as
working closely with the Joint Staff.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, all three admirals have had very
impressive careers, done a lot for our country, as have you,
and we just appreciate their presence here today. And with
that, Mr. Courtney is recognized for any questions he may have.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and to the witnesses
for all joining us here today.
Again, Secretary Stackley, as usual, you gave a great sort
of chronology and update regarding what is going on with the
carrier fleet. I guess, you know, the question I think that is
on a lot of people's minds is, though, that these necessary
adjustments that the Navy has had to make in terms of the
maintenance, new maintenance program, and as well the somewhat
of a delay for the Ford because of the shock trials. I mean, we
actually now have parts of the world where carriers used to be
that aren't there anymore, at least for some periods of time.
So maybe you could just sort of, for the record, again,
just kind of talk about, you know, what those gaps, as the
media calls it, or you know, the impact that this is having
right now?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, I am going to turn to Admiral
Aquilino to address that because he specifically has been
working this issue on the Navy staff.
Admiral Aquilino. Good afternoon, sir. Thank you for the
question. As you know better than anyone, the carrier force
today is the centerpiece of the Navy's deterrence factor, power
projection, lethality, and across the globe provides the
presence needed to deter conflict, which is our primary goal.
We are at a position now in time where due to prior, what I
would call, overutilization, we are not at a position where we
can push forward the amount of carrier presence we would like
in a sustainable affordable manner, as well as keep in the
reserve tank some surge capacity to be able to respond to
crisis when needed. That is due to a number of reasons.
Admiral Moore will probably talk later about the fact that
we are currently at 10. Eleven is the number that our force
structure analysis tell us we need.
Based on the fact that we are at 10, that puts us at an
ability--or not at the ability we need to push what we would
like forward. Additionally, we severely overused the carrier
force throughout the years 2011, 2012, and 2013 when we
maintained a 2.0 presence in the central--in the, excuse me,
the Middle East, while at the same time providing presence to
the Pacific where it is also needed, and that has put us in a
place where we are a little bit behind the power curve.
What we are trying to do now is to reset in stride. We have
to do that because very little chance to achieve a peace
dividend from a force that doesn't go back into garrison. So
our operate forward priorities did not give us the, really the
opportunity to come back and reset. So the Navy is present, as
you know, each and every day forward at almost the same levels
that we have been operating over the past 15 years.
So the plan we have developed is figure out how to provide
as much presence as we can sustain and afford, while at the
same time resetting to get to the CNO's stated goal of two-
plus-three carriers hopefully by 2020. Those short periods
where we can't provide presence are kind of--it is kind of the
bill we are paying now to get to that sustainable level we
need.
Mr. Courtney. And I think Secretary Stackley used the term
balancing in terms of trying to, again, deal with what is a
long overdue need, which is to get, like you said, a
maintenance schedule that is in stride, but also balancing,
obviously, the demands that are out there. And I guess the
question is, you know, you are going to be showered with
demands, and you know, it is going to take discipline to sort
of maintain this for the next 3 years or so. I mean, do you all
feel confident that, you know, we are going to be able to get
through this patch, and again, accomplish the goals of having a
fleet that is ready to again meet all the requirements that are
out there?
Admiral Aquilino. So before the Secretary jumps in, we are
confident that our model and our plan, sir, will get us to
where we need to be. Absent the fact that the world gets a
vote.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
Admiral Aquilino. So with that, sir.
Secretary Stackley. I was going to punctuate his comment
that it's a hypothetical in terms of what crises the Nation is
going to deal with and there is going to be a continual
rebalance of the risk. Today we are at 10. We are at 10
carriers, I think it is important to understand where are the
carriers today.
Four of the carriers are in deep maintenance today. We have
a carrier in RCOH [refueling and complex overhaul], the other
three carriers in depot that are going to be tied up in the
depot for a period of time. A fifth carrier, the George
Washington, is coming back to the States to enter her RCOH, so
she is not available. She will not be available for surge, so
you have five carriers then that are carrying on the operating
cycle, and they are going to be rotating through their
deployments.
So the question that you ask regarding will we have the
discipline to maintain our maintenance cycle and support--you
know, maintenance, training, operational cycle to get the
health of the force back up, we are operating a small number of
carriers, low density, high demand, and if the temperature
rises in a risk area around the world, then senior leadership
is going to have to decide is it more important to do that
maintenance, which is a long-term investment, or do we have to
respond today to the immediate crisis? And that is going to
come down to what the nature of the crisis is.
Mr. Courtney. I guess that is my last question. So again,
if the balloon goes up or there is some real imminent crisis
that threatens our Nation, I mean, there is a way that you can
sort of plug things up and move carriers out, even those that
are tied up back home in repairs?
Admiral Aquilino. From an operational standpoint, sir, I
think if the balloon goes up, we will, as the most flexible
agile force out there, figure out how to get it done. That will
accept some risk on our part with regard to the levels of
training of the forces that we would have to push and the
timelines in which we would have to push them, but I am pretty
confident we would be able to button some of them up, not all
of them.
I won't speak for my buddy next to me, the maintainer. It
is pretty hard to button up a carrier in RCOH, but there is
others that are at certain levels where we would be able to
accelerate their getting them to sea.
Admiral Moore. Sir, I think, you know, part of the answer
to the question is could you do it? Yeah, you could do it once.
Part of the challenge is, you know, we have these carriers,
they are designed for 50 years, and right now we are operating
them at a pace faster than they were designed. And I think not
only the sustainment of the carrier but you can see the impacts
on the industrial base today. So could we do it? Sure, we could
do it once, but my analogy is kind of like I couldn't run a 4-
minute mile. I might be able to run at that pace for 100 yards,
but then I would run out of gas.
And these ships right now, and you can see the impacts with
the Eisenhower and some of the other carriers. Right now, we
are consuming the service life of these ships at a pace that is
faster than they are designed, and eventually you are going to
use up that service life, and then we will be in a situation
where they won't make it to 50 years, and then the domino
effects from that will really cause us significant problems
downstream.
Mr. Courtney. I want to thank all of you for your testimony
and your service. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Before we go to Congressman Wittman, can we
clarify what we just said? We said ``we could do it.'' Tell us
what ``do it'' means and what risk we have to do it, because
when you are doing these deep maintenance on these carriers, I
take it you don't have sailors that are sitting there doing
their training and they are sitting on the carrier at that
particular point in time.
So what would you have to do if, as Mr. Courtney asked, you
needed to send one of these carriers out, where are you going
to get the sailors and the training, and what risk is it to
those sailors to go out there if they don't have that training
and they are not prepared at that particular point in time?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I am glad you asked the
question. As I walked through and described, we have got four
carriers in some level of maintenance from RCOH up to----
Mr. Forbes. And Mr. Secretary, we know what RCOH means.
Secretary Stackley. Okay.
Mr. Forbes. Can you, just for the record, make sure we are
clarifying that. Try to stay away from acronyms----
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. As much as possible because we are
using this record later.
Secretary Stackley. The refueling complex overhaul for a
carrier once in its midlife, it is about a 44-month depot
period where you open her up and refuel her, as well as, do
about a third of the total modernization that the ship will get
in its lifetime, so it is down hard. You are not going to pull
a carrier out of an RCOH.
And then you have other availabilities that are not as
invasive, but they do bring a carrier down and you are not
going to be able to pull a carrier right out. You are going to
have to restore systems, and at the same time you are restoring
systems, you have got to rebuild the crew because when a
carrier goes into a depot period, there is a lot of turnover of
the crew and they are not ready to go out and start operating.
They have got to go through their re-certifications to ready
for sea, and then a carrier comes with the air wing. You also
have to integrate the air wing back on the carrier.
So there is a very disciplined maintenance, training,
operational cycle that we are trying to return to with the O-
FRP. So the carriers that we have in deep maintenance today,
could we pull one or two out and make it available? Maybe, but
there is a timeline that you have to deal with, so you will not
get the response that we have committed to in the two-plus-
three regimen that the CNO has referred to, which is two
carrier presence, plus three surge capable within a very
limited window of time, which is factored into our operational
plans for major combat operations.
We would be delinquent to providing that, depending on
which carriers you pull out and how long it takes to button the
carrier back up, get its systems operational again, and then
integrate crew and air wing, get it ready to deploy.
Mr. Forbes. And I don't want to be facetious, but it is not
like we are just putting gas in a tank and we just have to pull
the hose out and put it back in the pump and call everybody
back, get on the ship. And we are talking about months of
training, preparation, putting crews together, getting
airplanes on, so during that month period of time, we still
have huge gaps in our operational plans where we wouldn't have
the carrier surge, fair?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Mr. Wittman is recognized for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you
so much for joining us today, and thanks for your service to
our Nation.
Admiral Manazir, I wanted to jump away from the ship itself
to a critical element of the ship, that is, our air wings. And
as we are going from 10 to 11, as we are bringing Ford on, the
question is, do we have the complementary aircraft to make sure
that they are available so as Ford becomes available, we make
sure that we have all the full complement across the spectrum
of our carriers to make sure the aircraft is there?
I know that we look at our F-18s; we are transitioning too,
to the F-35. Give me your perspective on where we are with the
number of necessary aircraft to make sure we have full
operational capability for all of our aircraft carriers, and
then where are we with number of F-18s on the deck, and then
where are we with the transition from F-18 to F-35?
Mr. Manazir. Yes, sir, Congressman Wittman. Thanks very
much for the question. You have rightly pointed out that a key
relevance of our aircraft carrier is the air wing on top. As
the committee knows, we retired USS Enterprise in 2012 after 51
years of service. The air wing that was on top of Enterprise in
the Cuban missile crisis was vastly different than the air wing
that was on top when we retired her in 2012, and the relevance
in the fights that--the conflicts that we have had is that
force.
The short answer to your question, yes, sir, we have enough
airplanes to source 11 aircraft carriers when Ford comes
online. Part of my job is to build that force and to afford
that force. Right now we have a current readiness problem in
our F-18Cs, and as I testified before, because of the extension
of the F-35 program to the right, we have had to sustain our F-
18Cs far longer than we had planned on.
Because we are sustaining them past 6,000 hours of their
service life, we are running into problems with corrosion
internal to the airplane that we had not seen or planned,
because we hadn't planned to take them past 6,000 hours. So our
near-term readiness problem is getting enough F-18Cs out to
source our carrier strike groups that deploy.
What we are seeing right now is we have enough to send out
F-18Cs on deployment, and we are taking--well, we have less
airplanes than we need in the earlier phases of our fleet
response training plan, so we are taking readiness hits there.
So the forces back here at home cannot train enough because
they don't have enough assets. So we are, in the vernacular,
taking risk here at home to make sure that we have deployed
assets.
Our F-18Es and Fs, sir, are the majority of our force going
to 2035. We might even fly those airplanes close to 2040. They
are relevant, very, very good airplanes, and when coupled with
the F-35C coming off the carrier deck, form the most potent
airplane combination of any force that is out there, and so
keeping that F-18E, F, relevant all the way through past 2035
is key.
The Navy plans to IOC, initial operational capability, the
F-35C in August of 2018. We will have enough squadrons to
outfit over half of our carrier force with F-35Cs,
complementing the F-18Es and Fs. We will have a predominant F-
18E and F force to 2035 with a single F-35C squadron in every
air wing by then. That complementary capability is going to
give us the warfighting power that we need.
Mr. Wittman. I know, as I visited the depots where the work
is going on in F-18s, that there is a pipeline issue there,
too, where we need to get more aircraft through there. Isn't
there overall, though, a strike fighter shortfall, and doesn't
that create a significant problem with that backup in the
depots, as you said, trying to get those [F-18] C aircraft out
and where the demand is, and if there is a backup there, to me,
it does create a problem, and there is an issue about the
number of strike air aircraft that we have.
Mr. Manazir. Yes, sir. As we testified, we have a strike
fighter inventory management challenge because if you look at
the demands on the strike fighters into 2030, we have a
shortfall. I can say that shortfall in the early part of the
2020s is about 138 airplanes; so we are taking measures to get
the depot to be more efficient, near term, and then to acquire
more airplanes to source that shortfall.
There are two reasons for the near- to mid-term shortfall.
The first one is the extension of F-35 has caused us to have to
extend the F-18Cs from 6,000 hours to 10,000 hours. That work
was the level of work done to each airplane was unplanned in
the depot.
The second thing that we haven't done is procured enough
airplanes to offset the amount of flying we have been doing to
what Vice Admiral Aquilino talked about the use of our
carriers. CNO Greenert testified a year ago that we need two to
three squadrons of Super Hornets to offset the attrition loss,
the hours that we have flown those airplanes. That is 24 to 36
airplanes.
When you infuse 34 to 46 new airplanes into this mix, plus
to get the depot to be more efficient, sir, that gets a long
way towards getting at that strike fighter inventory management
challenge, the shortfall if you look at supply, demand, and
usage.
If we also acquire enough F-35Cs starting in the latter
part of this decade in this Future Year Defense Plan, you will
now be able to manage to the warfighting requirement that you
talked about, getting out to those 11 carriers and having the
combat capability that we need. But it is a challenge we are
addressing, sir, with all of our might in the Naval Aviation
Enterprise.
Mr. Wittman. I understand with adding more Super Hornets
and being able to make up that shortfall, regardless of how
quickly we can get the depots to respond with efficiencies, but
can we, and is the capability there to move the F-35C to the
left to make that up? So the question is, is it a situation
where we may need more Super Hornets because you can't get
enough F-35Cs to the fleet, or is it a reality that you can do
both?
Mr. Manazir. Sir, we are looking for both. My definition of
the near-term problem or mid-term problem of F-18Es and Fs is,
if we acquire F-18Es and Fs, 2016, 2017, and 2018, 36
airplanes, 2 to 3 squadrons, and we IOC the F-35C on time in
August of 2018, with Block 3F software, that we will get at the
combat capability you are talking about.
Sir, we can certainly accelerate F-35 platforms to the left
and buy those, but they are not the capability that the Navy
wants. We specifically want 3F software. CNO Greenert testified
to that, and CNO Richardson has committed that that airplane
with Block 3F software is the capability that we need on our
carrier flight decks to support the integrated capability we
bring to the rest of our air wing. So yes, sir, we could buy
airframes, but they won't be the capability that the Nation
needs.
Mr. Wittman. I think that is the key to understand is the
current capability with E and F platforms, what you would have
are the 35Cs to make sure we got that complementary capability
there.
Let me ask you this in closing. You talk about making the
depots more efficient. To me, there is still a pipeline issue
in the aircraft that we have to move through the depots to make
sure we meet demand currently, not out into 2017, 2018, and
2019, but currently. Tell me where we are with making sure that
efficiency is going to be there because that creates a short-
term issue.
Mr. Manazir. Yes, sir. This gets a little bit complex, but
I will simplify it for you. When we brought the initial bunch
of airplanes into the depot, we applied a lean manufacturing
model to the depot, and that means that when you bring an
airplane in, you have a kit that you are going to replace parts
in the airplane, and the mechanic, the artisan takes a new
part, replaces an old part, moves the airplane along. When we
opened up these F-18Cs, given that we extended them past 6,000
hours, we found that there was so much corrosion in there, that
too much engineering work could be done.
So in stride, we have changed that process to something
called Critical Chain Process Management, which is looking at
the actual constraint for each airplane, assessing where that
constraint lies, and then attacking the constraint. We have
been underway in that process now for a year. We have already
increased the depot throughput by 40 percent. We expect it to
get even greater than that to where we have delivered somewhere
on the line of 30 airplanes from the depot a year ago. We are
looking to deliver 104 airplanes a year from now.
So yes, sir, we are getting our feet under us. We had to
change the whole process to understand what kind of an
engineering problem we have. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Secretary Stackley. Can I--I just wanted a little bit of
clarification. First, Admiral Manazir described what we are
doing in terms of increasing throughput at the depots. Part of
that has been bringing on additional engineers and artisans, so
we have, in fact, increased the hiring to help that throughput;
but we have also turned to Boeing as a facility with the
expertise and the tooling required.
So we are looking to pull the right levers to increase that
depot throughput. Today, we cannot--we cannot accept the
numbers that we are suffering through today, and so when
Admiral Manazir talked about the projected shortfall in the
2020s, we have got to improve upon the depot part of the
equation to do better than that.
The other piece in terms of procurement, he described the
F-35C. Just to clarify, the 2018 initial operating--operational
capability for the F-35C for the Navy, that is with 3F
software. F-35Cs bought in 2016 will deliver in 2018 in the 3F
configuration. That is a software configuration.
So the aircraft we are procuring will have the hardware
necessary to support the software. The issue is we haven't
crossed that bridge yet.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mrs. Davis is recognized for any questions she
might have.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Thank you very much all of you for
being here and your service.
Getting back to the issue of the number of air wings for
the 11th carrier as it comes online. Did I understand, are we
still behind in terms of that last air wing?
Admiral Manazir. No, ma'am. We have a model. We have 10 air
wings, and we resourced----
Mrs. Davis. You have already----
Admiral Manazir [continuing]. At 10 air wings. Yes, ma'am.
We do a--we do a tiered readiness approach to deploying our
forces. That is that as we get closer to deployment, the
resourcing gets higher and higher. The way that we have had to
manage our F-18C strike fighters is to take airplanes away from
the earlier stages of the training, and that is what the effect
has been to this depot throughput that Secretary Stackley
talked about, the challenge that we have had and that I have
relayed, but we can resource a number of air wings we need to
deploy our carriers.
Mrs. Davis. And the number--and the personnel that is
required as well, is the recruitment going in such a way that
we know that we are going to have the pilots when we need them?
Admiral Manazir. Yes, ma'am. We have exceeded. The Chief of
Naval Personnel will tell you that we are exceeding our
accession goals and we are exceeding our retention goals for
the force that we need across officers and enlisted, but we
definitely have enough people to resource all the air wings and
the carriers that we are pushing forward.
Mrs. Davis. Is there anything about that that still
concerns you?
Admiral Manazir. I think retaining our talent is always a
concern, making sure that the Navy rewards our sailors and our
officers and chiefs for doing the job that they do. We can't
adequately reward them because of the load, and we try to find
ways to motivate them to stay. Obviously, when a new sailor
comes in, we have to train them, and then that person has to
get expertise in order to work for us, so always retaining the
right kind of talent, retaining that high level of talent of
our young Americans is a concern, but keeping the numbers, no,
ma'am, I am not concerned about that.
Mrs. Davis. Because at one time we were using more bonuses.
You are not doing that now?
Admiral Manazir. I have to defer to the Chief of Naval
Personnel on the bonus structure for retention, but I will tell
you that the report to us is that we are meeting all our
retention and accession statistics.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. Great. I wanted to just move to the fleet
response time, Optimized Fleet Response Plans, and how they
affect carrier availability as well. We are first--more or less
into this first cycle, but what is it again, what concerns you
the most about that, how quickly could mitigation measures be
put in place if the carrier strike group maintenance gets
behind schedule.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks for the question, ma'am. I will
talk a little bit about the operational aspects and defer to
the maintenance questions. But the key portion of the Optimized
Fleet Response Plan is that it synchronizes all the things
needed to produce an aligned, fully trained, ready carrier
strike group, and to include the air wing, trained to execute
the high-end fight when it is needed, and it is predictable to
the sailors and the people who resource it.
It aligns maintenance, training, supply, ordnance, and nine
aspects that we have identified required to get that strike
group out on time, again, trained to the high end. So we are
confident that this will work. We have already seen aspects
that we have implemented shorter portions of it to some of the
strike groups, and the Eisenhower will be first one from start
to finish out the door, deploys in 2016, comes back in 2017. I
think we are on a good path.
Admiral Moore. Yes, ma'am. As far as the maintenance goes,
I think it is--you know, when we put the O-FRP together, we
made a conscious decision to put the maintenance piece first in
recognition that getting maintenance done as scheduled and
getting it done on time was a key part of the O-FRP, if not,
the most important part.
I think that we have seen here recently as a result of
being down at 10 carriers and having to run carriers at a pace
that they were--faster than they were designed for. For
instance, the Dwight D. Eisenhower, which just finished a 24-
month availability, which was only scheduled for 14 months. She
had deployed four times since 2008 with only one maintenance
availability in there, so much faster than we had designed,
consuming the service life of that ship much faster, so it is
really no surprise. I think that you saw some of the impacts
there.
We have got to get our arms around that. We certainly spent
a lot of time looking at Eisenhower to figure out where we can
do better going into maintenance periods. We appreciate the
support of the Congress and some resources to add personnel at
our naval shipyards. That is certainly going to help. But going
forward, you know, getting back 11 carriers is one of the ways
to get back into a maintenance cycle that will be sustainable
and then will support the O-FRP.
Mrs. Davis. Great. Thank you. Secretary Stackley, you just
briefly mentioned the budget deal, and I just--is everybody
breathing a little bit easier? Does that make a difference in
terms of moving forward?
Secretary Stackley. I think it makes a huge difference
because for at least the next 2 years, the next two cycles, we
will know what our top line is, and we will have some certainty
going into the next year. Uncertainty is a killer when it comes
to planning, when it comes to execution, and you make poor
decisions when you don't know what your budget top line will be
and when you will receive it.
So as I described it, we didn't get the full amount of the
President's budget request. We are going to work with you all,
obviously, to adjust, but having some certainty for the next 2
years goes a long, long way in terms of execution.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Conaway, the gentleman from Texas, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you. I am on the Seapower Subcommittee
because I am landlocked. I don't have a boat. I don't have a
dock. I don't have a homeport. I don't have nothing. Till 2006,
we tried this two and three issue with 12 carriers, and now we
are trying to squeeze a square peg in a round hole with 11
carriers, or 10 carriers. Can you talk to me--I don't know, Mr.
Stackley or who--about did the development of the two deployed
three surge concept, did it predate Putin's surge, and we
talked about the balloon going up. I would rather keep the
balloon going up with a deterrence factor, so how do we deter
Putin in the Atlantic and the Med and deter China in the South
China Sea, and keep something of the Persian Gulf. That looks
like three versus two, so can you talk to me, what would be the
history of the two plus three, and then how do we deter Putin
and reassure our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
allies that we are there where we need them, and when we are
needed.
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, thanks for the question. I will walk
you through a little bit, I think, on how we view the
deterrence portion, and don't have the history back to that far
on the two plus three. But for the deterrence portion of your
question, the Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century that
was signed in March by the CNO, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, as well as the Commandant of the Coast Guard, takes a
view of the maritime concerns that exist and how the Navy will
contribute to that deterrent requirement.
We are globally deployed, as you know, all the time, to all
the AORs [areas of responsibility]. We have a forward-deployed
naval force in the Western Pacific, compromised of the Ronald
Reagan strike group, specifically. We currently are--George
Washington is coming around. The South America just went
through the Straits of Magellan, participating in UNITAS
[annual multilateral exercise] with our South American
partners. We have ballistic missile defense ships forward
deployed to Rota, Spain, in support of the deterrence against
the Russian piece.
Mr. Conaway. I know I am over here talking about carriers.
So how--is it time to relook at the two plus three since
nobody--does anybody on the panel know what the history of two
plus three is, or how we got there? Mr. Stackley.
Secretary Stackley. It actually--I am going to say it was
three plus three just shy of a decade ago.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. About the 2007 timeframe. And this--the
numbers are derived from operational planning and the force
that would be required to win major combat operations in the 3-
0 plan.
Mr. Conaway. And so in that timeframe was--where was Putin
and his aspirations?
Secretary Stackley. Like I say, sir, this goes back to the
2006, 2007 timeframe, and it has evolved over time.
Mr. Conaway. Yeah, yeah. Is there a group in your team that
looks--that from time to time steps back and relooks at the
conventional wisdom to say, when that was done a decade ago,
when we set on two plus three, and we've held that through two
different administrations, and now we are trying to justify
that with 11 carriers that we might have at something--or 10 we
got now, 11 we will have in 2019, 2020, 2021, whenever the Ford
comes online. Is there a group that red-teams that to say, you
know, we really--given that Putin is out there, we need three
plus three or three plus two, what is it--is there somebody
that does that?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir, the combatant commanders are
responsible to identify the forces they need to meet the goals
for deterrence and then ultimately to be able to respond to
crisis----
Mr. Conaway. So General Breedlove would tell us that he
doesn't need--he would not prefer a carrier somewhere in the
Atlantic or the Med?
Admiral Aquilino. So the combatant commanders via our
global force management process have identified their
requirements. Those get supported by the services, and then
allocated per the Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Conaway. Yeah. I know you guys make hard choices. I got
it. We limit your resources and try to make you squeeze all
kinds of stuff out of it, but I guess I have got to ask for the
record, would 12 carriers make this overall two plus three and
the maintenance and the deployments and the training and the
aircraft and all the other kinds of things that you are talking
about, wouldn't it be easier with 12 than 11?
Secretary Stackley. Straight math, yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. Straight math. The reality is, the
larger the force----
Mr. Conaway. Yeah, I know----
Secretary Stackley [continuing]. The more flexible you have
got, and then the issue is how do you afford that.
Mr. Conaway. Yeah, I know, I got you.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. I got you. But I do think, at some point,
justifying the two plus three in today's world--because I would
argue that the world is not as safe today as it was in 2006 and
2007. China wasn't doing what it was doing, Russia is not doing
what it is doing, and so--and maybe we need a review of that
whole issue to see if we are, in effect, doing our country the
right way by at least saying we need that third carrier on
the--you know, out at any one point in time.
So I appreciate you guys being here, great service to our
country. I am awed by the distinguished careers each of you
have had, so thank you for what you have done for our country
and your families putting up with all that time being away from
them. So thanks on our behalf as well. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Conaway, thank you. And I was going to
defer my questions to the end, but I want to clarify a couple
of questions Mr. Conaway had just asked you.
Are we going to have a gap in our carrier presence in
either the Pacific Command [PACOM] or the Central Command
[CENTCOM] this year or next year?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. We currently are experiencing
what the CENTCOM commander would call a gap in the CENTCOM AOR.
Mr. Forbes. And what he would call a gap is actually a gap,
isn't it?
Admiral Aquilino. It is a----
Mr. Forbes. It is not like we are talking about
terminology, syntax that's different than we won't have a
carrier there. That is a gap, fair?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And coming back to what Mr. Conaway says, has
the United States Navy ever made the determination that the
presence of a carrier--of an aircraft carrier strike group has
a significant role in deterring a conflict from going to phase
zero to phase three?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. Again, deterrence is one of the
key missions.
Mr. Forbes. And it is a significant deterrence?
Admiral Aquilino. I believe so.
Mr. Forbes. Well, let me clarify.
Secretary Stackley. I will go so far as to say that it is
at the very core of our maritime strategy for national
security.
Mr. Forbes. And the reason that we can know that is because
you have no single unit that is more expensive, requires more
resources to deploy than a carrier strike group, isn't that
fair to say, in the national defense of this country, single
unit?
Secretary Stackley. I'm not putting dollars against that. I
am talking in terms of resources and capability that the
carrier provides on scene.
Mr. Forbes. And the reason that I am saying that is because
one of the things you guys come in to tell us always is the
role we have to do in balancing what we have, the resources we
have. So when you come in here and say that we need a carrier
strike group, as Mr. Conaway said, we need two, and be able to
surge three, the reason we need that is because it is so vital
and so important that we place one of the most important and
costly resource allocations we have, to try to deter that
conflict from going to phase zero to phase three. Is that a
fair statement? I see some nodding of heads, but for the
record, Admiral Manazir?
Admiral Manazir. Absolutely a fair statement, sir. There is
no replacement for a carrier strike group in any phase of any
kind of conflict. There are multiple examples of when a carrier
strike group was put in place to deter. Cuba in 1961; 1996,
through the Taiwan Strait, two carrier strikers were sailed
through there. The deterrence factor to the United States is
significant, the carrier strike group, and no, sir, because of
the resources the Nation puts into the carrier strike group,
which is not only the carrier but the five destroyers, cruisers
that go with it and all the people that go into that, it is
worth that deterrence factor. Yes, sir, no replacement.
Mr. Forbes. And the last part of that question is, the
United States Navy has also made the determination that the
ability to surge three more carriers is incredibly important to
us being able to win a conflict if that conflict were to
actually go from phase zero to phase three. Is that a fair
statement?
Secretary Stackley. Absolutely.
Mr. Forbes. Good. With that, I would like to recognize Mr.
Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. If you all ever get around to building a 12th
carrier, we will take it in Everett [Washington]. So I think it
is Admiral Moore. Can you--we covered the two RCOH carriers. We
didn't cover the three depot maintenance carriers. Could you
give us a flavor of what that schedule looks like?
Admiral Moore. Well, right now, you have got Abraham
Lincoln in RCOH at Newport News Shipbuilding. You have got USS
Nimitz in a 14-month availability in Bremerton. USS Carl Vinson
down in San Diego for a 6-month availability down in San Diego.
You have got USS George H.W. Bush at Norfolk Naval Shipyard
right now with an 8-month availability at Norfolk, and then as
the secretary alluded, you have right now USS George Washington
returning from Japan to commence a refueling overhaul in August
2017. She will go back to Norfolk in December 2015, essentially
she doesn't have enough gas in her tank to really--is a
deployable asset.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Moore. So you really have got those--in addition to
Lincoln, you have got those three other carriers plus George
Washington right now that is not available to us.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. And which of those are--which of those
maintenance schedules are being pushed by a utilization that
wasn't anticipated versus ones that are on schedule?
Admiral Moore. Well, I think the ones--the Eisenhower is
the one that we just finished, was the one that was
significantly impacted by the pace that we ran the ship. Right
now, it looks like Carl Vinson is doing fine, and as is George
H.W. Bush. The one up in Bremerton, the Nimitz, is probably
going to be the most challenging one to us for a couple of
reasons. One, she is 40 years old. She is the oldest carrier
ship of the class, so--and then, secondly, she has had a
significant period of time where we've really run her at a
higher op temp than some of the other carriers. So of the
availabilities we have right now going on, I will tell you that
the Nimitz, one that is in Bremerton, is the most challenging
in terms of size and the work package it is on.
Mr. Larsen. Has that added months to the maintenance
schedule over than what was anticipated?
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. We actually, because of Nimitz, we
were originally going to dock her this time. We decided to not
dock her but put her in what is called an extended maintenance
availability for 14 months, and then because of the run time of
the ship we are going to deploy her, but we are going to bring
her right back and put her back into a docking availability, so
she is going to have, in the span of about 3 years, a
significant amount of maintenance done on her to try and catch
her back up, if you will.
Mr. Larsen. And then she is due for decommissioning----
Admiral Moore. 2025 is when she inactivates.
Mr. Larsen. 2025.
Admiral Moore. Yes, sir. That is when she will hit 50
years.
Mr. Larsen. Any of this driving by the--I think the
Readiness Subcommittee had a hearing where Admiral Harley
testified that the Ford was going to be delayed 2 years, even
though it is being delivered in 2016 and goes to work in 2018,
there is a little delay there.
Admiral Moore. Well, there is no doubt that being at 10
carriers, which is exacerbated by the fact that the Ford won't
be now deployable till 2021, we will--you know, the law says
you have to be 11 carriers, but it is only measured by when we
commission Ford, and we will commission Ford next summer, but
the reality is she is not a deployable asset now because of the
way we are going to go test her until 2021, so we will be in a
period of 10 carriers here until about 2021.
Back to my initial comments, you know, when we inactivated
Enterprise in 2012, that took us down to 10, and then that--in
the last 3 years, in order to meet the demand signals of COCOMs
and meet the present surge requirements, we have run carriers
harder than we had typically done it and harder than they were
designed.
We have had--since 2012, had 7 aircraft carriers that have
gone more than 300 days of deployed time between maintenance
availabilities. Not all of it consecutive sometimes, but a lot
of time, and that is an awful lot of run time, and that is a
challenge that we are going to have to continue to face here
until we get Ford on the line.
Mr. Larsen. Yeah. Admiral Manazir, could you comment--I
think I know the answer to this, but I think you probably would
know it with regard to the 18Gs [EA-18G Growlers]. Do we
anticipate those being--do we anticipate the Navy's 18Gs being
the only air base electronic attack? Are we going to have the
national mission and the expeditionary as well being carrier
based, or is that what the Navy is anticipating, serving other
services?
Admiral Manazir. Yes, sir. So a couple of things in your
question. The 18G Growler is the only Department of Defense
airborne electronic attack platform that will be in service
once the last of the Prowlers decommissions. The United States
Navy has bought 153 Growlers. Thank you very much for the
partnership there. We are completing a study to see if that is
enough----
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Admiral Manazir [continuing]. Growlers for all of the
missions that the joint force would carry out.
Mr. Larsen. Right. Good. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and appreciate
hearing about the importance of the Growlers made in Missouri,
and we certainly are trying to be supportive of making sure
that you all have the assets that you need in that regard, so
continue to work with us on that.
I wanted to clarify about the USS Gerald Ford because at
the subcommittee hearing that we had earlier, it said it was
scheduled to be commissioned in the early half of 2016, but
then due to the shock trials, it would be delayed an additional
2 years, so that would be 2018, but then you are saying now it
will be 2021 before it is commissioned?
Admiral Moore. Yes, ma'am. If I could, just to clarify, we
will deliver the ship and commission it next summer in 2016,
and because it is the first ship of the class, it will have a
series of initial operational tests and evaluation that we
would have already done and that would have stretched out for
several years to go prove that the ship does what we contracted
the ship holder to do.
So she was originally scheduled to deploy--her first
deployment would have been in 2019, and now, because of the
shock trial, we will now deploy her for the first time in 2021,
so that is the delay I was referring to.
Mrs. Hartzler. And I know that they said in August 2015 is
when they wanted to have that shock trial, and I know it has
only been a few months, but have we had any development on
that? Have they arrived at that point yet to do any of those?
Admiral Moore. We will shock her in summer 2019, August of
2019, and we are making preparations to go do that now. We will
bring her out of the yard. We will shake her down, and in our
parlance, to make sure you kick the tires and make sure that
you are getting what the taxpayer said that we were buying, and
then we will go out and test her through a series of things for
this brand new ship. And then we will go ahead and set her up
and do a shock trial in the summer of 2019.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. Well, it is concerning that it will be
another 6 years basically, if I figure right, before we get to
11 full carriers again, and so hopefully we won't need them,
and the world stage will allow us to have that, only 10.
But I wanted to talk more, and several people have already
mentioned, but the maintenance situation. Of course, we had
almost a 2-year maintenance on the Eisenhower after you have
already talked about the extended service that it had that
resulted in that, but has there been any lessons learned by
these extended deployments to maintenance needs, that perhaps
you can bring to the Gerald Ford in redesigning or to help
decrease the amount of maintenance that is needed on the newer
model?
Admiral Moore. Yes, ma'am. Actually we spent an awful lot
of time in the design of the ship trying to figure out how you
could spend less time in maintenance and set the ship up so it
would require less maintenance, so a couple of things. One, the
Ford is designed to only have to dock the ship--dry-dock the
ship every 12 years. We dry-dock the Nimitz carrier today every
8 years, so over the life of the ship, that is two fewer
dockings, that means more time available to the combatant
commander.
We looked at a lot--we used a lot of specialized materials
on the ship that don't corrode as much, so a large portion of
the maintenance we do on the carriers today involves opening up
tanks, going in and blasting, coating, and painting those, that
takes--spend an awful lot of time.
The other thing that we did that I could point out to you
is a large portion of the Ford class, the interior of the ship
is air-conditioned, and while that may seem like a great thing
and you say, hey, it is nice you are doing that for the crew.
Actually the reason we have done that is because one of the
largest sources of corrosion and maintenance that we do on the
ship is the ingestion of salt air from the environment that we
work in, and so we spent an awful lot of time redesigning the
Ford to air-condition large portions of the ship.
For instance, this is the first aircraft carrier that we
have ever had that we will actually air condition the
propulsion spaces, and the combination of that and then a
redesign of the ship, which has resulted in the half number of
valves on board, we took the steam systems which generate hot
water on a Nimitz-class carrier, they are electric now, so we
don't have steam piping running throughout the ship.
So we tried to go back and take all the lessons learned off
the Nimitz class, a very manpower-intensive ship, great class
of ship, and rolled those into the Ford. So I think when you
see the Ford get out there, we projected we will spend
significantly less time in depot, which means the ship is
available to the combatant commander and we will spend 20
percent less on maintenance dollars.
The last thing is the class--this class of ship is designed
to only go into a depot availability every 43 months as to
compared to a Nimitz-class carrier which is right now at 36, so
you are--we won't put it into maintenance as much. When we put
it in for maintenance, we will do less maintenance.
Mrs. Hartzler. That is good to hear. Thank you very much. I
appreciate it. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In looking at how the
carrier fleet may be updated, there is a greater focus on the
use of automated systems to alleviate costs. What plans does
the Navy have in terms of extending ship life and freeing up
resources for other uses?
Secretary Stackley. Let me start with the ship life itself.
It is a 50-year service life on the aircraft carrier. And
today, the ship is not designed for a service life beyond 50
years. What we are trying to do is drive down the cost of
getting it to 50 years. So the automation that you described,
that is a critical component of that strategy because a big
part of your cost in service life is the cost of people.
And so to drive down the size of the crew on an aircraft
carrier, we have converted to first reducing the maintenance
load that the crew has to perform, but also relying on
automation. Where a sailor in the past might have taken a
particular action, now we are using automation to relieve that
burden from the crew.
So in total in terms of the ship's force itself, 600
sailors come off of the comparable number that puts a Nimitz-
class carrier to sea, largely thanks to the automation that we
have embedded into the systems. So that is a lifecycle cost
savings. And then as Admiral Moore described, the efforts to
improve reliability and reduce maintenance loads makes the
carrier more available to get underway in its 50-year service
life.
Going beyond 50 years, that would entail another refueling
cycle for the aircraft carrier. And our experience to date is
at that stage of the hull's life, you are better proceeding
with replacing the hull with a new ship than to try to refuel a
50-year-old hull to get another 25 years out of it.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. As our carriers operate within the
carrier strike group, how do we stand as far as supporting
vessels and resources that the Navy needs to ensure that every
carrier group is properly supported?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, the Military Sealift Command [MSC]
is the supporting assets to meet our carrier strike group
logistics requirements. They are currently structured to meet
the force structure size of 11 carriers. And they are sized
rightly to do that. They forward position in some cases, they
deploy with them in other cases. But currently, we are matching
the need with the requirement.
Secretary Stackley. I would simply add, I described in my
opening remarks the Force Structure Assessment that was
completed by the CNO in 2012 and updated each year since. That
outlines a very balanced force. So while the carrier, the 11-
carrier force is the centerpiece, it also includes all the
escort ships that are part of the carrier strike group, and
support ships associated with replenishing supplies on the
carrier and to support not just the carrier, but also the ships
that would accompany her on deployment.
And so then if you look at our shipbuilding plan going
forward, you will see each type of ship that is outlined in
that Force Structure Assessment, its procurement plan to either
build new or to extend its service life to ensure that we have
the full complement described.
Admiral Manazir. Sir, and if I can add, the Force Structure
Assessment that Secretary Stackley is describing, to go back to
a question that was asked by I believe the gentleman from
Texas, this Force Structure Assessment is sized for United
States Navy force to conduct a complex, multi-phase campaign
against a high-end adversary in one region, and be able to
deter or impose costs on an adversary in another region. This
force is designed to do that all the way to 2030, is our
assessment.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. In your opinion, does it make more
sense to--well, let me ask the question this way. With respect
to the sustainment phase of ship construction, how would the
requested funding be allocated to sustain the carrier force as
it is?
Secretary Stackley. I think what you are describing there,
sir, is our funding in the President's budget request, we have
new construction funding, which is ships, conversion, and Navy,
which is SCN, but inside of our operations and maintenance
account is the maintenance funding required to support the
carriers and their service life.
So we talked earlier about the Optimum Fleet Response Plan.
That lays out the cycle by carrier strike group for ships
entering the maintenance window between deployments. And then
the budget request that comes over annually provides the
funding for the stack of ships that would be in depot
maintenance as well as routine maintenance to execute the
requirements consistent with the O-FRP. And it is done by ship
type in terms of both maintenance and modernization for the
specific windows.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. And I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady from
New York, Ms. Stefanik, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
panelists for your testimony today and for your service and for
your families' service to our Nation.
I am proud to represent Fort Drum, home of the 10th
Mountain Division. And as you know, currently brigades are
forward deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have been since
September 11, 2001. And recently, I was fortunate to embark on
the USS Truman while she was underway. And I also accompanied
Chairman Wittman on a visit to the Naval Strike and Air Warfare
Center, at NAS [Naval Air Station] Fallon in order to view the
entire workup and training cycle prior to deployment. And these
visits, both of them, made it very clear the significant role
the Navy has in providing close air support to troops on the
ground.
And recently, there has been discussion about how our air
wings may require some adjustments in order for the carrier
strike group to be successful in the high-end fight against
competitors like China. But as our Navy considers how to meet
these challenges from the high-end threats, I also hope that
the capabilities are maintained so that the carrier air wing
can continue the support of troops on the ground like the 10th
Mountain Division soldiers that I represent.
So can you please explain to me how you plan to maintain or
improve the carrier air wing's current close air support
capabilities while simultaneously preparing for a high-end
fight against a peer competitor?
Admiral Manazir. So ma'am, that is my job as the Director
of Air Warfare. I will tell you that the F-18Es and Fs that are
over the top of our troops in northern Iraq and Syria and in
Afghanistan supporting those troops for a decade are the same
fighters that we will have through 2035. And coupled with the
Joint Strike Fighter F-35C, which has significant close air
support capabilities, you will still have the close air support
capabilities that we have enjoyed for the last 15 years in
these fights in different AORs.
Those same aircraft, F-18Es and Fs and F-35Cs, are capable
of operating in the high end, particularly when coupled with
the E-18G Growler. So the air wing that you see on the flight
decks now, augmented by the F-35C in August of 2018, will
continue to be able to operate across all the phases of
warfare, whether it is close air support or whether it is a
high-end fight against an anti-access/area-denial type of
adversary.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. Thank you, Admiral. Any other
comments?
Admiral Aquilino. No, ma'am, other than we are completely
integrated with the Army team on the ground. We have made
numerous operational changes. At my last deployment I had three
Army LNOs [liaison officers] who rode the ship with us in
direct communications with the troops on the ground in order
for the pilots who were about to take off had the latest and
greatest update on the situation on the ground so they could
best support them. It is the most important thing we do, and we
take it very seriously.
Admiral Manazir is putting together a great list of
equipment so that we are synchronized, aligned, and
interoperable with our Army and Marine Corps team that is on
the ground.
Ms. Stefanik. Great. I know I speak for the 10th Mountain
soldiers I represent that we are appreciative of that support.
And I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady yields back. The gentleman from
Oklahoma is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like
to thank all of the great service members that are testifying
today. I am a Navy pilot by trade. I recently traded in my
wings of gold for wings of silver. But I still, at heart, am a
Navy pilot.
I joined my fleet at a perfect time. I joined VAW-113, the
world famous Black Eagles. And when I joined the squadron, we
were in the middle of what was called at the time an
interdeployment training cycle, IDTC. So I had the opportunity
as a brand new guy coming out of the FRS [Fleet Replacement
Squadron], had an opportunity to see the whole IDTC worked
through. I got to participate in the Strike Fighter Advanced
Readiness Program. I got to participate in JTFX [Joint Training
Fleet Exercise], Air Wing Fallon, COMPTUEX [Composite Training
Unit Exercise]. I eventually, after I finished my sea tour, I
went and worked at the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center.
But what was interesting is, it was an 18-month cycle
followed by a 6-month deployment. And then we had the wars in
Afghanistan start and the war in Iraq start. And what was the
IDTC ended up being instead of a 6-month deployment, a 10-month
deployment. And at that point, it seemed like the
interdeployment training cycle pretty much went off the rails
and they started new programs, Fleet Response Plan, and now the
Optimized Fleet Response Plan. And even with these plans, to
get more out of less, still gaps are emerging that are in my
estimation dangerous.
And one of the questions I have is, have you guys done a
detailed analysis as to what the impacts would be for the
training cycle if instead of 11 carriers we had 12? And I know
other members have asked this question. But what would be
specifically the impacts? I know that 12 is better than 11; we
heard that. But what would it do, for example, for the IDTC,
which of course has a different name these days? What would it
do for the men and women who serve? Would they get to maybe not
deploy as frequently? Would the deployments be 6 months instead
of 10 months? Would there be fewer gaps, for example, in the
Persian Gulf or in the Mediterranean? Would there be more time
for us to stay at home training and maintaining not only the
ships, but also the aircraft?
So all of these kind of things that go into determining
what is the right force structure and do we need 11 or 12. Can
we get specific analysis as to what are the impacts? What is
the difference in the fleet if we have 12 instead of 11?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I will hold off on the analysis
piece, but I will get to your discussion on the training cycle.
So the Optimized Fleet Response Plan is targeted to do what you
highlighted as somewhat of a frustration. In that plan, the key
segments of the design, the ship must get in on time for
maintenance, it must get out on time. That preserves 120-plus
days of basic training for the ships and the pilots to do the
SFARPs [Strike Fighter Advanced Readiness Programs] and things
you described. It also carves out an integrated class advance
timeline of 120-some-odd days to do the COMPTUEXs and the
JTFXs. And it preserves that ability to do the high-end
training that previously I think we have seen was the shock
absorber for when you either had to deploy early or when the
ship came out of maintenance late.
We are fencing that, understanding that the only way to
train to the high end is to preserve that time and then have
discipline in the process. That is a critical part of O-FRP.
Mr. Bridenstine. So if that time is preserved, how are you
stretching? Are you getting like when you deploy, the
deployments are longer? Is that the goal?
Admiral Aquilino. We have done longer deployments in the
past. But the tenet of O-FRP that the CNO needed to get to,
based on a couple of questions before, was a commitment to a 7-
month deployment. That is for the crews and families so that,
number one, it is predictable; number two, it doesn't impact on
future retention problems later. Because as you know, you know,
1 day is okay, 6 months pretty challenging, 10 months is really
hard. And I think the CNO wants to get away--we need to put
that predictability back in. So the commitment to 7 months as a
part of our force generation model is critical.
Mr. Bridenstine. When you say commitment to 7 months,
meaning not to go past 7 months or do at least 7 months?
Admiral Aquilino. Seven months is the targeted goal for a
carrier strike group deployment. That is what we are bringing
into the global force management process. That is the number
that we use to generate the presence needed--or presence
provided under a supply-based model that we are using today.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. I am down to my last second here.
Can we get maybe for the record what that analysis would look
like for those items I mentioned regarding a 12-carrier fleet
vice an 11-carrier fleet?
Admiral Manazir. Sir, at risk of not answering your
question but telling you, we referred to a Force Structure
Assessment that was delivered by the Navy to the Congress in
February of this year. That Force Structure Assessment looked
from now until 2030 using the Optimized Fleet Response Plan and
looking at the projected threat capabilities. And that
assessment came down and said 11 is the minimum number we need
with an acceptable level of risk to----
Mr. Bridenstine. Does that mean gaps when you say
acceptable?
Admiral Manazir. Sir, the gap part is different. That is
the global employment of force. That is the global force
management model gap. But 11 is the minimum force we need from
a capability perspective. As Vice Admiral Aquilino testified
to, a different process is used as to where to put that force.
But the Force Structure Assessment was submitted by the Chief
of Naval Operations to say that 11 is the number if you look
across our force.
So that, sir, was the analysis that was submitted to
Congress in February of this year.
Mr. Bridenstine. So there is no analysis as to what would
the impact be if you had 11? I am just asking. I mean nobody
looked into that?
Admiral Manazir. From what perspective, sir? If you are
talking about where we would put the forces----
Mr. Bridenstine. From a gap analysis. Would it reduce gaps?
Would it allow service members to spend more time at home to do
training and to do maintenance and ultimately----
Secretary Stackley. Let me take that, sir. No, we have not
done an analysis for a 12-carrier force since the JFK [John F.
Kennedy] retired in 2006 timeframe.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. To conduct that analysis, in other
words to take the Force Structure Assessment that we have done
and say what if we were a 12-carrier Navy, that would be not
just adding a carrier, obviously, that would be adding all the
elements associated with the carrier strike group, as well as
the sailors that would be added to the deployment cycle, which
is not a one for one. So that would be a very comprehensive
assessment.
Today, what we do is, as Admiral Aquilino described, is we
are a supply-side equation today, where we know the force that
we have got, we take a look at the peacetime presence demands,
and we take a look at major combat operations and we see can we
supply the amount of force necessary to satisfy both? Clearly,
there is higher demand from the combatant commanders today than
we can provide in an 11-carrier force.
So there is a prioritization that takes place inside the
Joint Staff in terms of the GFMAP [Global Force Management
Allocation Plan]. For major combat operations, the 11-carrier
force to provide the two plus three surge carrier strike
groups, we believe is what is necessary to meet our
requirements. Would a 12th carrier strike group relieve some of
the burden to the total force in terms of operational cycles?
Yes, it would. Do we know what that would entail in terms of
the total force structure, including sailors, and how that
would ripple through the Optimized Fleet Response Plan? We have
not done that analysis.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes. The gentleman's time has expired. Let me say to
you gentlemen, thank you for being here. Just a couple of wrap-
up questions that I deferred from the beginning. The role of
our two subcommittees that we have chosen to take today is not
to point blame at Republicans or Democrats, the administration
or Congress, not to point blame at the cuts of $780 billion
versus sequestration, but it is to assess risk and to see how
we--and threats, and see how we can fill those gaps.
As I listened, Admiral Moore, to some of your speeches,
which I appreciate and look at, you had a phrase that I have
copied. And sometimes I give you credit for it and sometimes I
don't. But it is that we are an 11-carrier Navy in a 15-carrier
world. And you probably said it more articulately even than
that. But it sums up the fact that based on what Mr. Conaway
was talking about, all those risks, we probably need 15
aircraft carriers as opposed to 11.
Admiral Manazir, in all of your analysis you have told me
privately, and not with any analytical backing behind it, but
if we could ask you guys to go in another room and we brought
our combatant commanders here, the guys who look every day into
the risk that Congressman Conaway talked about, that growing
risk of Russia, China, everything else in the world, they may
say we need 21 aircraft carriers, but certainly more than what
we have. Regardless of what Admiral Moore would say that we
might need in the world, or Admiral Manazir, what we may have
from our combatant commanders, the reality is that the United
States Congress and the United States Navy have basically
agreed we need 11 aircraft carriers. And we have less than that
today.
The United States Navy has also, I think based on your
testimony, concluded that the mere presence of one of those
carrier strike groups has a significant role in stopping a
conflict from going to phase zero to phase three. Therefore,
not having that carrier creates a huge vulnerability that we
cannot stop that escalation from taking place.
So I ask any of you, if you can tell us the size gap that
we will have over the next 12 months in either the Pacific
Command or Central Command, where we will not have a carrier
strike group present?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. There are in the next year some
periods similar to what we are seeing in the CENTCOM AOR now.
Again, the reason is, number one, not because we don't want to.
Mr. Forbes. No, no, this is not fault.
Admiral Aquilino. Copy.
Mr. Forbes. And we have already established we have the
gap. How large is the gap? We have heard that in non-classified
statements. Can you tell me how many days that gap will be
present in the next 12 months?
Admiral Aquilino. I would prefer to tell you that offline,
if that is okay, for classification purposes.
[The answer was submitted in a classified forum.]
Mr. Forbes. Okay. That would be fine. Okay. How about
CENTCOM? Can you tell us what is going on there right now that
is not a classified?
Admiral Aquilino. Currently, as has been reported, there is
a gap in the CENTCOM AOR.
Mr. Forbes. And when we mean gap, just so we know when we
look the term up, we mean no carrier strike group.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. That is the gap.
Mr. Forbes. And the other thing that we can agree upon that
I think the United States Navy has concluded and made a
judgment of, and the CNO has said, is that if we do not have
that capability of having three carrier strike groups for the
surge, which means we can bring them to the fight if we are not
successful in keeping it from going from zero to phase three,
that that has a huge impact on whether or not we can win or
lose that conflict. Is that fair to say?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. Those follow-on assets that
would be needed for many of the crises that are potential, they
are critical to being able to win the fight, absolutely.
Mr. Forbes. And if they are critical to winning the fight
and we need three of those strikes to supplement the two that
we don't always have right now, give me an idea of the
timeframe that I would be looking at over the next 12 months--
and let me use my friend Mr. Courtney's phrase if the balloon
goes up--and maybe I would rephrase it if we had a conflict
that went from zero to three. How long would it take to
mobilize those three carrier groups and to send them on their
way to that fight?
Admiral Aquilino. If you don't mind, sir, I would prefer to
give you those numbers offline as well.
[The answer was submitted in a classified forum.]
Mr. Forbes. Be fair to say, though, it would be a
significant amount of time?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. And definition of significant--
--
Mr. Forbes. I understand.
Admiral Aquilino [continuing]. We can talk.
Mr. Forbes. Now, the last thing I would like to put on that
equation too is we know we do not have--we will have times
where we will not have a carrier strike group in the Pacific
Command or the Central Command, that that has a huge impact on
whether we can deter a fight from going from phase zero to
phase three. That in addition to that, we would have what we
would conclude to be a significant time period, regardless of
what significant means, in when we could mobilize the three
carrier strike groups we would need to surge, therefore having
an enormous detrimental impact on whether we could win or lose
that conflict.
When we talk about even if we win or lose, that time delay,
can you tell me whether or not that could also equate to
putting at significant risk the lives of men and women who
would be in that fight?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, sir. So a part of the
planning that goes on, absolutely, is identified by the amount
of time your forces can respond. The delay to the response of
those forces absolutely increases the risk, the timelines you
are on, and ultimately gets to a personal risk.
Mr. Forbes. And Admiral, you have looked at our military
objectives. Can we accomplish all of our military objectives
with our current aircraft carrier presence and surge posture?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, the 11-carrier force that is
identified as needed absolutely----
Mr. Forbes. No, no, I understand that. I am talking about
today, with what we have today, and the world we are living in
today and the environment you have. Can you accomplish it with
what you have?
Admiral Aquilino. I would say we are accomplishing it, the
requirements, at increased stress to the force and the ability
to get to a sustainable posture that allows us to carry a Navy
into the future to meet those same requirements over the long
term.
Mr. Forbes. And when I----
Secretary Stackley. Sir I would just add to that, and I
think it is in black and white in terms of the Force Structure
Assessment that the CNO outlined. We require 11 aircraft
carriers to meet our full range of military operational
requirements. Today we are at 10, and we are at 10 that are
highly stressed because they have been driven hard. And so we
have more carriers in depot maintenance today than we would
normally have under a stable, a more stable operational cycle
with an 11-carrier force.
So we have the compounding impact of we are down a carrier
and then driving the remaining carriers harder. We have more
carriers in depot maintenance. So we have a shortfall in terms
of our ability to generate the carriers with their air wings in
response to crisis today. And until we get the Ford ready for
deployment and we are back up to 11 carriers and the Optimized
Fleet Response Plan catches hold in terms of restoring our
operational and maintenance cycle to where it needs to be,
until we get back into that state, we are going to be operating
at a deficit.
Mr. Forbes. And Mr. Secretary, we are here to help you. We
are just trying to define what that risk is so we can make sure
we shore it up. I do have one last question for you. The Navy
has proposed a two-phased acquisition strategy for the
construction of the USS John F. Kennedy, CVN 79. Now I
understand that first phase would construct the hull and
superstructure of the ship and the second phase would insert
the combat systems. Has the Navy ever performed a two-phase
aircraft carrier strategy? And is such a strategy contemplated
for CVN 80? And can you tell us the reason why we are adopting
that phase?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. The first question regarding
whether the Navy has done this before on a carrier, I would
have to go back and research whether we have done it with a
carrier, but we have done that with surface combatants in the
past where the shipbuilder would build the ship and then at a
Naval Shipyard we would install the combat system.
Today, in fact, on the DDG-1000 [Zumwalt-class destroyers]
program we are doing exactly that as well. I would have to do
research in terms of whether we have done it on a carrier. The
motivation for doing this, the CVN 79 is the numerical relief
for the Nimitz, which retires in 2025. At one point in
planning, the Navy was looking at the construction schedule for
the CVN 79 to support a heel-to-toe replacement of the Nimitz.
That is not an optimal construction schedule for the
shipbuilder. So there is this tension between we wanted to
build the ship earlier to reduce cost of construction, but she
is not required until Nimitz gets ready to retire. So do we
ramp up a crew, have a ship operational for a period of time in
advance of when she is needed? So those were the trades that we
were looking at from a schedule perspective. Separately, we
were looking at how can we reduce the cost of the CVN 78 class
through its construction. And a couple things jump out.
One is there is work that is better tailored, better suited
for being accomplished outside of the new construction yard
where third parties could bid on it competitively. Two, we have
this long history of a very long construction cycle for the
carrier. Systems that you identify early on in the procurement
process, particularly electronic systems, command, control and
communication systems that are subject to obsolescence, by the
time the ship is built and it is outfitted and delivered, those
systems are already obsolete compared to the rest of the Navy.
So we looked for an opportunity to install those systems as
late as possible.
And then the third piece is a very specific system which is
the radar for the CVN 79 and follow. We are in fact developing
a new radar for our carriers and big deck amphibs [amphibious
assault ships], the Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar. That
would not be available to install in line in construction on
the CVN 79, but it is available to install in the second phase.
So we looked at let's optimize the construction schedule,
which means building it earlier, but then let's assign the
manning more in line with the replacement of the Nimitz. So
that created this bifurcation in terms of the schedule. And
then in this phase two window we will install the C4I [command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence]
equipment, the electronics equipment, we will install the new
radar, and then we will complete some of this work that would
be competed, frankly, with third parties and be able to be done
pierside.
It seems to be the right balance. It is unique to CVN 79
because of the schedule window that we have to do this. We will
not have this opportunity on CVN 80 because her schedule, her
construction schedule is going to be pressed up against she
will be the numerical relief for the CVN----
Mr. Forbes. So we don't have plans to use it on CVN 80?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. As
you know, each day we come into this rather impressive
committee room, I look at all the things I worry about in the
world and the things I am grateful for. One of the things I am
grateful for is that we have talented people with the kind of
commitment that you have to making sure you are defending and
protecting this country. So we thank you for that.
Also, I have told you at the beginning that we wanted to
give you any time that you needed to elaborate on something
perhaps that we didn't discuss you felt was important for the
record or to clarify something that you would like to clarify.
So at that time I would love to do that. And Mr. Secretary, we
will let you start.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, I gave an opening statement. I
have had plenty of time to discuss the issues and questions and
answers. And I would defer to my colleagues here.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I am trying not to get quoted by
you, as Admiral Moore did, just so you know.
Mr. Forbes. Look, I am praising him. We would love to have
another quote like that.
Admiral Aquilino. What I will leave you with, sir, just so
you are aware, you know better than anyone your Navy is forward
deployed each and every day doing the things that are needed.
So I thought, based on the carrier hearing, I would tell you
where your current--we talked about where the five parked ones
are. Let me tell you where the five working ones are.
So Theodore Roosevelt, just coming back from a greater than
8-month deployment that was in the north Arabian Gulf in
support of the fight against Syria and ISIL [Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant]. On the way home, they went and
participated with Operation Malabar with the Indian Navy. They
also participated with the Japanese Navy as a part of that as
well.
Ronald Reagan now deployed as the forward-deployed naval
force carrier coming out of Korea, doing operations in the
Western Pacific. They will participate in an operation called
ANNUALEX [Annual Exercise] with the Japanese. Pretty critical
to our allies and partners to stay plugged in, interoperable.
George Washington we talked about. While she is coming
around to go into overhaul, she is executing Operation UNITAS
on both the west side and the east side of South America,
working with our partners down there across the globe.
John C. Stennis on the West Coast and Harry S. Truman on
the East Coast, both are almost complete with their workups.
They will be deploying shortly as the follow-on replacements.
And sir, I know I don't have to tell you that, but I
figured you would want to hear that. Still working hard each
and every day. Thank you for your time. And I appreciate it.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. And Admiral Moore, we would
love to have another great statement.
Admiral Moore. I will try to avoid that today, sir, if I
could. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the time today. I have had
one of the great honors of my career to have the opportunity to
design and build and maintain our Nation's aircraft carriers.
We didn't spend a whole lot of time talking about the Ford
class today. Despite some of the challenges we have had with
Ford, we are going to deliver her next year. We are on a
sustainable path going forward. That is going to be a great
ship, built by some fantastic shipbuilders down at Newport
News, which are national assets.
I did spend a lot of time talking about the Nimitz class
and our need to maintain that ship for 50 years, and spent an
awful lot of time talking about the industrial base. What I
failed to mention is one of the things that we also should be
worried about; I think the industrial base, no matter how hard
we can run these ships, will be able to maintain the ship.
One thing I failed to mention I should have, the other
thing is we are also running the sailors and the men and women
on those ships extremely hard. And I have no doubt that the
industrial base can put those ships back together. But I do
worry about the pace that we are maintaining for our sailors.
And so I would just like to add that for the record and point
out again why it is so important for us to get back to 11
carriers.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Manazir, we are
going to let you do cleanup.
Admiral Manazir. Mr. Chairman, usually I am not shy as a
fighter pilot, but I will try also not to make declarative
statements beyond what you have already discussed with us
today. And I thank you for the opportunity. I would like to
clarify one point and then give some closing comments.
Chairman Wittman, when you and I discussed the Super
Hornets and F-35Cs, what I needed to clarify is why we buy both
of those, the impact of the F-18E/F is most impactful at 2016,
2017, 2018. The airplanes we are procuring now and that combat
capability of course go together. And as Secretary Stackley
said, the F-35Cs that we are procuring in 2016 to deliver 2018
is the capability impact. So I hope that is a little more
clear.
Sir, thank you very much. And Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member Courtney, thank you, members of the committee today, for
the opportunity to join you and for the personal investment so
many of you have made in ensuring Navy's ability to defend the
Nation, to protect American interests at sea, and specifically
for your ongoing support of our Nation's aircraft carriers.
As your Director of Air Warfare, this is what I worry
about, lose sleep at night about. But your bipartisan support,
your visits to our carriers both underway and while they are
being built and maintained, the assistance you and your fellow
members provide truly make a difference.
Adaptations and improvements to our carrier strike group
capabilities continue. And they include most recently USS
Eisenhower recently completing a highly successful series of
developmental tests for the F-35C, called Developmental Test
Period Two. That is our fifth-generation strike fighter that
will ensure the Navy's aircraft carriers deliver air dominance
in that high-end warfight. The E-2D Advanced Hawkeye was
deployed on the Theodore Roosevelt for the first time to bring
superior long-range battle management command and control, with
sensors that support offense and defense for the entire carrier
strike group.
The continued delivery of the carrier-based E-18G Growler
as the only tactical aircraft in the joint force that ensures
electromagnetic spectrum dominance of the battlespace. And the
continued development of advanced weapons for carriers and
their embarked air wings in anticipation of future adversaries,
such as the long-range anti-ship missile. And even high-energy
lasers, which will help ensure carrier strike groups can
establish sea control in any environment.
The maintenance and modernization of our current aircraft
carriers and the ongoing procurement of the new Ford-class
ships will ensure our Navy's aircraft carriers and carrier
strike groups continue to outpace the threat and bring
unparalleled warfighting capability for the combatant
commanders. My colleagues at this table and over in the
Pentagon understand and are committed to the work that remains
to ensure providing these capabilities does not cost the
taxpayer a dollar more than they should.
The Nation's investment in aircraft carriers is
significant. Their global reach, their ability to amass
firepower over sustained periods, their commanding presence and
proof of our national resolve have routinely demonstrated a
high return on these investments. The aircraft carrier, as the
centerpiece of a carrier strike group, provides us with an
unequaled hard, soft, and smart power advantage in a single,
responsive, flexible, and mobile package, unfettered by
geopolitical constraints. No other military capability delivers
more.
Sir, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
today.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you all. We appreciate the great work
your staffs do in helping as well. And with that, if there are
no other questions, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 3, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
November 3, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 3, 2015
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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. As to the two phase acquisition strategy, what would
the funding profile include, by fiscal year, to realize CVN-79 in a
single phase?
Admiral Moore. Delivering CVN 79 using a two-phased acquisition
strategy is essential to remaining under the Congressional cost cap,
delivering the ship with CVN 78-like capability, and affordably
maintaining an 11-carrier force structure. If the decision were made
today to transition to a single phase acquisition strategy, it would
cost $532M more to deliver CVN 79 in a single phase as opposed to the
current two-phased approach. The two funding profiles are shown below
for comparison:
In this scenario, a single phase delivery would prevent the
integration of a lower cost Enterprise Radar Suite (ERS), requiring
reversion to Dual Band Radar (DBR). The additional funding required in
FY2017 and FY2018 reflects the cost to procure DBR hardware and
software; accomplish the planning effort with HII-NNS to reintegrate
installation of the Phase II equipment into the current construction
contract; and the construction impact and time-related services caused
by an 18-month extension of the construction contract with HII-NNS
required to support installation of DBR. This process would deliver the
ship only about six months earlier than planned due to procurement
timelines associated with purchasing a DBR ship set for CVN 79.
______
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. I'm familiar with the report you provided to the
Defense Committees on the Automated Test and Retest (ATRT) program. In
your report you said there are significant benefits to the fleet
including reducing testing cost, improving product quality, reducing
the time to field new capabilities, and reducing life cycle costs. This
technology can rapidly re-test in response to cyber vulnerabilities. We
know this to be an issue of concern--and I've raised this issue with
both Secretary of Defense Carter and Under Secretary Kendall. Can you
assure me you are aggressively pursuing this technology to its full
potential including implementation across our entire carrier fleet?
Secretary Stackley. The Navy is pursuing Automated Test and Retest
(ATRT) technology for the aircraft carrier (CVN) Fleet. The ATRT
technology is being used in testing the CVN Machinery Control System.
The technology is also being used in CVN Ship Control System Shore
Based Facility testing. The Navy intends to extend the process and
technologies across additional control systems for the entire CVN
Fleet.
[all]