[House Hearing, 114 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 114-59]
COUNTERING ADVERSARIAL PROPAGANDA:
CHARTING AN EFFECTIVE
COURSE IN THE CONTESTED
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 22, 2015
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
97-493 WASHINGTON : 2016
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona, Vice Chair DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska
MO BROOKS, Alabama PETE AGUILAR, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York
Kevin Gates, Professional Staff Member
Lindsay Kavanaugh, Professional Staff Member
Nevada Schadler, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Armstrong, Hon. Matthew C., Broadcasting Board of Governors...... 3
Haas, MG Christopher K., USA, Director, Force Management and
Development Directorate, U.S. Special Operations Command....... 6
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.................. 5
Moore, Brig Gen Charles L., USAF, Deputy Director for Global
Operations, Joint Staff........................................ 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Armstrong, Hon. Matthew C.................................... 29
Haas, MG Christopher K....................................... 54
Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D...................................... 40
Moore, Brig Gen Charles L.................................... 64
Wilson, Hon. Joe............................................. 27
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Wilson................................................... 73
COUNTERING ADVERSARIAL PROPAGANDA: CHARTING AN EFFECTIVE COURSE IN THE
CONTESTED INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Thursday, October 22, 2015.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:08 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Wilson. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to call this
meeting of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee
of the House Armed Services Committee to order.
I am pleased to welcome everyone here for today's hearing
on information operations and counter-propaganda capabilities.
This hearing will focus on the challenges faced by the
Department of Defense [DOD] and the Federal Government when
dealing with the insidious propaganda and social media
messaging coming from groups like Daesh, and sadly, from
countries like Russia, China, and others. Not only do they
recruit members, raise money, and sway the opinion of potential
allies with this propaganda, but they sow doubt and dissension
as a means of preventing or discouraging U.S. military action
to protect American families.
Last month, our subcommittee held a closed roundtable
discussion with outside industry and academic experts to
explore this topic. That discussion helped our members better
understand some core challenges and concerns, including what
are our current capabilities for information operations and
counter-propaganda, and how are they being integrated into
larger strategies to deal with specific actors like Daesh,
Russia, Iran, China, and others.
How can new techniques and concepts improve our ability to
sense, detect, analyze, and respond to propaganda in the 21st
century media environment? What policy changes impair our
ability to realize the full potential of these new technologies
and concepts? These questions and issues remain relevant in
today's hearing.
Our panel of expert witnesses will proceed from that
starting point and provide us with their thoughts from a
governmental perspective on this important topic.
Our witnesses before us today are Mr.--the Honorable
Michael Lumpkin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict [SO/LIC]; the Honorable
Matthew Armstrong, Broadcasting Board of Governors [BBG]; Major
General Christopher K. Haas, Director of Special Force
Management and Development, United States Special Operations
Command, SOCOM, and also a very grateful dad of a Citadel
cadet, which I respect very much; and Brigadier General Charles
Moore, Deputy Director for Global Operations, Joint Staff.
I would like now to turn to my friend and ranking member,
Jim Langevin from Rhode Island, for any comments he would like
to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the
Appendix on page 27.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here, for your service to the country, and
for all you are doing to keep us safe. The Department of
Defense's ability to work in concert with other U.S. Government
agencies and international entities to effectively counter
propaganda is an issue that the members of this subcommittee
have been concerned with for some time, and I am glad, Mr.
Chairman, that again you are holding this hearing.
DOD has a long history of countering adversary propaganda
and influence in order to further our national security
objectives, and it has met with great success. However, unlike
World War II or in the 1980s, today's state and non-state
actors disseminate their messages far and wide instantaneously,
crossing multiple combatant command areas of responsibility and
reaching audiences all over the world, including U.S. citizens.
Unfortunately, time and distance are no longer on our side.
This evolution of the information environment forces us to
think about how to approach this issue. Should decisionmaking
within the military chain of command be decentralized so
efforts can be more effective in time and space? If so, how do
we maintain oversight and synchronization of efforts?
Further, how do we take into account privacy, freedom of
speech, and other issues as they pertain to U.S. persons and
nonadversaries in an environment without boundaries?
Essentially, how can we more effectively employ capabilities?
As the chairman mentioned, the subcommittee held a
roundtable with independent witnesses on the issue several
weeks ago, setting the stage for a deeper discussion of the
aforementioned issues.
Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses as to
how they are working to more effectively employ capabilities
that we do have and developing even better capabilities and
tactics, techniques, and procedures for the future.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to our witnesses'
testimony, and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Mr. Langevin. I would like
to remind our witnesses that your written statements will be
submitted for the record, so we ask that you summarize your
comments to 5 minutes or less, and then after that, we will
proceed with each member having 5 minutes to ask questions.
We have a person who is above reproach, Kevin Gates, as we
maintain the 5-minute rule, and then this is a unique hearing,
and so we will actually begin with questionings in reverse
order of how the seating, and we will begin with Congresswoman
Elise Stefanik when we begin questions.
So I would like to thank again all of you for being here
today, and we begin with Mr. Armstrong.
STATEMENT OF HON. MATTHEW C. ARMSTRONG, BROADCASTING BOARD OF
GOVERNORS
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak to the unique
role of the Broadcasting Board of Governors and the United
States international media, and the role we play in advancing
our national interest. I am pleased to join today's panel
alongside my colleagues from the Department of Defense. I have
a longer written statement for the record, and I will summarize
that here.
This committee knows well that while today's increasingly
interconnected world offers us a plethora of opportunity, it
also provides challenges. From Crimea, to Syria, Northern
Nigeria, and Southeast Asia, propaganda and censorship have
used our increasingly networked world to not just seek to win
the news cycle, but to shape the very choices of statecraft.
U.S. foreign policy cannot be effective if we do not
appreciate how information shapes the actions of policymakers,
institutions, and the public. The Broadcasting Board of
Governors is a unique tool within this broader context. We are
a 24/7 global media organization that oversees nonmilitary
international media support supported by the U.S. Government,
including the Voice of America [VOA], the Office of Cuba
Broadcasting, BBG-funded grantees Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Radio Free Asia, and Middle East Broadcast Network.
Our ultimate goal is to inform, engage, and connect people
around the world in support of freedom and democracy through
topnotch fact-based reporting. We broadcast in 61 languages and
reach more than 215 million people each week. We are unique,
however, in that we prioritize our contact to impact strategic
audiences. Many of our reporters are not only from our target
markets, but they also maintain extensive networks in them.
They speak as locals. They know their audiences deeply.
We are called upon to operate in markets until private
information dissemination is found to be adequate. Virtually,
by definition, we target markets that are hard to reach, and at
best, underserved by accessible, reliable, independent media.
In short, there is no other agency or corporation like us that
puts the audience first, that actively builds true independent
media markets in order to one day not be needed.
By unleashing the power of professional journalism, we not
only inform foreign publics, we allow individuals to aspire to
freedom by offering them a platform to make decisions based on
information that is verifiably true. When we cover the
successes of free and open elections, as we have recently in
Nigeria, for instance, we educate the audiences on how
opposition parties can seek power through the ballot.
We serve as a key explainer of U.S. policy as well. VOA's
charter mandates that our programs present the policies of the
United States clearly and effectively, and also present
responsible discussions and opinion on these policies. When we
train the lens on our policy discussions, for example, by
covering different views on recent negotiations with Iran, we
allow the world to see democracy as a constantly evolving work
in progress guided by the rule of law.
Even simply talking about how Americans go about paying a
parking ticket can open the eyes of our audiences. Allow me to
use some terms that are not usually associated with the BBG,
but are familiar to the committee and to my colleagues at the
table. The BBG is actively involved in foreign internal defense
through empowering the people with the truth and giving them a
voice through transparency and accountability. We work by,
with, and through local populations by training and equipping
local media and individuals to be better journalists. We
actively work with some 3,000 affiliate news organizations
around the world, including 400 radio stations in Indonesia
alone.
We are a force multiplier for broader U.S. public
diplomacy. We open markets and closed societies for fact-based
journalism so the audience can see an alternative future. Our
media provide a platform on which the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, Agency for International Development,
Agriculture, and others can build their own success.
As I had mentioned earlier, we face an increasingly
networked world filled with challenges and opportunities. Let
me mention five core--a couple of the core areas we are focused
on. One, we are accelerating our shift toward engaged audience
and digital platforms, video, mobile, social. Second, we are
concentrating efforts in issue areas such as Russia, violent
extremism, Iran, China. Third, we are focusing on impact
overreach, putting the audience first.
We are focused--and last, we focus on challenging
information and Internet freedom worldwide, which is an
enduring and central role. Through our Internet Anti-Censorship
Program and Open Technology Fund, we seek to support
journalists, bloggers, civil society actors, and activists to
use the Internet safely and without fear of interference. We
underwrite apps and programs for computers and mobile devices
that help encrypt communications and evade censorship. These
efforts have been successful, and we look forward to expanding
them.
As I close, let me say, journalism is a powerful force for
change. By acting as the foreign domestic media, the BBG plays
a critical role in the lives of the audiences by providing them
with news and information in their local language that is
relevant to their daily lives. Voice of America's first
broadcast stated, ``The news may be good or bad. We will tell
you the truth.'' At BBG, we continue to operate with that in
mind. Because truth builds trust and credibility, delivering
credible news is the most effective counter to propaganda and
ignorance, and provides the audience with information that will
affect their daily lives and their daily decisionmaking.
And with that, I am happy to take questions. Thank you for
your time and thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong can be found in
the Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Wilson. And thank you, Mr. Armstrong. We now proceed to
Secretary Lumpkin.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT
Secretary Lumpkin. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member
Langevin, and distinguished members of the committee, I
appreciate this opportunity today to discuss the Department of
Defense's role in direct support of the Department of State's
efforts in the contested information environment.
I would like to thank the committee for your support in
this critical field. I am pleased to be joined today by
Brigadier General Moore and Major General Haas. It is good to
have the--my counterparts here, and in proper reflection of the
need of a whole-of-government response to this challenge, I am
honored to sit next to Governor Matt Armstrong from the
Broadcasting Board of Governors.
I am here to discuss an aspect of our information
operations capabilities that has received special attention
from this committee, and that is, our military information
support operations force which requires--which provides a
critical capability in support of tactical and operational
needs of military requirements, as well as providing support to
the overall strategic messages effort led by the State
Department.
The scope of our current challenge in the informational
space is unprecedented. In a Washington Post editorial on the
threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL,
Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public
Affairs, Richard Stengel, estimated that only 1 percent of a
potential audience of 1.6 billion people who could be targeted
by ISIL's messaging will actually support ISIL's actions.
This 1 percent, while small at first blush, equates to
approximately 16 million potential supporters of ISIL's actions
around the globe. Even that startling number conceals a
critical difference, which is the unfettered geographic and
virtual dispersion of this new adversary.
Social media and other communications technologies has
enabled the virtual, and in some cases, actual mobilization of
dispersed and demographically varied audiences around the
world. Non-state actors can reach across the globe with
multiple, simultaneously targeted and tailored approaches to
motivate or manipulate a spectrum of audiences.
They do this in numerous languages with messaging designed
to specifically influence or motivate them according to their
personal beliefs or perceptions, all conducted through
smartphone, computer, and an Internet connection. In this
environment, technology is not limited to one-way broadcast
like television or radio, it allows interactive discussion any
time in almost any location with virtually unlimited reach.
This hyper-connected world has many positive benefits, but
the rise of ISIL and the ability for other state and non-state
actors to conduct recruitment operations and spread propaganda
almost certainly and with minimal cost highlights the dark
side, one that requires the whole-of-government response.
In this challenging environment, I see two main
implications for the Department of Defense. First, the
Department does not lead the U.S. Government effort or possess
the only capabilities in this space. All other civilian
departments and agencies have their own roles and missions as
part of the government's strategic communications efforts. This
demands close interagency coordination and clear understanding
of the appropriate roles and complementary nature for each
piece of the U.S. Government's communication and engagement
framework with global audiences.
The bottom line is that the Department's efforts alone
cannot solve the challenge of this contested information
environment and adversary propaganda, but we do have a critical
role to play as a contributor of our unique military
capabilities and a partner to the whole-of-government effort
led by the State Department.
Second, the complexity of this environment demands that we
use a thoughtful, strategic approach to achieve success against
differing adversaries. Simply trying to master adversaries
tweet for tweet, or Web site for Web site, is both fiscally
irresponsible and operationally ineffective. Instead, we must
rely on the skills of our talented workforce to develop
thoughtful, well-constructed plans, partnerships with
interagency and our international friends, and the use of a
variety of means to disrupt the adversary's narrative.
We need to expose its contradictions and its falsehoods,
and ultimately bring credible, persuasive, and truthful
information to audiences who have often have significantly
different perceptions and cultural norms than our own. We
acknowledge and are appreciative of the intent of the language
of section 1056 of the pending NDAA [National Defense
Authorization Act].
Thank you for your support of the Department's efforts in
this critical space, and I look forward to answering any
questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found
in the Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Secretary Lumpkin. We now proceed to
General Haas.
STATEMENT OF MG CHRISTOPHER K. HAAS, USA, DIRECTOR, FORCE
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORATE, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
COMMAND
General Haas. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S.
Special Operation Command's manning, training, and equipping of
the military information support operations, MISO, force.
Preparing our MISO forces for current and future conflict
is a critical role for USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations
Command]. The extensive propaganda efforts employed by both
ISIL and Russia makes USSOCOM's role in manning, training, and
equipping even more critical.
We have made significant improvements in all three areas
over the last decade, but there is considerable work remaining,
particularly improving our MISO force's capability to influence
on the World Wide Web. Now I would like to address SOCOM's role
in manning, training, and equipping.
The overall end strength of the two Active Duty groups is
approximately 1,050 officers and enlisted MISO soldiers. The
active officer and NCO [non-commissioned officer] core is
appropriately manned with the exception of sergeants at the E-5
level, which is below authorized levels. Our projections for
recruitment and retention indicate we should have our Active
Duty MISO groups fully manned by fiscal year 2019.
The complexity of the mission, and the expertise required
to carry out MISO missions, has shaped an extended selection
and training program for our MISO soldiers. They now attend a
2-week selection, and 42-week qualification course. This is
different from other U.S. Government training, because it
focuses on language, culture, and influence principles. This
ensures our soldiers know how to design persuasive arguments,
use the right symbols, and identify the best media. This
training makes MISO a distinct asset within the Department of
Defense.
As you well know, our adversaries use the Internet to
recruit followers, gain financial support, and spread
propaganda and misinformation. The current conflicts have
identified our need to expand MISO training on the World Wide
Web. Through the joint requirements process, multiple combatant
commands have identified capability gaps in regards to MISO's
use of the Web. SOCOM is now in the process of developing a
comprehensive plan to expand MISO training into social media
use, online advertising, Web design, and other areas.
Maintaining a current MISO equipment capability to meet our
operational requirement is also an ongoing effort, but one
USSOCOM is well-positioned to meet. We have a state-of-the-art
media production center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, with the
capability to provide for print, audio, and video production.
We are also constantly exploring and developing future MISO
capabilities to ensure that we meet the emerging needs of the
combatant commanders.
USSOCOM welcomes this committee's support regarding
technology demonstrations to assess innovative and new
technologies for MISO. The Web-based technologies we are
exploring will be more flexible in nature and provide support
to on-site commanders.
In closing, SOCOM is committed to meeting the challenges of
training and equipping the force, while simultaneously
addressing our current manning issues. I also want to thank you
for your continued support of our SOF [special operations
forces] personnel and their families. The tremendous demands we
have placed on them requires a continued commitment to provide
for their well-being and combat readiness. This concludes my
opening remarks, and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Haas can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General Haas. We will now
proceed to General Moore.
STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN CHARLES L. MOORE, USAF, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
FOR GLOBAL OPERATIONS, JOINT STAFF
General Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the actions
we and the Department of Defense are taking to counter the
propaganda campaigns of our enemies.
In order to effectively achieve our military objectives and
end states, information operations must be inherently
integrated with all military plans and activities in order to
influence and ultimately alter the behavior of our adversaries
and their supporters. To accomplish that goal, there are
several capabilities available to commanders, the most common
being employment of our military information support operation
forces, or MISO forces.
MISO personnel have the training and cultural understanding
to assess enemy propaganda activities and propose unique
solutions that directly support our ability to achieve our
military objectives. MISO forces operating from a U.S. embassy
and operational task force, or component headquarters, are
employed to execute DOD missions that support named operations,
geographic combatant commander, theater security cooperation
efforts, and public diplomacy. How combatant commanders employ
their MISO operation capabilities to counter adversarial
propaganda is what I understand you want to focus on today.
MISO forces are currently deployed to 21 U.S. embassies
working with country teams and interagency partners to
challenge adversary IO [information operations] actions and
support broader U.S. Government goals. To perform their
missions, MISO forces use a variety of mediums, including
cyber, print, TV, and radio, to disseminate information in a
manner that will change perceptions, and subsequently, the
behavior of the target audiences.
Unfortunately, as this is an unclassified hearing, the
specific examples that I can discuss are limited, but I do want
to provide you some brief examples of the efforts our MISO
forces are currently undertaking around the world. In Central
Command, MISO efforts are focused on challenging the actions of
violent extremist organizations.
For example, in Iraq, MISO forces are conducting an advise-
and-assist role, to help Iraqi forces learn to develop
indigenous military information support operations and counter-
propaganda activities. Central Command's online influence
strategy is used to counter adversary narratives, shape
conditions in the AOR [area of responsibility], and to message
specific target audiences. These operations include using
existing Web and social media platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube, support military objectives by shaping
perceptions while highlighting ISIL atrocities, coalition
responses to ISIL activities, and coalition successes.
European Command's efforts include exposing Russian
mistruths and their concerted efforts to mislead European
audiences as to their true intentions. We are in the final
stages of staffing European Reassurance MISO program, which
will provide expanded authorities to conduct MISO training, and
in some cases, messaging support to our partners in the region.
EUCOM [European Command] is also looking to expand their
engagement with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to further
improve their information dissemination capabilities.
Ultimately, regardless of the enemies that we face, the
Department of Defense understands the criticality of countering
an adversary supporter's confidence, conviction, will,
decisionmaking, while shaping behavior supportive of our
military objectives. We understand that these actions must be
taken while not exceeding the authorities that we have been
granted, while always operating within the boundaries the
Department has been given, and with the close coordination of
our interagency partners.
Finally, I also want to express my deep appreciation for
the committee's unwavering support of our men and women in
uniform, to thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear
this afternoon, and I look forward to answer any questions that
you might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Moore can be found in
the Appendix on page 64.]
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, General Moore, and we now
will proceed with the members' questions, and Kevin is going to
make sure the clock is properly maintained. And so we will
begin, of course, with Congresswoman Elise Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
testimony today.
Secretary Lumpkin, my first question is for you. In October
of 2014, the Department submitted a report to this committee on
future military information operations capabilities as a result
of section 1096 of the fiscal year 2014 NDAA. Can you give this
committee an update on what progress has been made in
implementing the findings and recommendations of that report?
Secretary Lumpkin. Yes, ma'am. As mentioned in 2014, we
answered that report, and we continue to develop and do this
holistic review of how we do business, from everything from the
authorities that we have in place, to the pieces of how we man,
train, and equip, and to actually how we operate--
operationalize our MISO efforts.
So this is part of our ongoing process, as we are always
looking and reevaluating in dialogue with our interagency
partners and with this committee and others to make sure we
have the right oversight and we have the right capabilities in
place.
So I think we are making good strides. Again, it is a
continual challenge to work through, but I think we are doing
the right things as we provide oversight and evaluate our
capabilities.
Ms. Stefanik. I wanted to follow up on the point you made
about the authorities.
Secretary Lumpkin. Uh-huh.
Ms. Stefanik. Since we are operating in a very complex IO
environment. At a previous hearing, we heard from the witnesses
about the lack of clarity of the rules of engagement and of
those authorities. Can you talk about some specific
improvements that we should be making in order to clarify that?
Secretary Lumpkin. I firmly believe that title 10 under
U.S. Code gives DOD the authorities it needs to do the
information operations that we are required to do to support
our current mission, and the way--so I am very comfortable with
our authorities in this space. We continue to work with our
interagency partners to make sure that we are supporting them
in the fullest and most robust way possible. And I--again, I do
believe we have the authorities in place to do what we need to
do.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you. My next question is for General
Haas. Based on the current projections to reduce Army personnel
by about 40,000 people, could you describe what effect these
reductions could potentially have on the military information
support operations community?
General Haas. I would respond to that question this way,
Congresswoman, is that the command is very concerned about the
reduction in the overall size of the United States Army, from
which we draw our pool of candidates for our MISO forces. It
would be difficult for me to fully quantify that because the
Army is currently in that process.
But as my commander has expressed in other forums, he is
concerned about that drawdown, because that does reduce the
pool of available candidates and qualified soldiers that would
want to--that we could recruit, select, and train for our MISO
force, and so we continually look and try to analyze, you know,
exactly what that impact will be over time.
As I stated in my opening remarks, we are trying to
mitigate some of these concerns through more active recruiting,
directed specifically at the E-5 level, to fill our current
shortages, and we are looking at other management tools in
order to ensure that we retain our best qualified MISO soldiers
in order to offset the potential impact of a smaller Army on
our community.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much, and I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And we now proceed to
Congressman Ashford of Nebraska.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
questions. One general one, and that is, in this area of
recruiting individuals who can engage in this activity,
General, how do you see, going forward with the authorities you
have and some of the work that has been done in the NDAA, how
do you see the private sector's expertise being tapped to raise
the level of activity in this area? What is your vision of
that?
General Haas. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So
SOCOM is exploring and is working on new relationships, not
only with the private sector but with academia in general,
trying to certainly garner the--and understand the skill sets
that they can help in provide to--certainly to our community.
So that is an ongoing effort, and we are also partnering,
as best we can, I think, with the interagency and we are
looking for areas in which to improve that, so that we not only
have a whole-of-government approach, but we have maybe a whole-
of-society approach towards improving the quality of our MISO
skills, knowledge, and abilities.
Mr. Ashford. And you believe you have adequate legislative
authority to undertake those partnerships, I assume. Is that--
--
General Haas. I would describe it this way: We have--
USSOCOM has the adequate authorities to do our current man,
train, and equip mission.
Mr. Ashford. Okay. So we can--having--well, let me give you
an example. And maybe I misinterpreted what Admiral Rogers
said, but I think I understood what he was saying in a
committee hearing we had, that--so, for example, the--on the
military side, we could reach out to the private sector, bring
in expertise from the private sector to fill out the--some of
these responsibilities on an interim basis or a short-term
basis. Is that something--assuming that the standards are
adequately adhered to, is that something that you all think
could happen?
General Haas. We obviously understand that the pace at
which technology advances, we will probably have to reach out
to the private sector in terms of contractors to bring that
expertise into the force until we can appropriately train our
soldiers, our men and women inside the MISO community to fully
understand--operate and understand that new technology. And we
are always working that balance between, you know, what is out
there in the private sector and what we can then incorporate,
gain into our community.
Mr. Ashford. Right. I think--let me ask General Moore.
Could I ask you a question specifically about language
competency? Hopefully I am asking--I think you talked about
that a little bit, but when we were in Iraq with the chairman,
there was discussion about, you know, the language, knowing the
language--not only knowing the language, but knowing the
nuances of the language, the different--and hopefully I am
asking the right, Mr. Secretary, the right person here. Anybody
can answer it. But are we--are we--that sort of sophisticated
nuanced language training, is that--do we have the adequate--do
we have adequate resources? You mentioned that is a challenge.
There is maybe----
General Haas. Yes, sir, that is more in my lane.
Mr. Ashford. Okay.
General Haas. We spend a significant amount of our time in
the qualification course for our MISO soldiers focused on
language and culture, so the--each one of the MISO soldiers is
required to graduate with a--what we call a one-one capability
in a targeted language. And so that allows them to speak
conversationally and read the language.
We are focused right now on a number of different
languages, but we have adequate resources within the community
to adjust that language, and then continually provide
sustainment training. But as you know, mastering a language is
sometimes a gift, and we look to target our soldiers with that
gift in languages to----
Mr. Ashford. And do you recruit--sorry.
General Haas [continuing]. So beyond one-one.
Mr. Ashford. Sorry. Do you recruit to that as well?
General Haas. Obviously, in order to attend our assessment
selection courses, those soldiers have to have an aptitude high
enough score on their language test to enter our courses, so we
do test to that.
Mr. Ashford. Thank you for your--for all your work. Thanks.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Ashford. We now proceed to
Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you. I always want to acknowledge the folks that wear the
uniform and put themselves at risk for the rest of us in terms
of even just putting your whole life to the cause of freedom,
and I am grateful to you.
Essentially, I guess we are discussing the Department's
capability today of, to use a quote here, ``conducting
operations to inform, influence, and shape adversarial behavior
in the information environment.'' That sounds pretty important
to me, given the ideological nature of some of the enemy that
we face.
So I guess my first question is, what do you think
represents the best bang for our buck, or the best strategic
niche that we can pursue in order to actually change the
behavior of our adversaries? And let's see, Secretary Lumpkin,
I will go ahead and begin with you, and if anybody else would
like to take the question, that would be great.
Secretary Lumpkin. Yes. Thank you for the question. I think
there is two principal aspects for us, is that one is that as
part of DOD's larger strategy, it is all operations, large or
small, have an information operation component that supports
that particular operation. So it is codified and actually
integrated in all operations. So I think that, first of all,
that is kind of the chapeau that--so everything we do.
The other piece is that our relationships with the
interagency where we look to how we can support our partners
who have--and bring our unique military capabilities, whether
it is print or it is working some other piece in order to help
them in their effort.
So once our--our principal role here outside of doing
information operations on operations, per se, that are uniquely
military, is how we support our partners, so I think that is
key and I think that is a huge value we bring as a Department.
Mr. Franks. Well, I have seen a lot of research that shows
that one of the challenges that we have with this ideological
enemy is that when we try to measure their commitment to their
cause, that we sort of have to break it down typically to
whether it is a sacred value to them or not. In other words, is
this something that they are joining the group just for sort of
the adventure, or if this is something that is deeply held
conviction that goes to the religious core of who they are.
And it just--I am just wondering if these are really some
of the leadership here is acting on sacred core values, and it
doesn't seem like anything we can say to them is going to have
a lot of impact, but it--perhaps our efforts would be
redirected at those less committed so that we sort of--sort of
impact the support base of the true believers, as it were.
Secretary Lumpkin. All good points. It is very interesting.
A study was recently done from a Lebanese-based company called
Quantum, and it put ISIL, in particular, people into nine
different bins of people who would join this organization, so
it allows for better targeting. Just a quick list of them that
I found were interesting.
The first one was the status seeker, somebody looking for
status; the second one was an identity seeker, somebody looking
for an identity; revenge, revenge seeker; redemption seeker;
responsibility seeker; the thrill seeker; somebody who is
looking for ideology, somebody who is looking for justice; and
then a death seeker are the nine different bins.
So as things are developed, just as our enemies target
specific audiences, the--we have to, as a U.S. Government writ
large, have to have unique messages directed towards each of
these nine different bins. I thought this was very informative
and very helpful in helping me understand the problem awhile
back.
Mr. Franks. Well, actually, you know, that is the point I
was really trying to get to, as you probably imagine, and it
sounds like that last guy is going to be a little bit
recalcitrant. The death seeker doesn't sound to me like someone
who is going to be open to a lot of, ``well, you just had a bad
childhood'' approaches.
So I guess then my final question to you is, with apologies
for this sequester and what it has done to pretty much the
entire military apparatus of this country, do you feel like--
and General Haas, this goes to your testimony, do you feel like
the Department has the appropriate resources--you sort of
touched on it already, but the appropriate resources and
programming personnel to successfully execute this current
counter-ISIL strategy? Do you think--and if you don't have
something that you need, what could we do to make your life
easier and more effective against these enemies of freedom?
Secretary Lumpkin. If I may actually take that question.
What I don't have is budget certainty. Where I am, I am trying
to come up with a multiyear strategy, because this doesn't
happen overnight. In order to influence somebody to change
their mindset, their viewpoints, there is a continual
engagement, so I am trying to do this in a multiyear plan on 1-
year money.
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Secretary Lumpkin. So it is hard for us to make sound and
long-term investments in our programming, in our planning to
execute information operations without that budget certainty.
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Secretary Lumpkin. And Matt, do you have----
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. It is a similar situation. We are
not sure what is happening.
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Mr. Armstrong. Is it possible to take a moment and answer
your question as relates to----
Mr. Franks. Well, I guess, of course, as far as not knowing
what is going to happen, given the potential veto, join the
club, you know, we don't know, any of us know what is
happening. Go ahead, sir. I want to be sensitive to my time
here. My time is expired. If the chairman wants to extend the
time for you to answer, that is great.
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you. So you asked about the audience
or the folks and the different ideological viewpoints and the
realities. This is where I emphasize the particular nature of
our toolkit, what we bring to the table.
The adversaries, and there are a whole bunch of different
adversaries we face unfortunately right now, and they tend to
rely on the say-do gap, they tend to rely on propaganda and a
mistelling of history and a mistelling of the present, and they
rely on the audience not knowing what the reality is, and they
squash the freedom of speech and the freedom to listen, and
that is where we are able to intervene and tell them what is
actually going on, what is the truth.
And then an important element, whether it is an IO, public
diplomacy, what we do is the trusted communicator, and we
empower the people on the ground that are familiar, whether it
is an affiliate radio station, or it is an individual that is
familiar with the particular potential extremist to communicate
and actually have the truth so that this individual is being
impacted from all angles with the reality, what is actually
happening, so that is another element where we are coming in.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
indulgence here, and I think this gentleman could probably seek
a career in political consulting at some point for campaigns
afterwards. If you can change these guys' mind and help people
see the truth, you have got a real future, brother.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you so much, Congressman Franks. We
now proceed to Congressman Marc Veasey of Texas.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask
specifically about some of the propaganda activities that we
are seeing out there in different regions of the world, Russia,
ISIL, and Iran, China. With there being such--with social media
itself being such a challenge to counter, you know, rumors and
innuendo and myths and what have you, how much can we
reasonably expect to be able to challenge some of the things
out there that we see from Russia or ISIL, or any of these
actors that are using social media to really keep things
stirred up?
General Haas. I know from a SOCOM prospective, what we are
looking at is how do we become more--much more proactive, and
as I stated in my opening comments, we are undergoing an entire
review based on combatant commanders requests that we take--
that we take a closer look at what is happening on the Internet
and social media sites, and then how do we help to influence
that particular targeted audience via that media? And we've
recognize that we are not on there constantly, and do we have
the technology to be able to immediately respond and be a
more--have a more persistent presence so that we can understand
and then provide more comprehensive recommendations to our
senior leaders and decisionmakers regarding the messages and
other ways to counter this propaganda.
And so that comprehensive review, and that look at
technology to enable us to do it is ongoing right now, and we
are hopeful that by the first quarter, fiscal year 2017, we
will have a better picture of how we are actually going to get
after that problem set of being able to be more proactive and
be involved in the discourse, you know, continuously, rather
than basically shooting behind the target, or being in a tweet-
for-tweet as the Assistant Secretary said, which we see only
validates the message that they are sending out.
Mr. Armstrong. If I may add, yes, we have to be proactive.
One of the other challenges, and I think the general was
getting to this, is we actually have to pay attention to the
impact rather. The existence of the propaganda itself doesn't
mean that there is impact. We have to look at what are they
striving for and how do we counter that? How do we respond to
that?
So often, the best counter is an indirect response. So we
look at, for example, Iran, and much of the propaganda coming
from Iran is trying to destabilize Iraq and Syria and wreak
chaos, so if we are in there and talking about it or engaging
on the subject matter of what we are actually doing, what is
the reality on the ground there? That is helpful.
With Russia, much of the propaganda that surfaces is aimed
at destabilizing the West, undermining the trust and
credibility of journalism, of government, of NATO [North
Atlantic Treaty Organization], of EU [European Union], and all
those things, and so we can have a conversation along this
other pathway, and we don't match propaganda. Certainly we
don't go tweet-for-tweet, but we go to the overarching issues
where they are having an impact.
And with Daesh, same thing, as I mentioned before, there is
a say-do gap, and we start to hit them, hit the audience on
what is the gap, what are they saying, but what is the reality?
And this will help impact and reach the audience. And again, we
empower that audience so that they start to recognize the
propaganda for what it is. It is not effective to tell somebody
that is propaganda. You have to get them to internalize, and
then, again, have them be the communicator and share that
experience.
Mr. Veasey. In the state of affairs today, with everything
going on with Russia, with ISIL, with Iran trying to keep
things stirred up in the region, where should we be focusing
most of our efforts as far as it pertains to counter-propaganda
and counter-social media tactics?
Mr. Armstrong. Well, sir, it is--that is a difficult
question because each one of these is a unique threat, and it
is a different environment.
Mr. Veasey. Who do you think is the most effective out of
those players in using the social media to cause discord?
Mr. Armstrong. I suspect we would have different answers
from different folks and the different marketplaces. I think
each one of these are sowing a very critical threat. As I said,
the Russian propaganda aimed at the non-Russian audiences aimed
at undermining NATO, EU, government, media, and that is a very
scary destabilizing influence if it is actually having the
impact and it is a seeping impact onto the audience.
With Daesh, we see the impact of that, and there are
questions on the resourcefulness of that, but honestly, I am
not sure that--I think that is a above my pay grade, on where
we should be focused. They are each unique threats, and it is
based on our foreign policy and where we want to go.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Veasey, and I will start my 5
minutes, and Kevin is pretty brutal about reminding me of this,
which is good, and then we will proceed to Mr. Langevin. But as
we begin, I want to indeed thank Mr. Armstrong, the
Broadcasting Board of Governors. For you to have 61 languages,
it is very impressive, too, for Voice of America to have
persons who are actually proficient in the language, possibly
even from--in their home community. That just comes across so
positive and real world. I want to thank you for that.
And then General Moore, I was grateful to hear that at
embassies, there are personnel, in a positive way, monitoring.
I minored in journalism. I love print media. When I visit
countries around the world, I enjoy picking up local newspapers
and seeing what is available. I was in Islamabad, Pakistan, a
couple of years ago and it was just a very positive newspaper
that I read. It had dispatches from Reuters and from Associated
Press. It had advertising giving an indication of a vibrant
consumer society and competition.
But then I got to the op ed page, and there was a hate-
filled column, and it was ridiculous. It was insane. And it was
specifically about how the American military spends all of its
time targeting mosques, hospitals, schools to achieve the
maximum number of civilian mass murder, and I thought this is
so insulting.
I mean, to the intelligence, in my reading it, who wrote
it, and I looked: Fidel Castro. So it was somewhat discredited
when I found out who the author was, but like entirely. But we
have just got to be vigilant because somebody might believe the
total and utter propaganda that I saw.
With that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, how closely are the
activities of our information operations capabilities and
people linked with the cyber operation capabilities and
personnel?
Secretary Lumpkin. I am going to defer to General Moore on
that question.
Mr. Wilson. That is fine. Thank you.
General Moore. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. They
are extremely closely linked, as has been indicated several
times so far in the discussions that we have been having.
Organizations like ISIL are very, very dependent upon using
cyber capabilities or the Internet, social media, through
everything from command and control, disperse their propaganda,
foreign fighter flow, and communications with regards to that,
funding efforts, et cetera. So they are inherently linked.
And as you are aware, Mr. Chairman, I know cyber is just
one of the many information-related capabilities that is part
of a broader information operation paradigm or structure, and
so all those things occur simultaneously.
Mr. Wilson. Well, we appreciate the effort very, very much.
And General Haas, is there an overarching DOD, or Federal
Government strategy to counter information operations and
propaganda? How effective has it been? Or if not, what lack of
strategy hindering our ability to take meaningful actions in
the information environment?
General Haas. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman. I
am going to defer to the Assistant Secretary.
Mr. Wilson. Hey, this is great. I want the right person to
answer the question.
Secretary Lumpkin. No, no, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the question. Again, the State Department is the
lead for the whole of government--U.S. Government response in
working in the information space. On the counterterrorism part,
they have the CSCC [Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
Communications], which is--manages that, and the rest is done
through the bureaus at State. It is how they manage their
regional messages, and we provide direct support again. And the
CSCC, for example, there is 20-some-odd people who were working
that particular mission set, and we are providing about 25
percent of them detailed over to the Department of State to
assist them in that mission.
So we are very closely linked within the interagency with
our partners as we continue to work this, this challenging
environment. And again, going back to the DOD's strategy, not
only is the interagency piece, but it is what I mentioned
earlier is that piece where every one of our operations has an
information operation component to it.
Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much, and Secretary, I
appreciate you pointing out that the ISIL target may be only 1
percent, but that is 16 million people, and sadly, in my home
State, we had a shooting at Ebenezer AME [African Methodist
Episcopal] Church. It was somewhat of a backhanded compliment
to the people of my State that the murderer identified he could
not find people locally who agreed with him. But what motivated
him was going on the Internet and finding people. And so what I
had hoped would be liberating of Internet can actually produce
an extraordinary danger to American citizens. And I now proceed
to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to,
again, thank our witnesses for your testimony.
So if I could, Secretary, maybe we can do a little deeper
dive on this the whole-of-government approach, how information
is managed, and can you talk more specifically? You say from
the strategic to the down to the tactical, how we are managing
the information, and the way in which the State Department has
input into this as well as the IC [Intelligence Community] in
terms of messaging, and again, how the information flows and
how it is managed?
Secretary Lumpkin. No, I appreciate the question, sir.
Again, the State Department has the lead, so they set the
conditions internationally, you know, as far as the messaging
piece. We, at DOD, you know, we execute in support, you know,
tactical- or operational-level military operations. We do that
as we continue to work with the State Department in the larger
message sets.
Now, the Intelligence Community, what they are doing is
they are continually watching our adversaries' actions, and to
see what they are doing and which feeds back into the process
of we know what they are doing and how they are responding.
You know, the two principal challenges we have in this
space within the Department is that, one, the speed of
technology and what our adversaries are able do with it, so we
are always adjusting and shifting; and there is also the
assessment piece that we do all the time, because we have to
assess if our actions are actually working.
And one of challenges we have that is kind of unique to
this space is that when we--when something doesn't happen,
something bad doesn't happen, that is frequently when we know
we are successful. So we are trying to validate something that
didn't happen. So it is a challenge. But as we work in the
overall structure within the whole-of-government approach, that
is always feeding back in as far as the whole process as we
work with the IC, the State, and then DOD's component in there.
Mr. Langevin. Is State properly resourced? And again, will
they have some of the lead on this? But the capabilities are in
the hands of DOD. Are they properly resourced to help to manage
the information flow?
Secretary Lumpkin. I think it is outside of my lane to talk
about State Department resourcing. That said, the fact that we
have, you know, 25 percent of the CSCC detailed to fill
critical positions over there tells me they don't have the
manpower to put against the mission like they would. That is my
guess, but I would defer to State for a more satisfying answer.
Mr. Langevin. That insight is helpful. I appreciate the
answer. So Secretary, ISIL is waging, obviously, an information
operations campaign using social media that has proven
effective in recruiting new fighters, obtaining financing, and
generally strengthening their political and strategic goals
while undermining U.S. and other regional partners' objectives.
ISIL also uses open sources for command and control, and
their broad use of social media has reinvigorated a discussion,
obviously, of DOD's role and effectiveness in the information
operations environment.
So little more--drilling down a little bit more on this
topic, are Department of Defense's policies and directives
keeping pace with the ever-evolving information environment?
And what reviews and discussions are taking place within
Department of Defense in whole of government to increase
effectiveness of military operations to counter propaganda, and
are new tactics, techniques, and procedures being developed?
Secretary Lumpkin. We are doing continual self-evaluation,
not just within the Department of Defense, but the interagency
writ large. As a matter of fact, I sat in a meeting yesterday
with Secretary Carter and Secretary Kerry, and this was one of
the topics that we discussed is that how we continue to work
better to counter and show the true nature of ISIL, and to make
sure we are leveraging every asset authority that we have
collectively between our two organizations to continue to show
the world what ISIL really is.
So it is a continual process, and we look forward to our
continued work with the committee here. If we do identify new
needs or authorities, we will come to you asking for those.
Mr. Langevin. Again, since my time is running out, I will
wait to if we go to a second round of questions. But to Mr.
Franks' question, the topic that he raised, and Mr. Armstrong,
you talked about these trusted partners and seeking them out
and making sure that the message is communicated; and
Secretary, your point of exposing ISIL for what they are,
finding, identifying those credible voices, particularly, for
example, President al-Sisi and the speech that he gave to the
religious community and the admonition that he gave, those are
the types of things that help to convey the message of a
counterbalance to what the message an organization like ISIL is
trying to convey. With that, I will yield back since my time
has expired.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ranking Member Langevin. We now
proceed to Congresswoman Stefanik.
Ms. Stefanik. My question is for Mr. Armstrong. We have
talked a lot today about the importance of countering
propaganda with a credible voice. And you mentioned that in
your testimony. But during a CODEL [congressional delegation] I
was on earlier this year, in Jordan specifically, much of the
leadership discussed the importance of the fact that this is a
long-term, generational struggle. And again, instead of talking
about our strategies for being reactive, what do we need to be
doing to make sure that our IO capabilities are more proactive?
I know that is a broad question, but I think it is an important
one looking 5, 10, and a generation down the line.
Mr. Armstrong. Thank you for the question. Because of the
nature of my agency, I am going to restate the question
slightly because we don't do information operations, but the
information environment. It is important that the value of
information, the value of the conversation, the value of
journalism, the freedom to speak and the freedom to listen, and
that empowerment to the audience, is maintained over the years.
This agency is Voice of America, it started in the 1940s, 1942.
And it has always had a fundamental purpose of empowering
people through the access to news and information. And that was
a fundamental counter to propaganda was access to the truth.
So I think the one answer is acknowledging that information
matters. We forget that. It seems to come and go in waves.
Two, appreciate that in the United States, we have a
fundamental appreciation of the press. And there is a reason
why, because it is fundamental to a democratic process and
whatever flavor of democracy that is. They are very important,
they're a voice for the people.
Three, that the people actually matter and that they need a
voice, not just the, quote, ``formal journalist.'' And then I
would add another is that our interagency partners can use us
more, that they can be available to us to get on because of our
access to the audience, they can come on and they can speak to
a vast audience much greater than simply standing at a podium
and hoping that a Western media will convey that story to a
foreign domestic audience that is a target audience or that
that local media, which often does not have a global reach and
does not understand the context of the statement of say
Secretary Kerry or the President or whoever it is going to be,
and that they utilize us more because we can help unpack that
story.
Ms. Stefanik. General Haas, did you want to comment on that
question?
General Haas. Well, SOCOM specifically is working on not
only the interagency aspect of this problem set, as the
Secretary said, but we are also very focused on building
reliable partnerships, which we see as critical to really
informing us about this generational issue. And so we spend a
lot of time at SOCOM and within our tactical forces building
those important, reliable international partnerships that we
will need to better inform us for the future.
Ms. Stefanik. Thank you very much for those thoughtful
answers. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ms. Stefanik. I think an unheralded
positive story has been the military information support
operations. And I think it would be very helpful for General
Haas, General Moore, possibly Secretary Lumpkin, if you all
could explain how these are developed and what has been the
experience for the last 14 years?
General Moore. As far as the training and equipping, et
cetera, that I know General Haas can get into the specifics for
you there. But I will tell you that they have been absolutely
critical, especially as I mentioned in some of the opening
statements, in our embassies to help advance the capabilities
of a lot of the governments and a lot of the military
organizations that we have been helping in terms of building
their partnership capacities, so that they can deal with these
problems on their own, which, of course, I know you understand,
ties right into really what our goals are in places like Iraq
right now, which is to let them work these issues from the
inside out.
So I think that they have been invaluable, and we will
continue to use them whenever they are requested by the chiefs
of mission, and supported by the relevant combatant commanders.
General Haas.
General Haas. The successes, as well as the lessons
learned, have helped us inform SOCOM in how do we adjust our
assessment selection process as well as our qualification
process for our MISO soldiers? So every 2 years, we do a
detailed review based not only on the successes that we are
seeing in the AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] AOR with hunting
Joseph Kony, to what we are experiencing in the Pacific AOR or
the Central Command AOR to help us refine the actual classes of
instruction, and the skills and attributes that we want to
build into our MISO force.
So they have been very informative over the last decade,
and they will continue to inform us in the future. So we are
fielding a MISO force that meets the requirements of the
specific combatant commanders. And if we have to, for example,
adjust a language requirement based on an emerging requirement,
then we have the capability to do that, and I think the
flexibility within our system to adjust to meet that emerging
requirement.
Mr. Wilson. And as I conclude, I want to thank you all. And
something that was meaningful to me, by getting proper
information out, it promotes a level of stability and certainly
robs people who have ill intent to their local community and
us. And I think in coordination with the United States Agency
for International Development. I wish more people knew about
that too. What was so inspiring to me on my 11 visits--12 to
Afghanistan, to see the number of signs that were by road signs
next to buildings of the clasped hands, U.S. flag, the flag of
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
And a point that always impressed me, many of these signs
were rusty, they had been there a long time. And if people
found that resentful of these schools being built, the
hospitals being built, the bridges being built, they could take
the signs down. And so much good. And I always quote
Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, and that is on my first visit
to Afghanistan, that good news has no feet and bad news has
wings. So good luck. And to the Board of Governors, please get
all this corrected. I now go to Congressman Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one final
question, I would go to General Haas. General, can you please
describe, to the extent that you can in an unclassified forum,
current information related to capabilities to counter
propaganda and social media? Which are most effective in your
opinion and why? And what challenges do forces face in
employment of these capabilities? And how are these challenges
being addressed? And what capabilities are being developed in
the future--for the future, I should say?
General Haas. Thank you for the question, sir. If I could
break that down and answer it. Your first part was----
Mr. Langevin. Which of the capabilities, to the extent that
you can talk about it in an open forum, which are most
effective and why?
General Haas. Thank you. So as I said in my opening
comment, I think the most important capabilities that we bring
is our language and cultural understanding, as well as the
training that we provide to our MISO soldiers on how to conduct
influence ops, particularly in the 21 deployed military
information support teams that General Moore talked about. That
is one of the distinct capabilities that we help bring to the
country team and the interagency, is this cultural
understanding and awareness, as well as this language
capability.
Now, as I stated, what we are looking to the future is
addressing the Internet-based operations of the future. And we,
in a different forum, we would be more than happy to discuss
what we are determining in that current assessment of our
capability gaps and where we see an opportunity to fill or
close those gaps in our current capabilities.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thanks, General. And I guess, you know,
related to this, the other part of my question was what
challenges do forces face in employment of these capabilities?
And how are the challenges being addressed?
General Haas. Well, I believe there is multiple challenges,
depending upon which region of the world we are deployed. I
think we have a great relationship with our interagency
partners in this area. And I think our combatant commanders,
without speaking for them, based on what they have identified,
is that we are probably not capable or doing enough on the
Internet or the Web. And that is what they have specifically
asked us to address, those challenges. As to the other
challenges, I would have to defer that to my Joint Staff
partner or those specific combatant commands that are employing
our MISO forces out there today.
Mr. Langevin. Anybody else want to comment on the
challenges?
General Moore. Sir, I think Major General Haas covered it
quite well. But if we take a look, like he said, it really
depends on what area of the world we are talking about. If we
want to take ISIL, for example, like we have said, their
abilities using social media, using cyber capabilities is
really one of their centers of gravity. And it is the speed at
which you can operate, an individual person can operate, it is
the depth at which they can reach into a population. They can
do it 24/7, 365 days a year. And so it is how do you keep up
and combat the speed at which that message may be getting out?
So it is not just about the message itself, it is also tied
into the speed at which they can get that message out and they
can update it.
Mr. Langevin. How challenged are we with respect to the
language barriers? I would imagine that this is something that
we have accounted for. And I know we have folks working on
developing and enhancing our linguistic capabilities. But how
is that hampering our ability?
General Haas. Where we are not fluent in a language, sir, I
think the challenge is we rely on interpreters. And we train
our soldiers in how to work with interpreters, but once again,
it could potentially be a foreign national, or a local national
that is providing that data, and therefore, it is not that
individual operator who has the fluency in the language to be
able to provide those recommendations, options, courses of
actions for how we should do counter-propaganda. It is coming
through an interpreter. So we are always working on trying to
improve our language skills within our MISO community.
Mr. Langevin. Good. Thank you, General. Thanks, Chairman, I
yield back. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Ranking Member. And again, for each
of you, we are very, very grateful for your service. You make a
difference to promote a level of stability, which is so
important not just for American families, but for people around
the world. With this, we now conclude and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 22, 2015
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
October 22, 2015
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 22, 2015
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. Wilson. How can COCOMs (and the United States Government in
general, including DHS, Treasury, and State) better utilize BBG's
unique pathways to and relationships with audiences?
Mr. Armstrong. The BBG's reach--226 million according to Gallup
research--is indeed significant.
BBG broadcasters routinely cover all major press availabilities at
the Pentagon and Department of State, and we have positive
relationships with senior State and DOD leaders.
That said, we continue to explore ways to expand cooperation.
We work with DHS representatives through various inter-agency
processes, and find DHS material on such topics as online recruiting
useful material for our programs.
We thank for the committee on their past support to revise the
Smith-Mundt Act and permit domestic access to BBG content. Our content
is easily accessible online. However, internal BBG procedures and
(possible over-reliance on) the use of licensed content from AP and
others, result in barriers for domestic media from reusing our content
for rebroadcast. DHS and other inter-agency partners can promote our
language services to specific immigrant communities, especially those
underserved by reliable media.
BBG receives regular updates on Treasury additions and deletions to
sanctions listings, and we find them particularly useful regarding
Iran. The listings provide story leads, especially involving sanctions
violations and financing of sanctioned organizations.
There are no regular, systematic meetings between BBG, DHS, and
Treasury, however, and the idea bears consideration.
Concerning the COCOMs, the BBG and Department of Defense have a
generally positive working relationship.
SOCOM's Washington office acts as one of the principle gateways
between DOD and the BBG. SOCOM facilitates rotation of videographers
and technicians from Ft. Bragg through short-term assignments at the
Voice of America. Soldiers have the opportunity to cover spot news in
the Washington area and assist in story editing and production
techniques.
MIST deploying overseas typically visit BBG prior to deployment,
where they receive assessments of the information and political
environment. They often receive the latest audience research and public
opinion studies from our Research Department.
And when they want to know about media consumption habits in the
target countries, we are more than happy to share our data.
There is often technical collaboration as well. For example, BBG
contributed both equipment and engineering expertise to SOCOM and other
DOD elements helping to rebuild Ukraine's heavily damaged broadcast
infrastructure.
BBG also contributed surplus broadcast equipment to National Guard
units working to create the next-generation quick-deployment broadcast
systems.
We have worked with PACOM in the creation of a dedicated, special
interest digital platform, BenarNews.
This website replaces the former Khabar web site funded through the
Trans Regional Web Initiative (TRWI). Funded by PACOM, BenarNews is
managed and edited through BBG grantee Radio Free Asia.
The result is a content-rich site that covers a number of Asian
countries--Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and India--which have been the
subject of intense online recruiting efforts by Daesh.
We have had discussions with CENTCOM, EUCOM and AFRICOM regarding
similar collaborations; those talks continue.
Working with contracting support from DOD's Countering Terrorism
Technical Support Office (CTTSO), we created a prototype of a Content
Exchange Platform. This digital platform would allow for easy exchange
of content between various parts of the USG working on anti-Daesh and
related efforts.
We believe there is merit in continuing the development efforts, as
resources permit.
Mr. Wilson. How do BBG and CSCC work together? Would you make any
recommendations for improving that working relationship?
Mr. Armstrong. BBG works routinely with CSCC. We provide a five-
days-a-week digest of BBG coverage of Daesh and related issues to CSCC,
which is then distributed to USG communicators along with CSCC's daily
thematic guidance.
We are also a participant in the inter-agency effort on Line of
Effort #6: Demonstrating ISIL's True Nature, and we work with NCTC on
Line of Effort 7: Impeding the Flow of Foreign Fighters.
As for areas of improvement, BBG is somewhat impeded by the fact
that it does not have ready access to the classified e-mail systems on
which much of NSCC and CSCC's business is conducted. I have been
pushing for our senior leadership, especially our strategists, to get
high-side accounts. At present, I am the only Governor and only one of
a few individuals with a high-side account, plus one person designated
as the ``drop box'' for receiving and sending classified email on
behalf of others.
In addition, much of the work product of these organizations would
provide rich content for news reports if it could be safely and
expeditiously declassified.
Mr. Wilson. The U.S. must have counter propaganda with a credible
voice, and do so proactively rather than reactively. a) How can we
improve our own credibility? b) How can we amplify the voices of other
trusted messengers? c) How do we expose the adversary's propaganda for
what it is, whether from non-state or state actors? How can we engage
foreign audiences to do the same? d) How can the interagency move to a
proactive posture, rather than reactive, to counter messaging?
Mr. Armstrong. The nature of credibility has changed in the digital
age. Even in highly filtered markets bombarded by domestic and foreign
propaganda, audiences can access more sources of information. As a
result, they often spend less time deliberating information and may
select sources that conform to their personal bias. This increased
competition for attention means the BBG must focus on being relevant to
the audience. Our credibility stems from being accessible in the local
language, using the local vernacular, being available on the platforms
the audience use (i.e. radio, TV, mobile, Internet, or print) and
providing verifiable and timely news and information the audience can
use. Professional journalism goes beyond simply conveying facts; it
also teaches the audience how to weight the different sides.
In broader terms, the U.S. must understand that actions and words
communicate and shape opinions. Often, it is the action that wins over
the words. Where there is a ``say-do gap,'' our credibility suffers.
This problem is magnified where our audiences have long memories.
Perhaps worse, such gaps pose potential opportunities for adversarial
propaganda by our opponents.
As we have seen, the Russians, Daesh, and the Chinese actively use
information to advance their foreign policy interests. They change the
``facts,'' alter perceptions, and shift blame. Exposing adversarial
propaganda for what it is, and exposing the reality that propaganda
seeks to gloss over requires agility, resources, and a strategy.
Tactically, we must first understand whether, how, and why
adversarial propaganda efforts are successful. The ``counter'' will
often not be through a bullhorn, but through a change in policy,
restating a policy, or bringing other resources, including
communications resources, to bear on the underlying problems that
propagandists seek to exploit.
Propaganda succeeds most when it is uncontested and when audiences
cannot turn elsewhere. The challenges posed by Russian, Daesh, Chinese,
and Iranian propaganda, among others, may have common elements, but
they will be specific in their targeting and impact.
The BBG can help several ways here, beyond professional journalism
that exposes the reality on the ground and potentially inoculates
against propaganda.
First, the BBG can undertake investigative journalism to expose
realities our adversaries are trying to hide. The BBG does not have the
resources to do this. During the Cold War, this was a focus of USIA and
VOA and they had the capability to execute effectively in these areas.
RFE/RL also was effective through their large staff dedicated to
investigating abuses and corruption in Eastern Europe and in Soviet
Russia.
While there are successful programs and efforts scattered across
the BBG, in particular at RFE/RL, RFA and VOA, there is not the
capacity for sustained, long-term corruption and investigative
reporting. The BBG would welcome conversations with Congress and the
Administration on how to continue to increase our investment into this
important resource.
Second, the BBG's journalists are the ``canary in the coal mine.''
That is because of their deep networks in countries of interest to U.S.
foreign policy. Because they grew up in these countries, lived and
worked in them, they often have a ``feel'' for what is happening on the
ground. The BBG should take their views into account, especially when
planning broadcast ``surge'' in response to crises.
It is critical that the BBG focus both its credibility and its
tools to proactively counter misinformation in key audiences around the
world. I look forward to working with this Committee, and the rest of
the Congress, to ensure that we are coordinated in our efforts, and I
would be happy to answer any additional questions you may have at any
time.
Mr. Wilson. In 2011, the Administration established the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC). Its charter is to
``reinforce, integrate, and complement public communications efforts
across the executive branch.'' DOD currently has approximately six
detailees assigned to the CSCC. a) How are DOD strategic, operational,
and tactical plans and operations coordinated with the CSCC? b) Is the
CSCC an effective organization to then integrate those plans and
operations within the interagency? c) Is the CSCC appropriately
resourced by DOD and other interagency partners?
Secretary Lumpkin. Aspects of DOD plans and operations that are
relevant to counterterrorism communications are closely coordinated
with the CSCC. The CSCC's role is to integrate counterterrorism
messaging of various U.S. Government departments and agencies. DOD
detailees to the CSCC provide military expertise, including in planning
which allows CSCC to be more effective in integrating DOD capabilities
into U.S. Government counterterrorism messaging. DOD's support to CSCC
is at the level requested and is adequate for the tasks assigned.
Mr. Wilson. Actions are a fundamental form of communication, and
strategic communications can affect actions. It is therefore imperative
that we make effective, credible, and timely communications a part of
our operations and planning across all levels--strategic, operational,
and tactical. Poorly integrated actions and messaging could degrade the
mission, while simultaneously bolstering our adversary's own
propaganda. a) How, where, when, and at what levels does DOD
incorporate strategic communications into military planning? b) How are
those plans integrated with interagency partners at the COCOM and Joint
Staff level? c) How are they integrated with coalition partners? d) Are
we prepared to counter state and hybrid actors, as we do non-state
actors? e) How are lessons learned shared within the Joint Staff,
COCOMs, and interagency partners?
Secretary Lumpkin and General Moore. DOD incorporates strategic
communications throughout all phases of operations, from strategic to
tactical levels. While acknowledging that Department of State has the
lead for strategic communication outside designated areas of hostility,
DOD plans for actions and activities that support USG strategic
communication objectives. For example, military exercises in Eastern
Europe are tangible actions that reinforce U.S. pledges of support to
our partners in the region. All of our plans are shared with
interagency partners for review and comment by the Office of the
Secretary of Defense. Additionally, the combatant command staffs have
representatives from various interagency partners on the staff. These
partners are vital to providing input and perspective of their parent
agency. Additionally, they are able to keep their agencies informed
regarding the direction of combatant command planning efforts. Our
closest coalition partners often have representatives on the Joint
Staff and at the COCOMs. Provided they possess the appropriate
clearances, coalition partners are full participants in our planning
processes. Absent those clearances, they are integrated to the fullest
extent possible while protecting USG interests. Yes, although our
adversaries and potential adversaries are taking advantage of new
technologies, we are prepared to counter state, non-state, and hybrid
actors alike. Our experiences over the last decade have shown us that
we must become more adept at dealing with all actors in the information
environment and has led us to develop capabilities and authorities
tailored to meet that challenge. With the advent of new technologies,
our adversaries will continue to evolve their efforts against us and we
must continue to rapidly adapt our capabilities and responses to
address all adversaries. All IO can be submitted into the Joint Lessons
Learned Process (JLLP) overseen by the J7. Joint Lessons Learned
Information System (JLLIS) is the automated solution supporting
implementation of the Chairman's Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP).
JLLIS facilitates the collection, tracking, management, sharing,
collaborative resolution and dissemination of lessons learned to
improve the development/readiness of the Joint Force. The validated
information also enables actionable Doctrine, Organization, Training,
Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF)
and Policy changes to improve joint and combined capabilities. The
outputs JLLP include changes to Joint Doctrine, Education, Concept
Development, Joint Exercises and Joint Capabilities. All COCOM's,
Functional Commands, Combat Support Agencies and Services participate.
JLLP supports the interagency, multinational and non-governmental
communities to foster mutual understanding and enhanced inter-
operability.
Mr. Wilson. What lessons related to MISO and IO have we learned
from the past 14 years of war? How do you think that will affect how
the MISO/IO force of the future will need to change in the next 5 to 10
years?
General Haas. Based upon our experiences and lessons learned over
the last 14 years, we have adjusted our personnel selection, updated
and enhanced our MISO training, and better integrated our force
structure. We have implemented a new personnel assessment and selection
program, which lasts two weeks, and is designed to test potential
members of the MISO community to ensure they have the attributes
necessary to conduct effective influence. We have expanded our MISO
training with an increased focus on language, culture, and influence
principles. Our MISO force structure now includes two active duty
groups, which are combined with Special Forces and Civil Affairs Groups
under one single command headquarters. This integration of capabilities
allows for better fusion of all Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF)
skill sets in execution.
With respect to the future, we have seen our adversaries, both
nation-state and terrorist, increasingly turn to extensive use of
misinformation and propaganda as their primary efforts. These efforts
have frequently taken advantage of the open nature of the Internet with
alarming results. We will need to master web-based operations and stay
abreast of emerging advances in technology to meet this challenge. We
have learned that we must remain committed to our Special Operations
Forces truths and continue to invest in our people. We must remain
focused on our long term objectives, rather than being reactive and
trying to match each of the adversaries' tweets/posts, etc. Our force
needs to remain flexible in posture rather than settle into one
operational paradigm (e.g. only deploying MISTs). We must be able to
execute in a range of missions across the operational and tactical
levels in evolving and ever-changing scenarios.
Mr. Wilson. What lessons related to MISO and IO have we learned
from the past 14 years of war? How do you think that will affect how
the MISO/IO force of the future will need to change in the next 5 to 10
years?
General Moore. The operational environment today contains a complex
mixture of audiences, media platforms and communicators all with a
great appetite for information. The last 14 years have provided with a
greater understanding of the cultural aspects of a specific operational
environment which factors local history, religion, culture, customs,
and laws. This increased understanding allows us to better understand
audiences, which is essential to effectively communicate to the right
audience to achieve an effect in support of our government objectives.
Another lesson learned is our increased U.S. interagency collaboration
at the operational, tactical, and, embassy levels, which has expanded
our whole of government efforts to synchronize messages with actions.
However, with increased coordination comes a slower approval processes
and one must maintain a balance to ensure actions and words send the
intended message.
Without a doubt, we'll continue to garner more lessons learned as
the information environment evolves. In the coming years, we'll need to
be more agile and flexible as our adversaries will also continue to do
so, especially in the information space.
[all]