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**EXAMINING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
SECURITY COOPERATION: WHEN IT  
WORKS AND WHEN IT DOESN'T**

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

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## **EXAMINING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION: WHEN IT WORKS AND WHEN IT DOESN'T**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 21, 2015.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:20 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. “Mac” Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. WILSON [presiding]. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to call this meeting of the House Armed Services Committee to order.

Chairman Thornberry is on his way. He has been delayed, but he will be here any moment.

Additionally, Mr. Smith, we will be working with Ranking Member Susan Davis of California.

But we would like to thank everyone for being here today. The hearing today is certainly very important. And the issues that are being discussed are critically important. And working with our allies to increase global security is an important mission for the U.S. military, rightfully so, as we have never been faced with a more complex or complicated array of threats to America’s security.

In addition, tight defense budgets put additional pressure on many of the accounts from which security assistance is drawn. For these reasons and others, the committee has dedicated this week for oversight of the Department of Defense [DOD] security cooperation activities, programs, and authorities. This week, the committee’s activities include a background briefing by Congressional Research Service, this opening hearing with outside witnesses, and a classified briefing with officials from both DOD and Department of State on the status of the administration’s efforts.

There is general agreement that security cooperation should be an important component of our national security strategy. It creates more capable fighting partners and builds relationships that promote U.S. security interests.

But we need to remember what it means, not as an ends. We have seen cases where security cooperation has been successful, for example, countering narcotics traffickers in the nation of Colombia or training Eastern European forces before they deploy to Afghanistan. We have also seen failures, with the Iraq and Syria train-and-equip programs the most notable, sadly, recent examples.

Through this weeklong review of security cooperation efforts, we hope to ask and answer a number of critical questions: What makes a program successful? And what can we learn from the fail-

ures? During today's hearing, we will look into our distinguished panel of experts to help us analyze the lessons learned, what works and what doesn't, so that the tool of security cooperation is used in the right way to ensure that future programs are set up for success.

Helping others develop the capability to do things that need to be done makes sense. And part of the reason DOD is doing more of it is because they actually get it done and, particularly in the case of counterterrorism, get it done in a timely way. Security cooperation week combined with the language of the National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] requiring the DOD to submit a strategic framework for building partnership capacity to Congress are the first steps by the committee as part of a long-term effort to review the use and effectiveness of security cooperation programs. In fact, this year, the National Defense Authorization Act includes important provisions to help improve our security cooperation efforts, such as the requirement for the security cooperation framework and a couple of new authorities.

I would like to make the final point about working with friends and allies beyond building partnership capacity and other security cooperation. The House and Senate have sent the President a National Defense Authorization Act that passed both Chambers with strong bipartisan majorities. The legislation is a result of months of collaboration across the aisle, people working together to support our troops, making critical reforms to acquisition and military retirement to ensure the country is more secure. Wouldn't it send a strong signal to the country, to our partners and friends, and to the rest of the world that the U.S. Congress and our President are pulling in the same direction when it comes to global security.

With that said, I turn to our ranking member, who has arrived, for any opening comments he would like to make. Mr. Smith.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important topic, building partner capacity, because there are certain realities in the world right now. And the U.S. military is not going to be able to go anywhere in the world and fix problems on its own. We need allies. We need friends. We need partners in order to multiply, be a force multiplier basically, to enable us to be successful in parts of the world where we have unquestioned national security interests but where the U.S. military simply showing up is not necessarily going to fix the problem.

So I think it is an incredibly important part of what we do. And it hasn't always been successful. A lot of folks have criticized some of those failures, some of those areas where it didn't work. And my great fear is that will be used as an excuse to say that we shouldn't do this when we cannot succeed in the current national security environment unless we build partner capacity, unless we use allies to help us achieve our national security goals. It is critically important. And a couple areas where I think we have been very successful at this: in the Horn of Africa, in dealing with Somalia and Al

Shabaab and AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula] with a very, very light U.S. footprint. The exact number of U.S. troops involved is classified, but it is triple digits, not quadruplefold. And the reason we have been successful there is we have worked with Ethiopia, we have worked with Kenya, we have worked with Uganda, we have worked with Burundi. We have helped build their capacity, and we have been able to contain the threat. Now, it is not, you know, 100 percent a peaceful, rosy scenario. But it certainly hasn't spun out of control. And we have had no attacks against U.S., Western targets come out of Al Shabaab and Somalia because we built that partner capacity and because we were able to successfully partner. And I think that is just critically important.

Also in the Philippines, the relatively light footprint, we have worked with the Philippine Government to contain insurgencies in the southern islands in the Philippines. Again, not a 100 percent success, there are still challenges down there. But we have built the capacity of the Filipino military to deal with that problem rather than sending in tens of thousands of U.S. troops. And I think that is going to be the model going forward: finding partners that we can work with to contain these threats.

We have that challenge now in northern Africa, in Mali and elsewhere, finding those partners. But, in that case, we have worked to some degree with some of our European partners like the French who have better connections, better relationships down there. We still have a long way to go, obviously, with the chaos coming out of Libya. But I think building that partner capacity and finding allies who can help us is a critical piece of it.

The final thing that I would add is that partner capacity sort of includes the Department of Defense building its partner capacity with our other two elements of national security, diplomacy and development. That is areas where I think we can better coordinate. I have been to dozens of countries where this has been tried. In some places, it works. And in some places, it doesn't. And I think one of the big factors is how well the State Department gets along with the Department of Defense in those areas. In some cases, you have ambassadors who have great partnerships with the Department of Defense. In other cases, they are going at each other all the time and always in disagreement about how to proceed and who exactly is in charge. Building up the level of cooperation between the State Department and the Department of Defense is very important.

And I would also say that building up development capacity—when I was in the Philippines, there was a great project, there we had an ambassador who worked very closely with our local special operations commander at the time and also worked very well with USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]—went to one of the southern islands when they were cutting the ribbon on a new school that they had built. And that partnership on our side between defense, development, and diplomacy is the building block to successfully build the partnerships with the local countries where we are working to build their capacity. So that has to be part of it as well.

With that, I look forward to testimony and questions from the members.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

And we now want to welcome our witnesses for the purpose of this hearing, which is "Examining Department of Defense Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn't." We are very grateful to have three distinguished witnesses with us today: Dr. Derek Reveron, Ph.D., professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College; Dr. Christopher Paul, who is, again, a Ph.D., a senior special scientist at the RAND Corporation; and also General Douglas Fraser, U.S. Air Force, retired, principal of the Douglas Fraser LLC, and former SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command] commander and former PACOM [United States Pacific Command] deputy commander.

Each of you, we are really grateful for your participation today. And we will begin with Dr. Reveron, and then we will proceed down the dais.

**STATEMENT OF DEREK REVERON, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

Dr. REVERON. Thank you very much and good morning. It is an honor to speak to the committee today about security cooperation. The ideas are my own and largely reflect my work and my book, "Exporting Security."

Security cooperation is not an abstract concept to me but something I participated in firsthand as an academic and as a naval officer. My study began in the late 1990s, when I observed military diplomacy firsthand, and continued through the last decade working with security assistance officers around the world to include dozens of militaries, Iraq and Afghanistan included. Additionally, my students at the Naval War College have been very helpful in my thinking on this.

During this time, there has been no shortage of foreign policy crises. In an effort to reach for peace, the U.S. seeks to prevent conflict by helping regimes through security cooperation, which includes all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments. By sending weapons, trainers, and advisers, the U.S. helps other countries meet their national security that is challenged by intrastate, transnational, and regional challengers. Security cooperation is much bigger than building partnership capacity in combat zones. It seeks to empower U.S. partners rather than address security challenges through American force alone. Since coalition operations are a norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with U.S. forces. For example, in Afghanistan, we operated with 50 partners who brought capabilities that we could not, such as police training. In Bahrain, a U.S. officer today directs 3 naval task forces composed of 30 partners who collectively protect vital trade routes. And in Key West, Joint Interagency Task Force South serves as a fusion center supporting international efforts to eliminate illicit trafficking into Caribbean and Latin America.

Security cooperation enables these coalitions to work. The programs ensure partners have access to the U.S. defense industrial



base. And U.S. sponsored military exercises promote interoperability. Known as the indirect approach, the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the United States. By providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean. And by selling Aegis destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States.

The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the U.S. or the international community would face pressure in the future to intervene. Given America's global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States. But the U.S. also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are obtaining base access as a quid pro quo; augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence support to coalition partners in the Middle East; promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapons systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran; harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense; promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip Program; reinforcing sovereignty, like programs such as the Merida Initiative with Mexico; and supporting the U.S. industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program.

At times, security cooperation can be limitless, dissatisfying, and futile. Further, risks abound. First, the non-exclusive nature of these activities will produce more failures than successes, which negatively impacts confidence in security cooperation as a tool.

Second, the personnel system is not producing sufficient talent to support these missions. American forces no longer operate in isolation and need an appreciation of the historical, cultural, and political context of where they operate.

Third, there is a tendency to over-rely on partners, thinking they can accomplish U.S. objectives when they either lack the political motivation or the skills to do so. Without indigenous political legitimacy, programs can only have a marginal impact on a country's security and stability.

Finally, other countries will rely on the U.S. to subsidize their own defense budgets, creating a free rider problem.

Given the disappointments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is the potential for the value of security cooperation to be ignored. But these programs are not confined to combat zones alone. When thinking about security cooperation, we should look at how international partners contribute to coalition operations, peacekeeping, and global security. U.S. budgetary declines will likely reinforce the importance of security cooperation, as the U.S. will need more partners and allies to augment its own defense capacities.

I hope this hearing can show those inside and outside of the government of the challenges of the by, with, and through partners ap-

proach and why security cooperation is an important pillar of U.S. defense strategy. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Reveron can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Professor Reveron.  
We now proceed to Dr. Paul.

**STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER PAUL, PH.D., SENIOR SOCIAL  
SCIENTIST, RAND CORPORATION**

Dr. PAUL. Thank you for inviting me here to testify today. My remarks today will draw on research on security cooperation that I have led at RAND over the last several years. In one study, we used detailed case studies of 29 countries over 20 years. In a follow-on study, we did deep-dive case studies of four countries chosen specifically because they highlighted the range of possible challenges.

The research has found several factors that are critical contributors in security cooperation. I will review them.

First, matching matters. Efforts to build partner capacity are most effective when what is being offered aligns well with partner nations' forces' baseline capabilities and with their ability to absorb training and technology.

Second, relationships matter, and they can take time to establish. Relationships contribute a necessary level of trust and understanding. And relationships also include the alignment of objectives between the United States and the partner.

Third, context matters. Certain characteristics or features of partners improve their prospects for success. Specifically, partners with relatively robust governance and relatively strong economies have historically had more success in this area. Having a functioning ministry of defense and having sufficient resources and willingness to invest in sustainment are also helpful.

Fourth, consistency and sustainment are key. By "sustainment," I mean the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to keep something going. That includes maintenance; spare and replacement parts; and some kind of plans for manning and personnel sustainment. In historical cases in which the United States provided consistent funding and effort over several years and some kind of sustainment effort was in place, be it provided by the U.S. or the partner, capacity was much more likely to be built and maintained.

While our research highlighted several elements conducive to security cooperation success, we have also highlighted various challenges that can reduce the prospect for success. I will list some of them. First among them is partner willingness. One of the findings of our research is that you can't want it more than they do. Lack of willingness can disrupt security cooperation at many different levels, any of which can result in delay, diminished success, or outright failure. Examples include partners who are unwilling to participate in security cooperation activities, partners willing to participate but unwilling to focus their efforts in areas of interest to the United States, and partners unwilling to use the capacity that has been built for the purpose that it was intended.

We found that many of the challenges to security cooperation success stem from shortcomings in U.S. practices, specifically that U.S. funds and delivers security cooperation inconsistently and that decreases effectiveness. Inadequate sustainment planning hurts security cooperation effectiveness too. As noted, unless they are sustained, forces and capabilities rapidly atrophy. Similarly, a lack of flexibility in security cooperation is a constraint on effectiveness. The administrative requirements lack needed flexibility. And these last three problems stem, in part, from some weaknesses in the legislative authorities.

While the patchwork of authorities available to fund and support security cooperation enable a wide range of activities, they rarely support an activity for more than a year or two, resulting in uncertainty about continuation. They also leave insufficient room for flexibility.

To support progress in this area, I will highlight five recommendations.

First, reform legislative authorities can improve flexibility and simplify procedures.

Second, revise or add new authorities to support a wider range of activities over longer periods of time and sustain them. This may entail new needed authorities, specifically to add a sustainment tail to existing programs and authorities.

Third, consider whether partners have the attributes or characteristics that are associated with effective security cooperation. Use the results of that consideration to manage expectations accordingly.

Fourth, regardless of the partner or context, review how well security cooperation goals and activities correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what that partner is capable of using and absorbing. As we have noted elsewhere, security cooperation must find the right ladder, find the right wrung, when aligning activities for partners.

Fifth and finally, emphasize sustainments when reviewing security cooperation programs and ask whether planners have identified means at the outset for the sustainment and maintenance of any capabilities to be built. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Paul can be found in the Appendix on page 52.]

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Dr. Paul.

We now proceed to General Fraser.

**STATEMENT OF GEN DOUGLAS FRASER, USAF (RET.), PRINCIPAL, DOUG FRASER LLC; FORMER SOUTHCOM COMMANDER, 2009-2012; AND FORMER PACOM DEPUTY COMMANDER, 2008-2009**

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, it has been over 3 years since I last had the opportunity to appear before you. I am honored to be here again—this time out of uniform—to share my perspective on the value of security cooperation programs and what they provide the Department of Defense and our Nation.

It is also a pleasure for me to share this table with such two distinguished scholars in Professor Reveron and Dr. Paul.

My comments today are based on my experience in planning and executing security cooperation programs in two separate geographic combatant commands, U.S. Pacific Command and the United States Southern Command. According to the U.S. National Security Strategy, maintaining the security, confidence, and reliabilities of our allies is one of the key national security interests of the United States. Department of Defense security cooperation programs provide the tools that enable the services to support this national security interest. Increasingly, international security threats require a coalition of nations to counter and defeat them. To this end, the Armed Forces of the United States routinely trains with partner nations to be ready to form and fight as coalition when called. Department of Defense cooperation programs enable this training.

Therefore, Department of Defense security programs provide three valuable contributions to the security of the United States. First, they build important relationships between the members of the Armed Forces of the U.S. and our partner nations which in turn enhances their capability to form and fight as the coalition in times of crisis. In conjunction with the Department of State's security assistance programs, security cooperation programs help build the capacity of partner nation armed forces to maintain security within their borders. And, third, these programs grow the professional understanding of partner militaries on the importance of adhering to international standards of conduct, to include respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of elected civilian authorities. On the flip side, I often think we think that security cooperation programs can accomplish more than they are designed to do.

Therefore, let me mention what I think security cooperation programs cannot do. First, they cannot prevent political change in the nation. Security cooperation programs encourage the armed forces of our partner nations to support the democratic process and defend the rights of their citizens to decide their political future. In maintaining these standards, political change can happen that does not support U.S. interests. And, second, security cooperation programs will not significantly reduce the breeding grounds of conflict, poverty, income inequality, or poor social infrastructure.

Mr. Chairman, while this hearing is focused on security cooperation, because the responsibility for helping partner militaries resides at both Defense and State, I think it is important to acknowledge the close relationship that exists between the Department of Defense security cooperation programs and Department of State security assistance programs. The training and exercise programs conducted under security cooperation mesh closely with the education and equipping programs conducted through security assistance programs. And in my experience in working in two combatant commands, the relationships, as Congressman Smith said, between the Department of State and the Department of Defense is very close and really works closely to manage and maintain those capabilities. By supporting each other, these programs actually increase the success for both.

Finally, security cooperation programs are important for the defense of the United States. We live in a globalized world. The United States will increasingly rely on our partners to help main-

tain peace and security around the world. As I said earlier, security cooperation programs play a key role in enabling the U.S. and our partners to train and fight together. I am concerned that declining budgets will have a disproportionate impact on these programs, cutting them to a higher degree than other defense programs and thereby reducing their effectiveness. I thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Let me thank you all for being here. And I apologize for being a little late. But I very much appreciate testimony.

I want to yield my 5 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina, who I appreciate filling in for me.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you for being here. And I appreciate—there was a reference to Colombia. And people only hear really the negative. But Plan Colombia has been a success. I am really grateful that I have had the opportunity to serve, along with my wife, as the co-chair of the Partners of the Americas Program, an association of our State, South Carolina, with Colombia. So I have had the opportunity to visit the country, an extraordinary country of 40 million people.

Also two of my sons actually were exchange students at a high school in Cali. And then we have had students come and live with us as exchange students. And we have seen the transition from a circumstance of narcoterrorists controlling extensive areas of the country and thousands of lives being lost, to Colombian families being protected. I wish more people in the United States knew of the success of the cooperation between the United States and the people of Colombia.

With that in mind, for each of you, what factors should we use to evaluate how well security cooperation activities are having with their intended effects? Beginning with Dr. Reveron. Professor.

Dr. REVERON. Thank you, sir. I think as we start thinking about success, just to reiterate what my colleague said, first is, the alignment of national interest is essential. And, in your case, that we highlight Colombia, I might add a couple of points and then certainly defer to General Fraser.

First, I thought what Congress did was limit the number of uniformed personnel that could be inside Colombia. I think initially it was 400 and then increased to 800. I think that had a very positive effect. One, it really sent the message to the Colombians that it is their fight, and we are here to help in terms of enable through planning, logistics, and then some critical missing capabilities, such as rotary wing.

Second, related to that, is really the absorption capacity, how well a partner can absorb U.S. aid. Sometimes we tend to treat other militaries as equal to our own. And I think in a professional setting, that, of course, is the right way to approach it. But when we start looking at training and absorption capacity, we sometimes get the standard wrong. So as I think about success and nonsuccess, it is really, I ask the question, to what standard should we be training partners? To the U.S. standard? To the NATO [North

Atlantic Treaty Organization] standard? Or to some other standard?

And, finally, in terms of success, I think, these are U.S. Government programs. And in my own experience, I find they work best when they are coordinated at the U.S. Embassy level. And my favorite quote, I can't name, but a combatant commander described himself or herself as the four-star, but when meeting with the U.S. Ambassador, that is the five-star. And when we see good bureaucratic alignment inside the U.S. Government in programs driven at the country level, I think we tend to see greater success.

Dr. PAUL. Thank you. I actually have a third report that addresses assessments and evaluation explicitly. I will make just a few points from it. I think when we are looking for criteria to evaluate success in security cooperation, it depends in large part on what we set out to do and how well we have specified that. One of the broader recommendations of my research and that of others is that objectives be specified in a way that is SMART—specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound—both short-term intermediate objectives for individual programs and program years and long-term objectives and strategies.

I think Colombia is a very interesting example because part of the story of Colombia is how it took time for the security cooperation relationship to mature and evolve. There was initially a mismatch in objectives. The United States was primarily concerned with drugs, the Colombians were primarily concerned with international security. And so because of that mismatch, there was often ineffective action. But as the relationship evolved and especially after 9/11 when our focus changed, that relationship became much more effective and the security cooperation did as well.

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman Wilson.

I guess I would put mine into three different categories. One is strategic patience. And I think security cooperation programs require strategic patience. Plan Colombia happened, but the United States had been working with the Colombian Government and the Colombian Armed Forces for 20 to 30 years prior to that, helping build the institutions within Colombia to be successful, primarily the military, with some corollary in coordination with the Department of State with the police. And so when Plan Colombia was put in place, the conditions were right in the country to help do that. So strategic patience I think is important.

Commitment also. And at the time that Plan Colombia happened, there was a lot of things came together in Colombia. And a lot of focus came together in the United States also. And we had a common commitment. Although, as Dr. Paul said, I think we were misaligned there. And going back to the earlier point of authorities, we had a misalignment of authorities. Our objectives were counterdrug. And we limited the use of the capabilities that we were supporting the Colombians with to that mission when there was an intertwined problem within Colombia of terrorism as well as counterdrug. And when we changed those authorities was when the support of the United States really helped make a difference in key areas for the support of Colombia.

But I also think it is important to remember that while United States support was very helpful and made a difference, it was really the Colombians who won Colombia's struggle.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask two questions. How important is development policy to the partner capacity issues that we are talking about in building those partnerships? And how can we improve the U.S. in terms of our development policy? Of course, I think it can be very important. I don't think we have the best, most coordinated development structure. But as you have gone in these places and tried to build that partner capacity, obviously, we have the military training component; we have the State Department diplomacy. Whether you are talking about Colombia or, as I talked about, the Philippines or the Horn of Africa, where does the development piece fit into this building partner capacity?

General FRASER. Congressman, let me start. From my standpoint, they have to be very much linked. In many cases, when I don't think security cooperation in our security overall foreign assistance isn't working well, it is when they are all working their own problems and where they see the problems as the most need but they don't fit together in the overall capacity of where the strategic direction of the country is. Colombia, going back to that example, was successful because the Colombians actually put together a very coordinated strategic plan of how they were going to move from one part of the country to another, gain secure locations in one part of the country, and then bring in the development programs to help secure that area while they maintain the security within the country.

In other parts of the region, and I will use Central America as an example, our efforts at times are very uncoordinated as they are applied at the tactical level in a country. So it is misapplied. And it is not necessarily well aligned within those countries. So it is that discussion, I think, between all the areas of foreign assistance that we have that conversation to really align those projects. And I think overall strategy of foreign assistance as it applies to the country matters also. And it is applied inconsistently or varies by embassy by embassy on how it is applied. So the roles of ambassadors are critically important.

Dr. PAUL. I think that how important development policy is depends in part on our objectives. But within that, development is clearly tied to absorptive capacity, clearly tied to ministerial capacity, and clearly tied to the partner nation's focus. So to the extent that our objectives rely on those things and those things are all correlated with success in security cooperation, it becomes important. As to what we can do to improve our development policy, that is not my area of expertise. So I will defer to the other gentlemen.

Dr. REVERON. I won't take that last part. But I think your question is very good. It also goes to the pace. And so as we think about the 3-D approach—defense, development, and diplomacy—the pace is very different. And so the example I like is the military can build a school pretty quickly. But it needs the Department of State to say where the school should be built. But it needs AID to train the teachers and provide the school supplies. And if we keep going back

to the Colombia case, we could point out they took a—reclaimed a pretty big part of territory held by the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] relatively quickly, but then that created the development challenge because then where the local farmers were growing coca and encouraged for crop substitution, there was no transportation system for them to get that out—the legitimate crops—out. And so that created a problem. And so sometimes with the pace, military can go in pretty quickly and maybe establish security in months, where development can take decades.

Mr. SMITH. As far as how we reform development policy, I think the best thing we could do is centralize it. Development policy in the U.S. is spread out amongst way too many agencies. When you think of USAID as being in charge of development policy, but they only control about 14 percent of the development dollars that are spent by the U.S., I mean it is a patchwork. But that is another discussion.

Just a quick question about Afghanistan, I thought something you said about Colombia was really important, that capping the number of troops in Colombia was an important part of the success because it made the Colombians aware that we would help but it was their fight. And I am just wondering, General Fraser, now that you are retired, speak frankly and clearly about, you know, this has been a great debate in Afghanistan, it was a debate in Iraq too, for that matter, is, you know, well, we can't possibly maintain the security environment because our troops are better than theirs, you know, we need more U.S. troops. And I think every military commander's first instinct is to say: Give me another 30,000 troops, and I can save the situation. When, in fact, I think that the opposite tends to be the case. And in Afghanistan, I think that is critically important. And though we certainly have struggles in Afghanistan, you have seen the military, even the police in Afghanistan become much more capable in the last several years as we have drawn down.

Now, it is a balance. You didn't say: Cap Colombia at 50 troops. There has to be a certain level where we can train and meet certain missions. But I am wondering if you could apply that logic to Afghanistan and where you see appropriate troop levels to be sufficiently supportive, but also to make it clear that it is the Afghans' fight.

General FRASER. I am going to—

Mr. SMITH. Punt?

General FRASER [continuing]. Give you a little bit of a coordinated, because my expertise is not in Afghanistan. So the first thing I will tell you is what happened in Colombia has a model, but it cannot apply specifically to Afghanistan. It is a completely different culture, completely different terrain, has differing issues that they are dealing with. So to apply them and use that as a comparison I think is unfair.

Mr. SMITH. Understood. But the basic principle of too much U.S. presence creates dependency instead of a sustainable situation, are you saying that they are so different that that doesn't even apply?

General FRASER. Sir, I think it needs to be applied to the situation that you find within Afghanistan. And I am not smart enough



on that or learned enough to be able to tell you, to answer that question.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Paul.

Dr. PAUL. I would be happy to speak to this because I have actually done other research on reaching negotiated settlements, which is, I think, optimistically the outcome that we are hoping for in Afghanistan at this point.

Mr. SMITH. A piece of it, yes.

Dr. PAUL. Yes. So I think your observation that, making it clear that it is the Afghans' fight is absolutely central in this. In our research on negotiated settlements, the first step of seven steps towards achieving negotiated settlements is the perception of stalemate. And stalemate is not just the military reality, it is a perception. And as long as the opposition in Afghanistan perceives that the U.S. is the reason there is a stalemate, then that may slow those perceptions because the classic statement from the Afghan perspective is: The Americans have all the watches, but we have all the time.

So the opposition is waiting for the coalition forces to withdraw, so they get a chance to fight just the Afghans and see how well Afghanistan security forces will fight. If when that happens, there is a stalemate, then we are well on the path towards settlement.

Mr. SMITH. But we have to get to that point. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here and sharing your expertise in areas of the world that many of us are not that familiar with. And probably Dr. Paul, because of your expertise, I will start with you. Many of us in the Congress are very concerned about the continued spending of billions and billions and billions of dollars and not being able to show the taxpayer—I am talking about Afghanistan now—how they are benefiting or how we are helping to improve the life, if you will, of people in Afghanistan.

An article on January 29, 2014, and the title is this, "U.S. Literacy Program for Afghan Military Comes Up Short." These are comments from John Sopko. I will be very brief. But as of February 2013, roughly half the Afghan forces were still illiterate, despite the Pentagon's expenditures of hundreds of millions of dollars on a literacy program there, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction John Sopko, an independent auditor.

One other sentence: Moreover, the United States military's stated goal of 100 percent of first grade literacy for the entire force by December 31, 2014, is probably unattainable. Now, the reason I wanted to ask this question because we have in our military, most, if not all, that go into the military are high school graduates. Okay. Then if we are trying to build the Afghan security forces—we have been there for 14 years I believe, and we are going to be there another 8 years. That is 22 years. What level in 22 years would you anticipate we could get that Afghan who maybe is not even at the first grade level now, what would you, what would be your projections as to where he or she might be in 22 years? I mean, this is

where General Fraser was saying declining budgets; they are declining left and right quickly.

We are going to raise the debt ceiling in just a few days and spend more and more money over in foreign countries that we can't even account for. And this is what is frustrating to the American people. And, quite frankly, that is why Donald Trump is getting these big crowds. So, Dr. Paul—and one of my dearest friends, by the way, is Ron Paul. I don't know if you all are kin or not, but he is one of my dearest friends. Would you respond to this concern about trying to train people to be able to fight and carry weapons and to do the things that need to be done to build a security force when they can't read at the first grade level? And it doesn't seem to be making a heck of a lot of progress. Please share your thoughts with me on that.

Dr. PAUL. That is a great question, sir. And I have a lot of relevant thoughts, so please be patient with me. First, the kernel of that latter issue is about absorptive capacity. And that is a really rough baseline, to take Afghan provincial tribesmen who have very low baseline literacy and any kind of education. So what your goals are has to align to that. Is it feasible? Is it really necessary to achieve desired end states? How many people do you really need to educate to what level? Let's look at the history of Afghanistan. A lot of Afghans have been fighting very effectively for a very long time without being literate. So some of that is a product of mirror imaging, that if we imagine that we want them to have conventional, mature, professional forces like our own, that, of course, to have a force like the United States' force, you need a high level of baseline literacy. That probably isn't feasible in Afghanistan.

But, sir, your broader question about what do we tell the American people, how do we account for the money spent, and what we have to show for it, that is fundamentally an assessment and evaluation question. And if we were doing more and better assessment and evaluation, we would have something to show them. All of this, the subtext to all of this is the chain of logic connecting the things that we are doing with how we think they are going to work with how that is going to get to our end states. And a well designed assessment framework considers the whole progress along that path, from the SMART objectives at the end, from the SMART intermediate objectives that lead and connect those paths.

Assessment and evaluation can be used to ask questions when you are planning operations and efforts, formative research: How is what I am planning to do likely to turn out? Assessment and evaluation can be asked of efforts in process: How is this effort going? Am I delivering the products and services and training that I planned to? How is that going?

And then, of course, assessment at the back end, when you are done with an effort: How well did it go? Was attendance at the level that was expected? Did the number of trainees that actually passed the course reach our target or not? So that as you continue to move on, you can revise and improve. So assessment supports planning. It supports process improvement. And it enables accountability.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to all of you for being here.

Nice to see you, General Fraser, as well. Yesterday, we met with the Congressional Research Service. And I think some of the folks are here now. And in some ways this follows with my colleague's question and adds to, one of my questions has always been, you know, what about State Department capacity? Do they have the capacity that is needed to do what needs to be done essentially? And one of the issues that was raised yesterday, which has been, I have heard this ever since I have practically been here after 9/11, is that the State Department doesn't have a bench, a wide enough bench, a deep enough bench, as does the military, to provide people to be together in an initial planning. And I think some of the questions raised by, you know, the answer just now are, what skill sets are needed to assess these things? Do people need to be embedded in a situation in order to really truly evaluate what is happening rather than always being brought in at the end?

We obviously have a budget problem. And this committee is not charged with having to budget the State Department. But at the same time, this is just such a recurring theme. How do we get our hands around this? Is that the problem? Or do you think they do have the capacity and that maybe it is within other departments, it is not just the State Department and the military, it is Commerce, it is Treasury, it is a whole host of things?

General FRASER. Well, good to see you again, Congresswoman Davis. Thank you. From my standpoint, the State Department is not resourced well enough. And if you look across the board at our foreign assistance, depending on what we want that foreign assistance to accomplish, we have to resource it accordingly. And that goes not just to the State Department, but that goes to many of the other agencies who provide foreign assistance throughout countries. If I look back at General Kelly's last posture statement from SOUTHCOM, his comment was he couldn't do what he is doing without the teamwork of everybody else in the Federal Government who is working this. So I think this overall, as the NDAA this year has put in a requirement for the Department of Defense to come back and give a strategy on security cooperation, I think there needs to be—the Congress would be well served by bringing multiple committees together and developing a strategy of foreign assistance.

Mrs. DAVIS. Foreign assistance strategy particularly, yes.

Dr. PAUL. I would concur. The State Department's role is absolutely critical. And the State Department is woefully undermanned. I routinely point out to colleagues in the Department of Defense and in the military services that the Department of State has fewer than 1,000 deployable officer equivalents. And that kind of helps them understand the manning mismatch.

Mrs. DAVIS. Did you want to comment?

Dr. REVERON. I think it works, all this works best when there is great cooperation. And State doesn't seem to have the personnel to be able to do this. But the cooperation is essential.

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there instances where you could see the need to have more professional skill sets available to do these evaluations and assessment? I mean, where do we look for that? I know that

we have people who have gained some expertise in this area. But to what extent are they really activated in these areas today? And what would you change?

Dr. PAUL. Evaluation isn't as hard as we often think it is. So if we provided more personnel with some basic evaluation training, they could do a better job. One of the big threats to effective evaluation is continuity. And often we see situations because of rotations both on the military and on the civilian side that some evaluation or assessment framework is in place, but then the next person on the job recognizes some deficiencies in that framework and starts a new one. So we need to inculcate a culture that says even mediocre evaluation done consistently is better than starting the baseline and starting evaluation over and over again. But there is certainly opportunity to bring in civilian experts and to identify positions both in defense and on the civilian side specifically for assessment and evaluation with possible considerable benefits.

Mrs. DAVIS. General.

General FRASER. Ma'am, I would just add one other thing. And that is with declining budgets, I think we have to focus very much on where we want foreign assistance to be successful and why. But that doesn't mean that there shouldn't be cooperation efforts undertaken with a bunch of different countries because I think maintaining relationships is an important outcome of security cooperation and foreign assistance.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Fraser, your last comment with declining budgets, we have to figure out where and why, I appreciate that. And that is something that has been one of my big concerns since I have been on this committee and watching the funding for the U.S. military and the number of men and women in uniform. And I look at the world and Africa's 50-plus countries with a billion people. We are talking about Latin America today; 20 or better countries with 600 million in population. And it certainly seems to me like we get more bang for our buck, if you will, in the Latin American and Central American countries with our partnerships there.

So to me, building that partnership capacity is the key to the U.S.'s ability to influence things in the right direction. And certainly you have been a big part of that. How would you rate the progress we have made in building partnership capacity in Latin America? And where do you think we can best spend our dollars to improve those partnership capabilities?

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you for that question. I would say that it has been episodic. At some points, we have success when we continue and, as you heard earlier, when those efforts are sustained. But they need to be focused. They need to be sustained. They need to have clear objectives that can happen in 3 to 5 years. And I would argue that is not the long-term objective, that is a stepping stone to a long-term objective.

So in support of Latin America, what happened in Colombia, which everybody uses as an example, took a long time to happen. But it got very focused. And it was very much a U.S. Government

effort supporting a Colombian Government effort. Both of them working together. And it had strong leadership on both sides of that coin. I think that remained a critical part.

Where should we spend that effort right now within Latin America? I think what General Kelly and the State Department is doing in focusing on the northern tier of Central America is the right place to continue to focus our efforts. But we need to maintain those relationships with other parts of the region as well.

Mr. SCOTT. Schools like WHINSEC [Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation], Western Hemisphere School for Security Cooperation, that helps build those military relationships with the future military leaders or current military leaders, really, of these other countries seems to be a cost-effective model. Is that something that we could extend to other regions of the world? Or is that a scenario under which cultural differences would create problems?

General FRASER. No, sir. I think we, in many cases, I think we already have those schools in many places. There are different names. For example, in Hawaii, the Pacific Command has the Asia Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, similar school, similar types of programs focused in the same areas. So I think a lot of those schools are already in existence. The real focus, from my standpoint, is they need to be continued to be funded.

Mr. SCOTT. Are we bringing those men and women from other countries to the U.S. to train them at those schools as we do at WHINSEC?

General FRASER. The Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies is in Hawaii. It is in Honolulu. I can't answer for the other combatant commands.

Mr. SCOTT. That is great. Thank you. I was not aware of that. It might be a good place for a CODEL [congressional delegation].

Mr. Chairman, I would yield the remainder of my time.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am worried that two topics have not been explored. One is the very nature of security cooperation, it is usually way more lucrative for the receiving nation. That is where the big money is, right? And I don't want to exaggerate that, but we have already heard some discussion of how meager State Department resources are. And General Fraser mentioned that one general with four stars was kind enough to refer to the ambassador as being the five-star. That five-star ambassador had no transportation, no bank account, no resources. So it sounds more like brown-nosing than a genuine compliment.

So to what extent in your analysis—and I know it is difficult to generalize and we should be country specific—we should be implementation plan specific, but, in general, security cooperation is almost a host country stimulus program compared to what the State Department can offer, right?

Dr. REVERON. Sir, I would say it is a part of it. Promoting international security, I think, is a key dimension of U.S. foreign policy. The partner certainly benefits. I think benefits have come back to the United States. I like the current—there is currently three mari-

time coalitions operating out of Bahrain. Not one is led by an American anymore. But the United States provides that backbone and lets three countries lead these efforts. And I think we benefit in that perspective. The other example that I like is when I was in Afghanistan, we had Mongolians guarding our base. And so we felt, we were able to gain that benefit. And we also didn't need 200 U.S. soldiers to guard our base because the Mongolians—

Mr. COOPER. I don't think you are really getting my point. The scale of the resources offered, whether in cash or in kind, are just amazing, like it was our base, and some others are guarding it. It was our flotilla, and some others are leading it. But this is amazing. Just transportation around Africa can really only be offered by AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]. The State Department doesn't have its own fleet of planes.

So just in terms of scale, I think it is important in your analysis to emphasize scale. If I were a receiving country, hey, I would go where the money was. And we did a lot of this in the Cold War era when some countries were almost pretending to be leaning communist so they would get more help from us. This is, as Walter Jones mentioned, a lot of our constituents are worried about foreign aid. And they are particularly worried about military aid that really ends up being foreign aid and that produces no real result.

But another aspect of this security cooperation that worries me is it tends to be incumbent protection. Because almost by definition, you talk to host militaries. You know, those are the folks in power. And General Fraser was kind enough to acknowledge that this cannot stop political change within the country, but sometimes it can certainly inhibit it. And money is fungible. And you really don't know where if you free up resources in the host nation, where those could be put. And some host militaries are so embedded in the economy, like, for example, the Egyptian military, it is kind of an amazing thing when they own appliance companies in Egypt and divert resources that way. And, yet, we are helping them with tactics, techniques, and procedures.

So to me, in your analysis, it would be more accurate—and I am not the expert; you all are—if you focused on the quantum difference in resources and also the incumbent protection nature of this. Almost by definition, you have to go with the host nation's incumbent military. And that puts a real bias in the process. And we are not even talking about upholding lines drawn primarily by the British Empire on the map in many regions of the world that have almost nothing to do with ethnicity or tribe or current conditions. As I have stated many times before, we are almost executors of the British estate here as we, unthinkingly, enforce those lines on maps. Maybe they make sense. Maybe they don't. But we just seem to automatically pump big dollars into incumbent governments, and we call it security assistance. And that does relieve us often of the obligation of putting U.S. troops in more directly. And we want friendships and partnerships. But sometimes we care more about these nations than even their host governments. To what extent do we monitor kleptocracy?

General FRASER. Congressman, let me attempt to answer a little bit, and that is—but I am going to talk specifically from a military perspective, not from a political perspective because we are sup-

porting those militaries, if you will, that are in existence. From supporting the incumbents, at least from a military perspective, my experience has been is it has not protected the military leadership. I have seen lots of military leadership changed. And there hasn't been a change in that country. And there hasn't been a change within that military.

From a political standpoint, I think it varies country by country what impact that may or may not have.

Speaking from a military standpoint with some of my counterparts, they would come to the United States looking for assistance that they were either unable to or unwilling to go to their own government to seek for assistance. So that is one that we have to always be watchful for and understand when it is happening. And one of the things, from a military standpoint, and I would argue from a U.S. in a lot of cases, we tend to mirror image our perspective on other governments and other cultures. We need to do a better job of understanding what is important within that culture and what means something as we develop these programs.

Mr. COOPER. I agree, General, we should never mirror image.

When I was last in Bogota, I asked where the wealthy part of town was, and I was told by our folks that, "Oh, the wealthiest Colombians, they all live in New York and Miami." You know, what is going on here? You know, they have to care as much about their country as we do.

General FRASER. Again, I don't want to speak for the Colombians, Congressman, but I would argue that if you look back over the last 15 years, Colombians have owned their problem. The Colombians instigated a war tax. That tax was focused on the wealthy. The wealthy stood behind it, and that is a large measure of why the Colombians have been successful, is because they paid for it.

The United States has encouraged other countries within Central America to follow that model to finance the needs for their own security.

Mr. COOPER. General, my information may be dated, but when I visited Colombia, it had the highest income inequality in the world.

General FRASER. Yes, sir, it still does.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank this panel for being here today. I am sorry I missed your opening remarks, but I had another committee assignment that I had to take.

You know what is striking, though—I was in Afghanistan in 2011 and with a bunch of Marines. And we went to a location that they took back from those that were fighting us in Afghanistan; rebuilt the school, not like the schools that we know of. Obviously, you have been there. What was striking is the Marines at the time were paying the headmaster to teach. I mean, they were paying his salary. But what changed was, you know, as we wanted to get out of Afghanistan, we were pushing more of it on the central government to take care of that particular issue, even though it was our foreign dollars, our foreign aid going to do that. But the headmaster wasn't getting paid, you know, for months at a time at that

point. And he risked his life. The school was burned down. He was chased; risked his life to come back to train the Afghani school-children, girls and boys for the first time. But when I asked the State Department, you know, what are we doing on checks and balances—I mean, you were out here, why wouldn't we make sure this guy gets paid? If the Marines were paying them at one point in time, and now we are giving money directly to the central government, and we know it is not getting to him—I guess what I am hearing from you is that they were underresourced to do it, but it was a real flippant response from the State Department in regards to, "Well, that is not our problem." But it is our dollars.

And so I guess in our rush sometimes to leave a country—and I get it, I have three kids in the Army that have been to those great places, like Afghanistan and Iraq—but if we are putting our dollars there in foreign aid, how do we make sure that those dollars are being spent correctly? I know that is really not the discussion here, but it is because, you know, the military, General, from your aspect, obviously that was important to stabilize a country, but when do we rush into it and—when do we draw the line and say, "Listen, yes, I know we want to get this government up and running, but maybe they are not ready yet to do it with our dollars"? Do we ever make that decision and say, "Hey, listen, no, we shouldn't do that"? Does the State Department ever do that, are you aware of?

Dr. REVERON. Sir, as it related to CSTC-A [Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan], the NATO training mission, I can explain at least what they tried to do because the corruption in Afghanistan is very well documented. There is no modern banking system and so at least when it went to—because U.S. taxpayers pay the salaries of Afghan military and police. So what CSTC-A did, I don't know if it is still active, but tried to set up an electronic pay system with an ATM card, but this is where the illiteracy challenge came in.

Mr. NUGENT. Right.

Dr. REVERON. As well as do regular census to monitor to make sure there weren't kind of ghost cash till, kind of ghost muster sheets, to make sure individuals were getting paid who actually existed. But many challenges, without a doubt. I think in Afghanistan it is probably the hardest problem because the civil war devastated society and the economy. And my own opinion, without the \$4.5 billion or so that the U.S. taxpayers provide, the system would collapse.

Dr. PAUL. If I may, I have a couple of thoughts about this as well. One of the things I mentioned in my opening remarks was the importance of flexibility. Sometimes we, unfortunately, encounter a situation where we begin security cooperation with a partner; it is authorized and funded; and delivery begins. And then some level in the partner hierarchy becomes reticent and stops cooperating. And, unfortunately, often the executors on the U.S. side don't have the authority to turn the tap on and off. And so how do you incentivize a partner to resume cooperation when deliveries are still being—

Mr. NUGENT. And I think you probably answered a question I didn't really lay out clearly, but you are answering the question.



Once we get on a track, do we ever reel it back? Do we ever, like you say, turn off the tap and say, "Hold on a second, you are not meeting the goals"? And you talk about goals and coming in and looking at a program to see if it is actually doing what it is supposed to do. That should be one of those. I would think it would give the commander on the ground a whole lot more responsibility because I know that Marine, the Marine major that was there, he was frustrated because it didn't seem like anybody was listening to him, and he is out there with these guys every day.

So how do we do that? How do we give them the flexibility to turn the tap off?

Dr. PAUL. I am not sure in process exactly what has to happen, but I think some of it has to be at the level of authorities, and then some of it has to be in the bureaucracy. Sometimes that authority is held somewhere in the bureaucracy, but the major on the ground in some province doesn't know who to talk to, to make that happen.

I think there is periodic reviews of these programs, but usually that is on an annual or semiannual basis. So, again, a push for assessment and increased flexibility in the authorities should help because that is a real problem, sir.

Mr. NUGENT. General.

General FRASER. If I could add in one thing, I think one, you have to have clearly defined objectives with very clearly defined metrics that you measure and then decide. But I also think not only an authorities part to this, but sometimes, at least within the Department of Defense, if you give money back or you hold money, then somebody else takes it. And so there has to be an incentive within the organization that I can make smart decisions and I can apply that money to other places without a large effort to try and make that happen, that I have the flexibility, as Dr. Paul says, to be able to move those funds to where they are going to go have the biggest impact and I can then—and then I need to be accountable for those decisions.

Mr. NUGENT. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me a little extra time.

Thank you, and I appreciate your comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing.

To some degree, you all mentioned the need for enduring relationships with partners that are actively looking for our cooperation. But you didn't, not one of you, mention one example of a successful program that accomplishes this goal. And it is the National Guard's State Partnership Program [SPP] that does an outstanding job at creating long-term relationships with countries and results in increased capabilities for the nations that take part. The Guard provides unique capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors via 68 comprehensive partnerships between the National Guard units across the United States and, gentlemen, 74 partner nations, with more being developed.

Now this program has been operating for more than 20 years, and I will be working to enhance the program. I would like to highlight one partnership in particular, the partnership between the

California National Guard and Ukraine. When conflict began in Ukraine, it was that relationship that gave us some of our best insight into what was actually happening on the ground, thanks to the long-term and often personal relationships that had developed. Not only did this put the Ukrainian military in a better position to respond, but it also gave us access that would have been very difficult to obtain in any other way.

Now my question is, how do you see the National Guard contributing to security cooperation in the future? Can any of you comment on the value of the State Partnership Program and how we can enhance it or other programs that develop these long-term relationships?

Now I realize, gentlemen, that most of our security cooperative programs aim to address counterterrorism, so how can we shape these programs to be broader in scope like the Guard program? And I would like to ask each one of you.

General FRASER. Ma'am, let me start, if I may. You are exactly right, the National Guard programs are critical tools for every combatant commander, and they make a big difference. One example when I was assigned in Alaska, the Alaska Guard had a relationship with Mongolia. When the President of Mongolia visited the United States, one of his stops was to visit the adjutant general in Alaska before he went back to Mongolia because the relationship was as close. So it is a critical tool, and we need to continue to use it.

We also, as well as building capacity, there is a lot of effort that goes into training and exercising with partner nations. And that is really that relationship that continues to grow. So those opportunities where we have to do that I think will help build the capacity.

Where there are opportunities to support their ability to do disaster response and to help support disaster response training and efforts within differing nations, I think that is a real strength that the Guard brings to any relationship that we have.

And then just the overall relationship that they bring into our military departments also is beneficial. So, from my standpoint, we always look to as much of the Guard's participation as they could afford.

Ms. BORDALLO. Dr. Paul.

Dr. PAUL. Thank you. The State Department partnership program is a great program, and it is very cost-effective because it doesn't require that much additional resourcing with potentially modest payouts. And I think that is a kind of program that often gets overlooked or can be in danger in times of austerity, a program that doesn't cost a great deal but doesn't have gigantic payouts. Many of the payouts are fairly modest but important, especially in long-term relationships. And that is something that as we think about assessment, that we have to keep in mind. Every mission has a primary mission that should be spelled out very clearly, but there may be other forms of ancillary benefit. So usually the primary mission of a National Guard engagement is to do some kind of building partner capacity exercise or some kind of interoperability exercise. But the ancillary benefit is the relationship. And those relationships can be hugely important, like the instance you mention with Ukraine and in other countries where there is

turmoil. And someone from the United States who is still in uniform can call up someone in the partner nation who is still in uniform and ask what is going on and open a dialogue that way.

Ms. BORDALLO. Dr. Reveron.

Dr. REVERON. Thank you very much for the question. It is a brilliant insight because I think security cooperation really works best building these long-term relationships, and the Guard is really suited for that because members of the Guard don't rotate as frequently as they do on Active Duty. And so if you are in the California Guard, you tend to stay in the California Guard, and you can keep going back to that country year after year after and all the different positions. So I think the SPP, you are absolutely right, ma'am, it is a fantastic program to develop these relationship.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I thank you very much for your comments to my question. I just wish it were mentioned in your opening statements. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Stefanik.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to the witnesses for your testimony today.

Members of this committee understand that security cooperation has long been a component of our national security strategy, and it has become more of a central figure over the last decade.

My question is a broad one, but I wanted to get each of you on the record. Can security cooperation be a substitute for U.S. forces? And the reason I am asking that question is I am concerned that some may assume that security cooperation can replace U.S. forces as a justification for the further drawdown. So I would like you to each comment on whether it can be a substitute.

I will start with you, General Fraser.

General FRASER. I would tell you that a lot of our security cooperation programs exist today because of the size of our force, and that it is an ancillary part to our ability to train and exercise and provide capacity and work with other countries. A drawdown in the size of our forces would mean that we have less opportunity to train with our partners because we would be focused on maintaining our own readiness and we would have fewer, smaller capacity to be able to do that.

Ms. STEFANIK. Dr. Paul.

Dr. PAUL. I think the idea of security cooperation is to lighten the load on our military forces and to decrease the frequency with which we have to deploy them in order to help other countries and other parts of the world help themselves. With that said, I don't think there is any danger of disbanding the Marine Corps in favor of the Peace Corps.

Ms. STEFANIK. So just to get it on record, security cooperation is not a substitute for U.S. forces?

Dr. PAUL. Correct.

Dr. REVERON. No, and I would add, in fact, it probably enhances U.S. power in general. And so, for example, we are very concerned with civil war in Somalia, don't want to put U.S. boots on the ground in Somalia. But by training and equipping Ethiopians, Kenyans, Burundians, and others, they can provide that force and

then the U.S. incurs that benefit of stability, an attempt of stability in Somalia.

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to the panelists.

Dr. Paul, you said in your comments and I paraphrase them, we can't want it more than they want it. And in some respects, I think we suffer from superimposing what we believe they want or convincing the leadership that it is what they want when it is not what the people want. The revelation that in Syria, after all the money we spent, \$500 million, we have four or five individuals who have been trained and equipped, is more than an embarrassment. And had that not become public at a Senate hearing, I think we would be moving forward, spending more money. How do we put in place some form of governance of these efforts so that when they are failing, we just fess up to it and pull that plug?

Dr. PAUL. Ma'am, I view that as an assessment question. That is part of assessment. I don't know anything more about the Syrian program than what has been discussed in the popular press. It is not an area of personal expertise, but thinking in general about these kinds of efforts, if there was assessment in place, clearly when you get to the point of measuring your measures of performance—is money being spent on what? What are you delivering? Well, we only have five trainees. That has got to be a concern, and there has got to be internal revisions to the program. There has to be a feedback loop. And then when you come to output, the output is the number of trained personnel produced, five. That has got to be well below the target, and there has to be accountability.

Ms. SPEIER. Well, yes, there should be accountability. But to just say we are going to put in an assessment tool, supposedly we have persons in authority that can make that assessment and should be making that assessment without the benefit of an assessment tool. I mean—

Dr. PAUL. No, fair enough that one is so clearly and obviously not successful that it shouldn't require much of an assessment framework, but if there were an assessment framework and assessment mindedness in place, that call would get made earlier. The whole benefit of assessment is, what can we learn from this? Why did this program go awry? How were we allowed to spend so much money over so much time without recognizing that things could be different? What could be different so that the next time we do this, it doesn't happen that way?

Ms. SPEIER. General Fraser, with our pivot to the Pacific, what or should there be efforts undertaken to improve our military relationship with China and create greater predictability in the South China Sea?

General FRASER. I think there is. And there is ongoing effort—at least from what I understand, again, from press, that there is an ongoing effort on the part of the Pacific Command as well as U.S. military to build those relationships. But we have to also remember the relationships are two-way streets. And so there has to be the same willingness and the same openness and the same abil-

ity on the part of whomever we are building that relationship with. But we find across, at least my experience, that the more we are able to understand one another—we may not agree with one another—but the more we can work and at least know what my counterparts' views are, that is important. So, yes, I think we should continue our efforts.

Ms. SPEIER. Is there anything else you think we should be doing that we are not doing?

General FRASER. I think it is a slow process. It is a step-by-step process. And we just need to work our way down that path. And it is going to take, in my opinion, a long time.

Ms. SPEIER. For all of you, are there any examples that you can give us of security cooperation in nondefense sectors that have been successful?

Silence is golden, I guess.

Dr. REVERON. I am not quite sure I completely understand the question.

Ms. SPEIER. Well, we are providing training and equipping, but we are also doing things in other nations that are non-security-related that you could argue are creating security cooperation. Can you point to any of those that are nondefense-related that have paid back in dividends?

General FRASER. Ma'am, the one I will use is really focused on the Department of Justice, if you will, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and a lot of the work that they do within Latin America and within counterdrug operations all over.

I think if you go in and look at some of the international narcotics logistics out of the Department of State that also fund similar types of programs, those are very helpful, but there is a close relationship and I will use the effort, the counterdrug effort, within the Caribbean led by JIATF-South [Joint Interagency Task Force South]. A lot of the intelligence that they get comes out of law enforcement organizations and relationships, then it moves into a military sphere if you can for an intercept, but once that intercept is taking place, then it is law enforcement who is then engaged again so that there is a legal procedure that continues from that, and then it goes into the court system from there. So that is a lot of different agencies who have found the ability to work together, and I think that is the real model, as we look at it, is we shouldn't try and divorce any of these programs from one another, they work best when they work together.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Rourke.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on some questions that have been asked about tough decisions that we have to make when our short-term security interests or those of our partners conflict with longer-term strategic interests or even just the standing of the United States in a given part of the world. The example of Egypt was used earlier where there is a prohibition on the kind of military assistance we would give that regime, the current regime, if it is a regime that is in place due to a coup. And we have essentially looked the other way because of very real, short-term immediate problems. ISIS [Is-

lamic State in Iraq and Syria] I think was one of the reasons given for contravening that part of U.S. law or policy.

To move back to this hemisphere, you can use the example of Guatemala in the 1950s or Chile in the 1970s, El Salvador, Nicaragua in the 1980s to see where that short-term focus has caused us long-term problems, and probably more importantly, it causes the people in those countries significant suffering and long-term harm.

Tell me, and I will start with General Fraser, your thoughts on the administration's recent decision to withhold 15 percent of Merida funding to Mexico because of human rights concerns. I know that is not strictly military aid, but it is connected to military aid that we have given that country. Is that a step in the right direction to begin to hold regimes accountable for things like human rights and their conduct using the money that U.S. taxpayers have supplied?

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you for that question. I think that—and there has been a big focus at least in my time in Southern Command. I know General Kelly continues it and has actually expanded the program on the focus on human rights and the importance of militaries sustaining their focus on human rights.

But as you say, there are very hard decisions that have to be made as we go through and look at what the results are. So I will argue that we need to have a very clear focus there as well and determine what we are trying to achieve and measure how we are able to do that. It is a situation that will always be troublesome as we go through it. I don't know all the specifics around the specifics of the Merida, but I know there is a lot of focus and effort that the Armed Forces put in to vetting organizations with whom they work for with abiding by human rights vetting and then supporting those organizations that we should.

And, in fact, the example I will use is during my time in Southern Command, we had a problem where one of the countries decided to shoot down airplanes. And we had to stop aid going in to them very specifically for that reason.

But on the other side of that, the current militaries, I have a hard time if nothing—if they have not had any human rights violations in 20 years, that we hold them accountable for what happened 20 years ago. There is somewhere in there, there has to be a balance.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Yeah. I don't know if other members of the panel would like to address this issue of how we balance what we stand for to ourselves and much of the rest of the world, you know, democracy and freedom and human rights, with some of the regimes and nonregime actors that we support who don't help us to achieve those things for the people in those countries, and does that diminish our standing in those regions and those countries, and is it counterproductive ultimately?

Dr. PAUL. It is definitely an issue because, as you have highlighted, we often have conflicting objectives. We have a short-term objective that is about improving the security situation or improving the capability of partner forces. But we have long-term objectives that have to do with our national values, things about human rights, things about democracy and other kinds of issues. So I

think we have to recognize that sometimes these objectives are in conflict, and there has to be some prioritization. From some of the cases I have examined over 20-year periods, we find that yes, if there is a suspension of the relationship due to human rights violations, that does unsurprisingly impair our ability to build partner capacity. But, pleasantly, in most of those cases, it has also caused the partner to improve their behavior.

Dr. REVERON. And maybe to add, I share your concern because while we might not have a deep appreciation for history, our partners certainly do. And we have to be very careful in protecting what the United States holds dear. And because we have a very nonexclusive list of partners, I really think what we need to make sure is that when we inculcate with these programs, that we are doing it in accordance with American values. And I think the officers that at least I teach understand that, and I think programs, like Leahy vetting, ensure that we identify that. But there are long-term consequences because our history shows we will support a wrong side. A U.S. graduate of an IMET [International Military Education and Training] program will stage a coup. That happens, as you know, sir.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Let me zoom back out for just a second. It kind of goes back to some things that Ms. Stefanik was talking with you all about. I mean, my assumption is we can't do everything in the world, so we have to have some partners of different capabilities. Some are sophisticated like NATO countries; some are lesser developed sorts of countries.

So if you had to give a grade for our security cooperation efforts, how are we doing when you look at this range, which is us and the Brits and the Australians at one level and, you know, a few advisers we are sending to Cameroon on the other—or wherever—at that level? How are we doing?

Dr. PAUL. I will take a stab, sir. In our study, we looked at 29 cases. In 23 of those 29, we evaluated there being some level of success in building partner capacity. So if we use a conventional American high school grading system, 23 out of 29 probably comes in the B range?

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. You all agree?

Dr. REVERON. Yes, sir. I mean, I think one of the things I look for is we empower our partners, and so it is everything from a country like Japan that not only wants to buy our weapons but operate with us but provide us host nation support, but also countries like Ethiopia that is willing to deploy into Somalia.

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the B rating. I think as you look at—focus it specifically on relationship building, I think we are probably in a B-plus, maybe a low A. But as you look at it the from a capability standpoint, I would argue we are probably down in the C range, maybe a little bit lower than that because that is a harder issue to take on. It requires a lot more focus and a lot more discipline and a lot more patience, if you will, than just the building relationship part of this.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I made note of your comments, General, on strategic patience because that is not a quality with which we are always associated in this country.

So let's just think for a second because a lot of attention recently has been on our disappointment at the Afghan forces not advancing faster, although they have made tremendous strides, but disappointment they haven't advanced faster. The Iraqis, it didn't work out very well when ISIS confronted them, and then, as Ms. Speier was talking about, the Syria thing. From those examples of trying to train and equip security forces in the Middle East and South Asia, without asking you all to be experts on any particular case, do you think there are lessons to be learned from those disappointing results?

Dr. PAUL. I can highlight two lessons just off the top of my head. First is about whether the glass is half full or the glass is half empty. Afghan security forces have made remarkable strides from their baseline state. Arguably, Iraqi forces made pretty impressive strides from their baseline states. The question is then, are they good enough to face the threat that they face? And the answer in both cases is equivocal.

The other key issue is about willingness to fight. This is an incredibly difficult thing to assess. It is incredibly difficult to know how willing to fight a force is until they are battle tested.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Dr. REVERON. If I can add, sir, 100,000 U.S. troops didn't defeat the Taliban, so I am not completely surprised that the Afghan forces we trained and equipped didn't either, haven't either, and struggled as well. Maybe the general lesson for me is military cannot solve a political problem. And so unless there is a legitimate semi-stable political authority that can control a border and actually run a government, efforts to reinforce another country's military are going to go have limited success.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, what I would say is I think there are important lessons that we can take from all three. I am not an expert on any one of them. But I will capsule it in that the three areas that we are talking about were all combat zones, and they were all security cooperation being conducted in combat and in a combat zone. That differs, I would argue, from security cooperation programs that we have other places.

And I would argue that it is much more difficult because the security situation is much, much more different. The security that the people feel is much different. The relationships, the political relationships are much more tenuous than they can be in other situations. So I think we really need to take a hard look at it from that standpoint and not just capture all security cooperation in one bucket.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, and, General, the Congressional Research Service were looking at a variety of test cases makes that exact point. The thing that we have the hardest time with is doing this sort of thing in war zones because, obviously, you have a war to fight while you are also building the capability. It is just hard. So I appreciate that.



You all talked a lot today about Colombia. Are there other examples of successes that you think deserve our attention? Various things I have read mention the Philippines as having some success, you know. Are there other examples?

Dr. REVERON. No. I think my favorite example is really South Korea because if you look at it over that 60-year period, you see what the country, government, military have really become, and it is still very capable. Another example is Israel. We don't really discuss Israel as a case of security cooperation, but if you look at from a funding perspective, it clearly is. And in that case, the U.S. benefits tremendously from the relationship because there are common areas of technology transfer. And then, on other examples, I would look to the peacekeeping programs funded under the Global Peace Operations Initiative, in particular, Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya.

Dr. PAUL. I will toss Jordan onto the pile. This is an example of a country where we have invested a great deal with a great level of success, so much so that they have become a regional center for training peacekeeping forces. So it is a pay-it-forward security cooperation model and success in that regard.

General FRASER. The only thing I will add, Mr. Chairman, is I think the Philippines is a good example also.

But I think it is important in this equation also as we look at those successes is to put the political dimension into this. To just apply a security cooperation program and expect it to achieve the results without having a companion political effort to get a political decision to follow that same path and follow that success were misaligned. And so I think we have to follow it in a holistic approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, no, I agree, and I appreciate all those examples. I don't know, it seems to me the challenge is, okay, what if you are in a messy place without a strong political infrastructure to work with. I am thinking of Mali, for example. We spent a fair amount of time trying to develop security forces there. It didn't work very well. And so the question for us is, do we not engage if there is not a strong political infrastructure, you know, with which to work? Do we engage with much lower expectations of what can result in it? And I don't know the answers. I guess I am literally thinking out loud here.

But I was listening as you all were talking with Mr. Smith and others about the importance of development assistance, the importance of the political engagement, the inadequacies of the State Department, the need for strategic patience. It is true: We need to know what works, and then the hard question is, okay, if you don't have all of those things, do you engage anyway? And, you know, I guess maybe that is a case-by-case sort of situation.

You all don't have to comment on that, but you are welcome to if you want.

Dr. PAUL. It seems to me that you have identified the right issues, that it is a challenge and that expectation management is key. So the decision should be made in each of those instances based on the realistic expectations.

Another observation from some of our research that might be relevant is the value of ministerial capacity building, so in a situation where you lack a lot of the contextual factors that make security cooperation more likely to be successful, some of the political sup-

port, baseline absorptive capacity. Well, investing in ministerial capacity can both help improve future absorptive capacity if you have strategic patience and is investing in the government, albeit through the defense ministry, and can make that more robust.

In fact, we noted a number of cases where we were able to successfully contribute to ministerial capacity building, and then, later on, historically later, 6, 7, 8, 10 years, they are able to start building actual forces capability.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks.

Let me touch on just one, maybe two other things right quick, and then I want to yield to Mr. Franks.

Dr. Paul, in your testimony, you talked about authorities and basically said we need more flexibility, that we get kind of wrapped around—CRS [Congressional Research Service] says we have 80 different authorities in DOD, and that doesn't even include State Department authorities—we get wrapped around that. What wasn't clear to me from your testimony is how big a problem this is. How much of a problem is caused by having all of these different complex authorities and signoffs and so forth?

Dr. PAUL. I actually think General Fraser may be able to speak to this better because of his experience. But I will say from what I know, talking to operators, doing interviews, looking at the histories, it is a problem in concert with other problems. So there is what is described in the community as a patchwork of authorities. There are a lot of different authorities to do a lot of different things. And if you are an experienced and practiced bureaucrat and invest a lot of time into it, it is amazing the kinds of things you can pull together to get stuff done.

Unfortunately, we have a rotational culture on both the military and the civilian side. So someone who has had a prior security cooperation billet and falls in on a very well-orchestrated set of programs may be able to make that transition and go smoothly. But if someone new rotates in and has transferred from some other aspect of the service and doesn't have any experience there and there isn't a good transition folder and there is changing needs in that country, they may well be quickly overwhelmed.

General FRASER. Sir, my perspective is, in a lot of cases, I would argue people trying to manage their way through the authorities becomes, results in, how are we going to do this to get a little bit of something done rather than what we need to have done? So they are just trying to help. They are trying to align with our partner's requests, but it is very hard when our partner says this, but my authority will only let me do a very small part of what you are asking to be able to do this. And it is all normally the authorities that we get placed on in various different places I would argue come from individual instances where we need an authority to go do something for some limited amount of time, and then they either sustain themselves, or they get patchworked in another way.

My thoughts are for security cooperation to be successful, security assistance, we need to have a longer range strategic objectivity. Then I am a believer—and then build the authorities to help achieve that objective rather than the patchwork that I have to manage along with all the other pieces to go out and to achieve that goal.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we talked about lots of things today; some of which is in the purview of Congress, and some of which is not. This is ours, you know. We can make this better, and I am just trying to figure out if it is worth the effort. You know, how much of a benefit comes from it I guess I should say.

Let me yield to Mr. Franks.

Mr. FRANKS. Well thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank all of you. I will try to just keep this to one general question because I think it goes to the core of what we are all talking about, and I am sure you have already touched on this substantively prior to that.

But, I mean, it is a very compelling concept, this building partnership capacity, because we are able to kind of lighten our load and try to bring in new friends. And there is something very compelling about that, but of course, sometimes we succeed pretty effectively, like we have with Israel and the Iron Dome and missile batteries. Those have been marked successes. And then sometimes we don't do as well, like the training and equipping program in Syria. And so it seems to me that the key here is to ascertain ways that we can make sure that those we are dealing with are the right ones that we should be dealing with. And I would look to you to tell us, what metric do you use to ascertain what you think has been a successful effort? And how should Congress measure that in our oversight capacity?

General Fraser, I will start with you. And thank you for your service here.

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. I guess I am struggling a little bit with how we put this together. I guess to be successful, in my mind, it has to be a two-way street. And a lot of times I think we go into this and we have a capability we think—and it is in our interest to help build your capacity in this way, but that partner may not see it exactly that same way. So we have to have a two-way conversation that matches and makes our goals match.

And then I would argue, then we have to stay very focused on whether or not we are doing that, through good assessment and metrics, but I would also argue, much as we rotate through a lot of people, our partners also rotate. And so sometimes when one senior leader in a government changes—or in a military—changes to another, the successor doesn't always agree with the program that was then put in place, but we continue that program along. So we have got to have another agreement every time leadership changes, I would argue, to help us be successful. And then put small goals, achievable goals, in a timely timeframe that will then step on, build on one another, rather than say that we have got [to] have the whole enchilada tomorrow.

Dr. PAUL. Sir, I believe that both of your questions about how do we deal with the right partner and how do we assess success hinge on objectives and interests. If we are clear about what our objectives are and what our interests are, then that can allow us to examine a potential partner or a partner that we are considering changing our relationship with and see whether our objectives align with their objectives so that we have shared interests and how much distance there is between their baseline condition and

where we want them to be and what we want them to do to meet our objectives.

And then, for assessment, how, again, the clarity of our objectives and the distance between where you start and where you are going to end up because I am aware of a lot of cases where security cooperation objectives were met. We dramatically improved the capability of a partner, but national security objectives were not met because that partner was not, at the end of the day, sufficiently robust to deal with whatever the threat or the challenge was by himself.

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. And I yield back right there. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O'Rourke, do you have further questions?

Mr. O'ROURKE. Yes, I wanted to follow up on a question that the ranking member asked about whether it is helpful to put some kind of absolute cap or horizon on aid to reduce the risk of a moral hazard. In other words, we don't want the partner country to think that U.S. assistance is going to be there no matter because then they will fail to develop the capacity and capabilities necessary for them to be able to take on their challenges without U.S. aid in the future.

Is that in fact the right approach? And Colombia was mentioned as an example. But are there examples where we set some kind of fixed amount of U.S. intervention or aid or a date certain that has been effective?

Dr. REVERON. You are absolutely right. I mean, there is a moral hazard in all of these. And an easy example, you look at NATO spending, NATO sets the target of 2 percent of GDP [gross domestic product] on defense. I think it is only 4 of the 28 make it.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Right.

Dr. REVERON. And there is that tendency.

Mr. O'ROURKE. They know the United States will be there.

Dr. REVERON. Absolutely, but I would also say, too, I am concerned if we get too narrowly focused on achievable objectives. Sometimes we give assistance because we gain base access. Sometimes we give assistance because we liked, we would joke, 50 flags over ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] in Kabul. We got legitimacy on that, and even you get a little moral upbringing when you saw the Bosnian flag flying because 20 years earlier, we were dealing with the ethnic conflict in Bosnia. And so I appreciate the concern and the question, and I think it is always there. And that is where I think really at the U.S. embassy level in those countries really have a better feel for it to capture some of this subjectivity that is involved in providing these programs.

Mr. O'ROURKE. I think you could argue the other side and use Iraq and Afghanistan as examples where you set a fixed deadline I think with the intention of forcing that partner country to step up and recognize that, at some point, they are going to go have to take these issues into their own hands, and it seems in Iraq not to have worked certainly. And in Afghanistan, the President has changed course and recommitted the current force size until conditions on the ground change. So would you argue that it is a case-by-case, condition-by-condition issue and that it is not helpful then

to set a deadline? Or is there some other way to resolve the potential for a moral hazard and perpetual U.S. presence?

General FRASER. My answer directly is it depends. I just don't think there is one standard that fits every situation. And I would argue that when you get into security cooperation, when you get into especially combat zones, those are morally hazardous zones. And there is no way, whether a number of troops or a standard or anything like that will avoid the fact that there are going to be some conflicts there. And so, from my standpoint, we need to realize that. We need to accept that, and then we need to understand where interests and those moral hazards come in conflict with one another and make very clear decisions on which way we need to go, but bottom line to it is it depends.

Dr. PAUL. I will echo and agree with it depends, but it should be a consideration as we are laying out our investment and our plan for engagement in a country. As I said earlier, you can't want it more than they do. And if you are in a situation where there is moral hazard, where there is some danger of us wanting it more than they do, then it is critical that we identify the right levers in order to retain some kind leverage over the partner so that we can influence them, so we can say: Well, you need to achieve this benchmark by this date, or there will be a consequence. And then we need to be willing to put those consequences in place, whether specific drawdowns of forces or changing the resource allocation or things like that.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Yeah. I think because this is so hard and the consequences are so significant, I am looking for some certain rules of the road, kind of like we have on the military intervention side, the Powell Doctrine, these eight preconditions must exist before you commit U.S. forces—I think you are saying that it is not going to be that easy and you cannot simplify it to that degree. And it is going to be on a condition-by-condition basis. Although I think you have given us some really important principles, like you can't solve a political problem militarily. And you have mentioned the need to resource and staff the State Department side of this so you have the corresponding diplomatic and political aspect covered. And I think that is helpful. So if, you know, we look forward to anything additional you can point me and other members towards that would help us to make better decisions as a country going forward. Thank you very much.

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one thing here. I think the real focus as you talk about this—because we are really talking about moral judgment, and we are talking about individuals having moral judgment in horrific circumstances—education is the focus. We have to build the capacity of military personnel on both sides, whoever we are working with, to be able to have that moral judgment that will meet international standards. And absent that, then it is a crap shoot.

Mr. O'ROURKE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to get to that in just a second.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It really goes along with this, but sort of the leverage that we have and whether we use it or we don't, the conditionality, I think

these are things that the public responds to. And often I hear from people that feel like, you know, we don't use it when we should. The example in Mexico recently is one; obviously Pakistan, another where the Congress has weighed in. And, you know, we are probably out of time now, but I am just trying to wade through that, sometimes muck, is really difficult. And, General, maybe you have had an example of where you wanted to use it, weren't able to use it. What was at stake there? What was occurring?

General FRASER. A lot of the zone, the same topics we are talking about are combat zones, but there have been examples where—and I will just air my frustration. We have had very strict rules on what we can and can't do with certain armed forces, and those are valid. But my concern has been to put a benchmark on what that means and what that means for current day leaders via something that happened in the past. And when is good enough good enough? Because, in some cases, good enough—a government took seriously what we were talking about. They made positive steps, and we changed the conditions. That shouldn't stand either. So we have to do some of our own understanding of what do we really want, what do we really expect as you look at, in combination with our other interests, as that understanding and conditionality, if you will, needs to be there, but it has to be put in a bigger context and not just something as a whole, from my standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today.

Obviously, in every situation, it is going to be different. And, you know, we are going to set an objective, and then we have to look at the pieces on the chessboard, if you will. Where is this country now? For example, in Iraq, should we have kept the military in place and started from there? Those types of discussions probably should take place long before we act and intervene and get in place. And I would agree with you wholeheartedly: there is a big difference between trying to prop up a military in the middle of a war and create a new military in the middle of a war, and that is a greater challenge.

One of the things that you mentioned today, a couple things: One, it comes down to dollars, will, and politics, I think, in a lot of cases, right? And to that point of will, I just have one question. I should know the answer to this. In Afghanistan today, are they operating under a draft, or are they a volunteer military?

Dr. REVERON. It is an all-volunteer force, sir.

Dr. WENSTRUP. That says a lot to their will, I would say. And we do hear more positive things about their will as opposed to other places. That is really all I have. Thank you very much for being here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just get to one other thing.

General Fraser, you talked about the rotational culture and the need for us to be better trained at training, if it will. And so one of the questions I have had is, how do you all evaluate our institutions, our organizations, for engaging with other countries? There have been suggestions, for example, that we need to form different organizations within the military who specialize in this. Of course, special forces has always been a key capability of theirs, but just

give me, if you will, you all's evaluation of how well prepared we are for the various sorts of things we have been talking about today?

General FRASER. Congressman, Mr. Chairman, let me start with that. In a lot of cases, I think where we are not as prepared as I would like to see us is in our understanding of whatever culture and whatever military we are working with. I just don't think we are very good at that, and even with those officers and enlisted personnel that we trained and who are embedded and really study those environments, they don't always understand the military organizations and what really drives some of the military organizations. For example, some of them in Latin America, we say, okay, they are just as committed to this program as we are. And what we found out in some cases is, well, no. In one case, 90 percent of an organization of an army was committed to helping private security because they don't get very much money from their government for this so this was a way for them to help build up the capacity of their armed forces. We don't understand that relationship and that intricacy a lot of times, so from that standpoint, we need to be able to do better than that, but that is an ongoing issue, and that is a rotational issue.

We are always going to have a problem with the expertise there because people cap out at a certain level within our Armed Forces normally who are in security assistance and security cooperation. And they have to have a skill set. To just be knowledgeable of another country's culture and how they operate when you are trying to build a military capacity, you need to have some military expertise also, and you have to build that somewhere. That has to happen within our organization. But I think what the Marines are doing today with designated special-purpose MAGTFs [Marine air-ground task forces] on a regional basis. The Army is doing the same thing with brigades. The Navy, I would argue, in some cases, routinely does that, in a lot of cases, better. I think that is a good step in the right direction. And that brings that combat expertise in our relationships, and that is valued by our partners.

Dr. REVERON. Mr. Chairman, at the Naval War College, for example, our intermediate course for O-3s and O-4s, it is regional focused. And so we divide the students by region, and then we give them sort of the problem over the term, how do you translate national strategy into regional strategy? And that is an attempt to kind of get at the broad base. I think, within the force, the FAO Program, Foreign Area Officer Program, is the gold standard. And then you see these different programs that have popped up over time, the AFPAK [Afghanistan-Pakistan] Hands, or I think the Navy has the Asia Pacific Hands. And those have limited life because we are a global force and you never quite know where the next resource is. I would argue then for across the entire force more programs that really emphasize the study of regions, cultures, and histories. And you see the Army, too, that designated their regional aligned force concept I think is another way to get at that.

Dr. PAUL. I concur with all of those remarks and note that we are really good at training ourselves. We habitually take men and women from civilian life and inculcate them into a highly effective

military and build our own capabilities quite well. We are really good at working with partners who are very much like us, with our NATO partners. The interoperability exercises we do with them are great. Where we struggle is in different contexts. We are too vulnerable to mirror imaging, and we don't have enough of a mindset of recognizing the kinds of things that can be different and how that can impact outcomes.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, well, that is helpful. You know, this is a complex area, and yet, as people have said, it is a central part of our security. So thank you all for helping to enlighten us and think through some of the issues. We may well draw on you again in the future. Again, we appreciate your testimony.

And, with that, the hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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# **A P P E N D I X**

OCTOBER 21, 2015

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

OCTOBER 21, 2015

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**Statement of Ranking Member Adam Smith**  
**HEARING ON**  
**Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn't**  
**October 21, 2015**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to join you in thanking our witnesses for appearing here today.

Whether we call it “Building Partner Capacity” (BPC) or “security assistance,” bolstering the ability of other nations to provide for their own security and to assist in providing regional security is a key component in American security strategy. This is not a new concept—at various times during the Cold War we helped build the militaries of other countries, including Iran under the Shah, so they could act as regional proxies in the struggle against communism.

Following the 9/11 attacks, however, the concept has become even more key as the United States has realized that ungoverned territory has provided the safe havens terrorists require from which to launch attacks against us and our allies. To push back on these groups and to begin to shrink the ungoverned space, we have created a variety of new authorities and provided hundreds of millions of dollars per year that the Department of Defense uses to build the capacity of foreign security forces. I have very much supported these measures.

In some cases, our efforts to help others provide security has met with some remarkable results—many proponents point to the Philippines or Colombia as great successes, but we should also look to Somalia and our assistance to the countries participating in AMISOM. In other cases, Yemen and Mali most notably, our assistance to other countries did not help with regional security over time. We need to understand why both successes and failures happen, and what we can do to make the former more likely while risking fewer failures.

Understanding what makes success more likely is extremely important. I don’t believe that we can ever guarantee success—as the name “Building Partner Capacity” implies, it requires us to act through other nations whose interests may not perfectly align with ours. But I do believe there are conditions that improve our chances, and I hope the panel can help us outline those.

I also hope the panel can think through any needed changes to how we do business. Security assistance, in the past, was mostly led by the State Department. That started to change after 9/11, with the creation of authorities like the 1206 program that was intended to help nations address immediate and short-term counterterrorism needs. That and other programs evolved over time, particularly with the creation of the Counter Terrorism Partnership, to the point that DOD is thinking about longer-term programs and support. Assuming everyone in the Administration and Congress agrees with this

evolution, we should consider if there are legislative or administrative changes that we need to make to improve our chances of success. For example, DOD has gotten much better over time about looking at a country's ability to sustain the assistance we provided, but this is hardly perfect. How do we do use our national security apparatus better?

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank our witnesses for appearing here today and for their assistance in helping us think through these questions. I yield back.

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STATEMENT  
OF  
DR. DEREK S. REVERON<sup>1</sup>  
PROFESSOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RI

BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON  
  
SECURITY COOPERATION  
  
21 OCTOBER 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL  
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HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

It is my honor to speak to this Committee today about security cooperation. The ideas here are my own and largely drawn from my book *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*.

Foreign policy of the 2010s was supposed to be different: there would be no great power tensions, the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan would be strong enough to confront their own security challengers, and the US could pivot away from Middle East turmoil to do nation building at home. Yet the United States has confronted a very different world. Russia invaded Ukraine and annexed parts of Crimea, and launched military operations in Syria; China violated Vietnam's sovereignty drilling for hydrocarbons in its Exclusive Economic Zone, established an air defense identification zone conflicting with Japan, and created "islands" in the disputed South China Sea, exacerbating tensions with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia; Iraq struggled against the group ISIS, ceding a significant portion of its territory; Afghanistan failed to parlay a decade of international investment, leading to a Taliban resurgence; and intrastate conflict caused closure of U.S. embassies in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. Graham Allison and Dmitri Simes summed it well "peace seems increasingly out of reach as threats to U.S. security and prosperity multiply both at the systemic level, where dissatisfied major powers are increasingly challenging the international order, and at the state and substate level, where dissatisfied ethnic, tribal, religious and other groups are destabilizing key countries and even entire regions."<sup>2</sup>

In an effort to reach for peace, the United States responds to foreign policy crises like these not by sending combat forces to confront aggression, but instead by sending weapons, trainers, and advisors to tackle security deficits.<sup>3</sup> The United States aspires to create true partners that can confront their own threats to internal stability (e.g. terrorism) or alleviate security dilemmas (e.g. the rise of China). Thus, strengthening weak states and supporting developed partners through security cooperation remain a national security priority. Not new, this approach continues a long-term tradition of U.S. foreign policy that seeks to empower its partners to confront their own security challenges rather than attempt to solve them through American force alone. To be sure, the U.S. military remains a potent combat force and regularly conducts counterterrorism strikes in the Middle East, leads maritime coalitions in the Indian Ocean, and maintains a capacity to wage major war in Asia. In addition to this warfighting capacity, successive administrations have sought to prevent conflict by helping regimes through security cooperation, which includes all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments.<sup>4</sup>

Since coalition operations are a norm, security cooperation also ensures partners are interoperable with US forces. For example, in Afghanistan, we operated with 50 partners who often could provide capabilities that the United States could not, such as police training. In Bahrain, a U.S. officer directs three naval task forces composed of 30 partners who collectively protect vital trade routes. And in Key West, Joint Interagency Task Force South serves as a fusion center supporting international efforts to eliminate illicit trafficking in the Caribbean and Latin America. Security cooperation enables these coalitions to work; the programs ensure partners have access to the U.S. defense industrial base, and U.S.-sponsored military exercises promote interoperability.

As the United States looks ahead, the country is sure to follow the tradition in defense strategy that prioritizes enabling partners through training and equipping their forces. Over the last 15 years, the number of status of forces agreements (SOFAs) increased from 40 to 117 (see



table 1). This is due, in part, to the fact that while administrations may change, fundamental U.S. interests have not. These include: protecting the US homeland from catastrophic attack, sustaining a global system marked by open lines of communication to facilitate commerce, promoting international security, and preventing powers hostile to the United States from being able to dominate important areas of the world.<sup>5</sup>

The United States aspires to create true partners who can confront their own threats to internal stability, which organized crime, violent actors, and regional rivals exploit. Known as the “indirect approach,” the U.S. helps countries fill security deficits that exist when a country cannot independently protect its own national security. American generosity helps explain this, but U.S. national security benefits too. For example, by providing radars and surveillance technology, Central American countries can control their airspace and can interdict drug-filled planes bound for the US; by providing logistic support, Pakistan can lead a maritime coalition promoting maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and by selling AEGIS destroyers, Japan can counter North Korean missiles and provide early warning of missile threats to the United States.

Through security cooperation programs like these, the United States helps other countries meet their immediate national security needs, but there is also an effort to foster independence so states can contribute to global security. This is most visible in a program such as the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative that trains and equips foreign militaries to participate in peacekeeping operations. While the United States does not want to deploy ground forces under the United Nations flag, it does play a key role in peacekeeping by training and equipping over 250,000 peacekeepers since 2005. Programs like GPOI enabled Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda to participate in an African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia. An officer from Chad seemed to capture the rationale for other countries’ efforts to contribute to global security: “When your neighbor’s house is burning, you have to put it out, because if not, yours is next.”<sup>6</sup> U.S. security cooperation often provides the tools countries need when their national security demands exceed their security capacities.

The preventive and cooperative approach to foreign policy is visible in today’s military, which has undergone dramatic change over the last three decades. Defense strategy embraces the notion that the U.S. military does much more than fight wars. The military trains, equips, and deploys peacekeepers; provides humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and supports other militaries to reduce security deficits throughout the world. With national security focused on weak states and regional challengers, the U.S. military has been evolving from a force of confrontation to one of cooperation.

The rationale for security cooperation has been based on the assumption that instability breeds chaos, which would make it more likely that the US or the international community would face pressure to intervene in the future. Given America’s global foreign policy, many countries have large expectations for assistance from the United States, but the US also derives benefits from security cooperation. Among these are:

- Obtaining base access as a *quid pro quo*
- Augmenting U.S. force structure by providing logistics and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to coalition partners in the Middle East
- Promoting a favorable balance of power by selling weapon systems and training programs to Gulf Cooperation Council countries to balance Iran

- Harmonizing areas of cooperation by working with Japan and Israel on missile defense
- Promoting self-defense through the Georgia Train and Equip program
- Reinforcing sovereignty through programs like Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico
- Supporting the US industrial base and creating interoperable air forces through the F-35 program

As these reasons suggest, security cooperation is much bigger than train and equip forces in combat zones. Given the scope of these programs and diversity of the partners, one can develop measurable objectives. These include: the strength of regional security agreements, the types of regional cooperation (e.g. participation in U.S.-led air, maritime, or land operations), willingness of foreign governments to counter threats the U.S. identifies (e.g. terrorism), and the relative receptivity of U.S. forces within the partner country. Internal to countries, one can measure how well partners combat security challenges, the strength of civil-military relations, and the levels of respect for human rights. Measurement can include the extent to which international commerce flows freely, levels of cooperation between military and international relief organizations, and support for international initiatives to combat disease, illicit activity, and weapons proliferation.

#### **Challenges for Security Cooperation**

At times security cooperation can be limitless, dissatisfying, and futile. At times partners misinterpret the assistance and do not appreciate the transitory nature of the assistance. To convince partners that Cold War logic no longer governs security cooperation, U.S. military officers promote human rights, encourage military professionalization, and serve as mentors to military officers in developing countries throughout the world. At the Naval War College, for example, over 65 countries send their best and brightest to learn alongside their American peers.

Over the last three decades, the U.S. military has embraced security cooperation, but there are important risks to highlight. First, the non-exclusive nature of these activities will produce more failures than successes, which negatively impacts confidence in security cooperation as a tool. Second, the personnel system is not producing sufficient talent to support these missions. American forces no longer operate in isolation and need an appreciation of the historical, cultural, and political dimensions of its partners. Third, there is a tendency to over-rely on partners thinking they can accomplish U.S. objectives when they either lack the political motivation or the skills to do so. Fourth, U.S. weapons may be protected as sensitive technology and training given to partners can be used against U.S. forces. Finally, other countries will rely on the U.S. to subsidize their own defense budgets creating a “free-rider” problem (see Table 2).

Underlying these risks are fundamental limits of what an external actor can accomplish through security cooperation; without indigenous political support, programs can only have marginal impact on a country’s security and stability. All of these programs clearly indicate that change in weak states must come primarily from within; external actors are limited in what they can accomplish.<sup>7</sup> Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter captured this while frustrated with U.S. efforts to enable Iraq to confront its security challenges. “We can give them training, we can give them equipment — we obviously can’t give them the will to fight. But if we give them training,

we give them equipment, and give them support, and give them some time, I hope they will develop the will to fight, because only if they fight can ISIL remain defeated.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Concluding Thoughts**

Security cooperation is not an abstract concept to me, but something I participated in firsthand as an academic and as a naval officer. With a strong background and a deep belief in the importance of good governance, universal human rights, and democracy, I am keenly aware of the dangers of arming repressive regimes, training militaries that are not grounded in civilian control, or upsetting regional balances of power that could lead to war. Given the non-exclusive nature of security cooperation and the large number of participants in U.S. programs, it is an unfortunate reality that the next military coup will be led by a former IMET participant. In spite of this risk, we are a far cry from Cold War programs that did not have the benefit of oversight and there is a strong U.S. commitment to professionalize foreign officers.

In my own experiences, I have yet to witness programs that do not support US interests on promoting security, stability, and good governance. And I have yet to encounter an officer from partner countries who was not grateful for the US attention to their security problems. Furthermore, I have yet to witness military programs that did not have the full endorsement and support of the U.S. ambassadors who see fragile security as a serious roadblock to reform and development efforts.

Given the disappointments in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, there is a potential for the value of security cooperation to be ignored, but these programs are not confined to combat zones alone. When thinking about security cooperation, we should look at how international partners contribute to coalition operations and global security. U.S. budgetary declines will likely reinforce the exporting security imperative, as the U.S. will need more partners and allies to augment its own defense capacities. I hope this hearing can show those inside and outside of government the importance of security deficits, how militaries are changing from forces of confrontation to forces of cooperation, the challenges of the “by, with, and through partners” approach, and why security cooperation is an important pillar of defense strategy.

Appendix:

Table 1: Expanding Security Programs <sup>9</sup>			
	2000	2009	2015
Status of Force Agreements	40	90	117
NATO Allies	15	28	28
Foreign Military Financing Budget	\$3.6 billion (FY01 est.)	\$5.03 billion (FY09 Total)	\$5.8 billion (FY16 Request)
International Military Education and Training Budget	\$58 million (FY01 est.)	\$93 million (FY09 Total)	\$111 million (FY 16 Request)

Table 2: NATO Countries' Defense Expenditures as Percentage of GDP <sup>10</sup>			
Country	Average 1985-1989	Average 2005-2009	2015 (est.)
Albania	-	-	1.2
Belgium	2.8	1.1	0.9
Bulgaria	-	2.1	1.2
Canada	2.1	1.2	1.0
Croatia	-	-	1.4
Czech Republic	-	1.5	1.0
Denmark	2.0	1.3	1.2
Estonia	-	1.6	2.0
France	3.7	2.3	1.8
Germany	3.0	1.3	1.2
Greece	4.5	2.8	2.4
Hungary	-	1.3	0.9
Italy	2.2	1.5	1.0
Latvia	-	1.4	1.0
Lithuania	-	1.1	1.1
Luxembourg	0.8	0.5	0.5
Netherlands	2.8	1.4	1.2
Norway	2.9	1.5	1.5
Poland	-	1.7	2.2
Portugal	2.5	1.5	1.4
Romania	-	1.6	1.4
Slovak Republic	-	1.5	1.0
Slovenia	-	1.5	1.0
Spain	2.1	1.1	0.9
Turkey	3.3	2.0	1.7
United Kingdom	4.5	2.4	2.1
United States	6.0	4.4	3.6

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The views expressed here are the author's alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

<sup>2</sup> Graham T. Allison and Dmitri K. Simes, "Russia and America Stumbling to War," *National Interest*, April 20, 2015. <http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-stumbling-war-12662>

<sup>3</sup> Presidential Policy Directive 23 (Security Sector Assistance) noted the US must "help partner nations build sustainable capacity to address common security challenges." Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-23: Security Sector Assistance, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2013).

<sup>4</sup> Security cooperation is defined in military doctrine as "All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation." Chairman, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 2015. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod\\_dictionary](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary)

<sup>5</sup> Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Mackubin T. Owens, *US Foreign Policy and Defense Strategy: the Evolution of an Incidental Superpower*, (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2015).

<sup>6</sup> Quoted in "African Training Exercise Turns Urgent as Threats Grow," *New York Times*, March 8, 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/africa/african-training-exercise-turns-urgent-as-threats-grow.html>

<sup>7</sup> Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done about It* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Quoted in Vanessa Williams, "Defense Secretary Carter: Iraq's forces showed 'no will to fight' Islamic State," *Washington Post*, May 24, 2015. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2015/05/24/defense-secretary-carter-iraqs-forces-showed-no-will-to-fight-islamic-state/>

<sup>9</sup> 2000 budget data from: "All Fund Sources 'Spigot' Report," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/4018.pdf>; 2009 budget data from: Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2010," <http://www.state.gov/f/releases/iab/fy2010cbj/pdf/index.htm>; 2015 budget data from Department of State, "Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 2016," <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236395.pdf>; International Security Advisory Board, *Report on Status of Forces Agreements*, January 16, 2015. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> Note: Countries without data were not NATO members at the time. Sources: "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1995-2015," Table 3. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_2015\\_06/20150622\\_PR\\_CP\\_2015\\_093-v2.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150622_PR_CP_2015_093-v2.pdf); "Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries, 1985-2013," Table 3. [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static\\_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf\\_topics/20140224\\_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20140224_140224-PR2014-028-Defence-exp.pdf)

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## What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation?

Christopher Paul

RAND Office of External Affairs

CT-441

October 2015

Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on October 21, 2015

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Christopher Paul<sup>1</sup>  
The RAND Corporation

*What Works Best When Conducting Security Cooperation?*<sup>2</sup>

Before the Committee on Armed Services  
United States House of Representatives

October 21, 2015

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee thank you for inviting me here to testify today.

When we talk about security cooperation, we generally include a wide range of programs and activities that comprise some combination of working by, with, and through partners in pursuit of national security objectives, as well as helping others to help themselves.<sup>3</sup> By working with and helping others to be better able to deal with problems in their countries and regions, the United States seeks to avoid the costs of having to take a greater role in those resolutions or of letting various security or humanitarian problems go unresolved.

When security cooperation efforts are effective, they bolster our partners, contribute to long-term stability, and help resolve problems, crises, and conflicts without heavy investment or involvement by the United States. When these efforts are ineffective, however, security cooperation fails to do these things and appears to be a wasted investment that still leaves unresolved problems and partners unable or unwilling to help solve them. To get the most out of security cooperation in the future, we must understand when and why security cooperation works, and when and why it does not.

My remarks today draw from research on security cooperation that I have led at the RAND Corporation over the past several years.

In one analysis, we used case studies of security cooperation engagements with 29 countries over a span of 20 years to identify which conditions and actions have led to success in security

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<sup>1</sup> The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

<sup>2</sup> This testimony is available for free download at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT441.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Building partner capacity and security force assistance both fall under the broader security cooperation umbrella.

cooperation and building partner capacity, and which have not.<sup>4</sup> In a second study, we conducted additional deep-dive case studies of four cases, chosen because they all lacked certain characteristics identified as beneficial to success in the first study. This second study focused on how efforts might still succeed even when an assistance provider is forced by circumstances to work with partners in a situation not favorable to success.<sup>5</sup>

All this is to say that the findings and recommendations that I share with you today stem from a substantial foundation of empirical evidence.<sup>6</sup>

### **What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity?**

Let me begin with the subset of security cooperation focused on building the capacity and capability of partner nation security forces. Several factors are critical contributors in those efforts.

First, **matching matters**. Efforts to build partner capacity are most effective when what the United States offers aligns well with partner nation security forces' baseline capabilities and their ability to absorb provided training and technology. Such alignment requires an understanding of what training and equipment partner forces already have and what they are ready for. Too often, U.S. training and equipping efforts are predicated on mistaken assumptions and equipment provided is a poor match for the partner nation's environment or for the technological sophistication of their forces; as a result, training misses the mark, being either too basic and remedial or too advanced and rapid to be of much benefit to trainees. For example, in many instances, U.S. providers have painstakingly translated instructional materials into partner languages, only to later discover that partner troops, while literate, did not have sufficient levels of basic education to make any use of the translated manuals. While these sorts of mismatches are often recognized and fixed over time, they lead to wasted initial investments and can sour important relationships.

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<sup>4</sup> Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, Stephanie Young, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Joe Hogler, and Christine Leah, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-1253/1-OSD, 2013 ([www.rand.org/t/MG1253z1](http://www.rand.org/t/MG1253z1)).

<sup>5</sup> Christopher Paul, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, Lisa Saum-Manning, Heather Peterson, and Brian Gordon, *What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity in Challenging Contexts?* Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-937-OSD, 2015 ([www.rand.org/t/RR937](http://www.rand.org/t/RR937)).

<sup>6</sup> Due to sensitivities associated with the data for specific case studies, I offer examples here without revealing names and places. Full details are contained in reports that are not available to the general public.

Second, the point about souring relationships is important because **relationships matter, and they can take time to establish**. Relationships support a necessary level of trust and understanding between the United States and the partner, as well as provide practical experience on how to work together. Personalities can play a significant role. Effective relationships require both the alignment of objectives between the United States and the partner (also a matching issue) and agreement across U.S. and partner nation stakeholders on specific objectives and approaches. Both are important to success.

Alignment of objectives includes both the extent to which the United States and the partner share broader security interests and the extent to which they share the specific security interest that is the object of the capacity-building effort. For example, in the early days of engagement with Colombia, U.S. objectives focused exclusively on counter-narcotics efforts, while Colombia was much more concerned with counterinsurgency and internal security. After 9/11, when U.S. policy shifted focus to include counterterrorism and support for counterinsurgency, the extent of overlap in interests with the Colombians was much higher, and capacity-building efforts became more successful.

Third, **context matters. Certain characteristics or features of partners improve prospects for security cooperation success**. Specifically, partners with relatively robust governance and relatively strong economies have historically been more successful participants in security cooperation. Having a functioning ministry of defense (or equivalent) and having sufficient resources (and willingness) to invest in the sustainment of capacity built are particularly useful.

Fourth, **consistency and sustainment are key**. By *sustainment*, I mean the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to keep something going, including maintenance, spare and replacement parts, and manning in the face of rotations, retirement, or attrition. In historical cases in which the United States provided consistent funding and effort toward capacity building over several years and some kind of sustainment effort was in place (either as part of the U.S. security cooperation effort or from partner investment), capacity was much more likely to be built and maintained. In too many of the historical cases, short-term successes were undermined when delivery of security cooperation was interrupted or dropped off, or because of atrophy of capability either for want of refresher/continuation training or for lack of parts and maintenance.

For example, in one instance, the United States provided small boats for a partner's coast guard that led to a dramatic increase in operating capability and effectiveness. However, the engine compartments for these small boats required a peculiar and distinctive wrench to gain access, and these wrenches were not provided. Even though partner forces were keen to maintain their

craft, they were unable to do so. In other cases, partner forces completely lack a culture of maintenance and treat all equipment, even vehicles, as disposable. In the first instance, provision of unique needed maintenance equipment and spare parts would have been sufficient for sustainment. In the second type of case, a much more robust sustainment process is required, involving either enduring maintenance contracts with a third party or considerable maintenance training for partners.

### **What Keeps Security Cooperation from Working?**

There have been a number of recent instances that appear to be less-than-successful security cooperation efforts, in which the United States has invested a great deal with little to show for it, or partner forces believed to be relatively capable proved to be inadequate to the threats they faced. In light of these instances, I offer two sets of observations from our research. The first concerns the difficulty of defining success for security cooperation efforts, and the second addresses challenges to effective security cooperation.

#### *Success Is Sometimes Difficult to Define*

What does it mean to “succeed” in security cooperation? When there are clear national security goals, stakeholders can easily see whether they have succeeded or failed in meeting them. But if the United States is undertaking security cooperation to support broader national security goals and the efforts fail to meet those broader goals, does that mean security cooperation has failed? I would argue that it does not. For example, if broader national security goals seek to prevent a regional conflict from spilling over into a partner country, security cooperation efforts might focus on improving border security forces and internal security forces. Those security cooperation efforts might be entirely successful, with the partner’s border and internal security forces dramatically improving their capability, but the adjacent conflict might still spill over into the partner country, exceeding the capacity of those forces.

Part of the challenge to identifying success stems from the lack of connections between the goals. Often, national security goals are multiple or ambiguous. Equally often, even if the goals and objectives of supporting efforts (like security cooperation) are themselves clear, they are not clearly nested with and connected to the higher-level goals, or they are not sufficient by themselves to achieve the higher-level goals. (In the example begun above, improved border and security forces alone were not enough to prevent conflict spillover.)

In addition, it is worth noting that goals at all levels tend to change over time. We should not be surprised, for example, if the United States initially sets out to help a partner build border security forces and those forces later prove to be ineffective when asked to perform counterterrorism missions.

Besides clarity and nesting in goals, another part of the problem is in defining success itself. In our research on building partner capacity, we used a scale developed by other RAND colleagues to score changes in partner capabilities.<sup>7</sup> Under that framework, each security area is represented by a number of subordinate factors, each scored from 1 (very low capability) to 5 (very high).

If a security cooperation effort takes a partner's capability in an important security area (say, internal security forces) from 2 to 4 on this scale, this would be an outstanding success at building partner capacity. However, it is by no means a guarantee that those forces will be up to the challenge posed by an insurgency backed by a transnational violent extremist organization, which could mean failure to deal with that threat and thus failure to meet broader U.S. national security objectives.

In our case studies, we defined successful partner capacity-building efforts as those that yielded an overall increase of 0.8 on this scale for the security area in which improvements were sought.<sup>8</sup> Based on this criterion, 23 of 29 cases we examined realized some kind of success. However, as noted, a modest level of success at capacity building does not necessarily equate to overall policy success. Nor does it guarantee a durable increase in capacity. Too often in our research, we observed evidence of successful capacity built, only to see that capacity atrophy and fall back toward baseline because neither the United States nor the partner took the steps necessary to sustain it.

Finally, even when goals are properly nested from top to bottom and security cooperation unambiguously supports national security objectives and successfully creates formations of trained and equipped forces that should be adequate to the challenges they will face, we can still find surprising security force collapses. Willingness to fight is one of the hardest things to measure prior to actual battle. Further, will to fight can be highly situationally dependent. Some forces will fight one foe but flee before another; some forces will fight if stationed in their home

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<sup>7</sup> Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Lynn E. Davis, Ely Ratner, Molly Dunigan, Jeremiah Goulka, Heather Peterson, and K. Jack Riley, *Developing a Defense Sector Assessment Rating Tool*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, TR-864-OSD, 2010 ([www.rand.org/t/864](http://www.rand.org/t/864)).

<sup>8</sup> See Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al. (2013) for details.

region but desert if called to battle in a different region of their country. Some forces will not fight unless they clearly and completely overmatch their opponent.

Thus, defining success may require setting more-realistic expectations, settling for incremental progress, and recognizing the inherent risks of failure in such complex environments.

#### *Challenges to Security Cooperation Success*

Our research also highlights various challenges that can reduce prospects for success in security cooperation. Some of these aspects can be controlled by the assistance provider and can (and should) be improved upon; others are inherent in or under the control of partners and are things the United States needs to keep in mind when managing its expectations for future security cooperation efforts.

First among these challenges relates to a previous section of my testimony today: **partner willingness**. One of the findings of our research is that **you can't want it more than they do**.<sup>9</sup> Lack of partner willingness can disrupt security cooperation at many levels, any of which can result in delay, diminished success, or outright failure. Examples include partners unwilling to participate in security cooperation (and this can be at the ministerial level, command level, or level of individual troop trainees), partners willing to participate but unwilling to focus their efforts in areas of U.S. strategic interest, partners unwilling to use the capacity built for the intended purpose (often because they would prefer to use it for something else), and partners unwilling to respect human rights while benefiting from and using the capabilities provided by security cooperation.

**Many of the challenges to security cooperation success stem from shortcomings in U.S. practices.** Because of funding and budgetary cycles and changing priorities, **the United States funds and delivers security cooperation inconsistently, and that decreases effectiveness.** This problem is exacerbated with partners who face significant contextual challenges. *When the United States drops the ball with a robust partner, either that partner picks it up or the ball floats to some extent. When the United States drops the ball with a partner that faces significant contextual challenges, the ball sinks.*

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<sup>9</sup> Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013, p. 85. See also Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, Beth Grill, and Molly Dunigan, *Paths to Victory: Lessons from Modern Insurgencies*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-291/1-OSD, 2013 ([www.rand.org/t/RR291z1](http://www.rand.org/t/RR291z1)), where partner commitment and motivation was found to be essential to success in expeditionary counterinsurgency, too, independent of the commitment and motivation of the expeditionary force.

**Inadequate sustainment planning hurts security cooperation effectiveness**, too. As noted, unless they are sustained, forces and capabilities built through partner capacity-building efforts rapidly atrophy. Some partners have resources to dedicate to sustainment, as well as forces with backgrounds and training that support maintenance, and some do not. Even where sustainment support from the partner is possible, it needs to be an integrated part of the overall security cooperation plan. When partners lack the resources necessary for sustainment, sustainment needs to be *provided* as part of the security cooperation package.

Similarly, **a lack of flexibility in security cooperation constrains its effectiveness**. The administrative requirements of security cooperation often prevent executors from wielding necessary flexibility. For example, in one country, the commander of the partner formation designated for security cooperation refused to allow his troops to participate. U.S. personnel located a similar formation in the same municipality whose commander was enthusiastic about the planned activities, but program procedures prevented U.S. personnel from making the needed shift and engaging with the willing formation. In another case, partner stakeholders were delaying participation in planned activities, but materiel and resources were still being delivered to the partner. U.S. personnel were extremely frustrated that they could not control the flow of resources sufficiently to use that as an incentive for better partner participation.

**These last three problems stem in part from weaknesses in the authorities**. While the patchwork of authorities available to fund and support security cooperation enables a wide range of activities, the authorities rarely support an activity for more than a year or two at a time, resulting in uncertainty about their continuation. Programs under Title 10 authorities are short duration; some Title 22 authorities (such as Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing) can be more enduring but have fairly limited scope and application. There are few authorities that allow for sustainment support, and none that I am aware of can support sustainment of capabilities built as part of some other effort. While needs, objectives, and the situation on the ground can change fairly quickly, once an effort is launched and funded by a program, it is difficult to change important execution details.

#### **The Benefits of Assessment and the Need for SMART Objectives**

Many of the available benefits from matching and context can be realized and many of the challenges avoided or overcome with better planning and assessment. To begin with, objectives in both security cooperation and broader national defense strategy development (which security cooperation is intended to support) need to be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and



time-bound (SMART).<sup>10</sup> With SMART objectives in place, assessment of prospects, process, and outcomes becomes possible. A thoughtful assessment framework can then support important inquiries at three points in the broader security cooperation process that could help improve ongoing and future efforts:<sup>11</sup>

- Prior to execution, ask: What could go wrong with the planned effort?
- During execution, ask: Is everything going according to plan? If not, why not? What can be done about it?
- After execution ask: Were all objectives achieved? If not, why not? What could be done about it in the future (either in this context or elsewhere)?

### Recommendations

To support progress in this area, this research suggests six recommendations.<sup>12</sup>

First, **reform legislative authorities to improve flexibility, and simplify procedures.** Currently, many authorities are inflexible. In addition, while there are a wide range of authorities with diverse application, using this patchwork of authorities requires considerable experience and bureaucratic expertise.<sup>13</sup>

Second, **revise (or add new) authorities to support a wider range of activities over longer periods of time, and sustain them.** This may need to entail new authorities specifically to add a sustainment “tail” to existing authorities.

Third, consider (and insist that U.S. security cooperation stakeholders consider) whether **partners have the attributes, characteristics, or behaviors that are associated with effective security cooperation.** Manage expectations accordingly.

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<sup>10</sup> See Christopher Paul, Brian Gordon, Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Lisa Saum-Manning, Beth Grill, Colin P. Clarke, and Heather Peterson, *A Building Partner Capacity Assessment Framework: Tracking Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes, Disrupters, and Workarounds*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-935-OSD, 2015 ([www.rand.org/t/RR935](http://www.rand.org/t/RR935)), and Christopher Paul, Jessica Yeats, Colin P. Clarke, Miriam Matthews, and Lauren Skrabala, *Assessing and Evaluating Department of Defense Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade: Handbook for Practitioners*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-809/2-OSD, 2015 ([www.rand.org/t/RR809z2](http://www.rand.org/t/RR809z2)).

<sup>11</sup> For an example of such a framework, see Paul, Gordon, et al., 2015.

<sup>12</sup> Recommendations are all drawn from Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013, and Paul, Moroney, et al., 2015.

<sup>13</sup> See Jennifer D. P. Moroney, David E. Thaler, and Joe Hogler, *Review of Security Cooperation Mechanisms Combatant Commands Utilize to Build Partner Capacity*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-413-OSD, 2013 ([www.rand.org/t/RR413](http://www.rand.org/t/RR413)).

Fourth, regardless of the partner or context, review how well **security cooperation goals and activities correspond with what the partner wants or needs and what it is capable of using and absorbing**. We have summarized this recommendation elsewhere as "find the right ladder, find the right rung," and it remains good advice for security cooperation planners.<sup>14</sup>

Fifth, review the extent to which security cooperation plans **identify possible challenges within the context and plan accordingly, and include assessment**. Theater security cooperation plans should include measurable (SMART) objectives, and plans for executing security cooperation should include plans to collect assessment data not only on objective attainment but also on process inputs and outputs and possible disrupters.

Sixth, **emphasize sustainment when reviewing security cooperation programs**, and ask whether Department of State and Department of Defense planners have identified means at the outset for the sustainment and maintenance of any capabilities to be built.

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<sup>14</sup> Paul, Clarke, Grill, Young, et al., 2013.

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 UCLA Department of Statistics, 2001-2002.

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2015: MCIOC; JIOWC Joint IO Assessment Working Group; UVA Seminar on Internal War; U.S. Air Force Special Operations School; *InfoWarCon 2015*; U.S. Army Information Operations Proponent Office IO Senior Leader Course; Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University; Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of State.

2014: Personnel in OSD(CAPE), OSD(P), and the Joint Staff; AETC Air Command and Staff College; USASOC HQ; JFKSWCS; RAND Pittsburgh National Security Seminar; U.S. Air Force Special Operations School; National Security Council; Rapid Reaction Technology Office; Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office; Naval Postgraduate School; NATO COE/DAT; Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University; RAND "Payday" Seminar Series; Carnegie Mellon University Center for International Relations and Politics.

2013: Senior personnel in OSD(CAPE), OSD(P), and the Joint Staff; personnel in Army G-3/5/7; Director, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center; Director for Information Operations OSD(P); Joint Staff J-38; Center for Army Analysis; Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Center; NATO HQ SACT; JCOA; USMC Small Wars Center and Irregular Warfare Integration Division; Naval Postgraduate School; Australian National University; New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College; New Zealand Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade; New



Zealand Defence Force Headquarters; New Zealand Institute of International Affairs; Royal New Zealand Air Force Base Ohakea; Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University; Australian Army Land Warfare Studies Centre; U.S. Air Force Special Operations School.

2012: U.S. Air Force Special Operations School; personnel in OSD(CAPE), OSD(P) and the Joint Staff; "One RAND" Colloquium Series.

2011: Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities; US Army/USMC COIN Center; General Tommy Franks Lecture Series at the U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence; personnel in Army G-2; U.S. Air Force Special Operations School; Center for Army Analysis; National Defense University Center for Complex Operations; NATO Operational Analysis Workshop; Naval War College's Ruger Chair workshop on "Economics and Security: Challenges and Opportunities in a Resource Constrained World."

2010: US Army/USMC COIN Center; RAND National Defense Research Institute Advisory Board Meeting; Matthew B. Ridgway Center, University of Pittsburgh; Naval Postgraduate School; Military Operations Research Society Symposium; U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute; Naval Postgraduate School; U.S. Army War College.

2009: Personnel in OSD(CAPE) and OSD(P); *2009 World Wide Information Operations Conference*; Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University; U.S. Department of State Foreign Service Institute; *InfoWarCon 2009; Information Operations and Influence Activity Symposium*, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Cranfield University; Military Operations Research Society *Irregular Warfare II* Conference; Naval Postgraduate School.

2008: *NATO Joint Senior Psychological Operations Strategic Communication Conference*; *Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC)*; U.S. Army War College; University of Pittsburgh Center for National Preparedness.

2007: University of Southern California Center for Public Diplomacy; U.S. Army Reserve Information Operations Conference; RAND Infrastructure, Safety, and Environment Advisory Board; National Defense University Transforming National Security Seminar Series.

#### *Op-Eds and Commentary*

Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke. "A broad approach to countering the Islamic State." *The Washington Post, Monkey Cage Blog*, 9/2/14.  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/09/02/a-broad-approach-to-countering-the-islamic-state/>

Christopher Paul. "Paths to victory: Christopher Paul discusses what history tells us about how to defeat insurgencies." *New Zealand International Review*, May/June 2014, vol. 30, no. 4, p. 17-21.

Christopher Paul. "Paths to victory in the Australian defence and security context." *The Strategist: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Blog*, 10/2/13.  
<http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/paths-to-victory-in-the-australian-defence-and-security-context/>

Christopher Paul. "Should the U.S. Leave Afghanistan Now? History Favors More Time." *New York Times, Room for Debate* forum, 4/3/12.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/04/03/should-the-us-leave-afghanistan-now>

Christopher Paul. "A Vision for Strategic Communication." *Perspectives*, Vol. III, Issue 8, August 2011. <http://www.layalina.tv/Publications/Perspectives/ChristopherPaul.pdf>

Christopher Paul. "Find the Right Balance Between Civilian and Military: Don't Just Strip the Department of Defense of Capabilities to Inform, Influence, and Persuade." *MountainRunner.us*. 10/31/10.  
[http://mountainrunner.us/2010/10/find\\_the\\_right\\_balance\\_in\\_influence.html](http://mountainrunner.us/2010/10/find_the_right_balance_in_influence.html)

Christopher Paul. "Psychological Operations by another name are sweeter." *Small Wars Journal Blog*, 7/29/10.  
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/07/psychological-operations-by-an/>

Christopher Paul. "Rethink Washington's 'War of Ideas.'" *Christian Science Monitor*. 6/2/09.  
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0602/p09s01-coop.html>

Christopher Paul. "PSYOP for everyone." *MountainRunner.us*. 5/4/09.  
[http://mountainrunner.us/2009/05/psyop\\_for\\_everyone.html](http://mountainrunner.us/2009/05/psyop_for_everyone.html)

Christopher Paul. "Opinion: A Lease on Training." *Training and Simulation Journal*. 4/2/07.  
<http://www.tsjonline.com/story.php?F=2572252>

Todd Helmus, Russell Glenn and Christopher Paul. "Outside View: Ad Men For U.S. Defense." *United Press International*. 3/20/07.  
[http://www.upi.com/International\\_Security/Industry/Analysis/2007/08/20/outside\\_view\\_ad\\_men\\_for\\_us\\_defense\\_/6253/](http://www.upi.com/International_Security/Industry/Analysis/2007/08/20/outside_view_ad_men_for_us_defense_/6253/)

### *Teaching Experience*

Lecturer/Advisor for *Systems Synthesis*, Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University, Spring 2010, Spring 2011, Fall 2012, Spring 2014, Spring 2015.

Professor for *Inform, Influence, and Persuade: U.S. Government Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Strategic Communication, Information Operations, and Psychological Operations*, Pardee RAND Graduate School, Fall 2011.

Instructor/Facilitator for *Information Operations*, UNI Strategic, Singapore, June 2009.

Lecturer for various introductory statistical methods courses (Anthropology 80, Geography 40, Economics 40, Sociology 18, Statistics 10, Statistics 11, Statistics 12) Department of Statistics, UCLA, academic year 2001-2002.

Teaching Fellow for *Changing Society and Making History* (Sociology 2), Department of Sociology, UCLA, Winter 2000.

Teaching Assistant for various courses in the Department of Sociology, UCLA, 1994-1999.

#### *Community Activities*

Host Family for AFS Foreign Exchange Students, August 2008-June 2009 and August 2010-June 2011.

Instructor for Wine Appreciation class, Community College of Allegheny County Community Education Program (West Hills Campus), February 2008 and October 2008.

President, RAND recreation committee role-playing games club, 2003-present.

Member of Team Pittsburgh Aquatics Masters Swimming Program, 2002-present.

#### *Honors and Awards*

Fulbright Specialist Grant in Peace and Conflict Resolution at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand, October and November 2013.

2013 Military Operations Research Society *Military Operations Research* Journal Award for "Qualitative Comparative Analysis of 30 Insurgencies, 1978-2008."

RAND Merit Bonus Award, 2010.

ASA Political Sociology Section Graduate Student Paper Prize, August 2000, for "Moving Forward with State Autonomy and Capacity: Example from Two Studies of the Pentagon During W.W.II."

UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship, 2000-2001.

UCLA Charles F. Scott Fellowship, 1996-1998, 1999-2000.

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

**INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES:** Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 114<sup>th</sup> Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or contracts or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the current and two previous calendar years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness's personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness's appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary.

**Witness name:** Christopher Paul

**Capacity in which appearing:** (check one)

☐ Individual

☒ Representative

**If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:** RAND Corporation

**Federal Contract or Grant Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

**2015**

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
Contract	Office of the Secretary of Defense	\$48,882,351	NDRI
Contract	U.S. Army	34,687,840	Arroyo Center

2014

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
Contract	Office of the Secretary of Defense	\$63,759,734	NDRI
Contract	U.S. Army	\$39,378,840	Arroyo Center

2013

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
Contract	Office of the Secretary of Defense	\$65,539,233	NDRI
Contract	U.S. Army	\$35,033,902	Arroyo Center

**Foreign Government Contract or Payment Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or payments originating from a foreign government, please provide the following information:

2015

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Please see attached supplement			

2014

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Please see attached supplement			

2013

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Please see attached supplement			

**Federal Contract or Grant Information**

The RAND Corporation is an independent, non-profit organization that performs research and analysis. During the time period in question (FY2013 through fiscal year 2015), RAND has had contracts and grants with various agencies of the federal government to perform research and analysis. Research has been performed for the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, Veterans Affairs, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston and New York, the Intelligence Community, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Science Foundation, the Social Security Administration, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. RAND has contracts with the Department of Defense to operate three federally funded research and development centers (FFRDC): PROJECT AIR FORCE for the U.S. Air Force; Arroyo Center for the U.S. Army; and National Defense Research Institute for the Department of Defense.

**Foreign Government Contract or Payment Information****FY15**

Foreign Contract/Payment	Foreign Government	Dollar Value	Subject of contract or payment
Contract	Commonwealth of Australia	\$6,512,435	Research
Contract	Canada	\$21,883	Research
Contract	Japan	\$25,000	Research
Contract	Korea	\$100,000	Research

**FY14**

Foreign Contract/Payment	Foreign Government	Dollar Value	Subject of contract or payment
Contract	Commonwealth of Australia	\$3,923,158	Research
Contract	Japan	\$190,000	Research
Contract	Instituto De Nutricion De Centro America y Panama	\$16,300	Research
Contract	Israel	\$59,175	Research

Contract	Kurdistan Regional Government	\$3,040,001	Research
Contract	Mongolia	\$750,000	Research

**FY13**

Foreign Contract/Payment	Foreign Government	Dollar Value	Subject of contract or payment
Contract	Arab Administrative Development Organization	\$575,000	Research
Contract	Commonwealth of Australia	\$3,000	Research
Contract	Instituto De Nutricion De Centro America y Panama	\$10,000	Research
Contract	Israel	\$64,000	Research
Contract	Kurdistan Regional Government	\$2,995,219	Research
Contract	Republic of Korea	\$104,015	Research
Contract	Republic of Singapore	\$444,500	Research
Contract	Mexico	\$22,845	Research
Contract	Department of House and Urban Development Guangdong Province - Peoples Republic of China	\$800,000	Research
Contract	Switzerland	\$10,000	Research
Contract	Thailand	\$20,900	Research
Contract	Qatar	\$296,127	Research



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BY THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES  
COMMITTEE

STATEMENT  
OF  
GENERAL DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF (RETIRED)  
PRINCIPAL, DOUG FRASER, LLC  
PENSACOLA, FLORIDA  
AND  
FORMER COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

BEFORE THE  
  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON  
  
SECURITY COOPERATION

21 OCTOBER 2015

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL  
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SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the House Armed Services Committee, it has been over three years since I last had the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of this committee. I am honored to speak with you again and share my perspective of the value of security cooperation programs for the Department of Defense and our nation.

### **The Value of Security Cooperation**

I am a proponent of continuing robust U.S. government and Department of Defense investment in security cooperation programs. I find that security cooperation programs are most successful when they are planned, funded, coordinated, executed, and evaluated in conjunction with Department of State security assistance and foreign assistance programs funded by the Congress. A coordinated interagency approach in foreign assistance enhances the security of the United States through a focused approach, approved by our friends and allies, helping them defend their sovereignty and maintain the security of their nations.

My comments today are based on my experience planning and executing security cooperation programs in two separate geographic combatant commands – United States Pacific Command and United States Southern Command. My comments also reflect my experience working with U.S. Embassies, U.S. federal agencies, and our regional partners to build relations and improve their capacity to address national security concerns and our combined capacity to address international security

concerns. Finally, my comments focus on security cooperation programs conducted outside of combat zones.

Using this framework, I think security cooperation programs build enduring relationships, build trust through familiarity and awareness with one another's armed forces, foster cooperation for working together in crisis, help build the capacity of the armed forces of friendly nations, and help strengthen the positions of the armed forces within society. I found that Department of Defense security cooperation training, education, and exercise programs are good investments for the United States government.

#### **What Security Cooperation Can Do**

I think security cooperation programs provide three valuable contributions for the Department of Defense. They build understanding and relationships between the members of the armed forces of the U.S. and our partner nations. In conjunction with Department of State security assistance programs, they help build the capacity of partner nation armed forces to maintain security within their borders. And third, they grow the professional understanding of partner armed forces for adhering to international standards, including respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of elected civilian authorities. Let me expand on each of these points.

First, Department of Defense security cooperation programs build understanding and strengthen the relations between the members of two or more armed forces. These relationships are formed through the shared experience gained by participating together in training and education programs, either in the U.S. or their country. These shared experiences test the participants physically, mentally, and show them the importance of working together.

The following example illustrates my point. In the mid 1980s, a U.S. Army officer, Major Ken Keen, and a Brazilian Army Officer, Major Floriano Peixoto, attended parachute training together in the U.S., and later attended the Brazilian Army Command and Staff College. Years later, when an earthquake demolished parts of Haiti in 2010, Lieutenant General Keen and Major General Peixoto found themselves in Haiti commanding the two key military organizations supporting relief efforts in Haiti, Joint Task Force Haiti (commanded by Lieutenant General Keen) and the United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH)(commanded by Major General Peixoto). (Background -- While I served as the Commander of United States Southern Command, Lieutenant General Keen served as my Deputy Commander. He and his staff were visiting Haiti on January 12, 2010 when a magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck near Port au Prince. Following the earthquake, I put Lieutenant General Keen in charge of Joint Task Force Haiti, the DOD effort to provide relief assistance in Haiti. Major General Peixoto was in Haiti commanding MINUSTAH). In this time of crisis, because of the relationship they had formed twenty years prior and the trust they had build, the two generals quickly cemented a

plan for how their forces would work together to speed the recovery of the Haitian people from this devastating earthquake. The shared training and education experience of these two officers built a common understanding that benefited the United States, Brazil, Haiti, and the United Nations. Strong, trusting relationships require investment. DOD security cooperation programs help foster these relationships. The success of international efforts to respond to the earthquake in Haiti, the largest humanitarian crisis in the Western Hemisphere, serves as a good example of the value of these relationships.

Second, along with building relations between military personnel, security cooperation programs help build the capacity of our partner nations armed forces to defend their national sovereignty. Security cooperation programs provide training in small arms, small force tactics, intelligence cooperation, logistics, command and control, military assistance to law enforcement, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and command and control of multi-national forces, enhancing the armed forces ability to plan and conduct operations and command and control their forces. In addition, through Defense Institution Building (DIB), the Department of Defense provides assistance for improving ministerial, general and joint staff, and military service headquarters management practices and processes. Strong defense institutions build and sustain capable, professional defense forces who are better able to meet national defense requirements.

Combined with Department of State security assistance programs, security cooperation programs enhance the capability of armed forces to defend their nation. These programs also build a common understanding of the language and procedures used by different armed forces to speed their ability to work together in times of crisis.

For example, the international military response to the Government of Haiti's request for support following the 2010 earthquake was fast and came from nations around the world. Because many of the responding international military personnel had trained with U.S. military forces or attended education programs with U.S. military personnel at some point in their career, the coordination, cooperation, and focus of the international forces deployed to Haiti quickly formed an effective operating force. The speed and facility with which this cooperation happened was facilitated through U.S. security cooperation programs conducted around the globe.

Finally, Department of Defense security cooperation programs help grow the professional capacity of partner militaries to respect international standards – respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the role of elected civilian authority over the military. The Geographic Combatant Commands and the Services all conduct courses on these topics in their training and education programs. They discuss how strong adherence to international humanitarian standards is critical for responsible military forces to maintain the trust and confidence of their societies. While not perfect, the overwhelming majority of U.S. military men and women

exemplify these standards and demonstrate them in their interaction with other international military personnel.

#### **What Security Cooperation Cannot Do**

I also want to discuss what Department of Defense security cooperation programs CANNOT do. First, by themselves, security cooperation programs cannot prevent political change. As stated earlier, security cooperation programs teach respect for the democratic process and the rule of law. They also teach that the role of the armed forces of a nation is to defend the rights of their citizens to decide their political future.

From my viewpoint, over the past three decades, Department of Defense security cooperation programs helped foster stronger standards of conduct within our partner militaries in Latin America. Despite a history of military coups in the region, many militaries witnessed significant political change occur in their country and did not get involved. So, while U.S. security cooperation programs may have influenced militaries to stay out of politics, the political change in these countries has not always been favorable to U.S. interests.

Just as security cooperation programs cannot prevent political change, they cannot change the cultural and social norms in a country. They also will not address poverty, income inequality, nor enhance poor social infrastructure. While these

problems impact the success of security cooperation, other U.S. federal agencies are tasked to help countries address these problems. Therefore, security cooperation programs must work hand in hand with U.S. foreign assistance programs in a "whole of government" approach to help countries address their problems.

#### **Close Relationship Between Security Cooperation and Security Assistance**

Mr. Chairman, while this hearing is focused on security cooperation, from my experience, I think it is important to acknowledge the close relationship between Department of Defense security cooperation programs and Department of State security assistance programs. During my time in U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Southern Command, both commands worked closely with the Department of State and the respective U.S. Embassies to coordinate security cooperation and security assistance programs. Training and exercise programs conducted through security cooperation meshed closely with the education and equipping programs conducted through security assistance programs. In fact, in many cases, more funding assistance to a country was provided through Department of State programs to enhance the capability of a nation's armed forces, like Foreign Military Financing, than came from Department of Defense programs.



**Improving Security Cooperation and Security Assistance Programs**

I see two significant ways to improve security cooperation and security assistance programs. These recommendations are specifically based on my experience in U.S. Southern Command, a command with limited resources supporting poorly resourced partner nation armed forces.

First, U.S. government administrative, oversight, and coordination processes are slow and unresponsive for meeting the urgent needs of poorly resourced partner armed forces facing critical internal defense problems. Many of our partner military organizations are relatively small and operate limited numbers of vehicles, naval vessels, and aircraft. They lack of the institutional structure and knowledge to accurately forecast future needs and therefore ask for equipment and training when their need is immediate. As a result, when these militaries cannot get the help they need when they need it, the slow speed of the U.S process reduces the importance of security cooperation programs for these under-resourced militaries, hurts cooperation, and encourages these nations to seek other nations to address their needs.

Let me use the C-130 program to illustrate my point. The majority of countries who operate C-130s in Latin America own small fleets of aircraft. These aircraft fleets range in size from two to eight aircraft, are supported by personnel with limited logistics planning expertise, have a limited capacity to predict when parts will fail,

and have low priority for requisitioning parts in the U.S supply system. When a part breaks, to get a new part, our partner's request a new part from the DOD global logistics system and are often told it will take six to 18 months to receive a new part. But they have a hard time understanding why. The Department of Defense operates hundreds of C-130s, so our partner's don't understand why, with so many aircraft, the U.S. cannot support their immediate need. And when the DOD doesn't, they view the U.S. military logistics system as unresponsive and not interested in supporting their operational success. From my point of view, while U.S. military readiness should remain a high priority, the U.S. government must find a way to respond quickly to address the urgent needs of all our partners. Our partners must routinely see the benefit of partnering with the U.S.

Another challenge DOD security cooperation programs face is declining budgets. Fewer resources supporting the same mission requirements mean fewer people with less money trying to accomplish the same job. The impact on security cooperation is that the DOD will conduct fewer programs, take longer to plan and execute them, be slower at responding to partner nation needs, and leave the impression that the U.S. is not interested in supporting their partner's security. Declining budgets will diminish our partner nation's trust in the DOD as a reliable partner.

**An Interagency Foreign Assistance Strategy**

I want to add one final point to my statement about DOD security cooperation programs. In the FY16 NDAA, the Committee approved language directing the Department of Defense to develop and deliver to Congress a strategic framework for conducting security cooperation programs. When delivered, this strategy will help the committee understand the DOD approach to security cooperation, but these security cooperation programs are only one part of the overall U.S. foreign assistance program. I think the Congress can do more.

Successful security cooperation strategies support successful foreign assistance programs. For example, Plan Colombia, a foreign assistance strategy to help Colombia defeat the FARC, used coordinated security cooperation, security assistance, and other foreign assistance programs to support the Government of Colombia's strategy to reduce the influence of the FARC and encourage them to come to the peace table. Plan Colombia succeeded because it brought all the ingredients of foreign assistance together to support a committed partner -- a well structured and funded U.S. foreign assistance strategy supporting strong Colombian national leadership, a unified domestic strategy, and the full support of the Colombian people. While the U.S. helped Colombia, the Colombians deserve credit for their success to date.

Therefore, I think that a successful foreign assistance strategy starts here in the Congress. Mr. Chairman, I ask you and the distinguished members of this committee, working with other Congressional committees, consider directing the responsible federal agencies, led by the Department of State, to develop a foreign assistance strategy, involving all appropriate parts of the Federal government, to report the results to a joint session of the responsible committees in Congress. While the U.S. interagency process has matured significantly in recent years, more progress is needed in both the Congress and the federal government.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee's continued investment in Department of Defense security cooperation programs is important to the defense of the United States. They enable the armed forces of the U.S. to build relations, improve the ability to conduct combined military operations, enhance partner military capacity and capability, and build readiness for responding together in crisis. Militaries must train to be ready when called. Security cooperation programs are an important part of investing in the Department's overall readiness.

DOUGLAS M. FRASER

1201 Bayou Blvd, Pensacola, FL 32503

786-512-3705. [dfraser15@me.com](mailto:dfraser15@me.com)**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Retired four star General who led US strategic military activities in the national and international arena. A strong leader with a distinguished record of developing high performance teams and organizations with extensive experience in strategic planning, operations, budgeting, supply chain management, logistics and in interfacing at the highest level with senior leaders in U.S. federal agencies and international governments.

**PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

**Independent defense and security consultant.** Miami and Pensacola, FL. **2013 - Present**

Working with U.S. defense companies, defense ministries, and not for profit organizations.

- Consulting with: Boeing Phantom Works, Northrup Grumman Electronics, and Stellar Solutions. On the Advisory Boards of: SAAB Defense Security, Beechcraft Defense Company, Iridium Communications, and Baptist Health Systems.

**Commander, U.S. Southern Command.** Miami, FL. **2009 – 2013**

One of the six U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands. Reported directly to the Secretary of Defense and the President. Directed U.S. military activity throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. Managed a \$1B annual budget with a staff of 3,000 persons.

- Led 22,000 military personnel in a highly successful DOD disaster relief effort following the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Coordinated relief efforts with U.S. federal agencies, international militaries, international relief organizations, and the UN.
- Changed the Headquarters \$240M financial management system, dramatically improving funding visibility and control.
- Changed the DOD strategy for detecting and monitoring transnational criminal air and maritime vessels in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific, producing immediate results.

**Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command.** Honolulu, Hawaii **2008 -2009**

Another of the six U.S. Geographic Combatant Commands. Responsible for directing a 2,600 person headquarters staff charged with overseeing U.S. military activity in the Asia Pacific region, involving over 300,000 U.S. military personnel. Managed a \$1+B annual budget.

- Strengthened security training, improved threat awareness and accelerated network fixes for the headquarters cyber operations procedures. The program is still in place.
- Led two command-wide training efforts involving tens of thousands of military personnel.

**Commander, Alaska Command.** Elmendorf AFB, Alaska **2005 - 2008**

Responsible for the air defense of Alaska, coordinating training and construction projects for more than 20,000 military personnel; supporting disaster response with the State of Alaska; and supporting the worldwide operations of over 10,000 Air Force personnel and 72 aircraft.

- Using a lean six sigma process, developed a merger plan for two large, culturally diverse organizations. The process became the Department of Defense model.

**Director of Operations, USAF Space Command. Colorado Springs, CO**

**2003 - 2005**

Responsible for overseeing the operations, training, and test of U.S. Air Force space operations, including two space launch ranges, multiple satellite constellations, the space surveillance network, the ballistic missile warning system and the intercontinental ballistic missile system.

- Developed and directed the first comprehensive global command and control capability for U.S. Air Force space operations, improving the speed and depth of response.

**Commander, USAF Space Warfare Center. Colorado Springs, CO**

**2002 – 2003**

Led a 1,000 person space innovation center developing innovative applications of space capability for use in U.S. military operations and for evaluating USAF space and intercontinental ballistic systems.

- Completely revamped a failing national intercontinental ballistic missile test program
- Delivered new space capability to commanders fighting Operation Iraqi Freedom – this capability is now routinely integrated into all combat operations.

**Military posts**

**1994 – 2001**

- Third Wing Commander. Elmendorf AFB, Anchorage, Alaska
- Executive Assistant to Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. Honolulu, Hawaii
- Director, U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Action Group. Washington, D.C
- Analyst for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, D.C.
- Commander, 366<sup>th</sup> Operations Group. Mountain Home Idaho

**EDUCATION**

M.P.S. Political Science, Auburn University at Montgomery  
B.S. Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy

**Professional Military Schools**

National War College, Washington DC  
Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama  
Squadron Officers School, Maxwell AFB, Montgomery, Alabama

**AFFILIATIONS**

Chairman, Air Force Studies Board. The National Academies, Washington D.C.  
Senior Fellow, National Defense University, Washington D.C.  
Trustee, Falcon Foundation USAF Academy.  
Life member of Air Force Alumni Association.  
Alumni Association, National War College.  
Board member, Goodwill Industries of South Florida. Miami, FL.  
Chairman, Advisory Council, Mission United of United Way Miami Dade  
Honorary member, Orange Bowl Committee. Miami, FL.

**LANGUAGES**

English and good knowledge of Spanish

**DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

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**Witness name:** Douglas Fraser

**Capacity in which appearing:** (check one)

☒ Individual

☐ Representative

**If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:** Douglas Fraser LLC

**Federal Contract or Grant Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

2015

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

2014

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

2013

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

**Foreign Government Contract or Payment Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or payments originating from a foreign government, please provide the following information:

2015

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
None			



2014

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Visit to Taiwan	Republic of China	Travel expenses - estimate, \$25,000	Meetings with Taiwan defense leaders

2013

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract or payment
Speech in Colombia	Colombia	Travel expense - \$1500	Speech at Colombian MOD Conference