    [House Hearing, 114 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR
                                      2016

    _______________________________________________________________________

                                     HEARINGS

                                     BEFORE A

                               SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

                           COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                             HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                         ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

                                  FIRST SESSION
                                      _______

         SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS

                          KAY GRANGER, Texas, Chairwoman

      MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida       NITA M. LOWEY, New York
      CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania    BARBARA LEE, California
      ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida          C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
      THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida        DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
      JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska       JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
      CHRIS STEWART, Utah

      NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Rogers, as Chairman of the Full
    Committee, and Mrs. Lowey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
    Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.

                Anne Marie Chotvacs, Craig Higgins, Alice Hogans,
                Susan Adams, David Bortnick, and Clelia Alvarado,
                                 Staff Assistants

                                     _______

                                      PART 5

                                                                       Page
      Funding to Prevent, Prepare for, and Respond to the Ebola
       Virus Disease Outbreak.......................................     1
      U.S. Department of State......................................   111
      U.S. Agency for International Development.....................   390
      Department of Treasury International Programs.................   489
      Assistance to Central America.................................   563
      United Nations and International Organizations................   627
                                    _______

              Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
                                    _______

                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    97-414                         WASHINGTON : 2015

                          COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

                                    ----------
                       HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman

      RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey       NITA M. LOWEY, New York
      ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama               MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
      KAY GRANGER, Texas                        PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
      MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho                 JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
      JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas               ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
      ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida                   DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
      JOHN R. CARTER, Texas                     LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
      KEN CALVERT, California                   SAM FARR, California
      TOM COLE, Oklahoma                        CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
      MARIO DIAZ-BALART, Florida                SANFORD D. BISHOP, Jr., Georgia
      CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania             BARBARA LEE, California
      TOM GRAVES, Georgia                       MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
      KEVIN YODER, Kansas                       BETTY McCOLLUM, Minnesota
      STEVE WOMACK, Arkansas                    STEVE ISRAEL, New York
      JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska                TIM RYAN, Ohio
      THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida                 C. A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
      CHARLES J. FLEISCHMANN, Tennessee         DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
      JAIME HERRERA BEUTLER, Washington         HENRY CUELLAR, Texas
      DAVID P. JOYCE, Ohio                      CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
      DAVID G. VALADAO, California              MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois
      ANDY HARRIS, Maryland                     DEREK KILMER, Washington
      MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
      MARK E. AMODEI, Nevada
      CHRIS STEWART, Utah
      E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia
      DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
      DAVID YOUNG, Iowa
      EVAN H. JENKINS, West Virginia
      STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi

                    William E. Smith, Clerk and Staff Director

                                       (ii)

    STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2016

                                  __________

                                          Wednesday, February 11, 2015.

    FUNDING TO PREVENT, PREPARE FOR, AND RESPOND TO THE EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE
                                    OUTBREAK

                                   WITNESSES

    AMBASSADOR STEVE BROWNING, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR EBOLA, U.S.
        DEPARTMENT OF STATE
    DIRK DIJKERMAN, EXECUTIVE COORDINATOR, EBOLA TASK FORCE, U.S. AGENCY
        FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
    JEREMY M. KONYNDYK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF U.S. FOREIGN DISASTER
        ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs will come to order. I want to welcome all
    the Members to the first subcommittee hearing of the 114th
    Congress. The purpose of today's hearing is to oversee funding
    within the State, Foreign Operations Subcommittee's
    jurisdiction to prevent, prepare for, and respond to the Ebola
    outbreak.
        I would like to welcome our three witnesses, Ambassador
    Steve Browning, Special Coordinator for Ebola at the Department
    of State; Mr. Dirk Dijkerman, USAID Executive Coordinator for
    the Ebola Task Force; and Mr. Jeremy Konyndyk, Director of
    USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Although the international response was slow at the
    beginning of the Ebola crisis, the level of effort by the
    United States has been unprecedented. More than 1,000 American
    troops are currently deployed. The CDC has public health
    professionals in the affected countries. Our diplomats continue
    to work with governments to contain the outbreak. USAID leads
    the response on the ground. There are also hundreds of brave
    healthcare workers, many of them Americans, who have been
    mobilized by nongovernmental organizations to respond to the
    disease.
        The results of the response effort are staggering and much
    different than expected. In September, scientific models
    predicted that by January of this year there would be 550,000
    Ebola cases in Sierra Leone and Liberia. I will repeat that
    number because I had to check it because it is so astonishing:
    Predicted 550,000 cases.
        Those of us who watched the progression of this disease
    from the beginning and witnessed its devastating effects are
    all thankful that the actual caseload was nowhere near what was
    predicted.
        The press reported 124 confirmed cases in West Africa last
    week, one of the lowest levels since the outbreak began, and
    the total cases reported in those countries is approximately
    22,000. This is a fraction of what was predicted.
        The administration has announced that almost all of the
    U.S. troops in Liberia, which peaked at 2,800 in December, will
    come home by the end of April. One hundred DOD personnel will
    remain to help the Liberian military and governments in that
    region.
        But the fight is not over. As our troops come home, the
    difficult work of eliminating the disease will fall even more
    on the shoulders of aid workers on the ground. Effectively
    addressing this next phase of the epidemic is critical.
        As we all saw last year, when the disease came to our own
    shores, just one case could have devastating effects. Last
    fall, my home State of Texas experienced the disease directly.
        The Fiscal Year 2015 Appropriations Act includes $2.5
    billion of emergency funding in this subcommittee's
    jurisdiction, representing a clear commitment by the Congress
    on behalf of all Americans to fight the Ebola outbreak in West
    Africa and prevent the further spread of the disease.
        It is this subcommittee's responsibility to oversee funds
    provided to fight the disease, to ensure there is a solid plan
    for spending resources, and guarantee that any lessons learned
    from this crisis can be applied to future global health
    emergencies.
        I hope the witnesses can give us an update on how funds
    have been spent and how remaining funds will be prioritized to
    eliminate the threat of Ebola. We also appreciate your thoughts
    on how we can respond more quickly and efficiently in the event
    of another international health crisis.
        We commend the U.S. military and government agencies who
    have responded to this crisis, but we must ensure that there
    has not been unnecessary duplication of effort. If so, we need
    to change course now and not wait for the next crisis to get it
    right.
        I want to close by expressing my sincere appreciation for
    the healthcare workers who fought the Ebola outbreak and cared
    for those in need. They take risks every day that many of us
    never have to face. They are heroes, and some of the stories I
    have heard are truly remarkable.
        I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
    opening remarks.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mrs. Lowey. Madam Chairwoman, I join you in welcoming our
    distinguished witnesses. This is an important hearing, and I
    believe we all owe the thousands of U.S. personnel a debt of
    gratitude for combatting the deadliest Ebola outbreak the world
    has ever seen.
        Last summer, it was a crisis spiraling out of control,
    taking lives indiscriminantly, seemingly dismantling
    governments and economies in the process. The fact that a mere
    6 months later, we have not only prevented an explosion of
    infections around the world but bent the curve downward and are
    in a position to reflect on what we have learned is a testament
    to our expertise and the fundamental generosity of the American
    people.
        While we were not alone in responding--and I hope we can
    discuss the important contributions of the global community and
    the affected countries themselves--USAID, CDC, and the
    Department of Defense irrefutably led the charge and set up the
    systems and practices for the rest of the international
    community to follow.
        Liberia's President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf said, ``We saw
    actual boots on the ground. You can't imagine the difference it
    made in the hopes of the people. It inspired them to do more.''
        While we all hope the worst of this crisis is behind us, I
    am gratified that the administration and this committee remain
    focused on the work ahead as well as what lessons need to be
    learned to improve our response in the future. Clearly, the
    international warning system for disease outbreaks failed the
    people of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea. We need to have
    faith that surveillance and alerts will provide enough warning
    to stay ahead of outbreaks before they spiral out of control.
        I hope our witnesses can offer some insight on how the
    world fell behind in addressing the Ebola outbreak and what
    changes need to be made to make sure we do not face such a
    situation again. This crisis has reinforced that health systems
    are not a luxury but a necessity. They cannot be treated as an
    afterthought. Without a strong global health infrastructure,
    this could happen again. Too many first responders, the health
    workers in the affected countries, died serving their fellow
    citizens. International doctors and nurses cannot be a
    substitute for trained, resourced health workers who have the
    confidence and support of their local communities.
        Lastly, we have shown yet again that we have the capacity
    within different agencies and departments to sustain a
    formidable and coherent response. I cannot remember an
    international crisis that required such seamless coordination
    of so many different parts of our government. I was pleased
    that the Congress provided $2.6 billion of the $2.8 billion
    requested by USAID and the State Department for Ebola response.
    It was not easy, but these resources were appropriated in
    recognition of the unprecedented nature of this crisis and the
    uncertainty of future needs.
        However, I would strongly urge the administration to remain
    in close communication with this committee about plans for the
    use of funds. The initial plan sent to Congress last month has
    not inspired confidence, and I want to express my sincere hope
    that coordination will improve.
        Again, I commend you and look forward to our conversation
    today. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Granger. I will now call on the witnesses to give their
    opening statements, and I would encourage each of you to
    summarize your remarks so we can leave time enough for
    questions and answers. Your full written statements will be
    placed in the record.
        We will begin with Ambassador Browning.

                    Opening Statement by Ambassador Browning

        Ambassador Browning. Thank you very much, Chairwoman
    Granger, Ranking Member Lowey, and distinguished members of the
    committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
    the U.S. Department of State's efforts to combat the ongoing
    Ebola epidemic and use of the recently appropriated funds.
        The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has already resulted in
    over 22,000 Ebola-infected persons and over 9,000 deaths. While
    Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have been affected the most
    by this epidemic, there have been cases in several other
    countries, including the United States. The three affected
    countries have borne and will continue to bear huge economic
    losses as a result of the epidemic.
        Thank you for appropriating funds toward defeating Ebola in
    West Africa. We appreciate the commitment and support your
    demonstrated efforts toward the response.
        Though the current case rate is falling, there is a long
    way to go. And we have to remember that one undetected case can
    start another outbreak. Last week we saw a rise in the number
    of cases in the region over the previous week, from 100 to 124,
    a reminder that we are not on a smooth glidepath toward zero
    new cases, which is the goal we must achieve.
        The United States has responded at home and abroad by
    implementing a whole-of-government strategy to lead the global
    effort on Ebola. With USAID as the lead agency for the
    international response, the Departments of State, Health and
    Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security, and other
    supporting agencies have worked together to combat the spread
    of the Ebola outbreak. DOD's mission in Liberia in support of
    the civilian response has essentially been completed. And we
    can be confident that Liberia will continue on the right track
    with robust civilian response that we have in place there.
        Our Ambassadors and Embassies Monrovia, Freetown, and
    Conakry have been essential to coordinating U.S., host
    government, and international partner efforts. U.S. Ambassador
    to Liberia Deborah Malac, U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone John
    Hoover, and U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Alexander Laskaris, and
    our interagency teams, both American and local staff, have
    worked tirelessly to help keep Washington abreast of all events
    on the ground, while encouraging their host governments to
    improve their responses.
        Additionally, our Ambassador to the African Union, Reuben
    Brigety, and his team were instrumental in convincing countries
    throughout Africa to provide assistance, including much needed
    healthcare workers. All four Ambassadors have displayed
    tremendous skill managing U.S. Government response on the
    ground.
        The Department has focused its energy on diplomatic
    engagement to increase international support for the Ebola
    response as well as improving coordination with the U.N.
    System, all the governments involved in providing resources,
    and international government and nongovernmental organizations.
    We have used every opportunity to impress upon the
    international community the necessity of joining together to
    win this struggle.
        State has also encouraged nongovernmental actors to join
    the Ebola fight. We have worked to identify stakeholders in the
    diaspora and private sector to devise ways to help. The State
    Department has supported the United Nations system in their
    response to Ebola. In mid-September, senior U.S. Government
    officials began high-level outreach calls to other governments,
    who have now committed a total of nearly $800 million to the
    fight against Ebola in response to this call. In addition to
    funding, many countries have committed essential personnel and
    other resources.
        And I brought fact sheets that describe the work of the
    broader international community, which I would like to have
    submitted for the record.
        It is essential that we focus on the immediate response
    until the epidemic ends. However, all humanitarian crises
    require a recovery period. In addition to the immediate
    response, we must ensure regional preparedness and rebuild
    health systems, not only in our tradition of humanitarian
    assistance but to protect ourselves from future infectious
    disease threats.
        The U.S. Government is working to improve preparedness
    planning, both internally and with the international community.
    The President launched the Global Health Security Agenda 1 year
    ago to accelerate global action to prevent, detect, and rapidly
    respond to infectious disease threats, whether naturally
    occurring like the Ebola epidemic or the result of bioterrorist
    threat.
        State and USAID are participating in an interagency effort
    focused on post-Ebola recovery and will work with international
    partners, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations
    to support sustainable recovery within the region.
        I would like to close with remarks from the President, who
    stated, ``This disease can be contained.'' It will be defeated.
    Progress is possible, but we are going to have to stay
    vigilant, and we have got to make sure that we are working
    together. If we don't have a robust international response in
    West Africa, then we are actually endangering ourselves here
    back home.
        Thank you for your time and consideration. I welcome the
    opportunity to answer any questions you may have.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.

     [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Granger. Mr. Konyndyk, you are now recognized.

                       Opening Statement by Mr. Konyndyk

        Mr. Konyndyk. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, and thank you,
    Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the subcommittee for the
    opportunity to update you today on the ongoing U.S. Response to
    the Ebola epidemic in West Africa.
        And thank you, in particular, Ms. Granger, for your
    recognition of the brave healthcare workers who have really
    been the central backbone of this entire effort and whose work
    has been indispensable.
        I also want to thank you for this subcommittee's leadership
    in passing the 2015 emergency funding for Ebola. That support
    has allowed the U.S. to rapidly scale up a massive response to
    this outbreak, which has so far infected more than 22,000
    people and killed more than 9,000 of them.
        I lead the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at
    the U.S. Agency for International Development. OFDA is the lead
    Federal coordinator for overseas disasters. And our Disaster
    Assistance Response Team, or DART, platform is, in the words of
    President Obama, the strategic and operational backbone of
    America's response to the Ebola outbreak.
        With staff deployed across the region, the DART team is
    facilitating a complex pipeline of expertise, funding, and
    supplies that has been crucial to the effective regional
    response. The DART simultaneously strengthens the broader
    international effort, coordinates the unique capabilities of
    our interagency partners like the Centers for Disease Control
    and Prevention, the Department of Defense, and the U.S. Public
    Health Service, and delivers vast amounts of direct assistance.
    This gives the U.S. the unique and singular capability to
    project leadership and drive a comprehensive regional strategy
    to control and ultimately extinguish this outbreak.
        On August 4, we deployed a USAID Disaster Assistance
    Response Team to the region, and a few weeks later, I traveled
    to Liberia with Dr. Tom Frieden of the CDC to observe the
    crisis firsthand. What we saw on that trip was shocking.
    Transmission rates were far outstripping the small containment
    capacity that existed. And the international response was
    hobbled by a lack of resources, personnel, and expertise.
    Treatment centers we visited in the capital were turning away
    patients. Infectious bodies lay in the streets uncollected. Lab
    capacity was minimal. And protective gear for responders was in
    short supply. To be blunt, at that time, we were losing to the
    disease. It was clear that only a massive, unprecedented
    international response with strong U.S. leadership would be
    able to stem this outbreak.
        Working closely with experts from the CDC and in support of
    the governments of the affected countries, the U.S. Government
    developed a holistic strategy to contain and ultimately defeat
    this outbreak. Through the DART platform, we called on DOD to
    bring speed and scale to the effort, building treatment
    centers, training medical staff, expanding laboratory testing
    capacity, and supporting logistics. We brought in the U.S.
    Public Health Service through the DART to operate the DOD-built
    Monrovia Medical Unit, which addressed a critical constraint to
    the response by assuring responders that they would have high-
    quality care available to them should they become infected.
        And we mobilized and financed an enormous scale-up of NGO
    and U.N. Agency partner capacity, to manage treatment centers,
    operate burial teams across Liberia, and launch massive social
    mobilization and messaging efforts that have reached millions
    of people while also providing coordination and logistic
    support.
        And our effort is not limited to Liberia. In Sierra Leone
    and Guinea, while we have not played the same lead role that we
    are playing in Liberia, the U.S. has supported similar lines of
    programming in complement to the efforts of the U.K., France,
    and other international partners.
        This effort has had an immediate impact. I returned to
    Liberia in October and found that, while still tenuous, the
    situation was already vastly improved. The scale-up of safe
    burials and social mobilization had attacked major drivers of
    transmission, and the additional case management capacity that
    we were bringing online was addressing critical shortages and
    treatment beds.
        By late October, the outbreak in Liberia had crested, and
    transmissions, while still worryingly high, had begun to
    decline. The trajectory in Guinea and Sierra Leone was
    following suit by the end of the year. As case rates have
    declined, we have shifted our goal accordingly from breaking
    exponential growth to getting the overall caseload down to
    zero. We have scaled back the size and number of planned U.S.-
    built treatment centers while continuing to ensure geographic
    coverage and access to safe treatment across all of Liberia's
    counties. We are maintaining surveillance and community
    outreach efforts and adding greater emphasis on targeted
    subnational interventions to hunt down every case and ensure
    rapid and robust response to new hotspots.
        The U.S. has by now mobilized well over 10,000 USAID-
    supported humanitarian partner staff across the region and
    provided over $939 million in assistance. This is the largest
    U.S. response to a global health emergency in history. And we
    are seeing remarkable progress.
        But the fight is far from over. We know, based on previous
    outbreaks, that it can be a long and bumpy road to get to zero.
    USAID strategy will continue to adapt along with conditions on
    the ground. And we will continue to chase down the last chains
    of transmission across the region until all affected countries
    have been declared Ebola-free. Thank you, and I look forward to
    answering questions.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Ms. Granger. Mr. Dijkerman, you are now recognized. Thank
    you.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
    Member Lowey, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
    the opportunity to update you on our strategy moving forward
    and building on the effort that we have underway to get to
    zero. To contain diseases like Ebola, we are focusing on
    building more resilient health and preparedness systems in West
    Africa and in other hotspots in Africa. Our goal is to detect,
    prevent, and respond to future outbreaks before they become
    global security threats.
        Let me outline our efforts. USAID proposes to invest nearly
    $440 million of the Ebola emergency funds in bolstering health
    and preparedness systems. These efforts will contribute to the
    Government's goal of strengthening health security through the
    Global Health Security Agenda. In the three most affected
    countries, USAID will begin to integrate the capabilities built
    up during the response phase into the existing healthcare
    system. This should help us safely restart healthcare services
    that have stopped because of Ebola and prepare the system to
    address future outbreaks.
        We will also work to institutionalize the data and
    communication capabilities necessary to detect future flareups
    and direct rapid responses. In the 13 West African countries
    most at risk of future Ebola outbreaks, we have supported the
    development of Ebola preparedness and response plans, and we
    are now testing them. These plans build upon earlier guidelines
    that we and others developed to contain Ebola and Marburg
    outbreaks in Central Africa last year. The focus here is
    preparing for and managing cases resulting from human-to-human
    transmission.
        Furthermore, we are expanding our viral surveillance
    program and mitigation efforts to track and contain viruses in
    wildlife in West Africa and other hotspots. Our focus here is
    upstream to detect and take actions that will mitigate the
    transmission of diseases like Ebola from animals to humans
    before it happens. This approach has proven successful in
    reducing outbreaks of H5N1 or bird flu. While addressing these
    health issues, we should not forget that Ebola hit hardest in
    three fragile states where half of the population lives in
    poverty. Ebola reduced economic activity. People lost their
    jobs, their incomes, and many are now less able to feed their
    families.
        Our best estimates right now show that over 40 percent of
    Liberians, Sierra Leoneans, and Guineans are projected to
    experience acute food insecurity this year. We plan to target
    food vouchers to vulnerable families and individuals, both in
    urban and rural areas. Building upon the community mobilization
    efforts that have been recognized as having helped turn the
    tide in the Ebola response, USAID will seek to strengthen
    citizen oversight and engagement with the three governments. We
    are also working with school authorities to safely reopen
    schools and get children back on track.
        By harnessing the ideas of others, we are leveraging our
    response to Ebola. We launched a competition that could result
    in up to 15 innovations to improve healthcare safety and
    patient safety. Our first awards included a redesigned personal
    protective equipment with a built-in cooling system. If you
    have been to Liberia, you know how hot and humid it gets.
    Another innovation is a long-lasting antiseptic spray and
    spray-on barrier that repels microbes. We have another
    announcement that we will be making today, announcing another
    15 innovations from universities and others that will help us
    in this fight against Ebola.
        Striving to get to zero new cases, strengthening health
    systems, and assisting those who lost ground are the best
    investments in helping these three countries return to their
    path of growth and stability. These efforts are at the core of
    USAID's mission to end extreme poverty and promote resilient
    democratic societies. They also contribute to Americans'
    security at home and abroad.
        And, in closing, like my colleagues, I want to honor the
    humanitarians, the healthcare providers, the military men and
    women, and all Americans who are working to turn the tide in
    West Africa.
        And, most importantly, I want to thank you all for the
    congressional support that made these efforts possible. Thank
    you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you very much. We will now go to
    questions, and now you can see how much time you have used. If
    you will limit the length of your question, we will have time
    for two rounds. I know people are very interested in this
    hearing, and I will begin with the first question.
        The Ebola response in West Africa required contributions of
    several U.S. Government agencies, not just those represented in
    the room. The Department of Defense and the Centers for Disease
    Control and Prevention have been key players.
        Ambassador Browning and Mr. Konyndyk, as the response
    evolved, how did the administration ensure there was
    coordination among the agencies and no duplication of effort?
    And are there more changes that need to be made? What lessons
    have you learned from this crisis? And what should be done
    differently in future global health emergencies?
        Ambassador Browning. Thank you very much. I think the key
    point is that we initially recognized the comparative advantage
    of the various agencies. In my own work in Uganda, when we were
    rolling out PEPFAR, we learned very quickly that CDC has
    strengths; USAID has strengths; DOD has its own abilities. And
    the administration looked to these agencies to use these
    comparative advantages when we first responded.
        USAID has the lead on the ground, and through their DART
    teams, their disaster emergency response teams, they
    coordinated the activities of all the various agencies. As far
    as back here in Washington, it was a very emotional, chaotic
    time. And we were looking for the best way to respond.
    Eventually the administration decided to bring on board Mr. Ron
    Klain, who helped bring together all of the agency responses
    and provide some structure to our response.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Konyndyk. I don't have a great deal to add to what
    Ambassador Browning said. I would just note that the focus on
    interagency coordination has been a core part of USAID's
    mandate and focus for many years and something that we have
    invested further in, particularly since the Haiti response in
    2010. And so what we have seen in this response, I think, is a
    proof of concept of some of the investments we have made since
    Haiti in being able to identify and organize and coordinate, as
    Ambassador Browning put it, the respective comparative
    advantages of different agencies.
        I think the other thing that has been critical is the
    excellent collaboration between our teams on the ground. The
    USAID and CDC personnel, in particular, worked very closely
    together.
        With respect to DOD, that is also an area where USAID has
    invested a lot of effort over the years in defining systems and
    interoperability between our different machines, if you will,
    and we have seen the real payoff here.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.
        I will now turn this over to Mrs. Lowey for questions.
    Thank you.
        Mrs. Lowey. Well, thank you, again. We have really been
    impressed with your leadership and, equally important, the
    results you have achieved. However, I think, from my
    perspective, I remain concerned with the weakness this exposed
    in the WHO that receives a contribution from our bill. On
    January 25, the WHO's executive board unanimously endorsed a
    resolution aimed at overhauling its capacity to head off and
    respond to outbreaks and other health emergencies. Clearly, we
    need a better system to react in a more effective and timely
    way.
        Could either of you respond about what we have learned
    about the role of the WHO and what prevented it from acting? I
    know that Dr. Frieden is a member of the WHO's Executive Board.
    Is the CDC the agency within the United States Government that
    has been charged with seeking reforms that will make the WHO
    more effective, or does that fall under Secretary Kerry as the
    WHO is the coordinating authority for health within the United
    Nations system?
        So how do we really ensure that, in the next outbreak, we
    have the emergency health workers, funding for the development
    of vaccines, and proper treatment regimes in place? And where
    does that fall within the responsibilities of WHO?
        Mr. Browning. Very good questions, which I am happy to
    respond to, and then I will ask my colleagues to also help. In
    general, we support the United Nations where and while they are
    adding value. And when they are not, we want to enhance their
    ability to do well. And in the case of WHO, clearly there were
    some missteps in the early response by WHO.
        We have met with WHO leadership since then here in
    Washington and in Geneva. I am convinced that Dr. Chan has
    recognized that WHO did not do well in the early response. They
    have come up with some proposals that we have endorsed, some
    changes in their structure and in their ability to respond.
    They are proposing that the development of a cadre of global
    health workers--that was one of the initial weaknesses--that
    this cadre, much like firefighters who have been trained and
    prepared and ready to go when called upon, that didn't exist in
    the early days.
        They are proposing an emergency fund that they can tap into
    so that their response is not dependant upon pledges and
    remittances and receipt of money from the member states. And
    they are changing their staffing proposal so that it is based
    on merit and not geographic preferences from the member states.
    So these are improvements, changes, that we think are
    warranted. We are going to help them work toward these changes.
        As far as the U.S. Government response, Dr. Frieden is on
    the board. Secretary Kerry retains his leadership role in all
    of the United Nations' entities. My understanding is the Board
    membership requires that the member be a physician, and so Dr.
    Frieden was tapped in addition to his medical credentials but
    also because of his CDC membership.
        Mr. Konyndyk. As Ambassador Browning said and as Director-
    General Chan has acknowledged several times, WHO's initial
    response had a lot of problems. However, what was particularly
    notable when I traveled out there in August was the vast
    improvement we saw in their performance once they got their
    emergency team involved. So their emergency team, while small
    and traditionally underresourced, brought some really important
    capabilities and some very, very strong personnel to the
    effort. And they rapidly got an additional ETU online in
    Monrovia in September and have brought value in various other
    ways as well, and we have supported them, as Ambassador
    Browning said, where we have seen them adding specific
    operational value.
        I think the challenge for the WHO and what we are trying to
    push from the USAID side through some of these WHO reforms is
    to take those valuable contributions and figure out how to
    better institutionalize those within WHO. And if they can
    achieve that--and we think they can--then that will be a huge
    contribution.
        Mr. Dijkerman. If I may, in terms of preparedness going
    forward, WHO has proven to be a very useful platform for us and
    CDC to advance some of the ideas and lessons we are learning.
    They were instrumental in helping adopt the 13 component
    standard that we need to have in place in the 13 countries to
    prepare for Ebola. And because we did it at the WHO, we were
    able to involve many other countries.
        The fact that we have been able to conduct 13 assessments
    and start response programs and not have to pay for it all
    ourselves but share it with other members of the WHO has
    enabled us to move much faster than we otherwise could.
        In addition to that, I focused on the Ebola preparedness on
    the human-to-human side, but if we look at the work that USAID
    is also doing on the animal-to-human transmission, we there,
    too, have been able to work through the WHO and get the
    adoption of a One Health approach, whereby we bring together
    not only the ministries of health in the countries in the
    region but also the ministries of agriculture and the
    ministries of security and policing, so that we get a
    comprehensive response to diseases like Ebola in the future.
    And it helps us figure out how to engage--in the United States
    we, for example, put together a 25-university consortium to
    work on veterinary sharing of best practices across countries.
    Bringing those capabilities together through this structure has
    enabled us to mitigate some of the transfer of diseases from
    animals to humans by changing practices on the ground in those
    countries, by having the veterinarians work in different ways,
    by changing market practices and so forth.
        So the WHO structure allows us to really leverage what we
    are doing. And so certainly there are areas for improvement,
    and I think my colleagues have identified that, but we have
    been able to use the structure to advance U.S. interests and
    U.S. priorities on global health security.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        First, an observation, which is when this subcommittee
    spends hard-earned taxpayer money for health efforts around the
    world or education efforts--something that the ranking member
    is very key on--or security efforts or human rights efforts
    around the world, I think the Ebola crisis really demonstrates
    that we really do it for our national interest. It is to
    protect the interests of the United States, and I think that
    was a very clear demonstration of why it is important to look
    at elsewhere and try to deal with these issues sometimes over
    there so that we don't have to deal with them here. And that
    was a great example of that.
        Now, there were some gaps, obviously, at the beginning. For
    example, we had a healthcare--facility here, I think it was
    only one, that was exposed here, and then we had a couple of
    healthcare workers who were exposed. It reminds me of,
    Hurricane Andrew in the State of Florida, where we were clearly
    ill prepared for the storm. After Andrew, Florida became,
    frankly, I will tell you, the national leader as far as
    preparedness for future storms.
        What are the lessons that you have learned--I am talking
    about here domestically--so that, hopefully it won't happen
    again? The chances are that we will have something else and it
    might--not be Ebola, it may be something, frankly, even more
    deadly, even worse, even more contagious than Ebola. What are
    some of the lessons, that the case of the exposure of the
    healthcare workers taught us so that we are better prepared in
    the future when we do have another incident, which may not be
    Ebola, may be something more dangerous?
        Mr. Browning. Certainly. I am happy to respond to that.
    While, for the State Department, our focus is foreign and
    overseas, we certainly care about the domestic response. And
    CDC and HHS take the lead here for domestic preparedness. I
    think one of the lessons we have learned in the State
    Department is that our national security does not begin and end
    at our borders. We must work to ensure that the health
    preparedness of nations around the world is strong enough to
    protect us and them from these diseases. And they will
    continue. They will grow. And we must not forget the lessons
    that we learned in this particular response.
        We were able to look at our visa operations. We were able
    to look at our ability to screen visitors to the United States.
    And so that is one procedure that we have improved that will
    help our domestic security particularly.
        Mr. Konyndyk. So for USAID, we are obviously focused
    internationally. So I don't have so much of an opinion on the
    domestic piece. But, you know, one thing that does, I think,
    touch on the domestic piece is the importance of being able to
    quickly mobilize U.S. healthcare personnel for something like
    this and what that entails, and so that has been things like
    State's great work on getting a medevac system up and running
    and as well as working with our partners to develop systems for
    how they can identify and deploy these medical staff quickly.
        Previously, a lot of our partners had trauma staff who
    could deploy on short notice, but they didn't have staff on
    call or volunteers on call who were trained and able to go and
    do something like this. So having more of a standing capability
    and a reserve pool of U.S. healthcare workers who can respond
    in this kind of a situation is something that we have
    definitely taken away as a lesson.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. I would imagine part of that is equipment,
    too. I mean, this is not----
        Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. You just can't show up there without, you
    know, protective gear.
        Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely, and we have worked quite closely
    with the private sector on ensuring that there has been a
    constant supply of enough personal protective equipment.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you.
        One of the lessons learned, I believe, that we are trying
    to convey is an international one, and that is we see some
    complacency setting in in places. We haven't beat the disease.
    And one of the things the United States needs to do in its
    messaging is to make sure that both in the countries that are
    most affected but also internationally we keep the focus on
    getting to zero because it is possible for one case to flare
    up. We need to remember this did start with one case. And so we
    have a leadership role in making sure that we keep everybody
    focused on that.
        By the same token, we need to keep focused on the fact that
    we were very lucky with this disease. It was transmitted by
    contact. And if we think about it, it could easily have been
    airborne, and then the situation we would have had would have
    been dramatically worse. So we need to keep the focus on a
    global security agenda that benefits not only ourselves but the
    entire world.
        And, lastly, I think a benefit that we have seen from other
    efforts that we brought to this one is the ingenuity or the
    innovation that is found in the United States can be brought to
    bear, and we have brought it to bear to the Ebola crisis. We
    have already had one grand challenge round that I mentioned.
    Today we will be announcing another 15 innovations that will
    help healthcare worker safety and patient safety. These are--I
    will let the press release come out later, but these are pretty
    neat things that are going to make a difference in people's
    lives in future outbreaks.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes, Madam Chairman, thank you, and it
    is good to be back on this committee. It is my first hearing.
    So I am the rookie.
        First thing, I want to thank you all. You can always learn
    to do better. You know, if you look at the world, the world
    looks at the United States to protect them from pandemics,
    terrorism, a lot of issues. And we are good because we have
    good, trained people.
        I want to talk about using technology to help. Ending the
    Ebola outbreak will continue to demand significant human and
    financial resources, especially having to identify and monitor
    Ebola cases in remote areas. You are going to have to project
    human resources capacity, human resource needs.
        Now, I happen to have in my backyard Johns Hopkins
    University and University of Maryland, who were very active
    with you in this case. And I want to talk about Johns Hopkins
    University houses an advanced supercomputer simulation and
    modeling center. The center has the ability to construct
    artificial worlds populated by virtual people programmed to
    respond as people would to real threats, such as infectious
    diseases like Ebola. The result is a highly visual and
    spatially realistic window into epidemics dynamics. And by
    incorporating psychology and human behavior, including
    contagious fear issues, the center's simulation models can help
    predict how complex societies and health systems might respond
    to a given event and what the ripple effects might be as the
    scenario unfolds.
        So my question is, starting with you, Ambassador Browning,
    do you think modeling, which I am talking about here, as an
    example the Johns Hopkins' supercomputer that I just talked
    about, would be useful to predict human future resource needs
    and where to have future resources available to address
    flareups or outbreaks, such as the Ebola situation?
        Ambassador Browning. I sure hope so.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's talk about--where my question is
    really focusing on, technology, medical modeling, and the
    supercomputer at Johns Hopkins.
        Ambassador Browning. No, I think, as the opening remarks
    made clear, in the early days in the summer of 2014, the models
    were all over the place, and they were predicting up to half a
    million. I have seen one of over a million cases a year if
    there were no interventions conducted. This was not helpful
    data for us. I mean, it was the best we had, and we responded
    with the data that we had, but Ebola virus disease moves
    around. It is a living, breathing creature, and it was really
    hard for us to keep a handle on its evolution and its
    development. So any kind of modeling that can factor in all the
    multiple factors, particularly the psychology of it--and this
    is what we are seeing on the ground today. We have got the
    medicine. We can deal with the medicine, and there are some
    behavioral changes that will come into play. But when people
    are afraid of their government, when people run away from
    healthcare workers, when people are distrustful of outsiders,
    it makes our job incredibly difficult. So, with hard data that
    a model like you are talking about, if that could give us more
    precise information on how to deal with it, that would be
    superb.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask you this. Are you familiar
    with the supercomputer I am talking about at Johns Hopkins?
        Ambassador Browning. I am not.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
        Is anyone here at the table? Then I would suggest that you
    make contact with them.
        Ambassador Browning. Sure.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I think this is innovation that makes us
    better, and it does the modeling that we are talking about.
        Ambassador Browning. Sure.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Including dealing with the issues of
    fear.
        Ambassador Browning. Okay.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Crenshaw.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        You talked some about the problems of coordination among
    the different agencies. I want to talk a little bit
    specifically about the military. But, before that, I
    understand, as relates to the military, that the Administration
    is going to bring home--I think they had 3,000 troops in West
    Africa, and most of them are home or going to be brought home
    soon. I guess that is the good news. There was criticism early
    on that it was slow, it was bungled, and that we didn't really
    meet the immediate need. But now it raises the question, is
    this too early to say we solved the problem and bring all the
    folks back home? Because, as I understand it, you would
    certainly not say it is over and there is still a lot of work
    to be done?
        That is the broad question. But let me specifically ask
    about the military because they were some of the first
    responders. People always say, ``why are we sending the
    military there?'' I think we came to understand that they were
    there to provide logistical support. They were there to train
    healthcare workers and build some of the infrastructure. But
    there were criticisms--and we are learning a lot as we look
    back--that there were 17 Ebola treatment centers. Some people
    argued it took too long to execute, and then they say some of
    those structures weren't used.
        I want you to talk about that. We have the best-trained,
    best-equipped military in the world, obviously, and the
    question is, is this the best use of the military? Were they
    adequately trained?
        You work with all these other agencies. Would you say, as
    you look back, that sending the military over there to build
    those units was that the right choice? Or as you look back,
    might there have been a better response? So talk about that
    specifically and if we were slow to get there or if we are, are
    we too quick to go home.
        Ambassador Browning. Let me address part of that, and then
    Jeremy, who has been working with them on a daily basis, I
    think, can get into much more detail. I do not believe it is
    too early to bring them home. I think now is the time to bring
    them home. We asked them to accomplish a discrete number of
    objects and procedures, objectives and programs. They have done
    that. We are leaving behind 102 uniformed personnel. They will
    continue to work very closely under AID's leadership in
    Liberia. And if there is a resurgence of Ebola virus disease,
    they will have a platform upon which they can build very
    rapidly. And this is one of the things that was missing when
    the military first came in.
        But we don't think that will happen because, in large part,
    due to our military's efforts, we have systems in place. We
    have physical facilities established now that we didn't have in
    the summer of 2014. So I think now is the right time to bring
    them home. We want the make sure that everyone there is fully
    engaged and employed. And I think the number they have come up
    where and the modules that they have identified in consultation
    with AID are the right ones to keep our military there.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Is the military the best? As you look back,
    are there other agencies that might have done this better? Was
    this the right thing to do, or was it an emergency and it was
    the only thing we could do?
        Mr. Konyndyk. This was absolutely the right call, yes. What
    the military brings is an unprecedented operational speed and
    scale that really no one else can match. And that is what they
    brought here.
        To the question in some of the reports about the timing of
    these centers being built and coming online they are complex,
    difficult things to build. And Liberia, and particularly rural
    areas of Liberia where the military was doing the construction,
    is just extremely logistically challenging. I do not believe
    anyone could have done it any faster than our military.
        On the question of empty facilities, there are some of them
    that are not seeing many patients, and that is, in our view, a
    very good thing. And the reason for that is, you know, when we
    started this, we were trying everything that we thought might
    work. And we have adapted and adjusted that over time as we
    have seen what has delivered. And to our great relief, some of
    these things that did come online very quickly, things like
    burial teams, had an impact that was greater than what we
    expected at the time. And so we scaled down the size of these
    centers as they were being built. We scaled down the size that
    they have opened at--they were originally going to open with
    100 beds apiece. Most of them now are opening only with 10 or
    20 beds apiece because that is the level of demand we expect to
    see.
        In terms of whether we are pulling the military out too
    early, the military went there to do a few specific things:
    Logistics, that has largely been handed over. The resupply of
    the treatment facilities was handed over to the United Nations
    successfully in December. The construction is now completed.
    The training piece is now completed. The Monrovia Medical Unit
    was completed. And their support to that is being transitioned
    to a USAID contractor. And their laboratories are being scaled
    back but will remain under a different DOD program under this
    new iteration. So we feel very confident that all those main
    lines of effort are being effectively transitioned and will not
    leave gaps.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you very much.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Madam Chair. It took me over 20
    years, but I am back on this committee. And I am glad to do so.
        Very briefly, I have a comment before I have a question,
    and that is, I think I speak for all my colleagues on behalf of
    this Congress and representation of this Nation, when you get a
    chance to thank those people who volunteered and those folks
    who went over--and thought of themselves--I know, in New York,
    people tried to be brave, but we were thinking about the subway
    going near NYU hospital, going downtown, riding a bus. We
    didn't know what we were dealing with, and these folks gave so
    much love and compassionate of themselves that I think this
    Nation has to show its gratitude. So, if I may, for all of us,
    when you run into any of them or those people in charge, tell
    them how grateful this Nation and this Congress is.
        My question. Farm production in the region has decreased in
    areas hard hit by Ebola, as farmers in some affected areas fled
    to areas seen as safer from exposure to disease. What actions
    has USAID undertaken to ensure that farm production in the
    region increases again to the level seen before the Ebola
    outbreak because I don't think what we want is on top of this
    issue to have yet another issue of longer or more hunger that
    may exist in the region already?
        Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you. I think I will capture that
    question right now and turn it over to my colleagues if they
    want to add. The analysis that we have done through another
    USAID instrument called the Famine Early Warning System and
    supplemented with work by the UN World Food Program and the
    Food and Agriculture Organization have pointed out there are
    areas where production has gone down, but overall, production
    has not gone down as much as one would have thought.
        What we are seeing is that there are more issues of access
    to food by people, particularly those who have lost incomes,
    and markets have stopped functioning because there were border
    closures. So what we have focused on--and when I mean ``we,'' I
    mean our Office for Food for Peace but also through Feed the
    Future, working in conjunction with the World Bank and many
    other international organizations is trying to get the markets
    functioning again. So, rather than bringing in food aid to meet
    people's needs, we are looking at giving vouchers so they can
    access the market and get the markets functioning, get the food
    supply going again.
        In some cases--I think this will be more a function of the
    World Bank--we are looking at what seeds and tools may be
    needed to increase production again because we are getting
    indications that, in certain areas, farmers are eating their
    seed, if you will, and so we do worry about that.
        Overall, we are projecting that there are going to be well
    over 6 million, closer to 7.5 million people that will be food
    insecure, both in urban areas and in rural areas, so the
    responses that we are trying to focus on are to get the markets
    functioning, get people access back to the private sector
    flows, if you will, rather than bringing food in from abroad.
        The other thing that we are focusing on is there are people
    that were disproportionately disadvantaged by Ebola compared to
    others. So we are putting together targeted food programs and
    voucher programs to get them not only back into the market but
    see how we can encourage them to get back to health centers.
    Simply reopening a health center is not in and of itself going
    to solve the problem. People need, as Ambassador Browning said,
    to have the confidence that they can go to that health center
    and not get sick.
        So we are looking at not only reopening health centers but
    also doing things through communities. So if they come in with
    a voucher and they get immunized, they can get a voucher to go
    to the market. And through that process, we can educate them
    that there is increased safety in getting health services
    again. And this will help, again, some of the most vulnerable--
    the orphans, the women, who disproportionately take care of the
    children and who have lost earning capacity in markets and
    other types of things. So we are trying to focus not only on
    the farm side but the whole package in urban and rural areas
    for those that have been particularly disadvantaged by Ebola.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you. That was a very informative answer,
    and when you say get them back in production or in the market,
    that is also encouraging farmers who left to come back to their
    land, I would imagine.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Yes. And one of the other things we are
    trying to do in this response is that before this crisis
    started, we had ongoing development programs. So, for example,
    we have a program at USAID based on Feed the Future, and they
    have had a number of long-term interventions going on that have
    stimulated rice markets, supported processing in rice markets
    to get more value added. So the World Food Program has actually
    been able to buy rice locally from these institutions that we
    helped create.
        Now, in the planning process going forward, we are sending
    out teams from our Office for Food for Peace that focus on
    vouchers and food, and sending them out with our Feed the
    Future folks so that as we design these immediate response
    programs to help people in need, we are also trying to modify
    our ongoing development programs to see what opportunities
    might be out there, not only in Liberia but in Sierra Leone and
    Guinea, to see if we can wrap around some of these other
    longer-term investments with some of the short-term problems we
    have identified. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Stewart.
        Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        And as the new member of this subcommittee, the guy who is
    sitting here at the very end of the row, I would like to thank
    the chairwoman for the opportunity to work on this very
    important committee.
        And to the witnesses, as I read your bios, it is
    impressive. And it makes us grateful that we have got
    individuals like you, who are engaged in what I think is
    obviously a very important cause. And many of you committed
    your entire lives to these types of efforts. And we thank you
    for that.
        I would like to express a concern. I may ask for your
    response, and then I would like to ask a question. But before I
    do that, my concern is this, as a former military officer, as
    an Air Force pilot for 14 years, it concerns me the role that
    the military has been asked to play in this. And when I talk
    with some of my associates who are members of the military
    still, it makes me more concerned. They were, in some cases,
    deployed without the training that they felt that was
    necessary, without some of the protections that they felt was
    necessary, and that makes me--again, gives me some cause.
        It is kind of like we have this attitude--and I don't blame
    us for this, and it is a compliment to the military that that
    is a fact--but it is like we sometimes throw our hands in the
    air and go, Well, I don't really know what to do, let's call
    the military and let them take care of it. And many times we
    do, and when we do that, they always do take care of it. I
    mean, we are grateful for their abilities and their sacrifices,
    but we have to remember that it doesn't come without a cost.
        For every military member that is in West Africa, that is a
    military member and another dollar spent that could have been
    spent or used in their core mission. And I think this falls
    outside of that.
        I would ask you to respond to that, but I think you have in
    some part already. And I would really actually like to spend my
    time on something else. And that is, I am an appropriator. As
    an appropriator, we are interested in the money. And it seems,
    in this case, we did something that Congress often does. And
    that is, when a crisis arrives, we throw a bunch of money at
    it. And then, you know, we hope that things go well. And
    sometimes we don't follow up or hold accountability toward that
    money like we should. And I don't think we want to do that in
    this case.
        So my question is, as I understand it, the State Department
    and USAID, the Ebola Response Preparedness Fund was
    appropriated something like $2.6 billion, of which we have only
    spent a part of it and probably a very small part of it. So I
    would like you to tell us, you know, what is in the remaining
    funds? And what is our intentions with those, you know,
    something more than a billion dollars that is left unspent?
        Ambassador Browning. Our plan is to make sure that we have
    addressed the need with the money available, and when that has
    reached its conclusion, the money returns.
        Mr. Stewart. Mr. Browning, do you have an accounting of
    that? Do we know how much has been spent of those appropriated
    funds, even a ballpark figure?
        Ambassador Browning. I think we do--I don't, but the panel
    does.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Yes. Well, actually what the committee wrote
    into the act is that we report every 30 days, and the next
    spend plan is going to be coming up pretty shortly. And I think
    the other important message we received from the subcommittee
    and in our discussions is that we know this is an emergency
    response, and it will evolve as we go. The benefit of having a
    30-day report to the subcommittee is that we can show how our
    knowledge and our response will evolve, and if we finish the
    job before we have spent all the money, then, as the Ambassador
    said, we will tell you.
        Mr. Stewart. But you would anticipate that we would finish
    the job before we spend all the money because this is winding
    down. Is that not true?
        Mr. Dijkerman. When the budget proposal was put together,
    we were clear with the subcommittee that we were anticipating a
    worst-case scenario. And so there is a likelihood that
    something might be left over.
        Now, how that will work out, we will have to see because we
    are not yet at zero. One of the challenges that we are working
    through, as I mentioned earlier about complacency, is that
    getting Ebola to zero in the other 24 examples that we have, it
    is, as Jeremy said, a bumpy road. This is the first time that
    we are trying to get to zero in a very large-scale Ebola
    outbreak. We are hopeful. We are confident, but I think we need
    to be cautious. And we will be reporting monthly to you as we
    do that.
        In terms of the funds being disbursed, we have been able to
    reimburse over $300 million of the funds that we have used from
    other accounts, and we have already committed roughly $100
    million to new emergency response activities. And there are
    other things that are in the pipeline that focus on
    preparedness that we are coordinating with the other donors.
    Let me maybe let Jeremy add a few points here.
        Mr. Konyndyk. So, just briefly, for the response piece,
    which is about $1.2 billion of that, as you noted we are right
    now ahead of where we thought we would be when we put the
    budget together. There are a lot of twists and turns that could
    yet arise. So if we were to see it reemerge in a neighboring
    country like Mali or Ivory Coast, that could scramble things
    quite considerably. So I think on the trajectory that we seem
    to currently be on, then I think we are on track to probably
    underspend what we thought.
        Mr. Stewart. Okay. My time is up. Let me conclude with
    this. You know, I am familiar with the use-it-or-lose-it
    mentality, as we all are, but I am asking you not to take that
    approach to this. We want to accomplish this goal and this
    mission. We all do. But, on the other hand, the fact that we
    have this pool of money there does not mean that every penny
    has to be spent. And we would look to you for accountability as
    to how that money is spent and returning to the people what
    money is not necessary.
        Mr. Konyndyk. Absolutely.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Fortenberry.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        This is a terrible dilemma because I have two hearings at
    once. So I apologize if some of the things that I may ask may
    sound redundant. And let me echo my colleague Mr. Stewart's
    comments. This is my first committee hearing on foreign
    operations, and I look forward to our robust dialogue.
        And thank you for your leadership, Madam Chair, and our
    ranking member, Ms. Lowey.
        Ambassador Browning, first of all, let me thank you all for
    your commitment and your intense passion on getting this right.
    I am from Nebraska. As you know, Nebraska has played a--I think
    it is safe to say--critical role in meeting the demands of
    treatment and trying to convey best practices to try to halt
    and stop the disease as well as treat those who have been
    impacted. So not only, obviously, do we have an interest, deep
    interest, in this for the sake of the proper humanitarian
    reasons you pointed out and international stability, but it
    also affects us right at home. In that regard, the initial
    reports, which were just a few months ago, were dire and
    ominous. And we were talking about the good news of slowing the
    exponential growth rate, the good news being we have had a what
    seems to me to be a complete turnaround from that perspective
    in spite of the tragedy of nearly 10,000 lives being lost.
        What is the single biggest factor that resulted in this
    turnaround that you can point to? Now a lot of things have
    converged here, and you have talked about the infrastructure
    brought to bear, the leadership of the United States, the basic
    improvements in sanitation, changes in cultural practices, and
    I see all that. But, obviously, none of this was predictable, I
    would say, 3 months ago. Can you answer that briefly? And I
    want to go to a couple of other things.
        Ambassador Browning. I don't know. So many factors.
        Mr. Fortenberry. How refreshing.
        Ambassador Browning. I say it quite often. I think it is
    hard to identify one factor that stands far and above the
    others. It is just hard to separate them, but perhaps Jeremy
    can do that.
        Mr. Fortenberry. I think we obviously need to lift from
    this so that we don't give ominous portents if something breaks
    in the future because we have an experience now of best
    practices and obviously some template that could be scaleable
    quickly based upon our learning of the last few months.
        Mr. Konyndyk. And Dirk will speak to that. What I would
    say, based on what we have seen, where we have seen rapid
    turnaround, it is not a single factor. It is when several
    critical factors are all working in tandem. So having safe
    burial teams without significant behavior change doesn't work.
    Having behavior change without treatment to refer people to
    doesn't work. So when you have that sort of virtuous
    combination of safe burial practices and capacity, social
    mobilization that drives popular behavior change, and adequate
    treatment capacity, that people can then refer to, when you
    have those things working in tandem, that is when we have
    seen----
        Mr. Fortenberry. Let me pivot to one other of my questions
    right quick regarding social mobilization. Would you define
    that further, please?
        Mr. Konyndyk. Sorry. Social mobilization is basically a
    variety of actions you take to change how a population behaves
    on a particular thing. So it is radio programs, house-to-house
    communication, and education, a range of things.
        Mr. Fortenberry. So let's take the case in Liberia. Because
    of the intensity of the impact--and I have been to Liberia
    before, but I have not been during this particular period--
    because of the intensity, there was not only an awareness of
    the need to change certain cultural practices or habits, that
    was almost instantaneously implemented because it became a
    narrative of an entire country. I assume that is what you are
    saying. Is that what you mean?
        Mr. Konyndyk. Yes. With a lot of programming to support
    that as well. But in Liberia, certainly the ferocity and the
    speed with which it broke out drove a lot of behavior change as
    well.
        Dirk, do you want to talk about the study?
        Mr. Fortenberry. I am sorry. I am going to interrupt you. I
    have a minute and a half, and I want to get a few other things
    on the table. I think Congressman Stewart rightfully points out
    that we have been willing as a Congress to assist you in a
    robust effort here, but to be prudent with the dollars,
    particularly as this has declined, is essential. In that
    regard, though, back to our Ranking Member Lowey's question,
    the line of authority here or the hierarchy of response
    mechanisms, would in my mind point to international
    organizations as a first responder, the WHO. You pointed out
    the problems there, getting caught off guard or not having
    capacity or whatever internal weakness led to them not being
    able to be in the lead. But, again, once again, the United
    States is put in the lead by, both by choice and default, in an
    international crisis situation.
        We have got to, as you rightfully pointed out, impress upon
    the international community their responsibility to partner
    here, even when we are leading. Now, you talked about $800
    million committed by other countries. Has that been delivered,
    and if that has been delivered, will that offset our costs?
        Ambassador Browning. That supplements our contributions.
    This was the round that President Obama, Secretary Kerry,
    National Security Advisor Rice, picked up the phone. They
    called England. They called the Netherlands. They said, Can you
    give us some money?
        Mr. Fortenberry. This is the new way of doing business.
        Ambassador Browning. Right.
        Mr. Fortenberry. I want to impress that upon you. It is the
    21st Century model for international stability. We can lead. We
    have a large capacity to do so, and many other countries depend
    upon us. But we will not do this alone as other people simply
    either are unwilling to sacrifice or have been empowered to
    simply hide behind us and other countries. But I do think,
    again, in urging or demanding the WHO bring about certain
    reforms that would put them in more of a leadership position,
    which is the natural place to look first, I think is a prudent,
    long-term strategy policy here. Do you agree with that? I am
    sorry. I am out of time.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Yes.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Madam Chair, if I may just follow up on that
    comment because I think it is a very important point you made
    about what was the key factor, and as Ambassador Browning said,
    we don't know. We have our suspicions. But that is why we have
    already embarked upon a process to lay out how we can do an
    independent assessment of what the components were of our
    strategy and what seemed to work. Another thing that was very
    important, at least in Liberia, was the role of the President
    herself in taking a very active stance in managing and getting
    the messages out there. And getting this independent assessment
    done, which will be done with USAID and other agencies, it will
    help inform things like the Johns Hopkins model. A model has to
    be based on facts. And as we try to get better in predicting
    future outbreaks, having these comprehensive independent
    assessments are going to help us.
        The other thing that we are doing is trying to learn better
    now--because we don't have to wait. We can start now, and we
    are. We are working with our IG to see what some of our
    interfaces were with other agencies, where we can make
    improvements. Are there further areas we can further streamline
    how we do procurement or coordination with other departments.
    And so we have already done some lessons learned, if you will,
    but we are trying to have a much more aggressive lessons-
    learned evaluative approach now. Actually Johns Hopkins is
    already helping us to work on one of the areas that Jeremy
    mentioned and you asked about, social mobilization and
    communications. One of the things we are finding it is very
    local, but we need to have a much more careful assessment about
    what worked where and how. And we need to put in place a system
    that is going to help us get that information and turn it
    around faster than we have been able to do in this response.
    Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Dijkerman, prior to the Ebola outbreak,
    the administration launched its Global Health Security Agenda,
    and it designated CDC as the lead. I understand that USAID and
    CDC plan to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to ensure
    that health systems are able, to prevent, detect, and respond
    to infectious diseases, such as Ebola. Could you describe the
    coordination and the division of duties between USAID and CDC?
        Mr. Dijkerman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I will also let Ambassador Browning speak up here because
    the State Department is an important partner in the Global
    Health Security Agenda. In terms of the Global Health Security
    Agenda that we have been focusing on with CDC, the
    collaboration has been quite, quite close. Where CDC--and I am
    going to speak in gross terms here--but where we have been
    working together on the Global Health Security Agenda--there
    are a number of components that have been laid out for the
    whole U.S. Government. The CDC is focusing on surveillance. It
    is focusing on lab capabilities, and it is focusing on the
    element of human-to-human transmission. Where AID has tended to
    focus in the past--we started this back in 2006 with the
    support of the subcommittee--is focusing on the animal-to-human
    transmission. I think some of the committee members may be
    aware that since about the start of this century, about 75
    percent of the new and emergent diseases have come from animal-
    to-human transmission. So that is where USAID is focusing.
        Now, when we go out to these countries and do assessments,
    we do joint assessments. I have some of my health colleagues
    here, but the assessments are both with CDC and USAID. And in a
    number of other cases, we bring in the WHO and others. So not
    only are we lashed up within the U.S. Government on this, but
    we are also lashed up with some of the other international
    organizations that can help share the load and move this
    forward. And I can give you a lot more detail on the components
    of the Global Health Security Agenda if you would like.
        Ms. Granger. Ambassador, do you have something to add to
    that?
        Ambassador Browning. I do. I think it more of a whole-of-
    government approach, then, as indicated, with CDC in the lead.
    This is very much a whole-of-government approach. And let me
    use an example from my previous experiences. When I was
    Ambassador in Uganda, we built PEPFAR at that time, 10 years
    ago, and part of the process was using CDC to help train lab
    technicians and public health administrators, and also USAID in
    the delivery of direct health care. Ten years later, now in
    Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, we have U.S.-trained
    Ugandans who volunteered to come to these Ebola-stricken
    countries, used the skills and the practices that we gave them
    10 years ago. This is the concept behind GHSA. Build this
    capacity in these countries throughout the region so that if
    this happens, when this happens again, they will be able to
    respond much more robustly than they were this time.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your
    wisdom, your service. We really do appreciate your experience.
    I have been concerned that, while we have stemmed the tide,
    some may think that the outbreak is over. Recent news reports
    suggest that there is an increase in new cases and that they
    were patients who had not been on the lists of people being
    monitored for possible infections. Dr. Bruce Aylward of the WHO
    said that, quote, ``Some of the new cases had emerged in people
    who had traveled far from their original points of infection,
    presenting additional complications on how to track all the
    people they might have infected and who now may be Ebola
    transmitters themselves,'' end quote.
        So, with just a few months before the start of West
    Africa's rainy season, if the virus reemerges, won't it be more
    difficult, especially in remote areas, to identify, isolate,
    and treat patients? I would be interested in your plan. Do we
    have enough resources to put an end to this epidemic? And have
    all those who pledged assistance provided it? And I would also
    be interested with the resources that we have spent, have we
    put in place, with our partners, adequate local systems, to be
    able to respond?
        Ambassador Browning. Let me ask my colleague, Mr. Konyndyk,
    to take the initial response on that.
        Mr. Konyndyk. I think those are all really important
    concerns, and I talk regularly with Bruce, and I will see him
    in Geneva next week. The biggest challenge now is ensuring that
    we avoid complacency and continue to have a very intense focus
    on driving to zero. In terms of whether there are enough
    resources, there are certainly enough financial resources. And
    with the network that has been built up now across the three
    countries, we are confident as well that that there are enough
    human and medical and logistical resources as well to get this
    done. The rainy season will complicate things. We have a few
    months before that hits, and I think we will see significant
    further progress until then. I am not overly concerned by the
    recent uptick in the last couple of weeks. I think that is part
    of a natural progression. And that is pretty typical of what we
    have seen in past responses, that you don't just have a smooth,
    straight, sustained curve. You see some bumpy ups and downs.
    The important aspect is that we have a very nimble structure
    that now has been built so if we need to focus a rapid response
    team on a particular area, we can get them on a helicopter and
    get them out there quickly, and we do that regularly. So I
    think the structure we have in place can get the job done.
        To the point on contact tracing, contact lists, that is a
    concern. That is one of the most challenging things because a
    case, for example, in Monrovia just earlier this week, there
    were a few new cases found. One of them was on the contact
    list. Two of them weren't because the way that they were
    exposed was they helped carry a woman who they didn't know was
    infected at the time back to her house. So it is very difficult
    to get someone like that on a contact list. That is just a
    long, hard slog. We have a long, hard slog, but I think we have
    the resources in place to get the job done.
        Ambassador Browning. I would just add that going from
    hundreds of cases to tens of cases is difficult. Going from
    tens of cases to one case is much, much more difficult. So it
    will get harder and more laborious as we get closer to zero. We
    just have to keep that in mind.
        Mr. Dijkerman. I think the other important element of what
    we are focusing on is we have talked a lot about the three
    countries, but we are putting the preparedness plans in place
    in the other countries. The thing to remember about that,
    except for Mali and Senegal, is those other preparedness plans
    while we are assessing them, they actually haven't been, if you
    will, battle-tested. So what we have encouraged the U.N. and
    our partners to do, and we are working with the governments to
    have a discussion about, is how we can somehow figure out how
    to, respecting everybody's sovereignty, have battle-tested
    assets from the three countries be able to cross into other
    countries when and if necessary. So if we have suspected or
    probable cases across the border, and there are some limits in
    the capacity in Ivory Coast because people are migrating and
    things like that, then we need to make sure that we have the
    means in place to quickly get on top of it, because we know
    quickness matters. And if there is a need to bring somebody to
    an isolation place, that we figure out how to get them into the
    Ebola treatment units right across the border back in Guinea or
    something like that. We are not there yet. We know this is
    coming, but we are focused on it, and like with the entire
    response, we are trying to make sure that we keep the
    governments fully in front with us and owning the solutions.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I want to get into the issue of
    Challenge Grants. I know that USAID launched a program in
    October. It was called Fighting Ebola. It is called A Grand
    Challenge For Development. I always like to promote my home
    town and institutions and people there, and let's get back to
    Johns Hopkins again. They won a grant in constructing a better
    protection suit. The prototype is designed to do a better job
    than current garments in keeping health care workers from
    coming in contact with Ebola patients' contiguous body fluids
    both during treatment and while removing a soiled suit. In
    addition, it is expected to keep the wearer cooler, an
    important benefit in hot, humid regions, such as West Africa.
        My questions are, can you talk about these Challenge
    Grants? If you look at innovation, I think a lot of times the
    private sector and institutions, such as Johns Hopkins, and
    University of Maryland Hospital. If they get the proper grants,
    they have the ability to really come up with some good product,
    which will help you. Which is what makes us stronger as a
    country, that relationship between the private sector and
    government coming together to deal with these problems. My
    question is, can you talk about the Challenge Grant, how you
    see them, how as a tool is this better to address epidemics
    like Ebola, and could you speak as to how Challenge Grants can
    be used as a general development tool?
        Mr. Dijkerman. I think you have almost answered it.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. I am trying to help you. Leading
    questions.
        Mr. Dijkerman. But there is no question that USAID has long
    worked to figure out how to better harness the energies and the
    innovations and different ideas and approaches of the private
    sector and foundations. And Jeremy can talk more about how we
    have done that on many fronts throughout this Ebola crisis,
    with the Paul Allen Foundation and others. The Grand Challenge
    program that we started is run by USAID, but we do pull in
    other U.S. Government resources to help evaluate the proposals
    so that we get the right technical people involved to see which
    grants and which possibilities make the most sense. So, again,
    it is a whole-of-government approach.
        As I mentioned, and I don't want to get ahead of our press
    release this afternoon, but I really do encourage folks to look
    at the array of new innovations that people have identified
    that may not help us immediately in this response--actually
    some of them may--but they will certainly help us in the next
    response. And one of the things that we are following through
    on is once we are able to get these products proven and tested,
    that we will also try to work with them to bring them to market
    and give them the due advertising, if you will, to others so
    that they know they are out there to be used. But I think it is
    one of the really good things that USAID has built on over the
    last couple years, and I give total credit to that to the USAID
    Administrator, Rajiv Shah.
        Mr. Konyndyk. I want to just call out in particular that
    suit that Johns Hopkins designed. It is an amazing design. It
    has yet to be fully field tested and all of that. It remains a
    prototype, so we will see how it does once it is rolled out in
    the field. But one of the biggest constraints that the Ebola
    treatment units face is the management and use of personal
    protective equipment. These suits are incredibly uncomfortable
    to wear. They are incredibly hot. When I was out there, I
    talked with personnel who have to work in these every day, and
    they talked at the end of a 1-hour shift--and they can only
    work for an hour in these suits before it becomes too
    overwhelming--their boots, their rubber boots are literally
    filled with sweat. I mean, they pour the sweat out of their
    boots. So having a better suit that is more comfortable and
    feasible to work in will improve patient care.
        It also will improve the safety of the workers themselves.
    One of the highest risks of exposure is when you are taking off
    your PPE. So having a safer way to take off PPE will greatly
    reduce the risks to healthcare workers who are working on those
    front lines. So this kind of innovation, again, still has to be
    tested. We will see how it works. I am sure there will be
    further tweaks, but it is a really important contribution.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. The good part about the innovation is it
    can not only be used for this situation but for many other uses
    within our country and hopefully throughout the world.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano, you have the last question.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
        And first, let me say that I think I am going to nominate
    Mr. Ruppersberger for the Johns Hopkins legislator of the year
    award.
        Ms. Granger. I took notes.
        Mr. Serrano. But it is a great institution, and it should
    be commended for its work.
        Let me have just one question. High Ebola infection rates
    among health workers have contributed to the closure of about
    62 percent of health facilities that offer non-Ebola-related
    care in Liberia. What steps has USAID taken to help the
    affected countries resume the operations of their health
    facilities so that they can continue to do work other than
    Ebola, which is the one we are concentrating on, of course?
        Mr. Konyndyk. I will say a couple words on how the response
    piece plays into that and then hand over to Dirk to talk about
    some of the longer-term efforts. It is a huge priority. As you
    know, Ebola has killed a lot of people, but malaria and
    maternal-child health challenges and other things kill far more
    people over time in these regions. So getting those services
    back online is absolutely critical. It is as critical as ending
    this.
        That is one of the reasons why even though some of these
    Ebola treatment units are not seeing a lot of patients, it is
    important to keep them open and keep them operating because it
    provides a safety net in that area and that community to enable
    those other systems to come online. And our teams have been
    telling us that healthcare workers in the normal health
    facilities feel a lot more confident going back to their jobs
    if they know they have a safe place where they can refer people
    who are suspect Ebola cases. And so that is one of the reasons
    why we are keeping those open, even if they are seeing very few
    patients. It is a critical piece of that.
        Mr. Dijkerman. Jeremy, through the response part of the
    operation, has already started expanding infection protection
    control training and commodities into non-Ebola affected
    clinics. But that is part of our response. The other part is
    that we need to make sure the clinics are designed or laid out
    in a way that they have isolation places. They have to be
    worked with to revise protocols, because if somebody comes in
    for a safe birth and you think it is a suspect or probable
    case, how do you deal with that? So there are a lot of things
    that we have to work through and then make sure that the
    healthcare workers in those institutions know what to do to
    feel safe.
        By the same token, I think, as I mentioned earlier, just
    simply opening a clinic is not going to cause people to come
    back. We have seen some opening of schools, and we are seeing
    less than 30 percent of the kids come back. So we need to have
    social messaging and education programs and outreach to have
    people get the confidence again that this clinic, public or
    private, is going to be a safe place for them to go. So we are
    working on that. We are also examining the logistics systems so
    they can manage and get out there in time in the necessary
    quantities the right types of equipment to be able to deal with
    Ebola-suspect probable cases.
        We are working on the transportation system. So if there is
    a case at a health clinic found, how do we get them to a safer,
    better isolation facility like an ETU? So there are a lot of
    elements that we are working on here. They are being laid out.
    Some are in process, as I mentioned, the training, but other
    pieces are still being fleshed out. With some of the partners
    that we have been working with before, we will have to change
    their job descriptions, if you will, to do a bit more to
    address some of these preparedness issues.
        Mr. Serrano. I thank you for your answer, and I want to
    thank you for your service. Our country gets criticized a lot.
    At times, we do some of it ourselves. But when we see people
    like you and see the volunteers and we see the doctors and the
    people that went over, that is America at its best. And we
    should be proud of ourselves and continue our good work because
    when we help others, we help ourselves and vice versa. And I am
    just so proud of the work you do. Thank you so much.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Thank you for the work you do. Thank you for being here
    today appearing before the subcommittee.
        Members may submit any additional questions for the record.
    The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
    Programs stands adjourned.

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                          Wednesday, February 25, 2015.

                            U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                                    WITNESS

    HON. JOHN KERRY, SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs will come to order.
        Mr. Secretary, I welcome you back to the subcommittee.
    There are many serious foreign policy matters and budget issues
    that Members will want to address with you during our time. We
    look forward to your testimony.
        At the top of the list is addressing the threat of the
    Islamic State and terrorists affiliated with ISIL. As Egypt,
    Jordan, and the Kurds in Iraq are retaliating and defending
    themselves against the group's heinous acts, security
    assistance is being delayed by bureaucratic processes across
    many agencies and poor policy decisions by this administration.
    As a result, our most trusted and capable partners in the
    region are not getting the help they need.
        Mr. Secretary, there are no excuses for this delay. I know
    that this delay is not your responsibility alone, and I have
    voiced my concerns directly to the President, as you know. Our
    allies and partners in the Middle East must get the help they
    need now to combat ISIL--not next week, next month, or next
    year.
        In Ukraine, violence continues despite a ceasefire that was
    reached almost 2 weeks ago. We want to hear your thoughts on
    steps being taken to resolve the situation and what assistance
    is needed to support the people of Ukraine and the region to
    combat Russian aggression.
        In Afghanistan, even with a new government in office and a
    signed bilateral security agreement, there are continued
    challenges, and, in fact, the security environment remains so
    unstable that our diplomatic and development personnel are
    pulling back to Kabul.
        In Africa, Boko Haram has not backed down. They are still
    on the offensive, committing unspeakable acts of brutality. And
    while there has been progress in ending the violence caused by
    the Lord's Resistance Army, the leader of the group, Joseph
    Kony, remains at large.
        For nearly a year and a half, you have worked with our
    international partners to put in place an agreement with Iran,
    and the United States must keep the pressure on as a final deal
    is negotiated. I am closely watching the elements of an
    agreement. I know many of my colleagues share my concerns. The
    security of the United States and our steadfast ally Israel is
    at stake.
        I hope you will address each of these policy issues today.
        In addition, we have questions about the budget request for
    your department's operations and foreign assistance programs.
    The total funding level requested for the State Department and
    USAID is 6 percent above last year, but, even at that level,
    you have sacrificed some of the priorities of members of this
    committee to make room for the administration's initiatives.
        It is difficult for me to justify a new $500 million
    program at the United Nations to fight global climate change
    and additional funding for an embassy in Cuba when, once again,
    many programs that have bipartisan support have been reduced
    below last year's level, such as democracy assistance and
    humanitarian programs.
        Another issue we will continue to address together is
    ensuring the safety of our Nation's diplomats. We need
    assurance that funding is being used effectively to address the
    most urgent security needs.
        Next, I want to mention an issue that I know is a priority
    for you, Middle East peace. Negotiating a peace deal requires
    trusted partners, and the recent actions by President Abbas at
    the International Criminal Court have jeopardized the trust
    that has been built over the years. We want to hear how you
    plan to respond to the Palestinians' move to join the ICC. And
    we question why the administration's budget request includes
    another $440 million for the West Bank and Gaza in light of
    these very troubling actions by the Palestinian leadership.
        Finally, I want to mention an issue that is a priority for
    me, a foreign policy issue in our own backyard. The
    administration's budget request includes $1 billion for the
    Central American countries, more than double the amount
    provided last year.
        Many members of this subcommittee understand the need for
    an increased investment in these countries to stop the flow of
    illegal immigration to the United States. I have, visited these
    countries and the U.S.-Mexico border several times and have
    seen this crisis firsthand. We need your help today to
    understand such a large investment and how it would change the
    situation on our border.
        Our neighbor Mexico is on the front lines of combating
    these troubling patterns of immigration from Central America.
    We must do all we can to help Mexico strengthen its borders and
    turn away those traveling illegally from Central American
    countries. We must also support and use the capabilities of
    partners in the region, such as Colombia, to continue to
    develop and implement a comprehensive security strategy.
        In closing, I want to thank you and the thousands of
    diplomats, development officers, and implementing partners for
    what you do every day to promote U.S. interests abroad. You
    have a very difficult job, and all of the members of this
    subcommittee recognize that.
        We also know that the United States must lead in these
    troubling times. It is our responsibility to hold you to
    account for managing the funds this committee provides to
    address these challenges.
        I will now turn to my good friend, the ranking member, Mrs.
    Lowey, for her opening remarks.

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                        Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey

        Mrs. Lowey. thank you to my good friend, Madam Chair.
        And welcome. We are so delighted to welcome our
    extraordinary Secretary of State.
        But before I officially do, if I can ask for the indulgence
    of the chair, I would like to acknowledge the absence of our
    colleague from California, Barbara Lee, who is unable to attend
    this important hearing today. Barbara is a longtime member of
    this subcommittee and an advocate of so many vital issues that
    we deal with in this subcommittee.
        As many of you know, she is not here today due to the
    recent passing of her mother, Mildred Parish Massey. And I just
    want her to know that our thoughts and prayers are with her and
    her family during this difficult time.
        Thank you very much.
        Well, Secretary Kerry, welcome back. You continue to
    represent our country with passion, dedication, energy,
    strength. I really do want to thank you for your tireless
    efforts.
        Since you were sworn in 2 years ago, you have worked
    diligently on Middle East peace and Iranian nuclear
    negotiations; faced nonstop crises in Syria, Iraq, and Ukraine;
    consistently worked to counter terrorism and advocated for
    human rights and humanitarian needs.
        Since the last time you testified, we have seen unspeakable
    atrocities committed by ISIL, terrorist attacks in the heart of
    Europe, multiple humanitarian disasters in Africa, devastating
    refugee crises even on our own southern border, anti-Semitism
    once again dangerously on the rise, and several countries on
    the brink of disintegration.
        Diplomacy and development are needed now more than ever to
    address these challenges and countless other global priorities.
    And, again, I want to say we are fortunate to have a person of
    your intelligence and your caliber in this role today. Thank
    you.
        I want to start with Iran. With the negotiations underway,
    I hope you can update us on progress made to narrow the gap
    since the last extension. We all agree we must make it
    impossible for Iran to make nuclear weapons, so I hope you will
    assure the members of this committee that any final deal will
    verifiably close all possible pathways to a bomb, dismantle
    crucial elements of Iran's current program, and ensure the IAEA
    access to Parchin. The final agreement must achieve these
    objectives.
        Additionally, I would like your assurances that the United
    States will remain in close communication with our key allies
    in the region during the remainder of the negotiations.
        I am also very concerned about any new funding for the
    Palestinian Authority, given President Abbas's unilateral
    actions before the United Nations Security Council and the
    International Criminal Court. I hope you will update us on your
    review of U.S. assistance, which, as you know, is intentionally
    conditioned to discourage provocative actions that undercut the
    peace process.
        Has there been any movement at all toward renewed
    negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis? I know
    how hard you have worked and how committed you are to that
    process. Since Abbas has pursued action at the ICC, do you
    think it is even possible for the parties to get together to
    reach a deal?
        With regard to Ukraine, I am pleased to see the request
    includes strong economic and security assistance to help
    counter Russian aggression. At the same time, I am very
    concerned about next steps should the current ceasefire
    unravel.
        This year's request also includes funding for new
    initiatives in Central America and Africa as well as a
    multilateral fund on climate change, yet the request reduces
    humanitarian and disaster assistance by $750 million compared
    to last year's levels. I look forward to hearing your
    rationale.
        I would also ask that you update this committee on our
    investments in health, women's empowerment, food security, and
    international family planning, all of which are vital
    components to our foreign policy objectives of improving lives,
    expanding economic opportunity, and enhancing our own national
    security.
        Lastly, while an improvement over prior requests, this
    year's budget request again fails to prioritize international
    basic education. I know we agree that educated girls and boys
    better protect themselves from hunger, poverty, disease, and,
    ultimately, extremism. As you have heard me say before, we
    simply cannot build the world we want for ourselves and for
    future generations without education at the center of our
    efforts.
        So I thank you again for your leadership, your commitment,
    your extraordinary hard work, and for being here today. Thank
    you.
        Ms. Granger. I will now yield to Chairman Rogers for his
    opening statement.

                    Opening Statement by Chairman Mr. Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome back to the Hill. I admire your
    tenacity and your physical prowess, putting up with the long
    travels that you constantly are undergoing.
        You are serving as the Nation's chief diplomat during a
    truly tumultuous period.
        Undeniably, the threat posed by ISIS demands our immediate
    attention. We have seen this group of terrorists senselessly
    kill innocent civilians and our partners and allies in the
    fight against ISIS, and they are stepping up threats to Western
    targets. ISIS brutality seemingly has no limits.
        The President has asked other countries to play a prominent
    role in dismantling ISIS, and the U.S. must support our friends
    and allies in this endeavor. I echo the chairwoman's concerns
    that security assistance for Egypt, Jordan, and the Kurds in
    Iraq must be delivered with all due haste.
        When our allies and partners are beating back a shared foe,
    they should be able to count on our country to come to their
    aid. I fear that countries like Russia are all too eager to
    fill any perceived vacuum in U.S. leadership, and I hope you
    can address that concern today.
        Speaking of support for our friends in the Middle East, I
    look forward to hearing from you about the peace process and
    its impact on Israel. You have personally poured metaphorical
    blood, sweat, and tears into this critically important effort,
    working hard to create a conceptual framework for talks between
    Israel and the Palestinians.
        Unfortunately, the Palestinians have largely walked away
    from those talks, preferring instead to pursue unilateral
    actions at the United Nations and to join the International
    Criminal Court. We look forward to hearing what the next steps
    might be to get peace talks back on track.
        As Israel's closest ally, the United States must remain
    strong as nuclear talks with Iran near their conclusion.
    Stability in the region, which is tenuous on a good day,
    depends on a resolution wherein Iran is not taking any steps
    toward a nuclear weapons capability.
        The press reports that some troubling concessions may be
    made to Iran despite the fact that Iran defiantly refuses to
    answer IAEA's longstanding questions about suspected work on
    nuclear weapons designs are troubling.
        I look forward to your thoughts about the process of these
    negotiations, your level of confidence that Iran will comply
    with the terms of any agreement that might be ultimately
    reached, and what actions the U.S. will take to enforce the
    terms of any deal. Certainly, we hope diplomacy yields results,
    but any deal must have teeth to be effective. Economic pressure
    and a credible military option should be fundamental tenets of
    negotiating an agreement.
        And, finally, Mr. Secretary, I regret that we do not agree
    on the administration's climate change policies around the
    world. The President's politically driven anti-coal
    environmental policies have wreaked havoc domestically, sending
    tens of thousands of hardworking Americans to the unemployment
    lines and casting into question our country's long-term energy
    security.
        Coal exports are the one bright spot for the thousands of
    mining families who are facing disastrous economic conditions
    in my district and elsewhere, and yet administration officials
    will not promote coal as part of its Power Africa initiative.
        However, this anti-coal posture by the U.S. will not
    preclude emerging African governments from making use of this
    reliable, ubiquitous, and affordable natural resource. These
    emerging countries, ripe for investment, will instead turn to
    the Chinese for financing and technology to build the same
    coal-fired power plants. With China's terrible environmental
    record, the projects they will fund will be dirtier than if
    American companies were involved.
        At the end of the day, these policies are anti-American-
    jobs and they will not have the intended environmental
    benefits.
        I also heard that the administration is encouraging members
    of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
    to impose stringent conditions on the public financing of
    overseas coal-fired power plants. As coal capture and
    sequestration technology is not yet commercially available,
    these conditions would result in a de facto ban on OECD public
    financing of coal plants in much of the world.
        For example, this plan could preclude funding for highly
    efficient coal plant investments in Pakistan. Given U.S.
    national security interests and Pakistan's role in the fight
    against terrorism, the U.S. should be encouraging affordable
    and reliable electricity that can bolster economic growth and
    job creation in that country, in turn reducing instability.
        In addition, the administration's policies have recently
    denied Overseas Private Investment Corporation, OPIC, support
    to an important energy sector project in Ukraine. I hope you
    can explain how these policies are in the long-term interests
    of our country and our allies and partners.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for taking time to be with us
    today. This committee takes seriously our role in overseeing
    the budget and policies of the Department. We appreciate your
    continued engagement with us.
        Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Ms. Granger. Secretary Kerry, please proceed with your
    opening remarks. Your full written statement, of course, will
    be placed in the record. We are going to have another set of
    votes fairly soon, so I would ask you to summarize your
    statement so we can try to get a full round of questions before
    those votes.
        Secretary Kerry.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you. Thank you very much,
    Madam Chairwoman; Madam Ranking Member, my friend Nita Lowey.
    Mr. Chairman of the full committee, Hal Rogers, thank you very
    much.
        I appreciate the enormously generous welcome from all of
    you, and I particularly appreciate the opportunity to be able
    to be here. I think we have some of the best dialogue on the
    Hill in this committee, and I always appreciate the chance to
    share thoughts with you.
        And that is what I want to do. This is not, this is not a
    combat. This is really a way to find mutual understanding about
    the Nation's priorities. Historically, we have always said that
    politics should end at the water's edge when it comes to
    American foreign policy, and what we are here to find is the
    common ground with respect to our interests and our values as
    we project them in the context of foreign policy.
        And that is what foreign policy is. It is the best
    enhancement of that combination--our values, our interests.
    There is always a balance. Sometimes one takes a little more
    precedence than the other, and people are uncomfortable one way
    or the other. But that is the objective, and, in the end, it is
    to keep the American people safe and keep our country strong.
        You have all laid out a broad array of issues which I
    couldn't begin, obviously, in just an opening comment to
    address. So I am going to leave them aside for a minute and
    honor the notion that you do have a few votes coming quickly
    and we want to really have the dialogue I talked about. So I am
    going to give a very, very short summary.
        We are here to talk about 1 percent of the budget--1
    percent of the entire Federal budget. That is what we put into
    foreign policy. Between USAID and the State Department and our
    general operations, you are talking about $50.3 billion. And
    that 1 percent, my friends, I promise you, will account for
    more than 50 percent of the history of this era when it is
    written.
        So I personally believe it ought to be much bigger than 1
    percent, and I think we have very justifiable reasons for
    making it so. That is not the budget we have in front of us and
    that we are arguing about here today, but I ask you to keep
    that in the forefront of your minds as you think about all of
    these priorities. Because we are robbing Peter to pay Paul
    right now. We are cannibalizing some programs--you have
    mentioned it yourself--to do other things that we need to do
    that are priorities, and I don't think in the end that serves
    America as well as we should be.
        I think that the richest country on the face of the planet,
    which has significantly reduced its deficit, can examine its
    priorities without a sort of rote, automatic process of
    sequestration or otherwise by which we limit real choices. And
    I just want to start with that.
        Secondly, I will say to you very quickly that this is as
    complicated a time as, in many ways, we have ever faced,
    because the world has changed so dramatically in the last 20
    years. Everybody is connected to everybody all the time. The
    numbers of cell phones in even poor countries is staggering.
        And the degree to which people know what other people have
    affects what they want. Aspirations are burgeoning in all kinds
    of places that it was never allowed to even be thought of,
    historically. So, in the Middle East, in the Sahel, in the
    Maghreb, in the Arabian Peninsula, in South-Central Asia, in
    Asia, I mean, countless places, there are pressures being
    released that are changing the dynamics of foreign policy.
        In many ways, we are looking at a world where states are
    behaving in the ways--and within the states, all kinds of
    different entities behaving independently with their own
    agenda, unlike the sort of clarity that seemed to define the
    differences in the course of the cold war--communism, freedom,
    democracy, et cetera. And we know that, in many dictatorships,
    many of these kinds of aspirations were tamped down, through
    tyranny and oppression, but tamped down, so we didn't have to
    cope with them. Now we do.
        It is counterintuitive, but the truth is that,
    notwithstanding the threat of ISIL, notwithstanding people
    being beheaded publicly and burned publicly and the atrocities
    that they are perpetrating--and it is a serious, serious
    challenge to us--notwithstanding that, there is actually less
    threat and less probability of people dying in some sort of
    violent conflict today than at any time in human history. And
    with advances of health and with advances of statehood and
    other kinds of things, we are living in a very different world.
        I am not going to go into all of that now. I just want to
    end my quick opening by saying to you this: I am proud of the
    way President Obama and this administration are, in fact,
    leading on issue after issue after issue. And while some may
    disagree with the choice that is made and some may feel that
    not enough was done in Libya, Syria, or in some particular
    place, I am telling you that never before in our history have
    so many crises and so many trouble spots and so many larger
    policy challenges been managed simultaneously and, I think,
    have been kept on track as much as they are today.
        And I will be specific. In ISIL, we built a global
    coalition that has Arab countries actually flying sorties
    against Arab countries in the Gulf, 60 nations participating in
    an effort we will talk about a bit today.
        In Iraq, we helped to guide and implement a transition of a
    government, with choices made by the Iraqis, their choices,
    their destiny, but we helped to create a framework within which
    they were transitioning from a Prime Minister Maliki to a Prime
    Minister Abadi and a new government that we could work with in
    order to be able to go out and fight against ISIL.
        In Afghanistan, we helped to shepherd a coalition
    government to emerge out of an extremely questionable election
    and close and negotiate a BSA and hopefully be in a position to
    transition Afghanistan.
        In the Iran negotiations, we are not complete. I don't know
    if we will get there. But I know that trying is the essence of
    United States leadership, to find out whether or not there is a
    way with diplomacy to succeed in preventing a country from
    getting a nuclear weapon, and that we owe it to our citizens
    and the world to prove our willingness to try to do it
    peacefully before we have to make other choices if we did.
        On Ebola, there were predictions of a million people dying
    by Christmastime. At the moment that President Obama made the
    decision to deploy 4,000 American troops to go over there and
    help build the capacity to be able to try to prevent that from
    happening, there were huge questions at the time about how fast
    it might spread and how dangerous that might be, what might
    happen.
        But because of American leadership pulling together
    countries all over the world, you can now look at Liberia and
    Guinea and Sierra Leone and see huge reductions in infection
    and see that, indeed, Americans are not waking up every day to
    the news of some new infection and some new challenge.
        On AIDS in Africa, we are on the cusp because of our
    additional efforts, which you have shared, you have helped
    lead, on the cusp of an AIDS-free generation of children.
        In Ukraine, we have held together, cobbled together, pieced
    together, cajoled, and managed to effect a series of sanctions
    that have--while not stopping everything altogether, no,
    nevertheless, has given Ukraine an opportunity to survive as an
    independent and sovereign Ukraine and has cost Russia a lot.
        Mr. Putin may be able to look at what is happening today in
    Donetsk or Luhansk or Debaltseve and say, wow, I am going a
    great job on short-term tactical stuff. But I will tell you
    this: Russia is not doing great right now--50 percent reduction
    in the ruble's value, $151 billion of capital flight,
    predictions that Russia will be in recession this next year,
    extraordinary restraint on growth. And that has happened
    because of the coordinated sanctions that we put in place.
        Now, there is more that I could run through. I am not going
    to do it all now, but I will just tell you: Between TPP and
    TTIP, we are pursuing two of the most ambitious and important
    trade agreements in recent history.
        Forty percent of global GDP is wrapped up in the TPP. If we
    can achieve that, we will have a definition of the new
    standards of doing business in the region. And even China has
    said to us, if this works, if it comes together, could we join
    it? We are far better ultimately seeing a China join an
    upgraded set of standards for doing business and rules of the
    economy and trade than to not do that and have others write
    those rules or have no rules at all.
        So I can run through, finally, on climate--we can talk
    about climate, Mr. Chairman. I hope we will in the course of
    this. China, up until last year, was an opponent to doing
    anything about climate change. But because we reached out and
    worked with them, starting literally a month and a half after I
    became Secretary, President Obama was able to go over there,
    and China joined in a deal to announce its targets for the
    reduction of emissions and fossil fuel dependency and a
    commitment of a goal to achieve alternative, renewable, and
    efficient energy.
        It is a huge impact. And because of that, in Lima, Peru,
    other countries came together and joined in to say, we have to
    make Paris negotiations a success this year.
        So I would say to you that, whether it is in the Arctic,
    the Arctic Council, which we will assume the chairmanship of in
    about a month and a half, or whether it is on any of these
    things I have listed--there are many things I haven't listed--
    cybersecurity, health, health structure--around the planet, the
    United States of America is proving that, when we lead, we can
    make a difference. And the world needs that leadership.
        And I hope that in this budget we can reflect the fact,
    ultimately, that the 1 percent we put into these endeavors
    which result in so much benefit in the long term, so much
    security to Americans, will not be nickeled and dimed at a
    critical moment where we need to bolster yet more those things
    that we are able to do, like the broadcasting, the
    countermessaging of ISIL, the counterterrorism initiatives we
    need to employ, the deprivation of the pool of recruits for
    ISIL. These are intensive efforts, and they will require a
    financial commitment. And we need to understand the connection.
        Mr. Chairman, I think you said something about the
    importance here of taking the budget role seriously. I know you
    do. But we need to connect the dots for everybody in America of
    the money spent out of this committee and the United States
    Congress on the security of our Nation that comes to us through
    the work of diplomacy and the work of development on a daily
    basis.
        And, frankly, we have been hurrying ourselves in the past
    years, where there has been a reduction from the population
    growth rate and the need and demand for that kind of
    investment.
        Madam Chair, thank you.

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        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        I will start with this question. The administration wants
    countries in the Middle East to step up and play a greater role
    in the fight against ISIL, as we do. But as Jordan and Egypt
    and the Kurds are taking on a significant role, and are often
    successful, they are not getting the assistance they need.
        The White House claims that there are robust security
    relationships with these countries, but I would argue the U.S.
    is risking our long-term strategic alliances. The Kurds and the
    Jordanians are very frustrated with the amount of time it takes
    to get military aid to them. I know you know that because they
    have argued that with you, and they have certainly called me.
        And the President's policy on Egypt continues to hold
    equipment such as the F-16s that are paid for and are clearly
    needed in the fight against ISIL and other terrorists in the
    region. I wanted to ask you, why is the administration
    continuing to withhold equipment for Egypt that would help them
    combat ISIL and other threats?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we are pushing very hard. In fact,
    that is a decision that I think is on the President's desk
    anytime now.
        We are tied, as you know, by Congress to a certification
    process that I have to exercise, and I can certify or I can
    waive and make a decision what to move. But we have broken
    certain things out.
        One of the things we were waiting for, frankly, Madam
    Chair, was the announcement of the parliamentary elections.
    Now, we finally got that announcement. There were a number of
    people in prison. There has been some harassment of Embassy
    employees. There have been some other--as you saw, Abd el-
    Fattah was just sentenced to 5 years for taking part in a
    protest. And, you know, these are things that matter to us,
    obviously--the Al Jazeera journalists who are imprisoned, the
    NGOs who were required to be listed.
        So we have been talking as reasonably and as frequently as
    possible with our friends in Egypt. I have a very good working
    relationship with the Foreign Minister, Sameh Shoukry. I have
    had several meetings with President el-Sisi. I am very grateful
    to President el-Sisi for his significant cooperation with
    respect to a number of security issues.
        And we want to get them these additional items. And I
    suspect, Madam Chair, that decisions will be made shortly to
    try to come to cloture on the, sort of, final choices of how we
    move on that.
        So Egypt has presented one set of challenges. One thing I
    want to make clear: I believe Egypt is helping enormously with
    respect to counterterrorism. Egypt is doing a huge amount in
    the Sinai. Egypt has been helpful with respect to Gaza. And
    Egypt has been essential with respect to some elements of the
    peace process, Israel and Palestine. Egypt is could cooperating
    very significantly with Israel, and there is great intelligence
    cooperation and so forth.
        So, by and large, I believe it is important for us to
    provide some of these items, and I believe decisions will be
    forthcoming that will set out how we may in fact proceed
    forward to do that.
        On Jordan, I think you know this; we have had many
    conversations about it, Madam. I am frustrated, as you are
    frustrated. And they have been a little frustrated, and I
    understand that.
        Before I received your letter, I met several weeks ago with
    Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh, whom you all know well, and we
    signed a memorandum in which we agreed to put $1 billion a year
    for the next 3 years into the relationship with Jordan. This is
    before we received the letter from you.
        In addition, before I had received the letter from you, I
    had already initiated a review based on my conversations with
    Foreign Minister Judeh to find out exactly what item was on
    request, exactly where it was in the chain of delivery, and why
    it might have been delayed.
        And I have already--I think just about the time I got your
    letter, I received the answer to all of those questions, and I
    now have a breakdown of all of those items--tier-one
    priorities, tier two, tier three.
        And so the tier-one items are now mostly on the way or in
    possession. F-16 spare parts, for instance, pilot survival,
    night vision, et cetera, are happening. The UH-60 Black Hawks
    we are trying to figure out. We will shortly notify you with
    respect to some formal procedures on that.
        So I could run through the long list with you. I think it
    is better, probably, to do that in a classified forum. But I
    can just tell you that we are on top of this and moving, and
    these items need to get there as rapidly as possible.
        Ms. Granger. We talked about this last year at the hearing,
    and I remember last year you were talking about these needed
    reforms and arrests of journalists and progress on, say,
    parliamentary elections. And those things have been done,
    literally----
        Secretary Kerry. Some. Some.
        Ms. Granger. Some.
        Secretary Kerry. I think two----
        Ms. Granger. Not all.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. Two people were released. But
    for every person that gets released, regrettably there have
    also been announcements of life imprisonments for one thing or
    another.
        Look, we are beginning to understand much better the
    restraints that President el-Sisi operates under. And there are
    some. And I think we are beginning to understand, also, some of
    the difficulties of independent judiciary and independent
    efforts that reflect on how the process is working there.
        What is important is Egypt is committed as a major partner
    in counterterrorism. And Egypt is critical, its viability is
    critical to long-term stability of the region. I think the
    United States needs to reflect that, and the President does in
    our policy. And I think we are seeing that happen in what is
    unfolding now.
        Ms. Granger. You may see it happening. I certainly don't.
        And you know we have had numerous conversations. The staff
    has asked questions about this. The situation with the Kurds
    has gone on for months and months and months. And every time we
    ask, we hear, we are making some progress.
        Secretary Kerry. Well----
        Ms. Granger. The Egyptians came back to me and said, we
    don't know what you want, we have no idea. Because we have
    urged them to play a part, and they certainly are. The King of
    Jordan, for goodness' sake, has put on his uniform and is
    flying the planes.
        So I think that the slowness of the process is simply very,
    very disturbing. And I would like from you a weekly status on
    this very immediate threat. It gets worse and worse. And
    everyone that we hear talk, the generals that come and say, we
    can stop it now, but at some point we can't stop it.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Madam Chair, let me just say to you
    respectfully on this issue of the Kurds--because I have heard
    this for a while, and I think it is a little out of proportion,
    if I can say so.
        We have provided more than 34 million rounds of light and
    heavy ammunition to the Kurds, 15,000 hand grenades, 45,000
    mortars, 50,000 RPG cartridges, and 18,000 rifles. Thousands
    more rounds of ammunition and weapons have been identified for
    donation and are being prepared for delivery now. This is in
    addition to more than 300 tons of arms and ammunition that the
    Government of Iraq provided and delivered directly to the
    Kurds.
        We have also provided 25 MRAPs to our Kurdish partners.
    Hundreds of airstrikes have hit ISIL elements in Mosul and the
    Sinjar Mountain and other areas of Northern Iraq, which has
    provided relief to the Kurdish forces. We have established a
    joint operations center in Erbil that has facilitated
    unprecedented cooperation with the KRG.
        We worked to get--I personally was on the telephone with
    President Barzani and others to work to create a corridor which
    helped the Kurds to be able to get into Kobane and help provide
    relief there and ultimately help win the victory of Kobane.
        We have provided $208 million in humanitarian support to
    deal with displaced Kurds. That is an estimated 850,000 people
    in the Kurdistan area. We have provided 110 tons of
    humanitarian supplies to them. We have provided extensive
    diplomatic engagement with----
        Ms. Granger. I am going to stop you.
        Secretary Kerry. Yeah, but I am just----
        Ms. Granger. I know what you are going to say, and I know
    what you are saying. You know my position. I think you know the
    position of Members of the Congress. And so we will continue
    this as we go on, but I certainly want to have other people
    have the opportunity to ask questions.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
        As you know, many of us have had many, many briefings on
    Iran, many of which are in a classified setting. So, obviously,
    the questions that I am going to ask do not include some items
    that have been discussed in a classified setting.
        But we know that the United States is at a crossroads with
    Iran. The overall package must ensure we have closed all
    pathways to a bomb. You have said repeatedly that no deal is
    better than a bad deal.
        I just want to make a couple of points, and then ask you to
    respond.
        Can you assure us that a good deal includes the following:
    dismantling Iran's centrifuge infrastructure; dismantling its
    heavy-water facility at Arak and closing all covert options;
    containing strict verification--
        Secretary Kerry. I am sorry. What was the second?
        Mrs. Lowey. The second one, dismantling its heavy-water
    facility at Arak and closing all covert options; containing
    strict verification and fully detailing the possible military
    dimensions of its programs; allowing full and unfettered access
    to any facility, including Parchin, Fordow, Natanz, and other
    facilities, military or otherwise; have phased-in sanctions
    relief to ensure compliance; and, last, no less than 15 years
    in duration.
        It has been reported that the Supreme Leader has said, and
    I quote, ``I would go along with any agreement that could be
    made. Of course, if it is not a bad deal.'' This is, of course,
    the same Supreme Leader who repeatedly refers to Israel as the,
    quote, ``barbaric Jewish state'' that, quote, ``has no cure but
    to be annihilated.''
        Many experts with whom I have spoken don't think that
    Khomeini is really capable of making a deal, but I know how
    hard and how focused you are in trying to make a good deal.
    And, again, you have said that no deal is better than a bad
    deal.
        Do you really see any evidence that the regime is seriously
    interested in giving up its nuclear program and working with
    the international community?
        You have indicated this is the last phase of negotiations
    and that the administration would not support another
    extension. You have just returned from Geneva. Is this still
    your assessment?
        You have already stated that a good deal provides us at
    least 1 year to respond should Iran renege on the deal and
    break out. I still don't understand how we arrived at 1 year.
    Why is 1 year enough insurance for us, for Israel, for the
    region?
        I know how hard you have been working on this issue. I,
    again, respect your commitment, your thoughtfulness. But if you
    could answer these questions, I would be most appreciative.
        Secretary Kerry. I will try to answer as many as I can as
    fast as I can, Congresswoman Lowey.
        Let me go to the end. That is probably a good place to
    begin, which is this question of breakout in 1 year and do we
    know it is enough and why do we know it is enough and so forth.
        Let me make clear what ``breakout'' is in the context that
    we are talking about. And I want to make clear, also, when we
    talk about 1 year, we are talking about 1 year for a period of
    time that we believe sufficient to build the confidence about
    our access and about the workings of the program and to
    understand that there isn't a covert track.
        But ``breakout'' in the way that many of us thought of it
    when I was here in the Senate in the 1980s, late 1980s and
    1990s--we were debating still the Soviet Union in the 1980s
    with Ronald Reagan and certain missile systems and so forth--
    ``breakout'' meant your ability to go with nuclear weapons,
    that you broke out and, man, you had a nuclear weapon right
    away and you would go do something. That is not what we are
    talking about here.
        What we are talking about here is--``breakout,'' as we
    apply it to the 1 year we are looking for for this period of
    time, is the time it takes from when they decide from their
    constrained and restricted and verified level of enrichment, if
    they were to kick everybody out and say, we are going at it
    now, and it is just obvious they are going at it, that would be
    a breach the moment they did it. You don't need 6 months. The
    minute they kick you out, you know they are in breach. So if
    you have a year, you have a lot of leeway.
        But that is a timeframe from when they make the decision to
    not comply to try to get a rush to enough fissile material for
    one potential weapon. Remember, enough fissile material for one
    potential weapon, 1 year. That is not having a weapon. That
    could be years away from having a deliverable weapon or a
    tested weapon or a weapon that you have to be concerned about.
        So if you have a year from the time in which one of your
    inspectors discovers they are not complying or a year from the
    time that one of your intrusive cameras or visits or visible
    inspections of the mining or their uranium or their production
    or their centrifuges shows you something is up, you can slap
    sanctions right back on and worse. Or, of course, you always
    have all the options we have that exist today. We are not
    giving up one option.
        When you say to me, do I know that 1 year is sufficient
    insurance with respect to the ability to regulate, you better
    believe it. And do you know what? You know what we have today?
    You know what Israel has today? Two to 3 months. And the reason
    it may be 3 or 4 months right now is because of what we put in
    place with the interim agreement.
        Now, remember, Prime Minister Netanyahu thought the interim
    agreement--quote: ``deal of a century for Iran.'' He thought it
    was the worst thing that ever happened. And some people in the
    Congress echoed that when I came up here to talk about the
    interim agreement.
        Well, guess what? Every aspect of the interim agreement has
    been complied with. The then-20-percent-enriched uranium that
    threatened Israel is now gone, reduced to zero. The Fordow that
    then we didn't know what was going on in it that threatened
    Israel is now inspected on a daily basis. Arak that then
    threatened it as a potential producer of plutonium and a track
    for weapons production has been stopped dead in its tracks, and
    they have not been able to further any commissioning of Arak.
    That makes Israel safer.
        I mean, it defies imagination to make the argument that, if
    Israel was threatened with a 2-month breakout period and they
    are now at more months and we are trying to get a year, that
    they are not safer.
        Now, that is just the beginning of the many pieces of this
    agreement. And I am not going to go into all of the agreement
    right now, because we don't have an agreement. We may not get
    an agreement. They may not be willing to do some of the things
    that you listed that you think are the ingredients of a good
    agreement. And I am not going to sit here, in fairness, Madam
    Ranking Member, and go through each of those items because I am
    not going to negotiate here. I want to negotiate with them and
    see where we are.
        But of course we have to have a resolution of Parchin and a
    resolution of Arak so it can't produce plutonium on a bomb path
    and a resolution of Fordow so it is not a secret, hidden
    enrichment facility and so forth. And those are the things that
    we are arguing about right now.
        Now, the point I would make to everybody is, in the year
    2000s, 2003, under the Bush administration, they had a policy
    of no enrichment. It was American policy. There were 164
    centrifuges then spinning--2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008--
    all during the Bush administration. Nothing stopped. What
    happened? They kept building. Now they are at 19,000 that could
    function. There are not that many functioning.
        And so, obviously, we pursued a policy for a period of time
    under a very tough administration that didn't hesitate to use
    its muscles when it wanted to, didn't use its muscles on that,
    and the fact is we wind up where we are today. Iran knows how
    to make fuel. They know how to do this.
        So we have to decide, how do we get the best shot at being
    able to constrain from the production of a nuclear weapon over
    the course of the future years? Now, that is what we are trying
    to do, and we are trying to close off each pathway to the
    bomb--through Natanz, through Fordow, through Arak, and covert.
    And the test of that will be in the days ahead.
        Mrs. Lowey. I just want to thank you very much. And,
    obviously, we could have a longer discussion, but I guess we
    have votes right now.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, we are going to have a longer
    discussion, I have no doubt about that, if we get an agreement.
    And if we don't, we will have a longer discussion about the
    things we are going to need to do as a result.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Chairman.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Mr. Secretary, let me talk about Iran.
        A New York Times article last Thursday cited a recent
    report by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Iran was
    still refusing to answer longstanding questions about suspected
    work on weapons designs.
        As you say, there is a very short time remaining for
    conclusion for that framework agreement. And their continued
    refusal to provide IAEA with answers about past nuclear weapons
    work, that is troubling. Because if they refuse to answer, how
    can we be sure that whatever is agreed upon they will live by
    and abide by?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, there are a bunch of questions the
    IAEA has asked that are going to have to be answered, and we
    have made that very clear. The IAEA is going to have to get
    answers to questions.
        What is more critical than answering, than having some
    confession of, oh, yeah, we were doing this back then, is
    getting the ability to know what they are doing now with
    clarity and going forward so that you can prevent any
    development whatsoever.
        We presume, I mean, we all have pretty good information, we
    are in a nonclassified venue here, but I think I can safely say
    that we have made our presumptions based on the information we
    have about what they were doing. So we are certainly proceeding
    with eyes open that it is our belief they had a weapons track,
    and we understand that we need to respond accordingly in
    whatever it is that we do here.
        Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, how can we trust Iran, given the
    lack of compliance with past agreements with IAEA? Your own
    deputy secretary, Tony Blinken, has testified before the Senate
    that during the Joint Plan of Action, there were situations
    that, quote, ``We believe there were violations of the JPOA,''
    end quote. How can we trust them given that?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, there have been no violations of
    JPOA. I am not sure what he is referring to. There may have
    been a place or two we had a question, but they were answered.
    We raised one issue. There was one centrifuge which was being
    fed at one point in time which we learned of, and we learned of
    it because of the verification that we had, which, by the way,
    is far less comprehensive than the verification we want to get
    ultimately.
        But we did learn of it, which is an indication that there
    was transparency and that we had accountability. And the moment
    we mentioned it, it was really based on a misunderstanding of
    what was current. Under the JPOA, under the interim agreement
    they are allowed to pursue the current level of what they are
    at. This, we argued, was new, and we won the argument, and they
    stopped, and that was the end of it.
        But, look, a fundamental basis of your question, Mr.
    Chairman, you said, how can we trust them? This agreement is
    not based on trust. No arms control agreement is based on
    trust. Remember, Ronald Reagan's famous ``trust but verify.''
    That is a euphemism for make sure you are able to know what is
    happening. And that is the guideline of this negotiation. It is
    not based on trust.
        You may be able to build some trust. The last year of
    compliance has, frankly, helped people to have a sense of
    seriousness of purpose here and intent. The fact that they did
    destroy their 20 percent uranium stockpile. The fact that they
    have provided access. The fact that they did stop work on Iraq.
    I mean, all of these things begin to build a little bit of
    confidence that this is serious.
        But we have to build a structure here that gives us great
    confidence going out into the future that we will know what
    they are doing so it isn't relying on anybody's word or on any
    level of trust.
        Mr. Rogers. A lot depends on what happens, obviously. So we
    wish you the best.
        I yield.
        Secretary Kerry. A lot does depend on it. I agree with you.
        Ms. Granger. Short question.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me try and make it short.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Getting back to what Chairwoman Granger
    was talking about and the issue of Egypt and Jordan and our
    relationship with them. We know Egypt, as an example, 82
    million people, we know there are human rights concerns. We
    also know the United States of America has the best country in
    the world and a democracy that works, and we want to make sure
    that we deal with issues of human rights in the countries that
    are our allies. But Egypt is very critical to the Middle East.
    They are critical to Israel. They are critical to a lot of our
    goals and agendas.
        I just want to ask this question. We want to export our
    democracy, but we are going into countries that have thousands
    of years of traditions. And yet it seems that if they aren't
    exactly following our model, that we are slow to be involved.
        So my question would be, we want to support democratic
    issues in these countries, but what lessons have we learned,
    based on what has happened in Egypt especially, by our
    democracy efforts. In fact, you had the Muslim Brotherhood
    taking control and the country was almost falling apart. And
    yet Egypt was trying to take control of their country with all
    the issues that they were dealing with as far as unrest and
    terrorism.
        Should we act more deftly with those countries, based on
    their traditions, while trying to influence them with our
    traditions, and hold back giving them the resources they need
    to take on ISIS or a terrorism situation?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I personally don't believe so,
    Congressman. I think that we have to be very, very careful and
    very thoughtful about each country's ability to transition and
    measure our expectations in a very thoughtful way. We should
    not be automatic and sort of simplistic about that endeavor. We
    certainly shouldn't stereotype and fit everybody into the same
    box because every place is different. And the lessons certainly
    that I have learned in the last 10 or 15 years are that we
    really need to think very, very carefully about what kind of
    political space, what capacity there is for the embrace of our
    vision and at what pace.
        We sometimes come crashing in with a sense that we can sort
    of hold out X amount of aid and say, you have got to do this
    and this in order to do it. And they kind of look at us
    nowadays increasingly in many countries and scratch their heads
    and ask a lot more questions than they used to and are not
    quite as impressed by the level of our leverage because,
    frankly, it is significantly diminished, if you want to know
    the truth.
        The Emiratis and Saudis are putting 20 billion bucks a year
    into Egypt, and we are putting a $1.3 billion or whatever it
    is, $1.6 billion. And so they look at it and they say, well, do
    we have to put up with all these headaches since we have got
    these other folks we could turn to and we will get some help
    there?
        President Putin just paid a very visible, well-received
    visit to Egypt, and there was an exchange, an agreement for
    some very significant purchase of weapons and so forth. They
    would prefer to buy them and have the relationship with
    America, but they feel like we are sometimes asking more than
    the market will bear at the rate at which we are looking to
    them to----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. We need to evaluate that policy. And
    Sisi said a very positive thing, which I think is important in
    the Muslim world. He stood up to his mullahs and said that you
    have to stop this type of radical jihad. That is a good message
    that we hope the Islamic community will send to the small 1
    percent of terrorists that are trying to take the world over.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I encouraged them strongly with
    respect to a number of people they needed to release. They
    released them. I encouraged them to rapidly move to set the
    date for the election. They set the date publicly for the
    election. We encouraged them to do a number of other things. I
    won't go into all of them here. But to the best of our
    awareness, they worked hard to try to do those things. They got
    some done and couldn't get others done, but we know they made a
    bona fide effort on some of them and ran into various
    roadblocks.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you. I am going to recess the hearing
    for members to vote. If you will return as quickly as possible.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. We are going to come back?
        Ms. Granger. We are going to come back. The hearing is now
    in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Ms. Granger. The hearing will now come to order. I will now
    turn to Mr. Dent for his questions.
        Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. Good to be with you.
        First, I wanted to commend you for your good effort in
    Afghanistan with respect to the presidential election where you
    helped mediate the aftermath, and successfully, I might add.
    And so I want to thank you for your leadership there. And I
    agree with what you just said moments ago on TPP and TTIP,
    about how essential those agreements are to setting standards
    and advancing our interests globally.
        On the issue of Ukraine, however, I wanted to raise a real
    concern that I have. This very recent cease-fire agreement
    facilitated by the Germans and the French seemed very desperate
    and feckless, to be quite honest. I believe the West has been
    humiliated. As much as I admire the Germans and the French,
    they have taken the idea of arming the Ukrainian Government off
    the table. Putin knows that. These cease-fires will last as
    long as Vladimir Putin wants them to last, and that has been
    the case.
        It seems that we, the U.S., have outsourced the
    negotiations to our friends, and the results have not been very
    good, and I am deeply concerned about that. I think there needs
    to be greater leadership. The West has been humiliated. And at
    some point, I believe we are going to have to provide some kind
    of lethal defensive weapons to the Ukrainian Government,
    antitank weapons, antiartillery. And I would like to hear your
    perspective on that because I just feel that this recent cease-
    fire has been really a major setback for all of us.
        And I do appreciate your leadership on the sanctions
    regime, and I know our European friends always haven't been as
    accommodating. So I appreciate hearing your comments.
        Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate that
    very, very much.
        In fairness, I think that Chancellor Merkel has actually
    been leading very forcefully in this and working very, very
    hard to make sanctions happen at times where others in Europe
    were not quite as prepared to hold the line, take the measures.
    So I think that Germany's leadership, France's engagement with
    Germany and leadership has been important.
        I think it was important for them to try to see whether or
    not they could make Minsk meaningful. And they, themselves,
    took the position that if Putin didn't adhere to it and was not
    prepared to take the steps of the Minsk, that then there is
    plan B.
        So plan B is really tougher sanctions and additional
    support to Ukraine. And I think I would not count everybody out
    in terms of whether or not, as a result of what has happened,
    they are automatically against the provision of some defensive
    assistance to Ukrainians. But there is not yet clarity to the
    breach, the total breach with respect to the Minsk effort. The
    prisoners were exchanged the other day. Some weapons have
    pulled back. Some battalions are now assembled on the border,
    not inside. So it is a little unclear, and I think they and we
    are waiting to see how this unfolds in the next days and hours.
        I talked at lunchtime yesterday with the Foreign Minister
    of Germany, who had just come out of the meeting with the
    French, the Ukrainians, and the Russians. And it was his sense
    that they had sort of mapped out a few potential steps over the
    next few days.
        So we are getting to that critical decision time,
    Congressman. The President has a number of options that he is
    asking his team to evaluate, and he will make the appropriate
    decision, together with discussions with Chancellor Merkel. In
    fact, he may well have talked to Chancellor Merkel today or
    yesterday.
        Mr. Dent. Can I also just quickly add, speaking of Germany,
    we have Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. I am very
    involved with the German-American Caucus and study group on
    Germany, and we have serious concerns about the State
    Department's decision to reduce by half the funding for the
    Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. This program is
    essentially maintaining a strong relationship between our two
    countries.
        Secretary Kerry. Right.
        Mr. Dent. Chancellor Merkel, I know, raised the issue of
    this cut when she visited the U.S. Can you give us the
    rationale why the State Department has gone against clear, I
    thought, congressional intent and unilaterally moved funding
    away from the Bundestag exchange program?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, it is still going to remain the
    largest exchange program between the United States and any
    country in the world. The academic year last year had about 710
    total participants, 350 Americans, 360 Germans. And the funding
    has been a pretty level $4 million.
        The reduction, in our judgment, would allow us to meet some
    other high priority demands for exchanges that we are having to
    support. One is like Ukraine, for instance. We are trying to
    get Ukrainians to be part of it. We are trying to bolster our
    networks in the entire periphery around that region. So whether
    it is Georgia, Moldova, or the Baltics, other countries, we
    want them to be able to participate. So it is really trying to
    allocate according to priority and available resources.
        Now, if you want to help us and plus it up a little bit,
    there is nothing we would like more than to keep it at the same
    level. But this is where I am talking about robbing Peter to
    pay Paul. All those are virtuous and important efforts, and I
    think you can see that.
        If you can get some students out of each of those other
    places and it makes a difference in the long-term capacity
    building of those countries and their outlooks, that is
    spreading the wealth a little more. And as I say, the German
    program will still remain the largest program we have.
        Mr. Dent. Thank you.
        Yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you. Mr. Serrano; I am sorry. I am
    wrong.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I apologize.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you. And I want to shift
    gears a little bit. I know that the line of questioning has
    focused mostly on the Middle East and Iran, but the
    subcommittee obviously has other focal points, including food
    aid and disaster relief. And so I wanted to just touch on where
    we are in our progress with reform. In recent years we have
    seen increased momentum to push for reform of our international
    food aid programs and make them more effective and more
    efficient and save more lives in less time. And so while
    obviously the focal point is being more fiscally responsible, I
    mean, hopefully our goal is also to make sure that we can end
    hunger and provide nutrition to more people. At the same time,
    obviously, that helps our own local farmers and agriculture and
    production.
        The President's budget request included several reform
    measures that allow for increased flexibility within those
    programs and increased funding for local and regional purchase
    of food aid, and that has bipartisan support. But my question
    is, do you believe that the reforms that have been proposed,
    the increased flexibility for the type of and delivery of aid,
    are those essential for responding to the crises that we are
    facing today, the ones that we might encounter in the future,
    and really enable us to effectively respond to food insecurity,
    and at the same time moving towards resilience and self-
    reliance?
        Secretary Kerry. We hope so, Congresswoman. I mean, that
    was the purpose of these reforms, as you know. The effort is to
    try to be able to deliver more faster with greater local buy-
    in. It increases our reach and it increases the cost savings.
        Now, the proof will be in what happens. I mean, right now
    it can take from 4 to 6 months to buy and deliver U.S.
    products. And we know there was a certain upheaval here about
    this. But if you allow more cash-based activities, then USAID's
    food programs could become much faster, much more nimble, much
    more responsive, and it actually helps to build some capacity
    and infrastructure in the communities you are trying to create
    a sustainable cycle for. So we think it is the right direction
    to move in, and it allows us to reach 2 million more
    beneficiaries, about 25 percent increase.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. And just briefly because I don't
    have a lot of time left, and I am the ranking member on the
    Legislative Branch Subcommittee and have to go back to that
    hearing, what steps is the Administration taking to ensure that
    the Helms amendment is correctly applied and that U.S. foreign
    assistance that may be used for abortions in the case of rape,
    incest, and life endangerment and to make sure that preventing
    pregnancy in those cases is our primary goal?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I mean, we evaluate it in every
    single country and every program where we are. I am not aware
    that there has been a specific complaint that something is
    lacking or missing in that effort. Is there something specific
    that you are----
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. There has been--not on the part of
    the Administration--an issue surrounding the misinterpretation
    of the Helms amendment that prohibits the use of funds for the
    performance of abortion as a method of family planning. That it
    has been incorrectly implemented, essentially to become a total
    ban on funding for abortion. And so that is a--I hate to use
    the term ``nuance''--but there is a difference between
    prohibiting abortion entirely and prohibiting its use as a
    method of family planning.
        Secretary Kerry. I understand.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. And so that is the interpretation or
    misinterpretation I am concerned about, and I am wondering if
    that has been addressed.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, let me do this. I haven't had that
    specific conversation, frankly. Let me investigate that. And,
    of course, I have a----
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. By the way, it predates this
    Administration.
        Secretary Kerry. I am not taking it personally actually. I
    remember this debate when I was up here. I just want to find
    out exactly, because I haven't been part of any conversation
    that has examined some shortfall in it. So let me find out
    where we are.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
        Secretary Kerry. We will examine that.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Madam Chair, I yield back.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, thank you. And thanks for coming. I
    know you are chairing something. I appreciate it. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mr. Secretary, let me bring you a little bit closer to
    home, to this hemisphere, Cuba. As you know, U.S. law states
    that if certain conditions are met by the Castro regime, the
    embargo in essence goes away. The President has been stating,
    he said in the State of the Union that he wants the embargo
    just to go away, and he wants Congress to lift the embargo
    without fulfilling those conditions that are in the law.
        So which of those conditions does this administration
    oppose? Or which of those conditions does this administration
    believe that the Cuban people do not deserve? Because let me
    tell you what they are. They are the release of all political
    prisoners. They are the legalization of political parties,
    independent press, and independent labor unions, and free
    elections.
        Those are the conditions in law. The administration has
    said that we don't need to meet those conditions, that Congress
    should get rid of the sanctions without those conditions. Which
    one of those conditions does this administration think are too
    much to ask or unfair or the Cuban people do not deserve?
        Secretary Kerry. None. They deserve them. There is none
    that is unfair. We should ask for all of them. What this
    administration believes, however, is that the embargo has not
    produced them and will not produce them. In fact, it is the
    exact opposite. We believe that if you lift the embargo and
    engage more thoroughly with Cuba, you have a much higher rate
    of probability and a much faster set of transformations that
    can take place. I believe that very strongly, personally. I
    believed it when I was here in that Senate.
        I think we have actually helped repression by shutting it
    down. It is much easier for regimes that are not held
    accountable, that don't interact with the world, that sort of
    are shut off to be repressive than places that have been opened
    up where there is engagement and countries are involved and
    families----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Let's talk about that, if I may, Mr.
    Secretary. As you know, I apologize for interrupting but we
    don't have a lot of time.
        Secretary Kerry. Go ahead.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. So as of the time of the President's
    December 17 announcement, there have been hundreds of political
    arrests, including more just this weekend, 200 last weekend,
    which include the arrests of over 80 Ladies in White, more than
    90 from the Cuban Patriotic Union, including very well-known
    activists. By the way, at least 5 of the President's so-called
    53 political prisoners that the President said is one of the
    things that he got out of this deal for the United States and
    for Cuba have been rearrested since then. And yet it seems that
    the administration is continuing to negotiate, even though the
    regime has not only continued their repression, has been
    escalating their repression, but even those that the President
    said were kind of the success story, that the Castro regime
    released, a number of them have been rearrested.
        So, it would seem that the administration is looking
    forward to normalization at all costs, regardless of what the
    regime is doing. And is there anything that the Castro regime
    would do, could do, to stop this administration from
    normalizing? Which, as you know, normalizing relations with the
    United States for a terrorist regime, that is a pretty good
    gift. So what could they do, what should they do, what can they
    do that would stop the President and this administration from
    normalizing?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, first of all, we don't know that
    they are currently engaging in international terrorism. That
    evaluation is being made.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, Mr. Secretary, there was a shipment
    of arms that went to North Korea that even the U.N. stated.
        Secretary Kerry. Yes.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. So, I mean, I am sure you are aware of
    that, Mr. Secretary.
        Secretary Kerry. I am aware of that. But the standard by
    which you all wrote the law with respect to what has to be
    measured for international terrorism is whether or not they
    have engaged in acts of international terrorism in the last 6
    months.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. You are aware that the Colombian military
    confiscated arms recently that were in the hands of the FARC?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, this is all being evaluated right
    now.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. You are aware of that?
        Secretary Kerry. I don't know who----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. That would qualify as an act of terrorism.
        Secretary Kerry. I don't know yet, I am not going to
    prequalify what is being appropriately judged with the input of
    all of our Intel Community. All the relevant agencies are asked
    to contribute to this. You will be well, obviously, advised and
    briefed with respect to what the conclusions are on it. And I
    don't know what they are yet because they are engaged in that
    endeavor. That is a prerequisite, obviously, for the ability to
    move forward.
        But that said, let me just say to you that we are well
    aware of the Ladies in White and the challenges internally.
    Actually, I interpret that as sort of a reaction to, it is a
    manifestation of the fear that might come. But I think there is
    a much greater opportunity to be able to hold them accountable
    and deal with that when you have the scrutiny that will come
    with additional transactions, commerce, presents, money in
    hands of people there, people traveling, open up standards that
    come with this. And there is a much greater ability.
        I mean, that is how we have operated in many other
    countries. I mean, Richard Nixon opened up and normalized our
    relations with China. We still have huge disagreements with
    China. We normalized and opened up our relations with the
    Soviet Union. We had huge years during the Cold War where we
    were fighting them in a cold war. But we were able to do more
    as a consequence of that engagement. And ultimately, both
    changed. One disappeared, the Soviet Union, and the other has
    been increasingly partnering, opening up, engaging in different
    ways, even as we continue to have some problems.
        So these things don't change overnight, and I don't expect
    that will, nor do you. The question is, are you better
    positioned to be able to fight for the things that matter to
    you? Can you leverage people's rights? Can you send an
    ambassador in to raise the profile on a particular human rights
    challenge? Can you do more to be able to do that?
        We have not backed off of one of those priorities. And, in
    fact, when Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary Jacobson was
    there, she met with civil society. They didn't like it, but she
    met with them.
        And so we will continue to press our case, but we also
    think we are far more advantaged in doing so if we are having
    diplomatic relations and engaging and opening up so that a lot
    of folks from Florida, from New Jersey, from other places who
    have family there would be free to visit, bring ideas, bring
    their openness, bring their money and other things, which will
    change life in Cuba. I have no doubt about it.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. And, Mr. Secretary, my time has clearly
    expired. I would not use China as a model to talk about when we
    talk about human rights. That is precisely what we do not. When
    you talk about the success of China, I will tell you that is
    not a success.
        Secretary Kerry. Please, don't put words in my mouth. I
    didn't say----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. You mentioned China. I did not, sir.
        Secretary Kerry. I did. I mentioned China as a country with
    whom we have normalized diplomatic relations----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, we do.
        Secretary Kerry [continuing]. And huge differences, is what
    I said, huge differences, both on a political system, on human
    rights, on business practices, cyber. Run the list.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yeah. And has that helped the human rights
    condition of the Chinese people?
        Secretary Kerry. But we have diplomatic relations.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Has that helped the human rights condition
    of the Chinese people? That is a discussion for another time
    because my time is up. I would argue, Mr. Secretary, that it
    has not.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service.
    Though the origins of Serrano and Diaz-Balart come from two
    different islands in the Caribbean, whenever we follow each
    other we usually stay on the same island for discussion.
        So, on the issue of Cuba, let me congratulate the
    administration for seeing the light that this country hasn't
    seen for over 50 years and understanding that we do better when
    we invade people with blue jeans and sneakers and ideas and
    trade than when we try to isolate them. And I think that you
    are right, we helped whatever went wrong in Cuba throughout
    these years by isolating them. I hope to see that change come
    true.
        So I have two questions for you and put them together.
    Without telling me what I am not supposed to know--I can't
    believe I am saying this on TV, we are supposed to know
    everything, right--but without telling me what I am not
    supposed to know, how are those negotiations going with Cuba
    and what is it that we want the Cubans to give us in return for
    opening up diplomatic relations?
        And secondly, total my opinion, and this is totally my
    opinion, we know that our differences with Venezuela stemmed,
    one, from the style of President Chavez, but it also came
    strongly from their relationship to Cuba. So if we get close to
    Cuba, does it open the door to get closer to Venezuela?
        Secretary Kerry. Let me answer both of those. First of all,
    the negotiations regarding with Cuba right now are really
    fairly straightforward regarding diplomatic relations. It is a
    process of diplomacy, an automatic process regarding
    normalization. The parameters of that were negotiated
    originally, which involved the release of the prisoners. There
    is obviously a concern about anybody who may have been
    rearrested or even the Ladies in White. That issue will be
    raised for certain.
        In addition, the Internet agreement and other components of
    what was already agreed on will be on the table. But the most
    important part of this now is really the pro forma stuff of
    diplomatic relations, visas, travel, the access and process by
    which your diplomats are going to be treated. That is sort of
    the hard stuff of diplomatic relations and that is what is
    being talked about right now.
        With respect to Venezuela and Cuba, I will tell you that I
    talked to President--I actually shouldn't--the President of a
    Latin American country to tell him that we were engaging in
    this policy. And there was almost a whoop of excitement on the
    other side of the phone saying, wow, that can really help
    change things throughout Latin America. If America can begin to
    have a different relationship with Cuba, it will change what
    has been a tool, a weapon that has been used against us by
    other countries in Latin America. And so, in fact, this
    President thought that he was going to undertake to call
    President Maduro immediately and talk to him and say, hey,
    don't get left behind, look what is happening, be part of the
    future.
        Now, that hasn't happened yet, and we have serious concerns
    about what is going on in Venezuela. And obviously we are sort
    of perplexed by the and frustrated by the frequency with which
    President Maduro seems to want to blame everything on us when
    we have, in fact, done nothing. And every time he is in
    political trouble he tries to play the anti-American card and
    starts citing some mythical coup or something that isn't taking
    place.
        It would be great if he could realize the benefits to the
    people of Venezuela. The people of Venezuela are currently
    being hurt by the policies that he is pursuing, and we hope
    that he will realize that we are ready to engage in normal
    relationship of nations and become engaged in helping to deal
    with the problems of his people, the poverty, the opportunity,
    the education that is needed, other things, if he wants to
    engage in a legitimate relationship.
        But there is no doubt that this was well received
    throughout Latin America. Quite surprised by many countries.
    Very welcomed by all.
        Mr. Serrano. Yes, it was. It was. And I can tell you----
        Secretary Kerry. Except, perhaps, Venezuela that may be
    highly unsettled by it because it sort of leaves them quite
    isolated.
        Mr. Serrano. But they are isolated, yes, but still unable
    to blame our country for its treatment of Cuba, which has been
    used by many Latin American countries throughout the years. So
    that is why you saw this whooping, you know, this excitement.
    And I think that your statement that the countries in Latin
    America would sign up, a lot of Americans just don't understand
    that Cuba became a symbol to them--to them--of American
    oppression. And so when that gets settled, then Latin America
    has to look at itself again.
        And we have to look at the fact--and I will close with
    this--that Latin America in our generation, Mr. Secretary, went
    from dictators to elected people who didn't care about their
    constituents to leftist people who built schools and got
    elected and built hospitals and got elected. And so if we
    understand that and we embrace that, regardless of how left
    they are of us, we may accomplish more than what we are
    accomplishing in Cuba.
        And I just want to congratulate you because I have spent 25
    years in Congress saying it is a wasted philosophy and policy
    and it serves nothing. And to see this President take this bold
    step, it is historic and I appreciate it and I thank you.
        Secretary Kerry. Thank you, Congressman. I appreciate it.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        The Secretary has to leave here at a quarter till 5. That
    is 15 minutes. And we have two members that have not asked
    questions.
        Mr. Fortenberry.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Secretary, welcome.
        I want to share with you a story and return to the Middle
    East. In 1979, when I was a young colleague student, I lived
    for a time in Egypt, and it was the year of the peace accords
    between Israel and Egypt, and there was a celebratory
    atmosphere of this newfound relationship with America.
        But I lived for a time in a remote oasis area with farmers
    in the western desert. And one of the farmers, their English
    was very limited, so you did the best you could, but one of the
    farmers wanted to show me something. And he took me to one of
    his neighbors, and he grabbed his neighbor's hand, and he took
    his wrist and he bowed and placed his neighbor's wrist right on
    his face. His neighbor was a Coptic Christian and he was a
    Muslim, and his neighbor had the tattoo of Christianity, which
    is common among Copts, on his wrist. He was trying to tell me a
    couple of things. One, that they were brothers, that they were
    friends, and also that I was welcome there in that village.
        This story is very hard to reconcile with what is happening
    today, particularly with the emergence of ISIL and this 8th
    century barbarism with 21st century weapons that is not only
    assaulting life, but it is assaulting this sacred space of
    human dignity, this right, this value of being able to hold
    reasonably held beliefs and exercise them in religious
    tradition.
        So once ISIL is hopefully contained, degraded, and
    eliminated, we still live with the difficult problem of
    assuring a religious pluralism and that the ancient peoples who
    have been there, who have every much right to be there as
    anyone else, Christians, Yazidis, other religious minorities,
    as well as innocent Muslim people who are being victimized by
    this, a new day should shine forth whereby this right of
    conscience and religious freedom should be respected.
        In this regard, in the State Department, I have a
    suggestion and a plea for you. You have an Ambassador for
    International Religious Freedom, but I understand that his role
    is not as perhaps robust as it could be in reporting directly
    to you. This assault by ISIL is not only an assault on human
    dignity and life, it is an assault on civilization itself. So,
    again, once it is contained, this ideal of bringing forth a new
    and robust understanding of protecting the rights and dignities
    of all persons, no matter their religious faith. Middle Eastern
    Christianity is shattered and someone is going to have to pick
    up the pieces here.
        If we have time, I would like to turn to the question of
    how the Kurds can help in this regard because they have been
    doing a very significant heavily lift in protecting that
    population, as well as the Yazidis. But if you would care to
    comment on the Ambassador for Religious Freedom and the
    position that they have in the State Department.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, Rabbi Saperstein is as distinguished
    an advocate as there is, and he has access to me any time. I
    mean, I have enormous respect for him. He knows that. I worked
    very hard to get him to be able to come in and take this job
    on. And the last thing he is going to suffer for is lack of
    access to me, I assure you.
        This is a huge priority within the State Department. I also
    appointed the first faith-based liaison office with Shaun Casey
    filling that role. We are deeply involved in trying to pull
    interfaith efforts together in order to appropriately stand up
    for religious freedom, but also to harness the full measure of
    force that comes from leaders within various religions to start
    speaking out about the true Islam, about interfaith abilities
    and needs, and so forth.
        So I am very excited about it. The position has existed
    under prior administrations, but I think everybody would agree
    that Rabbi Saperstein is hugely appropriate to this moment. And
    I expect nothing but good results.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Well, I agree. I hear you saying, I am
    interpreting your words, is that you have elevated and
    intensified the positioning of this Ambassador within the
    dynamics of the Department. And I think he, as well as whoever
    comes along, needs to have a seat at the table as the
    rebuilding begins in the Middle East so that not only stability
    takes place, but the very basis for that stability of respect
    for human dignity and rights as expressed in religious freedom
    is right there next to everything else, defense considerations,
    economic considerations, human dignity considerations.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, it is at the center of the struggle
    we are involved in.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
        Secretary Kerry. And we all need to pay attention to that.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Stewart.
        Mr. Stewart. Madam Chairwoman, thank you.
        And, Mr. Secretary, thank you, sir. Thank you for your
    many, many years of service. Thank you for your patience today
    as we have had votes and other responsibilities. And though you
    and I might see the world differently in some respects and
    politically we may not agree on everything, I do respect the
    leadership that you are providing in the administration now.
        In framing my question, I would like to tell you that I
    spent 14 years as an Air Force pilot, as a military officer.
    During that time, I was the pilot rep for the implementation of
    START treaty with the former Soviet Union. It was a great
    experience. I learned a lot.
        One of the things I learned from my military experience in
    general from that experience with the START treaty and,
    frankly, from some of my experience here in Congress is that
    for a treaty or an agreement to work there has to be a modicum
    of trust between the two parties. They may be adversaries, they
    may not like each other, but both of them must want the treaty
    to be successful and, again, for there to be some element to
    trust.
        And to return to a topic that we have discussed here, but I
    would like to pursue it in a slightly different way, I am not
    sure that we have that trust with Iran. And let me explain what
    I mean by that. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. They have
    been recognized as such for more than 30 years, Hezbollah,
    Hamas. The list of them working against our interest is very
    long.
        And so I would ask, to you, sir, two questions. I could go
    on for quite a long time telling you what you already know,
    that they have been and, I think, view us as an enemy in many
    regards, perhaps in most regards. They have a long list of
    working against our interests. Can you give me a single example
    of where they have worked with us as a partner or with any of
    our allies in a constructive way?
        And the second question would be, how do we reconcile the
    damage that I believe this has done with our primary partner in
    the area, and that would be our friend of Israel, and their
    suspicions of these negotiations and whether we protect their
    interest as well?
        Secretary Kerry. Well, first, let me begin, Congressman, I
    want to thank you for your service. I really appreciate, like
    everybody does, anybody who puts on the uniform and spends a
    few years.
        Mr. Stewart. I have got to tell you, flying jets was a lot
    more fun than what I do now.
        Secretary Kerry. As a pilot since I was in college, only
    out of currency since I have been Secretary of State, I agree
    with you.
        Let me just say to you that you raise two issues there. Is
    there any issue where they have worked with us? Well, they are
    working with us on this right now. They put the interim
    agreement in place over a year ago now. I think it was around
    November we cut the treaty--the deal, not a treaty. So it has
    been more than a year. They have done everything they said they
    would do in the context of that.
        They have also kept secret those things that we thought
    needed to be kept secret as we worked through what could be a
    final agreement. I mean, we operate under the rule nothing is
    agreed until everything is agreed. And that means that whatever
    we may have agreed over here we have got to keep, because it
    may require one or the other to say yes to something that may
    not be very popular back home, but may be defensible. But it
    isn't defensible until you have the whole agreement.
        They have not burned us with respect to that, nor we them,
    and that has facilitated a kind of dialogue that is pretty
    direct and open and allows us now to bear down on some of these
    things. They recognize we have difficulties. We recognize they
    have difficulties. And we all have bottom lines. That is in any
    negotiation.
        So the interim agreement is one example of trying to work
    together on something. Now there are some things they have done
    that help us, but we are not coordinating with them. We are not
    working on it. We haven't asked them to do it. But, for
    instance, fighting ISIL. They are totally opposed to ISIL, and
    they are, in fact, taking on and fighting and eliminating ISIL
    members along the Iraqi border near Iran and have serious
    concerns about what that would do to the region and so forth.
    So we have, at least, a mutual interest, if not a cooperative
    effort.
        But in the end, I emphasize to you, your second question
    was how to reconcile the damage that they may have done or that
    they could do to Israel in this. That is making a presumption,
    if you don't mind my saying so, that we are not going to have a
    deal here that, in our judgment, will absolutely protect
    Israel. It is not just Israel, by the way. It is us. It is
    every country in the region.
        And it is not just us at the table trying to do this.
    People need to focus on this. Russia is as adamant as we are
    that Iran cannot engage in proliferation activities. China is
    at the table. China has been helpful in this process, as has
    Russia, by the way. Even in the midst of the fight over
    Ukraine, Russia is working to help hold Iran accountable and
    get a favorable agreement, as is China. And then we have
    Germany, France, Great Britain, all at the table, all as
    equally concerned about where this goes.
        Then you have all the countries in the region, Turkey,
    Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Jordanians, they all
    have a stake in this.
        So we are not flying by the seat of our pants, nor are we
    proceeding in a solo basis here. And everybody understands the
    implications of the potential of their having a nuclear weapon.
    Israel is not the only country. Others worry about it. So they
    all want to see that we are trying to negotiate an agreement
    which will meet a high standard of accountability and eliminate
    the four pathways to a bomb: the Natanz pathway, the Iraq
    pathway, the Fordow pathway, and then, of course, the potential
    of a covert pathway.
        Now, that is complicated. We have to proceed. But you have
    to, also, measure this--I say carefully--against alternatives.
    Presumptions may be being made here by some people that there
    is an alternative way that you somehow get them to--you know,
    it is like ``Men in Black,'' you can hold up a little flash pen
    and flash it and they will forget everything they have learned
    about fuel cycle or nuclear weapons or nuclear production,
    peaceful nuclear production.
        Do you think that is going to happen? Is there any notion
    of reality in anybody's mind that says that we are going to
    negotiate a deal where they have eliminated all of their know-
    how? And if you don't have verification and if you don't have
    insight as to what they are doing, there is a greater
    likelihood they dig deeper under a mountain and do something
    that you don't know and you wake up one day and, boom, they do
    have something.
        So you have got to ask yourselves what are the real
    alternatives here. I hear people talk about dismantlement. I
    mentioned the Bush administration from 2003 on where their deal
    was no enrichment. But they just enriched away, and they
    centrifuged away, and they went from 164 to 19,000. They did
    that while they had sanctions, while there was a prohibition on
    the policy, while there was a U.N. resolution. And so you have
    got to stop and say, what is the best way to be able to
    guarantee they don't get a bomb for the period of time to build
    in the future as we begin to change a lot of other things,
    hopefully?
        Now, I will tell you this. I am not going to go into all of
    it now. I want us to see if we have a deal before I put all the
    arguments out there. But I am telling you there are many more
    arguments than have been heard about why this is important, and
    there are many more arguments than you will probably hear next
    week. And we need to wait and see what deal we have before you
    can really measure what it is that is at stake here and what
    the options are and how you feel about it.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We have run out of
    time. Mrs. Lowey has an issue she would like to bring up.
        Mrs. Lowey. I don't think we have time to discuss it today,
    but I would like to raise one point. I know Andy Lack was just
    appointed head of the BBG, a talented person, very capable. I
    know that you are investing $5 million, as announced by the
    President, in Center for Strategic Counterterrorism
    Communications. We have failed. We have lost this war. And I
    don't get it. As a proud Member of Congress, as a proud
    American, I don't understand why we can't communicate more
    effectively.
        I have been asking this question for a very long time. We
    are losing the public relations war. And while I think it is so
    important, we can't discuss it today. It is called the Center
    for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications. It is a $5
    million program. We have $742 million in program done by BBG.
    Together, I think we should figure out how we can be more
    successful.
        The President brought this up at the conference last week,
    and I would love to get a briefing and understand why we are
    losing this public relations battle.
        Secretary Kerry. Well, I really want to engage in that
    discussion with everybody. Russia today can be heard in
    English. Do we have an equivalent that can be heard in Russian?
    That is a pretty expensive proposition.
        They are spending huge amounts of money with speaking
    languages that other people understand and putting out
    information that other people understand in other countries
    around them, and we are not. We are beginning now to do this
    with respect to ISIL, and so we are putting out things in Urdo,
    we are putting out things in Somalia, we are putting out things
    in Arabic.
        But this is a big enterprise, folks. I am all for it. The
    President is all for it. But it takes money. And we have got to
    be prepared to invest in sort of that kind of marketing, if you
    will, and the penetration. What we have allocated now under BBG
    goes to Radio Free Asia, it goes to TV Marti, it goes to all
    these various entities, it is split up, while the real
    challenge is not as much there, to be honest with you, as it is
    in some of these other places.
        So we will all agree we ought to sit down and rethink it,
    recommit, figure out how we are going to do this most
    effectively. We haven't cornered the market on the wisdom of
    that. But you are right, Andy Lack is a very capable guy. We
    are hopeful that we are going to have a rejuvenation of that
    effort. And we are sure to come back to you and talk to you
    about some of the ways we could try to augment our initiatives.
        Mrs. Lowey. Let me just say in conclusion, because we are
    not going to have the discussion today, Walter Isaacson is a
    pretty talented guy too. He headed it for a couple of years
    before.
        Secretary Kerry. Very talented guy.
        Mrs. Lowey. We somehow have failed here, and I would be
    interested in having a serious discussion.
        Secretary Kerry. I will tell you what, I will commit to
    come to you with a program that will lay out, together with all
    of those folks you have just named, a stronger approach on
    this, and I hope we can have a meeting of the minds on it.
        Madam Chairwoman, with your indulgence, can I just say that
    we remain as deeply committed now as I was in the very
    beginning to trying to work something between the Palestinians
    and Israelis. It has been made very, very difficult by virtue
    of the Palestinian accession to the ICC, which we strongly
    advised them not to do and said would be acting against their
    own interests and the interests of a long-term resolution.
        As everybody knows, there is a critical election in Israel
    in the next weeks. We are assiduously not engaged and do not
    want to get in the middle of that. It is up to the people of
    Israel to make their own decision. Our hope is, however, that
    when that decision is made and a government comes together, we
    will have an opportunity to get back to the real work of peace
    and of finding a road forward.
        And the United States is deeply committed to that as
    before, and we are working right now to help make sure the
    Palestinian Authority doesn't collapse because of the lack of
    revenues and the stress that they are under. But make no
    mistake, that remains a major priority of many nations in the
    region, and I hear it wherever I go.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Secretary, as we adjourn the meeting, I
    have a request. Last year the House established the Benghazi
    Select Committee. It is in all of our best interest for the
    select committee's work to be completed as soon as possible. So
    your assistance in ensuring sufficient resources are dedicated
    to respond quickly to the select committee's requests is
    appreciated.
        Thank you again for your time today. This concludes today's
    hearing.
        Secretary Kerry. Thank you so much.
        Ms. Granger. Members may submit any additional questions
    for the record.
        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs stands adjourned.

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                                               Tuesday, March 17, 2015.

               UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

                                    WITNESS

    HON. ALFONSO E. LENHARDT, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES AGENCY
        FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms.  Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign
    Operations, and Related Programs will come to order.
        I want to welcome the Acting Administrator of the U.S.
    Agency for International Development, Ambassador Al Lenhardt.
        Ambassador, we look forward to hearing your testimony and
    certainly with working with you.
        USAID responds to some of the most challenging problems in
    the world, from tackling emergency situations, such as the
    Ebola outbreak in West Africa and the humanitarian crisis in
    Syria, to addressing long-term development needs in some of the
    poorest, most conflict-stricken places around the globe. I am
    proud of our men and women who serve overseas in our military
    and USAID missions, the Peace Corps, and our embassies around
    the world. I want to ensure that the United States continues to
    lead on the world stage.
        Real leadership requires the willingness to review what is
    going well and what isn't. I believe there are many areas of
    USAID that could see improvement that I hope we can work
    together to address. My first concern is that there are many
    U.S. Government agencies involved in health, development, and
    disaster response activities overseas. I am concerned that
    responsibilities may not always be clear, that agencies may
    duplicate each others' efforts, and coordination may not occur
    as it should.
        As you well know, as a former ambassador to Tanzania, an
    embassy that was attacked in the 1990s, desk space at U.S.
    embassies comes with a high price because of the security
    required. Overseas positions for all agencies should be
    carefully considered to ensure that the work gets done
    effectively and efficiently by the agency with the most
    appropriate skills to address the problems at hand. There is no
    room today certainly for replication of budgets.
        Another challenge that former Administrator Shah tried to
    address, is with the Feed the Future Initiative, and I hope you
    will continue to do so with other programs as well.
        In many countries USAID tries to do too much. The Agency
    needs to continue focusing on reducing the numbers of programs
    it manages and do those very well. You should terminate the
    programs that don't work or may be causing you to spread the
    Agency's people and resources too thin. I would love to work
    with you on some of those.
        My next concern is that it is difficult to get access to
    USAID. There are many American businesses, faith-based
    organizations, and universities that have development ideas to
    bring to the table, and we consistently hear complaints that
    they can't find ways to partner with the Agency. So I would
    hope you would look at that.
        Ambassador Lenhardt, with your military background and your
    time spent as a diplomat, you bring a great perspective to the
    Agency. I hope you can discuss some of the management
    challenges that are directly related to your budget and we can
    work together to solve them.
        The budget request includes $22 billion that USAID manages
    entirely or partially. This includes a $269 million increase
    for USAID's operating expenses. It is, frankly, very unlikely
    that our subcommittee's allocation would allow us to address
    all the areas identified in the request, so we will have to
    work closely together to prioritize many competing demands in
    international development, health, and humanitarian programs.
        I want to close by thanking you and the men and women of
    USAID as well as your implementing partners, who are committed
    to solving some of the most difficult global development issues
    around the world, often in very dangerous places. All of us on
    this subcommittee understand and appreciate that work.
        I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
    opening remarks.

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                        Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey

        Mrs.  Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Welcome, Acting Administrator Lenhardt. As a fellow New
    Yorker, I welcome you to our subcommittee and I look forward to
    discussing the President's vision for development and global
    health.
        We cannot build the world we want for ourselves and future
    generations without a strong, stable, and well-resourced
    development policy. USAID has spent the last several years
    endeavoring to rebuild itself as a premier development agency
    on the front lines of poverty reduction and disease eradication
    while leading international efforts to advance economic
    opportunity, health, education, food security, and democracy
    activities.
        The efforts of you and your AID colleagues, made possible
    only by the continued generosity of the American taxpayer, make
    us all proud. With so many challenges around the world it is
    our responsibility to make sure that USAID has the tools to
    prioritize global needs, effectively implement its programs,
    and evaluate what is and what is not working. And when
    challenges arise, Congress and the Agency need to speak frankly
    on how to remedy them.
        This year's request includes a significant increase for
    Central America to address the root causes and rapid increase
    in migration of unaccompanied minors. How does this initiative
    build on previous efforts in the region and to what extent are
    the Central American countries prepared to partner with you? I
    know we agree that our chances of success are significantly
    enhanced when local governments are fully engaged and prepared
    to contribute. I hope you will also address the long-term plan.
        I understand USAID cannot nor should be present in every
    country in the world. Nevertheless, is this year's dramatic
    increase for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia an attempt to make
    up for the fact that USAID has not been very active in Eastern
    Europe in recent years? Given Russia's continued provocation
    against Ukraine and its neighbors, is the requested assistance
    still adequate? How will USAID prioritize any new funding?
        I was very pleased that the Congress provided $2.6 billion
    in emergency funding to help combat the Ebola outbreak in West
    Africa. The U.S. response continues to showcase USAID's ability
    to lead international humanitarian efforts, particularly during
    a time of crisis.
        The outbreak also reinforced that robust national health
    systems are an absolute necessity and that without one in place
    crises are far worse, require far greater resources, and are
    likely to reappear. I hope you will address how we can build an
    appropriate health infrastructure to prevent another disease
    outbreak.
        I also need to raise two additional issues. First, basic
    education funding. The fiscal year 2016 request once again cuts
    current levels despite widespread agreement on the importance
    of these programs to the United States and millions of children
    around the world. I hope you will commit to working with me on
    both the amount of resources and the quality of USAID's basic
    education programs this year.
        The second issue is family planning. Giving women some
    measure of control over the size and spacing of their families
    has long-lasting benefits to them, their children, and their
    communities. I hope we can all work together this year to
    address this basic need without partisan fights and divisive
    policies.
        In closing, as I have said before, the strength of USAID is
    and always has been its dedicated public servants from the top
    down. While I know we will all miss Administrator Shah's
    tireless efforts, I look forward to working with you and to
    building on the many endeavors started under his leadership.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.

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        Ms.  Granger. Ambassador Lenhardt, please proceed with your
    opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
    remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
    full written statement will be placed in the record. And we
    understand that votes are going to be called about 3:30, so we
    hope to have everyone be able to ask their questions. Thank
    you.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
    Member Lowey, and members of this subcommittee, for allowing me
    to discuss the fiscal year 2016 budget request for the United
    States Agency for International Development.
        Thanks to strong interagency partners and bipartisan
    support in Congress, we are fortunate to have leaders
    throughout government who understand the importance of
    development to our own Nation's security and prosperity. At
    USAID, we believe that by partnering to end extreme poverty and
    promoting resilient democratic societies we are helping
    developing countries transform into peaceful, open, and
    flourishing partners for our own Nation.
        As I testify today, my colleagues at USAID are supporting
    that mission and representing our country in dynamic and
    challenging environments around the world. We are rooting out
    threats before they reach our shores, unlocking flourishing
    markets for American businesses, and connecting our young
    people and universities with global opportunities, all for less
    than 1 percent of the federal budget.
        This year's budget request advances our country's interests
    while responding to pressing national security priorities all
    over the world, from Nigeria to Honduras. By leveraging public-
    private partnerships and harnessing innovation we are
    maximizing the value of each and every dollar entrusted to us.
    At the same time, we are making difficult choices about where
    our work will have the greatest impact, shifting resources and
    personnel to better advance our mission of ending extreme
    poverty around the world.
        These investments have delivered real, measurable results
    on behalf of the American people. Our Feed the Future program
    has helped 7 million farmers boost their harvests with new
    technologies and improve nutrition for more than 12 million
    children. Power Africa has mobilized $20 billion in private
    sector commitments and encouraged countries to make critical
    reforms. And thanks to a groundbreaking investment in child and
    maternal survival, we are on track to save the lives of up to
    15 million children and nearly 600,000 women by the year 2020.
        These efforts are at the very core of the new way of doing
    business at USAID. After 5 years of reform, I am confident our
    Agency is now a more accountable and effective enterprise. Yet,
    I am equally humbled by the challenges before us and recognize
    that we have much more work ahead of us. That is why my focus
    will be on one core discipline, management. I will push our
    Agency to be more innovative and strategic in our effort to get
    better every day, because while we may not have all the right
    answers, we are asking the right questions. Above all, I will
    ensure that we are good stewards of the precious resources
    entrusted to us.
        Spending over 30 years in the Army and becoming a two-star
    general, and later as an ambassador to Tanzania, may not be the
    typical path to a job in development. But even though my
    journey was different from the development professionals with
    whom I have the privilege to serve, my conclusion is the same:
    America's investment in development is money well spent. Saving
    children from hunger and disease elevates our own moral
    strength. Empowering entrepreneurs to innovate and create new
    markets advances our own prosperity. Strengthening civil
    society not only gives a voice to the oppressed, but also makes
    our own citizens more secure.
        Through our work, we are opening up new paths to
    opportunity, energizing the global economy, and reducing root
    causes of insecurity. In doing so, we are advancing the values
    that unite the American people and the people throughout the
    world.
        As we work to tackle these global challenges, we will value
    your counsel on how we can become even more accountable and
    more effective.
        Thank you for your kind attention. I look forward to
    answering your questions.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you so much.

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        Ms.  Granger. As you were talking about that, I remember
    when I first came on this subcommittee and we were getting
    ready to go and Mrs. Lowey was the chair. I received a call
    that was from someone named Bono who said ``don't ever forget
    you are saving lives.'' There is a difference, so thank you
    very much.
        I will go into questions. I have one question. Ambassador
    Lenhardt, I know that you are aware of a recent press report
    that the State Department funded an organization that has been
    involved in trying to influence the upcoming elections in
    Israel. USAID was not involved in that. But the question is,
    how would you ensure that USAID wouldn't use U.S. taxpayer
    dollars to fund organizations trying to influence elections,
    including some of those of our closest allies?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        We are not involved in that situation. And before we get
    involved in any program, project, or activity we do a thorough
    assessment as to the appropriateness of it. In our involvement
    and our activities, we determine what are the outcomes and are
    they legitimate outcomes, are they ones that we want to see,
    and will they advance our committed work? And where the answer
    may be no, we don't get involved. It is that simple. So this
    particular case, I can assure you that we are not involved in
    that.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you, very much.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs.  Lowey. Thank you.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, the Ebola crisis
    has reinforced how important functioning and capable country
    health systems are. They are important not just for the
    citizens of that country, but as Ebola has shown, they are
    important to the safety of U.S. citizens as well. I was glad to
    hear that the Liberian Government is planning their own
    initiative to rebuild their health system.
        If you could share with us the current planning for the
    emergency fiscal year 2015 Ebola resources to focus on getting
    these countries' health systems at least back on their feet, if
    not better than they were before they were devastated by Ebola.
        Number two, how are we building a focus on stronger health
    systems into all of our global health work? And how does having
    disease-specific funding impact work on cost-cutting issues
    like health systems? And lastly, how is the Global Health
    Security Agenda working to ensure that we are ahead of the next
    disease outbreak, and what role is USAID playing vis-a-vis
    other U.S. Government agencies?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Ranking Member Lowey, for your
    question. It is one that certainly we have given a great deal
    of thought in terms of our response. Your question is
    multifaceted. I will tell you at the top of this, the men and
    women who responded from our disaster assistance team were very
    effective in coordinating a response that became one that
    involved CDC, Department of Defense, State Department, and as
    many other interagency teams in orchestrating the coordination,
    the collaboration of all of our efforts aimed at stopping the
    disease.
        At the height of the disease in Liberia there were 100-plus
    cases per week. I am happy to report now that we are near zero
    in terms of getting down to a point where we can say that this
    has been conquered. Guinea and Sierra Leone are being handled
    by the French and Brits, but we are assisting there as well. We
    are not walking away from that. We want to ensure that we
    respond as much as possible across the entire breadth of this
    epidemic.
        With respect to resiliency of institutions in Liberia, we
    are focused on that based upon the excellent and the great
    support we got from the Congress in providing for the Ebola
    emergency supplemental. Thank you very much for that. Those
    resources will be used, in fact, to bring back and reconstitute
    some of the institutions. Not all of them, as President
    Sirleaf, who was in my office about 3 weeks ago, she wanted to
    rebuild the entire country, and I said that was not possible,
    but we are certainly looking at how we can, in fact, bring you
    back up to a level where you then can take it forward and bring
    about your own increase in institutions. Medical is one, but
    also the economy, how might the economy be brought back,
    because there was a significant hit to the economy in Liberia
    as a result of this incident.
        My point in all of that is to say simply, this is a disease
    that America responded to with great resources, but also a
    determination to ensure that we bring it down. We feel very
    satisfied at this point in time that things are working, and we
    will continue to do that to the point where we finally get this
    thing under control and we can put it behind us.
        With respect to the Global Health Security Agenda, it is
    about detecting, early detection. It is about responding in an
    appropriate way as quickly as we can and preventing future
    incidents of this kind of epidemic.
        Mrs.  Lowey. I yield.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Crenshaw.
        Mr.  Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Let me just follow up on that question, and it is part of
    the debate that takes place in the foreign assistance
    community. I think indirectly she was referring to this. On one
    hand, this committee will appropriate money to specific sub-
    accounts for specific purposes. Some people say that is good.
    Yet, it doesn't take into consideration that there are other
    issues in the countries we are trying to help, like a health
    system. The other side of the debate is that if you had more
    flexibility then you could deal with the specifics, but you
    could also deal with some of the broader issues that you might
    run into in a particular country, which they might need more.
        I am wondering what you think about that. We have
    historically done a lot of specific appropriations, but from
    time to time, we have realized that we miss out on the broader
    picture. But if you have too much flexibility then we have a
    hard time maintaining our oversight capability and knowing
    where the money goes. Are you familiar with that debate, and is
    that something you have thought about? Where do you come down
    on that?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
        I have given a great deal of thought to this. But the
    reality is, in a constrained fiscal environment and competing
    priorities we can't do everything. We have to be much more
    selective and focus on those areas where we think we can do the
    most good. As we, in the case of a particular country, are able
    to get them up to a level where they then can make it on their
    own, middle-income status, then we will work ourselves out of a
    job in that country and move on to other locations where we
    can, again, do the same kind of goodness.
        The reality is, as many opportunities that we want to help
    children, help mothers, help education, as was mentioned
    earlier, we can't do everything. And so we have to be a lot
    more thoughtful about where we can have solid impact. That is
    what the Presidential policy directive 6 was all about. How do
    we stop salami slicing across the world where no one gets well
    and how do we focus then on those countries where we can bring
    them up and then move on to others where we can bring them up--
    --
        Mr.  Crenshaw. I figured that. It does make sense that,
    when you do that specifically, you are also helping the country
    in a broader sense as well and you are more focused.
        I have got a little time. Let me ask a more specific
    question about wildlife trafficking. You know that is a crisis.
    It has become a multibillion industry, and there is a lot of
    crime involved and criminal syndicates. I am pleased to see the
    administration has taken this under its wing. Our subcommittee,
    under Chairman Granger's leadership, in 2014 appropriated $45
    million and last year $55 million.
        Sometimes I hear that money is not getting down to where it
    needs to be to really deal with the problem. I know it is a
    complicated problem. On one hand, you look at Nepal, a very
    poor country, but, as I understand it, 2 out of the last 3
    years has had no poaching. I doubt if they spend $45 million or
    $55 million.
        So can you give us a little update on how that money is
    being spent, and how effective that is? Because I think we want
    to continue this fight. They tell me that almost every 15
    seconds an elephant is killed illegally in Africa. It is a huge
    crisis. So touch on how we are doing with the money we have
    already spent or we have appropriated. Is it effective?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you for the question, Congressman.
        Our programs are aimed at helping countries develop their
    own capacity in terms of how they are going to manage many
    types of conservation. How do they protect their heritage in so
    many cases? And so it is about training, how do we get training
    focused down to those rangers and other responding patrols who
    are looking for poachers within a particular country.
        You mentioned Nepal. It is about how do we get the Nepalese
    to handle their own situation, how do they then communicate to
    local residents so that local residents become part of the
    solution. It is about conservation. It is about land
    conservation where citizens within that country understand
    their participation and their need to protect the local
    environment so they keep poachers out. They know, by the way,
    who the poachers are because many of them are taking money
    right there on the scene. And so how do you back away from
    that?
        So the money that we have--and again, competing priorities,
    constrained budgets--it is focused on how much good can we do.
    In a perfect world, could we have more? The answer is yes. But
    the reality is, with as many priorities, that would not be
    wise.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. But it is a problem, and it is something
    that we are addressing in a meaningful way.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr.  Ruppersberger. Sure. Let me get into one issue, and I
    also want to get into tuberculosis assistance that you have
    been working on.
        The two main concerns, that Congress has with USAID, and I
    want to say it is an important agency for our country to be
    able to handle the issues that you do. So it is a very
    difficult agency, I am sure, to manage because there is also a
    lot of money.
        But you talk about how your priority was going to be
    management. Let's talk about what your management style will
    be. A lot of management has to be accountability. Are you going
    to be using more technology? When you have money you have to
    make sure that it is spent appropriately, and then come back to
    us on transparency and accountability.
        So let me get into a little bit more detail about your
    management style and what you plan to do to try to deal with
    some of the issues that your predecessor has been dealing with.
    These changes aren't going to happen overnight, believe me, and
    you do have a good agency. So if you could discuss your
    management style, I would appreciate it.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for that question.
        My style starts with people. It is all about people and
    powering down the authority for people to do their job to the
    lowest levels and then having them respond with that
    expectation to do their jobs. And when it is not working, then
    you have to correct for that. You have to fix it in some way,
    either through training or, for that matter, replacing
    individuals. But it is about the positive aspect of that and
    releasing the energy that people have to do the job. You take
    care of them, ensuring that they have the tools, they have the
    training, and they have the development aspects of how to do
    their job better.
        But it does not exclude, and it wraps very neatly with
    leveraging science, technology, innovation, and partnership. So
    that is a major part of it. And if I can cite some of the work
    that we are doing in USAID, it is about the Global Development
    Lab that helps our professionals who are out there doing a job.
    And by the way, they do superbly.
        Madam Chair, I thank you very much for recognizing them for
    the job that they do. They work in some very tenuous, dangerous
    conflict areas of the world, and they do it with aplomb. They
    do it with the knowledge that the activities they undertake
    bring about a better world, and they do it without hesitation.
        So all of that wraps around, I don't think you can separate
    anything in particular, I have given you a sense of how I come
    at things based upon my training both in the military, as well
    as a diplomat running nonprofit organizations, philanthropic
    organizations, for a very short period of time a business
    operation as well, to tell you that it is about people. You
    take care of people, they take care of everything else.
        And then you check to make sure that the systems that are
    in place to guarantee the efficiency, the effectiveness, and
    getting as much out of the limited resources, that is working
    for you as well. And when you need to make a midcourse
    correction, you make that. Or for that matter, if the midcourse
    correction says that you need to suspend, eliminate a program,
    then you don't hesitate to do that, having made the right
    judgments about how you come at it.
        Mr.  Ruppersberger. How many employees do you have at
    USAID?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Sir, I am sorry?
        Mr.  Ruppersberger. How many employees do you have at
    USAID?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. The number of employees, it is just under
    10,000, 9,800-and-some-odd. But, again, we are covering the
    world.
        Mr.  Ruppersberger. I am not complaining about it at all. I
    think your answer was good. You are only as good as your
    people. You have to give the people the resources to do the
    job, hold them accountable, and you have to motivate them too.
        But I would like you to just get a little bit more
    specific, especially as it relates to money. When money comes
    in you are going to have to have somewhere in your Agency to
    track the money and then make sure the money is spent wisely
    and held accountable. Do you have a team that does that?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes, sir, we do. We have a team that is
    focused specifically on that. We call it our Management Bureau.
    But also within each of the bureaus, our pillar bureaus as well
    as offices, everyone tracks their expenditures. They have to be
    able to articulate what it is that they are doing, the
    efficiency of that, and then how do they then rationalize the
    work, the continued work on any particular project, initiative,
    or program.
        In addition to that, we have something we call the
    Administrator's Leadership Council. And basically what it does
    is determine at any point in time whether or not we are green,
    amber, or red, and it takes a page from the old military
    readiness report. Those things that are green, that is the
    expectation. If it is amber, what do you need to bring it up to
    the green category? And if it is red, what is the problem? How
    do we fix that? What are the resources that you might need in
    order to bring it up?
        And so we do this routinely. It is done at least several
    times a month, sometimes to our chagrin because it keeps
    seeming to get rolled around faster each time. But we do it in
    a very organized, a very methodical way of ensuring that we are
    on the mark and that we have our systems that are checking and
    evaluating to make sure that we are there. And when it is not,
    then we back away.
        Mr.  Ruppersberger. Thank you.
        Yield back.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Rooney.
        Mr.  Rooney. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        General, I got to know Mr. Shah over the last couple years
    on this committee, and one of the things I tried to impress
    upon him the most that was interesting to me was the Food for
    Peace program. I wanted to ask you, generally speaking, with
    regard to South Sudan, the U.N. Security Council describes
    South Sudan's catastrophic food insecurity as one of the worst
    in the world. There is a funding reduction in fiscal year 2016
    from fiscal year 2014. The State Department and your Agency got
    additional emergency funding.
        My question is this: In order to reduce future demands for
    this kind of emergency humanitarian assistance that can be
    overly costly, how does your request help address long-term
    food insecurity through agricultural development? I am
    concerned because your fiscal year 2016 request only provided
    for $10 million in the Food for Peace program, which is the
    only program at USAID that focuses primarily on helping small
    community farmers to become self-sufficient. Obviously, it is
    the whole you can give people money or you can teach them how
    to feed themselves analogy. So that is sort of the focus of my
    question.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
        Food for Peace is but one program whereby we reach out to
    countries around the world and try to handle as many
    humanitarian assistance--or disasters, in this case--as we can.
    But it is not the only program. And so, in addition to Food for
    Peace, we have a program Feed the Future. And Feed the Future,
    as you mentioned, takes the approach of how do we teach
    farmers, how do we teach people how to grow their own food, how
    to become more food secure in their own right. And so Feed the
    Future currently is working with 7 million farmers around the
    world and feeding 12.5 million children nutritious foods,
    preserving their lives.
        I will tell you that in the case of Tanzania we had farmers
    who had increased their yield beyond anything they ever
    imagined, in some cases twofold, whereby they not only provided
    for their own families, but also had enough that they sold at
    market and therefore increasing their own ability to do other
    things with the money, send their children to school, have a
    better life.
        As lamentable as the situation in Sudan is, we are having
    success in a number of areas. Where the Sudanese cannot farm,
    then we are providing that support.
        My point in all of that is to say that there is an
    integration of our humanitarian assistance across the board,
    across many programs, focused again on how can we bring relief
    to as many people as possible. And we are doing that. The
    American people are reaching out to people of the world.
        And in many cases that I saw in Africa the response is very
    positive, very favorable towards Americans, because it is
    really the connection people to people that merely solidifies
    what I see as our own security, advances our own security, as
    well as our own prosperity. Because those countries, once they
    come up to a standard where they can start acting on their own,
    they start partnering with us. They are our allies. They become
    vanguards of democracy wherever they may be in the world.
        Mr.  Rooney. Thank you, General. I look forward to working
    with you on this, specifically with regard to South Sudan, as
    we move forward.
        Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Serrano.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
        Mr.  Serrano. Thank you. First of all, I want to
    congratulate you on the positive aspects of the work that you
    do at the Agency that is throughout the world.
        There is a question that I should have asked 25 years ago
    when I came to Congress that has always been on my head and I
    never asked it, and it has to do with Cuba.
        Cuba does not, even though things may change, Cuba does not
    trust and we spend a lot of time criticizing Cuba. Yet your
    Agency was in Cuba. Now, Cuba doesn't open its doors to any
    other American Government agency being there, and I know you
    didn't invade them by force. So what kind of agreement was
    there that would allow your Agency to be in Cuba.
        And secondly, notwithstanding what we think about the Cuban
    system, whenever they accused us of meddling in their system
    and trying to change it, what kept them from kicking us out? I
    mean, it is all very confusing, this relationship between USAID
    and Cuba.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question.
        Cuba is but one example, but we operate in a number of
    closed societies around the world, bringing democratic ideals
    to those countries, bringing to those countries support to
    civil society within those countries, and then, finally,
    ensuring as much as we can and trying to bring about the access
    to independent media, information within, and let's say the
    example used, within Cuba, among people. It is all about how
    can we inspire as much goodness.
        We do also have in Cuba humanitarian assistance to family
    members of prisoners, political prisoners of one description or
    another, from the standpoint of health, food aid, in some cases
    providing learning.
        So it is not a question necessarily that we are doing
    anything nefarious as much as we are doing what we can to
    advance democracy.
        One of the things that I mentioned----
        Mr.  Serrano. General, if you will forgive me. I understand
    that, and that is very commendable.
        My question is, how did you get there? Did they say it is
    okay for you to come in and try to undo our system? I mean,
    there is a part here that has always confused me. How did the
    Cuban Government, who is not friendly to us and we are not
    friendly to them for over 50 years, say this Agency is okay to
    come in, even though at times we will arrest one of them or
    imprison one of them because they are doing what they are not
    supposed to be doing. I am totally confused. I can see it from
    other agencies that do it in a covert situation, but you don't
    operate that way. So maybe it is a question that can't be
    answered.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Sir, I cannot answer it specifically as much
    as to say our brand is well known throughout the world, and so
    there are many, I am sure--I suspect, I suspect--there are
    places where people wink at the fact that we are there in
    closed spaces doing our work.
        And by the way, on closed spaces, part of what came out of
    the Cuban example is that we developed a new framework, an
    operating framework, so that we know what we are doing, how we
    are doing it, and ensuring that our implementing partners, who
    are valuable members of our team as well, understand the
    working in closed societies and the danger of that, and so that
    they then protect themselves and they then report up to us as
    to what is going on so that we have a sense of is it time for
    us to leave potentially--the potential of that rather--and the
    fact that we are committed to ensuring transparency, as well as
    balancing that with security.
        And so that is the example that came out of the Cuban
    situation. And it is one where, as the Deputy Administrator,
    when I came in Dr. Shah said to me, I want you to get this
    under control and figure out how we then respond. And so we
    review it on a periodic basis, at least quarterly, coming back
    to me to ensure that those countries that are closed to us, we
    know how people are operating within those countries and
    ensuring, again, transparency, as well as balancing it with
    security.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Fortenberry.
        Mr.  Serrano. Thank you.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Ambassador, nice to see you. I am confused by
    something, and I would like you to clarify it up front. When
    Mrs. Lowey, our ranking member, greeted you, she said so as a
    fellow New Yorker. When I said hello to you, you gave me the
    secret Cornhusker handshake? So what is it, Nebraska or New
    York?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. I will stop.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. I graduated from the University of Nebraska
    that I am very proud of.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. Yes.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. And I lived in Omaha, Nebraska.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. I just needed to get this on the record.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. I am also a New Yorker.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. But you had a wonderful experience in
    Nebraska, and I am glad you did, and so you are always welcome
    back home, so to speak.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
        Mr.  Fortenberry. I enjoyed your initial presentation where
    you talked about your own background as a soldier, having spent
    time as well as a private sector manager. Now you are in a new
    fight, a new type of fight, fighting poverty, fighting for
    values, fighting really for, frankly, international stability
    and the future of civilization.
        In regards to why we do this, why we spend a little bit of
    taxpayer money in this area, it is sometimes a hard question to
    ask, constituents ask it, because seemingly there is such
    little gratitude for what America does around the world.
        I try to answer it like this: That it is very hard for
    Americans to sit idly by while other people just die. That is
    not who we are. Secondly, we benefit from this exchange that
    takes place, both economically, as well as culturally. And
    third is, smart development is actually inextricably
    intertwined with international stability and that creates the
    conditions for our own national security. The military tells
    me, send us in last, do everything you can to promote smart
    diplomacy, smart development, and smart security outcomes.''
        So your work is very important, and I like the enthusiasm
    that you are bringing to it and, frankly, the commitment to
    answering that hard question that the taxpayer deserves--why
    are we doing this?--and to holding the Agency accountable in a
    transparent way to the necessity to be effective and efficient.
    And I assume you are going to carry on the good work of
    Ambassador Shah in trying to develop the metrics that actually
    show that.
        In this regard, I have two questions. One is, to focus on
    the Middle East, there is a dire humanitarian crisis in Iraq
    and through many areas of the Middle East flowing from the
    ruthless persecution of Christians, Yazidis, innocent Muslims,
    as well as other minority faith traditions. Many people are
    crying out for help, help to be able to defend themselves, as
    well as help for the displaced population.
        So it is a heavy lift. This is not fully your job, but it
    is a heavy lift. And I understand that your partners, USAID
    partners have been able to reach some internally displaced
    people, but it is a significant minority.
        Also, the other problem is that it is my understanding the
    people that you tend to be reaching are the ones housed in
    refugee camps, defined areas, versus other refugees flowing
    into other countries that still do need assistance but maybe
    aren't concentrated in one place.
        The second question I have goes to what our Chairwoman
    Granger raised regarding potential new partnerships with our
    own universities in the area of higher education, but also in
    the innovative and smart program of USAID, Feed the Future.
    Suddenly, development aid, as it exists through new innovative
    sustainable agricultural practices, has become cool. And I
    never thought agricultural policy would be cool, having been
    studying it myself years ago. But nonetheless to tap into the
    energy of the next generation and to further consolidate our
    efforts at partnerships with the universities who have
    complementary resources I think would be a good outcome for the
    efficiency goals that you have outlined.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congressman, for your question. I
    will start by saying that your observation----
        Ms.  Granger. Long days.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. Your observation is
    right on target with respect to soldiers having to fight. It is
    a lot more expensive than development. And so that is the
    choice that we first use, development as opposed to sending
    soldiers in.
        The second part of that is religious groups. In all of our
    work, in all of our humanitarian assistance, we don't target
    necessarily groups as much as we look at people in need. And
    within that group the people in need, both in Syria, as well as
    Iraq and other places, there are religious minorities. There
    are people who are receiving the benefit of our food aid,
    water, and health, as well as other services that we provide.
    And so that is happening. And so we are not targeting groups as
    much as we are opening the door for as many people.
        In the case of Syria, for instance, I would just say that
    all of the work we are doing, certainly there is a huge
    minority there in the Shi'as to begin with, but also Christians
    within that Syrian community as well.
        There are a couple of categories. There are refugees, but
    there are also internally displaced persons. And in Syria, that
    is almost 8 million people, and up to 4 million who are outside
    in Lebanon, Turkey, or for that matter Jordan.
        So those things are happening in a way that I feel
    comfortable in saying that, in a constrained environment,
    reduced with resources, that we can't prioritize everything
    that is happening, and we are servicing those various
    communities.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Ms. Lee.
        Ms.  Lee. Thank you very much.
        Good to see you, Mr. Lenhardt, and congratulations once
    again. And I look forward to working with you on so many issues
    that are so important to really the survival of many
    populations of people, children, vulnerable persons, people
    living with HIV and AIDS, mothers. Your work is so important in
    terms of the development of not only underdeveloped countries,
    but just in terms of the development of human beings so that
    they can live decent, healthy lives. So thank you very much.
        A couple of questions that I have quite naturally following
    up on Mr. Serrano's question as it relates to Cuba, and also
    the countries that you mentioned where USAID operates in closed
    societies. I have oftentimes visited countries around the world
    where people are concerned about USAID workers because they are
    not sure what they are doing. They are not sure if they are
    working for the CIA and USAID. And I think this really puts a
    lot of our staff and contractors at risk, i.e., Alan Gross.
        The contract--and we have talked about this--that Alan
    Gross was working on seemed to be perfectly reasonable,
    bringing in telecommunications, communications equipment to
    help set up a communications system where people could
    communicate with each other. Reasonable.
        But I don't believe, because I was very involved in the
    whole case, that Alan knew that this contract that he was
    working under and the work that he was conducting was forbidden
    by law by the host country where he was doing the work, and so
    we know what happened.
        And so I am wondering now, have you had a chance to go back
    and look--and we raised this before, Congresswoman Lowey and
    myself, with Mr. Shah--looked at these contracts to see if
    there are some disclaimers on it that if you are engaged in
    bringing support to civil society, if you are engaged in these
    democracy promotion programs that clearly, one, are against the
    laws of another country, do workers and contractors know that
    and that they could be subject to arrest? I mean, I think that
    we have an obligation to let our people know that they could be
    arrested by doing this work.
        And then, third, let me just ask you, as it relates to the
    countries where USAID is operating, how do we know what
    countries you are operating in doing this democracy work? Is it
    clear? Is it public? Are you transparent about that? I mean, I
    didn't know about the work, I heard about the work in Cuba, but
    I never could put my hands on it until it was exposed. So how
    do we know where you are doing this work?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, Congresswoman, for your question.
    To begin with, yes, in fact we are very cognizant of the work
    that we do and we operate in very dangerous environments, as I
    spoke of earlier, our implementing partners as well. And so, as
    I mentioned that framework earlier in terms of the Cuba
    question in response to Cuba, this framework gives a very
    specific approach to operating in closed societies or, for that
    matter, conflict areas, in terms of how do you protect
    yourself, what should you be considering, and how do we
    continually assess whether or not the situation may become
    untenable to the point where we have to curtail our activities.
        But the thing that we have learned is that local
    implementing partners know basically what is going on in the
    area so they can respond.
        Ms.  Lee. But that is after the fact, Mr. Lenhardt. I am
    talking about up front.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes.
        Ms.  Lee. How do people who willingly do this kind of work
    know up front that they could be either perceived as a CIA
    operative or they are working against the laws of the country,
    I won't even call it the host country, but the country that
    they are in, that could be perceived as----
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Ma'am, if I may, we are very transparent in
    our activities and there's nothing nefarious. There is no cloak
    and dagger. There is nothing that would suggest that our brand,
    which is a very recognized, very respected brand around the
    world, is going to be put in jeopardy to the point where we are
    doing something that could come back to either embarrass us or
    to create a major problem.
        Ms.  Lee. But it has in the past. And I am just wondering
    how we can get the information, this committee, this
    subcommittee, on where we are operating in this manner and what
    we are doing.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Ma'am, I can say sitting here that we are
    not operating in a manner that tracks with the CIA or, for that
    matter, any other intelligence organization. I say that with
    great confidence.
        Ms.  Lee. Okay. But just operating then in closed
    societies, doing the democracy promotion programs, is there a
    public list that we could have so we can kind of look at where
    USAID is doing the type of work that it is doing now in Cuba?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Ma'am, we can provide that to you. The
    answer is, yes, we can provide that to you.
        Ms.  Lee. Okay.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. And gladly.
        Ms.  Lee. Thank you very much.

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        Ms.  Granger. Mr. Dent.
        Mr.  Dent. Thank you.
        And thank you, Ambassador. I am going to follow up a little
    bit on what Mr. Crenshaw had been talking about a few moments
    ago, and I want to give you a little bit more time to
    elaborate, I think, on your answer.
        One of the frustrations I have heard by those working in
    USAID projects is the inflexibility of funding. When I was in
    Ethiopia a few years ago that was a common refrain I heard: We
    have money in the HIV/AIDS account, but we need to move the
    money to malaria or tuberculosis or some other health issue,
    for example. But the funding flexibility wasn't there, and so
    they couldn't transition that money to malaria prevention, for
    example, even where in a country where AIDS may have been more
    stabilized and under control than had been the case.
        What can we on this committee do to ensure that USAID and
    its partners are able to make the most effective use of these
    appropriated funds? Are there statutory changes that need to be
    made to provide this flexibility to you?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. As I understand the question, sir, whether
    or not we have funds that move from one account to another,
    sir, we have within global health objectives to reduce child
    and maternal deaths, as I mentioned, but also an AIDS-free
    generation and approaching and preventing infectious diseases.
    And so if you are asking the question, is it possible as we see
    the drawdown in one disease to move it to another disease, is
    that----
        Mr.  Dent. Yeah. Within a country, that is a common
    refrain, or they need money for fistula, for example, for
    women's health, they can't move the money. There is money
    available, but it can't be spent on the account in which it is
    in. There is no flexibility with limited dollars out there. I
    would rather be able to give you more flexibility to move money
    where it is needed rather than trying to appropriate additional
    funds that may not be necessary in every case.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. But, again, within the global health
    account, sir, we do have some flexibility to do that based upon
    the need. But, again, it is sometimes about competing
    priorities. And that is the biggest driver, more so than
    anything else, competing priorities. Would it be possible for
    us to be everywhere in the world? We can't do that. We don't
    have the resources.
        Mr.  Dent. And I am not asking you to. But that is the
    complaint I heard in the field from our people out there, that
    there is money available, but we can simply not move it to
    where it could be most beneficially spent.
        And now the second question I had, your predecessor, Raj
    Shah, had been applauded for bringing a business-minded
    approach to the Agency's operations, and by and large the model
    appears to be working pretty well.
        Can you tell us what objective metrics USAID is currently
    using to evaluate the effectiveness of its projects?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Which projects, sir?
        Mr.  Dent. Just how are you measuring the effectiveness,
    what are the metrics you are using to evaluate the
    effectiveness of the programs under your jurisdiction?
        Ms.  Granger. Before you answer that, could I say they have
    called votes. There are still 308 that haven't voted. We have
    two, Ms. Wasserman Schultz and Diaz-Balart, who haven't had a
    question.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Okay.
        Ms.  Granger. So we are going to try to do that.
        Mr.  Dent. That is my last question, though.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Okay.
        Sir, we use a number of methods to evaluate our programs.
    We use a tiered system in some cases based upon independent
    evaluations, but also those who are on the ground, our
    implementing partners. We also have our USAID personnel who are
    on the scene evaluating programs as well.
        And so it is a tiered approach. It is multifaceted. It
    comes across as looking for the golden thread that weaves
    itself throughout to ensure that we are getting maximum benefit
    from our programs. And where it doesn't work, and I will give
    you a couple examples, if I may. In the last couple of years we
    have conducted about 243 evaluations of one description or
    another. Fifty percent of those caused us to rethink, reprogram
    our direction with respect to a particular activity. And in a
    couple of cases, we suspended the program, we stopped the
    program. In the case of Malawi we stopped a program based upon
    it was no longer effective.
        So there is that evaluation that guides some decisions.
    Again, how do we conserve, how do we ensure those limited
    resources, constrained priorities, limited resources and
    constrained budgets are being effective and how they are being
    used? And so we continue to make those assessments.
        I am trying to get a handle on the question as much as
    anything. But I assure you we have those processes underway and
    we evaluate. We have a team that also looks at it from the
    standpoint of whether it make sense on what we are doing, and
    how then do we ensure that the outcomes that we expect are
    being realized. And where they are not, then we make
    adjustments.
        Mr.  Dent. Thank you.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair. Ambassador,
    welcome. Good to see you.
        Congressman Diaz-Balart and I sponsored the 1,000 Days
    resolution last year to call attention to that window in which
    we have an opportunity to really make a difference when it
    comes to the nutrition and future health of a young child.
        So that made it somewhat disappointing that there was a 12-
    percent cut in nutrition funding in the President's budget, and
    I would like to ask you to explain how are we going to continue
    to make sure that we can be a leader and leverage other
    countries in what is really a vital area. Now, I ask that
    question knowing that we have the Multi-Sectoral Nutrition
    Strategy and that we are trying to line up the resources with
    the strategy and the goals. But, you know, in the meantime,
    that strategy is not complete, and we want to make sure that we
    can maintain that leadership role and maintain momentum. So if
    you could answer that.
        I will just ask my second question since I know we have
    votes at the same time. I am concerned, even though we have not
    had any major national disasters that required a global
    emergency response, thankfully, recently, we have humanitarian
    needs that are alarming around the world. We have to make sure
    that we have adequate response capabilities, and the budget
    request has a 13-percent cut to humanitarian funding which
    includes significant decreases in both the migration and
    refugee and international disaster assistance account. So can
    you also talk about how we are going to be able to maintain
    those adequate response capabilities given that proposed cut?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you. Thank you, Congresswoman. To
    begin with, our fiscal year 2016 request for nutrition,
    recognizing the absolute importance of nutrition for children,
    both from the standpoint of physical wellbeing as well as their
    mental development, we have a number of other integrated
    programs for nutrition. Feed the Future is but one, but also
    specifically within the global health account and global health
    programs, nutrition has been identified separately. But across
    all of those accounts, we are well positioned to provide for
    nutritional value to children as well as to mothers.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, we are talking
    about recognizing and providing for 15 million children. With
    mothers, it is 600,000 by----
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. So, forgive me for interrupting,
    Ambassador, but are you realizing efficiencies in that proposed
    cut? I mean----
        Mr.  Lenhardt. It is a combination of efficiencies, but it
    is also recognizing that many of these efforts, again, in a
    constrained environment, and we are not saying that we are
    leaving children behind or not caring for them as much. We
    can't do everything. And so, in a budget-constrained
    environment and competing priorities, this is where we are. But
    we feel that what we are providing is workable, and it is
    solving a problem that we both know is something that needs to
    be addressed.
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. Ambassador, again, you are----
        Mr.  Lenhardt. If you are asking, should we be putting more
    money to it----
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. This isn't about whether we put
    more or less money into it. It is about making sure that we can
    maintain our leadership role, and in the interim, until we have
    that multisector plan in place----
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes.
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. That we not roll
    backwards.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. And so I understand that we can't
    be everything to everyone. That is not what I am suggesting. I
    want to make sure that with a proposed 13-percent cut, we are
    able to maintain that leadership and not go backwards----
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes.
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. In terms of the
    ability for us to provide assistance for children that badly
    need it.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, ma'am. I understand. But, again,
    we have nutrition integrated in other programs as well that is
    not part of that one identified area within global health. So
    that is happening. I will continue to look at that and make
    sure that we are being responsive as much as possible, but I am
    seeing the evidence of that. I saw it as the Ambassador to
    Tanzania, where the difference between a child who has been
    provided nutritional-valued foods and one who is not, is
    significant.
        The second part of that had to do with Ebola. Did I not
    answer----
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. No, you didn't.
        Ms.  Granger. Could we go to Mr. Diaz-Balart, and then come
    back if we still have time to your second question?
        Ms.  Wasserman Schultz. Sure. I think we have to vote, so I
    don't know that we are going to be able to.
        Ms.  Granger. I think we only have----
        Mr.  Diaz-Balart. And I will be very brief, Madam
    Chairwoman.
        And, again, thank you for your service to our country. You
    have been serving our country for many, many years. A couple of
    points, and it sounded like you are very committed to the
    democracy programs. Is that correct?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Yes.
        Mr.  Diaz-Balart. All right. And, obviously, democracy
    programs seem to be--are in closed societies. They are not in
    Liechtenstein, right, so they tend to be potentially dangerous,
    and you have spoken about that.
        With that in mind, I just want to bring you back to
    Venezuela. I don't have to tell you about the situation in
    Venezuela. The administration has been kind of taken aside. The
    Secretary of State said that he was compounded by the situation
    in Venezuela, and yet the House has consistently put--last year
    $8 million for democracy programs in Venezuela. The request
    from the administration is $5.5 million. Any chance that there
    will be an amendment to that request of $5.5 million since the
    administration is now realizing that we seem to have a serious
    issue with Venezuela and the lack of democracy therein?
        Mr.  Lenhardt. And, sir, I cannot answer the specific
    question. It is something that--in terms of a dollar amount--
    but, again, it is about human rights. It is about independent
    media, and it is providing for, in the case of Venezuela,
    transparent electoral processes. But, with respect to a dollar
    amount, I cannot answer that from the administration's point of
    view.
        But, again, we operate in those places because there is a
    need, because that is who we are as Americans in outreach to
    countries and the world, trying to, as much as possible,
    encourage democratic institutions.
        Mr.  Diaz-Balart. Well, I am glad to hear that, I mean,
    about your commitment to that. This committee has always been
    committed to that. I think you are going to see--that emphasis,
    not only in Venezuela, but in Cuba and elsewhere, and look
    forward to working with you on that.
        And I know I am out of time.
        Mr.  Lenhardt. Thank you, sir.
        Ms.  Granger. Thank you, Ambassador Lenhardt. Thank you
    again for your time.
        This concludes today's hearing. And Members may submit any
    additional questions for the record.
        The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
    Programs stands adjourned.

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                                             Wednesday, March 18, 2015.

                 DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS

                                    WITNESS

    HON. JACK LEW, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs will come to order.
        I would like to welcome Secretary Lew before the
    subcommittee to discuss the fiscal year 2016 budget request for
    the Treasury Department's International Affairs Programs.
        The funding under review today supports contributions to
    international financial institutions, such as the International
    Monetary Fund and the World Bank, global climate change
    programs, debt relief, and technical assistance programs.
        The budget request totals $3.1 billion, a 28 percent
    increase above fiscal year 2015. This funding level reflects
    the Congressional Budget Office's higher scoring of the IMF
    proposal than that of the administration.
        This is the third year that the administration has
    requested authority and funding for the IMF. In the past, there
    has not been sufficient congressional support for the IMF
    proposal. And, frankly, I don't expect much to change this
    year.
        Turning to the World Bank and the regional development
    banks, I have continued to express concerns about multiyear
    funding commitments made to these institutions. The
    administration argues that these organizations give us more
    ``bang for the buck'', but I question whether these
    multilateral institutions are being held to the same standards
    as our bilateral programs.
        The banks' lack of transparency in allocating funds and
    decision-making hurts their support in Congress. Increasingly,
    it seems the United States is one of the only voices demanding
    responsiveness and accountability.
        I would like to hear from you today about the efforts these
    institutions are making to publicly track funding and provide
    independent evaluations of program effectiveness.
        Last year the administration made a multi-billion-dollar
    pledge to the new Green Climate Fund. When you commit the
    United States to controversial programs that are unlikely to be
    fully funded by the Congress, the administration puts the
    credibility of the United States on the line. Mr. Secretary, I
    hope you can discuss this more with the subcommittee today.
        Finally, while the Treasury Department's role in U.S.
    policy toward Cuba lies more in the jurisdiction of the
    Financial Services Subcommittee, this subcommittee is also
    closely following the administration's move to normalize
    relations with Cuba, and I have deep concerns.
        Secretary Lew, thank you for being here today. We have many
    important topics to discuss.
        I will now turn to my ranking member, Mrs. Lowey, for her
    opening statement.

                        Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey

        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
        I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming our distinguished
    person here today. Thank you so much for your service to our
    country.
        I appreciate you coming before us today to present the
    administration's budget request for the coming fiscal year. As
    a former director of the Office of Management and Budget, you
    are keenly aware of the factors that go into the preparation of
    an annual budget proposal. It really is a statement of values.
        The administration's fiscal year 2016 proposal calls for
    investments in research, education, training, and
    infrastructure. Instead of relying on the outdated and
    unrealistic budget caps under sequestration, the President
    calls for them to be replaced with more targeted spending cuts,
    program integrity measures, and the closure of some outdated
    tax loopholes. The budget rightly calls for an end to the
    mindless austerity of sequestration.
        My colleagues may not agree with the administration's
    specific proposals, but I hope they can agree on the premise
    that a path forward must be found. We did it before with the
    Murray-Ryan plan, and we are going to have to do it again.
        There is simply no way an appropriations process can
    succeed unless we put in place reasonable allocations that give
    these bills a chance of being enacted. Without such an
    agreement, discretionary funding would be at its lowest level
    as a percentage of GDP since the Eisenhower administration.
        The President's 2016 budget request reflects the importance
    of our continued multilateral cooperation with international
    financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank. It
    continues important efforts to address root causes of
    instability, poverty, poor health, lack of education, as well
    as continues to promote global economic growth.
        Additionally, the President's budget continues to promote
    our own economic and national security interests while also
    making important investments in multilateral institutions,
    recognizing these are a cost-effective way to leverage taxpayer
    dollars.
        To that point, I remain perplexed by some of my colleagues
    who continue to oppose quota reform for the IMF while
    simultaneously warning of the risk if the European financial
    crisis deepens or if a fresh regional economic crisis were to
    emerge surrounding Ukraine.
        The IMF is an excellent tool to help stabilize struggling
    economies. It provides much needed protection of our own
    financial institutions in the event of a foreign financial
    emergency. Unless we support the IMF, I fear the potential
    effects on our economy would be far worse. I believe we need to
    maintain our leadership within the IMF, expand its lending
    capacity, and support the quota reforms.
        While there are a myriad of issues we can discuss today,
    one I hope receives priority is global climate change. As we
    are all now beginning to better understand climate change, it
    is not just an environmental concern.
        These important programs help reduce the instability caused
    by population displacement, address declines in global food
    supply, mitigate major shortages of water. A failure to provide
    for these priorities risks creating conditions for greater
    danger, failed states, and populations even more vulnerable to
    radicalization.
        I look forward to hearing about the administration's
    efforts in the coming fiscal year as well as hearing an update
    on the effectiveness of prior funding.
        Mr. Secretary, we have discussed before the fine work your
    Department has done in disrupting terrorist financing networks
    and enforcing sanctions against countries such as Russia, Iran,
    and North Korea. I continue to be impressed by the work of the
    Treasury Department and want to commend, in particular, the
    sustained implementation of these efforts as the backbone of
    our Iran policy.
        I hope to hear what additional economic actions and
    sanctions the administration will seek if negotiations with
    Iran fail to yield an agreement permanently denying Iran
    nuclear weapons capability. Equally, your leadership is crucial
    in implementing two key prongs of the administration's response
    to the Ukraine crisis: economic support for Ukraine and
    sanctions against Russia.
        With respect to Russia, I look forward to hearing more
    about what role our European partners will play in addressing
    the current situation. I would like to hear directly whether we
    should expect additional retaliatory countermeasures from
    Russia and, if so, what form those may take.
        Lastly, I hope you will address recent concerns that have
    been raised about some donors providing loans instead of grants
    as contributions to multilateral institutions. The committee
    needs to understand what the implication of this trend is for
    the United States contributions to these organizations.
        Thank you for being with us today. Our country, once again,
    is privileged to have your experience and thoughtful
    leadership.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
        I will now yield to Chairman Rogers for his opening
    statement.

                      Opening Statement by Chairman Rogers

        Mr. Rogers. Chairwoman Granger and Ranking Member Lowey,
    thank you for holding this important hearing.
        Mr. Secretary, good to see you. Thank you for coming in
    support of your 2016 budget request for international affairs.
        Unquestionably, the international programs that fall under
    your purview at Treasury have an important role to play in
    fostering U.S. leadership around the globe. Given the
    tumultuous times in which we find ourselves, this leadership is
    perhaps more important than ever before.
        When Secretary Kerry testified before this committee 3
    weeks ago, we heard from him about the global coalition joined
    in the fight against ISIL, the threats posed to our allies in
    the Middle East by a nuclear Iran, Russia's bold moves to
    assert herself in the region, and how the U.S. can help address
    the spread of disease and epidemics around the world. These are
    just a few examples.
        I say this to make the point that our contributions to
    international financial institutions must be targeted to ensure
    that we are promoting what Secretary Kerry called ``the best
    enhancement of our values and our interests.''
        With due respect, Mr. Secretary, I am not sure we see eye
    to eye on some of these investments, to put it mildly. I would
    like to focus my comments today on your budget proposals,
    particularly the International Monetary Fund and the Green
    Climate Fund and the proliferation of policies affecting the
    U.S. coal industry and power generation for the developing
    world.
        Taking CBO's scoring of the IMF proposal into
    consideration, Treasury's international programs request totals
    $3.1 billion. That is a whopping 28 percent increase over
    current levels. You know and I know that the committee will not
    be able to find that level of funding and stay within our
    discretionary allocation.
        As the chairwoman noted, the administration has once again
    made an IMF proposal that has not had sufficient support in
    previous Congresses, and the new Green Climate Fund proposal is
    particularly questionable.
        Next, Mr. Secretary, I have serious concerns about the
    administration's position on coal-fired power generation in
    developing countries. The President's politically driven anti-
    coal environmental policies have wreaked havoc domestically,
    sending tens of thousands of hardworking Americans to the
    unemployment lines and casting into question our country's
    long-term energy security.
        Coal exports are the one bright spot for the thousands of
    mining families who are facing disastrous economic conditions
    in my district and elsewhere. And, yet, administration
    officials are not only interested in precluding U.S. investment
    in foreign coal-fired generation, but the U.S. is actively
    encouraging our international partners, such as members of the
    Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to
    impose near-impossible conditions on the public financing of
    coal plants in the developing world. The results of these
    policies are troubling.
        First, I believe what we will see is significant Chinese
    investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. With China's terrible
    environmental record, the projects they will fund will be
    dirtier than if American companies were involved. At the end of
    the day, these policies are anti-American jobs and they will
    not have the intended environmental benefits either.
        Second, the international community will not make
    investments in efficient coal plants in places like Pakistan or
    Ukraine. Given our national security interests in those
    countries, the U.S. should be encouraging affordable and
    reliable electricity that can bolster economic growth and job
    creation there, in turn, reducing instability. I hope you can
    explain how these policies are in the long-term interest of our
    country and our allies and partners.
        Mr. Secretary, we thank you for being here today. This
    committee takes seriously our role in overseeing the budget and
    the policies of the Treasury Department. And we appreciate your
    continued engagement with us.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Granger. Secretary Lew, please proceed with your
    opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
    remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
    full written statement will be placed in the record.

                       Opening Statement by Secretary Lew

        Secretary Lew. Thank you, Chairwoman Granger, Ranking
    Member Lowey, Chairman Rogers, and members of the committee. I
    appreciate the opportunity to testify today on our proposed
    budget for our international programs.
        As we meet here today, the U.S. economy continues to make
    considerable progress. By almost every metric, America has come
    a long way since the depths of the worst recession since the
    Great Depression. Last year we saw the best year of job growth
    since the 1990s.
        Over the past 5 years, America's businesses have created 12
    million new jobs, the longest stretch of sustained private-
    sector job growth in our Nation's history. At the same time,
    our economy continues expanding and forecasts project above-
    trend growth for this year.
        American exports set another record last year for goods and
    services sold overseas, and our fiscal deficit, which has
    fallen by almost three-quarters, is forecast to decline even
    further in the next fiscal year. These achievements underscore
    America's enduring economic strength, and we can build on this
    progress with the right policies and bipartisan cooperation.
        The President's Budget puts forward sensible solutions to
    keep our progress going, including replacing sequestration by
    cutting spending and closing tax loopholes. This commonsense
    plan would continue to rein in the deficit and put the debt on
    a downward path as a share of the economy.
        If Congress does not act, defense and nondefense funding
    will fall when adjusted for inflation to their lowest levels in
    a decade. This would damage our national security, and it will
    keep us from making the investments that we need in key
    priorities to grow our economy.
        But we do not need to follow this course. With the right
    policies, we can fuel economic growth, job creation, and
    opportunity while strengthening our national security, driving
    long-term prosperity.
        The international financial institutions, which include the
    International Monetary Fund and the multilateral development
    banks (MDBs), are a critical part of this effort. Our
    investments in these institutions are some of the most cost-
    effective ways to reinforce economic growth at home and to
    respond to critical challenges abroad.
        To that end, it is essential that Congress pass the IMF
    quota reforms. These reforms will put the IMF's finances on a
    more stable footing over the long term, help modernize IMF
    governance structure, and preserve America's strong influence
    within the IMF and, more broadly, as a leader of the
    international financial institutions.
        As the international community waits for Congress to
    approve these reforms that we helped to design, emerging and
    developed economies alike are looking to other alternatives as
    a means of driving the global system forward.
        Our continued failure to approve the IMF reforms is causing
    other countries, including some of our allies, to question our
    commitment to the multilateral institutions that we helped
    create. Until these reforms are in place, the United States
    runs the risk of seeing its preeminent role in these
    institutions eroded, especially as others are establishing new
    and parallel institutions.
        The fact is the IMF reforms will help convince emerging
    economies to remain anchored in the multilateral system that
    the United States helped design and continues to lead. These
    reforms are a win-win for the United States. They retain our
    veto power and they do not increase our financial commitment.
    That is why we are determined to continue to work with Congress
    to get these reforms passed as soon as possible.
        As a clear example of the IMF's role in promoting American
    security and economic interests, the IMF is providing Ukraine
    with critical financial and technical support. The IMF is a
    cornerstone of a broad international effort to support Ukraine
    amid extraordinary circumstances, and it recently approved an
    augmented longer term program that will allow Ukraine to pursue
    a sustained set of economic reforms.
        Similarly, our investments in the World Bank and the
    regional development banks are key to advancing America's
    economic and strategic interests. My full statement that I
    submitted for the record lays out in detail how the MDBs help
    grow export markets, increase opportunities for American
    businesses, create jobs in the United States, and protect our
    national security.
        I would like to highlight quickly a few of the areas where
    these institutions have recently advanced our priorities.
        In Ukraine, the MDBs have stepped in to address the crisis
    and stabilize the country, increasing their commitments to
    nearly $5 billion.
        In Central America, they are working to spur stronger
    economic growth, which will help address the root causes of the
    flow of migrant children to our border.
        In Africa, they have taken a significant number of steps to
    fight the spread of Ebola and strengthen health systems.
        To be sure, the MDBs are essential to global stability.
    Whether it is fostering inclusive economic growth, promoting
    food security or increasing natural disaster preparedness, they
    are making a difference. It is no surprise that, throughout our
    Nation's history, both Democratic and Republicans Presidents
    have made it a priority to invest in these institutions.
        As you can see from our budget request, we are using what
    we have learned from the MDBs and specialized funds to launch a
    well-designed and cost-effective Green Climate Fund. This fund
    will enable the poorest countries to build resilience and will
    help cut carbon pollution globally, advancing some of our vital
    security and development objectives.
        In closing, let me say that the world is looking to the
    United States for leadership and it is essential as ever for
    the United States to demonstrate that leadership across all of
    the international financial institutions.
        This will, of course, require bipartisan cooperation. I
    look forward to working with all of you in this committee to
    make that happen. Thank you, and I look forward to answering
    your questions.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you very much.

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        Ms. Granger. In May of last year, Ukraine issued 1 billion
    dollars of new debt on the international capital markets,
    backed by the United States. It is my understanding that the
    proceeds are providing support for ongoing reforms and
    development in Ukraine.
        The President's request for fiscal year 2015 includes
    another $1-billion loan guarantee, but the funding request for
    $275 million to subsidize that loan guarantee is not consistent
    with OMB's most recent analysis of the appropriated funds
    required.
        Could you explain the funding needed and requested for a
    loan guarantee in fiscal year 2016.
        Secretary Lew. Madam Chairwoman, let me start with the
    policy and then come to the scoring. We have played an
    essential role in putting together a global response to the
    economic crisis in Ukraine.
        There is no question that Ukraine has a lot of economic
    challenges apart from the security situation. They need to have
    enormous reforms. They now finally have a government that is
    taking those reforms seriously, and our support and the support
    through the IMF is part of what enables them to do that.
        I think it is essential that Ukraine have the economic
    runway so that it can have the time to put those reforms in
    place. Frankly, while the security situation has to be settled
    down, if the economic situation isn't resolved, that will
    become something that is just an existential threat as well. So
    it is critical to Ukraine to get its economic house in order.
        We provided a billion dollars of loan guarantees last year
    as a part of a global effort, including the IMF support I
    described, including bilateral contributions from other
    countries and from the European group, and it is being used to
    support the economic reforms.
        We specifically designed our support last year so that as
    they reform their energy pricing system, there will be the
    ability to insulate the lowest income households, for example,
    from some of the burden. Because if they did not have the
    ability to make the impact on the most vulnerable of economic
    reforms manageable, the ability to carry out the reforms would
    have been jeopardized.
        The cost of the loan guarantees does not get frozen for all
    time. It is a reflection of what is going on at the time the
    scoring is done. So, as I think you know, the risk in Ukraine
    has been rising because of the geopolitical situation.
        As we have moved through from the first loan guarantee to
    the latest request, the cost of scoring has changed and gotten
    more costly because it is higher risk. We adjusted to that in
    realtime last year.
        We would look forward to working with you to continue to
    adjust to it, but we have always used the current scoring at
    the time we have made our proposal as the basis for estimating
    the cost.
        Ms. Granger. I understand what you just said. I also have
    another concern, and that is when will the additional loan
    guarantee we authorized in December be obligated.
        It has been 3 months now, I just returned from Ukraine, and
    time is of the essence. Can you explain when it will happen.
        Secretary Lew. I was in Ukraine myself a few weeks ago and
    at the time, signed an initial memorandum of understanding that
    launched the process of getting the details worked out.
        I met just the other day here in Washington with the
    finance minister of Ukraine, who is a real reformer and
    moving----
        Ms. Granger. I met with her yesterday.
        Secretary Lew. Yes, she is driving the reform agenda very
    hard. We agreed that our teams would continue to work as
    quickly as possible to finalize the terms.
        Obviously our loan guarantees, as is the support of the
    IMF, has been conditional on the Government of Ukraine taking
    certain actions. I am pleased to say that last week the
    Government of Ukraine enacted the critical reforms that were
    necessary for the IMF to approve their package, which also
    frees us to move forward.
        I am hopeful that we will be able to work very quickly with
    them and put in place a financing. I agree with you, time is of
    the essence.
        In addition to the USAID, we work very closely with the IMF
    to try and make sure that the structure of the IMF package
    provided enough up-front support to provide Ukraine the ability
    to get through this very difficult period.
        Ms. Granger. Good. I think everything we can do to help
    them will certainly be appropriate.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        While the Supreme Leader of Iran has said--and I quote--``I
    will go along with any agreement that could be made, of course,
    if it is not a bad deal,'' we have every reason to question
    Iran's real intentions, given their track record. This is, of
    course, the same Supreme Leader who repeatedly refers to Israel
    as the ``barbaric'' Jewish state that ``has no cure but to be
    annihilated.''
        I am very concerned by reports of various European
    commercial delegations traveling to Tehran in eager
    anticipation of sanction relief in the prospect of doing
    business with Iran.
        Have we weakened the resolve of the world community by
    providing sanctions relief in the interim deal?
        Secondly, the administration has pledged to continue to
    strictly enforce existing sanctions in Iran, other than those
    relaxed under the interim deal. Yet, I understand that Iran's
    oil exports are being offered from UAE trading firms acting as
    middlemen.
        What is the current status of overall Iranian oil exports?
    Are we talking to China and India, both of whom are reportedly
    increasing their imports from Iran this year? If these trends
    continue, is the administration going to sanction these
    countries? Specifically, what are the exports to China, India,
    and Turkey? And will you be making available publicly the
    Department's country-by-country estimates on Iranian oil
    imports?
        Thank you.
        Secretary Lew. Congresswoman Lowey, let me start with the
    first part of your question on the Joint Plan of Action and its
    aftermath.
        I think we all remember that, before the Joint Plan of
    Action went into effect, there were a lot of critics saying
    that it was going to provide massive relief from the sanctions.
        We said that was wrong. We said, at the time, that it was
    very enumerated relief. We could say very much to the dollar
    how much relief it would be, and that is the relief that Iran
    has gotten.
        It is single-digit billions of dollars of relief at a time
    when there is tens of billions of dollars of additional burden
    being placed on Iran because of the existing sanctions that
    were not part of the Joint Plan of Action.
        So over this period of time of the Joint Plan of Action,
    the actual pressure on Iran has gone up, not down. I think that
    is a very important point because we kept the oil and the
    financial sanctions in place and we essentially provided Iran
    limited access to enumerated amounts of its own money--not our
    money--and, in exchange, we got for the first time in over a
    decade a commitment for Iran to not just slow down, but
    actually take a step back on its nuclear program. We also put
    in place an inspection regime where we can actually see what
    they are doing.
        So I think what we have seen over the year, year and a
    half, almost, that the Joint Plan of Action has been in effect,
    we have had the first period of time in recent history where we
    have actually arrested the development of Iran's nuclear
    program and seen it deteriorate.
        I have read a lot and seen a lot of accounts of businesses
    going to see whether there is a future to do business in Iran.
    The message we have delivered very clearly around the world is,
    ``Iran is not open for business, and anyone who does business
    with Iran--until and unless there is an agreement which
    prevents Iran from having nuclear weapons which leads us to
    lift the financial and the oil sanctions--doing business with
    Iran is at your own risk because we are enforcing the
    sanctions, and we will continue to enforce the sanctions.''
        There have been reports--oil exports country by country
    fluctuate on a month-to-month basis. I would be happy to get
    back to you with a more detailed response.
        We have been working very closely with all of the countries
    that have been cooperating with the--and part of the sanctions
    on Iran. While there have been numerous times when I have heard
    the burden it is putting on other countries, I have also heard
    that they understand clearly that they know that we will
    enforce our sanctions and they do not want to get caught in
    sanctions enforcement.
        I do not think that, if you look at the condition of Iran's
    economy today versus before the Joint Plan of Action, they have
    seen any big dramatic turnaround. They have seen a slight
    slowing of the rate of inflation and slide of the economy, but
    they are in a deep hole that they will not get out of unless
    they reach an agreement that we find acceptable to assure us
    that they will not have nuclear weapons.
        We are not there. The negotiators are still working, as the
    President has said many times. At best, it is 50/50. We would
    be in a safer world if we have an agreement that is, clear,
    that will prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons. But until
    we are there, our sanctions regime stays in place.
        As the President has said on many occasions and as I have
    said on many occasions, no options will be taken off the table
    if it fails. We will continue to implement sanctions, we will
    come back, if need be, with tougher sanctions, and no options
    have been taken off the table.
        Mrs. Lowey. I will let it go at this point. Thank you very
    much.
        Ms. Granger. Chairman Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, as I said in my opening
    statement, the administration has not been shy about its utter
    disdain for an energy source that has kept the lights on in
    U.S. homes since the 1740s.
        The EPA's regulations, which are constitutionally dubious,
    have brought coal mining to a screeching halt and coal-fired
    power plants to their knees.
        Aside from the devastating effect to the mining families
    who rely on this industry for their livelihoods, we are going
    to see electric prices skyrocket for families and businesses in
    this country, and now the administration wants the same fate
    for families and businesses in the developing world.
        In 2013, your Department issued new guidance to vote
    against World Bank financing for coal-fired power plants unless
    the project employs carbon capture or sequestration technology.
    And later the Export-Import Bank announced similar new rules to
    deny financing for coal-fired power plants. In essence, you
    have said we can't mine coal, we can't burn coal, and now we
    are going to eliminate the international markets to export
    coal.
        As you know, carbon capture and sequestration technology,
    while promising, is not yet a reality, with commercial
    deployment not even expected in the U.S. for several years, to
    say nothing of poor countries in the developing world, at the
    same time as the administration is setting stringent
    regulations for greenhouse gas emissions domestically and
    abroad. The Energy Department is consistently slashing the
    fossil energy research and development budget to make this
    technology a reality.
        How do you reconcile that dichotomy, imposing that CCS
    structure on developing countries, but refusing to support the
    research necessary to get that technology off the ground?
        Secretary Lew. Mr. Chairman, I know that we have different
    views on coal policy. But I think you have to look at how our
    coal policy fits in domestically and internationally.
        We are very much of the view that we in the United States
    have to develop our energy resources. I think we have shown,
    over the course of the last 6 years, great success in
    developing our energy resources.
        Internationally, our view has been that getting power into
    the poorest countries is critically important, and we have
    promoted a range of alternative fuels, both in terms of the
    less-polluting traditional fuels and renewable energy sources
    including hydroelectric power.
        I think the policy we have had on coal distinguishes
    between the poorest of countries. In the poorest of countries,
    we have the exception that, if it is the only available power
    source, it is not treated the same as in other countries.
        I do not think there is any way to distinguish between the
    environmental impact of carbon emissions in one part of the
    world from another. Our planet is one system, and it is not
    that we are trying to apply rules internationally that are
    exactly the same as the rules here. We would not have the
    exception for the poorest countries, if we did.
        On the other hand, we know that as those countries adapt to
    meet the needs of their growing populations and their growing
    economies, they are going to need to develop sources that do
    not add, in a dangerous way, to the accumulation of carbon
    emissions. That is what our policies are designed to
    accomplish.
        Mr. Rogers. World energy demand continues to rise with 90
    percent of increased energy demand driven by the needs of
    developing countries. China and India alone will account for
    over 50 percent of the total increase between now and 2030, and
    these countries together account for 9 percent and 5 percent of
    U.S. coal exports, respectively.
        How do you expect to meet that demand if coal is not a part
    of the equation as a low-cost option?
        Secretary Lew. I think China and India are very important
    countries to work with. The President has worked with China. We
    have reached an agreement with President Xi on reaching goals
    that will help advance the reduction of carbon emissions. We
    continue to promote similar discussions in India, and they have
    committed to substantial commitment in other energy resources.
        But I think the fundamental point is that the growth in
    consumption, growth in population, and growth in the economies
    in the emerging markets, is going to be a big part of where the
    additional power generation of the future comes.
        They are going to need to adapt, and we, as a global
    community, as a world community, are going to need to help find
    alternatives that are sustainable, which is why we are working
    so hard with them like the Power Africa initiative is part of
    that. But the development of renewable energy sources in
    countries like China has been such a high priority.
        Mr. Rogers. I think this could be a self-defeating policy
    as developing countries will simply turn to other countries
    with lower environmental standards to finance the plants that
    they are going to have to build.
        Do you think China or India will step up to the plate to
    finance these projects in Southeast Asia and Africa? Is that
    the administration's stated preference?
        Secretary Lew. Our preference, obviously, is that we
    promote the view that it should be a position taken by the
    international community, which is why we have taken the
    positions that we have in the international financial
    institutions.
        I cannot disagree that there will be other sources of
    funding available for some continued projects, but our goal is
    to shift the focus of future development into areas that
    address the problems that we face globally in terms of carbon
    emissions. The solution is not for us to just proceed in a
    business-as-usual way.
        As I mentioned earlier, we do have the exception for the
    poorest of countries, recognizing that there are some countries
    that have no alternative and there they should use the cleanest
    technologies available.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Secretary, I don't think you and I are
    going to agree on much on this topic.
        Secretary Lew. I did not think so.
        Mr. Rogers. But I thank you for your testimony.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
        Secretary, you seem to show up at all the committees I
    belong to, and that is a good thing.
        Let me ask you a question. Last week the United Kingdom
    decided to join the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment
    Bank. Yesterday France, Germany, and Italy agreed to join the
    bank as well.
        What are your views on this bank? Do you think that China
    is seeking to enhance its power in the Asia-Pacific region at a
    time when our Nation is trying to strengthen its military and
    economic presence in the same region?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, let me start with what the goal
    of the bank is, to fund infrastructure in Asia. It is an
    important objective. It is one that we share. There is a huge
    need for infrastructure in many parts of the world, in Asia, in
    Africa, even here in the United States. So we do not disagree
    on the objective of having a mechanism to fund infrastructure.
        The concerns I have raised over the Asia Infrastructure
    Bank are that it is not yet clear what the governance structure
    of that institution will be and a concern that it not compete
    with the high-standard institutions that have been developed
    over the last 70 years, which promote very important standards
    in terms of labor protection, environmental protection,
    anticorruption efforts, and debt sustainability.
        The point that we have made, both directly in our
    conversations with China and in conversations with other
    countries that were considering their participation, is that
    those issues really need to be resolved and addressed as
    countries make the decision whether or not to participate. We
    will continue to engage with countries around the world to make
    sure that, both in bilateral and multilateral efforts, these
    kinds of standards are an important part of the institution.
        I would say that the conversation that we had earlier about
    the IMF, some of the back-and-forth, the importance of the
    Congress ratifying the IMF reforms is very significant. There
    is a lot of concern in developed and developing countries that
    the failure to ratify the IMF reforms in the United States, the
    last country to act, reflects our stepping away from those
    institutions and stepping away from the leadership role that we
    have traditionally played.
        That is a very dangerous thing strategically and I think it
    is a mistake. The reforms are well structured to preserve the
    U.S. position in the IMF, and I think the congressional action
    to approve the IMF reforms would very much increase the
    leverage we have to have these kinds of conversations with
    other countries.
        Mr. Serrano. It is interesting because you answered my
    second question at the same time.
        So my third question would be: Do you feel there is a tie-
    in between, for instance, approving the reforms and your
    ability or our government's ability to talk to the first
    question about that Infrastructure Bank and other issues?
        Secretary Lew. I must say I spend an inordinate amount of
    my time, when I meet bilaterally and in multilateral settings,
    defending our commitment to these organizations and making
    clear that we are still committed to getting the reforms
    approved.
        Whenever you have to spend your time defending against
    suspicions like that, it just reduces your ability to do other
    business and it makes countries start thinking about do they
    need to develop other alternatives. I do not think that is a
    good thing for the United States, and I do not think it is a
    good thing for the world.
        That is why I am committed to getting IMF reform done and I
    remain hopeful that we will be able to do it because it is just
    critical to our national security.
        Mr. Serrano. Well, thank you.
        And I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Serrano. He answered both questions in one.
        Ms. Granger. That was good.
        Mr. Crenshaw.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you.
        And thank you for being here, for your service.
        We talk a lot about sanctions in the broad sense. And I
    just wondered--for instance, some people would say the
    sanctions we put on Iran brought them to the table. Some people
    say that, when we ease the sanctions, they are less apt to
    deal. But I want to talk in a broader sense about sanctions, in
    general.
        How do you decide what kind of sanctions you are going to
    put in place?
        And, for instance, you mentioned you could almost measure
    to the dollar, in general, about what a sanction might do one
    way or the other.
        I am just curious to know some real-world examples of big
    sanctions, little sanctions, that we would understand exactly
    how you go about deciding.
        And how do you decide whether they are effective? And how
    do you decide whether they get outdated? Give us a primer on
    sanctions.
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, let me start with the broadest
    principle, which is that economic sanctions can create economic
    pain and economic impact in a country.
        We have gotten quite good at designing sanction regimes
    that can do that to affect the country that you are trying to
    sanction while reducing, to the extent that it is possible,
    spillover in areas that you do not want to see the effects
    felt.
        What sanctions can not do is force a leader to change their
    view, and in the case----
        Mr. Crenshaw. And I appreciate all that.
        Give me some real-world----
        Secretary Lew. In the Iran case, just to be clear, what I
    was describing in terms of the ability to enumerate quite
    precisely, was the relief in the Joint Plan of Action.
        Because what we were essentially doing, for the most part,
    was freeing up access to resources that we had frozen and
    saying, ``You can get X dollars of your money out of it.'' That
    is a little different than imposing sanctions where there is a
    degree of uncertainty.
        But as to Russia----
        Mr. Crenshaw. I am trying to understand just, real world,
    what--do you sit down and say, ``What is the biggest and best
    sanction we can put on Iran?''
        Secretary Lew. Well, obviously, what we have done is we
    basically cut them off from growth in oil sales and we have cut
    them off----
        Mr. Crenshaw. And how do you do that?
        Secretary Lew. We have put in place limits on how much oil
    can be exported, sanctions against the violation of that that
    affect both the importers as well----
        Mr. Crenshaw. And how do you decide----
        Secretary Lew [continuing]. They all need to do business
    through U.S. financial institutions----
        Mr. Crenshaw. Right.
        Secretary Lew [continuing]. Which gives us the ability
    through U.S. financial institutions----
        Mr. Crenshaw. And how--and I am just talking about real
    world. How does that work out when you decide, okay, you can
    only export X barrels of oil?
        Secretary Lew. Well, we have the ability to tie up funds
    that the Government of Iran can't get access to, and we have
    the ability to sanction countries that engage in transactions
    that violate the sanctions.
        Mr. Crenshaw. So you will say, ``You can't buy oil from
    Iran''?
        Secretary Lew. Yes.
        Mr. Crenshaw. And if you do, then what happens?
        Secretary Lew. Well, the--the----
        Mr. Crenshaw. I am not being argumentative. I am trying--I
    am really trying to understand how sanctions work. It is all--
    it is more--when I say we are going to put some sanctions on
    people----
        Secretary Lew. It is hard to give a general answer. You are
    asking about Iran. In Russia, we did some very different
    things.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Like what did you do----
        Secretary Lew. In Russia----
        Mr. Crenshaw [continuing]. Specifically?
        Secretary Lew. In Russia, we did not put sanctions on the
    whole Russian financial system. We put sanctions on individuals
    who were decision-makers and close to people in the inner
    circle to create pressure on----
        Mr. Crenshaw. But, I mean, what kind of sanctions--what do
    you do to that----
        Secretary Lew. They do not----
        Mr. Crenshaw. Well, how do you sanction an oligarch?
        Secretary Lew. Well, if your accounts are in the United
    States and you can not transact business anymore, that impedes
    your ability to get access to your money and to do new
    transactions.
        For example, in Russia, we said, the financial
    institutions--we did this in concert with Europe. It was not
    something we did unilaterally--we were going to limit the
    ability to roll over debt. Russian companies that were
    sanctioned could no longer roll over their debt for a year, 2
    years or 3 years. They were limited to very short-term
    rollovers.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Do you do that in terms of the lenders?
        Secretary Lew. Yes. Yes. And lenders who violate that would
    be violating sanctions----
        Mr. Crenshaw. I got you.
        Secretary Lew [continuing]. And they do not want to do
    that.
        The reason I was going to say it is a little bit hard to be
    entirely precise, I think we did an excellent job in Russia
    targeting the impact where we meant it to be felt.
        But we have actually seen the sanctions have greater impact
    because there was a voluntary action to curtail financial
    relations because there was a fear that the sanctions would get
    tougher or a desire to stay very far away from the boundary
    line.
        So it has actually had a slighly bigger impact, and then on
    top of that, the price of oil came down and a weakened Russian
    economy took a second hit.
        If you look at the design of the Russia sanctions, we were
    working with our European allies, very much of the view that we
    wanted, to the extent that we could, limit the spillover into
    Europe and the global economy. I think we have been successful,
    to date, limiting that impact.
        It also is not our view that the burden should be felt
    broadly by Russian consumers. It should be felt by those who
    might be able to effect the decision-making that was taking
    place. In Iran, it is much more of a blanket set of policies.
    So there is not just one way to do sanctions.
        We have learned a lot over the last 10 years in terms of
    how to design sanctions more precisely, and they are more
    highly engineered. I think what we have learned in the last
    year, in the case of Russia, is that you can have a very
    significant economic impact without causing as much effect
    outside of the country as you might otherwise. What we have
    unfortunately not been able to do is change the decision-making
    calculus of the leadership in Russia.
        In Iran, I think we did change their decision-making to the
    point that they came to the table. I believe that they came to
    the table to get relief. I think that the relief in the Joint
    Plan of Action was just a bit of a taste of what broader
    sanctions relief would be.
        Their top priority in Iran right now is to get their
    economy moving and have some relief. I think that is the only
    reason that they are having a serious conversation about
    foregoing the development of nuclear weapons. We are not there
    yet. I can not say that it has been ultimately successful. But
    I do not believe this negotiation would be underway but for
    sanctions.
        I wish I could say that we had made as much progress in the
    last year with Russia. We shall see.
        Mr. Crenshaw. Thanks so much.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. First, I want to talk to you about oil
    prices in Iran and possibly sanctions. It is a widely held view
    that the falling of oil prices are putting pressure on Iran and
    Iran cannot repatriate their oil revenues.
        But under the Joint Plan of Action, Iran can withdraw $700
    million a month from foreign-held reserves. And that being
    said, it seems Iran's economy is largely insulated from the
    fall in the price of oil, at least in the near term, and the
    fall of prices will be insufficient to put new pressure on the
    Iran regime to accept a good deal.
        My question would be: Do you agree with that premise? Could
    you share your analysis of the real impact of oil prices on the
    Iran economy.
        Secondly, have we seen any indication that oil prices are
    impacting Iran's decision-making in the ongoing negotiations?
        And, finally, given the state of the global energy markets,
    can countries that are purchasing oil from Iran now find
    alternative suppliers?
        Secretary Lew. There is no question that our sanctions
    regime puts Iran in such a seriously bad economic position that
    they do not have access to the revenues that would come from
    all their oil flows, to begin with. The amount that they do not
    have access to limits the impact, to some extent, of the
    decline of oil in the short run.
        In the long run, they are an economy that is highly
    dependent on oil and I think it does weaken them, in terms of
    what their prospects are. Even in the short term, it has an
    effect, but it is not dollar for dollar. So I think in Russia
    it is much more direct.
        You know, the challenge in Iran is that in order to
    maintain their oil industry at peak production level, it is
    more than access to their money they need, they need access to
    technology, they need the ability to develop resources.
        We have through the sanctions made it harder for them to
    continue growing their oil capacity. Looking forward, they see
    sanctions relief as being critical to their economic----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you think that is our number one
    leverage in the negotiations, the sanctions relief, based on
    their economy?
        Secretary Lew. I think their economy is in very bad shape.
    They still have very high inflation, very high unemployment.
    They still face a future that is very bleak. The only hope that
    is now in their economy is that, if there is an agreement, it
    will get better. That gets dashed pretty quickly if there is
    not an agreement.
        The relief in the Joint Plan of Action gave, as I said, a
    taste of what relief would mean. But it was just a fraction of
    the ongoing additional pain that sanctions put on Iran's
    economy.
        In the period of the first year of the JPOA, you know, it
    was about $40 billion of additional sanctions impact and
    roughly $7 billion of sanctions relief. It was still a great
    deal of additional pain because the oil and financing sanctions
    were staying in effect.
        They want access to their resources. They want to be able
    to grow their economy. They are only going to get that if there
    is an agreement that we can have confidence that it prevents
    them from having nuclear weapons.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Stewart.
        Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your time. I
    have some questions, and it is dealing with many--like many of
    us, on the sanctions. I am going to come to that in a moment.
        I have to reinforce what our full committee chairman said
    about some of his comments and your comments on carbon and his
    concerns there.
        Just very quickly, I will say that someone in the
    administration is going to have to go to 40 million children in
    India and China and tell them they will never have health care,
    they will never have a job, and they will never have an
    education, because you don't have those things without some
    source of energy.
        And those countries can't build nuclear power plants. They
    don't have hydro resources. And it concerns me that they would
    view us as fairly arrogant in taking that position and denying
    those things when it is beyond their ability to provide them
    for themselves.
        But putting that aside, coming to the Iranian nuclear
    program and the negotiations there--and I appreciate your
    comments on this so far--I want to tell you a little bit about
    my background. I was an Air Force officer and pilot for 14
    years, and I had this great honor of working with the START II
    and START III implementation with the former Soviet Union, as
    the pilot rep.
        Now, I had a very, very small picture of that. I was just a
    captain at the time, hardly a person of influence, but I did
    see how that agreement was implemented. And I learned from
    that, as I have written in editorials in the last few weeks,
    that if a nation wants to cheat on an agreement, they can.
        They can find a way around that, which brings us to the
    point of you having an extraordinarily powerful and influential
    position--you and your organization--in our national security,
    which I don't think many people would recognize, you know, the
    Department of Treasury and national security, how closely they
    are tied in this situation.
        So let me ask you this. And I want to go through a couple
    of questions very quickly--because I think you and I will agree
    on this--and that is, the difficulty of organizing our sanction
    partners and to come to an agreement to have the current
    sanctions imposed, would you agree that that was a significant
    effort, that it took, a degree of political capital, it took
    quite a long time and that it was a fragile process?
        Secretary Lew. Absolutely. One of the things that I think
    has really been quite profoundly successful both in Iran and in
    Russia has been our ability to work with the international
    partners that we have.
        Our unilateral sanctions against Iran could not be anywhere
    near as effective as they are without the cooperation of other
    countries, and it has required ongoing, continued engagement
    with them. That is one of the reasons we felt it was so
    important for us to not do anything that would be perceived as
    inconsistent with the agreement in the Joint Plan of Action.
        Mr. Stewart. And I get that. And I do. And I appreciate
    that this was a large and an intense effort to come to this
    degree of success. That these sanctions are fragile, I think we
    would agree with that.
        But in light of that--this is my fear, the good news and
    bad news. The good news is we got to this point. The bad news
    is it is very, very difficult to replicate that effort once
    again.
        And, you see, I wonder, how rapidly would the U.S. be able
    to reverse course if we come to a situation where we feel like
    our Iranian partners are cheating or they intend to withdraw
    from this agreement, especially, Mr. Secretary, in light of
    what you just said, with our partners of Russia and China?
        Because I don't think we could replicate this again,
    especially again with those two partners. And, if we could, it
    would take a long time. And the outcome is not at all certain.
        So can you see why those of us who are concerned about this
    and--recognize that these sanctions were a great effort, but it
    is very, very difficult to replicate that? And to just assume
    that we could turn that around and impose those sanctions
    again, I don't think that is true at all. I think that is a
    stretch, to make that assumption.
        Secretary Lew. First of all Congressman, these are issues
    that are still currently being discussed, what kind of
    sanctions relief should be part of an agreement, if there is an
    agreement. So, I do not want to prejudge what the outcome is.
    But I would say that in a world where there was an agreement
    with Iran, and Iran violated the agreement, we would feel
    perfectly within our rights to use every tool at our disposal.
    We have a lot of tools to put back in place, very severe
    penalties if we need to. Our ability to do that, if we needed
    to, even unilaterally, would be very widely understood if that
    violation was there.
        Mr. Stewart. I understand that. But I do think--and I think
    you would agree with me--it is much more difficult after this,
    especially with China and especially with Russia. Their frame
    of mind is different now than it was a year ago, I think.
        Secretary Lew. What I do not think is different is that the
    world community agrees that Iran should not have nuclear
    weapons. That is why there is this very tight engagement, even
    at a time when there is so much tension between the United
    States and Russia over Ukraine, tight engagement on working
    towards an agreement that prevents Iran from getting nuclear
    weapons.
        Mr. Stewart. Well, I certainly appreciate that. You and I
    agree on that, although, this is a national security and a DOD
    question, not necessarily in your area of expertise. But, I am
    afraid that this agreement makes that almost a foregone
    conclusion that they would rather then preclude him from that.
    But, again, that is another topic, and I know you would
    disagree with that conclusion, certainly.
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, if I could just go back to the
    point you made about the children in India.
        Mr. Stewart. Yes.
        Secretary Lew. I was just in Mumbai and Delhi a few weeks
    ago, and I have to tell you, I have never seen air pollution
    like I saw in Mumbai and Delhi. So the children in those cities
    are right now at risk for the air they are breathing, and I
    think we have to remember that as well.
        Mr. Stewart. I certainly appreciate that, and you can go to
    Beijing and see it just as bad, as in other places as well. But
    you can mitigate it. And I do not think that it is an either-
    or proposition. But thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        And madam, I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you. We will offer another round of
    questions.
        I am going to ask a question first. In 1993, the NAFTA
    agreement included a side agreement to create the North
    American Development Bank, NADBank, to tackle environmental
    issues on the U.S./Mexico border. NADBank was originally
    focused on water and waste water problems, but the bank has now
    moved into renewable energy projects. The budget request
    includes new funding for the NADBank, and I understand that
    part of the increase is because NADBank's ability to borrow on
    the capital markets is limited because of a downgrade by
    Moody's and other credit-rating agencies.
        First, I hope you can explain to Members why the NADBank
    was downgraded; second, how much of this downgrade was due to
    NADBank's shift to finance renewable energy projects; and
    finally, will the authorization language that is needed to
    recapitalize the NADBank require a change to the NAFTA treaty?
        Secretary Lew. Chairwoman Granger, my understanding of the
    downgrade is that there was a technical change in some of the
    credit-scoring rules, and it was not a reflection of a change
    in policy. So, I am not actually aware of it being due to any
    change of activity, but I am happy to check and get back.
        Going back to the origins of NADBank, I think it reflects
    the close relationship the United States and Mexico have, that
    we undertake infrastructure projects on both sides of our
    borders. We pay for projects on the U.S. side, they pay for
    projects on the Mexican side. It is in the interest of the
    region in the United States and in Mexico, and it is a source
    of ongoing encouragement to the free flow of trade, which is
    very important in terms of U.S. exports as well as Mexican
    exports.
        I am not aware that the inclusion of renewable projects has
    materially changed the structure of that relationship. The
    things that I have been most focused on, as I have talked to
    our Mexican counterparts, have been things to ease the flow of
    goods, roads, customshouses, and the like.
        There was one more part of your question and I might not
    have answered it.
        Ms. Granger. Will this require a change in NAFTA?
        Secretary Lew. Oh, I do not believe it does. I think it is
    just a funding issue.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. No.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
        Mr. Secretary, very quickly, I know that there are things
    you can't tell me about the negotiations going on with Cuba,
    but can you tell me at least, if you see, or the administration
    sees a willingness on both sides, and especially on the side of
    the Cubans, on the part of the Cubans, to make something to
    change the relationship to, to bring it to the point that I
    have wanted it, for the last many years and that other people
    have wanted. Do you see that desire to make this work?
        Secretary Lew. Congressman, I will have to defer to my
    colleagues in the State Department who are engaged in
    conversations----
        Mr. Serrano. But you have information?
        Secretary Lew. Yes. I have not actually gotten a report
    from the meetings that took place this week, so I do not have
    more current information.
        But, let me go to kind of the broader principle about why
    we undertook the changes that we did. It was our view and the
    view, frankly, of many people in many administrations of both
    parties that the program that was in place was not having the
    positive effect it was intended to have. It was not opening
    Cuba up. It was not leading to the kind of change that is going
    to promote human rights and free expression and a move towards
    a freer economy in Cuba. That more contact with the American
    people, the easier flow of funds amongst family members and the
    opening up of easier financial transactions for our
    agricultural exporters and the like, would ultimately bring
    Cuba closer to where we think they ought to be.
        I think it is premature for us to be talking about the full
    normalization. I mean, the international financial
    institutions, we are barred by law, as you know, from
    supporting their entry. We are not talking about changing the
    things that are as a matter of law, off limits. We have to take
    this one step at a time. We have opened a big door in a way
    that I think is going to promote the kind of positive change
    that I think we all want to see in Cuba.
        I think more contact, more communications, more telephone
    contact, more Internet contact, more exposure to printed
    material from the United States, is all going to be part of it.
    I am hopeful that we will see the kind of change in Cuba that
    the Cuban people need, but that will also be good for U.S./Cuba
    relations in the long run.
        Mr. Serrano. Right. And I am not trying to be funny, but I
    know that when you sit around that big table with other members
    of the cabinet, their discussions and opinions and so on, and I
    can honestly tell you that one of the parts that has confused
    me totally about our Cuban policy, I mean, a lot of things have
    confused me, is this whole thing of Cuba being on the list of
    terrorist nations. It never made any sense, and it is probably
    the kind of thing that 20 years from now we will decide was a
    political decision made to appease a certain part of the
    American community or whatever, but it doesn't make any sense.
        Going back to a question that was asked before by Mr.
    Crenshaw, what are sanctions like? I remember in the Cuba
    issue, for a while--I don't know if it is still in place--where
    if a ship did business--or a country did business with Cuba, it
    could not dock its ship in any of our ports for 180 days. So,
    those were the kind of things that people apply during
    sanctions. But, you know, I think many of us are on the same
    page, that it is time the end this policy. It has been a
    failure for the Cuban people and for our country, and it is
    time to move ahead and, you know, just deal with a country that
    is 90 miles from our coast.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Fortenberry, you will have the last question.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. I want to
    return to the discussion--which you probably already have. I
    missed the balance of the hearing--but on the IMF. You are a
    proponent of us embracing this reform package. Could you gives
    your rationale, please?
        Secretary Lew. Yes, I would be happy to, Congressman. The
    IMF reforms were negotiated about 5 years ago, to address the
    fact that the world has changed in terms of the size of
    different economies, the stage of development of different
    economies, but the rules at the IMF have not. It was very
    important to the United States that we maintain our position at
    the IMF, that we not see a dilution of our veto and the very
    substantial role that we play.
        There was essentially a reallocation of shares and
    executive committee membership so that a couple of seats moved
    from Europe to the emerging economies. There will be share
    increases that move around amongst countries, all the while
    preserving the U.S. interests. It is something that was
    considered a very important step forward by the emerging
    economies. It is something that even the countries that are
    giving up shares that they would rather not be giving up would
    like to see finalized so that the institution is stabilized and
    it has the resources it needs to go forward. So, that means a
    lot of these emerging economies will contribute more.
        We do not have to contribute more to meet the new levels of
    capital. We have, through the new arrangement to borrow, put
    money into the IMF during the financial crisis. That by simply
    moving those resources from the new arrangement to borrow into
    the general capital, we will meet our share of the new
    contributions. While a lot of other countries are bringing new
    money to the table, we are just moving it from one IMF fund to
    another.
        I think it was a very good deal for the United States. It
    is a very good deal for the IMF, because it gives the IMF the
    resources it needs to deal with whatever comes over the coming
    years, and it is a good deal for the emerging economies who
    legitimately want to see some increase in their representation
    in a body that was designed before they were part of the world
    conversation.
        Everyone but the United States has ratified. The United
    States is the last country. We have helped drive this forward,
    design it. It is an institution that we were fundamental to the
    creation of and the sustenance of. And our leadership in it is
    going to be challenged severely if we do not ratify the
    reforms. I think it is a good deal, and the sooner we ratify
    it, the better it is for both the United States and the IMF.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Even though we don't have any heightened
    direct fiscal impact from it, do we have heightened risk from
    additional obligations?
        Secretary Lew. Well, there is a scoring impact for
    technical reasons, but just to put it in perspective, it is
    moving a commitment of roughly $60 billion from one fund to
    another and the scoring impact is a few hundred million
    dollars. It is not a very substantial change, even if one takes
    the view that the scoring is the measure of the change. I
    personally do not think the scoring is even necessary, but
    rules are rules and we have come up with proposals to cover
    that cost.
        Mr. Fortenberry. As a lender of last resort, though, what
    is your perspective on the IMF power to interact with rogue or
    to stop, rogue fiscal policies that could undermine the very
    substantive change that need to take place in order to stop
    whatever crisis they might be intervening in?
        Secretary Lew. I think if you look at the IMF's involvement
    in the last decade, it has been a force for change not just to
    stop rogue fiscal policies, but to require that responsible
    fiscal policies be adopted as a condition for IMF support at a
    difficult time. Some have criticized the IMF for being too
    tough in demanding programs of reform in exchange for support.
        I think if you look at some of the situations, whether it
    is Ukraine today, or Europe during the financial crisis, there
    are important national security interests and economic
    interests for the United States. I believe we have a serious
    national security interest in making sure Ukraine can survive
    through this difficult period adopting the kinds of reforms it
    needs to have a future that is free from the kind of corruption
    that characterized its past.
        And without the IMF, I do not think those reforms would be
    as far as they are, and I don't think that they would have the
    runway that they have in order to withstand the very difficult
    security situation in the east. If you look at Europe, Europe
    is our biggest trading partner. If Europe had not had the IMF
    to go to, there was nowhere else to stop the spread of the
    economic crisis. The IMF was the first line of defense, and we,
    as a country that export quite a lot to Europe, that where the
    trade flows between the United States and Europe are a
    significant part of our economy, benefitted from that quite
    directly, not to mention the geopolitical risk of a totally
    collapsed European economy.
        Even in the last 10 years, the IMF has proved it is an
    essential asset in the world financial order, and it provides
    the first line of defense. Just a few months ago, when everyone
    was worrying about Ebola, the first relief that went to African
    countries to give them the ability to deal with the situation,
    it came from the IMF, because they can respond quickly.
        So I think that, like any institution, one can, raise
    questions of whether you would have done exactly what they did
    in one situation or another. We have a voice in that, that is
    very strong. I am afraid that that voice gets weakened if we do
    not come to the table having kept our part of the bargain,
    which is what ratification of the reforms is.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        And thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you. Secretary Lew, thank you again for
    your time. This concludes today's hearing, and members may
    submit any additional questions for the record.
        The subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
    Programs stands adjourned.

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                                               Tuesday, March 24, 2015.

                         ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA

                                   WITNESSES

    ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, WESTERN HEMISPHERE
        AFFAIRS
    AMBASSADOR WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
        INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
    ELIZABETH HOGAN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, LATIN AMERICA AND THE
        CARIBBEAN, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs will come to order.
        I would like to welcome our witnesses to today's hearing:
    Roberta Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western
    Hemisphere; William Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State
    for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; and
    Elizabeth Hogan, Acting Assistant Administrator for USAID for
    Latin America and the Caribbean.
        Thank you all for being here.
        Last summer, our country experienced a national security
    and humanitarian crisis of historic proportions as tens of
    thousands of unaccompanied minors were sent through criminal
    smuggling networks from Central America across Mexico into our
    southern border. Although the number of unaccompanied children
    has dropped since then, thousands more are expected to cross
    this year. And that is unacceptable.
        At the Speaker's request, I led a working group to examine
    this issue and provide recommendations. I visited the Texas-
    Mexican border several times. I also led a delegation to
    Guatemala and Honduras to see where the children were coming
    from and why.
        There are many reasons why so many families and children
    have made and continue to make this dangerous journey. Some of
    this can be explained by the administration's slow pace of
    deportations and insufficient focus on law enforcement at the
    border. The harsh conditions and lack of security in Central
    America also play a role. In addition, the lack of economic
    opportunity and high unemployment is causing people to look for
    other ways to survive.
        The purpose of today's hearing is to discuss what the
    United States and other countries in the region can do to put
    an end to this illegal migration at its source. The United
    States has provided assistance to Central America for many
    years. We need to take a hard look at what has worked, what has
    not, and what changes need to be made going forward.
        Last year's appropriations act increased assistance for
    Central America and also included support for programs to
    combat human trafficking and help countries repatriate and
    reintegrate their citizens. The administration's budget request
    includes one billion dollars for Central America, more than
    double the amount provided last year. The committee needs an
    explanation from our witnesses on how such a large investment
    will change the situation at our border.
        While the United States has a role to play in helping
    Central America, we cannot and should not do this alone. Other
    countries in the region have a stake in Central America's
    failure or success. Our neighbor Mexico is at the front lines
    of combating illegal migration, and we must do all we can to
    help Mexico strengthen its borders.
        In addition, we should also support and use the
    capabilities of partners in the region, such as Colombia. There
    are a number of lessons we can learn from Plan Colombia.
    Specifically, for lasting change to occur, we need a solid
    commitment from the partner countries themselves. These
    governments must be willing to make hard choices and address
    the needs of their own citizens.
        I have met with the presidents of some of these countries
    and have already seen progress. For the first time, the Central
    American governments had come together to develop a joint plan
    to address shared problems in the region. Just as I believe the
    United States should assist those countries, so, too, should we
    hold the governments accountable for following through on their
    commitments.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how
    we can best address these important issues.
        And I would now like to turn to my friend, Ranking Member
    Lowey, for her opening remarks.

                        Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey

        Mrs. Lowey. And thank you, my friend, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Granger. You are welcome.
        Mrs. Lowey. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, Assistant
    Secretary Brownfield, Acting Assistant Administrator Hogan, I
    must say it is a pleasure to see you here today and express my
    view that we are indeed fortunate to have people of your
    thoughtfulness, commitment, and intelligence serving the United
    States of America. And I thank you.
        Last summer, a humanitarian crisis came to our doorstep,
    with nearly 70,000 unaccompanied minors fleeing their home as a
    result of the abject poverty, lack of economic opportunity,
    rampant critical networks, and weak governments in Central
    America.
        These conditions have allowed drug trafficking and other
    criminal enterprises to grow in size and strength aggressively,
    intimidating and overwhelming government institutions and
    threatening public security and the rule of law. In fact,
    Central American countries represented four of the five
    countries with the highest homicide rates in the world. Their
    economic growth lags behind that of the rest of Latin America,
    and 50 percent of the population lives in poverty, with
    underemployment hovering between 30 to 40 percent in El
    Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala.
        Clearly, it is in our interest to develop an integrated
    strategy for engagement with the countries of Central America.
    More must be done to invest in civil society and to provide
    alternative livelihoods, education, and opportunities for
    youth.
        And while I support this effort, I have a number of
    questions about the policies being proposed. For example, this
    year's request for the region would scale up longstanding State
    and USAID programs in Central America. I can't help but ask:
    How will these programs be more effective than in the past?
    What makes them different? How many years of increased
    assistance will be necessary to successfully improve economic
    and security conditions? Given the history of organized
    corruption, do you all believe there is sufficient political
    will to undertake the necessary fiscal and policy reforms?
        The administration's engagement with the regions' leaders
    at the highest levels and the efforts of Presidents and Foreign
    Ministers of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador to consult in
    Washington on their alliance for prosperity in the Northern
    Triangle reflect a strong desire for real change and ownership
    of these reforms, which is critical to success.
        At the same time, to what extent have civil society groups
    been included in these discussions? Who speaks for the
    marginalized, the vulnerable, and disadvantaged during these
    meetings? Are their human rights concerns being addressed? And
    who is addressing the needs of the children who have been
    returned to their home country and are in desperate need of
    rehabilitation services?
        I also want to raise police and judicial reforms, which are
    at the core of citizen security. While enforcement by police
    and the military is important, security forces must
    institutionalize mechanisms to ensure transparency and
    accountability as well as respect for the rights of citizens.
    What commitments are the three Presidents prepared to make in
    terms of enhancing civilian police, providing accountability
    for any human rights abuses by police and military forces, and
    ensuring access to and credibility of independent judiciaries?
        Lastly, I hope you will detail how the requests will
    improve our public diplomacy capabilities. Before the crisis
    reached its height last summer, were embassy and consulate
    officials aware of the aggressive and misleading marketing
    tactics being used by coyotes to encourage families to send
    their children on a dangerous journey north? What were we doing
    to counteract such campaigns? These just didn't appear out of
    the blue, and I would be particularly interested in your
    addressing that. I hope your efforts include a public diplomacy
    component that can prevail over the lies of druglords and
    criminals.
        And I look forward to your testimonies.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you, Mrs. Lowey.
        I will now call on the witnesses to give their opening
    statements. I would encourage each of you to summarize your
    remarks so we leave enough time for questions and answers. Your
    full written statements will be placed in the record.
        We will begin with Assistant Secretary Jacobson.

                       Opening Statement by Ms. Jacobson

        Ms. Jacobson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman,
    Ranking Member Lowey, and members of the committee. Thank you
    for the opportunity to testify today on the administration's $1
    billion whole-of-government request to support the U.S.
    strategy for engagement in Central America.
        Central America is a top priority for the United States
    because important national interests are at stake. When Central
    America suffers, the United States absorbs the impacts of
    increased migration and other transnational challenges.
    Conversely, a well-governed, secure, and economically
    prosperous Central America will enhance the security and
    prosperity of the United States.
        And I would like to submit my testimony for the record and
    not take much of your time before we get to your questions.
        While conditions in Central America remain challenging,
    this region could be one of transformative change. We sense it.
    Central American governments sense it. And we are all driven by
    an urgency to act quickly but wisely and get it right.
        Last summer's spike in migration was a clear signal that
    the serious and longstanding challenges in Central America
    remain and, in some instances, are worsening. But with renewed
    political will among the regions leaders, we are working with
    them to change this trend and address the underlying factors
    driving migration or be prepared for the tragedy to repeat
    itself ad infinitum with higher impact in costs on the United
    States.
        Over the past 5 years of implementing our Central America
    Regional Security Initiative, we have learned a great deal
    about what works and what doesn't work on security in Central
    America, and this new request builds on that knowledge.
        What we learned most of all was that, unless we focus on
    improving the ability of governments to deliver services
    efficiently with accountability and also improve economic
    opportunities, especially for young people, as integral parts
    of security, nothing we do to make things safer will be
    sustainable. This budget request represents a significant
    increase from previous years, but we know that the cost of
    investing now pales in comparison to addressing these
    challenges later.
        Today the governments of this region are demonstrating the
    political will necessary to take the difficult decisions that
    can lead to systemic change. The Presidents of El Salvador,
    Guatemala, and Honduras have a plan. They presented the
    Alliance for Prosperity in November.
        Since last summer, El Salvador has passed an investment
    stability law, giving investors assurances that tax and customs
    regulations will not change over the course of an investment.
    Guatemala has reached agreement on reparations for communities
    where human rights were violated by the construction of the
    Chixoy Dam. Honduras signed an agreement with Transparency
    International to make government procurement information
    available and invited the U.N. Office of the United Nations
    High Commissioner for Human Rights to the country.
        We recognize that requesting additional funds from Congress
    will not make a difference unless these governments do more to
    invest their own additional resources and advance reforms that
    lay the groundwork for success and enable our assistance to
    produce the outcomes we all intend.
        During months of intensive work with these Presidents, it
    is clear that the notion of shared responsibility is more than
    a bumper sticker. We believe that each of the countries has
    taken and is committed to actions that will promote better
    business environment for investors and small business,
    strengthen police and judicial systems, and increase government
    transparency.
        So we are faced with a question: Do we want to work
    together with our Central American partners to help them solve
    the problems or merely mitigate them? This request for $1
    billion is a bold step so that we can do more than mitigate.
        We know that we are a long way from achieving our core
    goals in Central America. There is no clearer indication of
    this than the willingness of tens of thousands of children to
    travel to the United States last summer amid enormous risks.
        But there is reason to be optimistic about Central
    America's future, and we believe now is the time for a new
    approach to Central America. We have a vision and a plan, and
    we want to work with you to support Central America and protect
    U.S. national security. And, as Vice President Biden says,
    there is no reason why Central America cannot be the next great
    success story in the Western Hemisphere.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.

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        Ms. Granger. Assistant Secretary Brownfield, you are now
    recognized.

                   Opening Statement by Ambassador Brownfield

        Ambassador Brownfield. Thank you very much, Madam
    Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am
    honored to appear with my old friends Roberta Jacobson and Beth
    Hogan.
        We meet today to discuss the President's strategy for
    Central America, but we filter that discussion through our
    experience last summer, when tens of thousands of Central
    American migrants, many of them children, arrived at our
    southwest border. We learned lessons. The most important was
    that the solution to the migration crisis is not at our
    border--it is in Central America--and the root causes that
    drive the migration north.
        As Assistant Secretary Jacobson just described, the
    President's strategy attacks those root causes with three
    prongs: prosperity, governance, and security. I work the
    security prong, and I look forward to working with Beth on the
    governance prong.
        We do not start this exercise from scratch. Since 2009, my
    bureau has provided support and assistance, generously funded
    by the United States Congress through CARSI, the Central
    America Regional Security Initiative.
        There are some who suggest that after 6 years there is
    little to show for the effort. I do not agree. Thanks to
    Operations Martillo and Anvil, drug smuggling by air through
    Honduras is down perhaps 50 percent since 2012. Maritime drug
    seizures, our best measure of drug flow, have fallen 40 percent
    in Costa Rica and 60 percent in Panama.
        Seventy-two maritime drug smugglers have come to the United
    States to face justice. The homicide rate in Honduras has
    dropped more than 20 percent from 2011. And joint border law
    enforcement task forces now work along the borders between
    Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, as well as Panama
    and Colombia.
        I do not apologize for CARSI, Madam Chairwoman. I am proud
    of it.
        But if we had been completely successful, we would not be
    here today. I have been in this business more than 36 long
    years, and I have learned perhaps two lessons. First, it takes
    years to create drug crime and security-driven crises, and it
    will take years to resolve them. Second, no strategy succeeds
    unless it addresses the fundamental problems and provides
    adequate resources to do the job.
        The President's strategy addresses the three core
    challenges for Central America today. The INL request for the
    2016 budget is $205 million, 25 percent more than the amount
    generously appropriated by Congress for this year.
        The subcommittee has a right to ask--in fact, the
    subcommittee has already asked--what more will you see for this
    25 percent uptick.
        First, much closer integration between INL and USAID
    programs in Central America. That is the point of the
    President's strategy. The Central America problem is not one-
    dimensional. It is security, governance, and prosperity.
        Second, we plan to pilot a new programming approach that
    links USAID's community programming with INL's model police
    precincts. We call it the place-based approach. Jointly, we
    identify communities, age groups, security threats, root
    causes, and design specific programs to address them. Initial
    reports from Honduras on place-based programs are promising.
        Third, we will expand those CARSI programs with a
    successful track record--specialized and vetted units, joint
    task forces, police training and reform, border security, youth
    and gang education, drug demand and rehabilitation centers.
        Members of the subcommittee, we knew when we started CARSI
    together in 2009 that we were in this for the long haul. We
    knew that we would learn from programs that worked well and
    others that worked poorly. We knew that we would accomplish
    only as much as the regional governments' political will would
    support.
        We have delivered some results. Central America is a better
    place today. The United States is a safer place due to those
    efforts. We obviously have more work to do. I look forward to
    working closely with this subcommittee to get it done.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I look forward to your
    comments and questions.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.

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        Ms. Granger. Acting Assistant Administrator Hogan, you are
    now recognized.

                         Opening Statement by Ms. Hogan

        Ms. Hogan. Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member Lowey, members
    of the subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to testify
    today, and thank you for the committee's continuing support for
    USAID's work in Central America.
        I am pleased to update you on our efforts to address the
    root causes of migration and the crisis that we saw stemming
    from problems in Central America last summer.
        As Administrator Lenhardt testified last week, USAID's
    mission is to partner to end extreme poverty and promote
    resilient, democratic societies. In Central America, USAID
    assistance has improved access to health and education, created
    new businesses, contributed to justice reforms, improved food
    security, and responded to natural disasters.
        However, in recent years, social development and economic
    growth have been stymied by a dramatic rise in crime and
    violence, particularly in the Northern Triangle. This
    insecurity is rooted in deep-seated issues of social and
    economic inequality, the failure of the region's governments
    and private sector to expand economic opportunity for vast
    segments of the population, and increases in gang violence and
    transnational crime.
        We must work together to address the underlying factors
    that are compelling migration. As Vice President Biden said,
    the cost of investing now in a secure and prosperous Central
    America is modest compared with the cost of letting violence
    and poverty fester.
        To that end, we have developed an interagency whole-of-
    government strategy that advances three interrelated
    objectives: security, prosperity, and governance.
        The heart of USAID's security work is youth-focused crime
    and violence prevention. We have supported and tested a range
    of community-level prevention approaches in the highest crime
    communities in these countries. These include partnering with
    civil society, governments, and the private sector to create
    safe community spaces, expand after-school activities, provide
    job and life skills training for at-risk youth, build trust
    between police and residents, and launch community crime-
    prevention committees.
        Last fall, the results of an independent impact evaluation
    confirmed that these community-level prevention programs are
    working. The study showed significantly fewer robberies,
    murders, and extortion reported in the neighborhoods where
    USAID is working compared to similar communities where we are
    not.
        With additional resources under the new strategy, we are
    prepared to help governments of the Northern Triangle scale up
    what is working, particularly in the communities from which
    youth are migrating.
        Advancing prosperity in the region requires a concerted
    effort by governments and the private sector to reduce
    persistent poverty and create an enabling economic environment
    that includes women, youth, and marginalized populations. USAID
    is working to drive economic activity throughout the Northern
    Triangle with programs that prepare youth to join the formal
    labor force and increase their incomes.
        Last year, I heard from youth involved in our workforce
    development programs that offer these out-of-school youth from
    poor and dangerous neighborhoods an alternative to gang
    involvement or illegal migration. The success of these programs
    is typical of the one I visited in Guatemala, where 75 percent
    of graduates obtain employment, return to school, or start a
    business within 1 year.
        The sustainability of these programs depends upon strong
    governance from the Northern Triangle countries. For these
    reasons, USAID will continue to promote government
    accountability, institutional checks and balances, judicial
    reforms, human rights protections, and increased civil society
    participation in the democratic process.
        In El Salvador, for example, we have had success helping
    the government improve tax administration and thereby increase
    its spending on its own security programs.
        Local ownership also requires partnering with the private
    sector to leverage resources and spur development. USAID has 16
    active public-private partnerships in Central America. In the
    last 5 years, these partnerships have leveraged nearly $160
    million in private sector resources to complement our own
    investments in development. As an example, partnerships with
    more than 40 small and large companies in Honduras are helping
    us connect small-scale farmers to valuable markets.
        The success of the Central America strategy requires
    unambiguous commitment, leadership, and ownership of the
    Northern Triangle governments. Fortunately, those countries are
    demonstrating a deepening commitment to advocate their own
    development goals. This political will, in combination with
    improved local capacity, leveraged resources, and new
    partnerships, will allow us to help Central American
    governments create a peaceful, prosperous, and integrated
    region and, in so doing, improve the security and prosperity of
    our own people.
        Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.

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        Ms. Granger. Since last summer, there have been a number of
    strategies. You talked about two, the first being the Alliance
    for Prosperity, for which the three Central American countries
    came together under Honduras' leadership, putting together a
    plan. Then, of course, the Vice President put forward a plan,
    his own strategy. But neither one of those plans have goals
    that are tied to funds to implement them.
        Last year in our appropriations act, we required a strategy
    to target assistance to address the factors contributing to
    this problem, including goals, benchmarks, timelines, and a
    spend plan. That was due last week. So I would ask first,
    Secretary Jacobson, when we can expect that plan?
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think you are referring to the
    Central American migration strategy that we owe you all.
        Ms. Granger. Right.
        Ms. Jacobson. I do know that that has been held up a little
    bit by the ``653'' report that we all owe you, and I understand
    that that will be coming up very shortly. So we do know that we
    owe that for you.
        On the larger question of the commitments and the goals for
    these funds, what I would say is, if you look at what the Vice
    President talked about when he was in the region most recently
    and the document that came out of that, with very specific
    time-bound commitments, as well as some of the things the
    Presidents are already implementing, I think that gives us the
    very beginning of a roadmap. Then the leaders and the Foreign
    Ministers were here about a week ago to continue that work with
    the IDB, the Inter-American Development Bank.
        So we are trying to be as precise as we can as we move
    forward with this request to get very specific about the
    commitments that they are making and that we will use these
    funds to support going forward.
        Ms. Granger. Before we approve funding, we will have to
    have that strategy, which needs to be very specific as to if
    and how the Central American Presidents' plan fits into that.
        The other thing that is important to me in this is where we
    are right now with respect to the number of unaccompanied
    children, and what we went through last year. According to the
    Department of Homeland Security, over 68,000 unaccompanied
    children were apprehended in the United States last year, with
    three-quarters of that being from Central America, and most of
    the rest were from Mexico.
        We, the task force, visited Central America, and the first
    question I asked was, do you want your children back? It was a
    very straightforward question, and the answer would make a
    difference in what we would do as the United States. Their
    answer was: Absolutely, we want our children back. But last
    year the United States only returned 2,000 children--68,000
    apprehended, 2,000 returned.
        So now the administration is asking for one billion dollars
    to address the causes, but I would ask to the witnesses: Is it
    possible to get this under control without changes to our own
    laws and policies that allow those children to be quickly
    returned to their countries and their families?
        How do you take into account that although the children
    were coming from Central America, they were transitting through
    Mexico. We returned 2,000, but Mexico returned, I think, 18,000
    minors from Central America last year.
        So I would say, what are we doing right now, and how can
    you strengthen our border and also keep that commitment we made
    that we would return their children?
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, I will start with some of this, and I
    think my colleagues may have some answers too.
        I think there are things that we have to do on every level.
    Obviously, I think the President believes comprehensive
    immigration reform is part of this process, but I also think
    that, although we feel it is critically important to give the
    unaccompanied children who came last summer all of the
    protections they are due in this process--and that is one of
    the reasons that many have not been returned yet; they are
    going through that legal process--we did return a very large
    number of family units, including children and, obviously, many
    individual adults. And the family units we helped with the
    reintegration back into the countries that they came from.
        Also, the total number of those that were detained by
    Mexico was 127,000, most from Central America, up from 89,000
    the year before. So Mexico was crucial in this. And much of our
    work with Mexico is on their southern border. Assistant
    Secretary Brownfield can speak more about that.
        So I think we have to be doing both. But, ultimately, so as
    not to have this surge repeat itself, part of that is public
    diplomacy, part of it is making sure the word is out about what
    is and is not in our laws. But part of it, also, is to try and
    address some of the underlying causes of why they came. Because
    you are right, we have to deal with those who came before, but
    we also have to make sure it doesn't repeat itself.
        Mr. Brownfield. If I might offer just another minute on top
    of that, Madam Chairwoman.
        You raise absolutely valid points and questions. Some of
    them we obviously cannot answer. As you have correctly
    suggested, once a migrant has reached the United States of
    America, that person is then brought into the U.S. legal
    process. And adjusting that does require either changes to
    procedures or changes to law, and it is a broader dialogue than
    the three of us can offer guidance to.
        However, what we are talking about in this hearing would be
    investments that would prevent this sort of thing from
    happening in the future. That is what this strategy is designed
    to accomplish.
        You have correctly noted--and I wish to emphasize this to
    everyone in this room--the Government of Mexico performed
    exceptionally well during this crisis that we had last year on
    our border. Some might say they went beyond what they had ever
    done in the past, in terms of cooperating in this effort. I
    wish to acknowledge that, and I wish to state it publically and
    for the record.
        They have asked us----
        Ms. Granger. I was not criticizing Mexico in any way.
        Ms. Jacobson. No, no, no, no.
        Mr. Brownfield. No, you were not. And I just wanted to make
    sure--
        Ms. Granger. That was not my question to you.
        Mr. Brownfield [continuing]. They heard from me. Yes.
        Ms. Granger. That was not my question to you. My question
    was, should we have to change the laws? Because we sent back so
    few. Now these children will have been away from their families
    for a year and away from their countries, and I think that is
    something we need to address.
        I will address one more thing, because you were talking
    about root cause us and how we resolve this. When I came to
    Congress, one of the first things I worked on was Plan
    Colombia. And Colombia is a very different place today,
    amazingly different. It was very difficult to do, but you have
    businesses that are flourishing and great tourism. But, first,
    they made it safe.
        And as you are talking about employment and economic
    opportunities, companies are not going to move to a country
    that is one of the most violent and has the highest violence
    rate in the world.
        I come, we all come with our different backgrounds. Mine
    was Fort Worth, Texas. It has been a very difficult time for
    Fort Worth--very high unemployment because we lost a lot of
    defense contracts. So, as our economy went down, our crime went
    up. The first thing we did was make it safe again so those
    businesses would flourish.
        So, as we put these processes and these plans together,
    please don't give us a plan to fund for a billion dollars that
    says, first, we will offer opportunities to have business come.
    They are not going to do it unless it is safe.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Now, following up, I agree that Central
    American nations need support to address the root causes of
    unrest, but it ultimately depends on the leaders of each
    country to carry out substantial reforms, to raise revenues,
    reduce corruption, strengthen institutions, and expand
    educational and economic opportunities for their citizens.
        Now, for those of us who have been working in this area a
    long time, we know how difficult it is. But we also,
    unfortunately, have seen very little progress in some of these
    countries, and most of us feel progress in these areas is
    essential. So let me throw out a couple of things. Maybe you
    can give us some hope for positive change.
        To what extent are Central American nations undertaking
    fiscal and policy reforms? In your view, are Central American
    political and business elites convinced that such reforms are
    necessary, so much so that they are willing to even pay taxes?
    I would love some examples.
        Conditions on assistance are always a double-edged sword.
    From your perspective, what are the benefits and drawbacks of
    Congress tying our assistance to internal reforms in Central
    America? Absent buy-in from the business and political elites,
    can the strong fiscal policies proposed in this plan succeed?
        And I will throw out a couple of more, and then you can all
    take your turn. We know what I am getting at.
        So, assuming buy-in from business and political elites
    exists, do you believe the reform plans will allow the
    countries of Central America to meet the demand for needed
    services as well as sustain improvements in government? And how
    will such policies translate into increased public trust?
        How do we institutionalize the political commitment and
    capacity so that any progress made today extends to future
    political leadership?
        You can take any part of that. And who wants to begin?
        Ms. Jacobson. I will start, I guess. Those are great.
        I think----
        Mrs. Lowey. Not that you haven't heard them before.
        Ms. Jacobson. No, but they are exactly the right questions.
    And I think they really do get at the issues of, why is this
    different? You know, why is this night different from all other
    nights at this time of year?
        We look at this particular moment in Central America,
    facing huge challenges, as different than before, frankly
    because of the three leaders in place right now. That is what
    is different. There is both a particular urgency to this
    crisis, in part demonstrated by last summer, but that was only
    the most recent, sort of, exemplar. But it also is a function
    of three leaders who, while ideologically very different, all
    have the political will to act.
        And so what you have seen, for example, in Honduras, a
    country where a year ago I would have said it is the country I
    am most worried about in that region, you have seen a 21
    percent increase in tax revenue because of fiscal reform and
    closing of the budget gap by over 3 or 4 percent of GDP. That
    is enormously important in 1 year--an IMF standby agreement
    after many years of not having one. That was really getting his
    hands around a huge problem. And it is only a beginning, but
    that demonstrated enormous political will.
        I think, frankly, your question about business and economic
    elites is a very fundamental one. And one of the comments made
    about Colombia, I think, is instrumental here. The chairwoman
    is absolutely right; security does come first for businesses.
    But what we saw in Colombia and President Uribe was an
    agreement with the business class and the economic elite that
    they would join the President in focusing on security, they
    would be part of that answer. Bill knows that better than
    anybody.
        We haven't seen that until recently in Central America. The
    business class has been slow to get on board and to back those
    efforts, and that is beginning to change. And the commitments
    that we are seeing to private sector dialogue, to commitment on
    investment reforms, and real conversation with both civil
    society for their input and the business sector also gives me
    great optimism that that is changing.
        I think that we have also seen changes in the model of
    policing that Bill will talk about from old mechanisms to ones
    that are much more community-based and responsive to the
    population, a focus on women in the community as, often, heads
    of households when men have left.
        So all of these things are an accretion of the experiences
    we have had in the past with Presidents who are willing to back
    those lessons learned based on data that I think give us a much
    better chance of success than before.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Ms. Hogan. If I may, I would like to add to that in terms
    of what is different. I think we are different in the way we
    are approaching these problems. We are approaching them in a
    much more integrated fashion, as Ambassador Brownfield just
    alluded to.
        Also, because these governments are stepping forward and
    committing themselves to very tough policy changes that they
    are going to take on and new regulations that they are going to
    make, we are going to tie our assistance to their ability to do
    just that. And so we are not going to have resources lead
    reforms; we are going to have resources follow reforms.
        If, in fact, we see countries stall or backtrack on the
    commitments which they have themselves committed to, we are
    going to come back to you and ask your concurrence to reprogram
    resources to those countries that are advancing and are keeping
    faith with the changes that they have agreed to make.
        In El Salvador, we have something called a Partnership for
    Growth, and, in that partnership, we have something called a
    scorecard. It is a very public document, and it lists very
    specifically what donors are going to do and what the
    Government of El Salvador is going to do and the private sector
    is going to do.
        And that is the kind of model that we want to replicate as
    we move forward in the implementation of this program so that
    it is very clear, not just to governments but to the citizens
    of those countries, that this is what their governments have
    committed to, and we will hold them accountable to achieving
    that. And if they don't, as I say, we will look at other ways
    of reprogramming those resources.
        Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Ambassador, do you want to add to it?
        Mr. Brownfield. I really have very little to add, other
    than to say, among the lessons that we learned in Colombia and
    Plan Colombia, one, as already stated, there has to be some
    degree of security which produces the confidence which then
    produces the willingness of the business community to engage
    and support.
        Second, it requires some courage on the part of a
    government, because what the government is doing is changing
    the way that society has functioned for years, decades, in some
    cases centuries. And it takes a particular sort of government
    or an experience of having spent enough time in chaos to be
    willing to make that sort of decision.
        Third, it takes time. And I know you have heard this from
    me before, but I will say it again, and I will put it in a very
    personal context. In 2007, I arrived in Colombia as the United
    States Ambassador. Plan Colombia, at that point, was closing in
    on 8 years of operation. The narrative, at that point, was
    still: There are no results. We have not succeeded. What have
    we gotten for our investment in Plan Colombia?
        Well, we saw that in the course of the next 1 or 2 years.
    It had nothing to do with me; it had to do with 7 or 8 years of
    investment. And while no one wants to hear that, I will
    continue to note that we are in this Central America process
    for the long haul, and we are in it because it is in our
    national interest to focus this effort and these resources
    there.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        Let me follow up on what Chairwoman Granger mentioned about
    Plan Colombia. I mean, I think everybody understands that it
    has been a huge success, potentially the greatest success story
    after the Marshall Plan. I mean, it has really been a huge
    success.
        And, Ambassador, take some credit for it, because you were
    there, and I know a lot of the work that you did.
        But, clearly, the foundation of Plan Colombia, as the
    Chairwoman stated, was security. Listen to President Uribe. He
    will tell you. It is security. It is security first, it is
    security second, it is security third.
        And my concern is that I don't see that emphasis on
    security. And I don't disagree with what you all have talked
    about, that there are other components. But unless people feel
    secure--and I don't care how much opportunity we give, whether
    it is in Honduras or Guatemala, those gangs are still going to
    go to little girls and take them. Those gangs are still going
    to go to folks' families and murder them if they don't join the
    gangs, et cetera.
        Ambassador, I agree with you. I think CARSI has done some
    really good things, and it is a long-term proposition. So my
    concern is I just don't see in this proposal, frankly, enough
    emphasis on that security component.
        So I would just ask you, how is this different from Plan
    Colombia and how is it similar to Plan Colombia, particularly
    in the security aspect?
        Ms. Jacobson. I am going to let Bill answer in a second.
    Two things I would say.
        One, Congressman, I would say that in Central America one
    of the things we have learned is, with seven countries in
    Central America, even with the most acute security problems
    being in the Northern Triangle, unless we work with all of them
    and ensure that they are working together, the criminal
    organizations exploit the national boundaries, which we and the
    governments have to abide by but they don't. So it is more
    complicated, and we have to work with all of them, unlike,
    obviously, in Colombia.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. I agree.
        Ms. Jacobson. The second thing I would say is it is a
    fairly significant increase in the CARSI portion of this $1
    billion. It is $286 million on what is traditionally considered
    security.
        I would argue that, unless we do good governance, delivery
    of judicial systems and policing and courts and penitentiaries,
    all very much part of security, as well as communities that are
    safe and have places for kids to go, which is part of the
    governance and opportunity portions, that is all security. That
    was all done under CARSI. That has increased. So that is new
    and expanded in this program, as well.
        Mr. Brownfield. I would just add one additional point,
    Congressman.
        I mean, you are right. Of course you are right. There is
    going to be no economic growth and social justice if there is
    not security, if you do not have--as President Uribe, who we
    have mentioned several times, frequently would say, until I can
    get state presence, until I can get police officers and
    prosecutors or even mayors to be living in the towns that are
    under threat either from narcotics traffickers, criminals, or,
    in the case of Colombia, from guerillas, we are not going to be
    able to produce the outcomes that we are looking for.
        But as Alvaro Uribe would say, we start with security. We
    have to get to a certain level on security; then we have to
    feed in the social and economic developmental part. And he
    would acknowledge that you start heavy on security. At some
    point, you reach that tipping point, and then you are able to
    ratchet back how much is security and how much is economic and
    social development.
        I am not saying we are anywhere near that point in Central
    America today, but I do say you are correct, the same formula
    will apply.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I don't disagree with you. And it is
    just that, when I look at this, I see, again, yes, there is
    obviously security, and I understand the security component has
    different aspects of it. But I just don't see enough emphasis
    on how to deal with these criminal enterprises. They are
    criminal enterprises. These are drug gangs, narco-terrorists,
    narcotrafficking, you know--and I just don't see enough of
    that. That is my concern.
        So, since I have very little time, have you all been in
    contact with SOUTHCOM--Remember, I have SOUTHCOM in my
    district. How much of this has been put together, the security
    aspect--how much input has SOUTHCOM had? Do you all meet with
    them regularly?
        And, then, is it their plan, is the security coming from
    them? Is it coming from you, Ambassador? Is it coming from you,
    the Department of State? How much of this is SOUTHCOM-driven?
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, certainly, Bill and I meet regularly
    with General Kelly. It is certainly a plan that we worked very
    extensively with the interagency. It was developed by the State
    Department but then got the input of the full interagency--
    Department of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Department of
    Defense, including SOUTHCOM.
        And SOUTHCOM has a critical role in this, whether it is
    maritime interdiction, detection, and monitoring, and will be
    very active in it.
        Mr. Brownfield. I will be even simpler than that,
    Congressman. There is almost nothing that I am going to do in
    the region, from the INL perspective, the law enforcement and
    security perspective, that I don't coordinate in some way with
    SOUTHCOM. We are two fingers on the same hand, if you will. And
    there is nothing I will do that General Kelly is not in some
    way, shape, or form aware of.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. And my time is up. Thank you, Madam
    Chairman. I just do want to emphasize that unless we do have
    serious security, to your point, then everything else is wasted
    money.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Secretary Jacobson, it is my feeling that, throughout the
    years, part of our dealings in Central America and anywhere
    south of the Texas border had at times something to do with our
    dealings with Cuba. It had an overflow or just a resentment on
    the part of some folks in those countries.
        Do you think that our present--and I know this hearing is
    about Central America, but it becomes one neighborhood. Do you
    think that our negotiations now with Cuba will have a positive,
    negative, or non-effect on Central America in terms of how we
    are seen and what we can ask of them to do?
        Ms. Jacobson. Congressman, I have said publically since the
    December 17 announcement that it was broadly welcomed by
    countries in the region, and that would include Central America
    and Mexico, that they supported the President's announcement
    and they view the policy decision as very welcome. So I think
    they support that and they view it positively.
        But in terms of our relationship with Central America and
    Mexico, those relations were strong before, and they will
    continue as such. But they do view that very positively.
        Mr. Serrano. And, again, I know, first of all, that we are
    not here to talk about Cuba, necessarily, and, number two,
    there are things you can't tell me even if you wanted to tell
    me. I shouldn't say that in public because Members of Congress
    are supposed to know everything, but there are things you can't
    tell me.
        I see more of a better relationship with all of Latin
    America, I believe, if we straighten out our situation with
    Cuba. So do you think that the latest sanctions we put on some
    on Venezuelan leaders, members of the government, because of
    their relationship with Cuba may hinder our negotiation with
    Cuba, without telling me all the things I really want to know
    about how those negotiations are going?
        Ms. Jacobson. Congressman, I think that the Venezuelan
    Government's reaction to those sanctions was predictable, in
    terms of their wanting that narrative to be about the United
    States and Venezuela, which--the problem isn't about our
    bilateral relationship. It is about problems within Venezuela.
        But I also think that, somewhat, we expected the countries
    in the hemisphere do not like sanctions, and so it was not
    necessarily a surprise that they did not support those
    sanctions. But those sanctions are not against the Venezuelan
    people; they are not against the Venezuelan economy. They are
    against seven individuals.
        I don't really think they are going to have an impact on
    the conversations we are having with Cuba, although Cuba has
    publically rejected that move, as well.
        Mr. Serrano. Right.
        Let me just touch on one last point there, because you
    touched on an important point. It seems that, in both cases
    that I brought up, you said that, on one hand, there was wide
    support from Central America and other places in Latin America
    for the December announcement, and you told me that they don't
    like sanctions against any of their countries.
        So, assuming we reach my dream of seeing full relations
    with Cuba, is Cuba in any position to play a role in making our
    relations with the rest of Latin America easier to deal with,
    or are those separate and apart from our issues with Cuba over
    the last 50-odd years?
        Sometimes I wonder what role would Cuba play as at least
    someone who has--we won't call it an ally; that may shock some
    people--but certainly someone that we are now no longer
    fighting publicly.
        Ms. Jacobson. You know, I think that the influence of Cuba,
    in terms of our own bilateral relationships, is not one that I
    would overstate. I think our relationships with most countries
    are direct, and they are productive in most cases. Where they
    are not very productive, whether it has been Venezuela recently
    or other countries, I am not really sure that Cuba will be a
    helpful country in those relationships.
        I think, at this point, after the 50-year experience that
    we have with Cuba, we take this one step at a time. And I am
    not sure that I can yet view this in a broader context of them
    being helpful beyond just reestablishment of diplomatic
    relations.
        We have seen--and the Colombian Government has been clear
    on their role in facilitating the peace process with the FARC.
    President Santos has said that he believes they have played a
    positive role there, and so we certainly take him at his word
    in that case. And we hope that that proves successful.
        Mr. Serrano. And one very quick, Madam Chairman, one quick
    question.
        This is something I should know but I don't know. Are our
    American territories in the Caribbean, Virgin Islands and
    Puerto Rico, do they fall under a total different, under the
    American flag, situation? Or do they also get included in some
    of the conversations we have with the rest of Latin America?
        Ms. Jacobson. The territories are not, obviously, directly
    part of the State Department's responsibilities----
        Mr. Serrano. Right.
        Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. As they are not independent. But
    we do some coordination work, certainly, with Puerto Rico.
        Mr. Serrano. All right.
        Thank you so much.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Fortenberry.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        When you get a little older and you start to look back at
    your life, you think about formative moments that penetrated
    your conscience. And one of those for me was the killing of the
    four nuns and laywomen in 1981, as you all recall. I met the
    parents of one of the laywomen missionaries--her name was
    Jean--at an event in Georgetown when I was a young student, and
    I wanted to say something to them, but I couldn't even get out
    the words.
        And so, when you look back as to where we were a few
    decades ago and where we have the potential to be, I think it
    does create some hope.
        Now, with that said, having been in El Salvador fairly
    recently, and having sat next to, in their Congress, physically
    sat in their Congress, next to a woman who is former--landed
    gentry, if you would put it that way, and a woman who was a
    former communist guerilla, and watching them interact, work
    toward solutions from different perspectives philosophically,
    again, is very encouraging.
        But you do get the sense that, because of the wounds in El
    Salvador, their ability to look this way, there is a hesitancy,
    although they look at places like Cuba and Venezuela and say,
    ``No, thanks. Those models aren't the right fit either.'' So,
    again, another possibility for some hope.
        Guatemala has a longer stabilized relationship with us,
    and, to a degree, Honduras. But with the highest murder rates
    in the world in Honduras, with incapacity throughout that
    entire triangle, it becomes an important component, I agree
    completely, of our own immigration policy to try to work where
    the origins of the problem are.
        Now, I thought that the bigger request here was going to
    focus primarily on that security component, border security
    component, and mutual security efforts to stop the migration
    and to fulfill what our chairwoman quoted last year, the First
    Lady of Honduras' desires, when she said, ``We want our
    children back.''
        Now, I hear what you are saying in terms of some additional
    complexities in our own immigration law once children have
    arrived here. But I thought that the greater component of this,
    while not in any way diminishing your long-term perspective on
    poverty fighting, capacity enhancement--encouraging this
    current good trajectory of enhanced governance is all important
    and good--I thought the firm resolve was on that first piece
    because of the nature of the problem. One of you said it is the
    gateway now through which we are looking at all of the other
    issues, this surge-of-children problem.
        So can you address that? Because it seems to be packaged as
    a priority rather than an immediate priority, to try to stop
    this flow and protect these children.
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, I am going to ask Bill Brownfield if he
    can address that because I think he, along with Beth, have been
    the ones who have really responded very quickly to the problem
    of last summer and continued to address the issues. Just today,
    we saw the announcement of a new border task force on the
    Guatemalan-Honduran border. So many of the programs we are
    talking about go directly to these issues, including within the
    $1 billion.
        Can I ask you, Bill, to elaborate?
        Mr. Brownfield. Let me start, and then I will pass it to
    Beth.
        Congressman, I arrived at the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador
    in June-July 1981. One of the first cases that I took on--I was
    as junior an officer as you could be. I was a third secretary.
    There is nothing lower than a third secretary in an embassy--
    was the investigation of the churchwomen murders as well as the
    murders of the two AFL-CIO labor advisers.
        I believe we actually got the people who did the act of
    murder against the four churchwomen. I do not believe we got
    everyone who was involved in the murders of the two labor
    leaders.
        I mention this to you because by 1984-1985, when we finally
    brought these six members of the National Guard to justice in
    El Salvador, it shook up the system, it shook up the
    institutions, it shook up the nation, because, for the first
    time ever, people who had traditionally been part of the never-
    held-accountable club for what they did were being held
    accountable.
        I give you that long preamble because, to a certain extent,
    and as the Ranking Member has pointed out, that is what we are
    trying to do with our security programs in Central America writ
    large today. That is to say, we are trying to get into
    communities and groups of people, whether they are
    businesspeople or whether they are the political elites or
    other elites, and get them to contribute to the solution, which
    is necessary if we are going to first break through the
    security problem, which, in turn, will allow Beth and USAID to
    have the impact that we are all looking forward to in terms of
    the economic and social side of the house.
        Which allows me to conclude by saying what I think we have
    kind of been saying for the last 30 minutes: that it is
    security, and it is economic development. You can't have
    economic development without security, but, at the end of the
    day, you are also not going to get long-term security if you
    don't have economic development.
        Dr. Hogan, over to you.
        Ms. Hogan. Well, I will just quickly say that, as I
    mentioned in my opening remarks, the private sector is getting
    engaged. We have raised $350 million in public-private
    partnerships since 2013----
        Mr. Fortenberry. Okay. Let me interject right quick,
    because I know my time is up. Are we going to mitigate or stop
    the surge of children? A new surge has just started.
        Ms. Hogan. Our intention----
        Mr. Fortenberry. In the short term.
        Ms. Hogan. In the short term, we are mitigating. These
    programs will take time to have the full impact----
        Mr. Fortenberry. And I am not disparaging the fullness of
    the plan. Please understand. But we have an emergency situation
    here, and this is a critical moment.
        Ms. Hogan. Okay. Let me just say quickly that one of the
    things that we did in response to the surge is we invested in
    helping governments develop the reception centers to be able to
    take back----
        Mr. Fortenberry. Correct.
        Ms. Hogan [continuing]. These children and families. And I
    actually witnessed that----
        Mr. Fortenberry. Which, in the midst of this, I touted, by
    the way.
        Ms. Hogan. Oh.
        Mr. Fortenberry. And I think it would be very helpful, as
    you all are talking about this, to pull some of those threads
    out and highlight them, because it is the crisis at the
    moment----
        Ms. Hogan. Right.
        Mr. Fortenberry [continuing]. While we think long term,
    strategically, on the underlying parts of the crisis.
        Ms. Hogan. Will do.
        Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you very much. Good afternoon.
        Let me go back to Cuba for a minute, and I wanted to ask
    our Secretary a couple of things with regard to the upcoming
    Summit of the Americas.
        Now, of course it is no secret that for many, many years I
    have believed that Americans should have the right to travel to
    Cuba, I mean, since the 1970s, you know. I just think that this
    now-50-plus-year policy is what exactly I thought it was then
    it was going to be, and it is a failed policy. So I am pleased
    to see the President with his historic announcement and moving
    toward some semblance of normal relations with an island 90
    miles away.
        With regard to the seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama
    City that is taking place next month, I would like to find
    out--and, Madam Secretary, I know you have led a team to
    Havana, what, once or twice now--twice--to conduct the
    negotiations in terms of renormalizing relations. I just need a
    sense of an update from you with regard to lifting the caps on
    Cuban and U.S. diplomatic staff and on things like housing for
    diplomats and travel, and just where are we in terms of those
    negotiations.
        And then, within the context of the summit, how do you see
    the new move toward normalizing relations impacting the Summit
    of the Americas?
        Ms. Jacobson. Thank you, Representative Lee.
        We aren't there yet. As you know, we are hoping to be able
    to open embassies and reestablish diplomatic relations. That is
    only the first step in a much longer normalization process. But
    in terms of the things that we need for an embassy to run
    normally, having sufficient diplomats there and the ability to
    travel around the country, et cetera, we have not yet achieved
    all of the things that we need. I am still, obviously,
    optimistic about making progress there.
        The summit is coming upon us. I don't know whether we will
    achieve all that we need to open embassies before the summit.
    We will keep working to that, but we are not going to impose an
    artificial deadline. This has to be done properly.
        It is, obviously, the first summit in which Cuba will be
    present, and I think that is an important factor. It is also a
    summit that will have a civil society forum that will meet with
    the leaders for the first time. We expect independent members
    of civil society to be there from all countries in the
    hemisphere. And it is the first time that there will be an
    opportunity for them to be heard by leaders and create a
    permanent forum.
        And, also, there will be conversations on civil society
    participation as one of the themes, as well as democracy and
    human rights. So we think those things are important for
    leaders from Cuba, Venezuela, and other countries in the region
    to hear, as well.
        Ms. Lee. Good. Thank you. And I know many Members of
    Congress will be attending the summit.
        Ms. Jacobson. I hope so.
        Ms. Lee. Yes. I have heard that several Members were, and
    some here on this committee would like to attend also.
        And let me ask Dr. Hogan a couple of questions about the
    Caribbean as a region.
        So often, the Caribbean has not been put in the proper
    place, in terms of our policy, in terms of our foreign
    assistance. And since you have responsibility for the West
    Indies and Caribbean, could you give us a sense of CARICOM,
    where we are in terms of our policy in relations and USAID
    toward CARICOM nations and the West Indies?
        Ms. Hogan. Certainly. I would be happy to.
        In fact, we have just launched a new energy initiative with
    the Eastern Caribbean countries to try to help them look at
    ways that they can have alternative energy introduced into the
    grid. Of course, no island nations are safe from the impact of
    climate change and the frequency of increased and more
    turbulent storms that they get on a regular basis, so we are
    working with them on disaster mitigation and preparation.
        We are also working with them under the Caribbean Basin
    Security Initiative because they, too, have seen a spike in
    crime and violence related to the drug trade. As it goes down
    in one place, it pops up higher in someplace else, and that has
    been the fact that we have seen in the Caribbean. And so we are
    working--similarly to the work that we do in CARSI, we are also
    doing that work in the Caribbean.
        In Jamaica, as well, we have just launched a $10 million
    energy initiative. We know that part of the problem for the
    Caribbean is that they have a very, very high cost for energy
    compared to the rest of the world. So anything that we can do
    to help them conserve energy, find alternative uses,
    alternative sources of energy, and bring down their energy
    costs will help them develop their own economies and their
    security.
        Ms. Lee. Could you get to this committee the dollar amount
    in USAID going to the region, to the Caribbean region, country
    by country and then a total amount?
        Ms. Hogan. Certainly.
        Ms. Lee. Because for many years now I have been a bit
    concerned about our level of USAID and what we are doing. I am
    glad to hear about the energy initiative. But I travel around
    the Caribbean, and I have seen the lack of U.S. presence. And I
    do know China is very active in the Caribbean, and I would like
    to just see what we are doing as compared to what China is
    doing.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        And welcome to the committee. It is a pleasure to have you
    join us.
        I want to just ask a couple of questions, one of which
    relates to the situation in Argentina that doesn't appear to be
    getting any better to those of us who are concerned about the
    ongoing AMIA investigation are becoming increasingly concerned
    about.
        Obviously, the murder, for lack of a better term, of
    Alberto Nisman puts quite a crimp in the opportunity to make
    sure that we can more specifically get to the bottom of the
    perpetrators. I know that the State Department had offered
    assistance to the Argentine judicial system. Although that
    appears to be in dispute, from the feedback that I have had
    from those who know quite a bit about the ongoing discussions.
        Can you give us an update on if and how the U.S. is aiding
    the Argentine Government in its investigation?
        Obviously, we can't interfere in their internal affairs,
    but the AMIA center attacks were horrific and transnational and
    represent a growing terrorist foothold that we obviously need
    to make sure that we are paying attention to.
        Ms. Jacobson. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.
        And to note that it is 20 years since the AMIA attack. And
    I first did my graduate research on the Jewish community in
    Argentina, did many of my interviews in the AMIA building
    before it was bombed, and so it is very important to us.
        We continue to call for the suspects and those involved in
    the AMIA bombing to be brought to justice. We think that is
    critically important.
        In the case of pursuit of those suspects, we have always
    said that needs to be pursued wherever that trail leads. We
    were skeptical, obviously, of the MOU that the Argentine
    Government signed with Iran. And nothing has come out of that
    over a year afterwards, maybe almost a year and a half or 2
    years. And in the case of Alberto Nisman, we have called for a
    very full and transparent investigation into his death, as
    well. We will continue to do so.
        In terms of an offer of law enforcement support or
    assistance, we almost always offer such support when there has
    been a high-profile crime in countries. It is up to that
    country's government as to whether they want to take us up on
    that offer. But, at this point, I don't know of any U.S.
    involvement or activity in that investigation. And so we will
    continue to be ready to do anything that may be requested of
    us, but that is being undertaken by Argentine authorities.
        But, obviously, the whole issue continues to concern us,
    with no judicial resolution on the matter or resolution for the
    victims and their families.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Is there any hope, now that Alberto
    Nisman is deceased, given that he was found dead the day before
    he was to give testimony that would have shed some important
    light on the case, are there other avenues that we are able to
    pursue to get the same information or the information that he
    had? Or did that information die with him?
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, I think there have been a number of
    others both within the Argentine judicial system who have
    looked at his material, who are making comments about it, who
    are looking into the issues. There are certainly NGOs that have
    been active in taking up the issue. The Argentine organizations
    themselves, the DAIA and others, have been active.
        I think that the case is certainly getting a great deal of
    attention and scrutiny. And we are going to maintain our
    monitoring and our engagement, obviously, through the Embassy
    and our ambassador in Argentina.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Do you feel as though you are
    getting true cooperation from the Argentine Government to get
    to the actual bottom of----
        Ms. Jacobson. Well, it is not a U.S. investigation.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Right.
        Ms. Jacobson. So our ability to, sort of, as you say, get
    to the bottom of it is not----
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Rather, do you feel as though the
    Argentine Government is fully engaged in trying to actually get
    to the bottom of the origin of the attack?
        Ms. Jacobson. I have to say, that is difficult for me to
    evaluate from where I sit. I think we will continue to call for
    a full investigation. We will continue to consult with
    Argentine authorities and, most importantly, continue to
    consult with the entities in Argentina who I think are most
    involved, whether it is the DAIA, the Memoria Organization,
    which is the victims organization, and try and see how they
    feel about the way things are going. It is an extremely
    difficult time in Argentina right now, and so we will try and
    get the best information that we can from all sources.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
        I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. First, Administrator Hogan, my question
    is about the issue of security. Last fall, the results of a 3-
    year study from Vanderbilt University--are you are familiar
    with that study? It talked about the community-level prevention
    programs that are working in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
    and Panama.
        At the 3-year mark, there were significantly fewer reported
    robberies and murders and extortion in neighborhoods with a
    USAID presence, which is great, as compared to the control
    group of similar communities. Now, residents also reported
    feeling more secure walking alone at night. And they took
    measurably more collective action to address crime and the
    treatment than in control groups. And, again, these are really
    good signs.
        And, as we all know, a good security environment requires a
    lot of attention to detail, including a strong, independent
    judiciary, finding law enforcement that are incorruptible. And
    this Vanderbilt study, which is encouraging, as well, we know
    that crime also, though, moves to where there is opportunity
    and a new level.
        Now, my questions are basically: In areas without a USAID
    presence, how are we going to make sure that the security and
    law enforcement puzzle piece is in place before we spend the $1
    billion on development?
        Ms. Hogan. Thank you for your question.
        And you are right; we can't be everywhere. However, this
    proposal for a new strategy will allow us to at least scale up
    to a level where we think we can have national-level impact,
    provided that the government invests its own resources. And I
    am happy to say that in Honduras they have created a tax, a
    security tax, of which they have given us up to $2 million thus
    far to open additional community centers, which replicates the
    USAID model.
        So, going forward, we know what works, but to expand it to
    the level that is required, it is going to require increased
    investments from us, from governments, from private sector. And
    that is what we hope to achieve.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Good.
        Also, one of the points is to build trust between law
    enforcement and community and to develop local community crime-
    prevention activities. Can you go into a little detail about
    those programs? Are they in place now?
        Or is that for Secretary Brownfield?
        Mr. Brownfield. Congressman, why don't I take on that one,
    at least----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
        Mr. Brownfield [continuing]. To start, and then let Beth
    pick up on that? Because these are the sorts of programs that
    we in INL have been supporting for the last 5 years,
    particularly in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
        We have two that we attempt to link up at, kind of, the
    level of kids between about the ages of 12 and 18 with local
    law enforcement. One is called the GREAT Program, which is a
    gang-related program where we have trained local law
    enforcement who offer programs in the schools themselves of 3
    to 6 weeks in duration. And the kids, often for the first time
    in their lives, are actually dealing police officers but on a
    human basis and not on the basis of looking at someone who is
    the force of authority, if you will.
        The second one is the DARE program, the DARE program which,
    by the way, we have it in the United States, as well. That is a
    drug abuse reduction program. Same basic concept of using local
    law enforcement as well as healthcare professionals to bring,
    kind of, drug abuse reduction skill sets to the kids.
        My own view is we have hit about 200,000 in Honduras alone,
    to give you a sense of scale of what we are talking about. And
    they have at least the impact of allowing kids to have
    engagement with law enforcement and police in something other
    than a confrontational sort of situation.
        This is one of the things we would hope to be able to build
    on, as well as, as I was describing in my statement, our place-
    based approach whereby Beth and USAID and we and INL combine
    her community programs with our model police precinct programs
    and focus them specifically on individual communities. That is
    what we are aiming for.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay.
        Let me ask you about counternarcotics policies. Do our
    policies interact with related foreign policy goals of
    anticorruption, justice-sector reform, and improving the rule
    of law?
        Mr. Brownfield. In three words, yes, yes, and yes.
        This is to say, one, we cannot and will not, to the extent
    that we are aware of it, work with individuals or organizations
    that have been penetrated, that are corrupt, and that we are
    aware of.
        Second, we do work, for the most part, with vetted units,
    individuals pulled from the existing law enforcement structures
    that are reviewed in terms of their background and then
    polygraphed on a regular and systematic basis.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Good.
        Mr. Brownfield. So, at the end of the day, the answer is
    yes.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Do international regulatory and legal
    constraints limit the U.S. counternarcotics policy,
    potentially, for drug syndicates' foreign safe havens?
        Mr. Brownfield. It certainly complicates it, yes. You can
    imagine that there are some countries in the world, perhaps
    even some within this hemisphere, where it is more difficult to
    get cooperation from them on counternarcotics and law
    enforcement.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me ask my final question. What
    options might be available to prevent such legal safe havens
    from existing?
        Mr. Brownfield. My suggestions would be, first,
    international agreement or cooperation through U.N. or other
    organizations; second, trying to address the issue bilaterally,
    which is to say going at the government of those individual
    countries that offer the safe haven and attempting to reach
    some sort of agreement or accommodation; third would be using
    the stick as well as the carrot, and that is applying something
    in the way of sanctions, whether individual or collective,
    against those governments, those nations, or those individuals
    that provide the safe haven.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Okay. Thanks.
        I yield back.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        We will have a second round, and I have a question.
        Ambassador Brownfield, last year, you were a witness at our
    hearing on transnational crime, and I asked a question about
    whether the State Department was using DNA forensic technology
    as part of your efforts to support law enforcement. At the
    time, the Department was looking into it. Since then, the
    Committee included $3 million for DNA forensic technology in
    Central America in the fiscal year 2015 Appropriations Act.
        Would you tell us about the type of work you plan to do
    with these funds to strengthen law enforcement capacity in
    Central America through the use of DNA forensic technology?
        Mr. Brownfield. Sure thing, Madam Chairwoman.
        I am pleased to report that there is an academic
    institution located in north Texas which, in fact, has some
    degree of skill and expertise on this issue. We have consulted
    with them several times in terms of understanding what is the
    nature of the science that is available for this purpose. We
    are now engaged in conversations to try to structure what a
    program would look like.
        It is complicated, Madam Chairwoman, because we from INL
    and the State Department can work the external, the foreign
    side of this, which is to say that side that is in Central
    America itself. We need domestic partners--probably CBP, but we
    are still working our way through this--who would work the U.S.
    side, those who are now in the U.S. adjudicatory system, if you
    will. I think we are going to get there.
        My vision, subject to correction by any member of this
    subcommittee, would be that we use the $3 million that is found
    in the fiscal year 2015 appropriations bill to do that part of
    the program that would be linking up potential parents of these
    children downstream in Central America and then find a way to
    use a domestic agency's authorities and resources to link it up
    with the DNA that could be captured from minors, from children
    here in the United States.
        That is where we are right now. We owe you greater detail
    as we work this through with a domestic partner.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Actually, I wasn't going to bring the issue up of Cuba.
    Since a couple of my colleagues did and I have Secretary
    Jacobson here, let me bring it up.
        Narcotrafficking. There are a number of Cuban high-level
    officials who have been indicted by U.S. Federal grand juries
    for narcotrafficking.
        Rene Rodriguez Cruz, who was an official of the Cuban
    intelligence service and a former member of the Cuban Communist
    Party Central Committee, in your negotiations for
    normalization, is his return, his extradition to the United
    States, is that one of the conditions that you are asking for?
        Ms. Jacobson. We will be talking about law enforcement
    issues as part of a dialogue that will take place probably
    after the reestablishment of relations. We are beginning
    separate dialogues with the Cuban Government on a whole range
    of issues, one of which will be deepening the conversation on
    law enforcement, including matters----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well----
        Ms. Jacobson [continuing]. Such as people who are wanted in
    the United States, fugitives and others.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Right. And there are about 80 fugitives. I
    mean, there is three or four that are actual, you know, high-
    level----
        Ms. Jacobson. Right.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Regime members who were
    indicted by U.S. Federal grand juris for narcotrafficking.
    There are also fugitives from U.S. law----
        Ms. Jacobson. Right. There are also Americans who have fled
    to Cuba, yes.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Including in the top 10----
        Ms. Jacobson. Correct.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart [continuing]. Most wanted terrorist list,
    Joanne Chesimard and others.
        So my question is this. So you are going to normalize--
    before you are going to demand that these fugitives from
    American law, be returned. Whether it is those who have escaped
    from the United States, which are close to 80, or those who
    have been indicted, who are high-level officials. You can
    understand how some of us are a little taken back when the
    Department of State has gone to the extreme of sending back
    three high-level convicted spies, one of them who had a life
    sentence for conspiracy to commit murder, the murder of three
    Americans, and then went to the extreme of actually
    transporting sperm from a convicted spy. I don't know if, by
    the way, Madam Chairwoman, if you are aware of this. Our U.S.
    Government went to the extreme of transporting sperm from a
    convicted spy, again, who was in prison there for conspiracy to
    commit murder, the murder of three Americans, so that he could
    impregnate his wife in Cuba.
        So we have gone to that extreme of releasing and sending to
    Cuba three high-level terrorists, and that was before
    normalization. That has already been done. And yet, for three
    high-level indicted members, senior officials of the Castro
    regime, that will not be talked about later, or about 80
    fugitives of American law who are there, one of them as far as
    we can tell is even living--or has been living, in the Castro
    compound, again, who is on the FBI's most wanted terrorist
    list.
        You are telling me that that will be brought up after you
    normalize, correct?
        Ms. Jacobson. No.
        I want to be really clear about this.
        Number one, normalization is a long-term process. What we
    are doing now is reestablishing diplomatic relations. Many of
    the things we are going to talk about later, including claims,
    judgments for terrorism, and fugitives and law enforcement
    cooperation will come later as part of normalization but after,
    potentially, the reestablishment of diplomatic relations. These
    are not subjects in which we are having conditions on the table
    right now for reestablishment of diplomatic relations. They
    will be part of normalization conversations.
        Second of all, I want to make clear that nobody transported
    anything for fertility. The State Department issued a visa. The
    rest of this is the Justice Department and the Bureau of
    Prisons.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, the administration did.
        Ms. Jacobson. But I want to just be clear about that.
        And, third, the three Cubans who returned to Cuba were in
    exchange for an extremely high-ranking U.S. intelligence asset
    who gave us the Wasp Network, Ana Belen Montes, and Kendall
    Myers and his wife--important intelligence knowledge that we
    needed to keep this country safe.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without getting into debate now, Madam
    Secretary, you do know that those were conditions established
    by the regime before. So, in other words, the Cuban regime
    established conditions before they would talk about
    normalization, including the return of those spies.
        And, by the way, the families of the victims were told that
    this would not happen, and so they were lied to.
        But the regime's conditions, preestablished conditions,
    were met by the administration. But the administration, again,
    has not conditioned anything, whether it was the return of the
    three indicted for narcoterrorism or the close to 80 fugitives
    from U.S. law.
        That is something that will be discussed later, which,
    again, leads a lot of us to believe that these negotiations
    are, you know, frankly--it is what Senator Marco Rubio said.
    That is what happens when you send your speechwriter to
    negotiate with intelligence officers.
        I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart knows the respect I have for him and his
    whole family, but I can't pass up the opportunity to just
    remind ourselves that those negotiations and those discussions
    will also have two sides to it.
        I am sure Cubans will want the return, if that is the
    proper word, of people who have for years been known to be
    living in this country who took part in acts of violence
    against Cuba in the early days and in the 1970s in hotels,
    people, for instance, in Puerto Rico who were preparing
    travels, excursions to Cuba and other places throughout the
    country. That may be part of the negotiations, too. So it is
    not going to be a one-sided thing.
        And you are right, Madam Secretary, that first we
    establish--and the thing that--I hate to say this to a
    diplomat, but the thing you neglected to say is you can't
    negotiate if you don't have relations. You first have to
    establish the relations, and then you can negotiate on both
    sides. And that is going to happen. And I think the Cubans will
    also have claims against us.
        I keep almost half-jokingly mentioning an issue that nobody
    has paid attention to. I am not the brightest guy on the block,
    you know. I mean, there are other people who should have
    thought of this. But, you know, for 50-something years, we have
    been playing Cuban music--and you think, ``Music?''--Cuban
    music in this country, and not a single cent of royalty has
    been sent to anybody who lives in Cuba who have written those
    songs or whose relatives are still living there.
        So this is a long process. You are right. There are
    buildings in Cuba that belong to us, this country, are now in
    the Cuban hands. There are also things that were taken from
    Cuba, like those royalties.
        I will give you a last one that--I have no clue if this is
    true, but I have been told it is true. When the Cuban
    revolution took place, there were a couple of hundred, if not a
    couple of thousand, Cubans working on Guantanamo Base.
    Therefore, they were Federal employees. Those folks, because we
    don't send money to Cuba, when they retired from their jobs, or
    their relatives, never got a penny of a Federal pension because
    we didn't do that.
        So all I am saying is I am backing up your claim that first
    you establish relations, then you do--but I just wanted to
    clear up that this is going to be a two-sided conversation
    because there are claims on both sides.
        Ms. Jacobson. I am ashamed that you had to remind me of the
    value of diplomacy and its definition. It is true that it is
    critical--and this is the point of the President's policy--to
    be able to talk about some of the very things that, I agree
    with Mr. Diaz-Balart, we must try and talk about and get action
    on.
        Mr. Serrano. Right.
        And one last--I can't believe I am going to ask a non-Cuba
    question, but very briefly. The budget for USAID asks for a
    large increase. And so the question here is, are the countries
    that will receive this increase ready to receive this increase,
    ready to put it to work, and ready not to have people who
    believe in austerity telling us we wasted more money somewhere?
        Ms. Hogan. Thank you for the question. I am happy to
    respond.
        In fact, we are designing programs now in anticipation of
    increased resources both in fiscal year 2015 as well as the
    large increase in fiscal year 2016 that we are requesting so
    that we will be ready to work with governments and the private
    sector to absorb those resources.
        You know, this kind of an increase in Latin America and in
    Central America specifically isn't unprecedented. We had a huge
    increase in resources post-peace-process in Guatemala. We had a
    huge increase in resources in the region post-Hurricane Mitch.
    This is another huge increase in resources, but it is shared
    amongst three countries, and it is to build out what has been
    predominantly a security approach to two other lines of action.
        So, taken together, we think that we will be able to very
    ably invest those resources. So much is needed. And we are very
    excited about the opportunities that this request will enable
    both the governments and our own agency to help drive
    development results in a new way.
        Mr. Serrano. My last comment of the day--first of all,
    thank you for the work you do for our country and the service
    to our country. I know it is not easy, but you do it and you do
    it well.
        But, without mentioning names, on one of the subcommittees
    I was a member of, Madam Chair, as a former Secretary of State
    was leaving, we asked that person, ``What do you see in the
    future of Latin America? What big change should we be paying
    attention to?'' What that person said was very unique, said
    that they are going to start electing more and more people that
    look like themselves.
        And that is where you see, in a country like Bolivia, a
    President elected who is part of the majority, the vast
    majority. And we have to learn to go into those countries and
    immediately say, you elected that person, let's see if we can
    work with you before we call you a Socialist or a Communist or
    a friend of Castro or something. And I think we have made the
    mistake to label people too early without realizing why these
    changes have taken place.
        We said, have elections. They had elections. When we don't
    like the result of the election, then we get upset. We can't do
    that anymore.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. I thank the witnesses for appearing before the
    subcommittee today.
        Members may submit any additional questions for the record.
        The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related
    Programs stands adjourned.

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                                             Wednesday, April 15, 2015.

                 UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                    WITNESS

    SAMANTHA POWER, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS

                    Opening Statement by Chairwoman Granger

        Ms. Granger. The Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations,
    and Related Programs will come to order.
        Ambassador Power, thank you for being here to testify. We
    have many important policy and budget issues to discuss with
    you today. I am sure you are ready for that.
        First, I would like to address the recent announcement of a
    framework agreement for Iran's nuclear program. With each
    passing day, conflicting reports emerge about the parameters of
    the deal. I have serious concerns about promises that may have
    been made to lift sanctions on Iran, and I hope you can address
    this issue today.
        The International Atomic Energy Agency has a critical role
    to play in implementing any agreement. Yet, we all know Iran's
    record of cooperating with the IAEA is not good. I hope you can
    help the committee understand why we should have confidence
    that Iran will live up to its commitments this time and allow
    IAEA the access required.
        I am also deeply disappointed by the hostile actions taken
    by the Palestinian Authority to join international bodies over
    the last year. Their steps at the International Criminal Court
    have put U.S. assistance to the Palestinians in jeopardy.
        I am also very concerned about recent statements from
    administration officials that suggest the United States is
    reevaluating its approach to the peace process and reports that
    the U.S. may support a U.N. Security Council resolution laying
    out conditions and establishing deadlines. The administration
    must send a clear message to the Palestinians that the only
    path to statehood is through a negotiated assessment with
    Israel.
        Concerns also remain about the U.N. Human Rights Council. I
    fear that the Council's upcoming report on last year's
    hostilities in Gaza will unfairly criticize Israel's right to
    defend itself. There are Members of Congress who question why
    we should support the Council at all, and I welcome your
    comments on this issue.
        Regarding budget issues, the request includes a significant
    increase for accounts that fund the United Nations and other
    international organizations, approximately 25 percent higher
    than last year. Like many increases in the President's request,
    this one is difficult for me to justify.
        The United States is by far the largest contributor to the
    U.N., and more work needs to be done to ensure that the U.N.
    has its budget under control. For example, U.N. peacekeeping
    costs have skyrocketed. The administration should work with the
    U.N. to phase out peacekeeping missions when possible and lower
    the rate the United States pays for them.
        Madam Ambassador, you have committed to reform the U.N.
    and, as you know, our appropriations bill contains strong
    transparency and accountability requirements. Some progress has
    been made, but many international organizations continue to
    fall short. After all of these years, there is simply no excuse
    for this. I look forward to your thoughts on all of these
    important issues.
        In closing, I want to thank you and the American delegation
    in New York and around the world for the work you do to advance
    U.S. interests.

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        Ms. Granger. And now I will turn to Ranking Member Lowey
    for her opening remarks.

                        Opening Statement by Mrs. Lowey

        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ambassador Power, I join Chairwoman Granger in welcoming
    you today.
        Throughout my time in Congress, I have consistently
    supported robust U.S. engagement at the United Nations. The
    U.N. is instrumental in advancing our national security
    interests around the world and in helping confront terrorism,
    nuclear proliferation, infectious disease, extreme poverty, and
    environmental degradation.
        U.N. peacekeepers protect innocent civilians in some of the
    most war-torn, ravaged parts of the world, trying to bring
    peace and stability for a fraction of what it would cost the
    U.S. Armed Forces to undertake the same mission. Organizations
    like UNICEF, the World Food Program, U.N. Women, U.N.
    Population Fund help reduce poverty, protect children, feed the
    hungry, promote women's political and economic empowerment, and
    improve health standards for millions around the world.
        While the benefits are not always obvious to the casual
    observer, the U.N. delivers real results for every American tax
    dollar we contribute. The United States cannot be the world's
    policeman. As I have said before, no one nation can or should
    address today's global challenges alone. That is why we must
    continue to work together with the world community using every
    tool at our disposal. Unilateral action should be the last
    option, not the first.
        Those who view the U.N. negatively or advocate for reducing
    its resources undermine the U.N.'s effectiveness and limit our
    ability to influence international decisions. Simply put, we
    cannot expect the U.N. to perform if we starve it of the
    resources it requires or if we regard our treaty obligations as
    optional.
        However, like any organization, the U.N. is not perfect. I
    am particularly concerned about its actions with regard to the
    Israeli-Palestinian conflict and comments by the Obama
    administration suggesting a reevaluation of our longstanding
    policy of defending Israel at the U.N.
        Indeed, it was your predecessor, Ambassador Rice, who said,
    when vetoing a resolution on settlement activity, ``It is the
    Israelis' and the Palestinians' conflict, and even the best-
    intentioned outsiders cannot resolve it for them.''
        Supporting or remaining agnostic on a U.N. Resolution would
    violate the letter and spirit of the Oslo Accord signed in
    1993, which endorsed the seminal construct of Land for Peace
    through direct negotiations, however prolonged, intense, or
    seemingly intractable they may be. Such a stance at the U.N.
    would also reward Palestinian intransigence and ignore history.
        Madam Ambassador, I hope you will unequivocally assure the
    members of this subcommittee that the administration will do
    everything in its power to stand firmly with our ally Israel in
    opposing counterproductive and reckless U.N. proposals.
        Turning to Iran, in addition to ensuring the strictest
    inspections and monitoring of any facility, one of the most
    critical components of any deal will be the timing of any
    proposed sanction relief and our ability to immediately
    reimpose sanctions should Iran violate any part of the
    agreement.
        Given Iran's history of deception, I would like to hear
    from you that the core of U.N. sanctions will remain in place
    until Iran has taken major nuclear-related steps that
    demonstrate their sincerity. I would also like you to detail
    the mechanisms with which the U.N. could snap back U.N.
    sanctions at any point during the deal and beyond.
        Lastly, I hope you will also update the subcommittee on the
    U.N.'s conflict resolution efforts, such as ending the
    devastating warfare in South Sudan, countering violent
    extremism across the continent, which is all the more critical,
    given the barbaric massacre of Garissa University students in
    Kenya earlier this month.
        With unprecedented levels of human suffering and
    humanitarian needs around the world, I thank you for your
    leadership, your commitment, and passion, and for all you do to
    represent American values abroad. I look forward to your
    testimony.

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        Ms. Granger. Ambassador Power, please proceed with your
    opening remarks. I would encourage you to summarize your
    remarks so we will have enough time for questions and answers.
    Your full written statement will be placed in the record. We
    expect votes around 3:20.

                     Opening Statement by Ambassador Power

        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
    Lowey, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you
    so much for the invitation to testify today. And thank you for
    the rigor that you all bring in ensuring that America's
    contributions to the United Nations are used to maximum effect
    in advancing our interests and our values in the world.
        As this committee knows and as both of your opening
    statements testify to, we are living in a time of daunting and
    seemingly perpetual global crises.
        In the year since I last testified before this committee, a
    deadly epidemic exploded in West Africa, threatening tens or
    even hundreds of thousands of lives; a monstrous terrorist
    group seized large parts of Syria and Iraq, broadcasting
    beheadings and mass executions on YouTube; and Russia trained,
    armed, and sent soldiers to fight alongside separatists in
    eastern Ukraine, among too many crises to count.
        These are the kinds of threats for which the United Nations
    was created. Yet, they have exposed profound weaknesses and
    vulnerabilities in the international system.
        We have seen a global health system led by the WHO that,
    despite multiple warnings from credible sources, including our
    CDC, was slow to respond to the Ebola epidemic's growing
    momentum. We have seen Russia and China through their cynical
    veto of an ICC referral resolution at the U.N. Security Council
    block a step toward holding accountable a regime that has
    tortured, starved, gassed, and barrel-bombed its own people.
        Representing our Nation at the U.N., I have to confront
    these vulnerabilities every day. But the central point I want
    to make to this committee is that, even taking into account
    these weaknesses, America needs the United Nations to address
    today's global challenges.
        The United States has the most powerful set of tools in
    history to advance our interests, and we will always lead on
    the world stage. But we are more effective when we ensure that
    others shoulder their fair share and when we marshal
    multilateral support to meet our objectives.
        Let me quickly outline four ways we are doing that at the
    U.N. First, we are rallying multilateral coalitions to address
    transnational threats.
        Consider Iran. In addition to working with Congress to put
    in place unprecedented U.S. sanctions on the Iranian
    Government, in 2010, the Obama administration galvanized the
    U.N. Security Council to authorize one of the toughest
    sanctions regimes in the history of the organization. This
    combination of unilateral and multilateral pressure was crucial
    to bringing Iran to the negotiating table and ultimately to
    helping reach a framework that effectively cuts off every
    pathway for the regime to develop a nuclear weapon.
        It is not only on Iran where we have used the U.N. to
    catalyze action on issues where the international community has
    proven unable or unwilling to respond.
        Last September, as people were dying outside of hospitals
    in West Africa that had no beds left to treat the exploding
    number of Ebola patients, we chaired the first ever emergency
    meeting of the U.N. Security Council on a global health issue,
    pressing countries to deploy doctors and nurses, build clinics
    and testing labs, and fill other gaps that ultimately helped
    bend the outbreak's exponentially rising curve.
        Of course, America did not just rally others to step up. We
    led by example, deploying more than 3,500 U.S. civilian and
    military personnel to Liberia, where we helped bring the number
    of new infections down to zero last month.
        Second, we are reforming U.N. Peacekeeping to meet the
    challenges of 21st century conflicts. There are more than
    100,000 uniformed police and soldiers deployed in the U.N.'s 16
    peacekeeping missions, a higher number than at any time in
    history. They have more complex responsibilities than ever
    before. And the United States has an abiding strategic interest
    in resolving the conflicts where peacekeepers serve, which can
    quickly cause regional instability and attract extremist
    groups, as we have seen in Mali.
        Yet, while we have seen peacekeepers serve with bravery and
    professionalism in some of the world's most dangerous
    conflicts, as in the Force Intervention Brigade's success in
    neutralizing some of the rebel groups in the Democratic
    Republic of Congo, we have also seen chronic problems too
    often, including the failure to protect civilians.
        We are working relentlessly to address these shortfalls. To
    give just one example, we are persuading more advanced
    militaries to step up and contribute soldiers and police to
    U.N. Peacekeeping. That was the aim of a summit that Vice
    President Biden convened at the U.N. last September, where
    countries like Columbia, Sweden, and Indonesia announced new
    troop commitments, and it is the message I took directly to
    European leaders last month when I made the case in Brussels
    that peacekeeping is a critical way for European militaries to
    do their fair share in protecting our common security
    interests. This coming September President Obama will convene
    another summit of world leaders to build on this momentum and
    help catalyze a new wave of commitments.
        Third, we are fighting to end bias and discrimination
    within the U.N., an issue both of you have raised. Last year,
    in keeping with a commitment I made in my confirmation hearing,
    I told this committee, ``The United States will stand with
    Israel. We will defend it, and we will challenge every instance
    of unfair treatment throughout the United Nations.''
        We have lived up to that commitment, from mounting a full-
    court diplomatic press to help secure Israel's permanent
    membership into two U.N. groups from which it had long and
    unjustly been excluded, to consistently and firmly opposing
    one-sided actions in international bodies. And we will continue
    to live up to that commitment.
        In December, when a deeply unbalanced draft resolution on
    the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was hastily put before the
    Security Council, the United States successfully rallied a
    coalition to join us in voting against it, ensuring that the
    resolution failed to achieve the nine votes of Security Council
    members required for adoption.
        Fourth, we are working to ensure that the U.N, lives up to
    its obligation to promote human rights and affirm human
    dignity, as we did by pressing for the Security Council to hold
    its first-ever meeting on the human rights situation in North
    Korea. We used that session to shine a light on the regime's
    widespread abuses and give a face to its victims, like the man
    who was reportedly chained to the back of a car and dragged for
    some 30 miles in loops around his village simply for trying to
    escape to China.
        In closing, let me stress we take very seriously our duty
    to ensure taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. So when we request
    full support for the accounts that fund the U.N. and affiliated
    organizations, it is with confidence that we are doing
    everything within our power to make the U.N. more fiscally
    responsible, more accountable, and more nimble.
        Since the 2008-2009 fiscal year, we have actually reduced
    the cost per peacekeeper by 18 percent, and we are constantly
    looking for ways to right-size missions in response to
    conditions on the ground, as we will do this year through
    drawdowns in Cote d'Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia, among other
    missions.
        When we mobilize the U.N. and its member states to tackle
    global threats, we are doing more than just advancing our
    interests. We are enabling protection on U.N. bases for more
    than 112,000 displaced people in South Sudan who fled after
    security forces went house to house killing people based on
    their ethnicity.
        We are rallying the U.N. General Assembly to uphold the
    universal values that America holds dear, as when we convened
    and the U.N. General Assembly convened its first-ever meeting
    on anti-Semitism in January, where more than 50 countries
    condemned anti-Semitism's alarming rise and pledged to take
    steps to stop it.
        And we are not only helping prevent a generation of
    children in West Africa from being wiped out by a deadly
    epidemic, but also making it safe for them to return to their
    classrooms, as happened just yesterday in Sierra Leone, where
    schools reopened for the first time in over 9 months.
        These are the stakes. This is the reason we will continue
    to work tirelessly to make the U.N. more efficient and more
    effective, and this is why we are so grateful for this
    committee's support as well as for its efforts to hold the U.N.
    to the standards that America's security and the great crises
    of our time demand.
        Thank you. And I look forward to your questions.

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        Ms. Granger. I will have the first question.
        Madam Ambassador, one area of the reported nuclear deal
    with Iran that is troubling to me is the removal of all U.N.
    resolutions regarding Iran's nuclear program. The Department of
    State's fact sheet on the parameters of the agreement states
    all past U.N. Security Council resolutions on Iran nuclear
    issues will be lifted simultaneous with the completion by Iran
    of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns. The
    lifting of all U.N. Security Council resolutions related to
    Iran's nuclear program strikes me as quite a concession.
        I have questions such as: What is the rationale for the
    immediate removal of such resolution? Can you clarify the
    timing of the removal of sanctions? Exactly what obligations
    must Iran meet under the agreement? Does the promise to remove
    U.N. resolutions include the U.N. Security Council resolution
    that covers the sale and/or transfer of conventional arms and
    ballistic missile technology? If so, how can we credibly assure
    our allies in the region that their deep concerns about Iran's
    nuclear program, as well as Iran's aggression in the region,
    have not been dismissed?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        There is a lot there. So let me try to take a number of
    those issues in turn.
        First, let me stress a point I made in my opening
    statement, which is how central the U.N. Security Council has
    been to reinforcing what this body and the Executive have done
    in putting pressure on Iran that brought them to the
    negotiating table.
        I do want to distinguish that the sanctions definitely are
    responsible for the kind of economic pressure that Iran faces
    that has caused them to make a very large number of concessions
    that many would not have expected. However, those sanctions did
    not succeed, as you know, in dismantling Iran's nuclear
    program.
        Indeed, before the Joint Plan of Action, the estimates on
    Iran's break-out time were 2 to 3 months. And we are looking at
    19,000 centrifuges and so forth that will have to be now dialed
    back as part of this agreement.
        So, again, the multilateral effects are very real and they
    are why we are in a position, we think, to peacefully and
    verifiably ensure that Iran's nuclear program is for peaceful
    purposes only.
        With regard to your question, I think the most important
    point to stress is that Iran has to take a whole series of
    nuclear-related actions, actions at Iraq, action at Fordow,
    action at Natanz, actions, again, to greatly reduce the number
    of centrifuges down from 19,000 to some 6,000, the kilograms of
    enriched uranium, the quality of that uranium.
        All of those steps have to be taken before anything is done
    in New York and before any additional sanctions relief is
    provided. And those steps will need to amount to us having
    confidence that Iran's break-out time has gone from the 2 to 3
    months, where we are now, to more than a year. And that is,
    again, with those steps that have been outlined in the
    parameters document would bring about.
        So that is going to take some time. The estimates range
    from 6 months to 1 year. But, again, there will not be relief
    on the nuclear-related sanctions until those steps have been
    taken.
        Second, I think, if I may just underscore, that this
    relationship is--excuse me--this framework is not a framework
    predicated on trust. That is why, again, we have to await the
    completion of those steps before you would see Security Council
    resolutions.
        What we would do in New York, if this went forward, is,
    yes, lift the prior resolutions. But we would, of course, need
    to put in place a mechanism for ensuring that many of the
    sanctions remained.
        The conventional arms and the ballistic missile sanctions
    we believe should remain for some time. There will need, of
    course, to be the enshrinement in a Security Council mechanism
    of the nuclear-related commitments that Iran is taking on. And
    we are going to need to create some kind of procurement channel
    such that any acquisitions or purchases that Iran is
    contemplating making that might be dual use would have to get
    approved through this procurement channel.
        So by no means is it the case that, willy-nilly, we look
    and see that a deal is signed and then the Security Council
    sanctions that have been so critical to bringing us to this
    place simply melt away. Quite the contrary. We are looking at a
    phased approach and, again, one that we think leaves us in a
    much stronger position to ensure Iran's--the peaceful nature of
    Iran's nuclear weapons program.
        And if I left out any part of your question, please----
        Ms. Granger. I will come back to it.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you again.
        And thank you for your service.
        Since 1948, the United States has been a steadfast defender
    of the State of Israel at the United Nations. I am troubled by
    recent reports and press statements by the administration that
    the United States would ``reevaluate our approach,'' which
    could signal a shift in position at the United Nations. I
    believe it is in our national security interest that the United
    States unequivocally continues to stand by our democratic
    partner, Israel.
        Is it still the position of the administration to veto one-
    sided anti-Israel resolutions at the U.N.?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        I have worked tirelessly, Ambassador Rice has worked
    tirelessly, our predecessors in this job have worked
    tirelessly, to defend Israel's legitimacy and its security at
    the United Nations, and we will absolutely continue to do that.
        When there was a discussion about reevaluation, I want to
    be very, very clear that there was no contemplation and will
    never be a contemplation of reevaluating our deep security and
    deep partnership and friendship, relationship, with the State
    of Israel. As you know well, the military, the security, and
    the intelligence ties are as deep as ever.
        We have just in the same period that there have been some
    comments made in the public have achieved things working with
    the State of Israel in the United Nations that many would not
    have thought possible, such as something I mentioned in my
    opening statement, which is the first-ever General Assembly
    session dedicated to combating anti-Semitism, which occurred in
    January.
        So, too, of course, we just last fall opposed 18 U.N.
    General Assembly-biased and one-sided resolutions against
    Israel. And, indeed, in December, as you know, not only did I
    vote no on a hastily produced, one-sided resolution, but, also,
    I and Secretary Kerry and the President were able to mobilize a
    coalition to join us. So we will, again, continue to work
    extremely closely with Israel in New York.
        And, you know, as you know well, we have a record of
    standing when it matters for Israel. I think the one thing that
    is important to point out is there have been occasions, such as
    last summer during the Gaza crisis, where we worked with the
    State of Israel itself and our Israeli colleagues in New York
    on a Security Council resolution, and that never came to pass.
    It never actually came to a vote because we were not able to
    secure sufficient support for it across the Council.
        But, again, we will look to see what will advance Israel's
    security and what will advance peace in the region and stand,
    again, consistently for Israel's legitimacy and security.
        Mrs. Lowey. I appreciate your comments.
        So the language that was repeated in several print reports,
    ``reevaluating our approach,'' what did that mean?
        Ambassador Power. Well, again, to distinguish a couple
    aspects of this, we and our predecessors and, I think, all of
    you have long supported a two-state solution achieved through a
    negotiation process.
        Because of some of the comments that were made in the
    election period, it wasn't clear--and I will note, also, some
    of the actions of the Palestinians as well, of course, which
    were alluded to you in your opening comments--it isn't clear
    what the prospects for those negotiations are.
        So our objective, as an administration, again, which I
    assume is a shared objective, is: What can we do to defuse
    tensions? What would it take to get those negotiations back on
    track?
        And so those are the kinds of questions President Obama is
    asking. And as the new Israeli Government comes together, we
    will be in close contact with our Israeli friends to think
    through again what would lead us to the destination that we all
    agree is in the interest of both the Israeli people and the
    Palestinian people, which is the achieving of a two-state
    solution through a negotiated process.
        Mrs. Lowey. I appreciate those comments.
        Certainly, as long as I have been in Congress, I have been
    hopeful that there would be a two-state solution through a
    negotiation process. That is why it was so disturbing when the
    administration made that statement, that they were reevaluating
    their position at the United Nations. I am hoping, as I hear
    you, you are walking back that position and that position is
    not the position of the administration.
        Ambassador Power. What I am saying is that we are looking
    at how we can support what we have long supported, which is
    efforts to secure a two-state solution. And in order for a two-
    state solution to come into existence, the parties will have to
    reach agreement with one another. Absolutely.
        Mrs. Lowey. I wanted to make that absolutely clear. Because
    the history is clear, if you go back to Oslo and Taba and all
    the very serious negotiations. And in many of them, it was the
    Palestinians that walked back and walked away, as you know,
    whether it was President Clinton or President Bush.
        I do hope that in our lifetime we can see a two-state
    solution that is negotiated with both parties and we can see
    peace in that region of the world. So I thank you very much for
    your comments.
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much.
        Ambassador Power, good to see you. In this administration,
    you tend to be, sometimes the lonely voice in speaking up for
    human rights around the world, and I commend you for that.
        I have a couple of specifics. Last week in the Summit of
    the Americas in Panama, a group of Cuban pro-democracy
    activists, as well as a number of American citizens, were
    attacked by, among others, the head of the Cuban Intelligence
    in Venezuela, Colonel Alexis Frutos Weeden.
        By the way, after the attacks, the U.S. citizens were the
    ones detained. I have a picture here, Madam Chairwoman, of this
    colonel attacking an American citizen. By the way, there are
    multiple videos that show that it was not a fight. It was an
    actual attack, it has been shown already and expressed by the
    press.
        So this is the head of Cuban Intelligence in Venezuela
    attacking a U.S. citizen. This picture is of two individuals.
    The one with the two black eyes is an American named Gus Monge.
    The other woman is a woman from the Damas de Blanco, the Ladies
    in White, named Leticia Ramos. They were among the attacked.
        And, again, here we have a picture of the Americans and the
    Cubans who were accompanying them who were the ones who were
    detained for being attacked.
        Here is my specific question. Now, that we know that it was
    members of the Cuban regime who attacked these folks,
    unprovoked, and now that we know that there are multiple videos
    showing that, what specifically is the United States going to
    do to hold the Cuban regime accountable for this egregious
    attack on American citizens--violent attack on American
    citizens and Cuban activists in Panama?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you for
    being so outspoken on human rights in Cuba and well beyond.
        Let me just say that, while I know that there are
    differences of opinion up here on some of the moves that the
    Obama administration has made with regard to Cuba--it is
    probably an understatement--we do sincerely believe that the
    engagement we now have with this regime is going to give us
    more leverage over time. That said, the human rights conditions
    in Cuba remain deeply disturbing.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Madam Ambassador, my time is so limited.
    Specifically, we had Americans attacked, violently attacked. I
    showed you that. We know who attacked them. We have videos that
    show that they were attacked.
        What specifically is the United States going to do to hold
    accountable those in the Cuban regime who attacked U.S.
    citizens?
        Speaking of leverage, now, supposedly, we have more
    leverage. All right. What specifically are we going to do? What
    are we doing to hold those folks who attacked Americans? I
    don't remember, I am sure it happens, but it is rare when
    Americans are attacked by folks from another embassy where we
    have videos. What are we going to do to hold them accountable?
    What are we doing?
        Ambassador Power. Well, first of all, I would welcome the
    facts that you have, which I don't have the details that you
    have. I did myself issue a statement, as, I believe, did the
    State Department, on the attack when it occurred.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. And we can usually count on you doing
    that, and I am grateful for that.
        Ambassador Power. But I think, again, we now have channels
    in which these issues get raised. We are in a process of
    normalization. Right? We are not going from zero to 60
    overnight. We are in constant dialogue with you. We are in
    constant dialog with Cuban civil society.
        So, again, as this process moves forward, it is our job to
    show those individuals who exercise their peaceful rights that
    we have their backs, that we will defend them, and that we will
    raise incidents like this, again, through every channel that we
    now have with the Cuban authorities.
        I will have to take back the question on this specific
    incident----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Please, Ambassador.
        Ambassador Power [continuing]. On basis of the limited
    details that you----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Please, Ambassador, very briefly in the 30
    seconds that I have.
        In July, a ship sending elicit arms to North Korea was
    captured, was intercepted in Panama. You have been very vocal
    on that.
        What are the consequences for the Castro regime for sending
    elicit arms in violation of the U.N. Sanctions to North Korea?
        So far, the consequences have been a meeting with the
    President of an hour, even though the President didn't meet
    with the Prime Minister of Israel when he was here, but he
    spent an hour with the dictator of Cuba and his family. So far,
    the consequences of the North Korean shipment or of all these
    other atrocities has been recognition, normalization.
        What specifically are we going to do to make sure that the
    Castro regime is being held accountable for shipping elicit
    arms to North Korea?
        Ambassador Power. Well, as you know, that incident occurred
    before the normalization process was announced in December. So,
    again, I think it does highlight that the--in the prior--with
    the prior administration's policy--this administration's prior
    policy in place, we still were----
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Except the negotiations have already taken
    place, Madam Ambassador.
        Ambassador Power [continuing]. Incidents along the lines
    that you are describing.
        In New York, what we have done is condemned Cuba for its
    involvement in that incident. We have secured something that
    sounds very bureaucratic and technical, but in my world is
    important, which is an implementation notice out of the actual
    Sanctions Committee which documents Cuba's role in this, which
    is something they and the other parties involved strongly
    objected to. Our challenge, as you know, is the nature of the
    Security Council and the permanent memberships and those who
    stand in the way of more significant action.
        But, again, these are precisely the kinds of incidents that
    we will not change our response to. We will continue to work
    through the Sanctions Committee. We will continue to speak out.
    We will not pull our punches on violations of international
    law.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ambassador, thank you.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
        Ms. Lee. Thanks very much.
        Good to see you, Madam Ambassador.
        Ambassador Power. Good to see you.
        Ms. Lee. Let me just follow up with regard to the
    discussion you were having with our ranking member and just
    agree with her that I believe that the two-state solution is
    the only option that is going to achieve peace and security in
    the region and, also, for the United States.
        I also know--well, let me just say I have legislation,
    actually, that I have introduced for several years now calling
    for Congress to go on record supporting a two-state solution
    and the peace process.
        Having said that, I want to make sure we are clear that it
    is important that both sides, Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Abbas,
    agree that a two-state solution is the ultimate outcome and
    achievable and what they are seeking, also.
        And I know during the last few months, we have had some
    dialogue back and forth with regard to whether or not Mr.
    Netanyahu wanted a two-state solution and this process to move
    forward. So I hope that this chain of events that has taken
    place since then, that we are back to now agreeing that the
    Palestinians and the Israelis deserve a two-state solution and
    that we are going to encourage that to continue.
        And I think that the U.N. is going to be very important in
    your role in that. But I do know we have a little bit of
    history on what took place as it relates to a concern about
    whether or not the two-state solution was still a viable option
    in both parties' policy as well as throughout the region.
        Now, let me just thank you for a minute with regard to
    working with us to secure the contribution for the permanent
    memorial at the United Nations in honor of the victims of
    slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, which this committee
    supported. It is really important that the United States and
    the United Nations represented us at the unveiling on March 25.
        So I have to thank you, Ambassador, for that and, also,
    Ambassador Michele Sison, for ensuring U.S. participation. The
    African American community is deeply appreciative of the
    involvement of our country in that transatlantic slave trade
    memorial.
        Boko Haram. You know, this is--1 year now marks the
    kidnapping of over 200 Nigerian girls. Now, having said that,
    there are over 800,000 girls that have been abducted from their
    homes in Nigeria totally. It is very important that the U.N.
    continue its involvement and the United States.
        We supported the U.N. Security Council's resolution calling
    for adding them to the sanctions list. Congressman Honda and
    Pittenger and myself, we sent you a letter and we asked that
    they be included. And you did. And I guess these recent events
    now have shown us that we have got to do more.
        So I am wondering what the United Nations is doing and what
    we could do to support the international community to address
    the kidnapping of these young girls and Boko Haram's horrific
    actions in Nigeria, but now also their connection to ISIS and
    what you see as the next steps.
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. And thank
    you for your leadership on the slavery memorial, which is
    important not only, as you know, in commemorating the horrors
    of the past, but also because of the very real occurrence of
    slavery in the present, including, probably, the fate of the
    girls and how they are living, those that are still in the
    presence of Boko Haram or being coerced by Boko Haram.
        On Boko Haram, in brief, bilaterally, as you know, we right
    from the beginning offered up intelligence and other
    assistance--basically, any assistance the Nigerian Government
    wanted in order to respond to Boko Haram's capture not only of
    those girls, but, also, Boko Haram's rampage through the
    northern part of Nigeria.
        We have also been very supportive of the regional--the so-
    called multinational task force that has come into existence
    now with Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria, trying to actually
    contest Boko Haram militarily. We recognize that it is not a
    military solution alone, of course, because the governance
    issues and the economic deprivation in northern Nigeria is
    going to need to be addressed over time.
        It is similar--you mentioned ISIL. They have, of course,
    proclaimed allegiance to ISIL. Similar to our anti-ISIL
    efforts, you need all the different lines of efforts on
    messaging, on cutting off financing. And, again, there needs to
    be a military component.
        Because of the election in Nigeria, we see ourselves now at
    a crossroads where this effort can be ramped up significantly.
    The President-elect Buhari has committed himself. He made this
    a campaign issue.
        And we are hopeful that, with Nigeria determined to tackle,
    again, the underlying issues in the north, but most
    specifically to find out where the girls are, not just the 200,
    but what could be many more than that, and not just girls, but,
    of course, boys who were pulled out of classrooms and shot in
    the head just for wanting to learn--Boko Haram meaning
    education is forbidden--but with Nigeria at the core willing to
    help resource this with our support bilaterally and for the
    force itself and with our, again, continued messaging that it
    needs to be military, but, also, a whole set of other steps to
    be taken, that we can move into a new phase.
        Just recently, in the tail end of the election season in
    Nigeria, Nigeria began to step up its involvement in the north
    and Boko Haram is on its heels far more than it has been. But
    until they are eliminated entirely, no boy, girl, or citizen in
    that part of Nigeria or now into Chad and Cameroon and Niger is
    safe.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Rooney.
        Mr. Rooney. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Thank you, Ambassador. And I want to say personally I
    appreciate your work in the past with issues dealing with
    Northern Ireland. As somebody who worked for Seamus Mallon back
    in the old days for the SDLP, it is much appreciated.
        I want to follow up with something that Congressman Diaz-
    Balart brought up. One of the big issues that I think is
    important for any Cuba normalization process--and I wanted to
    get your take on whether or not you think it is part of it--are
    the constituents that came from Cuba that have property claims
    felt like, when they left, they would be returning in short
    order and weren't able to because of the Castro regime seizing
    their property.
        Part of the normalization process, in my mind, I think is
    property claims--land, homes, businesses. Is this going to be
    part of any negotiation for normalization for Cuban exiles in
    Florida who are still alive and believe that, once the Castro
    regime would fall, that they would be able to reclaim that
    property?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman.
        Let me say that we are now at the very early stage of the
    normalization process. And so the dialogues that we have begun
    are dialogues on whether or not we can establish diplomatic
    relations, dialogues incumbent--necessary in order to establish
    diplomatic relations to reopen embassies, perhaps.
        And we have started substantive dialogues in talking about
    issues like trafficking in persons, which we were just
    discussing, communications, telecommunications, information
    exchanges, et cetera. But we absolutely believe that these
    channels need to be used to push issues that are of concern, of
    course, to American citizens, to people living in this country.
        That includes human rights, which we spoke briefly about.
    It includes property claims and property--efforts at property
    restitution. There are issues of U.S. fugitives who are present
    in Cuba that we can't ever forget about and need to work
    through a law enforcement dialogue.
        So, again, we are at an early stage, but nobody is losing
    sight, again, of the needs and the demands of American
    citizens.
        Mr. Rooney. I know one of the arguments is like, ``Well, we
    do certain business with China and other countries that are
    communist''; but I think that what is lost in the whole
    dialogue is that we have constituents in our State, in our
    districts, that come to us and ask us and beg us to address
    this issue. And, you know, Mario obviously is much closer to
    this than I am. But it is so much more real than just doing
    business with countries like China, and trying to compare those
    two things is just wrong.
        One of my other questions I had is kind of a political
    question, but I am just curious. How is your job affected by
    the policy positions that the President takes, whether it is
    with regard to Iran, Russia, what have you, and the other
    people that you deal with, knowing that whoever the next
    President is going to be, whether it is Hillary Clinton or
    somebody on the Republican side, might do things differently?
    Do you get a sense that people sort of hedge their bets or do
    you just have to go with what you have right now and that is
    the reality that you live in? Do you do any kind of future
    planning?
        Ambassador Power. Well, I think, like my predecessors who
    would have been in similar situations, living through the
    beginning now of the presidential election cycle, we have to do
    just what is in the interest of the American people.
        And the U.N., in particular, if we are to reform, let's
    say, peacekeeping and deal with sexual assault by peacekeepers
    or deal with peacekeepers who duck and cover instead of
    protecting civilians, we have to make investments now that may
    not even see their full return, you know, until 2 or 3 years
    hence.
        But I think there is a certain continuity, again, in the
    commitment that Americans have to defending Israel's legitimacy
    and security within the U.N. I think we have something
    resembling a bipartisan coalition that recognizes that we are
    in a stronger position when we have paid our dues and when we
    are leading from a position of strength. And so that is
    something the Obama administration has been able to--working
    very closely with this committee, has been able to ensure.
        And there is such a great commitment on the part of the
    American people, including constituents, off in places you
    wouldn't always expect, to atrocity prevention, to trying to
    counter monstrous entities like Boko Haram or Daesh.
        So, again, things happen far more slowly than I would like
    at the U.N., in part because we have got to herd the cats of
    193 countries or, in the case of the Security Council, 15
    countries. And so we need to just keep plugging along on the
    reform agenda, on the strengthening peacekeeping agenda, and on
    the--again, defending Israel's legitimacy and security.
        And I hope that, whatever happens in November 2016 or in
    January 2017, that we have left a stronger U.N., that our
    interests are better advanced within the organization, and then
    we hand off the baton to somebody who is running quickly and
    will carry that cause forward.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Ruppersberger.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
        Ambassador, thanks for being here today.
        I am going to change to threats worldwide, global threats.
    And I think one of the most severe threats that we deal with,
    other than the issue of weapons of mass destruction and issues
    such as terrorism, is cyber and what is happening in the world,
    whether it is attacks like China, as an example, stealing
    billions of dollars--another country, Russia--from United
    States and other countries, including a lot of our allies, but,
    also, the destructive attacks, which was really Sony, the first
    time we had a destructive attack in the United States.
        I am wondering, from a United Nations point of view,
    dealing with all these countries, where is the status of the
    cyber issue? Have we taken a position on how to deal with this
    problem as far as cyber is concerned? And if, in fact, we are
    able to prove or the United Nations--and I don't know what
    mechanism that would be--that we can show that certain
    countries like a North Korea or someone would make those
    attacks, would the United Nations be in a position to introduce
    sanctions in order to punish or use as a deterrent?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you so much for the question.
        Let me start by agreeing wholeheartedly with the premise
    that cyber threats are one of the most serious national
    security threats that the United States faces and it is
    something that we are seeing now take effect around the world.
    Even the Vatican's Web site, apparently, was hacked just over
    the last couple days.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. It is going to keep happening all over
    the world.
        Ambassador Power. It is going to keep happening.
        So I think what you saw, of course, in response to the
    horrific North Korean attack on Sony is that we moved out with
    a very strong executive order, so a unilateral action within
    our own capability.
        I went door to door in New York to my Security Council
    counterparts and made it very clear that this was not something
    that one could consider sort of off to the side as something--
    that it was something that actually had the kind of economic
    and even physical effects of a more conventional attack, I
    mean, insofar as Sony being shut down. Of course, there was
    also the coercive part of that.
        I raised this issue in the Security Council in the session
    I mentioned that we convened on the human rights situation in
    North Korea because, usually, the human rights atrocities that
    a regime is committing is also a canary in the coal mine in
    terms of other threats of this nature.
        So we are looking, I think, at what the next step is to
    ensure that other countries, again, see this as being a threat
    of comparable gravity at times, again, to the more traditional
    attacks that the U.N. is used to dealing with.
        We are not there yet. I mean, it is not the case that we
    could move swiftly in the Security Council, particularly given
    the presence of the permanent members who might resist this,
    again, to get people to see this like other kinds of attacks.
    But we are moving out with information-sharing, with technical
    advice as to how countries and companies around the world can
    strengthen their defenses against these kinds of attacks.
        And now that we have just put in place the cyber executive
    order, which goes well beyond the attacks carried out by North
    Korea, I think that is something that we will seek to multi-
    lateralize both within the U.N. framework and then, of course,
    through regional cooperation agreements.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. From your role as Ambassador to the
    United Nations, give an example of China. China has been
    stealing billions of dollars from our country and other
    countries throughout the world.
        The good news for the United States--because a lot of that
    information was classified--a company called Mandiant was able
    to show the connection between the Chinese Government and their
    military and a lot of these attacks. And Mandiant's customers
    were The New York Times, Washington Post, major companies.
        And we had the information, but, yet, it is important that
    we also continue to have a relationship with China because of
    who they are, how powerful they are, the fact that we owe them
    a lot of money, but we still--you know, need to deal with them.
    And I think the best way to deal with China is through commerce
    and that that hopefully will pull us together.
        From your role and knowing, as an example, the evidence
    that we have with respect to China and your role in the United
    Nations, how would you handle the Chinese situation, as an
    example?
        Ambassador Power. The Chinese situation----
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Attacking us, we had the evidence that
    they attack us. What we need to do is to get China to grow up
    and get other countries to help us with a global type of system
    to handle these cyber attacks, because they are literally
    stealing from countries all over the world trade secrets, that
    type of thing. It has been estimated that in the United States,
    there are over a billion dollars stolen every year.
        How do you see that in the framework of your job as the
    Ambassador to deal with this at a global level? Because it is
    the only way in the end. We can have our laws and try to do
    that in the United States, but it is not going to stop if we
    don't deal with the global issue and have sanctions or some
    type of deterrent to have these other countries deal with it as
    well.
        Ambassador Power. Yes. So let me start by saying that,
    again, I think the bilateral tool that we have now put in place
    through this executive order--the cyber executive order can be
    really impactful because, when there are significant harms
    carried out by either companies or government institutions or
    private hackers who have government affiliations, this is a
    tool that we can use in order to hold accountable, punish
    people who do that, and deter and, indeed, incapacitate, deny
    their access to resources that they might use in order to sort
    of strengthen their arsenal in these aggressive actions.
        The challenge, which I alluded a little to implicitly
    before, in terms of U.N. Security Council action is that China
    is a permanent member and a veto holder. So our ability to move
    beyond the bilateral through the Security Council turns on
    China's willingness to support such an effort.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. My time is up. But I would suggest that
    we really focus on this as a high priority, especially within
    the Security Council, on these countries that are cyber-
    attacking other countries throughout the world.
        Ambassador Power. I agree with that.
        And if I may just add one point, just because we may not be
    able to move an enforcement action through the Council does not
    mean we can't use the bully pulpit of the council or use that
    forum in order to raise the alarm either about one country's
    actions or about the threat as a whole.
        Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Dent.
        Mr. Dent. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Good afternoon, Ambassador Power.
        I would like to return this discussion to the Iranian
    nuclear negotiations for a moment. Secretary Kerry and others
    in the administration have said that enhanced sanctions at this
    point, if they were to be imposed by Congress, would not be
    realistic because our negotiating partners really are champing
    at the bit to do business with the Iranians. Yet, we are told
    that sanctions will snap back in the event that there are some
    kind of major violations of this agreement.
        Now, it seems to me like that is wildly unrealistic. How
    could we expect sanctions to snap back at a time when we know--
    it seems that the Russians right now are lifting their
    sanctions by selling these anti-aircraft missile systems to the
    Iranians, which would basically prevent the United States or
    other nations from enforcing a nuclear agreement if the
    Iranians were to have violated it.
        So the question is: Do you think it is realistic that
    sanctions would snap back in the event of a serious violation,
    given the Russians and the U.N.? I mean, I can't imagine they
    would support us on this.
        Ambassador Power. It is an excellent question. It gives me
    an occasion to respond to one of Congresswoman Granger's
    questions or issues she raised in her opening statement. So let
    me try to take a clean shot at this.
        First, let me distinguish the two kinds of sanctions that
    we are talking about here and that have brought Iran to the
    negotiating table. The first are the very significant bilateral
    sanctions that we have brought to bear, including Congress's
    licensing and the Executive's use of secondary sanctions
    against those countries doing business with Iran.
        Those are extremely important. And they were reinforced and
    amplified by one of the toughest multilateral sanctions regimes
    in history, which was achieved over the course of several
    resolutions up in New York.
        So it is, I think, implicit in your question. But just so
    everybody is on the same page, of course, we will retain as the
    United States the U.S. sanctions architecture as we see the
    extent to which this deal is implemented, as we see inspectors
    seeking access to sensitive sites and whether or not they are
    able to secure that access. In other words, we retain a huge
    amount of power and snap-back capability ourselves well beyond
    the U.N. Security Council.
        Mr. Dent. You think those snap-back sanctions will be
    effective without our international partners?
        Ambassador Power. Well, particularly because we have the
    ability to put in place secondary sanctions and because so much
    of the world's business occurs in U.S. dollars and because so
    many companies want access to U.S. markets, I do.
        But I think your question on the second layer, which is the
    U.N. Security Council, is still very important. And I want to
    assure you that we are not going--we are going to secure an
    arrangement to allow for snap-back in New York that does not
    require Russian or Chinese support.
        So we are not looking at a situation where, in order to
    snap back, we would have to do a separate new resolution along
    the lines of what we did in 2010 because we recognize that
    today's Russia, frankly, is a different Russia than that in
    2010 and we want to retain this authority and this capability,
    again, within our own power.
        Mr. Dent. So you are saying to me that snap-back sanctions
    on our part would be effective--given Ayatollah Khamenei recent
    comments about the framework, which are completely
    contradictory to what we are saying publicly, why would not
    enhanced sanctions, if we were to impose them now
    congressionally--why would they not have an impact, but snap-
    back sanctions would?
        That is where I am having a big disconnect. If we passed
    enhanced sanctions by Congress, we were told, ``This is
    unrealistic. It won't work. Our partners won't support us. We
    will be isolated. We will be on our own,'' yet, at the same
    time, if the Russians and the Chinese won't participate in the
    snap-back sanctions, our sanctions--our enhanced sanctions will
    somehow be effective--I don't understand. I feel like I am
    hearing two different----
        Ambassador Power. There is a very clear answer to that.
        Right now Iran is in compliance with the JPOA. The IAEA
    has--people have expressed, including earlier, a lot of
    skepticism about the IAEA's ability to verify. It has been
    granted the access it needed to verify. In the one instance, it
    raised an issue with Iran of concern. Iran addressed that
    issue.
        So you are looking at a JPOA that has been respected and,
    thus, the idea of imposing sanctions at this point would seem
    very much at odds with the recent--recent only--but the recent
    track record to distinguish that then from the scenario that we
    were talking about earlier, which is a snap-back scenario,
    which is when Iran is in violation of any future comprehensive
    agreement.
        And that violation would be clear by virtue of the fact
    that either IAEA gets the access it needs, reports that Iran is
    carrying out the nuclear-related steps that it has pledged to--
    these are very different scenarios.
        Mr. Dent. I see my time has expired. I just want to
    conclude with is, it just seems to me that our Russian partners
    seem to be sitting on the other side of the table right now,
    given what I just learned about what they are selling to the
    Iranians now, and I just don't have a whole lot of confidence
    that the U.N. is going to be an effective partner with us at
    this point in the event that there is a violation, given that
    the Russians seem to be allied and partnered with Russia not
    just on this issue, but many other issues. They are trying to
    undermine our power and influence everywhere in the world,
    including in the Middle East.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mr. Serrano.
        Mr. Serrano. Thank you so much.
        And thank you, Ambassador, for being here with us and for
    the work you do in your service to our country.
        I am sorry that my colleague from Florida left, my other
    colleague from Florida, because I wanted to make a statement
    before I ask a question. And that is that, in negotiating with
    Cuba, it is going to have to be a game of give-and-take
    because, yes, we have claims on the Cuban Government.
        There are Cuban Americans who feel they have lost property.
    Whether they abandoned that property or not is a question that
    has to be settled. There are American corporations that lost
    property in Cuba rightfully--not rightfully--but they did
    actually lose the property, and that has to be settled.
        But then I always bring up something that makes people
    sitting in your chair at different hearings kind of scratch
    their head because, in all honesty, most people hadn't thought
    about it, and I hadn't thought about it for years. And that is
    that one of the most popular types of music in this country is
    salsa music. And salsa music, anybody who is into music knows
    that it is a New York creation of many Cuban rhythms.
        And for years what we have been dancing to and listening to
    in salsa was compositions and arrangements that belong to
    Cubans in Cuba who may no longer be alive, but whose relatives
    are alive, and not a penny was ever paid in royalties to them.
        And I have spoken to some people in the business who tell
    me we could be talking about hundreds of millions of dollars,
    if not more. And when you see a movie and you see Latin music
    in the background, chances are it was something written in Cuba
    by someone who didn't leave Cuba, who stayed in Cuba, and never
    got a penny. So those discussions are both-sided.
        Then you have the issue, yes, there are people living in
    Cuba that this government would want over here for allegedly or
    actual crimes that were committed here. But the Cubans have a
    list of people who are hanging around the 50 States and the
    territories who they claim have sabotaged and done other things
    in Cuba.
        So my whole point is that it is not a one-sided issue.
    These negotiations will continue to be very delicate because we
    have claims on them, but they have claims on us, too. And some
    artists are going to come into a lot of money, except there are
    no records of how much we owe them.
        But I just wanted to do--ask you one question because my
    time will run out, and that is: In light of the President's
    plan to remove Cuba from the state-sponsored terrorism list,
    which I strongly support, how can the U.N. be of help to the
    United States in normalizing diplomatic relations with Cuba? In
    other words, taking Cuba off the terrorist list, is that a plus
    for our getting more support from the U.N. to help us with this
    whole issue?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congressman. And thank you for
    raising the other issue, which I confess I had not reflected on
    before, despite being a big fan of salsa music.
        With regard to the U.N., what I can say is, up until the
    President's decisions from December, Cuba has been a very--even
    to call it a polarizing issue would be probably an
    understatement.
        There is an annual resolution in the General Assembly in
    opposition to the U.S. embargo against Cuba that usually
    passes, basically, with the support of a majority of countries
    within the U.N., but also with only a couple no votes, usually
    us and Palau and maybe, I think, on occasion, Israel.
        We have been very isolated within the international system,
    which I raise, and--again, given my earlier exchange over Cuba,
    because I think the steps that we have taken have actually made
    it easier, I feel, for me to be heard on Cuban human rights
    issues than I was before.
        Because every time I would raise Cuban human rights--and,
    again, I--Congressman Diaz-Balart, maybe this is just something
    I could also direct at you--in the past, when I would raise my
    human rights concerns--there have been 600 short-term arbitrary
    detentions of Cubans in the month of March alone. But when I
    would raise that in the past, all I would hear about is the
    embargo.
        And now I feel I have a clean shot at making the case
    because the diversion that--and, frankly, this is all that
    people were doing, was using it as a diversion, but we were
    very isolated. And now we are no longer isolated, and I think
    we are in a stronger position to raise our human rights and
    democracy concerns about Cuba.
        That is one example. And we do that whether it is with
    regard to individual prisoners. We tried for a long time to get
    an independent investigation into the death of Oswaldo Paya,
    and I tried that also within the U.N. Cuba--again, this may
    change--but has had a lot of support from some of the usual
    suspects, but also from some you wouldn't expect.
        And so we want to--again, we are very, very sincere that
    any process of normalization or--in the event that the state-
    sponsored terrorism designation goes ahead and is rescinded,
    that is not--does not mean Cuba gets a pass on the human rights
    issues of concern.
        Indeed, I think that we will be more successful in foraging
    coalitions and putting more pressure not just from the United
    States, but also from some of our European friends and others,
    if we can get, you know, our own issues sort of put to one side
    and focus on what really matters, which is the fate of the
    Cuban people themselves.
        Mr. Serrano. Well, I thank you. I thank you for your work
    on all this. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Mr. Stewart.
        Mr. Stewart. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        At the risk of repeating myself with some of my peers up
    here on the stand, I want to tell you a little bit about my
    background as I make my observation and then a question.
        Now, I had the real privilege of serving as a pilot
    representative when I served in the Air Force to the START II
    and START III implementation with the Russians, and I learned
    even as a young captain that this lesson--and I am certain that
    this is true--and that is, if someone wants to cheat on a
    treaty such as this, they can find a way to do that. There is
    no question in my mind that that is true. I could give you
    many, many examples of why I believe that.
        But the reason that those strategic negotiations worked
    with the Russians and the United States is that there was a
    modicum of trust between them. We had a generation of having
    negotiated over previous treaties in which they were carried
    out and verified, and we believed that we could work with them
    because we both wanted the same thing.
        I don't believe that is true at all with our negotiations
    with Iran. And I appreciate your efforts to move forward on a
    very important issue, but I think that you and I or the
    administration and I view their willingness to comply with the
    treaty in a very different way.
        If I could make one other observation and then I will ask
    my question. There has been much talk about the snap-back
    sanctions, and I think you and I would agree that it took
    extraordinary effort on your part--and I know that you were an
    important part of that--an extraordinary effort on the
    administration in order to put the present sanctions in its
    place. And I would say that they are fragile, and I think it
    has surprised many of us that they have held as well as they
    have.
        But imagine, if you would, 2 years from now when multiple
    countries, thousands of companies with millions and perhaps
    billions of dollars of investment on the line, and every
    industry--oil and finance and shipping and aviation--I don't
    think you are going to see snap-back sanctions. I think it is
    going to be an ooze-back at best. It is going to be slippery
    and slimy and full of holes.
        And we have already admitted that we will lose China and
    Russia, and I think we are likely to lose France as well. And
    once that happens, I don't know how you stop the dam from
    breaking. Because when other countries see these primary
    partners violating any snap-back provisions, I don't know how
    we would dissuade them.
        Having made those comments--and I am not asking you to
    reply because you already have, and we appreciate your response
    to this point--my question primarily is this, and that is with
    the IAEA. And many of us are frustrated--and I am sure you are
    as well--with their inability--and this isn't a criticism of
    them. It is a criticism of their Iranian partners--their
    inability to get very specific answers to a long list of
    questions regarding primarily Iran's military installations and
    the role that those have played in the development of their
    previous weapons and atomic weapons--or nuclear weapons
    programs.
        Do you share that frustration? And, if you do, why do you
    think that they are going to be any better as they try to
    implement and carry out this agreement?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, sir.
        And I am going to--I am unable to resist the temptation of
    responding just to your opening comments because they are, of
    course, very legitimate concerns. And when it comes to the lack
    of trust for Iran, we share it.
        This agreement framework and any ultimate agreement is
    predicated on a lack of trust rather than trust. That is why we
    are phasing sanctions. That is why we are talking so much about
    snap-back. And I will come to your ooze-back point in just a
    second. But----
        Mr. Stewart. Can we agree to call it ooze-back from now on?
        Ambassador Power. I think the Uzbeks would have a problem
    with that.
        But the--I think what is really, really important is the
    extent of the verification and the transparency regime, the
    agreement to implement and then ratify the additional protocol,
    the modified code, which requires them to declare anything not
    after it is already up and running and built, but, you know,
    when the idea has struck, and the extent of the presence, which
    we haven't seen.
        The JPOA is only over a finite period of time. I concede
    that point. But the IAEA has reported compliance. And, as I
    mentioned earlier, in the instance when it had a concern, it
    raised that with the Iranians and they complied.
        Now, you may say, well, that is just because Iran is on its
    best behavior because it wants to get the big deal in order to
    get----
        Mr. Stewart. And if I could comment on that----
        Ambassador Power. Yes please.
        Mr. Stewart [continuing]. Madam Ambassador, you say Iran is
    on their best behavior and, yet, look what they are doing from
    Yemen to Syria, to----
        Ambassador Power. No. No. No. But stick to the nuclear
    issue. I can--I can speak to the other issue. I deal with the
    other issues every day on Yemen, on Syria, on Iraq, et cetera.
        Mr. Stewart. I know your point. But it is worth making the
    point as well. This is as good as it is going to get with them.
        Ambassador Power. This is--I am speaking very narrowly
    about the nuclear issue.
        Mr. Stewart. I understand.
        Ambassador Power. I don't think there has been any
    improvement in Iran's behavior on the host of other issues that
    you mention and that I--again, that we all work on in
    cooperation with one another most days.
        The--but the fact that every part of the nuclear supply
    chain is going to be monitored by the IAEA, the fact that we
    will have in the declared sites, the ones we all know about,
    state-of-the-art technology, electronic seals, daily access, et
    cetera.
        But coming back to the nuclear supply chain--because that
    is the issue where the covert concerns get raised--they would,
    as you know, have to have an entire covert nuclear supply
    chain, so not just uranium mines that nobody has ever heard of,
    uranium mills nobody has ever heard of, storage facilities
    nobody has ever heard of--that takes a lot of work and a whole
    lot of subterfuge, and we retain the ability that we have
    demonstrated--we and our Israeli friends and others have--to
    also have our own independent ways of judging what is going on
    on the ground.
        So we will also see quickly whether or not the IAEA is
    getting the access that it seeks, and we will have a means of
    resolving any standoff in that regard that will go in favor of
    the IAEA. And so we will come to a point at which they are
    either in violation or they are not.
        On PMD, just to say that that is one of the issues along
    with the changes that need to be made at Iraq and Fordow and
    Natanz, those questions will need to be answered in the first
    phase before any relief is forthcoming----
        Mr. Stewart. And my time is well expired.
        Ambassador Power [continuing]. Further--any further relief
    is forthcoming.
        Mr. Stewart. Thank you.
        And if I could just conclude, reemphasizing what I think
    both of us have explored here, that if they want to cheat, they
    can find a way to cheat. Despite all of the details you have
    enumerated here, they still could find a way to cheat. And the
    IAEA is very frustrated because they haven't answered their
    questions, provided information. I am deeply concerned that
    that will be this case 2 years from now as well.
        Ambassador Power. But they could--the same argument
    applies, as you know, right now with all of the sanctions in
    place, the same argument about whether they are able to cheat.
        The difference is we will have more inspectors on the
    ground and more of an ability to catch them. Right now they are
    at a 2- to 3-month breakout time. The difference is they will
    be at a 1-year breakout time, which is in the U.S. interest.
        Mr. Stewart. I am happy to buy you a beer and continue.
        Ambassador Power. Okay.
        Ms. Granger. Ms. Wasserman Schultz.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ambassador, welcome. Good to see you.
        Ambassador Power. Thank you.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. I am going to mix things up a little
    and ask you something not related to Cuba, Iran, or Israel,
    because I have a sense, even though I just arrived, that that
    was pretty well covered before I got here. Just a hunch.
        I want to ask you a couple of questions that are near and
    dear to, I know, both me, Congresswoman Lee, Congresswoman
    Lowey, and Ms. Granger, and that is the way that women are
    treated and the potential for exploitation and what we are
    doing about it in U.N. Peacekeeping missions and in U.N.-funded
    operations.
        But I also want to ask you about the notion of training
    women peacekeepers. I know we know that the challenge in having
    more women peacekeepers at the U.N. is that there are not a lot
    of women in military and police roles. So, as a result, there
    is a very small pipeline.
        I recently learned about a special training program that is
    for female military officers. It was a first-of-its-kind
    initiative. U.N. Women in India, in partnership with the Center
    for United Nations Peacekeeping, developed and conducted a
    special technical course for female military officers. It was
    in New Delhi and, apparently, there were officers from 24
    troop-contributing countries that participated in the course.
    And it essentially is going to sort of build our bench.
        I think, obviously, it is important to have in very
    specific circumstances a woman on the front lines of the U.N.'s
    peacekeeping efforts versus men, not that men can't do a very
    effective job. But, obviously, with cultural sensitivities and
    gender sensitivities, having more women for a variety of
    reasons is really important.
        So I wanted to ask you about that program, ask you if you
    knew enough about that model to suggest that maybe we could
    expand it and use it for training going forward, but, generally
    what else can we do to train more women and to put more women
    in peacekeeping roles at the U.N.?
        And I will ask you the other question at the same time, and
    that is just the ongoing efforts to deter sexual exploitation
    in U.S. Peacekeeping operations. I mean, obviously, there are--
    U.N. Peacekeepers are operating in countries where there are a
    lot of challenges, but we have sexual abuse in U.N.
    Peacekeeping missions similar to what has gone on in our own
    military. I would like to know what steps are being taken to
    address that issue because, obviously, anything we can do to
    reduce and use our leverage financially to effect change there
    is important.
        Ambassador Power. Okay. Thank you so much, Congresswoman,
    for the change of pace and for the excellent questions. These
    are issues very close to my heart, and they should be easier to
    fix than they are.
        In terms of the program that you reference, we are very
    excited about this. We are constantly talking about it publicly
    as a way of encouraging more countries to institutionalize
    programs like this.
        We actually just recently passed another Security Council
    resolution that is the re-up to so-called Resolution 1325,
    which is the Women, Peace and Security resolution, which sort
    of set the framework for this now I guess 20 years ago.
        And in that we very explicitly called on countries to
    increase the recruitment of female soldiers and female police
    within their own militaries and then called on the U.N., also,
    to make more of a point when it engages a TCC, a troop-
    contributing country, or a PCC, a police-contributing country,
    to actually make--send a demand signal that this is what they
    want.
        As you know, the numbers are strikingly small, but we
    have--I have certainly seen in the field in places like Darfur
    the effects it has when women police officers are the ones to
    go and engage young women who have been raped en route to, you
    know, getting firewood, and it is just a wholly different
    dynamic.
        And the sense of shame and the--you know, trying to tell
    that story to a male foreign--you know, not even from your own
    country or your own community, but someone who doesn't speak
    your language and who is a guy, it is sort of really, really
    challenging and just, compounds the pain that these people are
    experiencing.
        So we, the United States, I think, since 2005 have trained
    about just over 5,000 women peacekeepers through our GPOI
    program, but we also, through our national action plan on
    Women, Peace and Security, on the implementation of 1325, have
    made a commitment to try to increase that.
        I think the more we talk about it, the more we emphasize
    it. It is a big priority for the Secretary General. But the way
    the U.N. works, of course, is the Secretary General is at the
    mercy of what, again, each of the member states puts forward.
        I think our embassies can put also--and our DATs, our
    defense attaches, can be engaging in, again, encouraging that
    kind of recruitment. But as a general rule, the U.N. tends to
    amplify what the dynamics are, as you suggested, within the
    composite member states of the U.N.
        So the world we need to change is the world inside member
    states, and that is why, again, having enormous resolutions and
    the political push is important, but we need to do it at the
    ground level.
        In terms of sexual exploitation and abuse, I think the U.N.
    has improved its vetting for troops and police who are going
    out into the field. Individuals who have been alleged to carry
    out these acts are generally sent home while an investigation
    takes place.
        There, though, does need to be far more follow-up in the
    host country. Because what happens is they go home and then,
    again, the U.N.'s relationship with it--I mean, there may not
    even be a U.N. Presence in a particular country--tends to
    become atrophied.
        So we also need to work through our embassies to also keep
    the pressure on those countries that say, ``Yes. We are going
    to do an investigation,'' but then, you know, enthusiasm for
    that can melt away, you know, once the individual is back in
    the host country.
        So it is--again, we are nowhere near where we need to be,
    but we are in a much--there is much more of a top-down
    commitment from the U.N. bureaucracy, much more of an awareness
    among TCCs and PCCs that this is a priority. And, again, we
    need to see results in the field.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Madam Chair, just 10 seconds more of
    indulgement, so that I could ask you know, we obviously have
    members travel around the world and we have meetings with a lot
    of your host countries.
        And, to the degree that--we are able to raise issues from
    our perspective so that they are not only hearing them from
    you----
        Ambassador Power. That so would be----
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz [continuing]. If you could find a way
    to let members know as we are approaching recesses where we
    know CODELs are going out, know many of us would be happy to do
    that.
        Ambassador Power. Great. Thank you so much, Congresswoman.
        Ms. Wasserman Schultz. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        We are going to have another round of questions, but we are
    going to have to be shorter in our questions and shorter in our
    answers or I won't get around to everyone.
        Ambassador Power. Will do.
        Ms. Granger. I am going to ask first about the Palestinian
    Authority briefly.
        As it is obvious that they are turning their attention away
    from direct negotiation, instead going to the U.N. and the ICC,
    how do their actions at the U.N. and the ICC affect U.S.
    financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority? I see
    another $440 million request for the Authority in the fiscal
    year 2016 budget request.
        I also ask you in that same vein if you expect the
    Palestinians to file formal charges against Israel and the ICC.
    What are you doing to try to discourage this? And if it is true
    that the ICC has already begun preliminary investigation into
    Israel's activities, how is the U.S. opposing the ICC's
    involvement?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will try to
    be very succinct. There were a number of questions there.
        First, as you know, we did not believe that the
    Palestinians were eligible to become a party to the ICC. We
    have made clear privately, publicly, many, many times over that
    we oppose their decision to go to the ICC, that it would be
    counterproductive, further poison the atmosphere that we were
    trying to, as we were discussing earlier, improve and--and
    hopeful that the parties can improve so that the aspirations of
    the Palestinian people, you know, can be advanced, which is not
    something that this ICC track is going to secure for them. A
    two-state solution will secure that for them.
        So on the funding question, we are reviewing our
    assistance. As you know, the Government of Israel has just made
    a decision to release some revenue, in part, because at its
    core, you know, much of the assistance, whether it is the
    assistance that goes through Israel or assistance that comes
    from this body, is assistance that we use in order to deepen
    the security partnership to counter violent extremism.
        The last thing we want is, you know, for the Palestinian
    territories to be radicalized, for youth to not have a place to
    go, for people not to be paid. And we know who exploits those
    kinds of environments. So I think we are in close touch, and it
    is a, you know, day-to-day discussion about how we go forward
    on the assistance question.
        Finally, on the ICC's own relationship to this issue, the
    prosecutor has announced that she is undertaking a preliminary
    examination. So it is prior to the investigation stage. There
    are a lot of questions that she will need to sort through.
        Again, we believe that one of those questions should still
    center on the eligibility question, given that a two-state
    solution has not been secured between the two parties. And
    while we are not a party to the ICC, you know, we, again,
    engage both the Palestinians to deter them from taking any
    further action, and, of course, we engage the court, both
    ourselves and through state parties to the ICC, to try to make
    very clear what the consequences of moving forward would be for
    what, again, we should all be for, which is peace and security
    in the region between the two parties.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        Mrs. Lowey.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you very much.
        First of all, I thank you, Madam Chair, for asking the
    question about the ICC and wonder where the chair is going. I
    won't pursue that point, but I would be interested. If you have
    any additional information, keep us updated.
        And I do want to say to Mr. Stewart at the end, I
    appreciate his pursuing the question with regard to the
    military sites.
        In fact, I just recently asked Secretary Kerry that exact
    question because, after dozens of briefings that I have been a
    part of, there seems to be no progress in Parchin or the other
    military sites, and he assured me that there could not be, and
    there would not be, a deal unless there was absolute inspection
    by IAEA of the military sites.
        So I must say I have been asking this question for months,
    and I was pleased to hear from the Secretary that this is an
    absolute given if there is going to be a deal. Otherwise, their
    view is that no deal is better than a bad deal.
        So I thank you for bringing that issue up.
        I would like to ask another question that we haven't
    touched on. We have the whole world to deal with. What about
    Russia? What are they really up to? I thought their recent
    statement about selling anti-missile equipment to Iran was an
    interesting one. I have asked for a long time what does Russia
    really want. On the one hand, they are part of our alliance to
    try to get a deal with Iran. On the other hand, they continue
    to stir up problems not only in Ukraine, but in Syria and Yemen
    and Iraq.
        So I know that you and the Secretary have looked for
    various incentives that will bring Russia into step with the
    world community. Could we be on the verge of a new cold war?
    Can you enlighten us as to your views as to Russia's intention
    in the world? And we know they continue to support the Assad
    regime.
        To what extent is this driven by Russia's battle with
    terrorism in the Caucasus? Is Russia still profiting from arms
    sales to the Assad regime? I would be interested to know your
    view of Russia's role in their region and in the world and in
    our future relationships.
        Ambassador Power. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is a
    question that, given Russia's role as a permanent member of the
    Security Council, I grapple with every day and see different
    manifestations of every day.
        First, it is really, really important, particularly today
    and this week, to point out that Russia's aggression in Ukraine
    has not ceased. There was a significant drop in violence, but
    now that situation has escalated.
        And it has escalated in large part because the separatists
    backed by Russia did not withdraw their heavy weapons as they
    were supposed to under the Minsk Agreement from the front lines
    because Russia maintained a regular army presence within
    eastern Ukraine, including command and control and training.
    The convoys that are not inspected by the international
    community, the OSC or the ICRC, keep coming in. I think we are
    expecting the 24th such convoy that just moves across the
    border blatantly.
        So, again, this is an area of significant concern, and it
    causes us again and again--at the time that we would very much
    like to see the Minsk Agreement be implemented and move out of
    this period of confrontation and diplomatic and economic
    isolation of Russia, we now have to be thinking again about
    what are the consequences going to be of further aggression in
    Ukraine.
        So you have that as the most egregious example of Russia's
    defiance of international norms. Alongside that you mention the
    support for Assad, support even as we work together to
    dismantle Assad's declared chemical weapons program.
        You know, this is a regime that drops thousands of barrel
    bombs on civilian neighborhoods, uses chlorine against children
    and adults, for that matter, and, yet, the Russian support for
    that government continues. And it is, again, a huge problem and
    it has really paralyzed the U.N. Security Council, where I sit
    every day, which is responsible for maintaining international
    peace and security and cannot meet that responsibility because
    of Russian obstructionism.
        So you have all of that and the internal situation in terms
    of the human rights crisis that civil society and others are
    facing, anybody who speaks out being vulnerable, independent
    media being cracked down upon, of course, the recent
    assassination of a leading opposition figure, and just a really
    difficult situation for anybody who wants to express their
    views or assemble peacefully, et cetera, inside the country.
    And we, again, always make our views known on this, speak out,
    and make those concerns, again, known publicly and privately.
    So you have all of that on the one hand.
        But then, again, back to Congressman Stewart's--the
    exchange I had with him, on the other hand, you have the fact
    that they did stand with us through the P5+1 negotiations. They
    were a--and remain on, again, the declared chemical weapons
    program a critical part of dismantling that program and getting
    rid of, you know, more than 1,000 metric tons of sarin and
    other, you know, toxic chemicals that Assad probably would have
    used as a routine weapon of war if they were still within the
    country.
        On ISIL, on the stopping--trying to stop the flow of
    foreign terrorist fighters, we have very, very useful technical
    discussions, and I think that is an area where cooperation
    needs to continue. Of course, Russia's definition of a
    terrorist and our definition of a terrorist, you know, tend to
    be different. But on ISIL and on Al Qaeda, you know, again,
    that is something that we need to work on together.
        So we are entering into a period where we will cooperate on
    areas that are in our national security interests, and,
    presumably, that is the logic of their cooperation as well. And
    we will take measures as we need to when they defy
    international norms and commit aggression in their neighborhood
    or beyond.
        Mrs. Lowey. Thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you.
        I will say before we go on that, in the past 5 weeks, I
    have been to Ukraine twice with bipartisan, very high-ranking
    delegations from Congress, and we sent a letter to the
    President. The President of the Ukraine made a very impassioned
    plea for weapons for them to defend themselves. They are very,
    very concerned about what is going on there.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
        By the way, before I say anything else, I do need to thank
    Ms. Chartrand--I always get your name--Jennifer, your name
    wrong.
        But during this crisis when the Americans were being
    attacked in Panama City, I contacted her, we contacted her.
    They put us in contact with the DCM in our Embassy in Panama,
    and they were exceedingly responsive. And I think it is
    important to note that. And so I am very grateful for that. So
    thank you.
        Ambassador, you mentioned a number of issues with Russia,
    you know, Assad--I think that the concept that he was a
    reformer--that has been thrown out the window. You mentioned
    again the support for Assad, the Russian support for Assad. You
    know, we have got the weapons to Iran. There is a million
    things that we could mention. And I will forget many and you
    will forget many.
        Obviously, the invasion of the Ukraine, their continuing
    aggression in the Ukraine, and they still have troops in
    Georgia. And so--and I will tell you the previous
    administration at first thought that Putin was a person that--
    you know, he looked into his eyes and read his soul and,
    eventually, he--President Bush realized and called him a very
    cold human being.
        Have we reset the reset? And I am not saying this as a
    gotcha thing. Is there an understanding that--and I think, from
    your words, I mean, you clearly understand that. But is there
    an understanding that the--you know, treating and disregarding,
    which is what a reset--disregarding past abuses? And, remember,
    the reset was done right after the invasion of Georgia.
        Is there a different attitude now as to how we deal with
    the Russians as opposed to kind of like, ``Well, don't worry
    about it. We are okay. We are buddies''? Is there a different
    understanding now of the true nature of a regime that I believe
    is a dictatorial human rights-abusing regime?
        Ambassador Power. Well, I think Russia has taken actions
    that have resulted in not only the attempted lopping off of
    part of a neighbor, but the attempted neutering and
    evisceration of the Democratic progress that Russia had also
    made internally, you know, including throwing out USAID, which
    was a critical source of support for--and a lifeline for some
    of the lawyers groups and independent journalists and
    anticorruption crusaders within Russia.
        So the relationship, of course, is now one that takes on
    these issues. I mean, back in 2009, if you had been told that,
    by virtue of U.S. and European sanctions, the ruble would have
    depreciated the extent to which it has, economic growth would
    have shriveled--I mean, Russia was going in a very different
    direction.
        But I want to stress this isn't--I mean, sanctions, just as
    with Iran, are not an end in themselves. We are not interested
    in sanctions that are hurting the Russian economy for the sake
    of sanctions. We are interested in Putin ending his aggression
    in Ukraine.
        Our dialogue with the Russians on Syria is rooted in an
    argument that has not proven persuasive up to this point, but
    which is that, actually, we both have an interest in seeing the
    end of the Assad regime because the Assad regime has made
    possible the growth of ISIS across Syria. And, indeed, it was a
    safe haven, of course, for those ISIS soldiers that then went
    into Iraq and took over Mosul and inflicted such suffering on
    so many.
        So we still believe that our shared interest in combating
    terrorism, in ensuring that chemical weapons are not used and
    they don't become a routine weapon of war anywhere--and that
    includes chlorine--should allow us still, notwithstanding a
    very significant deterioration in the way that we engage with
    them by virtue of sanctions and by virtue of their aggression
    in Ukraine--we still believe that there have to be areas of
    tactical cooperation that we maintain, and the discussion
    earlier of sanctions evasion is just one example.
        It is in our interest for Russia to be a country within the
    U.N. system that observes the international sanctions that
    Russia is a part of putting in place. We need--even if we want
    to put in place something that is of great interest to
    Congresswoman Lee and that others have mentioned, sanctions on
    the protagonists in South Sudan who are pulling ethnic Nuer or
    Dinka out of the house and just killing them because they are
    of the wrong ethnicity, we have to go through Russia in the
    Sanctions Committee of the United Nations Security Council.
        So we don't have the option of just turning our back and
    writing off this country, but we are very clear-eyed about the
    differences and the very disturbing trends.
        Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairwoman, I want to thank you.
        Ms. Granger. Ms. Lee.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
        Sudan. I co-chair the bipartisan caucus on Sudan and South
    Sudan, and we have worked for many, many, many years on a
    bipartisan basis addressing the humanitarian crisis in South
    Sudan, which is now deteriorating. According to USAID, more
    than 1.5 million people have been displaced, 2.5 million people
    are facing food insecurity in South Sudan since the outbreak of
    violence in December in 2013.
        Now, with the recent collapse in the peace talks, I believe
    it is very, very critical--and the caucus also believes this--
    that the U.S. Government increase pressure on the parties to
    reach a negotiated settlement and to work to bring U.N.
    sanctions into force.
        So, Madam Ambassador, can you tell us what the dynamics are
    at the United Nations. You mentioned Russia as it relates to
    sanctions, but we have asked for the establishment of an arms
    embargo. You know, we can't seem to get that done.
        Also, the current U.N. peacekeeping troop levels in South
    Sudan--want to know, are they being maintained at the current
    level? What do we need to know from this committee's vantage
    point that we need to do to make sure those peacekeeping forces
    are funded?
        And then, finally, with regard to U.N. peacekeeping mission
    in Haiti, I believe the troop reduction will take place very
    soon and will pull down to what they were prior to the
    devastating earthquake in 2010. So what is the timeline of this
    reduction? And how will this affect the security in Haiti?
        Ambassador Power. Thank you.
        And let me, if I could, just take this occasion--since we
    haven't had too much time to talk about our budget request,
    take advantage of the opening that you have given me to make a
    fervent appeal that the President's budget requests be
    fulfilled, in part, because of, well, frankly, the whole host
    of issues we have discussed up to this point, but because I
    think what you see with the Haiti drawdown is that we are--and
    with the drawdown in Liberia that is now recommencing, now that
    the Ebola crisis has abated, at least in Liberia. Nobody can be
    overconfident about that, given its presence elsewhere in the
    neighbors. But you can count on us. We are looking at every
    mission and seeing where we can recalibrate, right-size.
        In the case of Haiti, just to pick up where you ended,
    Haiti is entering into a process where elections are occurring,
    but they have also massively increased the capability of the
    Haitian National Police.
        I was down there in January and was told by the U.N. Police
    Commissioner that it takes 10 international police to do the
    work of one fully trained Haitian police, which is not normally
    necessarily the ratio one would expect. But that is a testament
    to how far they have come, I think, with the U.N.'s help.
        I cannot stress how alert we are to the expanding size of
    the demands that we are making on this committee and on the
    Congress and the--and the appeal to American taxpayers that I
    feel I continually have to make, but it is for these causes
    that are critical to our national security.
        And so, if we can draw down in Haiti, right-size--because
    we don't want to in any way squander the gains that have been
    made--if we can consolidate in Liberia and in Cote d'Ivoire--we
    have to increase in South Sudan. It is actually a modest
    infusion, considering the scale of the threat. We have to
    fortify the mission in Mali because terrorists are now taking
    on peacekeepers, and even today we had another incident where
    there was a suicide attack at a U.N. Base. It is a horrific
    situation.
        But when you go through the list of the peacekeeping
    missions that we are asking you to help us fund, there is just
    not one mission that you would take of and say, ``Eh''--you
    know, even Cyprus, which is the mission that everybody sort of
    cites, is funded largely not by us, but actually by the parties
    themselves. And, indeed, of course, given the number of crises
    in the world, the last thing you would want to do is
    destabilize something when there is a peace process that we
    want to ensure reaches results over the long period that that
    crisis has existed.
        But my point is just join us in this--if you could, in this
    process of looking at these missions. We have cut the per-
    peacekeeper cost by 18 percent. It can go down more. We are
    pushing every day on that. We are shrinking the size of
    missions because we know that there is a certain fluidity where
    other missions need to be increased. We know there is not an
    infinite pie here.
        But we are carrying over into this year a significant
    deficit from last year, hopefully, less of one than we thought
    we were going to be carrying. And, thus, while our appeal looks
    bigger this year, the actual requirements are just--are a
    little bit lower even than they were in 2015 for 2016, at least
    the requirements that we expect.
        On South Sudan, just very briefly, as my time is up, we
    have put in place through this recent Security Council
    resolution--now you might call it a pressure architecture. So
    we have a sanctions regime and now we will need to go forward
    in collaboration with our IGAD friends, who are trying to
    broker this peace process with designations on those who are
    spoiling and who are responsible for the breakdown in talks. We
    have to be strategic about that and think about how to ramp up
    perhaps or what the right sequencing is.
        And the resolution also references an arms embargo, and we
    are very drawn, as are you, to the idea that, of course,
    stemming the flow of arms to this region may be another factor
    that could change the calculus.
        But the biggest issue in South Sudan is that the very
    leaders that this Congress and our administration and our
    predecessors supported have not put the interests of their
    people above their own parochial desire for power or for self-
    preservation. And that is the roadblock that we have to lift,
    and pressure has got to be part of that.
        Ms. Lee. Thank you very much.
        Ms. Granger. Thank you, Ambassador Power. Thank you again
    for your time today and for your service to the country.
        This concludes today's hearing. Members may submit any
    additional questions for the record. The subcommittee on State,
    Foreign Operations, and Related Programs stands adjourned.

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                               W I T N E S S E S

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                                                                       Page
    Brownfield, Ambassador W. R......................................   563
    Browning, Ambassador Steve.......................................     1
    Dijkerman, Dirk..................................................     1
    Hogan, Elizabeth.................................................   563
    Jacobson, R. S...................................................   563
    Kerry, Hon. John.................................................   111
    Konyndyk, J. M...................................................     1
    Lenhardt, A. E...................................................   390
    Lew, Hon. Jack...................................................   489
    Power, Samantha..................................................   627

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