[House Hearing, 114 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO THE ARRIVAL OF A DIRTY BOMB AT A U.S. PORT ======================================================================= (114-30) HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ OCTOBER 27, 2015 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Available online at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/ committee.action?chamber=house&committee=transportation ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 97-310 PDF WASHINGTON : 2016 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman DON YOUNG, Alaska PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of Vice Chair Columbia JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERROLD NADLER, New York FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey CORRINE BROWN, Florida SAM GRAVES, Missouri EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland DUNCAN HUNTER, California RICK LARSEN, Washington ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois BOB GIBBS, Ohio STEVE COHEN, Tennessee RICHARD L. HANNA, New York ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland JEFF DENHAM, California JOHN GARAMENDI, California REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANDRE CARSON, Indiana THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky JANICE HAHN, California TOM RICE, South Carolina RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania DINA TITUS, Nevada RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York MARK SANFORD, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut ROB WOODALL, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida TODD ROKITA, Indiana CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois JOHN KATKO, New York JARED HUFFMAN, California BRIAN BABIN, Texas JULIA BROWNLEY, California CRESENT HARDY, Nevada RYAN A. COSTELLO, Pennsylvania GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana MIMI WALTERS, California BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia CARLOS CURBELO, Florida DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina LEE M. ZELDIN, New York ------ 7 Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Chairman DON YOUNG, Alaska JOHN GARAMENDI, California FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland BOB GIBBS, Ohio CORRINE BROWN, Florida MARK SANFORD, South Carolina JANICE HAHN, California GARRET GRAVES, Louisiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida CARLOS CURBELO, Florida JULIA BROWNLEY, California DAVID ROUZER, North Carolina PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon (Ex LEE M. ZELDIN, New York Officio) BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex Officio) CONTENTS Page Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv TESTIMONY Panel 1 Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, Assistant Commandant for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard....................................... 4 Huban A. Gowadia, Ph.D., Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................... 4 Todd C. Owen, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection............................. 4 David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office............................... 4 Panel 2 Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D., Senior Fellow, Los Alamos National Laboratories................................................... 32 Charles A. Potter, Ph.D., Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff, Sandia National Laboratories............................ 32 Joseph M. Lawless, Chairman, Security Committee, American Association of Port Authorities................................ 32 Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D., Director, Center for Resilience Studies, Northeastern University........................................ 32 PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown...................................... 48 Huban A. Gowadia, Ph.D........................................... 53 Todd C. Owen..................................................... 58 David C. Maurer.................................................. 65 Gregory H. Canavan, Ph.D......................................... 82 Charles A. Potter, Ph.D.......................................... 91 Joseph M. Lawless................................................ 98 Stephen E. Flynn, Ph.D........................................... 101 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, Assistant Commandant for Response Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, response to request for information from Hon. Garret Graves, a Representative in Congress from the State of Louisiana............................................. 26 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO THE ARRIVAL OF A DIRTY BOMB AT A U.S. PORT ---------- TUESDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2015 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Hunter. Good morning. The subcommittee will come to order. Before I get into my statement, I want to indicate my displeasure at the lack of response from the Secretary of Homeland Security regarding a letter I sent on October 7th for this hearing asking for information related to today with what we are going to talk about. I specifically asked about the number of containers inspected prior to arrival at a U.S. port, the percentage inspected after arrival, the different inspection methods used and criteria used to determine increased or reduced screening. So basically I asked them: How many containers do you screen? How do you screen them? How do you scan them? You would think that the Department of Homeland Security would have those numbers in front of them because that is what they do. In addition, I asked about the Department's progress to meet the 100-percent container scanning requirement in the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 for containers headed to U.S. ports. The information requested is relevant to today's hearing, and the Department should have been able to provide a response within a 3-week lead time, roughly the same amount of time taken to develop the testimony we will hear from Department witnesses today. Are any of you aware of the status of the Secretary's response to my letter I guess would be the first question. Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. I am aware that the letter has cleared the interagency with the departments within, and it is waiting for final approval at the Department level. Mr. Hunter. Of the numbers? Mr. Owen. I am aware of the numbers, sir. Yes, sir. Mr. Hunter. So you have the numbers? Mr. Owen. I have the numbers prepared for today, sir. Yes, sir. Mr. Hunter. Great. OK. And let me say one last thing, too. We are not going to hear from anybody from SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], and we are not going to hear from anybody from NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command], because the OSD, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, refused to send witnesses or briefers from either SOUTHCOM or NORTHCOM. I am not sure whether that was the Department of Defense saying this is a Department of Homeland Security issue and a Department of Homeland Security issue only or whether they just didn't care enough to send somebody. Maybe they have a beef with me. And I would say to OSD that that is pretty petulant, to not send anybody from any--besides the Coast Guard from the Department of Defense, from NORTHCOM or SOUTHCOM. The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss the scenario of a dirty bomb--a radiological dispersal device--in a U.S. port; the potential for how such a device could be brought in; measures that can be taken to deter, detect, and interdict the security threat; and ways to prevent an adversary from reaching its intended target within the U.S. The United States has an exclusive economic zone spanning 3.5 million square miles, 95,000 miles of open shoreline, over 360 ports, and numerous small harbors across the country. Our maritime border is unique compared to our land or air borders due to its sheer size and the potential ease of moving large quantities of materials undetected. Interdiction efforts are about more than the seized contraband. Understanding the pathways used by smugglers is a critical part of the process. Pathways used for drugs today could be used to bring in anything--nuclear, radiological material, or anything. If you can carry thousands of pounds of something, you can carry thousands of pounds of something else. Knowledge of existing smuggling practices coupled with trends on how actions change due to law enforcement efforts can assist in disrupting future smuggling efforts. After 9/11, security measures were enacted to better protect our homeland by expanding efforts to detect and deter threats overseas. It is obviously much better to find things if they are not on U.S. shorelines. These efforts include screening cargo manifests before containers are loaded onto a U.S.-bound ship, scanning shipping containers that have been determined to be high-risk, screening ship personnel data, knowing where a ship and its cargo have been before entering United States territory, and intercepting a vessel at sea and preventing its entry into a U.S. port. We will hear from our witnesses today on how the Federal Government deploys a whole-of-government, layered approach, including law enforcement, technology, and intelligence, to detect, deter, and interdict potential threats. These internal measures are combined with treaties and agreements with foreign governments to conduct cooperative enforcement efforts at ports overseas. In early October, the Associated Press reported on the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and Eastern European authorities' efforts over the last 5 years to successfully interrupt four attempts by criminal gangs with suspected Russian ties to sell cesium to Middle Eastern extremists. And we can talk about cesium either in this panel or the next panel. It is not the most dangerous stuff, but it is still bad stuff. The successful disruption of the sale was a positive result; however, the desire of our adversaries to obtain, at a minimum, materials for a dirty bomb or, to the extreme, materials for a nuclear weapon are growing. Due to the Iranian deal, no matter what you think about it one way or the other, and the reaction that the other Middle Eastern countries are going to have to Iran having nuclear facilities, there is going to be more nuclear material out on the market. That is just the way it is going to be going forward. Over the next 10 or 25 years, you are going to have more countries with more nuclear capability than we have probably ever seen in the world. And I think that is one of the reasons we are going to kind of start this series of hearings up, is because the interdiction efforts by the Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security are going to be paramount. I mean, that is the only line of defense, not just the first line of defense, that we have in this country. It is concerning that the administration's whole-of- government approach does not appear to include foreign nuclear policy. For an administration that proclaims to be anti- nuclear-proliferation, we are heading down a path where our adversaries will have greater access to nuclear material. While this hearing is about preventing, deterring, and interdicting threats from coming onto our ports, it is important to be aware of how our foreign policies may conflict and potentially disrupt enforcement measures to keep our country safe. With that, I yield to Ranking Member Garamendi. Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the hearing. When you first noticed the hearing, I am going, ``Wait a minute, I have been here, I have done this. What is--when did it occur?'' About 2005, we did a national meeting on natural disaster insurance. Including among the three things that we looked at in 2005 was, let's see: Hurricane up the east coast-- that would be Sandy; earthquakes at the New Madrid fault, but that hasn't happened, thankfully; and terrorism, a dirty bomb at the Port of Long Beach. So there is a study out there. I really wanted to get it in time for this, but I wasn't able to gather it. In any case, this is a subject that we need to pay attention to, and I thank you for holding the hearing. The threat of a nuclear or radiological dirty bomb arriving at a U.S. port is sobering. It certainly was in 2005 when we did that national review of disaster insurance. An idea that was virtually unimaginable 15 years ago--well, not quite 10 years ago--is now the primary focus of coordination, multilayering strategy involving multiple Federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard. By most accounts, it would appear that the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and numerous Federal programs, activities, capabilities that are implemented to fulfill this strategy seem to be meeting the challenge of keeping radiological or other nuclear threats outside of the U.S. homeland. This is something we ought to be grateful for, and I certainly appreciate that because of the effort made by thousands of Federal employees every day to protect us. And yet we cannot let our guard down, for even the likelihood of a terrorist cell smuggling weapons of mass destruction into the country in a shipping container may be low but the consequences would be catastrophic. At least, that is what we learned in 2005. And because the risks are potentially catastrophic, we must continue to do everything possible to make sure it doesn't happen. Among the questions we are going to be asking, or, at least, I will be asking--I assume you will also, Mr. Chairman and Members: Are we adequately testing and validating our technologies and procedures and training to make sure that they remain relevant given the current and emerging threats and circumstances? Second, in the event of a detonation of a dirty bomb at a U.S. port, are we making sure today that we will have in place the technologies and capabilities to quickly and effectively respond to the cleanup and recovery of such an attack? I know on the insurance side the answer in 2005 was ``no,'' and today I am sure it is also ``no.'' And, thirdly, considering that a future terrorist may be homegrown, are we doing everything we can to track and monitor within the U.S. the coastwide trade to make sure that vessels operating in U.S. domestic waters are not a potential conduit for those seeking to do us great harm? It is going to be an interesting hearing. Thank you for the panels. I thank the witnesses who are here. And looking forward to the testimony. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member. I am going to introduce everybody really quick. Rear Admiral Peter J. Brown, the U.S. Coast Guard's Assistant Commandant for Response Policy. Thanks for being here. Dr. Gowadia--did I get it right?--the Department of Homeland Security's Director for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Mr. Todd Owen, the Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Thanks for being here. And Mr. David Maurer, the U.S. GAO [Government Accountability Office] Director of Homeland Security and Justice. And we will start with you, Admiral Brown. You are recognized. TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PETER J. BROWN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR RESPONSE POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD; HUBAN A. GOWADIA, PH.D., DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; TODD C. OWEN, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION; AND DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Admiral Brown. Well, thank you. And good morning, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's role in the prevention and response to the arrival of a radiological dispersion device, or dirty bomb, into a U.S. port. And I thank you for your strong support of the Coast Guard and our men and women in uniform. It is a pleasure to be here today with two of our most important partners within the Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The Nation is safer in no small part due to the partnerships that we have with these two organizations. And I would like to personally thank both Dr. Gowadia and Assistant Commissioner Owen for their ongoing support and leadership. My complete statement has been provided to the subcommittee, and I ask that it be entered into the record. Mr. Chairman, through a layered security approach, the Coast Guard pushes border and port security out well beyond our Nation's shoreline and the exclusive economic zone by fostering strategic relationships with partner nations to detect, deter, and counter threats as early and as far from U.S. shore as possible in order to prevent an attack on the homeland. The Coast Guard's efforts to prevent dirty bombs from nearing the U.S. ports and shores begins overseas with robust international partnerships that provide access to maritime ports of origin. Through our International Port Security Program, the Coast Guard performs overseas port assessments to confirm that foreign trading partners meet international standards for security and antiterrorism. Since the inception of this program in 2004, Coast Guard personnel have visited more than 150 countries and approximately 1,200 port facilities. To more effectively counter these threats in the offshore region and throughout this hemisphere, the Coast Guard maintains more than 40 maritime bilateral law enforcement agreements and 11 bilateral Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, ship-boarding agreements, which allow Coast Guard teams to board vessels suspected of carrying illicit shipments of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, or related materials far from shore. The Coast Guard's membership within the intelligence community provides global situational awareness, analysis, and interagency collaboration with various components, including the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], National Counterterrorism Center, and the FBI, among others. Through our Maritime Transportation Security Act, we provide security plan compliance and inspections for maritime facilities and vessels, and this reduces the vulnerability to terrorist attacks in or involving our ports. Building on these preventive efforts, the Coast Guard also brings agility and mobility to our detection regime with the ability to deliver our detection capabilities anywhere in the maritime domain. The Coast Guard conducts over 400 routine vessel inspections, examinations, and law enforcement boardings every day. And Coast Guard personnel who visit boats, vessels, and regulated facilities carry detection devices to alert the users to the presence of radiation. In 2004, we developed a Maritime Radiation Detection Program and have since maintained a close relationship with DNDO [Domestic Nuclear Detection Office] to standardize our equipment and enhance our national capacity for detection with multiple levels of capability, including the ability to reach back to scientific experts for more information. We do this in conjunction with CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] and with TSA's [Transportation Security Administration's] Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response, or VIPR, Program. Many of our units, including our Coast-wide sectors, our deployable specialized forces, and our major cutters, are equipped with these devices that can identify specific isotopes, distinguish between man-made and natural sources, and, as I said, reach back to interagency experts for assistance. Specifically, our Maritime Security Response Team, or MSRT, provides the Nation with a unique maritime capability for nuclear and radiological detection, identification, and self- decontamination in routine or hostile situations. The MSRT is specifically designed and exercised to integrate with other interagency or DOD [Department of Defense] response forces. At the national level, together with CBP's National Targeting Center, the Coast Guard screens ships' crew and passenger information for all vessels that are required to submit what we call an ANOA, advance notice of arrival, 96 hours or more prior to entering port. In 2014, that process screened over 124,000 notices of arrival and over 32 million crew and passenger records. The Coast Guard's response to a dirty-bomb threat would be part of a coordinated interagency effort to bring the most capable and appropriate resources to bear. If a dirty bomb is suspected en route to or identified within a U.S. port, the interagency Maritime Operational Threat Response protocol, or MOTR, would be employed to coordinate whole-of-government interagency action to achieve the best solution. And, with that, sir, thank you. Mr. Hunter. Thanks, Admiral Brown. Doctor? Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member DeFazio, and Ranking Member Garamendi, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to testify with my colleagues from the Department of Homeland Security and the Government Accountability Office on our efforts to prevent and respond to the introduction of a dirty bomb into a maritime port. An attack with a radiological dispersal device--that is, a dirty bomb--at a U.S. port would have profound and prolonged impacts to our Nation and the world. At the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, we have a singular focus: preventing nuclear terrorism. It cannot be accomplished by any one agency, and, in fact, it takes a whole-of-enterprise approach. And so DNDO was deliberately established as an interagency office and benefits from the support of detailees from across the Federal Government. In both our nuclear detection and forensics missions, we work closely with our Federal, State, local, and international partners and those in the national laboratories, in industry, and in academia. My testimony today focuses on DNDO's work to strengthen the operational readiness of our maritime partners to detect illicit radioactive material. DNDO is responsible for the domestic implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The GNDA is a framework for detecting, analyzing, and reporting on nuclear and other radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control. Now, the tendency can be to place great focus on technology alone. It is, however, more effective to carefully integrate intelligence, law enforcement, and technical capabilities to improve the GNDA. Indeed, our GAO colleague, Director Maurer, captured it well in a previous hearing, stating, ``Detection technology is an important part of the overall effort to keep a nuclear device out of the U.S., but it is not the only one. Consider this,'' he said. ``If the U.S. ever has to rely on a radiation portal monitor to stop a smuggled nuclear device, a lot of other things have already gone wrong. It means law enforcement missed it, the intelligence community missed it, our allies missed it, risk-based screening missed it, treaty regimes did not work, and nonproliferation programs failed.'' Keeping his words in mind, our strategy is to provide effective technologies to well-trained law enforcement and public safety professionals as they conduct intelligence-driven operations. By implementing a multilayered, multifaceted, defense-in-depth approach, it is our objective to make nuclear terrorism a prohibitively difficult undertaking for the adversary. And so our efforts to secure the homeland begin overseas, relying largely on sovereign foreign partners to develop and enhance their own national detection programs. In this endeavor, DNDO works closely with the interagency and multilateral partners to develop and share guidance, best practices, and training. The collective efforts abroad help ensure illicit radioactive material or devices can be interdicted before they arrive at our shores. The layered approach continues at our borders. DNDO procures radiation-detection systems for use by DHS [Department of Homeland Security] operational components at our ports of entry, along our land and maritime borders, and within the United States. Today, all Coast Guard boarding teams are equipped with detection devices. DNDO has also acquired detection systems for the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection to scan small vessels before they reach our shores. And at our seaports of entry, CBP scans nearly 100 percent of all incoming maritime containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats. Building operational capacity across the Federal, State, and local enterprise is also critical. And so DNDO is presently working with 33 of the Coast Guard's Area Maritime Security Committees, sharing information and intelligence, assisting with alarm adjudication, and providing technical support to our operational partners as they build their detection programs. In case of an attack of nuclear terrorism or the interdiction of a nuclear radiological threat, leadership will need rapid, accurate attribution based on sound scientific evidence. Nuclear forensics, when coupled with intelligence and law enforcement information, supports those determinations. DNDO, therefore, advances technologies to perform forensic analyses on predetonation nuclear and other radioactive materials. Make no mistake: The United States remains committed to holding fully accountable any State, terrorist group, or other nonstate actor that supports or enables terrorist efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction. At DNDO, we will continue to work with our partners to counter nuclear terrorism and improve our overall collaboration across the technical, intelligence, and law enforcement communities. We sincerely appreciate the committee's support of our efforts to secure our homeland. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Doctor. Our next witness is Mr. Todd Owen, the Department of Homeland Security's Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Field Operations for U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Mr. Owen, you are recognized. Mr. Owen. Good morning. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, esteemed members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the role of U.S. Customs and Border Protection in preventing and responding to the threat of a radiological weapon at our ports of entry, an important responsibility we share with our partners here today. As the lead DHS agency for border security, CBP works closely with our domestic and international partners to protect the Nation from a variety of dynamic threats, including those posed by containerized cargo arriving at our air, land, and seaports. Before my appointment as the Assistant Commissioner of CBP's Office of Field Operations earlier this year, I served as the Director of Field Operations for the Los Angeles-Long Beach Seaport, and I have also served time as the Executive Director responsible for all of CBP's cargo security programs. I know firsthand how complex cargo security operations are and how valuable our programs and partnerships are to our national security. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, CBP has established security partnerships, enhanced our targeting and risk assessment programs, and invested in advanced technology-- all essential elements of our multilayered approach to protecting the Nation from the arrival of dangerous materials, such as a dirty bomb, at our ports of entry. CBP has several key programs that enhance our ability to assess cargo for risk, examine high-risk shipments at the earliest possible point, and increase the security of the supply chain. I would like to highlight just a few of these efforts for you today. Since 2002, CBP has been receiving advance information on every cargo shipment, every vessel, every crewman before they arrive at our ports of entry. For maritime containerized cargo, this information is received 24 hours prior to lading the cargo in the foreign seaport. This advance information is then run through CBP's Automated Targeting System, which will compare the data against multiple law enforcement and trade databases. Those shipments identified as high-risk will be selected for examination. High-risk shipments may be examined overseas before being laden onto the vessel heading for the United States as part of CBP's Container Security Initiative. CBP's CSI program places U.S. officers in 60 foreign seaports in 35 countries around the world. These overseas CBP officers have the ability to reach 80 percent of the maritime cargo heading to the United States. All overseas examinations are performed with the assistance of our host-country counterparts. Every cargo inspection conducted overseas includes a scanning of the container for radiation, as well as subjecting the shipment to a nonintrusive inspection. A nonintrusive inspection uses systems of high-energy x ray or gamma ray to look into the container for anomalies which may be of concern. In fiscal year 2015, CBP performed over 124,000 overseas examinations of high-risk cargo before the cargo was placed on a vessel destined to the United States. If the exam is not performed overseas at a CSI seaport, the shipment will be inspected upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry. At the U.S. ports of entry, CBP also deploys the same large-scale, nonintrusive inspection systems to quickly examine containerized cargo for the presence of anomalies which may indicate a threat. Those containers found with anomalies in their cargo are physically searched at warehouses located in the seaports. Lastly, every containerized shipment leaving a U.S. seaport, every single shipment, is scanned for radiation and has been since 2010. There are over 1,280 radiation-detection portal monitors deployed at our U.S. border crossings, allowing for nearly 100 percent radiation screening of---- Mr. Hunter. Mr. Owen, you just said that 100 percent of cargo leaving U.S. ports? Mr. Owen. Leaving U.S. ports, yes, sir. Mr. Hunter. ``Leaving'' is correct? Mr. Owen. Yes, sir, 100 percent. So the 1,280 radiation portal monitors allow us to scan nearly 100 percent of the arriving seat containers, trucks, and passenger vehicles arriving from Canada and Mexico, as well shipments in the mail and aircargo environments. So most Americans are unaware of this critically important security measure in place at U.S. ports of entry throughout the country. CBP's detection technology, targeting capabilities, and partnerships are strategically aligned to prevent the arrival of a dangerous weapon like a dirty bomb at a U.S. port. However, if such an event were to occur, CBP has established contingency plans and standard processes to ensure a coordinated and effective response. In the event CBP detects or suspects radiological material, all personnel are trained in ``secure, isolate, and notify'' protocols. The suspect cargo is secured, the immediate area is isolated, and scientific experts are notified. CBP scientists at the CBP Teleforensic Center in northern Virginia will confer with the Department of Energy and, when necessary, refer the findings to the FBI to coordinate an appropriate response. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I am here to answer your questions. Mr. Hunter. Thank you very much. And our last witness is Mr. David Maurer, again, the U.S. GAO's Director of Homeland Security and Justice. Mr. Maurer, you are recognized. Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member DeFazio, Ranking Member Garamendi, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DHS's efforts to prevent a dirty-bomb attack on a U.S. port. Preventing the smuggling of a nuclear or radiological device into the U.S. is understandably and deservedly a top national priority. And, as we have heard from the other witnesses, there are a wide array of programs and activities at several Federal agencies to help address and mitigate this threat. Mr. Chairman, my statement today focuses on one key aspect of this much larger effort: DHS's covert operations to assess its capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear materials into the U.S. Over the years, DHS has invested billions to develop, purchase, and deploy radiation-detection equipment on our Nation's borders, as well as equip and train DHS personnel on how to use this technology. DHS has invested substantially less on testing to see whether it is being properly used. For example, over a recent 5-year period, CBP spent $1 million for covert testing--and that is ``million'' with an ``m''--and that spending covered all types of covert testing, not just nuclear and radiological. Now, it is very important to give CBP credit. Through much of that period and up to the present day, they were only required to do a single covert test per year. CBP took it upon themselves to do more than that, roughly one or two dozen a year. While CBP did more than required, this resource investment meant that they could not test every port of entry. In its covert tests, undercover CBP officers tried to smuggle radiological materials through U.S. ports of entry. Basically, this is a real-world test of the equipment and the personnel using it. We found that CBP's testing provided limited assessment of its rad/nuc-detection capabilities. Specifically, the number of covert tests was not sufficient to make a generalizable assessment of all U.S. ports of entry. Over an 8-year period, CBP conducted covert tests at 86 of the 655 locations where testing could have been done. In addition, CBP's decisions on which locations to test were not based on risk assessments. That meant its covert testing did not prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment. For example, 31 percent of CBP's tests were done at fixed checkpoints within the U.S., not at ports of entry. We recommended that CBP use a risk-informed approach to help determine where to conduct its covert tests. CBP agreed and is in the process of doing just that. We also reviewed what CBP did with the results of its covert tests. Over a 5-year period, these tests found problems with officer noncompliance with policy, equipment failures, as well as officer error due to lack of training. The good news is that CBP followed up on systemic problems like these to ensure corrective actions were taken. However, they did not consistently track the status of actions to fix problems at individual locations. We recommended that they do so, and they have actions underway to do that. Mr. Chairman, in some respects, our findings on this program mirror some of the themes we have seen over the past several years. In general, the U.S. has made significant progress combating nuclear smuggling and enhancing the security of U.S. ports. In particular, we have made great strides since 1998, when the U.S. began deploying radiation-detection equipment. At the same time, many of these programs could and should have been implemented better. Agencies sometimes failed to assess whether their programs were working as intended or did not fully integrate risk assessments into their planning. In some cases, agencies rushed to failure to deploy technologies before they were ready. Over the years, DHS and other agencies have implemented GAO recommendations to address these problems and, as a result, strengthened their programs. Looking ahead, Congress, DHS, and other agencies face some tough decisions. The multilayered Federal effort is complex, vital to our security, and certainly not inexpensive. As DHS and other agencies adapt to changing threats, upgrade or replace aging equipment, and enhance their capabilities, GAO will be there to provide Congress independent oversight of this critically important mission. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning. I look forward to your questions. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Maurer. I am going to now recognize Members for questions, beginning with myself. So let's just stay on this. You are satisfied that CBP took into account what you guys found and that they are making corrective action? Mr. Maurer. Yes. They took the findings from our report from last year very seriously. They put together a team of folks within CBP to address those recommendations, and they have actions underway to fully address them. They are not all the way there yet. We are working with them on that. But they have taken actions. Mr. Hunter. Good. Thank you. Mr. Owen, let's start with the questions from my letter with the numbers. And what is the percentage of shipping containers inspected prior to arrival at a U.S. port? Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. Every container, again, is assessed for risk. The highest risk inspections occur overseas. In fiscal year 2015, 124,000 of those containers were inspected overseas. That is about 1 percent---- Mr. Hunter. So what is that percentage? Mr. Owen [continuing]. A little over 1 percent of the 12 million containers that arrive from foreign ports every year. Mr. Hunter. OK. But everything is analyzed---- Mr. Owen. Everything is analyzed. Every shipment is---- Mr. Hunter [continuing]. And screened, I guess you could say. Mr. Owen. Depending on how you define ``screening'' and ``scanning.'' And there is confusion as to how those terms are used. We do look at the advance data we receive from the shipper, in terms of the manifest, as well as from the importer, in terms of our importer security filing. We compare all of that data to what we have in our databases in terms of our Automated Targeting System, the intelligence information that is provided. And, from those reviews, certain containers will rise to the top, causing us greater concern. Those highest risk containers are the ones we look at overseas. Mr. Hunter. So what happens when you look at a country like UAE [United Arab Emirates] that have--they scan everything. Mr. Owen. Yes. Mr. Hunter. They have those passive systems set up--by the way, those are made in San Diego. Mr. Owen. Right. Mr. Hunter. But, anyway, they have those passive systems set up, and they scan everything, right? Mr. Owen. Yes, that is correct. Many countries have now deployed radiation-scanning equipment similar to what we have in the United States, you know, in seaports around the world. The radiation scanning is very doable from a technology standpoint. The challenge becomes the x-ray imaging of the containers. Whether it is a high-energy, medium-energy, or low- energy system, it still takes human intervention to analyze the result of that scan. So you have a radiation portal monitor that is a very effective passive system, will tell you if there is a source emanating from the container that is of concern. You then need to take a second step to have the x-ray technology see what is inside. That is really the part of the process that slows things down. Most countries in the world use a risk approach like we do and only inspect those highest containers of concern through x-ray systems. Mr. Hunter. OK. What percentage are inspected after they get here? So if 1 percent total---- Mr. Owen. A little over 1 percent overseas, yes, sir. Mr. Hunter. And then what percentage when it hits U.S. ports? Mr. Owen. Here in the maritime environment, it is about 2.7 percent on top of the 1 percent. So we are looking at a 3.7- percent overall in the maritime arena. Mr. Hunter. The next 2.6 or 2.7 percent is the next level down---- Mr. Owen. Yes, sir. Mr. Hunter [continuing]. From the highest risk stuff? Mr. Owen. Yes. And then the next level down is what we will inspect here in the U.S. seaports. And, again, that is in the maritime environment. The rates are approximately 26 percent on the land border with Mexico. So we look at, obviously, a higher percentage of what is coming in from Mexico because of the narcotics threat. Mr. Hunter. And when you use the risk-based assessment on where you should do this at, are there any ports in particular? I mean, like Mr. Maurer said, when you were doing your own testing, you did not use your own risk-based approach on where you were going to do that testing at, right? Mr. Owen. Right. Two aspects of this. Number one is high-risk containers will be examined at whatever seaport they come into. A lot of that is dependent on the shipping patterns of what is arriving from what parts of the world, you know, into what parts of the country. So you will see those. The GAO's findings were specific to the testing that we do of ourselves and should we focus more on those ports that have a greater likelihood of finding that type of device as opposed to a more universal approach. So their findings, we felt, were very fair, and we have taken those into building a new risk matrix that will allow the operational testing at the ports that have the more likelihood of finding those types of containers. However, we will inspect high-risk containers wherever they enter the United States. Mr. Hunter. So let me just get this--because in 2007--was it 2007 was when you all passed the--I wasn't in Congress in 2007--that said--2006--100 percent of cargo will be inspected, right? Mr. Owen. Yes. That is correct. Mr. Hunter. So what happened was everybody said, ``That is impossible. There is no way to do that.'' Mr. Owen. Well, what happened was, from 2007 through 2010, we ran a series of six pilots around the world: in Qasim, Pakistan; Southampton, the U.K.; Salalah, Oman; Puerto Cortes, Honduras; a terminal in Busan, Korea; and a terminal in Hong Kong. From those 4-year pilots, we were able to identify and clearly document all sorts of challenges, from the technology, the logistical impact, the effect on the efficiencies of the throughput of the cargo, things down to weather that would impact the dependability of the machines. So, through our 4- year pilots, we were able to identify and catalog all of the challenges that we have found. From that time, we didn't really move forward in pursuing that any further. Now, since then, the Department has reengaged on this issue and has committed to take a look at what can now be done, being 5 years from when these pilots last ended, in terms of the technology that is available, the relationship with host countries, an understanding of what technology, as you mentioned, in the UAE is now present at other locations. And, again, throughout all of these pilots what we have learned is it is not the radiation screening piece that is troublesome; it is the x raying of these containers. And, again, the 100-percent scanning law requires both aspects, 100 percent scanning, 100 percent screening for radiation, and 100 percent x ray of all of the containers. And that becomes the troublesome piece. Mr. Hunter. And just for everybody's benefit who is here, the next panel are a bunch of smart people from labs who can tell us what can be seen and what can't be seen, as far as they can go in a nonsecret hearing. That answers enough for now, Mr. Owen. Thank you. One last question for Admiral Brown. If something did happen--and this is, I guess, just a general homeland security type of question--but if something did happen, can the Coast Guard talk to everybody? I mean, can you communicate with the CBP and can you communicate with the sheriff and the ports and everybody all at the same time right now? Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. There are systems in place called Area Maritime Security Committees that bring together port stakeholders, governmental and nongovernmental, to plan for, prepare for, and, in the case of an actual event, respond and set up an incident command system network that responds to an incident, whether it is a dirty bomb or some other type of incident in a port. So at the tactical level, there are ongoing communications among all the port stakeholders. From unit to unit, vessel to vessel, patrol car to patrol car, there is no single communication system that integrates all of Federal, State, and local government, but---- Mr. Hunter. So you are saying that there is not a communication system that integrates everybody? Admiral Brown. There is not a tactical radio system that communicates across all those entities--State, Federal, local, and industry. But there are coordination protocols and the incident command system that allows each agency to communicate with others and then to communicate to their own unit. Mr. Hunter. So satphone to satphone? Admiral Brown. So we use interagency operations centers, some of which are virtual, some of which are actual bricks-and- mortar facilities, to coordinate those operations. And, again, in a significant incident, those entities would be brought together in an incident command structure so that the operational priorities for action would be taken, divvied up among the agencies. The agencies would go out and perform those, given the tasking to their individual tactical units. Mr. Hunter. OK. Thanks, Admiral. Thank you all. And, with that, I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to go into the budget and the availability of money. It looks like you have spent $2.4 billion on this overall project since 2013. Is that correct, Ms. Gowadia? Ms. Gowadia. I do not have the exact numbers at my fingertips, but across the enterprise that sounds about right for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Mr. Garamendi. I will take that back. It is since 1995 to 2013, $2.4 billion putting in place the technology. And the question for the three of you is: Is this a money issue--that is, not enough resources, not enough money to get the job done? Let's start with Admiral Brown. Admiral Brown. Sir, I would say that one of our challenges remains coordination. We have a great thing going now with DNDO, CBP, TSA. And, within our department, as we have implemented the unity-of-effort goals of the Secretary, one of the areas in which we are applying greater effort is to coordinate the acquisition, the technology, so that the physical devices that we are using and the doctrine and the tactics by which we use them are similar and coordinated across multiple agencies. And DNDO has the lead in that. Mr. Garamendi. So in your annual budget request to Congress, do you need more money or less money for this specific purpose? Admiral Brown. Sir, for this specific purpose, we run our requirements through the Department and through DNDO. Mr. Garamendi. OK. Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, and thank you for that question, sir. We at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office are the strategic sourcing partners for this particular mission in the Department. What that means is we have the responsibility to bring in all the requirements from all the operational components, work with the Department's Joint Requirements Council, and allocate the right resources to meet the mission need. Very recently, we did something for the first time in the Department. We pulled together requirements from across the agency and made a single purchase, not just for the equipment itself, one particular unit, thereby standardizing the capability across the operational components, but also the maintenance contract. In the long run, this will save the Department a good bit of money. So that has helped, certainly. I would put in a slight plug for your efforts to pass our budget. The continuing resolution, sir, would put a significant clamp on our ability to support CBP, in particular, to replace some of the aging radiation portal monitors and support operations at high-volume ports. Mr. Garamendi. Ah, yes. Back to sequestration and continuing resolutions. Mr. Owen? Mr. Owen. Sir, and similar to the Coast Guard, we define our operational needs to the DNDO, who then will survey the technology that is available and procure those equipment on our behalf. So their funding purchases the equipment that we need in terms of rad/nuc detection. Mr. Garamendi. OK. Most of this has been dealing with dirty bombs. There is another whole aspect of this radiological material control that is over in the Department of Defense budget and the Department of Energy budget, having to do with the international transshipment and the effort to address that. I will note that in the House version of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] we cut that budget, which would seem to be unwise. I understand that the recently vetoed bill increased it at the Senate level--perhaps still insufficient. I do note that we are spending some $30 million this year on an east coast missile defense system to protect us from an Iranian nuclear bomb. And that is a $3.5 billion investment, should it ever come to pass, and another $1.2 billion annual investment in missile defense systems. So the question for the three of you is: Are we more likely to see a missile incoming or a bomb in a tugboat or a fishing boat or in a container? Mr. Owen? A dirty bomb or otherwise bomb? Mr. Owen. I think the likelihood of a dirty bomb is mitigated by several factors. Beginning on the international arena, as you mentioned, the presence of radiological-detection equipment at ports of entry or border crossings throughout the world is much higher. There is also the logistics aspect of international shipping. If you actually have your hands on a dirty bomb, you turn it over to a truck driver, who is going to take it to the port. The port will turn it over to the terminal operator, who will turn it over to a carrier. The carrier will put it on the vessel. That vessel may move to other ports, where it is offloaded. You lose control of your asset. So I think the nature of that works against supporting the dirty bomb in that container. So there is much more detection than we have had in the past, and you would also, again, lose control of your asset for some time as it goes through the shipping channels. I think there are probably other scenarios where you retain control of that asset that may be more of a greater threat. Mr. Garamendi. For example? Mr. Owen. General aviation, small boats. Mr. Garamendi. Admiral? Small boats? General aviation? Admiral Brown. I would tend to agree with Mr. Owens' assessment, sir. I think the answer to your question probably would better come from the intelligence community, but I would say that, in addition to the dirty-bomb scenario in a container and the challenges associated with delivering one, that some of the other threats we would face would be from smaller boats. And whether they were radiological devices or other improvised explosive devices or small arms attacks, those are another area of port security that we take very seriously. Mr. Garamendi. I think most of this hearing is going to be focused on other than that, but it would be useful for us to focus on that. I know we have had some previous testimony in other hearings about that piece of it. My time has expired. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Gibbs is recognized. Mr. Gibbs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the witnesses and all the work you do to protect this country. I guess, Mr. Owen, a year or so ago, some of us had the opportunity to visit the Shanghai port and Hong Kong port. And we saw at Shanghai, I guess, the radiation detectors, you know, the container semis coming through there. I think they were probably put in place in the early 2003 period after 9/11, correct? What is the status for monitoring their effectiveness, their wear and tear, and the lifespan? And then to replace them, is there a plan? Or if there is new and better technology, is there a plan for replacement? Mr. Owen. To the ports in Shanghai or to---- Mr. Gibbs. Well, in general. I just saw that in Shanghai's, but---- Mr. Owen. Right. We started deploying that equipment here with U.S. Customs and Border Protection in 2002. So it was right around that time that you would see this equipment deployed nationwide or around the world. We anticipated about a 10- to 15-year life cycle at that time. This technology was new. We didn't quite know what to expect. It has held up very well. It has been the workhorse of radiation detection in our seaports. They are now coming towards the end of that life cycle, so we do need to replace them. There is better technology, or the algorithms that support this technology have advanced from where we were in 2002. The original equipment, again, just speaking for Los Angeles-Long Beach, the equipment that was deployed would receive about 300 to 400 radiation alarms a day of the roughly 13,000 containers that enter L.A.-Long Beach on a given day. Those were all nonthreat materials, naturally occurring radioactive materials, medical isotopes, those types of nonthreat. With the new algorithms that we now have within our radiation portal monitors, we have reduced that number to about 35 to 50 alarms a day, so about an 86-percent reduction, by having science advance in the last decade and where the algorithms are in 2015 as opposed to where they were in 2002. Mr. Gibbs. So there is a plan in place to, you know, replace those, you know, just like the private sector does, a business---- Mr. Owen. There is, like, a refresh of all the algorithms behind the radiation portal monitors here in the States that have been taking place for the past year and a half. I would assume globally that same type of activity is underway. Mr. Gibbs. I also wanted to ask you--I believe, if my memory serves me right, there is, like, a certified program of shippers, because, you know, stuff like--for example, coming out of China, there are a lot of containers coming out of China, obviously. And if you have shippers that you work with all the time, that are credible or go through certain procedures, you can certify---- Mr. Owen. Right. Mr. Gibbs [continuing]. Those containers? Mr. Owen. There is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program that we work with not only vessels but as well as importers, manufacturers, truckers. They adopt higher security protocols, and, as part of that adoption, we go out and we validate that they have implemented what they said they would. We will treat them as lower risk than an unknown company or---- Mr. Gibbs. So, in essence, you can segregate that somewhat---- Mr. Owen. That is the intention of it, yes, sir, the higher risk from---- Mr. Gibbs [continuing]. So you can be more effective. Mr. Owen [continuing]. And the unknowns from the unknowns. Yes, sir. Mr. Gibbs. I guess for the admiral: Once a specific pathway for smuggling is intercepted, how often is that used for interdiction? You know, when you find something, when you shut it down, does it open back up later on, the pathway? Admiral Brown. Transnational criminal organizations, sir, are very resilient. They react when we are successful, and so they will move the geography of their smuggling. They will sometimes change the conveyance and the timing in ways to try to thwart us. We combat that primarily with intelligence and intelligence-based operations so we can try to have our very limited offshore assets in the right places at the right time. I would say, though, that I started my career as a boarding officer in the Caribbean in the mid-1980s. And, just this week, we interdicted fishing vessels and go-fasts that are trying to get from South America toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. So criminal organizations, in my opinion, never completely give up on something that works for them, and so we continue to monitor those same threat pathways even 30 years later. Mr. Gibbs. It was just mentioned earlier, the real challenge is small aviation and small boats, you know, offshoring from somewhere else and getting through. I think, you know, that would be a real challenge. And I don't know how you handle that, but, you know, that has to be a real challenge. Did you want to say something, Doctor? Ms. Gowadia. When it comes to small or general aviation, I would mention that all incoming general aviation aircraft are met by our CBP officers using radiation detectors. So we have even increased in the last 10 years our capability in the general aviation environment, thanks in large part to their efforts. Mr. Gibbs. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. I guess, just dovetailing there, bad guys aren't going to send stuff on cargo ships; they are going to send stuff up the way that the bad guys are sending stuff up now, right? Which is small fast boats coming up from Central and South America. I mean, isn't that how they would get anything here? Semisubmersibles? Meaning, do you think we are putting too much priority on the shipping container portion, when the bad guy is sending all the drugs up in small boats to go-fasts that are hard to interdict, of which we only get--what was SOUTHCOM's number? Thirty-something percent total of the 100 percent that we know of coming up from South and Central America, right? Admiral Brown. That is a fairly accurate statistic, sir. We do interdict somewhere in the 15 to 20 to 30 percent, depending on how you measure and what we believe the flow rate to be of those drugs that are bound ultimately toward the United States. However, sir, those small vessels, semisubmersibles, almost never attempt to make landfall in the United States. The era of a go-fast vessel going from the Bahamas towards south Florida or a fishing vessel going from Colombia all the way to the Florida Keys are long over, sir. Most of the drugs that leave South America first make landfall somewhere in Central America and then take land pathways toward the border in much smaller packages, much more difficult to detect. So the success that we have using offshore aircraft, highly capable offshore cutters, that really takes the multiton loads out of circulation. And because of the success we have had over the past decades, we see very few drug-smuggling vessels actually arriving in the United States. Small amounts of marijuana landing in California, some relatively small amounts of cocaine and marijuana landing in Puerto Rico. So that particular pathway from South America toward the United States is not really a full maritime pathway. And so we don't see a significant threat of nuclear material along that pathway in the maritime. Certainly, it could be exploited. It would have to make landfall somewhere in Central America and then move on land pathways toward the U.S. Mr. Hunter. OK. I got you. Thank you. And we are honored today to have the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. DeFazio, who is recognized. Mr. DeFazio. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for holding this. I served 8 years on the House Committee on Homeland Security, and a lot of these programs were very much a work in progress when I served there. GAO, have you audited the C-TPAT [Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism] program lately? I mean, when I served a number of years ago, we found significant problems in the integrity of that program. Mr. Maurer. Yes, that is right. We looked at that program in roughly 2008. We have an ongoing review that just started just a month or two ago. So it is still underway, and we are very far from having our final findings, but we would be happy to come up and chat with you about what we are learning along the way. Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. Because that was a major vulnerability previously. Now, Admiral, in terms of, you know, when you say that under the NOA [notice of arrival] you are going to have the registered owner of the vessel--real registered owner or a front? When I was in Malta discussing these issues when I was on the Committee on Homeland Security, they were like, ``No way we are going to give you the names of the people who own these ships because we will lose all of our business here.'' You know, that is what we provide. We provide cover. Has that changed? Are we getting the names of the real owners? Admiral Brown. Sir, we typically get corporate names and holding companies. Mr. DeFazio. Right, which are double-blind, triple-blind, lawyers' offices and--yes. Admiral Brown. Yes, sir. So what we scan against are the names of all of the ownership entities associated with the vessel, with the containers, and with the crewmembers and their hiring. So those are some of the areas that we look at to try to see beyond the individual names of the people on board or the company that is shipping a given container. But we try to look at all of the corporate entities and their history behind the vessel itself, its cargo, the ports that it has been in, and the crewmembers and the hiring practices, as well, because we see some characteristics of companies that are engaged in the hiring of mariners that may be more problematic that an individual mariner, himself or herself. Mr. DeFazio. OK. Thank you. Dr. Gowadia, you mentioned the radiological monitoring of all GA [general aviation] aircraft coming in. What are we doing in a maritime environment for ships or boats or even large pleasure craft that cross international borders into the U.S.? Ms. Gowadia. So, as I mentioned in my opening statement, sir, all Coast Guard boarding teams carry radiation sensors. So all the boardings that the admiral mentioned certainly include the radiation-detection element. We have also worked with our CBP and Coast Guard partners to give them some capability to detect the standoff ranges for small-vessel scanning. So whether they are scanning a marina for a 4th of July event or they have some basis or some reason to go up out at sea to look at a particular small vessel, they have now a capability not just that they can carry on their backs but in their boats as well. Mr. DeFazio. OK. Ms. Gowadia. The Coast Guard also asked us to look at detecting from above. So we have a very interesting research project where we are looking at the ability to equip Coast Guard's fixed-wing and rotary craft with detection systems so that they could scan out at sea from above, as well. Mr. DeFazio. Excellent. Very good. Admiral, on the AIS [Automatic Identification System], I mean, what about an exchange, a theoretical exchange, at sea? I mean, maybe the containers have been scanned, we know the risk, but a ship stops at sea and exchanges a container. I mean, theoretically, I guess if someone was watching every vehicle's AIS at every moment, you would know that, you know, perhaps these two ships came in very close proximity and there seemed to be no movement, but, I mean, we are not doing that. Admiral Brown. Right. And that type of rendezvous at sea, while it would be, I think, extraordinarily uncommon in a container ship environment, is a common thing we see in drug trafficking. And so we use a variety of systems, AIS being one of them, to try to detect if a vessel lingers somewhere for a longer period of time than expected or deviates from an economically viable route. So, using AIS systems and other national sensors that are available, I think we would be able to detect if a laden container ship deviated from its track or significantly delayed en route in a noneconomical way. And we would be able to then decide how to target that vessel either offshore or once it arrived in port for additional scrutiny. Mr. DeFazio. OK. All right. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Sanford is recognized. Mr. Sanford. I thank the chairman. A couple questions. One is, I notice that you had said that we monitor every container on the way out. Who cares? Why? Mr. Owen. We scan every container before it leaves the port of entry before it enters the commerce of the United States. Mr. Sanford. No, no. But you said in the reverse, on the way out of the country. Mr. Owen. No, on the way out of the seaport. Mr. Sanford. Out of the seaport. Mr. Owen. Out of the seaport. Mr. Sanford. On its way still in. Mr. Owen. No. The radiation portal monitors are positioned at the exit gates of the seaport before it gets on the roads and leaves the seaport environment. Ms. Gowadia. To enter the United States. Mr. Sanford. To enter the United States. So we are not monitoring on the way out. So I misunderstood that. Mr. Owen. You mean our exports? Mr. Sanford. Correct. Mr. Owen. No, we are not radiation screening exports. Mr. Sanford. Got it. OK. Mr. Owen. No, sir. Mr. Sanford. I guess in the post-9/11 environment, I wouldn't call it overreaction, it was, I mean, warranted reaction based on the tragedy that occurred on 9/11. But what we all know, whether from the civil liberties standpoint, from a variety of different standpoints, there was probably overreach in some cases because of operational things, were just flat out impossible to get to, and in other cases from a cost standpoint, they didn't prove that effective in deterring whatever it was that we were trying to deter in that particular sphere. And I guess, as I listen to this, my question would be along the same lines. I mean, if you look at the briefing material, it says with a dirty bomb there is really not enough radiation to kill people. You look at the logistical component in terms of the improbability of use in that somebody trying to do it that way would, as you put it, lose control of their bomb. You look at alternatives to sort of masking where one would come from in terms of rendezvous at sea or other things. It becomes a relatively low-probability vehicle, but we are spending a couple billion dollars a year, as I understand it, in the gestalt on these different programs. Is it overplay relative to the degree of risk that we are really confronting as a Nation in this particular sphere? Ms. Gowadia. Congressman, the way we calculate risk is we couple the likelihood with the consequences. And the consequence of a nuclear attack would be so catastrophic that we cannot afford to take our eye off this ball. We do need to remain vigilant, make sure that we have sufficient capabilities to detect and mitigate. This is the ultimate preventable catastrophe. We can't stop doing it. Mr. Sanford. But, again, let's back up just a second. I mean, we are looking at in essence a 1-percent real check rate on the way in, maybe you bump that up to maybe close to 4 percent. But the reality is that papers in Pakistan or papers in a lot of other places around the globe can be relatively mixed. That is ultimately what we are checking in about 95 percent of the cases, we are looking at that as to trigger a degree of further inspection or look. And that further inspection look is at less than a 5-percent rate. So you would say the consequences are catastrophic, but we have already determined that we can't inspect every container, we are not doing so, and so we are inspecting less than 5 percent, and we are still spending a couple billion dollars a year. Ms. Gowadia. I apologize. I was thinking about the nuclear threat writ large. Mr. Sanford. Correct. Ms. Gowadia. We do need--I could not agree with you more-- we need to level our investments across all the pathways, across all the layers, so that we are not overstrengthening any one element of our transportation system or the ways and means things can come into the Nation. Mr. Sanford. Well, I see I have only got 1 minute. Let me just come at you from a different angle. I guess what I am saying is this: If you look at break bulk, for instance in the Port of Charleston there is a lot of break bulk activity as well as containerized activity, the overwhelming majority of our inspection seems to be at the containerized level, not at the break bulk level. So if you wanted to bring something in bad, seems like you could do it break bulk. Going back to what one of my colleagues was raising with regard to a small boat, the reality is if you leave Bimini in the Bahamas and you head for Fort Pierce, you are not inspected by an officer until after you have docked that boat. Well, at that point, you are in the Intracoastal Waterway, you could have hopped off and let the boat go and it goes. I mean, in other words, the inspection is coming after the point of entry. So if you really want to do harm, it just seems to me that there are a variety of other relatively porous vehicles by which to do so if you are looking at maritime traffic. So we are, again, spending a couple billion dollars a year on an overlay that gives us, I think, a false sense of security. Ms. Gowadia. Sir, again, really I could not agree with you more. We have to be careful to make sure that we apply our resources across the board, which is why we work with our interagency partners, our international partners, to begin with nuclear security, material security, build their own detection architecture so the law enforcement capabilities overseas are attuned and aware to when materials come out of regulatory control and can stop them before they are in any form of conveyance to the United States. And we will continue to work with our interagency partners to do that. Mr. Sanford. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. The distinguished gentleman from Maryland is recognized. Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Mr. Maurer, your testimony describes GAO's review of the CBP's operational geo-testing division covert tests. Your review found several areas in which the CBP could do a better job of targeting its limited covert testing resources. Do you believe that the CBP has taken the steps necessary to identify systemic trends and systemic weaknesses and to resolve these trends and weaknesses in a timely manner when and where they are found? And let me tell you why I am asking this question, this series of questions. I have found that so often, as in Katrina, we have a situation where we are talking to each other, telling us everything is going to be fine, and then we say when the rubber meets the road everything is going to be fine, but then when it comes time for the rubber to meet the road we discover there is no road. So where are we? Talk to me. Mr. Maurer. Sure. We had three recommendations to CBP in our report last year. CBP has taken actions to address all three of those recommendations. They have taken actions to try to use a more risk-based approach to target their limited resources for covert testing to areas that are of higher risk or on the technologies that were more costly to deploy and to use. They have also done a better job of following up on the recommendations on the findings of their prior covert tests. So, in other words, when they found problems in the past, we want to make sure those problems have been recognized and those problems have been fixed. They have made improvements in that realm as well. They haven't done enough quite yet for us to consider those recommendations closed, but they are very close, and we are pleased with the progress they have made. It has only been about a year since our report came out. Mr. Cummings. Now, is the deployment of DHS's screening and detection capabilities across our Nation's seaports done in a manner that corresponds specifically to the varying threat levels and scenarios at each port or is the deployment simply based on a single standard that all ports are to meet, and if so, are all ports meeting the standard? Mr. Maurer. The radiation detection equipment is deployed to ensure that every single container is scanned for radiation before it leaves the port and enters into the United States. So from that perspective, DHS is making investment decisions to ensure that everything is looked at before it is entered onto the roads in the United States. Mr. Cummings. Now, Admiral Brown, can you please discuss the steps being taken to counter the risk posed by the smuggling of people onboard vessels arriving at U.S. ports, and what trends are you observing in human smuggling onboard vessels? Admiral Brown. Thank you for that question, sir. I will really address this in two different ways. We did have for quite a while a problem with stowaways on commercial vessels, but since the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and the reciprocal arrangement that I described in which we can go out and assess port security at international facilities, the number of stowaways on commercial vessels has dropped dramatically over the past decade. We are down in essentially single digits per month of stowaways on commercial vessels arriving in the United States. Mr. Cummings. As compared to what? Admiral Brown. As compared to what had been hundreds in the early 2000s. And the fiscal responsibility for the repatriation of those stowaways is on the shippers and shipping companies, and so the shippers and the ship captains are highly incentivized to prevent stowaways from coming onboard. So that problem has been mitigated substantially with a combination of international standards and appropriate financial incentives. With regard to migrants coming on more traditional pathways from the Caribbean, South and Central America toward the United States, including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, we do have a nationality and threat-screening process. In the case of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, it involves biometric scanning of many of the people who are attempting to get in. And we have maritime repatriation agreements with Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Bahamas, and Cuba that ensure that those migrants interdicted at sea are in very high percentages returned to their country of departure or origin. Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Owen, in your testimony you identified the Secure Freight Initiative and Pakistan as an example of the CBP's strong working relationship with our foreign partners. As I understand it, the Secure Freight Initiative was previously being implemented at several foreign ports other than the one in Pakistan. Is that correct? Mr. Owen. Yes, sir, that is correct. Secure Freight was our pilot program to test 100 percent scanning overseas, 2007 to 2010. Qasim, Pakistan, was one of the six locations we piloted in. Mr. Cummings. I see my time has expired, so I will have some questions in writing. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Hahn, my colleague from California, is recognized. Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi. Thanks for holding this hearing. This has been of a huge concern for me really since 9/11. Actually when I came to Congress, I started the PORTS [Ports Opportunity, Renewal, Trade, and Security] Caucus because ports, I think, are so important to this country, they are the main economic engine. And yet I always had a sense that after 9/11 we spent a little more time, effort, and money on securing our airports than we did our ports. And when people ask me what keeps me up at night, it is a dirty bomb at the Port of Los Angeles or Long Beach. You know, ships make 50,000 calls a year on our U.S. ports, they carry 2 billion tons of freight, 134 million passengers. They are incredibly important. And one dirty bomb at Long Beach-L.A., which accounts for about 44 percent of all the trade that comes into this country, would be disastrous. We were able to finally quantify what those ports meant to our economy in 2002 when there was a labor dispute and the workers were actually locked out for 10 days. Everyone finally figured out that the closure of the west coast ports accounted for about $1 billion a day to our national economy. So I am concerned. And I applauded Congress when they passed the 2006 SAFE [Security and Accountability for Every] Port Act and wanted 100 percent scanning of all cargo containers. And as we are hearing today, we are around 3 percent of scanning. Screening is very different than scanning. We keep moving that deadline. No one really seems to believe that we can ever do 100 percent scanning. And so that deadline just keeps being bumped down the road. But it makes me extremely nervous. All the scenarios that you all are saying never could happen, like we had a panga boat that made land in Rancho Palos Verdes, about 1 mile from where I live, not too long ago. And do you all remember in 2002 and 2003 when ABC News smuggled depleted uranium through the Port of New York and the Port of Long Beach? No one detected it. It was, like, was in the size of a soda can, it was shielded by material that was bought off the shelf, and no one detected that in either port. So I get that with resources we are doing this layered approach and risk-based approach, but I am still very concerned that we are not scanning. And by the way, there is a big gap between when they come into port and then scanning them before they leave on a truck. I am worried, and I thought this hearing was about what could happen at one of these large ports, a dirty bomb exploding, not to mention the lives. We have 5,000 men and women that work on the docks at Long Beach and Los Angeles every single day. So I am still extremely concerned. And the next panel I am going to see if we can talk about technology that actually could scan 100 percent without slowing down commerce. But I am worried. And I think part of why our ports are vulnerable to this kind of terrorist attack is because of the disruption that it would cause to our national economy and the global economy, and also because I am not convinced all of our ports in this country have a good recovery plan if, in fact, something like this happened. So I was going to ask Rear Admiral Brown, what are you doing to work with ports in their recovery plan? You know, if you imagine the Port of Los Angeles or a couple of those ships overturned in the main channel, not to mention maybe thousands of lives that would be lost, folks not even being able to get there to work or to rebuild a ship or clear a main channel. What are you doing that would convince us--and maybe the terrorists--that it wouldn't be such an attractive target, because we can get back up and running quickly? There was a question in there somewhere. Admiral Brown. Thank you for that question. I am going to have to go overtime to answer it, though, because it is fairly complex. One of the things I would say is that through the Area Maritime Security Committee process, part of that is an exercise program that we call AMSTEP [Area Maritime Security Training and Exercise Program], and each port Area Maritime Security Committee can prioritize for itself what scenarios they think are the most important security-related scenarios. Since about 2003, different ports around the country have done over a dozen--two dozen, actually--exercises that specifically address dirty bomb scenarios, and one of the elements of each exercise is recovery. We have learned through a variety of real-world events that the resilience of the maritime security system is vitally important to our population and to our economy. And so we have developed a process called the Maritime Transportation System Recovery Unit, or MTSRU, that we have used in response to Superstorm Sandy. We used it actually in response to the Haiti earthquake, recognizing, that you do, that you don't feed the country or its economy through an airport, but in fact through the seaport. So helping to recover that port from containers in the water, sunken vessels, damaged piers have all informed our processes so that we engage with industry, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Navy Supervisor of Salvage, and other Federal partners, as well as industry, to put recovery of the maritime transportation system on the fast track of priority for recovery in a scenario like this. Ms. Hahn. And I know my time is up. I know Los Angeles has a port recovery plan. Are you convinced that every seaport in this country actually has at their disposal a recovery plan in the case of a major disaster? Admiral Brown. I couldn't tell you that every port has a plan as robust and partnerships as well exercised as the Port of L.A.-Long Beach, but it is a significant part of every Area Maritime Security Committee's responsibility. Ms. Hahn. I would like to see that as being the Coast Guard's priority in working with ports. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Graves, is recognized. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today. I just have a few quick questions. Number one, Admiral, do you have any information on the percentages of vessels that are inspected that are actually coming into U.S. ports, and then any breakdown of foreign vessels as opposed to domestic vessels? Admiral Brown. Sir, I am afraid I don't have a specific percentage breakdown, because the inspection and examination regimes for U.S. vessels and foreign-flagged vessels are quite different. For foreign-flagged vessels, as a port state, we have relatively limited authority primarily related to safety and security of that vessel. And what we do are called ``port state control examinations,'' and they are risk-based, based on the vessel's history, as I was discussing with one of the Members earlier, the ownership, the cargo shippers, and so on. And so some vessels are examined every time they come to a U.S. port based on their track record; for some, they may go years without being examined. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Would you be able to just kind of gut--and obviously you could come back to the committee and provide information for the record--but would you know just off-the-cuff if we inspect more domestic or foreign vessels coming into U.S. ports? Admiral Brown. I would have to ask my staff to do some research and get back to you in writing. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Would you mind, if you could provide that information on the---- Admiral Brown. We would be happy to do that, sir. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. [The information follows:] RESPONSE PART 1: In calendar years 2010 through 2014, an average of 9,220 distinct vessels made 78,068 port calls to the United States. The Coast Guard conducted a yearly average of 9,644 port state control (PSC) examinations and 8,718 international ship and port facility security (ISPS) examinations on these vessels during this period. The average yearly number of ships detained for environmental protection and safety related deficiencies during this period was 124. The average yearly number of ships detained for security related deficiencies during this period was 12. Vessels are targeted by their Coast Guard inspection history; associations with owners, operators, charterers, flag states, and recognized organizations (often classification societies) with poor PSC performance history in the U.S., lack of recent Coast Guard inspections, vessel type and age, and last ports of call. More often than not, a vessel is targeted for examination due to its first arrival to the U.S. or because it has not visited the U.S. in more than 12 months. For the most part, ships are examined one or more times a year, except for ships recognized as quality ships by our QUALSHIP 21 program (these ships are subject to port state control safety examinations every 2 years and ISPS examinations every year, unless a threat is identified prior to arrival). Additionally, the USCG imposes Conditions of Entry (COE) on any vessels arriving to the United States after calling on ports that the Coast Guard has determined to lack effective anti- terrorism measures, or from those ports that the Coast Guard cannot ascertain that effective anti-terrorism measures are in place. COEs are additional security measures that the vessel must implement while in identified countries. These countries and the list of COEs are found in the publicly available USCG Port Security Advisory (3-15), dated 22 June 2015. The USCG verifies COEs prior to, or immediately upon, the vessel's arrival to the United States. The USCG conducted 1,627 of these boarding in calendar year 2014. RESPONSE PART 2: In calendar years 2010 through 2014, an average of 20,326 inspections were conducted on U.S.-flag inspected vessels. Currently, there are 11,867 active U.S.-flag inspected vessels. This equates to an average of 1.71 inspections per vessel. Generally speaking, U.S.-flag inspected vessels are attended at least once a year. In addition, those in saltwater service are attended twice in any 5-year period for a drydock and internal structural exam while those in freshwater service are attended once in a 5-year period for a drydock and internal structural exam. Next, should a vessel be involved in a marine casualty, it is generally attended for a damage assessment and to witness/test any repairs. Finally, those vessels enrolled in the Alternative Compliance Program (ACP) or the Maritime Security Program (MSP) may be targeted for additional oversight inspections based on their compliance history, vessel age/type, owner operator history, outstanding deficiencies and/or classification society requirements and history of port state control detentions or domestically initiated operational controls. Additionally, the USCG imposes Conditions of Entry (COE) on vessels arriving to the United States after calling on ports that the Coast Guard has determined to lack effective anti- terrorism measures, or from those ports that the Coast Guard cannot ascertain that effective anti-terrorism measures are in place. COEs are additional security measures that the vessel must implement while in identified countries. These countries and the list of COEs are found in the publicly available USCG Port Security Advisory (3-15), dated 22 June 2015. The USCG verifies COEs prior to, or immediately upon, the vessel's arrival to the United States. The USCG conducted 1,627 of these activities in calendar year 2014. Admiral Brown. With regard to U.S. vessels, because as the flag state we are responsible not only for the safety and security, but the safe manning, operation, and environmental standards on the vessel, they are subject to a different inspection regime that may subject them to more visits than a foreign-flagged vessel or less depending on the specific inspection regime. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Thank you. A second question. I have seen, and am actually curious about the Department of Homeland Security's response as well, but I have seen statistics and somewhat dated that showed the percentage of vessels that are actually inspected, and I remember it being extraordinarily low and that raising serious concern. But can you talk about the some of the work that you are doing in the source and transit zones as well, which may suggest that the actual percentage of vessels inspected at U.S. ports may be deceiving? Does that make sense? Admiral Brown. It certainly does, sir. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. And then how that relates to transnational criminal organizations. Admiral Brown. Certainly. So with regard to both security with regard to a dirty bomb, the main subject of this hearing, but also with regard to protecting our borders from other transnational threats, our operation is based on layered security, where we attempt--and I have described earlier some of the partnerships that we have with regard to port security-- to inspect port facilities for their security regime overseas. With regard to specifically the source and transit zone for narcotics, we also have significant partnerships with countries in South and Central America that allow us to board their flagged vessels on the high seas, recognizing that many of these nations don't have robust coast guards or navies with the kind of offshore capability that we have. And so those partnerships allow us to detect and interdict drug shipments very far offshore, in the case of one interdiction I made at sea of a major cutter, over 1,000 miles west of the Galapagos Islands, with drugs that were destined for a maritime landing in Mexico, but then ultimately for the United States. So we do, using our long-range aircraft, our long-range cutters, and detection and monitoring capabilities of the Department of Defense and other partners, we attempt to identify those targets as far away as possible, interdict them as far away as possible, but then whenever we can, prosecute in the United States so we not only take the drugs off the market, but we attack the criminal network behind those shipments. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. I am not sure if any of the Customs or DHS or any of you folks care to---- Mr. Owen. In terms of your vessel inspection question, I would just like to note that every vessel arriving from foreign are boarded by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers to take care of the immigration admissibility issue. So there is a Federal law enforcement presence on each one, not to the level of inspection for the issues that the Coast Guard looks for, but to determine the admissibility of those crew. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you. Commissioner, I would actually like to ask you one other question. You know, whenever I look across Government, you obviously have local law enforcement, you have State, and you have Federal law enforcement entities that are out there. In the State of Louisiana, particularly in the Baton Rouge area where I am from, the Pointe Coupee Parish sheriff--we have parishes instead of counties--has formed this organization known as JTF-7, Joint Task Force 7, that initially was seven of the surrounding parishes' sheriffs that were all grouped together and they were doing a lot of maritime security work. What role do you see those folks playing, considering they are on the ground, they have better coverage in many cases than some of your folks do, but what role do you see them playing in port security, maritime security as part of the overall system? Mr. Owen. Yes, absolutely. I mean, our presence is limited in some of the ports, especially in some of the parishes. I was the port director in New Orleans for 4 years, so I understand the parish system. And the important role that the local county sheriffs will play in assisting us is that additional presence as to what is taking place. They will often come in contact with individuals that may be of concern as to what they are doing in those seaports. They will notify us. We'll respond out. So very strong working relationships, particularly in small communities where all of the law enforcement community have to rely on each other because no single entity has the resources that they need. So clearly a strong role for that State, Federal, local partnership. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you, Commissioner. If the chairman will---- Mr. Hunter. Sure. Ms. Gowadia. Well, I would just like to add that we certainly believe very strongly in our State and local partnerships, and we have been working with our Area Maritime Security Committees and also with our State and local partners in law enforcement, particularly in your backyard, to build capabilities across the State public safety and law enforcement agencies. In fact, today all 50 States, we have engaged with all 50 States beginning to build capabilities across our Nation. Mr. Graves of Louisiana. Great. Thank you very much. I just want to make note that Sheriff Torres, who leads this thing, called me and told me a while back that apparently the Department of Homeland Security was no longer allowing the seven or eight sheriffs that are all part of this task force to apply for a Federal Homeland Security grant jointly, that they were required to separate out. I am not sure of the status of that, but I just wanted to put it on your radar. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Brownley, my colleague from California, is recognized. Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my first question is to Mr. Maurer. I represent a small port, but a deepwater port, on the coast of California, Port Hueneme, and a lot of automobiles come through that port. Big ships come in, and there are 6,000 automobiles coming off of those ships. And so I was wondering if the GAO had reviewed the screening procedures for noncontainerized cargo versus containerized and if you had any specific recommendations for improving screening for noncontainerized cargo. Mr. Maurer. Most of our work has been focused on containerized cargo, because that is where the bulk of the Federal investment has been. From a larger perspective, we have done work looking at the much broader interagency effort to make sure that terrorists and nation-states aren't getting their hands on radiological material or nuclear material that would allow them to construct a device and bring it into the United States through whatever mechanism. So one of the themes of our body of work has been that the technology and the screening procedures are very important. But there are all these other programs that are designed to secure the material at the source or to work through treaty regimes or to ensure that we have a robust intelligence community or law enforcement presence that is sharing information among Federal, State, and local partners to identify plots well before someone is able to construct a device and bring it into a port. Ms. Brownley. And, Mr. Owen, can you talk a little bit about the screening process for noncontainerized? Mr. Owen. Yes, absolutely. For all of the bulk, the break bulk, the RoRo [roll-on, roll-off], as you see up in Port Hueneme there, dependent on how the cargo is discharged, it may still pass through a radiation portal monitor. If it does not, the officers will address that through handheld radiation isotope devices. So in the case of Port Hueneme, most of those roll-on, roll-off vehicles do pass through the radiation portal monitors. The bananas, the pineapples that are coming into Port Hueneme as well are often containerized in that warehouse there onsite and then actually comes through the radiation portal monitor. So the radiation portal monitors are our primary detection methodology. However, we do have the handheld radiation isotope devices that we use on bulk, break bulk. And every CBP officer carries a personal radiation pager on their duty belt that will alert should they come in contact with any of that as well. Ms. Brownley. Well, thank you for that. Do you think small ports are more vulnerable than large ports? Mr. Owen. I think small ports are less vulnerable, because everyone seems to know everyone. And, again, in the case of Port Hueneme, you have those same vessels that call every 3 or 4 days, you have the same crewmen, you have the same stevedores, you have known entities working these. I think in that environment someone from the outside unknown who may be up to something no good clearly stands out. We have strong relationships with the seaport communities. When the terminal operators, the longshoremen, the stevedores, when they notice something that is amiss, they reach out to either the Federal or the port police across the board. Ms. Brownley. Very good. And, Rear Admiral, to follow up on Ms. Hahn's line of questioning, if there was a port that went down, are there contingency plans to keep trade moving? Admiral Brown. That is a great question. Thank you. Partly, since trade is not entirely a Federal responsibility, the private sector and their distribution shipping networks would adapt to any disruption, whether it was a natural or man-made disruption, in a port. Some of that could be directed or shaped by Federal response, including the actions of the Coast Guard captain of the port responsible for a port, who might need to shut down a port from certain activities for a time to allow, whether it was recovery or investigation, and would work with neighboring captains of the port to see if we could expedite the adaptation of shippers to the new conditions. Ms. Brownley. So each port is not necessarily aware of a specific contingency plan, it is just if something happens, you will adapt? Admiral Brown. Right. Each port has this Area Maritime Security Committee which has a planning process, but because the type and the duration of the disruption would be so dependent on the specific scenario, the vessels that happened to be in port on that particular day, it would be impossible to prescribe ahead of time a specific recovery plan for shipping in that particular port. Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. We have a second panel now. We were just looking at their testimony, and it is in math, whatever language math is, it is in math. But I just want to stress one last--we talked today about stuff coming in from known areas where you can do risk assessment. I guess my last question for all of you is, why wouldn't bad guys that want to get a bad device in the U.S. take the same routes as guys that want to get drugs into the U.S.? Meaning, why wouldn't you bring it up from Central or South America and work up through the land borders and sneak it across? Is that totally--is that crazy talk? Do you think that they would ship it in and have the manifest be honest and all that kind of stuff? Ms. Gowadia. So that is certainly one of the scenarios we consider in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture when we analyze it. So we do look at multiple means and modes of bringing the vessel in. In fact, I would love to sit down and share with you a classified briefing where we analyze almost 400 elements of the architecture and base it on defensive capabilities, offensive options, and then base our resources and our---- Mr. Hunter. We will take you up on that. We are going to have a classified hearing on this exact thing, and we can talk there more. Ms. Gowadia. Excellent. Mr. Hunter. Ms. Hahn is recognized. Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess I just want one more clarification from the three of you. I mean, we are basically banking on this layered approach, this point of origin when it leaves the port. Are the three of you sitting here today saying that you are 100 percent positive that a dirty bomb could not slip through and get to one of our ports under this security model? Ms. Gowadia. Ma'am, I don't think anybody could give you a 100-percent guarantee for that, but I can tell you that based on the incredible resources of our law enforcement officers, our intelligence community, and our technical community, we are bringing every last resource we have to bear. And if we didn't use all that was at our disposal in this layered, multifaceted approach, we would be more vulnerable. We are far better off today than we were 10 years ago. Ms. Hahn. Would we be better off with 100 percent scanning? Ms. Gowadia. In a classified session, I would love to walk you through and explain to you why we probably would not be. Ms. Hahn. Rear Admiral? Admiral Brown. Ma'am, the only thing I would add to that is that we have had over the past 12 years or so several scenarios in which there was a radiological or threat concern on a vessel coming in from overseas. And with the MOTR process begun, that is the Maritime Operational Threat Response interagency process, we are able to either board the vessel at sea and resolve the issue or bring the vessel to a safe place with minimal population to conduct an examination and resolve the issue. And in one very specific case, not regarding a bomb threat, but a possible terrorist threat where it was ambiguous as to whether the vessel was going to a United States port or a Canadian port, we are able to do that same level of interagency coordination with our Canadian counterparts to very good effect. So I am confident that the processes that we have in place are effective for recognizing and responding to these threats in a way that will mitigate the probable impact. But as Dr. Gowadia said, I couldn't say with 100 percent certainty that we can prevent a dirty bomb scenario. Ms. Hahn. Todd? Mr. Owen. And I would also agree there is no 100 percent certainty. But with the 100-percent scanning, I think when you look strategically at where it does make sense, like what we are doing in Qasim, Pakistan, where every container coming out of Qasim is scanned, with what we started this year in Jordan, in Port of Aqaba, where every container coming out of Jordan is scanned, I think in those strategic locations that give us more concern, it is the right approach. Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. And we are not going to shake hands and stuff, because we have about a half an hour with the next panel. So thank you very much for your time and for what you do. And we will have more hearings on this coming up, Ms. Gowadia, so we will have a classified, fun hearing. Mr. Garamendi [presiding]. While the chairman is out, if the next panel would come up and take their places. Mr. Gregory Canavan, Charles Potter, Joe Lawless and Stephen Flynn. The chairman is out of the room for a few moments, but he asked me to begin your testimony. We do have a short period of time, so we will begin. Mr. Canava, Canavan? Mr. Canavan. Canavan, sir. It is Irish. Mr. Garamendi. It is a fine name, then. Mr. Canavan, please. Mr. Canavan. Should I begin? Mr. Garamendi. Yes, would you please. TESTIMONY OF GREGORY H. CANAVAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORIES; CHARLES A. POTTER, PH.D., DISTINGUISHED MEMBER OF THE TECHNICAL STAFF, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES; JOSEPH M. LAWLESS, CHAIRMAN, SECURITY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES; AND STEPHEN E. FLYNN, PH.D., DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR RESILIENCE STUDIES, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY Mr. Canavan. I am Greg Canavan. I am from Los Alamos. I submitted my testimony. Apparently the chairman doesn't want me to read the math, so I will summarize, if you don't mind, and ask that you submit it for the record. I am very honored to be here. Thank you for inviting me. And I will not use math, I will just say a few words. I am listed as a senior fellow from Los Alamos, that is my daytime job, but this is not necessarily a Los Alamos project. It is something that I have been working on, on and off, whenever I had a few minutes, ever since 9/11. On that day, the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense were kind enough to send an airplane out to New Mexico to get Dr. Hagengruber and I from--he is from Sandia--to come back here to pursue some projects that we had been looking into before 9/11 on unusual threats to the United States, one of which was a concern that there might have been nuclear materials here in the Capitol, perhaps in an operational form. And so we spent some time looking into that. We were not looking for dirty bombs, we were looking for nuclear weapons, but the detection approaches are similar and also quite difficult. As Ms. Hahn pointed out earlier, groups have smuggled depleted uranium into the country fairly frequently. Actual enriched uranium is a little harder to find, but not that much easier. And so we were trying to find nuclear materials. I might say that as an Air Force colonel and for the last 50 years or so, I have worked on designing nuclear weapons, testing nuclear weapons, occasionally flying nuclear weapons. But 9/11 was the first time I ever had to worry about the problem of trying to detect nuclear materials, and I found it to be a very difficult and challenging business. There is not much signature from them at all. They are a lot harder to find in a way than dirty bombs. And we also found that although we have quite good techniques for defeating nuclear weapons--that is diffusing them once you have found them--that the business of trying to find them in the first place is very, very difficult. After 9/11, I continued to work with the Department of Defense for a couple of years to try to remedy this problem. It was very frustrating, it was quite difficult, in part because I think we went off on the wrong direction. We recognized that neutrons, tiny particles of matter that don't carry any electrical charge at all, can go right through anything, through this building, through ships, through whatever, so they are a great way for candling nuclear materials. Particularly since when they hit a fissionable material they produce a lot more neutrons and enhance the signature, so that makes them a good thing to work with. But we kind of got off on the wrong footing in that we adopted the idea that the right approach was to stand off 2, 3, 4 miles with an enormous particle accelerator from high-energy physics and try do the interrogation from there. It didn't improve your survivability if something went off, it just made everything a lot more complicated, and we kind of got discouraged with that approach. But anyhow, we went that way. And so after a while, it just looked too hard, and we kind of gave up. And so the problem has not advanced very much from 9/11 to today in terms of detecting actual nuclear weapons. So what has changed? And I think that there are five things that have changed. One is that a decade of development in nuclear sources and detectors have made much more practical schemes and automated schemes possible and even affordable, so that you could now have detector systems that could fit on ports, transporter vehicles, ships, whatever, and do, if you will, an inspection of all the things that came through the port for nuclear weapons. What that leads to then, in the testimony that I handed in, it lends to a sort of modular deployment. That is, most stuff that moves today moves in TEUs, the 20-foot equivalent units that go on cargo ships now are now in the two TEUs, the 40-foot units that get racked up between the bulkheads in these big ships. And happily, if you use neutrons, particularly fast neutrons, they are very well suited to uniformly candling or inspecting such containers either in port or in transit. So I found that very interesting. The second thing that hit me was a mistake that we made early on was to ignore countermeasures to the approaches that we were advancing for detection. We were sort of asked to go against a friendly adversary, if you will, somebody that made life easy for us. And that turned out to be not a favor, because we ignored the fact that there are absorbers, things like cadmium barium, that are used to control ordinary power nuclear reactors. They absorb neutrons very efficiently, so that one-thousandth of an inch of cadmium could knock the signals from a nuclear weapon down to almost nothing. But then I realized that fast neutrons, neutrons up at the energy where they are born, could easily get around these absorptions and produce big signals, and they were relatively insensitive to the known countermeasures. There is the penalty that someone mentioned already. In radiography, when you are x raying something, most of your x rays go places that you are not interested in. For instance, in these big TEUs, if you are looking for a bomb that is maybe 10 centimeters across and the TEU is 3 meters across, only a fraction, maybe 1 percent of the neutrons actually hit the weapon to produce a signal and the rest of them act as noise. So that is a problem that you have to overcome. But then the third thing, I realized after some thinking was that in the process of hitting the nuclear core, the neutrons sort of identify themselves. Instead of being at their initial energy, they kick out neutrons that have a spectrum all the way from 10 percent to 90 percent of that of the neutrons that are incident on them. They are easily identified, so they can be collected and you can throw away the noise very efficiently, particularly since the separation in energy of noise from the source is large and fairly specific and energy doesn't degrade much in the process of slowing down. Therefore you don't wind up with too many of the noise neutrons showing up in your bin where you are expecting your signal. So those four things made life a lot easier, to the point where you can do very effective filtering on energy, which makes up and makes up more than for what you lose initially in the numbers of neutrons that missed the target. And so overall you can get signal-to-noise ratios at the appropriate energies, which are sort of halfway through the slowing-down process, signal-to-noise ratios of 100 to 1,000 or more, which means that you can have very confident detection of the nuclear materials with a very low false-alarm ratio of other materials. Someone alluded to it in the previous talk, that the tough thing about x rays is that you never know what is going to be in one of these shipping containers. It may be axles, it may be electronics, it may be whatever. And even if you can radiograph one of these things 1 percent of the time, then you still have to go through some long screening process or unpacking process to figure out what the detected object actually was. With a very high signal-to-noise ratio nuclear signal, you have a fighting chance of passing everything through without having to go back and try to sort out what the problem was in the first place. So it just seemed to have all of the characteristics that we were looking for. Even before 9/11, I was on the advisory committees for U.S. Space, Air Force Space, and North Command when it was first created, and we were sitting down trying to figure out how you should parcel out responsibility for detection. Neutrons seemed to do everything that we had hoped that the Coast Guard would be able to do in its charter as the Service that would detect things before they got to the coast, eradicate losses and false alarms on the spot, and execute the first line of defense of the country. Mr. Hunter [presiding]. That is all right, Doctor. Thanks for being here. And we will come back to this stuff too. Dr. Potter, you are recognized. And our next witness is Dr. Charles ``Gus'' Potter, Distinguished Member of the Technical Staff for Sandia National Laboratories. You are recognized. Mr. Potter. Thank you. Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and distinguished members of the Coast Guard, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the topic of preventing and responding to an RDD [radiological dispersal device] attack. My name is Dr. Charles Potter. I am a systems analyst and a health physicist from Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and I have specialized in the RDD threat and radiological nuclear detection architecture for over the past 5 years. The United States Government and many of our foreign partners have been working for more than a decade to reduce the risk of a successful radiological dispersal device attack. From an engineering standpoint, we define risk as a combination of the likelihood of the attack--that is, the degree at which an adversary has the intent, capability, and materials required-- and the consequence of the attack. The RDD threat is a very complex and a multidimensional problem, and the U.S. Government has designed and implemented a variety of programs, based on scientific studies by Sandia National Laboratories and others, to reduce the likelihood of an RDD attack in terms of reducing the availability of material for exploitation, as well as identifying and impeding probable pathways from device to target. However, the scientific understanding of the cost, time needed to clean up, and psychological effects of an RDD event are less well understood. No comprehensive standard has been established regarding what radiation limits would constitute a successful cleanup. Publications and released documentation written by the Al Qaeda organization indicate their understanding of the public unsettlement and possible economic consequences from an RDD attack. Dhiren Barot in 2006, Jose Padilla in 2007, and Glendon Crawford in August of this year were each convicted of attempting to develop and use a dirty bomb in New York City, Chicago, and elsewhere. RDDs can be developed by a spectrum of adversaries from a relatively low capability lone wolf, such as these three individuals, to a highly capable and technically competent adversary, such as Aum Shinrikyo, who perpetrated the coordinated sarin attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995. The more technically capable an adversary is, the more likely they would be to find ways to spread the radioactive material over larger areas and at higher radioactive levels. Since the 2000 UCLA [University of California, Los Angeles] study on RDD risk at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, many policies, programs, and systems have addressed the threat likelihood. This includes NRC [U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission] regulations for source security, the DOE [Department of Energy] Office of Radiological Security's domestic and foreign programs on radiological source security and recovery, and the DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Global Nuclear Detection Architecture to identify radioactive material outside of regulatory control. If a device is located prior to detonation, multiagency teams now exist for rapid response. RDDs are unlikely to result in large immediate health effects beyond those caused by the explosive blast, although there may be some long-term effects to more exposed individuals. However, depending on the radionuclide involved, the economic consequences could be considerable. If the radionuclide is difficult to remove from surfaces, as some are, the contaminated area could be off limits for months or even years. This would result in businesses within those areas being effectively shuttered and residents being relocated, semipermanently or permanently, while costly decontamination efforts are undertaken. Additionally, there would be interdependencies in the quarantined area between the residents and the businesses they patronize. Since there is no comprehensive policy or standard for post-cleanup radiation levels, it is difficult to estimate the cost that would be directly associated with decontamination. In summary, the RDD risk is real and multifaceted, and the U.S. Government has implemented a number of programs to increase the security of U.S. radiological materials and increase the difficulty of illicit movement of those materials, resulting in a reduced likelihood of an RDD attack. However, there is still significant uncertainty in our understanding of the costs that would accrue after such an event. The development of policies and technical capabilities for effective cleanup to allow for resumption of normal operations following an RDD attack would constitute an important element of the multidimensional integrated solution for addressing the RDD threat. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Dr. Potter. And you actually gave 30 seconds back from Dr. Canavan. The next witness is Mr. Joe Lawless, the chairman of the Security Committee for the American Association of Port Authorities. You are recognized. Mr. Lawless. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Ranking Member Garamendi, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. My name is Joseph Lawless. I am the director of maritime security at the Massachusetts Port Authority in Boston. I am here today on behalf of the American Association of Port Authorities, where I chair the Security Committee. AAPA is the unified and collective voice of the seaport industry in the Americas. AAPA empowers port authorities, maritime industry partners, and service providers to serve their global customers and create economic and social value for their communities. Our activities, resources, and partnerships connect, inform, and unify seaport leaders and maritime professionals in all segments of the industry around the Western Hemisphere. Security is our top priority for all of our members, and this testimony I am giving today is on behalf of our U.S. members. Securing our ports and communities from dirty bombs could not happen without strong partnerships. This means our ongoing relationships with port authorities, the Federal Government, specifically the Customs and Border Protection agency, the United States Coast Guard, the FBI, shippers, port workers, and State and local law enforcement, who all play a vital role in identifying threats and combining security resources to coordinate if a dirty bomb were to arrive on the U.S. shores. The threat of dirty bombs ending up in the hands of people who want to cause us harm in this country was underscored recently by accounts of a disrupted illicit smuggling operation. It was reported that over the last 5 years there have been at least four attempts by criminals in Eastern Europe to sell radioactive materials to Middle Eastern extremists. If any of these smuggling plots were successful, these radioactive materials could have been used to construct a dirty bomb that could be ultimately used against us. The concern is that terrorists could exploit the maritime transportation system to convey a dirty bomb into this country. Stopping dirty bombs before they reach our shores is a priority, but we must have an effective system of detecting dirty bombs if they were to make it to our shores. A fully funded and staffed Customs and Border Protection agency is the first step in fighting the threat of dirty bombs. CBP officers meet the ships at all ports of entry to check the manifests and utilize radiation portal monitors. CBP and ports rely upon the RPMs to detect dirty bombs in containerized cargo shipped into this country. RPMs are detection devices that provide CBP with a passive, nonintrusive process to screen trucks and other movements of freight for the presence of nuclear and radiological materials. They are mandated in the SAFE Port Act of 2006, and the 22 largest ports by volume must have RPMs and all containers must be screened for radiation. Almost 10 years have passed since the RPMs were mandated. However, a decade into this program questions have been raised regarding who pays for the maintenance of the RPMs, who is responsible for paying for new portals during port expansion, and what is the long-term obligation for the next generation of RPMs. A DHS inspector general 2013 CBP ``Radiation Portal Monitors at Seaports'' report states that the initial estimates of deployed RPMs showed an average useful life expectancy of 10 years. What we hear repeatedly from our port members is the lack of clarity in funding and administering the RPM program. It has become a real hindrance in how we protect our ports. We are fast coming to the end of the first generation of RPMs' life expectancy. Ports such as Tampa, Jacksonville, Long Beach, New York/New Jersey, and Mobile have all reported complicated discussions with their regional CBP officers on the ongoing responsibilities related to RPMs. A recent example is the Port of Jacksonville, where CBP requested that Jacksonville assume financial responsibility for the RPM technology sustainment, hardware, software, and connectivity. This is significant given the complex and critical nature of these federally owned and currently maintained systems. Other ports are reporting similar disruptions in the RPM program. There is too much at stake for ports and CBP officers to have to engage in policy and funding negotiations. Congress and the administration must set a clear path on the RPM program. RPM detection is a federally mandated program. CBP should request adequate Federal funding to purchase, install, and maintain all RPM equipment at ports throughout the United States. If this is not feasible, then the Department of Homeland Security should consider the creation of a stand-alone priority within the FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Port Security Grant Program, titled ``Radiation Detection Portal Monitors,'' or expand upon the CBRNE [chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives] core capability to allow ports to request security grant funding in support of the purchase and installation of radiation detection portals. Regarding the Port Security Grant Program, many port authorities have utilized the Port Security Grant Program to obtain radiological and nuclear detection equipment. Personal radiation detection devices that first responders wear on their belts, isotope identifiers that are used to determine the source of radiation alarms, and sophisticated backpack detection devices are some of the items acquired through the Port Security Grant Program. These items not only supplement CBP's efforts, but also enhance law enforcement's role in the Coast Guard's small vessel rad/nuc detection program. I would urge Congress to restore the funding for the Port Security Grant Program to its original level and maintain the Port Security Grant Program as a stand-alone Department of Homeland Security grant program. Additionally, we would encourage that whenever possible, the grants go directly to the ports so that our security facilities will have the necessary resources to fully implement their security programs. In conclusion, we must provide law enforcement agencies, such as the CBP, and our port security directors with all the tools and resources necessary to succeed. I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today, and I look forward to answering any questions that you might have. Thank you. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Mr. Lawless. The final witness on the second panel is Dr. Stephen Flynn, director of the Center for Resilience Studies with Northeastern University. You are recognized, Dr. Flynn. Mr. Flynn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are going to hear two back-to-back Boston accents here now coming at you. I have been at this for about 30 years, first as a Coast Guard officer, retired from that Service, and now currently at Northeastern University where with the support of the MacArthur Foundation I am looking at the growing risk of managing the threat to our global supply chains via the risk of radioactive material as well as weapons of mass destruction. So I am honored to be here today. Mr. Chairman, it is my assessment that the threat of a dirty bomb at a U.S. port remains a clear and present danger. Simply stated, current U.S. efforts are not up to the task of preventing a determined adversary from exploiting the global supply system and setting off a dirty bomb in a U.S. port. If a dirty bomb was set off in a U.S. port it would not be so much of a weapon of mass destruction as it would be of one of mass disruption. There would be three immediate consequences associated with this attack. First, there would be local deaths and injuries associated with the blast of the conventional explosives. Second, there would be the environmental damage and extremely high cleanup costs. As Dr. Potter was laying out here, we don't have standards for actually coping with the aftermath. And then third, there would be what I call the morning- after problem. That is, since there would be no way of determining where the compromise that led to the incident happened within the security system, we would have sort of two outcomes. One, the entire supply chain, all the transportation nodes and providers, would be presumed to be potentially a risk of potential follow-on attacks. Further, it would call into question all the existing container port security initiatives that the first panel talked about here today. On March 28, 2006, nearly a decade ago, and this is my 29th time talking about these issues before Congress since 9/11, I outlined the following hypothetical scenario that had been informed by my own research as well as the insights provided by Gary Gilbert, who is the chairman of the Security Committee of Hutchison Port Holdings, the world's largest terminal operator. I included in that testimony before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations the following scenario. A container of athletic footwear from a name brand company is loaded at a manufacturing plant in Surabaya, Indonesia. The container doors are shut and the mechanical seal is put into the door pad-eyes. These designer sneakers are destined for retail stores in malls across America. The container and seal numbers are recorded at the factory. A local truck driver, in this case sympathetic to Al Qaeda, picks up the container. On the way to the port he turns into an alleyway and backs up the truck at a nondescript warehouse where a small team of operatives pry loose one of the door hinges to open the container so they can gain access to the shipment. Some of the sneakers are removed, and in their place the operatives load a dirty bomb wrapped in lead shielding, which will defeat the radiation portal monitoring, and then they refasten the door. The driver then takes the container, now loaded with a dirty bomb, to the port of Surabaya, where it is loaded on a coastal feeder ship carrying about 300 containers for a voyage to Jakarta. In Jakarta the container is transferred to an Inter-Asia ship, typically carrying 1,200 to 1,500 containers, to the Port of Singapore or the Port of Hong Kong. In this case, the ship goes to Hong Kong, where it is loaded on a super-container ship that carries 5,000 to 8,000 containers for the trans-Pacific voyage. The container is then off-loaded in Vancouver, British Columbia. It is then loaded directly on to a Canadian Pacific railcar, where it is shipped to a rail yard in Chicago. Because the dirty bomb is shielded in lead, the radiation portals currently deployed along the U.S.-Canadian border do not detect it. When the container reaches its distribution center in the Chicago area, a triggering device attached to the door sets the bomb off. Now, this scenario remains as realistic today as it was in 2006, because it exploits a longstanding vulnerability of the global supply system that still remains unaddressed: The ability of smugglers to potentially target a containerized shipment while it is being transported by a local truck from the factory or logistics center where it originates to the port where it's loaded aboard a vessel. Now, once a truck leaves a factory, as a practical matter there are few controls in place for preventing a shipment from being diverted before it arrives at a port, particularly if the driver has been recruited, bribed, or intimidated into cooperating with a terrorist group intent on placing a dirty bomb into the container. The container doors are typically ``secured'' with a numbered bolt seal that can be purchased in volume for about $1.50. But even if the bolt seal is left in place, as my scenario laid out, the door hinges can be removed or the container's relatively thin-metal skin can be breached so they can put the bomb in the box. Now, I speculated that the hypothetical terrorist group would purposely target a container from a known shipper. I did this for two reasons. First, it can count on the fact that it is extremely unlikely that CBP will subject the container to any physical security as it originated from a well-established company. We have heard about the risk management system. And if it has no past record of smuggling, there is virtually no chance it will hit anybody's radar screen as a container to be checked. Such a shipment from a trusted source would be deemed to be low-risk and as such not identified for an overseas port-of- loading inspection or an inspection in Vancouver when it is off-loaded to a U.S. bound train. Second, by exploiting the container from a known shipper, the terrorist group can be confident they can generate the maximum amount of fear that all containers previously viewed low-risk now be judged as potentially high-risk. Fanned by the inevitable sensational media coverage, Governors, mayors, and the American people would place no faith in the entire risk management regime erected since 9/11. I want to emphasize that this is why potentially a thoughtful adversary would put a dirty bomb in a box versus in a small boat. It is because the goal is not to get the bomb into the United States, it is to disrupt the global supply chain system by how we would respond in its aftermath. What we see here is that if we are suddenly spooked, there is a bomb in a bomb or there are other bombs in boxes, we basically would freeze the system to sort it out, not just one port closure, but almost certainly all port closures. Then we have a challenge. We can't check the boxes until they are off-loaded, but the only way we can check them is if they are off-loaded. This catch-22 translates into ships queuing up in Anchorage outside our ports. Overseas you can't just basically freeze the system. You are not going to send new ships into the U.S. if it is already backed up. You can't receive new boxes from trains and trucks. So essentially within 10 days to 2 weeks, the entire global intermodal transportation system goes into gridlock. The impact of that is disruption of our global commerce on a huge scale. So what would we do? The real threat essentially is not so much the attack or the local harm for the port community, as significant as that is likely to be. It is the risk of mass disruption to international commerce that would follow from such an attack. So two steps I outline in my testimony. The U.S. Government needs to shift its interests from one that focuses primarily on policing U.S.-bound cargo to one that advances the overall security resilience of the global supply system at large. There is compelling rationale for doing this. Everybody is signed up to trying to prevent the proliferation of weapons and materials around the planet. Specifically, all countries have signed on to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 that requires that nations take actions to detect and intercept outbound shipments of illicit nuclear and radiological materials. We have the international rationale. Let's get on with this at a global scale. Secondly, the U.S. Government really needs to focus on enlisting the active participation of private industry that owns and operates the port terminals and transportation conveyances that move supply chains. They have a rationale to do this. This is a significant business continuity enterprise resilience imperative. As such, the conventional wisdom that security is basically a public sector responsibility is wrong. It is primarily a public sector responsibility to work this, but the private sector has a critical role to play. The foiled October 2010 bomb plot involving explosives hidden in printer cartridges shipped from Yemen make the case. In the aftermath of that we saw the aircargo industry working with U.S. and European authorities to significantly step up the scrutiny of aircargo. The maritime transportation system, in short, is a highly concentrated system with a few large port terminal operators and ocean carriers responsible for handling the vast majority of global cargo. With support from the U.S. Government and other authorities, these companies could potentially take on a leadership role for deploying the technologies and tools on a global scale by providing a near real-time visibility and accountability for contents and location of all cargo. What they would need is the means to recover the associated costs through a fee-for-service requirement that is borne by importers and exporters. The estimated cost of putting nonintrusive inspection and terminal operations around the world ranges from $3 billion to $5 billion. Given that there are millions of containers moving through, we are talking about a $10 to $15 per-box cost largely to do this, or less than the security surcharge I had from flying from Boston to Washington for this hearing today. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the risk of an adversary exploiting the global supply system to import a dirty bomb at a U.S. port remains clear and present. The disruption that such an attack would generate goes well beyond the local port. It would ripple through the entire maritime transportation system. It would be disastrous for global trade. Accordingly, the stakes for the United States national security and economic security could not be higher. There is an urgent need to significantly bolster and build upon the many post-9/11 initiatives which aim to improve the security of the maritime transportation system. In the end, these global networks require trust to operate. We have got to work on ensuring we can survive that trust in the event of a dirty bomb going off in a port. Thanks so much. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, Doctor. And thanks to my colleagues for sticking around too. I am just going to ask a quick question and then going to pass it off so everybody else can get a question in before we have to leave. Dr. Canavan, I guess the question is this. If you are going to have a nuclear weapon come in, dirty or not, it is going to be shielded. If it is not, I would recommend to our enemies that they shield it, otherwise it will be easier to see. So I would think that some smart people would shield it. Can you still see it? Mr. Canavan. Yes, sir, good question. I cover that a little bit in my testimony. Bombs are not easily shielded from inspection by neutrons. As I said, if you keep the neutrons fast enough--that is, with high enough energy--they are not affected by absorbers. Neutrons can go through a whole ship without hardly slowing down. The tricky part is what are called moderators, things that reduce the energy of the neutrons. If a bomb was packed in a bunch of moderator material, carbon or something like that that can slow neutrons, enough of it could slow the neutrons down to where not enough of them would penetrate into the core to give you a good nuclear signature. It is not a precise number, but a foot or so of carbon outside the device might effect that sort of slowing down. But there are two things that you have to consider. One is that by the time you have a few feet of carbon on either side of the device you block the whole TEU, the container that it is in, and that in itself would be a signal that someone had tried to hide it. It is not an easy thing to do. The other thing is, it is a technical point, but when neutrons bounce off of a moderator like carbon they produce a spectrum of bands of energy that are easily detectable. The spacing of the energy bands are a good indicator of what kind of moderator the person is using to try to beat you, and the number of those bands tell you how thick the moderator is. That is the game that they would play. It is not an easy game for the adversary. That is all I can say. Mr. Hunter. There is a company that I know of called Decision Sciences that actually is able to sense nuclear stuff inside of really thick lead, but you have to be in their system, meaning that you can't walk around and scan stuff. It has got to be within basically one of those drive-through systems to do this. And it takes more than just a drive through, it takes a couple of seconds. Mr. Canavan. Decision Sciences uses muons. They do not select nuclear material, just mass. Neutrons go through anything. They particularly like to go through steel and lead. So ordinary shielding, which is very effective for dirty bombs and even uranium in its natural state emitting radiation is not very effective against fast neutrons. Somebody has to really, really go out of their way with a lot of shielding to try to knock the signal down. Sorry. Mr. Hunter. But these handheld detectors, they wouldn't sense something if it was in carbon or lead. It would take an actual scanning system to do that, right? The handheld CBP detectors, they are not going to detect stuff if it is in a TEU? Mr. Canavan. Correct. Handheld detectors are defeated by a modest amount of shielding. The trick with neutron detection is that you inject a signal which is magnified by the target itself to a detectable number of neutrons coming back out. And so you are stimulating very gently the fissile material to produce a signal that would not be there in the case if you didn't stimulate it. Mr. Hunter. And the only way to do that is through one of these drive-through systems, meaning none of this is going to happen by a handheld device that someone is holding walking around or a belt device. Mr. Canavan. Correct. The spontaneous signal is too weak for them to detect. Mr. Hunter. All of this only comes, even the best we can do, through, like, a drive-through scanning system, right, where you can spray it with neutrons and then have that read on the other side, which takes a system. Mr. Canavan. Neutrons could act in a drive-through, but they could also operate in other modes discussed below. There is no free lunch. You do have to produce the neutrons, but neutrons are not very hard to produce. The trick is knowing that you have to both put them where you want them and then collect them in a smart way. Mr. Hunter. Thank you. And I am going to yield, because I am out of time. Mr. Garamendi is recognized. Mr. Garamendi. Apparently the bottom line on your testimony is that a compact fast neutron inspection can work. We are not presently deploying those. Is that correct? Mr. Canavan. Correct. As I said, we kind of went off on a tangent that was not very productive. And it has only been sitting around and scratching my head for a long time sort of gave me the idea. As Dr. Teller, my old professor, always used to tell me, the hardest thing about doing something is unlearning what you thought---- Mr. Garamendi. We are going to move this right along because we are out of time. Dr. Potter, you seem to think that domestic steps need to be taken, cesium chloride specifically? Mr. Potter. A National Academy study was done, some years ago now, pointing out the need to protect cesium chloride sources throughout the United States, yes. Mr. Garamendi. So you drew our attention to that issue, and presumably we will avoid dealing with that problem. Mr. Potter. Uh-huh. Mr. Garamendi. Which is not a good solution. And finally, Mr. Lawless, it comes down to money, doesn't it? Who is going to pay for the detectors, the kind Mr. Canavan is talking about, domestically with cesium chloride? How much money do you need to put these detectors and to maintain them? Mr. Lawless. Well, that is a difficult question to answer. I would suggest that the Government fund these research projects, like these drive-through portals, that we would see that could detect neurons and gamma at the same time. We are invested at my particular port working with DNDO and a company to develop a state-of-the-art detection system in the Port of Boston. But there is definitely money needed to fund these programs. There has to be clarity on who is paying for these systems. They are federally mandated systems. And the ports believe that the Federal Government should be paying CBP and DNDO to fund these projects. Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Flynn is willing to put $10 to $15 on each container. I assume you have an opinion on that. Yes? No? Mr. Lawless. Yes. Mr. Garamendi. All right. And I would just go back to where I started this, in that we make choices around here, and we are looking to spend $3.5 billion for a missile defense system for the east coast to deal with Iran nuclear weapons, which presumably aren't going to be available for some decades. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Mr. Hunter. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Hahn is recognized. Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Dr. Flynn, thank you for being here today. I have followed your work and read a lot of what you have written. Again, I represent the Port of Los Angeles and I am always very concerned. As you said, the Container Security Initiative scans less than 1 percent of U.S.-bound cargo. Do you believe that scanning at the point of origin is effective, 100 percent effective, or should we be investing more in scanning at our domestic ports? Mr. Flynn. Well, this is an issue where the stakes are so high we should be looking at dealing with this across the board. So relative to where we put resources, this really ranks right up there, I think, given the consequence we laid out. And I have spent a good bit of time in the Port of L.A. and Long Beach and you really get the sense of scale about what is going on here. And what the problem would be in this dirty bomb scenario, where if we spread all that stuff around how would you work in that port, as well as, of course, neighbors who live in San Pedro and so forth? This would be a real challenge. So in the face of this here there is opportunity at the port of loading, even at the largest terminals, to scan cargo. Now, what that would do is it should be baked into the terminal operations. Just as the radiation portals are here even when you leave the terminal, we would like to ideally have that when people drive into the terminal. And you can't do it for just U.S., you have to do it for everything. And that is where there is counterproliferation value to doing this, because most of the stuff we worry about proliferation is going not to the United States, but is going around. And to the extent that is a national security imperative, trying to get visibility into what moves through the intermodal transportation system should be a key. So let's be clear right now with the numbers: 2013, the numbers of CBP inspections overseas in the then-58 ports around the world was 103,000. If you divide that by 365 days and 58 ports, we are talking 5 containers per port, per day are being examined overseas under the CSI system. OK, it is five a day. And if you have been to places like Singapore or Shanghai or others, I mean, it may be up a little bit. Why is that? It is because the current approach is we are going to identify the risk and actually go pluck the box and take it to a Government inspection facility. If you bake it into the operation of the terminal you would collect this in real time. It doesn't mean you have to look at images every time. What you would do is would get those and use your risk- based approach to do it, but you would have a much greater degree of confidence about deterring this risk, but also ultimately finding things when they go wrong to intercept them, or worse case even isolating the incident afterwards so you don't shut down the whole system. So there is just so much that can be done, should be done, that is not being done. Ms. Hahn. Thank you. I appreciate the warning. And as you commented, which I also did in the first panel, was the threat to our global economy is significant, particularly if something happened at Long Beach and Los Angeles. We know what that impact would have on not just our national economy, but the global economy. So I was going to ask one more, Dr. Canavan. I mean, I think the biggest issue that everyone tells me why we can't have 100 percent scanning is that in some way that would impede, slow down commerce and we just can't afford that. And by the way, I do have a bill that would provide grants to two ports in this country that would voluntarily decide to implement 100 percent scanning with the technology that we have available, just to I sort of want to prove everybody wrong, that actually we can do this and not impede commerce in a way that would really impact the economy. But, Dr. Canavan, is there technology, of that that you spoke about, which one of those technologies could work and also not impede commerce? Mr. Canavan. Well, there are two--there is one technology I talk about and that is interrogation with neutrons. I think it would fill the requirements that you are setting down there. There are these big cranes that move containers around. I would like to put a little source on one leg of the crane and the detector on the other, so while it is moving them around there would be plenty of time to inspect them. It does its inspection in seconds or milliseconds. It is very fast. The other approach would be to mount the source and detector on the bulkheads of the ship, sort of one per canister, so that you could keep track of what happens to that canister the whole time it is out at sea. I think you could do that, but I haven't proved it, ma'am. I have tried to show that the physics is OK. Ms. Hahn. Thank you very much. Mr. Hunter. Ms. Brownley is recognized. Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Dr. Flynn, your points and your testimony I think were well taken, that it is not an attack just on U.S. soil, but an attack on trade and interrupting goods movement in our country. And I am just wondering if you have very specific recommendations for how individual ports and the businesses within those ports can really prepare for--or prepare for a contingency plan in the event that we did have an attack, and also specific recommendations for governmental agencies and what they should be doing for contingency as well. Mr. Flynn. I mean, I really applaud the question and the focus, because unless we assume that this is a zero chance that this will happen that we will have a nuclear event, we should have a plan. That is something we can do. It is not a huge cost issue. It is a heavy coordination issue and a collaboration issue. The core challenge is that, as I also laid out in my testimony, this is a global system sort of running on steroids. And so if you disrupt it at any point, increasingly it cascades across the system. So it is a lot of choreography. Right now the U.S. Government has no plan for how to deal with this beyond the U.S. borders. There is a global strategy the President put out. I think it is the world's thinnest strategy, it is four and a half pages. It basically says we should have a plan, but nobody actually has executed on that. And thinking through that, so some specifics. Clearly it is raising the awareness about what this event would look like and then mechanics about, OK, how do we deal with the immediacy of the dirty bomb? What is safe? I mean, this is something a community can't solve because the U.S. Government has to set what standards are for safety in terms of putting people back into that community. But the coordination is really heavily between the industry that runs the system and the port authorities and the local authorities and the governmental authorities who manage the system. There we have very limited visibility about how it works. And what makes this, I think, a unique and challenging issue for critical infrastructure, the maritime transportation system, is that 90-plus percent of it is internationally owned, it is not U.S.-owned, and we have to coordinate therefore with those key players. But the opportunity is, it is a concentrated industry. There are roughly five terminal operators that move about 80 percent of all the goods to the United States. They are in ports all over the world. You don't have to go to 180 nations, you go to 5 companies. There are basically 20 ocean carriers that matter. You can work with 20 CEOs. What we have been doing is looking at this as a Government- to-Government issue or local government issue when it really is an international private system that we have to have a capability. In our financial meltdown in 2008 we had central bankers who could manage the morning after. It was messy, but we had a system. We have no such system for managing a major disruptive event, and that is something that I think transcends anything that these agencies who are here this morning their job is to do, but it is a high order national security and economic security issue for us to wrestle with. Ms. Brownley. And you had mentioned that we should be listening to industry and businesses clearly in terms of what they believe are the right--what is the right direction and the right plans for contingency. And do you have any idea what they, I guess, would suggest? I mean, in the earlier testimony they said if we had an incident we would just--industry would just respond and that would be the contingency plan. Mr. Flynn. Well, I have worked closely on that and I have talked to the CEOs of the largest terminal operators. If there is a plan, they are willing to engage on the plan. This is a business continuity issue for them. If there is a cost-recovery mechanism for deploying equipment, they are willing to do that. I had two colleagues and I that work out of the Wharton School looking at two choices, the one we have right now where we would select a box out of a container and send it to be inspected at very small percentages or one where you scan all of them. The terminal operator we worked with said, ``It is easier for me to scan them all then for you to come into my yard, packed six high, and grab two to get the one and take it around.'' So in some places it turns out doing more is easier. The economics work better. OK? And in other places, in sleepier, slower places, you are probably not going to have that same level of buy-in and then you probably use a different approach. I mean, there is not going to be a one-size-fits-all. But when you have a conversation with industry it comes out a lot different than maybe the one you have when you do a Government- to-Government one. And here it is an engineering problem, it is an operational problem with some technical complexity. But it is not insoluble. We should not be throwing our hands up in the air and going let's just hope it never happens. Shame on us when it does happen. Ms. Brownley. Thank you very much. And I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hunter. I thank the gentlelady. We have run out of Members. By the way, this was not a bad showing for today. Usually it is just me and John sitting here. So at least we had some people. But thank you very much for what you all do for the country and for industry and thanks for being here. With that, the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] [all]